IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

In re MOHAMMAD MOHAMMAD

on Habeas Corpus.

S259999

Second Appellate District, Division Five

B295152

Los Angeles County Superior Court

BH011959

January 3, 2022

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the

Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban,

Jenkins, and Levy* concurred.

Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kruger 

concurred.

__________________________

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

In re MOHAMMAD

S259999

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

This case asks whether Proposition 57, The Public Safety 

and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, requires California’s

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) 

to provide early parole consideration to individuals currently 

serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony. 

Petitioner Mohammad Mohammad was incarcerated after 

having been convicted of nine violent felony counts and six 

nonviolent felony counts. The trial court ordered all terms to be 

served consecutively. After petitioner’s conviction, the 

electorate approved Proposition 57 in November 2016, which 

added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution to 

provide, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person convicted of a 

nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be 

eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term 

for his or her primary offense.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. 

(a)(1).)1 The ballot initiative also directed the Department to 

“adopt regulations in furtherance of these provisions” and 

instructed the Secretary of the Department to “certify that these 

1 Article I, subdivisions 32(a), 32(a)(1), 32(a)(1)(A), and 

32(b) of the California Constitution are referred to in this 

opinion as “article I, section 32(a),” “article I, section 32(a)(1),” 

“article I, section 32(a)(1)(A),” and “article I, section 32(b).” 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

2

regulations protect and enhance public safety.” (Art. I, § 32, 

subd. (b).)

The Department subsequently adopted regulations

implementing early parole consideration under article I, section 

32.

2

 Those regulations exclude from nonviolent offender early 

parole consideration any inmate who “is currently serving a 

term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony[.]’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)3 The regulations state that a 

“ ‘[v]iolent felony’ is a crime or enhancement as defined in 

subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code.” (Id., § 3490, 

subd. (c).)

Consistent with those regulations, the Department 

determined petitioner was ineligible for nonviolent offender 

early parole consideration because he was serving a term of 

incarceration for a violent felony. Petitioner challenged that 

determination, and the Court of Appeal granted relief, holding 

that the language of article I, section 32(a) requires early parole 

consideration for any inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony 

even when that inmate was also convicted of a violent felony. 

(In re Mohammad (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 719, 727 

(Mohammad).) 

2 The Department refers to early parole consideration under 

article I, section 32 as “nonviolent offender parole review.” 

(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 

Nonviolent Offender Parole Review Process for DeterminatelySentenced Inmates <https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/nvoproverview/> [as of Dec. 28, 2021].) All internet citations in this 

opinion are archived by year, docket number, and case name at 

<http://courts.ca.gov/38324.htm>. 

3 Further undesignated references to the California Code of 

Regulations are to title 15 unless otherwise noted. 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

3

We granted review to decide the validity of the 

Department’s regulation prohibiting early parole consideration 

under the Proposition 57 scheme for inmates “currently serving 

a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony.’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., 

§ 3490, subd. (a)(5).) While the matter was pending in this 

court, four other appellate courts disagreed with Mohammad

and concluded the Department’s regulations properly excluded 

from early parole consideration inmates currently serving a 

term of incarceration for a violent felony offense.4 

We conclude that the Department acted within the 

authority provided by article I, section 32(b) when it adopted the 

regulation at issue here. In reaching this conclusion, we find 

the constitutional text is ambiguous concerning the application 

of article I, section 32(a) to an inmate like petitioner who is 

currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony 

offense. Considering the text together with the materials 

presented to the voters, we hold that the Department’s approach 

is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of 

Proposition 57. We therefore agree with the majority of the 

appellate courts, and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal 

below.

4 We granted review in each of those four matters and 

deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of 

the issue before us in this case. (In re Guice (2021) 

66 Cal.App.5th 933, 937, review granted Sept. 29, 2021, 

S270524; In re Ontiveros (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 899, 902–903, 

review granted Aug. 25, 2021, S269832; In re Viehmeyer (2021) 

62 Cal.App.5th 973, 984–985, review granted June 30, 2021, 

S268660; In re Douglas (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 726, 729, review 

granted June 16, 2021, S268570.) 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

4

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Underlying Conviction

In 2012, petitioner pleaded no contest to nine counts of 

second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and six counts of 

receiving stolen property (id., § 496, subd. (a)). The trial court 

designated one count of receiving stolen property to be the 

principal term and ordered the remaining counts to run 

consecutively. Petitioner was sentenced to 29 years in prison —

three years for the principal term of receiving stolen property, 

eight months for each of the other counts of receiving stolen 

property, one year for each of the nine counts of robbery, and a 

total of 13 years eight months for gang enhancements attached 

to six counts (id., § 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C)).5 

Petitioner did not appeal. 

B. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the 

Court of Appeal Opinion

The electorate approved Proposition 57 in 2016. 

Petitioner subsequently filed a request with the Department 

asking for early parole consideration. He asserted that 

Proposition 57 requires early parole consideration for inmates 

who have completed the full term for a primary offense when 

that offense is nonviolent. He noted that the trial court in his 

case designated as the principal term one count of receiving 

stolen property, and that receiving stolen property is not defined 

as a violent felony under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision 

(c). The Department denied petitioner’s request. Petitioner 

5 The principal term is “the greatest term of imprisonment 

imposed by the court for any of the crimes, including any term 

imposed for applicable specific enhancements.” (Pen. Code, 

§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

5

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Los Angeles 

County Superior Court. The superior court denied the petition 

in November 2018, agreeing with the Department.

In January 2019, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in 

the Court of Appeal. That court ultimately held in a published 

opinion that the Department’s regulations improperly excluded 

petitioner from early parole consideration. (Mohammad, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 729.) The court focused on the language of 

the constitutional provision establishing parole consideration 

for “ ‘[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense’ upon 

completion of ‘the full term of his or her primary offense.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 726, quoting art. I, § 32(a)(1).) This language, the court 

held, contains the sole requirement for early parole 

consideration under Proposition 57 — conviction of a nonviolent 

felony. (Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726.) Early 

parole consideration is therefore required, according to the 

Court of Appeal, “so long as [the inmate] commits ‘a’ single 

nonviolent felony offense — even if that offense is not his or her 

only offense.” (Ibid.)

