2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

12-28-2011

USA v. Arthur Heath

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-1709

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Arthur Heath" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 34.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 11-1709

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

v.

ARTHUR HEATH, 

Appellant

______________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Crim. No. 2:10-cr-00565)

District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis

______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 28, 2011

______________

Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: December 28, 2011)

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OPINION

______________
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Appellant Arthur Heath (“Heath”) was convicted by a jury in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of a single count of gun possession 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment

and now appeals his conviction and sentence. We hold that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of Heath’s flight and resistance to arrest to be 

introduced at trial. For the reasons stated herein, we will affirm the District Court’s 

judgment and sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 

essential facts.

On August 24, 2010, members of the United States Marshals Warrant Squad 

sought to arrest Arthur Heath on an arrest warrant issued in May 2010. The marshals 

surrounded a residence located at 1733 Edgley Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 

Immediately after announcing their presence, marshals stationed in the rear of the home 

saw Heath throw a gun out of a barred window. The gun fell to the ground and was later 

recovered and identified as a loaded nine-millimeter Glock semi-automatic pistol. Heath

escaped from the residence onto the roof of the building. 

Roughly two hours after Heath’s escape, the marshals found him hiding in the 

basement of a nearby residence. Heath refused requests to surrender. Initially, the 
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marshals were unable to subdue Heath, even with the use of tasers. Sometime later, with 

additional efforts, he was taken into custody. Law enforcement officers on the scene 

identified him as the person whom they had seen throw the gun from the window of 1733 

Edgley Street earlier that day.

Heath was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He submitted a pretrial motion in limine to exclude 

evidence that he fled from police and resisted arrest. The District Court denied the 

motion. A jury found Health guilty. He was sentenced to sixty months of imprisonment. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

jurisdiction from the District Court’s final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

“review the district court’s decision to admit evidence of prior ‘bad acts’ under Rule 

404(b) for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 

2006) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Heath alleges that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion in 

limine to exclude from trial evidence indicating that he fled from the police and resisted 

arrest. The District Court admitted the evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules 

of Evidence because his flight from police indicated consciousness of guilt as opposed to 

proving an essential element of the crime charged. Consequently, we consider four 
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factors in determining whether the District Court abused its discretion in allowing the 

evidence under Rule 404(b): (1) whether it was introduced for a permissible purpose; (2) 

whether it was relevant; (3) whether its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair 

prejudice; and (4) whether the District Court provided a limiting instruction that 

“charge[s] the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purposes for which it 

[was] admitted.” United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 

Huddleston v. United States 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)); see also United States v. 

Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2002).

We have previously stated that “‘[o]ther acts’ evidence satisfies the first two 

requirements if it is ‘probative of a material issue other than character.’” Cross, 308 F.3d 

at 321 (quoting Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685); see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (allowing 

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to be admitted for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident). The Government avers that the evidence of Heath’s flight and 

resisting arrest are probative in that they indicate his consciousness of guilt. It further 

asserts that the District Court’s decision to admit the evidence comports with Rule 404(b) 

because it was not being used to prove Heath’s character “in order to show action in 

conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). We agree that evidence of consciousness 

of guilt is relevant and we find that evidence admitted for this purpose is proper under 
5

Rule 404(b). We, therefore, find that the first two prongs of the Givan/Huddleston test 

are met. 

We afford the District Court great deference in reviewing its consideration of the 

third prong of the test. United States v. Universal Rehab. Serv. (PA) Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 

665 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that because the trial judge is “in the best position to assess 

the extent of the prejudice caused a party, [he] must be given a very substantial discretion

in balancing probative value on the one hand and unfair prejudice on the other.”) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to justify reversal, we would have to find 

the District Court’s analysis and resulting conclusion to be arbitrary or irrational. Id. 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). We see no basis for such a conclusion in this 

case. The District Court carefully measured the relevance and probative value of the 

evidence reflecting consciousness of guilt and weighed it against the danger of unfair 

prejudice, concluding that the majority of the resulting prejudice did not qualify as unfair.

Consequently, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger 

of unfair prejudice.

Finally, the District Court satisfied the fourth prong of the test by providing a 

limiting instruction for the evidence of flight and resisting arrest. The Court explained 

that the testimony relating to the flight and resisting arrest “was presented on the potential 

issue of consciousness or awareness of guilt.” App. 123. It further explained how the 
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jury could consider such evidence stating, “if you conclude that [Heath] fled or did the 

other things because of an awareness of his culpability in this case, then that’s an 

inference that you could make with respect to consciousness of guilt.” App. 124. 

Finally, the Court explicitly instructed the jury that “flight or resistance standing alone 

without anything else are not sufficient to establish guilt.” Id. We find that such an 

instruction clearly fulfills the Givan/Huddleston requirement. 

The District Court properly applied Rule 404(b) in admitting evidence of Heath’s 

flight and resisting arrest. We, therefore, conclude that the District Court did not abuse 

its discretion in allowing the evidence at trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, and for those articulated by the District Court, we 

will affirm the District Court’s judgment and sentence.