Opinion filed March 31, 2017

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-15-00058-CV

__________

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant

V.

PEDRO MONROY ARCINIEGA, Appellee

On Appeal from the 1st Multicounty Court at Law

Nolan County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2,421

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The Texas Department of Public Safety appeals from the county court’s order

restoring Pedro Monroy Arciniega’s driving privileges. In its order, the county court 

reversed an administrative law judge’s decision that authorized the Department to 

suspend Arciniega’s driver’s license based upon his refusal to submit a breath 

specimen after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. See TEX. TRANSP.

CODE ANN. § 724.035 (West 2011). The county court found that the administrative 
2

law judge erroneously determined that reasonable suspicion supported the initial 

stop. In its sole issue, the Department asserts that the county court erred in holding 

that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop Arciniega. We reverse and render.

When reviewing an administrative suspension, courts use a substantial 

evidence standard of review. Mireles v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 

131 (Tex. 1999). A court applying the substantial evidence standard of review may 

not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Id. The issue for the reviewing 

court is not whether the agency’s decision was correct, but only whether the record 

demonstrates some reasonable basis for the agency’s action. Id. Courts must affirm 

administrative findings in contested cases if there is more than a scintilla of evidence 

to support them. Id. An administrative decision may be sustained even if the 

evidence preponderates against it. Id.

We review the trial court’s decision de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. 

Gonzales, 276 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). This means 

that we independently assess the administrative law judge’s decision under the 

substantial evidence standard of review. Id. Whether substantial evidence exists to 

support an administrative law judge’s order is a question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. 

Safety v. Alford, 209 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. 2006). The true test is not whether the 

agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis exists in 

the record for the action taken by the agency. See Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. 

Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984). The reviewing court 

is not bound by the reasons given by an agency in its order, provided there is a valid 

basis in the record supporting the agency’s action. See id.

In an administrative license-suspension hearing, the Department bears the 

burden of proving several elements, the first of which is that “reasonable suspicion 

or probable cause existed to stop or arrest the person.” TRANSP. § 724.042(1). The 

only contested element in this case is whether the arresting officer had reasonable 
3

suspicion to stop Arciniega. The administrative law judge made the following 

finding on this element:

FINDING OF FACT 1: On July 19, 2014, Police Officer M. Campa, 

Sweetwater Police Department, at approximately 10:50 p.m.,

personally observed a motor vehicle, i.e., a white pickup truck being 

driven by Defendant north bound on Sam Houston, a public place in

Sweetwater, Nolan County, Texas. Defendant’s vehicle was approaching a stopped vehicle at a rate of speed that appeared to Campa to be

dangerous. Defendant’s vehicle did not brake until late, and had to 

maneuver to one side to avoid a collision. Campa made a stop of

Defendant. On July 19, 2014, reasonable suspicion to stop or probable 

cause to arrest the Defendant existed.

Accordingly, we must determine whether substantial evidence supports the 

administrative law judge’s finding that reasonable suspicion existed for 

Officer Campa to stop Arciniega. In that respect, we stand in the same position as 

the county court, and we review the administrative law judge’s order without 

deference to the county court’s judgment. See Alford, 209 S.W.3d at 103. 

Our scope of review is confined to the administrative record. Dep’t of Pub. 

Safety v. Hirschman, 169 S.W.3d 331, 336 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied); 

see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(e) (West 2016). The evidence in this 

administrative record is quite brief in that it only consists of three documents offered 

by the Department. One of the three documents was the “Peace Officer’s Sworn 

Report” prepared by Officer Campa. The opening paragraphs of his narrative stated 

as follows:

On July 19, 2014 at approximately 20:50 [hours] I Officer 

Campa was parked in front of the Mi Familia restaurant located on the 

500 blk of Sam Houston Street running radar, and scanning the 

intersection for traffic violations.

I observed a white pickup traveling north on Sam Houston 

approaching the intersection behind a white car which had stopped at 

the stop sign on Sam Houston. The truck was traveling at a fast rate of 
4

speed, and did not appear to be slowing down when approaching the 

white car, at this point I believe the truck was going to strike the stopped 

car from the rear. The trucked then braked hard, and made an evasive 

move to the left of the white car, barely missing striking the car from 

behind.

I then initiated a traffic stop on the truck by activating my 

emergency overhead lights.

These paragraphs of Officer Campa’s narrative are the only portion of his report 

addressing his basis for stopping Arciniega. 

