UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________ ) GL ORI A HAL COMB, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 02-1336 ( PL F) ) NOPADON WOODS, ) ) Def endant. ) __________________________________________)
OPI NI ON In November

of 2009, plaintiff Gloria

Halcomb pr esente d to a jury her c laims that defe ndant Nopadon Woods was liable to he r for false a rre st, assault, battery , intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of he r F ourth Amendment rights. The jury found in Ms. Halcomb’ s favor

as to most of those claims and a war ded her

$75,000 in compensatory and $175,000 in punitive damag es. This matter is now be fore the Court on Mr. Woods’ motion for judgme nt as a matter

of law or , alternatively , for a new tria l. Mr. Woods arg ues that (1) he is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law on Ms. Halc omb’s common law cla ims of false a rre st, assault, and battery , and on her Section 1983 claim of unc onstitut ional arr est; (2) no re asonable jury could have awa

rded punitive damag es base d on the evidenc e pre sented at trial; and (3) qua lified immunit y

shields him from liabilit y for unc onstitut ional sear ch and a rre st. The Court will gra

nt Mr. Woods’ moti on in part and de ny it in part, vaca

ting the jur

y ’s awa rd of punitive damag es but leavingthe re mainder of its verdict uncha

ng ed. 1
The filings considere d by the Court on this motion include: M r. W o ods’ rene wed 1 motion for judgme nt as a matter of law or, alternatively , for a new trial (“Mot.”); Ms. Halcomb’ sI . BA CKGROUND A. Proce dural History Ms. Halcomb’s c omplaint, filed on J uly 1, 2002, orig inally

contained c laims ag ainst Mr. Woods, the W ashing ton Area Metropolitan Tra

nsit Authority

(“WMATA” ), and the District of Columbia. See Compl. ¶¶ 6-8. Ag ainst Mr. Woods, Ms. Halcomb pled claims of false a rre st, assault, battery , intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I d. ¶¶ 37- 48, 52-56. She cla imed that WMATA was liable unde r the theor y of respondeat superior

for the a lleg edly

tortious actions of Mr. Woods. I d. ¶¶ 49- 51. In addition, she asse rted a

claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress ag ainst the District of Columbi a, alleg ing that the District was vica riously liable for the actions of se vera l unidentified office rs of the D istrict of Columbia Metropolitan Poli ce D epar tment. I d. ¶¶ 60- 63. She also soug ht to hold the District of Columbi a liable f or Mr. Woods’ alleg ed violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I d. ¶¶ 64- 67. Ms. Halcomb re quested c ompensatory damag es in the amount of at least $75,000 and an unspe cified a mount of punitive damag es. I d. at 12. At Ms. Halcomb’s r equest, he r cla ims ag ainst WMATA were dismiss ed in September of

2002. On Marc h 13, 2003, on the District of Columbia’s motion, the Court dismiss ed Ms. Halc omb’s Section 1983 claims ag ainst the District. Halc omb v. Wash. Area Metro. Tra

nsit Auth., Ci vil Action No. 02-1336, Orde r at 1-2 ( D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2003) . Ms. Halcomb’ s remainingclaims ag ainst the District of Columbia and Mr. Woods were tried to a jury opposition to Mr. Woods’ motion (“O pp.”); Mr. Woods’ reply to Ms. Halcom b ’s o p p o sition (“Reply”); Ms. Halcomb’ s motion to strike portions of Mr. Woods’ reply (“Mot. to Strike”); Mr. Woods’ opposition to that motion (“D ef.’ s Opp.”) ; Ms. Halcomb’ s complaint (“Compl.”); and the instructions provided to the jury on November

6, 2009 (“Jury

Instructions”). 2beg inning on De cembe r 10, 2007. Afte r eig ht day s of trial and ne arly two day s of deliber ations, the jury was una ble to rea ch a ve rdict, and the Court declar ed a mistrial. Althoug h the jury had failed to re ach a

decision on Ms. Halc omb’s claims, the def endants filed a

motion for judgme nt
as a matter of law , which wa s g rante d as to the District of Columbia but denied a s to Mr. Woods. See Ha lcomb v. Woods, 610 F. Supp. 2d 77, 87 (D.D.C. 2009). Ms. Halcomb’ s claims ag ainst Mr. Woods were tr ied ag ain bef ore a jury in November

of 2009. Afte r five da

y s of trial and
near ly three day s of deliber ations, the jury returne d a ver dict for Ms. Ha lcomb on a number of her c laims.
B. Evidenc e Prese nted at the Sec ond Trial

The e vidence prese nted by the par ties at trial must be understood in lig ht of the undisputed fac ts about the manner in which the District of Columbia’s subwa y sy stem, called “Metro,” operates. A passe ng er ma y rea ch a Me tro train platfor m only afte r first passingthroug h a bar rier c alled a f

are g ate. To ope n a fa

reg ate, a passeng er must either

touch a plastic c ard, c alled a SmarTr ip car d, to an elec tronic sensor loc ated on top of the g ate, or insert a pa

per c ard, c alled a far eca rd, into a slot located on the side of the g ate. The car d — whether made of paper or plastic — is electronic ally

encode d with a monetar

y value. I f that value is equal to or hig her tha n the minimum far e nee ded to ride a Metro tra in, the far eg ate will open a fter e lectronic ally “re ading ” the ca rd.
1. The Plaintiff’s Evidenc e Ms. Halcomb testified a s follows at the sec ond trial: On Octobe r 30, 2001, at around 6 p.m., she le ft the United States Capitol building, whe re she worke d, and wa lked to
3Union Station to catch a Me tro train. She inserte d a pape r fa rec ard c ontaining suf

ficient fa re to enter the Metro sy stem into a far eg ate a nd passed through the g ate a fter it opene d. Once in the
are a of the station reser

ved for Metro passe ng ers, she then proc eede d to a bank of pay phones and called Sam Ta

ylor, a fr iend whom she wa s scheduled to mee t for dinner that night. While she was on the phone , she wa s approa ched by Mr. Woods, at the time an offic er of the WMATA Metro Tra

nsit P olice. He informed he r that her far eca rd did not have suf

ficient moneta

ry value to trigg er the far eg ate a

nd asked Ms. Ha lcomb to give him the car d. Once she had done so, he
car ried the f are car d to a nea

rby kiosk. Ms. Halcomb did not see what he did there
. When Mr. Woods returned fr om the kiosk, he said that he ha d chec ked the va lue of Ms. Halc omb’s car d and conf irmed that it was below the minimum value ne eded to e nter the Metro sy stem. Ms. Halcomb denie d this claim and asked if Mr. Woods would accompa ny her to a fa re ma chine so that they

could che ck the va lue of the c ard tog ether . He r efuse d her r equest and re tained possession of the f are car d, informingMs. Halcomb that he w as g oing to write her a citation for f

are evasion. He a sked to see he r identification. After at first ref using to provide 2 identification, Ms. Halc omb showed him a media c rede ntial and a wor k identification ca

rd, but Mr. Woods rejecte d those and a sked for a diffe rent for

m of identification, one w ith her photogr aph on it. He then r eac hed for Ms. Halcomb’s pur se, whose stra ps Ms. Halcomb wa s holding with her

rig ht hand. Saying that he was sur e ther e wa s identification in her ba g , Mr. Woods gra sped two of Ms. Ha lcomb’s fing ers, be nt them back, a nd held onto them for a

couple of sec onds.
Fa

re e vasion is de fined by statute as follows: “No person shall
. . . knowing ly enter 2 or leave the paid are a of a rea l transit station owned and/or opera t ed b y [ W M AT A]
. . . without paying the established fa

re . . . .” D.C. C O D E § 35-216.

