Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 2, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 80077 

various enforcement agencies and 

parties, pursuant to the CFPB’s statutory 

objective to ensure Federal consumer 

financial law is enforced consistently. 

12 U.S.C. 5511(b)(4). 

Consumer Financial Protection 

Circulars are also intended to provide 

transparency to partner agencies 

regarding the CFPB’s intended approach 

when cooperating in enforcement 

actions. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 5552(b) 

(consultation with CFPB by State 

attorneys general and regulators); 12 

U.S.C. 5562(a) (joint investigatory work 

between CFPB and other agencies). 

Consumer Financial Protection 

Circulars are general statements of 

policy under the Administrative 

Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 553(b). They 

provide background information about 

applicable law, articulate considerations 

relevant to the Bureau’s exercise of its 

authorities, and, in the interest of 

maintaining consistency, advise other 

parties with authority to enforce Federal 

consumer financial law. They do not 

restrict the Bureau’s exercise of its 

authorities, impose any legal 

requirements on external parties, or 

create or confer any rights on external 

parties that could be enforceable in any 

administrative or civil proceeding. The 

CFPB Director is instructing CFPB staff 

as described herein, and the CFPB will 

then make final decisions on individual 

matters based on an assessment of the 

factual record, applicable law, and 

factors relevant to prosecutorial 

discretion. 

Rohit Chopra, 

Director, Consumer Financial Protection 

Bureau. 

[FR Doc. 2024–22551 Filed 10–1–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2024–2317; Project 

Identifier AD–2024–00468–T; Amendment 

39–22856; AD 2024–19–14] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 777–200, 

777–200LR, 777–300ER, and 777F series 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by a 

report of potential latent failures of the 

lightning protection features for the 

engine fuel feed system. This AD 

requires repetitive inspections and bond 

resistance measurement of the bonding 

jumpers on the first fuel feed tube 

installed immediately forward of the 

wing front spar at each of the two 

engine locations, and applicable 

corrective actions. The FAA is issuing 

this AD to address the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective October 17, 

2024. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of October 17, 2024. 

The FAA must receive comments on 

this AD by November 18, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

regulations.gov. Follow the instructions 

for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov by searching 

for and locating Docket No. FAA–2024– 

2317; or in person at Docket Operations 

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

The AD docket contains this final rule, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The street address for 

Docket Operations is listed above. 

Material Incorporated by Reference: 

• For Boeing material identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data 

Services (C&DS), 2600 Westminster 

Blvd., MC 110–SK57, Seal Beach, CA 

90740–5600; telephone 562–797–1717; 

website myboeingfleet.com. 

• You may view this material at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available at regulations.gov 

under Docket No. FAA–2024–2317. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Samuel Dorsey, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St, 

Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206– 

231–3415; email: Samuel.J.Dorsey@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites you to send any 

written data, views, or arguments about 

this final rule. Send your comments to 

an address listed under the ADDRESSES

section. Include Docket No. FAA–2024– 

2317 and Project Identifier AD–2024– 

00468–T at the beginning of your 

comments. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the final 

rule, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. The FAA will consider 

all comments received by the closing 

date and may amend this final rule 

because of those comments. 

Except for Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) as described in the 

following paragraph, and other 

information as described in 14 CFR 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received, without change, to 

regulations.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. The agency 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact received 

about this final rule. 

Confidential Business Information 

CBI is commercial or financial 

information that is both customarily and 

actually treated as private by its owner. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt 

from public disclosure. If your 

comments responsive to this AD contain 

commercial or financial information 

that is customarily treated as private, 

that you actually treat as private, and 

that is relevant or responsive to this AD, 

it is important that you clearly designate 

the submitted comments as CBI. Please 

mark each page of your submission 

containing CBI as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA 

will treat such marked submissions as 

confidential under the FOIA, and they 

will not be placed in the public docket 

of this AD. Submissions containing CBI 

should be sent to Samuel Dorsey, 

Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 

South 216th St, Des Moines, WA 98198; 

phone: 206–231–3415; email: 

Samuel.J.Dorsey@faa.gov. Any 

commentary that the FAA receives that 

is not specifically designated as CBI will 

be placed in the public docket for this 

rulemaking. 

Background 

In 2023, the FAA received reports of 

latent failures of the lightning protection 

features for the engine fuel feed system 

on Boeing Model 747 airplanes. 

Subsequent analysis has shown that 


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similar failures are expected to be 

present on Model 777 airplanes. 

