RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2641-19

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

L.B.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

D.W.,

Defendant.

_________________________

IN THE MATTER OF J.B.,

a minor.

_________________________

Argued March 22, 2021 – Decided August 17, 2021

Before Judges Messano and Suter.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-2641-19

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FN-09-0204-19.

Adrienne Kalosieh, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Adrienne Kalosieh, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

William Rodriguez, Deputy Attorney General, argued 

the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Sookie Bae, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; William Rodriguez, on the brief).

Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Alexis Pollock, on 

the letter brief).

PER CURIAM

Following a fact-finding hearing, see N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.44, the Family Part 

judge concluded defendant L.B. had abused or neglected her eleven-year-old 

son, J.B. (James), in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).1 Approximately nine 

months later, defendant entered a voluntary identified surrender of her parental 

rights in favor of James' then-current resource parent, and the next month the 

judge entered an order terminating this Title 9 litigation.

1 We use initials and pseudonyms pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(12).
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Defendant now appeals, raising a single argument. She contends that the 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) did not prove, and 

the judge erred in finding, that defendant failed to provide the minimum standard 

of care for James required by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4), or that she willfully 

abandoned her son, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5). The Division argues 

otherwise. Through his Law Guardian, James takes no position on the appeal. 2

Having considered the arguments in light of the record and applicable 

legal standards, we affirm the order as modified.

I.

At the hearing, the judge heard the testimony of Division caseworkers 

Tiffany Meredith and Sandra Cruz-Medrano and considered several Division 

documents entered into the record. Defendant did not testify or call any 

witnesses. At the start of the hearing, the parties agreed with the judge that 

hearsay statements in the documents that were not subject to any exception 

would not be admitted.

The Division was involved with the family for several years prior to the 

December 2018 incidents that led to the filing of the verified complaint. At the 

2

James' father, defendant D.W., was incarcerated at the time of the hearing, did 

not appear in the litigation, and is not part of this appeal.
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time of his birth in 2008, James was deemed "medically fragile," subsequently 

underwent multiple surgeries, and was diagnosed with multiple behavioral and 

psychiatric problems. After an earlier removal and placement in an inpatient

program, the Division returned James to defendant's care in February 2017. 

On December 13, 2018, the Jersey City Medical Center (JCMC) contacted 

the Division after defendant left James at the hospital because she was unable to 

manage his aggressive and sometimes violent behavior. Defendant wanted the 

hospital to admit James for inpatient care, but the staff psychiatrist determined 

admission was unwarranted. Meredith responded to the referral, was able to 

reach defendant later that evening and convinced her to transport James to 

Hoboken University Medical Center (HUMC) for a second opinion. That 

hospital admitted James for monitoring, however, after one week, the staff 

determined that he was cleared for discharge. Although the Division offered 

defendant services to cope with James' behaviors, she refused to report to the 

hospital and take custody of her son, believing it was necessary to place James 

in an inpatient program for further care. The Division took custody of James at 

the hospital, placed him in foster care with an unrelated family, and filed its

complaint.
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At the fact-finding hearing, Meredith's testimony included an explanation 

of James' prior residential treatment, his placement in foster care, and his 2017 

reunification with defendant. When she was able to contact defendant about the 

referral from the JCMC, Meredith arranged to meet at defendant's home. She 

testified that defendant was "very frustrated" and believed "no one was making 

a proper diagnosis for her son." Defendant described how James had become 

"aggressive and violent," suffered from "insomnia," and experienced "audio and 

visual hallucinations about demons." Defendant described an incident in which 

she awoke to find James holding a knife and threatening to kill her and her other, 

older son. Defendant stated that for everyone’s safety, she was no longer able 

to care for James.

Meredith testified that she persuaded defendant to seek a second opinion, 

even though defendant made clear she was specifically trying to secure an 

inpatient placement for James. Meredith accompanied defendant and James to 

HUMC for an evaluation. During the long wait to see the doctor, defendant 

showed Meredith a video recording of the incident that led her to seek help at 

the Medical Center; in it, James was seen screaming at his mother. Meredith 

also observed James becoming more "agitated and frustrated" as he waited to be 

evaluated in Hoboken, and heard the child claim to see demons and converse 
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with invisible beings. Finally, after being assessed, the hospital admitted James 

to its "children's psychiatric unit." 

After a one-week observation period, the hospital staff met to discuss 

James' recommended treatment on discharge to a partial hospitalization program

(PHP). Meredith said defendant reiterated her frustration and belief that doctors 

continued closing the case and would arrange for continued services, including 

placement in a PHP program. Defendant agreed to pick up James at the hospital; 

however, she never did, causing the Division to take custody of James at HUMC

and secure a placement for him.

During cross-examination, Meredith testified about defendant's efforts to 

address James' behavioral and psychiatric problems after reunification. 

