Revised 6/9/03								Docket No. 93628289–Agenda 3–March 2003.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

								JOSE GUADALUPE PEREZMMARCELO LEDESMA et al. (Jose Guadalu8pe Jose Perez et al.,  								Appellants.

Opinion filed June 19, 2003.

	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following simultaneous traffic stops of two vehicles resulting

from an anonymous 911 tip and police observations based on that

tip, defendants were charged with delivery of cannabis in violation

of section 5(f) of the Cannabis Control Act (Act) (720 ILCS

550/5(f) (West 1998)) and possession of cannabis in violation of

section 4(f) of the Act (720 ILCS 550/4(f) (West 1998)). The

circuit court of Vermilion County granted a defense motion to

suppress as evidence drugs found in one of the vehicles. The

appellate court reversed (327 Ill. App. 3d 805), and we granted

leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We are asked to determine

whether the evidence should have been suppressed because the

traffic stops in question were based on information obtained in

violation of state eavesdropping statutes, federal wiretapping

statutes, and constitutional protections against unreasonable

searches and seizures contained in the United States and Illinois

Constitutions. We are also asked to determine whether the police

search of one of the vehicles was conducted pursuant to the

driver’s consent.

BACKGROUND

	Between 11:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on September 18, 1998,

Tilton police officers received a radio dispatch that an anonymous

911 caller reported a “possible drug deal” was to take place in the

parking lot of an Aldi store on Georgetown Road in Tilton, Illinois.

The anonymous caller stated that he had overheard a cellular phone

conversation on his police scanner. The caller stated that one of the

vehicles involved in the transaction would be teal-colored. The

officers positioned themselves in a parking lot across the road from

the Aldi store. As officers watched the Aldi parking lot, a maroon

automobile drove into the Aldi lot and then into the parking lot of an adjacent gas station. Officers observed the maroon vehicle pull

alongside a parked teal vehicle and stop. The headlights on both

vehicles were turned off and they briefly remained parked beside

each other. The vehicles then left the gas station parking lot

simultaneously and traveled north on Illinois Route 1, where

another police vehicle was waiting. Police pulled over the vehicles

along Route 1. Marcelo Ledesma was the driver of the teal vehicle

and defendant Jose Perez was his passenger. Richard W. Roth, Jr.

was the driver of the maroon vehicle and Jeremy A. Edwards was

his passenger. After stopping Ledesma’s vehicle, police officer

Steve Cornett informed Ledesma that he had reason to believe he

had engaged in drug-related activity and asked if there were any

drugs or alcohol in the vehicle. Ledesma replied that there were

none. Officer Cornett then inquired if Ledesma had any objections

to Officer Cornett “taking a look” in the vehicle. Ledesma stated

he had no objections. After indicating his consent to the search and

exiting the vehicle along with Perez, Ledesma inquired into the

purpose of the search and, in the words of Officer Cornett, was

“kind of hem-hawing around.” Ledesma did not expressly

withdraw his consent to the search. Officer Cornett’s narcotics

detection canine “indicated” the presence of narcotics on Perez’s

legs and the vehicle doors. The canine also indicated on the seat

and a bag found on the front passenger floorboard. Officer Cornett

opened the bag and discovered what appeared to be a substantial

amount of cannabis. Tests confirmed that the substance was

marijuana weighing in excess of 2,200 grams.

	Upon stopping the vehicles, Officer David Phillips approached

the maroon vehicle and asked the driver, Roth, for a driver’s

license. Roth stated that his license had been revoked and he was

immediately placed under arrest for driving with a revoked license.

While seated in the front seat of the squad car, Roth advised

Officer Phillips that his bond money was underneath the front seat

and that he wanted Edwards to get it for him. While Officer Mike

Schull reached in to get the bond from under the seat, Officer

Phillips, who was standing beside Edwards outside the car, noticed

that a large amount of cash had fallen out from underneath the

driver’s seat. Police discovered $5,000 in cash laying loose

underneath the seat.

