### FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT March 8, 2004 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

* Honorable Maurice

M. Paul, Un

ited State s District

Judge for

the Northern Distr

ict o f Florida, sitting by de signation. [PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EL EVENTH C IRCUIT

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_______ No. 02-16 393

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_______ D. C. Docket No. 02-00051 CV-2-W DO-5 RONALD BAR THOLOMEW, BENNY CHILDERS, et al., Plaintiff s-Appell ants,

versus AGL RESOURCES, INC., ATLANTA GAS LIGHT COMPANY, Defenda nts-Appel lees.

_________________

_______ Appeal from the United States D istrict Court for the Mi ddle Distr

ict of Ge orgia

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________ (March8, 2004) Before EDMONDSON, Chief Ju dge, COX, Circuit Judge, and PAUL * , Distr ict Ju dge

. COX, Circuit Judge:2

Five form er field

service represe ntatives of Atla nta Gas Light Com

pany (“A tlanta Gas”) a ppeal the d

istrict c ourt’s gran t of sum mary judgm ent in favo r of AGL Resource s, Inc. and Atlanta Gas on the ir Geor gia state- law cla ims of

breach of contract , intentional

infliction

of em otional distr

ess, tort ious interf

erence wit h business relations , and defamation

. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal of Charlie Johnson, and as to the otherplaintif fs, we affirm

in part, vacate in part, a

nd

rema nd. I. BACKGRO UND & PROCE DURAL HIST ORY The plaintiff

s – Ronald Bartholomew, Benny Childers, James Higgins, Lester Moss, and Charlie Johnson – were employe d by Atlanta Gas as Class A Field Service Representatives in Macon, Georgia . Durin g a statew ide reduc tion in force in March 2000, Bartholom

ew, Chi lders, and Higgins were “ bumped” out of the ir positions by field serv ice r epr ese nta tiv es wi th mo re se nio rit y. These three employ ees were then permitted to transfer to other positions hel d by fi eld service represe ntatives w ith less seniority – to “b ump” l ess senior

field ser vice repr esentative s – but

they de clined the opportunity

to do so and were laid off on March10, 2000. Moss a nd Johnson, by contrast, were a

mong the least seni or field service re presenta tives, an d they d

id not have enough seniority to “bum p” other field service representat ives. As a re sult,3

Moss and Johnson w ere laid off on Mar ch 10, 2000, without ha

ving been af

forded the opportunity to transfer. The plaintiff

s’ em ployment with A

tlanta Ga s was gove rned by a c oll ective bargaining

agreem ent between Atlanta Gas and th eir union. Bartholom ew, H iggins, and Childers complained to their union steward ab o ut their layoffs, and they submitted written grievances. Johnson also complained to his union

stewar d about his layof f, and Moss com

plained to a

n individual w

hom hebelieved t o be his union steward about his layof

f, but neither Jo hnson nor Moss submit ted writ ten grieva nces. Pursuant to Artic le 13 of the coll ective ba rgaining ag

reem ent, the u

nion ma de

a form al reques t for a gr

ievance m

eeting on be half of Ba

rtholo mew, H iggins, and Child ers. After the mee ting, on May 11, 2000, Atlanta Gas notified the union an d the se th ree em

ployee s that their

grievanc es had bee n denied. Under the term s of Article 14 of the co llective b argaining a greem ent, the u

nion then h ad ten day s to submit the em ployee s’ grie vances to a

rbitratio n, but the union took no further action. On Septem

ber 18, 200 1, Bartholom

ew, H iggins, Chi lders, Moss and Johns on fileda com

plaint in G eorgia sta

te court. In the fou

r-count compl aint, they asserted claims under Georgia law f or breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious int erfere nce with b u siness relations , and defamation ; AGL1 A third d efenda nt, the ch

ief exec utive off icer of Atlanta G as, was v oluntaril y dismissed by stipulation of the parties. 4 Re sources, Inc. and

