1

Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Hall CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANDREW ALBERT HALL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A165142

 (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 01001959303)

Defendant Andrew Albert Hall appeals from a judgment of conviction 

and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of assault with a firearm 

(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)).

1 He contends the trial court erred by 

excluding evidence of an internal Sheriff’s Department report that had 

cleared him of violating departmental policy and expert testimony confirming 

that he violated no policy. Hall further contends the court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury on defense of others as to the assault charge. We will affirm 

the judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an Information 

charging Hall, a Contra Costa County Deputy Sheriff at the time, with 

1 Except where indicated otherwise, all statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
2

voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 1) and assault with a firearm 

(§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2) after he shot and killed a suspect following a 

vehicle pursuit. As to both counts, the Information alleged that Hall 

personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to count 2, the 

Information alleged that Hall personally inflicted great bodily injury 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The matter proceeded to a jury trial.

A. Prosecution’s Case

1. Dispatch Call

Around 11:00 a.m. on November 3, 2018, dispatch for the Contra Costa 

County Sheriff’s Department issued a call to patrolling units with a report of 

a suspicious person—subsequently identified as Laudemer Arboleda. The 

reporting party had called the police because Arboleda rang her doorbell and 

then walked around Laurel Drive in Danville. 

Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Deputies Nicholas Muller and Sonasi 

Maka responded in a patrol car as the primary unit. Deputy Charles Caruso, 

who had a civilian ride-along, advised that he would also address the call. 

Hall told dispatch he was making a vehicle stop of an unrelated vehicle. 

2. Units Investigate and Pursue Arboleda

Deputies Muller and Maka arrived at the scene and observed Arboleda 

entering a silver Honda. They walked toward the Honda to make contact, 

and Arboleda drove away. Deputy Caruso, who also arrived at the scene, 

noted Arboleda’s license plate. 

The deputies followed the Honda without activating their lights. Based 

on the license plate number provided by Deputy Caruso, dispatch advised 

that the Honda was not reported stolen or associated with any warrants or 

alerts. 
3

Eventually Arboleda stopped. Deputy Muller got out of his patrol car 

and tried to wave Arboleda down, but he drove away. The deputies followed 

him. Arboleda increased his speed to approximately five miles over the speed 

limit, and the deputies attempted to initiate a formal traffic stop by 

activating their overhead lights and emergency equipment. 

Arboleda stopped again, and Deputies Muller and Maka attempted to 

contact him. Arboleda, however, drove away again. The two units followed 

Arboleda and attempted to pull him over, taking turns being primary and 

secondary units, but Arboleda continued driving. 

Around this time, Sergeant Chris Martin—the supervisory deputy on 

shift—left the station and drove toward the pursuit in case the responding 

units required assistance, advising dispatch. 

Meanwhile, Arboleda ran a stop sign and turned onto Laurel Drive. At 

this point, he was driving “a little over” the speed limit. On Laurel Drive, the 

deputies pulled him over. Deputy Muller got out of his patrol vehicle and 

drew his firearm, but Arboleda drove away again. 

Arboleda then turned onto Hartz Way and parked. Deputies Muller, 

Maka and Caruso exited their patrol cars with guns drawn and ordered him 

to stop. Muller thought Arboleda looked “zombie-ish, kind of maybe out of it.” 

Thinking Arboleda did not present a danger to the deputies, Muller said, “ ‘let 

him go, don’t shoot, don’t shoot’ ” as Arboleda drove off once again, going 

westbound on Hartz Way. Muller advised dispatch that they had approached 

Arboleda at gunpoint but he drove away. 

Arboleda turned onto Front Street, and the two assigned patrol units 

continued their pursuit. Deputy Muller was again in the lead vehicle and 

advised dispatch they were traveling north on Front Street at speeds of 30 or 

35 miles per hour in light traffic. 
4

3. Hall Joins the Chase and Kills Arboleda

Near the intersection of Front Street and Diablo Road, Sergeant Martin 

and Hall converged on Arboleda. As Sergeant Martin approached, he saw 

Hall’s patrol car turning onto Diablo Road. Martin turned behind Hall, just 

as Arboleda and the two assigned units arrived at the location from the other 

direction. Hall stopped in front of Arboleda’s Honda and got out of his 

vehicle. Sergeant Martin stopped some feet away from Hall’s car, leaving a 

narrow gap between the two patrol vehicles, but stayed in his vehicle. 

Arboleda’s Honda began to roll forward while Hall walked to the back of his 

patrol car. Martin thought that Hall had entered the gap between Hall’s 

vehicle and Martin’s vehicle, that Arboleda was attempting to maneuver 

through that gap, that the gap was too narrow for him to do so, and that his 

Honda was going to hit Hall. Deputy Muller also thought Hall was at risk of 

being hit. Deputy Caruso saw Arboleda driving in Hall’s direction and did 

not think Arboleda would fit through the gap. 

Hall, who had already drawn his firearm, fired 10 shots at Arboleda. 

Sergeant Martin heard the gunshots as Arboleda was driving between the 

two patrol vehicles. Because the shots were coming from Hall toward 

Arboleda and Martin’s vehicle, Martin, who was still sitting in his vehicle,

was afraid that he (Martin) would be hit by gunfire. Nine of Hall’s shots hit 

Arboleda, and one of them was fatal. After Arboleda was shot, his car 

continued moving and crashed into a bystander vehicle. The Honda never 

struck Hall, Hall’s vehicle, or Martin’s vehicle. 

