COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Petty, AtLee and Senior Judge Clements 

WILLIAM THOMAS, III 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2066-15-3 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 31, 2016 

ELIZABETH FAYE OWENS THOMAS 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 

C. Randall Lowe, Judge 

 (Robert M. Galumbeck; Galumbeck, Dennis & Kegley, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 (David L. Scyphers; Scyphers & Austin, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

 William Thomas, III (husband) appeals a final decree of divorce that incorporated the terms 

of a premarital agreement. Husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 

premarital agreement. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this 

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See 

Rule 5A:27. 

BACKGROUND 

 On September 1, 2000, husband and Elizabeth Faye Owens Thomas (wife) entered into a 

premarital agreement (the premarital agreement). The premarital agreement included a spousal 

support waiver and addressed the parties’ property rights. 

 On September 2, 2000, husband and wife married. On July 15, 2009, the parties 

separated. On February 9, 2011, wife filed a complaint for divorce and attached a copy of the 

premarital agreement. Husband filed an answer and counterclaim. He challenged the validity of 

UNPUBLISHED 
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the premarital agreement. Wife subsequently filed an amended complaint and again attached the 

premarital agreement. She asked that the premarital agreement be incorporated into an order. 

Husband filed an amended answer and counterclaim. He still challenged the validity of the 

premarital agreement. 

 On March 24, 2014, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing regarding the 

enforceability of the premarital agreement. On April 3, 2014, the trial court issued a letter 

opinion, which upheld the validity of the premarital agreement. It found that husband entered 

into the premarital agreement voluntarily. It noted that husband could read and write and had an 

opportunity to review the premarital agreement before he signed it. Husband argued that the 

premarital agreement did “not exclude consideration of equitable distribution.” The trial court 

disagreed and stated, “A cogent reading of the document clearly demonstrates that the parties 

shall have full access and control of their property, including any profits earned during the 

marriage, expressly free of claims of the other party.” On May 7, 2014, the trial court entered an 

order incorporating its April 3, 2014 letter opinion. The order states that the parties’ premarital 

agreement is enforceable. 

 The parties took evidence by deposition and submitted memoranda to the trial court 

regarding their respective positions. The parties disagreed about the interpretation of the 

premarital agreement and its impact on equitable distribution. Prior to the marriage, wife owned 

property that was titled solely in her name. During the marriage, wife sold that property and 

purchased another piece of property, which also was titled solely in her name. Husband argued 

that the property acquired during the marriage was marital property because of contributions he 

made to both properties. Husband asserted that the premarital agreement affected title only and 

not classification or distribution. He believed that equitable distribution should apply to all of 

the property. On the other hand, wife argued that the trial court already held that the premarital 
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agreement was enforceable and that the premarital agreement stated that property titled in a 

party’s sole name was his/her separate property. She further asserted that the premarital 

agreement provided that any jointly titled marital property should be divided equally. 

 On June 11, 2015, the trial court issued a letter opinion. The trial court agreed with wife 

and her interpretation of the premarital agreement. It held that the property titled solely in wife’s 

name was wife’s separate property, according to the terms of the premarital agreement. It further 

found that the jointly titled property should be sold and divided equally between the parties, 

pursuant to the premarital agreement and Code § 20-107.3. On November 25, 2015, the trial 

court entered a final decree of divorce, which incorporated the trial court’s letter opinions. This 

appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS 

 Husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the premarital agreement.1

 

He asserts that the premarital agreement specifically includes a waiver of spousal support and 

inheritance rights, but not a waiver of equitable distribution. Accordingly, husband contends 

Code § 20-107.3 applies and the trial court should have divided the parties’ property, regardless 

of title, in accordance with the statute. 

 “On appeal, the Court reviews a trial court’s interpretation of a contract de novo.” 

Plunkett v. Plunkett, 271 Va. 162, 166-67, 624 S.E.2d 39, 41 (2006) (citing Eure v. Norfolk 

Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002)). 

