FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ULY 3, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N os. 06- 1551 4 & 06- 1587 4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 02-01686 -CV -MH S-1 KENNY A ., by

hi s n ex t fr ie nd Lin da W in n, KARA B., by he r ne xt fri en d Li nd a Pac e, MAYA C., by her n ex t fr ie nd Lin da Pace , PHELICIA D., by he r ne xt fri en d Th eres a Ro th , SABRI NA E., by her n ex t fr ie nd Reb ecca Sil ve y , KORRINA E., by

he r ne xt fri en d R eb ecca Sil ve y , TANYA F., by her n ex t fr ie nd Caro l Hu ff, PRIS CILLA G., by

he r Nex t Fr ie nd Ro sl yn M . Sat ch el , BRIA NAH. , by

her next fr iend Linda Pac e, on their o w n b e h a l f

an do n b e h a l f

o f a l l o t h e r s s i mi l a r l y si tu at ed , Plaintiffs-AppelleesCro ss -Ap pe ll an ts , ve rs us SO NN Y P ERDU E, in his official capacity as G overnor of th e St at e o f Geo rg ia , DE PA RT MEN T O F H UMA N RES OU RCE S O F T HE ST AT E O F GEORGIA, JA ME S MA RT IN , in his of fi ci al c ap ac ity

a s Co m m iss ion er of the D ep ar

tm en t of H um anRe sour ce sRobert M. Sharp, The L ore a nd L eg ends of Wall Street 233 (1989) . 1 2 of th e St at e o f Geo rg ia , D IV IS IO N O F FA MI L Y A N D CH IL D REN S E RV IC E S, F ult on Co un ty, BE V E RL Y JO N E S, in he r of fi ci al c ap ac ity

a s D i r e c t o r o f th e F u l t o n C o u n t y De p a rt men to f F a mi l y an d C hi ld ren Serv ic es , DEKALB COUNTYDFCS, WA YN E D RU MM O N D , in his of fi ci al c ap ac ity

a s D i r e c t o r o f th e De K a l b C o u n t y De p a rt men to f F a mi l y an d C hi ld ren Serv ic es , De fendants-AppellantsCro ss -Ap pe ll ees , FULTON COUNTY , DEKALB COUNTY , Defen da nt s.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J ul y 3, 200 8) Be fo re CA RN E S, W IL SO N and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. CAR NE S, Circuit Judge: Whe n a sk edho w m

uc h m on ey

wou ldbe en ou gh forhi m , Jo hn D. Rockefeller

reportedly

said: “ Just a little bit m ore. ” T he attorney s for the 13

pla int if f cl as s inthi s c as e w an t m or e than j ust ali ttl e bit

m or e. T he y

w an t a lot m ore m oney

than they would rece ive from

m ultip ly ing th e num

ber of hours they w orke d onthi s c as e by

the hourl y

r at e the y c harg e. A nd the dis tr ic t c ourt gave the m alot m or e— $4, 500, 000 m or e— out of the poc ke ts o f the ta xpay er s of Geo rg ia . N ot c au ght

up i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s sp ir it of ge ne ro sity

w iththe ir

m one y , the G eo rg iata xpay er s ( thr oughthe ir gov er nor a nd o the r of

fi ci al s w ho are de fe ndants ) have appealed the attorney s’ fee s award because of that m ulti-m illion dollar en hanc em en t and f

or oth er r ea sons . T he pla int if

fs ’ a tto rn ey s, c onvi nc ed

that the district court was not generous enoug h, have cr oss-appealed (through the class they represe nt), insisting that they deserve even m ore than the $10,500,000 total fees th atth e co ur t awa rd edth em . I. Ke nny A. and eight oth er nam ed plaintiffs in this law suit are foster c hildren in the c ust ody

of the G eo rg iaD ep ar

tm en t of H um anRe sour ce s. K en ny A . e x r el . W inn v. Perdue, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (N. D. Ga . 2006) (K enny A. III ). In June 200 2, on behalf of a class of all foster c hildren in Fulto n and DeK alb Counties an d asub cl as s of

A fr ic anA m er ic anf

ost er c hil dr en , the pla int if

fs sue d th e g o v ern o r, DHR , i t s co m

m i s s i o n er , F u l t o n an dDe Ka l b Co u n t i es , e ac h co u n t y’ s4

de partm en t of

f am ily and c hil dr ense rv ic es , a nd the dir ec tor of e ac h of tho se de partm en ts. I d. a t 12 66–6 7. T he c om pla int a lle ge d sy ste m ic de fi ci en ci es in the co unt ie s’ f

ost er c ar e sy ste m s. I d. a t 12 67. T he se de fi ci en ci es , a cc or din g to the co m pla int , inc lud ed : (1 ) as sig nin g e xc es siv e num be rs of c as es to ina de qua te ly

tr ai ne d and poorlysupervised caseworker s; (2) not develop ing a sufficient num ber o f f o s t erh o m es p ro p er l y s cr ee n ed t o en s u re th e p l ai n t i ff ch i l d re n ’s sa fe ty ; ( 3) not

ide nti fy ing a dul t r el at ive s w ho c oul d c ar e fo r the plaintiff children as an alternative to strangers or im personal instit ution s; (4) failing to provid e re levant inform ation and su pport se rv ic es to fo ste r pare nts in or de r to p re ve nt f ost er pla ce m en ts f

ro m being di srupted; (5) failing to develo p adm inistrative controls such as an inform ation m anagem ent sy stem that ensures plaintiff children are ex p ed i t i o u s l y p l ac ed i n a f o s t erh o m e mat ch ed t o m ee tth e c h i l d re n ’s spe ci fi c ne ed s; ( 6) f

ai lin g to pr ovi de ti m el y

a nd a ppr opr ia te pe rm an en cy

planni ng, inc lud ing f

ai lin g to pr ovi de se rv ic es that w oul d en ab le pla int if

fs to ac hie ve the ir

pe rm an en cy

planni ng g oa ls; ( 7) pla ci ng p la int if

fs in dange ro us, uns an itary , ina ppr opr ia te she lte rs a nd other placem ents; (8) failing to provi de appropriate and necessary m en ta l he al th, m ed ic al , and e duc at ionse rv ic es to ch ildre n inthe ir cu sto dy ; and ( 9) se paratin g te en ag e m oth er s inf ost er c ar e fr om

the ir own children and separating sibli ngs in foster care f rom each other w ith out pr ovi din g vi sit at ion . Id . The co m

pl ai nt ass ert edfif

te en cau se s o f act io n u nd er fe de ral an d s ta te law. Ken ny A. ex rel . W in n v . Perdue , 21 8 F .R.D. 27 7, 2 83 (N.D. Ga. 20 03 ) (Ken ny A. I). The fed eral law cl ai m s i nc lu de d a ll eg edvi ol at io ns , bro ug ht un de r 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , of the c la ss m em

be rs ’ F ourte en th A m en dm en t r igh ts t o su bst an tiv e an d5

pr oc ed ur al due pr oc es s and the ir F ir st, N inth, a nd F ourte en th A m en dm en t r igh ts t o lib er ty , pr iva cy , and a sso ci at ion . I d. T he c om pla int a lso a lle ge d vi olatio ns o f the class m em

bers’ statutory

rights un der the A dopt ion Assistance and Child W elfar e A ct of 198 0, the Mu lti ethni c Pl ac em en t A ct of 199 4, a s w el l a s vi olatio ns o f the earl y and p er iod ic sc re en ing , dia gnos is, a nd tre atm en t pr ogr am of the Me dic ai d A ct . I d. T he state lawc la im s a sse rt ed inc lud ed vio la tio ns o f the c la ss m em be rs ’ subs tanti ve due pr oc es s and e qua l pr ote ct ionr igh ts unde r the G eo rg iaCo nst itu tio n, vio la tio ns o f vari ous G eo rg iastatut es , a nd c la im s of nui sanc e, br ea chof

c ontra ct , an d in ad equa te and i ne ff

ec tiv e le ga l r ep re se ntatio n. I d. T he c om pla int sou ght de cl ar at or

y and i nj unc tiv e re lie f, a s w el l a s a tto rn ey s’ f ee s and e xpe nse s. I d. a t 28 3 n. 1. The district court denied the defendants’ m otion s to dis m iss and for summ ary j udgm en t. K en ny

A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 69; K en ny A . e x r el . W innv. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355 (N. D. Ga . 2005) (K enny A. II) ; Ke nny

A. I, 218 F. R. D . a t 30 5. I t c er tif ie d th e cl as s of

a ll fo ste r ch ildre n inthe F ult on and De Ka lb Count y

foster care sy stem s, and the subgroup of A frican Am erican foster children “ who have had, or are subject to the r isk of havin g, their a dopt ion delay ed or denied on th e basis of their ra ce or c olor,” K enny A. I, 218 F.R. D. at 305, and set the c as e fo r tr ia l, K en ny

A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 68–6 9.6

At the sam e tim e, the district court refe rred the c ase to m ediation. Id. at 1269 . As that court w ouldlater descr ibe it, “ over the next four m onth s the parties atte nde d e igh te ense parate m ed ia tio n se ssi ons w he re the y spe nt m or e than 11 0 hour s tr y ing to ha m

m er out ase ttl em en t a gr ee m en t. ” I d. T he y w er e ev en tua lly suc ce ssf ul. I d. In May 2006 the district court gave final approval to the settlem ent betwee n the plaintiff class and Fulton andDe Ka lb Count ies; the parties agree d to an attor ne y s’ f ee s aw ar d inthat part

of the c as e; the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d th at a w ar d, an d it ha s no t be enappe al ed . T his appe al a ri se s f ro m the se ttl em en t i nvol vin g th e res t o f th e d efen da nt s, wh ic h was ap pr ov edby the di st ric t co ur t i n Oct ob er 2 00 5. I d . Th e c o u rts u mm a r i z e dth a ts e t t l e men tth i s wa y: It s c en te rp ie ce is a se ri es of thi rty -o ne out co m e m ea sur es that S ta te De fendants have agreed to m eet and sustain for at least three co nse cu tiv e six -m onth r ep ortin g pe ri ods. T he out co m e m ea sur es , m an y of the m r equir ing pha se d- in re sul ts o ve r a tw o- y ear pe ri od, se ek to im pr ove pe rf

orm an ce in the fo llo w ing are as : t im el y

c om m en ce m en t and thor oughc om ple tio n of investig ations of reported abuse or neglect; regular visits of foster ch ildre n by

c as e w orke rs ; a

ppr ova l and l ic en sur e of

f ost er hom es a nd oth er pla ce m en ts; the pe rc en ta ge of c hil dr enw ho are the vic tim s of subs tanti at ed

m al tr eatm en t w hil e in f

ost er c ar e; the pe rc en ta ge of ch ildre n inf

ost er hom es that e xc ee d th ei r lic en se d c ap ac ity ; the pe rc en ta ge of

c hil dr en w ho h av e expe ri en ce d m ult ipl e m ove s w hil e in fo ste r care ; and p er iod ic j udi ci al r ev ie w s of the sa fe ty

a nd s ta tus of fo ste r ch ildre n.7 Ina ddi tio n, the Co nse nt D ec re e re qui re s c om pr eh en siv e an d pe ri odi c de liv er

y of m ed ic al , de nta l, a nd m en ta l he al th s er vic es to fo ste r ch ildre n; a

de ta ile d pr oc es s f

or im pr ove d go al -s ettin g, c as e plannin g and periodic reviews of c hildren’ s status while in foster car e; lim its on the pla ce m en t of c hil dr enin em er ge nc y

she lte rs a nd g ro up hom es and instit ution s, and protections against ov ercr owding in fost er hom es ; and the e sta

bli shm en t of

r ei m bur se m en t r at es to ad equa te ly co m pe nsa te pr ovi de rs f

or c ar ing f or f ost er c hil dr en . Mor eo ve r, S ta te D ef

en dants c om

m it to r ed uc ed c as el oa ds f

or a ll ca se m an ag er s and s upe rv iso rs ; a f ull y im ple m en te d si ngl e state w ide au tom at ed

c hil d w el fare inf

orm at ionsy ste m ; and m ai nta ini ng o r es ta bli shi ng p la ce m en ts and r el at ed se rv ic es ide nti fi ed

in a “ ne ed s as se ssm en t” to be c ondu ct ed by ane utr al e xpe rt . T he se ttl em en t a lso includes processes for the supervisi on of private contract agencies that provide ho m es and services for foster children; im provem ents in foster pare nt s cr ee nin g, li ce nsi ng and tra ini ng, a s w el l a s f ost er pare nt supp ort and c om

m uni catio n; i m

pr ove m en ts i n c as e m an ag er tr ai nin g; im provem ents in processes for addressing su spected abuse or neglect an d su spe ct ed

c or por al pun ish m en t of

c hil dr enin fo ste r care ; and im pr ove m en ts i n e ff

orts t o m ax im iz e av ai la

ble f ed er al f undi ng. Finally , the settlem ent provides th at two c hild welfar e spe ci al ist s w ill se rv e as the Co urt’ s in de pe nde nt a cc ount ab ili ty a ge nts ch ar ge d w iththe r es pons ibi lity of m ea sur ing a nd r ep ortin g publi cl y on the State D efendants’ com pliance with these and other undertakings as specified in the Consent Decre e. Id . a t 12 89. T he 200 5 se ttl em en t a gr ee m en t f urthe r ac know le dge d th at “ Pl ai nti ff Cl as s is entitled to recover its expenses of litig ation, includin g reasonable attorney s’ fee s and non taxable costs, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 198 8 and Fed. R . C iv. P. 23(h).” T he a gr ee m en t sa id tha t the part ie s w oul d “ atte m pt w ith out

c ourt i nte rv en tio n to8

resolve the proper am ount of Class Counsel’ s fees and expens es of litigation .” If the part ie s c oul d no t r ea chan a gr ee m en t, the n “ [t ] he a m ount of a ny a w ar d sh al l be de te rm ine d by

the Co urt i n a cc or danc e w iththe r equir em en ts o f ap pli ca ble lawand procedures.” T ha t i s w ha t ha

ppe ne d. B ec au se the part ie s c oul d no t a gr ee on the a m ount of fe es , the c la ss f

ile d am oti on f

or the c ourt t o m ak e a de te rm inatio n and aw ar d. I d. at 126 9–70 . I t w as a cc om

panie d by 2, 500 pa ge s of

bil lin g r ec or ds, by

a ff idavit s from the two lead c ouns el for the c lass, and by aff idavits from

five A tlanta area attor ne y s w ho w er e not

inv olv ed in the c as e. I d. a t 12 70, 129 0. T he m oti on s ough t a tot al of $14 , 342, 860 in f

ee s. I d. H al f of

that am ount , $7, 171, 434. 30, w as to com pensate the attorney s and their paralegals for the 29,908.73 ho urs they claim ed to h av e w orke d a t r at es the y sou ght ; those r at es r an ge d f ro m $75 to $495 . I d. T he other $7,171,434.30 theysough t wa s to be an enhancem ent of the fee aw ard for a j ob w el l do ne . I d. T he de fe ndants obj ec te d to som e of the hourl y

r at es r eque ste d and t o th e num ber of hours claim ed. Id. They broke down the 2,500 pages of sub m itted bil lin g r ec or ds i nto f

if te enc at eg or ie s of

hours r ep re se nti ng d if

fe re nt s ta ge s of

the case, and argued that in fourteen of those categories the plaintiffs’ attorney s had expe nde d m or e hour s th anw as r ea sona bly ne ce ssary

to ef fe ct ive ly r ep re se nt the9

class. Id. at 1273 –74 & n.5. T he defendants also argued that m any of the entries on the bil ling records wer e too vague to su pport a claim for com pensation . Id. at 1274 . A s f

or the r eque st tha t the f

ee a w ar d be double d by

m eans o f a $7 m ill ion enhancem ent, the def

endants ob

j ected, arguing that thi s was not one of the rar e ca se s inw hic h an e nhanc em en t w oul d be appr opr iate . T he y a rg ue d th at

e nhanc ing the f ee ba se d onthe r es ult s ob ta ine d w oul d be im pr ope r be ca

use the ski ll of

the pla int if fs ’ a tto rn ey s inli tig at ing the c as e w oul d a lr ea dy have be entake n in to ac co unt in se tti ng the ir

hourl y r at es . D oubl e co unt ing the ski ll fa ct or w oul d be in ap pr op ria te , th e d efen da nt s ar gu ed . T he dis tr ic t c ourt ov er

ru le d a ll of

the de fe ndants ’ obj ec tio ns t o th e hour ly rate s so ught

by the pla int if

fs ’ a tto rn ey s. I d. a t 12 85. I t gr an te d inf ull e ac h ho ur ly rate r eque ste d, r an gin g f

ro m $21 5 to $49 5 f

or pla int if fs ’ a tto rn ey s, de pe ndi ng o n the ir r el at ive ski ll an d e xpe ri en ce . I d. a t 12 84–8 5. T he c ourt di d no t r ed uc e the re que ste d r at es a t a ll ev entho ugh som e of the m w er e N ewY ork r at es ins te ad of A tlanta r at es , and e ve n th oughsom e of the a tto rn ey s ( fo r ex am

ple , Marc ia Ro bin son L ow ry , one of

the tw o le ad

a tto rn ey s) r ec en tly

ha d be ena w ar de d a sm aller hourly

rate for w ork on anot her ca se of exactly the sam e ty

pe. Id. at10

12 84 –8 6. L ike w ise , the c ourt a ppr ove d inf

ull the r eque ste d ho ur ly

r at es of $75 to $150 f or para le ga l w ork. I d. a t 12 85. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d part ia lly sus ta in the de fe ndants ’ obj ec tio n to the nu m be r of ho ur s t ha t t he pl ai nt iff

s’ att orne y s cl ai m edto ha ve work edon th e cas e. Id . a t 12 74. T he c ourt a gr ee d w iththe de fe ndants that so m e of the e ntr ie s on co unse l’ s bi lli ng r ec or ds w er e va gue a nd tha t the hours c la im ed f or e igh t of the fifteen billing categories we re e xcessive. T hose eight excessiv ely billed categories w er e: ( 1) pr ep ar ing the c om pla int a nd m an da tor

y dis cl osur es ; ( 2) li tig at ing the pr el im inary

inj unc tio n m oti on; ( 3) pr oduc ing a nd ana ly zi ng d oc um en ts; ( 3) litigatin g discov ery

m otion s; (4) confer encing with each other; (5) preparing expert w itn es s r ep orts; ( 6) r es pond ing to the sum m ar y j udgm en t m oti on; ( 7) pr ep ar ing f or tri al ; an d (8 ) tr av el . Id. at 12 74 –8 4, 1 28 6. T he c ourt de al t w iththe va gue a nd e xc es siv e bil lin g tw o w ay s, one f or the non- tr av el hours and the oth er f or tr av el hours . I t m ad e “ ana cr oss -the -b oard 15% reduction in th e num

ber of non-travel re lated hours claim ed by plaintiffs’ counsel.” Id. at 1286 . This 15 percent re duction am ount ed to 4,371.22 hou rs being sliced off the 29,141.46 tot al num

ber of non-travel hours for w hich the attorney s had requested com

pensation . In dollar term s, that am ount ed to a reduction of $1, 040, 176. 92 i n no n- tr av el r el at ed a tto rn ey s’ f

ee s. T o r em edy

the va gue ne ss and11

ex ce ssi ve bil lin g pr obl em a s it r el at ed to tr av el hours , the c ourt ha lve d th e hour ly rate, thereby

eff ectively halving the num

ber of travel hours th at w ere com pensated from 767.27 to 3 83.64, w hich am ount ed to a reduction of $118 ,460.75. When tr av el and n on- tr av el f

ee s are c onsi de re d to ge the r, the c ourt r ed uc ed the ove ra ll $7, 171, 434. 30 f

ee r eque st b y

$1, 158, 631. 40, w hic h am ount ed to anove ra ll re duc tio n of

16 p er ce nt. A ft er

the r ed uc tio ns, the tot al a w ar d w as $6, 012, 802. 90 be fo re en ha nc em en t. Id . On the applicability

of an enhancem ent to the fee r equest, the court overruled the de fe ndants ’ obj ec tio ns. I d. a t 12 88. T he c ourt f ound that the pla int if

fs ’ attor ne y s w er e en tit le d to an e nhanc em en t be ca use the ir hourl y r at e did “ not take into account (1) the fact that class counsel we re r equired to advance case e xpenses of $1. 7 m ill ionove r a thr ee -y ear pe ri od w ithno o ngoi ng r ei m bur se m en t, ( 2) the fa ct that c la ss c ouns el w er e not pa id o n an on -g oin g ba sis a s th e w ork w as be ing pe rf orm ed , and ( 3) the f

ac t tha t c la ss c ouns el ’ s a

bil ity to re co ve r a fe e an d e xpe nse re im bur se m en t w er e co m

ple te ly c ont ing en t onthe out co m e of the c as e. ” I d. (fo ot no te om it te d) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso f

ound that “ the sup er

b qu al ity of [ co unse l’ s] represe ntation far

exceeded what could reasonablybe expected for the standard hour ly r at es use d to c al cu la te the [ fe e] . ” I d. a t 12 88–8 9. T he c ourt c om m en te d12

that “ [q ] uit e sim

ply , pla int if

fs ’ c ouns el br ough t a

hig he r de gr ee of

ski ll, com m itm ent, dedication, and profession alism to this li tigation than the Court has seen display ed by

the attorney s in any

other case during its 27 y ears on the bench.” Id . a t 12 89. F ina lly , the c ourt sa id tha t an e nhanc em en t w as appr opr ia te be ca use

“ the evidence establishes that pl aintiffs’ success in this case was tr uly exceptional.” Id . F o r th e s e r e a s o n s , an db a s e do n th e a f f i d a v i t s o f s o me A t l a n t aa r e aa t t o rn e ys urging th e court to enhance the fe e aw ard (e ven m ore than it did), the court m ult ipl ie d th e $6, 012, 802. 90 f ee a w ar d by

1. 75, the re by

e nhanc ing it

by 75 p er ce nt or $4, 509, 602. 00. I d. a t 12 90. T ha t e nhanc em en t bo ost ed the tot al f

ee a w ar d to $10, 522, 405. 08. I d. II. Inr ev ie w ing the de ci sio ns o f the dis tr ic t c ourt r ai se d inthi s a ppe al a nd cr oss -a ppe al , w e loo k a t qu es tio ns o f lawa ne wbut w e re vie wthe c ourt’ s f

ind ing s o f f ac to n l y fo r c l ea r e rr o r. At l an t a J o u rn al & C o n s t i tu t i o n v . C i t y o f A t l an t a D ep ’t of A viatio n, 442 F . 3d 1 283, 128 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) . T he abuse of dis cr et ion standard appl ie s to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de te rminatio n of the num be r of c om pe nsa ble bil la ble hours , the hourl y

r at e at w hic h pl ai nti ff

s’ c ouns el is co m

pe nsa te d, the aw ar d of c ost s and e xpe nse s, and the e nhanc em en t de ci sio n. S ee A m . Ci vil13

L ibe rt ie s U nio n of

G a. v. Barn es , 168 F . 3d 4 23, 439 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ; R ic hard son v. A la . S ta te Bd . of

