No. 81-257 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1981 

LIFE INSURAXCE COMPANY OF NORTH 

AMERICA, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

JUDITH ANN EVANS, individually and as 

Personal Representative of the Estate 

of LORENZO LLOYD EVANS, Deceased., 

Respondent and Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Douglas & Bostock, Libby, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 2, 1981 

Decided: November 6, 1981 

Filed: h'O\' 6 - 1%? 
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Honorable Russell E. Smith , a senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Montana, has certified to 

us a question of law in which it appears there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion, the adjudication of 

which by this Court would materially advance a decision in 

federal litigation. The following questions were certified: 

Are the decisions of law set down in Kingsland v. 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1934), 97 Mont. 558, 37 

P.2d 335, and Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 

(1934), 96 Mont. 254, 29 P.2d 1046, still law in Montana? 

If the Kingsland and Sullivan cases still state the 

law in Montana, are the differences in the language of the 

"exclusions" clauses sufficient to distinguish the policy 

involved here from those considered in Kinqsland and 

Sullivan? 

Lorenzo Lloyd Evans lived at an isolated location, 

known as "Copper Creek," fifty miles from Libby, Montana, 

and twelve miles from Noxon, Montana. He was a lawyer, 

admitted to practice in Montana, with offices in Libby. 

Evans kept various wild animals and birds at his place on 

Copper Creek, including an eleven-year-old wolf which he had 

raised from a pup. On the morning of June 27, 1979, Lloyd 

Evans was feeding his wolf when the wolf attacked and bit 

him on his right hand and wrist. Evans went back to the 

house, wrapped his hand with a towel, and sat down. 

Within a period of approximately eight to fifteen 

minutes after the wolf attack, Evans indicated to his wife 

that the bite had precipitated a heart attack and that he 

should be driven to a hospital right away. Evans walked to 
his car and laid down in the backseat. His wife had called 

an ambulance, and when they had traveled a little over half 

of the distance to Libby, they met the ambulance on the 

highway. Evans was transferred to the ambulance where 

oxygen was administered to him, and his pulse was monitored. 

While in the ambulance, and after a lapse of approximately 

forty-five to sixty minutes following the wolf attack, 

Evans' pulse stopped, and he went into cardiac arrest. 

Oxygen and C. P.R. were administered, and Evans showed some 

signs of life when the ambulance arrived at the hospital 

emergency room in Libby. Approximately fifteen minutes 

after arrival at the hospital, Lloyd Evans died. 

Lloyd Evans had previously suffered a heart attack on 

April 4, 1979. He was hospitalized at the Veteran's 

Administration hospital in Spokane, Washington, for about 

three weeks. On April 25, 1979, he was given a regular 

discharge and returned to the care of his physician, with 

the recommendation that he be in house rest for another six 

weeks and gradually resume his prehospital activities. 

Medical evidence indicates that the immediate cause 

of Lloyd Evans' death was heart attack, but that the heart 

attack was "triggered" by the wolf bite. The wolf bite was 

not severe enough, by itself, to have caused the death of 

Evans. 

Lloyd Evans had applied for, and Life Insurance 

Company of North America had issued, a certain group 

voluntary accidental death and dismemberment insurance 

policy, No. OK-2598, in the principal sum of $50,000, 

effective November 1, 1972. The policy was in full force 

and effect, according to its terms, on the date of Lloyd 
Evans' death. The policy contained this language: 

"[The insured] is insured . . . asainst loss 

resulting directly and independently of all 

other causes from bodily injuries caused by 

accident occurring while the policy is in 

force as to the Insured, herein called such 

injuries. 

"EXCLUSIONS 

"The policy does not cover loss caused by or 

resulting from any one or more of the following : 

"(D) Illness, disease . . . bodily infirmity 

or any bacterial infection other than bacterial infection occurring in consequence of 

an accidental cut or wound." (Emphasis supplied.) 

The issue here is whether Kingsland v. Metropolitan 

Life Insurance Co. (1934), 97 Mont. 558, 37 P.2d 335, and 

Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1934), 96 Mont. 

254, 29 P.2d 1046, are still law in the State of Montana. 

After a review of the rules in these cases, we agree with 

respondent Judith Evans that the reasoning and rules set 

down in Sullivan and Kinqsland are strict and harsh. 

In Sullivan, the insured tripped over a piece of 

sheet metal and fell, hitting his head. Five days later he 

died of a cerebral hemorrhage. Evidence was submitted at 

the trial that the insured was suffering from high blood 

pressure and arteriosclerosis at the time of the fall. 

Evidence also indicated that had a man not suffering from 

high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis tripped over the 

sheet metal, in all probability, no hemorrhage would have 

resulted. 