In support of its conclusion, the court pointed to the 

constitutional language defining the “ ‘full term for the primary 

offense’ as ‘the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the 

court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an 

enhancement, [a] consecutive sentence, or [an] alternative 

sentence.’ ” (Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726, 

quoting art. I, § 32(a)(1)(A).) Under this provision, the court 

asserted, “an inmate who is ‘convicted of a nonviolent felony 

offense’ not only remains eligible if he or she is sentenced to a 

consecutive sentence, but in fact, becomes eligible for an early 

parole hearing prior to serving that consecutive sentence.” 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

6

(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727, quoting art. I, 

§ 32(a)(1).)

The court rejected the Department’s regulations as 

incompatible with the language of article I, section 32(a)(1). 

(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 726–727.) The court 

noted that those regulations “dictate a different result, but only 

by impermissibly defining and limiting the universe of eligible 

inmates to ‘nonviolent offenders’ — a term that does not appear 

anywhere in [article I,] section 32(a)(1).” (Id. at p. 726, quoting 

Cal. Code Regs., § 3491.) The court declined to consider the 

ballot materials presented to the voters, determining that

review of extrinsic sources was unnecessary because the 

language of the constitutional provision itself was unambiguous. 

(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727, citing Silicon 

Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space 

Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 444–445.)

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Department’s 

argument “has some intuitive appeal. It cannot be, the 

argument goes, that voters intended a defendant who is 

convicted of more crimes, i.e., both violent and nonviolent 

felonies, to be eligible for early parole consideration while a 

defendant convicted of fewer crimes, i.e., the same violent felony 

but no nonviolent felonies, is not.” (Mohammad, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 727.) But this “intuitive appeal” is 

overcome and that interpretation foreclosed, the court 

determined, by the language of the provision. (Id. at pp. 727–

728.)

The court also noted that petitioner’s case “is an unusual 

one” in that the trial court designated a nonviolent felony as 

petitioner’s principal term, while “[o]ften” an individual’s most 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

7

serious violent felony is deemed the principal term. 

(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.) The court

suggested that these facts — “when an inmate becomes eligible 

for early parole consideration before serving time for any of his 

or her violent felony offenses” — “will not frequently arise.” 

(Ibid., fn. omitted.)

We granted the Attorney General’s petition for review. 

After the filing of our opinion in In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 

915 (Gadlin), we granted petitioner’s motion to file 

supplemental briefing to address Gadlin as well as Proposition 

20, a ballot initiative that was rejected by the voters in 

November 2020.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Proposition 57

We recently described the history of Proposition 57 in 

Gadlin. We noted there that the California Legislature and the 

electorate have taken steps to decrease the California prison 

population, including the electorate’s approval of Proposition 57 

in November 2016. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 922–923, 

citing Cal. Sect. of State, Statement of Vote Summary Pages 

(2016) p. 12 <https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-

general/sov/06-sov-summary.pdf> [as of Dec. 28, 2021].) The 

initiative, in relevant part, added section 32 to article I of the 

California Constitution, which provides: “Any person convicted 

of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall 

be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term 

for his or her primary offense.” (Art. I, § 32(a)(1).) Article I, 

section 32 further specifies that “the full term for the primary 

offense means the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the 

court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

8

enhancement, consecutive sentence, or alternative sentence” 

(id., subd. (a)(1)(A)),

6 directs the Department to “adopt 

regulations in furtherance of these provisions” (id., § 32(b)), and 

instructs the Secretary of the Department to “certify that these 

regulations protect and enhance public safety” (ibid.).

We described the purposes of the constitutional provision 

in Gadlin: “ ‘[T]o enhance public safety, improve rehabilitation, 

and avoid the release of prisoners by federal court order, 

notwithstanding anything in this article or any other provision 

of law.’ ” (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 923, quoting art. I, 

§ 32(a).) Uncodified portions of Proposition 57 further identify 

the initiative’s purpose and intent, in relevant part, as follows: 

“1. Protect and enhance public safety. [¶] 2. Save money by 

reducing wasteful spending on prisons. [¶] 3. Prevent federal 

courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners. [¶] 4. Stop 

the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, 

especially for juveniles.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. 

(Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.) The initiative further 

states that the “act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 

purposes.” (Id., § 9, p. 146.)

B. The Department’s Regulations

In March 2017, the Department proposed emergency 

regulations to implement Proposition 57. As we described in 

Gadlin, those emergency regulations were replaced by final 

6 This definition of an individual’s “primary offense” for 

purposes of early parole consideration renders the primary 

offense distinct from an individual’s principal term. (See art. I, 

§ 32(a)(1).) As noted above, the principal term is “the greatest 

term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes, 

including any term imposed for applicable specific 

enhancements.” (Pen. Code, § 1170.1, subd. (a).) 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

9

regulations in May 2018 and subsequently amended in response 

to various appellate opinions. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 

pp. 924–925.) The regulations define a “determinatelysentenced nonviolent offender” as an inmate who is not, among 

other things, “currently serving a term of incarceration for a 

‘violent felony.’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(5).) 

Further, the regulations define a “violent felony” for purposes of 

early parole consideration as “a crime or enhancement” listed in 

Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). (Id., § 3490, subd. (c).)

Other provisions of the regulations exclude from early 

parole consideration individuals “currently serving a 

determinate term prior to beginning a term of life with the 

possibility of parole or prior to beginning a term for an in-prison 

offense that is a ‘violent felony’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., § 3490, subd. 

(a)(4)) and those “currently serving a term of incarceration for a 

nonviolent felony offense after completing a concurrent 

determinate term for a ‘violent felony’ ” (id., § 3490, subd. (a)(6)). 

Additionally, the regulations detail the eligibility criteria for 

both determinately-sentenced offenders (see id., §§ 3490–3491) 

and indeterminately-sentenced offenders (see id., §§ 3495–

3496). Like the regulatory provision defining a “determinatelysentenced nonviolent offender” (id., § 3490, subd. (a)), the 

regulations define an “indeterminately-sentenced nonviolent 

offender” as an inmate who is not, among other things, 

“currently serving a term of life with the possibility of parole for 

a ‘violent felony’ ” (id., § 3495, subd. (a)(3)). Because petitioner’s 

exclusion from early parole consideration is governed solely by 

section 3490, subdivision (a)(5) of the California Code of 

Regulations, however, we decline to address in this case the 

validity of any other portion of the regulations. 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

10

C. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory 

Interpretation 

We apply well settled principles to determine the validity 

of regulations promulgated by a state agency. As in Gadlin, we 

acknowledge that although these precepts “have traditionally 

been applied in the context of a state agency’s regulations 

addressing statutes enacted by the Legislature (Gadlin, supra, 

10 Cal.5th at p. 925, citing Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 

733, 748 (Morris)), the parties here do not assert that “the 

relevant principles of interpretation differ when an agency has 

promulgated regulations to give force to a constitutional 

provision, rather than a statutory provision” (id. at p. 926).

In undertaking this analysis, we ask whether the 

regulation is “ ‘consistent and not in conflict with’ ” the 

constitutional provision that authorizes it (see Morris, supra, 

67 Cal.2d at p. 748, italics omitted, quoting Gov. Code, former

§ 11374

7

) and whether the regulation is reasonably necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the authorizing law (Morris, supra, 

67 Cal.2d at p. 749; see also Gov. Code, § 11342.2 [“Whenever by 

the express or implied terms of any statute a state agency has 

authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make 

specific or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no 

regulation adopted is valid or effective unless consistent and not 

in conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the statute”]; Woods v. Superior Court

(1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 679 (Woods)). Our task “ ‘ “is to decide 

whether the [agency] reasonably interpreted the legislative 

mandate.” [Citation.] ’ ” (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, 

7 Former section 11374 of the Government Code was 

renumbered as section 11342.2. (Stats. 1979, ch. 567, §§ 1–2.)
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

11

quoting Credit Ins. Gen. Agents Assn. v. Payne (1976) 16 Cal.3d 

651, 657.) In doing so, we presume the validity of the regulation 

(Assn. of California Ins. Companies v. Jones (2017) 2 Cal.5th 

376, 389); the burden lies with the party challenging the 

regulation to show its invalidity (Payne, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 

p. 657). Because this inquiry poses a question of law (see 

Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board of Equalization (2013) 

57 Cal.4th 401, 415), we review the Court of Appeal’s decision 

de novo. (See People v. Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 49, citing 

Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.)

Our “primary concern” in construing a constitutional 

provision enacted through voter initiative is “giving effect to the 

intended purpose of the provisions at issue” (California 

Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933) 

by applying “the same principles that govern statutory 

construction” (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685, citing 

Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276). In doing 

so, we look to the text of the constitutional provision at issue 

and, as appropriate, extrinsic sources such as an initiative’s 

ballot materials. (See City of Upland, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 

pp. 933–934.) Although we are obligated to strike down 

regulations that alter or amend the constitutional provision or 

its scope (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, citing Morris, supra, 

67 Cal.2d at p. 748), our role is not to examine the wisdom of the 

regulations but their legality (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679, 

quoting Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 737). “Such a limited 

scope of review constitutes no judicial interference with the 

administrative discretion in that aspect of the rulemaking 

function which requires a high degree of technical skill and 

expertise.” (Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679.)
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

12

D. The Language of Proposition 57

We begin our analysis with the language of the 

constitutional provisions enacted by Proposition 57. Article I, 

section 32(a)(1) states: “Any person convicted of a nonviolent 

felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for 

parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her 

primary offense.” Article I, section 32(a)(1)(A) defines the “full 

term for the primary offense” as “the longest term of 

imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding 

the imposition of an enhancement, consecutive sentence, or 

alternative sentence.” And article I, section 32(b) provides that 

the Department shall “adopt regulations in furtherance of these 

provisions.” The question here is whether these constitutional 

provisions require the Department to provide early parole 

consideration when the inmate is currently serving a term for a 

violent felony.

As noted, the Court of Appeal below concluded that the 

voters intended to extend early parole consideration to an 

inmate convicted of “a” nonviolent felony, regardless of whether 

that inmate was currently serving a term for a violent felony. 

(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 725; see id. at pp. 725–

726.) The court declined to consider the ballot materials 

presented to the voters, concluding “[t]here is nothing 

ambiguous about what [article I,] section 32(a)(1) means in this 

case . . . .” (Id. at p. 727.) The Department asserts, on the other 

hand, that the constitutional provisions are ambiguous and 

require consideration of the ballot materials to determine the 

intent of the electorate. 

We first examine whether the constitutional language is 

ambiguous; if the text “is unambiguous and provides a clear 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

13

answer, we need go no further.” (Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise 

Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750, 758.) When a constitutional 

provision is “ ‘clear and unambiguous’ ” it should be given its 

ordinary meaning. (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357, 

quoting Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) 

“The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping 

in mind the statutory purpose . . . .” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair 

Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387

(Dyna-Med).) If the text is ambiguous, it is appropriate to 

examine the ballot materials before the voters. (People v. 

Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 364, citing Robert L. v. Superior 

Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 905.) 

Article I, section 32(a)(1) establishes early parole 

consideration for “[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony 

offense . . . after completing the full term for his or her primary 

offense.” This language does not expressly address whether 

inmates with nonviolent felony convictions who are currently 

serving a prison term for a violent felony are eligible for early 

parole consideration. The parties and appellate courts have 

offered various interpretations of this provision. 

The Court of Appeal concluded the language is clear and 

unambiguous: An inmate convicted of “a” nonviolent felony

would be eligible for early parole consideration after completing 

the full term of the primary offense. (Mohammad, supra, 

42 Cal.App.5th at p. 725; see id. at pp. 725–726.) The court 

stated that the requirement that an inmate be convicted of “a” 

nonviolent felony “takes the singular form, which indicates it 

applies to an inmate so long as he or she commits ‘a’ single 

nonviolent felony offense — even if that offense is not his or her 

only offense.” (Id. at p. 726.) The court also determined the 

inclusion of the term “primary offense” in the constitutional 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

14

provision further indicates the electorate would have 

understood that inmates “might be serving a sentence for more 

than one offense, i.e., a primary offense and other secondary 

offenses.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the court noted that the 

constitutional definition of the “full term for the primary 

offense” specifically references (and excludes) the imposition of 

a consecutive sentence. (Ibid.) 

