Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 77A01-1706-DR-1358 | April 3, 2018 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Zachariah M. Phillips

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Karen R. Swopes

Terre Haute, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amy Fulk,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Jonathan Fulk,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 3, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

77A01-1706-DR-1358

Appeal from the Sullivan Superior 

Court

The Honorable Hugh R. Hunt, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

77D01-1112-DR-408

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, Amy Fulk (Mother), appeals the trial court’s Order, 

modifying the custody and parenting time of the minor children in favor of 

Appellee-Petitioner, Jonathan Fulk (Father). 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Mother presents us with four issues on appeal, which we restate as: 

(1) Whether the trial court showed bias during the proceedings and denied 

Mother due process; 

(2) Whether the trial court properly proceeded on Mother’s emergency 

petition to modify custody of J.F.;

(3) Whether the trial court erred in modifying parenting time with J.F; and

(4) Whether the trial court failed to include in its Order that the parenting 

time coordinator had discretion to modify Mother’s parenting time 

pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On February 27, 2012, the marriage between Mother and Father was dissolved 

by agreed settlement. In their settlement, the parties consented to share joint 

legal and physical custody of their two minor children, A.F., born on January 

10, 2003, and J.F., born on October 29, 2005. On July 14, 2014, the parties 

modified custody by agreement, assenting that Mother would have primary 
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physical custody of A.F. and Father would have primary physical custody of 

J.F.; each party was to receive parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting 

Time Guidelines. After the parties modified custody, Father no longer received 

significant parenting time with A.F. 

[5] At some point in October of 2015, Father contacted A.F.’s school, West Vigo 

Middle School, to inquire how she was doing. When West Vigo Middle School 

informed Father that A.F. had missed a lot of school days, he called the 

Department of Child Services (DCS) and requested them to investigate. A.F.’s 

school records revealed that she was absent from school for 137.5 full and half 

days for the combined 2014/15 and 2015/16 school years. For the 2015/16 

school year alone, it was determined that A.F. was absent for 112 full days and 

an additional 17 partial days. A.F.’s school records included a certificate of 

student’s illness and capacity form, dated November 12, 2015 and signed by 

Robert Fallon, MD. When the school nurse requested Mother to sign a release 

for A.F.’s medical records, Mother refused. 

[6] In October of 2015, Mother also informed Father that A.F. was being treated at 

Riley Hospital for Children (Riley Hospital) after being diagnosed with cancer 

and that she was terminally ill. When Father was scheduled to accompany 

A.F. to a doctor’s appointment, it was cancelled at the last minute. Although 

Father carried health insurance on A.F., no medical claims were submitted, 

and, not receiving any further information from Mother, Father, upon 

contacting Riley Hospital directly, discovered that no records of any treatment 

existed. A.F.’s Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) contacted the manager of Riley 
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Hematology Oncology Outpatient Clinic who, upon examination of the 

signature on the certificate of student’s illness, disavowed any familiarity with 

the signature as being of one of the physicians at Riley. After a diligent search 

of the records, the manager also informed the GAL that there were no records 

establishing A.F. had been treated at Riley Hospital.

[7] Father discovered that A.F. had been treated and released from the emergency 

department of Union Hospital at Terre Haute on September 30, 2015. 

Although Mother testified that A.F. had been treated for an enlarged spleen 

during that visit, the medical records do not indicate such a finding. In fact, the 

results of all the tests appear to be normal. A mere fifteen days after A.F. had 

been treated and released from Union Hospital, Father was alerted of a benefit 

to raise funds for A.F.’s treatment for leukemia. Father did not attend as he did 

not believe that A.F. was terminally ill. 

[8] On July 8, 2016, Father filed a motion for rule to show cause, a motion for 

expedited hearing, and a motion for attorney fees1 (First Motion). On 

September 13, 2016, the parties appeared before the trial court regarding the 

First Motion and agreed that Father’s parenting time would start again by 

October 13, 2016, and that the parties would participate in counseling to 

rehabilitate the relationship between Father and A.F. On November 28, 2016, 

 

1 It should be pointed out that Appellant’s Appendix is woefully incomplete. Besides the chronological case 

summary and the trial court’s order, Appellant failed to submit any of the other filings or pleadings that are 

helpful to this court in its review. 
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Father filed a second motion for modification of custody of A.F., a motion for 

modification of parenting time, a motion for rule to show cause, and a motion 

for attorney fees (Second Motion). 

