1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 122,742

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

TROY A. ROBINSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Shawnee District Court; NANCY E. PARRISH, judge. Opinion filed December 17,

2021. Affirmed.

Jonathan B. Phelps, of Phelps-Chartered, of Topeka, for appellant. 

Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., GREEN and ISHERWOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Troy A. Robinson appeals from the district court's denial of his 

K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. On appeal, Robinson claims the district court erred in denying 

the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Robinson asserts his trial counsel 

was ineffective for: (1) failing to request a second competency evaluation; and (2) failing 

to present a mental disease or defect defense. The sole issue before us is whether the 

district court erred in not granting Robinson's request for an evidentiary hearing. For the 

reasons set forth in this opinion, we find that the district court appropriately resolved 

Robinson's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Thus, we affirm the 

district court.
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FACTS

On December 20, 2012, Robinson was arrested for premeditated first-degree 

murder. Robinson's arrest occurred after he told his mother that he had stabbed the victim 

in the neck, and his mother called the police. After a trial on June 24-30, 2014, a jury 

convicted Robinson of premeditated first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and 

misdemeanor theft. The facts leading to the charges and convictions are set out in State v. 

Robinson, 306 Kan. 431, 432-35, 394 P.3d 868 (2017). 

After the district court denied several posttrial motions filed by Robinson, the jury 

recommended that he serve a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 

50 years. The district court then sentenced Robinson to a hard 50 life sentence for firstdegree murder and imposed consecutive sentences of 34 months for aggravated burglary 

and 12 months for theft. Robinson's convictions and sentence were subsequently affirmed 

by the Kansas Supreme Court on direct appeal and a mandate was issued on June 27,

2017. 306 Kan. at 450.

On February 5, 2018, Robinson filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, which is the 

subject of this appeal. In the motion, Robinson asserted numerous allegations of error. In 

doing so, he focused on alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Robinson 

attached a letter dated January 4, 2018, to the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. In the letter, his 

trial attorney, Julia Spainhour, gave him advice regarding issues that he could raise in his 

K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. The letter appears to have been written by Spainhour in response 

to questions posed to her by Robinson. 

On March 7, 2018, the district court appointed another attorney to represent 

Robinson in the proceedings on the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Several months later, 

Robinson's new attorney filed an addendum to the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion after 

interviewing Spainhour. On February 26, 2019, the State asked the district court to 
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summarily deny Robinson's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Robinson filed a reply to the State's 

request to deny the motion on January 31, 2020.

On March 27, 2020, after some delays unrelated to this appeal, the district court 

judge—who also presided over Robinson's jury trial—summarily denied Robinson's 

K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in a comprehensive 17-page memorandum decision and order. 

The district court found that nine of Robinson's allegations were addressed in his direct 

appeal or had been waived because they should have been raised in the appeal to the 

Kansas Supreme Court. In ruling on the issues, the district court specifically addressed 

Spainhour's letter in which she suggested that her representation of Robinson was 

ineffective. 

Specifically, the district court found that the letter contained mere conclusory 

allegations without any factual support: 

"[T]rial counsel's letter does not provide factual details to support her statements. For 

example, the letter states, 'trial counsel was ineffective in failing to negotiate a plea 

bargain in the case,' but provides no further explanation. Trial counsel may genuinely 

believe she was ineffective, however, her admissions via a letter to Robinson are not 

dispositive." 

The district court also examined the record regarding Robinson's allegations 

regarding his competency and his capability to form the specific intent required for firstdegree murder. In addition, the district court reviewed the record regarding his allegations 

regarding plea negotiations. Regarding Robinson's claim that trial counsel was ineffective 

in failing to raise Robinson's competency as an issue, the district court found that 

Robinson failed to include any evidence that he was incompetent or unable to 

understanding the proceedings. In addition, the district court ruled that the evidence in the 

record supported Robinson's competence. As such, the district court concluded that his 

claims "[did] not meet the first prong of the test regarding ineffectiveness of counsel." 
4

Next, the district court found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

pursue a defense of lack of mental state to commit first-degree murder. In examining this 

issue, the district court pointed to evidence in the record that showed that trial counsel 

investigated the possibility of a lack of mental state defense, but she concluded that there 

was no evidence that such a defense would have been appropriate in this case. In his 

K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Robinson did not provide any evidence to the contrary outside of 

his conclusory allegation that trial counsel should have pursued this defense strategy. 

