IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-16-00271-CV

IN RE JERRY A. BULLIN, INDIVIDUALLY, CJB PARTNERS, LTD.,

AND ITS GENERAL PARTNER CJB PARTNERS MANAGEMENT, 

LLC, AND BRE GROUP, LTD

Original Proceeding

No. 10-16-00343-CV

IN RE TEXAS PRIVATE SCHOOLS FOUNDATION, INC.

D/B/A ALLEN ACADEMY

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In cause number 10-16-00271-CV, relators, Jerry A. Bullin, individually, CJB 

Partners, Ltd., and its general partner CJB Partners Management, LLC and BRE Group, 

Ltd. (collectively “Bullin”), contend that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering 
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 2

the production of adjusted-gross-income (“AGI”) and taxable-income (“TI”) figures for 

tax years 2008, 2012, and 2013. In a competing petition for writ of mandamus in cause 

number 10-16-00343-CV, relator, Texas Private Schools Foundation, Inc. d/b/a Allen 

Academy, contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its request to 

compel Bullin to produce AGI and TI figures for tax years 2009, 2010, and 2011. 

On original submission, we denied both petitions for writ of mandamus. See 

generally In re Bullin (In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc.), Nos. 10-16-00271-CV & 10-16-

00343-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 7352 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 2, 2017, orig. proceeding) 

(mem. op.). However, since our denial of the mandamus petitions, the parties have filed 

motions for rehearing, as well as motions to transfer in-camera records from a previous 

mandamus petition involving the same parties. See generally In re Bullin, No. 10-15-00423-

CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2604 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 10, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. 

op.). In the current proceedings, the parties submitted records that included Bullin’s 

heavily-redacted tax returns that did not reveal his AGI or TI for the relevant time 

periods. But, in the prior proceeding, the in-camera records contained Bullin’s partially 

redacted tax returns that disclosed AGI, TI, and charitable-contribution figures, but 

redacted other information. Therefore, for the purpose of analyzing the motions for 

rehearing, we granted the parties’ motions to transfer the in-camera records from the 

prior Bullin mandamus proceeding. And after reviewing the record, we grant Bullin’s 

motion for rehearing, withdraw our memorandum opinion and judgments issued 
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 3

August 2, 2017, and substitute the following in their place. We conditionally grant

Bullin’s petition for writ of mandamus and dismiss as moot Allen Academy’s petition for 

writ of mandamus.

I. APPLICABLE LAW

Mandamus relief is available only to correct a “clear abuse of discretion” when 

there is no adequate remedy by appeal. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) 

(orig. proceeding). Clear abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court “reaches a decision 

so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Id. at 

839 (citing Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. 

proceeding)). When reviewing factual issues, the reviewing court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court. Id. at 839-40. Even if the reviewing court would have 

decided the issue differently, it cannot disturb the trial court’s decision unless the 

decision if shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 840.

The scope of discovery is much broader than the scope of admissible evidence. In 

re Exmark Mfg. Co., 299 S.W.3d 519, 528 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, orig. 

proceeding); see In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 204 S.W.3d 831, 835 n.8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2006, orig. proceeding) (“Relevance should not be confused with admissibility. 

Admissibility is not required for information to be discoverable.” (citing TEX. R. CIV. P.

192.3(a); Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990))). Nevertheless, the 

determination of the scope of discovery is generally within the trial court’s discretion. 
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 4

Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 1995). Discovery requests, 

however, must be reasonably tailored to include only matters that are relevant to the case. 

Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995). When the trial court orders 

discovery exceeding the scope permitted by the rules of procedure, it abuses its 

discretion. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).

Parties are entitled to seek discovery “regarding any matter that is not privileged 

and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). 

Information is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to 

the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the 

information. TEX. R. EVID. 401.

Tax returns are treated differently than other types of financial records, as 

evidenced by the Texas Supreme Court’s expressed “reluctance to allow uncontrolled 

and unnecessary discovery of federal income tax returns.” Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493, 

494-95 (Tex. 1995) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez, 824 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1992) 

(per curiam)). This is because federal income tax returns are considered private and the 

protection of that privacy is of constitutional importance. Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 

299, 301 (Tex. 1962). The sacrifice of such privacy should be “kept to a minimum, and 

this requires scrupulous limitation of discovery to information furthering justice between 

the parties which, in turn, can only be information of relevancy and materiality to the 

matters in controversy.” Id. Therefore, unlike when other types of financial information 
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 5

are sought, after a resisting party objects to the production of tax returns, the burden 

shifts to the party seeking to obtain the documents to show that the tax returns are both 

relevant and material to the issues in the case. El Centro del Barrio, Inc. v. Barlow, 894 

S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ); see Hall, 907 S.W.2d at 494.

