See T

. C

. A

. § 55

- 10

- 40 6(b) ( “ A ny per s on wh o i s un cons ci ous as a r es ul t of an ac ci dent or i s un cons ci ous at 1 t h e t i me of

a r r es t or a ppr eh en s i on or ot h er wi se i n a c on di t i on r en der i n g t h at pe r s on i n ca pabl e of r ef u s al , s h al l be (c o n tinu e d ...) 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs Jul y

17, 200 7 STATE OF TENNESS EE v . MICHAE L R. KI NG Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Dickson Coun ty No. CR7813 G eorge C. Sexton, Judge

No. M2006- 01932-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Septem ber 28, 2007

The de fenda

nt, Michael R. King , was indi cted by the Dickson County Circuit Court Gra nd J ury on two counts of driving under the influence of an intoxi cant ( DUI ), sec ond offe nse. SeeT.C.A. §§ 55- 10-401, -403( a)( 1) (2004). He moved to suppress the results of hi s blood alcohol test. Following the circuit court’s denial of the motion, a plea ag ree ment resulted in a nolle presequiof count one (DUI ), a guilty

plea to count two ( DUI

per se , see id. § 55-10-401( a) (2 )) , an d t h e reservation of a c e rt if ie d qu e sti on

of law: “ Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d f oll ow inga

su pp re ssi on he ari nghe ld o n July 1 0 , 2 0 0 6 , th a tt h e r e s u l t s o f t h e D e f e n d an t ’ s b l o o d

a l c o h o l t e s tm ay

b e a dm i t t e d

i n t o e v i d e n c e ?” Be cause the ce rtified question wa s not properly rese rved f

or re view, we dismiss the appe al.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al D ism iss e d.
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J E R R Y L. S MI TH , J ., joined. J OS EP H M. T I PTON , P.J ., filed a se parate conc urringopinion.
T i m o thy V. P o t t er , Di ck s o n , T en n es s ee , fo r t h e ap p el l an t , M i ch ae l R

. Ki n g. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; and Ma rk A. F ulk s, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee. OP IN ION At the suppression hea

ring , t h e p ro s ecutor

and def ense c ounsel appa

rently ag ree d that, following a De cembe r 16, 2004 automobile ac cident, the defenda nt had been t ranspor

ted to the ho sp ita l, whe re tr e a tin g me dic a l pe rs onne l dr e w b loo d f ro m th e un c on sc ious defe nd ant fo r u se in chemica l tests, including a blood a lcohol analy sis. The State claimed that no law enfor ceme nt ag ent reque sted a blood alc ohol test on the defe ndant. The prose cutor, howe ver, a nnounced that he had 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

s ubj ect ed t o t he t es t or t es t s as provi ded f or by §§ 55

- 10

- 40 5 t o - 41 2, but t he r es ul t s t her eof s hal l not be us ed i n e vi dence aga i ns t t hat per s on i n a ny cour t or bef ore any r egu l at ory bod y wi t hout t he cons ent of t he pers on s o t es t ed .

. . . ”) , ( e) (“ P rovided pro b ab l e cause exi st s f o r cri m i nal p rosecut i o n for the o f f ense o f d ri vi ng und er t he i nf

l uence o f a n i nt o xi cant und er § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 1 , nothi ng i n t hi s sect i o n s hal l af f ect t he ad m i ss i b i l i t y int o e vi d ence i n a c ri m i nal p rosecut i o n of any che mi cal an al y s i s of

t he al cohol o r d r ug co nt ent o f t he def endan t ’ s b l oo d t hat has been obt ai ned wh i l e t he def endan t was h o sp italiz e d o r o the rw ise re c e ivin g m e d ic a l ca re in the o rd ina ry c o u rs e o f m e d ic a l t re a tm e n t.”)

. -2- no witnesses to prese nt in opposition to the motion to suppress. The defe nse rejoined, “ [I ]t might very well be the case [t hat no l aw e nforc ement ag ent re quested the te st] . We argue that it’s not [t he case ;] . . . the burde n of proof . . . is on the State.”
The de fenda

nt then t estified in the suppre ssion hearingthat he wa s rende red unconscious in an a

utomobile accide nt on Dece mber 16, 2004. He was take n to the hospital and wa s un awa re that his blo od wa s dr awn
. He wa s a llo we d to le ave the ho sp ita l b ut was subse qu e ntl y char g ed with DUI . The de fenda nt ad mitted that, when he woke up in the hospital, no law enfor ceme nt office rs wer e pre sent.