4Ms. Halcomb told Mr. Woods to l et g o of her hand. He did so, and she withdre w her w allet from he r purse and showe d him her driver ’s license . Mr. Woods then called a nother police unit on his radio and r ead of f Ms. Halc omb’s identifying inf ormation. He told Ms. Halcomb that he was g oing to issue he r a c itation. Ms. Halcomb still denied that she had done any thing wr ongand insisted that he show he r the fa rec ard he had take n from her . He r efuse d to do so. Ms. Halcomb’s fing ers, the one s that Mr. Woods had bent back while trying to obtain he r driver’ s license, we re be g inning to swe ll. She complained to him that he had injured he r and
war ned him that she would file a complaint ag ainst him. Mr. W oods told her that if she wa nted medical tre atment, he would ha ve to take he r D.C. Gene ral Hospital, and that she would also have to “ g o to jail” first in order to ge t medical attention. At that point, Mr. Woods put a hand c uff on Ms. Ha lcomb’s rig ht wrist and then “yanked” her right a

rm behind her

back to c omplete the proc ess of ha ndcuff ing he r, injuringher
arm a nd shoulder in the proc ess. Once Ms. Halcomb wa s handcuf fed, Mr . Woods puton rubber g loves and be g an to sea

rch he r and c ollect her

proper ty . He r oug hly

pulled off he r ea

rring s and, in trying to r emove he r nec klace , twisted it in such a way that it broke. He also ripped he r belt from her trenc h coat. The n he put his knee be tween Ms. Ha lcomb’s leg s to push them apart, bruising the m in the proce ss, and sea rche d her f

ront, bac k, and sides. He “stomped” on Ms. Halcomb’ s rig ht foot.

At the conc lusion of the sear ch, an of fice r fr om the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depa rtment arrived on the sce ne, and he and Mr. Woods place d Ms. Halcomb in a patrol car

outside Union Station. Ms . Halcomb wa s driven to a police prec inct and led inside. Somehow duringall of this, Ms. Halcomb said, her blouse had c ome open, e x posing
5her br easts, and of fice rs and pr isoners in the pre cinct taunted he r as she was led pa st them. She was locke d in a ce ll for an unspe cified numbe r of hour s, until she was remove d from the pr ecinc t and take n to D.C. Gener al Hospital by Mr. Woods and another of fice r. At D.C. Gene ral, Ms. Ha lcomb was plac ed in another cell while she waited to
rec eive medic al attention. Ms. Halcomb wa s so horrified by the dirty condition of the ce ll that she urinate d on herse lf rathe r than use the toilet provided. Her hand and f

oot pained her , and at some point she vomited. After she had bee n in the cell for some time, Mr. Woods arrived a nd took her to be tre ated by

a phy sician. B efor e see ing the doctor, Ms. Ha lcomb spoke with a nurse , who aske d her some que stions and rec orded he r conta ct information on a me dical for m. When Mr. Woods saw the addr ess that was written on the medica l form, he sa id something a long the lines of, “Now

that Iknow wher e you live, Ioug ht to come out there and put a bullet in your hea d for makingme g o throug h all this [ expletive] with y ou tonight.”

A phy sician orde red x-ray s of Ms. Halcomb’ s rig ht hand and f oot but found no fra cture s of her

bones. On Ms. Ha lcomb’s medica l forms, he wr ote that she ha d a contusion (bruise) on her r ight ha

nd and instructed he r to use compr esses a nd Motrin to treat the injury
. After the doctor’ s examination of Ms. Halcomb had ende d, Mr. Woods took her back to the c ell wher e she pr eviously

had bee n place d. At about 5:00 a.m. on the morningof Oc tober 31, 2001, she wa s driven to another police pre cinct, whe re she was photog raphe d, fing erpr inted, and plac ed in another c ell. She was re lease d later that morning, at about 7:30 a.m., afte r her friend Sam Taylor paid her

fine. At the time, she ha d pain in her shoulder , foot and ha nd, and her

thighs
wer e bruised.

6After Ms. Halcomb finished testify ing, he r counse l called se vera l supporting witnesses. Ruth Enoch, a f riend of Ms. Ha lcomb’s, testified that Ms. Halc omb had bee n very upset afte r her

experience with Mr. Woods. A former Ne w York City police ca ptain, Edwar d Mamet, appe are d as an e x pert witness a nd testified re g ardingthe standar ds g overning police behavior duringinvestigations and arr ests. Ms. Halcomb’s doc tor, Danny Mamodesene , testified that Ms. Halcomb ca

me to see him on Nove mber 1, 2001, c laiming that she had bee n injured duringa conf

rontation with a police of fice r and c omplaining of

injuries to her right hand, rig ht foot, and both thig hs. Dr. Mamode sene dia g nosed Ms. Halc omb as havinga rig ht wrist “spra in/contusion,” a shoulder spr ain, and br uises on her r ight thig h and ankle , alongwith insomnia and anxiety
.

Sam Taylor, Ms. Halcomb’s f riend, testified that he had g one to Union Station on the eve ning of

October 30, 2001, afte r hea

ringover the phone the be g inning of Ms. Halcomb’s confr ontation with Mr. Woods
. Acc ordingto Mr. Taylor, he a rrived at Union Station after Ms. 3 Halcomb ha d alre ady

been ha ndcuff ed and se arc hed by

Mr. Woods. Ms. Halcomb was cr ying and told Mr. Tay

lor that Mr. Woods had bent bac k her f inge rs and stomped on he r foot. She
seeme d to Mr. Taylor to be in great pain. She insisted on ge tting medica l treatment for her injuries, prompting a

police off

icer who was standingwith Mr. Woods and Ms. Halcomb to inform Mr. Ta

ylor that the police c ould only g et Ms. Halcomb medic al treatment by takingher to D.C. Gene ral Hospital, and c ould only do that if Ms. Halcomb wa s under a rre st.

Mr. Taylor passed awa

y betwee n the first and second trials of Ms. Halcomb’ s claims. 3 His sworn testimony from the first trial was rea d into the rec ord at the second trial by a profe ssional actor hired by plaintiff’s counse l. 7Once Ms. Halcomb wa s removed f rom Union Station by

the offic ers, Mr. T aylor tried to find out wher e she ha d been ta ken. Eve ntually

he found he r at the N ew Yor k Avenue police substation, wher e he pa id Ms. Halcomb’s fine , and she w as re lease d.
2. The De fenda

nt’s Evidence Unsurprising ly , Mr. Woods related a n acc ount of his confrontation with Ms. Halcomb that diff

ere d dramatically

from her s. He testified that he had stood in the kiosk in Union Station on October 30, 2001, monitoringthe fa reg ates. Thr oug h the transpa rent windows of the kiosk, he c ould see pe ople passingthroug h the g ates. He could also look down at a machine c alled the “ Sy stem Monitor Acknowledg ment Display” (“ SMADS machine”) , which display ed on a sc ree n the information enc oded on the c ards be ing use d at the fa reg ates. When Ms. Halcomb appr oache d a fa reg ate, Mr. Woods noticed that a lthough she was usinga pape r far eca rd, which must be inser

