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[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 22 (Tuesday, February 3, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 5876-5880]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-02053]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology

[Docket Number: OST-2014-0112]

Agency Information Collection Activity; Response to Comments on 
Notice of Request for Approval To Collect New Information: Voluntary 
Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas Operations on the Outer Continental 
Shelf

AGENCY: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R), U.S. 
Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Notice; response to comments.

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SUMMARY: On July 2, 2014, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) 
announced its intention in a Federal Register Notice (79 FR 37837) to 
request that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approve the 
following

[[Page 5877]]

information collection: Voluntary Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas 
Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). At that time, BTS also 
encouraged interested parties to submit comments to docket number DOT-
OST-2014-0112, allowing for a 60-day comment period. The comment period 
closed on September 2, 2014. BTS received three public comments from: 
LLOG Exploration (DOT-OST-2014-0112-0004), the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) and the Center for Offshore Safety (COS) (DOT-OST-2014-
0112-0003), and the Offshore Operators Committee (OOC) (DOT-OST-2014-
0112-0002). The purpose of this Notice is to respond to the comments 
received on the July 2, 2014 announcement and allow 30 days for public 
comment to OMB on this collection from all interested individuals and 
organizations.

DATES: Written comments should be submitted by March 5, 2015.

ADDRESSES: BTS seeks public comments on its proposed information 
collection. Comments should address whether the information will have 
practical utility; the accuracy of the estimated burden hours of the 
proposed information collection; ways to enhance the quality, utility 
and clarity of the information to be collected; and ways to minimize 
the burden of the collection of information on respondents, including 
the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology. Send comments to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street 
NW., Washington, DC 20503, Attention: BTS Desk Officer.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Demetra V. Collia, Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Research and Technology, U.S. Department of Transportation, RTS-31, 
E36-302, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001; Phone 
No. (202) 366-1610; Fax No. (202) 366-3383; email: 
demetra.collia@dot.gov. Office hours are from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., EST, 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Data Confidentiality Provisions: The confidentiality of near miss 
data is protected under the BTS confidentiality statute (49 U.S.C. 
6307) and the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical 
Efficiency Act (CIPSEA) of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, Title V). In 
accordance with these confidentiality statutes, only statistical and 
non-identifying data will be made publicly available through reports. 
BTS will not release to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE), or to any other public or private entity, any 
information that might reveal the identity of individuals or 
organizations mentioned in near miss reports without explicit consent 
of the respondent.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. The Data Collection

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. chapter 35; as 
amended) and 5 CFR part 1320 require each Federal agency to obtain OMB 
approval to initiate an information collection activity. BTS is seeking 
OMB approval for the following BTS information collection activity:
    Title: Voluntary Confidential Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas 
Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf.
    OMB Control Number: TBD.
    Type of Review: Approval of data collection.
    Respondents: Employees working in the oil and gas industry on the 
OCS.
    Number of Potential Responses: Based on near miss reporting trends 
in other industries, BTS expects to receive no more than two responses 
per calendar day during the first three years of the program 
(approximately 730 responses per year).
    Estimated Time per Response: Not to exceed 60 minutes (this 
includes estimated time for a follow up interview, if needed).
    Frequency: Intermittent for 3 years. (Reports are submitted when 
there is a qualifying event, i.e., when a near miss occurs in oil and 
gas operations on the OCS.)
    Total Annual Burden: 730 hours.

II. Public Participation and Request for Public Comments

    On July 2, 2014, BTS published a notice (70 FR 37837) encouraging 
interested parties to submit comments to docket number DOT-OST-2014-
0112 and allowing for a 60-day comment period. The comment period 
closed on September 2, 2014. To view comments, go to http://www.regulations.gov and insert the docket number, ``DOT-OST-2014-0112'' 
in the ``Search'' box and click ``Search.'' Next, click ``Open Docket 
Folder'' button and choose document listed to review. If you do not 
have access to the Internet, you may view the docket by visiting the 
Docket Management Facility in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the 
DOT West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays.