Considered alone and outside of the context of the entire 

initiative, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation is a plausible

reading of the language that is, on its face, consistent with 

article I, section 32(a).

8 But language that seems plain when 

considered in isolation may be ambiguous when examined 

within the context of the scheme it implements. (See, e.g., Small 

v. United States (2005) 544 U.S. 385, 388 [finding phrase 

“convicted in any court” to be ambiguous when determining 

whether statute included a conviction in a foreign court], citing 

Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League (2004) 541 U.S. 125, 132 

[“ ‘any’ ” can mean “different things depending upon the 

setting”]; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008 

[noting the term “convicted” “may have different meanings in 

8 Another Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion, 

finding that the language of section 32(a)(1) “support[s] a 

conclusion that an inmate is eligible for early parole 

consideration after completing his or her primary offense if the 

inmate was convicted of a nonviolent offense, even if the term 

for that nonviolent offense was not designated as the primary 

offense, and even if the inmate was also convicted of one or more 

violent offenses . . . .” (In re Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 731.) Ultimately, however, that appellate court concluded 

that interpreting the initiative in such a manner would lead to 

absurd results not intended by the electorate and thus declined 

to do so. (Id. at pp. 732–734.) 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

15

different contexts, or even different meanings within a single 

statute”].)

We have found similar language to be ambiguous. (In re 

Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765 (Reeves).) In Reeves, we considered 

a statute that provided “ ‘any person who is convicted of a 

[violent] felony offense . . . shall accrue no more than 15 percent

of worktime credit . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 768, fn. omitted, quoting 

Pen. Code, § 2933.1, subd. (a).) The issue in Reeves was whether 

an inmate convicted of both nonviolent and violent felonies was 

subject to the 15 percent credit limit. (Id. at p. 770.) We noted

that the “seemingly plain language” of the statute was subject 

to various possible interpretations based on the term “ ‘is 

convicted.’ ” (Id. at p. 770; see id. at p. 771 [“ ‘any person who is 

convicted of a [violent] felony offense’ [citation], might 

conceivably refer simply to a point of historical fact”].) We 

therefore determined that “the conclusion that [the statute] is 

ambiguous, at least as applied to the facts of this case, seems 

inescapable.” (Id. at pp. 770–771.) 

The constitutional provision here contains language 

nearly identical to the statutory language we considered in 

Reeves. Article I, section 32(a) does not directly state whether 

an inmate like petitioner — who has nonviolent felony 

convictions but is currently serving a term of incarceration for a 

violent felony — would be eligible for early parole consideration. 

Like in Reeves, it “seems inescapable” that the language is 

ambiguous as it applies to inmates like petitioner. (Reeves, 

supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 770–771.) 

Further, the appellate courts and the parties here advance 

various interpretations of article I, section 32(a) that reflect 

ambiguities in the constitutional language. Petitioner, for 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

16

example, asserts that inmates convicted of a nonviolent felony 

as their primary offense are eligible for early parole 

consideration “once they have served the full term for that

offense.” (Italics added.) In other words, under petitioner’s 

view, early parole consideration is required when an inmate’s 

primary offense is a nonviolent felony even if the inmate is 

currently serving a term for a violent felony, but not when the 

inmate’s primary offense is a violent felony and the inmate is 

currently serving a term for a nonviolent felony.9 

A concurring opinion in another appellate decision

provides a different approach: When an inmate has been

convicted of a violent felony offense that is deemed the primary 

offense and also has been convicted of a nonviolent felony 

offense, the inmate is eligible for nonviolent offender parole 

consideration after serving the sentence for the violent felony. 

(In re Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 735 (conc. opn. of 

Robie, Acting P. J.).) The Department asserts the language 

permits the exclusion of inmates who have nonviolent felony 

9 Petitioner asserts this approach is consistent with the 

approach adopted by the Court of Appeal below. We disagree. 

Although the court’s discussion took place in the context of 

evaluating petitioner’s eligibility for early parole consideration 

(and petitioner’s primary offense was a nonviolent felony), no 

language in the Court of Appeal’s opinion limited its holding to 

inmates whose primary offense was a nonviolent felony. Indeed, 

the Court of Appeal’s language was quite broad: “under 

[article I, section 32(a) and article I, section 32(a)(1)(A)], an 

inmate who is serving an aggregate sentence for more than one 

conviction will be eligible for an early parole hearing if one of 

those convictions was for ‘a’ nonviolent felony offense.” 

(Mohammad, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 726.)
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

17

convictions and are currently serving a term of incarceration for 

a violent felony offense.

The language of article I, section 32(a) alone does not tell 

us which of these interpretations is correct. That there are

several plausible interpretations of the constitutional language 

indicates the meaning of the text is ambiguous. (See People v. 

Gonzales (2018) 6 Cal.5th 44, 52 [considering ballot materials 

when statutory language “could have several possible 

interpretations”]; Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 

979 [“there is no need to construe a provision’s words when they 

are clear and unambiguous and thus not reasonably susceptible 

of more than one meaning”], citing People v. Leal (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 999, 1007, People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 

621; see also In re Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 735

(conc. opn. of Robie, Acting P. J.) [“It is clear section 32(a)(1) is 

ambiguous given the divergence of appellate opinions as to its 

meaning”].) 

Petitioner contends that our recent opinion in Gadlin

compels a contrary conclusion. But in Gadlin, we found the 

language of article I, section 32(a)(1) to be unambiguous in other 

respects. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 935.) There, we were 

asked to decide whether the Department could exclude from 

early parole consideration all inmates convicted of a sex offense 

requiring registration under Penal Code section 290, even when 

the Department’s regulations defined some of those inmates as 

nonviolent offenders. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 919–

920.) We held it could not in light of the language of article I, 

section 32(a)(1), which provides that “[a]ny person convicted of 

a nonviolent felony offense” shall be eligible for early parole 

consideration. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 932–933.) 