The electrical bonding of the engine 

fuel feed tube penetrating the fuel tanks 

of Boeing Model 777 airplanes and other 

Boeing airplane models is the primary 

design feature to prevent the 

development of an ignition source 

inside the fuel tank during a lightning 

strike to the engine nacelle. The fuel 

feed lightning protection features 

include the spar bulkhead fitting that 

redirects the majority of current during 

a lightning event. Separate bonding 

jumpers outside and inside the fuel tank 

provide additional electrical paths for 

current from lightning strikes. An 

additional non-bonding feature, an 

encapsulation seal over the spar fitting 

inside the fuel tank, provides additional 

protection from sparking at that 

location. 

In related rulemaking, the FAA issued 

AD 2023–23–14, Amendment 39–22616 

(88 FR 83494, November 30, 2023) (AD 

2023–23–14), to address this unsafe 

condition on Model 747 airplanes. 

From analysis of reports submitted in 

connection with AD 2023–23–14, 

Boeing and the FAA have determined 

that Model 777 airplanes are likely to 

experience similar encapsulation and 

bonding failures to those seen on Model 

747 airplanes. On Model 747 airplanes, 

the bonding jumper outside the fuel 

tank is failing at an excessive rate in 

addition to the known degradation of 

the primary electrical bonding path 

through the spar fitting. Furthermore, 

multiple failures of the spar fitting’s 

encapsulation have been reported. 

Model 777 airplanes are expected to be 

affected to a similar or somewhat lesser 

degree. While no reports of failed 

encapsulations or jumper bonds have 

been received for Model 777 airplanes, 

these features are generally only 

inspected and/or replaced 

conditionally, and they share 

substantial similarity to Model 747 

airplanes. The fuel feed line 

encapsulation seals are located inside 

the fuel tank and therefore would 

generally not be inspected closely 

unless there was a specific maintenance 

concern with the fuel feed fitting. Poor 

electrical bonding would not be 

expected to be detected during oncondition maintenance as electrical 

bonding is a function of the installation, 

and the relevant component would 

likely be removed without a resistance 

measurement. Upon replacement, the 

component installation would be 

measured and adjusted as necessary to 

meet the relevant bonding requirements 

in the Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness. 

The spar fitting’s encapsulation is 

designed to isolate any sparks or arcing 

generated at the bulkhead fitting during 

a lightning strike because of failed 

electrical bonds from flammable fuel 

vapors in the tank. This fitting, 

including the in-tank coupler 

connecting the fuel feed line to the 

fitting, is the most probable location for 

sparking when electrical bonding is 

poor. Therefore, an unreliable 

encapsulation significantly increases the 

risk of a fuel tank explosion following 

a lightning strike to the engine nacelle 

on an airplane with poor electrical 

bonding. Analysis has shown that at 

least a subset of the encapsulation 

failures seen on Model 747 airplanes is 

expected on Model 777 airplanes. 

Model 777 airplanes are equipped 

with bonding jumpers connecting the 

fuel feed line to the airplane structure 

at two locations on each wing: 

immediately forward of the front spar, 

and in the upper portion of the engine 

strut area. These jumpers provide an 

alternative lightning current path to the 

airplane structure, reducing current 

passed into the fuel tank. However, 

airplanes produced with General 

Electric Company GE90 series engines 

were designed without the additional 

bonding jumper installation in the 

engine strut area that would otherwise 

sufficiently reduce the risk of a 

lightning strike that would result in the 

unsafe condition. The FAA may issue 

further rulemaking to address all Model 

777 airplanes including those powered 

by Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce 

engines. 

A lightning strike to an engine nacelle 

combined with a latent failure of the 

lightning protection features for the 

engine fuel feed system, if not 

addressed, could result in the potential 

for ignition sources inside fuel tanks. 

This condition, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, if not addressed, 

could result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. The 

FAA is issuing this AD to address the 

unsafe condition on these products. 

FAA’s Determination 

The FAA is issuing this AD because 

the agency has determined the unsafe 

condition described previously is likely 

to exist or develop in other products of 

the same type design. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

Under 1 CFR Part 51 

The FAA reviewed Boeing Multi 

Operator Message MOM–MOM–24– 

0463–01B, dated September 4, 2024. 

The material specifies procedures for 

inspecting and measuring the bond 

resistance of the bonding jumpers on the 

first fuel feed tube installed 

immediately forward of the wing front 

spar at each of the two engine locations, 

which includes the following actions: 

• repetitive detailed inspections of 

the two fuel feed tube saddle clamps to 

detect contact between the saddle 

clamps’ metal components with the fuel 

tube; 

• repetitive detailed inspections of 

the engine fuel feed tube to wing 

structure bonding jumpers and tube 

clamps immediately forward of the wing 

front spar for damage to the bonding 

jumpers or any loose bonding jumper 

lugs or tube clamps; and 

• repetitive measurement of the 

electrical bonding resistance between 

the wing structure and engine fuel feed 

tube. 

