UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MARCUS ALLEN MURPHY, Defendant - Appellant. No. 23-1099 (D.C. No. 1:23-MJ-00055-LTB-1) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before EID , CARSON , and ROSSMAN , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Marcus Allen Murphy, appearing pro se, appeals from the dist rict court’s order summarily remanding his crim inal case to Colorado st ate court. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND Mr. Murphy filed a notice of removal (No tice) in federal dist rict court. The Notice involved a criminal case filed ag ainst him in Colorado state court. Mr. Murphy alleged he was a licensed atto rney in Colorado and admitted to practice

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 30, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 12 before the federal courts in Colorado. He also alleged he was being “unlawfully & unconstitutionally incarcerated, without Warra nt or Indictment, on Excessive Bail of $35K, for 46-days since Wed., Jan. 25, 2023 . . . as the result of a self-help, non-judicial botched-Eviction by an out-of-state slumlord & felon-burglar maintenance-man/super.” R. at 4. Mr. Murphy asserted two statut ory bases for removal—28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(3) and 1443. Section 1442(a)(3) authorizes removal of civil actions or criminal prosecutions filed in state court against “[a]ny o fficer of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of his duties.” In pertinent part, § 1443(1) au thorizes removal of state civil actions or criminal prosecutions “under cer tain conditions, in light of Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,” Johnson v. Mississippi , 421 U.S. 213, 215 (1975). 1

1 In full, § 1443 provides: Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the de fendant to the district court of the United States for the district and di vision embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law prov iding for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; (2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law. Although the Notice referred to both s ubsections of § 1443, the record and Mr. Murphy’s appellate filings suggest that only § 1443(1) is relevant to removal in this case. Therefore, we, like the district court, focus on § 1443(1). Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 23 Mr. Murphy asserted removal was prope r under § 1442(a)(3) because he “is a Federal court-officer, who was in the pe rformance of his offi cial-duties, while protecting the Presidential-Motorcade duri ng the Marshall-fire tour of Boulder, Colorado,” in January and February of 2022. R. at 4–5. And he asserted removal also was proper under § 1443 because th e Colorado state court was denying his constitutional rights to due pr ocess, a speedy trial, an d equal protection. He requested an evidentiary h earing to determine if removal would be permitted. The district court entered an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4) summarily remanding the case to state c ourt. Section 1455 is titled “Procedure for removal of criminal prosecutions,” and § 1455(b)(4) provi des: “The United St ates district court in which such notice [of removal] is file d shall examine the no tice promptly. If it clearly appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits a nnexed thereto that removal should not be permitted, the c ourt shall make an order for summary remand.” The district court provided two altern ative grounds for summary remand. First, the court determined Mr. Murphy failed to comp ly with § 1455(a), which requires that a notice of removal must “cont ain[] a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon [the defendant],” § 1455(a). 2 Second, the court concluded Mr. Murphy articulated no basis for rem oval under either § 1442(a)(3 ) or § 1443(1). As to

2 Mr. Murphy did not provide copies of any documents served on him in state court or attach anything to his Notice. Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 34 § 1442(a)(3), the court found Mr. Murphy’ s criminal case was unrelated to any alleged duties performed as a federal court officer in Janua ry 2022 in service of the Presidential motorcade. Turning to § 1443(1), the court concluded Mr. Murphy’s factual allegations did not meet either pr ong of the test for § 1443(1) removal: (1) that he had been denied rights due to his race, as required under Johnson , 421 U.S. at 219; or (2) that he could not enforce his federal rights in the state criminal proceeding because of “a pervas ive and explicit state or federal law,” id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted) . Thus, the district court ordered summary remand. Mr. Murphy filed a timely appeal from the remand order.
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 3 We must begin by addressing our appella te jurisdiction. “The authority of appellate courts to review district-cour t orders remanding remo ved cases to state court is substantially limited by statute.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs.,
Inc. , 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007). One such statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which generally serves as a jurisd ictional bar to appellate revi ew of remand orders unless the removal was pursuant to either § 1442 or § 1443: An order remanding a case to the Stat e court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwis e, except that an order remanding a