Indeed, in so holding, we stated that “article I, section 32(a)(1), 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

18

although containing some terms that might be ambiguous in 

other respects, is not ambiguous concerning its scope regarding 

offenders who were previously convicted of a registerable sex 

offense or who are currently convicted of a registerable sex 

offense that the Department has itself defined as nonviolent.” 

(Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 932, italics added.) Our holding 

was thus limited to the specific question before us in that case, 

and we acknowledged that the language of the constitutional 

provision might be ambiguous in other respects. Thus, Gadlin

does not compel a conclusion that the constitutional provision is 

unambiguous as it relates to the distinct question before us now. 

We disapprove of the following opinions to the extent they have 

held the language of article I, section 32(a) is unambiguous in 

this context: In re Ontiveros (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 899, 905 

[“We accept, for purposes of our opinion, that the text of 

Proposition 57 is clear and unambiguous”]; In re Douglas (2021) 

62 Cal.App.5th 726, 731. 

E. Consideration of the Ballot Materials

Because the constitutional text provides “ ‘no definitive 

answer’ ” to the question before us (People v. Hazelton (1996) 

14 Cal.4th 101, 105, quoting People v. Coronado (1995) 

12 Cal.4th 145, 151), we consider the materials that were before 

the voters. (People v. Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 364, citing 

Robert L. v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 905.)

1. The ballot materials presented to the voters

The voters were provided ballot materials that consisted 

of the official title and summary prepared by the Attorney 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

19

General, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst, and the 

arguments in favor of and against the proposition.10

The official title and summary described the relevant 

provisions of Proposition 57 as follows: “Allows parole 

consideration for persons convicted of nonviolent felonies, upon 

completion of prison term for their primary offense as defined. 

[¶] . . . [¶] Requires Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation to adopt regulations to implement new parole 

and sentence credit provisions and certify they enhance public 

safety.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, Official 

Title and Summary, p. 54.)

The analysis by the Legislative Analyst generally 

summarized California’s then-existing sentencing and parole 

consideration scheme, and described the changes to the parole 

system that would result were Proposition 57 to be adopted. The 

analysis described the proposed parole scheme as “parole 

consideration for nonviolent offenders” and stated that the 

initiative “changes the State Constitution to make individuals 

who are convicted of ‘nonviolent felony’ offenses eligible for 

parole consideration after serving the full prison term for their 

primary offense.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 

analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 56.) The analysis noted 

that “[a]lthough the measure and current law do not specify 

which felony crimes are defined as nonviolent, this analysis 

assumes a nonviolent felony offense would include any felony 

offense that is not specifically defined in statute as violent.” 

10 The Arguments included an argument in favor of the 

initiative by the proponents followed by a rebuttal by the 

opponents, and an argument against the initiative by the 

opponents followed by a rebuttal by the proponents. 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

20

(Ibid.) Based on that assumption, the analysis estimated that, 

“[a]s of September 2015, there were about 30,000 individuals in 

state prison who would be affected by the parole consideration 

provisions of the measure.” (Ibid.) And the analysis estimated 

that eligible inmates “currently serve about two years in prison 

before being considered for parole and/or released” but under the 

initiative “would serve around one and one-half years in prison 

before being considered for parole and/or released.” (Ibid.) 

Finally, the arguments in favor of and against the 

initiative were presented to the voters. The proponents urged 

that Proposition 57 would allow “parole consideration for people 

with non-violent convictions who complete the full prison term 

for their primary offense.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 

supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) The proponents did 

not address whether individuals with nonviolent felony 

convictions who are currently serving a term of incarceration for

a violent felony would be eligible for early parole consideration. 

The opponents’ rebuttal and argument against 

Proposition 57 asserted that the initiative would allow parole 

consideration for “VIOLENT CRIMINALS.” (Voter Information 

Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument in favor of 

Prop. 57, p. 58.) The opponents claimed the measure was 

“poorly drafted” and would allow for parole consideration for 

various crimes allegedly categorized by Proposition 57 as “nonviolent.” (Id., p. 59.) The opponents asserted that if the measure 

passed “16,000 dangerous criminals, including those previously 

convicted of murder and rape, would be eligible for early 

release.” (Id., p. 59, italics omitted.) The opponents did not 

address whether individuals with nonviolent felony convictions 

who are currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent 

felony would be eligible for early parole consideration. 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

21

The proponents’ rebuttal responded by stating that the 

initiative would not authorize parole for violent offenders, and 

cited Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 62 Cal.4th 335 for the 

position that Proposition 57 would apply “ ‘only to prisoners 

convicted of non-violent felonies.’ ” (Voter Information Guide, 

Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59, 

quoting Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 352.) 

The proponents emphasized, too, that “[v]iolent criminals as 

defined in Penal Code 667.5(c) are excluded from parole.” (Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument 

against Prop. 57, p. 59.) 

2. Analysis 

The Department contends the ballot materials reveal that

the voters intended to exclude any inmate currently serving a 

term for a violent felony from early parole consideration, 

regardless of whether such an inmate has also been convicted of

a nonviolent felony. The Department stresses that the 

Legislative Analyst stated that the initiative provided for 

“parole consideration for nonviolent offenders.” (Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 

Legis. Analyst, p. 56.) The Department also emphasizes that 

the rebuttal to the arguments opposing Proposition 57 

reiterated that the initiative “Does NOT authorize parole for 

violent offenders” and that “[v]iolent criminals as defined in 

Penal Code 667.5(c) are excluded from parole.” (Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument 

against Prop. 57, p. 59.)

11

11 In its briefing before this court, the Department also

asserted that the number of inmates eligible for early parole 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

22

The Department further contends that even if it was not 

compelled to exclude from early parole consideration inmates 

currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony, it 

acted within its discretion to do so. In support of this position, 

the Department points to article I, section 32(b), which directs

the Department to “adopt regulations in furtherance of [the 

constitutional] provisions . . . .” (Art. I, § 32(b).) The exclusion

of inmates currently serving a term for a violent felony from 

early parole consideration, the Department asserts, reflects its

reasoned consideration of the policy and public safety 

considerations vested in it by article I, section 32(b), and aligns 

with the intent of the voters as reflected by the ballot materials.

We agree that the Department acted within the authority 

granted by article I, section 32(b) when it promulgated section 

consideration under the Court of Appeal’s approach — inmates 

convicted only of nonviolent felonies and inmates convicted of 

both nonviolent and violent felonies — constituted 

approximately 96 percent of the prison population in 2019. The 

Department contrasted this number with the Legislative 

Analyst’s estimate that 30,000 inmates would receive early 

parole consideration under the initiative. 

Prior to oral argument, however, the Department 

discovered its statistics were erroneous and withdrew its 

arguments related to those statistics. Following oral argument, 

the Department submitted additional data regarding the 

inmate population but did not purport to rely on the new data 

or to otherwise reassert its original argument. Although such 

data may be relevant to interpreting the voters’ intent in some 

contexts, we decline to consider it here given the Attorney 

General’s withdrawal of the argument on this point.
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

23

3490, subdivision (a)(5) of the California Code of Regulations.12 

We reach this conclusion based on our consideration of the 

constitutional text, the ballot materials, the stated purposes of 

the initiative, and the Department’s discretion to promulgate 

regulations under the Constitution. We hold that the

Department’s regulation is consistent with article I, section 32, 

and is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of 

Proposition 57. (See Morris, supra, 67 Cal.2d at pp. 748–749.) 

Neither the language of the constitutional provision nor 

the materials presented to the voters explicitly stated whether 

an inmate currently serving a term for a violent felony would be 

eligible for parole consideration under the initiative. As we have 

explained, the constitutional text is ambiguous on this point. 

Although the ballot materials do not directly answer the 

question, they conveyed to the voters that Proposition 57 would 

establish “parole consideration for nonviolent offenders” (Voter 

Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by 

Legis. Analyst, p. 56) and would not authorize early parole 

consideration for “violent offenders” (Voter Information Guide, 

Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59). 

As the Department observes, the proponents’ rebuttal 

asserted “violent offenders” and “[v]iolent criminals as defined 

in Penal Code 667.5(c)” would not be eligible for early parole 

consideration. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 

rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59.) Moreover, the 

ballot materials focus on the distinction between inmates 

convicted of violent felonies and inmates convicted of nonviolent 

12 In light of this conclusion, we do not address the 

Department’s position that article I, section 32 compels the 

approach the Department adopted in its regulations.
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

24

felonies. For this reason, the opponents and proponents sparred 

over the scope of the term nonviolent felony. The proponents 

asserted violent felonies would be defined by Penal Code section 

667.5, subdivision (c) (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., 

supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59), that the 

initiative would “[k]eep[] the most dangerous offenders locked 

up” (id., argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58), and that “parole 

eligibility under Prop. 57 applies, ‘only to prisoners convicted of 

non-violent felonies.’ [Brown v. Superior Court, supra,

63 Cal.4th at p. 352.] Violent criminals as defined in Penal Code 

667.5(c) are excluded from parole” (Voter Information Guide, 

Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59). 

The opponents’ arguments in the ballot materials did not 

allege that inmates currently serving a term for a violent felony 

offense would be eligible for parole consideration under the 

initiative, or assert the initiative should be rejected for that 

reason. Instead, the thrust of the opponents’ arguments was 

that the scope of the term “violent felony” was too narrow. (See 

Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument against 

Prop. 57, p. 59.) The opponents described a number of 

offenses — including certain types of rape, sex trafficking, and 

assault with a deadly weapon — that would be categorized as 

“nonviolent” under the initiative. (Id., rebuttal to argument in 

favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) 

In this context, Proposition 57 directed the Department to 

“adopt regulations in furtherance of [the constitutional] 

provisions,” and to “certify that these regulations protect and 

enhance public safety.” (Art. I, § 32(b).) In doing so, the 

Department determined that individuals currently serving a 

term of incarceration for a violent felony should be excluded 

from early parole consideration, regardless of whether the 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

25

inmate had also been convicted of a nonviolent felony. (See Cal. 

Code. Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(5).) This approach “reasonably 

interpreted” the Department’s mandate to adopt regulations

(Woods, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 679), is consistent with the 

constitutional language and ballot materials, and is “reasonably 

necessary to effectuate the purpose” of Proposition 57 (Gov. 

Code, § 11342.2).

The ballot materials support such a conclusion. 

Underlying the debate between the proponents and opponents 

of Proposition 57 was the implication that an inmate serving a 

prison term for a violent felony would be excluded from parole 

consideration. As the Department puts it, “the singular focus on 

‘nonviolent felonies’ supports the inference that individuals 

serving time for violent felonies would not be eligible.” There 

would be little reason to debate the meaning and scope of the 

term violent felony if having a conviction for a nonviolent felony 

triggered early parole consideration regardless of whether an 

individual was currently serving a term of incarceration for a 

violent felony conviction. The Department’s decision to craft its 

regulations in a way that excluded individuals currently serving 

a term of incarceration for a violent felony is consistent with the 

distinction between violent and nonviolent felonies emphasized 

in the ballot materials.

Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. 

First, he notes the materials presented to the voters stated that 

“persons convicted of nonviolent felonies” would be eligible for 

parole “upon completion of [a] prison term for their primary 

offense as defined,” but did not indicate that there was an 

exception that would apply if these individuals were currently 

serving a term for a violent felony. (See Voter Information 

Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, Official Title and Summary, p. 54.) 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

26

This assertion is premised on the assumption that the phrase 

“any person convicted of a nonviolent felony” in article I, section 

32(a)(1) clearly and unambiguously applies to inmates currently 

serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony conviction —

a premise we have already rejected above.

Second, petitioner asserts the ballot materials should not 

be relied on because they are partisan and “may serve to mislead 

a voter about an initiative’s purpose, intent, and effect.” It is 

true that, as we noted in Gadlin, the voters “were explicitly 

warned in the margins of the voter guide that ‘Arguments 

printed on this page are the opinions of the authors, and have 

not been checked for accuracy by any official agency.’ ” (Gadlin, 

supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 940–941, quoting Voter Information 

Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, pp. 58, 59.) Still, petitioner provides 

no explanation regarding why any potential partisan bias aids 

him here. He observes that the opponents emphasized the 

initiative would apply to “violent criminals.” (Voter Information 

Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument in favor of 

Prop. 57, p. 58, capitalization omitted.) But the opponents’ focus 

on the term “violent criminals,” when taken in context, had 

nothing to do with inmates currently serving a term for a violent 

felony. Rather, the opponents were concerned with the types of 

offenses that would be considered nonviolent under the 

initiative. (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, 

rebuttal to argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58 [asserting 

inmates convicted of crimes including sex trafficking, assault 

with a deadly weapon, lewd acts against a 14-year-old, hostage 

taking, and hate crimes causing injury would be classified as 

nonviolent].) As noted above, neither the proponents nor the 

opponents of Proposition 57 expressly addressed the 

circumstance we consider here. Thus, it cannot be said that the 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

27

materials misled the voters with respect to the treatment of 

inmates currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent 

felony, or that the Department acted in excess of its authority 

when crafting the regulation at issue here. 

Petitioner next asserts that the initiative informed the 

voters that the Board of Parole Hearings would guard public 

safety by evaluating each eligible inmate for parole suitability. 

(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument in favor 

of Prop. 57, p. 58.) But petitioner does not explain how this 

would have conveyed to the voters an understanding that 

inmates currently serving a term for a violent felony would be 

eligible for early parole consideration. 

Further, petitioner’s reliance on Gadlin with regard to the 

ballot materials is misplaced. In Gadlin, we rejected the 

Department’s position that the ballot materials indicated the 

voters intended to exclude from early parole consideration 

inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses requiring registration 

pursuant to section 290. (Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 939–

940.) We noted that the Department relied on “a single line in 

the proponents’ rebuttal argument” in a manner that “overlooks 

the context of the entire ballot materials provided to the voters.” 

(Id. at p. 939.) Here, by contrast, the ballot materials provide 

much stronger support for the Department’s position than the 

single line on which it relied in Gadlin. As described above, the 

ballot materials consistently contrasted for voters the 

distinction between violent felonies and nonviolent felonies. 

This contrast was further underscored by the analysis of the 

Legislative Analyst, which “assume[d] a nonviolent felony 

offense would include any felony offense that is not specifically 

defined in statute as violent.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. 

Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 56.) 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

28

Unlike the circumstances in Gadlin, the Department was well 

within its discretion to frame its regulations in light of the 

robust debate captured in the ballot materials.

Finally, petitioner asserts the voters’ rejection of 

Proposition 20 at the 2020 election constitutes evidence that the 

voters, in passing Proposition 57 in 2016, intended to afford 

parole consideration to inmates serving terms of imprisonment 

for both violent and nonviolent felonies. He notes that 

Proposition 20 would have explicitly excluded such inmates 

from early parole consideration by adding Penal Code section 

3040.3, subdivision (a) to state: “An inmate whose current 

commitment includes a concurrent, consecutive, or stayed 

sentence for an offense or allegation defined as violent by 

subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or Section 3040.1 shall be 

deemed a violent offender for purposes of Section 32 of Article I 

of the Constitution.” (Text of Proposed Laws, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 

2020) text of Prop. 20, p. 20.) He asserts that voters’ rejection of 

this “opportunity to override the lower court’s decision in the 

current case” indicates that voters intended Proposition 57 to 

apply to inmates like him who have been convicted of both 

violent and nonviolent felonies. 

Petitioner’s argument is entirely unavailing. A failed 

initiative presented to the voters in 2020 cannot provide 

evidence of the voters’ intent when they cast their ballots in 

2016. (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. 

Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 238 [“we cannot speculate that 

the rejection [of an initiative by the voters] amounted to an 

implied approval” of a court opinion that would have been 

effectively overturned by the initiative], citing Dyna-Med, supra, 

43 Cal.3d at p. 1396; In re Guice, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 942
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

29

[“There is simply no way of knowing why voters rejected 

Proposition 20 four years after they approved Proposition 57”].) 

We therefore conclude that the Department acted within 

its discretion when it promulgated section 3490, subdivision 

(a)(5) of the California Code of Regulations excluding 

individuals currently serving a sentence for a violent felony from

early parole consideration. This conclusion, however, is not a 

determination that the Department’s regulation is the most 

plausible of the various interpretations offered. Because the 

Department is vested with the authority to adopt regulations in 

this context, we need only conclude that its regulation is a valid 

exercise of its rulemaking authority.

As to the application of the regulation to this case,

petitioner does not contest the Department’s determination that 

he is currently serving a term of incarceration for a violent 

felony. As described, petitioner was convicted of nine counts of 

second degree robbery (a violent felony), six counts of receiving 

stolen property (a nonviolent felony), and various gang 

enhancements. His only argument before this court is that he 

should be entitled to early parole consideration because he is a 

“mixed-offense prisoner whose nonviolent felony offense is his 

primary offense and whose violent offenses are secondary ones 

that run consecutive and subordinate to that primary and 

principal offense.” Because petitioner has not contested the 

Department’s determination that he is currently serving a term 

for a violent felony, and because we have determined that the 

regulation excluding from early parole consideration inmates 

who are currently serving a term for a violent felony is a valid 

exercise of the Department’s rulemaking authority under 

article I, section 32(b), we conclude the Department’s denial of 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

30

petitioner’s request for early parole consideration was 

permissible.13 

III. CONCLUSION

Neither the language of article I, section 32(a)(1) of the 

California Constitution nor the ballot materials presented to the 

voters speak directly to whether inmates with nonviolent felony 

convictions who are currently serving a term for a violent felony

must be considered for early parole suitability. Against this 

backdrop, and the direction in article I, section 32(b) to 

promulgate regulations, the Department determined that 

inmates serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony 

should be excluded from early parole consideration. (Cal. Code 

Regs., § 3490, subd. (a)(5).) The Department’s approach is

consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the constitutional 

language and the ballot materials. We cannot say that the 

Department abused its rulemaking authority in coming to this 

conclusion.