ted into a slot on the side of a f are g ate to be pr ocesse d, she swiped the ca rd ac ross the top of the f

are g ate a s if it were a plastic SmarTr ip car d. She then “pig g y backe d” throug h the fa

reg ate by slipping throug h the g ate be hind another pe rson bef ore it closed be hind the person who ha d enter ed in front of her. Mr . Woods, believing that Ms. Halcomb ha d evade d paying he r fa re, g lance d down at the SMADS scre en and sa w that no SmarTrip ca

rd had be en used at the far eg ate through which she ha d just passed. Convinced that Ms. Halc omb had enter ed the Me tro sy stem illega lly — he said he had “r easona

ble suspicion” at this point — Mr. Woods approache d her a nd asked f

or her far eca rd. Afte r she ha

nded it to him, he took it t o the kiosk, where he inserte d it into t he SMADS machine. A ccor ding to the ma chine, the c ard ha d not been use d to enter a Union Station fareg ate

8that evening ; the last place of entry encode d on the ca

rd wa s Glenmont station. Mr. Woods conclude d that Ms. Halcomb had not pa id her fa re when she pa ssed throug h the fa reg ate a nd believed he then had pr obable c ause to be lieve she ha d committed the offe nse of f are evasion. Mr. Woods returned to the pla ce where Ms. Halcomb wa s standing, a sked her for a form of identification, and infor

med her that he wa s g oing to issue he r a c itation for fa re e vasion. Ms. Halcomb de nied that she ha d done any thing wr ong , ref

used to g ive Mr. Woods any identification, and wa lked off towa

rd a ba nk of pay phones to make a

call. Mr. Woods followed her and ag ain asked f or a f orm of identification or for identify ing inf ormation. He a dvised her that he nee ded
cer tain information, includingher na me and a ddress, in orde r to issue her a citation for f

are evasion. When Ms. Halc omb refuse d to provide identification after Mr . Woods’ third request, he told her that he w ould have to ar rest her if she re fused to identify

herse lf, and he showed he r his handcuf fs. Ms. Halcomb continued to r efuse to provide any information about her

identity
. Mr. Woods then attempted to place her in ha ndcuff s. She resisted, pulling a

way from him and twisting fr om side to side; they strug g led. Ultimately , Mr. Woods was forc ed to obtain assistance from anothe r Metro Tr ansit police off icer , Spencer

Pines, before he wa s able to close the handcuf fs ar ound both of Ms. Halcomb’s wrists. Mr. Woods t hen per formed a sear ch of Ms. Halcomb. He remove d her je welry and belt without damag ing e ither. He said he did not intentionally

stomp on her foot and did not bend he r fing ers ba ck. Eventually , afte r wa iting at Union Station for a transport ve hicle for

roug hly ninety minutes, Mr. Woods t ook Ms. Halcomb to D.C. Gene ral Hospital bec ause she was complainingof injuries. Onc e at the hospital, he informed pe rsonnel ther e that he ha d broug ht in
9a prisoner

who re quired medic al attention. Afte r Ms. Halc omb was re g istered a s require d by the hospital, Mr. Woods t ook her to a cell for arr estee s/prisoners that is maintained and monitore d by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depa rtment. Sometime later Ms. Halc omb was seen by a phy sician and x-ray s were taken, a fter which she wa s returne d to the cell. L ater Mr. Woods t ook her to the Thir d District Metropolitan Police Depa rtment station to be booked and place d in a ce ll. She was rele ased later that morningafte r Sam Tay lor paid her

fine. Mr. Woods denied e ver thre ateningto come to her house and “ put a bullet in [ her] head.” To support his testimony , Mr. Woods produced a paper far eca rd that he ide ntified as the one g iven to him by Gloria Ha lcomb on the nig ht in question. He testified that, as wa s standard pr actice for tra

nsit poli ce of

fice rs, he ha d kept the ca

rd in a filingcabine t at his home since that nig ht. His counsel introduce d in evidence a photograph of the information display ed on the scre en of a

SMADS machine whe n the ca rd wa s inserted into the mac hine appr ox imately two y ear s after

Ms. Halcomb’s a

rre st. She also introduced a second, more rec ent photog raph of the information display ed by a SMADS machine when the c ard w as inserte d. Mr. Woods testified that both photogr aphs showed what the SMADS machine ha d shown him on October 30, 2001: that the car d had not bee n used to enter the Metro sy stem at Union Station that evening
. Mr. Woods’ testimony was followe d by

that of three other individuals: Paul Mazz ei, an e x pert on police proce dures; Jonathan Strong, a Metro tec hnician who e x plained the operation of the SMADS machines; and Spenc er Pines, the other Metro tra nsit officer

who was in Union Station on t he eve ning in que stion.

103. The Jury ’s Ver dict The jury found in favor

of Ms. Halc omb on her c ommon law claims of assa ult, battery , and fa lse arr est, but rejec ted her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Ver dict For

m, Docket No. 184, at 1. Wi th reg ard to Ms. Ha lcomb’s additional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the jury

was a sked to answe r the followingquestions, with the understanding that an af firmative a

nswer a s to any

one of the m would mean that Ms. Halc omb had established a Section 1983 violation:

Do you find that Gloria Ha lcomb has prove n a cla im under the United States Constit ution ag ainst Nopadon Woods for any of the following acts: A. Unre asonable seizure? B. Unre asonable arr est? C. Unre asonable sear ch? D. Ex cessive use of for ce? I d. at 2. The jury

found that Ms. Halc omb had prove n an unre asonable arr est and a n
unrea sonable sea

rch, but not an unr easona ble seizure or e x cessive use of for ce. I d. Havingfound for

Ms. Halcomb on four

of her claims, the jury

awa rded he r $75,000 in compensatory damag es and $175,000 in punitive dama g es. F inally , since it had found for Ms. Ha lcomb on her c onstitut ional claim, the jury was a sked to respond to thre e spec ial interrog atories. This wa s done in order to assist the Court in deciding the issue of qualified immunit y . The jury

answe red a s follows: Do you find that Nopadon Woods: 1. Be nt Gloria Ha lcomb’s fing ers ba ck? Yes
112. Used e x cessive f orce in applying Ms. Ha lcomb’s handcuf fs? No 3. Stomped on Ms. Halcomb’s foot in the manne r claimed by

Ms. Halcomb? No Ver dict For

m at 4.
C. Post-Tri al Motions Mr. Woods made a Rule 50 motion at the close of plaintiff’s ca se and a g ain at the close of a ll the evidence . The Court denie d the motion on both occasions. Afte r entry of judgme nt based on the jury ’s ver dict, Mr. Woods filed the pendingmotion for judgme nt as a matter of la

w or, in the a lternative, f

or a ne w trial. Ms. Halc omb filed a memora ndum in opposition t o that motion, and Mr. Woods i n turn replied to that opposition. Ms. Halcomb has since filed a

motion to s trike Mr. Woods’ reply memorandum on the ground that it contained
new a rguments not presente d in the post-trial motion it self, Mot. to Strike at 1, which Mr. Woods opposes. B eca

use Mr. Woods has moved for two alterna

tive forms of r elief — judg ment as a matter of la

w or a new tria l — the Court addre sses them separ ately , beg inning with the defe ndant’s re quest for a

new tria l.
I I . MR. W OODS’ REQUEST F OR A NEW TRI AL Mr. Woods asserts that a ne w trial is war rante d under Rule 59 of

the Fe dera l Rules of Civil P roce dure on e ither one of two g rounds: (1) “ the jury ’s ver dict is inherently inconsistent”; and/or (2) the Court err ed in re fusingto allow Mr. Woods to present evidenc e that Ms. Halcomb pre viously

had re ceive d a citation for far e eva sion in 2000. Mot. at 20-21. For the
rea sons give n in open cour t on November