	On September 21, 1998, Ledesma, Perez, Roth, and Edwards

were charged with delivery of cannabis in violation of section 5(f)

of the Act (720 ILCS 550/5(f) (West 1998)) and possession of

cannabis in violation of section 4(f) of the Act (720 ILCS 550/4(f)

(West 1998)). Defendants moved to suppress all evidence obtained

as a result of the traffic stop. The trial court granted the motion to

suppress, holding that a Terry stop (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) was not warranted because

there was insufficient independent corroboration of the tip and that

police had exceeded Ledesma’s consent to search his vehicle. The

appellate court reversed, holding that the stop was permissible

because there was no violation of state or federal statues or

constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and

seizures. Ledesma, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 810-15. The court also held that the search did not exceed the scope of Ledesma’s consent. 327 Ill.

App. 3d at 815. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

ANALYSIS

	A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is

subject to reversal only if it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 230 (1995). As both parties note, de novo review is appropriate, however, when neither facts nor credibility of witnesses is questioned. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d at 230. Although the parties may have varying interpretations of the

motives of the anonymous caller or the conversation that took

place between Ledesma and Officer Cornett, neither party has

identified any disputed facts. Therefore, we review de novo the suppression of the evidence.

The Anonymous Tip and Propriety of the Stop

	Defendants argue that the evidence should have been

suppressed because the sole basis for the traffic stop was based on

a “vague and anonymous” 911 call that indirectly provided police

with information obtained in violation of state eavesdropping

statutes, federal wiretapping legislation, and constitutional

protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

State Law

	Defendants argue that evidence seized during the stop should

be suppressed pursuant to the Illinois eavesdropping statute (720

ILCS 5/14–1 et seq. (West 1998)). Section 14–5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) provides:

			“Any evidence obtained in violation of this Article is not

admissible in any civil or criminal trial, or any

administrative or legislative inquiry or proceeding, nor in

any grand jury proceedings; provided, however, that so

much of the contents of an alleged unlawfully intercepted,

overheard or recorded conversation as is clearly relevant,

as determined as a matter of law by the court in chambers,

to the proof of such allegation may be admitted into

evidence in any criminal trial or grand jury proceeding

brought against any person charged with violating any

provision of this Article.” 720 ILCS 5/14–5 (West 1998).

	Section 14–2 of the Code provides in part:

			“A person commits eavesdropping when he:

			(a) Uses an eavesdropping device to hear or record all

or any part of any conversation ***; or

			(b) Uses or divulges *** any information which he

knows or reasonably should know was obtained through

the use of an eavesdropping device.” 720 ILCS 5/14–2

(West 1998).

	Section 14–3(d) contains a number of exemptions to the

activities prohibited under section 14–2. Section 14–3 exempts:

			“(d) Recording or listening with the aid of any device to

any emergency communication made in the normal course

of operations by any federal, state or local law

enforcement agency or institutions dealing in emergency

services, including, but not limited to, hospitals, clinics,

ambulance services, fire fighting agencies, any public

utility, emergency repair facility, civilian defense

establishment or military installation[.]” 720 ILCS

5/14–3(d) (West 1998).

	The Illinois eavesdropping statute defines “conversation” as

“any oral communication between 2 or more persons regardless of

whether one or more of the parties intended their communication

to be of a private nature under circumstances justifying that

expectation.” 720 ILCS 5/14–1(d) (West 19948).

	The defendants acknowledge that when a criminal defendant brings a motion to suppress evidence as the result of a search and seizure that is alleged to be illegal, the initial burden is on the defendant to establish that the search or seizure was unreasonable or violated his or her legal rights. See People v. Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1993). Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the police acted without a warrant and that he or she was not acting in a manner to justify intrusion by the police, the burden of going forward with evidence justifying the intrusion shifts to the State. See People v. Drake, 288 Ill. App. 3d 963 (1997).

	Section 114–12(b) of the Code permits the bringing of a

motion to suppress evidence illegally seized and states that “the

burden of proving that the search and seizure were unlawful shall

be on the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/114–12(b) (West 1998). In

People v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 306-07 (2003), this court stated:

		“The defendant bears the burden of proof at a hearing on

a motion to suppress. [Citations.] A defendant must make

a prima facie case that the evidence was obtained by an illegal search or seizure. [Citation.] If a defendant makes

a prima facie case, the State has the burden of going forward with evidence to counter the defendant’s prima facie case. [Citation.] However, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant. [Citation.]”