E duc . , 935 F . 2d 1 240, 124 8–49 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) . I n a ppl y ing the abuse of discretion stand ard, we keep in m ind th at “ [w ] hen a district court has dis cr et ion , the re are usu al ly ar an ge of

c hoi ce s it

m ay m ak e an d st ill be a ff

irm ed ; there is not onlyone right choice for the court to m ake.” Blasland, B ouck & Lee , In c. v. Ci ty

of N . Mi am i, 283 F . 3d 1 286, 129 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ; M cM ah anv. T oto , 256 F. 3d 1 120, 112 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( sa m e) . T his is tr ue “ ev entho ugh w e w oul d ha ve go ne th e o th er way ha d i t b een ou r cal l.” Ra sb ury v. In te rn al Rev en ue Serv ., 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994 ). O f co ur se , “ [a ] dis tr ic t c ourt by de fi nit ionabuse s it s di sc re tio n w he n it m ak es an e rr or

of law . ” K oon v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 518 U . S. 81, 100 , 116 S . Ct . 203 5, 2047 ( 1996 ); a cc or d S ch lup v. D el o, 513 U . S. 298 , 333 , 115 S . Ct . 851 , 870 ( 1995 ) (O ’ Co nnor , J. , c onc ur

ri ng) ( “ It is a para dig m at ic abuse of dis cr et ionf

or ac ourt t o ba se it s j udgm en t onan e rr one ous vie wof the law . ”) . W e m ay

a lso f ind a n a buse of dis cr et ionif

the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ai le d to f oll owpr ope r pr oc ed

ur es in m ak ing it s de te rm inatio n, ba se d an aw ar d up on f ind ing s of

f ac t tha t are c le ar ly

e rr one ous, or co m m itt ed ac le ar e rr or of j udgm en t. Joh nsonv. Br ee de n, 280 F . 3d 1 308, 132 6 (1 1thCi r. 200 2) ; S unA m er ic a Co rp . v. S un L if e A ssuranc e Co . of

Can. , 77 F . 3d14

13 25 , 13 33 (11 th Cir . 19 96 ); B an kAt la nt ic v. Bl yth e Eas tm an Pai ne W eb be r, In c., 12 F.3d 1045 , 1048 (11th Cir. 1994). III . Inthe ir c ro ss- ap pe al the pla int if

fs c ont en d th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s dis cr et ionin tw o r es pe ct s: (1 ) by not appl y ing the c om

m on f und an d c om

m on benefit doctrines, w hich would have resulted in a fee award substant ially higher than th e one the y

r ec ei ve d; and ( 2) by

not c om pe nsa tin g th em

f or the $80 1, 864. 40 the y spe nt o n e xpe rt

w itn es s e xpe nse s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt r es olv ed e ac h of tho se tw o is sue s c or

re ct ly , and w e af

fi rm it s de ci sio n of

the m on the ba sis of

the re as oni ng c ont ai ne d init s op ini on. K en ny A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 70–7 2, 1291 –92. IV. The def endants conceded in th e settlem ent agreem ent that the class had prevailed in the litigatio n and was entitled to recover r easonable attorney s’ fee s unde r 42 U . S. C. § 19 88. T ha t se ct ionpr ovi de s inr el ev an t part that i n any

a ct ion , like this o ne, where the plaintiffs seek to enforc e their constitutio nal rights un der 42 U. S. C. § 198 3, “ the court, in its discretion, m ay allow the pre vailing party , other than the United States, a re asonable attorney ’ s fee a s part of the costs.” 42 U. S. C. § 1 98 8( b) .15

Inthe ir appe al the de fe ndants c ont en d th at the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s dis cr et ionin thr ee w ay s. T he ir f ir st c ont en tio n is that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d no t have aw arded the plaintiffs’ attorney s all of the photo copy ing expens es they cl ai m ed . S ee K en ny

A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 94–9 5. A lth oughw e pr oba bly w oul d no t aw ar d th e fu ll am ount of the c la im ed

e xpe nse s if

w e w er e de ci din g th e m atte r in the f

ir st i nst an ce , w e cannot

say that the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s di sc ret io n i n d oi ng so . V. W e tur n no wto the de fe ndants ’ oth er c ont en tio ns, start ing w iththe ir ar gum en t tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in ca lc ulatin g th e lod es tar am ount . “ T he m ost useful starting po int for determ ining the am ount of a r easonable fee is the num ber of hours r ea sona

bly e xpe nde d onthe li tig at ionm ult ipl ie d by

ar ea sona

ble hourl y rate . ” H en sle y

v. E ck er hart , 461 U . S. 424 , 433 , 103 S . Ct . 193 3, 193 9 ( 1983 ). T he pr oduc t of

thi s f orm ula is the “ lod es tar, ” L or an ge r v. S tie rh ei m , 10 F . 3d 7 76, 781 (1 1thCi r. 199 4) ( pe r curi am), w hic h is “ the gui din g li ght of our f ee -s hif tin g j ur isp ru de nc e. ” Ci ty

of Burl ing tonv. D ag ue , 505 U . S. 557 , 562 , 112 S . Ct . 263 8, 26 41 (19 92 ).The de fenda nts did object in the district court that the hourly rate s reque sted wer e too 2 high, but th e y

have no t r a ise d th at a s an is su e on a pp e a l. A c c or din g ly , w e have no oc c a sio n to pa ss o n th at matte r, but w e do no t me an to imp ly a pp ro va l of

tho se ho ur ly

rate s, wh ic h a

pp e ar t o be on the g ener ous side. 16 A lth oughthe de fe ndants no l onge r co nte st the hourl y r at e co m pone nt o f the district court’ s lodestar calculation, they do contendthat the district court 2 co m pe ns at edth e p la in ti ffs ’ at to rn ey s fo r an un reas on ab le nu m be r of ho ur s. As we have alrea dy

explained, the court essentially cut the total num

ber of hours subm itted by

16 percent because of vague entrie s and excessive billi ng. Se e supra at 10–11 . W e have held that wher e the billing rec ords are volum inou s, as they are here, a district court m ay m ake a r easonable across the board reduction in ho urs ins te ad of e nga gin g inthe pic k and s hove l w ork ne ce ssary to m ak e a m or e pr ec ise de te rm inatio n. S ee L or an ge r, 10 F . 3d at 78 3. E ve n so , the de fe ndants a rg ue , the di st ric t co ur t’s cu t was un reas on ab ly sha ll ow— it sh ou ldha ve cu t m uc h d eep er. The district court’ s reduction of onl y 16 percent in the subm itted hou rs does ap pe ar c hari ta ble , m ay be e ve n e xc es siv el y

so, in favor

of the pla int if

fs ’ a tto rn ey s, but we ar e not quit e convinced that it was a c lear e rror of j udgm ent, which is what w e w oul d have to co nc lud e in o rd er to fi nd an a

buse of dis cr et ion . S ee Joh nson , 280 F.3d at 1326 ; SunAm erica Corp., 77 F.3d at 1333; BankAtlantic, 12 F. 3d at 1048 . E ve n th oughw e w oul d have c ut the bil la ble hours m or e if

w e w er e de ci din g the m atter in the fir st instan ce, we cannot say that the result the district courtThe view s expressed in Parts I –V and Par

t VI Iof this opinion represe nt the views of a 3 ma jor ity of the Court , c on sis tin gof

Judg e s Ca

rn e s a nd Hi ll. Th e vie ws e xpre sse d in thi s p art , Part VI , of this opinion represe nt the views of the a uthor of this opinion alone. The view s of J udg e Hill on the question addre ssed in this part are expressed in his separate conc urringopinion. The view s of J udg e Wilson are expressed in his sepa rate concur

ringopinion. 17 reac hed was outside the range of perm issib le choices on this record. S ee Cook ex re l. E state of

T es sie r v. S he ri ff

of Mo nr oe Co unty , F la . , 402 F . 3d 1 092, 110 3–11 04 (11th Cir. 2005); Cooper v. S outh ern Co. , 390 F. 3d 69 5, 711–12 (11th Cir. 2004); Ra sbur y , 24 F . 3d at 16 8. V I. 3 T he de fe ndants ’ f

ina l c ont en tio n is that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d no t have granted plaintiffs’ attorney s a $4.5 m illion enhancem ent to the $6 m illion dollar lod es tar am ount . T ha t c ont en tio n c anc la im the f av or of apr es um pti on, a nd n ot a w eak on e ei the r. T he S upr em e Co urt ha s in str uc te d us that the re is a “ str ong presum ption ” that the lodestar figure, without any adj ustm ent, is the re asonable fee aw ard. D ague, 505 U. S. at 562, 112 S. C t. at 2641 ; Pennsy lvania v. D el. Va lley Ci tiz en s’ Co unc il fo r Cl ean A ir , 478 U . S. 546 , 565 , 106 S . Ct . 308 8, 309 8 ( 1986 ) (D el aw ar e V al le y

I ). T ha t stro ng p re sum

pti on c anbe r eb utt ed

onl y in “ rare ” an d

“ exceptional” cases, De laware V alley I, 478 U.S . at 565, 106 S. Ct. at 3098, wher e the fee applicant has sho wn that w ithou t an upward a djustm ent of the lodestar am ou nt th e fee wou ldbe un reas on ab le , Dagu e, 50 5 U.S. at 56 2, 1 12 S. Ct. at 26 41 .18

E ve n inthe r ar e an d e xc ep tio na l c as e w he re a n e nhanc em en t i s pe rm iss ibl e, it m ust be “ supp orte d by

both ‘ spe ci fi c ev ide nc e’ on the r ec or d and d et ai le d f ind ing s by th e lo wer co ur t.” Del aware Vall ey I, 47 8 U.S. at 56 5, 1 06 S. Ct. at 30 98 . A. In order to apprec iate j ust ho w r are and exceptional a case m ust be for an en hanc em en t of

the lod es tar am ount

to be pe rm iss ibl e the se day s, ar ev ie wof the ev olu tio n of

S upr em e Co urt thin kin g inthi s are a is n ec es sary . T he his tor y of the iss ue is one of

e ar ly , te ntativ e state m en ts i ndi catin g m or e re ce pti ve ne ss t o en ha nc em en ts th an th e st at em en ts an d h ol di ng s o f la te r de ci si on s ac tu al ly perm it . Su gge sti on h as be enf

oll ow ed by r etre nc hm en t, r es ult ing in a de ci sio na l arc that be nd s d eci de dl y

ag ai ns t en ha nc em en ts . He nsley , a

1983 decision, wa s the Court’ s first stab at interpreting what Co ngr es s m eant b y

a“ re as ona

ble f ee ” unde r § 19 88 and s im ilar fe e- shi ft ing st atut es . In t ha t ca se th e Co ur t ad op te d t he lo de st ar m et ho d fo r cal cu la ti ng fees . H en sle y , 461 U . S. a t 43 3–34 , 103 S . Ct . a t 19 39–4 0. I n do ing so, the Co urt sa id that “ [t] he m ost us eful starting poin t for deter m ining the am ount of a r easonable fee i s th e n u mb e r

o f h o u r s r e a s o n ab l y e x p e n d e do n th e l i t i g a t i o n mu l t i p l i e db y a re as ona ble hourl y

r at e. ” I d. a t 43 3, 103 S . Ct . a t 19 39. I t a dde d, how ev er , that this

“ does not end the inqu iry ,” because “ [t] here r em ain other considerations that m ay19

le ad the dis tr ic t c ourt t o a dj ust the f ee upw ar d or

downw ar d, inc lud ing the im portant f ac tor of the ‘ re sul ts o bta ine d. ’ ” I d. a t 43 4, 103 S . Ct . a t 19 40. T he context in which that statem ent was m ade, however, wa s not on e of upward en ha nc em en t. In ste ad , the a ct

ua l a dj ustm en t i ssu e de ci de d inH en sle y w as w he the r the lod es tar fi gur e shou ld b e re duc ed f or pla int if fs w ho h av e ac hie ve d on ly part ia l or lim ite d su cc es s. S ee id. a t 42 6, 103 S . Ct . a t 19 35–3 6 ( “ T he iss ue in thi s c as e is whether a partially

prevailing plain tiff m ay

rec over an attorney ’ s fee f or legal se rv ic es on un su cces sf

ul cla im s.”) ; s ee al so id . at 4 34 –3 7, 1 03 S. Ct. at 19 40 –4 1. T h e C o u rtd e c i d e dth a tth e f e e s s h o u l db e r e du c e db y t h e a mo u n ts p e n to n c l a i ms that do no t succeed. Id. at 440, 103 S. C t. at 1943 (“ Where the plaintiff has fa iled to p re va il on a

c la im that i s di sti nc t i n a ll re spe ct s f ro m his suc ce ssf

ul c la im s, the hour s sp en t onthe uns uc ce ssf ul c la im sho uld be e xc lud ed

in co nsi de ri ng the am ount of ar ea sona

ble f ee . ”) ; se e al so i d. ( “ [W ] he re the pla int if f ac hie ve d on ly lim ite d su cc es s, the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d aw ar d on ly that am ount

of f ee s th at is re as ona ble in re la tio n to the r es ult s ob ta ine d. ”) . E ve n th oughthe iss ue of en hanc em en ts w as not

pr es en te d inH en sle y , the opi nio n do es c ont ai n th is d ic ta :

“ Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney shoul d recover a fu lly c om pe nsa tor y f ee . N orm al ly

thi s w ill e nc om

pa ss a ll hour s r ea sona

bly20

expended on the litigatio n, and indeed in som e case s of exceptional success an enhanced aw ard m ay

be j ustified.” I d. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940. T he use of “ m ay be ” in st eadof “ wil l b e” was a ha rb in ge r of de ci si on s t o c om e. T he ne xt t er

m the S upr em e Co urt de ci de d B lum v. S te nson , 465 U . S. 886 , 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984), w hich, unlike Hensley , w as a ca se in which the district co urt ha d a ct

ua lly aw ar de d an e nhanc em en t. I d. a t 89 1, 104 S . Ct . a t 15 45. T he co urt ha d e nhanc ed

the lod es tar fi gur e by

50 p er ce nt “be ca

use of the qua lity

of represe ntation , the c om

plexityof the issues, the riskiness of success, and the great benefit to the large class that w as achieved. ” Id. (quotation om itted). Unim pressed with that rea sonin g, the Suprem e Court held that awarding the enhancem ent was an ab us e o f di sc ret io n. Id . at 8 96 –9 02 , 10 4 S . Ct. at 15 47 –5 0. Whil e re pe at ing the H en sle y opi nio n’ s st at em en t tha t “ in s om e ca se s of exceptional success an enhanced award m ay be j ustified,” id. at 897, 104 S. C t. at 1548 ( quot at ionom itt ed ), the Bl um Co urt qu al if

ie d th at pos sib ili ty

w iththe statem ent that the lodestar am ount “ is presum ed to be the reasonable fee co nte m plate d by § 19 88. ” I d. T he Co urt the n c onsi de re d and r ej ec te d e ac h of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

our j ust if ic at ion s f or the e nhanc em en t. I t be gan: T he nov el ty

and c om ple xity of the iss ue s pr es um ab ly

w er e fu lly re fl ec te d in

the num be r of bil la ble hours r ec or de d by

c ouns el a nd thus do n ot w ar

rant an up w ar d a dj ustm en t i n af ee ba se d onthe num

be r of bil la ble hours ti m es r ea sona

ble hourl y

r at es . T he re m ay

be c as es , of21

co ur se , w he re the e xpe ri en ce a nd s pe ci al ski ll of the a tto rn ey

w ill re qui re the e xpe ndi tur e of f ew er hours than c ouns el nor

m al ly w oul d be expected to spend on a particular ly novel or com

plex issu e. In tho se c as es , the spe ci al ski ll an d e xpe ri en ce of c ouns el sho uld

be re fl ec te d in

the r ea sona

ble ne ss o f the hourl y

r at es . N ei the r co m

ple xity nor nov el ty of the iss ue s, the re fo re , is anappr opr ia te f ac tor in de te rm ini ng whe the r to i nc re as e the ba sic f ee a w ar d. Id . at 8 98 –9 9, 1 04 S. Ct. at 15 49 . T he Bl um

Co urt the n m ove d onto the ne xt f ac tor : T he “ qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n” . . . ge ne ra lly is re fl ec te d inthe re as ona ble hourl y

r at e. I t, the re fo re , m ay

[ not e the use , a ga in, of

the w or d “ m ay ” ins te ad

of “ w ill ”] j ust if

y a n up w ar d a dj ustm en t on ly in the rare case where the f

ee applicant offe rs specific e vidence to sho w that the qua lity

of se rv ic e re nde re d w as sup er ior to that on e re as ona

bly shou ld e xpe ct

in lig ht o f the hourl y

r at es c harg ed

a nd tha t the suc ce ss was “ ex cep ti on al .” Id . a t 89 9, 104 S . Ct . a t 15 49 ( w or ds i n br ac ke ts a dde d) . O the rw ise , the Co urt sa id,

“ anupw ar d a dj ustm en t f

or qua lity of r ep re se ntatio n is ac le ar

e xa m ple of double co unt ing . ” I d. T he Co urt f ound the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s op ini on tha t “ [t ] he qua lity of w ork pe rf orm ed by c ouns el thr ough out

thi s c as e w as hig h, ” w ith out a ny spe ci fi c ev ide nc e to s uppo rt

it , ins uf fi ci en t t o j ust if

y the e nhanc em en t. I d. a t 89 9–90 , 104 S. Ct. at 1549 (quo tation om itted). Re gard ing the r es ult s ob ta ine d f ac tor , the Co urt r ea sone d th at suc ce ssf ul re sul ts are to be c onsi de re d w he n c al cu la tin g c ouns el ’ s ho ur ly r at e. I d. a t 90 0, 104 S. Ct . a t 15 49–5 0. “ Be ca use a cknow le dgm en t of

the ‘ re sul ts o bta ine d’ ge ne ra llyIn Delaw are Valley I , the Court revie wed a

n attorney s’ fe es aw ard that was orde red 4 pursuant to the Clean A ir Act § 304(d) , 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d). Dela war e Va lley

I , 478 U.S. at 557, 106 S. Ct . at 3094. The Court he ld that “[g]iven the common purpose of both § 304(d) and § 1 98 8 to pr omo te c iti zen e nf or c e me nt o f i mpo rt ant f

e de ra l po lic ie s, we fi nd

no re a so n n ot t o interpre t both provisions gover ning attorney ’s fe es in the same ma nner.” I d. at 560, 106 S. Ct. at 3096. Delaw are Valley

Ihas bee n applied to § 1988 ca ses by this Court, as well. See, e.g ., Norman v. H ousing Auth. of Montgome ry , 836 F.2d 1292, 1298–99 ( 11th Cir. 1988). 22 w ill be sub sum ed

w ith in o the r fa ct or s us ed to ca lc ulate ar ea sona

ble f ee , it norm ally shoul d not p rovide an independ ent basis for increasing the fee aw ard. ” Id. ( footnot e om itted). T he Bl um

Co urt l ef t f or anothe r day

the que sti on o f w he the r the r isk bor ne by the plaintiffs’ counsel in takin g the case on a contingency basis couldever jus ti fy an en ha nc em en t o f th e lo de st ar. Id . at 9 01 n.1 7, 1 04 S. Ct. at 15 50 n.1 7. A ssu m ing that i t c oul d, how ev er , the Co urt sa id tha t the r ec or d di d no t i de nti fy any s p e c i f i c r i s k s t o c o u n s e l i n th a tc a s e . I d . a t9 0 1 , 1 0 4 S . C t . a t1 5 5 0 . Ac c o r d i n g l y, the Co urt va cate d th e portio n of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r en hanc ing the pla int if fs ’ fe es aw ar d. I d. a t 90 1–02 , 104 S . Ct . a t 15 50. The C ourt’ s next “ reasonable fee ” case wa s Delaware V alley I. T he district 4 co urt ha d e nhanc ed

the pla int if

fs ’ lod es tar ca lc ulatio n inthat c as e be ca use of the co nti nge nt n at

ur e of the f ee and the qua lity

of c ouns el ’ s w ork “ w hic h c ulm inate d in anout standi ng r es ult . ” D el aw ar e V al le y I , 478 U . S. a t 55 5, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 93 (quot at ionom itt ed ). A s it ha d do ne in Bl um , the D el aw ar e V al le y I Co urt re vie w ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ea sons f or e nhanc ing the f

ee a w ar d and f

ound a ll of23

the m w an tin g. T his ti m e the Co urt di d no t j ust say that the re ’ s apr es um

pti on, but em pha siz ed that the re is a “ str ong pr es um pti on” that the lod es tar fi gur e re pr es en ts the r ea sona

ble f ee . I d. a t 56 5, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98. T he Co urt e xpl ai ne d th e ba sis fo r that stro ng p re sum

pti on: A str ong pr es um

pti on tha t the lod es tar fi gur e— the pr oduc t of reasonable hours tim es a re asonable rate—re presents a “ reasonable” fe e is whol ly

c onsi ste nt w iththe r at ion al e be hin d th e usua l f ee -s hif tin g statut e, inc lud ing the one in the pr es en t c as e. T he se statut es w er e not de sig ne d a s af

orm of e co nom ic r el ie f to i m

pr ove the f

inanc ia l l ot o f attorney s, nor w ere they

intended to replicate exactly the fee an at to rn ey co ul d e arn th ro ug h a pri va te fee arran ge m en t wi th hi s cl ie nt . In ste ad , the a im

of suc h st at ute s w as to en ab le pr ivate part ie s to obt ai n le ga l he lp i n se ek ing r edre ss f or inj ur ie s r es ult ing f

ro m the a ct ua l or threatened violation of specific f ederal laws. H ence, if plaintiffs, such as D el aw ar e V al le y , f

ind it pos sib le to en ga ge alaw y er ba se d onthe statut or y a ssuranc e that he w ill be pa id a “ re as ona ble f ee , ” the pur

pose be hin d th e fe e- shi ft ing statut e ha s be ensa tis fi ed . Id . T he Co urt i n D el aw ar e V al le y I c los ed som e door s f

or e nhanc em en ts tha t i t had left aj ar in earlier c ases. It held that the strong p resum ption that the lodestar fi gur e is the a m ount

to be aw ar de d—the pr es um pti on a ga ins t en hanc em en ts— cannot

be ove rc om e by

the spe ci al ski ll an d e xpe ri en ce of c ouns el , the qualityof repr esentation, or the re sults obtained. Id. T hose factors, the Court re as one d, “ ar e pr es um ab ly f ull y r ef le ct ed in the lod es tar am ount , a nd thus cannot24

se rv e as ind ep en de nt b as es f or inc re as ing the ba sic f

ee a w ar d. ” I d. T his is the Co urt’ s r ea soni ng: [W ] he n an a tto rn ey

f ir st a cc ep ts a

c as e an d a gr ee s to r ep re se nt the cl ie nt, he obl igate s hi m se lf to pe rf orm to the be st o f his abil ity

a nd t o pr oduc e the be st p oss ibl e re sul ts c om m en sur at e w ithhis ski ll an d hi s cl ie nt’ s in te re sts . C al cu la tin g th e fe e aw ar d inam an ne r that a cc ount s for these fa ctors, e ither in determ ining the rea sonable nu m ber of hours expe nde d onthe li tig at ionor in se tti ng the r ea sona

ble hourl y

r at e, thu s ad equa te ly

c om pe nsa te s th e attor

ne y , a nd l eave s ve ry

li ttl e ro om

f or enhancing th e aw ard based on his po st-engagem ent perform ance. In shor t, the lod es tar fi gur e inc lud es m ost , if not a ll, of the r el ev an t factors c onsti tutin g a “ reasonable” attorney ’ s fee, and it is unn ecessar y to e nhanc e the f

ee f or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce in or de r to s er

ve the statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal assistance. Id . a t 56 5–66 , 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98. N ot u sin g th e ove ra ll qua lity of pe rf orm an ce to en hanc e the f

ee r em ove s “ an y

dange r of

‘ doub le c ount ing . ’ ” I d. a t 56 6, 106 S . Ct . at30 99 . The D elaw are Va lley