[9] On January 31, 2017, the GAL filed a report with the trial court and a request 

for order mandating the disclosure of A.F.’s medical records, which was 

granted by the trial court that same day. On March 3, 2017, the GAL filed a 

request for hearing with the trial court. Thereafter, on April 7, 2017, Father 

again filed a motion for rule to show cause, for attorney fees, and a motion for 

the appointment of a parenting time coordinator (Third Motion). On April 12, 

2017, the trial court held a hearing on Father’s Third Motion and found Mother 

in direct contempt of court for failing to provide the requested medical records,

as ordered previously. The trial court allowed Mother one week to purge her 

contempt. On April 19, 2017, Mother failed to provide any evidence of medical 

records, leading the trial court to exclaim “the fact that there’s -you cannot 

provide one (1) shred of medical evidence that this child has been diagnosed 

with anything, it’s just, it’s preposterous, it’s unacceptable.” (Suppl. Tr. p. 75). 

Accordingly, the trial court entered an order, mandating Mother to serve 

twenty days at the Sullivan city-county correctional facility due to her contempt 

of the trial court’s order to provide “documentation regarding [A.F.’s] diagnosis 

of and treatment for CLL.” (Appellee’s App., Vol. II, p. 35). During the time 

Mother served her jail sentence, Father was granted temporary physical custody 

of A.F. To date, Mother has yet to provide records of any medical providers or 
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affiliated university, indicating that A.F. was diagnosed and treated for CLL 

Blood Disorder/Leukemia or any other terminal illness. 

[10] During the twenty days A.F. was in Father’s custody while Mother was serving 

her sentence for contempt, A.F. spent time with family members she had not 

seen in years and appeared to enjoy herself. After Mother was released and 

A.F. returned to her custody, Father has not received any parenting time with 

A.F. On May 19, 2017, the GAL filed her report with the trial court, 

recommending a change in custody of A.F. from Mother to Father. On May 

30, 2017, the day before the parties’ modification hearing, Mother filed a 

petition for emergency custody of J.F. 

[11] On May 31, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ motions 

for modification of the children’s custody. During the hearing, the trial court 

treated the hearing as “a continuation of the hearings that have gone before” 

and, as such, took judicial notice of previous testimony and incorporated the 

exhibits already admitted during the hearing of April 12, 2017. (Tr. Vol II, p. 

5). 

[12] In response to Mother’s allegations raised in her petition for emergency custody 

of J.F., Father testified that he had dropped his son off for parenting time with 

his Mother on Friday, May 26, 2017. At the time, J.F. appeared fine. The 

following day, Saturday, May 27, 2017, J.F. was admitted to the emergency

room at Regional Hospital. The medical records indicated that J.F. was 

diagnosed with a broken arm. Although the x-ray appeared normal, the MRI 
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showed a “slight volar angulation of the distal humerus, and an elbow joint 

effusion is present.” (Exh. 7). DCS was informed because J.F. explained that 

his Father had hurt his right arm by pulling him off his ATV the Tuesday 

before. Recalling the incident, Father explained that J.F. was out on his Razor, 

picking up sticks on the field, while Father was on a tractor. At a certain point, 

J.F. complained that his right arm had “lost power.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 130). 

Later that evening, J.F. called Mother and told her about the incident. Father 

asked J.F. if he needed to go to the emergency room, but J.F. assured him that 

he was “fine.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 131). The following morning. J.F. went fishing 

and tossed the football around with his stepbrother. 

[13] On July 10, 2017, the trial court issued its very detailed findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and judgment, decreeing, in pertinent part:

Educational Neglect. Due to the complete lack of any medical 

record that supports Mother’s assertion that [A.F.] was 

diagnosed and treated for CLL Blood Disorder/Leukemia, the 

[c]ourt finds that [A.F.] was not diagnosed and treated for CLL 

Blood Disorder/Leukemia. As such, the level of educational 

neglect, 112 full days and 17 partial days in the 201/2016 school 

year, is a substantial change of circumstances that supports a 

change of custody pursuant to [I.C. §] 31-17-2-21.

Mental and Physical Health: It is clear to the [c]ourt that 

Mother’s story of [A.F.’s] CCL Blood Disorder/Leukemia is a 

fabrication. The [c]ourt also concludes from the nature of the 

fabrication and extent to which Mother has held firm to it that 

she may be suffering from some type of mental illness, whether 

Munchausen by proxy, antisocial personality disorder or some 

other type of mental illness, and as a result that parenting time 
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with Mother might endanger the child’s physical health or 

significantly impair the child’s emotional development, and that 

it is in the best interest of [A.F.] for parenting time with Mother 

to be supervised.

Further, the nature of the fabrication is particularly troubling to 

this [c]ourt. The lack of empathy and respect for those who 

suffer true pain and hardship due to terminal illness is appalling. 

It is beyond the pale that a person or persons would benefit from 

a fundraiser for an illness that is fabricated. It is beyond the pale 

that a doctor’s signature would be forged to perpetuate this lie.

It is clear to the [c]ourt that custody of [J.F.] should not only 

remain with Father because Mother has not met her burden of 

proof regarding modification of custody (emergency or 

otherwise), but that Mother’s parenting time with [J.F.] should 

be supervised as well. The [c]ourt finds that, for [J.F.] as well, 

parenting time with Mother might endanger his physical health 

or significantly impair his emotional development, and that it is 

in the best interest of [J.F.] for parenting time with Mother to be 

supervised. [J.F.’s] injuries and story do not align with the 

observations of multiple persons who observed and interacted 

with him in the days preceding Mother’s parenting time with him 

commencing on May 26, 2017. They also do not align with the 

observations of multiple persons who have observed and 

interacted with Father and son over the years.

Parental Alienation: It is clear to the [c]ourt that Mother has no 

intention of allowing Father to have parenting time with his 

daughter. The [c]ourt is convinced that if custody of [A.F.] were 

to remain with Mother, that Father would never have the 

opportunity to have a relationship with his daughter. It is clear 

that Mother’s actions in routinely denying parenting time to 

Father, to which Father was entitled, is a substantial change in 

the interrelationship of the parties, which permits a modification 

in custody pursuant to Indiana caselaw. It is also clear that 
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profound parental alienation has already occurred due to the 

fabrication of [A.F.’s] illness. [A.F.] clearly blames Father for 

the consequences of her Mother’s lies.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 24-25).

[14] Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[15] The trial court entered specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its 

Order modifying custody and parenting time in favor of Father. Pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), this court will “not set aside the findings or judgment 

unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 

trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Jarrell v. Jarrell, 5 N.E.3d 

1186, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. 

2012)), trans. denied. Considering only the evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s judgment and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, we will find 

clear error only if the evidence, either directly or by inference, fails to support 

the findings, or if the findings fail to support the conclusions. Id. 

[16] In addition, there is a well-established preference in Indiana “for granting 

latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Swadner v. 

Swadner, 897 N.E.2d 966, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). “[A]ppellate courts ‘are in 

a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the 

trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized 
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their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand 

the significance of the evidence.’” D.C., 977 N.E.2d at 956-57 (quoting Kirk v. 

Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)). Our State’s courts have long 

emphasized a concern that there be finality in matters concerning child custody. 

Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind. 2008). “Modification of 

custody is an area committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we 

are constrained to neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses.” Joe v. Lebow, 670 N.E.2d 9, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 

I. Judicial Bias and Prejudice

[17] Mother first contends that trial court’s numerous instructions preventing her 

from presenting any testimony with respect to A.F.’s illness amounted to bias 

and violated her due process rights. The law presumes that a judge is unbiased 

and unprejudiced in the matters that come before the judge. Flowers v. State, 738 

N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied. A judge has the discretionary 

power to disqualify himself or herself sua sponte whenever any semblance of 

judicial bias or impropriety comes to the judge’s attention. Id. In addition, 

where a judge harbors actual prejudice in a case, justice requires that a sua 

sponte judicial disqualification from the case be made. Id. The test for 

determining whether a judge should recuse himself or herself is “whether an 

objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a 

reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality.” James v. State, 716 

N.E.2d 935, 940 (Ind. 1999). Furthermore, the party alleging judicial bias 

“must show that the trial judge’s action and demeanor crossed the barrier of 
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impartiality and prejudiced the [party’s] case.” Flowers, 738 N.E.2d at 1061. 

An adverse ruling alone is insufficient to show bias or prejudice. Id. at 1060 

n.4. 