	Assuming, arguendo, that defendants met their initial burden of making a prima facie showing in this case, we find that the State met its burden of going forward. In this case, pPolice responded to a call from

the dispatch office that a tip had been received stating that a drug

transaction was to take place involving a specific type of vehicle at

a specific location. The officers’ observations corroborated the

information reported by the tipster. The informant stated that he

overheard the cellular conversation while listening to a police

scanner. Police scanners are devices designed to “[r]ecord[ ] or

listen[ ] * * * to any emergency communication made in the normal

course of operations by any federal, state or local law enforcement

agency or institutions dealing in emergency services ***.” 720

ILCS 5/14–3(d) (West 1998). Such devices are specifically exempt

from the eavesdropping statute by section 14–3(d) of the Code

(720 ILCS 5/14–3(d) (West 1998)). Defendants have failed to demonstrate We find nothing in the record

to indicate Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the Illinois eavesdropping statute was violated or

that the tipster’s interception of the conversation was anything but

inadvertent. The factual content of the tip was sufficiently

corroborated through the officers’ observations and defendants have failed to establish a prima facie showing that the police intrusion was not justified. 

Federal Law

	Defendants also contend that all evidence seized during the

stop should be suppressed pursuant to section 2515 of the federal

“wiretap” statute. 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1994). Section 2515 prohibits

the use of intentionally intercepted wire or oral communications as

evidence in criminal or civil proceedings. It provides:

			“Whenever any wire or oral communication has been

intercepted, no part of the contents of such

communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be

received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other

proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department,

officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or

other authority of the United States, a State, or a political

subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information

would be in violation of this chapter [119].” 18 U.S.C.

§2515 (1994).

	A person violates the provisions of chapter 119 when he or

she:

			“(a) intentionally intercepts[ ] [or] endeavors to

intercept *** any wire, oral, or electronic communication;

 			***

			(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to

any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or

electronic communication, knowing or having reason to

know that the information was obtained through the

interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication

in violation of this subsection[.]” 18 U.S.C. §§2511(1)(a),

(1)(c) (1994).

	The federal wiretap statute is similar to the Illinois statue and

defines “oral communication” as “any oral communication uttered

by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is

not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such

expectation.” 18 U.S.C. §2510(2) (1994). 

	Defendants argue that the possession of a police scanner is

illegal under federal law pursuant to section 2512. 18 U.S.C.

§2512(1)(b) (1994). Therefore, the mere fact the informant was in

possession of a device capable of intercepting of a a cellular communication indicates that he or she intended or endeavored to

intercept the communication in question. Section 2512 states, in

part:

			“(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this

chapter, any person who intentionally:

				***

						(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any

electronic, mechanical, or other device, knowing or

having reason to know that the design of such device

renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the

surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic

communications, and that such device or any

component thereof has been or will be sent through the

mail or transported in interstate or foreign

commerce 

***

				***

		shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than

five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. §2512(1)(b) (1994).

	However, as previously discussed, possession of a device,

such as a police scanner, that is designed to “[r]ecord[ ] or listen[ ]

*** to any emergency communication made in the normal course

of operations by any federal, state or local law enforcement agency

or institutions dealing in emergency services” (720 ILCS 5/14–3(d)

(West 1998)) is a lawful activity in Illinois. Further, such activity

is permissible under the federal statute, as well. Section

2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) states, “It shall not be unlawful under this chapter

or chapter 121 of this title for any person *** to intercept any

radio communication which is transmitted *** by any

governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile,

or public safety communications system, including police and fire,

readily accessible to the general public[.]” 18 U.S.C.

§2511(2)(g)(ii)(II) (1994). Our federal courts have not interpreted

federal wiretap legislation to include a ban on police scanners.

While it is possible that police scanners may occasionally intercept

cellular telephone communications, and other devices may exist

that are specifically designed for the purpose of intercepting

cellular telephone communications or that may have the capability of inadvertently intercepting cellular calls even though not designed

for that use (e.g. a monitor for a baby’s nursery), it cannot be said that police scanners are “primarily useful for the purpose of the

surreptitious interception” (18 U.S.C. §2512(1)(b) (1994)) of

cellular telephone communications. 

