Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed February 3, 2021.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D19-1884

Lower Tribunal No. 17-258-P

________________

Paul Evan Bates,

Appellant,

vs.

Magda Jhovanna Bates,

Appellee.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Monroe 

County, Sharon I. Hamilton, Judge.

Ross & Girten, and Lauri Waldman Ross, for appellant.

Law Office of Jack Bridges, P.A., and James R. (Jack) Bridges, for 

appellee.

Before LOGUE, SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ. 

SCALES, J.
2

In this marital dissolution action, Paul Evan Bates appeals an August 

30, 2019 non-final order finding the parties’ prenuptial agreement invalid 

because it was the product of duress and coercion. We have jurisdiction. 

See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)c. (“Appeals to the district courts of 

appeal of nonfinal orders are limited to those that . . . determine . . . in family 

law matters . . . that a marital agreement is invalid in its entirety[.]”). 

Concluding that the trial court’s findings as to coercion are supported by 

competent, substantial evidence, we affirm.1

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

On May 29, 2001, Paul Evan Bates (“Husband”) and Magda Jhovanna 

Bates (“Wife”) met in Cali, Colombia through a matchmaking website called 

Latin Connection. At the time, Husband was a divorced, forty-one-year-old 

commercial airline pilot with a net worth of approximately $4 million. 

Husband was looking for a “Christian based woman of child-bearing age” to 

marry, bring to the Florida Keys and start a family. Wife, who was a virgin 

1 In this opinion, we address only whether the trial court erred by invalidating 

the parties’ prenuptial agreement on the grounds of duress and coercion. 

We affirm, without discussion, the remainder of the issues raised in this 

appeal. 

2 The facts set forth herein are taken from the lower court’s factual findings 

in the August 30, 2019 non-final order and, to the extent they are undisputed, 

from the trial transcript. 
3

and had never been married, turned eighteen years old just three days prior 

to meeting Husband. She had the equivalent of a high school education and 

was in her second year of medical school in Colombia. Wife was looking for 

a wealthy American man to marry and to bring her to the United States.

The parties’ courtship was far from ordinary. Because Husband did 

not speak Spanish and Wife spoke little English, Husband used a translator 

during the parties’ initial meetings. A chaperone accompanied the parties 

on their dates, which occurred when Husband had layovers on flights to Cali. 

To breach the language barrier, Husband used a handheld translator and 

translation programs on a laptop. 

In June 2001, during an unchaperoned trip to Cartagena, Colombia, 

the parties had sex and became engaged the same day. When Wife later 

learned that she was pregnant, Husband paid for her to have an abortion in 

mid-August 2001, shortly before the parties married on August 31, 2001. 

Wife’s family was unaware of her premarital sex, pregnancy and abortion.

A. The prenuptial agreement and the parties’ marriage

During their whirlwind courtship, Husband told Wife that he wanted her 

to sign a prenuptial agreement. Husband obtained a form prenuptial 

agreement from a co-pilot acquaintance and modified the agreement to 
4

Husband’s satisfaction. The parties never discussed the prenuptial 

agreement or negotiated any of its terms.

In late August 2001, Wife took the prenuptial agreement to a 

Colombian attorney, Alba Mielan Ceballos De Lince (“Attorney Ceballos”), to 

have the agreement translated from English into Spanish. On August 29, 

2001, Attorney Ceballos provided Wife with the Spanish translation of the 

prenuptial agreement. Despite Attorney Ceballos signing a certification in 

the agreement attesting that she was knowledgeable in Florida law and had 

advised Wife about her rights under the subject agreement, Attorney 

Ceballos now admits that she does not know Florida law and that she did 

nothing more than have the agreement translated into Spanish by a third 

party. 

The next day, August 30, 2001, the parties executed the English and 

Spanish versions of the prenuptial agreement before a notary public. Wife 

did not read the agreement before signing it. On August 31, 2001, the parties 

were married in a civil ceremony at Wife’s home that was attended by a small 

group of family and friends, followed by a catered meal and live 

entertainment.
5

Several days following the civil ceremony, the parties went to a 

previously scheduled appointment at the Colombian embassy to start Wife’s 

emigration process. 

