alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The undersigned, Michael Ceccon, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Kitcher Resources Inc. hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Kitcher Resources Inc. for the quarterly period ended April 30, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Kitcher Resources Inc.





Date: March 19, 2012




/s/ "Michael Ceccon"Michael CecconPresident, Chief Executive Officer





/s/ "Michael Ceccon"Michael CecconChief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signatures that appear in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Kitcher Resources Inc. and will be retained by American Resources Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-05-00832-CR

Alex Garcia, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF SAN SABA COUNTY

NO. 6,856, HONORABLE BYRON THEODOSIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On February 21, 2003, appellant Alex Garcia pleaded guilty and was convicted by

the court of driving while his license was suspended. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Garcia was

sentenced to ten days in jail and a $100 fine, but imposition of sentence was suspended and Garcia

was placed on probation. As part of the bargain, Garcia waived his right of appeal.

On December 20, 2004, the county court revoked probation and imposed sentence

following a hearing on the State’s motion. Garcia filed his notice of appeal the same day. This

Court was first notified of the appeal on December 28, 2005, when the clerk’s record was received.

On January 10, 2006, the Court received a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s

certification stating that this is a plea-bargain case and Garcia has no right of appeal and that Garcia

waived the right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d).
2

If a defendant plea bargains for probation, the right to appeal the conviction is limited

by rule 25.2(a)(2). Feagin v. State, 967 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (applying

predecessor rule). But rule 25.2(a)(2) does not apply to an appeal from an order revoking probation.

Id. Even if a defendant plea bargains for probation, an appeal from an order revoking that probation

is not a plea-bargain case. Thus, while the trial court’s certification would have been correct if

Garcia had sought to appeal his original conviction, the plea bargain and waiver of appeal do not

limit Garcia’s right of appeal from the revocation order.

For these reasons, the trial court’s certification of Garcia’s right of appeal is incorrect

and therefore defective. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The

appeal is abated so the county court can prepare a corrected certification of appeal stating that this

is not a plea-bargain case and the defendant has the right of appeal. A supplemental clerk’s record

containing the corrected certification shall be tendered for filing no later than February 24, 2006.

__________________________________________

Bob Pemberton, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Patterson and Pemberton

Filed: February 14, 2006

Do Not Publish
United States 

Office of 

Personnel Management 

The Federal Government’s Human Resources Agency

Benefits Administration Letter

 

Number: 14-310 Date: November 2014

 Subject: Federal Employees Benefits Cost Factors for Fiscal Year 2015 

This letter provides the imputed cost factors related to the Federal Employees Benefits Programs 

for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. 

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM 

The FEHBP cost factors for FY 2015 are as follows: 

Quarter

1st $1,346

2nd 1,360

3rd 1,374

4th 1,389

FY 2015 $5,469

RETIREMENT AND LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAMS 

Agencies should use the FY 2014 cost factors provided in Benefits Administration Letter 

(BAL) 14-304, “Fiscal Year 2014 Factors for Calculating Imputed Costs” for calculating the FY 2015 

Cost Factors for Retirement and Life Insurance for the first three quarters of FY 2015. 

Those FY 2014 factors can be obtained from the OPM Web site at 

http://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/benefits-administration-letters/2014/14-

304.pdf

A BAL providing the FY 2015 annual imputed cost factors for all civilian benefit programs will be 

posted on the OPM Web site on or before August 15, 2015. 

If you have any questions about this letter, please send an email to FinancialBALs@opm.gov or call 

us on 202-606-0606. We look forward to assisting you. 

 

Kim Farington 

Associate Chief Financial Officer 

Financial Services
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United StatesCode), Michael J. Barrist, Chief Executive Officer of NCO Group, Inc. (the“Company”), does hereby certify with respect to the Quarterly Report of theCompany on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010 (the “Report”)that:

 

(1)                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date:  | August 13,  2010    |   | /s/  Michael J. Barrist |
|--------|--------------------------|--------|-------------------------|
|   | Michael  J. Barrist      |
|   | Chief  Executive Officer |

 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnishedsolely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code) and is not being filed aspart of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.

 

----
#### In the Matter of the Accounting of National Bank of Westchester, White Plains, as Executor of Tamme Kashiwabara, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Westchester County,

February 17, 1958.

*Young, Seacord é Lane*for petitioner.

*Paul W. Williams, United States Attorney,*for United States of America.

*Louis J. Lefkowits, Attorney-General,*for State of New York.

*John R. Harold,*special guardian.

John L. Dillon, S.

The questions submitted for determination in connection with the judicial settlement of the executor’s account are disposed of as follows:

(1) By reason of the default of the claimant, the claim set forth in Schedule D-l of the account is dismissed.

