[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 192 (Thursday, October 3, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 80384-80390]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-22731]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 91

[Docket No. FAA-2020-0874; Amdt. No. 91-359B]
RIN 2120-AL98


Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the 
Tehran Flight Information Region (FIR) (OIIX)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action extends the prohibition against certain flight 
operations in the Tehran Flight Information Region (FIR) (OIIX) by all: 
U.S. air carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the 
privileges of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such 
persons are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air 
carrier; and operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when 
the operator of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier, for an 
additional three years, from October 31, 2024, to October 31, 2027. The 
FAA finds this action necessary to address significant unacceptable 
safety-of-flight risks to U.S. civil aviation operations that continue 
in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) during periods of heightened regional tensions 
and increased military activities. The FAA also republishes the 
approval process and exemption information for this Special Federal 
Aviation Regulation (SFAR), consistent with other recently published 
flight prohibition SFARs.

DATES: This final rule is effective on October 3, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bill Petrak, Flight Standards Service, 
through the Washington Operations Center, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-3203; email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e7decaa1a6a6caa891829594828694a18b8e808f93b795888f8e858e938e888994a7818686c9808891"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="4a73670c0b0b67053c2f38392f2b390c26232d223e1a3825222328233e232524390a2c2b2b642d253c">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Executive Summary

    This action extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 117, Sec.  
91.1617 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), from October 
31, 2024, to October 31, 2027. SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617, prohibits 
certain flight operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) by all: U.S. air 
carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges 
of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons 
are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and 
operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator 
of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier. The FAA finds this action 
necessary to address significant unacceptable safety-of-flight risks to 
U.S. civil aviation that continue in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) during 
periods of heightened regional tensions and increased military 
activities, conditions that led to the January 2020 accidental 
shootdown of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 (PS 752) by 
Iranian air defense

[[Page 80385]]

forces. The FAA also republishes the approval process and exemption 
information for this flight prohibition SFAR, consistent with other 
recently published flight prohibition SFARs.

II. Authority and Good Cause

A. Authority

    The FAA is responsible for the safety of flight in the U.S. and for 
the safety of U.S. civil operators, U.S.-registered civil aircraft, and 
U.S.-certificated airmen throughout the world. Section 106(f) of title 
49, U.S. Code (U.S.C.), subtitle I, establishes the FAA Administrator's 
authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle VII of title 49, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority. Section 40101(d)(1) provides that the Administrator shall 
consider in the public interest, among other matters, assigning, 
maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest 
priorities in air commerce. Section 40105(b)(1)(A) requires the 
Administrator to exercise this authority consistently with the 
obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements.
    The FAA is promulgating this rule under the authority described in 
49 U.S.C. 44701, General requirements. Under that section, the FAA is 
charged broadly with promoting safe flight of U.S. civil aircraft in 
air commerce by prescribing, among other things, regulations and 
minimum standards for practices, methods, and procedures that the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national 
security.
    This regulation is within the scope of the FAA's authority because 
it continues to prohibit the persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR 
No. 117, Sec.  91.1617, from conducting flight operations in the Tehran 
FIR (OIIX) due to the continuing significant hazards to the safety of 
U.S. civil flight operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) as described in 
the preamble to this final rule.

B. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

    Section 553(b)(B) of title 5, U.S. Code, authorizes agencies to 
dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency 
for ``good cause'' finds that those procedures are ``impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' Also, section 553(d) 
permits agencies, upon a finding of good cause, to issue rules with an 
effective date less than 30 days from the date of publication. In this 
instance, the FAA finds good cause to forgo notice and comment and the 
delayed effective date because they would be impracticable and contrary 
to the public interest.
    Providing notice and the opportunity for the public to comment here 
would be impracticable. The FAA's flight prohibitions, and any 
amendments thereto, need to include appropriate boundaries that reflect 
the agency's current understanding of the risk environment for U.S. 
civil aviation. This allows the FAA to protect the safety of U.S. 
operators' aircraft and the lives of their passengers and crews without 
over-restricting or under-restricting U.S. operators' routing options. 
However, the risk environment for U.S. civil aviation in airspace 
managed by other countries with respect to safety of flight is fluid in 
circumstances involving fighting, violent extremist and militant 
activity, or periods of heightened tensions, particularly where weapons 
capable of targeting or otherwise negatively affecting U.S. civil 
aviation are or may be present. This fluidity, and the potential for 
rapid changes in the risks to U.S. civil aviation, significantly limits 
how far in advance of a new or amended flight prohibition the FAA can 
usefully assess the risk environment. The delay that would be 
occasioned by providing an opportunity to comment on this action would 
significantly increase the risk that the resulting final action would 
not accurately reflect the current risks to U.S. civil aviation 
associated with the situation and thus would not establish boundaries 
for the flight prohibition commensurate with those risks.
    While the FAA sought and responded to public comments, the 
boundaries of the area in which unacceptable risks to the safety of 
U.S. civil aviation existed might change due to: evolving military or 
political circumstances; violent extremist and militant group activity; 
the introduction, removal, or repositioning of more advanced anti-
aircraft weapon systems; or other factors. As a result, if the 
situation improved while the FAA sought and responded to public 
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be over-restrictive, 
unnecessarily limiting U.S. operators' routing options and potentially 
causing them to incur unnecessary additional fuel and operations-
related costs, as well as potentially causing passengers to incur 
unnecessarily some costs attributed to their time. Conversely, if the 
situation deteriorated while the FAA sought and responded to public 
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be under-restrictive, 
allowing U.S. civil aviation to continue operating in areas where 
unacceptable risks to their safety had developed. Such an outcome would 
endanger the safety of these aircraft, as well as their passengers and 
crews, exposing them to unacceptable risks of death, injury, and 
property damage that could occur if a U.S. operator's aircraft were 
shot down (or otherwise damaged) while operating in the Tehran FIR 
(OIIX).
    Alternatively, if the FAA made changes to the area in which U.S. 
civil aviation operations would be prohibited between a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and a final rule due to changed conditions, the 
version of the rule the public commented on would no longer reflect the 
FAA's current assessment of the risk environment for U.S. civil 
aviation.
    In addition, seeking comment would be contrary to the public 
interest because some of the rational basis for the rulemaking is based 
upon classified information and controlled unclassified information not 
authorized for public release. In order to meaningfully provide comment 
on a proposal, the public would need access to the basis for the 
agency's decision-making, which the FAA cannot provide. Disclosing 
classified information or controlled unclassified information not 
authorized for public release in order to seek meaningful comment on 
the proposal would harm the public interest. Accordingly, the FAA 
meaningfully seeking comment on the proposal is contrary to the public 
interest.
    Therefore, providing notice and the opportunity for comment would 
be impracticable as it would hinder the FAA's ability to maintain 
appropriate flight prohibitions based on up-to-date risk assessments of 
the risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in airspace 
managed by other countries, and contrary to the public interest, as the 
FAA cannot protect classified information and controlled unclassified 
information not authorized for public release and meaningfully seek 
public comment.
    For the same reasons discussed above, the potential safety impacts 
and the need for prompt action on up-to-date information that is not 
public would make delaying the effective date impracticable and 
contrary to the public interest.
    Accordingly, the FAA finds good cause exists to forgo notice and 
comment and any delay in the effective date for this rule.

III. Background and Discussion of the Final Rule

    The FAA originally issued a prohibition on U.S. civil aviation 
operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) after Iran conducted retaliatory 
ballistic missile strikes targeting U.S. air bases in

[[Page 80386]]

