IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16-20744

Summary Calendar 

In the Matter of: CLEVELAND IMAGING & SURGICAL HOSPITAL, L.L.C. 

also known as Doctors Diagnostic Hospital, 

 Debtor 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 

CAMIL KREIT, Medical Doctor, 

 Appellant 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER L. QUINN, 

 Appellee 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:16-CV-2135

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and CLEMENT and SOUTHWICK, Circuit 

Judges. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 13, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Dr. Camil Kreit appeals the district court’s denial of his 

motion to extend the court’s filing deadline and the court’s subsequent denial 

of his motion for leave to file out of time. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Dr. Kreit is a member and manager of Cleveland Imaging & Surgical

Hospital, LLC (the “Hospital”). Following a dispute among the Hospital’s 

doctors in Texas state court, the court appointed a receiver, Douglas Brickley, 

to manage the Hospital and its assets. Pursuant to the power the receivership 

order specifically granted him, Brickley filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on the 

hospital’s behalf, triggering the automatic stay provisions found in 11 U.S.C. § 

362. After a series of unsuccessful bids, the bankruptcy court ultimately 

approved the Hospital’s sale to CISH Acquisition, LLC (“Acquisition”) over Dr. 

Kreit’s objection. The bankruptcy court entered an order, the “Acquisition Sale 

Order,” approving the asset purchase agreement on August 21, 2015. Because 

no party appealed the bankruptcy court’s order, it became final and 

nonappealable on September 8, 2015. 

Approximately two months later, on November 1, 2015, Dr. Kreit sent 

letters to the U.S. Deputy Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and 

the Office of Policy and Coordination of the Federal Trade Commission, 

alleging that Dr. Kreit’s fellow Hospital member, Dr. Ravi Kunar Moparty, had 

“divert[ed] funds,” “embezzle[d] or conver[ted]” the Hospital’s assets, and 

“engaged in a hostile acquisition of [the Hospital],” thereby “unlawfully 

depleting [the Hospital’s] operating capital . . . [and] driving [it] into 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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bankruptcy.” Dr. Kreit also sent a similar letter to Chip Roy, a First Assistant 

Attorney General for the State of Texas, making similar allegations and 

stating that Dr. Moparty “conspired with [Iberia Bank] by participating in 

fraudulent bidding, fixing a bid,” engaging in “unlawful accommodation 

bidding,” and effectively “eliminating” any competition in the bidding process. 

Dr. Kreit closed each letter by requesting “any available administrative 

remedy.” 

On November 16, 2015, Dr. Kreit e-mailed Christine March, the attorney 

for the U.S. Trustee, attaching a copy of each of the letters and restating his 

allegations. March then forwarded Dr. Kreit’s e-mail to the Hospital’s 

attorney. Consequently, the Hospital filed a show cause motion in the 

bankruptcy court on November 18, 2015, asking the court to hold Dr. Kreit in 

contempt for violating § 362(a)(3) and for his collateral attack on the court’s 

prior orders, namely the Receivership Order and the Acquisition Sale Order. 

After a three day hearing, the bankruptcy court agreed with the Hospital and 

found that Dr. Kreit’s letters violated § 362(a)(1), (3) and constituted an 

impermissible collateral attack on the court’s prior orders. 

On June 2, 2016, the bankruptcy court held another hearing on the 

amount of damages the Hospital incurred as a result of Dr. Kreit’s conduct. At 

the hearing, Dr. Kreit’s and the Hospital’s counsel informed the court that they 

had reached an agreement; specifically the parties agreed that 

(1) the amount of damages incurred by the [Hospital] as a result of 

the Receiver spending time responding to Dr. Kreit’s allegations 

totals $18,571.68; (2) the amount of attorneys’ fees incurred by the 

[Hospital] for having to prosecute the Show Cause Motion is 

$26,428.32; (3) Dr. Kreit shall pay these sums by no later than 

August 2, 2016; and (4) if he fails to make payment by August 2, 

2016, then he shall be liable to The Claro Group[, of which the 

Receiver is a principal,] for the amount of $24,742.50 and to [the 

Hospital’s] counsel in the amount of $35,209.67. 

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The bankruptcy court concluded that Dr. Kreit had knowingly and 

willfully disregarded the automatic stay and the court’s prior orders and 

imposed the stipulated damages. 

On June 16, 2016, Dr. Kreit appealed the bankruptcy court’s imposition 

of sanctions to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. On 

September 14, 2016, the day before his appellate brief was due, Dr. Kreit 

moved to extend the filing deadline, which the district court denied. On 

October 7, 2016, three weeks past the deadline, Dr. Kreit moved for leave to 

file his appellate brief out of time. The district court again denied Dr. Kreit’s 

motion and granted Appellee Christopher Quinn’s motion to dismiss pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8018(a)(4). Dr. Kreit now appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION 

On appeal, Dr. Kreit challenges this court’s jurisdiction to consider the

the case. He also contends that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion to extend the filing deadline and his motion to file out of 

time. We address each issue in turn.

A.

Dr. Kreit challenges this court’s jurisdiction to consider the bankruptcy 

court’s sanctions order, arguing that the Texas state court that appointed 

Brickley as receiver over the Hospital lacked the authority to give him 

managerial authority. According to Dr. Kreit, although the Texas court had 

authority to appoint a property receiver, it did not have the authority to 

appoint Brickley as a rehabilitating or liquidating receiver, thereby depriving 

him of the ability to file for bankruptcy. Therefore, Dr. Kreit argues, because 

Brickley lacked the authority to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on the 

Hospital’s behalf, neither the bankruptcy court, the district court, nor this 

court have jurisdiction over the case. Quinn counters, arguing that the RookerFeldman doctrine deprives this court of jurisdiction to review a state court 

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judgment. See Aguiluz v. Bayhi (In re Bayhi), 528 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir. 2008) 

(“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the . . . federal courts are without any 

authority/power/jurisdiction to modify or reverse a judgment rendered by a 

state court . . . . [T]he state court’s judgment—correct or not—is immunized 

by that doctrine from vacatur or any other restraints by the bankruptcy court, 

the district court, and this court.”). Dr. Kreit responds by arguing that the ab 

initio exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to this case, as his 

challenge to the Texas court’s judgment is jurisdictional, and, therefore, does 

not ask this court to question a valid state court judgment. 

This court has neither endorsed nor rejected the ab initio exception. See 

Houston v. Queen, 606 F. App’x 725, 732–33 (5th Cir. 2015). Our sister circuits 

are split on the issue. See Keeler v. Acad. of Am. Franciscan History, Inc. (In 

re Keeler), 273 B.R. 416, 421 (D. Md. 2002) (“There is a split among the circuits 

as to whether there is a narrow exception to Rooker-Feldman for state 

judgments that are void ab initio.”); compare James v. Draper (In re James), 

940 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing the ab initio exception) and 

Singleton v. Fifth Third Bank of W. Ohio (In re Singleton), 230 B.R. 533, 538 

(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (same) and Lake v. Capps (In re Lake), 202 B.R. 751, 758 

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (same), with Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th 

Cir. 2003) (“acknowledg[ing]” but “not endors[ing]” the void ab initio exception) 

and Ferren v. Searcy Winnelson Co. (In re Ferren), 203 F.3d 559–60 (8th Cir.

2000) (per curiam) (declining to create a void ab initio exception to the RookerFeldman doctrine when a state court allegedly interfered with bankruptcy 

court jurisdiction) and Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(declining to adopt a void ab initio exception based on the state court’s lack of 

jurisdictional authority) and In re Thomas, No. 04-26010, 2006 WL 5217796, 

at *3 (Bankr. D. Md. Feb. 21, 2006) (“The Fourth Circuit has not addressed a 

void ab initio exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”). 

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We do not reach this issue, however, because it is clear that the Texas 

court had jurisdiction over the Hospital and its assets. Under Texas law, 

“[w]here a trial court ha[s] jurisdiction of both the parties and the subject 

matter, the order appointing a receiver is not void.” Sclafani v. Sclafani, 870 

S.W.2d 608, 612–13 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Hous. [1 Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Here, 

even assuming arguendo that the Texas court lacked the ability to create a 

particular kind receivership, that the court had the authority to create a 

receivership in general is indisputable. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 11.402 (“A 

court that has subject matter jurisdiction over specific property of a domestic 

or foreign entity that is located in this state and is involved in litigation has 

jurisdiction to appoint a receiver for that property . . . .”); Whitaker Oil Co. v. 

Ward, 396 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1965, no writ) (“The fact 

that [the receivership] was made improvidently, or issued on insufficient 

evidence does not nullify an order appointing a receiver.”). Moreover, the 

Texas court specifically vested Brickley with the authority to file for 

bankruptcy on the Hospital’s behalf. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 11.406(a)(5) 

(“A receiver appointed under this chapter . . . has the powers and duties that 

are stated in the order appointing the receiver.”). Concluding that this court 

has jurisdiction over the appeal, we address the merits of Dr. Kreit’s claims. 

B. 

“Our review of the actions of the district court in its appellate role is for 

an abuse of discretion.” In re Kelly Oil Co., 46 F.3d 66, 66 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing 

In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 774 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeal for 

Appellant’s failure to file a timely brief. See In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 774 

F.2d at 1305 (“Bankruptcy appeals have frequently been dismissed for the 

appellant’s failure to comply with the duty of diligent prosecution, and we have

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dismissed civil appeals for failure of prosecution when the appellant’s brief was 

not timely filed.”). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

III. CONCLUSION 

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

judgment in full. 

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