II. DISCUSSION

Here, Allen Academy sought AGI, TI, and charitable-contribution figures from 

Bullin’s tax returns for the tax years 2008 through 2013. The purpose for the request was 

to show that “’notes’ actually representing charitable donations were executed by Allen 

Academy at Bullin’s request for his ‘tax and accounting purposes’ with no expectation of 

repayment.” After a hearing, the trial court ultimately concluded that Allen Academy 

was entitled to the AGI, TI, and charitable-contribution figures from Bullin’s tax returns 

for tax years 2008, 2012, and 2013, but not for tax years 2009, 2010, and 2011.1 In his 

mandamus petition, Bullin argues that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring 

him to produce AGI and TI figures from his tax returns for tax years 2008, 2012, and 2013. 

 

1

Interestingly, the trial court initially denied Allen Academy’s motion to compel Bullin’s tax 

information for the relevant tax years, stating the following:

This suit seeks a declaratory judgment that certain promissory notes are unenforceable or, 

alternatively, that Jerry A. Bullin be found to have breached an alleged fiduciary duty or 

committed fraud. The Court finds that there is not a sufficient nexus between these claims 

and the need for the information requested. The Court therefore sustains Defendants’ 

objections and denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production.

However, upon reconsideration, the trial court ordered Bullin to produce the AGI, TI, and charitablecontribution figures shown on his 2008, 2012, and 2013 tax returns.
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 6

In essence, Bullin contends that none of the AGI and TI figures for tax years 2008 through 

2013 should be produced, whereas Allen Academy asserts that the figures should be 

produced for all of the relevant tax years.

The mandamus record shows that Bullin contributed large sums of money to Allen 

Academy. Many of these contributions were initially loans, as documented by the 

numerous promissory notes contained in the mandamus record.2 Allen Academy 

acknowledges that it executed promissory notes with Bullin; however, Allen Academy 

argues that it is not liable on the notes because Bullin expressed that he would later 

forgive the notes.

A. The Parol-Evidence Rule

The parol-evidence rule is a rule of substantive law. See Hubacek v. Ennis State 

Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30, 31 (1958); see also DeClaire v. G&B McIntosh Family Ltd. 

P’ship, 260 S.W.3d 34, 45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). 

When parties reduce an agreement to writing, the law of parol evidence 

presumes, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, that any prior or 

contemporaneous oral or written agreements merged into the written 

agreement and, therefore, that any provisions not set out in writing were 

either abandoned before execution of the agreement or, alternatively, were 

never made and are thus excluded from consideration in interpreting the 

written agreement.

 

2 The promissory notes are considered negotiable instruments under the Uniform Commercial 

Code because they are a written, unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money, upon demand or 

at a definite time, and is payable to order or to bearer. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (West 

Supp. 2017).
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 7

DeClaire, 260 S.W.3d at 45 (internal citations omitted).

Additionally, Texas courts have held that a promissory note that is clear and 

express in its terms cannot be varied by a lender’s alleged representations that the debtor 

will not be liable on the note. See Town N. Nat’l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 

1978) (“The rule from these cases is, quite clearly, that a negotiable instrument which is 

clear and express in its terms cannot be varied by parol agreements or representations of 

a payee that a maker or surety will not be liable thereon.” (internal citations omitted)). 

More specifically, this Court has stated:

But even had defendants offered proof under proper pleadings that 

plaintiff had induced defendants to sign the note by a false representation 

that he would not be personally liable thereon or made an agreement or 

had an understanding to that effect, and had the jury so found, it still would 

avail defendants nothing. An unconditional written instrument cannot be 

varied or contradicted by parol agreements or by representations of the 

payee that the maker would not be held liable according to the tenor of the 

instrument.

Dean v. Allied Oil Co., 261 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1953 writ dism’d); 

DeClaire, 260 S.W.3d at 45 (citing Dameris v. Homestead Bank, 495 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. Civ. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ)).

“We review parol-evidence questions de novo, as questions of law.” DeClaire, 260 

S.W.3d at 45 (citing City of Pasadena v. Gennedy, 125 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)). “Evidence that violates the parol evidence rule has no legal 

effect and ‘merely constitutes proof of facts that are immaterial and inoperative.’” Id.

(quoting Piper, Stiles & Ladd v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 435 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Tex. Civ. App.—
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 8

Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Moreover, because all prior negotiations and 

agreements merge into the final agreement, parol evidence is not admissible to vary, alter,

or supplement the terms of an otherwise unambiguous contract except to show: (1) that 

the contract was induced by fraud, accident, or mistake; (2) that an agreement was to 

become effective only upon certain contingencies; or (3) in the case of ambiguity, that the 

parties’ true intentions differ from those expressed in the agreement. Id. (internal 

citations omitted); see Town N. Nat’l Bank, 569 S.W.2d at 494 (“Therefore, . . . we believe 

that implicit within their holdings that extrinsic evidence is permissible to show fraud in 

the inducement of a note is the requirement there be a showing of some type of trickery, 

artifice, or device employed by the payee in addition to the showing that the payee 

represented to the maker he would not be liable on such note.”).