(2) Title to the residuary estate having been given to persons under the age of 21 years, with possession thereof to remain *427in the executor trustee, the court determines that the testator by the language of paragraph “ ninth ” of his will created a power in trust with the executor as the donee thereof. (Beal Property Law, § 138.)

(3) A question of construction has arisen with respect to the bequest contained in paragraph “ sixth” of the will, hereinafter quoted: “sixth: I give and bequeath to the United States Navy Hospital, the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.) Dollars. ’ ’

Due to the failure of the testator to name a specific hospital as the recipient of said gift, the court is called upon to exercise its cy pres power pursuant to section 12 of the Personal Property Law. The gift created by the testator is for a charitable purpose. *(Matter of Cohen,*58 N. Y. S. 2d 924.) The general policy of the courts is to sustain charitable bequests wherever possible. *(Matter of Syracuse Univ.*[Hendricks], 1 Misc 2d 904; *Matter of Yungel,*153 N. Y. S. 2d 418; *Matter of Brown,*93 N. Y. S. 2d 881; *Matter of Cohen, supra.)*Despite the absence of express words of trust, the court may still apply the cy pres doctrine to sustain a gift for a charitable purpose. *(Matter of Durbrow,*245 N. Y. 469; *Matter of Brundrett,*87 N. Y. S. 2d 851.) Gifts for the benefit of naval hospitals may be accepted by the Secretary of the Navy, and deposited in a fund entitled “ Department of Navy, General Gift Fund ”. (U. S. Code, tit. 10, § 2601.)

The court determines that the intention of the testator can best be given effect by holding that the legacy provided in paragraph £ *1*sixth ’ ’ of the will shall be paid to the Department of the Navy, general gift fund, for use in the improvement of Navy hospitals as the Secretary of the Navy directs.

Settle decree.
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 21.1



                         Subsidiaries of the Registrant



                CMS Research Corporation, an Alabama corporation
Order entered September 26, 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 14
- 00638
- CR No. 05
- 14
- 00639
- CR ZANTAR LADON KELLY, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . F 13
- 00158
- S , F07
- 60023
- S



### O RDER Appellant’s September 24, 2014 motion to withdraw as appointed counsel on appeal and
to abate the case s to the trial court for appointment of substitute counsel is GRANTED

. Kathleen A. Walsh and the Dallas County Public Defender’s Office are removed as counsel of record for appellant.
We ORDER the trial court to appoint new counsel to represent appellant in th ese appeal s . We ORDER the trial court to transmit a supplemental clerk = s recor d containing the order appointing new counsel to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order.We ABATE the appeal s to allow the trial court to comply with this order. We will

reinstate the appeals within thirty days of the date of this order or when we receive the order appointing new counsel.
/s/ LANA MYERS JUSTICE
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATIONS
PURSANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    The accompanying quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008 as filed
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date: August 8, 2008
    
    By:
Name:
    
    /s/ Dale E. Oberkfell
 Dale
E. OberkfellTitle:
    
    Chief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 5, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-50276 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus
ENRIQUE MADRID-MARQUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:05-CR-2229

-------------------- Before JONES, Chief Judge, and SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Enrique MadridMarquez raises arguments that are foreclosed by United States v. Garcia-Mendez , 420 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 1398 (2006), which held that a Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation was equivalent to burglary of a dwelling and therefore was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, and by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion forNo. 06-50276 -2- summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Virgin Mobile USA, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Daniel H. Schulman, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date: November 16, 2007 |  |  |  | /s/ Daniel H. Schulman 
|                        |  |  |  | Daniel H. Schulman     
|                        |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Virgin Mobile USA, Inc. and will be retained by Virgin Mobile
USA, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

** **

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, John V. Winfield, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this Amendment No 1 to the annual reporton Form 10-K/A of Portsmouth Square, Inc.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

Date: August 24, 2012	

 

/s/ John V. Winfield

John V. Winfield

President and Chief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19A1769. ROGER C. DAY v. THE STATE.