4. Accident Reconstruction

California Highway Patrol Officer Victor Ruiz, an investigator with the 

Multi-Disciplinary Accident Investigation Team specializing in accident 

reconstruction, testified that Arboleda was traveling approximately six miles 
5

per hour five seconds before the crash. Four and a half seconds before the 

crash, Arboleda was engaging the brake pedal. Three and a half seconds 

before the crash, Arboleda’s car was traveling at five miles per hour. Two 

and a half seconds before the crash, Arboleda’s car was traveling 11 miles per 

hour. By the time of the crash, it was traveling 25 miles per hour. Ruiz 

confirmed that Arboleda braked after entering the gap between the patrol 

vehicles and then accelerated after a couple of seconds. He also agreed that 

video from Hall’s body-worn camera showed the wheels of Arboleda’s car were 

pointed toward Hall. 

5. Evidence of Policies on Pursuit, Stops, and Shooting

Sergeant Martin testified regarding the Danville Police Department 

pursuit policy at the time.

2 “Normally pursuits should be limited to two 

units, a primary and a secondary unit, unless in the supervisor’s judgment 

additional units are necessary.” (Bolding omitted.) Although other units who 

hear the broadcast about the pursuit are to move to the area to assist and 

“remain alert to the pursuit progress and location,” they should “stay off the 

air and away from the pursuit.” (Bolding omitted.) “Barricading a roadway 

should be avoided unless necessary to safely end a pursuit and shall not be 

undertaken unless authorized by the patrol supervisor.” Martin 

acknowledged that it was standard for officers to draw their weapons at the 

end of a pursuit. 

Mark Johnson, a Lieutenant at the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s 

Department (Sheriff’s Department), testified about the California Peace 

Officer Standards and Training and the training Hall received. Johnson 

2 Sergeant Martin explained that “the town of Danville is a contract city 

for the sheriff’s office; the sheriff’s office supplies their sworn personnel. 

Their police officers are also sheriff’s deputies.” 
6

explained that a vehicular pursuit usually results in a high-risk stop, in 

which a primary officer typically gives commands to the suspect and a 

secondary officer ensures that the primary officer and bystanders are not in 

danger. Hall was trained to communicate with fellow officers and dispatch 

before and during a high-risk stop, to know the location of other officers and 

civilians so cross-fire and injury can be avoided, to maintain 20–30 feet 

between his patrol car and the suspect vehicle, to conduct the stop from 

behind the vehicle, to weigh whether the need for immediate apprehension 

outweighs the danger created by the pursuit, and to not drive straight toward 

the suspect vehicle. Hall was also trained on barricade policy, which provides 

that barricading a roadway should be avoided unless necessary to safely end 

a pursuit and shall not be undertaken unless authorized by the patrol 

supervisor, in order to avoid a collision or the suspect’s flight into other traffic 

lanes or onto a sidewalk. Johnson confirmed that officers who are not 

primary or secondary units are to stay away from the pursuit unless they 

have permission to join. 

Johnson further testified that officers are trained not to discharge a 

firearm at a moving vehicle except in defense of self or others. As Johnson 

explained, “[i]f a vehicle is moving and you shoot the driver, that vehicle has 

to go somewhere. Basically no one’s in control of the car.” 

B. Defense Case

Deputy Caruso testified that one of the times the deputies stopped 

Arboleda, Caruso stood in front of Arboleda’s car and pointed a gun at him. 

Arboleda rolled forward toward Caruso, and Caruso moved out of Arboleda’s 

way, returned to his patrol vehicle, and continued the pursuit. Later he 

observed that Hall “had come off of Diablo and canted his car on Front Street 

. . . which stopped [Arboleda’s] silver Honda from being able to go right there 
7

in that direction.” Then Sergeant Martin arrived and stopped alongside 

Hall’s patrol car. 

Dr. Rajeev Kelkar testified as an expert in accident reconstruction and 

biomechanics. According to Dr. Kelkar, nine seconds elapsed from the time 

Arboleda’s car started moving to the time of impact with the bystander car on 

Diablo Road. According to the video footage, “five seconds before the impact, 

the Honda is in a sharp right steer maneuver to get past the front-end of the 

Martin police vehicle” and lightly braking. The speed of Arboleda’s car 

increased “from about 6 miles per hour to between 12 and 15 miles per hour” 

during this time frame. Hall started shooting at Arboleda approximately 4.4 

seconds after Arboleda began moving and stopped shooting approximately 2.2 

seconds later. Arboleda’s speed was six miles per hour when Hall first shot 

him and had increased to 12 miles per hour at the last shot. In short, Hall 

started firing about a half-second after Arboleda maneuvered around 

Martin’s vehicle and toward Hall.

On cross-examination, Dr. Kelkar confirmed that Arboleda was braking 

as he drove around the front of Sergeant Martin’s vehicle and did not fully 

depress the gas pedal until after Hall shot him. A study performed by The 

Foundation for Traffic Safety on the Impact Speed and a Pedestrian’s Risk of 

Severe Injury or Death showed a near zero percent risk of severe injury from 

a vehicle traveling 10 miles per hour. 

