IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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m 00-30804

Summary Calendar

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SANDRA J. BRIDGES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(98-CV-931)

_________________________

April 27, 2001

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES,

and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*

SandraBridgesrequested a designated handicapped parking space fromher employer, the

Department of Social Services (“DSS”).

When she did not get one, she sued under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

claiming that she did not receive a reasonable

accommodation. The district court granted

summary judgment for DSS, and we affirm.

I.

Bridges experiences pain in walking.

Although her condition does not prevent her

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.
2

either from working in the office or from

household chores, she requested a parking

space close to the building to minimize her

walking distance. The DSS accommodated

her request by assigning her to a space in the

parking garage near the building as soon as it

became available, whereas she previously had

to park in an open lot across the street.

Bridges contends that she should have

received a designated “handicapped” parking

space. She complains that when the

handicapped space became available, it was

assigned to another employee who had

requested an accommodation. 

Bridges avers that she must park in a

“stacked” space, which requires her to make

extra trips to the garage to accommodate the

person in the other space. DSS explains that

the handicapped slot is the only parking space

closer to the building than is the one Bridges

uses; the two spaces are separated only by the

width of a driveway.

II.

We review a summary judgment de novo,

applying the same standards as did the district

court. Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458,

462 (5th Cir. 2000). We draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-movant.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is

proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue of material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 

III.

The ADA requires that covered entities

make “reasonable accommodations to the

known physical or mental limitations of an

otherwise qualified individual with a disability

who is an applicant or employee unless such

covered entity can demonstrate that the

accommodation would impose an undue

hardship on the operation of the business of

such covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)-

(5)(A). Bridges can state a claim for

discrimination based on her employer’s failure

to accommodate a disability by showing that

(1) the employer is covered by the statute; (2)

she is an individual with a disability; (3) she

can perform the essential functions of the job

with or without reasonable accommodations;

and (4) the employer had notice of the

disability and failed to provide

accommodation. Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68

F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a

failure to provide a parking space for a

disabled employee may present a cognizable

claim under the ADA). 

DSS does not contest that it is a covered

entity and that Bridges can perform the

essential functions of the job.1 Although

1 A failure-to-accommodate claim under the

ADA is distinct froma claimof disparate treatment

and is analyzed separately under the law. E.g.,

Green v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894, 897-98

(7th Cir. 1999). Such failure to accommodate,

however, may provide evidence of disparate

treatment. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d

305, 314 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A wrongful termination

claim under the ADA is not properly analyzed

under a reasonable accommodation theory unless

an employer is shown to have terminated a

qualified individual with a disability in order to

avoid accommodating that employee’s impairments

at the workplace.”). Because Bridges alleges no

adverse employment action, we need not apply

disparate treatment analysis here. To the extent

that the district court relied on disparate treatment

analysis to grant summary judgment for DSS, it

erred. We may affirm, however, on any basis

(continued...)
3

Bridges has suffered no adverse employment

action, she may still raise a claim of

discrimination based on the alleged failure

reasonably to accommodate her disability. See

Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel, Inc., 178 F.3d 731,

734 (5th Cir. 1999). To raise this claim

independently of a disparate treatment claim,

however, she “must demonstrate that a

substantially limiting impairment somehow

affected [her] ability to perform [her] job.

Without such a showing, there would be

nothing for an employer to accommodate.”

Burch, 119 F.3d at 315 n.4.

A.

We must consider whether Bridges is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, which

defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more of the major life functions of such

individual;(B) a record ofsuch impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “[T]he

impairment must be substantiallylimiting at the

time ofthe requested accommodation.” Burch

v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir.

1997). 

To examine “major life functions” and substantial limitations, we look to the regulations

promulgated by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission. Dutcher v. Ingalls

Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir.

1995). These regulations classify walking as a

major life function. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(i)). The definition of “substantially

limits” includes “significantly restricted as to

the condition, manner, or duration under

which an individual can perform a particular

major life activity as compared to the

condition, manner, or duration under which

the average person under which the average

person in the general population can perform

the same major life activity.” Id. (citing 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). 

Bridges can walk around the office and can

do household chores, shopping, and yard

work. She has identified no activity in which

she cannot engage. She asserts, however, that

she attempts to minimize walking because it

causes her pain. This condition does not qualify as a “significant” restriction on her ability

to walk within the meaning of the ADA.2

B.

Even if we were to conclude that Bridgesis

“significantly restricted as to the . . . duration”

of her walking, she could not recover, because

she has not demonstrated that DSS knew of

her disability and failed to make reasonable

accommodation. Bridges had several informal

conversations with her supervisors about her

parking assignment in an open lot some

distance fromthe office building, and she made

a formal request for accommodation in July

1996. In September 1996, the DSS assigned

her a parking space in the office building

garage. This spot is precisely sixty feet, six

inches from the entrance to the building.

Bridges’s main complaint with the

1

(...continued)

supported by the record. Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d

504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999). 

2

See Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726 n.11 (concluding

that difficulty in picking little things up from the

floor, operating a car ignition, or holding things

high up or really tightly for long periods of time did

not present sufficient evidence for a jury to

determine that impairment significantly limited a

major life activity). The district court found that

Bridges had not demonstrated a substantial limit to

themajor life activity of working. Bridges does not

contest this finding.
4

accommodation is that she occasionally hasto

make an extra trip to the garage because she

parks in a stacked space.

“The ADA is a federal discrimination

statute designed to remove barriers which

prevent qualified individuals with disabilities

from enjoying the same employment

opportunities that are available to persons

without disabilities.” Taylor v. Principal Fin.

Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5thCir. 1996).

Bridges has alleged no barrier to her

employment opportunities. Moreover, “the

ADA requires employers to reasonably

accommodate limitations, not disabilities.” Id.

at 164. 

“This is a critical distinction, because the

existence vel non of a disability or impairment

is material to a reasonable accommodation

claim only insofar as it limits an employee’s

ability to perform his or her job.” Burch v.

Coca-Cola, Co., 119 F.3d 305, 314 (5th Cir.

1997). Bridges has not alleged any limitation

on her ability to perform her job under the

current arrangement. Therefore, the district

court correctly concluded that DSS had no

duty to provide her with the specific parking

space that she requested. 

AFFIRMED.