[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11436

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DR. STEVEN RHODES, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DETECTIVE PAUL ROBBINS, 

in his individual capacity,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00673-MMH-JBT

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11436

Before GRANT, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Steven Rhodes was arrested on insurance fraud charges 

eight years ago, but the charges were dropped after he completed 

a pretrial intervention program. Rhodes afterward sued Paul 

Robbins—the detective who signed the affidavit for his arrest 

warrant—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging malicious prosecution. 

The district court dismissed Rhodes’s claim in part and later

rendered summary judgment for Robbins. Because Robbins is 

protected by qualified immunity, we affirm.

I. 

Rhodes is a chiropractor licensed to practice in Florida. In 

early 2014, Robbins—a Florida detective working in the

department of insurance fraud—began investigating complaints 

alleging fraudulent insurance billing by Rhodes. After interviewing 

seven patients, Robbins determined that Rhodes had submitted 

bills to insurance companies for services that “should not have 

been performed” or that “were not rendered.” Robbins signed an 

affidavit to that effect and brought it to a judge, who issued an 

arrest warrant for Rhodes.

Rhodes was arrested on seven counts of false and fraudulent 

insurance claims and a single count of engaging in a scheme to 

defraud. See Fla. Stat. §§ 817.234(1)(a)(1) (2014), 817.034(4)(a)(3)

(2014). But rather than bringing his case to trial, the state referred

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21-11436 Opinion of the Court 3

it to a felony pretrial intervention program. Once Rhodes 

completed the program—which required performing community 

service, reimbursing the state’s investigation costs, and paying 

restitution to two insurance companies—all charges against him 

were dropped. 

That might have been the end of the story. But three years 

later, Rhodes filed suit against Robbins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

asserting a malicious-prosecution claim based on the violation of 

his “Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 

seizures.” The district court disposed of the case in two stages. 

First, it dismissed a portion of Rhodes’s suit pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6), concluding that Robbins was entitled to qualified 

immunity on four of the charges he had brought against Rhodes.

Then, after a period of discovery, the district court entered

summary judgment in favor of Robbins on the remaining four 

charges—again on the grounds of qualified immunity, but this time 

considering evidence produced by Rhodes. Rhodes appeals both 

decisions. 

II. 

To prevail on his § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim, 

Rhodes must “prove both a violation of his Fourth Amendment 

right to be free of unreasonable seizures and the elements of the 

common law tort of malicious prosecution.” Williams v. Aguirre, 

965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations and brackets 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11436

omitted).1 More specifically, a plaintiff challenging an arrest 

pursuant to a warrant in a malicious prosecution action must 

establish both that “the legal process justifying his seizure was 

constitutionally infirm” and that “his seizure would not otherwise 

be justified without legal process.” Id. at 1165. Showing that an

officer “intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or 

omissions necessary” to support an arrest warrant satisfies the first 

prong of this inquiry. Id.

Robbins raises qualified immunity as a defense. Qualified 

immunity “shields public officials from liability for civil damages 

when their conduct does not violate a constitutional right that was 

clearly established at the time of the challenged action.” Id. at 1156

(quotation omitted). It is designed to protect “all but the plainly 

incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” 

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation 

omitted). An officer seeking qualified immunity must first 

demonstrate that she was acting within the scope of her 

discretionary authority when the disputed acts occurred. Id. The 

burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must prove both that the 

1 On appeal, both parties cite to cases involving false-arrest § 1983 claims rather 

than to Williams v. Aguirre, the case governing the analysis of § 1983 

malicious-prosecution claims in this Circuit. See 965 F.3d 1147, 1156–70 (11th 

Cir. 2020). Because claims of malicious prosecution involve “a different kind 

of seizure” than those of false arrest, we rely on Williams rather than 

analogizing to false-arrest cases. Id. at 1158; see also id. at 1164 (abrogating a 

past case “to the extent it held that the standards for malicious prosecution and 

false arrest are coextensive”).

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21-11436 Opinion of the Court 5

officer “violated a federal statutory or constitutional right” and that 

the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was “clearly established 

at the time.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1156 (quotation omitted).