Jason Fries testified as a 3-D video reconstruction expert. Although he 

lacked expertise in accident reconstruction, he testified that Hall fired all ten 

rounds in 2.16 seconds, that Hall’s center of mass was approximately six or

seven inches from Arboleda’s Honda less than a second after the first shot, 

and Hall was 0.6 feet from the Honda when he fired the third shot and 1.2 

feet from the Honda when he fired the fifth shot. 
8

C. Jury Verdict and Sentence

The jury deadlocked as to count 1 (voluntary manslaughter), with seven

of 12 jurors voting for acquittal, but convicted Hall of count 2 (assault with a 

firearm). The jury also found true the allegations of personal use of a firearm 

and personal infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Hall 

to six years in prison. Hall filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

Hall contends the trial court erred by precluding him from introducing 

evidence that he did not violate departmental policy, which he claims was 

relevant to the prosecutor’s arguments that Hall acted unreasonably and 

excessively. He further contends the court erred by not instructing sua 

sponte on defense of others on the count 2 charge for assault with a firearm. 

Relevant to both of these arguments are several instructions the court 

provided to the jury.

As to count 1 (voluntary manslaughter), the trial court instructed 

pursuant to CALCRIM No. 572. That instruction required the People to 

prove (1) that Hall committed an act that caused Arboleda’s death and 

unlawfully intended to kill someone, or (2) that Hall intentionally committed 

an act that caused Arboleda’s death and the natural consequences of that act 

were dangerous to human life, that Hall knew when he acted that the act was 

dangerous to human life, that Hall “deliberately acted with conscious 

disregard for human life,” and that Hall “killed without lawful excuse or 

justification.” (Italics added.)

Based on CALCRIM No. 505, the trial court also instructed on selfdefense or defense of another as applied to manslaughter: “The defendant is 

not guilty of manslaughter, which is charged in Count 1, if he was justified in 

killing someone in self-defense or defense of another. [¶] The defendant acted 
9

in lawful self-defense or defense of another if: [¶] 1. The defendant 

reasonably believed that he or Sergeant Martin was in imminent danger of 

being killed or suffering great bodily injury; [¶] 2. The defendant reasonably 

believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend 

against the danger; and [¶] 3. The defendant used no more force than was 

reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. [¶] . . . [¶] The 

reasonableness of a particular use of force by a police officer must be judged 

from the perspective of a reasonable police officer with the same knowledge 

and training as the defendant rather than with the 2020 vision of 

hindsight. . . . The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the killing was not justified. If the People have not met this 

burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of manslaughter.” 

Regarding count 2 (assault with a firearm), the trial court instructed

pursuant to CALCRIM No. 875. That instruction required the People to 

prove that Hall acted with a firearm willfully and in a way that would by its 

nature directly and probably result in the application of force to a person, 

that Hall was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize 

that his acts by its nature would directly and probably result in the 

application of force to someone, that Hall had the present ability to apply 

force with a firearm to a person, and that Hall “did not act in self-defense or 

in defense of someone else.” (Italics added.)

The trial court thereafter instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3470, 

which gives the court the option of instructing on self-defense, defense of 

others, or both. This time, the court only chose to instruct on self-defense, 

and not defense of others: “Self-defense is a defense to voluntary 

manslaughter and to assault with a firearm. [¶] The defendant is not guilty 

of these crimes if he used force against the other person in lawful self-
10

defense. [¶] The defendant acted in lawful self-defense if: [¶] 1. The 

defendant reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of suffering bodily 

injury or was in imminent danger of being touched unlawfully while in a 

vehicular pursuit; [¶] 2. The defendant reasonably believed that the 

immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger; and 

[¶] 3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to 

defend against that danger. [¶] Belief in future harm is not sufficient no 

matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant 

must have believed there was imminent danger of violence to himself. 

Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and he must have acted 

because of that belief. [¶] The defendant is only entitled to use that amount 

of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in this situation. 

[¶] If the defendant used more force than reasonable, the defendant did not 

act in lawful self-defense. [¶] When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs 

were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and 

appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar 

situation with similar knowledge would have believed.” (Italics added.)

In light of these instructions, the issues for the jury included whether 

Hall acted with conscious disregard for life, whether he reasonably believed 

the immediate use of force was necessary, and whether he used more force 

than was reasonably necessary, based in part on Hall’s knowledge at the 

time. Germane to the first issue on appeal—the exclusion of defense 

evidence—the prosecution attempted to prove these facts by emphasizing 

that Hall acted contrary to what he knew from his training, including 

departmental policy, and therefore acted with the mens rea needed for 

voluntary manslaughter and unreasonably for purposes of self-defense. 

Pertinent to the second issue on appeal—purported instructional error—the 
11

trial court instructed under CALCRIM No. 875 that self-defense and defense 

of others were defenses to the assault with a firearm charge, but CALCRIM 

No. 3470 referred only to self-defense.

A. Exclusion of Evidence

Hall contends the trial court precluded him from introducing evidence 

relevant to the departmental policies relied upon by the prosecution. 

Specifically, he complains that he should have been able to introduce 

evidence of an internal investigation conducted by the Sheriff’s Department, 

which found he had not violated departmental policy in regard to Arboleda’s 

killing. He further contends the court precluded him from introducing expert 

testimony that he had not violated those policies. We conclude that, if any 

error occurred, it was harmless.

