ORIGINAL 

lfn tbe Wniteb ~tates ~ourt of jfeberal QClaint5 

No. 16-959L 

(Filed: April 25, 2017) 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

CLARENCE WALKING EAGLE, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE UNITED ST A TES, 

Defendant, 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

ORDER 

Cobell v. Salazar; Statute of 

Limitations; Claim 

Preclusion. 

FILED 

APR 2 5 2017 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff, Clarence Walking Eagle, Jr., is a Sioux Native American in 

the Fort Peck Sioux Tribe and resides on Fmi Peck in Brockton, Montana. 

Appearing pro se, he filed his complaint on August 8, 2016, seeking 

$10,000,000.00 in compensatory damages under various treaties and statutes 

due to, among other alleged wrongs, "being unlawfully alienated from the 

exclusive use and benefit of [his] trust land and exposed to foreign jurisdiction 

without consent for the benefit of non-Indian concerns for almost ninety-nine 

years." 1 Pl. 's Compl. ~ 48. Plaintiff also seeks $10,000,000.00 in punitive 

damages and various forms of equitable relief, such as an order restraining 

state law enforcement agencies from exercising jurisdiction within the 

boundaries of Fmi Peele 

On December 5, 2016, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

arguing that plaintiffs claims accrued outside this comi's six-year statute of 

1 Along with his complaint, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in Jonna 

pauperis on August 8, 2016. 

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limitations and that plaintiff is precluded from bringing these claims due to his 

participation in the Cobell class-action settlement, which is described in more 

detail below. See Cobell v. Salazar, No. 96-1285(TFH), 2011WL10676927 

(D.D.C. July 27, 2011); Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") Ex. 4 (copy of 

the Cobell settlement agreement). We agree and deem oral argument on this 

motion unnecessary. Because we find that plaintiffs claims accrued outside 

of this court's six-year statute of limitations and that, in any event, plaintiff is 

precluded from bringing these claims due to the Cobell settlement agreement, 

we grant defendant's motion to dismiss. 

Prose plaintiffs are afforded latitude in their filings, see, e.g, Henke v. 

United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and are entitled to a liberal 

construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972) (requiring that allegations contained in a prose complaint be held to 

"less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). That said, 

the prose plaintiff is not relieved of his duty to meet the court's jurisdictional 

requirements. See Henke, 60 F .3d at 799. Before the court considers the merits 

of a complaint, it must determine the threshold matter of subject-mater 

jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env 't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 

(1998). Because we are deciding a motion to dismiss, we construe the 

allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and assume 

all unchallenged factual allegations to be true. See Henke, 60 F .3d at 797. 

However, the court is not confined to an examination of the complaint when 

considering a motion to dismiss, but may also look to "evidentiary matters 

outside the pleadings." Schuerman v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 420, 425 

(1994)(quotingCedars-SinaiMed. Ctr. v. Watkins, 11F.3d 1573, 1584(Fed. 

Cir. 1993)). 

The Tucker Act, this court's primary grant of jurisdiction, affords us the 

authority to "render judgment upon any claim against the United States 

founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation 

of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the 

United States ... in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l) (2012). 

Thus we do not have general equitable jurisdiction to provide the various nonmonetary relief that plaintiff seeks. Outside the context of a bid protest, 

equitable relief may only be provided as an incident of and collateral to a 

money judgment. See James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

As we discuss in more detail below, plaintiffs complaint does not include 

allegations that lead to such a circumstance. Accordingly, we do not have 

jurisdiction over plaintiffs non-monetary claims. 

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Plaintiff also frequently refers to a conspiracy and uses other language 

that intimates some form of criminal conduct on the part of the government 

and its agents. However, we do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal 

claims. See Hufford v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 702 (2009). Therefore, 

to the extent that plaintiff is alleging any criminal conduct by government 

employees, we do not have jurisdiction to entertain such allegations. 

Similarly, plaintiffs conspiracy claims would fail if they were characterized 

as a tort because this court does not have jurisdiction over cases sounding in 

tort. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (excluding cases "sounding in tort"); Gable v. United 

States, 106 Fed. Cl. 294, 297 (2012) ("The United States Court of Federal 

Claims does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims."). We are also 

without power to award punitive damages. See Environmental Safety 

Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 98 (2010). 

We are left with plaintiffs primary claim for compensation, which 

centers on plaintiffs belief that the United States improperly allowed 

Roosevelt County, Montana to build County Road 1041 ("CR 1041 ") on a 40-

acre individual land allotment held in trust by the United States for plaintiff 

(the "Trust Land"). Comp!. iJ 17. However plaintiff may attempt to frame a 

claim arising out of the construction of CR 1041, it is time-barred. 