Defendant also said she had developed post-traumatic stress disorder and a heart 

condition requiring surgery because of the stress of caring for James. Meredith 

acknowledged observing damage James caused to defendant's apartment, and 

she acknowledged being sympathetic to defendant's plight and her desire to have 

James placed in a residential treatment facility. Meredith testified the Division 

found "the act of neglecting [James] by abandoning him at the hospital was an 

act of desperation" and confirmed "the child did not suffer any injury or harm 

as a result of being left in the hospital."
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Cruz-Medrano, a permanency supervisor for the Division, worked after 

hours for its special response team for more than twelve-and-a-half years. She 

responded to HUMC. Her first contact with defendant was by phone later that 

evening. Defendant told her that she "would not be able to take her child home 

due to his behaviors and that she was fearful." Defendant provided no names of 

relatives who might care for James. Cruz-Medrano spoke with James at the 

hospital; he told her that "he was just waiting for his mom to come pick him up." 

Because James was cleared for discharge and defendant had no intention to pick 

him up, the Division executed an emergency removal. Defendant provided the 

Division with a "bag of clothes . . . and some . . . Christmas gifts" she had for 

her son. Cruz-Medrano testified that James admitted he was "unable to control 

his anger" and confessed to hearing voices. Defendant told Cruz-Medrano that 

she wanted James to remain hospitalized out of fear, that "home support had 

failed her," and she did not have a plan for James' return.

After considering the summations of counsel, the judge reserved decision

noting the case was not "clear cut."3 Two days later, the judge issued a written 

3 Defendant notes in passing that the judge should have dismissed the Title 9 

complaint and proceeded under Title 30 to provide services to the family. She 

notes her trial counsel made such a request. That is an apparent reference to a 

single sentence at the close of defense counsel's summation in the Family Part. 
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decision in support of her order. After detailing the testimony and citing 

relevant case law, the judge wrote:

[T]he record contains substantial, credible evidence to 

support a finding of neglect under both N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4) and (5). Not only did defendant fail to 

"exercise a minimum degree of care," she clearly and 

explicitly refused to care for her child when she 

willfully refused to take responsibility . . . and to take 

him home when he was cleared for discharge despite 

the Division's offer of services and his enrollment in a 

partial hospitalization program. Defendant believed 

that this was not sufficient despite it being the 

recommendation from the hospital . . . . The only plan 

that she would accept was residential treatment . . . . 

Not even the hospital recommended residential 

treatment. At the time of his discharge, [James] was 

not hearing voices. He believed that his mother was 

coming to pick him up.

Defendant "abandoned" her son, leaving him 

alone and forcing the Division to assume care, custody 

and control of him. . . . A parent is not allowed to 

abandon a child merely because that child is difficult to 

control or has mental health issues, since neither

circumstance mitigates the fundamental responsibility 

of the parent to provide care for her child. But for the 

Division's intervention, defendant left [James] without 

a safe and secure place to stay, thereby exposing the 

child to an actual and imminent risk of harm. In 

essence, defendant "willfully forsook [her] parental 

Undoubtedly, without any finding of abuse or neglect, the trial court was 

empowered to proceed under Title 30 and provide services to the family. N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs v. I.S., 214 N.J. 8, 15 (2013). However, even if 

counsel's summation comment was a sufficient request, the crux of the issue in 

this case was defendant's refusal to accept the services proposed by the Division. 
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responsibilities." In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 

N.J. [32,] 39 [(1992) (second alteration in original)].

II.

Well-known standards guide our review. "[A]ppellate courts defer to the 

factual findings of the trial court because it has the opportunity to make firsthand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand; it has 

a feel of the case that can never be realized by a review of the cold record.'" 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 342–43 (2010) 

(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). 

Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in 

family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court 

factfinding." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).

However, "[t]here is an exception to th[e] general rule of deference: 

Where the issue to be decided is an 'alleged error in the trial judge's evaluation 

of the underlying facts and the implications to be drawn therefrom,' we expand 

the scope of our review." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 

596, 605 (2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188–

89 (App. Div. 1993)). When the issue presented turns on a legal conclusion 

derived from the Family Part's factfinding, "we are not required to defer." N.J. 
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Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.R., 419 N.J. Super. 538, 542–43 (App. Div. 

2011). This is such a case.

"In general, 'Title 9 controls the adjudication of abuse and neglect cases.'" 

Dep't of Child. & Fams., Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 

166, 177 (2015) (quoting M.C. III, 201 N.J. at 343). "The focus of Title 9 'is 

not the "culpability of parental conduct" but rather "the protection of children."'" 

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 368 (2017) 

(quoting E.D.-O., 223 N.J. at 178). Title 9 defines an "abused or neglected 

child" as one under the age of eighteen whose 

physical, mental, or emotional condition has been 

impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming 

impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or 

guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care (a) 

in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, 

shelter, education, medical or surgical care though 

financially able to do so or though offered financial or 

other reasonable means to do so, or (b) in providing the 

child with proper supervision or guardianship by 

unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted 

harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the 

infliction of excessive corporal punishment . . . .

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).]