1. Procedural Background

Before trial, the prosecution moved to introduce evidence of the 

training Hall received on the use of force, high-speed pursuits, and high-risk 

stops. The prosecution also moved to exclude the evidence of Hall being 

cleared by the Sheriff’s Department of violating internal departmental 

policies. Hall, meanwhile, moved in limine to exclude any “evidence or 

testimony that would claim or allege [he] violated departmental policies when 

he used force against Mr. Arboleda.” 

As characterized in Hall’s opening brief, the 300-page Sheriff 

Department’s report described an internal affairs investigation into the 

shooting. According to Hall, the report concluded: “The investigation did not 

reveal any violations of Contra Costa County Office of the Sheriff Policies and 

Procedures. Viewed objectively, the actions . . . concerning Mr. Arboleda were 

legal, proper, and in congruence with Contra Costa [County] Office of the 

Sheriff Policies and Procedures.” 
12

The trial court granted the prosecution’s request to introduce evidence 

of Hall’s training, as relevant to his state of mind. The court further agreed 

with the prosecution that the Sheriff Department’s internal investigation was 

not relevant to the issues at trial. In addition, the court granted Hall’s 

motion to exclude “references to alleged policy violations, . . . because it’s not 

going to be couched in terms of policy violation or no violations, but it goes 

back to what kind of training did Deputy Hall have and then the jury will 

take that information and factor it in in determining whether or not Deputy 

Hall acted reasonably on the day in question.” The court observed, “I don’t 

think anyone should be testifying about whether or not there was a violation

of sheriff’s policy here.” (Italics added.) The court explained: it is “not 

relevant that the department may have cleared him,” and “[t]his is a criminal 

trial and it will be up to 12 jurors to decide whether or not he acted 

reasonably in his use of force.” For the same reason, the court precluded any 

expert testimony as to whether Hall acted in lawful self-defense. 

In her opening statement, the prosecutor began to recite the Sheriff

Department’s policy on vehicle pursuits, and Hall’s attorney objected. The 

trial court noted the objection and stated it would be addressed at another 

time, and the prosecutor continued her opening statement, interspersing 

departmental policy with her descriptions of Hall’s conduct. 

Outside the presence of the jury, Hall’s attorney explained his 

objection, complaining that the prosecutor stated that Hall had violated 

policy. The trial court correctly observed that the prosecutor had not actually 

said Hall violated the policy but merely stated what the policy was, although 

the implication was that Hall had violated it. The court reiterated its ruling: 

“Let it be clear though that I did grant the in limine that there was to be no 

argument and no evidence presented as to Deputy Hall violating Contra 
13

Costa policy. The policies can be put into evidence. The conduct of Deputy 

Hall can be put into evidence. And then the jury has to make a 

determination.” 

Defense counsel asserted that, if the prosecutor was going to argue that 

Hall violated policy, the defense should be able to “bring in evidence that he 

didn’t violate policy, including the fact that there was a full investigation 

conducted.” The trial court confirmed that “whether or not Deputy Hall 

violated department policy is not an issue that’s to be litigated here. So, the 

People walk a fine line here because on the one hand it is relevant to the 

issue of reasonableness, whether a police officer is conducting himself in 

accordance with department policies; on the other hand, you run the risk of 

invading the province of the jury on the issue of reasonableness because the 

issue is[,] was Deputy Hall reasonable in his belief that he needed to use 

deadly force to [meet] deadly force. It’s not whether or not he violated some 

technical aspects of vehicle pursuit policy. So, are we clear, Prosecution?” 

The prosecutor replied, “Yes.” As described above, the prosecutor thereafter 

introduced evidence of Hall’s training and departmental policies on vehicle 

pursuits, barricading, high-risk stops, and use of force.3

In sum, the trial court allowed evidence of the departmental policies on 

which Hall was trained, precluded evidence of the department’s 

3 While testifying, Sergeant Martin expressed confusion as to what he 

could say given the in limine rulings. The trial court explained, “What you 

are allowed to testify about—or I shouldn’t say allowed, or what this case is 

really about in terms of the jury is policies, what were the policies, what’s the 

training, and then the jury will factor that policy training along with other 

facts and determine whether or not Deputy Hall’s actions were reasonable at 

the time. So they’re not going to be asked to determine whether or not any 

policy was violated, they’re going to be asked to determine whether or not 

Deputy Hall’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances.” 
14

determination that he had not violated any policies, generally prohibited 

evidence or argument as to whether any policies were “violated,” but allowed 

argument that Hall acted inconsistent with the policies on which he was 

trained and therefore his conduct was unreasonable. 

2. Abuse of Discretion

Respondent insists that the prosecution’s evidence of Hall’s training on 

high-risk stops, pursuit policy, barricading, and use of force was relevant to 

determine his mens rea. For the voluntary manslaughter charge, Hall’s 

training was germane to whether he knew his actions were dangerous to 

human life and whether he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for 

human life when he shot and killed Arboleda. It was also relevant to 

whether Hall acted in lawful self-defense, which required the jury to consider 

what a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge 

would have believed, and whether he applied reasonable force. 

Hall’s point, however, is not that the prosecutor’s evidence was 

irrelevant, but that even though the prosecution was allowed to produce 

evidence that Hall violated departmental policy (and therefore acted 

unreasonably and with conscious disregard for life), Hall was not allowed to 

produce evidence that he did not violate policy and that his conduct was 

therefore reasonable, particularly for purposes of his self-defense theory. We 

review these evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

a. The Internal Department Report and Ruling

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the 

Sheriff Department’s report that had cleared Hall of departmental violations. 

This internal investigation, including its conclusion as to whether Hall

departed from departmental policy, would have risked the jury deciding the 

case based on the department’s evaluation of whether Hall followed internal 
15

protocol, rather than on the jury’s own evaluation of whether Hall acted 

reasonably under the circumstances. (See Thompson v. City of Chicago (7th

Cir. 2006) 472 F.3d 444, 458; People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 

168–170 (Brown) [jury would look to an internal affairs investigator and 

member of the police department’s use-of-force board as a better judge than 

they of the reasonableness of the officer’s tactics].) 

b. Other Evidence That Hall Did Not Violate Policy

Hall and respondent assume that, for Hall to introduce other evidence 

that he did not violate department policy, Hall would have needed to call an 

expert in police procedures. For expert witness testimony to be admissible, it 

must be “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience 

that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, 

§ 801, subd. (a).) Even then, an “expert must not usurp the function of the 

jury” (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1099), and it is the 

exclusive province of the jury to resolve any conflicts in the evidence (see 

People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206).

The parties debate whether expert testimony that Hall did not violate 

policy would have been permissible under Evidence Code section 801. Hall 

contends that whether his actions were consistent with the Sheriff

Department’s Policy and Procedure Section 1.06.52, regarding vehicle 

pursuits (including barricading), and Policy and Procedure Section 1.06.61,

regarding the use of force, were subjects sufficiently beyond common 

experience that expert testimony would have been useful. Respondent 

disagrees. 

Respondent points us to Brown, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 140, which 

held it was error to allow an expert to testify about officer training on the use 

of force and opine that the force used by the officer was justified. The court of 
16

appeal explained that the testimony was improper because at issue was not a 

specialized law enforcement tool, but the officer’s use of his fists, which the 

jury could evaluate without the need for expert testimony. The testimony 

also improperly summarized the law and invaded the province of the jury to 

evaluate the reasonableness of the force employed. (Id. at pp. 165–169.)

Both parties try to find support in People v. Sibrian (2016) 3 

Cal.App.5th 127 (Sibrian). There, the defendant had refused to exit his 

vehicle after a traffic stop and officers punched, tased, and handcuffed him. 

(Id. at pp. 129–130.) The trial court ruled that an expert could not testify 

that the officers’ conduct was reasonable or constituted excessive force, which 

would be for the jury to decide. (Id. at p. 134.) But it allowed the prosecutor 

to call an expert “in the area of law enforcement training, law enforcement 

tactics, and law enforcement procedures regarding the use of force” and 

opine, based on a hypothetical similar to the facts of the case, that the 

officers’ conduct was consistent “with the industry standard.” (Id. at p. 131.) 

The court of appeal affirmed because “jurors would not necessarily know 

about the need for escalating force in response to a noncompliant suspect.” 

(Id. at p. 134.)

Hall’s case, involving his training on high-speed pursuits and high-risk 

stops, is arguably closer to Sibrian than it is to Brown, which only involved 

an evaluation of an officer’s use of his fists. If so, Hall should have been 

allowed to present expert testimony on whether he complied with the policies 

that the prosecutor insisted he breached. In fairness, since the prosecutor 

elected to prove that Hall acted unreasonably by showing his conduct was 

contrary to the departmental policy with which he was trained, the defense 

should have been allowed to call an expert to explain why Hall’s conduct 

actually conformed with that policy—not to prove whether or not a policy was 
17

violated, but to equip the jury to decide whether Hall’s conduct was 

reasonable or in conscious disregard for human life. Indeed, the fact that the 

prosecution introduced the policies through other peace officers who, in effect, 

testified as experts arguably compounded the unfairness to Hall.

That said, the record is not clear that Hall ever asked to present an 

expert on the specific issue of whether his conduct was consistent with the 

policies with which he was trained—or that the trial court would have 

rejected such a request. Hall sought admission of the internal departmental 

report that concluded he did not “violate” policy, and the court indicated it 

would not allow evidence or argument that departmental policy was (or was 

not) violated. But the court was open to evidence and argument that Hall 

acted consistent with his training. It cannot be said that the court abused its 

discretion if it was never asked to exercise it.

Ultimately, we need not decide whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in ruling as it did. As discussed next, even if the court erred, the 

error was harmless.4

3. Harmless Error

Where a trial court has erroneously excluded evidence under state 

evidentiary rules, we consider whether it is “reasonably probable the jury 

would have reached a result more favorable to” the appellant if the evidence 

had been admitted. (People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 791; People v. 

Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1001, quoting People v. Watson (1956) 46 

4 Respondent argues that the evidence was also inadmissible under 

Evidence Code section 352 because it would have caused an undue 

consumption of time and confusion for the jury. Although the trial court did 

not rely on that reasoning, we may affirm the court’s ruling on any ground. 

(People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12.) But since we conclude 

that any error in excluding the evidence was harmless, we need not decide 

this alternative theory of exclusion.
18

Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) [Watson harmless error standard applies in cases of 

erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence].)

Here, both counts required the prosecutor to prove that Hall “did not 

act in self-defense.” On this issue, evidence that Hall’s conduct was 

consistent with his training and departmental policy may have been relevant 

to whether Hall reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was 

needed and whether Hall used no more force than was reasonably necessary

for purposes of self-defense. The question, therefore, is whether the 

admission of the evidence would have led a juror to conclude that Hall acted 

reasonably in firing 10 shots at Arboleda as Arboleda’s Honda rolled through 

the gap at approximately six miles per hour.5

Hall fails to establish this. Although Hall states generally that the 

trial court precluded evidence that he did not violate departmental policy, he 

does not point to any offer of proof that he had an expert prepared to testify 

or what the testimony would have been. Absent such an offer of proof, it is 

impossible for us to determine whether any erroneously excluded evidence 

would have been prejudicial. Even if we assumed that Hall could have found 

an expert to testify along the lines of the opinions in the Sheriff Department’s 

report, Hall does not provide a record citation for the report—which does not 

appear to be in the record. Nor does Hall identify any specific opinion in the 

report, or any policy to which Hall adhered, that would have led a juror to 

find a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

5 Although the trial court did not instruct the jury on defense of others as 

to count 2, that does not change the analysis here, because the analysis is the 

same as to both self-defense and defense of others.
19

Hall argues that this was a close case on the issue of self-defense or 

defense of others because of the amount of time jurors spent on the issue and 

the questions they asked during deliberations. (Citing People v. Woodard 

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 329, 341 [six-hour deliberation and conflicting evidence 

suggested the case was close]; People v. Pearch (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1282, 

1295 [juror questions and requests for readback indicated a close case].) He 

also points to the fact that the jury voted 7–5 to acquit on the voluntary 

manslaughter count. (Citing People v. Epps (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 691, 698 

[verdict reflecting jury’s selective belief in the evidence indicated prejudicial 

error].) It is true that the jurors asked questions pertaining to CALCRIM 

No. 505 (self-defense or defense of others) as to count 1, and one of those 

questions asked whether, in deciding voluntary manslaughter, they should 

take into account all evidence “(including police policies, procedures, etc.)” or 

just the “moments of the actual shooting.” But we cannot discern from the 

record what portion of the jury’s deliberations pertained to self-defense or 

defense of others. Moreover, there is no indication that the jurors’ concerns 

had anything to do with the subject of the excluded evidence—whether Hall’s 

actions complied or did not comply with departmental policy. Jurors asked 

whether they could consider police policies, but that does not mean they were 

on the fence as to whether Hall complied with them. In any event, absent an 

offer of proof, we cannot determine whether the excluded evidence would 

have tipped the balance regardless of how close the issue was for the jury.

Hall also argues that the prosecutor, especially in closing argument, 

relied heavily on the idea that Hall’s acts were inconsistent with 

departmental policy. Specifically, Hall contends the prosecutor “explicitly 

argued that [he] did not follow the Sheriff department’s ‘pursuit policy,’ or the 

department rules regarding (1) barricading (2) pursuit or (3) the use of force.” 
20

There is nothing wrong, however, with the prosecutor arguing the 

significance of the evidence. The trial court allowed defense counsel to do the 

same, explaining to Hall’s lawyer outside the jury’s presence that, although 

he could not argue there was no evidence Hall violated his training or 

departmental policies, he could argue that Hall “did not act inconsistently . . . 

with his training.” In response, defense counsel said, “I got it, that’s fine.” 

Counsel proceeded with his closing. Hall fails to show that unspecified expert 

testimony would have made his arguments so much more persuasive that 

any juror, otherwise convinced of his guilt, would have found a reasonable 

doubt.

Hall further contends that the exclusion of the evidence not only 

violated state evidentiary rules but also infringed on his constitutional rights 

to a fair trial and due process, and therefore the issue of harmless error 

should be evaluated under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 

(Chapman) [requiring “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” for errors of 

constitutional dimension]. We disagree. 

The exclusion of expert testimony as to whether Hall violated specific 

departmental policies did not constitute “the complete exclusion of evidence 

intended to establish an accused’s defense.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 926, 999.) Hall was free to—and did—make the case that his conduct 

was consistent with his training on high-risk stops and pursuits and that he 

fired in self-defense. Even without expert testimony that he did not violate 

departmental policy, Hall had a meaningful opportunity to present his 

defense. (See Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690 [the Constitution 

guarantees criminal defendants “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a 

complete defense’ ”].) Accordingly, there was no federal constitutional error, 

and Chapman does not apply.
21

B. Jury Instruction

As to voluntary manslaughter, the trial court instructed on self-defense 

and defense of Sergeant Martin pursuant to CALCRIM No. 505. As to 

assault with a firearm, the court instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 875 

that the prosecutor had to prove Hall “did not act in self-defense or in defense 

of someone else,” but that instruction did not set forth the elements of those 

defenses. In instructing further with CALCRIM No. 3470—which can be 

used to state the elements of self-defense and defense of others—the 

instruction given by the court mentioned only self-defense, not defense of 

others. Hall argues that the specific instruction (CALCRIM No. 3470)

prevailed over the more general instruction (CALCRIM No. 875), and 

therefore the instruction—specifically, the court’s inclusion of self-defense but 

not defense of others in its reading of CALCRIM No. 3470—improperly 

allowed jurors to convict on count 2 without finding that the attempt to 

commit an injury was “unlawful.” Hall’s argument has no merit.