Privacy Act

    All comments the BTS received were posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov. Anyone may search the electronic form of all 
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or of the person signing the comment, if 
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on January 17, 2008 (73 FR 3316), or you may visit 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-785.pdf.

III. Discussion of Public Comments and BTS Responses

A. General Discussion

    BTS announced on July 2, 2014, in a Federal Register Notice (79 FR 
37837), its intention to request that OMB approve the following 
information collection: Voluntary Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas 
Operations on the OCS. BTS received three comments during the 60-day 
public comment period. Comments from LLOG Exploration, API/COS, and the 
OOC covered various topics including the definition of a near miss 
reporting (i.e., the reporting of conditions, root cause analysis, 
duplicative reporting, information-sharing, the scope of reporting, and 
the potential for reporting to multiple systems), the estimated number 
of burden hours, notification of near misses at their respective 
facilities, evaluation of the program, and the intent of the 2011 
report by the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
(the National Commission Report).

B. Definition of a Near Miss

    All three of the commenters had questions about the description of 
a near miss used by BTS in the July 2, 2014 notice. BTS appreciates the 
commenters' concerns. BTS intends the term ``near miss'' to encompass a 
variety of safety conditions, since a narrow operational definition of 
the term may unduly inhibit reporting of events or conditions that, 
regardless of potential severity, would limit the program's 
effectiveness in preventing and minimizing safety risks. In addition, 
the BTS' description of the term is consistent with the International 
Maritime Organization's (IMO) definition of a ``near miss'' and is 
therefore widely recognized around the world.''

[[Page 5878]]

C. Reporting

1. Reporting of Conditions
    Two of the three commenters were concerned that any hazard could be 
deemed a ``condition'' and be reported as a near miss. BTS's experience 
with the railroad and aviation industry close call/near miss reporting 
programs indicates that the reporting of ``conditions' may be very 
valuable to causal analysis of potential safety risks and the 
prevention of safety incidents. By learning more about potentially 
unsafe conditions, the public, government, and industry will be better 
able to identify hazards, hazardous conditions, and potential design 
and operational improvements that could reduce risks on the OCS.
2. Root Cause Analysis
    All three of the commenters sought additional information on 
whether and how BTS would conduct root cause analyses of near miss 
reports. In addition, one commenter had questions about the background 
and experience of those individuals that would review and analyze the 
near miss reports. BTS agrees that causal analysis of near miss 
information reported under this program will be very important and 
should be conducted by experienced personnel. For this program, BTS 
intends to employ subject matter experts (SMEs) in oil and gas 
operations and trained in investigative techniques to conduct follow-up 
interviews with individuals who report near misses. Further, SMEs, 
using well-established causal analysis tools similar to those widely 
used by industry and research organizations, will collect additional 
information about potential contributing factors to reported near 
misses and unsafe conditions as well as help conduct causal analyses of 
reported near misses.
3. Duplicative Reporting
    Two of the three commenters expressed concern about how multiple 
reports for the same near miss event would be handled. BTS has 
experience, through its other reporting programs, with identifying 
duplicate reports for the same event; e.g., through comparing event 
location, event description, event time, and other factors. In 
addition, assessment and follow-up of near miss reports by experienced 
SMEs acting on behalf of BTS will help identify duplicative reports. 
However, occasional multiple reports to BTS of a single near miss event 
by more than one source is not necessarily a problem. Reports on the 
same event from different sources can provide different and useful 
perspectives, and thus may help BTS obtain a more complete picture of 
the event.
4. Information-sharing
    One of the three commenters expressed some concern over how long it 
might take for a hazard to go uncorrected if it is only reported 
through this reporting system; the commenter indicated that such 
reports should be made directly to the facility or company involved so 
that the hazard can be promptly corrected. If BTS receives a near miss 
report indicating a significant hazard or condition exists that poses 
an imminent risk, BTS will take action, consistent with CIPSEA, to 
share that information with an affected facility or facilities, or with 
the industry as a whole, as quickly as possible. Under CIPSEA, BTS may 
disclose such reported information, as appropriate, if the reporter 
consents to BTS doing so and in cases of potentially imminent risks, 
BTS would seek such consent expeditiously. In addition, assuming a 
reporter does not consent to share information from an individual 
report, BTS may be able to aggregate data in a way that protects the 
anonymity of the reporter and the confidentiality of the specific 
report and share information about the potential risks in near real 
time.
5. Scope of Reporting
    All three commenters had questions about the scope of reporting 
near misses by individuals to the Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System 
and advocated that near miss information should be reported by OCS 
companies or industry associations. BTS recognizes the potential value 
of the near miss reporting systems operated by individual companies and 
other entities. The near misses reported to company or other industry 
systems undoubtedly provide important safety information to the 
individual companies and could provide valuable information to the 
industry, government, and public, if shared. BTS looks forward to 
discussing with industry groups and companies their potential 
participation in a near miss reporting system.
    However, BTS does not agree that an offshore oil and gas near miss 
reporting system should be limited to participation by companies or 
other industry organizations that collect near-miss information. This 
Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System provides strict protection, under 
CIPSEA, of the reporters' identities and of the confidentiality of the 
information, which is typically not afforded by company or other 
industry organization reporting systems. Thus, this system will afford 
individuals--including company and contractor employees--an opportunity 
to report near misses that they otherwise might not feel safe to report 
to their employers. Accordingly, this near miss reporting system could, 
through BTS' aggregate reports, provide information to industry, the 
workforce, the government, and the public about potential hazards and 
unsafe conditions that would not be reported (or shared) under company 
or other industry programs.
    Moreover, if participation in this voluntary program were limited 
to companies, or other industry organizations, the information provided 
to BTS would be circumscribed by whatever definitions or other 
limitations each company or entity places on its reporting programs. 
For example, as indicated by some of the commenters, existing industry 
programs appear to focus on high impact or high potential events, to 
the exclusion of lower potential events or conditions. By contrast, 
this near miss reporting system extends to what industry might consider 
``low severity'' near misses that could, depending upon other factors, 
indicate the potential for more severe events to occur or demonstrate a 
lack of safety culture or awareness about specific hazards with 
industry-wide implications.
    Similarly, if this voluntary near miss reporting system were 
restricted to participation only by companies or other industry 
entities, the information submitted to BTS would also be subject to 
whatever limits the specific company or entity places on the 
information it chooses to share. For example, the company or entity 
might decide to submit only information that it considered 
``legitimate'' or significant, instead of providing the initial or 
``raw'' information that the company/entity had received. BTS believes 
there is potential value to be gained from near miss information that 
companies/entities may think is of low severity or importance or of 
uncertain validity, but that reflects the individual reporters' unique 
perspectives on the event or condition.
    In addition, BTS disagrees with the suggestion made by two 
commenters that individuals should not be allowed to participate in 
this system because they would not understand `contributing factors' or 
root causes. That concern is academic since individual reporters would 
not participate in the causal analysis process; BTS, with help from 
appropriately qualified SMEs, would perform causal analyses.

