### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 22, 200 4 S es sio n
C HR IS TI N A K. Y EU BA N KS v. M ET HO D IS T H EA LT HC A R E M EM P HI S HOS PITAL S, ET AL 

### .
A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-006938-02 The Honorable D’Ar m y Bailey, Jud ge

No. W2003-01838-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 18, 2004

Appellant, the mother

of a nine y ear

old gir l w h o died af

ter be ing se riously

injured in an automobile acc ident, challeng es the trial court’s di smissal of her suit for f ailure to pay

discretionary c os ts r e su lti ng fr om a

prior tr ia l of he r s uit (w hic h e nd e d wi th vo lun tary dis mis sa l of so me c la ims , and dire cted ve rdict for

Appellee s on other cla ims). Appell an t contends that the trial court that
o ri gi n al l y h ea rd t h e ca s e d i s p l ay ed b i as o r p re j u d i ce i n fa v o r o f A p p el l ee s d u ri n g t h atp ro ce ed i n g. A p p e ll a n t c o n te n d s th a t, d u e to th e c o u r t’ s a ll e g e d b ia s in f a v o r o f d e f

e n d a n ts , th e d ivision of the circ uit court in which she r e-f iled the ca se er

red in transfer

ring the case back to the origina l divisi on in which it was hea

rd. Appe llant further contends that, upon the case being transfe rre d back to the division in which it wa s orig inally hear d, the trial court erre d in not recusing itself due to its alleg ed bia s o r p re

jud ic e . App e lla nt al so c on te nd s tha t, af te r faili ng to r e c us e its e lf, th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in dismiss ing her lawsuit for failure to pay discretionary costs assessed at the conc lusion of the prior trial. We aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt, and re mand for de termination of dama g es for the fi lin g of a frivo lou s a

pp e a l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J . and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

T. Robert Hill and Randall J. P hillips of Jackson For A ppellant, Christina K. Yeubanks

Le e J

. C h a s e , III

o f M e m p h i s F o r

A p p e l l e e , M e t h o d i s t H e a l t h c a r e - M e m p h i s H o s p i t a l s , d/ b / a Le Bonhe ur Children' s Medical Cente r, I nc.

Tere sa J. S igmon a nd Claire M. Cissell of Memphis For Appe llee, Amy L . Hertz, M .D.T h is a c tio n w a s initia lly re fil e d in the U .S . D istric t C o u rt fo r th e W e ste rn D istric t o f T e n n e sse e o n J u ly 1
1 0 , 20 0 2

. O n O ct o b er 1 8 , 2 0 0 2 , t he D i st ri ct C o urt d i smi ss ed t he case fo r l ack o f s ub ject m at t er j uri sdi ct i o n. A f t er t he d i s m i s s a l b y t h e Di s t r i c t C o u r t , M s

. Ye u b a n k s r e

- f i l e d t h e a c t i o n i n S h e l b y C o u n t y C i r c u i t C o u r t , Di v i s i o n I V.
-2- Albert C. Harvey

and Mar cy

L . Dodds of Memphis For Ap p ellees, S. Doug las Hix son, M.D. and Pediatric Surg ical Gr oups, I nc. OP IN ION This appea l arises out of a persona l injury

lawsuit that was dismissed for no n-payment of discretionary

costs. Appellant, Christina Yeubanks, contends that seve ral e rror s at trial re quire us to r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt : the tr a ns fe r of the c a se to a div isi on in wh ic h the tr ia l ju dg e wa s a lle g e d to have de monstrated bias a nd prejudice in favor of defe ndants; the failure of the a lleg edly biased trial judge to rec use himself and transfer th e ca se to another

division; and the dismissal of the ca se for failure to pay

discretionary co s t s

. Finding no er ror, we aff

irm the trial court, and re mand for a de te rm inatio n o f d a ma g e s f or thi s f ri vo lou s a pp e a l.

I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sarah N icole Ande rson, a nine y ear old girl, was seriouslyinjured in an automobile accide nt
on F ebru ary 17, 1 99 8, a nddie d th e ne xt mornin g a t L e B on he ur Chi ldr e n’ s Me dic a l Ce nte r i n Me mph is ( “ L e B on he ur ” ). He r m oth e r, Christ ina Ye ub a nk s, br ou g ht s uit

a g a ins t a n u m b e r of pa rt ie s, i n c l u d i n g t h r e e p h y s i c i a n s , t h e m e d i c a l g r o u p t o w h i c h o n e o f t h e p h y s i c i a n s b e l o n g e d , a n d Le B on he ur , a sse rt ing va

ri ou s the orie s of lia

bil ity fo r he r daug hte r’ s death. Ms. Ye ub a nk s v olu nta ri ly dismiss ed seve ral of her claims, and the trial court direc ted a ver dict in favor of L e B onheur a s to the two other claims. The complex history of this case may be found in our e arlier

opinion in Y

eubanks
v . M e tho dis t Ho sp ita l e t. a l. , No. W2000-03068-C OA-R3-C V (Tenn. Ct . App., at Jackson, S ept. 19, 2002), perm . app. denied (Tenn.Dec. 8, 2003) (her einaf ter “ Yeub ank

s I ”). H oweve r, most of the facts and issues that ar ose in Yeub ank s I do no t dir e c tly c on c e rnus in this app e a l. R a the r, thi s appea l conce rn s matters that ar ose af ter the r e-f

iling of this lawsuit in Division 4 of the Shelby Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt on De c e mbe r 6, 20 02