In December 2001, the parties had a religious ceremony performed in 

a Catholic church in Colombia. The reason for the delay between the civil 

and religious ceremonies was two-fold. First, as a divorced, nondenominational Christian, Husband, in order to be married in the Catholic 

church, needed to perform various steps to obtain approval from the 

Colombian archdiocese. This process took months to accomplish. Second, 

not wanting to delay the emigration process, the parties had the civil 

ceremony first, at Wife’s request. 

 Thereafter, with the emigration process completed and the religious 

ceremony performed, Wife moved to the Florida Keys to live with Husband, 

where Husband resided and owned businesses. The parties had five 

children during the course of their marriage.

B. The verified petition for dissolution of marriage

In May 2017, Wife filed a verified petition for dissolution of marriage 

with minor children in the Monroe County Circuit Court. Therein, Wife 

sought to set aside the prenuptial agreement “on the grounds that it was 

reached under fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation or 
6

overreaching.” Among other things, the pleading alleged that the prenuptial 

agreement had been “executed involuntarily as a result of the timing of the 

Agreement.” As a separate basis for invalidating the prenuptial agreement, 

the verified petition asserted that “[t]he provisions for the Wife in the 

Agreement are grossly inequitable.”

C. The trial on the validity of the prenuptial agreement

The trial court held a bench trial on the validity of the prenuptial 

agreement on March 12, 15, 19 and June 10, 2019. The court heard live 

testimony from three witnesses: Wife, Husband, and a former employee of 

one of Husband’s businesses. The parties also introduced the deposition 

testimony of Wife, Husband and Attorney Ceballos.3

Consistent with her deposition testimony, Wife testified that she was a 

virgin prior to her June 2001 trip to Cartagena with Husband; that she 

became pregnant from having sex with Husband; that Husband paid for her 

to have an abortion in mid-August 2001; and that she was raised in a strict 

Catholic household that did not approve of premarital sex or abortion. 

Further, Wife was in severe pain and distress related to the abortion both on 

August 29, 2001, when she retrieved the Spanish translation of the 

3 Because the trial court based its findings of duress and coercion on the 

court’s acceptance of Wife’s testimony and rejection of Husband’s testimony, 

this opinion focuses on Wife’s testimony.
7

prenuptial agreement from Attorney Ceballos, and on August 30, 2001, when 

she executed the prenuptial agreement before a notary. According to Wife, 

“[t]he only reason it didn’t get signed on the 29th is because I could barely 

walk. I was bleeding. I was bleeding . . . [a]nd in pain.”

Wife further testified that when Husband first presented her with the 

English version of the prenuptial agreement in late August 2001, Husband 

told her repeatedly that signing the prenuptial agreement “was a 

requirement” for Wife to immigrate to the United States. In particular, Wife 

testified that, “he told me before I had the appointment [with the Colombian 

embassy] and in order for [me] to come to the States you have to sign this.” 

On cross-examination, Wife agreed that she would have signed 

anything that Husband had given her to sign because Wife loved and wanted 

to marry Husband, and because Wife wanted to immigrate to the United 

States.

D. The non-final order invalidating the prenuptial agreement

On August 30, 2019, the trial court entered a non-final order 

invalidating the parties’ prenuptial agreement because it “was the product of 

duress and coercion.” As to “coercion” the trial court held: 

15. Mrs. Bates was in a vulnerable emotional position at the time 

of executing the prenuptial agreement. She had endured an 

abortion only a couple of weeks before the legal wedding was 

scheduled. Mrs. Bates had already scheduled an appointment 
8

with immigration set for a date shortly after the legal wedding. 

The demand to sign the translated prenuptial agreement the day 

before the wedding or the consequences would be no wedding 

and no immigration, is clear coercion.