F oll ow ingthi s te sti mony , the de fe ns e a g a in a rgue d th a t “ the burd e n is on the State to show that that blood w as drawn from his body for other than law enfor ceme nt pur poses. I t’s not [the de fe nd ant’ s] jo b to argue and dis pr ov e a

ne g a tiv e . H e ’s un c on sc iou s. ” Th e de fe nd ant a lso argued that the e x trac tion of the blood and/o r t h e u s e o f the test re port violated statutory and constitutional standards.

F oll ow ingargume nt, the c ir c uit jud g e state d, “ [T]he ini tia l bu rd e n in a wa rr antl e ss se arc h is up on

the de fe nd ant t o e sta

bli shthat th e re wa s a

se arc h. Th e defe nd ant ha s f a ile d to e sta bli shthe re wa s any

se arc h in thi s c a se be c a

us e the y haven’ t e sta

bli sh e d th e re wa s a

ny State a c tio n .
. . .” B a se d u

po n th a t ho ldi ng , th e c ourt ov e rr ule d th e mot ion

to s up pr e ss. The e nsuing plea ag ree ment resulted in a judg ment of guilty of DUI per se and an order that specifie d the re servation of a ce rtified question of law . The judg ment stated, “Cer tified Question: Whether the trial c ourt err ed followinga suppre ssion hearingheld on J uly 10, 2006, that the re sults of the Defe ndant’s blood alcohol test may be admitted int o evidenc e? ” The sepa rate order simil arly stated the c ertified que stion.
Re se rv inga

c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of law fo r a

pp e llate re vie w i s g ov e rn e d b y Rul e 37 (b )( 2) of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure , w hic h p ro vid e s, An appeal l ies from a

ny order or judg ment in a cr iminal procee ding wher e the law

provides for

such appe al, and f

rom an y judgme nt of conviction:

. . . .-3- (2) Upon a

plea of g uilty or nolo contende re if: (i ) T he de fe nd ant e nte re d into a ple a a g re eme nt un de r R

ule 11(e) but expl icitly

rese rved w ith the consent of t he st ate and of the court the rig ht to appeal a cer tified question of law that is dispos itive of the c a se , a

nd the fo llo wi ngre qu ir e me nts are me t: (A) T he judg ment of conviction, or other document to which su c h ju dg me nt r e fe rs tha

t is fi le d b e fo re the no tice of a pp e a l, m us t contain a statement of the c ertified question of law re serve d by the defe ndant for a

ppellate r eview; (B ) Th e question of law

must be stated in the judg ment or document so as to identify clea rly the scope and limits of the leg al issue rese rved; (C) The judg ment or document must ref lect that the c ertified question was expressly rese rved with the consent of the state a nd the trial judg e; and (D) Th e judgme nt or document must ref lect that the defe ndant, the state, a

nd t h e trial judge a

re of the opinion that the cer tified question is disposi tive of the c ase[.] Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)( i)(A) - (D)

.

As in an y o th e r a

p p e a l b e f o r e th i s c o urt , o ur f

i r s t c o n c e r

n i s w h e th e r th i s c o urt is a uth or ize d to he ar t

he c a se . Jur isd ic tio n to he ar a d ir e c t a pp e a l f oll ow inga

g uil ty ple a g e ne ra lly mus t be pre dicated upon the provisions for re servin g a ce rtified question of law . “Appe als of ce rtified questions of law run c ounter to the g ener al rule that a defe ndant enjoy s no rig ht of appe al following a guilty plea.” State v. Fe

stus Babundo , N o. E2 00 5- 02 49 0- CCA -R 3- CD , s lip op . at 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. , K no xvill e , M ay

26 , 2 00 6) ; compare Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(1) with id. 37(b)( 2).
Be cause of the dispensatory nature of a c ertified que stion appeal, our supr eme c ourt firmly reje cted a rule of substantial c ompliance, see State v . Armstrong , 126 S.W .3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003), and instead de manded strict a dhere nce to Rule 37(b) , as that rule ha s been a mplified by

the court itself. F or instance , in Sta tev . P e nd e rg ra ss , our supre me cour

t “emphasized” that [r]e g ard le ss o f what a

pp e are d in

pr ior pe tit ion s, or de rs , c oll oq

uy in open court or ot herw ise, the final order or judg ment from which the time b e g ins to r