Iraq on January 7, 2020, following the death of Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. 
airstrike.\1\ Due to the heightened military activities in the region 
at that time, including the heightened alert status of Iranian military 
forces, and increased political tensions in the Middle East, which 
included the potential for further escalation, the FAA determined an 
unacceptable risk to U.S. civil aviation existed in the Baghdad FIR 
(ORBB), the Tehran FIR (OIIX), and the overwater areas of the Persian 
Gulf and the Gulf of Oman due to the potential for miscalculation or 
misidentification.\2\
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    \1\ Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Tehran Flight 
Information Region (FIR) (OIIX) final rule, 85 FR 68435 (Oct. 29, 
2020).
    \2\ Id.
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    To address these immediate safety-of-flight hazards, on January 7, 
2020, UTC, the FAA issued Notices-to-Airmen (NOTAMs) KICZ A0001/20, 
A0002/20, and A0003/20, which prohibited U.S. civil flight operations 
in the Baghdad FIR (ORBB), the Tehran FIR (OIIX), and the overwater 
airspace above the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, respectively.\3\ 
Unfortunately, within hours after the FAA issued NOTAM KICZ A0002/20, 
Iranian air defense forces accidentally shot down PS 752 shortly after 
its departure from Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport 
(OIIE).\4\ These forces apparently misidentified the aircraft, which 
was conducting a regularly scheduled passenger flight, as a missile 
threat.\5\ There were no survivors out of the 176 passengers and crew.
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    \3\ Id. SFAR No. 117, 14 CFR 91.1617, and this rulemaking action 
are limited in scope to the Tehran FIR (OIIX).
    \4\ Id.
    \5\ Id.
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    Following this tragedy, there was uncertainty about how long the 
hazards to civil aviation in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) would persist; 
whether Iran would be transparent in its investigation into the downing 
of PS 752; and whether Iran would implement changes in its air defense 
command and control procedures, airspace de-confliction processes, and 
rules of engagement for air defense engagements to reduce the risk of 
further tragedies sufficiently to allow for safe U.S. civil aviation 
operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX). The FAA was also concerned about 
the risks to U.S. civil aviation associated with the wide array of 
military activities then occurring in, emanating from, or transiting 
the Tehran FIR (OIIX), in an environment of heightened regional 
tensions and the potential inadvertent risks from Iranian-fielded GPS 
and communications jammers.\6\ Due to the unacceptable risk environment 
for U.S. civil aviation in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) created by this 
confluence of circumstances, on October 29, 2020, the FAA published 
SFAR No. 117, 14 CFR 91.1617, in the Federal Register, incorporating 
the flight prohibition for the Tehran FIR (OIIX) contained in NOTAM 
KICZ A0002/20 into the Code of Federal Regulations.\7\
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    \6\ Id.
    \7\ Id.
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    On September 20, 2022, the FAA published a final rule in the 
Federal Register extending SFAR No. 117, 14 CFR 91.1617, for an 
additional two years due to continued concerns, described in more 
detail in the preamble to that final rule, regarding the potential for 
unannounced Iranian ballistic missile fire, as well as UAS activity, 
originating from western Iran and targeting sites in the region.\8\ The 
FAA was concerned about the safety-of-flight hazards to civil aviation 
and airspace de-confliction challenges posed by such activity.\9\
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    \8\ Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the 
Tehran Flight Information Region (FIR) (OIIX) final rule, 87 FR 
57379 (Sept. 20, 2022).
    \9\ Id.
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    The FAA continues to assess the situation in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) 
as presenting an unacceptable risk to the safety of U.S. civil 
aviation. Since the early October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the 
initiation of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, which 
remain ongoing, regional tensions have further escalated, resulting in 
increased Iranian military activities and heightened alert status of 
Iranian military forces posing safety-of-flight risk concerns similar 
to those that led to the tragic shootdown of PS752. The FAA also has 
not observed any transparent sustained changes to Iran's air defense 
command and control procedures, airspace de-confliction procedures, and 
rules of engagement that would sufficiently diminish the risk of 
another accidental shootdown of a civil aircraft by Iranian air defense 
units in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) during future periods of heightened 
tensions for U.S. civil aviation operations to resume safely.
    The FAA acknowledges Iranian authorities proactively issued a 
series of NOTAMs to deconflict and mitigate risks to civil aviation 
operations prior to the April 13, 2024, retaliatory operations 
emanating out of western Iran, which represented some level of improved 
civil-military coordination. Additionally, Iranian authorities took 
actions to mitigate risks to civil aviation operations during the April 
19, 2024, strikes in Isfahan, Iran. However, the FAA continues to 
closely monitor Iranian activities for indications of sustained and 
consistent improvements in Iran's ability to proactively mitigate risks 
to civil aviation operations during periods of heightened regional 
tensions and increased military operations in, or emanating out of, the 
Tehran FIR (OIIX).
    Additionally, the FAA has continued concerns regarding the 
potential for unannounced Iranian ballistic missile launches and 
weaponized UAS activity originating from Iran and targeting sites 
across the region. For example, in January 2024, Iran conducted 
uncoordinated cross-border attacks on targets in Syria, Iraq, and 
Pakistan, using weaponized UAS and missile strikes. These military 
operations presented airspace deconfliction challenges and safety-of-
flight hazards to civil aircraft, including those operating on 
international air routes in the region. Additionally, the FAA has 
concerns with the increased level of Global Positioning System (GPS) 
and communications jamming in the region, which poses additional safety 
concerns for flight operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX). In April 2024, 
Iranian authorities issued a NOTAM to advise operators of the potential 
for GPS/Global Navigation Satellite System interruptions in the Tehran 
FIR (OIIX). The FAA acknowledges Iran's provision of safety information 
to the international civil aviation community in this particular 
instance; however, the FAA reiterates the need for sustained and 
consistent improvements in Iran's ability to proactively mitigate risks 
to civil aviation operations during periods of heightened regional 
tensions and increased military operations in, or emanating out of, the 
Tehran FIR (OIIX).
    Therefore, as a result of the significant continuing unacceptable 
risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in the Tehran FIR 
(OIIX), the FAA extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 117, Sec.  
91.1617, from October 31, 2024, until October 31, 2027.
    Further amendments to SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617, might be 
appropriate if the risk to U.S. civil aviation safety and security 
changes. In this regard, the FAA will continue to monitor the situation 
and evaluate the extent to which persons described in paragraph (a) of 
this rule might be able to operate safely in the Tehran FIR (OIIX).
    The FAA also republishes the details concerning the approval and 
exemption processes in Sections IV and V of this preamble, consistent 
with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, to enable 
interested persons to refer to this