I Court r eversed the enhancem ent part of the fe e aw ard ins of ar a s th e en hanc em en t w as ba se d onthe qua lity of the a tto rn ey ’ s w ork and the outst anding result obtained. Id. at 568, 106 S. C t. at 3099 –100 . It left undecided the que sti on o f w he the r the e nhanc em en t w as pr ope r ins of ar a s it w as ba se d onthe co nti nge nc y

na tur e of the f ee —the r isk

that the a tto rn ey s w oul d lo se the c as e an d rece iv e n o fe es . Thatis su e was to be rearg ue d i n t he same case th e n ex t t erm , id ., 106 S. Ct . a t 31 00, but

that a tte m

pt t o de ci de it

m isf ir ed w he n th e Co urt f

ra ct ur ed ,The fe es in Dague we re a war ded pursua

nt to the Soli d Waste Disposal Act § 7002(e ), 5 42 U. S.C. § 6 97 2( e ), and

the Cle an Wate r A c t § 5 05 (d ), 33 U. S.C. § 1 36 5( d) . D a gue , 5 05 U. S. at 559, 112 S. Ct. at 2639. As it had in Delawar e Va lley I , the Dague Court held that the languag e of the se attorne y s’ fe es statutes ar e “similar to that of ma ny other fe dera l fee -shifting statutes; our ca se law c onstruing what is a ‘r easona ble’ fe e applies unifor

mly to all of them.” I d. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 25 with no opin ion garnering a m aj ority vote. S ee P ennsy lvania v. D el. Va lley Citizens’ Council for Clean A ir, 483 U.S . 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987) (De laware Vall ey II). It w as not unt il five y ears late r, after the m em bership of the Court had changed, that the contingency issue was definitively

resolved. I n Dague the Court square ly r ej ec te d th e pr opos iti on tha t a c ourt “ m ay

e nhanc e the f

ee a w ar d a

bove the

‘ lodestar’ am ount in order to ref lect the fa ct that the party ’ s attorney s wer e re tained on a c ont ing en t- fe e ba sis and thus as sum ed the r isk of r ec ei vin g no paym en t a t a ll for their ser

vices.” Da gue, 505 U. S. at 559, 112 S. C t. at 2639 . T he Court 5 reasoned that an enhancem ent for contingency would dupl icate in substanti al part factors that had alre ady

been considered in arriving at the lodestar. I t explained that “ [t ] he r isk

of los s inapart ic ular ca se ( an d, the re fo re , the a tto rn ey ’ s c ont ing en t ri sk) is the pr oduc t of

tw o f ac tor s: (1 ) the le ga l and f ac tua l m er its of

the c la im , and (2 ) th e d iff

ic ul ty of es tabl is hi ng th os e m eri ts .” Id . at 5 62 , 11 2 S . Ct. at 26 41 .26

T he se co nd f

ac tor , the Co urt sa id, is “ or din ar ily r ef le ct ed in the lod es tar— ei the r in the hig he r num be r of hours e xpe nde d to ove rc om e the difficulty , or in the hig her hourly rate of the attorney

skilled and exp erience d en oughto do s o. ” I d. “ T ak ing a cc ount of it a ga in thr oughlod es tar en hanc em en t am ount s to double c ount ing . ” I d. a t 56 3, 112 S . Ct . a t 26 41. T he Co urt r ec ogni ze d th at , unl ike the se co nd c ont ing en cy f ac tor , the f

ir st one —the r el at ive m er its of the c la im —i s no t t ak enint o c onsi de ratio n in de te rm ini ng the lod es tar fi gur e. T ha t i s no pr obl em , the Co urt de ci de d, be ca use the relative m erits of the claim “ shou ld play

no part in the calculation of the award.” Id . F or one thi ng, the re is al w ay s ar isk that a c as e w ill be los t— “ no c la im ha s a 100% c hanc e of

suc ce ss. ” I d. A s ar es ult , pe rm itt ing a dj ustm en ts b as ed on r isk wo u l dm ea n th at th e “co m p u t at i o n o f t h e l o d es t arwo u l dn ev eren dth e c o u rt ’s inqu iry in contin gent-fee c ases.” Id. T hat would contradict the Court’ s repeated ins tr uc tio n th at

the re is a str ong pr es um

pti on tha t the lod es tar is the f ee to be award edan d a dju st m en ts to itare t o b e th e rar e ex cep ti on , no t t he ge ne ral rul e. N ot o nly that, the Co urt sa id, but

a w ar din g e nhanc em en ts b as ed on the f i n a n c i a l r i s ki n t a k i n g th e c a s e w o u l da l s o “p r o v i d e a t t o rn e ys w i t h th e s a me in cen ti ve to bri ng rel at iv el y m eri tl es s cl ai m s as rel at iv el y m eri to rio us on es .” Id . T he “ soc ia l c ost

of ind isc ri m inate ly

e nc our ag ing non m er ito ri ous cl ai m s” w oul d be27

too hig h, and e nc our ag ing a tto rn ey s to take le ss m er ito ri ous ca se s is “ anunl ike ly ob jecti ve of t he ‘ reas on ab le fees ’ pr ov is io ns .” Id . at 5 63 , 11 2 S . Ct. at 26 42 . A cc or din gly , the Co urt c onc lud ed that a c ont ing en cy

e nhanc em en t i s “ not co nsi ste nt w ithour

ge ne ra l r ej ec tio n of

the c ont ing en t- fe e m ode l f or f ee a w ar ds, nor is it ne ce ssary

to the de te rm inatio n of

ar ea sona

ble f ee . ” I d. a t 56 6, 112 S . Ct . at 2643. The Court in Dague did not m erely rever se the application of a conting ency

or risk enhancem ent in that case, but also ruled o ut one in anycase,

“ concludin g that no con tingency enhancem ent whatever

is compatible with the feesh ift in g s ta tu te s at is su e.” Id . at 5 65 , 11 2 S . Ct. at 26 43 . T he D ag ue de ci sio n is the la st w or d w e ha ve f ro m the S upr em e Co urt onthe iss ue of w he the r, and i f so whe n, the lod es tar am ount m ay be e nhanc ed

in cal cu la ti ng th e at to rn ey s’ fees un de r on e o f th e fed eral fee- sh ift in g s ta tu te s. B. The district court’ s $4.5 m illion enhancem ent to the $6 m illion lodestar fig ur e in th e p res en t ca se can no t b e sq ua redwit h t he Supr em e Co ur t d eci si on s we ha ve dis cu sse d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e xpl ic itl y m en tio n, m

uc h le ss g ive f

ull ef fe ct to, the str ong pr es um

pti on tha t the lod es tar am ount is a re as ona

ble f ee a nd the re fo re the f

ee to be aw ar de d. S ee D ag ue , 505 U . S. a t 56 2, 112 S . Ct . a t 26 41 (“ W e ha ve e sta

bli she d astr ong pr es um

pti on tha t the lod es tar re pr es en ts the28

reasonable fee , and have placed upo n the fee a pplicant who seeks m ore than that the bur de n of

sho w ing that su cha n a dj ustm en t i s ne ce ssary to the de te rm inatio n of a re asonable fee. ” (quotation andcitation om itted)); D elaw are Va lley I, 478 U.S . at 565, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98 ( “ A str ong pr es um pti on tha t the lod es tar fi gur e— the product of reasonable hours tim es a re asonable rate—re presents a ‘ reasonable’ fee is wholly consistent with the rationale behin d the usual fee-shifting statut e, includi ng the on e in the present case. ”). T he dis tr ic t c ourt r el ie d onse ve ra l f ac tor s ingr an tin g th e m

ult i- m ill ion dol lar en hanc em en t t o th e lod es tar fi gur e, m ost of w hic h are c ite d inthe f

oll ow ing pa ssa ge f ro m it s op ini on: First, the evidence establishes that th e quality of service re nde re d by

c la ss c ouns el , inc lud ing the ir e xtr ao rd inary

c om m itm en t of capital re sources, w as far superior to what consum ers of legal se rv ic es in the le ga l m ar

ke tpl ac e in A tlanta

c oul d r ea sona

bly e xpe ct to re ce ive f or the r at es use d inthe lod es tar ca lc ulatio n. S pe ci fi ca lly , the ev ide nc e show s th at

the hourl y

r at es use d inthe lod es tar ca lc ulatio n do n ot t ak e int o a cc ount

( 1) the f ac t tha t c la ss c ouns el w er e re qui re d to advanc e ca se e xpe nse s of $1. 7 m ill ionove r a thr ee -y ear pe ri od w ithno ongo ing r ei m

bur se m en t, ( 2) the f

ac t tha t c la ss c ouns el w er e not pa id on an on -g oin g ba sis a s th e w ork w as be ing pe rf orm ed , a nd ( 3) the fa ct that c la ss c ouns el ’ s a

bil ity to re co ve r a fe e an d e xpe nse re im bur se m en t w er e co m

ple te ly c ont ing en t onthe out co m e of the case. FN 8 (Chandler D ecl. ¶¶ 5–8; Fellows D ecl. ¶¶ 5–8; Knowle s D ec l. ¶ ¶ 7–12 ; R aw ls D ec l. ¶

¶ 5–8; L ow ry

D ec l. ¶ 25; Br am le tt D ec l. ¶¶ 7 (a) & 10 , 13 –1 4.) FN 8. Alod es tar en hanc em en t c an not be ba se d on conting ency

alone. City

of Burlington v . D ague, 505 U. S.29 557, 112 S . Ct . 263 8 ( 1992 ). I n th is c as e, how ev er , the ri sk o f nonr ec ove ry

is onl y one of se ve ra l f ac tor s whic h, take n to ge the r, e sta

bli sh a le ve l of se rv ic e w el l be y ond w ha t c oul d r ea sona

bly be e xpe ct ed

f or the r at es c la im ed . Ke nny A. , 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (citations om itted). N one of the three fa ctors the district court relied on in that pass age to j ustify boost ing th e aw ard is a proper ba si s fo r do in g s o. 1. St ar tin g f ro m the e nd o f the li st, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r el ianc e on the qua lity of se rv ic e an d su

pe ri or pe rf or m an ce , w hic h are e sse nti al ly the sam e thi ng, c onf

lic ts w iththe S upr em e Co urt’ s te ac hin gs tha t those c onsi de ratio ns are a de qua te ly ac co unt ed

f or “ ei the r in d et er

m ini ng the r ea sona

ble num be r of hours e xpe nde d on the litigatio n or in setting the rea sonable ho urly rates, ” and that it is “ unnecessary to e nhanc e the f

ee f or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce in or de r to s er

ve the statut or

y pur pose of enabling pl aintiffs to secure legal a ssistance.” D elaw are Va lley I, 478 U.S . at 565– 66, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98; se e al so i d. a t 56 5, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98 ( “ H en ce , if plaintiffs . . . find it pos sible to engag e a lawy er based on the statutory assurance that he w ill be pa id a

‘ re as ona ble f ee , ’ the pur

pose be hin d th e fe e- shi ft ing statut e ha s be ensa tis fi ed . ”) . I n th is c as e, the dis tr ic t c ourt sp ec if ic al ly c onsi de re d “ the ste llar pe rf

orm an ce of

pla int if fs ’ c ouns el thr ough out

thi s lo ng and d if

fi cu lt ca se ” inTh e dis tr ic t c ourt did c ut t he ho ur ly ra te s f or tr ave l ti me in h a lf

, b ut n ot i n o rd e r t o 6 lower the rate s. Instead, the r eduction wa s the court’ s way of cor rec ting f or the attorney s’ excessive billing of time. Ke nny A. I I I , 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.

30 ap pr ov in g t he ir h ou rly rates , whi ch reac he d $ 45 0 a nd $4 95 forlea d c ou ns el . K en ny A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 84, 128 6. H av ing a lr ea dy be enuse d to inc re as e the lod es tar am ount , the qua lity of the se rv ic es r en de re d and s upe ri or perform ance could not also b e used to enhance the lodestar am ount that had been calculated using th ose high er r ates. See De laware V alley I, 478 U.S . at 565, 106 S. Ct . at 3 09 8. Do ub le co un ti ng si m pl y is no t al lo wed . It w as after

the successful settlem ent had been achieved, a fter they knew howw el l the y

ha d pe rf orm ed , a ft er

the y kne wthe de gr ee of

dif fi cu lty inv olv ed , and after they

knew how m

uch capital resources and legal ef fort had been required that the pla int if

fs ’ a tto rn ey s a ske d f

or hourl y r at es the y

tho ught that the y de se rv ed . O ve r the obj ec tio ns o f the de fe ndants , the dis tr ic t c ourt gave the m tho se r at es in full. I t did no t reduce a

single ho urly

rate for any

attorney or parale gal by

so m uch a s ap e n n y. 6 In requesting their hou rly rates, the lead counsel for the plaintiffs repre sented that those r at es w er e ad equa te , sub j ec t t o c onsi de ratio ns the y spe ci fi ed , to com pensate them . Marcia

Robinso n Low ry , one of the tw o lead counsel, testified by a ff idavit that:31 The standard hourly

rates r eflec ted in Exhibit 2 are fair , re as ona ble , and c onsi ste nt w ithhourl y r at es in the A tlanta

m ar ke t f or the price of legal ser

vices of com

parable quality

rendere d in cases dem anding sim ilar skill, j udgm ent and perform ance. T hese standard hour ly r at es do n ot, how ev er , take int o a cc ount the f ac t tha t c la ss co unse l w as r equir ed

in thi s c as e to a dvanc e the e nti re $1. 7 m ill ion expense of prosecuting this case for the benef it of the class, or the fact that c la ss c ouns el ’ s c om

pe nsa tio n w as tot al ly

c ont ing en t up on pr ev ai lin g inthi s a ct ion . Je ff re y O . Br am le tt, the oth er

le ad c ouns el , te sti fi ed

by a ff idavit that: “ T he hourlyrates set f

orth in Exhibit 1 correc tly ref lect the hourly

rates m y lawfirm curr en tly c harg es and c oll ec ts f

ro m c lie nts w ho h ir e us t o pe rf orm le ga l se rv ic es on a St an dard

H our ly Rate ba sis . ” H ow ev er , he f urthe r te sti fi ed : Standard H ourly

Rates are pre dicated on the assum ption s that the c lie nt w ill pay

in fu ll on a

30– 60 d ay

c y cl e, that c ouns el is not required to shou lder any

significant financial risk of unreim bursed ca se e xpe nse , and tha t c ouns el w ill be pa id c ur re ntl y r eg ar dle ss o f the result ultim ately

achieved. He re, Class Counsel was for ced to advance ca se e xpe nse s a

ppr oa ch ing $1. 7 m ill ionto pr ote ct the Cl as s’ int er es ts, largely because State D efendants ref used Plaintiffs’ suggest ion of a ne utr al c as e re co rd

r ev ie wthat w oul d have save d bo th s ide s ( an d ultim ately

the State) dupli cative cost. He re, Class Counsel was for ced to p er sona lly

a dvanc e Pl ai nti ff

s’ portio n of

that c ost in the f ac e of St at e D ef en dants ’ vig or ous as se rt ionthat i t w oul d no t and c oul d no t be r ec ove re d. H er e, Cl as s C ouns el ’ s r ec ove ry of a ny c ost , le t a lon e fee, was ut te rly dep en de nt up on th e co nt in ge nc y of a su cces sf

ul res ul t. H er e, Cl as s C ouns el w as f or ce d to inv es t m or e than $8 . 85 m ill ionof pr of es sio na l t im e an d ou t- of

-p oc ke t e xpe nse ove r a thr ee -and- one -h al f ye a r p e r i o dwi t h n o a s s u r a n c e o f a n y re c o v e ry. Ther e is no indi cation that Mr. Bram lett’ s firm ’ s regular hourly rates are anywher e ne ar the lowsid e of

the A tlanta

le ga l m ar

ke t or e ve n th e m idp oin t.32

T he pos iti on tha t the tw o le ad c ouns el too k inthe ir

a ff idavit s is that the hour ly r at es use d to c al cu la te the lod es tar fi gur e w er e the sam e rate s pay ing c lie nts w oul d have be enc harg ed . T he y e ac h r ep re se nte d th at

tho se r at es w oul d f

ull y co m pe nsa te the m

e xc ep t f or thr ee f ac ts tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt l ist ed in its opi nio n:

“ (1 ) th e fac t t ha t cl as s co un se l wer e req ui redto ad va nc e cas e ex pe ns es of $ 1.7 m illion over a three -y ear period with no ong oing reim bursem ent, ( 2) the fac t that cl as s c ouns el w er e not

pa id o n an on -g oin g ba sis a s th e w ork w as be ing pe rf orm ed , an d ( 3) the f

ac t tha t c la ss c ouns el ’ s a

bil ity to re co ve r a fe e an d e xpe nse rei m bu rs em en t wer e co m

pl et el y co nt in ge nt on th e o ut co m e o f th e cas e.” Ken ny A. II I, 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 88. 2. T he f ir st tw o of

tho se thr ee c onsi de ratio ns are de lay ed paym en t f

ac tor s, and if the y w er e pe rm iss ibl e ba se s f or e nhanc ing af

ee a w ar d, a n e nhanc em en t w oul d be required in virtually

every class action covered by

one of the traditional federal fee- shifting statutes. It is a rar e § 1983 action wher e those whose rights have been violated finance the cost of the litigatio n. A ttorney s for the plaintiffs in these ty pes of c as es a lm ost

a lw ay s have to advanc e the c ost of the li tig at iona nd d o no t r ec ei ve an y paym en t f

or the ir ti m e unt il the c as e is c om ple te d. T ha t i s si m

ply the na tur e of the beast. I f the delay s in reim bursem ent for costs and paym ent for service s that33

the se c as es ine vit ab ly

e nta il j ust if

ie d e nhanc em en t, the re w oul d be a n e nhanc em en t in alm ost every

case. W e know that cannot be, bec ause the Suprem e Court has ins tr uc te d us that w e m

ust e m plo y astr ong pr es um

pti on a ga ins t e nhanc em en ts and confine them

to the rare and exceptional case. D ag ue , 505 U . S. a t 56 2, 112 S . Ct . at26 41 ; Del aware Vall ey I, 47 8 U.S. at 56 5, 1 06 S. Ct. at 30 98 . Pa rt i cu l ar l y i n s t ru ct i v e o n th i s p o i n ti s s o m e o f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s reasoning in con cluding that there could be no enhancem ent for the contingency na tur e of ac as e— fo r the r isk

that the pla int if

fs w oul d no t be pa id at a ll fo r the co sts the y a dvanc ed

and the ti m e the y

e xpe nde d. S ee D ag ue , 505 U . S. a t 56 3, 112 S. Ct . a t 26 41. B ec au se the re is al w ay s ar isk that a c as e w ill be los t, pe rm itt ing en hanc em en ts b as ed

on the de gr ee of

r isk w oul d m ean th at

c al cu la tio n of

the lodestar would never end the inqui ry in a contingent -fee case, and that, the Court de ci de d, w oul d be una cc ep ta ble . I d. L ike w ise , pe rm itt ing e nhanc em en ts f or the delay in com pensation for expenses incurred and service s rendered w ouldm ean that c al cu la tio n of

the lod es tar w oul d be m er el y the f ir st s te p, not

the pr es um

pti ve last step in th e process. T hat would be unacceptable. Finally , w e have said that any delay in paym ent for professional services re nde re d is of

fs et by the f ac t tha t the hourl y

r at es use d are tho se that pr ev ai l a t the co m ple tio n of the c as e ins te ad

of the usu al ly

low er r at es that w er e in e ff

ec t a t the34

tim e the e ar lie r w ork w as don e. S ee N orm an , 836 F . 2d at 13 02 ( “ [W ] he re the re is a de lay the c ourt sh oul d take int o a cc ount the ti m e va lue of

m one y a nd the e ff

ec ts o f inf la tio n and g en er al ly

aw ar d c om

pe nsa tio n a t c ur

re nt r at es r at

he r than a t hi sto ri c rate s. ”) . I n th is c as e, a s inm ost , the hourl y r at es use d w er e tho se in ef fe ct a ft er the ca se ha d be enc om

ple te d. ( Se e R3 2:4 95: E x. C: ¶6 ) (“ T he hourl y r at es se t f

orth i n E xhi bit 1 c or re ct ly r ef le ct the hourl y

r at es m y f irm c ur re ntl y c harg es a nd c oll ec ts fr om c lie nts w ho h ir e us t o pe rf orm le ga l se rv ic es on a

S tandard H our ly Rate ba si s.”) . T ha t c ove rs tw o of the thr ee f

ac tor s th e dis tr ic t c ourt r el ie d onin determ ining that the hourlyrates w ere underinclus ive and an enhancem ent was warra nt ed . Kenn y

A. III, 45 4 F . Sup p. 2 d a t 1 28 8.

3. The third factor w as the conting ent nature of the ca se. Enhancing a lodestar based on cont ingency

is flatly forbidden by

the Da gue decision . The district court wa s under the m istaken im pression th at the D ague rule forbids onlyan en hanc em en t ba se d onc ont ing en cy a lon e. I d. a t 12 88 n . 8. T he r ule is not so lim ite d. T he S upr em e Co urt’ s de sc ri pti on o f the sc ope of it s ho ldi ng l eave s no wiggle room . The C ourt stated that it was “ concludin g that no con tingency enhancem ent whatever

is com patible with the fee- shifting statutes at issue.” D ag ue , 505 U . S. a t 56 5, 112 S . Ct . a t 26 43. I n c as e an y one m iss ed the poi nt o f35

that, the Co urt un equiv oc al ly state d inthe pe nul tim at e se nte nc e of it s op ini on:

“ [W ] e hol d th at

e nhanc em en t f

or c ont ing en cy

is not pe rm itt ed

und er the fee- sh ift in g s ta tu te s at is su e.” Id . at 5 67 , 11 2 S . Ct. at 26 43 –4 4. Pe rio d. Ev en i f w e w er e t o g o b eyo n dth at cl ea r l an g u ag e o f t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s com m and, the re asons it g ave for c onclud ing th at contingencyenhancem ents are inc om pa tib le w iththe f

ee -s hif tin g st at ute s a ppl y w ithe qua l f

or ce to usi ng co nti nge nc y

a s on e of se ve ra l r ea sons f

or a n e nhanc em en t. F or

e xa m ple , takin g th e ri sk o f los s in to a cc ount

both inthe lod es tar an d ina n e nhanc em en t am ount s to doub le c ount ing the dif

fi cu lty of the c as e, id. a t 56 2–63 , 112 S . Ct . a t 26 41, re gard le ss o f w he the r co nti nge nc y is the sol e en hanc em en t f ac tor . N o do ubl e countin g m eans no dou ble countin g. A llowing conti ngency to figure into an en hanc em en t t o any

e xte nt w oul d a lso pr ovi de a tto rn ey s w itha n in ce nti ve to br ing re la tiv el y m er itl es s c la im s. S ee id. a t 56 3, 112 S . Ct . a t 26 42; se e al so i d. a t 56 6, 112 S. Ct. at 2643 (“ Conting ency enhancem ent would m ake the setting of fees m or e co m

pl ex an d a rb it rary, hen ce m or e u np red ic tabl e, an d h en ce m or e li ti gabl e.”). That, the Court rea soned, would be bad. D ague, 505 U. S. at 566, 112 S. C t. at 26 43 . Insum

m ar y , non e of

the thr ee f

ac tor s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e num er at ed a s a basis for determ ining that the professional services rendered by plaintiffs’ counsel36

w er e “ far supe ri or

to w ha t c onsum er s of

le ga l se rv ic es in the le ga l m ar ke tpl ac e in Atlanta could rea sonablyexpect to rece ive for the rates used in th e lodestar ca lc ulatio n, ” K en ny

A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 88, is a pe rm iss ibl e ba sis f or en hanc ing the lod es tar am ount . A n e nhanc em en t ba se d onthe m is inc onsi ste nt w ithc ontro lli ng S upr em e Co urt de ci sio ns. 4. Makin g af

urthe r atte m

pt t o j ust if

y the e nhanc em en t, the dis tr ic t c ourt a lso state d th at : Ina ddi tio n, ba se d onit s pe rs ona l ob se rv at ionof pla int if fs ’ counsel’s per form ance throughou t this lit igation , the C ourt finds th at the sup er b qu al ity of the ir r ep re se ntatio n f

ar e xc ee de d w ha t c oul d re as ona bly be e xpe ct ed

f or the standard

hourl y r at es use d to c al cu la te the lodestar. Q uite sim

ply , plaintiffs’ counsel broug ht a higher degree of ski ll, c om

m itm en t, de dic at ion , a nd p ro fe ssi ona lis m to thi s li tig at ion than th e Co urt ha s se endis play ed by the a tto rn ey s ina ny

oth er c as e dur ing it s 27 y ears on the be nc h. T he f ost er c hil dr enof

F ult on and De Ka lb Count ies we re indeed fortunate to have such unparalleled le ga l r ep re se ntatio n, and the Co urt w oul d be r em iss if it f ai le d to co m pe nsa te c ouns el f

or thi s e xtr ao rd inary

le ve l of se rv ic e to the ir cl ie nts . Id . a t1 2 8 8

– 8 9 . Th i s ra t i o n al e i s l i t t l e mor e t h an a r es t at emen to f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s posi tio n th at

the lod es tar am ount

sho uld be e nhanc ed

be ca use of the qua lity

of the re pr es en ta tio n. T w o po int s a bout that. First, the district court itself found th at plaintiffs’ attorney s had sub m itted va gue r ec or ds and o ve rb ill ed in ei ght of f if te enc at eg or ie s, f

or ci ng the c ourt t o c ut37

m ore than 4,700 hou rs off those they claim ed, am ount ing to a re duction of m ore than $1 m ill ionof

bil la ble ti m e. S ee sup ra

a t 10 –11. A nd, a s w e ha ve ind ic at ed , if anything , the district court w as too kin d to plain tiffs’ attorney s in that respect. See supr a at 15– 17. A ny

kin dne ss a sid e, in D el aw ar e V al le y I the S upr em e Co urt he ld that the “ elim ination of a lar ge num ber of hours on the groun ds that theywe re unnecessary , unrea sonable, or unprodu ctive is not su pportiv e of the court’ s later conclusio n that the rem aining h ours represented w ork of ‘ superior quality .’ ” D el aw ar e V al le y

I , 478 U . S. a t 56 7, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 99; se e ge ne ra lly id. a t 55 4 n. 2, 106 S. Ct . a t 30 93 n . 2. T he hol din g r ef le ct s th e co m

m on s en se ide a that ba d and ex ce ssi ve bil lin g is inc onsi ste nt w ithsup er b law y er ing . T he dis tr ic t c ourt f ai le d to co ns id er t ha t i nc on si st en cy in it s fi nd in gs . The sec ond, and m ore fundam ental, point about th e district court’ s reliance on the qua lity

of the r ep re se ntatio n a s agr ound f or e nhanc ing the lod es tar am ount i s th at i tamou n t s t o d o ub l e c o u n t i n g an di s co n t ra ry t o th e S up re m e C o u rt ’s de ci sio n inD el aw ar e V al le y I . A s w e ha ve a lr ea dy

e xpl ai ne d, in that de ci sio n th e Court reverse d an enhancem ent for superior perf orm ance, holdi ng that “ the special skill andexperience of

counsel” and “ the qualityof repr esentation” are

“ presum ably

fully ref lected in the lodestar am ount , and thu s cannot serve as ind ep en de nt b as es f

or inc re as ing the ba sic f

ee a w ar d. ” D el aw ar e V al le y I , 478The Court in Dela war e Va lley

Ialso said that “[b]ecause c onsiderations conc erningthe 7 qu a lity of a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y ’s c ouns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n n or ma lly a re re fl e c te d in

the re a so na

ble hourly rate , the over all quality

of per formanc e ordina

rily should not be used to adjust the lodestar, thus re moving a ny dang er of

‘double c ounting.’ ” De lawar e Va lley I , 478 U.S. at 566, 106 S. Ct . at 3099. J udg e Wilson’s concurr ing opinion re ads the wor ds “normally” and “ordina rily ” to evisce rate the Court’s clea r instruction that “it is unnece ssary to enhanc e the f

ee for supe rior per formanc e in orde r to serve the statutory purpose of

enablingplaintiffs to secur e le g a l a ssi sta

nc e .” I d. Th at r e a din g , whic h in fe rs too muc h f ro m tw o w or ds , w ou ld l ic e ns e c ourt s to awar d enhanc ements for superior pe rfor

mance or re sults in any

case wher e the pe rfor

mance or result was a

ny thing be tter than “ ordinary” or “ normal,” the reby contra dicting the Court’s clea r instruction that there is a strongpresumption ag ainst an enha nceme nt for any

rea son and that they sh ou ld r are ly

be gra nte d f or any re a so n. I d. at 56 5, 10 6 S. Ct. at 30 98 . T hat r e a din gwo uld a lso be inconsistent with much of what the Court has said on the subjec t, contradic ting, f or example, the clea r implication of the Court’s later teac hings in the D ague ca se. See infr a at 40–42. 38 U . S. a t 56 5, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98 ( quot at iona nd c itatio n om itt ed ); se e al so i d. a t 56 6, 106 S. Ct . a t 30 98 ( “ Insho rt , the lod es tar fi gur e inc lud es m ost , if not a ll, of the re le vant f ac tor s c onst itu tin g a‘ re as ona ble ’ a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee , a nd i t i s un ne ce ssary

to en hanc e the f

ee f or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce in or de r to s er

ve the statut or

y pur pose of enabling p laintiffs to secure legal assistance. ” (e m phasis add ed)). 7 The f inal reason the district court gave for the $4.5 m illion enhancem ent was that “ plaintiffs’ success in this case was tr uly exceptional.” K enny

A. III , 454 F. Su pp. 2d at 12 89. T he r es ult w as so g ood, the c ourt sa id, that: “ A ft er 58 y ears a s a pr ac tic ing a tto rn ey

and f ed er al j udge , the Co urt i s un aw ar e of a ny oth er c as e in w hic h apla int if

f cl as s ha s a ch ie ve d su chaf av or ab le r es ult

on s uc h a co m pr eh en siv e sc al e. ” I d. at 12 90. N ot o nly that, but the dis tr ic t c ourt a lso sa id that “ even if the plaintiffs had prevailed in a trial of this case, it is dou btful that39

they would have obtained relief as ‘ intricately detailed and com

prehensive’ as that co nta ine d inthe Co nse nt D ec re e. ” I d. a t 12 89–9 0. To the extent that the district court rew arded plaintiffs’ counsel with an en hanc em en t f

or obt ai nin g be tte r re sul ts than th e cl as s w oul d have r ec ei ve d ha d th e case been r esolved on the m erits, that is plainl y wr ong. The purpos e of the fe eshi ft ing statut es , a s th e Su pr em e Co urt e xpl ai ne d inD el aw ar e V al le y I , is “ to en ab le pr ivate part ie s to obt ai n le ga l he lp i n se ek ing r edre ss f or inj ur ie s r es ult ing from the actual or threatened violatio n of specific fe deral law s.” De laware V alley I, 478 U . S. a t 56 5, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98. T he statut es a re de sig ne d to e nsur e that c ivi l rights pl aintiffs are adequately repre sented by

counsel. Se e H ensley , 461 U. S. at 429, 103 S . Ct . a t 19 37 ( “ T he pur pose of § 19 88 i s to e nsur e ‘ ef

fe ct ive a cc es s to the j udi ci al pr oc es s’ f

or pe rs ons w ithc ivi l r igh ts g ri ev an ce s. ” (quot ing H . R. Re p. N o. 94-155 8, at 1 ( 1976 ))) . For that re ason, a f ee aw ard should“ result[] in fees which ar e ad equa te to attr ac t c om pe te nt c ouns el , but

w hic h do not

pr oduc e w ind fa lls to attor ne y s. ” Bl um , 465 U . S. a t 89 3–94 , 104 S . Ct . a t 15 46 ( quot ing S . Re p. N o. 94- 10 11 , at 6 (19 76 ), rep rin te d i n 1 97 6 U.S.C.A.A.N. 59 08 , 59 13 ). St at ed f ro m the oth er dir ec tio n, the f

ee -s hif tin g st at ute s are not

de sig ne d to pr ovi de r ep re se ntatio n th at w ill w in p la int if

fs m or e than ac or

re ct appl ic at ionof subs tanti ve and r em ed ia l l awe nti tle s th em to re ce ive . T he ir

pur pose is not

to40

pr ovi de r ep re se ntatio n th at w ill se cure se ttl em en t r el ie f that i s m or e “ intri cate ly de ta ile d and c om

pr eh en siv e, ” K en ny

A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 89–9 0, than th e pl ai nt iff s wo ul d h av e rec ei ve d i f th ei r cl ai m s h adbe en li ti ga te d t o fi na l ju dg m en t. T he pur pose of the statut es , m ost

a ssure dly , is not

to pr ovi de pla int if

fs w ith re pr es en ta tio n th at

da zz le s or

be da zz le s th e dis tr ic t c ourt j udge . F ee a w ar ds s houl d be calculated in a w ay

that furthers the purpose of the fee- shifting statutes; they shou ld not be used to encourage or rew ard re sults that go bey ond th at purpose. Se e Bl um , 465 U . S. a t 89 3–95 , 104 S . Ct . a t 15 46–4 7. S o me o f th e d i s c u s s i o n i n th e Da g u e o p i n i o n i s u s e f u l i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g wh y en hanc em en ts s houl d no t be giv enf or m er its -e xc ee din g r es ult s. A s w e ha ve re co unt ed , in that c as e the S upr em e Co urt r ej ec te d th e ide a of e nhanc em en ts f

or c o n t i n g e n c y o r

r i s ko f l o s s i n p a rtb e c au s e p e rmi t t i n g th e m wo u l dp r o v i d e a t t o rn e ys w ithsom e inc en tiv e to b ri ng r el at ive ly m er itl es s c la im s. D ag ue , 505 U . S. a t 56 3, 112 S. Ct . a t 26 41–4 2. T he soc ia l c ost of e nc our ag ing atto rn ey s to pr es s c la im s of dubi ous m er it w oul d be too hig h, the Co urt r ea sone d, a nd p ro vid ing a tto rn ey s w ith inc en tiv es to br ing the m

is “ anunl ike ly

obj ec tiv e of

the ‘ re as ona

ble f ee s’ pr ov is io n.” Id. at 56 3, 1 12 S. Ct. at 26 43 . A r es ult that ob ta ins m or e or

be tte r re lie f than pl ai nti ff s are e nti tle d to re ce ive und er

the lawis, to the e xte nt i t e xc ee ds the ir e nti tle m en t onthe m er its ,41

an al ogou s to r el ie f on a

m er itl es s c la im . Jus t a s D ag ue ins tr uc ts u s th at

f ee a w ar ds sh ou ldno t u nd erwri te effo rts to ob ta in rel ie f whe re n on e is du e u nd er t he law, ne ith er sho uld the y und er w ri te e ff orts t o r ec ei ve m or e or

be tte r re lie f than th at

due u n d e r th e l a w . J u s ta s th e s o c i e t a l c o s t s f o r f e e a w a r d s f

o r n o n - me r i t o r i o u s c l a i ms are t oo hi gh , so als o a re t he y to o h ig h fo r res ul ts th atex ceed what th e la w all ows . Jus t a s e nc our ag ing non -m er ito ri ous cl ai m s c an not have be ena n ob

j ec tiv e of the fe e- shi ft ing pr ovi sio ns, ne ith er c ane nc our ag ing r es ult s th at go b ey ond w ha t the law allows have been an obj ective. T o pu t i t i n an e ith er -o r m an ne r, sup er b r es ult s are e ith er

w ha t a f ai r ap pli catio n of

the lawpr oduc es , w hic h m eans tha t the y a re not tr uly “ supe rb , ” or the y are r es ult s th at

e xc ee d w ha t the lawa llo w s and f or that r ea son ar e be y ond the purpos e of the fe e-shifting statut es. Those statutes are designedto provid e a reasonable fee for a reasonable result, not an extraordinary fee for a result that goes bey ond what the law w ouldprovide if the claim s wer e litigated to their correct co nc lu si on on th e m eri ts . L ook at it thi s w ay . Am er its -e xc ee din g r es ult f or pla int if fs m ust be the pr oduc t of

one , or som e co m

bin at ion , of

the f oll ow ing f

ac tor s: supe ri or

law y er ing by pla int if fs ’ c ouns el , ba d law y er ing by de fe ndants ’ c ouns el , poo r de ci sio n m ak ing by the court, or dum

b luck. T he Suprem e Court held in Delaw are Va lley I thatI t is unclear why , in its di scussion of the af fidavits, the district court omitted any 8 discussion of the one sig ned by Ralph Goldberg . See Ke nny A. I I I , 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. F or the sake of complete ness, we w ill include it in our discussion. 42 superior lawy ering by

the plaintiffs’ counsel is no t a proper basis for an en ha nc em en t. Del aware Vall ey I, 47 8 U.S. at 56 5– 68 , 10 6 S . Ct. at 30 98 –1 00 . So , the f ir st p oss ibl e ca

use of r es ult s th at

go b ey ond the m er its c an not be use d to ju s t i f y an e n h a n c e men t . No r

c a n i tp l au s i b l y b e a r g u e dth a tp l a i n t i f f s ’ a t t o rn e ys ough t to reap a w indfall, and defendants ough t to have to pay m ore in fee s than t h e y o t h e rw i s e s h o u l d , b e c au s e o f b a dl a w ye r i n g o n th e d e f e n s e s i d e . S u r e l y a de fe ndant s uf

fe rs e noug h f

ro m the a ddi tio na l r el ie f gr an te d a ga ins t i t be ca use of inferior re presentation without m aking th e defe ndant pay a surchar ge to the other sid e fo r the pr ivi le ge of

havin g be enthe vic tim

of ba d law y er ing . N or

c anit be ar gue d, w ithton gue out

of c he ek , that f

ee s sh oul d be inc re as ed

to re w ar d pl ai nti ff

s’ attor ne y s f or be ing on the sid e that ha ppe ns t o be ne fi t f

ro m ba d j udgi ng o r good luc k. T ha t e xhaust s th e poss ibl e explana tio ns f or e xc es siv el y

f av or ab le r es ult s, and no ne supp or ts award in g a n e nh an cem en t. 5 . T he dis tr ic t c ourt r el ie d to som e ex te nt o n f our of the f ive a ff idavit s th at

the pl ai nt iff s’ att orne y s i n t hi s ca se ob ta in edfro m th ei r fri en ds who do si m il ar wo rk . K en ny A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 90. T he dis tr ic t c ourt f ound that the a ff

iants 8Four of the five aff

idavits indicate that they

are from attorne y s who prac tice re gularly as plaintiffs’ lawyers de pendingon attorney s’ fe e aw ards. The lone exception is J ohn Chandler, wh os e a ff ida vit ind ic ate s th at a lth ou g h mo st o f h is w or k h a s b e e n o n th e de fe ns e sid e he ha s a lso serve d as counse l for some plaintiffs’ classes. Court : Who se le c te d th os e lawye rs wh o s e rv e d a s e xpe rt s? 9 B r am l e t t : I s o u g h tth o s e w i tn e s s e s o u t . I m e anth e C o ur td i dn ’ ts ay– Court : Iwo uld be sh oc ke d if

y ou tol d me y ou

ha d n e ve r f

ile d a n a ff ida vit fo r o ne of the m. Br amlett: You would be shoc ked and that would be incorr ect. B ut, but the fa c t is that a ll f

our o f t he se lawye rs are highly

e xpe ri e nc e d, highly c omp e te nt, have pr a c tic e d la w i n th e At lanta

mark e t– Court : A nd highly int e re ste d in

ke e pin gthe rate s u

p a nd the mul tip lie rs as hig h as possible– Br amlett: Ah. 43 were “ di si nt eres te d At la nt a at to rn ey s.” Id . Thatfin di ng is cle arl y erro ne ou s. At or al arg um en t, one of

the tw o le ad

c ouns el f or the pla int if

fs c onc ed ed

that he not onl y ha d r ec ru ite d th es e attor

ne y s to pr ovi de the a ff

idavit s bu t tha t i n th e pa st h e had also sup plied som e of them with sim ilar af

fidavits to h elp boos t their own fe e aw ar ds. 9 A sid e fr om

the ne ed to supp ort those w ho s uppo rt the m , the law y er s w ho sig ne d th e af

fi da vit s have af

inanc ia l i nte re st i n ke ep ing the f ee a w ar d inthi s c as e and every case like it as high as possi ble. T he higher this fee aw ard is the m oreTh e c on c ur ri ngop ini on

state s th at “ [i]t c ann ot b e re a so na bly c onte nd e d th at th e a

ble 10 and experienc ed district judg e in this case ne ver c onsidered the possibili ty that the af

fiants . . . could der ive an indire ct bene fit from the pre cede ntial value of a high f ee a war d.” See inf

ra at 8 3

– 8 4 (W i l s o n , J . , co n cu rr i n g s p ec i al l y ). Ac tu al l y , th e ab l e a n d

ex p er i en ce d

d i s tri ctco urtj u d ge himself expli citly

found that the a ffiant attorney s were “disintereste d.” That finding, which underla y any cre dit the court g ave to the a ffidavits, is clea rly err oneous. It just i s not true. 44 use fu l i t w ill be a s pr ec ed en t f or the law y er

sig nin g th e af

fi da vit w he n he se ek s a hi gh fee awa rdin hi s o wn ca se s. Th e affi an ts are an yth in g b ut “ di si nt eres te d.” 10 T he lod es tar am ount

w ill ne ve r suf

fi ce f or a tto rn ey s w ho p ra ct ic e in this ar ea . T he y

w ill a lw ay s be lie ve , in al l si nc er ity , that the y de se rv e m or e an d th at

the j ust ic e sy ste m

w ill f unc tio n be tte r if

the y a re pa id m or e. L awy er s w ho h an dle the se kin ds o f ca se s c an not be dis int er es te d w itn es se s be ca use the y a re f inanc ia lly int er es te d. T o st at e thi s is not to slam law y er s inge ne ra l or

pla int if fs ’ law y er s in particular. It sim

ply rec ogni zes that because self -interest is hard-w ired into hum an circuitry , no group is dis interested when it com es to the questio n of what m em bers of the gr oup ar e to b e pa id. C f. H . L . Me nc ke n, AL itt le Bo ok i n C Ma j or 22 ( John L an e Co . 191 6) ( “ It

is hard to be lie ve that a

m anis te lli ng the tr

uthw he n y ou know that y ou would lie if y ou were in his pl ace. ”). A sid e fr om

the obv iou s se lf

-i nte re st o f the a ff

iants , the c ont en ts o f the af fi da vit s th at

w er e fi le d inthi s c as e ar e al so f law ed in oth er w ay s. F or

e xa m ple , in e a c h o f th e m th e a f

f i a n ts o l e mn l y s w o r e th a tth e a mo u n to f c o mp e n s ab l e t i me(R32:495:Ex .F:4) ( aff idavit of J ohn Chandler) ; (R32:495:Ex .G:4) (a ffidavit of H enry 11 D. Fe llows, J r.); (R32:495:Ex .H:4) (a ffidavit of James C. Rawls). (R32:495:Ex .E:4–5) (a ffidavit of Ralph Goldbe rg ). 12 (R32:495:Ex .D:5) (a ffidavit of Ralph I . Knowles, Jr.) (empha sis omit ted). 13 (R32:495:Ex .D:6–8, 11) (a ffidavit of Ralph I . Knowles, Jr.); (R32:495:Ex .E:5–6) 14 (af fidavit of Ralph Goldber g ); (R32:495:Ex .F:4–5) ( aff idavit of J ohn Chandler) ; (R32:495:Ex .G:4–5) (a ffidavit of H enry D. Fe llows, J r.); (R32:495:Ex .H:4–5) (a ffidavit of James C. Rawls). 45 cl ai m ed in thi s c as e w as “ re as ona ble , ” w as “ re as ona

ble , f ai r, a nd f ull y 11 co m pe nsa ble , ” or w as “ fa ir , r ea sona

ble , a nd f ull y de se rv ing of

a de qua te a nd f

ull 12 co m pe nsa tio n. ” Y et , w e knowtho se a sse rt ion s are not tr ue . A s w e ha ve a lr ea dy 13 not ed , the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that pl ai nti ff

s ha d in fl at ed

the num be r of hours f or w h i c h th e y we r e du e c o mp e n s a t i o n i n mo s to f th e f i f t e e n b i l l i n g c a t e g o r i e s a n db y a subs tantial am ount . Ke nny A. III , 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1274– 84, 1286; supra at 10–1 1. T he court’ s finding , which is being aff irm ed by this Court, that the hours subm itted wer e not reasonable contradicts a key prem ise in every

one of the law y er af fi an ts. All five of

the aff idavits u rged the district court to enhance the fee aw ard ba se d onthe f

ac t tha t pl ai nti ff

s’ c ouns el a dvanc ed

the c ost of e xpe nse s. T ha t i s

14 not a perm issib le basis for an enhancem ent. S ee supra at 32–34. A ll of the af fi da vit s ur ge d th e co urt t o e nhanc e the f ee a w ar d be ca

use of the r isk or(R32:495:Ex .D:6–8, 11) (a ffidavit of Ralph I . Knowles, Jr.); (R32:495:Ex .E:5–6) 15 (af fidavit of Ralph Goldber g ); (R32:495:Ex .F:4–5) ( aff idavit of J ohn Chandler) ; (R32:495:Ex .G:4–5) (a ffidavit of H enry D. Fe llows, J r.); (R32:495:Ex .H:4–5) (a ffidavit of James C. Rawls). (R32:495:Ex .D:8) (a ffidavit of Ralph I . Knowles, Jr.); (R32:495:Ex .F:5) ( aff idavit of 16 J ohn Chandler) ; (R32:495:Ex .G:4–5) (a ffidavit of H enry D. Fe llows, J r.); (R32:495:Ex .H:5) (af fidavit of James C. Rawls). 46 conting ency

fac tor. T hat, too, is an im perm issib le fac tor for an e nhancem ent, a s 15 th e co nc urrin g o pi ni on in th is cas e co nc ed es . See i nf ra at 82 (W il so n, J ., concurring specially ). The Suprem e Court itself has specifica lly ruled it out. See supr a at 34– 36. F our

of the a ff idavit s e ve n ur ge d th e co urt t o ba se it s f ee a w ar d on the c om m on f und or c om m on b en ef

it doc tr ine s, w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly 16 concluded was not legally perm issib le or even possibl e. See Ke nny A. III , 454 F. Su pp. 2d at 12 70–7 2; s upr a at 14. T he f

ac t tha t the opi nio ns e xpr es se d ina ll fi ve of the a ff idavit s w er e ba se d onc onsi de ratio n of se ve ra l i m

pr ope r fa ct or s m ak es any finding of the district court based on the affidavits clearly err oneous , and it renders an y rel ia nc e th e co ur t p la cedon th os e affi da vi ts an ab us e o f di sc ret io n. As we ha ve r ec ogni ze d, “ [i ] t w oul d be apara dig m at ic abuse of dis cr et ionf

or ac ourt t o ba se it s j udgm en t onan e rr one ous vie wof the law . ” Mc N ai r v. A lle n, 515 F . 3d 1168 , 117 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 8) ( int er na l m ar ks o m itt ed ) (quot ing S ch lup v. D el o, 513 U. S. at 333, 115 S. C t. at 870 (O’ Connor, J., concurring)); see a lso Koon, 518 U.S . at 100, 116 S. C t. at 2047 (“ A district court by definition abu ses its dis cretion when47

it m akes an err or of law .” ); U nited States v. H all, 349 F. 3d 13 20, 1323 (11t h Cir. 2003 ) (e xplaini ng that if a district court decision is “ based on an error of law, then it is by definition an abu se of discretion”). It is no less an abuse of discretion for a dis tr ic t c ourt t o ba se it s de ci sio n ona ff idavit s th at

a re the m se lve s ba se d onle ga lly erro ne ou s as su m

pt io ns . W er e it oth er

w ise , the re w oul d be no e nd t o e nhanc em en ts and n o li m it to the m . I n e ve ry

c as e w he re an e sta

bli she d m em

be r of the Bar se ek s an e nhanc em en t he will be able to get his colleagues who are interested in keeping fee aw ards as high as possib le to sign affidavits statin g that the onl y thing that will ensure adequate repre sentation in cases like that one is a m ulti-m illion dollar enhancem ent. A nd som e district court j udges will credit those interested affiants as