3, 2009, and in the Memora ndum Opinion and Orde r 12issued on October 30, 2009, the Court reje cts the sec ond arg ument. See Ha lcomb v. Woods, Civil Action No. 02-1336, Me morandum Opinion and Or der at 2-3 (D.D.C. Oc t. 30, 2009). As for the f irst, the defe ndant has fa iled to identify any aspec ts of the jury ’s ver dict that are so inconsistent as to justify

a new trial. “Claims that a jury

verdic t is int erna lly

inconsistent impose a specia l obligation on the cour t to view the evidenc e in a manne r that re conciles the verdic ts if possible, and to gr ant a new tria l if not.” Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097, 1102 (D .C. Cir. 2007). “[S] ucce ssful claims of ver dict inconsistency are rar e,” a

rising only

when the jur

y has re ache d conclusions that “c annot re asonably be re conciled or

sustained.” I d. Her e, the de fenda nt claims that the jury ’s ver dict was inconsistent in three way s: (1) the jury “found no e x cessive f

orce in the constitutional contextand no intentional infliction of emotional distress, y et nonethele ss
awa rded punitive damag es”; (2) “the jury found no unre asonable seizure, but found fa lse arr est and unre asonable sear ch”; a nd (3) the jur

y ’s “f inding of unrea sonable a

rre st is inconsist ent with a verdic t for def

endant on unr easona

ble seizure.” Mot. a

t 20. The de fenda

nt’s first argument — that the jury ’s awa rd of punitive dama g es is inconsistent with its reje ction of Ms. Halc omb’s claims of excessive f orce and intentional infliction of emotional distress — makes little sense. The jurors we re g iven an instruction on the law of punitive damag es — agree d to by the par ties — that ref

lected the law in the District of Columbi a and w as not limit ed to any particula r cla ims in t he ca se. See Jury Instructions, Docke t No. 180, at 86-89. Under D istrict of Columbia law, “punitive damag es ar e ava ilable in actions for intentional torts.” Oliver v. Mustafa, 929 A .2d 873, 878 (D.C. 2007). The jury found Mr. Woods l iable for

three such torts: assault, battery , and fa lse arr est. Any one or more of those
13torts could have pr ovided the founda tion for the jury ’s awa

rd of punitive dama g es, and the defe ndant has not made any attempt to expl ain why

a findingof excessive use of forc e or liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress should have been a nece ssary

predic ate f

or that
awa rd. The log ic under lying the defe ndant’s other arguments is sim ilarly

dubious. As a leg al matter, it is true that a finding of unconstitutional arre st is incompatible with a finding of no unconstitutional seiz ure; a n arr est, afte r all, is a seizure within the mea ning of the Four th Amendment. See, e .g ., California v. Hoda ri D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). Tha t fac t, however , was not re flec ted in the jury instructions developed jointly by the par ties and pre sented to the jury . Those instructions did not even include a full def inition of what a constitutionally
unrea sonable seizure — a s distinct from a constitutionally unrea sonable a

rre st or excessive use of forc e — mig ht be. The only instructions presente d to the jury conce rningunrea sonable seizure
as a c onstitut ional claim independe nt of unrea sonable a rre st or excessive use of f orce consisted of the following : UNCONSTI TUTI ONAL CONDUCT – UNREASONA BL E SEI Z URE DEF I

NED 4 The F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protec ts persons from be ing subje cted to unre asonable seizures by the police. A la

w enf orce ment officia l may

only seize a per son if there is appropriate justification to do so. I n this case, Plaintiff Halcomb c laims that she was not fr ee to lea ve Union Station due to Def endant Woods’ conduc t and that such c onduct was

The heading for this instruction and the following instruction was not rea d to the jury ; 4 only the text was. As is the C ourt’s practice, however , a wr itten copy of the instructions was se nt to the jury room for rea dy ref ere nce during deliberations, and thi s wr i tten set of instructions contained the heading s. 14unrea sonable a nd not justi fied. She a lleg es that she wa s subjected to an unlawf

ul seizure under the Constit ution. Iwill now give y ou more de tails on what constitutes a “seizure” and on how to dec ide whethe r a se izure is unreasona ble under the circ umstances. UNCONSTI TUTI ONAL CONDUCT – UNREASONA BL E SEI Z URE A “se izure” occ urs when a police off

icer restra ins a person in some wa

y , either by

means of phy sical for ce or by a show of authority

that the per son obey s. A person is “se ized” within the meaningof the F ourth Amendment if, in view of all the circ umstances surr ounding the incident, a r easona ble per son would have be lieved that he w as not fre e to ig nore a police pre sence and leave . In decidingwhether a seizure ha s occur

red unde r this test, y ou may consider c ircumstance s such as whe ther the of fice r phy sically

touched the pe rson, whethe r the off icer phy sically display ed a r estraining

device , and the of

fice r’s use of

languag e or tone of voice
. J ury Instructions at 66-69. Glar ingly absent fr om these agree d upon instructions is any definition of re asonable ness or a

ny explanation of the distinction between a rea sonable seizure a

nd an
unrea sonable one . The instructions formulate d by the par ties thus left the jury

an incomplete a

nd potentially

confusingdiscussion of the conc ept of a n unrea sonable seizure. 5 At worst, the leg ally

contra dictory

finding s of unre asonable arr est but no
unrea sonable seizure r evea l that the jury may not have f

ully understood the mea

ning of the claim for unr easona

ble seizure as distinct from the pla intiff’s other c onstitut ional claims. Mr. Woods has identified no r eason to be lieve, howe ver, that the jury did not understand and c orre ctly apply
I mmediately following the above instructions, the Court instructed the jury on arr est 5 without probable cause , unre asonable sear ch, and excessive us e of forc e. See J ury Instructions at 70-76. All three of those cate g ories of claims are descr ibed in detail, but without any mention of the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f e x c e s s i v e u s e o f f o r c e o r a r r e s t w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o unrea sonable/unconstitutional seizure. 15the much cle are r and more complete instructions re g ardingunconstitutional arre st,

unconstitutional searc h, and excessive use of for ce that were g iven. See CSX Tra nsp., Inc. v. Hensley , 129 S.Ct . 2139, 2141 (2009) ( “[J ]uries are pr esumed to follow the c ourt’s instructions.”). The Court theref ore r ejec ts Mr. Woods’ claim that a new tria l is necessa ry on the g round that the jury ’s findingof unre asonable arr est was irr econc ilably inconsistent with its finding of no unconstitutional seizure. 6

The Court also re

jects the a ssertion that the jury ’s findingof no unre asonable seizure is inconsistent with it s finding in r esponse to a spe cial interr og atory , that Mr. Woods did bend bac k Ms. Halcomb’s f inge rs bac k, as she a lleg ed. Ac cordingto Mr. Woods, “[ t] here was no other c laim for unre asonable seizure, sepa rate and apa

rt from the a

rre st, other than the ‘bendingof [Ms. Halcomb’s] finge rs.’” Mot. at 20. This argument is both confusing and unsupported by

any ref ere nce to the tr ial rec ord. To the Court’s knowle dg e, the jury had no
rea son to suppose that a findingon unrea sonable seizure w as equiva lent to or wholly depende nt upon a findingon whether Mr. Woods had bent bac k Ms. Halcomb’s f inge rs. Those two finding s do not indicate any confusion or inc onsistency on the par

t of the jury

that would justify the g rant of a

new tria l.