The insurance policy in Sullivan provided coverage if 

the insured sustained "bodily injuries, solely through 
external violent and accidental means, resulting directly 

and independently of all other causes." The Court in 

Sullivan admitted that a reasonable scope of insurance was 

contemplated by the policy. Nevertheless, because of the 

clear and unequivocal nature of this language in the policy, 

the Court held that there would be no recovery if ". . . the 

insured might suffer an accident resulting in death to which 

disease or bodily infirmity contributed indirectly or 

partially . . . " Sullivan, 29 P.2d at 1052. Because the 

insured was suffering from arteriosclerosis, which contributed to and actively cooperated with the accident to cause 

the insured's death, there was no recovery. 

In Kingsland, the insured had stepped onto a chair 

sitting on an uneven cement surface; he lost his balance and 

fell head first on the rough cement. The insured died 

shortly after the fall. The cause of the insured's death 

was described as a ruptured aneurysm of the aorta, precipitated by the fall and by striking his head on the cement 

floor. 

The Court in Kingsland first looked to the language 

of the insurance policy which contained the condition that 

death must be shown to result "solely through external, 

violent and accidental means." Kingsland, 37 P.2d at 337. 

The Court then reasoned that the term "proximate cause" is 

inapt in this class of cases because "recovery can be had 

only if death resulted 'solely' (not proximately) from 

injuries received through accidental means . I1 

Kingsland, 37 P.2d at 337. According to the Court in 

Kinqsland, there could be no recovery if the insured's 

condition was a contributing cause of death. If a pre- 
existing infirmity were shown, recovery could only be had if 

the accidental injury was sufficient in itself to cause the 

death of a healthy man. 

The Kinqsland Court reasoned further that in Sullivan 

the fall alone was not sufficient to cause the insured's 

death, and his condition was therefore a contributing cause. 

In contrast, because evidence showed that the fall of the 

insured in Kingsland was sufficient to cause the death of 

the insured, recovery was granted. 

The issue here is whether this Court should still 

follow the rule set down in Kingsland and Sullivan that if a 

preexisting condition contributes to an insured's death, 

there can be no recovery. Given the extreme harshness of 

this rule and the liberal interpretation placed on such 

insurance policies in many jurisdictions today, we must 

overrule the Kingsland and Sullivan cases to the extent that 

they hold that there can be no recovery if a preexisting 

disease either directly or indirectly contributes to an 

insured's death. 

We are persuaded that the better rule for the interpretation of such insurance policies is the following: 

Where an accidental injury aggravates or triggers a preexisting dormant disease or physical infirmity, the accident 

may be said to have been the proximate cause of the resulting disability within the terms and meaning of an ordinary 

accident insurance policy. See, Boring v. Haynes (1972), 

209 Kan. 413, 496 P.2d 1385; Carlson v. New York Life 

Insurance (1966), 76 Ill.App.2d 187, 222 N.E.2d 363; 

McMackin v. Great American Reserve Ins. Co. (1971), 22 

Cal.App.3d 428, 99 Cal.Rptr. 227; Nash v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of America (1974), 39 Cal.App.3d 594, 114 Cal.Rptr. 299; 

Brown v. State Mutual Life Insurance Company of America 

(La.App. 1979), 377 So.2d 355; Zurich Ins. Co. v. Ruscoe 

(Miss. 1967), 203 So.2d 305; Couey v. National Benefit Life 

Insurance Company (1967), 77 N.M. 512, 424 P.2d 793. For a 

discussion of cases on this matter, see 84 A.L.R.2d 176. 

The mere presence of a preexisting disease or infirmity will no longer relieve the insurer from liability in 

this state. Recovery may be had even though the disease 

appears to have actually contributed to the cause of death 

as long as the accident sets in motion the chain of events 

leading to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause. 

See, Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1945), 27 Cal.2d 

305, 163 P.2d 689; Kater v. United Insurance Company of 

America (1960), 22 Ill.App.2d 22, 165 N.E.2d 74. 

A mere frail condition should not relieve an insurer 

from liability. As Chief Justice Cardozo noted in Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Co. (1930), 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 

914, an insurance policy is not accepted with the thought 

that its coverage is to be restricted to an Appollo or a 

Hercules. 

We agree with the following language from Couey v. 

National Benefit Life Insurance Company, supra, 424 P.2d at 

795: 

"In our view of the case, every injury or 

disease suffered by a person from his birth 

to the date of a particular injury contributes to some degree to the condition then 

present. Necessarily, by the words used in 

the policy it could not have been intended 

that payment would be due only when the 

accident was literally the sole cause of 

hospitalization. If a person had suffered a 

broken leg which had healed perfectly five 

years before, and a second accident wherein 

the leg had broken at the same place, could 
it be said that the condition resulting from 

the first break did not in any way contribute 

to the second break? We think the answer is 

obvious and, under defendants' theory, plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. In our 

view, this application of the language of the 

policy is entirely too restrictive and would 

be unreasonable. Other courts have agreed . . 

Likewise, the rulings of Sullivan and Kingsland were too 

restrictive, and any rules in these cases must be overruled to 

the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion. 

Since we have held that Kingsland and Sullivan no 

longer state the law in Montana, we need not discuss the second 4 

l' 

question certified to us. 

Justice V 

We concur: 

?A4$ j wdw 

Chief Justice