. Th e so le iss ue fr om Yeub ank s I that is pe rt ine nt t o th is 1

case involves discretionary costs from the f

irst trial. At the conc lusion of that trial, the court or dere d Ms. Ye ub a nk s to pay

dis c re tio na

ry c os ts t o th e de fe nd a nts , a ri sin g ou t of t he fi rst c a se , p ri or to ref iling the c ase. In our Yeub ank s I op ini on , we aff

ir me d th e a sse ssm e nt o f d isc re tio na ry c os ts
a g a ins t Ms . Y e ub a nk s, bu t hel d tha t the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inre qu ir ing he r t o p a y su c h c os ts p ri or

to
re fi lin g the c a se , n oti ng that Ru le 41 .0 4 o f the Te nness ee Rule s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re“ c le arl y contemplates that the determination of when the pl aintiff mus t pay costs previously order ed is made afte r the c ase is re filed.”

After Ms. Yeubanks re- filed the case in Circ uit Court Division 4, Appellee Hertz moved, on Dec ember 1 8 , 2 0 0 2 , to tr a n s f e r th e c a s e b a c k

to Ci r c u it

Co u r t D iv is io n 8 ( w h e r e th e c a s e h ad
orig ina lly be e n h e ard ). Th is m oti on wa s p ur su a nt to Rul e 4( e ) o f the L oc a l Ru le s f or the Th irtie th J udicial District. The motion was g rante d. On April 24, 2003, plaintiff filed a motion for rec usal and tr a ns fe r, a ndthi s mot ion wa s de nie d by the tr ia l c ou rt

. On Ma y 12 , 2 00 3, the tria l c ou rt

or de re d M s.-3-

Yeuba nks to pay the di scre tionary costs assessed in Yeub ank s I within thirtyday s. The costs we re not paid and the c ase w as dismissed on J une 16, 2003. Ms. Yeubanks timelyfiled a notice of appe al on J uly 11, 2003. II. ISSU ES
Ap pe lla nt, Ms. Ye ub a nk s, pr e se nts the fo llo wi ng iss ue s o n a pp e a l:

Issue 1: “Whether the trial court, Division 4, err ed when it transfer red the case to Division 8, wh e re fo ur

(4 ) o f the jur or s f

ro m the fi rs t tr ia l ha d g ive n a ff ida vit s statin g that the tr ia l ju dg e in Division 8 demonstrated per sonal bias and pr ejudice in f avor of the def endants during the trial.”

Issue 2: “Whether the trial court, Division 8, err ed when it f ailed to rec use itself and transfer the ca se to another

division wher e four (4) of the j urors from the first trial had g iven af fidavits stating that the tr ia l jud g e in Di vis ion 8 de mon str a te d pe rs on a l bi a s a ndpr e jud ic e in f

a vo r o f the de fe nd a nts during the trial.”

Issue 3: “Whether the trial court erre d in dismiss ing the case for f ailure to pay

discretionary costs afte r it ref

used to rec use itself and transfer the ca se to another

division.”
Appellee s prese nt the following issue for r eview:

Issue 4: Whe the r this app e a l is frivo lou s.

III . STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW

The trial c ourt’s judg ment will be revie wed de novo upon the re cord w ith no p re s u m p t i on o f co rrectness ac companying the trial court’ s conclusions of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Waldron v. Delffs , 988 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Sims v . St e war t , 973 S.W.2d 597, 599-600 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

IV . A NA LY SIS

Issue 1: “Whether the trial court, Division 4, err ed whe n it transfer red the case to Division 8, wh e re fo ur (4 ) of the jur or s fr om the fi rs t tr ia l ha d g ive n a ff ida vit s st a tin g that th e tria l ju dg e in Division 8 demonstrated per sonal bias and pr ejudice in f avor of the def endants during the trial.”

Ms. Yeubanks’ first issue on appe al is whether the trial court, Shelby

CountyCircuit Court Di vis ion4, e rr e d intr a ns fe rring the c a se ba c k to She lby Cou nty Cir c uit Cou rt Di vis ion8, wh e re it was orig inally

hear d, upon the def

endants’ motion. The de fendants based their motion upon L ocal Rul e 4( e ) o f the 30 th Jud ic ia l D ist ri c t, w hic h s ta te s a s f

oll ow s:
Whenever

any case has bee n assig ned to or tried be fore any J udg e of the court, a nd comes on for

a trial or r etrial a s the result of a n o n -s u it, mis trial, reve rsal, settingT e n n . C o n st. ar t. 6 , § 1 1 , re a d s, in r e le v a n t p a r t: “ N o ju d g e o f t h e S u p re m e o r In fer io r C o u rts sh a ll 2
pres i d e o n t h e t r i al of

a n y c au s e i n t h e ev en t of w h i ch h e may be i n t er es t ed, or w h er e ei t h er of t h e par t i es s h al l be

conne ct ed wi t h h i m b y af f i ni t y of cons ang ui ni t y , wi t hi n s uch degr ees as may be pres cr i bed by l aw, or i n whi ch he may have b een o f

co unsel , or i n whi ch he m ay have p res i d ed i n any Inf eri o r Co urt , excep t by consent of al l t he p art i es. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 1 7

- 2

- 1 0 1 (19 9 4 ) cont ai n s e ssent i al l y t he same p rovis i o ns. N o ne o f t hese const i t ut i o nal or st at ut o ry provi s i ons i s appl i cabl e i n t hi s ca s e.