13 The concurring opinion in Douglas agreed that the 

petitioner there was “still serving a sentence for a violent felony 

offense” and thus was ineligible for early parole consideration at 

the time he sought it. (Douglas, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 739 

(conc. opn. of Robie, Acting P. J.).) The concurring opinion 

further asserted that article I, section 32(a)(1)(A) required the 

court to “break an inmate’s sentence into its component parts 

for the purpose of determining whether that inmate has served 

his or her primary offense, making the particular sequence in 

which an inmate serves his or her violent offense a meaningful 

abstraction.” (Id. at p. 738.) Because petitioner here does not 

contest that he is currently serving a term of incarceration for a 

violent felony, we are not presented with the issue of whether 

article I, section 32 requires us to break an inmate’s sentence 

into its component parts. We express no view on that issue or 

on the approach adopted by the concurring opinion in Douglas.
In re MOHAMMAD 

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

31

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

LEVY, J.*

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 

section 6 of the California Constitution.
In re MOHAMMAD

S259999

Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu

The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, known 

as Proposition 57, provides that “[a]ny person convicted of a 

nonviolent felony offense . . . shall be eligible for parole 

consideration after completing the full term for his or her 

primary offense.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1) (article I, 

section 32(a)(1)).) To implement this provision, the Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) adopted a 

regulation that makes ineligible for early parole consideration 

any inmate who is “currently serving a term of incarceration for 

a ‘violent felony.’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5).) 

For the reasons stated in today’s opinion, I agree that this 

regulation, as written, is a reasonable construction of article I, 

section 32(a)(1).

Lurking beneath this holding, however, are a number of 

questions concerning what it means for an inmate with both 

violent and nonviolent felony convictions to be “currently 

serving a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony.’ ” (Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5).) But because petitioner 

Mohammad Mohammad has not contested the Department’s 

determination that he is currently serving a term for a violent 

felony, we have no occasion here to examine the proper 

application of the regulation to inmates like Mohammad who 

are incarcerated for both violent and nonviolent felony offenses. 

(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 29–30 & fn. 13.)

Mohammad was sentenced to a consecutive term of 29 

years for multiple violent (robbery) and nonviolent (receiving 
In re MOHAMMAD 

Liu, J., concurring

2

stolen property) offenses. In its administrative review of his 

request for early parole consideration, the Department 

determined that his robbery offense (any one of them) “ ‘makes 

all of his offenses to be considered violent during this term.’ ” 

(In re Mohammad (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 719, 724.) In In re 

Reeves (2005) 35 Cal.4th 765, 772, we said that “[u]nder the 

Determinate Sentencing Act ([Pen. Code,] § 1170 et seq.), 

multiple consecutive determinate terms must be combined into 

a single, ‘aggregate term of imprisonment for all [such] 

convictions’ ([id.,] § 1170.1, subd. (a)) that merges all terms to 

be served consecutively . . . .” The Department seems to 

contemplate that the merger of consecutive terms into a single 

aggregate term means that an inmate serving a consecutive 

sentence for violent and nonviolent felony convictions is 

“currently serving a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony’ ” 

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3490, subd. (a)(5)) throughout the 

entire duration of the consecutive sentence.

But there is some tension between the Department’s view 

and Proposition 57’s definition of “primary offense” to mean “the 

longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any 

offense, excluding the imposition of an enhancement, 

consecutive sentence, or alternative sentence.” (Art. I, 

§ 32(a)(1)(A), italics added.) As Justice Robie explained in In re 

Douglas (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 726, this language seems to 

“require[ ] us to break an inmate’s sentence into its component 

parts,” notwithstanding the merger rule, in order to determine 

what term the inmate is currently serving at the time he or she

seeks early parole consideration. (Id. at p. 738 (conc. opn. of 

Robie, Acting P. J.); see art. I, § 32(a) [“The following provisions 

are hereby enacted . . . notwithstanding anything in this article 

or any other provision of law . . . .”].)
In re MOHAMMAD 

Liu, J., concurring

3

Consider, for example, an inmate serving a consecutive 

sentence for a robbery offense with a six-year term and a 

receiving stolen property offense with a three-year term. The 

robbery offense is the “primary offense” because it carries “the 

longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any 

offense.” (Art. I, § 32(a)(1)(A).) Once the inmate has completed 

the six-year term for his primary offense of robbery, is he then —

for purposes of article I, section 32(a)(1) — currently serving a 

term for the nonviolent offense of receiving stolen property and 

thus eligible for early parole consideration, as Justice Robie’s 

view suggests? Or does article I, section 32(a)(1) allow the 

Department to treat him as currently serving a term for the 

violent offense throughout the entire nine-year aggregate 

sentence and find him ineligible for early parole consideration 

on that basis?

Today’s decision does not answer these questions, nor does 

it address at what point, if any, during Mohammad’s consecutive 

sentence he may become eligible for early parole consideration. 

These issues await resolution in future cases.

LIU, J.

I Concur:

KRUGER, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion In re Mohammad

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Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 42 Cal.App.5th 719

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

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Opinion No. S259999

Date Filed: January 3, 2022

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Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: William C. Ryan

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Counsel:

Michael Satris and Heather MacKay, under appointments by the

Supreme Court, for Petitioner Mohammad Mohammad.

Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Michael Mongan, 

State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorneys General, Janill L. Richards, Principal Deputy 

State Solicitor General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helen H. Hong, Deputy State Solicitor General, Amanda J. Murray 

and Charles Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the 

People.

Kent S. Scheidegger and Kymberlee C. Stapleton for Criminal Justice 

Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent the 

People.

Richard J. Sachs, Deputy District Attorney (San Diego) and Mark 

Zhaner for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae 

on behalf of Respondent the People.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

Heather MacKay

P.O. Box 3112

Oakland, CA 94609

(510) 653-7507

Helen H. Hong

Deputy State Solicitor General

600 West Broadway, Suite 1800

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 738-9693