un to p ur su e a

T. R.A .P. 3 a

pp e a l must contain a s t a t em ent of the dispositive certified question of law reserved by defendant for appellate rev iew, and the questi on of law must be stated-4- so as to clearly identify the sco p e a n d the limits of t he legal issue reserv ed . F or e xamp le , whe re qu e sti on s of la w inv olv e the va lid ity of sea rche s and t he admissi bility of st atements a nd confe ssions, etc., the re asons re lie d u p o n by defe ndant in the trial cour t at the suppression hear ing must be ide ntified in the statement of the cer tified question of law[,] and review by the appe llate courts will be lim i t ed to those passe d upon by the trial judg e and stated in the cer tified questi on, absent a constitutional requireme nt otherwise. Wit hout an explicit s tatement of the cer tified quest i o n , neither the defe ndant, the State nor the trial judg e can make a meaning ful de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he iss ue so ug ht t o b e re vie we d is dispositi ve of the case
. . . . Also, the order must state that the cer

tified question was ex pressly rese rved as part of the pl ea ag ree ment, that the State and the t ri al judge consente d to the rese rvation and that the State and the tr ia l ju dg e are of

the opini on

that th e qu e sti on

is dispositi ve of the case . Of c ourse, the bur den is on defe ndant to see

. . . that the rec ord broug ht to the appellate c ourts contains all of the proce edi n gs below that bea r upon whe ther the c ertified que stion of law is dispositi ve and the mer i t s of the question ce rtified. No issue beyond the scope of the c ertified que stion will be conside red.
Sta tev . P e nd

e rg ra ss , 9 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d 8 3 4 , 8 3 6 -3 7 (T en n
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( qu o t i n g State v. Preston , 759 S.W .2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988) ) (e mphasis supplied in Pe nd e rg ra ss ); see State v . Lill ie Fran Ferguson , No. W2000-01687-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr . 27, 2001) (lame nting g ener al, widespre ad failure to comply with Pr esto n-Pe nd

e rg ra ss and citingcase s in which court of criminal appe als has dismissed cer tified-question appe als).
This court has said that, g iven the mandate for stric t compliance, ine ffe ctual ce rtified question appea ls continue to “add[] t o the g rowingheap of appellate fata lities that have re s u lted w h e n w o u ld

- b e a

p p e ll an ts f

a il e d to h eed the Presto n-Pe nd e rg ra ss litany

of re quirements for cer tified-question appe als.” See State v . Carl F. Neer , No. E2000-02791- CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Oct. 8, 2001). F or at least two rea sons, the prese nt case must be tossed onto this heap.

First, the que stion as presente d does not “identify clea rly the scope and limits of the leg al issue re serve d,” as r equire d by Tenne ssee Ru l e o f Criminal Procedur e 37(b) (2)( A)(ii). The question merely

asks whethe r the trial c ourt err ed in ove rruling the motion to suppress a nd identifies no le g a l is su e a s a

ba sis fo r e rr or . T his la

ps e a lon e dis qu a lif

ie s th e a pp e a l. Second, the judg ment, which bea rs no appr oving sig nature s of either the def endant’ s attorney or the prose cuting att o rn ey , does not itself indicate that the “re serve d” question wa s dispositi ve of the case and deemed as such by both parties and the t rial court. Rule 37 require s that “the judg ment or [other document to which su ch j u d gm en t ref ers that is filed be fore the notice of-5-

appea l] ref

lect[] that the ce rtified question was expressly rese rved with the consent of the state a nd the trial cour

t.” Id. at 37(b)( 2)(A) (iii). Fur thermore , the “judg ment or docume nt [ must] ref lect that the defe ndant, the state, a

nd the trial cour

t are of the opinion that the ce rtified question is dispositi ve of the c ase.” Id. at 37(b)( 2)(A) (iv). Althoug h a Rule 37(b) appea l m ay b e ad v ance d when the othe r wise nonconf

ormingjudgme nt incorporates by ref ere nce a n exis ting doc ument that satisfies the terms of the Pr esto n-Pe nd e rg ra ss r u le , see , e.g. , State v. ChanceCoy Herron , No. M2004- 0 0 5 5 3 -C C A- R 3 -CD, slip op. 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Dec. 1, 2004) , the judg ment under revie w incorpor ated nothing . Thus, the attempt to rese rve a ce rtified question fa ils for this reason, a s w e ll.
I n li g ht o f t he se de te rm inatio ns , w e dis mis s th is p os t- g uil ty ple a a pp e a l.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE