RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3113-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

DARREN R. PIEPER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted November 27, 2023 – Decided March 4, 2024 

Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hunterdon County, Accusation No. 

19-09-0287. 

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief). 

Renée M. Robeson, Hunterdon County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Tina M. DiFranco, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3113-21

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Darren Pieper appeals from an April 6, 2022 order denying his 

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We 

affirm. 

I.

In July 2018, the Readington Township Police Department (Readington) 

conducted a search of defendant's home in response to a report from Virginia 

police concerning T.L., a missing juvenile from Virginia. The Virginia police 

believed T.L. was in Readington because the credit card history indicated 

packages in his name were delivered to an address in Flemington. Readington 

police went to that address, encountered defendant, and inquired about T.L. 

Defendant, however, denied knowing anyone by that name. 

 Three days later, T.L.'s father contacted Readington police and requested 

further investigation because additional packages had been sent to defendant's 

address. T.L.'s father also informed Readington officers that T.L. also used the 

name J.L. The officers returned to the home that same afternoon. Defendant 

denied knowing J.L. or that packages were received for anyone with that name. 

The officers left defendant's home and checked the location of J.L.'s cellphone, 

which indicated the cell phone was in the vicinity.
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 Several officers returned to the home and defendant's wife answered the 

door. When shown a picture of J.L., she confirmed that he was in the home. 

Defendant then came to the door and confirmed J.L. was sleeping in the 

basement. J.L. was returned to his family. 

 In May 2019, J.L. went missing again. The Virginia police again 

contacted the Readington police and requested a welfare check at defendant's 

home. Several officers returned to defendant's home and spoke with defendant's 

wife. After explaining to her that J.L. was missing, she consented to a search of 

the home. 

 As the officers were searching defendant's home, defendant was seen 

exiting the detached garage on the property. The officers told defendant that 

J.L. was missing and believed to be on the property. Defendant acknowledged 

that he had been in contact with J.L., and he had previously stayed at defendant's 

home. Yet, defendant claimed that he was unable to recall the last time J.L. 

stayed at his home and claimed that he was unable to contact J.L. Defendant 

consented to a search of the detached garage, which produced teenager's 

clothing, a wallet containing a debit card belonging to someone with J.L's last 

name, and a pack of birth control pills. The officers read defendant his Miranda1

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1996). 
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rights and asked additional questions regarding J.L's whereabouts. Defendant 

eventually admitted J.L. was on the property and messaged J.L. that the police 

were there to help him. 

 As defendant was being questioned, other officers looked through the 

windows of several vehicles parked in an open area within 300 feet of 

defendant's detached garage. J.L. was found in a van when an officer saw a foot 

sticking out from underneath a seat and ordered J.L. out of the van. Defendant 

was arrested and his cellphone was seized from his person pursuant to a search 

incident to arrest. 

 Defendant was subsequently charged with third-degree interference with 

custody, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(a)(1); third-degree endangering the welfare of a 

child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); fourth-degree hindering apprehension or 

prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4); fourth-degree obstructing the administration 

of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1a; and the disorderly persons offense for providing 

alcoholic beverages to underage person, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-17a. 

 The next day on May 14, 2019, defendant's wife signed a Hunterdon 

County Prosecutor's Office (HCPO) consent to search form, providing consent 

to search the basement, barn, and outside buildings on their property. The 

consent to search form stated that she had the rights to refuse consent, to 
5 A-3113-21

withdraw consent at any time, and to be present during the search. Defendant's 

wife declined to be present and informed the officers that she and defendant had 

been married for nineteen years but had been living separate lives for several 

years and did not share a bedroom. 

 HCPO and Readington officers searched defendant's property the same 

day. They found money and a black cellphone on the nightstand in a basement 

bedroom shared by defendant and J.L. Defendant's wife later told the officers 

that the black cellphone was defendant's second cellphone. The officers also 

found an empty cellphone box and three USB storage drives. The search of the 

detached garage revealed lubricant, condoms, empty alcohol containers, an iPad 

in a black leather case, an android cellphone in a green case, and an envelope 

containing money. 

 Readington Detective Brown applied for and was granted a 

communications data warrant (CDW) to access and search the electronic devices 

seized on May 13 and 14. A forensic examination of the cellphone found in the 

basement bedroom revealed thirteen images of child sexual abuse material. 

Also, a video of child pornography was found on both the cellphones seized 

from defendant's person and on the phone recovered from the basement room. 

The video depicted an adult male engaging in a sexual act with a prepubescent 
6 A-3113-21

boy. Defendant was then charged with third-degree endangering the welfare of 

a child. Further examination of the cellphone seized from defendant's person 

revealed that defendant had engaged in sexually explicit conversations with 

multiple male juveniles and a video of defendant engaging in sexual activity 

with a male juvenile. 