3 We ordered Mr. Murphy to addres s any legal basis for this court’s jurisdiction over his appeal. He has responded, a nd we have considered his response. Because Mr. Murphy asserts he is a licensed attorney, we d ecline to construe his pro se filings liberally. See Smith v. Plati , 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). Even if we did, it would not alter th e outcome of this appeal. Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 45 case to the State court from which it wa s removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be re viewable by appeal or otherwise. § 1447(d). 4 But “[d]espite the seemingly unqualifie d language of the first clause of § 1447(d), its prohibition on a ppellate review applies onl y if the district court remands on grounds perm itted by § 1447(c).” Miller v. Lambeth , 443 F.3d 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation marks omitted). The statute provides: A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction mu st be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time befo re final judgment it appears that the di strict court lacks subject matt er jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. § 1447(c). The “two categories of rema nd” within § 1447(d)’s “prohibition on appellate review . . . are remands for l ack of subject matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure.” Miller , 443 F.3d at 759. “Thus, we have jurisdiction to review a remand order only if (1) the re mand was for a reason other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal pro cedure or (2) the ‘except’ clause of § 1447(d) gi ves us jurisdiction.” Id. We need not decide whether the dist rict court’s first ground for remand involves defects in removal procedure that would fall within § 1447(d)’s bar to

4 Although § 1447(d) does not contain the word “jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court and this court have viewed the section as a jurisdictional limitation. See, e.g. , Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc. , 556 U.S. 635, 636 (2009) (framing issue concerning § 1447(d)’s bar to appellate review as i nvolving “jurisdiction”); City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc. , 864 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 2017) (same). Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 56 appellate review. 5 Instead, we conclude Mr. Mur phy removed the case “pursuant to” § 1442 and § 1443 and therefor e § 1447(d)’s “except” clause gives us jurisdiction to review both grounds for remand.
In BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore , 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (2021) (“ BP ”), the Supreme Court consider ed the following question: “Does 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) permit a court of a ppeals to review any issue in a district court order remanding a case to state cour t where the defendant premised removal in part on the federal officer rem oval statute, § 1442, or the civil rights removal statute, § 1443?” To answer that question, the Co urt first examined whether the defendants had removed the case under § 1442. 6 The Court observed that “[t]o remove a case, a defendant must comply with . . . § 1446,” which “requires the de fendant to provide affected parties and cour ts with a notice stating its grounds for removal.” 7 141 S. Ct.

5 Compare, e.g. , § 1455(b)(4) (directing district court to “promptly” review notice of removal of criminal case and to order “summary remand” if “removal should not be permitted”) with Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc. , 519 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding, in civi l case, that “[b]ecause § 1447(c) provides that a remand based on a defect other than l ack of subject matter jurisdiction must be effected by granting a timely filed motion, an order granting an untimely motion or entered without a motion at all does not fall within the scope of § 1447(c) and therefore is not barred fro m review by § 1447(d)”).

6 The defendants in BP had relied only on § 1442, but it is clear from the question presented and the Court’s disc ussion that the Court’s analysis and conclusions also apply to removals based on § 1443. See 141 S. Ct. at 1538 (noting § 1447(d) extends appellate review to “orders . . . re manding a ‘case . . . removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443’” (quoting § 1447(d)).

7 Section 1446 provides the procedure for removal of a civil case. Compliance with § 1446 effects removal and prevents the state court from proceeding further. See BP , 141 S. Ct. at 1539 (“[I]t is generally the defenda nt’s actions under § 1446 Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 67 at 1538. The Court then concluded that “[ t]o remove a case ‘pursuant to’ § 1442 or § 1443 . . . just means that a defendant’s no tice of removal must assert the case is removable ‘in accordance with or by r eason of” one of t hose provisions.” Id. (first quoting § 1447(d), then quotin g Black’s Law Dictionary (re v. 4th ed. 1968)). “[T]he defendants’ notice of removal did just that by citing § 1442 as one of its grounds for removal.” Id. Turning back to the question pres ented, the Court concluded that once the notice of removal cited § 1442 as a gr ound for removal “and the district court ordered the case remanded to state court, the whole of it s order became reviewable on appeal.” Id. The Court further explained that ev en the frivolous assertion of § 1442 or § 1443 as a ground for rem oval is sufficient to fall within § 1447(d)’s “except” clause. See id. at 1542 (rejecting argument that frivolous addition of § 1442 or § 1443 to other grounds for removal would “i nvite gamesmanship . . . with an eye to ensuring appellate review down the li ne if the case is remanded”).
BP is consistent with the approach we have long taken to determine whether a case is removed pursuant to § 1442 or § 1443. In Colorado v. Lopez , 919 F.2d 131,