1. Forfeiture

The parties and the trial court discussed CALCRIM No. 3470 before it 

was read to the jury. The court stated it would include the language that 

“defendant reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of suffering bodily 

injury or was in imminent danger of being touched unlawfully ‘while engaged 

in a lawful vehicular pursuit,’ ” leaving no question that the instruction 

would cover only self-defense. (Italics added.) Hall’s attorney replied, “[t]hat 

works for the defense” and did not take issue with the instruction or request 

that it refer to the defense of Sergeant Martin.

Respondent argues that defense counsel’s agreement to CALCRIM 

No. 3470 forfeited Hall’s current claim. Hall counters that appellate review 

is proper because the purported error affected his substantial rights and 
22

therefore no objection was required. (§ 1259; People v. Campbell (2020) 51 

Cal.App.5th 463, 499; People v. Rivera (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 141, 146.) 

Further, Hall argues that once the trial court instructed on self-defense, it 

had a sua sponte duty to do so fully and correctly. Because “[a]scertaining 

whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the 

defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim,” we 

will proceed to the merits. (People v. Anderson (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 

1249.)

2. The Trial Court Did Not Err

The trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to 

the issues and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v. 

Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73.) Nonetheless, “[a] trial court’s duty to instruct, 

sua sponte, on particular defenses arises ‘ “only if it appears that the 

defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence 

supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the 

defendant’s theory of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 

424, italics added.)

CALCRIM No. 3470, entitled “Right to Self-Defense or Defense of 

Another (Non-Homicide),” bears this out. It speaks of “lawful (self-defense/ 

[or] defense of another),” indicating that the trial court may choose whether 

defense of others should be included in the instruction or not. The Use Note 

explains: “The court must instruct on a defense when the defendant requests 

it and there is substantial evidence supporting the defense. The court has a 

sua sponte duty to instruct on a defense if there is substantial evidence

supporting it and either the defendant is relying on it or it is not inconsistent

with the defendant’s theory of the case. . . . Substantial evidence means 

evidence of a defense, which, if believed, would be sufficient for a reasonable 
23

jury to find a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” (Italics added, 

bolding removed.)

Here, the trial court had no obligation to include a reference to defense 

of others in its reading of CALCRIM No. 3470, because Hall never relied on 

that defense and because there was no substantial evidence to support it.

a. Hall Did Not Rely on Defense of Others

Hall represents that “the defense was that the shots Officer Hall fired 

during [a] 2.16 second interval were in self-defense/defense of another,” and 

the “ ‘another’ ” was Sergeant Martin. To the contrary, Hall did not assert a 

defense of others theory in opening statement, in negotiating the jury 

instructions on count 2, or in closing argument.

In opening statement—long before the jury instruction conference—

Hall’s attorney repeatedly stated it was a “self-defense” case. She 

emphasized that Arboleda’s car was heading directly at Hall, the tires were 

pointed in his direction, and Hall faced serious injury. She never mentioned 

any concern for Sergeant Martin or anyone else.

In closing argument, Hall’s counsel only argued self-defense, not 

defense of others. Indeed, counsel repeatedly emphasized that Hall shot 

Arboleda to protect himself. For example, counsel stated: “The inquiry is as 

narrow as that gap between those two patrol cars and everything unfolded 

rapidly in an intense situation. Andrew Hall fired those shots to protect 

himself from being run over by a car.” (Italics added.) Counsel later argued: 

“Here are the three elements of self-defense, but here’s the proper lens to look 

at them through. He is not guilty unless the prosecution can prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that . . . he did not reasonably believe he was in imminent 

danger. . . .” (Italics added.) “If it was reasonable for Deputy Hall to believe 

he was going to be hit by the Honda and injured seriously or killed, the 
24

Honda did not actually have to have hit him. He just has to have a 

reasonable belief.” (Italics added.) “[H]e began firing his weapon in order to 

stop the Honda from running him over.” (Italics added.) “[T]raining says you 

can shoot at a moving vehicle in defense of your life.” (Italics added.) Finally, 

counsel concluded: “Andrew Hall is not guilty because he was reasonably 

defending himself.” (Italics added.) Not once during his closing argument did 

defense counsel suggest that Hall believed he was defending Sergeant 

Martin. 

b. No Evidence of Defense of Others

Moreover, there was no evidence—let alone substantial evidence—that 

Hall reasonably believed Sergeant Martin was in danger and acted 

reasonably to defend him.

Hall did not testify. He refers us to Sergeant Martin’s testimony that 

the gap between Martin’s and Hall’s vehicles was “narrow,” Martin “saw Mr. 

Arboleda’s car coming in [his] direction” as he pulled in, Martin was afraid 

Arboleda would “ ‘ram him’ ” because he “drove right at [Martin],” and he 

thought Arboleda was going to hit him. However, Hall’s depiction of the 

testimony is inaccurate.

Sergeant Martin actually testified that, while he initially believed 

Arboleda was going to run into his vehicle, Arboleda instead made a “hard 

right” and attempted to go through the gap between Hall’s and Martin’s 

vehicles.6 Martin thought Arboleda was not going to make it and was going 

6 Sergeant Martin did say that he lacked a clear view of Hall’s location 

because Martin was “looking at the car that was driving at me.” But he also 

testified that, by the time he heard the shots fired, the Honda was going 

through the gap between the cars. Martin explained: “I thought [Arboleda] 

was going to hit me, but then he turned and went into that gap between our 

two vehicles.” (Italics added.)
25

to hit Hall, believing that Hall was standing in the gap. When Hall started 

shooting, Arboleda was venturing through the gap and Martin’s concern was 

not that Arboleda was going to hit him with his vehicle, but that Hall was 

going to hit him with gunfire. Other percipient witnesses, namely Deputies 

Muller and Caruso, suggested that Hall was at risk of being hit by Arboleda. 

