Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1701-CR-122| June 23, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Justin R. Wall

Wall Legal Services

Huntington, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joseph E. Waldron,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 23, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

35A02-1701-CR-122

Appeal from the Huntington 

Circuit Court 

The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

35C01-1609-FC-155

Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Joseph E. Waldron brings an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of 

his motion to suppress evidence, following a hearing on that motion. He raises 

one issue, namely, whether the trial court erred when it found that a search 

warrant included within its scope the seizure of electronic devices capable of 

storing video recordings from surveillance cameras. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On Tuesday, May 10, 2016, six-year-old A.W. disclosed to school personnel 

and police that Waldron, her father, had physically battered her with a Taser 

over the previous Friday and Saturday at their home in Huntington. Based 

upon the information from A.W., Huntington Police Detective Andrew Ellet 

(“Officer Ellet”) obtained a search warrant that afternoon for Waldron’s

residence to search for and seize: “a taser, all surveillance cameras both inside 

and outside the home, and electronic devices used to store video recordings 

from the surveillance cameras.” Appellant’s App. at 28-29; State’s Ex. 1. The 

search warrant also directed the officers “to search all recovered surveillance 

cameras and electronic devices for the following: video recordings or pictures 

involving child physical abuse.” Id. 

[3] At around 4:00 p.m., Officer Ellet and other Huntington police officers 

executed the search warrant in Waldron’s presence. The officers located in the 

home a digital video recorder (“DVR”) connected to the indoor and outside 

surveillance cameras. Officer Ellet was aware that the purpose of the DVR was 
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to record video from the surveillance cameras and that it had limited capacity to 

store information. Within close proximity to the DVR, the officers also located 

a taser, a computer tower, a laptop computer, an internal hard drive, several cell 

phones, and a digital camera. The computer tower, the laptop computer, and 

the internal hard drive all had the capability of storing video recordings from 

the surveillance cameras transferred through the DVR over a wireless router.

The officers did not know which electronic devices Waldron used to store the 

videos recorded by the DVR. 

[4] Detective Ellet seized the taser, the laptop computer, the computer tower, the 

internal hard drive, and the DVR, including its hard drive. Indiana State Police 

Sergeant Jeremy Chapman (“Officer Chapman”), a forensic examiner of digital 

evidence and an audio visual enhancement specialist, examined the electronic 

devices and discovered on them evidence of child solicitation committed 

against a sixteen-year-old girl and images of child pornography. On September 

1, 2016, the State charged Waldron with two counts of Class C felony child 

exploitation and one count of Level 6 felony possession of child pornography. 

[5] On October 3, Waldron filed a motion to suppress, which alleged that the 

officers exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing all electronic devices

except the DVR. Specifically, Waldron argued that the language of the search 

warrant limited the seizure of evidence to only those electronic devices 

physically connected to the surveillance cameras, i.e., the DVR. Following a 

hearing on Waldron’s motion to suppress, the trial court issued an order 

denying that motion. The trial court’s order stated, in relevant part:
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The Court finds this attempt to restrict the ability of the officers 

to properly search for evidence with the [w]arrant is incorrect.

The home had many devices upon which storage of video 

recordings from the surveillance cameras could have been stored. 

The Court could not have been aware of what was in the home 

and capable of storage. Therefore, devices capable of storage by 

connecting to the camera on the DVR would be allowed to be 

taken and searched by the [w]arrant.

Appellant’s App. at 58. 

[6] Waldron subsequently obtained an order certifying the order on his motion to 

suppress for interlocutory appeal. On February 24, 2017, we accepted 

jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Waldron appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 

Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other 

sufficiency issues. Gonser v. State, 843 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

We determine whether there is substantial evidence of probative 

value to support the trial court’s ruling. Litchfield v. State, 824 

N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). We do not reweigh evidence and 

[we] construe conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial 

court’s ruling. Widduck v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2007). We must also consider uncontested evidence 

favorable to the defendant. Id. The trial court’s ultimate 

determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is, 

however, reviewed de novo. Harper v. State, 922 N.E.2d 75, 79 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 
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244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)) (applying this standard to a Terry stop), 

trans. denied.

Woodson v. State, 960 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[8] Waldron maintains that all electronic devices except the DVR were erroneously 

admitted into evidence because they were beyond the scope of the warrant to 

search his home. 

To protect a citizen’s right to be free from unreasonable searches 

and seizures, our state and federal constitutions require officials 

to obtain a warrant before conducting searches and seizures.

Green v. State, 676 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. 

denied. A warrant may not issue unless an affidavit is submitted 

to a judge or magistrate, describing with particularity the place to 

be searched and the items to be seized. Id. The particularity 

requirement restricts the scope of the search, authorizing seizure 

of only those things described in the warrant; a warrant which 

leaves the executing officer with discretion is invalid. Lee v. State, 

715 N.E.2d 1289, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

Pavey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 692, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. 

However, “[o]ur supreme court has noted that while the items to be searched 

for and seized must be described with some specificity, there is no requirement 

that there be an exact description.” Id. (citing Phillips v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1073, 

1075 (Ind. 1987)).

[9] Here, the search warrant authorized the police to search Waldron’s home for 

“electronic devices used to store video recordings from the surveillance 

cameras,” and to seize such items. Appellant’s App. at 58. The warrant further 
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authorized the police to “search all recovered surveillance cameras and electronic 

devices for . . . video recordings or pictures involving child physical abuse.” Id. 

(emphasis added). Officer Chapman, who had been employed as a forensic 

examiner of digital evidence for thirteen years, testified that recordings from the 

surveillance cameras could have been transferred from the DVR to the seized 

laptop computer, computer tower, and internal hard drive for storage. Such a 

transfer could have been accomplished either by a hard connection or through a 

wireless router. He testified that such a transfer was likely, given the limited 

storage capacity of the DVR. Moreover, the DVR unit had the capability of 

transferring data directly to the computer tower. Thus, the seized electronic 

devices were capable of storing “video recordings from the surveillance 

cameras.” Id. And, since the officers obviously could have no way of knowing 

which, if any, of the devices actually stored such recordings until they searched 

each of them, the warrant authorized them to conduct such a search of each 

seized electronic device. Id. 

[10] Waldron maintains that only the DVR fell within the scope of the warrant 

because it was the only device that was physically connected to the surveillance 

cameras at the time of the search. Thus, he contends, only the DVR could be 

used to store video recordings “from” the surveillance camera. That contention 

is without merit. The warrant contains no language limiting the search and 

seizure to electronic devices that happen to actually be attached to the 

surveillance camera at the time of the search. Nor does it limit the search to 

only devices that can directly record the video from the surveillance camera. 
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Rather, the plain language of the warrant applies to devices “used to store” 

recordings, and the evidence shows that the seized electronic devices were 

capable of such storage. Moreover, this was not a situation where the officers 

were authorized to seize one kind of item, but seized an item of unrelated 

character. C.f. Ogburn v. State, 53 N.E.3d 464, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding 

seizure exceeded scope of warrant where the item seized “was not of the same 

character as” the items described in the warrant), trans. denied.

[11] The record contains substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial 

court’s denial of Waldron’s motion to suppress the electronic devices.

[12] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.