1 15-1416 Brayboy v. O’Dwyer UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

### SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appe ndix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary ord er must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, at 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26 th day of January, two thousand sixteen. Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge , RICHARD C. WESLEY, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

________________________________________________ RONNIE BRAYBOY, Plaintiff , MONA BRAYBOY, as fiduciary of the estate of Ronnie Brayboy, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. No. 15-1416 MICHELLE O’DWYER, in he r individual capacity, Defendant , CAROLE PANOZZO, in her individual and official capacities, CITY OF BRIDGEPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION, MARIA O’DWYER, Defendants-Appellees

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________________________________________________2 For Plaintiff-Appellant: Jose phine S. Miller, Danbury, CT. For Defendants-Appellees: Arthur C. Laske II I, Office of the City Attorney, Bridgeport, CT.
Appeal from the United States District Cour t for the District of Connecticut (Garfinkel,
M.J. ). ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. Plaintiff Mona Brayboy, in her capacity as fiduciary of the estate of Ronnie Brayboy, appeals a judgment of the United St ates District Court for the Dist rict of Connecticut (Garfinkel,
M.J. ) entered on May 22, 2014, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. We assume the parties’ fa miliarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. This dispute arises from an incident that occurred on December 9, 2010 between Ronnie Brayboy, an African-American man who was at that time employed by the City of Bridgeport as a school security officer, and Maria O’Dwyer, w ho worked as a secretary at the same school. Brayboy contends that he made a joking comm ent to O’Dwyer, who responded by calling him a “nobody” and then uttering a racial slur under he r breath. O’Dwyer claims that Brayboy sexually harassed her, and that he had done so on severa l previous occasions. O’Dwyer made a complaint to Carole Pannozzo, the Executive Director of Human Resources, who placed Brayboy on paid administrative leave while O’Dwyer’s allegati ons were investigated. The same day, Brayboy wrote a memorandum to his supervisor, copying the city’s Director of Labor Relations, accusing O’Dwyer of using a racial sl ur against him. In March 2011, Brayboy filed a charge of discrimination against Pannozzo with the C onnecticut Commission on Human Rights and3 Opportunities (“CCHRO”). After Brayboy filed hi s complaint, Pannozzo was removed from the investigation of O’Dwyer’s sexual harassment complaint. Brayboy was reinstated at the end of 2011 and assigned to a different school. In December 2012, the Board of Education informed Brayboy that he was being placed on a leave of absence because it had come to the Board’s atte ntion that he lacked a certification that was required by the state. Brayboy was provided an o pportunity to prove that he had obtained the necessary certification, but instea d, he tendered his resignation. In his Fourth Amended Complaint, Brayboy asserted eleven claims against O’Dwyer, Pannozzo, and the City of Bridgeport Board of Education (“Board of Education”), including claims that the Board of Educa tion retaliated against him in vi olation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. St at. § 46a-60(a)(4), and of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Th e district court gran ted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Brayboy’s cl aims. In this appeal, Brayboy challenges only the dismissal of his CFEPA and Title VII retaliat ion claims against the Board of Education. To make out a prima facie case of retalia tion under Title VII, an employee must demonstrate that he or she “was engaged in pr otected activity; that the employer was aware of that activity; that the employee suffered advers e employment decisions; and that there was a causal connection between the protected ac tivity and the adverse employment action.” Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons , 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988). The same standards apply to a cl aim of retaliation under the CFEPA. See Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp. , 609 F.3d 537, 556 (2d Cir. 2010). The district court dismissed Brayboy’s retaliation claims on the ground that he failed to present any evidence of a causal connection between his4 protected activity—either his December 2010 memo randum to his supervisor or his March 2011 CCHRO complaint—and his re tirement in December 2012. Brayboy does not challenge the district cour t’s holding that there was no causal nexus between the protected activity a nd his 2012 retirement. Instead, he argues that the district court should have considered other adve rse employment actions that he suffered, specifically: (1) the School Board’s failure to investig ate his claim of raci al discrimination, and (2) his placement on paid administrative leave for approximatel y one year while O’Dwyer’s complaint was investigated. Neither ar gument has merit. First, we have held that “[a]n employee whose complaint is not investigated cannot be said to have thereby suffered a punishm ent for bringing that same complaint.” Fincher v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp. , 604 F.3d 712, 721 (2d Cir. 2010). A failure to investigate can be considered an adverse employment action onl y “if the failure is in retaliation for some separate, protected act by the plaintiff.” Id. at 722. Here, Brayboy alleges that the School Board’s failure to investigate his complaint constituted retaliation for bringing that same complaint. Fincher makes clear that this allegation is insu fficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, we have held that “administrative leave with pay during the pendency of an investigation does not, without more, cons titute an adverse employment action.” Joseph v.
Leavitt , 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, Brayboy’s own allegations indicate that he was placed on administrative leave before he wrote his December 2010 memorandum complaining of racial harassment. In addition, there is no evidence that his placement on administrative leave amounted to anything more than “simply appl[yi ng] reasonable disciplinary procedures to an5 employee.” Id. at 92 n.1. Accordingly, Brayboy’s suspension did not constitute an adverse employment action. We have considered Brayboy’s remaining argum ents and find that they lack merit. For the reasons given, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK