J-S57005-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONALD TERELL STOCKTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 844 MDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 8, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-31-CR-0000254-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2019

Ronald Terell Stockton appeals pro se from the order dismissing as 

untimely his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”). We affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the history of this case as follows:

As has been the modus operandi of [Appellant], his latest 

PCRA petition echoes a laundry list of alleged grievances against 

the trial court, his court-appointed trial counsel, and the 

Huntingdon County District Attorney. [Appellant]’s allegations, 

which have been previously litigated, are raised again well-after 

the final judgment in this case. 

. . . [Appellant] was found guilty of one count of aggravated 

assault after a trial by jury on September 16, 2014. He was 

sentenced to 27 to 100 months in a state correctional institution 

to run consecutively to any sentence that he was then serving. 

[Appellant] subsequently filed multiple post-sentence motions and 

multiple appeals to the Superior Court.

After the judgment of sentence was affirmed by the Superior 

Court on December 4, 2015, [Appellant’s] petition for allowance 
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of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied at 14 

MAL 2016 on April 20, 2016.

[Appellant] then filed a PCRA petition that was dismissed by 

this court on August 15, 2017, and that dismissal was affirmed by 

the Superior Court on August 6, 2018, at 1421 MDA 2017. On 

May 3, 2019, [Appellant] filed another document entitled PCRA 

petition that he referred to in the preamble as a “nunc pro tunc

PCRA petition.” It is the dismissal of [the] May 3, 2019 petition 

that brings us to [Appellant’s] latest appeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/8/19, at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant states several questions for this Court’s consideration. 

However, our resolution of the following are dispositive of this appeal:

A. Whether the [PCRA] court failed to analyze [Appellant]’s 

claim/petition as meeting the time exception to the PCRA under 

actual innocence?

B. Whether the [PCRA] court failed to analyze [Appellant]’s 

claim/petition as meeting the exception to the time bar of [the] 

PCRA under the miscarriage of justice analysis?

Appellant’s brief at 1.

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We begin our review by noting that it is well-settled that the timeliness 

of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

____________________________________________

1 The PCRA court, by order served on Appellant by first class mail on June 4, 

2019, directed Appellant to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal 

within twenty-one days pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On July 8, 2019, the 

clerk of courts docketed a statement that Appellant dated June 7, 2019. We 

shall assume for the sake of argument that Appellant’s statement was timely 

filed pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 780 n.7 (Pa.Super. 2008) (accepting under the 

prisoner mailbox rule date on proof of service as the date on which 1925(b) 

statement was filed). His statement includes the issues we address herein. 

See Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 7/8/19, at 4.
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Lewis, 63 A.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Pa.Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for 

relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment of sentence is final unless the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to timeliness is satisfied. 

Those exceptions relate to governmental interference with the presentation of 

the claim; newly-discovered facts; and a newly-recognized, retroactivelyapplicable constitutional right. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

Appellant, conceding that his petition is facially untimely, urges us, as 

he urged the PCRA court, to acknowledge “actual innocence” and “miscarriage 

of justice” as exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar. See Appellant’s brief at 1; 

PCRA Petition, 5/3/19, at 1. Appellant’s contentions are unavailing.

[I]t is now well settled that there is no generalized equitable 

exception to the jurisdictional one-year time bar pertaining to 

post-conviction petitions. The PCRA confers no authority upon 

this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA 

time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in 

the Act.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

Specifically, this Court has held that neither “actual innocence” nor 

“miscarriage of justice” are viable PCRA timeliness exceptions. See 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418, 420-21 (Pa.Super. 2016)

(rejecting actual innocence as a basis for jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA 

petition); Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(“[T]here is no ‘miscarriage of justice’ standard exception to the time 

requirements of the PCRA.”). 
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Accordingly, because Appellant failed to plead any cognizable exception 

to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, the PCRA court properly dismissed 

Appellant’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/25/2019