	That is not to say, however, that cellular telephone

conversations are not entitled to a measure of protection from

surreptitious or intentional interception. The State relies on People v. Wilson, 196 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1009-10 (1990), in support of its argument that the cellular telephone conversation in this case was

not protected by state eavesdropping legislation or federal wiretap

laws. Wilson held that a cordless telephone conversation intercepted by a radio scanner was not protected from disclosure,

and that any evidence derived from the intercepted call was

admissible in subsequent court proceedings. Defendants argue that

the Wilson court’s determination that the federal wiretapping statute does not protect cellular telephone conversations has been

superseded by subsequent amendments to the federal legislation.

The federal wiretap statute was amended in 1994 to include

cordless telephone conversations within its protections. Public Law

No. 104–132, section 202(a)(1), struck out the provision contained

in section 2510(1) (18 U.S.C. §2510(1) (1994)), which had

excluded cordless telephone communications from the definition of

a “wire communication,” the interception and dissemination of

which is prohibited under section 2511 (18 U.S.C. §2511 (1994)).

See H.R. Rep. No. 103–827 at 10, 17-18, 30 (1994), reprinted in

1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3490, 3497-98, 3510. The Supreme

Court has held that the amendments extend protections to cellular

telephone conversations. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 149 L. Ed. 2d 787, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001). Thus, since the interception

of the cellular call in this case took place long after the 1994

amendments, the State’s argument that cellular telephone

conversations are not protected under federal law must fail.

	However, a complete reading of section 2511 leads us to

conclude that federal law was not violated in this case. Section

2511(1)(a) provides that a person violates federal eavesdropping

laws when he “intentionally intercepts[  ] [or] endeavors to intercept *** any wire, oral, or electric communication.” (Emphasies added.) 18 U.S.C. § 24511(1)(a) (1994). Defendants

have failed to establish that the actions of the informant in this case

were surreptitious or that the interception of the telephone

conversation was intentional. See United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1993) (to find intentional interception of

telephone conversations of third parties without their knowledge

or consent, jury must find that the act was deliberate and

purposeful, rather than product of mistake or accident); Citron v. Citron, 539 F. Supp. 621, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (liability for unlawful interception of telephone conversations requires showing

that interceptor acted in intentional or reckless disregard of legal

obligations), aff’d, 722 F.2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1983). Therefore, we find no violation of federal law requiring the suppression of evidence

gathered as a result of the traffic stops.

Constitutional Protections Against Unreasonable 

Search and

Seizure

	Defendants argue that the trial court’s suppression of evidence

seized from their vehicles should be affirmed because the police

lacked sufficient probable cause to conduct the stops. Defendants

argue that an investigatory stop may not be premised solely upon

an “uncorroborated” and “vague” anonymous tip.

	The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and

article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution protect individuals

from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV;

Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §6. The fundamental purpose of these

provisions is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals

against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 201 (1996). We must carefully balance the legitimate aims of law enforcement against the right of our

citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusion. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245 (1984); People v. Smith, 95 Ill. 2d 412, 422 (1983).

	“[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an

appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of

investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no

probable cause to make an arrest.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906-07, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. “Although the officer need not

have probable cause to arrest or search in order to stop and frisk

[citations], he must have knowledge of sufficient articulable facts

at the time of the encounter to create a reasonable suspicion that

the person in question has committed, or is about to commit, a

crime.” People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 434 (1980), citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640-41 (1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 148, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1964). To justify a temporary

detention, the police officers must point to specific, articulable

facts that, when considered with natural inferences, make the

intrusion reasonable. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d at 436. We have previously held that a totality-of-circumstances approach will

achieve a fairer balance between public and private interests. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 245. “The central issue is *** whether the

information, taken in its totality, and interpreted not by technical

legal rules but by factual and practical commonsense

considerations, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to

believe that the person stopped had committed an offense.” People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 396-97 (1989).