Accordingly, the district court found that Robinson's claims did not meet the first prong 

of the test regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Finally, the district court ruled that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

negotiate a plea or for failing to inform Robinson of the potential plea offers or the 

maximum penalties for the charges against him. Once again, the district court pointed to 

specific evidence in the record showing that Robinson was involved in plea negotiations 

and that he was aware of the maximum penalty that he was facing. Finding direct 

evidence contradicting Robinson's claims, the district court found that Robinson failed to 

allege facts to support a finding that trial counsel was ineffective in her role during plea 

negotiations. 

Thereafter, Robinson filed a timely notice of appeal. 

ANALYSIS

The only issue Robinson raises on appeal is whether the district court erred in 

summarily denying his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without first conducting an evidentiary 

hearing. When considering a movant's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, a district court has three 

available options. Here, the district court exercised the first option and summarily 

dismissed Robinson's motion. As a result, we conduct a de novo review to determine 
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whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant 

has no right to relief. Breedlove v. State, 310 Kan. 56, 59, 445 P.3d 1101 (2019).

To be entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, the movant—in this case 

Robinson—must establish by a preponderance of the evidence either: (1) "the judgment 

was rendered without jurisdiction"; (2) "the sentence imposed was not authorized by law 

or is otherwise open to collateral attack"; or (3) "there has been such a denial or 

infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment 

vulnerable to collateral attack . . . ." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(b) (grounds for relief); 

Supreme Court Rule 183(g) (2021 Kan. S. Ct. R. 239) (preponderance burden). 

Robinson filed his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion pro se and it was later supplemented by 

the attorney appointed by the district court to represent him in presenting his motion. 

Generally, pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Mundy v. State, 307 Kan. 280, 

304, 408 P.3d 965 (2018).

"Nevertheless, a pro se movant still bears the burden to allege facts sufficient to warrant a 

hearing on the motion, and 'mere conclusions of the defendant or movant are not 

sufficient to raise a substantial issue of fact when no factual basis is alleged or appears 

from the record.' State v. Jackson, 255 Kan. 455, 463, 874 P.2d 1138 (1994)." Mundy, 

307 Kan. at 304.

When a pro se movant offers only conclusory statements and incomplete facts, the 

movant presents no evidentiary basis to support the claims. 307 Kan. at 304. 

A movant bears the burden to prove his or her K.S.A. 60-1507 motion warrants an 

evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the movant must make more than conclusory 

allegations and must state an evidentiary basis in support of the claims or such a basis 

must appear in the record. Once this burden is satisfied, the district court must grant an 
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evidentiary hearing unless the motion is successive or seeks similar relief to that 

previously sought. Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 881, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014). 

In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing must be held, the district court 

generally must accept the movant's factual allegations as set forth in the motion as true, 

but the factual allegations must be specific and not mere conclusions. Skaggs v. State, 59 

Kan. App. 2d 121, 130-31, 479 P.3d 499 (2020), rev. denied 313 Kan. 1042 (2021); see 

Mundy, 307 Kan. at 304. It is error to deny a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion without a hearing 

where the motion alleges facts that do not appear in the original record that, if true, would 

entitle the movant to relief and the motion identifies readily available witnesses whose 

testimony would support such facts or other sources of evidence. Beauclair v. State, 308 

Kan. 284, 296, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018); Swenson v. State, 284 Kan. 931, 939, 169 P.3d 298 

(2007).

We first consider Robinson's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel by failing to sufficiently investigate and pursue a motion to 

determine Robinson's competency to stand trial and assist in his defense. A district court 

must set aside a movant's conviction if "there has been such a denial or infringement of 

the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral 

attack . . . ." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(b). The right to effective counsel is embodied in 

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and "plays a crucial role in the 

adversarial system . . . ." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 

80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. denied 467 U.S. 1267 [1984]); see Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 

650, 657, 694 P.2d 468 (1985) (adopting Strickland). 

Ineffective assistance of counsel can be categorized into three subgroups, one of 

which is a claim that defense counsel's "performance was so deficient that the defendant 

was denied a fair trial." Sola-Morales, 300 Kan. at 882. That is, "counsel's conduct so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
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relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. To meet his 

burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, Robinson must establish that 

Spainhour's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. State v. Adams, 311 Kan. 