 On June 14, 2019, Detective Brown applied for and was granted a search 

warrant for defendant's home and another CDW, which were executed three days 

later. The State and defendant dispute how the warrant was executed. 

Defendant asserts the officers used a battering ram to enter the home and the 

State contends that officers knocked on the door and defendant's spouse granted 

entry into the home. Nevertheless, the officers recovered multiple tablets, 

cellphones, laptops, laptop backups, USB storage sticks, defendant's passport, 

and various tapes and audio recordings from the basement, garage, and a vehicle 

in the garage. A forensic examination of the electronic devices revealed 

defendant had communicated with multiple male juveniles using different 

computers and cellphone applications regarding the sexual activity that had 

occurred between defendant and the juveniles, as well as the exchange of photos 

of defendant's and the male juveniles' genitalia. 
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 The male juveniles identified in the conversations with defendant were 

interviewed by the officers. T.M., then twenty at the time of his interview, told 

officers he met defendant online through a dating application and had engaged 

in sexual activity five or six times with defendant when he was fifteen or sixteen 

years old. Officers identified two other male juveniles under the age of sixteen 

that also engaged in sexual activity with defendant. Defendant was subsequently 

charged with three counts of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2(c)(4), and three counts of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a. 

 On September 26, 2019, defendant entered a guilty plea to one count of 

second-degree sexual assault pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement. 

Defendant testified that he met with plea counsel on "at least seven occasions" 

while in jail, he was provided with and reviewed the discovery the State intended 

to use at trial, he reviewed the possible defenses, and he discussed the State's 

initial plea offer and proposed counteroffer with counsel. Specifically, 

defendant admitted the day before the plea hearing, he met with plea counsel 

and reviewed the waiver and accusation, Megan's Law registration, community 

supervision for life, and was provided an explanation regarding the adult 
8 A-3113-21

diagnostic treatment evaluation, and how it could determine or affect defendant's 

placement in prison. 

 In a colloquy with the court, defendant iterated that he had sufficient time 

to speak with counsel, he was satisfied with his services, he reviewed all the 

plea documents with counsel, and counsel had answered his questions. 

Defendant testified that he understood that he was pleading guilty to seconddegree sexual assault and understood the State's recommendation was a sevenyear sentence. After the plea colloquy, the court accepted his guilty plea. 

 On January 24, 2020, defendant was sentenced to a seven-year term 

consistent with the plea agreement. The court rejected defense counsel's request 

for consideration of mitigating factor two and seven, explaining that based on 

the "totality of the circumstance" defendant "intended to meet with and engage 

in sexual acts" with young boys, went to "great lengths" to form those 

relationships, "prey[ed] on [their] weaknesses," and continued contact from the

time that he was charged through incarceration. The court ultimately concluded 

defendant "did not fully understand that [his] conduct was wrong." 

 Defendant did not file a direct appeal. Instead, defendant filed a timely 

pro se PCR petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Thereafter, 

appointed PCR counsel filed an amended PCR petition. 
9 A-3113-21

 After hearing oral argument on April 6, 2022, the PCR court denied 

defendant's PCR petition in a comprehensive written opinion and corresponding 

order. Based on the record, the court concluded defendant failed to satisfy the 

Strickland/Fritz test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State 

v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). The court found that both the plea colloquy and 

defendant's certification filed in support of the PCR petition "demonstrated that 

[trial counsel] met his professional obligation." The court stated the plea 

colloquy "undercut" defendant's arguments concerning his review of discovery 

and defendant's satisfaction with plea counsel's services. The court concluded 

that trial counsel engaged with defendant "exactly how a competent defense 

attorney" would be expected to act and did not fall below an objective standard 

of reasonableness. 

 The court considered the second prong of Strickland that there was a 

"reasonable probability" that but for trial counsel's errors he would not have 

pleaded guilty. The court similarly determined defendant's submissions 

"undercut" that argument. Specifically, defendant "did not state 'definitely' that 

with more time, he would have refused the plea, and he [did] not present any 

evidence to demonstrate that he would have done so." The court concluded 

defendant did not provide evidence to support his claim and did not make a 
10 A-3113-21

strong claim that he would have done anything different. Nor did defendant 

demonstrate that it would have been reasonable for him to reject the State's plea. 

 The court rejected defendant's reliance on State v. Cushing, 226 N.J. 187 

(2016), and concluded each of the searches were lawful and a motion to suppress 

would have been "unsuccessful." Regarding the May 13 search, the court found 

the officers received "valid consent" to search the defendant's home and the 

garage both from defendant's wife and defendant. The search behind the garage 

was pursuant to a valid exception to the warrant requirement and defendant's 

cell phone was seized pursuant to a valid search incident to the arrest. As to the 

May 14 search, the court concluded the officers conducted a valid search based 

on the "reasonable conclusion" that defendant's wife had authority to consent to 

the search because she resided on the property. Lastly, the June 17 search was 

likewise valid because it was issued "pursuant to a warrant properly issued by a 

detached and neutral magistrate." 