-4- aside of a verdic t, or dismissal on s o m e gro u n d n ot going to the merits, then such
case shall be assig ned for any subsequent trial or trials to the division of th e c o urt pr e sid e d o ve r b y

the Judg e be fo rewh om th e ca se wa s p re vio us ly pe nd ing , u nle ss g o o d c au s e b e s h o w n t o t h e c o n tr ar y. Any attorney who files or is counse l in any cause desig nated he rein shall inform the cler k of t h e C i rc u i t Court of such filing and the c lerk shall assig n the cause to the court in which the prior ca use wa s filed.

Ms. Yeubanks c ontends that the ca se should not have be en tra nsfer red, a rg uing that the alleg ed bias of the Division 8 circ uit judge c onstitut ed g ood cause why the case should not ha ve bee n transfe rre d back to the orig inal division in which it was filed. T o substantiate her claims of bias, Ms. Ye ubanks has collec ted af

fidavits from her

trial counsel, T. Robert Hil l and Frankie E. Wade, and from four jurors who sat in the origina l trial, stating that Judge Ba i l ey , t h e trial judge, display ed bias or pr e jud ic e in f

a vo r o f the de fe nd a nts in the orig ina l tria l.

L oc a l Ru le 4( e ) m ake s it

c le ar that, i n th e abs e nc e of a sh ow ing of g oo d c aus e wh y the c a se sh ou ld n ot b e a ssi g ne d to the div isi on wh e rethe c a se wa s p re vio us ly he ard , th e re -f

ile d c a se sh ou ld be heard by

the same division. The que stion before us, then, is whether Division 4 circuit court e rre d in f ailing to f ind that Ms. Yeuba nks’ alleg ations of bias and prejudice, suppor ted by aff idavits by her tr ia l c ou ns e l a ndfo ur

jur or s f ro m th e orig ina l tria l, c on sti tut e d g oo d c aus e no t to tr a ns fe r the c a se back to Division 8.

T h e d e c i s i o n o f w h et h erre cu s al i s wa rr an t ed i s l ef tt o t h e s o u n d d i s cr et i o n o f t h e j u d ge whose re cusal is soug ht, with the exception of g rounds enumerated in Te nn. Const. art. 6, §11, or Tenn. Code Ann. § 17- 2-101 (1994)

. I n case s where rec usal i s n o t m an d ated by the Tenne ssee 2 Con sti tut ionor

statu te, it is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d inTe nn e sse e that “ the de c isi on of wh e the r r e c us a l is
war rante d must in t he first instance be made by the judg e himself or her self.” Kina rd v . Kinar d , 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct

. App. 1998) . Ms. Ye ub a nk s, by c ha lle ng ing the tr a ns fe r o f h e r l a ws uit back to Division 8 wher e it was orig inally hear d, soug ht for the Division 4 c ircuit court to compe l th e r e c u s a l o f

Ju d g e B a il e y

w ith o u t f ir s t g iv in g Ju d g e B a il e y

th e o p p o r tu n ity

to r e c u s e h im s e lf

. We be lie ve t hi s con tra ve ne s th e princ ipl e e xpre sse d inKina rd , that a motion for re cusal must first be decide d by

the judg e whose rec usal is sought. I f the judge declines to re cuse himself or herse lf, the party who see ks rec usal may

then cha llenge t h i s d ecision on appe al, and the de cision will be
re v i e w e d u n d e r a n ab u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n s t a n d ar d

. W e b e l i e v e t h a t M s

. Y e u b a n k s ’ a t t e m p tto s ho rt

--5-

circ uit this proce ss by having another division of t he circuit court force the recusal of J udg e B ailey is improper. We conc lude that the Division 4 trial court did not e rr in re fusing to compel such re cusal and tra nsfer

ring the ca se bac k to Division 8 where it was pr eviously hear d.

Ho we ve r, we no te that e ve n if it were app ro pria te fo r ano the r d ivi sio n o f the c ir c uit c ou rt to forc e Judge B ailey ’s re cus al under these cir cumstance s, the rec ord on appe al would provide an ins uf fi c ie nt b a sis fo r u s to fi nde rr or in the tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re to fo rc e su c h a re c us a l. O n a

pp e a l, M s. Ye ub a nk s h a s d e c lin e d to fi le a tr a ns c ri pt of the tria l pr oc e e din g s in wh ic h Jud g e B a ile y a lle g e dly demonstrated suc h marke d bias and prejudice . I nstead, Ms. Ye ubanks base s her a lleg ation solely on six aff idavits—two f

rom her trial counsel, and four from jurors who sat in the origina l trial—alleg ing that J udg e B ailey

demonst ra t ed b i as or pr ejudice in f avor of the def endants. The se af

fidavits, for
rea sons that we will explain in our discussion of I ssue 2, inf ra , do not provide suffic ient evidenc e up on wh ic h w e c ou ld f

indthat th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d infaili ng to f

or c e Judg e B a ile y ’s re c us a l.

Issue 2: “Whether the trial court, Division 8, err ed when it f ailed to rec use itself and transfer the ca se to another

division where f

our (4) of the jurors from the first trial had g iven af fidavits stating that the tr ia l jud g e in Di vis ion 8 de mon str a te d pe rs on a l bi a s a ndpr e jud ic e in f

a vo r o f the de fe nd a nts during the trial.”

Th e se c on d is su e on app e a l is wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt , Di vis ion 8 of theShe lby

Cou nty Cir c uit Court, erre d in failing to rec use itself and transfer the ca se to another

division. As noted i n our discussion of I ssue 1, su

pr a , Ms. Yeubanks ha s declined, on a ppeal, to file a

transcript of the hea

ring in w hich J udg e Bailey alleg edly demonstrated bias or prejudice in f avor of the def endants. Instead, the so le e vid e nc e Ms. Ye ub a nk s p re se nts fo r this c on te nti on area ff ida vit s by tw o o f h e r t

ri a l c ou ns e l, T. Rob e rt Hi ll a ndF rankie Wad e , a nd a ff ida vit s by fo ur jur or s—John Da vid Ho wa rd , We sle y

Mo ss, Lyn n e M

. H i n t o n , a n d S e a n M u rr i n

— w h o s a ti n t h e p r e v i o u s tr i a l b e f o r e J u d g e B a i l e y.

L i t i g a n t s ar e e n t i t l e d t o h a v e t h e i r c a s e s h e ar d b y f a i r a n d i m p ar t i a l ju dg e s. See Kin ard v. Kina rd , 986 S.W.2d 220, 227-8 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1998) . The ne e d to pre se rv e pu bli c c on fi de nc e in the judicial sy stem further require s that the judg e “not only be impartial in fa ct , b u t also that the judge be per ceive d to be impartial.” Id. at 228. As our Supreme Court stated in the case of Da v is v. Liberty Mutual In s. Co. , 38 S.W.3d 560 (Tenn . 2001) : Given the importanc e of impartiality , both in fact a nd appea ranc e, dec isions
conce rning whether recusal is warr anted a re a ddresse d to the judge ’s discre tion, which will not be reverse d on appea l unless a clea r abuse appea

rs on the fa ce of

the
rec ord. A motion to recuse should be g rante d if the judg e has any doubt as to his or he r a bil ity to p re sid e imp art ia lly

in the cas e . H ow e ve r, be c aus e pe rc e pti on is important , re cusal is also appr opriate w hen a pe rson of ordina ry prudenc e in the judge ’s position, knowing a ll of the fac ts known to the j u d ge, would find a
re as o n ab l e b a s i s f

o r q u es t i o n i n g t h e j u d ge’ s i m p ar t i al i t y

. T h u s , ev en wh en a j u d ge believes that he or she c an hea r a case fairly and impartially , the judg e should g rant t he motion to recuse if the judg e’s impartialitymight re asonably be questioned.-6-

Henc e, the test is ultimately an objec tive one since the appe arance of bias is as injurious to the integrity

of the judicial sy stem as ac tual bias. Howe ver, the mere fac t that a jud g e ha s rule d a dv e rs e ly to a pa rty or wi tne ss i n a

prior jud ic ia l pr oc e e din g is not gr ounds for re cusal .... I f the rule wer e other wise, re cusal would be required as
a ma tte r o f c ou rs e sin c e tr ia l c ou rt s n e c e ssa ri ly ru le a g a ins t pa

rt ie s a nd wi tne sse s in
e ve ry c a se , a ndlit ig a nts c ou ld m a nip ulate the imp art ial ity iss ue fo r s tr a te g ic advanta g e, which thecourts fr own upon.
Id. at 564-5 (interna l citation s o m i t t ed ). Therefor e, we must determine whe ther Judge B ailey
c omm itt e d a n abu se of dis c re tio n infaili ng to r e c us e him se lf . In ma kin g thi s d e te rm inatio n w e wi ll look for a “ clea

r abuse ... on the fa ce of

the re cord.”

Th e a ff ida vit s f ile d by Ms. Ye ub a nk s on app e a l con ta in a nu mbe r o f f

a c tua l a lle g a tio ns that, in h e r v ie w, e sta

bli sh Judg e B a ile y ’s bia s or pr e jud ic e in fa vo r of de fe nd a nts . We wi ll q uo te a t le ng th fr om the a ff

ida vit s o f M s. Ye ub a nk s’ c ou ns e l, T. Rob e rt Hi ll a nd F rankie E. Wad e , s inc e , o f the six aff idavits filed by

Ms. Yeubanks, the se conta in the most detailed fac tual alleg ations on this is sue.

I n his aff idavit, T. Robert Hil l asserts that the foll owing incidents indicated Judge Bailey ’s “ef fort ... to unre asonably

favor the def endants in this medical malpra ctice c ase” : (A) On J une 11 and 12, 2001, be fore the start of the trial and without prior notice to th e p l ai n t iff, the Court (J. Bailey ) ente rtained ove r plaintiff’s obje ction mul tip le ne w writt e n mot ion s fo r su mma ry jud g me nt (o r mot ion s to d ism iss ) supported by leng thy briefs and non-spec ific ref ere nces t o d eposition testimonytaken f

rom more than f

ift y witnesses (ove r 3,000 pag es) and hundreds of

documents an d pleading s claiming that the hospital and other de fe nd a nts c ou ld no t be he ld le g a lly re sp on sib le fo r a c ts o f c e rt a in r e sid e nts
a ndun lic e ns e d in te rn a tio na l me dic a l stud e nts be caus e the de fe nd a nts (movants) we re not n o t i fied of the specific names of the residents a nd stu de nts

. (B ) Plaintiff’s trial counsel wa s require d to respond without time to read the motions and briefs or to re spond to the motions as perm i t ted by law. The Court (J . Bailey ) conti nually demande d that counsel point out by pag e and line from more than fifty depositions and over 200 pleading s, the testimony
or o th e r “ p la c e s ” th a t w o u ldd is p r o v e th e d e f e n d a n ts ’ c o n c lu s ionary arg uments. Even af

ter pointing out several “place s” t hat containe d the inf orma tio n, Judg e B a ile y

sti ll g rante d d e fe nd a nts ’ m oti on s to dis mis s. (C ) Th e c ou rt e xpe nd e d the fi rs t tw o tr ia l day s on the se la st se c on d de fe ns e motions, even though plaintiff had multiple experts and witnesses on standby to start the trial. No e v idence was take n until the afternoon of the six th day of tr ia l.I n vi ew of M r

. H i l l ’ s r ef er enc es t o “ t he r ecor d” i n hi s af f i davi t , we ar e puzzl ed as t o w hy M s. 3
Y e u b a n k s’ trial c o u n se l ch o se no t t o fi le a tra n sc rip t o f t h e p ro c e e d ing s o n a p p e a l.
-7- (D) J udg e B ailey repe atedly spent hours on other case matter s befor e ca lling the plaintiff’s ca se to trial. I n fac t, f rom J une 11, 2001 to J uly 18, 2001 the Court hear d witnesses’ testimony on only 14 day s. The plaintiffs’ proof took a total of appr ox imately

36 and one- half hours, an aver ag e of two and one- half hours per trial day , which signific antly incre ased the cost of the trial to plaintiff and her attorney s and wre cked the continuity of plaintiff’s c ase- in-chief

. (E) J udg e B ailey

repe atedl y , solely

beca use this lawy er w ished to arg ue an opposite position on an issue or for no reason a ppare nt on the rec ord, threatened to send me to jail. This attack on counse l both in front and out of the pre sence of the jury

is clea r fr om the rec ord and f

rom post-trial interview s wi th j ur or s a s e vid e nc e d b y the ir a ff ida vit s. 3
(F ) Th e Cou rt

(Jud g e B a ile y ) w ou ld n e ve r e nte rt a in p la int if f’ s r e qu e sts (m oti on s) to conclude an expert witness befor e adjournment , but would make eve ry ac co m m o d a t i o n fo r d ef

en d an t s t h atwa s re q u es t ed , i n cl u d i n g al l o wi n g a defe ndant’ s l i abil ity

/causation ex pert witness to testify in the middle of pl a int if f’ s c a se be c aus e the e xpe rt wa s p la nn ing a

va c a tio n. Th is
acc ommodation was g rante d defe ndants when the Cour t h ad delay ed plaintiff’s experts’ testimony for day s to hear

contested divorc e matter s and
un re la te d mo tio ns a ndoth e r m a tte rs

. (G) Your a ffiant e stimates that the Court’s attitude towar d plaintiff and he r attorney s increa sed the c ost of the aborted first trial by 300% or more

. (H) The Court interr

upted the examination of witn es s es an d on one occ asion terminated the examination (in front of the jury ) su a s po nte beca

use he ha d
no t he arda nythi ng re le va nt t o th e c a se e ve n th ough th e wi tne ss c la ime d to have be en pre sent when the plaintiff’s nine ( 9) y ear [ol d] child bled to death.

I n her a ffidavit, plaintiffs’ trial counse l Fr an k i e E . Wade re lates a similar list of occ urre nces that d e m o n s tr a t e “ t h e h o s t i l i t y, b i a s a n d p r e j u d i c e ” o f

J u d g e B a i l e y: (A) As a re sult of J udg e Bailey ’s demea nor and court room proce dures, I beg an keeping time on the first day of trial. The court hear d witnesses on fourteen (14) day s. The avera g e ti me of trial testimony per day was two (2) hours and fi fty -n ine (5 9) min ute s, ma ximum

. (B ) J udg e B ailey

ref used to g ive plaintiff’s c ounsel time to rea d and pre pare for
arg ume nt o n n ume ro us pr e -t ri a l mo tio ns la te -f

ile d b y de fe nd a nts

.-8-

(C) J udg e B ailey

repe ated ly

interrupted a

rg uments of plaintiff’s c ounsel to the extent that plainti ff’ s position could not be adequate ly explained.
(D) Although Jud g eB ail e y h e a r d d e fendants’ late-f

iled (and he ard ove r plaintiff’s objections) motions within seven (7) day s of the trial begi n n i n g, when plaint if f p re se nte d a

lis t of mot ion s to be he ardbe fo reop e nin g state me nts , Judg e B a ile y

re fu se d to he ar p la int if

f’ s mo tio ns

. (E) J udg e B ailey

sustained the objec tion of all defe ndants to plaintiff’s use of demonstrative a ids during ope ning a rg ument. Howeve r, over p laintiff’s objection, J udg e B ailey

allowed Dr

. Hix son’s counsel to use a demonstrative ai d d u ri n g o p en i n g. (F ) Plaintiff reque st ed the judg e’s c ooperation in the scheduling and ca lling of plaintiff’s experts. The judge ref used. Howe ver, Judge Bailey allowed defe ndant Hertz t o prese nt the testimonyof one of her e x perts during plaintiff’s proof