In 1990, Roger C. Day was convicted of six counts of burglary, two counts of

rape, and one count of aggravated assault, for which he was sentenced to two

consecutive life sentences for the rape convictions, plus an additional 100 years to

serve on the remaining convictions. Day has had multiple appeals in this Court. His

convictions were affirmed on appeal. Day v. State, 203 Ga. App. 186 (416 SE2d 548)

(1992). Day then challenged his sentence as void, but we found no error in the

imposition of consecutive life sentences. Day v. State, 216 Ga. App. 29 (453 SE2d

73) (1994). We then addressed multiple post-trial motions filed by Day, including

another motion to correct a void sentence, in which Day asserted his sentence was

improperly enhanced based on a prior conviction. We found no merit in any of the

motions. Day v. State, 242 Ga. App. 899 (531 SE2d 781) (2000). Day then appealed

the denial of another motion to vacate a void sentence, which we dismissed on res

judicata grounds in an unpublished decision. Day v. State, Case No. A02A0596

(decided July 9, 2002). In 2018, Day filed another motion to vacate a void sentence,

again asserting that hissentence wasimproperly enhanced. The trial court dismissed

his motion, and Day filed this direct appeal. 

The present appeal is from the denial of Day’s third challenge to his sentence. 

“It is axiomatic that the same issue cannot be relitigated ad infinitum.” Echols v.

State, 243 Ga. App. 775, 776 (534 SE2d 464) (2000). In light of Day’s previous

appeals, we are precluded from revisiting the issue. See Paradise v. State, 321 Ga.

App. 371, 373 (740 SE2d 238) (2013) (“Although a void sentence may be challenged

at any time, this important legal principle is, nevertheless, subject to the equally well

April 19, 2019
established principles of res judicata and the law-of-the-case rule once the issue has

been raised and ruled upon.” (punctuation omitted); Ross v. State, 310 Ga. App. 326,

328 (713 SE2d 438) (2011) (while a void sentence is a nullity and may be vacated at

any time, it is still subject to res judicata and law-of-the-case rule; defendant is “not

entitled to multiple bites at the apple”). Accordingly, this appeal is hereby

DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

04/19/2019
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Virginia Saving Bancorp, Inc. (the Registrant)
for the period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) the undersigned executive officers of the Registrant hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ W. Michael FunkName:

W. Michael FunkTitle:

President & Chief Executive Officer/s/ Noel F. PilonName:

Noel F. PilonTitle:

Senior Vice President & Chief Financial Officer


August 14, 2008



36
#### STEIN v. STATE.

No. 17505.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 10, 1935.

Heidingsfelder, Wander & Hawkins and Horace Soule, all of Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

The conviction is for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.

The count of the indictment upon which the conviction is founded is that charging that appellant "did then and there possess intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale.”

The indictment is insufficient to charge an offense.

The subject is discussed in the case of Offield v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 75 S.W.(2d) 882.

The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
#### TEMPLE v. STATE.

No. 18287.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 13, 1936.

A. C. Chrisman, of Cleburne, for appellant,

* Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

Theft of chickens is the offense; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for 'two years.

Appellant was charged by indictment • with the theft of eighteen chickens. It is also charged that on May 9, 1933, appellant was convicted in the same court of theft of personal property over the value of $50 in two. cases; that the previous convictions are averred as a basis for a cumu-' lative penalty.

A plea of guilty was entered and a trial by a jury was waived.

The record is before us without statement of facts or bills of exception.

We have perceived nothing in the record which would warrant this court in interfering with the verdict

The judgment is affirmed. '
#### Roslyn Dankner et al., Respondents, *v.*Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

January 30, 1958.

*Joseph F. Manley, Jr,,,*and *Walter X. Connor*for appellant,

*William Miren*for respondents.

*Fer Curiam.*

The record discloses sufficient evidence, indicating that defendant’s counsel had no authorization to settle this case. An attorney cannot settle a suit and conclude his client in relation to the subject matter of the litigation without the consent of his client *(Countryman*v. *Breen,*241 App. Div. 392, affd. 268 N. Y. 643). The court below had no authority to direct the entry of judgment upon the oral stipulation of the attorney, in view of the denial by the defendant that it acquiesced in the settlement *(Sherman & Sons*v. *Princess Shirt Waist Mfg. Co.,*213 App. Div. 140).

The judgment and order should be reversed, without costs, and case restored to the calendar for trial for February 17, 1958.

Hecht, J. P,, Aurelio and Tilzer, JJ., concur.

Judgment and order reversed, etc.
#### Ex parte SHEETS.

No. 16390.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 8, 1933.

Nami & Vaughan, of San Antonio, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE, Judge.

The former opinion herein is withdrawn. This is an appeal from a refusal of a writ of habeas corpus and an order dismissing appellant’s application therefor. The matter was heard before the Honorable W. S. Anderson, judge of the Thirty-Seventh judicial district court, on August 22,1933. Upon the refusal to grant the writ appellant excepted and gave notice of appeal to this court. Under all the authorities it appears that no appeal lies from such order or judgment. Many authorities are cited in section 243 of Mr. Branch’s Annotated P. C., supporting our view.

The appeal will he dismissed.