I t is worth noting that at the conclusion of the instructions, the Court called counsel 6 to the Be nch to ask if they had any objections to the instructions just g iven. Other than to incorpora te earlier objections by ref ere nce — none of wh i ch relates to the issues raised in defe ndants’ re quest for a

new tria l — there w ere none.

16I I I . SUFF I CI ENCY OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTI NG THE V ERDI CT Mr. Woods also argues for judgme nt as a matter

of law unde r Rule 50(b) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. He maintains that the jury ’s ver dict should be set aside in whole or in pa

rt bec ause ( 1) no re asonable fac tfinder would have re turned a verdic t in Ms. Halcomb’ s favor

with reg ard to he r cla ims of false a rre st, unconstituti onal ar

rest, unconstitutional
sear ch, common law a ssault, or common law battery , Mot. at 2, 6; and (2) a rea sonable fa ctfinder could not have f

ound by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that Ms. Halc omb is entitl ed to punitive damag es. Mot. at 16. While the first of these a rguments is unconvincing , the sec ond has merit. A. Standard of Review After a jury trial, the Court may

g rant a motion for judgme nt as a matter of law under Rule 50 of

the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e only if it finds that “a re asonable jury would not have ha d a leg ally sufficie nt evidentiary

basis to find for the pa

rty on that issue[.] ” F E D . R. C I V . P. 50(a)( 1). Judgment as a matter of la

w is proper , “conside ringthe evidenc e in the light most favor able to the [non-movants] and making a ll reasona ble infer ence s in their favor ,” if the Court conclude s that there is no leg ally sufficie nt evidentiary

basis for a

rea sonable jury

to have f ound in their favor

under c ontrolling law . Hendr y v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 400 ( D.C. Cir. 1996); see F ox v. District of Columbia, 990 F. Supp. 13, 19 (D.D.C. 1997). The jury ’s ver dict must stand “unless the evidenc e, tog ether with all infere nces that can be rea sonably drawn there from is so one-sided [in favor of the movingparty] t hat re asonable persons c ould not disag ree on the ver dict,” Milone v. Washington Me tropolitan Area Transit Authority , 91 F.3d 229, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1996), that is, unless the non-movant’s e vidence is so insufficient that a

17rea sonable finde r of f act “ could not possibly

find for the non-movant.” 9 M O O R E ’ S F E D E R A L P R A C T I C E § 50.60[1] at 50-87 (3d e d. 2002). Ac cord Muldrowex rel. Estate of Muldrow v. Re-Dire ct, Inc., 493 F .3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2007); McGill v. Munoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2000); L loy d v. Ashcrof t, 208 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2002). In decidinga motion for judg ment as a matter of law , the Court is not to resolve leg itimately

disputed issues of fac t alrea dy decide d by

the jury . 9 M O O R E ’ S F E D E R A L P R A C T I C E § 50.60[1] at 50-87 (3d e d. 2002). Even if the Court finds the evidenc e that led to the jury verdic t unpersuasive , or that it would have r eac hed a dif fer ent re sult if it were sitting a s the fac tfinder, that is not a basis for over turning the jury ’s ver dict and g rantingjudgme nt as a matter of law. I d. The Court may

not gr ant the motion unless “the evide nce is such that, without weighing the cr edibility

of the witnesse s or otherw ise consider ing the weig ht of the evide nce, the re c an be but one conc lusion as to the verdict that re asonable [persons] could have rea ched.” Me, I nc. v. Taylor, 157 F.3d 139, 142 ( 2d Cir. 1998).

As the Supreme Court ha s expl ained, at the Rule 50 stag e, “a lthough the c ourt should review the rec ord as a whole, it must disreg ard a ll evidence favor able to the movingparty that the jury

is not required to be lieve. That is, the court should g ive cr edenc e to the evide nce favor ing the nonmovant as we ll as that evidenc e supportingthe moving pa rty that is uncontra dicted and unimpea ched, at least to the extent that that evidence comes fr om disinterested witnesse s.” Reeve s v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) ( internal quotation marks a nd citations omitt ed).

18B. False Arrest and Arrest in Violation of t he Fourth Ame ndment The jury returne d verdic ts in Ms. Halcomb’s favor on her c ommon law claim of false a rre st and her c onstitut ional claim of unre asonable arr est in violation of the Four th Amendment. See V erdic t Form at 1-2. Under District of Columbia common law, “the f ocal point of [an] action [for common law f alse a rre st] is the question whether the ar restingoffice r was justified in order ing the arr est of the plaintiff.” Scott v. District of Columbi a, 101 F .3d 748, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The jur y was instructe d that a per son commits a false a rre st at common law “when he intentionally detains or r etains anothe r, for any leng th of time, whether

by actua l forc e or thre at of for ce, without legal justif

ication .” Jury

Instructions at 47 (empha sis added). Thus, a fa lse arr est claim ca nnot succe ed if “ the ar

restingoffice r had pr obable c ause to be lieve that the ar restee committed a cr ime.” Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d at 754. “Ge nera lly , probable cause exis ts where the fa cts and c ircumstance s within the arre sting off icer ’s knowledg e . . . ar e suff

icient in themselves to war rant a rea sonable be lief that an of fense has bee n or is beingcommitted.” In re T.H ., 898 A.2d 908, 913 (D.C. 2006).

Simi larly , under the Constit ution, “[a] n arr est based on pr obable c ause c annot constitute an unre asonable . . . seizure within the meaningof the F ourth Amendment.” Carr v. District of Columbia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99 (D.D.C. 2008) ( citing Whre n v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996)), rev’d on other grounds by587 F.3d 401 ( D.C. Cir. 2009). “Probable
cause exis ts when ‘f

acts a nd circ umstances within the off icer ’s knowledg e . . . ar e suff icient to
war rant a prudent pe rson in believingthat the suspect ha s committed, is commit ting, or is about to commit an offense .’” Ma rcus v. District of