Officer Ruiz—on cross-examination by defense counsel—agreed that the 

wheels of Arboleda’s car were pointed at Hall . 

Moreover, even if a juror could conclude that Hall reasonably believed 

the Honda heading for him posed some imminent danger to Sergeant Martin, 

there is no substantial evidence that Hall “used no more force than was 

reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.” (CALCRIM No. 3470.) 

Arboleda was driving through the gap toward Hall at roughly six miles per 

hour, while Martin remained inside his patrol vehicle. No juror would 

reasonably conclude that Hall firing 10 shots at Arboleda—including shots in 

Martin’s general direction—was a reasonable defense against whatever little 

harm Martin faced from Arboleda. No substantial evidence supported a 

defense of others theory as to count 2.7

Because Hall did not rely on a defense of others theory and there was 

no substantial evidence to support that theory, the trial court was not 

obligated to instruct sua sponte on defense of others. Hall fails to establish 

that the court erred in not including “defense of Sergeant Martin” in its 

reading of CALCRIM No. 3470 as to count 2. 

7 Hall assumes that, since the trial court mentioned defense of Sergeant 

Martin in instructing on defenses pertaining to voluntary manslaughter, the 

court must have found substantial evidence that Hall acted in Martin’s 

defense. But Hall does not point to anywhere in the trial where the 

sufficiency of the evidence for defense of others was raised as an issue for the 

court to decide. As such, the mention of Martin in the CALCRIM No. 505 

instruction bears no significance here.
26

3. Harmless Error

Even if we were to assume that the trial court should have mentioned

“defense of Sergeant Martin” in reading CALCRIM No. 3470, or that some 

error arose because the instruction under CALCRIM No. 3470 contained no 

explicit reference to defense of others while the earlier instruction under 

CALCRIM No. 875 did, the failure to reference defense of others in 

CALCRIM No. 3470 would not compel reversal. We evaluate instructional 

error under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818. (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

620, 670 [court’s failure to instruct on the affirmative defense of 

unreasonable belief in consent evaluated under Watson]; People v. Beltran 

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 955 [“ ‘ “[M]isdirection of the jury, including incorrect, 

ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not amount to 

federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard 

articulated” in Watson’ ”].)

Just as the jury rejected Hall’s claims of self-defense on count 2, the 

jury would have rejected a claim of defense of Sergeant Martin, especially 

since Hall was outside his patrol vehicle and far more exposed to Arboleda’s 

car than Martin was. Again, we see no probability that a rational juror 

would have found that Hall was reasonably acting in Martin’s defense when 

he fired 10 times, including in Martin’s general direction, while Arboleda 

drove through the gap toward Hall at roughly six miles per hour and Martin 

was inside his own patrol car. 

In contending the purported instructional error was prejudicial, Hall 

points us to the 7–5 vote for acquittal on the manslaughter charge. He 

argues that jurors were instructed on self-defense on the assault charge and 

found him guilty, so they must have rejected the self-defense theory. As to 

the manslaughter charge, however, jurors were instructed on self-defense 
27

and defense of others, and seven jurors voted for acquittal. Thus, he urges, 

the rational explanation for the two verdicts is that the seven jurors voting 

for acquittal found that Hall acted in defense of another, and Hall would have 

obtained the same vote on count 2 if only the trial court had mentioned 

defense of Sergeant Martin in CALCRIM No. 3470.

We disagree. Given the absence of evidence supporting a defense of 

others theory, the 7–5 split on the manslaughter charge is not logically 

attributable to a juror’s belief that Hall acted to defend Sergeant Martin. 

Instead, it is most likely attributable to the fact that manslaughter, unlike 

assault with a firearm, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

defendant possessed a mens rea of intent to kill or conscious disregard for 

human life. Any error arising out of the court’s instruction under CALCRIM 

No. 3470 was harmless.8

C. Cumulative Error

Reversal is required when the cumulative effect of errors deprives the 

defendant of a fair trial and due process. (People v. Williams (2009) 170 

Cal.App.4th 587, 646.) Hall contends that reversal is required here due to 

the combined effect of the errors alleged in his opening brief. Not so.

As we have explained, there was no instructional error, and any error 

in the exclusion of evidence was harmless. We further conclude that, even if 

8 Hall argues that the Chapman standard applies because jurors were 

given both proper and improper instructions on the “ ‘unlawful attempt’ ” 

element of assault. (Citing In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 591 [state must 

prove that no “rational juror who made the findings reflected in the verdict 

and heard the evidence at trial could have had reasonable doubt regarding 

the findings necessary to convict the defendant [absent the instructional 

error]”].) We disagree with Hall’s premise, but in any event we would affirm 

even if Chapman applied. No rational juror could have had a reasonable 

doubt that Hall’s conduct was unlawful based on a defense of others theory.
28

there was instructional error, that error was also harmless, and the two 

reputed errors collectively did not deprive Hall of a fair trial. (See People v. 

Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 454 [“A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a 

perfect one”].) We find no cause to reverse the judgment.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CHOU, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.

SIMONS, J.

People v. Hall / A165142