J-S15007-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SALEEM SNEAD

Appellant No. 3444 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 5, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013827-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 22, 2017

Saleem Snead appeals from the judgment of sentence of life 

imprisonment that the trial court imposed after a jury found him guilty of 

first degree murder, carrying an unlicensed firearm, carrying a firearm in

public in Philadelphia, and possessing an instrument of crime. We affirm. 

Appellant and the victim, then seventeen-year-old Paris Talbert, were 

engaged in an ongoing dispute. Over the course of several months, 

Appellant tracked, chased, and threatened Mr. Talbert. On September 7, 

2012, the dispute culminated in gunfire. At approximately 11 p.m. on the 

day in question, Appellant found Mr. Talbert in Charles Finley Park, 

Philadelphia. Upon locating the victim, who was sitting in the park with his 

friend, then seventeen-year-old Donald Carter, III, Appellant opened fire on 
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the two boys and fatally struck Mr. Talbert as he attempted to flee. Mr. 

Carter escaped unharmed. 

That evening, Mr. Carter was transported to the homicide unit, and 

early the next day, he provided detectives with written and videotaped 

statements identifying Appellant as the person who shot Mr. Talbert. The 

detectives thereafter sought and received two search warrants for locations 

where Appellant was thought to reside. At 6 a.m. on September 9, 2012, 

the officers executed the first search warrant at a home on East Albanus 

Street in Philadelphia. Upon entry, Appellant was discovered and 

apprehended. Appellant’s birth certificate was recovered from the house, 

but the search revealed no further evidence. Similarly, the execution of the 

second search warrant yielded no evidence linked to Mr. Talbert’s murder. 

Following his arrest, Appellant was transported to the homicide unit for 

questioning. After being provided his Miranda1rights, Appellant indicated 

that he wished to supply the detectives with a statement without the aid of 

counsel. He provided a written statement wherein he acknowledged his 

constitutional rights, and alleged that he had been present for Mr. Talbert’s 

murder, but that an accomplice, Keith Brandford, had killed the victim. 

Subsequently, Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses. 

____________________________________________

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Appellant filed a pre-trial motion requesting that the court suppress his 

inculpatory statements contending that they were the fruits of an illegal 

arrest, or alternatively, that he had not been adequately apprised of his 

constitutional rights. Appellant also entreated the court to suppress Mr. 

Carter’s out-of-court identification, alleging that the police utilized an unduly 

suggestive identification procedure. During pre-trial proceedings, the 

Commonwealth asked to introduce evidence of prior bad acts, consisting of 

two previous incidents where Appellant pursued Mr. Talbert, once while 

carrying a firearm. 

On June 1, 2015, the court held a hearing on the pre-trial motions, 

and thereafter, it denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. The court 

permitted the Commonwealth to proffer evidence of the previous encounters 

between Appellant and the victim. The case proceeded immediately to a 

jury trial. On June 5, 2015, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all 

counts, and the court immediately imposed a sentence of life in prison. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied by 

operation of law on October 7, 2015. Trial counsel filed a motion to 

withdraw, which was granted, and the court granted appeal counsel’s motion 

to file an appeal nunc pro tunc. Appellant complied with the directives of 

Rule 1925(b) and the court authored its Rule 1925(a) opinion. This matter 

is now ready for our review. 

Appellant presents five issues for our consideration:
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I. Did the lower court err by permitting the Commonwealth 

to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts in which 

he sought out Talbert, though those prior bad acts were 

irrelevant to the matters at issue and unduly prejudiced 

[A]ppellant? 

II. Did the lower court abuse its discretion by failing to grant 

a mistrial when the Commonwealth published highly 

prejudicial evidence to the jury regarding Appellant’s prior 

gun conviction where the Commonwealth conceded the 

evidence was inappropriate? 

III. Did the lower court err in denying Appellant’s motion to 

suppress his custodial statement, as it was given after an 

illegal arrest and Appellant did not voluntarily waive his 

right against self-incrimination prior to giving the 

statement? 