Columbi a, 646 F . Supp. 2d 58, 61 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting United States v. Wesley , 293 F.3d 541, 535 ( D.C. Cir. 2002)).
19Mr. Woods argues that no re asonable fac tfinder c ould have f ound him liable for either f alse or unc onstitut ional arr est bec ause he “had pr obable c ause, e ven in the constitutional sense, to ar

rest the [p]l aintiff.” Mot. a t 5. The def

endant a sserts that Mr. Woods “observe d Ms. Halcomb e nter the station in a[n] [ illega l] piggy back ma nner” and used the SMADS machine to “conf irm[] . . . that Ms. Halcomb had not inser ted her far eca rd into the far eg ate in orde r to move from the unpa id are a to the paid a rea .” I d. at 5-6. B ut those alleg ations are based solely on Mr. Woods’ testim ony , and since Mr. Woods was an intere sted party , the jury was not re quired to believe his a ssertions. See, .e.g ., Pitt v. District of Columbia, 558 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2008); District of Columbia v. Minor, 740 A.2d 523, 531 (D.C. 1999). Nor was the jury

require d to acc ept the authe nticity

of the fa rec ard pr oduced by

Mr. Woods and identified as that of the plaintiff, since, a g ain, all ave rments of such a uthenticity

wer e made by

Mr. Woods him self. Take n in the light most favor able to the non- moving pa rty , as it must be on a motion made under Rule 50 of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, the e vidence prese nted at trial showed that Ms. Ha lcomb enter ed Union Station, inserted a pa per f are car d containingmore than the minimum fare into a f are g ate, a nd enter ed the pa id are a of the station after the g ate proper ly proce ssed her

car d. The jury

rea sonably

could have inferr ed fr om that evidence that Mr. Woods could have had no r easona ble belief that Ms. Halcomb had c ommitt ed the c rime of f are evasion, a nd that his arre st of Ms. Halcomb ther efor e wa s not leg ally justified. I ts verdicts in Ms. Halcomb’s f

avor w ith reg ard to he r cla ims of false a rre st and unconstitutional arre st there fore wer e per

missibl e and in a ccor dance with the law.

20C. Assault and Bat tery “An a ssault is an intentional act and unla wful attempt or thre at, either by words or by acts, to do phy sical har

m to the victim,” while “[a] battery is an intentional act that c auses a harmful or

offe nsive bodily

contac t.” Evans- Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930, 937 (D.C. 2007). The unrea sonable use of forc e by a police of

fice r may be an a ssault and batter

y under D istrict of Columbia law, Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d at 1101, but a police office r has a

qualified privileg e to use re asonable forc e to ef fec t an ar rest, provide d that the
means e mploy ed ar e not in excess of those which the [officer] rea sonably believes to be
nece ssary .” Scale s v. District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722, 730 (D.C. 2009) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). As the jur y was instructe d: “A law e nforc ement off icer may use only that amount of for ce r easona bly nece ssary

to arre st a person a

nd to keep the a

rre sted person in custody . An offic er is not allowed to use forc e beyond that rea sonably nece ssary

to
acc omplish hi s lawful purpose .” Jury Instructions at 57. Ba sed on the e vidence prese nted at trial, Mr. Woods argues that any rea sonable fac tfinder would ha

ve found that any

forc e used a g ainst Ms. Halcomb wa s both nece ssary and
rea sonable, thus subject to a qua lified privileg e. Mot. at 8. To support this proposition, however, he ag ain re lies on evidenc e that the jury was not re quired to ac cept: “T he uncontr overte d evidenc e at tria l was that De fenda nt found it nece ssary

to reque st the assistance of Offic er Spencer Pines to secure Ms. Halcomb in handc uffs. The ref ore, O ffice r Woods not only proved his use of for ce w as re asonable , but also that the forc e he e mploy ed wa s initi ally insufficient to
overc ome the Plaintiff’s re sistance.” I d. The jury rea sonably

conclude d that the evidenc e showed no such thing . Mr. Woods and Offic er Pines did testify that Mr. Woods requested
21Offic er Pines’ he lp in securingMs. Halcomb, but, contra ry to the defe ndant’s asse rtion, that testimony was not uncontrove rted. Ms. Ha lcomb testified that Off icer Pines did not participate in her a rre st, and the jury

was fr ee to be lieve her

over the defe ndant and Of fice r Pines. Fur thermore , the jury

specific ally

found in answe r to a spec ial interrog atory that Mr. Woods bent back Ms. Ha lcomb’s fing ers. Ac cordingto Ms. Halcomb, that incident occ urre d before her a

rre st, when Mr. Woods attempted to g ain ac cess to her purse. B y

Ms. Halcomb’s
acc ount, Office r Pines was not involved in that incident, nor did Ms. Halc omb pose any threat that would make the use of for ce a g ainst her a t that point reasonable . Mr. Woods’ assertion of qualified privileg e ther efor e could r easona bly have be en re

jected by the jury
. Mr. Woods also sugg ests that the jury ’s findingfor Ms. Ha lcomb on her c laims of assault and battery

is “undermine[d]” by

its finding ag ainst her on he r cla im of excessive use of forc e in violation of the F ourth Amendment. This ar g ument is mispl ace d. The Court ca nnot and will not guess at what fa ctual finding s may have motivated the jury ’s ver dict on the excessive forc e cla im and then apply those assumed finding s to its analy sis of the assault and battery claims. I f Mr. Woods believed the jur y ’s ver dict on the Four

th Amendment claim to be inconsistent with its finding s on assault and ba ttery , he should have moved for a new tria l on the g round that those aspe cts of the ve rdict we re irr econc ilably inconsistent and evidenc e of
unacc eptable c onfusion on the par t of the jury . See, e.g ., Mazloum v. Dist rict of Columbia Metro. Police De p’t, 576 F. Supp. 2d 25, 42 (D.D .C. 2008) (rulingon the evidenc e pre sented in that case that a findingag ainst an off icer on a cla im of excessive use of f orce in violation of the Four th Amendment was inc onsistent with a finding in his favor on a c ommon law battery claim).

22Mr. Woods cannot attempt to translate the jury ’s findingon the Four th Amendment claim into a judgme nt in his favor on the c ommon law claims.
D. Punitive Dam ages Under the law of

the District of Columbia: The test for

punitive damag es . . . is a rig orous one. [Punit ive damag es] are a

form of punishment. The ir purpose is to punish unlawful c onduct and to dete r its repe tition. P unitive damag es ar e, acc ording ly , to be awa

rded only in case s of outrag eous or eg reg ious wrong doing where the def endant ha s acte d with evil motive, actual malice , or in willful disreg ard f or the rights of the plaintiff. In keepingwith this hi g h substantive burden, the plaintiff must prove egreg ious conduct and the requisite mental state by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e. Rosenthal v. Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, L L P, 985 A.2d 443, 455-56 (D.C. 2009) ( internal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). “Clear and convinc ing e vidence is evidence that will 7 produce in the mind of the trier of fac t a firm belief

or convic tion as to the fac ts sought to be established.” Wood v. Neuma n, 979 A.2d 64, 73 (D.C. 2009) ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). The Court conc ludes that, eve n taken in the lig ht most favorable to Ms. Halcomb, the e vidence prese nted at trial c ould not suffice to produc e in the mind of a r easona ble
Wit h respe ct to claims broug ht pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “punitive damag es . . . 7 are available ag ainst .
. . individual de fenda nts where their conduc t was ‘motivated by evil motive or i ntent, or when it involve[d] rec kless or callous indiffer ence to the federa lly protec ted ri g hts of others.’” Elkins v. District of Columbi a, 527 F
. Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2007) ( quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983))
. The standard for the awa rd of punitive damag es under Section 1983 thus differ s somewhat from the standard applicable under District of Columbi a common law. Ms. Halcomb did not reque st a separ ate j u ry i n s t ru cti on on punitive damag es under Section 1983, howeve r; her reque sted instruction on punitive damag es wa s based solely on District of Columbi a law. See J ury Instructions at 86-89 (using Instructi o n 1 6 -1 from the Standardized Civil J ury Instructions for the District of Columbi a to explain the circ umstances under which punitive damag es can be awa