“ disin terested attorney s.” Bu t no ne of

thi s and n one of

the m ult ipl e, spe ci fi c, a nd s er iou s de fe ct s inthe af fi da vit s th at

w er e fi le d inthi s c as e shou ld o bsc ur e the m or e fundam en ta l po int , w hic h is that e nhanc em en ts f or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce a nd r es ult s are not pe rm iss ibl e, no m atte r howm uc h th e int er es te d m em

be rs of thi s part ic ular se gm en t of the bar m igh t w an t the m to be . S ee sup ra

a t 36 –42. S upr em e Co urt de ci sio ns cannot be ove rr ule d by a ff idavit s.48 6. Our c onclusi on that th e enhancem ent to the lod estar am ount in this case was im pr ope r doe s no t m ean th at one w ill ne ve r be appr opr ia te und er a ny ci rc um stanc es . I f, a s th e Su pr em e Co urt ha s in str

uc te d us , the pr ope r ca lc ulatio n of the lod es tar am ount

le av es “ ve ry

li ttl e ro om ” fo r en hanc em en ts, w hic h m ay be proper only

in “ rare ” and “ exceptional” cases, De laware V alley I, 478 U.S . at 565– 66, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98, w he re is that l itt le r oom —and wha t are tho se r ar e an d ex cep ti on al cas es th atm ay fit wit hi n i t? W e can th in k o f so m e. Suppos e, for exam

ple, that an attorney ’ s representation vindi cates the fe deral ri ght s of an unpopu lar cl ie nt and a s ar es ult that a tto rn ey

suf fe rs alos s of

standi ng in the c om

m uni ty w hic h dam ag es his pr ac tic e an d in co m e. T he kin d of sit ua tio n w e ha ve in m ind

w as dis cu sse d by

Jud ge F rank M . Joh nson , Jr . , a lbe it not on the iss ue of e nhanc ing alod es tar am ount . A ct ua lly , the dis cu ssi on c am e be fo re the en ac tm en t of

the § 19 88 f

ee -s hif tin g st at ute a nd w as in the c ont ex t of de ci din g th e am ount of f ee s th at sho uld be aw ar de d by

the c ourt thr oughthe e xe rc ise of it s equit ab le pow er . N A A CP v. A lle n, 340 F . S upp. 703 ( M. D . A la . 197 2) , a ff ’ d in relevant part, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974 ). In deciding how m uch the attorney shou ld r ec ei ve , Jud ge Joh nsonstate d: [A ] law y er

r ep re se nti ng b la ck

pla int if fs in ane m

plo ym en t discrim ination case, or in any civil rights lit igation , is likely to suffer49

soc ia l, pol iti ca l and c om

m uni ty ostra ci sm . T his li ke lih ood is m ultip lied, of c ourse, in a c ase such as the present one in which pla int if fs have sue d hi gh- ranki ng s ta te of fi ci al s and h av e al le ge d and proved racial discrim ination . Even m ore dam aging to an attorney invo lved in su ch litigatio n is the probabi lity that he will be estranged fr om oth er m em be rs of his pr of es sio n w ho are unw ill ing to part ic ipate in, or e ve n le nd m or al sup port t o, sui ts s ee kin g to vin dic at e the pub lic good . Id . at 7 10 . W e hope that thr ee -and- a- ha lf de ca de s a ft er

tho se w or ds w er e w ri tte n inthe Allen ca se attorney s who repre sent victim s of rac ial discrim ination no lon ger suffer social, political, or professional os tracism . But attorney s who repre sent other ty pes of pla int if fs m igh t. I t c oul d ha

ppe n to a n a tto rn ey

w ho r ep re se nts ape doph ile atta ck ing ase xua l of

fe nde r re gis tr at ionlawon D ue P ro ce ss g ro unds , or pe rh ap s to ana tto rn ey

in a sm al l B ibl e Be lt town w ho s uc ce ed s inhavin g apop ular publ ic re lig iou s pr ac tic e en

j oin ed a s c ontrary

to the E sta

bli shm en t C lause . Whe the r tho se ci rc um stanc es , and o the rs w e ha ve not m en tio ne d, w oul d be pr ope r one s f or en hanc ing the lod es tar am ount are iss ue s f

or oth er day s. F or

nowit is en oughto re co gni ze the pos sib ili ty

and t o po int

out that the “ rare ” an d “ ex ce pti ona l” circum stances that we have m entioned wouldbe m ore likely to fit within the “ very little room ” that the Suprem e Court has told us is left f or enhancem ents. D elaw are V al le y I , 478 U . S. a t 56 5–66 , 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98. T he S upr em e Co urt de ci sio ns o n fe e- shi ft ing do n ot c le ar ly pr ec lud e ane nhanc em en t of the lod es tar am ount

in tho se50

ci rc um stanc es . A nd an e nhanc em en t i n th ose c ir cum stanc es is le ss l ike ly to re sul t in d oubl e co unt ing , or

to en co ur ag e m er itl es s law sui ts, or to go b ey ond the ba sic purpos e of the fe e-shifting statut es than the enhancem ent that the district court aw ar de d inthi s c as e doe s. Representing children who find them selves in foster care is not th e sam e as re pr es en tin g a ct ivi st athe ist s inthe Bi ble Be lt or pe doph ile s any

w he re . T he pla int if fs ’ a tto rn ey s inthi s c as e do n ot, a nd r ea sona bly c oul d no t, c la im

to ha ve suffere d any

social or professional ostracism , nor do they contend that th eir victory he re w ill som eh owdam ag e the ir le ga l pr ac tic e. T o th e co ntr ar y , vin dic at ing the rights of helpless children is the kind of acc om plish m ent that brings professional ac co la de s and e nhanc es one ’ s st an din g inthe c om m uni ty . I t i s to that ty

pe of en hanc em en t, ins te ad

of am one tary

one , that the a tto rn ey s m ust loo k f or a ny sa tis fa ct ionbe y ond the $6, 012, 802. 90 the y a re a lr ea dy

r ec ei vin g f

or the ir w ork in th is cas e. And Mr. Bram lett, f

or one, has done so. T he “ Attorney Profile” on his law fir m ’s webs it e b oa st edof h is “ tra ckreco rdof r es ul ts in cla ss act io n l it ig at io n,”Bondur ant, Mix son & Elmore L L P, J eff rey O. B ramlett Attorney

Profile, 17 htt p:/ /w ww .atla

nta g e or g iatr ia lla

wye rs .c om/ atto rn e y s/b us ine ss_ tor ts_ lawye r_

br amle tt. htm l ( la st visited Dec. 8, 2007) . Bondur ant, Mix son & Elmore L L P, J eff rey O. B ramlett Attorney

Profile, 18 htt p:/ /w ww .atla

nta g e or g iatr ia lla

wye rs .c om/ atto rn e y s/b us ine ss_ tor ts_ lawye r_

br amle tt. htm l ( la st visited Dec. 8, 2007) . Bondur ant, Mix son & Elmore L L P, J eff rey O. B ramlett Attorney

Profile, 19 htt p:/ /w ww .atla

nta g e or g iatr ia lla

wye rs .c om/ atto rn e y s/b us ine ss_ tor ts_ lawye r_

br amle tt. htm l ( la st visited Dec. 8, 2007) . 51 listin g three of his biggest s uccesses. T he one that was discussed the m ost was 17 de sc ri be d a s f

oll ow s: Pr o s ec u t i o n o f c l as s ac t i o n i n co n ju n ct i o n wi t h Ne w Yo rk ’s Ch ildre n’ s R igh ts, I nc . r es ult ing in sy ste m at ic r ef orm of S ta te of Ge orgia’ s dy sfunction al foster c are sy stem and establishi ng that foster ch il dr en ha ve a ri gh t t o c ou ns el . Th e f ed er al ju d g e w h o p re s i d ed o v erth e c as e f o r G eo rg i a’s fo ste r ch ildre n w ro te of

the w ork pe rf

orm ed by the le ga l t eam

le d by Je ff and M ar ci a Ro bin son L ow ry of N ewY ork’ s C hil dr en s’ Ri ght s, In c. : “ [P ] la int if

fs ’ c ouns el br ough t a

hig he r de gr ee of

ski ll, co m m itm en t, de dic at ionand p ro fe ssi ona lis m to thi s li tig at ionthan th e Co urt ha s se endis play ed by the a tto rn ey s ina ny

oth er c as e dur ing it s 27 y ears on the be nc h. . . . A ft er 58 y ears a s apr ac tic ing a tto rn ey a nd fe de ra l j udge , the Co urt i s un aw ar e of a ny oth er c as e in whic h a pla int if f cl as s ha s a ch ie ve d su chaf av or ab le r es ult

on s uc h a co m pr eh en siv e sc al e. ” 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 89–9 0. [18] T he pr of ile a lso r ec ount ed

that M r. Br am le tt re ce ive d th e E lbe rt P . T utt le Jurisprud ence A ward from the Anti-D efam ation League “ for dedication to justice an d f ai r tr eatm en t f

or a ll pe opl e. ” H e re ce ive d th at a w ar d in200 7 and h e w as 19Bondur ant, Mix son & Elmore L L P, J eff rey O. B ramlett Attorney

Profile, 20 htt p:/ /w ww .atla

nta g e or g iatr ia lla

wye rs .c om/ atto rn e y s/b us ine ss_ tor ts_ lawye r_

br amle tt. htm l ( la st visited Dec. 8, 2007) . 52 al so c hose n a s P re sid en t- el ec t of the G eo rg iaS ta te Bar that sam e y ear. T hose 20 hono rs c am e the y ear af

te r the j udgm en t tha t he he lpe d se cure w as e nte re d inthi s law sui t. I t a

ppe ar s th at , if

anythi ng, Mr . Br am le tt’ s pr of es sio na l st an din g and prestige, as w ell as his earning ability , have bee n enhanced as a re sult of his service as one of the le ad c ouns el f or the f ost er c hil dr en . The other c o-lead counsel for the foster c hildren in th is case has not suffered an y r ed uc tio n inpr of

es sio na l st an din g or

li ve lih ood be ca

use of he r w ork init , either. T o the contrary , what she did in this case has furthere d her cre dentials, her re put at ion , he r ch ose n li fe w ork, a nd the pur pose of he r or ganiz at ion . Marc ia Ro bin son L ow ry

ha s li tig at ed

on b eh al f of

c hil dr en ’ s w el fare f

or m or e than a qu art er o f a cen tu ry . Sh e ha s “ dir ec te d m aj or li tig at ione ff

orts i n j ur isd ic tio ns through out th e U nited States designed to prom ote m aj or ref orm of child welf

are sy stem s.” (R32:495 :Ex. B:2.) Ms . L ow ry

f ound ed and i s th e E xe cu tiv e D ir ec tor of the Ch ildre n’ s R igh ts Gro up , a no n- pr of

it org an iz at io n t ha t ad vo cat es an d l it ig at es on be ha lf o f ch il dr en . T he or ganiz at ion ’ s w eb sit e expla ins that, a m ong oth er thi ngs, “ Ch ildre n’ s R igh ts files class action law suits on behalf of classes of abused and neglected childrenChi ldr e n’ s Ri g hts , F re qu e ntl y As ke d Q ue sti on s, 21 http:// www.c hildrensrig hts.org /site/P ag eServe r? pag ename =fa q#L awsuit (last visited J une 5, 2008). Press Release , Children’s Rights, Ne w Settlement Guar antee s the Right to L eg al

22 Counsel for Abuse d and Ne g lected Children in De Kalb County , Geor g ia, htt p:/ /w ww .c hil dr e ns ri g hts .o rg/pd fs /pr e ss_ re le a se s/D e Ka lbC ounty Se ttl e 3% 20 23 1. pd f ( la st visited J une 5, 2008) Press Release , Children’s Rights, Settlement of Class-Ac tion L awsuit Mandate s 23 SweepingReform of F oster Care in Atlanta, Geor g ia (July 5, 2005), http:// www.c hildrensrig hts.org /pdfs/press_re lease s/07-05-05.pdf ( last visited J une 5, 2008). Press Release , Children’s Rights, Inc., In First Ruling of its Kind in Nation, Fede ral 24 Judg e in G e or g ia

Rul e s Abu se d a

nd Ne g le c te d Ch ild

re n H ave Right t o a

n A tto rn e y

Whil e in State Custody

(F eb. 8, 2005), at http://www.childre nsrig hts.org /pdfs/press_re lease s/02-08-05.pdf 53 w ho h av e co nta ct

w ithpub lic c hil d w el fare sy ste m s, to en fo rc e the ir le ga l r igh ts. The goal of these lawsuits is to im prove the functioni ng of state child welfare sy stem s . . . .” 21 A s w ithany

or ganiz at ionthat i s larg el y de pe nde nt u

pon donatio ns and gr an ts, Ch ildre n’ s R igh ts c an not a ff or d to hid e its a ch ie ve m en ts, a nd i t ha s no t be enshy about w ha t i t a ch ie ve d inthi s c as e. I n a t l ea st f our pr es s r el ea se s ov er

the co ur se of the law sui t, Ch ildre n’ s R igh ts trum pe te d w ha t i t ha d do ne a nd w as doi ng for “ som e of A tlanta’ s m ost vu lnerable citizens, ” and it proudl y proclaim ed that 22

“ [a] fter so m any

y ears of failure and broken prom ises by the state, this lawsuit has given th ese abused and neglected children a voice.” T he organization described 23 one of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r

uli ngs as “ a landm ar

k de ci sio n natio na lly

a nd a hug e vic tor y f or the r igh ts o f ab use d and n eg le ct ed c hil dr en . ” I t l at er

r ef er re d to the 24(last visited J une 5, 2008).

Pr e ss R e le a se , Ch ild

re n’ s Ri g hts , Inc ., L andmark Se ttl e me nt Gua

ra nte e s th e Right t o 25 L eg al Counsel for Abuse d and Ne g lected Children in Atlanta , Geor g ia (F eb. 13, 2006), at http:// www.c hildrensrig hts.org /pdfs/press_re lease s/3197_001.pdf (last visited J une 5, 2008). Children’s Rights, Inc., Annua l Report, at 4 (2006–2007), 26 http:// www.c hildrensrig hts.org /pdfs/Annual%20Repor t%202006-2007.pdf ( last visited J une 5, 2008). Children’s Rights, Inc., Annua l Report, at 5 (2006–2007),

27 http:// www.c hildrensrig hts.org /pdfs/Annual%20Repor t%202006-2007.pdf ( last visited J une 5, 2008). 54 “ gr ound br eakin g se ttl em en t a gr ee m en t” in the c as e, a ddi ng tha t the a gr ee m en t

“ appears to be the first of its kind nation ally , and we expect that c hildren thr ough out

G eo rg iaand p er

ha ps e lse w he re in the c ountry w ill be ne fi t. ” T he

25 accom plish m ents of Children’ s Rights in this case we re discussed in its ann ual report: “ In 2006– 2007 , w e took the fight for Am erica ’ s abused and negl ected children” to eight states. G eorgia is listed in th e re port as one of the eight states 26 whe re Ch il dr en ’s Rig ht s t oo k “ th e fi gh t.” 27 The point is not that Ms. L owry and her organization don ’ t have every re as on t o bo as t a

bout the ir r ole in thi s c as e. T he poi nt i s th at the ir w ork inthi s c as e is som ething th at is in their interest to boast abo ut. It is not som ething th at requires m ore than the $495 per hour that Ms. L owry rec eived to attract her and her or ganiz at ionto thi s c as e. T his are a of the lawis the se a in whic h th ey sa il an d c la ss ac tio n law sui ts are the ir

c hose n ve sse l. I t i s w ha t the y do. T he y

sub m itt ed55

thr ee -f ourths of the bil la ble hours in thi s law sui t. E xc ep t f or the r el at ive ly in si gn ifi can t t rav el ho ur s, t he y were p ai d a t t he hi gh ho ur ly rates th ey de m an de d. To suggest that the pros pect of a huge m onetary bonu s was nee ded to attract them to this law suit is n ot onl y absurd, but it also dem eans the dedication of Ms. L ower y an d he r or ganiz at ion . C f. D el aw ar e V al le y I , 478 U . S. a t 56 7, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 99 (“ Cl earl y , D el aw ar e V al le y w as able to obt ai n c ouns el w ith out a ny pr om ise of rewar d fo r ex tra or di na ry

pe rfo rm an ce.”) . T he m ult i- m ill iondol lar en hanc em en t, ove r an d be y ond the f ull lod es tar sum that Ms. L ower

y and her organization rece ived, am ount s to an invo luntary , f ederal co urt or de re d c ontri but ionf ro m the ta xpay er s of

G eo rg iato a non- pr of

it or ganiz at ion . T he pe rv er se ir ony of the se ve n f

igure , c ourt or de re d gr at

uity in thi s case is that it reduces the am ount of state funds available to care for what Ch ildre n’ s R igh ts i tse lf

ha s de sc ri be d a s so m e of G eo rg ia ’ s “ m ost

vul ne ra ble ci ti zen s,” t he ve ry

gro up th atth e o rg an iz at io n i s d ed ic at edto pro te ct in g. Fo r al l o f th e rea so ns we ha ve di sc us se d, wer e we fre e to de ci de th e is su e we w oul d r ea dil y

c onc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s aw ar d of a$4, 500, 000 en hanc em en t to the lod es tar am ount

in thi s c as e is an a

buse of dis cr et ion , be ca

use it is ba se d on an erro ne ou s v ie w of t he law an d re fle ct s a c le ar erro r of jud gm en t.56 C. U nf ortun at el y , und er

the pr ior pane l pr ec ed en t r

ule w e ar e not

f re e to d ec ide the e nhanc em en t i ssu e, but m ust ins te ad f oll owthi s C ourt’ s e ar lie r de ci sio ns i n N A A CP v. Ci ty

of E ve rg re en , 812 F . 2d 1 332 (1 1thCi r. 198 7) , a nd N orm anv. H ousi ng Auth or ity

of Mo ntg om er

y , 836 F . 2d 1 292 (1 1thCi r. 198 8) . B othof tho se de ci sio ns w er e iss ue d a ft er the S upr em e Co urt l as t sp oke on the sub j ec t of en hanc em en ts f

or qua lity of r ep re se ntatio n and s upe ri or r es ult s, w hic h w as in the Dela ware Val le y

I cas e. Inthe N A A CP c as e, the pla int if fs ’ a tto rn ey s ha d r eque ste d a50 p er ce nt en hanc em en t of

the lod es tar am ount , w hic h w as ba se d, in part , on “ the a sse rt ion that the r el ie f obt ai ne d w as of gr eat be ne fi t t o th e bla ck c iti ze ns o f E ve rg re enand represe nted exceptional su ccess. ” N AA CP, 812 F.2d at 1336. Af ter the district co urt de nie d th e re que st, the pla int if fs appe al ed

a nd this Co urt va cate d and re m an de d, in part

be ca use “ [t ] he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s op ini on d oe s no t a ddr es s a t a ll the last factor that the N AA CP ar gued justified enhancem ent—that the relief obtained wa s of great benef

it to the black citizens of Evergre en and represented exce ption al suc ce ss. ” I d. I n r em an din g, th e Co urt i nstru ct ed : [T ] he dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d m ak e fi ndi ngs w ithr eg ar d to e ac h of the gr ound s pu t f

or w ar d by the N A A CP a s w ar

ranti ng an e nhanc em en t an dre l at e t h o s e f

i n d i n g s t o i t s u l t i m at e d et er m i n at i o n o f t h e i s s u e. We not e, how ev er , in re m an din g, that the S upr em e Co urt ha s he ld tha t the57

fa ct the r es ult s ob ta ine d w oul d be of f ar -r ea ch ing sig nif

ic an ce to a larg e num

be r of pe opl e usua lly

is not gr ound s f

or e nhanc em en t, be ca use the r es ult s ob ta ine d, a s on e of the Joh nsonf

ac tor s, nor

m al ly will be subsum ed in the calculation of a rea sonable fee and, therefore , usuallyshoul d not p rovide an independ ent basis for increasing the fee aw ar d. B lum

v. S te nson , 465 U . S. 886 , 900 , 104 S . Ct . 154 1, 154 9–50 (1 984) . T he aw ar d m ay

be e nhanc ed , how ev er , “ in s om e ca se s of e x c e p t i o n a l s u c c e s s . ” I d . a t8 9 7 , 1 0 4 S . C t . a t1 5 4 8 ( qu o t i n g He n s l e y, 4 6 1 U.S . a t4 3 5 , 1 0 3 S. Ct . a t1 9 4 0 ). Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s re co nsi de ratio n of

the appr opr ia te ne ss o f ane nhanc em en t ba se d on th is fact orsh ou ldbe m ad e in li gh t o f th es e p rin ci pl es .FN6 FN 6. T he ba sic a ssu m

pti on o f Bl um , how ev er , is that the dis tr ic t c ourt w ill have take n f ac tor s su cha s th e be ne fi t obt ai ne d in to a cc ount

in its ini tia l de te rm inatio n of the reasonable fee . Ther e is no indi cation that the dist rict co urt ha s do ne so i n th is c as e. I n f ac t, it appe ar s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt l im ite d it s c onsi de ratio n of the r es ult s obt ai ne d to it s de te rm inatio n th at the pr ev ai lin g and unsu cc es sf

ul c la im s w er e se para

ble . O n r em an d, the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d take int o a cc ount a ll re le vant co nsi de ratio ns p ut f

orth b y the N A A CP in de te rm ini ng the e ff ec t of the r es ult s ob ta ine d, a s w el l a s th e ef fe ct of the other John son factors, on its initial calculation o f a reasonable attorney ’ s fee. It should th en consider whether the NA ACP has shown groun ds for an en hanc em en t of

that i nit ia l c al cu la tio n. Norm an , 81 2 F .2dat 1 33 7 & n.6 (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . In Norm an the attorney s for the prevailing civil rights plaintiffs had re que ste d asub stanti al e nhanc em en t of the lod es tar am ount

ba se d inpart

on the

“ qualityof repr esentation prov ided.” N orm an, 836 F. 2d at 129 7. I n deny ing th at re que st the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound “ that su bst an tia l r es ult s w er e obt ai ne d e ve n if the58

lawsuit wa s unnecessary

to obtain them ,” but that an enhancem ent was ina ppr opr ia te “ be ca

use of the pos sib ili ty

of dup lic at ionof

e ff orts and the poss ibi lity

of im pr ope rl y c harg ed hours . ” I d. a t 12 97–9 8. T his Co urt r ev er se d th e denial of the enhancem ent because “ the wr ong st andards wer e applied.” Id. at 13 06 . In doing so, the N orm an Court explained that “ [i] f the re sults obtained were exceptional, then som e enhancem ent of the lodestar m ight b e called f or.” Id. at 1302 ( ci tin g D el aw ar e V al le y I , 478 U . S. a t 56 4–65 , 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98) . I t a lso state d th at