[[Page 5879]]

    Finally, based on its experience with other industry reporting 
programs, BTS does not agree with the comment made by two commenters 
suggesting that BTS limit participation in the program to companies/
entities in order to reduce the estimated time for responses. For the 
reasons stated elsewhere in this notice, BTS believes there will be 
substantial potential benefits from individual reporting and that, even 
assuming a company could submit reports in less time than an 
individual, the suggested efficiency of company reporting does not 
warrant precluding individuals from filing reports offering their own 
perspectives on the same events. Moreover, as discussed previously, if 
reporting were limited only to companies, BTS likely would not receive 
reports on all of the near-misses that could be reported by 
individuals.
    In addition, BTS does not agree with the two commenters who 
asserted that the estimated time (60 minutes) for individual responses 
is excessive. The estimated time needed to complete an initial report 
is approximately 15 minutes, which is short enough to encourage 
widespread participation. The remainder of the estimated 60 minutes 
would be used for a confidential follow-up interview, as warranted by 
the initial report. It is important to point out that follow-up 
interviews are voluntary and not every respondent will consent to be 
interviewed. Although, a respondent who feels it is worthwhile to 
voluntarily submit an initial report is likely to be willing to 
participate in a confidential interview in order to ensure that the 
reported information is clearly understood and correctly evaluated by 
BTS.
6. Potential for Reporting to Multiple Systems
    Two commenters asserted that this near miss reporting system may 
create redundant reporting with other private and governmental 
reporting programs or near miss initiatives. In particular, the 
commenters suggested that individuals may submit reports under BSEE's 
regulation allowing voluntary reporting of hazardous or unsafe working 
conditions on OCS facilities (30 CFR 250.193). BTS disagrees with these 
comments. The BTS Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System is strictly 
voluntary and is not intended to replace or interfere with industry, 
BSEE, or other agency reporting programs, whether voluntary or 
mandatory. Instead, the BTS Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System will 
provide another opportunity for reporting a wide range of potential 
hazard and risk information related to OCS oil and gas operations.
    As one commenter recognized, in some cases an individual may feel 
inhibited about reporting a near miss to a company or other industry 
reporting program and thus may choose to report the event or condition 
to BTS under the protections afforded by CIPSEA. In such cases, there 
would be no duplication of reporting.
    Similarly, an individual may prefer reporting to CIPSEA under the 
guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality provided by CIPSEA rather 
than reporting voluntarily to BSEE under 30 CFR 250.193. Although 
section 250.193 of BSEE's rules allows an individual to report 
hazardous or unsafe working conditions anonymously, BSEE is subject to 
FOIA and cannot guarantee the anonymity or confidentiality of the 
information to the same degree BTS can protect information collected 
under CIPSEA. Thus, individuals concerned with protecting their 
anonymity or with confidentiality may choose to submit near miss 
information to BTS under CIPSEA rather than to BSEE. Moreover, the 
types of issues that may be reported under Sec.  250.193 (potential 
violations of BSEE rules and hazardous or unsafe working conditions) 
are potentially not as inclusive as the issues that may be reported 
under this near-miss reporting system.
    BTS also does not agree with the two commenters who suggested that 
BTS should not accept reports for near misses that have been reported 
to industry. The reports submitted to BTS will serve an important 
purpose even if some of the near misses were also submitted to 
industry. For example, the aggregated results of BTS analysis of near 
miss reports will be widely disseminated to government agencies, the 
industry, and the public. By contrast, information from existing 
industry near-miss systems, to date, is generally not shared within the 
industry or with the government and the public. In any event, at 
present BTS has no way of knowing which specific near misses have been 
reported to industry, and thus no basis for rejecting individual 
reports submitted under this near miss reporting system.
    API/COS noted in their joint comments, the implementation of the 
COS Learning from Incidents (LFI) program, which COS believes could 
inform BTS's Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System but also demonstrates 
a potential overlap between the two programs. BTS is aware of the 
potential benefits of the COS LFI program, for COS' members, and looks 
forward to discussing with COS the potential sharing of that 
information with BTS, and potential sharing of lessons learned from 
that information with all stakeholders. However, it is evident that the 
LFI program is limited in scope to only information from COS member 
companies regarding specifically-defined incidents and ``High Value 
Leaning Events.'' Moreover, as API/COS also notes in their joint 
comments, the aggregated information from that program is only shared 
with COS members. For that reason, BTS does not agree that the proposed 
near miss reporting system should be delayed pending the outcome of 
further consideration of the LFI program.