IV. Did the Commonwealth fail to prove that the single 

photograph out-of-court identification procedure employed 

was reliable and further was that procedure was wholly 

unreasonable? 

V. Did the lower court improperly allowed [sic] Carter to 

testify as to hearsay statements of identification ostensibly 

made by Talbert shortly before his death? 

Appellant’s brief at 4. 

As Appellant’s first and fifth issues pertain to the admission of 

evidence, we consider them together. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings 

are afforded great deference. Thus, “[w]e give the trial court broad 

discretion, and we will only reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or deny 

evidence on a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 539 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error in judgment, but an 
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overriding misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, 

as shown by the evidence of record.” Id. 

Appellant first assails the trial court’s decision to allow the 

Commonwealth to offer evidence of his past interactions with the victim. We 

observe, 

Generally, evidence of prior bad acts or unrelated criminal 

activity is inadmissible to show that the defendant acted in 

conformity with those past acts or to show criminal propensity. 

However, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when 

offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and 

absence of mistake or accident. In determining whether 

evidence of prior bad acts is admissible, the trial court is obliged 

to balance the probative value of such evidence against its 

prejudicial impact. 

Commonwealth v. Sitler, 144 A.3d 156, 163 (Pa.Super. 2016) (internal 

citation omitted); Pa.R.E. 404(b). 

The trial court permitted the Commonwealth to offer evidence 

pertaining to an encounter on March 3, 2012, where Appellant chased Mr. 

Talbert while brandishing a firearm, and another incident on April 7, 2012, 

where Mr. Talbert fled after observing Appellant driving towards him. The 

court determined that this evidence was properly admitted to prove “motive, 

identity of the shooter, and to establish the natural sequence of events 

leading up to the murder.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/16, at 13. It noted 

that the evidence supported that the parties were embroiled in an ongoing 
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dispute, which directly established motive, and that the probative value of 

such evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Id. 

Appellant first argues that the past acts were not probative of 

Appellant’s motive since, although they evince an intent to seek out the 

victim, they did not shed light on the motivation behind their quarrel. In 

addition, Appellant maintains that the evidence did not identify Appellant as 

the shooter, since the circumstances surrounding the prior encounters were 

not sufficiently similar to those encompassing Mr. Talbert’s death to warrant 

an exception to Rule 404(b). Finally, Appellant asserts that the evidence 

was not sufficiently probative of the natural sequence of events as he 

admitted that he was engaged in a dispute with the victim, and thus, that 

evidence was cumulative and unnecessarily prejudicial. 

We find the evidence of Appellant’s prior acts was admissible under the 

res gestae exception, and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing the relevant testimony. This Court previously 

explained the res gestae exception in Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 

320 (Pa.Super. 2012). We stated, “where the distinct crimes were part of a 

chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and were 

part of its natural development (sometimes called “res gestae” 

exception)[,]” the evidence may be admissible. Id. at 326. Moreover, 

relying on Supreme Court precedent, we observed that “the ‘res gestae’ 

exception to the general proscription against evidence of other crimes, is 
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also known as the ‘complete story’ rationale, i.e., the evidence of other 

criminal acts is admissible to ‘complete the story of the crime on trial by 

proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’” Id. 

The res gestae exception is subject to a balancing test to ensure the 

probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. Thus, we 

consider factors such as the strength of the “other crimes” 

evidence, the similarities between the crimes, the time lapse 

between crimes, the need for the other crimes evidence, the 

efficacy of alternative proof of the charged crime, and the 

“degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 

overmastering hostility.” 

Id. 

Here, the probative value of the two prior instances where Appellant 

sought out the victim clearly outweighed its prejudicial impact. Appellant 

was convicted of murder after his ongoing dispute with the victim ended in 

gunfire. Appellant was found to have stalked Mr. Talbert late at night in a 

park near the victim’s home. The two contested incidents occurred months 

prior to the shooting, and demonstrated Appellant’s settled desire to track 

down and confront Mr. Talbert. The fact that Appellant admitted to 

quarreling with Mr. Talbert does not render this evidence as cumulative, but 

rather, it was a necessary means to inform the jury of the context, history, 

and natural development of the hostility between Appellant and the victim. 