. (G ) Pla int if

f c a lle d St e ph a nie Plu nk

a s a wi tne ss anda sk e d th e c ou rt to d e sig nate her a s an adver se witness beca use she was still a hospital employ ee and was
re pr e se nte d b y

de fe nd a nt h os pit a l’ s c ou ns e l. T he Judg e re fu se d. Whe n M s. Plu nk re fu se d to re sp on d to no n- le a din g qu e sti on s, Judg e B a ile y un ilate ra lly ended pla intiff’s direc t testimonybeca use of Mr. H ill’s asking le ading qu e sti on s. (H ) Pla int if

f c a lle d T e re sa

Stobau gh, an oth e r e mpl oy e e of the ho sp ita l. R e c e ss w a s t ak e n d u r i n g h e r

t e s t i m o n y. D u r i n g t h e r e c e s s , J u d g e B a i l e y su a s po nte asked w hat re levant evide nce the witness had. De fendant hospital objected to further testimony . J udg e B ailey dismiss ed the witness without explanation t o t h e j u r y. (I ) Juro rs a sk e d th e c ou rt to se e c e rt a in e xhibi ts, inc lud ing theho sp ita l c ha rt

. Judg e B a ile y

fo rg ot t o p a ss the m. D uring themid dle o f p la int if f’ s w itn e ss L inda Tipton’s testimony , he int err upted t he witness and dis trac ted the jury during her te stimony by

conver sing ope nly

with his bailiff and asking that the bailiff g ather

and pass the hospital chart to the jurors. His ac tion caused Mr

. Hill to object (see his a ffidavit).
(J) Du ri ng tr ia l, Jud g e B a ile y he arde xten siv e arg ume nt r e g ard ing a se pa rate lawsuit by the dece ased child’s fathe r ag ainst plaintiff an d sustained p l ai n t i ff ’s o b

j ec t i o n s t o i t s ad m i s s i b i l i t y

. Ho we v er , af t ert h e t ri al , J u d ge Bailey enter ed an orde r, which ha d not been se rved on the plaintiff or-9- approve d for e ntry , allowing defe ndants to obtain confidential se ttlem ent documents in that ca se. (K) I discovere d the order onl y afte r obtaining the technic al re cord to pre pare for appea l. I immediately advised Mr. Hill of t he matter and he took the ac tion
se t ou t in his a ff

ida vit

. The a ffidavits of the f

our jurors who sat t h ro u gh t h e orig inal trial of Ms. Yeubanks’ lawsuit wer e considera bly less detailed in their a lleg ations. J uror John David Howar d stated, “It is myopinion that during the trial of the Y

eubanks case J udg e B ailey exhibi ted an obvious, per sonal bias or pre judice in f avor of the de fendants in the presenc e of the jury . To me, this bias or pre judice wa s evident fr om the beg inning of the t rial.” J uror W esley Moss stated, “D uring the trial, it was and is my opinion that the re we re se ve ra l ti me s Judg e B a ile y app e are d b ia se d o r p re

jud ic e d in favo r of th e de fe nd a nts in front of the jury .” Juror Ly nne Hinton stated, “ I n m y o p inion, J udg e B ailey seeme d to favor the de fe nd a nts thr ou g ho ut the tr ia l of the c a se . O ne e xamp le of ho w h e se e me d to f

a vo r the de fe nd a nts is in how he allowed their lawy ers to que stion witnesses compare d to how he allowe d the plaintiff’s lawy er to c onduct the questioning of wit nesses.” J uror Sean Murrin, who offe red the most detailed
a ff ida vit , s ta te d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s,
5. I t is myopinion that during the tr i al o f the Y eubanks case J udg e B ailey
e xhibi te d a n obv iou s, pe rs on a l bia s or pr e jud ic e in fa vo r o f the de fe nd a nts in the pre sence of the jury . To me, this bia s or prejudice was evident fr om the be g inn ing of

the tr ia l.

6. I t was my

observation and opinion, a s a juror, that J udg e Bailey had per sonal prejudice or ill will against Ms. Yeubanks’ attorney , Mr. Robert Hill. Of particula r conc ern t o me was that when Mr. Hill attempted to question a wi tne ss, the jud g e c on tin ua lly int e rr up te d h im or

wo uldno t a llo w h im t o a sk questions of the witness, or attempted to cut the witness’ testimonyshort, but would allow the attorne y s for the doctors and hospitals as muc h uninterrupted time as they

wanted.

7. Al so , a n e ve nt I

fo un d d istur

bin g a s a jur or wa s w he n a wi tn ess for Ms. Yeuba nks was testify ing, J udg e B ailey interrupted he r testimony by passing exhibi ts not related to her testimony

to the jury

for e x amination, there by distracting the jury

from what she had to say . The judg e then a bruptly ended her te stimony , say ing hehad hea rd enoug h.

8. Du ri ng the tr ia l, th e jud g e c ut s ho rt mor e than o ne of

Ms. Ye ub a nk s’ witnesses. This was disturbin g t o m e b ecause I felt, as a

juror, that the wi tne sse s sh ou ld h a ve be e n g ive n th e op po rtun ity to c omp le te the ir t e s t i m o n y.-10-

9. As a juror

in this ca se, I

also found it disturbing that Judge Bailey allowed the attorney s for the doctors and hospital to question Ms. Y eubanks for se vera l ho ur s a bo ut h e r p a st. I t se e me d th ey were try ing ve ry ha rdto m ake Ms. Y e u b a n k s l o o k b a d a n d t h e j u d g e d i d n o ts t o p t h e m , h o w e v e r , t h e a t t o r n e ys for the d o c to r

a n d h o s p it a l s p e n t a lm o s t n o ti me a t a ll ta lkin g ab o u t w h at ha pp e ne d at th e ho sp ita l, w hic h w a s th e re a so n w e we rein c ou rt