D. Estimated Burden Hours

    Two of the three commenters questioned BTS's estimated number of 
near miss reports that would be submitted. In particular, OOC claimed 
that the number of potential respondents submitting reports could be up 
to 4 or 5 times higher than BTS's estimate, ``if a reporting compliance 
level of 10-15% is reached,'' primarily because the broad scope of 
``near miss'' in this system will result in a large number of reports 
on ``low potential'' events. In the absence of actual near miss 
reporting rates in offshore oil and gas operations, BTS's estimates 
were based upon BTS' experience with near miss reporting in other 
industry sectors. This estimate will be revised, as appropriate, once 
BTS can establish an expected annual reporting rate based on ``actual'' 
reporting statistics of near misses collected during the initial phase 
of this program (i.e., first 3 years).

E. Notification of Near Misses

    Two of the three commenters asked that facilities be notified when 
a near miss has been reported for their installation or unit. BTS, 
however, cannot notify an owner or operator of a near-miss reported 
which is reported in confidence without jeopardizing the anonymity of 
the individual making the report or the confidentiality of the 
information provided, and thus violating the statutory protections 
afforded by CIPSEA, unless the reporter consents to sharing that 
information. Moreover, if the reporter's identity were discovered, it 
would open the individual up to potential sanctions or retaliation by 
the company. The National Commission Report which recommended that BSEE 
develop a near-miss reporting system for OCS oil and gas operations, 
also specifically recommended that whistleblowers who notify 
authorities about lapses in safety be provided protection: ``All 
offshore

[[Page 5880]]

workers have a duty to ensure safe operating practices to prevent 
accidents. To ensure all workers, regardless of employer, will take 
appropriate action whenever necessary, Congress should amend the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act or specific safety statutes to provide the 
same whistleblower protection that workers are guaranteed in other 
comparable settings.''

F. Program Evaluation

    One commenter requested that BTS report the results of the program 
to stakeholders at least once a year and that the program be evaluated 
after two years of operation. The frequency of public reports will 
depend on how many near miss reports are reported to the system. To 
comply with CIPSEA, reports of aggregated data must be prepared in such 
a way that no third party could determine the identity of a reporter, 
directly or indirectly. BTS expects to issue public reports at least 
once per year and potentially more often, as appropriate.
    With regard to re-evaluating the program after two years, as 
demonstrated by near miss reporting in the aviation industry, it took a 
commitment of several years before employee reporting increased 
sufficiently to allow for a robust program evaluation. BTS agrees that 
``formative evaluation'' is essential in developing a successful data 
collection program and will conduct such evaluation as soon as there is 
sufficient quantitative information in the near miss data system to 
allow for such analysis. However, the potential value of sharing data 
in a confidential manner is worth the investment of time and effort 
because the continuation of environmental and human losses is an 
unacceptable alternative to the public and the government.

G. Intent of the National Commission Report

    One commenter correctly noted that the National Commission Report 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill was issued in 2011, not 2013 as 
the 60-day notice inadvertently stated. BTS, however, does not agree 
with the commenter's suggestions that the National Commission Report 
did not envision a government-managed system for near miss reporting, 
or that the Commission's recommendation for an industry ``self-policing 
institute that would gather incident and performance data'' would 
satisfy the recommendation for a near miss reporting program. In fact, 
the two recommendations are contained in different parts of the 2011 
report, and it was in that part of the report directed to the 
Department of the Interior (DOI) that the National Commission 
recommended that DOI: ``Develop more detailed requirements for incident 
reporting and data concerning offshore incidents and `near misses.' 
Such data collection would allow for better tracking of incidents and 
stronger risk assessments and analysis.''

    Issued On: January 28, 2015.
Rolf Schmitt,
Deputy Director, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology.
[FR Doc. 2015-02053 Filed 2-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
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