The material also specifies procedures 

for applicable corrective actions, which 

include the following: 

• reworking of the bonding jumper or 

saddle clamp installation; 

• replacing saddle clamps whose 

metal contacts the fuel tube; 

• cleaning and replacing damaged 

bonding jumpers and related hardware; 

and 

• contacting Boeing for repair 

instructions if any resistance 

measurement exceeds specified limits 

and doing the repair instructions. 

This material is reasonably available 

because the interested parties have 

access to it through their normal course 

of business or by the means identified 

in the ADDRESSES section. 

AD Requirements 

This AD requires accomplishing the 

actions specified in the material already 

described, except for any differences 

identified as exceptions in the 

regulatory text of this AD and except as 

discussed under ‘‘Difference Between 

this AD and the Referenced Material.’’ 

For information on the procedures, 

see this material at regulations.gov 

under Docket No. FAA–2024–2317. 

Interim Action 

The FAA considers this AD to be an 

interim action. The manufacturer is 

currently developing a more 

comprehensive inspection that will 

address both out-of-tank and in-tank 

lightning protection features. Once this 

inspection is developed, approved, and 

available, the FAA might consider 

additional rulemaking. 

Justification for Immediate Adoption 

and Determination of the Effective Date 

Section 553(b) of the Administrative 

Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 551 et 

seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense 

with notice and comment procedures 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 2, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 80079 

for rules when the agency, for ‘‘good 

cause,’’ finds that those procedures are 

‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary 

to the public interest.’’ Under this 

section, an agency, upon finding good 

cause, may issue a final rule without 

providing notice and seeking comment 

prior to issuance. Further, section 

553(d) of the APA authorizes agencies to 

make rules effective in less than thirty 

days, upon a finding of good cause. 

An unsafe condition exists that 

requires the immediate adoption of this 

AD without providing an opportunity 

for public comments prior to adoption. 

The FAA has found that the risk to the 

flying public justifies forgoing notice 

and comment prior to adoption of this 

rule because a lightning strike to an 

engine nacelle combined with latent 

failures of the lightning protection 

features for the engine fuel feed system 

could result in the potential for ignition 

sources inside fuel tanks. This 

condition, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors could result in a 

fuel tank explosion and consequent loss 

of the airplane. Accordingly, notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

are impracticable and contrary to the 

public interest pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

553(b). 

The compliance time in this AD is 

shorter than the time necessary for the 

public to comment and for publication 

of the final rule. In addition, the FAA 

finds that good cause exists pursuant to 

5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this 

amendment effective in less than 30 

days, for the same reasons the FAA 

found good cause to forgo notice and 

comment. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The requirements of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (RFA) do not apply when 

an agency finds good cause pursuant to 

5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt a rule without 

prior notice and comment. Because the 

FAA has determined that it has good 

cause to adopt this rule without notice 

and comment, RFA analysis is not 

required. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates that this AD 

affects 174 airplanes of U.S. registry. 

The FAA estimates the following costs 

to comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Inspection and measurement .. 3 work-hours × $85 per hour = 

$255 per inspection cycle.

$0 $255 per inspection cycle ....... $44,370 per inspection cycle. 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to do any on-condition actions that 

would be required based on the results 

of the inspection and measurement. The 

FAA has no way of determining the 

number of aircraft that might need these 

actions: 

ON-CONDITION COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Replacing saddle clamp ............................................... 0.5 work-hour × $85 per hour = $42.50 ....................... $3 $45.50 

Reworking bonding jumper installation ........................ 1.0 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ............................ 0 85 

Replacing bonding jumper ............................................ 1.0 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ............................ 3 88 

The FAA has received no definitive 

data on which to base the cost estimates 

for the on-condition repair specified in 

this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

and 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2024–19–14 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–22856; Docket No. 

FAA–2024–2317; Project Identifier AD– 

2024–00468–T. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective October 17, 2024. 


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(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 777–200, 777–200LR, 777–300ER, and 

777F series airplanes, certificated in any 

category, with General Electric Company 

(GE) GE90–76B, GE90–85B, GE90–90B, 

GE90–94B, GE90–110B1, and GE90–115B 

model turbofan engines installed. 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 28, Fuel. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by a report of 

potential latent failures of the lightning 

protection features for the engine fuel feed 

system. The FAA is issuing this AD to 

address such latent failures. A lightning 

strike to an engine nacelle combined with 

latent failures of the lightning protection 

features for the engine fuel feed system, if not 

addressed, could result in the potential for 

ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in 

combination with flammable fuel vapors, 

could result in a fuel tank explosion and 

consequent loss of the airplane. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Required Actions 

Except as specified by paragraph (h) of this 

AD: Within 90 days after the effective date 

of this AD, or within 1 year after the date of 

issuance of the original airworthiness 

certificate or original export certificate of 

airworthiness, whichever comes later, do 

detailed inspections and measure the bond 

resistance of the bonding jumpers on the fuel 

feed tube installed immediately forward of 

the wing front spar at each of the two engine 

locations, and do all applicable corrective 

actions, in accordance with the Part 2 of the 

Work Instructions of Boeing Multi Operator 

Message MOM–MOM–24–0463–01B, dated 

September 4, 2024. All applicable corrective 

actions must be done before further flight. 

Repeat the inspections and bonding 

resistance measurement thereafter at 

intervals not to exceed 1 year. 

(h) Exception to Service Information 

Specifications 

(1) Where Boeing Multi Operator Message 

MOM–MOM–24–0463–01B, dated September 

4, 2024, specifies contacting Boeing for 

instructions if a bonding resistance 

measurement continues to exceed specified 

limits after multiple failed corrective action 

attempts, this AD requires doing a repair 

before further flight using a method approved 

in accordance with the procedures specified 

in paragraph (i) of this AD. 

(2) Boeing Multi Operator Message MOM– 

MOM–24–0463–01B, dated September 4, 

2024, refers to Aircraft Illustrated Parts 

Catalogue (AIPC) AIPC 28–11–51–01 in 

several places; however, the correct AIPC 

reference is AIPC 28–11–51–02. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, AIR–520, Continued 

Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or responsible Flight Standards Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the certification office, 

send it to the attention of the person 

identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to AMOC@

faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the responsible Flight Standards Office. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair, 

modification, or alteration required by this 

AD if it is approved by The Boeing Company 

Organization Designation Authorization 

(ODA) that has been authorized by the 

Manager, AIR–520, Continued Operational 

Safety Branch, FAA, to make those findings. 

To be approved, the repair method, 

modification deviation, or alteration 

deviation must meet the certification basis of 

the airplane, and the approval must 

specifically refer to this AD. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Samuel Dorsey, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206–231–3415; 

email: Samuel.J.Dorsey@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the material listed in this paragraph under 5 

U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) You must use this material as 

applicable to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Multi Operator Message MOM– 

MOM–24–0463–01B, dated September 4, 

2024. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For Boeing material identified in this 

AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 

Attention: Contractual & Data Services 

(C&DS), 2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110– 

SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740–5600; telephone 

562–797–1717; website myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this material at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. 

Issued on September 20, 2024. 

Peter A. White, 

Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate 

Management Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2024–22802 Filed 9–30–24; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

15 CFR Parts 748 

[Docket No. 240926–0254] 

RIN 0694–AJ82 

Expansion of Validated End User 

Authorization: Data Center Validated 

End User Authorization 

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Department of Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: In this rule, the Department of 

Commerce, Bureau of Industry and 

Security (BIS), amends the Export 

Administration Regulations (EAR) to 

expand the Validated End User 

Authorization (VEU) program to include 

VEU Authorization for data centers 

located in specified destinations (‘‘Data 

Center VEU’’ or ‘‘Data Center VEU 

Authorization’’). This expansion of the 

VEU program to include Data Center 

VEU is intended to facilitate quick and 

reliable export or reexport of items on 

the Commerce Control List necessary for 

a data center, including advanced 

computing items, to preapproved 

trusted end users. Data Center VEU 

adopts much of the framework of the 

existing VEU program, with additional 

requirements. This expansion of 

eligibility is intended to update the VEU 

program to recognize the advancement 

and benefits of artificial intelligence. As 

under the original VEU Authorization 

Program, the U.S. government will 

rigorously review Data Center VEU 

candidates’ applications subject to 

detailed and verifiable criteria. 

DATES: This rule is effective on October 

2, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Chair, End-User Review Committee, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary for 

Export Administration, Bureau of 

Industry and Security, Department of 

Commerce, Phone: (202) 482–5991, 

Email: ERC@bis.doc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

In this rule, the Department of 

Commerce, Bureau of Industry and 

Security (BIS), amends the Export 


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