 Finally, the court concluded defense counsel's performance during 

sentencing was reasonable because counsel's choices were a matter of "sound 

trial strategy." The court further concluded there was no prejudice to defendant 

because he had the opportunity to "speak up" at sentencing and he was sentenced 

in accordance with the plea agreement. 
11 A-3113-21

 Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal: 

POINT I 

DEFENDANT RAISED PRIMA FACIE CLAIMS FOR 

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WHICH ENTITLED 

HIM TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 

A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES 

REGARDING CLAIMS FOR INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY 

HEARINGS[,] AND PETITIONS FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. 

B. PLEA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 

FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE SEARCHES OF 

DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE. 

C. PLEA COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 

FAILING TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE 

CASE AND COMMUNICATE WITH HIS CLIENT. 

D. [PLEA] COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 

PROVIDING DEFENDANT WITH 

MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE TERMS AND 

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA. 

E. [PLEA] COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR 

FAILING TO ARGUE MITIGATING FACTORS AT 

THE SENTENCING HEARING. 

 We conduct a de novo review of a PCR court's legal conclusions and 

factual determinations rendered without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Harris, 

181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004); State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338-39 (App. 

Div. 2020). Accordingly, we "view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
12 A-3113-21

defendant." State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311 (2014); see also State v. Chau, 

473 N.J. Super. 430, 443 n.7 (App. Div. 2022). 

 It is well-settled that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the 

reasonable likelihood that his claim will ultimately succeed on the merits under 

the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 and Fritz, 105 N.J. 

at 58. A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard requires the 

denial of a PCR petition. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013); Fritz, 105 

N.J. at 52. 

 Under the first prong of Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient and "was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed 

the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Under 

the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's errors 

prejudiced the defense to the extent that the defendant was deprived of a fair and 

reliable trial outcome. Id. at 687. Bare assertions are "'insufficient to support a 

prima facie case of ineffectiveness.'" State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 299, 

(App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 171 (App. 

Div. 1999)). 
13 A-3113-21

 When asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim after the entry 

of a guilty plea, "a defendant must show that (i) counsel's assistance was not 

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases; and 

(ii) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, [the 

defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 

State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 

N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in original)) (quotations omitted). 

 "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim may occur when counsel fails 

to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation." State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 352 

(2013). Our Supreme Court has held that "'counsel has a duty to make 

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary.'" State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).

 A court reviewing a PCR petition based on claims of ineffective assistance 

has the discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing if a defendant establishes a 

prima facie showing in support of the requested relief. State v. Preciose, 129 

N.J. 451, 462 (1992). The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle a 

defendant to an evidentiary hearing. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170, certif. 

denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999). 
14 A-3113-21

 We affirm the order denying defendant's PCR petition substantially for 

the reasons set forth in the PCR court's comprehensive written decision. 

Defendant argues plea counsel was ineffective by not challenging the searches

of his property. Defendant makes this argument even though he consented to 

the search on May 13, his wife consented to the search on May 14, and a judge 

signed the CDW warrant. Moreover, the PCR court concluded a motion to 

suppress would have been "unsuccessful" because each of the searches were 

lawful. 

 Defendant next argues that his counsel did not afford him enough time to 

review discovery, that his confinement limited his access to resources that would 

have aided his defense, and that his counsel did not adequately explain the 

consequences of a guilty plea. We are not persuaded. We agree with the PCR 

court that defendant's arguments are "undercut" by the extensive colloquy with 

plea counsel and the trial court. Defendant's bald assertion that if he had more 

information, he might have refused the State's offer is insufficient to establish a 

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 We also conclude there is not merit to defendant's argument that plea 

counsel was ineffective for failing to assert mitigating factors at the sentencing 

hearing. In its opinion, the PCR court acknowledged the sentencing 
15 A-3113-21

memorandum submitted by counsel requesting the sentencing judge consider 

mitigating factors two and seven. The PCR court found defense counsel 

presented a persuasive written argument supplemented with oral argument at 

sentencing. Nevertheless, the PCR court rejected those arguments and 

determined mitigating factors two and seven were not applicable. Having 

reviewed the record, we agree with the PCR court that defendant did not present 

evidence to rebut the presumption that defense counsel wrote the sentencing 

memorandum based on sound strategy, resulting in competent representation. 

 We discern no abuse of discretion in the PCR court's decision to deny an 

evidentiary hearing. Since defendant has failed to establish a prima facie claim 

in support of ineffective assistance of counsel or any other basis to support the 

holding of a hearing, the PCR court correctly determined he was not entitled to 

an evidentiary hearing. 

 Affirmed.