	Where an informant’s tip is received by telephone, it may form

the basis for a lawful Terry stop, but the information must bear some indicia of reliability, and the information upon which the

police act must establish the requisite quantum of suspicion. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 869 (1997). Where the reliability of the information obtained from an anonymous informant cannot be

easily corroborated and no other suspicious circumstances are

known to the police, a stop may be found unwarranted. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 869. However, substantial corroboration not only

establishes an informant’s veracity, but also supports an inference

that an informant obtained his story reliably. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 210 (1991); Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 251. “Whether such corroboration consists of innocent or incriminating activity is

not the question. Instead, the proper focus is ‘ “whether the actions

of the suspects, whatever their nature, give rise to an inference that

the informant is credible and that he obtained his information in a

reliable manner.” ’ ” Williams, 147 Ill. 2d at 210, quoting Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d at 251, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 269, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 568, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2349 (1983) (White, J.,

concurring).

	Like many issues involving constitutional protections against

unreasonable searches and seizures, the reliability of a tip and the

propriety of police action in response to that tip are often closely

decided issues. For example, defendants rely heavily on two cases

from our appellate court in which tips from anonymous callers

were found to be insufficient bases for making investigatory stops.

In People v. Messamore, 245 Ill. App. 3d 627 (1993), the defendant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police officers

based solely on a caller’s tip that a suspicious vehicle was seen

driving near a specific intersection. The caller described the vehicle

as a dark-green or blue Oldsmobile, but was unable to state the

year or model. In addition, the caller gave no specific details upon

which he based the conclusion that it was suspicious except that it

had been circling the area for approximately half an hour.

Messamore, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 630. The record showed that the caller gave his name to the dispatcher. However, that information

was not given to officers responding to the call. The officers

admitted they knew nothing about the caller’s identity, and, as

such, they had no idea if the caller was reliable. Other evidence

showed that the call may have been made by a citizen of a

residential watch area. However, the officers also had no

knowledge of that information. One of the officers testified that

after receiving the call he saw a dark-green Oldsmobile at an

intersection approximately two blocks from the intersection

reported by the caller. He followed the vehicle for approximately

four to six blocks. During that time the driver of the vehicle did not

commit any traffic violations. The owner of the vehicle did not

have a suspended or a revoked license and the vehicle’s license

plate and sticker were proper. The officer then activated the lights

on his squad car and pulled the vehicle over in a parking lot. The

officer admitted that he stopped the Oldsmobile based solely on the

fact that a citizen had reported that the vehicle was suspicious.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion

to suppress, finding the stop unlawful. The appellate court

affirmed, holding that the anonymous informant’s tip was brief and vague, and that the officers did not independently corroborate the

tip before making the stop. The court noted “that the caller did not

describe any activity from which the officers could form a

reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.” Messamore, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 630.

	In People v. Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d 561 (1984), the appellate court evaluated a traffic stop based on a call to an

organization that passed information on to police and sometimes

offered rewards for information leading to arrests. Under a

program known as Catch A Thief With Citizen’s Help (CATCH),

operators would take calls regarding criminal activity from

anonymous sources and then relay the information to police. A

detective in the Elgin police department received a phone call from

an operator at CATCH informing him that an individual by the

name of Moraca possessed a machine gun, which he carried in a

black pouch, and was also allegedly in possession of cannabis,

which he kept in a green bag. The operator also said that Moraca

drove a blue van, provided a license plate number for the van,

informed police that Moraca frequented the area of Hickory Street

in Elgin, and stated that Moraca may have had his driver’s license

suspended or revoked. Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 562. The detective and his partner cruised the area of Hickory Street and

observed a blue van bearing the license plate number provided by

the CATCH tipster parked and unoccupied in a driveway. A license

plate check indicated the van was registered to a lawn care

business. After returning to the police station for approximately 20

minutes, the detectives came back to Hickory Street accompanied

by a uniformed officer and observed the van being driven away by

a white male, whom the detectives did not recognize. The driver

stopped once to drop off a passenger before being pulled over by

the uniformed officer in his marked squad car. Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 562-63. The sole basis for effecting the stop was the

information supplied by CATCH. The driver of the van exited the

vehicle from the driver’s side, left the door open, and walked back

toward one of the detectives who had pulled up next to the van.