“Parol evidence may also be admissible, under an additional exception, to show 

collateral, contemporaneous agreements that are consistent with the underlying 

agreement to be construed.” DeClaire, 260 S.W.3d at 45 (internal citations omitted). “But

this latter exception does not permit parol evidence that varies or contradicts either the 

express terms or the implied terms of the written agreement.” Id. at 45-46 (internal 

citations omitted). 

In its live pleading, Allen Academy asserted fraud and negligentmisrepresentation claims against Bullin, noting that it would not have entered into the 

notes except for the representations made by Bullin that the notes would be forgiven and 
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 9

taken as a charitable-contribution deduction on his tax returns. However, Allen 

Academy does not direct us to any evidence demonstrating that Bullin engaged in some 

sort of trickery, artifice, or device regarding the execution of the notes. Therefore, what 

we are left with is simply Allen Academy’s allegation that Bullin stated he would forgive 

the notes. As shown above, this is not enough to overcome the presumption that an 

“unconditional written instrument cannot be varied or contradicted by parol agreements 

or by representations of the payee that the maker would not be held liable according to 

the tenor of the instrument.” Dean, 261 S.W.2d at 902; see Town N. Nat’l Bank, 569 S.W.2d 

at 491; DeClaire, 260 S.W.3d at 45; Dameris, 495 S.W.2d at 54; see also Simmons v. Compania 

Financiera Libano, S.A., 830 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ 

denied) (holding that the “clear terms of a negotiable instrument, such as the ones in this 

case, cannot be varied by a parol agreement which purports to change the obligor’s 

responsibilities”); Tex. Export Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Dallas 1974, no writ) (holding that parol evidence tendered by the maker of a note is 

inadmissible because it “negates the very obligation imposed upon him in the written 

instrument”). Accordingly, we cannot say that the information sought by Allen Academy 

would lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); see also In 

re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 152; In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) 

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“This Court has repeatedly emphasized that discovery 

may not be used as a fishing expedition.”).
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 10

Thus, because Allen Academy cannot use parol evidence to vary the terms of the 

underlying notes without evidence of trickery, artifice, or device, we cannot say that the 

tax information sought tends to make the existence of fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the 

information. See TEX. R. EVID. 401; see also In re Brewer Leasing, Inc., 255 S.W.3d 708, 711-

12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (“Discovery requests, 

however, must be reasonably tailored to include only matters relevant to the case.” (citing 

Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995))). Or, in other words, we 

conclude that Allen Academy has failed to demonstrate that the tax information sought 

from Bullin is relevant or would lead to the discovery of relevant information. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 192.3(a); TEX. R. EVID. 401; see also In re Brewer Leasing, Inc., 255 S.W.3d at 711-12. 

We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bullin to 

produce the actual figures for AGI and TI for tax years 2008, 2012, and 2013. See Hall, 907 

S.W.2d at 494; see also Barlow, 894 S.W.2d at 779. 

As stated earlier, to be entitled to mandamus relief, a petitioner must show both 

that the trial court abused its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal. 

See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839; In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004). “It 

is well-established that there is no adequate remedy by appeal for the erroneous 

compelling of a person to disclose tax records.” In re Wharton, 226 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2005, orig. proceeding); see Hall, 907 S.W.2d at 495. Therefore, because the 
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 11

trial court abused its discretion in compelling the production of this tax information, and 

because that order leaves Bullin without an adequate remedy by appeal, he is entitled to 

mandamus relief. See In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 135; Hall, 907 S.W.2d at 495; 

Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839; see also In re Wharton, 226 S.W.3d at 458.

III. CONCLUSION

Having concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling the 

production of the complained-of tax information and that Bullin has no adequate remedy 

by appeal, we grant Bullin’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our memorandum opinion 

and judgments issued on August 2, 2017, substitute the following in their place, and grant 

Bullin’s mandamus petition in cause number 10-16-00271-CV. We order respondent to 

vacate his discovery order compelling Bullin to produce AGI and TI figures for tax years 

2008, 2012, and 2013. We are confident respondent will comply, and the writ will issue 

only if respondent fails to do so. Additionally, given our disposition of the mandamus 

petition filed by Bullin, we dismiss Allen Academy’s mandamus petition and 

corresponding motion for rehearing in cause number 10-16-00343-CV as moot.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice
In re Bullin, et al. & In re Tex. Private Sch. Found., Inc. Page 12

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Conditionally granted & dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed January 10, 2018

[OT06]