NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK, 

Yavapai County Attorney, Petitioner, 

v. 

THE HONORABLE TINA R. AINLEY, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT 

OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of YAVAPAI, 

Respondent Judge, 

DANIEL NEWTON HEAD, 

Real Party in Interest. 

No. 1 CA-SA 15-0110 

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Yavapai County 

No. P1300CR201400418 

The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge 

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED 

COUNSEL 

Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott 

By Robert J. Johnson 

Counsel for Petitioner 

Law Office of David Michael Cantor, PC, Phoenix 

By Michael Alarid, III 

Counsel for Real Party in Interest
STATE v. HON. AINLEY/HEAD 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined. 

K E S S L E R, Judge: 

¶1 The State seeks special action relief from the superior court’s 

order regarding the sentencing range available for the crime of knowingly 

engaging in prostitution with a police officer posing as a minor who is 15, 

16, or 17 years old. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-3212(B)(2) (Supp. 

2014).1 Daniel Newton Head was indicted for allegedly soliciting two 

undercover police officers for sex after the officers represented they were 

each 16 years old. In light of our decision in State v. Campbell (Kraps), 1 CASA 15-0107, 2015 WL 4626844 (Ariz. App. Aug. 4, 2015), we hold an 

individual convicted under A.R.S. § 13-3212(B)(2) for engaging in 

prostitution with a police officer posing as a 16-year-old, is sentenced as a 

class 2 felony subject to the sentencing enhancements in A.R.S. § 13-3212(G). 

Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In a sting operation, police officers posed as 16-year-olds in 

online advertisements and offered to engage in sexual conduct for money. 

Head allegedly called the “minors,” they told him they were 16 years old, 

and he ultimately agreed to meet them at a Prescott hotel room. At that 

meeting, Head allegedly offered them money for sex. After his arrest, Head 

was indicted on two class 2 felony charges of child prostitution under A.R.S. 

§ 13-3212(B)(2). Head sought clarification of the applicable sentencing 

range, and the superior court held that the enhanced sentence provided by 

A.R.S. § 13-3212(G) required the other person to actually be 15, 16, or 17 

years old. The court stayed its ruling while the State sought special action 

 

1 The legislature has revised the statute effective July 24, 2014. This case 

concerns A.R.S. § 13-3212, as it was in effect from July 20, 2011 to July 23, 

2014. See generally State v. Campbell (Kraps), 1 CA-SA 15-0107, 2015 WL 

4626844, at *1 n.1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Aug. 4, 2015) (quoting version of A.R.S. § 

13-3212 in existence from July 20, 2011 to July 23, 2014). 
STATE v. HON. AINLEY/HEAD 

Decision of the Court 

3 

relief. While the State’s petition was pending, we held this matter in 

abeyance until we could decide the identical issue in Campbell, 2015 WL 

4626844, at *1, ¶ 5. Once Campbell was decided, we asked all parties to 

address the applicability of Campbell to this action. 

JURISDICTION 

¶3 Special action jurisdiction is available when there is no other 

equally plain, speedy or adequate remedy by appeal. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 

1(a). Special action jurisdiction is appropriately invoked when there is an 

issue of statewide importance. See State v. Bernini (Lopez), 230 Ariz. 223, 225, 

¶ 5, 282 P.3d 424, 426 (App. 2012) (determining special action jurisdiction 

appropriate in case involving pure issue of law that had arisen at least twice 

within several months); State ex rel. Romley v. Martin, 203 Ariz. 46, 47, ¶ 4, 

49 P.3d 1142, 1143 (App. 2002) (“Special action jurisdiction is appropriate in 

matters of statewide importance, issues of first impression, cases involving 

purely legal questions, or issues that are likely to arise again.”), aff’d on other 

grounds, 205 Ariz. 279, 69 P.3d 1000 (2003). Given the reoccurring nature of 

this type of case, to avoid conflicting decisions by the superior court, and 

given the serious nature of child prostitution, we accept jurisdiction. 