“Antenuptial agreements, like marital property settlements, are contracts subject to the 

rules of construction applicable to contracts generally, including the application of the plain 

meaning of unambiguous contractual terms.” Pysell v. Keck, 263 Va. 457, 460, 559 S.E.2d 677, 

 1

 Husband does not challenge the validity of the premarital agreement. 
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678 (2002) (citing Southerland v. Estate of Southerland, 249 Va. 584, 588, 457 S.E.2d 375, 378 

(1995)). 

“When a contract is clear and unambiguous, it is the court’s duty to interpret the contract, 

as written.” Stacy v. Stacy, 53 Va. App. 38, 44, 669 S.E.2d 348, 351 (2008) (en banc) (quoting 

Palmer & Palmer Co., LLC v. Waterfront Marine Constr., Inc., 276 Va. 285, 289, 662 S.E.2d 77, 

80 (2008)). “According to the rules of construction, ‘courts cannot read into contracts language 

which will add to or take away the meaning of words already contained therein.’” Rutledge v. 

Rutledge, 45 Va. App. 56, 64, 608 S.E.2d 504, 508 (2005) (quoting Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 

184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)). “The contract must be read as a single document. Its 

meaning is to be gathered from all its associated parts assembled as the unitary expression of the 

agreement of the parties.” Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983). 

 The premarital agreement included several sections regarding the parties’ property. It 

started by saying, in pertinent part: 

WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that each has accumulated 

his and her own separate property and estate, prior to the marriage, 

which shall forever constitute such persons’ own separate estate 

without claim therein by the other party; and, 

WHEREAS, each party has agreed to waive any right, title, interest 

or claim in or to the properties of the other party, as owned or held 

by either of them prior to the marriage . . . . 

 In Section III, the parties agreed that each party “shall separately retain all rights in her 

[or his] own property, both real and personal, tangible or intangible, whether now owned or 

hereafter acquired . . . .” The premarital agreement further explained that each party “shall have 

the full, absolute and unrestricted power and right to lease, manage, sell or dispose of her [or his] 

own property in any manner, and to receive all moneys, rents, issues and profits therefrom, free 

from any claim that may be made by” the other party. 
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 In Section V, the parties agreed that “[p]roperty hereafter acquired by the parties hereto 

shall be owned in that matter specified on the document of title thereto.” This section of the 

premarital agreement further explained that if there was “no document of title, then an agreed 

memorandum of title between the parties shall determine ownership.” Section V also stated that 

if there was no title or memorandum of title, then there was a “conclusive presumption that such 

property is owned as co-tenants without regard to the source of funds applied for the purchase 

thereof, with each party holding a one-half interest in such property.” 

 In Section VI, the premarital agreement states, “Nothing contained herein shall affect the 

rights of the parties to hereafter acquire jointly held property.” 

 Contrary to husband’s arguments, the premarital agreement explains how the parties’ 

property will be divided. If a party owned property prior to the marriage, or if property was 

titled solely in his/her name, then the property remained that party’s separate property. If 

property was jointly titled, then the property is divided between the parties. 

 The trial court determined that Section III of the premarital agreement controlled the 

property titled in wife’s name and held that it would remain her sole and separate property, 

“regardless of any claim made by Mr. Thomas.” Section V further supports this ruling because 

the property was titled solely in wife’s name, so according to the terms of the premarital 

agreement, she would continue to own it. In addition, Section VI states, “nothing contained 

herein shall effect the rights of the parties to hereafter acquire or convey separate property, 

without claim or interest therein by the other.” 

 Husband correctly states that the parties did not waive equitable distribution in the 

premarital agreement. However, the premarital agreement limited the trial court in its 

application of Code § 20-107.3 because the terms of the premarital agreement provided that 

property owned before the marriage and property titled solely in one party’s name was separate 
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property. The trial court considered the factors in Code § 20-107.3 when it divided the parties’ 

jointly titled marital property. The trial court discussed each factor in its letter opinion dated 

June 11, 2015, prior to dividing the marital property equally. 

 The terms of the premarital agreement are clear and unambiguous. The trial court did not 

err in its interpretation of the premarital agreement to the division of the parties’ property. 

 Wife asks this Court to award her attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. See 

O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). On consideration 

of the record before us, we deny her request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs she 

incurred on appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.