IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0752

Filed August 18, 2021

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DONTERIUS J. BOMAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah E. Crane, Judge.

Donterius Bomar appeals the sentence imposed on his conviction of firstdegree robbery. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Carr, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2021).
2

CARR, Senior Judge.

Donterius Bomar pled guilty1to second-degree murder and first-degree 

robbery. Bomar and the State agreed to jointly recommend consecutive prison 

sentences of fifty years for the murder conviction, with a seventy percent 

mandatory minimum sentence, and twenty-five years for the robbery conviction, 

with a fifty percent mandatory minimum sentence.2 The district court adopted most 

of the parties’ sentencing recommendation but deviated from it by imposing

concurrent sentences and a seventy percent mandatory minimum sentence on the 

robbery conviction.3

On appeal, Bomar challenges the imposition of a seventy percent 

mandatory minimum sentence on his robbery conviction. We review a sentence 

for correction of errors at law. See State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Iowa 

2021). Because the robbery sentence falls within the statutory limits, it “is cloaked 

with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of 

discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Boldon, 954 

N.W.2d 62, 73 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). A sentencing court abuses its 

discretion when it imposes a sentence for reasons that are not supported by 

substantial evidence or misapplies the law. See State v. Moore, 936 N.W.2d 436, 

439 (Iowa 2019).

 

1 Because Bomar challenges his sentence rather than his guilty plea, he satisfies 

the “good cause” requirement of Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020). See 

State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).

2 The recommendation would result in a total term of seventy-five years in prison, 

with Bomar serving a minimum of forty-seven and one-half years.

3 The result is a total term of fifty years in prison, with Bomar serving a minimum 

of thirty-five years.
3

Iowa Code section 902.12(3) requires a person serving a sentence for firstdegree robbery to serve between fifty and seventy percent of the maximum term. 

The sentencing court must determine the length of the mandatory minimum 

sentence “based upon all pertinent information including the person’s criminal 

record, a validated risk assessment, and the negative impact the offense has had 

on the victim or other persons.” Iowa Code § 901.11(3). Bomar argues the 

sentencing court abused its discretion “by failing to appropriately consider [those] 

factors.”

In imposing sentence, the district court considered the presentence 

investigation report, statements made at the plea hearing, and statements made 

at the sentencing hearing. The court noted the seriousness of the offenses, which 

occurred close in time but involved different victims. After noting Bomar’s mental 

health and his age, the court declined to impose consecutive sentences because 

Bomar “will still be facing a significant prison sentence and significant mandatory 

prison term,” which the court hoped would allow him to consider and atone for his 

actions. The court imposed a seventy percent minimum sentence on the robbery 

charge instead of the fifty percent minimum the parties recommended, citing the 

seriousness of the crime and injury to a second victim. The written sentencing 

order further states that the court considered Bomar’s age, criminal record, family 

circumstances, mental-health and substance-abuse history, the nature of the 

offense, the plea agreement, and the statutory sentencing requirements. 

The court’s statements at the sentencing hearing and in the written 

sentencing order show that it considered the factors set forth in section 901.11(3) 

in imposing a seventy percent mandatory minimum sentence. See State v. 
4

Alloway, 707 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2006) (noting that the court can satisfy the 

requirement to state its reasons for imposing sentence either by orally stating the 

reasons for sentencing at a reported hearing or in the written sentencing order), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 

2010), and State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014). In each, the 

court stated it considered the information in Bomar’s presentence investigation 

report, which included his criminal record and a risk assessment. Although the 

court did not refer specifically to the risk assessment or Bomar’s criminal record in 

imposing sentence, it was not required to do so. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 

9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing 

circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.”). And because 

the court ordered concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, the minimum 

amount of time Bomar must serve is less than the amount the parties 

recommended to the court. We find no abuse of discretion. 

AFFIRMED.