[[Page 80387]]

final rule for comprehensive information about requesting relief from 
the FAA from the provisions of SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617.

IV. Approval Process Based on a Request From a Department, Agency, or 
Instrumentality of the United States Government

A. Approval Process Based on an Authorization Request From a 
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of the United States Government

    In some instances, U.S. Government departments, agencies, or 
instrumentalities may need to engage U.S. civil aviation to support 
their activities in the Tehran FIR (OIIX). If a department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the U.S. Government determines that it has a 
critical need to engage any person described in paragraph (a) of SFAR 
No. 117, Sec.  91.1617, including a U.S. air carrier or commercial 
operator, to transport civilian or military passengers or cargo or 
conduct other operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX), that department, 
agency, or instrumentality may request the FAA to approve persons 
described in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617, to conduct 
such operations.
    The requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or 
instrumentality must submit the request for approval to the FAA's 
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety in a letter signed by an 
appropriate senior official of the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality.\10\ The FAA will not accept or consider requests for 
approval from anyone other than the requesting U.S. Government 
department, agency, or instrumentality. In addition, the senior 
official signing the letter requesting FAA approval must be 
sufficiently positioned within the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality to demonstrate that the organization's senior 
leadership supports the request for approval and is committed to taking 
all necessary steps to minimize aviation safety and security risks to 
the proposed flights. The senior official must also be in a position 
to: (1) attest to the accuracy of all representations made to the FAA 
in the request for approval, and (2) ensure that any support from the 
requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality 
described in the request for approval is in fact brought to bear and is 
maintained over time. Unless justified by exigent circumstances, 
requesting U.S. Government departments, agencies, or instrumentalities 
must submit requests for approval to the FAA no less than 30 calendar 
days before the date on which the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality wishes the operator(s) to commence the proposed 
operation(s).
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    \10\ This approval procedure applies to U.S. Government 
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities; it does not apply to 
the public. The FAA describes this procedure in the interest of 
providing transparency with respect to the FAA's process for 
interacting with U.S. Government departments, agencies, or 
instrumentalities that seek to engage U.S. civil aviation to operate 
in the area in which this SFAR would prohibit their operations in 
the absence of specific FAA approval.
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    The requestor must send the request to the Associate Administrator 
for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Electronic submissions are acceptable, 
and the requesting entity may request that the FAA notify it 
electronically as to whether the FAA grants the request for approval. 
If a requestor wishes to make an electronic submission to the FAA, the 
requestor should contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone 
at (202) 267-3203 or by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#92abbfd4d3d3bfdde4f7e0e1f7f3e1d4fefbf5fae6c2e0fdfafbf0fbe6fbfdfce1d2f4f3f3bcf5fde4"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ba8397fcfbfb97f5ccdfc8c9dfdbc9fcd6d3ddd2ceeac8d5d2d3d8d3ced3d5d4c9fadcdbdb94ddd5cc">[email protected]</span></a> for submission instructions. The 
requestor must not submit its letter requesting FAA approval or related 
supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. Rather, 
the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to an 
appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service for further 
assistance.
    A single letter may request approval from the FAA for multiple 
persons described in SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617, or for multiple 
flight operations. To the extent known, the letter must identify the 
person(s) the requester expects the SFAR to cover on whose behalf the 
U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality seeks FAA 
approval, and it must describe--
    <bullet> The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
mission being supported;
    <bullet> The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will 
provide;
    <bullet> To the extent known, the specific locations in the Tehran 
FIR (OIIX) where the proposed operation(s) will occur, including, but 
not limited to, the flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it 
is operating in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) and the airports, airfields, or 
landing zones at which the aircraft will take off and land; and
    <bullet> The method by which the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality will provide, or how the operator will otherwise 
obtain, current threat information and an explanation of how the 
operator will integrate this information into all phases of the 
proposed operations (i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-
flight, and post-flight phases).
    The request for approval must also include a list of operators with 
whom the U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality 
requesting FAA approval has a current contract(s), grant(s), or 
cooperative agreement(s) (or its prime contractor has a subcontract(s)) 
for specific flight operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX). The requestor 
may identify additional operators to the FAA at any time after the FAA 
issues its approval. Neither the operators listed in the original 
request, nor any operators the requestor subsequently seeks to add to 
the approval, may commence operations under the approval until the FAA 
issues them an Operations Specification (OpSpec) or Letter of 
Authorization (LOA), as appropriate, for operations in the Tehran FIR 
(OIIX). The approval conditions discussed below apply to all operators. 
Requestors should contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone 
at (202) 267-3203 or by email at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#bf8692f9fefe92f0c9dacdccdadeccf9d3d6d8d7cbefcdd0d7d6ddd6cbd6d0d1ccffd9dede91d8d0c9"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="bc8591fafdfd91f3cad9cecfd9ddcffad0d5dbd4c8ecced3d4d5ded5c8d5d3d2cffcdadddd92dbd3ca">[email protected]</span></a> for instructions on how to submit 
the names of additional operators the requestor wishes to add to an 
existing approval to the FAA. The requestor must not submit the names 
of additional operators it wishes to add to an existing approval to the 
Washington Operations Center. Rather, the Washington Operations Center 
will refer the requestor to an appropriate staff member of the Flight 
Standards Service for further assistance.
    If an approval request includes classified information or 
controlled unclassified information not authorized for public release, 
requestors may contact the Washington Operations Center for 
instructions on submitting it to the FAA. The Washington Operations 
Center's contact information appears in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this final rule.
    FAA approval of an operation under SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617, 
does not relieve persons subject to this SFAR of the responsibility to 
comply with all other applicable FAA rules and regulations. Operators 
of civil aircraft must comply with the conditions of their 
certificates, OpSpecs, and LOAs, as applicable. Operators must also 
comply with all rules and regulations of other U.S. Government 
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities that may apply to the 
proposed operation(s), including, but not limited to, regulations 
issued by the Transportation Security Administration.

