United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 15, 2018

Decided June 25, 2018

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 17‐2171

TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES IN‐

CORPORATED,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RAJ SHEKAR,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States   

District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:15–cv–01392        

Ronald A. Guzmán,

Judge.

O R D E R

Teledyne Technologies fired Raj Shekar from his job as a marketing and sales man‐

ager. Shekar did not go quietly—he took Teledyne’s property with him and flouted the

district court’s order that he return it. The court held him in civil contempt, but even that

did not inspire his obedience. Instead of complying with the court’s order, Shekar en‐

gaged in a campaign of defiance, deceit, and delay. The court’s patience finally ran out: it

found that Shekar had failed to purge himself of contempt and entered sanctions against

him. Despite the utter lack of respect that Shekar has shown for the judicial process

throughout this entire suit, he now asks us to reverse the district court’s judgment. We

affirm it.   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17‐2171    Page 2

I.

Teledyne hired Raj Shekar as a sales and marketing manager in June 2013 and

fired him less than two years later. Shortly after terminating his employment, Teledyne

discovered that Shekar had contacted and threatened Teledyne’s potential customers;

he had also initiated a large data transfer from Teledyne servers and retained posses‐

sion of electronic equipment and data belonging to Teledyne. Teledyne sued Shekar in

federal court, asserting common‐law claims in tort and contract, as well as statutory

claims under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, and the

Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. It sought injunctive relief, compensatory

and punitive damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.   

   

Four days after Teledyne filed the suit, the district court entered a temporary re‐

straining order directing Shekar to return his Teledyne‐issued laptop computer, VPN

token, projector, printer/scanner, and iPhone. The order specified that Shekar was to

turn over the property unaltered. In addition, the order compelled him to respond to

interrogatories that asked him, among other things, to identify any devices or drives

that had been in his possession during a period covering the majority of his employ‐

ment. The court gave Shekar five days to comply with the temporary restraining order.

He did not do so.   

The court scheduled a hearing on Teledyne’s motion for a preliminary injunc‐

tion, and when Shekar failed to appear, the court granted the motion. The preliminary

injunction was broader than the temporary restraining order insofar as it required She‐

kar to produce all computers and other devices in his possession—not only those be‐

longing to Teledyne. This meant that Shekar was obliged to turn over his personal

computer for inspection. When Shekar failed to comply yet again, the district court

granted Teledyne’s motion for a show cause hearing to determine whether Shekar was

in civil contempt.   

As his first line of defense at the show cause hearing, Shekar made the

far‐fetched claim that he had never received proper notice of either the temporary re‐

straining order or the preliminary injunction. But notice of the temporary restraining

order had been sent to each of Shekar’s thirteen known email addresses and

hand‐delivered to his home.1 Shekar claimed that none of the thirteen email addresses

                                                 

1 Teledyne used a process server because FedEx said that Shekar’s past conduct was so egregious it

would no longer deliver to his home.   
No. 17‐2171    Page 3

belonged to him; as a back‐up argument, he asserted that his email addresses block all

communications originating from @winston.com, the domain of Teledyne’s counsel.

The first argument was a blatant lie: Shekar had sent unauthorized ex parte communi‐

cations to the court from some of the thirteen email addresses after the temporary re‐

straining order had been issued. As for Shekar’s second argument, the district court

noted that “Shekar can hardly expect to be rewarded for willfully evading notice.”

Shekar’s protest that he never received notice of the preliminary injunction is equally

implausible. Teledyne sent notice to Shekar’s home address, fifteen different email ad‐

dresses, and a PO Box that Shekar had specifically identified as his preferred address

for service.   

When the show cause hearing shifted from notice to substance, the lies kept on

coming. Two witnesses testified: Shekar and Daniel Roffman, a forensic computer ex‐

pert whom Teledyne retained to analyze Shekar’s laptop and iPhone. Following com‐

mon forensic practice, Roffman analyzed Shekar’s Teledyne‐issued laptop by using an

“image”—a verified exact replica—of it. (The physical laptop was in the possession of

the Department of Defense Criminal Investigation Services for reasons not relevant to

this appeal.) Roffman’s analysis of the laptop image revealed that eleven different de‐

vices had been connected to the laptop, three of them on or after the date that Teledyne

had fired Shekar. The district judge found that Shekar had failed to account for any of

the devices that had been connected to the laptop after his termination. Shekar falsely

denied that he had ever possessed two of them. As for the third, a hard drive, Shekar

turned over a fake: it was made by the same manufacturer, but not only did its serial

number differ from the missing device, the court observed that it appeared to be “total‐

ly blank ... turned over to Teledyne fresh from the electronics store.”   