. Upon re viewing these a ffidavits, we conclude that there is not sufficie nt e vidence in the rec ord for
us to h oldthat Judg e B a ile y abu se d his dis c re tio n infaili ng to r e c us e him se lf fr om the tr ia l of

thi s matter. Although several affiants did desc ribe spec ific instance s that, in their view, demonstrated the bias and pre

judice of J udg e Bailey , we find these alleg ations to be unhelpful whe n unacc ompanied by a tr a ns c ri pt of the pr oc e e din g s in the fi rs t tria l of Ms. Ye ub a nk s’ la ws uit . It is imp orta nt t o n ote that, as the Te nnessee Supreme Court pointed out in Davis v. Libe rty Mutu al Ins. C o. , 38 S.W.3d 564-5 (Tenn. 2001), the question is whether “a pe rson of ordina

ry prudenc e in t he judg e’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge , would find a re asonable basis for que stioning the judg e’s impartiality ” (e mphasis added) . Only a tra nscript would allow us to know “a ll the f acts known to the judge .” A transcript would permit us t o consider the se incidents in the trial c ontext in which they
occur red. It is not clear to us that the incidents, prese nted to us in affida vits out of the context of the trial as a w hole, could be r easona bly thought, by

an objec tive and prude nt observer , to evince any bias or pre

judice on Judge Bailey ’s part—rather, they may simplybe dec isions of the trial court that did not please Ms. Y eubanks and her c ounsel. As the Supreme Court noted in Da v is v . L ibe rty Mutu al Ins. C

o. , [T] he mer e fa ct that a judg e has r uled adve rs el y t o a p ar ty or witness in a prior judicial proce eding is not grounds f or re cusal .... I f t he rule were otherwise, r ecusa l
wo uldbe re qu ir e d a s a

ma tte r o f c ou rs e sin c e tr ia l c ou rt s n e c e ssa ri ly rul e ag a ins t pa rt ie s a ndwi tne sse s in e ve ry c a se , a ndlit ig a nts c ou ld m a nip ulate the imp art ia lit y issue for strateg ic adva ntag e, which the courts fr own upon.
38 S.W.3d at 565 (Tenn. 2001)

. Moreove r, we note that the only specific alleg ations of bias made b y j u ro rs co n ce rn ru l i n gs b y t h e t ri al co u rt t h atm ayh av e b ee n p er fe ct l y p ro p er , ev en i f su ch ru l i n gs ma y ha ve se eme d to re fl e c t th e jud g e ’s bia s to ob se rv e rs un famil iar w iththefi ne po int s o f c ivi l p r o c e d u r e a n d tr i a l p r a c t i c e

. F o r e x a m p l e , j u r o r Lyn n e H i n t o n d e t e c t e d b i a s i n “ h o w [ J u d g e B a i l e y] allowed [the defe ndants’] lawy ers to question witnesses compared to how he allowed the pla intiff’s lawy er to c onduct the questioning of witnesses.” But a s every attorney k n o ws , plaintiffs and defe ndants have differ ent deg ree s of latitude in questioning w itnesses at trial. Simi larly , juror Sean Mu rrin “ fo un d it

dis tur bin g that Judg e B a ile y a llo we d the a tto rn e y s for the do c tor s andho sp ita l to qu e sti on Ms. Ye ub a nk s f or sever a l ho ur s a

bo ut h e r p a st, ” wh ile sp e nd ing “ a lmo st n o ti me a t a ll talking a bout what happe ned at the hospital ....” As with Ms . Hinton’s alleg ation, this appear s to be
a re flec tion more of a jur or’s unde rstandable ignor ance of trial pra ctice, r ather than proof of any biasW e n ot e t hat , i n e ach of t hei r aff i davi t s , M s

. Y euban ks ’ at t orn ey s , T

. R ob er t H i l l and Fra nk i e E

. W ade, 4 emph as i ze t hei r l on g c ar ee r s a s a t t or n ey s

— t h i r t y
- f i v e y ea r s of

e x per i en ce for M r

. H i l l a n d t we n t y
- f i v e y ea r s of exper i enc e f

or M s

. W ade. T hei r s i x dec ades of comb i ned exper i enc e prac t i ci ng bef ore t he cour t s of T enn es s ee makes

e v e n m o re ine x p lica b le the ir d e c isio n no t t o fi le a trial tra n sc rip t i n this a p p e a l.
-11- o r p re j u d i ce o n J u d ge B a i l ey ’s p ar t

. T h e s i x af fi d av i t s s i m p l y

ar e i n s u ff

i ci en tt o fi n d t h atJ u d ge Bailey abused his discre tion in failing to re cuse himself. 4 Ho we ve r, e ve n if

there wer e su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to f

indthat Judg e B a ile y

abu se d h is discretion in f

ailing to r ecuse himself, we believe Ms. Ye ubanks wa ived this issue by failing to move fo r h is r e c us a l du ri ng the tr ia l. It is we ll- e sta bli sh e d inTe nn e sse e la w that “ a pa rty mus t c omp la in and see k relief immediately afte r t he occurre nce of a prejudicial eve nt and may not silentlyprese rve the eve nt as an ‘a ce in the hole ’ to be used i n event of an adve rse de cision.” Go twa ld v . Gotw ald , 768 S.W.2d 68 9 , 6 9 4 (Tenn. Ct. App.,1988) . The incide nts describe d by Ms. Yeubanks, that
a lle g e dly e sta bli shJudg e B a ile y ’s bia s or pr e jud ic e in f a vo r o f the de fe nd a nts , b e g a n o n th e ve ry fi rs t day of th e t rial, as Ms. Ye ubanks’ tria l counsel admit in their af fidavits. Ms. Wade, for e x ample, states that she be g an kee ping t i m e on the ve ry first day of trial “[a]s a result of Judge Bailey ’s de me a no r andc ou rt

