UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-4045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

WILLIE JOE GOODWIN, II,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (3:17-cr-01143-JMC-1)

Submitted: June 26, 2020 Decided: July 13, 2020

Before NIEMEYER, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sherri A. Lydon, United States Attorney, William Camden Lewis, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Kathleen Michelle 

Stoughton, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Willie Joe Goodwin, II, pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2018). The district court 

determined at sentencing that Goodwin’s prior convictions for possession with intent to 

distribute marijuana in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(a)(1) (2018), did not 

qualify as “controlled substance offense[s]” and declined to sentence Goodwin as a career 

offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 (2016). The Government 

appeals, arguing that Goodwin qualified as a career offender. We vacate Goodwin’s 

sentence and remand for resentencing.

We review de novo a district court’s determination of whether a defendant’s prior 

conviction qualifies as a career offender predicate. United States v. Furlow, 928 F.3d 311, 

317 (4th Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded on other grounds, __ S. Ct. __, No. 19-7007, 

2020 WL 2814758 (U.S. June 1, 2020). In Furlow, we held that a similar South Carolina 

statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) (2018), is divisible and subject to the modified 

categorical approach.1

 Id. at 319-22 (citing with approval United States v. Marshall, 747 

F. App’x 139, 150 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding § 44-53-370(a)(1) is divisible), cert. denied, 

1 Section 44-53-370(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person “to manufacture, 

distribute, dispense, deliver, purchase, aid, abet, attempt, or conspire to manufacture, 

distribute, dispense, deliver, or purchase, or possess with the intent to manufacture, 

distribute, dispense, deliver, or purchase a controlled substance.” Section 44-53-375(B) 

provides that any person “who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, delivers, purchases, or 

otherwise aids, abets, attempts, or conspires to manufacture, distribute, dispense, deliver, 

or purchase, or possess with intent to distribute, dispense, or deliver methamphetamine or 

cocaine base” is guilty of a felony.
3

139 S. Ct. 1214 (2019)). We also determined that South Carolina distribution of crack 

cocaine qualified as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the career offender 

Guideline. Furlow, 928 F.3d at 322. Based on Furlow, which we decided after Goodwin’s 

sentencing, the district court’s conclusion that Goodwin’s South Carolina § 44-53-

370(a)(1) convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana did not qualify as 

predicate convictions for purposes of the career offender Guidelines was incorrect.2

 

Therefore, we vacate Goodwin’s sentence and remand for resentencing. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

2 Goodwin argues that any error by the district court was harmless because the 

district court considered the career offender sentence and determined that the sentence 

imposed was appropriate and necessary under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) factors. 

However, for a Guideline error to be harmless, “something more than a review by the 

district court of the § 3553(a) factors is needed, particularly since an assessment of those 

factors is required at every sentencing.” United States v. Montes-Flores, 736 F.3d 357, 

370 (4th Cir. 2013). After a review of the record, we are unable to conclude with any 

certainty that the district court would have imposed the same sentence if it had correctly 

applied the career offender enhancement. See United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194, 203 

(4th Cir. 2012).