In addition, evidence of the two past incidents was indispensable in 

apprising the jury as to both the identity of the shooter and Appellant’s 
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motive. Although Appellant conceded that he was present at the time of the 

shooting, he denied firing the weapon. The evidence of the two men’s past 

confrontations refuted Appellant’s claim by tending to show that Appellant, 

rather than Mr. Branford, tracked Appellant to the park late at night with the 

intent to kill him, and, thereafter, that he indeed shot Mr. Talbert to resolve 

their differences. Hence, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in permitting this evidence, and Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

Appellant’s fifth claimed error involves the trial court’s decision to 

permit Mr. Carter to testify regarding the statements made by the victim 

immediately prior to his death. As noted above, our standard of review is an 

abuse of discretion. Talbert, supra. Appellant directs our attention to the 

following testimony by Mr. Carter, claiming it represents inadmissible 

hearsay: 

Prosecutor: Mr. Carter, did you have a chance to read the five 

lines below, and this was from the morning of this incident or the 

morning after this incident. I’d asked you earlier what you 

remember [Mr. Talbert] saying when [Appellant] was walking 

up. Reading this now, do you remember everything that he said 

to you concerning what he said when [Appellant] walked up?

 

Mr. Carter: Yes. 

Prosecutor: And what did he say? 

Mr. Carter: He said, That’s Saleem. 
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Appellant’s brief at 38; N.T. Trial, 6/2/15, at 89-90. Appellant posits that 

Mr. Carter’s testimony was offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and 

that not one of the enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule apply. 

Hearsay is any statement, “other than one made by the declarant 

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 

of the matter asserted.” Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 A.3d 1049, 1057 

(Pa.Super. 2016); Pa.R.E. 801(c). The trial court acknowledged that the 

victim’s statement identifying Appellant prior to his shooting, as relayed to 

the court by Mr. Carter, constituted hearsay. Nevertheless, it reasoned that 

the statement was admissible pursuant to the present sense impression 

exception to the hearsay rule contained in Pa.R.E. 803(1). 

The rule against hearsay does not exclude evidence of a statement 

made by a person “describing or explaining an event or condition, made 

while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” Pa.R.E. 803(1). The 

trustworthiness of the declaration “depends upon the timing of the 

statement . . . [it] must be made at the time of the event or so shortly 

thereafter that it is unlikely that the declarant had the opportunity to form 

the purpose of misstating his observation.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 

A.2d 560, 571 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). 

Whether Mr. Talbert’s statement qualifies as a present sense 

impression requires us to decide if it came so shortly after the events in 

question that it is unlikely that he would have the opportunity to fabricate a 
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lie. Here, Mr. Talbert stated “That’s Saleem,” as a figure approached him 

and Mr. Carter in the park. Immediately thereafter, the assailant began 

shooting. We find Mr. Talbert’s contemporaneous statement satisfies the 

timing requirement of the present sense impression so as to be deemed 

trustworthy. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting 

the victim’s observation. 

In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the lower court abused its 

discretion when it failed to grant a mistrial after the Commonwealth 

mistakenly published prejudicial evidence to the jury. The evidence in 

question was contained in Appellant’s statement to police. The statement 

was displayed on a screen, and the Commonwealth inadvertently included 

the portion of the statement indicating Appellant had served time in prison. 

We afford the trial court broad discretion in ruling on a motion for mistrial. 

The court must determine

whether misconduct or prejudicial error actually occurred, and if 

so, . . . assess the degree of any resulting prejudice. Our review 

of the resulting order is constrained to determining whether the 

court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in 

conformity with the law on facts and circumstances before the 

trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the 

court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, 

it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner 

lacking reason. 

Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615, (Pa.Super. 2016 (brackets 

and citations omitted). 
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Appellant contends that he suffered unfair prejudice when the 

Commonwealth inadvertently published Appellant’s report that the murder 

occurred “shortly after he was released from prison on a gun charge.” 

Appellant’s brief at 22. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. 

The court offered to provide the jury with an immediate curative instruction, 

but defense counsel rejected this suggestion due to a concern that it would 

highlight the prejudicial information. Instead, defense counsel requested 

that the general prior bad acts limiting instruction be given with the jury’s 

charge. Nevertheless, Appellant argues the limiting instruction was not 

sufficient to overcome the prejudice flowing to Appellant by the erroneous 

publication of his concession. 

The trial court noted that the disputed portion of Appellant’s statement 

“was only a small portion of what was displayed on the screen, and when 

noticed, the statement was immediately removed from the screen and the 

jury removed from the room.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/16, at 14. The 

court reasoned that any prejudice caused by the Commonwealth’s mistake 

was cured by the limiting instruction contained within the jury charge, since, 

“it is not clear that the jury even saw the complained of portion of the 

statement,” and thus, “there is no reason to believe that the jury did not 

follow the court’s instructions.” Id. at 15. 

Here, the Commonwealth mistakenly presented a prejudicial portion of 

Appellant’s statement to the police. Following an objection by defense 
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counsel, the court denied a motion for mistrial, but agreed to offer the 

following jury charge: 

Now, you’ve heard evidence that the defendant was involved in 

acts not charged and for which he is not on trial. You must only 

consider this evidence only for its bearing, if any, on the 

question of the defendant’s intent, identification and motive, and 

for no other purpose. You must not consider this evidence as 

evidence of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is now on 

trial. 

You must not regard this evidence as showing the defendant is a 

person of bad character or criminal tendency from which you 

might be inclined to infer guilt. 

N.T. Trial, 6/5/15, at 116-117. 

Upon review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial. We agree with the 

trial court that the offending statement was briefly presented to the jury. 

Moreover, the statement was within a larger portion of text and was not 

read into the record. When the mistake was discovered, the text had been 

visible for only a short time and it was promptly removed. Further, the jury 

charge directed it to consider any information elicited of Appellant’s past 

behavior only for its bearing on his intent, identification, and motive. The 

jury is presumed to follow such instructions. Commonwealth v. Mason, 

130 A.3d 601, 673 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). Since the record does not 

disclose that Appellant suffered prejudice from the brief reference to his 

prior conviction, his second claim is without merit. 
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Appellant’s third issue relates to the denial of his motion to suppress. 

Our standard of review of a denial of a motion to suppress is limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. [Since] the prosecution prevailed in the suppression 

court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and 

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the 

trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if 

the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. 

Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034, 1039 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

Appellant’s argument is two-fold. First, he claims that he was arrested 

inside his home without an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances in 

contravention of his constitutional rights under the United States and 

Pennsylvania constitutions. Moreover, Appellant maintains, the 

Commonwealth failed to prove the arresting officers had probable cause for 

the arrest since Appellant’s identification as the perpetrator of the crime was 

corroborated by only a single eyewitness. 

At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth offered the testimony 

of Detective James Burns, who was assigned to assist in the investigation of 

Mr. Talbert’s murder. Detective Burns recounted his interview with Mr. 

Carter during the morning following Mr. Talbert’s death. Detective Burns 

related that Mr. Carter, who was seventeen years old at the time, identified 

Appellant as the shooter by name and indicated that he had known him 
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since sixth grade. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/1/15, at 18-19. Mr. Carter 

provided a physical description and knew Appellant’s home neighborhood 

and other places he frequented. Id. at 19-20. Upon being shown a 

photograph of Appellant, Mr. Carter immediately recognized him as the 

shooter. Id. at 20-21. 

Based upon this information, two search warrants were obtained for 

locations wherein Appellant was believed to reside. Detective Burns 

reported that Appellant was discovered and apprehended while the detective 

and other officers executed the first search warrant for a residence located 

on West Albanus Street. Id. at 25. Appellant’s birth certificate was also 

recovered from this location. Id. at 26. 

Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Williams, 396 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 

1978), for the proposition that the Dorman factors2 militate in favor of 

finding that his constitutional rights were violated by his warrantless arrest 

within his home. We find that Williams is not dispositive, and thus, that the 

Dorman factors are not applicable. 

____________________________________________

2

In Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc), 

the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia detailed factors that should be 

analyzed in determining whether exigent circumstances permit the 

warrantless arrest of a suspect within his own home. Those factors include: 

a grave offense; reasonable belief that the suspect is armed; a clear 

showing of probable cause; a strong reason to believe the suspect is present 

in the premises being entered; a likelihood the suspect will escape if not 

swiftly apprehended; peaceful entry; and time of entry. Id. at 392-393. 
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In Williams, the court considered, inter alia, whether an arrest 

following the warrantless entry into a suspect’s house violated the Fourth 

Amendment. At the time of the police’s entry and apprehension of the 

suspect, they had neither a search warrant nor an arrest warrant. The court 

noted that it was a matter of first-impression whether “an arrest warrant is 

required to effectuate a valid arrest inside an arrestee’s home.” Williams, 

supra at 1179. The court relied upon the Circuit Court of the District of 

Columbia’s analysis in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 

1970) (en banc), in determining that the suspect’s in-home warrantless 

arrest, where the authorities entered the domicile for the purpose of 

effectuating that arrest, was illegal. 

Following Williams, supra, the United States Supreme Court clarified 

the constitutional implications of an in-home arrest without an arrest 

warrant, noting, “[the Dorman court] reasoned that the constitutional 

protection afforded to the individual’s interest in the privacy of his own home 

is equally applicable to a warrantless entry for the purpose of arresting a 

resident of the house[.]” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588 

(1980) (emphasis added). It ruled that, “the Fourth Amendment has drawn 

a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent existent circumstances, that 

threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Id. at 590 

(emphasis added). Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that an “an 

arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited 
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authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason 

to believe the suspect is within.” Id. at 603. The High Court’s resolution in 

Payton underscored that this Court’s analysis should first center upon 

whether law enforcement’s entry into a suspect’s home is constitutionally 

infirm before considering the legality of any ensuing arrest. 

This Court has since clarified the holding in Payton, finding that 

“[w]hile Payton stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment 

prohibits a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home in 

order to make a routine arrest, it does not prohibit warrantless arrest from 

occurring within a home.” Commonwealth v. Gelber, 592 A.2d 672, 678 

(Pa.Super. 1991). In Gelber, we found that a warrantless arrest within the 

defendant’s home did not implicate Payton since the officer could have 

arrested the suspect outside the home, but entered it only to preserve 

evidence within. Id. at 678-679. Thus, as in Gelber, the circumstances 

herein are distinguishable from Williams, supra. 

Instantly, Appellant does not contest the validity of the search warrant 

used to gain entry to his house or the reliability of Mr. Carter’s identification 

of him as the perpetrator of the crime. Instead, he maintains that the 

Commonwealth cannot justify his warrantless arrest when viewed in light of 

the Dorman factors, and that a single eyewitness is not sufficient to create 

clear probable cause for the arrest without further corroboration. However, 

in light of Payton, supra, Appellant erroneously applies the Dorman factors 
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to analyzing whether Appellant’s arrest was unconstitutional, rather than 

contesting the legality of the police’s entry into his house. 

Further, Gelber, supra, explains that Payton does not bar a 

warrantless arrest within a home, unless entry was secured in order to 

effectuate that arrest. Here, the police entered Appellant’s residence 

pursuant to a valid search warrant to discover evidence linked to Mr. 

Talbert’s homicide. After doing so, the officers located and apprehended 

Appellant within the home. Thus, the officers were legally within Appellant’s 

residence at the time of his arrest. 