One of the policemen, with his revolver drawn, ordered driver up

against the van, instructing him not to move while the uniformed

officer frisked him. The detectives approached the van, one from each side of the vehicle and, peering through the window, saw a

beer can on the dashboard. One of the detectives opened the door,

reached in and felt the can which “was cold and had some beer in

it.” The other detective opened a black, zippered pouch which had

been partially protruding from underneath the driver’s seat, and

observed what appeared to be a machine pistol. Up to this point,

no one had asked the driver for his name or identification and the

officers did not ask nor did defendant grant his permission to go

inside the van. Detectives established that the driver was Moraca

and learned that his driver’s license was presently suspended.

Before placing defendant under arrest, one of the officers

conducted a second search of the defendant’s person, whereupon

a green bank bag fell from defendant’s coat to the pavement. One

of the detectives opened the bag and observed a quantity of what

he suspected was cannabis. Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 563. The trial court suppressed the evidence because the stop violated

defendant’s fourth amendment rights and the appellate court

affirmed. Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 567.

	Defendants correctly assert that Messamore and Moraca are similar to this case. However, both are distinguishable. In

Messamore, the officers did not observe the defendant engaging in any suspicious activity before stopping him. The vehicle’s

identification was proper and no traffic violations were committed.

As opposed to the case at bar, where a specific illegal activity was

described by the caller, the caller in Messamore simply stated that a suspicious dark green or blue Oldsmobile was in the area. The

vague and general information provided by the caller did not

establish that the tip was sufficiently reliable. Similarly, in Moraca, no activity took place that would provide any indicia of reliability

for the tip. As the Moraca court stated, the tip relayed by CATCH “only informed police that defendant was ‘in possession’ of

cannabis and a machine gun, but did not specify whether these

items were even on his person or in the van.” Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 565. The only corroborating events in Moraca that occurred prior to the stop were that the police located a blue van

parked in the vicinity of Hickory Street. Probable cause cannot be

based solely on an anonymous tip that merely provides the static

details of a suspect’s life along with an allegation of criminal conduct. People v. Brannon, 308 Ill. App. 3d 501, 505 (1999); People v. Yarber, 279 Ill. App. 3d 519, 529 (1996).

	The United States Supreme Court has addressed the propriety

of an anonymous tip as the basis for a stop. In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), police

received a telephone call from an anonymous person, stating that

White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a

particular time in a brown Plymouth station wagon with the right

taillight lens broken. The informant stated that White would be

going to Dobey’s Motel and would be in possession of about an

ounce of cocaine inside a brown attaché case. White, 496 U.S. at 327, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 306-07, 110 S. Ct. at 2414. Police

proceeded to the apartment complex and observed a vehicle

matching the description given by the caller parked in front of

building 235. Police observed White leave the building empty-

handed and enter the station wagon. Police followed the vehicle as

it traveled the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel. The vehicle was

stopped just short of the motel. One of the officers asked White to

step to the rear of the car, where he informed her that she had been

stopped because she was suspected of carrying cocaine in the

vehicle. The officer asked for and received permission to look for

cocaine. A locked brown attaché case was found. Respondent

provided the combination to the lock. The officers found marijuana

in the case and placed White under arrest. During processing at the

police station, police discovered three milligrams of cocaine in

White’s purse. White, 496 U.S. at 327, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 307, 110 S. Ct. at 2415. The trial court denied White’s motion to suppress

the evidence, but the appellate court held that the police did not

have reasonable suspicion under Terry to justify the investigatory stop, and that the marijuana and cocaine should have been

suppressed. A divided Supreme Court of Alabama denied the

prosecution’s writ for certiorari. Citing differing views in the state and federal courts over whether an anonymous tip may furnish

reasonable suspicion for a stop, the United States Supreme Court

granted certiorari. White, 496 U.S. at 327-28, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 307, 110 S. Ct. at 2415.

	As recognized by the Supreme Court in Gates, “an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity inasmuch as ordinary citizens generally do not provide

extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations and

given that the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is ‘by

hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.’ ” White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 110 S. Ct. at 2415, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 237, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.