Rhodes does not dispute that Robbins acted within the scope 

of his discretionary authority, so we confine our analysis to 

whether Rhodes has established a violation of clearly established 

law. Rhodes alleges that Robbins “knowingly and deliberately, or 

with a reckless disregard of the truth, made false statements or 

material omissions in his application for the warrant for Plaintiff’s 

arrest” and that “such statements or omissions were necessary to 

the finding of probable cause to issue said warrant.” If Rhodes were 

correct, that would be a violation of clearly established law and 

qualified immunity would not shield Robbins from liability. But 

Rhodes does not persuade us.

III. 

We begin by considering the four charges that the district 

court disposed of at the motion to dismiss stage. We review a 

district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss de novo, 

accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and 

construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, 

Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 723 (11th Cir. 2021). To survive a motion to 

dismiss, however, a plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11436

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009).

The district court concluded that even if all of the allegations 

in Rhodes’s complaint were true, four of the eight charges Robbins 

had brought against Rhodes could not support a claim of malicious 

prosecution. This Court’s analysis in Williams v. Aguirre guides 

our review of that decision. We first ask whether Robbins made 

an intentional (or reckless) false statement or material omission in 

the warrant affidavit for each charge brought against Rhodes. At 

the motion to dismiss stage, we accept allegations in the complaint 

regarding such falsehoods or omissions as true. We then consider 

whether, after the alleged falsehoods and omissions are rectified, 

the affidavit would be sufficient to establish probable cause for each 

of the charges. Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165.

For three of the four charges dismissed by the district court, 

Rhodes alleges that Robbins omitted material information from 

the warrant affidavit. Rhodes first attacks the charge arising from 

his treatment of patient D.B. Rhodes explains that D.B. “indicated 

that she had been pregnant since May of 2013, so her insurance 

company should not have been billed for a particular treatment 

which would have ceased being administered to her upon advising 

Plaintiff of her pregnancy.” He alleges that Robbins possessed 

copies of D.B.’s medical records, which show that she did not tell 

Rhodes of her pregnancy until August 2013—and that in any event, 

D.B.’s child was born in April 2014, making it impossible for her to 

be pregnant in May 2013.

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Changing the affidavit to reflect that Rhodes was not 

notified of D.B.’s pregnancy until August 2013 does not change the 

fact that Robbins had probable cause to bring the charge against 

Rhodes. Even if the pregnancy date is corrected, the only result is 

that there are three fewer months in which D.B. allegedly did not 

receive one type of treatment (electrical stimulation). The affidavit 

would still state that she received no such treatment for a period of 

eight months.2 And, of course, the affidavit also states that her 

insurance company was billed without authorization for three 

other kinds of treatment. That is sufficient to establish probable 

cause.

Rhodes next disputes the charge related to his treatment of 

O.V. Here, he alleges two material omissions made by Robbins: 

first, that O.V. initially reported that she had been billed over 

$56,000 by Rhodes, before admitting that it was only $2,734; and 

second, that after claiming that Rhodes had failed to provide 

certain services, she told another doctor that “she was receiving the 

treatments at issue on a regular basis.”

These omissions do not render the warrant affidavit 

insufficient to support probable cause. Rhodes does not allege that 

the dollar amount on the warrant itself is incorrect, and earlier

2 In his initial brief on appeal, Rhodes argues that in August 2013, D.B. 

informed him that she was pregnant and “electrical stimulation treatment and 

billing ceased” at that time. This assertion appears nowhere in the third 

amended complaint.

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-11436

estimations (even if inaccurate) do not change the warrant’s 

substantive allegations based on O.V.’s statements—that she “had 

expressed concern several times when signing paper work for 

services that were not rendered,” that Rhodes and his staff 

“personally assured her that the paper work would be submitted 

correctly to the insurance company, but it was not,” and that 

Rhodes billed O.V.’s insurance company without authorization.

Nor does the fact that O.V. told another doctor that she was 

receiving the treatments have any effect on the affidavit’s efficacy. 

Rhodes’s complaint does not allege that Rhodes was the doctor 

providing O.V. “the treatments at issue on a regular basis.” O.V.’s 

statement that she received treatment elsewhere is irrelevant 

unless she received that treatment from Rhodes—an assumption 

we have no reason to make.

Rhodes also challenges the insurance fraud charge based on 

his treatment of B.L. The affidavit states that B.L.’s insurance 

received unauthorized bills for “Ultrasound Therapy, Traction 

Therapy and Manual Therapy,” and that Rhodes told B.L. that he 

had billed her insurance company without first giving her the 

treatment. In response, Rhodes alleges that Robbins omitted from 

his affidavit paperwork signed by B.L. “attesting the services ‘were 

actually rendered.’”

Once again, correcting this omission does not affect the 

affidavit’s validity. The affidavit describes Rhodes as explaining to 

B.L. that he had been billing her insurance company without 

providing treatment, but that he planned to provide that treatment 

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21-11436 Opinion of the Court 9

in the future—this time without billing the insurance company—

in order to make up for it. B.L. may have signed the alleged 

paperwork later, once she received the promised treatment after

the unauthorized billing (consistent with Rhodes’s statement

described in the affidavit). Or, similar to O.V.’s experience, she 

may simply have “sign[ed] paper work for services that were not 

rendered.” B.L.’s signature does not negate her later reports of 

unauthorized billing.

The affidavit establishes probable cause for the charges

based on Rhodes’s treatment of D.B., O.V., and B.L. even in spite 

of its alleged omissions. The district court thus correctly granted 

Robbins qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage to the 

extent that Rhodes’s suit relies on those charges.

The fourth charge dismissed by the district court is 

dependent on the first three—one count of engaging in a scheme 

to defraud. This offense is defined by Florida law as “a systematic, 

ongoing course of conduct with intent to defraud one or more 

persons, or with intent to obtain property from one or more 

persons by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 

promises or willful misrepresentations of a future act.” Fla. Stat. 

§ 817.034(3)(d) (2014). As shown above, even when Rhodes’s 

allegations are accepted as true, Robbins had probable cause to 

charge Rhodes with (at least) three counts of making a false and 

fraudulent insurance claim. That alone establishes probable cause 

for this charge. Because he had probable cause to charge Rhodes 

with three insurance fraud offenses, Robbins had a sufficient basis 

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to conclude that Rhodes engaged in a systematic, ongoing attempt 

to defraud insurance companies by billing them without 

authorization for treatment that was not received. The district 

court thus properly granted qualified immunity to Robbins for this 

charge at the motion to dismiss stage.

In an attempt to escape this outcome, Rhodes alleges that

Robbins made two errors of law that—in his view—invalidate the 

warrant affidavit and remove any probable cause for the scheme to 

defraud charge. Qualified immunity protects officers who commit 

reasonable errors of law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009). So to prevail, Rhodes must show not only that Robbins 

committed an error of law, but that the error was unreasonable.

The first alleged error relates to the affidavit’s assertion that 

Rhodes’s clinic was billing for therapy provided by “a massage 

therapist with an expired massage license.” Rhodes argues that 

under Florida law, “a chiropractic physician can bill for such 

manual physical therapy when it is performed by medical assistants 

incidental to the practice of the physician,” and that Robbins’s 

“claim that Plaintiff violated the law by billing for manual therapy 

was incorrect.”

We find no legal authority to support Rhodes’s argument 

that, as a matter of Florida law, doctors may bill insurance 

companies for manual therapy provided by massage therapists

with expired licenses. Rhodes points to State Farm Mutual 

Automobile, Insurance Co. v. Universal Medical Center of South 

Florida, Inc. See 881 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). But as 

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the district court explained, State Farm answers “a narrow certified 

question about medical assistants” and “sheds no light on whether 

‘manual therapy’ performed by an unlicensed massage therapist 

can be billed” in the way Rhodes argues. Rhodes offers no other 

cases to support his characterization of Florida law. We thus 

cannot conclude that Robbins made a mistake of law here.

The second alleged mistake of law relates to the affidavit’s 

statement that “Rhodes was submitting his notes for billing which 

indicated more units of treatment than what was actually 

provided.” Rhodes’s billing company told Robbins that two units 

of massage involved “hands on treatment for thirty minutes,” not 

including dressing or undressing. But Rhodes explains that the 

federal Medicare manual applies a less stringent standard: if a 

“manual therapy session lasts at least 23 minutes, then a provider 

may bill for two units.” Therefore, Rhodes alleges, Robbins (and 

some of the patients he interviewed) were mistaken in believing

that billing less than 30 minutes of therapy as two units was 

problematic. 

Rhodes fails to show that this alleged mistake of law was

unreasonable. “Generally, an officer is entitled to rely on a victim’s 

criminal complaint as support for probable cause.” Rankin v. 

Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998). Robbins was told by 

several patients that unauthorized bills had been submitted to their 

insurance companies. And even if some of these patients may not 

have fully understood the billing system, Robbins was reasonably 

entitled to rely on their consistent testimony (which also 

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-11436

referenced billings for treatments that were not manual therapy at 

all—and therefore not subject to the rule explained by Rhodes).

In short, Robbins had probable cause to charge Rhodes with 

engaging in a scheme to defraud, and he did not make an 

unreasonable mistake of law. We thus conclude that the district 

court correctly dismissed Rhodes’s claim to the extent it was based 

on the scheme to defraud charge.

IV.

We next consider the charges against Rhodes rejected at 

summary judgment. We review de novo a district court’s grant of 

summary judgment, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Hill v. Cundiff, 

797 F.3d 948, 967 (11th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and 

the record entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We reverse a grant of summary judgment “if 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Robbins once again asserts the defense of qualified 

immunity at summary judgment. Our Williams analysis remains 

the same, but at the summary judgment stage we must consider 

the facts in the record rather than accepting the complaint’s 

allegations as true.

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Rhodes argues that the record contains genuine disputes of 

material fact for the four counts that survived dismissal. Pointing 

to statements later signed by the patients whose treatment 

allegedly gave rise to those counts, he contends that they “directly 

refute[] and conflict[] with the contents” of the warrant affidavit

such that it cannot establish probable cause once those portions

conflicting with the statements are stricken (the second step under 

Williams).

Even assuming that Rhodes’s proffered evidence meets the 

evidentiary requirements of Rule 56, we are not persuaded.3 We 

consider each of the four remaining counts of false and fraudulent 

insurance claims—those relating to patients R.G., M.S., H.C., and 

A.N.—in turn.

To begin, the signed statements offered by patients R.G. and 

M.S, even when accepted as true and construed in Rhodes’s favor, 

do not affect the affidavit’s validity.4 Rhodes argues that each 

patient’s statement demonstrates that Robbins “knowingly 

included falsities in his warrant affidavit.” To begin, Robbins could 

3 As the district court explained, three of the four statements on which Rhodes 

relies are signed and notarized, but unsworn; they do not qualify as affidavits 

or declarations. Like the district court, we assume without deciding that they 

are sufficient evidence for consideration at summary judgment. 

4 M.S. was treated alongside H.S., her daughter, and both are referred to in the 

affidavit in support of the same charge of making false and fraudulent 

insurance claims. Rhodes offers no evidence regarding H.S., and so we 

consider only the statements made by M.S. relating to that charge.

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-11436

not have known when he relied on his interviews with R.G. and 

M.S. that their stories would later change. What’s more, both 

statements simply assert that the patients “did receive” the medical 

treatment for which their insurance companies were billed—they 

do not dispute that R.G. and M.S. told Robbins that their insurance 

companies had been fraudulently billed. We therefore conclude 

that Robbins had probable cause to bring the charges based on the 

treatment of R.G. and M.S.

Patient H.C. signed a more substantial statement explaining 

that he had not fully understood the situation when he was 

interviewed by Robbins. But once again, the statement goes to the 

merits of the state’s fraud case against Rhodes, not to whether 

Robbins had probable cause when he signed the affidavit. Like 

R.G. and M.S., H.C. states clearly that his previous allegation of 

fraudulent billing was unfounded. But also like those other 

patients, he does not dispute that he told Robbins otherwise before 

Robbins prepared the warrant affidavit. Indeed, H.C.’s statement

indicates that he changed his view only after previously unknown 

information was explained to him. 

Finally, Rhodes offers no evidence to support his allegation 

that A.N. “flatly denied” the facts that Robbins claimed to have 

learned from him. While we construe evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party at summary judgment, here 

there is no evidence to construe. We cannot conclude that Robbins 

lacked probable cause for the fraud charge arising out of A.N.’s 

treatment when the record offers no support for that assertion.

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Robbins had probable cause to charge Rhodes with each of 

the four counts remaining at summary judgment. We therefore 

conclude that he is protected by qualified immunity for each of 

those four charges.

* * *

We AFFIRM the district court’s orders dismissing Rhodes’s 

claim in part and rendering summary judgment in favor of 

Robbins.

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