DISCUSSION 

¶4 The issue presented is whether the enhanced sentencing 

provisions in A.R.S. § 13-3212(G) that apply to convictions based on 

engaging in prostitution with minors who are age 15, 16, or 17 also apply to 

convictions for engaging in prostitution with adult police officers posing as 

minors of those same ages. This is an issue of statutory construction which 

we review de novo. Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 

526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994). In construing statutes, statutory language 

is “the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning.” State v. Cramer, 

192 Ariz. 150, 152, ¶ 10, 962 P.2d 224, 226 (App. 1998) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). We construe statutes in a practical, commonsense manner so as to fulfill the legislative intent and avoid absurd results. 

See A.R.S. § 1-211 (2002); State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, ¶ 16, 968 P.2d 

606, 610 (App. 1998) (“Courts will apply constructions that make practical 

sense rather than hypertechnical constructions that frustrate legislative 

intent.”); State v. Flores, 160 Ariz. 235, 239, 772 P.2d 589, 593 (App. 1989) (“In 

construing a statute, courts should give the statute a sensible construction 

which will accomplish legislative interest and purpose, and which will 

avoid absurd results.”). Whenever possible, we will give meaningful 

operation to all of the statutory provisions. Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 

281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991). 
STATE v. HON. AINLEY/HEAD 

Decision of the Court 

4 

¶5 In Campbell, we held that the enhanced sentencing provisions 

in A.R.S. § 13-3212(G) apply when the defendant is led to believe that the 

other person is 15, 16, or 17 years old even though the other person is an 

adult police officer posing as 15, 16, or 17 years old. 2015 WL 4626844, at 

*4, ¶ 13. Head argues that Campbell was wrongly decided. The State argues 

that Campbell was correctly decided and controls the result in this case. We 

agree with the State, adopt the reasoning in Campbell, and reaffirm the 

holding in Campbell. 

¶6 The crime at issue is “[e]ngaging in prostitution with a minor 

who the person knows is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age.” A.R.S. 

§ 13-3212(B)(2). As in Campbell, we conclude “the statutory language is 

clear: Subsection (B)(2) crimes must be punished under Subsection (G)” 

when the defendant engages in prostitution knowing the other person is 

age 15, 16, or 17, even if the other person is in fact an adult police officer. 

2015 WL 4626844, at *4, ¶ 13. The plain language of Subsection (G) 

provides: “If the minor is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age, child 

prostitution pursuant to subsection A and subsection B, paragraph 2 of this 

section is a class 2 felony, the person convicted shall be sentenced pursuant to this 

section and the person is not eligible for . . . release . . . .” (Emphasis added.) A 

defendant knows the person is 15, 16, or 17 years old if “with respect to . . . 

a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense . . . a [defendant] 

is aware or believes that the . . . circumstance exists,” A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b) 

(Supp. 2015).2 

¶7 Head argues that Campbell was wrongly decided because, in 

his view, we emphasized the wrong statutory language. Rather than 

focusing on the sentence applicable to a violation of A.R.S. § 13-3212(B)(2), 

see supra emphasized language ¶ 6, Head argues we should focus on the 

conduct that triggers the increased penalty. Thus, according to Head, 

because A.R.S. § 13-3212 consistently refers to the term “minors,” and 

Subsection (C) only precludes a defense for a defendant if the other person 

is a police officer posing as a minor age 15, 16, or 17, the legislature must 

have intended that the enhanced sentencing provisions in Subsection (G) 

be limited solely to true minors age 15, 16, or 17. 