After hearing both witnesses, the court largely credited Roffman’s disinterested

and professional testimony and discredited Shekar’s self‐serving, unsubstantiated tes‐

timony. It had plenty of reason to do so—the record is replete with Shekar’s flimsy,

disingenuous, and contradictory explanations. For example, Shekar returned his com‐

pany‐issued iPhone, but the passcode he provided did not unlock it. The court found

Roffman’s conclusion that Shekar locked the phone more credible than Shekar’s “con‐

spiracy theories” about why it was Teledyne’s fault that the passcode he provided did

not work. Another example: after repeatedly insisting that he did not possess any Tele‐

dyne data or emails, Shekar offered a Teledyne email as an exhibit at the show cause

hearing. Yet another: Shekar answered “none” to interrogatories inquiring whether he

currently possessed any devices or hard drives that could be used to store data; this was

demonstrably false based on Roffman’s credible forensic analysis of Shekar’s laptop.
No. 17‐2171    Page 4

And if all of this weren’t enough, Shekar defiantly admitted that he had decided not to

produce his personal computer for inspection, despite the court’s unambiguous com‐

mand that he do so. Shekar defended his choice by observing that the computer did not

contain any Teledyne information. He appears to believe that this explanation serves as

an excuse, rather than what it was: an outright admission that he failed to comply with

the court’s order.

Based on the evidence presented at the show cause hearing, the court found

Shekar in civil contempt. The court gave him two weeks to purge himself of contempt

and comply with the directives of the preliminary injunction. Teledyne was awarded

the attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the show cause hearing.   

Shekar’s first argument on appeal is that the court abused its discretion by find‐

ing him in civil contempt. He is wrong. The facts we have recounted here, and others

we thought it unnecessary to repeat, speak for themselves. After the district court rea‐

sonably credited Roffman’s testimony and discredited Shekar’s, the obvious conclusion

was that Shekar stood in civil contempt for failing to substantially comply with the

terms of the preliminary injunction.   

II.

The two weeks the court gave Shekar to purge himself of contempt came and

went. Instead of obeying the court’s crystal‐clear orders, Shekar spent the next year en‐

gaging in a campaign of resistance: he filed numerous unsuccessful emergency motions;

threatened the court, its officers, opposing counsel, and expert witnesses; filed a frivo‐

lous appeal; successfully pleaded highly dubious health concerns to convince the very

patient district judge to rescind an order for compulsory incarceration; and fired three

different attorneys. By August of 2016, the district court was rightfully fed up. Finding

that Shekar had repeatedly failed to purge himself of civil contempt, it entered sanc‐

tions against him.   

Shekar’s second argument on appeal is that the court abused its discretion by

finding he failed to purge himself of civil contempt. Again, Shekar is wrong. The district

court found that Shekar had still not sufficiently accounted for the three devices that

were connected to his Teledyne laptop after his termination. He altogether failed to

produce two of the devices, claiming that he had either lost or never received them,

despite compelling forensic evidence to the contrary. And although he finally produced

the third device—this time, with a serial number matching that of the missing hard
No. 17‐2171    Page 5

drive—he wiped it clean before turning it in. There were other failures too: Shekar nev‐

er produced seven of the eight devices that had been connected to the laptop prior to

his termination, he refused to provide access to his Teledyne email accounts, and he lied

in his answers to interrogatories. Shekar offers no reason—other than his own discred‐

ited and unsubstantiated statements—why we should find that any of these factual

findings are clearly erroneous. And on these facts, it was plainly within the court’s dis‐

cretion to find that Shekar remained in civil contempt.   

III.

The August 2016 finding that Shekar had failed to purge himself of civil con‐

tempt was accompanied by sanctions against him. The court noted that every effort to

secure Shekar’s compliance—multiple contempt findings, large attorneys’ fees awarded

to Teledyne, threats of compulsory imprisonment—had been met by unrelenting and

unrepentant dishonesty. It sanctioned him by entering default judgment for Teledyne

on all of its claims, granting a permanent injunction against Shekar, dismissing Shekar’s

counterclaims against Teledyne, and ordering Shekar to pay the reasonable attorneys’

fees and costs that Teledyne had incurred litigating the contempt issue. In the end, the

district court awarded Teledyne $366,956.18 in attorneys’ fees; $5,817.50 in damages on

its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim; $549 in compensatory damages and $1,098 in

punitive damages for the willful conversion of Teledyne’s projector; and $67,186.70 in

additional attorneys’ fees under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act and the Illinois Uniform

Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which grant attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party when

the defendant acts willfully or maliciously.2   

Shekar challenges these sanctions as an abuse of the district court’s discretion.

The district court has wide latitude to craft civil contempt sanctions to coerce obedience

to the court’s orders and compensate the plaintiff for losses. Connolly v. J.T. Ventures, 851

F.2d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of America,

330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). It did not exceed its authority here.

We’ll start with the largest penalty: the $366,956.18 in contempt‐related attor‐

neys’ fees. These were calculated based on the presumptively reasonable “lodestar

method,” which multiplies the hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate.

See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010). Shekar gives us no reason to

                                                 

2 See Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILCS 1065/5; Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS

510/3.   
No. 17‐2171    Page 6

question the reasonableness of either the total number of hours or the hourly rates used

to calculate the fee award. His objection boils down to a complaint that he will have to

pay a lot of money. But Shekar lies in a bed of his own making. The extraordinary

amount is due solely to Shekar’s decision to drag opposing counsel (not to mention the

court) through a disingenuous legal battle rather than comply with the court’s clear or‐

der. Indeed, the court repeatedly warned Shekar that he was racking up attorneys’ fees

every time he drew the proceedings out instead of obeying the preliminary injunction.

An award of $366,956.18 is high, but not unreasonable in light of Shekar’s one‐man legal

circus.   

Shekar also claims that the district court abused its discretion by awarding Tele‐

dyne damages after entering default judgment for Teledyne on all of its claims, but the

district court was well within its discretion to impose this sanction. See Chambers v.

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (noting that courts have the inherent power to

“fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process”). Given

Shekar’s outrageous conduct throughout the litigation, we find no error in either the

entry of default judgment to Teledyne or in the amount of damages awarded.   

The court gave Teledyne $5,817.50 in damages on the Computer Fraud and

Abuse Act claim, which was the amount Teledyne expended on forensic analysis. The

record justified this amount: Teledyne documented the time and money it spent identi‐

fying the problems that Shekar’s antics caused its servers. Shekar offers no evidence

that this calculation is in error. The district court also awarded Teledyne $549 in com‐

pensatory damages and $1,098 in punitive damages for Shekar’s willful conversion of

its projector. The record justifies this amount as well: the compensatory damages repre‐

sent the projector’s uncontested value, and Shekar makes no argument as to why the

punitive damages are unreasonable. Finally, the district court awarded Teledyne

$67,196.70 in additional attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under the Illinois Uni‐

form Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. Illinois law enti‐

tles Teledyne to these fees, and Shekar does not challenge the amount as unjustified. In

sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages and attorneys’

fees on Teledyne’s legal claims.   

Shekar’s various other challenges to the district court’s sanctions similarly fail.

These other sanctions—dismissing Shekar’s counterclaims and granting Teledyne a

permanent injunction—were well within the district court’s discretion.   
No. 17‐2171    Page 7

IV.

Finally, Shekar claims that he was denied discovery, hearings, and a proper op‐

portunity to cross‐examine witnesses throughout the proceedings related to his various

objections on appeal. This argument is meritless. Shekar failed to take advantage of the

multiple opportunities the district court provided to challenge the court’s contempt

findings. Furthermore, it is well documented that Shekar did nothing but abuse the le‐

gal process throughout the entirety of this case.   

* * *

Shekar has demonstrated nothing but disrespect, deceit, and flat‐out hostility

toward the court, its officers, and opposing counsel during the three years this case has

been pending. He has no cause to complain about the district court’s eminently reason‐

able orders. In fact, we will send a copy of this order to the United States Attorney so

that he may consider whether a criminal prosecution for perjury or contempt of court is

appropriate.   

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.