ro om p ro c e du re s. ” Simi larl y , inhis a ff ida vit Mr

. Hi ll a dd uc e s se ve ra l in c ide nts t h ato cc u rr ed p ri o r t o t h e s t ar to f t h e t ri al , an d d u ri n g t h e fi rs t t wo d ay s o f t ri al , as ev i d en ce o f J u d ge Bailey ’s alleg ed bias or pr ejudice in f avor of the def endants. Ye t, the rec ord conta ins no sugg estion that Ms. Yeubanks’ trial counsel sought J udg e Bailey ’s recusal, or otherwise br oug ht his alleg ed bias
or pr e jud ic e to h is atte nti on , d uring the tria l.

Th e re fo re , f

or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e fi ndthi s is su e to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

Issue 3: “Whether the trial court err ed in dismissing the ca se for failure to pay

discretionary costs afte r it ref

used to rec use itself and transfer the ca se to another

division.”

Ms. Ye ub a nk s’ thi rdiss ue on app e a l is wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d indis mis sin g the c a se fo r f a ilu re to pay dis c re tio na

ry c os ts a ft e r the tr ia l c ou rt faile d to re c us e its e lf a ndtr a ns fe r the c a se to ano the r d ivi sio n. Al tho ug h M s. Ye ub a nk s state s thi s a s on e of theiss ue s o n a

pp e a l, s he pr e se nts
n o ar g u me n t f

o r it in h e r ap p e a l b r ie f

. I n o u r d e c ision in Y euba nks I , this Court affirmed the trial
c ou rt ’s a wa

rd of dis c re tio na

ry c os ts a g a ins t Ms. Ye ub a nk s, bu t we he ld that “ the tria l c ou rt e rr e d in
or de ri ng that th e c os ts be pa id prior to the re fi lin g of thec a se

.. .. ” I ns te a d, we he ld, “ [t]he ru le c le arl y contemplates that the determination of when the pl aintiff mus t pay costs previously order ed is made afte r the c ase is re filed.”
Now, i n the pre sent appe al, Ms. Yeubanks arg ues that, since Judge Bailey should have
re c us e d h ims e lf, h is e ntry of a fu rthe r o rd e r d ism iss ing thi s c a se fo r f a ilu reto p a y

dis c re tio na

ry c os ts
wa s in e rr or . In li g ht o f o ur ho ldi ng that Judg e B a ile y didno t a bu se his dis c re tio n infaili ng to r e c us e himself, we pr etermit any consideration of this is sue.
Issue 4: Whe the r this app e a l is frivo lou s.-12-

Ap pe lle e ’s so le iss ue on app e a l is wh e the r the pr e se nt app e a l by Ms. Ye ub a nk s is f ri vo lou s. A f ri vo lou s a pp e a l is on e that ha s no re a so na ble c ha nc e of

su c c e ss. Love lace v . Owens-Illin ois, Inc. , 632 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tenn . 1982) . T .C. A. 27 -1 -1 22 pr ov ide s fo r da ma g e s to be a wa rd e d a g a ins t
a pa rty wh o b ri ng s a

frivo lou s a

pp e a l: When it appear s to any

revie wing court that the a ppeal f rom any court of r ecor d was frivolous or take n solely

for de lay , the court may , either upon motion of a pa rty or of its own moti on, awa

rd just damag es ag ainst the appe llant, which may i n cl u d e, but need not be limit ed to, c osts, inter est on the judg ment, and expenses incur red by the
app e lle e a s a

re su lt o f the app e a l.
As our Supreme Court has stated, “Su cc essful litiga nts should not have to bear the expense and vexation of gr oundless appea ls.” Da v is v . G ulf Ins ura nc e Gr

oup , 54 6 S.W .2 d 58 3, 58 6 (T e nn. 1977) . In r e vie wi ng the re c or d a ndc on sid e ri ng thi s is su e , t hi s Cou rt fi nd s it te lli ng that Ms

. Yeuba nks, throug h her counsel, declined to include a transcript of the trial proc eeding s, despite the fac t that her issues on appe al all conc erne d the alleg ed bias of the trial judg e. Seasone d trial counsel
su c h a s tho se re ta ine d by Ms. Ye ub a nk s, wi th a c omb ine d s ixty

y e ars of pr a c tic e be fo rethe c ou rt s of Tenne ssee, c an be e x pecte d to know that claims of bias re q u i re t h e reviewing court to make a c los e a nd c are fu l exam inatio n of the tr a ns c ri pt of the tria l, to s e e the jud g e ’s ru lin g s a ndre mark s in
c on te xt. We ho ld that th is a pp e a l is frivo lou s.

V. CO NC LU SION The judg ment of the trial court is af firmed, a nd this cause is re manded to the tria l court for
a de te rm inatio n o f d a ma g e s f or the frivo lou s a

pp e a l. C os ts i n th is a

pp eal are a sse sse d a g a ins t A p p e l l a n t , C h r i s t i n a

Y e u b a n k s , a n d h e r

s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F R A N K C R A WFO R D , PR E S I DI NG JUDG E, W.S.