¶8 We agree with the result and reasoning in Campbell. If we 

were to adopt Head’s argument we would be rewriting A.R.S. § 13-3212(G) 

to add a final sentence that the legislature did not include: “If the minor is 

fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age, child prostitution pursuant to 

 

2 We cite the current version of the applicable statute because no revisions 

material to this decision have occurred. 
STATE v. HON. AINLEY/HEAD 

Decision of the Court 

5 

subsection A and subsection B, paragraph 2 of this section is a class 2 felony, 

the person convicted shall be sentenced pursuant to this section and the 

person is not eligible for suspension of sentence, probation, pardon or 

release from confinement on any basis except as specifically authorized by 

§ 31-233, subsection A or B until the sentence imposed by the court has been 

served or commuted. The presumptive term may be aggravated or 

mitigated within the range under this section pursuant to § 13-701, 

subsections C, D and E. [These sentencing provisions do not apply if the person 

is not in fact a minor, but rather a police officer posing as a minor.]” (Additional 

language shown in brackets and italics.)3 We will not rewrite a statute 

“under the guise of judicial interpretation.” Alliance TruTrus, L.L.C. v. 

Carlson Real Estate Co., 229 Ariz. 84, 87, ¶ 12, 270 P.3d 911, 914 (App. 2012). 

¶9 Head also argues that Campbell incorrectly distinguished State 

v. Regenold, 227 Ariz. 224, 226, ¶ 4, 255 P.3d 1028, 1030 (App. 2011), and State 

v. Villegas, 227 Ariz. 344, 345, ¶ 3, 258 P.3d 162, 163 (App. 2011). We 

disagree. Campbell succinctly explained that those cases dealt with a 

different and distinguishable statute, luring a minor for sexual exploitation, 

A.R.S. § 13-3554 (Supp. 2014). 2015 WL 4626844, at *2, ¶¶ 7-8. 

¶10 Finally, Head argues Campbell misinterpreted State v. Hazlett, 

205 Ariz. 523, 73 P.3d 1258 (App. 2003). Hazlett is distinguishable from the 

issues here. In Hazlett, we upheld the constitutionality of Arizona’s sexual 

exploitation of minors statute, A.R.S. § 13-3553 (Supp. 2002), in the context 

of child pornography. 205 Ariz. at 531, ¶ 29, 73 P.3d at 1266. We held that 

the statute was not constitutionally overbroad because its reference to 

minors in such pornography was limited to actual minors as opposed to 

simulations. Id. at 526, ¶ 7, 73 P.3d at 1261. We pointed out that a different 

statute in the same scheme expressly defined a “minor” as a person “under 

the age of eighteen of years of age at the time [the pornography] was 

created, adapted or modified,” and that the general definitional statute in 

the criminal code defined “person . . . as a human being.” Id. at 527, ¶ 9, 73 

P.3d at 1262 (quoting A.R.S. §§ 13-3551 (Supp. 2002) and -105(26) (2001)). 

The child pornography statutes at issue in Hazlett did not preclude a 

 

3 Head argues that under Campbell, we are essentially rewriting Subsection 

(G) to read: “If the minor is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age, [or the 

peace officer is posing as a minor who is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of 

age] . . . .” (Additional language shown in brackets and italics.) Our 

holding in Campbell and our conclusion here do not rewrite the statute. 

They give effect to the legislative intent that the reference to “minor” 

throughout the statute refers to either a minor or a police officer posing as 

a minor who is 15, 16, or 17 years old. 
STATE v. HON. AINLEY/HEAD 

Decision of the Court 

6 

defense that the person in the depiction was an adult, but only provided 

that if the person in the depiction was represented to be a minor, the finder 

of fact may draw an inference that the person was a minor. Id. at 529, ¶ 16, 

73 P.3d at 1264 (citing A.R.S. § 13-3556 (2010)). Since the statutes at issue in 

Hazlett have no counterpart to A.R.S. § 13-3212(C), the Hazlett analysis does 

not apply here. 

¶11 For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with Campbell and 

hold that Subsection (G) is the appropriate sentencing regime for all 

Subsection (B)(2) crimes. When the defendant knowingly seeks out a minor 

for prostitution purposes, the defendant, if convicted, is subject to the 

enhanced sentencing provisions of Subsection (G) even if the “victim” is an 

adult undercover police officer. 

CONCLUSION 

¶12 For the reasons stated, we accept special action jurisdiction 

and grant relief.