(Emphasis added). As to “duress” the trial court held:

19. The fact that Mrs. Bates would have signed anything to 

marry Mr. Bates appears to benefit Mr. Bates’ argument that the 

agreement was executed freely and voluntarily. However, it can 

conversely be used to show the disparity of the parties’ 

bargaining positions. Mrs. Bates came from a strict Catholic 

family. Mr. Bates testified that she had to be home at a certain 

hour or her mother would throw all her clothes out into the alley. 

Mrs. Bates was desperate to marry Mr. Bates and come to the 

United States. She had given her virginity to Mr. Bates, got 

pregnant, [and] had an abortion, all while supposedly expertly 

negotiating the terms of the prenuptial agreement.[4]

 These 

circumstances coupled with the fact that Mrs. Bates came from 

a strict Catholic family that would not condone having sex prior 

to the wedding day (not to mention what her family would have 

done had they known of the abortion), added more emotional 

stress and duress to Mrs. Bates during that time.

(Emphasis added). Husband timely appealed this August 30, 2019 non-final 

order.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s invalidation of the subject prenuptial 

agreement for competent, substantial evidence. See Ziegler v. Natera, 279 

4 The trial court discounted Husband’s testimony that the parties had 

discussed and negotiated the agreement, concluding that “no meaningful 

negotiations could have occurred with the complex legal language contained 

in the document with the language barriers.”
9

So. 3d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). “[T]he findings of the trial court come 

to this court clothed with a presumption of correctness[,] and will not be 

disturbed absent a showing that there was no competent evidence to sustain 

them.” Id. (quoting Baker v. Baker, 394 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1981)). Accordingly, “[w]e take the facts most favorably in support of the trial 

court’s decision.” Waton v. Waton, 887 So. 2d 419, 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

III. ANALYSIS 

There are two distinct grounds for invalidating a prenuptial agreement: 

(1) where the defending spouse has engaged in “fraud, deceit, duress, 

coercion, misrepresentation, or overreaching”; and (2) where “the agreement 

makes an unfair or unreasonable provision for [the challenging] spouse, 

given the [relative] circumstances of the parties.” Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 

2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1987).5 In this case, Wife’s verified petition argued that the 

prenuptial agreement was invalid on both grounds, arguing that the 

agreement was the product of duress and coercion (ground 1) and that the 

agreement contained provisions that were grossly inequitable (ground 2). 

5 Although Casto involved a postnuptial agreement, the legal analysis 

employed therein applies to prenuptial agreements as well. See Waton, 887

So. 2d at 423 n.1. Effective October 1, 2007, the grounds for invalidating a 

prenuptial agreement outlined by the Florida Supreme Court in Casto were 

codified in section 61.079(7) of the Florida Statutes. See Ch. 2007-171, § 1, 

Laws of Fla.
10

Because the trial court’s August 30, 2019 non-final order concluded only that 

the prenuptial agreement was the product of duress and coercion, we limit 

our analysis to the trial court’s conclusion.

A. Definition and elements of “duress”

In the context of considering whether a prenuptial agreement is invalid, 

this Court has defined “duress” as being a “condition of mind produced by 

an improper external pressure or influence that practically destroys the free 

agency of a party and causes him [or her] to do an act or make a contract 

not of his [or her] own volition.” Ziegler, 279 So. 3d at 1242 (quoting Herald 

v. Hardin, 116 So. 863, 864 (Fla. 1928)).6 To prove duress, the challenging 

spouse must show: (1) “that the act sought to be set aside was effected 

involuntarily and thus not as an exercise of free will”; and (2) “that this 

condition of mind was caused by some improper and coercive conduct of the 

opposite side.” Id. (quoting City of Miami v. Kory, 394 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 

6 Husband would have this Court apply a more strenuous definition for 

“duress” and require that the defending spouse’s conduct not only be 

“improper,” but also be “unlawful.” See Fuller v. Roberts, 35 Fla. 110 (Fla. 