All claims brought under the Tucker Act are subject to a six-year statute 

of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). In order for this court to entertain 

plaintiffs suit, he must have filed within six years after his claim accrued. As 

a general matter, a claim accrues "when all the events have occurred that fix 

the alleged liability of the government and entitle the claimant to institute an 

action." Ingrum v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 

Alliance of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 

1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). As defendant points out, "an action for breach of 

fiduciary duty accrues when the trust beneficiary knew or should have known 

of the breach." Jones v. United States, 801F.2d1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 

Defendant attached a satellite image of CR 1041 dated June 11, 1996-more 

than 20 years before plaintiff filed suit-as exhibit 3 to its motion to dismiss. 

In his response, plaintiff described the 20-year-old image as "prima [ facie] 

evidence of the gran[t]s of right[s] of way[], easements, and the physical 

County Road 1041 that was illegally placed in the middle of [the Trust Land] 

without consent or just compensation." Pl.' s Resp. at 27. A deeper examination 

of the factual background is not necessary because we are satisfied that 

plaintiff knew or should have known about the existence of CR 1041 no later 

than June 11, 1996. As a result, plaintiffs claims accrued outside this court's 

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six-year statute of limitations. 

In any event, plaintiff is precluded from bringing these claims due to the 

preclusive effect of his status as a Trust Administration Class member in the 

Cobell settlement. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff must plead plausible facts that 

"allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged." Barnes v. United States, 122 Fed. CL 581, 583 

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The court will grant a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when it is clear that the plaintiff 

can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Id. Here, as 

defendant argues, we find that there is no scenario in which plaintiff could be 

entitled to relief due to the fact that he waived his claims as a member of the 

Trust Administration Class in the Cobell settlement. 

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 

briefly summarized the Cobell class-action litigation and settlement-in which 

plaintiff was a member of both the Historical Accounting Class and the Trust 

Administration Class-as follows: 

[F]ive named plaintiffs ("Class Representatives") 

initiated a class action lawsuit in 1996 seeking to compel the 

United States Department of the Interior to perform a historical 

accounting of the hundreds of millions of dollars held by the 

Department in trust for Native Americans. That accounting was 

required by the American Indian Trust Fund Management 

Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239. In 

2001, [the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit] affirmed the district court's conclusion that 

the Department had unreasonably and unlawfully delayed that 

statutorily mandated accounting. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 

1081, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For the next decade, the parties, 

the district court, and Congress all struggled to determine how 

the Depaitment could feasibly discharge its legal duty to conduct 

an accounting of the hundreds of thousands of "Individual 

Indian Money" trust accounts under its control. ... 

We pick up the story in 2010 with the enactment of the 

Claims Resolution Act ("Claims Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-291, 

124 Stat. 3064(2010). The Claims Act authorized, ratified, and 

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confirmed the parties' comprehensive Settlement Agreement 

resolving the class action litigation. See id. § 101 ( c )(! ) .... 

Under the Settlement Agreement, each member of what 

was known as the "Historical Accounting Class" received 

$1,000 in lieu of an actual accounting .... A separate class, 

known as the "Trust Administration Class," received a baseline 

payment of $500 and a prorated share of any funds left over in 

the settlement account after specified payments were made ... 

. Id. at 914-915. In exchange, all class members released the 

Department of Interior from liability arising out of prior 

mismanagement of their trust accounts. Id. 

Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

As defendant points out, plaintiff was a member of the Trust 

Administration Class and had the ability to opt out but did not do so. Relevant 

here, plaintiff received an award as a member of the Trust Administration 

Class, totaling $1,753 .81.2 The Cobell settlement agreement provided that "all 

members of the Trust Administration Class ... shall be deemed to have 

released, waived and forever discharged the [United States] from, and ... shall 

be deemed to be forever barred and precluded from prosecuting, any and all 

claims and/or causes of action that were, or should have been, asserted in the 

Amended Complaint when it was filed, on behalf of the Trust Administration 

Class ... with respect to ... Land Administration Claims .... " Def.'s Mot. 18, 

Exh. 4 at 44. The Cobell settlement agreement defines "Land Administration 

Claims" to include"[ fjailure to obtain fair market value for leases, easements, 

rights-of-way or sales; ... Misappropriation; ... [and] Failure to control, 

investigate allegations of, or obtain relief in equity and at law for, trespass, 

theft, misappropriation, fraud or misconduct regarding Land." Id. at 11-12. 

Plaintiff received an award as a member of the Trust Administration Class in 

the Cobell settlement, and he knew or should have known of the claim he 

asserts in this action no later than June 11, 1996. He is therefore precluded 

from pursuing his claims here. 

2 Plaintiffs award was subject to a lien. He received a check for $405.90 

and the State of Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services 

Child Support Enforcement Division received the remaining $1,347.91. 

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In sum, plaintiffs only claims over which we could conceivably have 

jurisdiction are outside this comt's six-year statute of limitations period and 

precluded due to plaintiffs participation in the Cobell settlement. Thus 

plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed. As a result, the following is ordered: 

1. Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) and Rule 

12(b )( 6) is granted. 

2. For good cause shown, plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis is granted. 

3. The Clerk of Court is ordered to dismiss the complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction and enter judgment accordingly. No costs. 

Senior Judge 

~1/ 

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