rded)
. The Court there fore applies the District of Columbi a standard in deter mining whether punitive damag es we re a vailable to Ms. Halc omb as a matter of law. 23trier of

fac t “a f irm belief or

conviction” that Mr. Woods eng ag ed in outrag eous or e g reg ious conduct “ evincingmalice or its equivalent.” Pitt v. District of Colum bia, 491 F.3d 494, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (inter

nal quotation marks and c itation omit ted). Ms. Halcomb asse rts that the jury rea sonably

could have assessed punitive damag es base d on a findingthat any one or more of the following had occ urre d: (1) Mr. Woods threatened to “c ome to Ms. Halcomb’s home a nd ‘put a bullet in [her] head,’” Opp. at 24; (2) Mr
. Woods “bent Ms. Halcomb’s fing ers ba ck to ac cess a driver’ s license in her

wallet,” id. at 25; (3) the de fenda

nt “violently

place d Ms. Halcomb under arr est and pe rfor

med a f ull-body sear ch,” “jamm[ing] his knee betwe en Ms. Halc omb’s leg s, violently pull[ ing] her ne cklac e off , [and]
sear chingher in a

n overly ag g ressive a

nd phy sical manne r,” id. at 25, 27; (5) Ms. Halcomb wa s place d in a dirty

cell at D.C. Ge nera l Hospital and taken to two sepa rate police pre cincts, id. at 25; and (6) Ms. Ha lcomb was subjec ted to “ver bal assault fr om other prisoner s” while she w as in custody . I d. As an initial matter, the Court notes that punitive dama g es ar e a r emedy , not a claim; Ms. Halcomb ca

nnot rec over punitive damag es for acts of Mr . Woods t hat could not as a matter of la

w form the ba sis for one of the leg al claims on which the jury returne d a ver dict in the plaintiff’s fa

vor. See I aca

ng elo v. Geor g etown Univ., 580 F . Supp. 2d 111, 113-14 (D.D.C. 2008) (pointingout that punitive damag es ar e a r emedy , not the basis for a fre e-standingleg al claim). Thus, e ven if it is assumed that the jury believed Ms. Ha lcomb’s testimony that Mr. Woods t hreatened to shoot her, that she was plac ed in a dirty cell, and that other prisoner s mocked he r, none of

those finding s could support an a war d for punitive dama g es, bec ause none

24could form the ba sis of one of the le g al claims on which the jury returne d a ver dict in Ms. Halcomb’ s favor
.

Ms. Halcomb’s c ontention that Mr. Woods t hreatened to “put a bullet in [ her] head” was pre sented to the jury as grounds for a

finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury

found in Mr. Woods’ favor on that claim. The pla intiff in passing ha s sug g ested the possibility

that the jury

could have construed the alleg ed thre at as a n assault. See Opp. at 15. B ut that theory of the plaintiff’ s assault claim wa s never prese nted to the jury . Even if it had bee n, as a matter of law , the jury could not have f

ound Mr. Woods’ liable for a ssault on the basis of his threat, made while standing with Ms. Halcomb in D.C. Gene ral Hospital, that he oug ht to go out to her

house and put a

bullet in her hea d beca

use she ha d cause d him so much trouble. Unde r the c ommon law of the District of Columbia, a thre at “to ca use phy sical har

m or offe nsive contac t with another pe rson” only qualifies as a

n assault if it appea

rs that “the pe rson makingthe threat . . . has the present abilityto car ry out the harmful or

offe nsive contac t.” S T A N D A R D I Z E D C I V I L J U R Y I N S T R U C T I O N S F O R T H E D I S T R I C T O F C O L U M B I A § 19.01 (2009) (empha sis added). See also J ury Instructions at 53-54. To c onstitut e an a ssault, then, a thre at must create a r easona

ble “a pprehe nsion of immediateoffe nsive contac t.” I d. cmt. (citingMadden v. D.C. Transit Sy stem, Inc., 307 A.2d 756, 757 ( D.C. 1973)) (e mphasis added) ; see a lso Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 22 (1965). The thr eat attributed to Mr. Woods i n this case doe s not meet those cr iteria. Ac cordingto Ms. Halcomb, Mr. Woods threatene d action in the indefinite future while standingin front of the nur se’s station at D.C. Ge nera l Hospital, awaiting the ar rival of a phy sician. Given those undisputed c ircumstance s, a re asonable person c ould not have f elt that offe nsive contac t was imminent.
25Be cause Mr. Woods’ threat did not constitute an assa ult as a matter of

law, and the jury found ag ainst Ms. Halcomb on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the threat cannot ser

ve as a basis for punitive dama g es. Simil arly , the fa ct that Ms. Halcomb wa s place d in an unpleasa

nt cell at the hospital and ta unted by other pe rsons in custody

cannot justify the awa rd of punitive dama g es, bec ause ne ither alleg ation, even if assumed to be true , provided a foundation for

any of the leg al claims that the jury decide d in Ms. Halcomb’s fa vor. Despite the attempts of Ms. Halcomb’s counse l to chara cter ize her ar rest as “violent” a

nd “over ly

ag g ressive,” the awa

rd of punitive dama g es must rest on the evide nce prese nted at trial, not on counse l’s char acte rization of it. Taken in the lig ht most favorable to Ms. Halcomb, the e vidence on the claims of a ssault and batter y showed that Mr. Woods pulled on two of her

fing ers in an a

ttempt to open or g rab he r purse ; that he bruised he r thig hs while pushing he r leg s apar

t so that he could complete the sea rch inc ident to arre st; and that he twisted her ne cklac e whe n attempting to r emove it, bre akingit in the process. None of those ac ts is sufficie ntly

eg reg ious to demonstrate by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that Mr. Woods acte d with the intent to injure Ms. Halcomb, nor c an such a n intent be infer

red f rom surrounding circ umstances. Mr. Woods’ bendingof Ms. Halc omb’s fing ers, be cause it constitut ed a use of forc e not justified by

any threat or rea sonable lawenfor ceme nt objective, could support a
rea sonable jury ’s findingof assa ult and battery . But the r ecor d contains no sug g estion that Mr. Woods developed a se nse of malice toward Ms. Ha lcomb prior to the fing er- bendingincident. Even a ccor ding to Ms. Ha lcomb, Mr. Woods said nothing at the time of the incident to indicate malicious intent and the bendinglasted for only a fe w sec onds. The re sultant injuries to Ms.
26Halcomb’ s fing ers — swe lling and br uises — are too mild t o serve as cle ar a nd convincing evidenc e, in and of

themselves, that Mr. Woods aimed to hurt Ms. Halcomb by g rabbingher fing ers or that his conduct wa s eg reg ious or outrag eous. With so l ittle evidence reg ardingMr. Woods’ moti ves, no re asonable fac tfinder c ould have r eac hed a f irm conclusion that Mr. Woods acte d with malice.

In the same w ay , a findingthat Mr. Woods had, as Ms. Halcomb c laimed, bruised her thig hs with his knee while sea rching her w ould not just ify

an aw ard of

punitive damag es. A
sear ch incident to an a

rre st nece ssarily

is a phy sical proc ess; de minimis i njuries such a s bruises, while not to be condone d, at the same time do not demonstrate the e x istence of an intent to injure by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e. Nor does Mr. Woods’ brea

king of Ms. Halcomb’s ne cklac e constitute eg reg ious conduct or e vidence of malice . Acc ordingto Ms. Halcomb’s own testimony , the nec klace broke while Mr. Woods was looking f or the fa stener of

the nec klace and “turne d” it in such a wa

y that it “popped.” Such a descr iption indi cate s acc ident, not malice. Finally , the plaintiff did not introduce a ny evidenc e tendingto show that Mr. Woods wil lfully

disreg arde d her rights whe n he ar rested he r. Ther e is no evidenc e in the re cord to sugg est that Mr. Woods knew or ha rbore d malice towa

rd Ms. Halc omb before he stopped he r or that he be lieved her

to be innocent of

the cr ime for whic h he ar rested he r. It is true that Mr. Woods rejected Ms. Ha lcomb’s claims of innoce nce a nd ref used to show her

the information the SMADS machine showed to be encode d on her f are car d. By

Ms. Halcomb’s own a ccount, howeve r, Mr. Woods twice took her car d to the kiosk where the SMADS machine wa s located to chec k that he had not made a mistake in stopping he r. Of c ourse, the jur y was not re quired to believe that Mr. Woods di d in fac t chec k the SMADS machine onc e in the kiosk, or that the
27machine show ed that Ms. Halc omb had committed far e eva sion. But in light of Ms. Ha lcomb’s

own admission that Mr. Woods appeare d to go twic e to che ck the c ard, the jury could not
rea sonably

have f ound by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that he ha d been r eckle ss with reg ard to Ms. Halcomb’s F ourth Amendment right to be fre e of unr easona ble sea rche s and seizures. In light of the se consider ations, the Court conclude s that a re asonable jury could not have f

ound by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e, base d on the evidenc e pre sented at trial and construed in the lig ht most favorable to Ms. Halcomb, that Mr. Woods eng ag ed in egreg ious, tortious conduct with a malicious state of mind. As a result, the jury ’s awa rd of punitive damag es will be set aside
. I V. QUAL I FI ED I MMUNI TY

Mr. Woods argues that he “ has qualified immunity both for the a

rre st [ of Ms. Halcomb] itself and for

the limited amount of forc e nec essar y to effe ctuate the arr est.” Mot. at 7. The sec ond part of that contention is entirely unnece ssary ; although Mr . Woods, for rea sons unknown, devotes muc h of his discussion of qualified immunity to the subject of e x cessive use of for ce, se e Mot. at 13-14, the jur y found in Mr. Woods’ favor on that claim. See Ve rdict F orm at 2. Qualifie d immunit y is releva nt only to those constitutional claims that were de cided a g ainst Mr. Woods: unreasonable sear ch and unr easona ble ar rest. The de fenda

nt advanc es the mistaken a nd unsupported ar g ument that “police office rs possess qualified immunity from suit absent egreg ious circumstanc es.” Mot. at 9. That contention misstates the law. As the c ourt of appe als has noted:

The Supreme Court has held that “g overnme nt officials pe rfor ming discretionar

y functions g ener ally

are shielded fr om liabilit y for
28civil damag es insofar as their c onduct does not violate c lear ly established statutory

or constitutional rig hts of which a r easona ble person would have known.” Har low v. Fitzge rald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Wil son v. L ay ne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (holding that qualified immunity turns upon the “objec tive leg al rea sonablene ss of the off

icer s’ ac tion, assessed in light of the leg al rules that we re c lear ly

established at the time the a ction was take n” (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)). Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d at 509. A de fenda nt’s entitlement to qualified immunity is a question of law

to be dec ided by

the cour t, see id., althoug h sometimes, as in this case, the f acts establishing what the cha lleng ed conduc t was ar e leg itimately in dispute and must first be decide d by

the jury befor e the c ourt answe rs the ultimate leg al question whethe r a de fenda nt is entitled to qualified immunity . See Z ellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 367- 68 (2d Cir. 2007); Halcomb v. Washing ton Metropolitan Are a Tra nsit Authority , 526 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22 (D.D .C. 2007). “Whether

an off icial protec ted by

qualified immunity

may be held pe rsonally

liable . . . g ener ally turns on the objective le g al re asonable ness of the a ction.” Wilson v. L ay ne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). In assessingwhether a par ty is entitled to qualified immunit y , the fa cts must be taken in the lig ht most favorable to the party asser ting the c onstitut ional injury . See Saucie r v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (c iting Sieg ert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)), rev’d on other grounds byPearson v. Callaha n, 129 S.Ct . 808 (2009); see also Scott v. Harr is, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007).

In this case, a

violation of Ms. Halcomb’s c onstitut ional rights to be fre e fr om
unrea sonable a

rre st and unrea sonable sea rch w as found by

the jury , and that findingrema ins undisturbed by

the Court. See supra

at 11. The sole que stion remainingfor de cision is whether Mr. Woods’ arre st and sear ch of Ms. Ha lcomb “‘violate [d] clea rly established constitutional

29rig hts of which a r easona ble per son would have known.’” Pitt v. District of Columbi a, 491 F .3d at 510 (bra ckets in orig inal) (quotingHar low v. Fitzge rald, 457 U.S. at 818). Another formulation of this standard is “ whether an objec tively

rea sonable off

icer would have be lieved his conduct to be law ful, in light of c lear ly established law[.]” I d. at 509-10; see Br osseau v. Haug en, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004).

Unfortunately , Mr. Woods does not address the pr oper issue — whether “an objectively

rea sonable off

icer ” would have believed Mr . Woods’ conduct to be in ac corda nce w ith clea rly established law, se e Ha lcomb v. Washing Metr opolitan Area Transit Authority , 526 F. Supp. 2d at 22 — but instead attempts to relitigate the fac tual finding s made by the jury and aff irmed in this Opinion by

the Court. See, e.g ., Mot. at 12 (ar g uing that Mr. Woods’ “ey ewitness
acc ount” — which, a g ain, the jury was not re quired to believe — provides proof of proba ble
cause ). As alr eady

explained, the jury

could re asonably

have c oncluded that Mr. Woods arr ested Ms. Halcomb for

far e eva sion even though she had pr operly inserted a

far eca rd with a va lue g reater than the minimum far e into the fa reg ate at Union Station. S uch a f inding c ould neg ate a claim of proba

ble ca use, establishinga constitutional violation. Mr. W oods has not argued, much less established, that the c onstitut ional law g overningthe exist ence of proba ble ca use in such a situation is unclear. He conseque ntly has fa iled to show that he is entitled to qualified immunity
. V. CONCLUSI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court will g rant in par t and deny

in part the defe ndant’s motion for judg ment as a matter of law or, in the alter

native, for

a new trial. The jury ’s awa

rd of punitive dama g es will be vac ated, but the jury ’s ver dict otherwise w ill remain

30unchang ed. B eca use the Court has not re lied on any of the a lleg edly

inappropriate ar g uments made in the de fenda

nt’s reply to the plaintiff’s opposition to the moti on for judg ment as a matter of law, the plaintiff’s motion to strike that reply is denied as moot. An Or der c onsistent with thi s Opinion shall issue this s ame da y . SO ORDERED. /s/_______________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN United States District J udg e DATE: Mar ch 3, 2011

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