that ‘effect the removal,’” and “[o]nce a defendant complies with § 1446, a state court may not proceed ‘further unless a nd until the case is remanded.” (quoting § 1446(d))). In contrast, under § 1455’s pr ocedural rules for removal of criminal prosecutions, state proceedings may continue up until judgment: “The filing of a notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State court . . . from proceeding further, except th at a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless the prosecution is first remanded.” § 1455 (b)(3). We see no reason to distinguish BP based on this difference. Section 1455(b)(4) and (5) clearly require the federal district court to remand th e case if warranted, which indicates that removal has occurred (at least for § 1447( d) purposes) notwithstanding continued proceedings in state court. Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 78 132 (10th Cir. 1990), we relie d on § 1447(d) to exercise jurisdiction to review the merits of a district cour t’s order remanding a criminal prosecution to state court because the defendant had “filed a petiti on for removal pursuant to . . . § 1443.” 8 We did so again recently in Lopez v. Cantex Health Care Centers II, LLC , No. 23-2038, 2023 WL 7321637 (10th Ci r. Nov. 7, 2023) (unpublished), relying on BP

. See id. at *2 (“Because Appellants asserted § 1442 as a ground for removal, we have jurisdiction to review the remand order.”). We take that same appr oach here. In his Notice, Mr. Murphy stated he “submits this Notice of Rem oval from the [state court] per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1443.” R. at 4. We conclude that was a sufficient assertion that his case was removable “in accordance with or by reason of” those statutes, BP , 141 S. Ct. at 1538 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore have jurisdiction over “the whole of [the di strict court’s] order” a nd proceed to the merits. Id. 9

8 Although not always citing Lopez , we have on many o ccasions applied its test, which implicitly deems that removal is “pursuant to” § 1442 or § 1443 if the defendant simply asserts either st atute as a ground for removal. See, e.g. , First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Smith , 229 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting only that the defendant had “cit[ed] [§ 1443(1)] as his basis for removal”); Colorado v. Carrillo , 644 F. App’x 826, 826 (10th Cir. 2016) (“B ecause Carrillo expressly relied on § 1443 in his notice of removal, we possess jurisdiction.”).

9 In Miller v. Lambeth , decided in 2006, we took a different approach to resolving our jurisdiction, concluding that “a bald citation to § 1443” was insufficient and instead “review[ed] the record to dete rmine whether [the removing party had] alleged a basis for removal under § 1443.” 443 F.3d at 760. When faced with conflicting precedent, we should follow the earlier case. See United States v. Suggs , 998 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir. 2021) (“In cases of conf licting circuit precedent our court follows earlier, settle d precedent over a subseque nt deviation therefrom.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Lopez constitutes such earlie r settled precedent. Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 89 III. MERITS Having established our juri sdiction under § 1447(d) to review both grounds for remand the district court relied on, we may re solve this appeal on waiver principles. Mr. Murphy has not challenged the district court’s first ground for remand—that he failed to comply with § 1455( a)’s procedural requirements. He has therefore waived appellate review of that ground. See Sawyers v. Norton , 962 F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“I ssues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And because the § 1455(a) ground for remand was an alternative and adequate ground, Mr. Murphy’s waiver of any challenge to it means he neces sarily loses on appeal. See Shook v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs , 543 F.3d 597, 613 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]h ere a district court’s disposition rests on alternative and adequate grounds, a party who, in challenging that disposition, only argues that one alternative is erroneous necessarily loses because the second alternative stands as an independent and adequa te basis, regardless of the correctness of the first alternative.”). Finally, Mr. Murphy alternatively request s a writ of mandamus to challenge the remand order. But mandamus is not av ailable to obtain appellate review of a remand order even where § 1447(d)’s general prohibition on appellate review applies. See In re Stone Container Corp. , 360 F.3d 1216, 12 18–19 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting request for review of rema nd order by way of mandamus ra ther than appeal because “[a] remand order terminates the litigation in federal c ourt and therefore . . . is appealable as a ‘final d ecision’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291— unless § 1447(d) forecloses Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 910 appeal .” (emphasis added) (inter nal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1220 (“[A] remand order is always fi nal and may be reviewed by appeal when it may be reviewed at all.”).
IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the district court’s Or der For Summary Remand. We grant Mr. Murphy’s motion to proceed on appeal w ithout prepayment of costs or fees. We deny his Emergency Motion to Seal Case Records and All Files.

Entered for the Court

Veronica S. Rossman Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 23-1099 Document: 010110992182 Date Filed: 01/30/2024 Page: 10