1

Filed 8/18/20

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MICHAEL JAMES HANNA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

E070995, E071457

(Super.Ct.No. MCC1701055)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Angel M. Bermudez, 

Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Michael James Hanna, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker and Daniel J. Taylor for Defendant 

and Respondent.

The trial court declared plaintiff Michael Hanna to be a vexatious litigant under 

several subparts of Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b).1 As a result of 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exceptions of parts A. through E. of the DISCUSSION. 

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2

that determination and the trial court’s additional finding that Hanna was not reasonably 

likely to succeed on the merits of this action, Hanna was ordered to furnish a $100,000 

security bond. The trial court also imposed a prefiling restriction on Hanna in future 

litigation, requiring Hanna to seek permission from the presiding justice or presiding 

judge of the court if he brings a civil action as a pro se litigant.

In these consolidated appeals, Hanna challenges the vexatious litigant 

determination and the determination that he was not likely to succeed on the merits of the 

action. We conclude that his challenges are not meritorious. We therefore affirm the 

prefiling restriction placed on Hanna’s filing of future actions as a pro se litigant.

Hanna further contends that the trial court lacked authority to rule on discovery 

motions and to impose discovery sanctions after the filing of the motion under section 

391.1 to declare Hanna a vexatious litigant and to have him furnish security. In the 

published portion of this opinion, we agree that the trial court was without authority to 

rule on the discovery motions or to impose sanctions. Under the plain language of 

section 391.6, all further proceedings in the action should have been stayed once the 

vexatious litigant motion under section 391.1 was filed. We therefore reverse the orders 

imposing discovery sanctions. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. 

BACKGROUND

A. Present Litigation

In October 2017, Hanna filed an amended complaint against Little League 

Baseball, Inc. (Little League), alleging trade libel and two claims for unfair and 

fraudulent business practices in violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL; Bus. & 
3

Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.). Hanna alleged that he was the president of a youth sports 

organization known as Team Hemet Baseball and Softball (Team Hemet). He alleged 

that in his capacity as president of Team Hemet, in January 2017 he “executed an 

agreement” with Little League “for the individual ‘. . . right to conduct a baseball and 

softball program under the name “Little League”’” for one year. In July 2017, Little 

League “purportedly” placed Team Hemet on a regional hold, which “prevent[ed] any 

operations by [Team Hemet] until satisfied.” For the UCL causes of action, Hanna 

alleged that Little League “ha[d] improperly obtained money from [Hanna], and 

continue[d] to improperly obtain money from the general public.” The trial court 

dismissed the trade libel claim on demurrer.

B. Vexatious Litigant Determination and Discovery Rulings

In May 2018, Little League moved for an order finding Hanna to be a vexatious 

litigant and requiring him to furnish security because he was not reasonably likely to 

succeed on the merits. Little League requested that the court judicially notice 14 

different civil actions filed from 2009 through 2018 involving Hanna as a pro se plaintiff 

and a defendant. The only evidence that Hanna submitted in opposition was a declaration 

from himself in which he attached several screenshots of purported social media posts.

On June 7, 2018, the trial court found Hanna to be a vexatious litigant under 

subdivision (b)(1)-(3) of section 391. The trial court further concluded that Hanna did 

not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the UCL claims. The trial court also 

issued a prefiling order prohibiting Hanna, “unless represented by an attorney,” “from 

filing any new litigation in the courts of California without approval of the presiding 
4

justice or presiding judge of the court in which the action is filed.” At the same hearing, 

the trial court also granted Little League’s pending discovery motions and imposed a total 

of $1,200 in discovery sanctions ($400 for each of the three motions) against Hanna.

On July 26, 2018, the trial court ordered Hanna to furnish a $100,000 security 

bond pursuant to section 391.7 by the end of the next month. On the same day, Hanna 

filed a notice of appeal in which he purported to appeal from both the “June 7, 2018,” 

order and the July 26, 2018, order.

We stayed the appeal pursuant to section 391.7, subdivision (c), pending Hanna’s 

compliance with the prefiling order’s requirement that he seek permission from the 

presiding justice to file the appeal. Hanna filed that request in August 2018, and we 

partially granted it on October 23, 2018. We lifted the stay only as to Hanna’s “appeal 

from the June 7, 2018 order declaring [Hanna] to be a vexatious litigant subject to a 

prefiling order.”

In the meantime, in September 2018, the trial court dismissed the action in its 

entirety for Hanna’s failure to furnish the requisite security bond. Hanna appealed from 

the judgment. We granted permission for him to proceed with the appeal. We 

consolidated the appeals.

DISCUSSION

A. Statement of Appealability 

Little League urges us to strike the opening brief for Hanna’s failure to comply 

with the rule of court requiring that the opening brief include a statement that the final 

judgment is appealable or “explain why the order appealed from is appealable.” (Cal. 
5

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B).) The opening brief does not include a proper 

statement of appealability. The section containing that title includes two sentences 

addressing the standard of review for a vexatious litigant determination. It does not 

identify the judgment or order that is being appealed or explain why the order is 

appealable.

When a brief violates the rule of court requiring a statement of appealability, we 

may “[s]trike the brief with leave to file a new brief within a specified time” or 

“[d]isregard the noncompliance.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(e)(2)(B) & (C); 

Westchester Secondary Charter School v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 237 

Cal.App.4th 1226, 1235, fn. 4.) We choose the latter option. As we explained in our 

October 2018 order granting in part Hanna’s request to appeal from the June 2018 order 

declaring him a vexatious litigant, the initial appeal was premature except as to the 

prefiling order. (In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 

[vexatious litigant prefiling order under § 391.7, subd. (a), appealable as an injunction 

under § 904.1, subd. (a)(6)].) The order requiring Hanna to post a security bond, 

however, was not appealable. (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated (1994) 29 

Cal.App.4th 982, 985, fn. 1 (Childs).) Nor were any of the other interlocutory orders of 

which he complained—discovery orders and sanctions of less than $5,000. (Doe v. 

United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432 [“There is no statutory 

provision for appeal from an order compelling compliance with a discovery order”]; cf. 

§ 904.1, subd. (b)(12) [interlocutory orders imposing sanctions over $5,000 immediately 

appealable].) Those orders did, however, become reviewable on appeal from the final 
6

judgment, from which Hanna appealed. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1); County of Nevada v. 

Kinicki (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 357, 363.) Consequently, the issues that Hanna raises in 

his opening brief all concern orders that are properly before us, so we reject Little 

League’s contention that the grounds for the appeal are “not readily apparent.” We 

therefore exercise our discretion to disregard Hanna’s noncompliance with the rules of 

court.

B. Vexatious Litigant Statutory Scheme

“The vexatious litigant statutes (§§ 391–391.7) are designed to curb misuse of the 

court system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly litigating the 

same issues through groundless actions, waste the time and resources of the court system 

and other litigants.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169 (Shalant); Bravo 

v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 220-221.) Section 391, subdivision (b), lists four 

ways in which a person can qualify as a “vexatious litigant.” (§ 391, subd. (b)(1)-(4).) 

As relevant here, a “vexatious litigant” is defined as a person who “[i]n the immediately 

preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria 

persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been . . . 

finally determined adversely to the person . . . .” (§ 391, subd. (b)(1).) “‘Litigation’” is 

defined as including “any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending 

in any state or federal court.” (§ 391, subd. (a).) “A litigation includes an appeal or civil 

writ proceeding filed in an appellate court.” (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 

402, 406 (Garcia).) “A litigation is finally determined adversely to a plaintiff if he does 
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not win the action or proceeding he began, including cases that are voluntarily dismissed 

by a plaintiff.” (Ibid.)

The “vexatious litigant statutes provide courts and nonvexatious litigants with two 

distinct and complementary sets of remedies. In pending litigation, a defendant may have 

the plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant and, if the plaintiff has no reasonable probability 

of prevailing, ordered to furnish security. If the plaintiff fails to furnish the security, the 

action will be dismissed. (§§ 391.1–391.6.) In addition, a potential defendant may 

prevent the vexatious litigant plaintiff from filing any new litigation in propria persona by 

obtaining a prefiling order and, if any new litigation is inadvertently permitted to be filed 

in propria persona without the presiding judge’s permission, may then obtain its 

dismissal. (§ 391.7.)” (Shalant, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)

“The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a 

vexatious litigant. Review of the order is accordingly limited and the Court of Appeal 

will uphold the ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. Because the trial court is 

best suited to receive evidence and hold hearings on the question of a party’s 

vexatiousness, we presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply 

findings necessary to support the judgment.” (Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 

616, 636 (Golin); Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1169 (Fink).) We also 

will uphold the trial court’s determination that the vexatious litigant does not have a 

chance of success in the action if that determination is supported by substantial evidence. 

(Golin, supra, at p. 636; Garcia, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) The trial court 

weighs conflicting evidence and is not required to assume the truth of the allegations. 
8

(Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 782, 786 

(Moran).)

C. Substantial Evidence Supporting Vexatious Litigant Determination

Hanna contends that there was not substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s 

determination under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), that he as a pro se litigant had 

commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five civil actions in the preceding seven 

years that had been finally determined adversely to him. We do not agree.2

Little League presented evidence of 14 civil actions in which Hanna represented 

himself as a plaintiff or a defendant from 2009 through 2018. The vexatious litigant 

motion was filed in May 2018, so the relevant seven-year period begins in May 2011. 

(Stolz v. Bank of America (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 217, 224.) On appeal, Hanna concedes 

that one of the lawsuits—Hanna et al. v. State Farm General Insurance Co. et al.

(E052055, app. dismissed Jan. 10, 2012)—qualifies under the statute. We agree as to the 

appeal in that action. Hanna commenced the action pro se in 2009, and it was dismissed 

in August 2010, before the start of the relevant seven-year period under section 391, 

subdivision (b)(1). Hanna’s pro se appeal in that action, however, was not dismissed 

until January 2012. The appeal therefore was maintained during the relevant seven-year 

period and qualifies as one of the five civil actions adversely determined against Hanna 

2 Hanna requests that we judicially notice the declaration and accompanying 

exhibits that he filed in the trial court in support of his motion for reconsideration of the 

order declaring him a vexatious litigant. We deny the request. Hanna does not challenge 

any aspect of the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, so the documents 

are not relevant.
9

as a pro se litigant in that period. (Garcia, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 406 [litigation 

under § 391, subd. (b)(1), includes appeals].) The question remains whether at least four 

of the remaining 13 actions qualify. Hanna contends that none of them does. 

We conclude that there is substantial evidence that at least four of the remaining 

13 cases qualify under section 391, subdivision (b)(1). Those cases are (1) Hanna v. Hall

et al. (C.D.Cal., Sept. 8, 2015, No. EDCV15-MC-00009-UA (DTB) (Hall); (2) Hanna v. 

Hemet Youth Baseball, Inc. (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2015, No. RIC1512685) 

(Hemet Youth Baseball I); (3) Hanna v. Paino (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2017, No. 

HEC1701170) (Paino); and (4) Hanna v. Townsend (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2017, 

No. HEC1701533) (Townsend). Hanna, as a pro se litigant, commenced all four of those 

cases within the relevant time period, and all of them were finally adjudicated against 

him.

The first two, Hall and Hemet Youth Baseball I, were brought against the same 

individuals, with the latter including two additional corporate defendants, Hemet Youth 

Baseball, Inc. and Pony, Inc. In Hall, which was brought in federal court in August 2015, 

Hanna petitioned the court to perpetuate the testimony of each of the individual 

defendants in anticipation of future federal litigation he planned to bring against them. In 

September 2015, the petition was denied for failing to meet the requirements of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 27, and the action was dismissed with prejudice. The next 

month, in October 2015, Hanna filed Hemet Youth Baseball I in Riverside Superior 

Court. That action was dismissed without prejudice on December 17, 2015. Hanna does 

not dispute that he commenced both of those actions as a pro se litigant, that they fall 
10

within the relevant timeframe, or that they qualify as “litigation” under section 391, 

subdivision (b)(1).

Hanna instead maintains that both of those cases do not qualify under the statute 

because they purportedly were part of a “‘global settlement’” and therefore were not 

adversely determined against him. He further contends that dismissals pursuant to 

settlement agreements do not qualify as adverse determinations against the pro se litigant. 

We need not address that issue, because the record contains no evidence that those two 

cases were dismissed as part of any “global” settlement or were otherwise part of any 

settlement agreement. The settlement agreement that Hanna claims involved those cases 

was entered into in March 2016 and did involve all of the named defendants in those two 

cases, as well as several additional individuals. By its express terms, however, the 

settlement agreement involved yet another action brought by Hanna against those 

defendants—Hanna v. Hemet Youth Baseball, Inc. (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2016, 

No. RIC1513590) (Hemet Youth Baseball II)—filed in state court in November 2015. 

Hemet Youth Baseball II is the only lawsuit that was mentioned in the settlement 

agreement. In the recitals section of the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that it 

was the allegations in the complaint in that action (Hemet Youth Baseball II) that the 

parties “desire[d] to settle” “without the necessity of trial and [had] agreed to do so” 

through that settlement agreement. The agreement was executed in March 2016, and the 

underlying case was subsequently dismissed. 

The record contains no evidence to support Hanna’s contention that the settlement 

of Hemet Youth Baseball II also included Hall (which was dismissed before Hemet Youth 
11

Baseball II was even filed) or Hemet Youth Baseball I (which was dismissed four months 

before the settlement agreement in Hemet Youth Baseball II and only one month after that 

action was filed). It is irrelevant that those cases purportedly involved related issues. 

Hanna does not contend that the settlement agreement contains any ambiguous language 

on the basis of which we could construe it to include or to relate back to the two prior 

actions. Nor do we perceive any. “If contractual language is clear and explicit, it 

governs.” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264; Weddington 

Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 [“A settlement agreement is a 

contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement 

contracts”].) By its express terms, the settlement agreement encompassed the allegations 

in the complaint in Hemet Youth Baseball II only and not the two prior actions brought 

against the same defendants, Hall and Hemet Youth Baseball I. Consequently, Hall and 

Hemet Youth Baseball I qualify as litigation adversely determined against Hanna under 

subdivision (b)(1) of section 391.

The two remaining civil actions pursued by Hanna as a pro se litigant and 

determined adversely against him within the relevant period (Paino and Townsend) were 

both unsuccessful requests Hanna made for civil harassment restraining orders. The 

request in one action (Paino) was denied after a hearing in July 2017, and the other action 

(Townsend) was dismissed in August 2017 after Hanna did not appear for the hearing. 

On appeal, Hanna’s only argument specific to these cases is that “[t]he Register of 

Actions is not evidence of the character or finality of the litigation.” Little League 

submitted computer printouts of the complete dockets from both actions to demonstrate 
12

that Hanna had pursued them within the relevant time period as a pro se litigant and that 

the actions were determined adversely against him. No minute orders from those actions 

were submitted. The only authority that Hanna cites as support for the proposition that 

the dockets are inadequate proof is an unpublished Court of Appeal opinion. The rules of 

court prohibit Hanna and us from citing or relying on that opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1115(a).) If a superior court chooses to keep a register of actions, then “the title of 

each cause, with the date of its commencement and a memorandum of every subsequent 

proceeding in the action with its date” “shall be entered” in the register. (Gov. Code, 

§ 69845.) We presume that the docket entries are accurate. (Evid. Code, § 664; In re 

Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146 [presumption that preparation of docket entry was 

regularly performed duty of the court clerk].) Hanna does not contend otherwise. The 

docket entries for both cases document what occurred in the hearings and the resolution 

of those matters. The computer printouts of the dockets or registers of actions are 

sufficient to demonstrate that the civil actions were brought by Hanna as a pro se litigant 

within the relevant time period and that those actions were decided adversely against 

him.3

Hanna argues that Little League failed to carry its burden of presenting evidence 

that the prior litigations were “finally determined,” because Little League did not 

3

In his reply brief, Hanna complains that Little League “attempted to introduce 

evidence, via an inappropriate method (Request for Judicial Notice) which bars 

presumption of truth of the matters stated therein.” We consider the argument forfeited 

because Hanna did not make it in his opening brief and has not demonstrated good cause 

for failing to do so. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)
13

demonstrate that “the prior litigations ha[d] been adjudicated on appeal or that the time to 

request appellate review ha[d] expired.” Hanna relies on Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 

at page 994, for the proposition that Little League was required to “submit evidence that 

the prior litigations ha[d] been adjudicated on appeal or that the time to request appellate 

review ha[d] expired.” Childs is inapposite here. It stands for the proposition that a case 

in which an appeal is pending is not determined finally against the litigant because all 

avenues of appellate review have not been exhausted. (Id. at pp. 992-993.) 

Here, unlike in Childs, the record contains substantial evidence of finality for all 

five of the cases that qualify under section 391, subdivision (b)(1). Of the four 

nonconceded cases, three are state court cases that were terminated in December 2015, 

July 2017, and August 2017. The fourth is the federal action that was dismissed in 

September 2015. The time limit for filing appeals in each of these actions had long 

passed by the time that Little League filed its motion in May 2018. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.104(a)(1) [normal time to appeal in civil case is 60 days]; Fed. Rules App.Proc., 

rule 4(a)(1)(A) [normal time to appeal in civil case is 30 days].) No further evidence of 

finality was needed.

Because we conclude that the trial court order finding Hanna to be a vexatious 

litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), is supported by substantial evidence of five 

qualifying actions brought by or maintained by Hanna pro se during the relevant sevenyear timeframe and determined adversely against him, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in finding Hanna to be a vexatious litigant under that 
14

subdivision.4 We consequently need not and do not address whether the trial court’s 

findings under the other subdivisions were supported by substantial evidence.

D. Substantial Evidence Supporting Determination of No Reasonable Likelihood of 

Success

Hanna contends that the trial court’s finding under section 391.3, subdivision (a), 

that he did not have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the UCL claims 

was not supported by substantial evidence. The contention lacks merit.

“The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair competition, which it 

defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” (Kwikset Corp. 

v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320 (Kwikset), superseded by statute on another 

ground as stated in Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 594, 

fn. 2; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Private standing under the UCL “‘is limited to any 

“person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property’ as a result of 

unfair competition.”’” (Kwikset, supra, at pp. 320-321; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) 

The trial court found that Hanna’s UCL causes of action did not have a reasonable 

likelihood of success because Hanna did not have standing to pursue those claims. That 

finding is supported by substantial evidence. Little League submitted substantial 

evidence that Hanna did not suffer an injury in fact. The only payments that Little 

League received related to Team Hemet were a $150 check to pay the charter fee and a 

4 Because the vexatious litigant statute requires only that five litigations be 

determined adversely against the pro se litigant in the prior seven years, we need not and 

do not address Hanna’s arguments about whether any of the other past actions qualify 

under the statute.
15

$20.52 credit card payment to pay for the addition of teams to the league. Hanna did not 

make those payments individually. Instead, those payments were made by Team Hemet. 

In addition, Hanna never paid any money to Little League. The vice president of 

operations for Team Hemet in 2017 further stated that to his knowledge “Hanna ha[d] 

never contributed any of his own money to Team Hemet.”

The only evidence that Hanna submitted in opposition to Little League’s motion to 

declare him a vexatious litigant and to require him to furnish security was Hanna’s own 

declaration, to which he attached screen shots from social media posts. Nowhere in the 

declaration does Hanna offer any evidence of how he personally suffered any financial or 

property loss. The social media posts likewise had no relation to any possible financial 

injury. At the hearing on the motion, Hanna stated that he planned to submit evidence at 

trial demonstrating his injury, but he presented no such evidence at the hearing.

Hanna argued in the trial court, as he does here, that the Little League “[c]harter 

[a]pplication and [i]nsurance [e]nrollment [f]orm” that he attached to the original 

complaint (and we assume for the sake of argument was also attached to the first 

amended complaint)5 demonstrates that he was personally liable for Team Hemet’s 

obligations. He argues that he, as “controller of the organization,” was “liable for all of 

5 Although the agreement with Little League is listed as an exhibit to the amended 

complaint, that exhibit is not included in the clerk’s transcript on appeal. The agreement 

is included as an attachment to the original complaint. “An ‘amended’ complaint 

supersedes all prior complaints,” and “[t]he original ceases to ‘“perform any function as a 

pleading.”’” (Lee v. Bank of America (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 197, 215.) We assume for 

the sake of argument that the agreement was also attached to the amended complaint in 

the trial court. Neither party suggests otherwise.
16

the debts and obligations of the organization” because the agreement that he signed as the

president of Team Hemet contained the following provision: “I pledge myself and my 

organization to strict compliance with all the Rules and Regulations of Little League 

Baseball, Incorporated.” That statement does not support the proposition that Hanna was 

in any way personally liable for Team Hemet or that he suffered any financial injury 

based on the hold placed on Team Hemet by Little League. It instead provides that 

Hanna was required in his capacity as president to comply with Little League’s rules. 

Nowhere does the agreement provide that Hanna was personally responsible for Team 

Hemet’s financial obligations by virtue of his role as president of the organization or 

otherwise.

After weighing the evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court found that it 

was not reasonably likely that Hanna would succeed on the merits of the UCL claims. 

Because that finding is supported by substantial evidence, it “‘“is in this as in every civil 

case binding upon the appellate court.”’” (Moran, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 785.)

E. Effect of Initial Appeal

Hanna contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the case because 

he had already filed a notice of appeal from the order declaring him a vexatious litigant. 

We do not reach the merits of this argument because any error would be harmless.

There are two different ways in which a court can lack jurisdiction. (People v. 

Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286.) “A court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense 

when it has no authority at all over the subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any 

power to hear or determine the case. [Citation.] If a court lacks such ‘“fundamental”’
17

jurisdiction, its ruling is void.” (Ibid.) “Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction, 

however, the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act 

only in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations.” (Id. at pp. 286-287.) 

“When a trial court has fundamental jurisdiction but fails to act in the manner prescribed, 

it is said to have acted ‘in excess of its jurisdiction.’” (Id. at p. 287.) “Because an 

ordinary act in excess of jurisdiction does not negate a court's fundamental jurisdiction to 

hear the matter altogether [citation], such a ruling is treated as valid until set aside.” 

(Ibid.)

Hanna does not specify whether he believes that the trial court lacked fundamental 

jurisdiction or acted in excess of its jurisdiction. There is no question that the court did 

not lack jurisdiction in the fundamental sense—the trial court possessed jurisdiction over 

the subject matter and the parties. Consequently, the trial court at worst acted in excess 

of its jurisdiction. But we need not decide whether the trial court acted in such a manner, 

because any such error would be harmless. The only way that Hanna could have been 

prejudiced by such an error would be if the vexatious litigant determination were not 

supported by substantial evidence or were otherwise erroneous. But we have concluded 

otherwise. Because of that conclusion, Hanna still would have been required to file the 

security bond to proceed with his lawsuit in the trial court, which he did not do. 

Therefore, the trial court’s reason for dismissing the action—that Hanna failed to furnish 

the requisite security bond—was supported too. Thus, regardless of whether the trial 

court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by failing to stay the litigation while the appeal 

from the prefiling order was pending, any error was harmless.
18

F. Litigation Stay

Hanna contends that the trial court was without authority to rule on Little League’s 

pending discovery motions, which included requests for sanctions, because the litigation 

should have been stayed after Little League filed its motion to declare Hanna a vexatious 

litigant and to require him to furnish security.6 We agree.

We independently review questions of statutory interpretation. (Reid v. Google, 

Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527 (Reid); Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.) 

“‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the 

Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We must look to 

the statute’s words and give them “their usual and ordinary meaning.” [Citation.] “The 

statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are 

ambiguous.” [Citations.] “If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable 

interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative 

history, and public policy.”’” (Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 527.)

6 Little League’s appellate brief does not address this argument on the merits. 

Instead, it maintains that Hanna failed in his opening brief “to show whether a final 

judgment is being appealed and how the discovery addressed in the appeal could relate to 

such a judgment.” Little League’s argument is based on this court’s order limiting 

Hanna’s initial appeal to the vexatious litigant prefiling order and denying his request to 

appeal from the interlocutory discovery orders, which were not appealable. (Doe v. 

United States Swimming, Inc (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432 [“There is no statutory 

provision for appeal from an order compelling compliance with a discovery order”].) 

Little League’s argument fails because Hanna also appealed from the final judgment. As 

Little League acknowledges, discovery orders are reviewable on appeal from a final 

judgment. (§ 906; County of Nevada v. Kinicki (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 357, 363.) 
19

Section 391.6 provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 391.3, 

when a motion [to furnish security] pursuant to Section 391.1 is filed prior to trial the 

litigation is stayed, and the moving defendant need not plead, until 10 days after the 

motion shall have been denied, or if granted, until 10 days after the required security has 

been furnished and the moving defendant given written notice thereof.” (§ 391.6.) No 

published cases have interpreted the scope of the litigation stay under section 391.6.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “stay” as “[t]he postponement or halting of a 

proceeding, judgment, or the like.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).) Under the plain 

language of section 391.6, the entirety of the litigation is stayed once the defendant files a 

motion to determine that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant who should be required to 

furnish security in that action. Furthermore, the stay shall remain effective until 10 days 

after the motion is denied or 10 days after the security is furnished. (§ 391.6.) Section 

391.6 does not carve out any exception for proceedings that may continue during that 

period except for the dismissal of the action under section 391.3, subdivision (b). That 

exception does not apply here.

Little League filed its motion to declare Hanna a vexatious litigant under section 

391.1 and to have him furnish security on May 14, 2018. At that time, Little League had 

several pending discovery motions, all requesting the imposition of discovery sanctions. 

At the same June 7, 2018, hearing at which the trial court granted Little League’s 

vexatious litigant motion, the trial court also granted Little League’s discovery motions 

and imposed a total of $1,200 in discovery sanctions ($400 for each of the three motions) 

against Hanna. The trial court did not have authority to rule on the discovery motions 
20

once Little League filed its motion under section 391.1. Consequently, we reverse the 

June 7, 2018, orders imposing a total of $1,200 in discovery sanctions against Hanna.

DISPOSITION

The June 7, 2018, orders imposing a total of $1,200 in discovery sanctions against 

Hanna are reversed. The June 7, 2018, order imposing a prefiling restriction on Hanna as 

a pro se litigant is affirmed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties 

shall bear their own costs of appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

MILLER

J.