Atlanta Gas wer

e nam ed as defendants. 1 The def end ant s re mo ve d the action to the UnitedStates D istrict C ourt for th e Northe rn Distr ict of Ge orgia, a

nd the action was then trans ferred to the Middle Distric t of

Georgia . The gr

avam en of the plaintiff

s’ com plaint wa s that the de fendants t erminated their em ployment in violation of the coll ective ba

rgaining ag

reem ent and that the defendant s’ m anagem ent emplo yees ma de s tat ement s th at g ave ris e to tor t li abi lit y. AGL Resources, Inc. and Atlanta Gas filed a m otion for summary

judgment as to a ll of the plaintiffs’ claims. On October 22, 2002, the district court entered a n order granting th e defendant s’ m otion. In its order, the c ourt reac hed the fol lowing conclusions: (1) th e pl ain ti ffs ’ st ate -la w cl aims were pr eemp ted by § 301 of

the Labor Managem

ent Relations Act (the

“LM RA”), 29 U.S. C. § 185; ( 2) to the exte nt that the plaintiff s’ preempted stat e-law c la ims c ould be tre ated as “ hybrid” § 301/fair represe ntation claim s und er the L MRA, th ese claim s were b arred by the six-m

onth statute of limit a tions; and ( 3) even if the plainti ffs’ st ate-law claim s were n ot preempted

by the LMRA, Moss and Johnson’s claim s were due to be dismissed because they f

ailed to av ail them selves of t he grieva nce proce dure esta

blished in the5

collectiv e bargai ni ng agreem ent and theclaim s of Bart holome w, Child ers, and Higgins wer e barred by the on e-year state stat ute of limitati ons. The plaintiff

s ti mely f iled a notic e of appeal, and the notice inc ludes all f

ive plaintiff s: Bartholom

ew, Chi lders, H iggins, Mos s, and Jo hn son. But Jo hnson was no t named on the appe llants’ initial br ief, nor was he li sted in thecertificate of interested person s. The om

ission of John son was br ought to the a

ppellants’ attention b y the defendant s in their a

nswer br ief, but th e appella

nts’ re ply bri ef again f

ailed to lis t Johnson and it did not

mention John son’s omission. We a re left to conclude that Johnson has not file d a brief

in this appe al, and a s a consequence, we dismis s his appeal for fa ilure to p rosecute. See 11th Cir. R. 4 2-1(b).

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW T he only iss ue on appeal is whether the distr ict court erred when i t grante d

summar y judgm ent

in favor of AGL Resources, Inc. and Atlan ta Gas a s to all of t

he plaintiff s’ claims. We r eview a dist rict c ourt ’s grant of summ ary j udgmen

t de novo, and we view the eviden ce in the l ight

most favorable to the non moving party. Artistic Entm’t, Inc. v. City of

Warn er Robins , 331 F.3d 1196, 1203 (11th Cir. 2003). Summ ary judgment is proper

only w hen “t here is no g enuine issue as to any mater ial fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a m atter of law.” Fed. R. C iv. P. 56(c). Whether the L MRA preempts a state-law claim is a question of law6

which we review de no vo. Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc. , 60 F.3d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1 995). III. PREEMPTION DISCUSSION Section 301 (a) of th e Labor Managem ent Relat ions Act pr

ovides: Suits for violat

ion of contr

acts betw een an e mployer and a l abor organizat ion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce

. . . may be brought in any district co urt of the United St ates having jurisdic tionof the par

ties, w ithout

respect to the am ount in contr oversy or withou t regard to the citizen ship of th e parties. 29 U.S .C. § 185 (a). T

his section grants j urisdiction to federal courts t o adjudic at e emplo ym ent

disp utes involving collectiv e barga ining agreements , and it e mbodie s the policy that fede ral law , fashion ed from national la

bor law, should provide the substantivelaw t hat applies i n § 301(a) suits. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v

. Lincoln Mills of A la. , 353 U. S. 448, 4 56, 77 S. Ct. 912, 91 8 (195 7); Lightning , 60 F.3d at 155 6. Acco rdi ngl y, § 301 provides the foundation for the preemption doctrine that the Supreme Court co ncisely summ arized in Lingle v. Norge Div ision of Magic Chef, Inc. , 486 U.S. 399, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988): [I]f the resolution of a sta te-law claim depends upon the m eaning of a collectiv e -barg aining agreement, the application of state law ( which might lead to inconsiste

nt results s ince there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre- empt ed and federal labor-law7

principle s – necessar

ily unif orm t hroughout the

Nation – m

ust be employed to resolve the dispute. Id. at 405-06, 108 S. Ct. at 1881. T his preem ption doctrine exists to “ensure uniform interpre tation

o f collectiv e-barga

ining agreem

ents, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent

resolution of labor-management disputes,” id. at 404, 108 S. Ct. at 1880, b ut it i s impor

tant to notethat “not every dispute conc erning em

ployment, or tangential ly involvi ng a provision of a collective-bargaining ag reem ent, is pre-em

pte d by § 301 . . . .” Allis-Ch almers Co rp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 211, 1 05 S. Ct. 1904, 1911 (1985). The Supreme C ourt has instructed that a state-law claim is preempted by § 301 of the LM RA if “ evaluation of the tort c laim is inextric ably in tertwine d with

cons ideration

of the terms of th e labor con tract,” or, sta ted anoth er wa y, “ whe n resolution

of a state -law cl aim i s substantially dep endent upon a nalysi s of th e te rms of an agreem

ent made betwe en the par

ties in a labor contract,” the state-law claim has been preempted

. Id. at 213, 220 , 105 S. Ct. at 19 12, 1916

. In light of t hese prin ciples of § 301 preemptio n, we now turn our at

tention to each of th e plaintiff

s’ four state -law cl aims to determ ine wheth er these claim s have been preempted by the LMRA. If one or more of the plaintiffs’ claims have not been preem pted, we m

ust then cons ider the alternativ e grounds fo r affir manc e asserte d by the defen dants on appe al.8

A. Breach of Contract In Count I, t

he plainti ffs a ssert a st ate-law breach of

contract claim against AGL Resources, Inc. and Atlanta Gas. In particul ar, they allege tha

t “[b ]y entering into the collec tive barga ining agreement with the plaintiffs, Defenda nts have expressly assumed contract ual and fid

uciary obligations t o the plaintiff s.” (R. 1-1 ¶ 12.) Moreover, the plainti ffs alle ge the defendants “have violated their contractual obligations by ter

minat ion of these P laintiffs ’ emplo ym ent in m anners co ntrary to the ter ms of the coll ective ba rgaining ag

reem ent. ” (

Id. ¶ 13.) It i s undisputed t hat the plaintiff s’ breach of

contract claim refers solely

to the colle ctive-ba

rgaining agreement that g overned t he plaint iffs’ employment with the de fendant. The elements of a

right to recover for a breach of contract under Georgia law

are simply

“thebreach a

nd the resu ltant dam

ages to the

party who has the

right to compl ainabout the contract being broken.” Budget R ent-A-C ar of A tlanta, Inc. v. Webb , 469 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1996). To determine whether the defendants breached the collectiv e-bargaining agreement, there is n o doubt that we w ould

be calle d upon to consider

the term s of the la

bor contra ct. Bec ause the pl aintiffs’ state-law breach of contract claims are substanti ally de pendent upon a

n analy sis of the c ollective bargaining

agreement, they

are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and we affirm the9

district court’s grant of summ ary judgm ent in favor of AGL Re sou rces, I nc. and Atlanta G as as to Cou

nt I of thecompl aint. B. Intentional Infliction of Em otional Di stress In Count II, theplaintiff

s assert a state law claim for intent

ional infli ction o f emotional distress. Their c ompla in t incl udes only the m ost general allegati ons regardin g this claim. For instance, they allege in Co unt II that the defen dants “have behaved in

an extrem

e and/or out

rageous m

anner,” and that thi s conduct “ gave rise to intense fe elings of anxiety , depres sion, and e xtrem e outrage .” (R. 1-1 ¶ 15.) In the “FactualBackgroun d” of t he complaint, the plaintiffs allege that they “ have been placedunder tre mendou s stress an d econom ic pressur

es as a dir

ect result of the actions and omission s of [the def endants],” and the plaintiffs further allege that they “have suffere d loss of

weight, una ble [sic] to s leep, . . . high blood pre ssure, f eelings of humiliation, depression and severe mort ification.” ( Id. ¶ 10.) A lthough the plaintiff s’ compl aint does not

specify the outrag eous o r ext reme conduct that provides the foundation for their intentional infliction of emotional distress c laims , it is clear from the record and the briefs on appeal that their claims are basedon their belief that2 For instance, the plaintiffs assert that their opportunity to transfer was not “meaningful,” (Appellants’ Br. at 2), and that they were

“terminated without notice in an egreg ious and harassing manner,”

( id. ). Moreover, they

assert that “[t]he very manne r of the terminations was done in amanner that insulted, humiliated and embarrassed each of the pl ainti ffs du e to th eir lo ngtermemployment and ca

used all the factual elements of a state law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” ( Id. at 3.) 10 they were not provided w ith proper

notice of their termination and that they were not allowed a meaningful opportunity to consider their option to transfer. 2 Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must pr ove four e leme nts to sustain aclaim for intentional infliction

of em otional distr

ess: “ (1) [t] he conduct m

ust be inten

tional or reckless ; (2) [t]he conduct must be extrem e and outrageo us; (3) [t]here m ust be a causal connection

between the wrong ful conduct

and the emotional distress; a

nd (4) [t]heemoti onal distre ss must be seve re.” Northside Hosp., Inc. v. Ruotanen , 541 S.E. 2d66, 68-69 (2000); see also Y arbray v. S . Bell Tel. & Tel. Co

. , 409 S.E .2d 835, 837 (1991). F or us to determine whether the defendants’ conduct in term inating the pl ain ti ffs was “ext reme and outrage ous,” we necessar ily m ust consider t

he term s of the collective-bargaining agree ment t h at governs the plainti ffs’ e mploy ment. As a consequence, we concl

ude that our

evaluatio n of the plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress c laims would be su bstantiall y dependent u

pon an analy sis of the labor agreem ent, and w e hold that t

hese clai ms are pr eem

pted by the LMRA.3 This result is w ho ll y consistent with this court’s prior holding in Lightning v. Roadway Expres s, Inc. , 60 F. 3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1995). In Lightning , we concluded that the plaintiff’s claim for

intentiona

l infliction of emotional distre ss was not preempted by the LMRA. Id. at 1557. I

n that ca se, howe

ver, the inte ntional infliction of emotional distress claim was predicated

upon the v erbal a

nd phy sical ab

use that was brought to bear upon the plaintiff, and the court co ncluded that it could evaluate the allegedly “extreme and outrageous” conduct of t h e defendant without considering the collective-barg aining agree ment. Id. Notably, in Lightning , this court acknowl edged

that ana lyzin g an inte ntional inf

liction of emotiona

l d is tress cla

im may well require consideration of the terms of a collective-barg aining agreement. Id. We conclu de, in this case, th at it does. 11 Acco rdi ngl y, w e affir

m the district c ourt’s g

rant of sum

mary judgm ent in favo r of AGL Resources, Inc. and Atlanta Gas as to Count II of the com plaint. 3 C. Tortious I

nterference wit

h Business R

elations In t he third co unt of the c ompla int, the pl aintiffs assert a claim for torti o u s interference with busines s r elations. The plaintiffs al lege that t he chief e xecutive officer of Atlant a Gas and

other age nts of AGL Resource s, Inc. “took a ffirmative actions to jeopa

rdize the business oppor

tunities of

Plaintif fs. ” (R.1- 1 ¶ 17.) More spe cifi call y, accordin g to the plaintiffs, the defen dants torti ously interfe red with

their “cont racts of employm

ent with potential subsequent employers,” and the chief executive officer “m

ade defamatory

comm ents over

the last year as to the stat us and capabilities” of the plai ntiffs. ( Id. ) The pla intiffs a llege th at the defen dants’ representatives made statem ents, both before and after their term ination, that hinder ed the p laintiff

s in their s ubsequent a

ttemp ts to obtain e mploy ment; for exam

ple, the12

plai ntiffs contend tha

t a repre sentative of Atlant a Gas told contract ors that t

he y should not hire emplo yees who had been laid off by Atlan ta Gas. To establish a

cause of action for

tortious int erfere nce with business re lations under Georgia law, a plaintiff m ust show that the defendant, (1) acting improperl y and without pr

ivilege (2 ) and acti

ng purposely

and with malice w ith the inte nt to injure, (3) induced a third party or parties n ot to enter into or cont

inue a busine ss relations hip with the pl aintiff ( 4) for w hich th e plainti ff suffered some financial inju ry. Perimeter

Realty v. GAPI, Inc. , 533 S.E.2d 136, 144-45 (2000). To the ex tent that the plainti ffs’ t ortious in ter fer enc e wi th bu si nes s re lat io ns cla ims are base d upon statem ents made prior to th eir termination or during the grieva nce process , we

con clu de t hat th eir cla ims are pre empte d by the LMRA . In such a circum stance, to determ ine whether

the defen dants’ alleged sta teme nts were

“im proper” a nd “w ithout privileg e,” we necessarily would need to consider the term s of the collectivebargaining

agreem ent, including, for instance, the Management Rights clause of that agreem ent. Howeve r, to theextent tha t the plaint

iffs base their tortious interference with bu si nes s re lat io ns cla ims o n s tat emen ts ma de b y com pany represent atives to pr ospectiveemployers after their layoff and after t he grievan ce procedu re wa s concluded, we hold thatth eir cla ims a re n ot pre empt ed. In e val uat in g s uch a cl aim,4 First, the defendants contend that the p laintiff

s offer ed only inadmissib le hearsay

at the summary judgme

ntstage regarding

the post-termination statements. Because the district court did not address this argument in its order, we decline to do so here and remand fo r further consideration. Se con d, the defe

ndants contend tha

t the plain

tiffs wa ived thei r argu ment that t

he posttermination statemen

ts were made outside of the collective-bargaining a greement, and thus were not preempted

by the L MRA. Having reviewed the recor d, we conclude that the ar gument was not waived. (R.2-31 at 7-8.) Third , the defe

ndants contend tha

t even if a compan

y r eprese ntative ma

de an ad miss ibl e statement following

the plain tiffs’ te rmination that coul d give r

ise to a tortious interfe

rence c laim, their claims would still b e preem pted by the LMRA. I

n support o f this con

tention, the defen

dants point to Turner v. American Fed’n of Teachers Local 1565 , 138 F.3d 878 (11th Cir. 1998 ). In Turner , we held

that a tortious interference with employ ment claim was preempted by the LMRA. Id. a t 8 84. But Turner

is distinguishable. The plaintiff in Turner had been terminated from her position with the American Federation of Teachers ( “AFT”), and she bro ugh t s ui t ag ain st AFT . In her suit, she alleged that AFT (and two for mer executive officials of AFT) tortiously interfered

with her empl oym ent with AFT , which was governed

by a collective bargaining ag reement. In holding that her tortious interference with employ ment claim was preempted by the LMRA, we noted that resolution of her st ate-law claim would depend upon the terms of the collective ba rgaining agreement

because her claim was “based solely upon her theory

of wrongful discharge.” Id. at 884 n.14. By contras t, in this case, Count I II does not a

llege t hat t he plaintiff

s were w rongfu lly discharged

from Atlanta Gas. Instead, the plaintiffs contend

that the d efenda nts interf ered wit h their relation ship with a prospective employer. As a consequence, we ar e not co mpel le d b y Turner to conclude that the plaintiffs’ tortious interference with business relations claims are preempted by

the LMRA.

5 Onappeal, the defendants contend that even if § 301 of

the LMRAdoes not preempt the plaintiffs’ tortious interference claims, the defenda nts are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment as to these claims because they fail as a matter of law. But the district court did not reach the merit s of the state-law claims asserted by the plaintiffs. Because the district court did not address their argument in the first instance, we decline to do so here. 13 we need not co nsult the co lle ct ive-barg aining agre emen t. 4 As a cons equence, the district court er

red when it granted summ ary j udgmen

t inthe defen dants’ favor on th e ground that all of the plai

ntiffs’ tortious int erfere nce with b usiness rel ati on s cl aims were preemp ted. 514

D. Defam

ation In t he final c ount of the c ompla int, the pl aintiffs assert a state-la w claim of defam ation. The p laintiffs allege tha t the defe ndants “made

charges a

gainst the plaintiffs in refer

ence to their trade and profes sion calcu lated to i njure” them. (R.1-1 ¶ 20.) Although the co mplaint again is s ilent rega rding the f

acts that u

nderlie th is cla im, it is clea

r following our revie w of the recor d and the br

iefs on app eal that t

he plaintiffs base their def

amat ion claim on essential ly the same

statem ents that f

orm t he foundation

of their tortious interference with busine ss relati ons claim. In particular, the pla int iffs ’ def

amati on c lai ms are bas ed o n al leg ed s tat ement s by a co mp any official that the plaintiffs “were laid off for a reason.” (R.2-25 at 140-141; R.2-29 at 84-87; R.2 -30 at 245 .) For ess ent ial ly the same

reasons a

rticulate d above re garding the tortious interference with

business re lations cla

ims, the plainti ffs’ de fama tionclaim s are not preempted

by the LMRA to the extent that they are base d upon defam

atory statem ents that occurred after their term ination. Under Georgia law, an oral def amat ion action lies when (1) a

defendant makes charges against the plaintiff in reference to his trade, office, or profession, if such charges are calculated to injure h im t herein; ( 2) the charge is false; (3) the c harge is made with m alice; a

nd (4) thecomm

unication is not p r ivileged. Ga. Co de Ann. § § 51-5-4(a )(3), 51 -5-5, 51- 5-6, 51-5- 7. Beca use the6 The defendants contend that even if the defama tion claims are not preempted by the LMRA, they

are still entitled to summary judgment because the defamation claims fail as a matter of law. Again, the district court did not reach this argument. Accordingly, we leave this issue to the district court to consider in the first instance. 15 plaintiff s’ defam ation

claim is based

upon alleged statements made by an Atlanta Gas official to a contrac tor after th ey were terminated, our an alysis of their d efam ation cla ims un de r Georgi a law is n ot substantia lly dep endent upon t

he term s of the collectiv e-bargaining agreem ent. Simp ly sta

ted, the e leme nts of the pl aintiffs’ posttermination

defam ation clai m do not

turn upon the

term s of their labor contr act with the defendant s. Acc ordingly , we hold that the dis trict cour

t also erred when it granted

summar y judgm ent in the de fendants’ favor on th e ground that all of the plainti ffs’ defamation clai ms were precluded b y the LMRA. 6 E. “Hybr id ” Se cti on 30 1/ Fai r Re pre sen tat io n Cl aim The district c ourt, having concluded that the plaintiffs’ state-law claim s were preempted

by the LMRA, apparently hee ded the Supr eme Court’ s invitation in AllisChalmers and

treated the plainti ffs’ st ate-law claim s as claim s under § 301. See AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck

, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 1 05 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 ( 1985) (notin g that when t

he resolution of a state -law cl aim i s substantially dep endent upon t he ter ms of a colle ctive bar gaining agreement, the cl aim should be dismissed as preempted

or treat ed as a § 301 claim ). But to prevail on

their § 301 claim s against7 Of course, Moss never filed

a grievance with the union, and therefore he was barre d from asserting a claim under § 301. DelCoste llo , 462 U.S. at 163, 103 S. Ct. at 2290. 16 AGL Resource s, Inc. and

Atlanta Gas, the

plaintiff s must s how both that the employer violated the term s of the col lective- bargaining agreem ent and tha

t the union

breached its duty of

fair re presenta tion

. C hauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry , 494 U.S. 558, 564, 1 10 S. Ct. 133 9, 1344 (1 990). As a conseque nce, alt hough the p l aintiffs’ compl aint only name s their em

ployer , the distr

ict court p roperly characterized

the plainti ffs’ § 301 cla i ms as “hy brid” § 301/f

air representation

claim s. See DelCoste llo v. In t’l Bhd. of Teamst ers , 462 U. S. 151, 1 03 S. Ct. 2281 (1983) (noting that the employee may sue the employer, the union, or both, but that the case he must prove i s the s ame in all circum stances). Because the plaintiffs’ preem pted state-law claims are properly construed as hybr

id § 301/fair

represe ntation claims, the

s ix-mo nth statute o f limitations from § 10(b) of th e National Lab or Relatio ns Ac t applies. Id. at 169, 103 S . Ct. a t 2293

. The court did not err when it concluded that the s tatute of

limit ations bega

n to run when the plaintiffs we re inform ed that the unionwould not sub mit

their grievances to arbitration, which occurred no later than May 16, 2000. 7 Because

the com plaint in thi s case w as filed on Septem ber 18, 200 1, the court held

that the pla

intiffs’ hybrid

§ 301/fair representation claims were bar red by the six-month statute o f limitations , and we agree.17 IV. CONCLUSION Because Johnson failed to f ile a brie f on appea l, we D ISMISS his appeal for failure to prosecu

te. As t o the appeals brought by Bartholom

ew, Chi lders, Moss, and Higgins, we AFFIRM IN PART, VACATE IN PART, and REMAND. W e AFFIRM the district c ourt’s g

rant of sum

mary judgm ent in favo r of AG L Resour ces, Inc . and Atl anta Gas as to the plaintiffs’ state-law breach of contrac t claims an d thei r intentional infliction

of em otional distr

ess claim s. Likewise, we AFF IRM the district court ’s grant of summ ary judgm ent in favor of the defendants’ as to the p lain tiffs’ cla ims under § 301 of

LMRA. But we ho ld that the p lainti ffs’ st ate -law cl aims for tortious interfe rence w ith business re lations and defam ation are not preem

pted by the LM RA to the exte nt that thes e claim s are base d upon the def endants’ conduc t following t he plai ntiffs’ termination and u nrelated to the grie vance proc ess. Acco rdi ngl y, we find that the district court erred whenit granted summ ary j udgmen

t in favor of AGL Resources, Inc. and Atlanta Gas as to Bartholomew’ s, Ch ilde rs’s , Mo ss’s, and Higgins ’s state -law cl aims for torti ous interf erence with busin es s relations and

defamation, and we V

ACATE the district

court’ s judgm ent as to the se claims and REMAND for fu rther proce edings.18

APPEAL OF C HARLIE JOHNSON DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE; REMAINING APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PAR T , VACATEDIN PART, AND REMANDED.