"Included under Title 9 is a separate category of abuse or neglect: 'willful 

abandonment.' A child less than [eighteen] years of age may be found to be 
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abused or neglected if the child has been willfully abandoned by his parent or 

guardian." A.B., 231 N.J. at 368–69 (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(5)).

The "minimum degree of care" element in subsection (c)(4) reflects "the 

intermediary position between simple negligence and the intentional infliction 

of harm." Id. at 369 (citing G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 179 

(1999)). After considering the totality of the circumstances and assessing each 

case on its facts, we must determine whether the parent or guardian "fail[ed] to 

exercise a minimum degree of care when he or she is aware of the dangers 

inherent in a situation and fails adequately to supervise the child or recklessly 

creates a risk of serious injury to that child." Id. at 369 (quoting G.S., 157 N.J. 

at 181).

Here, defendant's decision not to take custody of James at HUMC did not 

expose the child to the imminent risk of serious injury or harm. There was no 

medical testimony adduced by the Division that detailed in any way James' thencurrent psychiatric diagnosis or any evidence of how defendant's failure to 

provide him with the services the Division intended to supply proved that the 

child faced "some form of actual or threatened harm," which Title 9 requires. 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 25 (2013). James was in 

the process of being released from HUMC and certainly faced no imminent risk 
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of harm. Although his future psychiatric treatment hung in the balance, we 

cannot conclude based on the evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing that 

defendant's conduct amounted to abuse or neglect under Title 9. See N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. S.I., 437 N.J. Super. 142, 154–55 (App. Div. 2014) 

(holding that although "[a] teenager's . . . thoughts of suicide should never be 

ignored by adults," the "limited" evidence "fail[ed] to prove the child was in 

'imminent danger' or that a 'substantial risk' of harm would result from [the 

defendant's] refusal to seek immediate psychiatric review, which are 

prerequisites to sustain a finding of abuse or neglect").

N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 defines abandonment of a child as:

(a) willfully forsaking a child; (b) failing to care for and 

keep the control and custody of a child so that the child 

shall be exposed to physical or moral risk without 

proper and sufficient protection; (c) failing to care for 

and keep the control and custody of a child so that the 

child shall be liable to be supported and maintained at 

the expense of the public . . . .

In A.B., the Court cited with approval Chief Justice Vanderbilt's formulation of 

the pre-Title 9 law of abandonment, noting the parent's conduct needed to meet 

"an extremely high bar" demonstrating "a 'settled purpose' to forego her parental 

rights." 231 N.J. at 371–72 (citing Lavigne v. Fam. & Child.'s Soc'y, 11 N.J. 

473, 480 (1953)); see also, In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 377 (1999) 
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(noting that under Title 30, "abandonment may not be based on parental conduct 

that is only uncertain, ambivalent or equivocal in fulfilling parental duties." 

(citing In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, 488, (1994))). In 

A.B., the Court concluded the evidence failed to establish the defendant 

"willfully relinquished her parental rights." 231 N.J. at 372.

By citing K.L.F. in her written opinion, the trial judge apparently 

concluded the evidence here was sufficient to demonstrate defendant "willfully 

forsook [her] parental responsibilities." 129 N.J. at 39. However, as the 

Division correctly notes, "[a] trial court judgment that reaches the proper 

conclusion must be affirmed even if it is based on the wrong reasoning." Hayes 

v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018) (citing Isko v. Plan. Bd., 51 N.J. 162, 

175 (1968)).

Neither N.J.S.A. 9:6-1(b) or (c) require the Division prove that a parent 

acted willfully or permanently forsook the child. In a different context, we noted 

the distinction between subsection (a) and these other subsections.

The alternative definitions of abandonment in 

N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 also tend to support our view. Both of 

the other definitions proscribe "failing to care for and 

keep the control and custody of a child" so that the child 

shall be exposed to harm, subsection (b), or shall 

become a financial burden upon the public or others not 

chargeable with the child's care, subsection (c). Both 

of those alternatives do not require a permanent 
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relinquishment and do not use the word forsaken which 

is employed, in stark contrast, only in subsection (a). 

We believe the Legislature was thereby drawing a line 

between harms, physical, moral, or financial, that might 

befall the child or others from even a temporary 

leaving, and the "ultimate act" of neglect described by 

"willfully forsaking."

[State v. N.I., 349 N.J. Super. 299, 311–12 (App. Div. 

2002).]

In this case, however well-intentioned defendant's conduct may have 

been, she willfully refused to accept custody of her son when HUMC was 

prepared to discharge the child. As a result, the Division, which was prepared 

to provide services to defendant, including a PHP mental health program, was 

forced to accept custody and find a placement for James. Defendant produced 

no medical evidence challenging the hospital's decision that discharge was 

appropriate. It is beyond serious debate that parents cannot simply refuse to 

accept custody of their child because their experiences and beliefs lead them to 

conclude their opinions about what is best for the child are correct, and the

opinions of medical providers are wrong. The facts in this case demonstrate the 

Division proved defendant willfully abandoned James pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(4)(c)(5).
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We affirm the Family Part's order as modified.