“ [e ] xc ep tio na l r es ult s are r es ult s th at a re out of the or din ar

y , unu sua l or rare , ” not tho se that are e xpe ct ed , be ca use “ [t ] he lawis usua lly

f ai thf ul t o it s te ac hin gs, and s o an ou tc om e that i s no t un expe ct ed in the c ont ex t of

e xtant subs tanti ve laww ill not

or din ar ily

be e xc ep tio na l. ” I d. T he se w er e am ong the rem and instructio ns in th e N orm an case: Any enhancem ent begins with a finding that the results wer e ex ce pti ona l; the dis tr ic t c ourt ha s a lso f ai le d to a ddr es s th is i ssu e w ith re fe re nc e to the e xtant s ubst an tiv e law . A cc or din gly , w e re m an d f or reconsideration. I n adjusting the lod estar, as has been noted earlier, the c ourt m

ust take int o a cc ount

the sig nif

ic an ce of the r es ult s obtained in relation to thos e sought . It is at this poin t that the court m ay wish to m ake adj ustm ents for unsuccessful theories and dis m issal of the c as e as to som e part ie s. E ve n if the c ourt f

ound the r es ult s ob ta ine d to be e xc ep tio na l, no enhancem ent for these re sults would be j ustified un less the court also finds th at class counsel’ s representation wa s superior to that59

w hic h w oul d have be ene xpe ct ed c onsi de ri ng the r at es r eq ue ste d. Bl um , 465 U . S. a t 89 9, 104 S . Ct . a t 15 49. N orm an , 836 F . 2d at 13 06; a cc or d A ss’ n of D isa ble d A m s. v. N ep tun e D es ign s, In c. , 469 F . 3d 1 357, 135 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) ( dic ta ) (“ T he c ourt m ay the n a dj ust

the lod es tar to r ea cham or e ap pr opr ia te a tto rn ey ’ s f ee , ba se d onavari ety

of f ac tor s, includi ng the degree of the plaintiff’ s success in the sui t.” (footnote om itted)); Villano v. City

of Boy nton Beac h, 254 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (dicta) (“ If the c ourt de te rm ine s th at the r es ult obt ai ne d w as a n e xc el le nt r es ult , the n th e aw ar d of f ee s ‘ w ill e nc om

pa ss a ll hour s r ea sona

bly e xpe nde d onthe li tig at ion , and i n d ee di n s o m e c as es o f e x ce p t i o n al s u cc es s an en h an ce daw ar dm ay b e ju s t i fi ed .’” (c itatio n om itt ed )) ; D uc kw orth v . Whis en an t, 97 F . 3d 1 393, 139 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) (d ic ta ) (“ A ft er

de te rm ini ng the lod es tar am ount a s a bove , the c ourt i s e nti tle d to ad j ust the a m ount

of f ina l f ee s aw ar de d inli ght

of the r es ult s ob ta ine d th ro ugh the li ti ga ti on .”). The N AA CP and N orm an decisions b oth vacated district court orders de ny ing e nhanc em en ts f

or sup er ior r es ult s and i ssu ed

r em an d in str

uc tio ns. T hose ins tr uc tio ns, e spe ci al ly

the one s inN orm an , c onst itu te ahol din g th at sup er ior re sul ts c oupl ed

w ithsup er ior

pe rf orm an ce c anbe the ba sis f or a n e nhanc em en t of the lodestar am ount . For the re asons we have alr eady explained at length, we are60

convin ced that holdin g is wrong and conflicts with relevant Suprem e Court de ci si on s. N o n e t h e l e s s , a s al a t e r

p a n e l w e a r e b o u n dt o f

o l l o wi t . H u rt h v . M i t c h e m, 400 F. 3d 8 57, 862 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( “ [W ] e ar e not pe rm itt ed

to re ac h ar es ult co ntr ar y to a pr ior pane l’ s de ci sio n m er el y

be ca use w e ar e co nvi nc ed

it is w ro ng . . . . ”) ; S m ithv. G T E Co rp . , 236 F . 3d 1 292, 130 3 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( “ T he ide a of an e xc ep tio n to the pr ior pane l pr ec ed en t r

ule w he re asub se que nt p an el is co nvi nc ed

the pr ior one r ea ch ed

the w ro ng r es ult

—f or wha te ve r re as on— is a lso inc onsi ste nt w ithanum

be r of de ci sio ns i n w hic h pane ls o f thi s C ourt have obe die ntl y

f oll ow ed pr ior pane l pr ec ed en ts the y

w er e co nvi nc ed

w er e w ro ng. ”) ; i d. at 130 4 ( “ Insum

m ar y , the part ie s’ a lte rn at ive a rg um en t bo ils down to the pos iti on that [a decision of this Court] incorrectly interpreted and applied [a Suprem e Court decision] . . . . The prior panel precedent rule c learly forec loses their pos ition .” ); W as cura v. Carv er , 169 F . 3d 6 83, 687 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( “ W as cura a rg ue s th at

the re as oni ng o f [a

de ci sio n of

thi s C ourt] is unc le ar

a nd i na de qua te to supp ort i ts hol din g. W e ha ve no o cc as ionto pa ss o n th at c ri tic ism , be ca

use w e ar e boun d by [that] decision regardless of whether we agree with it.” ); U nited States v. S teele, 14 7 F .3d13 16 , 13 18 (11 th Cir . 19 98 ) (en ba nc ) (“ Und er o urpri orpre ced en t ru le , a pa ne l ca nn ot ov erru le a pr io r on e’s ho ld in g e ve n t ho ug h c on vi nc editis wron g.” ).Both Judges Wilson and Hill have author ed conc urringopinions in t his case. See n.3, 28 supra. Ref

ere nces in this opinion to “the concur ringopinion” are to J udg e Wilson’s. Th e c on c ur

ri ngop ini on

c ite s si x ad dit ion a l c a se s f ro m ot he r c ir c uit s in

su pp or t of its 29 position t hat the district cour t may enhanc e the lodesta

r base d on the quality

of the re prese ntation and super ior results: the Second Circuit’s de cision in Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F .3d 422 (2d Cir. 1999), the F ourth Circuit’s dec ision in Hy att v. Apfe l, 195 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 1999), the F if th C ir c uit ’s de c isi on

in S hip e s v . T ri nit

y Ind us ., 98 7 F .2 d 3 11 (5 th C ir . 1 99 3) , th e Ni nth Circuit’s decision in Van G erw en v. Gua rante e Mutual L ife Co., 214 F.3d 1041 ( 9th Cir. 2000), the Eig hth Circuit’s in Forshee v. Waterloo Industries, Inc., 178 F .3d 527 (8th Cir. 1999), and the Tenth Circuit’s Roe v. Cheyenne Mounta in Confere nce Re sort, Inc., 124 F .3d 1221 (10th Cir. 19 97 ). Th e re are thr e e pr ob le ms w ithre lia nc e on tho se de c isi on s. For one thing , none of the m actually holds that the lodestar may be enha nced ba sed on the quality of re prese ntation. Indeed the Shipes decision reje cted the district c ourt’s enha nceme nt on that g ro un d, ho ldi ngthat “ [e]v e n th ou g h Sh ipe s’ s c ouns e l pr e se nte d e xten siv e statis tic a l data with competenc e, nothingless should be expected of c ounsel; conseque ntly , this factor a lone does not support enha

nceme nt.” Shipes, 987 F.2d at 321. Be cause the Quar atino case did not even involve, dire ctly or indirec tly , an enha

nceme nt of any ty pe, Qua ratino, 166 F .3d at 424, any thing that opinion say s about enha nceme nts is pure dicta. L ikewise, the issue be fore the cour t in Van Ger

wen wa s “whe ther—a

nd if so, how—a district court may

permissibly

reduc e an attorney ’s fe es aw ard unde r fe dera l fee -shiftingstatutes to refle ct poor qua lity

of re prese ntation.” Van G erw en, 214 F .3d at 1044. B eca use it was a f

ee reduc tion case, not a

n enhanc ement ca se, any

thing the V an Ge rwe n opinion say s about 61 O ur c oll ea gue , Jud ge W ils on, is of the opi nio n th at

thi s C ourt’ s de ci sio ns i n N A A CP and N orm anare c or re ct , that e nhanc em en ts o f the lod es tar am ount c anand shou ld b e al low ed

f or the qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n and the e xc ep tio na l natur e of t h e r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d . Wh i l e w e r e s p e c tth o s e v i e w s , w e a r e u np e r s u a d e db y t h e m. 28 T he c onc ur

ri ng o pin ione sse nti al ly

a dopt s th e posi tio n of

the S ixth C ir cu it in G ei er v. S undquis t, 372 F . 3d 7 84 ( 6thCi r. 200 4) , that the S upr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ng about perform ance enhancem ents in Delaw are Va lley I is nothin g but d icta. Id. at 794. T ha t pr opos iti on i s am atte r of ne ce ssi ty f or tho se w ho d ef

en d 29enhanc ements is also dicta. F inally , in Forshe e, the c ourt of appa ls rever sed the district cour t’s fee enhanc ement bec ause it wa s based on the c ontinge nt nature of the ca se. F orshee , 178 F.3d at 532. There was no e vidence supporting a n enhanc ement for

superior r epre sentation or re sults. Th e c ourt sa id: “ the c a se wa s n ot u nu su a lly dif fi c ult or c omp le x to pr e pa

re and tr y , th e re su lt while favorable to Forshe e wa s not ex ceptional, F orshee g ave only an impermissible rea son for enhanc ement, and the district court made no ‘deta iled finding s’ that would justify an enha nced fee awa rd.” I d. As with the other two c ases, a ny thing the F orshee court said a bout superior repr esentation or results is dicta. Finally , none of the opinions from other cir cuits in those six case s eng ag es in an e x tended discussion of the Supreme Court’s D elawa re V alley Iand Da gue opinions, nor do they confr ont the Sup re me Court ’s re a so nin gin t ho se tw o d e c isi on s, re a so nin gtha t is inc on sis te nt w ith enhanc ements for

superior r epre sentation and re sults. 62 en hanc em en ts b as ed

on s upe ri or

pe rf orm an ce a nd the r es ult s it pr oduc es , be ca

use w ha t the Co urt i nstru ct ed us i n th e D el aw ar e V al le y I de ci sio n is that “ it is unne ce ssary

to en hanc e the f

ee f or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce in or de r to s er

ve the statutory purpose of enabling plaintiffs to secure legal assistance. ” D elaw are Va lley I, 478 U.S . at 566, 106 S. Ct. at 3098. W e should not worry about that ins tr uc tio n, G ei er

and the c onc ur

ri ng o pin iona ssure us, be ca use it w as j ust a summ ary of the Court’ s earlier

Blum decision, and Blum

did no t say

that. I n other words, the Suprem e Court in De laware V alley I m ischaracter ized its own ear lier de ci sio n inBl um . T ha t vi ewis w ro ng f or tw o r ea sons . T he f

ir st o ne , of

c our se , is that the Suprem e Court knows its decisions better than w e do, and w e ar e not free to d isr eg ar d th e Co urt’ s in str uc tio ns b ec au se w e thi nk the y m ay be ba se d ona m is read in g o f it s o wn p rio r de ci si on s.63

Se co ndl y , G ei er

and the c onc ur

ri ng o pin iona re a lso w ro ng a bout the c ont ex t in whic h th e Su

pr em e Co urt t old

us i n D el aw ar e V al le y

I that e nhanc em en ts f

or supe ri or pe rf orm an ce and r es ult s are unn ec es sary . T ha t ke y state m en t i s no t confined to a recitation of the Blum case. It is part of an addition al discussio n that follows one in which the Court had stated that the federal f ee-shifting statutes

“ w er e not de sig ne d a s af

orm of e co nom ic r el ie f to i m

pr ove the f

inanc ia l l ot o f attor ne y s. ” D el aw ar e V al le y

I , 478 U . S. a t 56 5, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 98. I nst ea d, the Co urt e xpl ai ne d, the sol e pur pose of tho se statut es is to e nable “pr ivate part ie s to obt ai n le ga l he lp i n se ek ing r edre ss f or inj ur ie s r es ult ing f

ro m the a ct ua l or threatened violation of specific f ederal laws. ” Id. T hat purpos e, the Court em pha siz ed , is sa tis fi ed

if pla int if fs “ fi nd i t po ssi ble to en ga ge alaw y er ba se d on th e st atut ory

ass ur an ce t ha t h e wil l b e p ai d a ‘ reas on ab le fee.’” Id. Im m ediately after explaining that, in the next paragra ph of the Delaw are V al le y I opi nio n, the S upr em e Co urt m ad e the state m en ts tha t the c onc ur ri ng opin ion and Geier w ouldhave us disregard. T hat paragraph, in its entirety , r eads as fo llo w s: Mor eo ve r, w he n an a tto rn ey f ir st a cc ep ts a

c as e an d a gr ee s to re pr es en t the c lie nt, he obl igate s hi m se lf to pe rf orm to the be st o f his ab ili ty and t o pr oduc e the be st p oss ibl e re sul ts c om m en sur at e w ithhis skill andhis client’ s interests. Ca lculating th e fe e aw ard in a m anner that a cc ount s f

or the se f ac tor s, e ith er

in de te rm ini ng the r ea sona ble num ber of hours expended on the litigatio n or in setting theA s w e e xp la in e d e ar li e r in th is o p in io n , th e Co urt c ar r ie d o v e r f o r r e ar gume n t t

h e n e xt 30 term the issue of whether an enha nceme nt for conting ency

risk was prope r. See D elawa re V alley I , 4 78 U. S. at 56 8, 10 6 S. Ct. at 31 00 . B ut t he Court did re ve rs e the re st o f t

he e nh anc e me nt, including the incre ase f

or super ior perf

ormanc e and e x ceptional r esults. I d. (“The judgme nt be low is the re fo re a ff

ir me d in so fa

r a s it up he ld t he awa rd of atto rn e y ’s fe e s f

or the wo rk do ne in Pha se s I Iand

IX a nd , e xce pt f

or the mul tip lie r f

or ri sk , is oth e rw ise re ve rs e d. ” (e mph a sis added) ). 64 re as ona ble hourl y

r at e, thu s a de qua te ly

c om pe nsa te s th e attor

ne y , a nd le av es ve ry

li ttl e ro om

f or e nhanc ing the a w ar d ba se d onhis post-engagem ent perform ance. In short, the lodestar f igure includes m ost, if not all, of the relevant fa ctors constitu ting a “ reasonable” attor ne y ’ s f ee , and i t i s un ne ce ssary

to en hanc e the f

ee f or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce in or de r to s er

ve the statut or

y pur pose of e nabli ng plaintiffs to secure legal assistance. Id . at 5 65 –6 6, 1 06 S. Ct. at 30 98 (em ph as is ad de d) . T ha t st at em en t i s no t di ct a. I t m igh t have be enif the Co urt ha d so m eh ow af fi rm ed the f ee e nhanc em en t f

or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce in D el aw ar e V al le y I , but the Co urt di d no t do that. I nst ea d, the Co urt r ev er se d th e fe e aw ar d be ca use of the en hanc em en t, statin g inthe ve ry ne xt s en te nc e af

te r the quo te d para gr ap h: “ W ith t h i s t ea ch i n g fr o m

o u r p ri o r c as es i n m i n d , we s u s t ai n th e C o m m o n we al t h ’s contentio n that the lower c ourts erred in increa sing th e fe e aw ard to De laware Va lley in Phase Vbased on the ‘ superior quality ’ of counsel’ s perform ance. ” Id. at 566, 106 S. Ct. at 3099. T he teaching the Suprem e Court had in m ind in cluded 30 the le sso n th at

it w as unn ec es sary

to en hanc e fe es f

or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce . A ny ad dit ion al state m en ts a

bout the part ic ular ev ide nc e in tha t c as e that c om e la te r in65

the opin ion are, at m ost, addition al or alter native hold ings. See id. at 566, 106 S. Ct . at 3 09 9 (“ Fu rth erm or e, we are u np ers ua de d t ha t . . .” (em ph as is ad de d) ). E ve n if the f ir st h old ing state d inthe D el aw ar e V al le y I opi nio n, w hic h is that fee e nhancem ents for superior perform ance and exce ption al results are unne ce ssary , is vie w ed

a s on e of tw o a lte rn at ive hol din gs, w e ar e sti ll re qui re d to fo llo wit . S ee Ma ssa chuse tts v. U nit ed S ta te s, 333 U . S. 611 , 623 , 68 S . Ct . 747 , 754 (1 948) ; R ic hm ond Sc re wA nc hor Co . v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 275 U . S. 331 , 340 , 48 S. Ct . 194 , 196 ( 1928 ) (“ It doe s no t m ak e a re as on g ive n f or ac onc lus ionin a ca se obiter dictum , bec ause it is onlyone of two re asons for the sam e conclusion .” ); John son v. D eS oto Co unty Bd . Co m m ’ rs , 72 F . 3d 1 556, 156 2 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) (“ [W ] e ar e boun d by

a lte rn at ive hol din gs” ); Mc Cl el lan v. Mi ss. P ow er & L igh t Co . , 545 F . 2d 9 19, 925 n. 21 ( 5thCi r. 197 7) ( “ It ha s lo ng b ee n se ttl ed

that a ll al te rn at ive r at ion al es f

or agiv enr es ult

have pr ec ed en tia l va lue . ”) . T he c onc ur ri ng opi nio n, the S ixth C ir cu it’ s de ci sio n inG ei er , a nd o ur de ci sio ns i n N A A CP a nd N orm ana ll dis re gard

the te ac hin g th at

the S upr em e Co urt us ed

a s aba sis f

or it s de ci sio n inD el aw ar e V al le y I . T he y a ll co ntr ad ic t the S upr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ng t h at fe e e n h an ce m en t s fo r s up er i o r p er fo rman ce an dre s u l t s ar e u n n ec es s ary. W e wou ldno t, i f we were n ot bo un d b y th e p rio r pr eced en t ru le to do so .On a re late d p oint, t

he c on c ur ri ngop ini on ’s re lia

nc e on our o wn de c isi on in V ill ano , is 31 mis pla c e d. Th e Vi lla

no c a se ha d n oth ingto d o w ithfe e e nh anc e me nts . Ins te a d, it i s a c a se in wh ic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a c tua lly re du c e d th e lod e sta

r a mou nt b e c a us e the pla int if

f d id n ot p re va il on all claims or ag ainst all of the def endants, a nd did not recove r all of the da mag es he w as seeking . Villano, 254 F.3d at 1304. The unre marka ble holding of

Villano is that before a cour t can r educe the lodestar a

mount for limited success it must consider not just the benef it the plaintiff obtained f

or himself mea sured in the damag e aw ard but a lso the public benef it of vindicatingfede ral rights ag ainst a g overnme ntal entity . I d. at 1306–07. Of c ourse. But to say , as Villano does, that a fee awa rd should not be re duced be low the lodestar amount for pa

rtial succe ss without consideringall aspec ts of the succ ess is one thing . To say , as the conc urringopinion in thi s case does, that the lodestar should be incre ased f

or succ ess if the public g ained some be nefit fr om havingfede ral rights vindicated is an entire ly differ ent thing. Indeed, if public benef

it through vindication of fede ral rights was enough to justi fy an enhanc ement of the lodestar a mount, there would be an enha nceme nt in every

single fee case . 66 T he opi nio ns c onc lud ing that e nhanc em en ts f or tho se r ea sons a re appr opr ia te also fail to m ention, m

uch less grapple with, the part of the Da gue decision that discuss es enhancem ents related to the m erits of the fe deral cla im s that have been vin dic at ed

in the law sui t. A s w e ha ve a lr ea dy poi nte d ou t, se e supr a at 34– 35, in the c our se of

r ej ec tin g any

e nhanc em en t t o f

ee a w ar ds b as ed

on c ont ing en cy , the Su pr em e Co urt un equiv oc al ly c onc lud ed

in D ag ue that e nhanc em en ts s houl d no t be gr an te d ba se d onthe le ga l and f ac tua l m er its of

the c la im or the dif fi cu lty of es ta bli shi ng those m er its . D ag ue , 505 U . S. a t 56 2–63 , 112 S . Ct . a t 26 41. I t i s log ic al ly im poss ibl e to r ec onc ile tho se c le ar ins tr uc tio ns f ro m D ag ue w iththe posi tio n th at

e nhanc em en ts c anbe gr an te d ba se d onthe sup er ior pe rf orm an ce of co un se l i n e st ab li sh in g t he leg al an d fa ctua l m eri ts . Whi ch m ay be why Geie r, N A A CP , N orm an , and the c onc ur ri ng o pin ionm ak e no atte m pt t o do so. 31There can be no fee awa rd under § 1988 and its statutory

cousins unless plaintiff’s counse l has obtained a judg ment establishing that some fede ral statutory or constitutional rig ht has bee n violated. Ever

y judgme nt that will support a fee awa rd will have be nefitted the public by vindicatingfede ral rights and servingas a de terre nce to f uture violations. There fore , under the concur ringopinion's log ic, eve ry fee awa rd should be incr ease d as a r ewa rd for succe ss and on public benef

it gr ounds. That ca

nnot be. 67 D es pit e our

dis ag re em en t w iththe c onc ur ri ng o pin ionabout

the c or re ctne ss of our N A A CP and N orm ande ci sio ns, w e do a gr ee that those de ci sio ns c ontro l the o u t co m e o f t h i s ca s e. Th ey d o n o tfo re cl o s e u s fr o m v ac at i n g th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s j udgm en t ba se d onit s im pr ope r co nsi de ratio n of

the c ont ing en cy

na tur e of the aw ar d, the a dvanc ing of

e xpe nse s, a nd the de lay

in paym en t of

f ee s. H ow ev er , our re ad ing of

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s op ini on l eave s us c onvi nc ed that i t w oul d be poi ntl es s to r em an d to that c ourt w ithins tr uc tio ns tha t i t r ec onsi de r w he the r to g ive ane nhanc em en t, or

the a m ount

of one , f re e of tho se im pr ope r co nsi de ratio ns. T he dis tr ic t c ourt w as so o bvi ousl y e na m or ed

w iththe pe rf

orm an ce of

pla int if fs ’ counsel and with the result that th ey achieved, and so determ ined to reward them for it, that we have no dou bt the court would sim ply reinstate the enhancem ent. S o lon g a s our N A A CP and N orm ande ci sio ns s tand, the dis tr ic t c ourt c an , a nd w oul d ag ai n onr em an d, r ea chthe sam e re sul t tha t w e ha ve be fo re us and r es t i t onthe ba sis of qua lity of r ep re se ntatio n and s upe ri or r es ult s. A ll that a

r em an d w oul d ach ie ve is m or e d el ay

an d t he ge ne rat io n o f m or e b il labl e h ou rs .68

O f co ur se , thi s C ourt si tti ng e n banc , or the S upr em e Co urt, c anove rr ule any prior decisions o f this Court. U nless and un til this Court does overrule NA ACP an d N orm an , w e ar e co nstra ine d to le t st an d th e $4, 500, 000 en hanc em en t t o th e lo de st ar am ou nt th atis in cl ud edin th e d is tri ctco ur t’s jud gm en t i n t hi s ca se . V II. AFFIRMED.69