However, the Court was careful to point out that this did not mean

that an anonymous caller could never provide the reasonable

suspicion necessary for a Terry stop. “Something more” is required to provide an indicia of reliability of the tip. White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. The Court found

that the tip in White was significantly corroborated and exhibited

sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop. The

Court held, “[I]t is not unreasonable to conclude in this case that

the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects

of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree of reliability to

the other allegations made by the caller.” White, 496 U.S. at 331- 32, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 3010, 110 S. Ct. at 2417.

	Ten years later, the United States Supreme Court addressed

the propriety of an investigatory stop based on an anonymous tip

in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). In J.L., an anonymous caller reported to the Miami- Dade police that a young black male standing at a particular bus

stop was carrying a gun. Officers proceeded to the bus stop and

observed three black males there, one of whom, J.L., was wearing

a plaid shirt. Apart from the anonymous tip, the officers had no

reason to suspect any of the three of engaging in any illegal

conduct. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 259, 120 S. Ct. at 1377. One of the officers approached J.L. and told him to put up

his hands. The officer frisked him and seized a gun from J.L.’s

pocket. After being charged under state law with two criminal

offenses related to possession of the gun, the trial court granted

J.L.’s motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search.

The Florida Supreme Court held the search invalid under the fourth

amendment. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268-69, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 259, 120 S. Ct. at 1377-78. The officers’ suspicion that J.L. had a weapon

“arose not from any observations of their own but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 120 S. Ct. at 1378.

	In affirming the Florida Supreme Court, the United States

Supreme Court pointed out that “ ‘an anonymous tip alone seldom

demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’ ”

J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 120 S. Ct. at 1378, quoting White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 110 S. Ct. at 2415. The Court recognized that “there are situations in which

an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits ‘sufficient indicia

of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion of reliability to make the

investigatory stop.’ ” J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 120 S. Ct. at 1378, quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 306, 110 S. Ct. at 2414. The Supreme Court found that the tip

in J.L. lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White. The anonymous call that led to J.L.’s arrest “provided no

predictive information and therefore left the police without means

to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 271, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 120 S. Ct. at 1379. The Court further

held:

			“That the allegation about the gun turned out to be correct

does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had

a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in

unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of official suspicion

must be measured by what the officers knew before they

conducted their search. All the police had to go on in this

case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable

informant who neither explained how he knew about the

gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside

information about J.L. ***

			* * * 

			An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable

location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited

sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person

whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however,

does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed

criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue

requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality,

not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 271-72, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 260-61, 120 S. Ct. at 1379.

	The facts of this case fall somewhere between those in White and those in J.L. In our opinion, this case is more closely related to White. Not only do both cases involve stops related to vehicles, but both involve specific information provided by the tipster that

predicted future behavior or gave police a basis on which to

corroborate information by observing the activities of the suspect

or suspects. There was no such corroboration present in J.L. While the tip in this case, standing alone, may not have been sufficient to

support an arrest or search warrant, the information provided by

the caller carried sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a forcible

stop. The tip was specific in its description of one of the vehicles

that would be involved in the illegal activity and in its reference to

the location where the transaction was to occur. Tilton police did

not seek out defendants based on a vague description or innuendo.

The information available to the police, coupled with the factual

corroboration of the tip’s content and interpreted by commonsense

considerations, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to

believe that sufficient articulable suspicion had been established and

that further investigation was warranted, thus justifying the stops.

See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 552-53, 103 S. Ct. at 2335-36; Alabama, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 310, 110 S. Ct. at 2417; Adams, 131 Ill. 2d at 396-97; Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 869. “When significant aspects of the caller’s predictions were

verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was

honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to

justify the stop.” Alabama, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 310, 110 S. Ct. at 2417. While the officers could not observe an

exchange of drugs or money from their vantage point, the officers’

beliefs that the sufficient articulable suspicion to warrant the stops

had been established were reasonable in this case in light of specific

content of the tip coupled with the officers’ experiences and

observations. Therefore, we find that defendants’ constitutional

rights were not violated.

The Search

	Defendants argue that, even if the tip was reliable and the stop

was proper, police improperly searched Ledesma’s vehicle.

Defendants argue that probable cause to believe a crime has been

committed is required before a search of an automobile may be

conducted (People v. Erickson, 31 Ill. 2d 230, 233 (1964)), and that police were supplied with probable cause only after a narcotics

detection dog “indicated” the presence of narcotics on Perez’s

pants and on the doors of Ledesma’s vehicle.