1895) (defining duress in the context of a claim for duress of goods, 

determining the compelling party’s actions must be “unlawful or wrongful”). 

We disagree. There is a clear distinction between an action for duress of 

goods – discussed in Fuller – and a petition to invalidate a prenuptial 

agreement based on the actions of the defending spouse. Certainly, 

unlawful conduct is improper; nevertheless, Husband cites no family law 

case that has defined “duress” as requiring the defending spouse’s conduct 

be unlawful. 
11

3d DCA 1981)). In other words, the defending spouse’s external pressure 

must result in the challenging spouse’s subjective loss of free will at the time 

the prenuptial agreement is signed. Id.; Parra de Rey v. Rey, 114 So. 3d 

371, 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“[T]he party claiming duress must establish 

that the effects of the alleged coercive behavior affected their subjective 

intent to act.”).

B. Definition and elements of “coercion”

Neither party provided any case that defines “coercion” in the context 

of determining the validity of a prenuptial agreement. Nor did this Court’s 

review of Florida case law reveal any such definition for coercion. While 

similar, the terms “duress” and “coercion” are certainly not synonymous in all 

respects. Otherwise, the use of both words by the Florida Supreme Court 

and the Florida Legislature would be redundant. Nevertheless, at times, it 

appears the Florida appellate courts have applied the terms interchangeably. 

See e.g., Paris v. Paris, 412 So. 2d 952, 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (defining 

“duress” and finding that the defending spouse’s “acts amounted to duress 

and coercion”); Flaherty v. Flaherty, 128 So. 3d 920, 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) 

(determining that the parties’ prenuptial agreement “should have been set 

aside based upon duress and coercion,” because the “coercive 

circumstances” demonstrated that the challenging spouse’s execution of the 
12

agreement was not voluntary); Berger v. Berger, 466 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 

4th DCA 1985) (concluding the defending spouse’s acts that amounted to 

criminal extortion “must inevitably involve coercion and duress”).

In Gribbin v. Gribbin, 499 So. 2d 858, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)

(Glickstein, J., concurring specially), the concurring judge quoted an Ohio 

Supreme Court decision that observed the primary difference between 

“duress” and “coercion” is the level of compulsion exerted by the compelling 

party. That is, while “duress” generally occurs by means of actual physical 

force or threatened physical force to one’s person or by threats to one’s 

property or reputation, “coercion” is “generally defined more broadly to 

include undue influence and other lesser forms of compulsion.” Id. (quoting 

State v. Woods, 357 N.E. 2d 1059, 1065 (1976)). In either instance (duress 

or coercion), the act of compulsion must be sufficient to overcome the 

recipient’s free will such that the recipient’s actions are not of his or her own 

volition. 

Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “coercion” as the “[c]ompulsion 

of a free agent by physical, moral or economic force or threat of physical 

force.” Coercion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The definition 

further compares “moral coercion” with “undue influence,” which is defined 

as “[t]he improper use of power or trust in a way that deprives a person of 
13

free will and substitutes another’s objective; the exercise of enough control 

over another person that a questioned act by this person would not have 

otherwise been performed, the person’s free agency having been 

overmastered.” Undue Influence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).7

Appellate courts outside of Florida have likewise recognized that 

“duress” and “coercion” are distinct terms in the context of invalidating a 

prenuptial agreement and resorted to Black’s Law Dictionary to define their 

meaning. See Balogh v. Balogh, 332 P.3d 631, 647 (Haw. 2014); Fordeley 

v. Fordeley, 2020-Ohio-5380, 2020 WL 6867942, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 

23, 2020); Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, L-88-032, 1989 WL 80947, at *10 

(Ohio Ct. App. July 21, 1989); see also Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 

(Ohio 1984) (stating that the terms fraud, duress, coercion, and overreaching 

“may be read with their generally accepted meaning being applicable”); cf.