W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng: I ag re e w iththe de ci sio n to uph old the f ee a w ar d inthi s c as e. I do n ot, how ev er , share m

y c oll ea gue Jud ge Carn es ’ vie wthat the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n an d our ow n pr ior

pr ec ed en ts i n th is are a ar e inc onsi ste nt w iththe te ac hin gs o f the Su pr em e Co urt. T he Co urt ha s no t he ld tha t qu al ity of r ep re se ntatio n and exceptional results can never be grounds for an upward adj ustm ent of the lodestar figure. To the c ontrary , the C ourt has allowed for the possibili ty of an enhancem ent based on th ese fa ctors wher e, as here, specific r ecord evidence in di cat es th atth e lo de st ar am ou nt is in su ffi ci en t t o p ro vi de a reas on ab le fee. A c c o r d i n g l y, I c o n c u r

i n th e r e s u l to n l y. I . In B lum v . Ste nson , 465 U. S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541 , 79 L . E d. 2d 891 (198 4), the S upr em e Co urt c onsi de re d w he the r, a nd unde r w ha t c ir cum stanc es , qua lity of rep res en ta ti on an d e xc ep ti on al res ul ts can supp or t an en ha nc em en t o f th e lo de st ar. T he Co urt no te d th at

the qua lity

of a n a tto rn ey ’ s r ep re se ntatio n “ ge ne ra lly is refle cted in the reasonable hourly rate. ” I d. at 899, 104 S. C t. at 1549 . How ever, the Co urt st at ed

that this f

ac tor m ay j ust if y a n up w ar d a dj ustm en t “ in the r ar e ca se wher e the fe e applicant offer s specific evidence to show that the quality of service re nde re d w as sup er ior

to that on e re as ona

bly sho uld e xpe ct in lig ht o f the hourl y70

rates char ged and that the su ccess w as ‘ exceptional.’ ” Id. (quot ing He nsley v. Eck erhart , 46 1 U.S. 4 24 , 43 5, 1 03 S. Ct. 1 93 3, 1 94 0, 7 6 L. Ed. 2 d 4 0 (1 98 3) ). Be ca use the a tto rn ey s in B lum offer ed no such evid ence, the Court concluded that the district court’ s reliance on quality of repr esentation as groun ds for an en ha nc em en t am ou nt edto do ub le co un ti ng . Id . T he Court indicated, however , that the out co m e w oul d have be endif fe re nt h ad

the re be enspe ci fi c ev ide nc e show ing th atan en ha nc em en t was ne ces sa ry to refl ectco un se l’s s up eri orpe rfo rm an ce. See id. a t 90 0, 104 S . Ct . a t 15 49 ( “ Abse nt s pe ci fi c ev ide nc e to the c ontrary , w e cannot say that [ the ] r at es . . . f

or the se thr ee a tto rn ey s do not f ull y r ef le ct the qua lity

of their repre sentation.”). W ithr es pe ct

to the r es ult s ob ta ine d, the Co ur t sa id tha t this f

ac tor li ke w ise w ill “ ge ne ra lly

. . . be sub sum ed

w ith in o the r fa ct or s us ed to ca lc ulate ar ea sona

ble fe e, ” an d th er ef

or e “ it nor

m al ly sho uld not pr ovi de a n in de pe nde nt b as is f or increasing the fee award.” Id . a t 90 0, 104 S . Ct . a t 15 49- 50. T he Co urt di d no t hol d, how ev er , that c onsi de ratio n of the r es ult s ob ta ine d is c at eg or ic al ly im pe rm iss ibl e. I n f

ac t, the Co urt t ook the opp osi te pos iti on, r ei te ratin g it s pr ior s t a t e me n tf

r o m He nsley : “ [W ] he re apla int if f ha s ob ta ine d e xc el le nt r es ult s, his attor ne y sho uld r ec ove r a fu lly

c om pe nsa tor y f ee . N orm al ly

thi s w ill e nc om

pa ss a ll hour s r ea sona

bly e xpe nde d onthe li tig at ion , a nd i nde ed in som e ca se s of71

exceptional success an enhancem ent award m ay be j ustified.” B lum , 465 U. S. at 901, 104 S . Ct . a t 15 50 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ) (quot ing He nsley , 461 U . S. a t 43 5, 103 S . Ct . a t 19 40) . A ga in, the Co urt i ndi cate d th at the de te rm inativ e co nsi de ratio n is w he the r the r ec or d c ont ai ns e vid en ce “ show [i ng] that the be ne fi t achieved requires an upward adj ustm ent to the fee. ” Id . a t 90 0, 104 S . Ct . a t 15 50. B lum thu s e sta

bli she s th at

e nhanc em en ts f

or qua lity of r ep re se ntatio n and exceptional results, while not warranted in m ost cases, are per m issib le w here supp orte d by

spe ci fi c ev ide nc e. T he re fo re , to ac ce pt Judge Carn es ’ vie wthat the se factors c an never be grounds for an enhancem ent, one w ouldhave to conclude that the Suprem e Court has repudiated that aspect of B lum . I find little supp ort for that pr opos iti on. Jud ge Carn es ’ opi nio n c ite s langua ge in P en nsy lv ani a v . D elaw are V all eyCi tiz en s’

Co unc il for

Cl ea n A ir

( De laware Valley I

), 478 U.S . 546, 106 S. Ct . 308 8, 92 L . E d. 2d 4 39 ( 1986 ), that, w he n r ea d iniso la tio n, a rg uably ch ar ac te ri ze s B lum a s havin g e sta bli she d ac at eg or ic al r

ule a ga ins t c onsi de ratio n of th e qua li ty of rep res en ta ti on an d t he res ul ts ob ta in ed . Se e id. at 565, 106 S. C t. at 3098 ( “ [W ] e spe ci fi ca lly

he ld i n B lum that . . . the ‘ qua lity of r ep re se ntatio n, ’ and the ‘ re sul ts o bta ine d’ f

ro m the li tig at iona re pr es um ab ly f ull y r ef le ct ed in the lod es tar am ount , and thus cannot se rv e as ind ep en de nt b as es f or inc re as ing the ba sic f ee aw ar d. ” (quot ing B lum , 46 5 U.S. at 89 8- 90 0, 1 04 S. Ct. at 15 48 -1 55 0) ).See B lum , 465 U.S. at 899, 104 S. Ct . at 1549 (statingthat quality of re prese ntation 1 “ may jus tif y an u pw ard a dju stm e nt o nly

in t he ra re c a se wh e re the fe e a

pp lic ant o ff

e rs sp e c if ic e vid e nc e to s ho w that th e qu a lity of se rv ic e re nd e re d w a s su

pe ri or to t hat on e re a so na

bly sh ou ld expect in light of the hour ly rate s char g ed and that the succe ss was ‘e x ceptional’ ” (quoting Hensley , 4 61 U. S. at 43 5, 10 3 S. Ct. at 19 40 )) ; id. at 90 0, 10 4 S. Ct. at 15 49 (“ Ab se nt s pe c if ic e vid e nc e to t

he c ontr ary , w e c ann ot s ay that [th e ] rate s . . . fo r t

he se thr e e atto rn e y s d o n ot f ull y 72 Judg e Car

nes’ reliance on this passage is m isplaced for a num ber of r easons. A s an ini tia l m atte r, the state m en t i s in te rn al ly inc onsi ste nt: w hil e pr ovi din g th at the nam ed fac tors “ cannot serve as independent b ases for incr easing the basic fee aw ar d, ” it al so i ndi cate s th at the f ac tor s are onl y

“pr es um ab ly ” re fl ec te d inthe lod es tar am ount . T hus, e ve n st an din g a lon e, the state m en t pr ovi de s un ce rt ai n supp ort f or Jud ge Carn es ’ opi nio n’ s c onc lus ion . Mor e sig nif

ic an tly , the state m en t i s no t a hol din g of

the Co urt. I t i s m er el y part of adis cu ssi on s um

m ar iz ing B lum and citing th e case with approval. A r eview of the discussi on as a whole m akes clear that the Court wa s not pu rporting to alter B lum in any

way . Indeed, in the sentence im m ediately following the languag e at iss ue , the Co urt r es ta te d B lum ’ s ho ldi ng tha t up w ar d a dj ustm en ts are pr ope r “ in ce rt ai n ‘ rare ’ and ‘ ex ce pti ona l’ c as es , sup porte d by both ‘ spe ci fi c ev ide nc e’ on the record and detailed findi ngs bythe lower courts.” Id

. ( quot ing B lum , 465 U. S. at 898-90 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1548-50 ). T he Court’ s refe rences to “ specific evidence” are quot ed from

the portions of B lum addressing th e showing necessary for an en hanc em en t ba se d onqua lity of r ep re se ntatio n. R ea d inthi s c ont ex t, the 1ref

lect the qua lity

of their r epre sentation.”). 73 langua ge c ite d by

Jud ge Carn es ’ opi nio n c an not r ea sona bly be c hara ct er iz ed

a s a d e p artu r e f

r o m B lum . Rather, it m

ust be const rued as a r eaff irm ation of B lum ’s te ac hin gs c onc er

nin g th e “ qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n” a nd “ re sul ts o bta ine d” f ac tor s: nam ely , that while these consid erations are presum ably ref lected in the lodestar fi gur e, and c an not

se rv e as gr ound s f

or a n e nhanc em en t w he re that i s th e ca se , the presum ption m ay

be rebutted by

specific evidence. The portions of De laware Valley I setting forth the Court’s holding con firm this in terpretation. In concludin g that the enhancem ent awarded by the district co urt w as im

pr ope r, the Co urt di sc uss ed the “ qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n” f

ac tor in non- cate gor ic al te rm s c onsi ste nt w ith B lum : “ Be ca use c onsi de ratio ns c onc er nin g the qua lity

of apr ev ai lin g party ’ s c ouns el ’ s r ep re se ntatio n norm all ya re r ef le ct ed in the reasonable hourly

rate, the overall quality

of perf orm ance ordi nari lysho uld not be used to adjust the lodestar, thus rem ovin g any danger of ‘ doub le counting .’ ” De laware Valley I

, 47 8 U.S. at 56 6, 1 06 S. Ct. at 30 99 (em ph as is ad de d) . Moreover, the Court conducted a case-specif ic analy sis, explaining how the re cord be fo re i t fa il edto supp or t an up wardad jus tm en t. Se e, e . g. , id. at 567, 106 S. C t. at 3099 ( not ing that ne ar ly

one -thir d of

hours r ea sona

bly spe nt o n r el ev an t ph as e of cas e were n ot co m

pe ns at edat h ou rly rate f

orm os t d iff

ic ul t wo rk ).74

It w as thi s la ck

of e vid en tiary

sup port—

rathe r than ablanke t r

ule a ga ins t consideration o f the quality of repr esentation or the results ob tained—that co m pe lle d r ev er sa l, a s th e Co urt r ep eate dly m ad e cl ear. A s to the a tto rn ey s’ perform ance, the Court stated: “ [V ] iewing the evidence subm itted by De laware V al le y to supp ort i ts p et iti on f

or a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s, the re is no i ndi catio n a s to w hy the lod es tar did

not pr ovi de ar ea sona

ble f ee a w ar d r ef

le ct ing the qua lity

of represe ntation . . . .” Id

. T he sam e co nc lus ionappl ie d to the r es ult s ob ta ine d:

“ D el aw ar e V al le y

pr es en te d no spe ci fi c ev ide nc e as to w ha t m ad e the r es ult s it obtained . . . so ‘ outst anding ,’ nor did it prov ide any indication that the lodestar figure for this portion of the case w as far below aw ards m ade in sim ilar ca ses wher e the court found equally superior qualityof perf

orm ance. ” Id

. a t 56 7- 68, 106 S. Ct. at 3099. Finally , the C ourt deem ed it signi ficant that neither of the lowe r courts “ m ade detailed findings as to why the lodestar am ount wa s unreasonable, an d inpart ic ular, a s to w hy the qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n w as not

r ef le ct ed in the product of the reasonable num ber of hours tim es the rea sonable ho urly rate. ” Id . at 568, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 99. T he Co urt l ef

t l itt le doubt tha t the se c onsi de ratio ns w er e cr iti ca l t o it s dispo sition of the case. U sing lang uage virtually identical to that of B lum , the Co urt c onc lud ed : “

In the abs en ce of suc h e vi de nc e and suc h fi ndi ngs , w e fi nd n o75

reason to increase the f

ee aw ard . . . f

or the quality

of repr esentation.” Id

. a t 56 8, 10 6 S . Ct. at 30 99 -1 00 (em ph as is ad de d) . Cf

. B lum , 465 U. S. at 900, 104 S. C t. at 15 49 (“ Abs en t s pe ci fic ev id en ce t o t he co nt rary, w e can no t s ay th at[th e] rates . . . for these three attorney s do no t fully ref lect the quality

of their re presentation.”). T he se state m en ts unde rm ine a ny sug ge sti on tha t De laware Valley I pr ec lud es c ourts f

ro m e ve r co nsi de ri ng the qua lity of r ep re se ntatio n and the r es ult s obt ai ne d a s gr ound s f

or e nhanc ing the lod es tar fi gur e. S uc h an in te rp re ta tio n cannot be squ ared w ith the Court’s r epeated descriptions of these factors as presum ptively , but not absolu tely , r eflec ted in the lod estar f igure. M oreover, had the Co urt i nte nde d to e sta bli sh s uc h ar

ule , it s e nti re dis cu ssi on c onc er nin g th e de fi ci en ci es in the r ec or d and the la ck of f ind ing s by

the low er

c ourts w oul d have be en un ne ces sa ry . Judg e Carn es ’ opi nio n arg ue s th at w e m ay ign or e the Co urt’ s st at em en ts regarding the recor d because they are m erely

alternative holding s. H owever , that view f ails to account for the statem ent that imm ediately prece des the Court’ s record an al ysi s : “ Be ca u s e c o n s i d er at i o n s co n ce rn i n g th e q u al i t y o f a p re v ai l i n g p ar t y’ s co unse l’ s r ep re se ntatio n norm all ya re r ef le ct ed in the r ea sona

ble hourl y

r at e, the overall quality

of perf orm ance ordi nari lyshoul d not b e used to adjust the lodestar .

. . . ” 478 U . S. a t 56 6, 106 S . Ct . a t 30 99 ( em pha sis a dde d) . A t no poi nt d id the76

Co urt su gge st tha t this unam big uous state m en t of

the gov er

nin g law( a state m en t that Ju dge Carn es ’ opi nio n do es not a ddr es s) w as som eh owa n a lte rn at ive ba sis f or its de ci sio n. Mo re ove r, a s di sc uss ed , the Co urt r ep eate dly m ad e cl ear that the ev ide nti ar

y de fi ci en ci es and l ac k of

f ind ing s w er e es se nti al to the out co m e in the cas e. Se e, e . g. , id. at 567, 106 S. C t. at 3099 (“ In sum , view ing th e evidence subm itt ed by D el aw ar e V al le y

to supp ort i ts p et iti on f

or a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s, the re is no ind ic at iona s to w hy

the lod es tar did

not pr ovi de ar ea sona

ble f ee a w ar d r ef

le ct ing the qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n pr ovi de d duri ng P ha se V of the li tig at ion . ”) ; id. a t 56 8, 10 6 S . Ct. at 30 99 -1 00 (“ In th e ab se nc e o f su ch ev id en ce an d s uc h fi nd in gs , we fin d n o re as on to in crea se th e fee award. . . fo r th e qua li ty of rep res en ta ti on .”). Ther e sim

ply is no basis for concluding, as Judge Carnes’ opini on do es, that w e ar e fr ee to dis re gard

vir tua lly a ll of P ar t I II . B o f the Co urt’ s op ini on. Judg e Car

nes’ opini on also relies on lang uage in which the Court described en hanc em en ts f

or sup er ior pe rf orm an ce a s “ unne ce ssary ” fo r pur pose s of e nabli ng pl ai nt iff s t o s ecu re l eg al ass is ta nc e. Se e id. a t5 6 6 , 1 0 6 S . C t . a t3 0 9 8 . I n th e s a me dis cu ssi on, how ev er , the Co urt r ei te rate d th at suc h e nhanc em en ts are not cate gor ic al ly

barr ed , de spi te be ing dis favor ed a s age ne ra l m atte r. I n e xpl ai nin g the r ea sons f

or the “ str ong pr es um

pti on” that the lod es tar fi gur e re pr es en ts a reas on ab le fee, se e id. at 565, 106 S. C t. at 3098 , the C ourt noted th at an attorneyJ udg e Carne s’opinion also asserts that e nhance ments for super ior perf ormanc e ca

nnot 2 be re conciled w ith City of Burli ngton v. Dague , 505 U.S. 557, 112 S. C t. 2638, 120 L . Ed. 2d 449 (1 9 9 2 ), i nwh i ch th e C o urth el d th aten h an ce m en t s fo r c o n t i n gen cy ar e n o tp erm i t t ed . As J u d ge Carnes’ opinion notes, the DagueCourt de fi ne d a n atto rn e y ’s c ontin g e nt r isk in a pa rt ic ula r c a se as the produc t of “(1) the leg al and f actua l merits of the cla im, and (2) the dif ficulty of establishing those merits.” Id. at 562, 112 S. Ct. at 2641. However , Dagueis i na pp os ite beca use, unlike an attorney ’s level of risk, the quality

of his or her

repr esentation cannot be define d solely

by ref ere nce to these two fac tors. Two attorne y s could bringidentical cla ims, the merits of which a

re e qually difficult to establish. Even if both attorne y s preva il, it does not follow that their re spective pe rfor mance s were nece ssarily

equal in quality . In any

g iven ca se, a ho st o f f a c tor s b e y on d th os e re latin gsp e c if ic a lly to t he me ri ts o f a

c la im a re pe rt ine nt t o assessingthe quality

of an attorney ’s re prese ntation. Nothing in Dagueprec ludes courts fr om c on sid e ri ngthe se a dd iti on a l f a c tor s a s p os sib le g ro un ds fo r a n e nh anc e me nt. 77 w ho a cc ep ts a

c as e “ obl igate s hi m se lf

to pe rf orm to the be st o f his abil ity

a nd t o p ro du ce th e b es tp o s s i b l e r es u l t s co m m en s u ra t e w i t h h i s s k i l l an dh i s cl i en t ’s interests.” Id. Ther efore, the Court said, “ [c] alculating the fee aw ard in a m anner that a cc ount s f

or the se f ac tor s, e ith er

in de te rm ini ng the r ea sona ble num be r of ho ur s ex pe nd edon th e li ti ga ti on or i n s et ti ng th e rea so nabl e h ou rly rate, . . . ad eq ua te ly com

pe ns at es th e at to rn ey , and le av es v er y lit tle roo m for

e nhan ci ng t

he award b ased on h is pos t-engagement performance .” Id . at 565-66, 106 S. Ct. at 3098 (em phasis add ed). T he Court’ s subs equent description of perf orm ance-based enhancem ents as “ unnecessary ” m ust be read in light o f that statem ent, which m ak es cle ar t ha t s uc h a dju st m en ts are p erm is si bl e u nd er n arro w cir cu m st an ces . G ive n th at

ins tr uc tio n, a s w el l a s th e Co ur t’ s nu m er ous oth er

state m en ts ar tic ulatin g anon -c at eg or ic al appr oa ch , the langua ge c ite d by Jud ge Carn es ’ opi nio n c an not

be r ea d to pr ec lud e en hanc em en ts f or pe rf orm an ce in al l c as es . 278

A cc or din gly , I c an not

a cc ep t the c onc lus ionthat our de ci sio ns i n NA AC P v . City of Ev ergreen , 812 F . 2d 1 332 (1 1thCi r. 198 7) , a nd No rm an v . H ousi ng A uth ori tyof M

ont gom er y , 83 6 F .2d12 92 (11 th Cir . 19 88 ), were wro ng ly deci de d. In NA AC P , the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d ar eque st f or a n e nhanc em en t bu t f

ai le d to m ak e fi ndi ngs w ithr eg ar d to one of the f ac tor s r el ie d up on a s aj ust if ic at ion : “ the as se rt ionthat the r el ie f obt ai ne d w as of gr eat be ne fi t t o th e bla ck c iti ze ns o f E ve rg re enand r ep re se nte d e xc ep tio na l su cc es s. ” 812 F . 2d at 13 36. Whil e str es sin g th at

the r es ult s ob ta ine d “ nor m al ly w ill be sub sum ed

in the c al cu la tio n of a re asonable fee, ” id. a t 13 37, w e not ed that “ [t ] he a w ar d m ay

be e nhanc ed

. . . ‘ in som e case s of exceptional success,’ ” id. ( quot ing B lum , 465 U . S. a t 89 7, 104 S . Ct . at15 48 ). W e th eref

or e rem an de d fo r reco ns id erat io n i n l ig ht of t ho se pri nc ip le s. Id . S im ilarl y , in No rm an , the district court fa iled to m ake a f indin g as to whether the results obtain ed we re e xceptional. 836 F.2d at 1306. In re m anding , w e w ere care ful to note that even a finding of exceptional results would not suppo rt an enhancem ent unless th e court also found that coun sel’ s representation “ wa s superior to that which would have been expected considering th e rates requested.” Id . ( ci tin g B lum , 46 5 U.S. at 89 9, 1 04 S. Ct. at 15 49 ). NA AC P a nd No rm an thu sSince NAA CP and Norman we re de c ide d, we have re pe ate dly re ite rate d th e ir 3 understandingof the Court’s tea ching s. See Ass’n of Disabled Ams. v. NeptuneDesigns, Inc . , 46 9 F .3 d 1 35 7, 13 59 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 6) (p e r c ur iam) (“ Th e c ourt may the n a dju st t

he lod e sta

r t o rea ch a mor e appr opriate attorney ’s fe e, base d on a var iety of fa ctors, includingthe degree of the plaintiff’s succ ess in the suit.”); Villano v. City of Boynton Beach , 2 54 F .3 d 1 30 2, 13 08 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (“I f the c ourt deter mines that the result obtained w as an e x cellent r esult, then the awa rd of fe e s ‘ wi ll e nc omp a ss a ll h ours re a so na bly e xpe nd e d o n th e lit ig atio n, and ind e e d in s o m e c as es o f e x ce p t i o n al s u cc es s an en h an ce d aw ar d m ay b e j u s t i fi ed . ’” (qu o t i n g Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S. Ct . at 1940)) ; Duck worth v. W

hisenant , 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 ( 11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam order inc orporating district cour t decision into opinion) (“Afte r dete rmining the lodestar, the c ourt may

adjust the amount depe nding upon a number of f

actor s, including the qu a lity of the re su lts and

re pr e se ntatio n o f t

he lit ig atio n. ” ); Lorange r v . S tie rh e im , 10 F.3d 776, 78 1 ( 11 th C ir . 1 99 4) (p e r c ur iam) (“ [Th e ] ‘l od e sta r’ may the n b e a dju ste d f

or the re su lts obtained.”) . 79 ar e fu lly c onsi ste nt w iththe pr inc ipl es se t f orth i n He nsley , B lum , a nd D elaw are Valley I . 3 Oth er ci rcu it s s ha re o urun de rs ta nd in g o f th e Co ur t’s t each in gs . Se e, e . g. , G ei er v . Sun dqui

st , 372 F. 3d 78 4, 794-95 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that De laware Valley I pe rm its e nhanc em en ts b as ed on qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n and re sul ts o bta ine d inr ar e an d e xc ep tio na l c as es ); V an G erwe n v . G uara nte e M ut. L ife Co . , 214 F . 3d 1 041, 104 6 ( 9thCi r. 200 0) ( statin g th at upw ar d a dj ustm en t f

or qua lit y of r ep re se ntatio n “ is j ust if

ie d on ly in the r ar e ca se w he re the re is spe ci fi c evidence that the qualityof service wa s superior in lig ht of the hourlyrates c harged an d th at the suc ce ss w as e xc ep tio na l” ); Hy att v. A pfel , 195 F. 3d 18 8, 192 (4th Cir. 1999 ) (a ff irm ing e nhanc em en t f

or r es ult s ob ta ine d) ; For

sh ee v. Wate rl oo Indus ., Inc. , 178 F . 3d 5 27, 532 ( 8thCi r. 199 9) ( statin g th at , to j ust if y e nhanc em en t f

or80

outst anding service and results, applicant “ m ust establis h that the qualit y of service re nde re d and the r es ult s ob ta ine d w er e supe ri or to w ha t on e re as ona

bly sho uld expe ct in lig ht o f the hourl y

r at es c harg ed

a nd the num

be r of hours e xpe nde d” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar

ks o m itt ed )) ; Q uara tin o v . T iff any& Co . , 166 F . 3d 4 22, 425 (2 d C ir . 199 9) ( “ T he lod es tar m ay be a dj ust ed