	It is well settled that an individual may consent to a search

conducted without a warrant, thereby eliminating the need for

probable cause and a search warrant. See People v. Phillips, 264 Ill. App. 3d 213, 217 (1994); People v. Cardenas, 237 Ill. App. 3d 584, 587 (1992). A consent to search is valid under the fourth

amendment if it is voluntary. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 355, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996). Voluntariness

is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the

circumstances. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 117 S. Ct. at 421. The standard for measuring the scope of a

suspect’s consent is that of “ ‘objective’ reasonableness,” which

requires consideration of what a “typical reasonable person

[would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and

the suspect.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 302, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991).

	In most instances, this determination is easily made because

courts ordinarily define the scope of a search by its express object

or purpose. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 111 S. Ct. at 1804. By indicating to the suspect the intended object of the

search either directly or by revealing a suspicion of specific criminal

activity, a police officer not only “apprises the suspect that his

constitutional rights are being impacted, but he also informs the

suspect of the reasonable parameters of his inquiry.” People v. Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d 146, 150 (1998). As a result, courts have determined that an officer may search smaller containers

found inside the larger area being searched if it would be

objectively reasonable to find the stated object of the search in that

smaller container. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 111 S. Ct. at 1804 (defendant’s consent to search his car included search of a small paper bag found in the car because he

was informed that the officer suspected that he possessed

narcotics); Phillips, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 222 (defendant’s consent to search of his motorcycle included search of a jacket located in

the rear cargo area when the express object of the search was

narcotics); United States v. Lechuga, 925 F.2d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1991) (consent to search unfurnished apartment included

search of suitcase in closet because the express purpose of the

search was drugs); United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1993) (defendant’s consent to the officer’s request to

look in his truck included suitcase located behind the passenger

seat because the officer had just asked the defendant if he had any

narcotics in the truck).

	It is not necessary for police to specifically use the term

“search” to constitute a valid search request under the fourth

amendment. See Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 150. However, the officer’s words, when viewed in context, must objectively

communicate to a reasonable person that the officer is seeking

permission to examine the vehicle and its contents. See Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 150-51. For example, in People v. Kelk, 231 Ill. App. 3d 797 (1992), police stopped a defendant for minor traffic

violations. The officers asked the defendant if there were any drugs

or weapons in the vehicle, to which defendant replied that there

were not. The officers asked the defendant if he cared if they

“looked in” the car. The defendant consented. The officers

discovered cannabis in a duffle bag inside the vehicle. Kelk, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 798-99. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding

that the police had exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent

to search. Kelk, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 798. The appellate court reversed, holding:

			“The request by a police officer to look in a suspect’s

car might reasonably be understood as meaning no more

than just that–only to look. The person addressed by the

officer might reasonably believe from that request that a

police officer would seek further and additional authority

from the suspect if the officer wished to search objects he

found when he looked in the car. Here, the police officer

asked the defendant, immediately prior to his request to ‘look in the car,’ if there were any drugs or weapons in the

vehicle. The context of that question sufficiently informed

the suspect of what the officer intended to do, and, under

those circumstances, the officer could reasonably consider

the defendant’s statement–that he did not care if the

officer looked in his car–to be a general consent to a

search of that car, including contents thereof ***.”

(Emphases addeomitted.) Kelk, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 800-01.

	Similarly, the appellate court in this case found that Ledesma

gave a valid general consent permitting police to search the vehicle

and its contents. Even though Ledesma later inquired as to the

purpose of the search, and according to police testimony “hem-

hawed around,” he never limited or withdrew his consent. We

agree and hold that the trial court erred by granting defendants’

motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the search of

Ledesma’s vehicle. Because we find that Ledesma consented to the

search of his vehicle, we need not reach defendants’ arguments

regarding the propriety of the use of the narcotics detection canine.

CONCLUSION

	We find that the trial court erred in granting defendants’

motion to suppress the evidence in this matter. We therefore affirm

the appellate court’s decision reversing the trial court and

remanding this cause for further proceedings.

Affirmed.