569, 578, 465 P.3d 176 (2020). 

Before trial counsel's assistance is determined to be so defective as to require 

reversal of a conviction, the movant must establish the well-known two-pronged test. 

First, the movant must establish that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. 

This requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that his or her performance 

was less than that guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. Second, the movant must establish that counsel's deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense, thus depriving the defendant of a fair trial. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Salary, 309 Kan. 479, 483, 437 P.3d 953 (2019). To 

establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different. Adams, 311 Kan. at 578.

The benchmark for judging an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether 

counsel's conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that 

the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result." Miller v. State, 298 Kan. 

921, Syl. ¶ 2, 318 P.3d 155 (2014). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance in a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel is highly deferential and requires consideration of all 

the evidence before the judge or jury. The reviewing court must strongly presume that 

counsel's conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance. State 

v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 970, 318 P.3d 987 (2014). 

Here, Robinson asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 

to determine his competency. The criminal trial of one who is incompetent violates due 

process. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353
8

(1992). In Kansas, a defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he or she is charged 

with a crime and, due to mental illness, is: (1) unable to understand the nature and 

purpose of the proceedings, or (2) cannot make or assist in making his or her defense. 

K.S.A. 22-3301(1)(a) and (b). See State v. Stewart, 306 Kan. 237, 251, 393 P.3d 1031 

(2017).

A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial. State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 

860, 348 P.3d 583 (2015). However, the defense, trial counsel, the prosecutor, or the 

judge may raise the issue of a defendant's competency at any time between the filing of 

the charging document and before pronouncement of the sentence. If the district court 

judge has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the 

proceedings should be suspended, and a competency hearing must be held. K.S.A. 2020 

Supp. 22-3302(1). 

In this case, the district court ordered a competency evaluation at the request of 

Spainhour, which was performed by Dr. David Blakely on January 31, 2013. Dr. Blakely 

noted that Robinson had a long history of psychiatric difficulties, including multiple 

hospitalizations, cutting himself, and "suicidal acting out." He noted that Robinson's 

diagnoses include Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Bipolar 

Disorder, and Borderline Personality Disorder. Dr. Blakely asked Robinson numerous 

questions about his understanding of the criminal proceedings, and he noted that 

Robinson had a "broad understanding of what the roles of the Court Officers are, and he 

knows what he is charged with." 

Although Dr. Blakely acknowledged that Robinson struggled with significant 

mental illness, he concluded that he was competent to stand trial. He stated: 

"The first problem is competence. Despite the patient's significant psychiatric 

liabilities he is competent. He understands the charges, and he can help in his own 
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defense. He also has significant psychiatric liabilities. What to call them is a conundrum. 

Bipolar is descriptive but probably not entirely the issue here. He has a significantly 

disturbed upbringing, a significantly disturbed sense of self. He goes up and down in a 

hurry. He is quite labile in his emotions. He probably genuinely is ADHD in terms of 

being calmed down by Adderall, and he very likely needs other psychiatric medications 

and treatment, so this is a man with significant psychiatric impairment who nonetheless is 

competent." (Emphases added). 

After this competency evaluation, Spainhour employed Dr. Mitchell Flesher to 

conduct a psychological evaluation. In a report dated March 9, 2014, Dr. Flesher 

provided a psychological evaluation detailing Robinson's past and current struggles with 

mental illness, but nothing in the report suggested that Robinson was not competent to 

stand trial or to understand the criminal proceedings. 

Robinson argues that the record shows that he should be entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing based on Spainhour's failure to obtain a second competency evaluation prior to 

trial or sentencing. However, Robinson fails to support his suggestion that Spainhour was 

incompetent with any facts showing that his competency was at issue beyond the fact that 

he struggled with mental illness. In the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Robinson does not state 

that he was incompetent or that his competency had changed since Dr. Blakely's 

evaluation. Robinson does not suggest that Dr. Blakely's conclusion was wrong. In 

addition, Robinson does not point to anything in Dr. Flesher's evaluation—beyond the 

fact that he suffered from mental illness—to suggest that he was incompetent. Finally, 

Robinson does not point to anything in the record suggesting that he was incompetent.