ba se d onse ve ra l f

ac tor s, inc lud ing in p ar tic ular the r es ult s ob ta ine d . . . . ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed )) ; Roe v . C

heyenne Mountain Conf

erence R esort, Inc. , 124 F . 3d 1 221, 1233 n. 8 ( 10th C ir . 199 7) ( “ T he lod es tar fi gur e m ay be a dj ust ed

to sui t the part ic ular ci rc um stanc es of the c as e, e spe ci al ly

w he re the de gr ee of

suc ce ss ac hie ve d is e xc ep tio na l. ”) ; Shi pes v . T rin ityI ndus . , 987 F. 2d 31 1, 320 (5th Cir. 1993 ) (n oti ng tha t up w ar d a dj ustm en ts b as ed on qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n and re sul ts o bta ine d are pr ope r w he re sup porte d by spe ci fi c ev ide nc e on r ec or d and detailed finding s by

lower courts). In eac h of these cases, the court rec ogni zed (at le as t i m pli ci tly ) that De laware Valley I did not f undam en ta lly

a lte r the c ontro lli ng lawr eg ar din g e nhanc em en ts f or out standi ng p er fo rm an ce a nd r es ult s. Jud ge Carnes’ opini on thu s conflicts not o nly with tw o decades of our own j urisprudence, but a lso w iththe de ci sio ns o f num er ous oth er c ourts.81 II. In this case, the district court m ade detailed findings as to why the lodestar fi gur e did not f ull y r ef le ct the qua lity

of r ep re se ntatio n and the e xc ep tio na l r es ult s ac hie ve d. A s to the f

orm er , the c ourt f

ound that “ the qua lity

of se rv ic e re nde re d by class counsel, includin g their extraordinary com m itm ent of capital re sources, w as far supe ri or

to w ha t c onsum er s of

le ga l se rv ic es in the le ga l m ar ke tpl ac e in A tlanta could reasonablyexpect to rece ive for the rates used in th e lodestar calc ulation .” Ke nnyA . e

x re l. W inn v . P erdue (

Kenny A . I

II ), 45 4 F . Sup p. 2 d 1 26 0, 1 28 8 (N.D. G a. 200 6) . I n su

ppor t of that c onc lus ion , the c ourt c ite d a ff idavit s su bm itt ed by fo ur a tto rn ey s w ithe xte nsi ve e xpe ri en ce in the A tlanta le ga l m ar

ke t, part ic ularl y

in th e are a o f cl as s ac ti on li ti ga ti on . Se e id. at 1290. T hese attorney s each stated that the hourl y

r at es c la im ed

by c ouns el w oul d no t pr ovi de a f ee suf fi ci en t t o r ef

le ct the va lue of the se rv ic es pe rf

orm ed . F or

e xa m ple , H en ry

D . F el low s, Jr . te sti fi ed : In the c u rr e n tA t l a n t am a rk e tf o r l e g a l s e rv i c e s , th e S t a n d ar dH o u r ly Ra te s sp e c i f

i e di n th e D e c l a r a t i o n s o f M a r c i aR o b i n s o n L o w ry a nd Je ff r e y O . B r a m l e t t w o u l d b e g e n e r a l l y i n a d e qu a t e a n d i n s u f f i c i e n t t o i n du c e l a w y e r s o f

c o m p a r ab l e s k i l l , j u d g m e n t , p r o f e s s i o n a l r e p u t at ion an d e xpe ri en ce to pe rf

orm the ne ce ssary se rv ic es to p ro se cu te ac as e of thi s m ag nit

ude on te rm s whe re the law y er s are not pa id o n an on goi ng ba sis a s th e w ork is be ing pe rf orm ed , a re r equir ed

to adva nce c as e expe nse s of

$1. 7 m ill ion over

athr ee y ear pe ri od w ithno o ngoi ng re im bur se m en t, an d the l awy er s’ abil ity to re co ve r a fe e an d e xpe nse reim bursem ent are com

pletely conting ent on the ou tcom e of the ca se.82

[F el low s D ec l. , R3 2:4 95: E x. G :¶ 7; se e als o K now le s D ec l. , R3 2:4 95: E x. D :¶ 11; Ch an dl er Decl ., R32 :4 95 :Ex .F:¶ 7; Rawl s Dec l., R3 2: 49 5: Ex.H: ¶7 .] Inthe vie wof

thr ee of the se a tto rn ey s, a1. 5- 2 m ult ipl ie r w as ne ce ssary

to br ing the f ee aw ar d in to l ine w ithaw ar ds i n c om para ble c la ss a ct ionli tig at ion s inthe A tlanta m ar ke t: T ak ing int o a cc ount the w ork re qui re d to ac hie ve the re sul ts o bta ine d f or the pla int if

f cl as s in this ca se , the le ve l of exp en se a nd r isk e nta ile d f

or cl as s c ouns el to pr ose cu te thi s c as e ove r a thr ee -y ear pe ri od w ith recovery of fee and inves t m en t in advanced case expenses, and fees ac tua lly aw ar de d by

c ourts i n c la ss a ct ion s in thi s dis tr ic t in s ec ur iti es , an titru st and oth er ty

pe s of non- ci vil r igh ts c as es pr es en tin g c om para ble com plexityand risk, a m

ultip lier of no less than 1.5-2 tim es the lodestar am ount . . . w oul d y ie ld a

r ea sona ble f ee c onsi ste nt w ithpr ev ai li ng prices in the Atlanta legal m arket for legal services of c om

parable value. [F el low s D ec l. , R3 2:4 95: E x. G :¶ 8; se e als o Ch an dle r D ec l. , R3 2:4 95: E x. F: ¶8 ; Rawl s Dec l., R3 2: 49 5: Ex.H: ¶8 .] Judg e Carn es ’ opi nio n di sc ount s th es e af fi da vit s onthe gr ound

that the fa ct or s i de nti fi ed

in the m —the la ck

of ong oin g paym en t, the a dvanc em en t of c as e expe nse s, and the c ont ing en t natur e of the f ee r ec ove ry

a nd re im bur se m en t— cannot

sup port an e nhanc em en t. I a gr ee w iththat c onc lus ion in so far a s i t p ert ai ns to co nt in ge nc y . Se e Ci tyof B url ing ton v . D ague , 505 U. S. 557, 567, 112 S. Ct. 2638 , 2643-44, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992) (holdi ng that en hanc em en t f

or c ont ing en cy

is not pe rm itt ed

und er f ee -s hif tin g st at ute s) . T he83

oth er tw o f ac tor s, Jud ge Carn es be lie ve s, have a lr ea dy be ena cc ount ed

f or be ca use th e lo de st ar was cal cu la te d u si ng cu rren t ra th er t ha n h is to ric ho ur ly rates . Se e ant e at 33- 34( ci tin g No rm an , 836 F . 2d at 13 02) . B ut w e did not hol d in No rm an that the use of curre nt rates w ill alway s be sufficient to com pensate for delay ed paym en t. H er e, the a ff

idavit te sti m ony

ind ic at es that the r at es use d to c al cu la te the lod es tar, a lth oughc ur

re nt, w oul d be ina de qua te to pr ovi de ar ea sona ble f ee in lig ht of the e xc ep tio na lly

hig h c om

m itm en t of

c ap ita l r es our ce s by

the a tto rn ey s and the thr ee -y ear de lay

in re ce ipt

of paym en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y r el ie d onthi s ev ide nc e in c onc lud ing that an up w ar d a dj ustm en t w as w ar rante d. Judg e Carn es ’ opi nio n a lso f au lts the dis tr ic t c ourt f

or f ai lin g to giv e sufficient we ight to the testify ing attorney s’ own interest in securing a high fee aw ar d f or pla int if fs ’ c ouns el in thi s c as e. B ut d et er m inatio ns a s to the c re dib ili ty an d th e w ei ght

of te sti m oni al e vid en ce a re c le ar ly w ith in the pur

vie wof the di st ric t co ur t i n t he se cir cu m st an ces . Se e Ch ild re y v. B en ne tt , 997 F . 2d 8 30, 834 (1 1thCi r. 199 3) ( “ [I ] t i s th e ex cl usi ve pr ovi nc e of the j udge in non-

j ur y tr ia ls t o assess the credibility

of w itnesses and to assign we ight to their testim ony .” ). Such de te rm inatio ns a lw ay s in vol ve an a sse ssm en t of the f ac tor s be ar ing upo n a w itn es s’ s ob

j ec tiv ity . I t c an not

r ea sona bly be c ont en de d th at

the able a nd expe ri en ce d di str ic t j udge in thi s c as e ne ve r co nsi de re d th e poss ibi lity that the84

af fi an ts— w ho are pr om ine nt A tlanta a tto rn ey s—m igh t be kno w n by pla int if fs ’ co unse l, or

that the y c oul d de ri ve a n in dir ec t be ne fi t f ro m the pr ec ed en tia l va lue of a high fee aw ard. T he court concluded, however, that these considerations we re ou twei gh edby oth er fa ct or s t ha t b ol st ered th e p ro ba ti ve va lu e o f th ei r te st im on y . T he se inc lud ed

the c ourt’ s f

am ili ar ity w iththe a ff

iants , the ir

r ep utatio ns i n th e Atl an ta leg al co m

m un it y , and th ei r ex pe rie nc e in co m pl ex cla ss act io n l it ig at io ns . See Kenny A . I

II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 90. Abse nt any sho w ing of

c le ar e rr or , it is im pr ope r fo r us t o se co nd- gue ss the c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n, e ve n if w e w oul d have m ad e a d iff

eren t cr ed ib il it y

fin di ng or we ig he d t he ev id en ce d iff eren tl y . Jo hnso n v. D eS oto Co unt y B d. of Co m m ’r

s , 72 F . 3d 1 556, 156 1 n. 5 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) ( “ T he credibility

of com peting exp erts and the we ight to be acc orded the evidence subm itted by

both si des will, of course, be decided by the district court, subje ct onlyto clear ly erroneous reviewon appeal.”) ; J ones v . Ch ild

er s , 18 F . 3d 8 99, 908 (1 1 t h Ci r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( “ We . . . wi l l n o tp re s u m e t o s ec o n d g u es s th e t ri al ju d g e’s as se ssm en t of

the cr ed ibi lity

of the w itn es se s and the w ei ght a ssi gne d to the ir te sti m ony . ”) . S uc h de fe re nc e is p ar tic ularl y appr opr ia te in thi s c as e, giv enthat the defendants did n ot introd uce evidence challenging the attorney s’ conclusion that ane nhanc em en t w as ne ce ssary to y ie ld a f ee c onsi ste nt w ithpr ev ai lin g r at es in the A tlanta le ga l m ar

ke t f or sim ilar se rv ic es .85

In addition to the affidavits, the district court took into account its personal observation s of the attorney s’ perform ance in this case: [T ] he court finds that the superb quality of [counsel’ s] repre sentation far ex ce ed ed w ha t c oul d r ea sona

bly be e xpe ct ed

f or the st an da rd hourl y rates used to calculate the lodestar. Q uite sim ply , plai n t i ffs’ counsel br ough t a highe r de gr ee of ski ll, c om

m itm en t, de dic at ion , a nd pr of es sio na li sm to this li tig at ionthan th e Co urt ha s se endis play ed by the a tto rn ey s inany

oth er c as e dur ing it s 2 7 y ears on th e be nc h. T he fo ste r ch ildre n of Ful ton an d De K al b Count ie s we re ind ee d fortun at e to ha ve suc h unpara lle le d le ga l r ep re se nt at io n, a nd the Co urt w oul d be re m iss if it f ai le d to c om

pe nsa te c ouns el f

or thi s ex tr ao rd inary le ve l of se rv ic e to the ir

c lie nts . Kenny A . I

II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 88- 89; se e als o id . a t 12 86 ( “ [B ] as ed

upo n th e Co urt’ s own su

bst an tia l e xpe ri en ce a nd f am ili ar ity w iththe pr ev ai lin g r at es in A tlanta , and the Co urt’ s ob se rv at ionof the ste llar pe rf

orm an ce of

pla int if fs ’ counsel throu ghou t this lo ng and di fficult case , it f inds th e re quested ho urly rates em inentlyfair and reasonable. If anything , they are too low.”) . Inthe are a of

f ee aw ar ds, it

is w el l e sta

bli she d th at

“ [t ] he c ourt . . . is its el f an expert on the questio n and m ay consider its own kno wledge and experience co nc ern in g re as on ab le an d p ro pe r fee s an d m ay for m an in de pe nd en t ju dg m en t . . . as to value.” No rm an , 836 F . 2d at 13 03 ( quot ing Campbell v. Gree n , 112 F . 2d 143, 144 ( 5thCi r. 194 0) ). A s part of thi s de te rm inatio n, the c ourt m ay f ac tor in its pe rs on al ass es sm en t o f th e qua li ty of co un se l’s re pr es en ta ti on . See D uckworth v.86

W his en ant , 97 F . 3d 1 393, 139 7 ( 11th C ir . 199 6) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt thus did not er r in r el y ing on the se c onsi de ratio ns a s a ddi tio na l gr ound s f or a n e nhanc em en t. As to the results obtained, the court found that th e plaintiffs’ success wa s

“ truly exceptional.” Kenny A . I II , 454 F . S upp. 2d at 12 89. T he c ourt pr ovi de d a de ta ile d su m

m ar y of the Co nse nt D ec re e en te re d in to b y the part ie s, f

ind ing that i t pr ovi de d “ sw ee pin g r el ie f to the pla int if f cl as s” a nd w as “ co m

pr eh en siv e in i ts scope and detailed in its coverage. ” Id . Based on these considerations, the court fo und the r es ult

a ch ie ve d to be “ ex tr ao rd inary , ” part ic ularl y in lig ht o f “ the co nte nti ousn es s of

the li tig at ion , c om

ple xity of the iss ue s and the unc er

ta int ie s and delay s of further litigation.” Id . at 1 29 0 (i nt ern al qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) . To unde rs co re the tr

uly e xc ep tio na l natur e of

the out co m e, the c ourt a ga in c ite d it s ow n e xpe ri en ce : “ A ft er

58 y ears a s apr ac tic ing a tto rn ey a nd f ed er al j udge , the Co urt i s un aw ar e of

any oth er c as e in whic h apla int if

f cl as s ha s a ch ie ve d su cha favorable re sult on such a com prehensive scale.” Id

. Judg e Carn es ’ opi nio n take s is sue w iththe c ourt’ s st at em en t tha t the re m ed ia l m ea sur es e sta

bli she d by

the Co nse nt D ec re e go b ey ond the r el ie f the pla int if fs li ke ly w oul d have obt ai ne d ha d th ey pr ev ai le d a t tri al . W e ha ve re co gni ze d, how ev er , that the une xpe ct ed na tur e of ar es ult is re le vant t o th e de te rm in at io n o f whe th er i t i s ex cep ti on al . Se e No rm an , 8 3 6 F. 2 dat 1 3 0 2 (“[A]n87

out co m e that i s no t un expe ct ed in the c ont ex t of

e xtant s ubst an tiv e laww ill not ordinarily be exceptional.”) . In finding exceptio nal results here, the district court did no t err in consid ering the fact that the r em edies agreed upon by the parties ex ce ed ed it s own e xpe ct at ion s a s to the na tur e an d sc ope of r el ie f lik el y

to re sul t fro m th is li ti ga ti on . Se e id. ( “ E xc ep tio na l r es ult s are r es ult s th at a re out of the ordinary , unusual or rare .” ). Mor eo ve r, oth er

c ourts h av e re co gni ze d th at r es ult s si m ilar to those obt ai ne d he re c anj ust if

y an e nhanc em en t. F or

e xa m ple , in Hy att v. A

pfel , 195 F. 3d 1 88 ( 4thCi r. 199 9) , the F ourth C ir cu it af fi rm ed a n e nhanc em en t f

or r es ult s obt ai ne d w he re the pla int if f cl as s pr ev ai le d inc ha lle ngi ng a S oc ia l S ec ur ity Adm inistration policy

pertaining to di sabilitybenefits. The e nhancem ent was pr ope r, the c ourt he ld, be ca use the pla int if

fs “ suc ce ed ed

in br ing ing about fundam en ta l c hange to a re ca lc itr an t a ge nc y , ” the c ha lle nge d po lic y a ff ec te d th e de te rm inatio n of

hun dr ed s of

tho usands of

dis ab ili ty

c la im s, a nd the gov er

nm en t pr om ul ga te d n ew na ti on al reg ul at io ns in res po ns e to th e li ti ga ti on . Id . at 1 91 -9 2. T he c ourt a lso f

ound it sig nif ic an t tha t “ [t ] he se r es ult s w er e obt ai ne d inthe f ac e of m onum ental resistance [ by the governm ent] on every claim .” Id

. a t 19 2. T he se factors c losely

resem ble those inv olved in this case, wher e the plaintiffs succeeded88

in e ff ec tin g sy ste m ic c hange s to the f ost er c ar e sy ste m s inF ult on and D eK al b Co unt ie s, in spi te of

c onsi de ra

ble opp osi tio n by

de fe ndants . L ike w ise , in Ship es v. Trinity Industr ies , 987 F . 2d 3 11 ( 5thCi r. 199 3) , the Fifth Circuit held that an enhancem ent m ight b e w arranted for the results obtained in a “ le ng th y

an d p ro tra ct ed ” Tit le VII cl as s ac ti on . Id . at 322. T he court noted that the pla int if

f’ s vi ct or y w as c om ple te on a ll iss ue s and r es ult ed in both subs tanti al m one tary

dam ag es and, “ ve ry

im portantl y , f

uture pr ote ct iona ga ins t discrim ination in the form of injunctive re lief. ” Id

. T he Co nse nt D ec re e in this ca se pr ovi de s si m ilarl y

c om pr eh en siv e re lie f. I t r em ed ie s nu m er ous ex ist ing de fi ci en ci es in the de liv er y of f ost er c ar e se rv ic es a nd p ro vid es sa fe guard s a ga ins t future unlawf

ul condu ct by

defendants. T hese results are no less exceptional than tho se obt ai ne d in Ship es . A d d i t i o n a l l y, w e h a v e r e c o g n i z e dth a tth e p ub l i c b e n e f i tc r e a t e db y a lawsuit is an im

portant factor in the determ ination of a r easonable fee aw ard. In Villano v. City of Boynton Beach , 254 F . 3d 1 302 (1 1thCi r. 200 1) , w e he ld tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in re duc ing apla int if

f’ s f ee a w ar d w ith out

c onsi de ri ng the pu bl ic be ne fit of t he cas e. Id . a t 13 07. W e state d th at

“ [p ] ubl ic be ne fi t i s a distin ct m easure of success in civil right s actions,” and thus it m ust be accounted fo r in th e cal cu la ti on of a fee awa rd . Id . W e furthe r re co gni ze d th at the89

vin dic at ionof

ac onst itu tio na l r igh t a ga ins t a gov er nm en t i nst itu tio n he igh te ns a law sui t’ s pu

bli c be ne fi t by

de te rr ing f

uture unc onst itu tio na l c ondu ct by pub lic of fic ia ls . Id

. ; se e als o P opha m v . Ci tyof Ke nnesaw , 820 F . 2d 1 570, 158 0 ( 11th Cir. 1987 ) (“ The a ffirm ation of consti tutio nal principles prod uces an undou bted publ ic be ne fi t tha t c ourts m ust c onsi de r in aw ar din g a tto rn ey s’ f ee s un de r Se ct ion 1988 . ”) . A cc or din gly , w e ins tr uc te d th e dis tr ic t c ourt a s f oll ow s: O n r em an d, the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust e xam in e the qua lit at ive va lue of [p la int if f’ s] suc ce sse s. I n do ing so, the c ourt ne ed s to a cc ount f or the vital role pr ivate li tig at ionplay s inthe e nf or ce m en t of

c ivi l r igh ts, the difficulties invo lved in su staining t h ose lawsuits, the heightened im portanc e of

suc h law sui ts whe n th e de fe ndant i s apub lic body , a nd the pub lic be ne fi t tha t occ ur s whe n th ose law sui ts u lti m at el y vin dic at e a co nst itu tio na l r igh t. V illano , 254 F. 3d at 130 8 (citation om itted). A lth ough V

illano invol ved the reduction of a fee aw ard rather than an en hanc em en t, it s pr inc ipl es are r el ev an t t o th is c as e. T hr oughthe pr ovi sio ns o f the Consent Decr ee, the plaintiffs have obtained redress for the constituti onal vio la tio ns a lle ge d inthe c om pla int , the re by

vin dic at ing the c onst itu tio na l r igh ts o f the c la ss m em

be rs . G ive n th e sc ope of the r em ed ia l m ea sur es a gr ee d to by the de fen da nt s, t he pu bl ic be ne fit crea te d b y th is li ti ga ti on is en or m ou s. Se e No rm an , 836 F.2d at 1302 (stating that vin dication of class-wide rights is generally m ore sig nif ic an t than r el ie f fo r iso la te d c onst itu tio na l vi olatio n) . T his c onsi de ratio nJ udg e Carne s’ opinion argues that the public be nefit cr eate d by a lawsuit ca

nnot be a 4 fac tor supportingan enha nceme nt beca

use eve ry suit that vindi cate s a fe dera l rig ht benef its the pu bli c in s ome wa

y . T he re fo re , h e argue s, takin gthe pu bli c be ne fi t into a c c ount w ou ld r e su lt i n an enha nceme nt in every

succe ssful fee case . Idisag ree . The fa ct that eve ry vindication of fede ral rights confer s some public benef it does not mean that the be nefit is equal in eve ry case . Th e pr e se nt c a se un de rs c or e s th is p oint. T he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s op ini on de mon str ate s th at th e pu

bli c benef it created her e wa s truly

exceptional, far

exceedingthat achie ved in the majority of ca ses of this ty pe. See Ke nny A. II

I , 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (“ After 58 y ear s as a pr acticingattorney and fede ral judg e, the Court is unawa re of any other c ase in whic h a plaintiff c lass has ac hieved suc h a fa vorable result on such a

compre hensive sca le.”) . Takingthis factor into ac count is proper under the “re sults obtained” ana ly sis, which asks whethe r the outcome in the case was “ out of the ordinary , unusual or ra

re.” Norman , 836 F.2d at 1302.

90 furthe r supp orts the c onc lus ionthat an e nhanc em en t f or e xc ep tio na l su cc es s is warranted in this case. 4 III . I find no abuse of discretion in the district court’ s fee award. The c ourt m ad e de ta ile d f

ind ing s a s to w hy

the lod es tar did

not f ull y r ef le ct the qua lity

of represe ntation and the results achieved in this case, and those findi ngs are supp orted by

specific evidence in the re cord. Beca use I conclude that the district co urt’ s de ci sio n is c onsi ste nt w ithc ontro lli ng S upr em e Co urt and E le ve nthCi rc uit pr ec ed en ts, I c onc ur

onl y in the r es ult .91

H ill , J. , c onc ur

ri ng: I co nc ur in the j udgm en t. T he e nhanc em en t by the dis tr ic t c ourt i s du e to b e affi rm edbe cau se we are b ou nd by the pri orcas es of o urco ur t, NAA CP v . Ci tyof Ev ergreen , 812 F . 2d 1 332 (1 1thCi r. 198 7) , a nd No rm an v . H ousi ng A uth ori tyof M ont gom er y , 836 F. 2d 12 92 (11th Cir. 1988 ). I do n ot a dd anythi ng t o m y c oll ea gue s’ dis cu ssi ons of the hol din g and opi nio ns i n th ose c as es oth er than to a cknow le dge that the y a re sc hol ar ly

a nd w el l done. N o do ubt

the se a ddi tio na l w ri tin gs w ill be of int er es t t o j ur ist s w ho m igh t wish to pursue the m atter in further proceedings, should any arise.