Arciniega contends that Officer Campa did not have reasonable suspicion to 

stop him because Officer Campa did not identify a traffic offense that Arciniega

violated and because his narrative does not demonstrate that he committed a traffic 

offense. Conversely, the Department asserts that Officer Campa had reasonable 

suspicion to believe that Arciniega committed the traffic offense of speeding or 

reckless driving. 

We note at the outset that the bulk of the cases addressing reasonable 

suspicion are criminal cases where the issue has been litigated in the context of a 

motion to suppress. These cases typically have a much more developed record than 

the administrative record before us. Additionally, the applicable standard of review 

for a motion to suppress affords a great deal of deference to the trial court’s 

resolution of historical facts and credibility issues. See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 

666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under the standard of review applicable to this 

appeal, however, we give no deference to the county court’s judgment, and we are 

also not bound by the reasons given by the administrative law judge in his order. 

Instead, we focus on whether some reasonable basis exists in the record for the action 

taken by the agency. 

A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, 

articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead 
5

him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be 

engaged in criminal activity. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2011). This standard is an objective one that disregards the actual 

subjective intent of the arresting officer and looks, instead, to whether there was an 

objectively justifiable basis for the detention. Id. It also looks to the totality of the 

circumstances; those circumstances may all seem innocent enough in isolation, but 

if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an 

investigative detention is justified. Id. 

“It is well settled that a traffic violation committed in an officer’s presence 

authorizes an initial stop.” Armitage v. State, 637 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App.

1982); see Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“[T]he 

Supreme Court has recognized that the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable 

where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 

occurred.”) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). “[F]or a 

peace officer to stop a motorist to investigate a traffic infraction, as is the case with 

any investigative stop, ‘proof of the actual commission of the offense is not a 

requisite.’” Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting 

Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)); see Tex. Dep’t of 

Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (The 

State “is not required to show a traffic offense was actually committed, but only that 

the officer reasonably believed a violation was in progress.”). 

A person commits the offense of reckless driving if he “drives a vehicle in 

willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TRANSP.

§ 545.401(a). “In the context of reckless driving, willful and wanton disregard 

means the deliberate and conscious indifference to the safety of others.” 

Fernandez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.)

(quoting Brown v. State, 183 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
6

2005, pet. ref’d). Proof of an evil or malicious intent is not an element of reckless 

driving. Id. (citing White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1983, pet. ref’d)). In Fernandez, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals determined that 

the reckless driving statute does not require actions “that caused a wreck or nearly 

caused a wreck” in order for a violation to occur. Id. at 358.

In this case, Officer Campa described a situation wherein Arciniega nearly 

collided with another car. Officer Campa stated in his narrative that Arciniega was 

“traveling at a fast rate of speed” as he approached a stop sign and a car that was 

stopped at the stop sign. Officer Campa further stated that Arciniega “did not appear 

to be slowing down when approaching the white car” and that he believed that 

Arciniega was going to strike the stopped car from the rear. Officer Campa then 

stated that Arciniega “then braked hard, and made an evasive move to the left of the 

white car, barely missing striking the car from behind.”

Reasonable suspicion “is an objective standard that disregards the subjective 

intent of the officer and requires only some minimal level of justification for the 

stop.” Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing 

Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Foster v. State, 326 

S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). Officer Campa identified specific, 

articulable facts that provided him with an objectively reasonable basis to justify a 

temporary detention to investigate the traffic offense of reckless driving. 

Arciniega’s act of almost striking a vehicle stopped at stop sign ahead of him 

supported a reasonable belief that he was operating his vehicle in willful or wanton 

disregard for the safety of persons or property and thereby driving recklessly. See 

TRANSP. § 545.401(a). The Transportation Code requires a driver following another 

vehicle to “maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles so that, 

considering the speed of the vehicles, traffic, and the conditions of the highway, the 

operator can safely stop without colliding with the preceding vehicle or veering into 
7

another vehicle, object, or person on or near the highway.” TRANSP. § 545.062(a). 

Officer Campa’s narrative indicates that Arciniega was not in compliance with this 

requirement because he was operating his vehicle in a manner that prevented him 

from being able to safely stop behind the stopped vehicle. Instead, Arciniega had to 

veer to the side of the stopped car in order to avoid striking it. The Department’s 

sole issue is sustained.

This Court’s Ruling

We reverse the order of the county court, and we render judgment in favor of 

the Department, reinstating the decision of the administrative law judge.

JOHN M. BAILEY 

JUSTICE

March 31, 2017

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.