In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 823 (Cal. 2000) (relying on Black’s Law 

Dictionary for the definition of “voluntarily” because California’s Uniform 

Premarital Agreement Act – like Florida’s Act – fails to define the term); In re 

7 Not surprisingly, Florida’s appellate courts have used the term “undue 

influence” when considering whether the challenging spouse executed a 

prenuptial agreement voluntarily. See Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 

1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (determining that “sufficient coercive 

circumstances” surrounding the execution of a prenuptial agreement “g[a]ve 

rise to a presumption of undue influence and overreaching”); Flaherty, 128 

So. 3d at 923 (same).
14

Estate of Psota, 900 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Neb. 2017) (same); In re Marriage of 

Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 512 (Iowa 2008) (same).

We find the distinction between “duress” and “coercion” discussed by 

Judge Glickstein in his special concurrence in Gribbin to be persuasive in 

the context of considering whether to invalidate a prenuptial agreement. 

“Coercion” occurs where the defending spouse, through undue influence or 

moral or economic force, compels the challenging spouse to sign a 

prenuptial agreement under circumstances which, from a subjective 

viewpoint, evidence that the challenging spouse did not act of his or her own 

free will.

C. The trial court’s determinations on duress and coercion

In this case, the trial court cited the definitions for duress and coercion 

discussed by the special concurrence in Gribbin, and then made separate 

findings of duress and coercion. We will address each determination in turn.

1. Duress

The trial court concluded that Wife’s premarital sex with Husband, her 

pregnancy and her subsequent abortion, coupled with Wife coming from a 

strict Catholic family that would not condone her actions and, perhaps, would 

exact some form of reprisal upon learning of the abortion, constituted duress. 

We disagree with the trial court’s conclusions in this regard. 
15

Duress can occur where the defending spouse threatens an action –

even an action that the defending spouse has a right to take – for the 

defending spouse’s own pecuniary advantage. See Berger, 466 So. 2d at 

1151; Paris, 412 So. 2d at 953.

In Berger, the Fourth District invalidated a property settlement 

agreement executed during a divorce proceeding where the wife presented 

unrebutted testimony that the husband had “admittedly insisted that [the wife] 

sign it or he would turn her over to the Internal Revenue Service” for “failing 

to report substantial cash receipts from the operation of her beauty salon 

business.” Berger, 466 So. 2d at 1151. Even though the husband had a 

right to report the wife to the IRS, our sister court found the husband’s action 

constituted duress because he made the threat for his own pecuniary gain. 

Id.

In Paris, the First District similarly invalidated a settlement agreement 

executed during a divorce proceeding where the wife presented unrebutted 

testimony that “her husband had threatened her that if she did not sign the 

agreement, he would tell the couple’s two minor children that one of their 

female cousins was, in fact, the wife’s daughter from a previous marriage.” 

Paris, 412 So. 3d at 953. Even though the husband had the right to tell his 

children that their “cousin” was actually their half-sister, the Paris court 
16

concluded that the husband’s threat to the wife’s reputation amounted to 

duress because he had threatened to divulge the wife’s secret for his own 

pecuniary advantage. Id. 

Sub judice, the trial court might have been correct that Wife was fearful 

as to what would happen if her family, who raised her in a strict Catholic 

household, learned of Wife’s pre-marital relations with Husband, her 

pregnancy and her subsequent abortion. What is missing in this case, 

however, is any evidence from which it could be inferred that Husband had 

threatened to tell Wife’s family about these circumstances if Wife did not 

execute the prenuptial agreement. There being no evidence that Husband 

threatened to besmirch Wife’s reputation for his own pecuniary gain, we 

conclude that there was not competent, substantial evidence to support the 

trial court’s finding of duress. See Berger, 466 So. 2d at 1151; Paris, 412 

So. 2d at 953.

2. Coercion

But our inquiry does not end because the trial court separately 

concluded that Wife was coerced by Husband into signing the prenuptial 

agreement. The trial court essentially concluded that Husband exploited the 
17

time pressure aspects8 of the parties’ courtship and Wife’s “vulnerable 

emotional position” to coerce Wife into signing the prenuptial agreement, to 

Husband’s pecuniary advantage.9 Specifically, Wife was still experiencing 

emotional and physical pain from having an abortion just two weeks prior 

and the parties had an upcoming appointment at the Colombian embassy to 

start the emigration process that Husband insisted could not take place 

unless Wife signed the agreement. Based on these factors, the trial court 

determined that Husband had engaged in coercion.

8 In the August 30, 2019 non-final order, the trial court highlighted numerous 

“red flags” that influenced the court’s determination, including: “Mrs. Bates 

[sic] receipt of the prenuptial agreement translated into Spanish on August 

29th; the prenuptial agreement being signed by the parties on August 30th 

with the wedding on August 31st; . . . and the timing of the demand to execute 

the agreement or there would be no immigration processing and no 

wedding.”

9 In the August 30, 2019 non-final order, the trial court found that Husband’s 

demand that Wife “sign the translated prenuptial agreement the day before 

the wedding or the consequence would be no wedding and no immigration, 

[was] clear coercion.” Given our determination, supra, that the primary 

difference between “duress” and “coercion” is the degree of compulsion 

exerted by the defending spouse, we conclude that coercion, like duress, 

can arise where the defending spouse threatens an action for the defending 

spouse’s own pecuniary gain. See Berger, 466 So. 2d at 1151; Paris, 412 

So. 2d at 953. We, therefore, examine the lower court’s finding of coercion 

within this context. To this end, we conclude further that the legal principles 

espoused in the “duress” cases cited in this section are, to the extent 

discussed herein, equally applicable to “coercion.” 
18

 In this appeal, Husband argues that (1) he made no specific threat to 

cancel the parties’ civil ceremony or to stop the emigration process if Wife 

did not sign the prenuptial agreement, and (2) Wife’s act of signing the 

contract was a decided and deliberate choice on her part, both of which 

precluded a finding of coercion. Notwithstanding Husband’s arguments, 

because there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to support 

the trial court’s findings to the contrary, we are compelled to affirm.

At his deposition, Husband made it clear that Wife knew that he would 

not marry her unless she signed a prenuptial agreement:

Q. If [Wife] tells you no, I’m not signing a prenup you

would have been done?

A. Out of there.

Q. So it was a prenup or bust?

A. There is a lot of bust but that was definitely a bust. She 

knew about them ahead of time. . . . 

Husband’s ultimatum, by itself, did not constitute the level of compulsion 

necessary for coercion. See Doig v. Doig, 787 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2001) (concluding that an ultimatum that there would be no wedding without 

a prenuptial agreement “does not, in itself, constitute duress”); Eager v. 

Eager, 696 So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“It is not a threat or duress 

for the proponent to make it clear that there will be no marriage in the 
19

absence of the agreement.”). Additional acts by Husband, however, raised 

the level of compulsion into the realm of coercion.

Husband repeatedly told Wife that “it was a requirement” that the 

prenuptial agreement be signed for Wife to come to the United States. More 

important, Husband told Wife she needed to sign the prenuptial agreement 

before their upcoming appointment with the Colombian embassy, implying 

that signing the agreement was part of the emigration process. Contrary to 

what Husband told Wife, immigration to the United States is not conditioned 

on the execution of a prenuptial agreement. These acts, combined with the 

time pressure aspects10 of the parties’ courtship and Wife’s vulnerable 

physical and emotional condition following the abortion, constitute 

competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of 

coercion. See Ziegler, 279 So. 3d at 1241, 1243 (concluding that the parties’ 

prenuptial agreement was the product of duress where the husband 

“threatened life-altering consequences, by imperiling their shared, long-term 

plan to begin life anew with their children to the United States”; specifically, 

the day before the wedding in Venezuela, “the husband threatened to cancel 

the ceremony if the wife did not sign the agreement, and advised her that a 

failure to obtain the marriage certificate on the planned date would thwart the 

10 See footnote 8, supra.
20

couple’s imminent plan to emigrate to the United States”); Hjortaas v. 

