[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-11248

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:11-cr-80078-DMM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

KERBY AURELHOMME,

WINSKY MONDESTIN, 

 Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(January 16, 2015)

Before MARTIN, JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Kerby Aurelhomme and Winsky Mondestin challenge their 240-month 

sentences of imprisonment, imposed after their convictions for Hobbs Act robbery,

conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and making false statements of material 

fact to investigators. Aurelhomme argues that the district court erred under

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), by applying a 

firearms enhancement based on facts not found by a jury. He also argues that the 

district court clearly erred by finding that the discharge of a firearm was reasonably 

foreseeable, and that a victim was abducted—two findings that led to further 

enhancements of his sentence. Mondestin argues that the district court clearly 

erred by finding that the discharge of a firearm and the victim’s injuries were 

reasonably foreseeable—two findings that led to enhancements of his sentence. 

After careful review of the record, we affirm.

I.

We review de novo claims of Alleyne error. United States v. King, 751 F.3d 

1268, 1279 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 389 

(2014). In Alleyne, the Supreme Court concluded that a fact is an element of the 

offense that must be found by a jury if it increases the range of sentences 

authorized by statute. 570 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2162. Following Alleyne, this 

Court has held that a district court may make guidelines calculations based on 

judicial factfindings so long as those findings do not increase the statutory 

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minimum or maximum authorized by facts determined in a guilty plea or jury 

verdict. United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2014).

The district court’s finding that a firearm was discharged during the robbery 

did not increase the statutory minimum or maximum for any of Aurelhomme’s 

convictions. Enhancing his sentence based on this judicial factfinding was 

therefore not Alleyne error.

II.

Defendants challenge several other enhancements based on judicial 

factfindings. We review the district court’s factfindings for clear error, its 

application of the guidelines to the facts with due deference, United States v. 

Garcia-Sandobal, 703 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013), and its determinations of 

the applicable guidelines range de novo, United States v. McCrimmon, 362 F.3d 

725, 728 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). When a defendant challenges the factual 

basis of his sentence, the government must prove disputed facts by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra, 740 F.3d 587, 592 

(11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The district court must make independent 

factfindings supporting its guidelines calculations. United States v. Hamaker, 455 

F.3d 1316, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006). Its findings may be based on evidence heard at

trial, undisputed statements in the PSR, or evidence presented at sentencing. Id.

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III.

A.

First, both defendants challenge the district court’s application of a sevenlevel enhancement because a firearm was discharged during the robbery. See

United States Sentencing Guideline § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). When a defendant is a party 

in a criminal conspiracy, he is accountable for any conduct of his coconspirators 

that is in furtherance of and reasonably foreseeable in connection with the jointly 

undertaken criminal activity. United States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th 

Cir. 2014). An act is reasonably foreseeable if it is a “necessary or natural 

consequence of the unlawful agreement.” United States v. Cover, 199 F.3d 1270, 

1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), superseded by regulation on other grounds as 

noted in United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1107 (11th Cir. 2001). Reasonably 

foreseeable acts may include those not expressly agreed to by the conspirators. Id.

The district court did not clearly err by finding that the discharge of a 

firearm by defendants’ coconspirator was reasonably foreseeable to them.

Undisputed statements from the PSR show that defendants worked for a company 

that transported money and other valuables in armored vehicles. Before robbing 

one of those vehicles, they planned the robbery by discussing its security features 

with their supervisor, and by making at least twenty phone calls to each other on

the morning of the robbery. Aurelhomme worked as an armored vehicle driver, so 

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he and his coconspirators should have known that the guard in the vehicle was 

usually armed. The discharge of a firearm is a necessary or natural consequence of 

robbing an armored vehicle because an armored vehicle is usually guarded by 

armed personnel. Further, discharging a firearm is assaultive conduct, which is 

foreseeable given the nature of a robbery. USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2. Applying the 

firearm-discharge enhancement was not error.

B.

Second, Aurelhomme challenges the district court’s application of a fourlevel enhancement because a person was abducted to facilitate the robbery. See id.

§ 2B3.1(b)(4). An abduction occurs when a victim is forced to accompany an 

offender to a different location. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(A).

The district court did not clearly err by finding that a guard in the armored 

vehicle was abducted to facilitate the robbery. The victim testified that he was 

thrown into the rear of the armored vehicle, and that his assailant forced him onto 

the floor as the vehicle was driven away. The abduction facilitated the robbery 

because the money in the vehicle was unloaded at the destination. Applying the 

abduction enhancement was not error.

C.

Finally, Mondestin challenges the district court’s application of an 

enhancement because a victim of the robbery suffered a bodily injury. See id.

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§ 2B3.1(b)(3). A defendant is accountable for all harm—including bodily injury, 

id. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.4—resulting from his own acts and from reasonably foreseeable 

acts of others in furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, id.

§ 1B1.3(a)(3).

The district court did not clearly err by finding that Mondestin was 

accountable for the gunshot wound and heart attack that the victim suffered during 

the robbery. Mondestin was accountable for the gunshot wound because it resulted

from his coconspirator’s discharge of a firearm, which was reasonably foreseeable 

to Mondestin. See id. § 1B1.3(a)(3). And he was accountable for the heart attack 

because it resulted from his coconspirator’s assault of the victim, which was 

reasonably foreseeable conduct during a robbery. See id. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2; see 

also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (Hobbs Act robbery requires the use of actual or 

threatened force, violence, or fear of injury to a person, his property, or the person 

or property of a relative or family member or anyone in his company at the time). 

Applying the injury enhancement to Mondestin’s sentence was not error.

AFFIRMED.

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