[[Page 80388]]

B. Approval Conditions

    If the FAA approves the request, the FAA's Aviation Safety 
organization will send an approval letter to the requesting U.S. 
Government department, agency, or instrumentality informing it that the 
FAA's approval is subject to all of the following conditions:
    (1) The approval will stipulate those procedures and conditions 
that limit, to the greatest degree possible, the risk to the operator 
while still allowing the operator to achieve its operational 
objectives.
    (2) Before any approval takes effect, the operator must submit to 
the FAA:
    (a) A written release of the U.S. Government from all damages, 
claims, and liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and 
expenses, relating to any event arising out of or related to the 
approved operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX); and
    (b) The operator's written agreement to indemnify the U.S. 
Government with respect to any and all third-party damages, claims, and 
liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and expenses, 
relating to any event arising out of or related to the approved 
operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX).
    (3) Other conditions the FAA may specify, including those the FAA 
might impose in OpSpecs or LOAs, as applicable.
    The release and agreement to indemnify do not preclude an operator 
from raising a claim under an applicable non-premium war risk insurance 
policy the FAA issues under chapter 443 of title 49, U.S. Code.
    If the FAA approves the proposed operation(s), the FAA will issue 
an OpSpec or LOA, as applicable, to the operator(s) identified in the 
original request and any operators the requestor subsequently adds to 
the approval, authorizing them to conduct the approved operation(s). In 
addition, as stated in paragraph (3) of this section V.B., the FAA 
notes that it may include additional conditions beyond those contained 
in the approval letter in any OpSpec or LOA associated with a 
particular operator operating under this approval, as necessary in the 
interests of aviation safety. U.S. Government departments, agencies, 
and instrumentalities requesting FAA approval on behalf of entities 
with which they have a contract or subcontract, grant, or cooperative 
agreement should request a copy of the relevant OpSpec or LOA directly 
from the entity with which they have any of the foregoing types of 
arrangements, if desired.

V. Information Regarding Petitions for Exemption

    Any operations not conducted under an approval the FAA issues 
through the approval process set forth previously may only occur in 
accordance with an exemption from SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617. A 
petition for exemption must comply with 14 CFR part 11. The FAA will 
consider whether exceptional circumstances exist beyond those described 
in the approval process in the previous section. To determine whether a 
petition for exemption from the prohibition this SFAR establishes 
fulfills the standards described in 14 CFR 11.81, the FAA consistently 
finds necessary the following information:
    <bullet> The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
operation;
    <bullet> The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will 
provide;
    <bullet> The specific locations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) where the 
proposed operation(s) will occur, including, but not limited to, the 
flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it is operating in the 
Tehran FIR (OIIX) and the airports, airfields, or landing zones at 
which the aircraft will take off and land;
    <bullet> The method by which the operator will obtain current 
threat information and an explanation of how the operator will 
integrate this information into all phases of its proposed operations 
(i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-flight, and post-
flight phases); and
    <bullet> The plans and procedures the operator will use to minimize 
the risks identified in this preamble to the proposed operations to 
support the relief sought and demonstrate that granting such relief 
would not adversely affect safety or would provide a level of safety at 
least equal to that provided by this SFAR. The FAA has found 
comprehensive, organized plans and procedures of this nature to be 
helpful in facilitating the agency's safety evaluation of petitions for 
exemption from flight prohibition SFARs.
    The FAA includes, as a condition of each such exemption it issues, 
a release and agreement to indemnify, as described previously.
    The FAA recognizes that, with the support of the U.S. Government, 
the governments of other countries could plan operations that may be 
affected by SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617. While the FAA will not permit 
these operations through the approval process, the FAA will consider 
exemption requests for such operations on an expedited basis and in 
accordance with the order of preference set forth in paragraph (c) of 
SFAR No. 117, Sec.  91.1617.
    If a petition for exemption includes information that is sensitive 
for security reasons or proprietary information, requestors may contact 
the Washington Operations Center for instructions on submitting it to 
the FAA. The Washington Operations Center's contact information is 
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this final 
rule. Requestors must not submit their petitions for exemption or 
related supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. 
Rather, the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to 
the appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service or the 
Office of Rulemaking for further assistance.

VI. Severability

    Congress authorized the FAA by statute to promote safe flight of 
civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing, among other things, 
regulations and minimum standards for practices, methods, and 
procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce 
and national security. 49 U.S.C. 44701. Consistent with that mandate, 
the FAA is prohibiting certain persons from conducting flight 
operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) due to the continuing hazards to 
the safety of U.S. civil flight operations. The purpose of this rule is 
to operate holistically in addressing a range of hazards and needs in 
the Tehran FIR (OIIX). However, the FAA recognizes that certain 
provisions focus on unique factors. Therefore, the FAA finds that the 
various provisions of this final rule are severable and able to operate 
functionally if severed from each other. In the event a court were to 
invalidate one or more of this final rule's unique provisions, the 
remaining provisions should stand, thus allowing the FAA to continue to 
fulfill its Congressionally authorized role of promoting safe flight of 
civil aircraft in air commerce.

VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Federal agencies consider the impacts of regulatory actions under a 
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive 
Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and Executive Order 14094 
(``Modernizing Regulatory Review''), direct that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354), as codified in 
5 U.S.C. 603 et seq., requires agencies to analyze the economic impact 
of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements 
Act of

[[Page 80389]]

1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as codified in 19 U.S.C. Chapter 13, prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter 25, requires agencies 
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other 
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate 
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or Tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of 
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of 
the economic impacts of this final rule.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined this final 
rule has benefits that justify its costs. This rule is a significant 
regulatory action, as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 
as amended by Executive Order 14094. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not require 
notice and comment for this final rule, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 do not 
require regulatory flexibility analyses regarding impacts on small 
entities. This rule will not create unnecessary obstacles to the 
foreign commerce of the United States. This rule will not impose an 
unfunded mandate on State, local, or Tribal governments, or on the 
private sector, by exceeding the threshold identified previously.

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    This action extends the expiration date of the SFAR prohibiting 
certain flight operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX) for an additional 
three years due to the significant, continuing risks to U.S. civil 
aviation detailed in the preamble of this final rule. The FAA 
acknowledges this flight prohibition might result in additional costs 
to some U.S. operators, such as increased fuel costs and other 
operational-related costs. However, the FAA expects the benefits of 
this action to exceed the costs because it will result in the avoidance 
of risks of fatalities, injuries, and property damage that could occur 
if a U.S. operator's aircraft were shot down (or otherwise damaged) 
while operating in the Tehran FIR (OIIX).

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), in 5 U.S.C. 603, requires an 
agency to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing 
impacts on small entities whenever 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law 
requires an agency to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking 
for any proposed rule. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. 604 requires an agency to 
prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis when an agency issues a 
final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553 after that section or any other law 
requires publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking. The 
FAA concludes good cause exists to forgo notice and comment and to not 
delay the effective date for this rule. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not 
require notice and comment in this situation, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 
similarly do not require regulatory flexibility analyses.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and 
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil 
aviation from risks to their operations in the Tehran FIR (OIIX), a 
location outside the U.S. Therefore, the rule complies with the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and Tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $183 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
the FAA to consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens it imposes on the public. The FAA has determined no 
new requirement for information collection is associated with this 
final rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, the FAA's policy is to conform to 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices correspond to 
this regulation. The FAA finds this action is fully consistent with the 
obligations under 49 U.S.C. 40105(b)(1)(A) to ensure the FAA exercises 
its duties consistently with the obligations of the United States under 
international agreements.
    While the FAA's flight prohibition does not apply to foreign air 
carriers, DOT codeshare authorizations prohibit foreign air carriers 
from carrying a U.S. codeshare partner's code on a flight segment that 
operates in airspace for which the FAA has issued a flight prohibition 
for U.S. civil aviation. In addition, foreign air carriers and other 
foreign operators may choose to avoid, or be advised or directed by 
their civil aviation authorities to avoid, airspace for which the FAA 
has issued a flight prohibition for U.S. civil aviation.

G. Environmental Analysis

    The FAA has analyzed this action under Executive Order 12114, 
Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, and DOT Order 
5610.1C, Paragraph 16. Executive Order 12114 requires the FAA to be 
informed of environmental considerations and take those considerations 
into account when making decisions on major Federal actions that could 
have environmental impacts anywhere beyond the borders of the United 
States. The FAA has determined this action is exempt pursuant to 
Section 2-5(a)(i) of Executive Order 12114 because it does not have the 
potential for a significant effect on the environment outside the 
United States.
    In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: 
Policies and Procedures, paragraph 8-6(c), the FAA has prepared a 
memorandum for the record stating the reason(s) for this determination 
and has

[[Page 80390]]

placed it in the docket for this rulemaking.

VIII. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132. The agency has determined this action will not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship 
between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. 
Therefore, this rule will not have federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211. The agency 
has determined it is not a ``significant energy action'' under the 
executive order and will not be likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609 promotes international regulatory cooperation 
to meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, 
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has 
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of 
Executive Order 13609 and has determined that this action will have no 
effect on international regulatory cooperation.

IX. Additional Information

A. Electronic Access

    Except for classified and controlled unclassified material not 
authorized for public release, all documents the FAA considered in 
developing this rule, including economic analyses and technical 
reports, may be accessed from the internet through the docket for this 
rulemaking.
    Those documents may be viewed online at https://www.regulations.gov 
using the docket number listed above. A copy of this rule will be 
placed in the docket. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are 
available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days 
each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded 
from the Office of the Federal Register's website at https://www.federalregister.gov and the Government Publishing Office's website 
at https://www.govinfo.gov. A copy may also be found on the FAA's 
Regulations and Policies website at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA) (Pub. L. 104-121) (set forth as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601) 
requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document may 
contact its local FAA official or the persons listed under the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. 
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91

    Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety, 
Freight, Iran.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends part 91 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, 
as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101, 40103, 40105, 
40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 
44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 
47122, 47508, 47528-47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 
U.S.C. 44703 note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).


0
2. Amend Sec.  91.1617 by revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  91.1617  Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 117--Prohibition 
Against Certain Flights in the Tehran Flight Information Region (FIR) 
(OIIX).

* * * * *
    (e) Expiration. This SFAR will remain in effect until October 31, 
2027. The FAA may amend, rescind, or extend this SFAR as necessary.

    Issued in Washington, DC, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
106(f), 40101(d)(1), 40105(b)(1)(A), and 44701(a)(5).
Michael G. Whitaker,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2024-22731 Filed 10-2-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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