McCabe, 656 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (concluding the “timing of 

the signing” of the prenuptial agreement indicated the wife’s signature was 

the product of duress, where the agreement was presented to the wife two 

days before the wedding – “the actual terms of which were previously 

unknown to her” – giving the wife one day “to make an independent 

evaluation of the contract, or to cancel her wedding”); Flaherty, 128 So. 3d 

at 921-23 (concluding the prenuptial agreement was the product of duress 

where the husband gave the wife an edited version of the agreement at the 

Las Vegas airport, at 11:30 p.m., the night before a destination wedding, and 

the wife spent the next several hours frantically trying to find a notary and 

never read the agreement prior to signing it); Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 

1111, 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (invalidating the prenuptial agreement where 

the husband presented the prenuptial agreement to the wife a day before the 

wedding, while the parties were at the jewelry store sizing their wedding 

rings, and the husband insisted that the wife sign the agreement or the 

wedding would be called off); Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So. 2d 522, 525 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (recognizing that “the time pressure aspect of cases” 

can support a trial court’s determination as to whether a prenuptial 

agreement should be set aside because it was the product of duress).
21

Finally, we recognize that Wife’s testimony that she would have signed 

anything Husband presented her is an indication that her signing the 

prenuptial agreement was a volitional act. Nevertheless, under the particular 

facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude there were “sufficient 

coercive circumstances” surrounding the execution of the prenuptial 

agreement to give rise to a presumption that Wife did not execute the 

agreement of her own free will. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1115-16; Flaherty, 

128 So. 3d at 923. The trial court clearly found that Husband did not 

sufficiently rebut this presumption at trial. On this record, we do not disturb 

this finding.

IV. CONCLUSION

We are “mindful that it is not within the province of an appellate court 

to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Baker, 394 So. 2d at 

466. Taking, as we are required to do, the facts most favorably in support of 

the trial court’s decision, Waton, 887 So. 2d at 422, we conclude there is not 

competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination 

that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was the product of duress; there is, 

however, competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s 

determination that the agreement was the product of coercion. Accordingly, 
22

we affirm the August 30, 2019 non-final order invalidating the subject 

prenuptial agreement.

Affirmed.

LOGUE, J., concurs.
23

 Bates v. Bates,

Case Number: 3D19-1884

LINDSEY, J., dissenting in part.

I agree there is no competent substantial evidence to support the trial 

court’s finding of duress, but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 

conclusion that there is competent substantial evidence that the parties’ 

prenuptial agreement was the product of coercion. I would reverse the order 

on appeal because the trial court’s findings established that the wife 

voluntarily signed the prenuptial agreement, and the trial court committed 

legal error when it relied on the expansive definition of coercion set forth in 

a special concurrence to an unwritten per curiam affirmance. See Gribbin v. 

Gribbin, 499 So. 2d 858, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (Glickstein, J., concurring 

specially).

As an initial matter, the trial court’s order appears to conflate two 

separate grounds by which a spouse may challenge a prenuptial agreement. 

The first ground, which is applicable here, requires the challenging spouse 

to establish “fraud, duress, coercion, mispresenting or over-reaching.” Casto 

v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1987) (citations omitted). The second 

ground has to do with unreasonableness. Id.; see also § 61.079(7)(a) 

(setting forth grounds under which a premarital agreement is not 

enforceable). To establish unreasonableness, the challenging spouse must 
24

present evidence of the parties’ relative situations. Casto, 508 So. 2d at 333. 

As the majority correctly observes, the trial court’s order invalidates the 

agreement due to duress and coercion (ground one). However, the trial 

court’s analysis seems to rely on the unreasonableness test (ground two) by 

invalidating the agreement due to the parties’ relative bargaining positions. 

With respect to duress and coercion, I agree with the majority that “[i]n 

either instance (duress or coercion), the act of compulsion must be sufficient 

to overcome the recipient’s free will such that the recipient’s actions are not 

of his or her own volition.” See also Dienstag v. Dienstag, 864 So. 2d 9, 11 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Whether the terms of the agreement are fair is of no 

consequence providing that the wife entered into the contract freely and 

voluntarily.”). 

Here, the trial court’s findings establish that Mrs. Bates acted 

voluntarily. More specifically, although Mrs. Bates testified that she went to 

Latin Connection to practice her English, the trial court found that “Mrs. Bates 

did not go to the Latin Connection merely to practice her English as she 

contends. It was her intention to sign up with the Latin Connection dating 

service to search for an American husband who was wealthy and who would 

help her leave Colombia with legal immigration status in the United States.” 

Moreover, the court also found that the legal wedding was performed at an 
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earlier date for Mrs. Bates’s benefit, so she “could begin the immigration 

process as soon as possible.” Finally, the court accepted Mrs. Bates’s 

testimony that “she would have signed anything no matter what was 

contained in the agreement because she loved Paul. She also wanted to 

come to the United States and enjoy the attributes that came along with 

marrying a wealthy established American pilot.”

Importantly, the court explicitly found that “[t]he fact that Mrs. Bates 

would have signed anything to marry Mr. Bates appears to benefit Mr. Bates’ 

argument that the agreement was executed freely and voluntarily.” 

(Emphasis added). But despite these findings, the court relied on “the 

disparity of the parties [sic] bargaining position” and a number of “red flags”—

such as Mrs. Bates’s age, her limited English, and her lack of business 

experience—in order to find that “Mrs. Bates was indeed persuaded, coerced 

and under emotional duress when she executed the prenuptial agreement.”

The trial court also improperly relied on Judge Glickstein’s special 

concurrence to a per curiam, unwritten affirmance in Gribbin to get around 

the evidence that the agreement was voluntary. This special concurrence, 

citing a case from the Ohio Supreme Court,11 asserts that “[c]oercion is 

11 The special concurrence in Gribbin relied on State v. Woods, 357 N.E.2d 

1059 (1976), an opinion that considered the meaning of duress and coercion 

in the context of mitigating a death sentence under Ohio law where the 
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generally defined more broadly [than duress] to include undue influence and 

lesser forms of compulsion.” Id. Mrs. Bates relied on Gribbin’s special 

concurrence in the lower court to argue that “[c]oercion may include a 

compulsion brought about by moral force or in some other manner with or 

without physical force.” See id. The lower court, in its order invalidating the 

parties’ prenuptial agreement, adopted this analysis.

Because the special concurrence in Gribbin has no precedential value, 

I would hold that the trial court committed legal error when it relied on the 

definitions of duress and coercion set forth in Gribbin. See Dep’t. of Legal 

Affs. v. Dist. Ct. of Appeal, Fifth District, 434 So. 2d 310, 311 (Fla. 1983) 

(holding that an unwritten per curiam affirmance has no precedential value); 

St. Fort ex rel. St. Fort v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, 902 So. 2d 244, 

245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“We reiterate that a per curiam affirmance without 

written opinion, even one with a written dissent, has no precedential value 

and should not be relied on for anything other than res judicata.”); see also

Philip J. Padovano Appellate Practice § 20:7 (2019 ed.) (“The value of an 

appellate decision as a precedent is derived from the written opinion of the 

court. A per curiam decision without a supporting opinion is binding on the 

defendant claimed he would not have committed the crime if he had not been 

under duress or coercion. 
27

parties under the doctrine of the law of the case, but it is not a precedent for 

future cases. An appellate decision does not establish a precedent if the 

court did not write an opinion. Furthermore, the only kind of written opinion 

that has any precedential value is a majority opinion.” (footnote omitted)). 

Moreover, because the trial court’s factual findings establish that the 

agreement was entered into voluntarily, I would reverse the order on appeal 

invalidating the parties’ prenuptial agreement.