Robinson points to Spainhour's letter suggesting that he raise the issue of 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue a second competency evaluation 

and to his addendum indicating that Spainhour told his K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel that she 

was ineffective for failing to do so. However, neither the letter nor the addendum to the 
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original K.S.A. 60-1507 motion contain any facts supporting his claim that Spainhour 

was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a second competency evaluation. 

Robinson merely points to his mental illness and the conclusory claims that 

Spainhour was ineffective for failing to file a motion seeking a second competency 

evaluation. However, mental illness by itself is not enough to show that a person is 

incompetent to stand trial. See State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, 516, 847 P.2d 1191 

(1993). Rather, the Kansas Legislature defined the phrase "incompetent to stand trial" in 

K.S.A. 22-3301(1). As set forth in that statute, a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if 

he or she "because of mental illness or defect is unable: (a) To understand the nature and 

purpose of the proceedings against him; or (b) to make or assist in making his defense." 

K.S.A. 22-3301(1). Kansas caselaw provides further analysis, indicating the test to 

determine competency to stand trial is "'whether [the defendant] has sufficient present 

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—

and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 

him.'" State v. Marshall, 303 Kan. 438, 445, 362 P.3d 587 (2015) (quoting Dusky v. 

United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 [1960]). See Woods, 301 

Kan. at 857-58.

The defense, the State, or the judge can raise the question of whether a defendant 

lacks competency to stand trial. In this case, no one questioned Robinson's competency 

after the initial competency evaluation was complete. There is nothing in the record that 

suggests that Robinson was unable to understand the nature and purpose of the 

proceedings against him or that he was unable to assist in his defense. To the contrary, 

the record shows that he understood the proceedings and that he actively participated in 

his defense. There is no evidence in the record of any mental illness that affected 

Robinson's ability to understand the proceedings, assist in his defense, or that would have 

justified a second competency evaluation. 
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In contrast, in State v. Zabala, No. 107,408, 2013 WL 1010302 (Kan. App. 2013) 

(unpublished opinion), the movant provided the district court with specific factual 

allegations supporting his claim that an evidentiary hearing should have been granted 

regarding his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency 

hearing before trial and again before sentencing. In that case, Zabala supported his claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel with a specific assertion that his trial counsel would 

testify that he suspected Zabala was incompetent and sought advice from Zabala's mother 

regarding her son's mental stability. Zabala specifically alleged that trial counsel's 

testimony would show that 

"his suspicion was such to cause him to question the Petitioner's mother regarding the 

Petitioner's mental stability and that for whatever reason, [trial counsel] chose not to take 

additional steps to verify the Petitioner's competency given that Petitioner's mother had 

no expertise or experience to properly address [trial counsel's] concerns." 2013 WL 

1010302, at *2.

The Court of Appeals panel noted that concerns about Zabala's competency were 

supported by the record. 2013 WL 1010302, at *2. The panel held that the district court 

erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing because Zabala had alleged facts that, if 

true, would entitle the movant to relief and that he had properly identified a readily 

available witness whose testimony would support such facts. 2013 WL 1010302, at *2.

After remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Zabala's claims and denied 

relief, and the denial was affirmed by another panel of this court. See Zabala v. State, No. 

116,661, 2017 WL 4558558 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion).

In this case, in contrast to Zabala, Robinson did not support his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel with specific facts as to the need for another competency 

evaluation. Robinson identified a witness in Spainhour, but he provided no facts or 

expected testimony. There is nothing in the district court's factual findings or in the 

record before us that addresses trial counsel's suspicions regarding her client's 
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competency issues. It is error to deny a K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing where the motion alleges 

facts that, if true, would entitle the movant to relief where the motion identifies readily 

available witnesses whose testimony would support such facts or other sources of 

evidence. Swenson, 284 Kan. at 939. But Robinson provides no facts supporting his 

claim.

Significantly, Robinson does not allege any facts in his original K.S.A. 60-1507 

motion or in the addendum to the motion suggesting that he was incompetent or that 

Spainhour was incompetent for failing to pursue a second competency evaluation. 

Robinson makes no allegation that his competency status had changed or that his mental 

health had declined since the first competency evaluation. He merely claims that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a second competency evaluation. Conclusory 

statements are not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Rather, the K.S.A. 60-

1507 motion must include specific factual allegations to support the claim. Skaggs, 59 

Kan. App. 2d at 130-31. Without specific facts, there is nothing to support Robinson's 

request for an evidentiary hearing based on an allegation that Spainhour was ineffective 

for failing to request a competency evaluation.

Next, Robinson argues that the record shows that he should be entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing based on trial counsel's failure to identify an expert that could speak 

to Robinson's alleged inability to form the requisite intent required for first-degree 

murder and to file a notice of the defense of lack of mental state under K.S.A. 22-3219. 

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5209 provides: "It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any 

statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable 

mental state required as an element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not 

otherwise a defense." 

Robinson claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a defense 

that due to his mental disease or defect, he was unable to form the intent of premeditation 
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required for first-degree murder. See, e.g., State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 319-23, 409 

P.3d 1 (2018). All capacity defenses in Kansas are valid only regarding the mens rea or 

specific intent of the crime. State v. Pennington, 281 Kan. 426, 434, 132 P.3d 902 (2006). 

A defendant cannot merely "'introduce evidence as to the existence of a mental disease or 

defect to litigate the defendant's mental condition in general.'" 281 Kan. at 434-35. 

Although the record supports Robinson's claim that he suffered from mental disease or 

defect, he provides no evidence that his mental disease or defect prevented him from 

forming the requisite intent to commit the crime. A review of the pleadings and 

supporting documentation show that Robinson's allegations are not supported by specific 

facts.

In addition, the record contains evidence that refutes Robinson's claim that 

Spainhour was ineffective because it shows that Spainhour considered and investigated 

the mental defect defense. At a hearing on November 8, 2013, Spainhour informed the 

district court that "there is significant documentation of mental health issues that I believe 

could result in the defense providing that notice of mental disease, but what I would tell 

the Court at this time is our investigative stage, we're still in the investigative stage." 

Spainhour indicated that she planned to make a catalog of information and consult with 

experts to determine the viability of such a defense. Approximately five weeks later, 

Spainhour informed the court that she had "no information at this time that would 

support" the defense of lack of mental state. In addition, in a subsequent motion hearing 

before trial, Spainhour sought a continuance to assist in preparing Robinson's defense 

regarding the sentencing phase. In that hearing, Spainhour confirmed that she had 

previously investigated a defense of lack of mental state, but that information regarding 

Robinson's mental state as it relates to the sentencing phase was different than her 

previous investigation. The record suggests that trial counsel investigated such a defense 

and concluded that it did not apply.
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Although Dr. Blakely evaluated Robinson for competency and not specifically for 

lack of mental state, Dr. Blakely did not conclude that Robinson had a mental disease or 

defect that prevented him from forming the requisite intent to commit the crime. In 

addition, Spainhour employed Dr. Flesher to conduct a psychological report, and he 

provided that report to her on March 9, 2014. In that report, as previously noted, Dr. 

Flesher provided a detailed psychological evaluation documenting Robinson's past and 

current struggles with mental illness. However, Dr. Flesher did not suggest that Robinson 

lacked the mental state to commit the crime. Dr. Flesher concluded that Robinson 

impulsively lashed out in anger, and when that impulsive behavior ceased "Robinson was 

left with a sense of disbelief at his actions, as well as regret and resignation, with 

knowledge of the consequences that he would inevitably face." The report stated that 

Robinson acted impulsively, but Dr. Flesher did not suggest that Robinson lacked the 

mental state required to commit first-degree murder.

In the penalty phase of the jury trial, Dr. Flesher testified as to Robinson's mental 

health and his ability to control his conduct and make decisions in stressful situations. 

The following exchange took place: 

"Q. Doctor, you're not suggesting that the defendant didn't know what he was doing that 

night, are you?

"A. No.

"Q. You're not suggesting that [Robinson] had absolutely no control over his actions, are 

you?

"A. No.

"Q. Or his choices, are you?

"A. No, I wouldn't suggest that." 

Once again, we turn to the pro se K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, Spainhour's letter, and 

the addendum to the original motion. In that motion, Robinson alleges that he was under 

"extreme mental and emotional disturbance at the time of the crime" and that Spainhour 
15

should have presented a "Mens Rea defense." He then states that he was found to have 

"mental disease," so there was enough evidence to pursue the defense. Robinson provides 

no facts as to how his mental disease or defect prevented him from forming the requisite 

mental intent nor does he provide details as to what Spainhour should have done to 

pursue that defense. In Spainhour's letter, she identifies issues for Robinson's appeal, 

including that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to "identify and prepare expert 

testimony" that Robinson's bipolar disorder prevented him from forming the requisite 

intent to commit first-degree murder. She also suggests that Robinson should raise the 

issue that trial counsel should have sought a continuance to obtain additional expert 

testimony about his mental conditions. However, Spainhour's letter does not include any 

facts to support her conclusory claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue 

that defense. Without a factual basis for his claim, there is nothing to support Robinson's 

claim that Spainhour was ineffective.

Finally, K.S.A. 60-1507 counsel interviewed Spainhour on October 29, 2018, and 

he filed an addendum to the original K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. However, even though 

counsel should have known that his assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

be supported by specific facts, he merely makes two conclusory assertions: (1) 

"Spainhour admitted that [Robinson] suffered from a serious mental illness, and that she 

was ineffective for not filing a notice of the defense of lack of mental state pursuant to 

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-5209," and (2) "Spainhour admitted that she was ineffective for 

not obtaining a second opinion of the viability of a lack of mental state defense." 

Although Robinson places great weight on Spainhour's admissions, there are no facts to 

support Spainhour's assertions. Robinson has presented no facts that he actually had a 

mental disease or defect that prevented him from forming the requisite mental intent to 

commit first-degree murder. Mental illness, by itself, does not meet the definition of 

K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5209. In addition, Spainhour provides no facts supporting the 

theory that a second opinion would have produced helpful information. Robinson 

presents no information that a second expert would have been helpful or testified that he 
16

lacked the required mental state to commit the crime. Merely identifying the fact that 

Spainhour would be a potential witness to testify that she was ineffective is not enough 

without supporting facts as to how she was ineffective. With no facts supporting his 

assertions, we conclude that Robinson has failed to show that the district court erred in 

denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.

In addition, standing alone, trial counsel's admissions that she was ineffective do 

not show ineffective assistance of counsel. Judging whether counsel is ineffective is an 

objective standard and largely a matter of law. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109-

10, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) ("Strickland, however, calls for an inquiry 

into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state 

of mind."). Consequently, Spainhour's claim that she was ineffective, without facts 

supporting such a basis, bear little weight in our analysis. See, e.g., Newland v. Hall, 527 

F.3d 1162, 1208 (11th Cir. 2008); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 n.16 

(11th Cir. 2000); Marrero v. Horn, 505 Fed. App'x. 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished 

opinion).

The record also provides nothing to show that the defense of lack of mental state 

would have any merit. Spainhour cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless 

defense. See Khalil-Alsalaami v. State, 313 Kan. 472, 499, 486 P.3d 1216 (2021) 

(showing prejudice requires proving a different result would have occurred). Without 

such a showing, we cannot conclude that she was ineffective on this basis.

On appeal, Robinson limited his argument that his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion 

warranted an evidentiary hearing to the two issues already addressed: trial counsel's 

failure to seek another competency evaluation and trial counsel's failure to pursue a 

mental disease or defect defense. Thus, we hold the other issues presented in this K.S.A. 

60-1507 motion are deemed waived. See State v. Boysaw, 309 Kan. 526, 537, 439 P.3d 

909 (2019) (when a party fails to adequately brief an issue, it is waived.). 
17

We conclude that Robinson's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion did not warrant an 

evidentiary hearing. Robinson offers only conclusory allegations and no facts to support 

any of his claims, and—where his claims could be viable 60-1507 claims at all—no basis 

can be found in the record. A K.S.A. 60-1507 motion must be supported with specific 

facts that, if true, would entitle the movant to relief on his or her claims. See Skaggs, 59 

Kan. App. 2d at 130-31. Robinson provides no facts to support any of his conclusory 

allegations. Even liberally construed, Robinson's motion does not entitle him to an 

evidentiary hearing.

Thus, we affirm the district court's summary denial of Robinson's K.S.A. 60-1507 

motion.

Affirmed.