Additionally, Appellant’s arrest was supported by probable cause. We 

consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating whether probable 

cause exists to justify a warrantless arrest. Commonwealth v. Martin, 

101 A.3d 706, 721 (Pa. 2014). We note that “[p]robable cause exists where 

the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to 

warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been 

or is being committed,” and must be “viewed from the vantage point of a 

prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer on the scene at the time of the 

arrest guided by his experience and training.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Since Mr. Carter provided a reliable eyewitness identification of 

Appellant to Detective Burns, who was one of the arresting officers, 
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Appellant’s arrest was supported by probable cause.3 Mr. Carter supplied 

Appellant’s name and where he lived, and claimed to have known him for 

years before identifying him in a picture provided by Detective Burns. As 

such, Appellant’s arrest was supported by probable cause. See 

Commonwealth v. Dozier, 99 A.3d 106 (Pa.Super. 2014) (finding 

warrantless arrest supported by probable cause and stating “[w]e would 

struggle to find a more detailed description of an assailant than an 

immediate identification by name by a victim who knew the suspect for 

many years[.]”); Commonwealth v. Simmen, 58 A.3d 811 (Pa.Super. 

2008) (finding warrantless entry while investigating car accident permitted 

by third party consent and subsequent warrantless arrest inside defendant’s 

home supported by probable cause). 

Second, Appellant alleges his inculpatory statements should have been 

suppressed because he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. 

Appellant claims that he requested an attorney prior to offering a statement 

to police, but that request was denied by Detective Burns. Appellant 

emphasizes the following statement provided by Detective Burns at the 

suppression hearing in support of this allegation: 

certainly, like, he had some kind of reluctance with the idea of 

signing anything or signing any statements. That didn’t last very 

____________________________________________

3 We discuss the reliability of Mr. Carter’s identification of Appellant in the 

text infra. 
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long. It was a little of conversation back and forth about that, 

where, eventually, he did agree to give a written interview. 

Appellant’s brief at 33; N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/1/15, at 37. Appellant 

argues that the detective’s testimony lends credence to Appellant’s assertion 

that he entreated the officer for an attorney prior to giving his statement. 

We disagree. 

The trial court credited Detective Burn’s testimony that Appellant 

agreed to speak to him without a lawyer, and that he did not request a 

lawyer thereafter. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 6/1/15, at 33; 35. Appellant 

testified that he could not remember when he asked for a lawyer, but that 

he was apprised of, and understood his Miranda rights. N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 6/2/15, at 44. Further, upon review of the certified record, we find 

that Appellant acknowledged that he received, understood, and waived his 

Miranda rights. Appellant admitted as much in his written statement to 

police, wherein he signed and initialed his recognition of those rights prior to 

providing his statement. As the evidence of record supports the suppression 

court’s finding that Appellant waived his right to counsel, this claim does not 

warrant relief. 

Appellant’s fourth issue assails the trial court’s refusal to suppress Mr. 

Carter’s out-of-court identification of Appellant. He concedes that Mr. Carter 

provided Detective Burns with Appellant’s name and physical description, but 

complains that the utilization of a single photograph was unduly suggestive. 
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We remain mindful of our standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a 

motion to suppress. Postie, supra. In addition, suppression of a pre-trial 

identification is warranted where it prevents police misconduct. 

Commowealth v. Lark, 91 A.3d 165, 168-169 (Pa.Super. 2014). 

Suggestiveness is but one factor used to determine the admissibility of a 

pre-trial identification as the court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances in rendering a suppression ruling. Id. at 168. As such, 

“[i]dentification evidence will not be suppressed unless the facts 

demonstrate that the identification procedure was so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification.” Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 978 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). 

Here, we find that the police’s reliance on a single photograph to 

confirm Appellant’s identify was not unduly suggestive. As noted above, 

Detective Burns credibly testified that Mr. Carter provided him with 

extensive information regarding the identity of Mr. Talbert’s assailant, 

claiming that he had known Appellant “for a number of years.” N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 6/1/15, at 19. Mr. Carter provided additional 

identifying information and at no point did he express doubt as to the 

suspected offender. Detective Burns then supplied a single photo to 

confirm, for the police’s sake, the identity of the shooter. When viewing Mr. 

Carter’s statements under the totality of the circumstances, a single-photo 
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could not have been “so impermissibly suggestive as to give right to a very 

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” Stiles, supra, since 

Mr. Carter had already identified Appellant and the photo was used merely 

to substantiate the information offered by Mr. Carter. Hence, this claim 

fails. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/22/2017