[18] Mother proceeded pro se during the continuation of trial on May 31, 2017. It is 

well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed 

attorneys, and thus are required to follow procedural rules. Evans v. State, 809 

N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. However, when Mother 

questioned the GAL and Father’s witnesses, she was prone to interject her own 

testimony. As such, the trial court had to instruct her on numerous occasions 

to ask questions only. During Mother’s cross-examination of the GAL, the trial 

court navigated the issue as follows:

[TRIAL COURT]: Again, you’re not asking questions. So, [], 

maybe I can take over here.

[MOTHER]: Sorry.

[TRIAL COURT]: The assertion’s been made by [Mother], and 

maybe we can put that to rest, that you [i.e., GAL] may be just 

focused in on a short period of time. Is there any way we can 

kind of clarify that? I mean, we understand that—and you must 

understand [Mother], it’s not like she has the time[] to go over 

every second [] every facet of the relationship from beginning to 

end. I mean, it’s [] only possible that she is going to get a quick 

snapshot sometimes[.]

(Tr. pp. 28-29). When Mother commenced presenting her case-in-chief, the 

trial court advised her that she had “the right to present [her] case as she 

wanted.” (Tr. p. 179).
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[19] Nevertheless, claiming that the trial court displayed actual bias, Mother argues 

that the trial court did not allow her to present any testimony to contradict 

Father’s allegations that she had fabricated A.F.’s illness. By order of January 

31, 2017, the trial court had mandated Mother to present A.F.’s medical 

records. Mother refused and was held in contempt, serving twenty days in jail. 

Despite the fact that Mother never provided A.F.’s medical records and the trial 

court reminded her of the contempt, the hearing transcript is littered with 

Mother’s testimony referencing A.F.’s illness. The trial court even noted in its 

findings of fact:

32. Mother testified, under oath, that [A.F.] was diagnosed and 

treated for CLL Blood Disorder and that is why she was absent 

from school, and also that she was treated for it in a ‘university 

study.’ Mother described for the [c]ourt the ‘shots’ that [A.F.] 

was given as treatment. Mother also indicated to the GAL that 

[A.F.] has received an evaluation/consultation at Riley Hospital 

for Children.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 15). Furthermore, evidence presented during the 

April 12, 2017 hearing, which the trial court took judicial notice of during the 

May 31, 2017 hearing, revealed the GAL reporting:

I discussed [A.F.’s] health issue with [Mother] and she explained 

in September of 2015 she became concerned because the doctors 

could not figure out what was wrong with [A.F.]. She indicated 

she took [A.F.] for a ‘consult with Riley Children’s Hospital’ and 

‘they wanted to remove [A.F.’s] spleen and do chemo. I chose a 

less invasive process through St Louis Children’s Hospital.’ 

[Mother] reported [A.F.] was diagnosed with ‘CLL blood 

disorder’ and explained it was a ‘type of leukemia.’ I inquired as 
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to whether she had brought any documentation regarding the 

illness and she indicated she did not and that she was not going 

to provide any information to me or to [Father]. She stated ‘I am 

not giving [Father] the information. John has it.’ I provided her 

documentation where Riley Hospital and St Louis Children’s 

Hospital had reported they had no records regarding [A.F.]. She 

stated that was correct because Riley was merely a consult and 

the ‘trial’ [A.F.] received was administered by a ‘University’ 

rather than the Hospital. [Mother] presented pictures that she 

represented were done during [A.F.’s] treatment. However, 

[A.F.’s] face did not physically appear in the pictures, which she 

said was due to [A.F.] not liking to have her picture taken. 

[Mother] reported her lack of willingness to provide any further 

information is because [Father] would merely find fault in the 

type of treatment she chose to seek on behalf of [A.F.], but 

acknowledged the treatment was successful and [A.F.] is doing 

well. She stated ‘I am putting my foot down . . . something else 

will come from it.’ [Mother] repeatedly expressed her feelings of 

frustration regarding [Father] and stated ‘it’s got to stop. Why 

am I trying to prove myself worthy? He should be proving he is 

worthy.’

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p 18).

[20] At no point was Mother prevented from presenting her case or from 

questioning witnesses. At most, the trial court admonished her and reminded 

her “not to expound [] forever” on A.F.’s illness. (Tr. p. 23). Despite this 

reprimand, numerous witnesses testified about A.F.’s perceived illness and its 

impact on their lives and Mother was allowed to cross-examine them. The trial 

court clearly considered this evidence when it issued its Order. Accordingly, 

we cannot conclude that an objective person, knowledgeable of all the 

circumstances, would have a reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s 
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impartiality” or that the trial court’s “demeanor” prejudiced Mother. See James, 

716 N.E.2d at 940: Flowers, 738 N.E.2d at 1061. 

II. Mother’s Emergency Petition for Custody

[21] Despite Mother filing an emergency petition for modification of J.F.’s custody

the day before the hearing, she now contends that the trial court erred on 

proceeding on her petition. Indiana Trial Rule 6(D) provides that “[a] written 

motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing 

thereof shall be served not less than five (5) days before the time specified for 

the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the 

court.” During the hearing, the trial court consulted the parties, noting that 

“yesterday a Verified Petition for Emergency custody was filed,” but that 

counsel for Father had informed the court that they are “willing to address this 

motion here today.” (Tr. p. 120). Mother did not object and presented her 

evidence related to her petition. As Mother had the opportunity to present 

evidence and introduce exhibits related to her emergency petition, she cannot 

now be heard to complain.

III. Modification of Parenting Time

[22] Next, Mother claims that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying her 

parenting time with J.F., modifying child support, and modifying the parties’

financial obligations with respect to the children’s extra-curricular activities. 

Again reiterating her arguments about the trial court’s treatment of her 

emergency petition for modification of J.F.’s custody—which we rejected—
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Mother contends that as the custody issue should not have been decided, the 

parenting time should likewise not have been altered. Moreover, as “[n]o 

motion was ever filed to address extra-curricular expenses,” the trial court’s 

order abused its discretion in ordering them split. (Appellant’s Br. p. 20). 

Father, on the other hand and without any reference to the record, responds 

that “[i]n addition to the motion for a modification of custody and parenting 

time, Father’s motion included the language ‘and for all other just and proper 

relief in the premises,’ which would properly include child support.” 

(Appellee’s Br. p. 30).

[23] Indiana Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f) provides that the Appellant’s Appendix shall 

contain “pleadings and other documents from the Clerk’s Record in 

chronological order that are necessary for resolution of the issues raised on 

appeal.” Mother’s Appendix only includes the chronological case summary, 

and the trial court’s order, while Father’s Appendix included those same 

documents, as well as the trial court’s order of June 1, 2017, the order of April 

19, 2017, and mother’s emergency petition for custody of J.F. Neither party 

provided us with any other motions, and most notable in absence are Father’s 

three motions for modification of custody. Because the parties failed to comply 

with the Indiana Appellate Rules, we have no basis on which to review the 

substantive issue of parenting time and child support with regard to J.F. 

Mindful of the discretion yielded by trial courts in family matters, we affirm the 

trial court’s Order. 

IV. Parenting Time Coordinator
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[24] Lastly, Mother complained that during the hearing the trial court had agreed 

that the parenting time coordinator could modify Mother’s parenting time 

pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Mother maintains that 

even though the trial court stated that this would be memorialized in its written 

Order, the Order does not contain this language. 

[25] When discussing parenting time, the trial court stated:

[TRIAL COURT]: Well that’s now modified. [J.F.’s] parenting 

time with [Mother] is going to be modified to supervised. There 

will be no summer parenting time as it is, unless that is addressed 

at a later hearing and I reverse myself, but as of now parenting 

time with [Mother] and [J.F.] will be supervised.

[MOTHER]: And how long will that be?

[TRIAL COURT]: Until further order of the [c]ourt.

[MOTHER]: What do I need to abide by that. Do I need to see 

this evaluation [sic]?

[TRIAL COURT]: [The parenting time coordinator] is going to 

coordinate you[r] parenting time with [J.F.] and [A.F.] Once I 

receive an evaluation from an accredited psychologist that shows 

that there’s no issues with you, no danger to the children, then 

[the parenting time coordinator] will have the discretion to 

increase parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time 

Guidelines. And she will not have to have the assistance of the 

[c]ourt in doing that.

* * * *

[TRIAL COURT]: [] [B]ut before you’re [sic] parenting time is 

increased, we would have to have that information.

(Tr. pp. 216-16). Accordingly, while Mother is correct that the parenting time 

coordinator can increase her parenting time without the involvement of the trial 

court, the trial court did not bestow this discretion on the parenting time 

coordinator until the trial court receives the report of Mother’s psychological 
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evaluation. As Mother does not dispute the order of a psychological 

evaluation, we affirm the trial court. 

CONCLUSION

[26] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by modifying the custody and parenting time of the minor children in 

favor of Father.

[27] Affirmed.

[28] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur