COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

HUDSON VENETIAN BLIND SERVICE, INC. 

 AND PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL 

 INSURANCE COMPANY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 1611-98-2 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 18, 1999 

DONALD A. HUDSON 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

(Bradford C. Jacob; Taylor & Walker, P.C., on 

brief), for appellants. 

 (Andrew J. Reinhardt; Kerns, Kastenbaum & 

Reinhardt, on brief), for appellee. 

 Hudson Venetian Blind Service, Inc., and its insurer 

(hereinafter referred to as “employer”) contend that the Workers’ 

Compensation Commission erred in holding that Donald A. Hudson 

proved (1) that he suffers from a polyneuropathy or a peripheral 

neuropathy based upon the opinion of Dr. Robert J. DeLorenzo; (2) 

that his condition was caused by exposure to chemicals at work; 

(3) that he suffers from a compensable occupational disease rather 

than a gradually incurred, noncompensable, cumulative exposure to 

chemical solvents; (4) that a June 1, 1995 extender spill incident 

caused his condition; and (5) that he was totally disabled since 

March 1, 1996, and, therefore, was not obligated to market his 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

residual capacity. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of 

the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission’s decision. See

Rule 5A:27. 

I., II. and IV. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

Factual findings made by the commission will be upheld on appeal 

if supported by credible evidence. See James v. Capitol Steel 

Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). 

Moreover, “[t]he actual determination of causation is a factual 

finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible 

evidence to support the finding.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 

Va. App. 684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). 

 Dr. DeLorenzo, chief neurologist at the Medical College of 

Virginia Hospital (“MCV”), a neurology professor, and the Director 

of the Neuroscience Research Facility, testified that he talked to 

Hudson on several occasions, performed a one and one-half hour 

history and complete physical and neurological examination of 

Hudson, reviewed Hudson’s MCV medical chart for approximately four 

to five hours at various intervals, spent another hour reading 

Hudson’s initial evaluations, and another two hours reviewing all 

of his laboratory testing. In his de bene esse deposition, Dr. 
- 3 - 

DeLorenzo opined that Hudson suffers from “a peripheral neuropathy 

with both sensory and motor components, as well as evidence of 

central nervous system damage . . . probably . . . in the spinal 

cord . . . called a myelopathy.” Dr. DeLorenzo testified that to 

a reasonable degree of medical certainty the damage to Hudson’s 

nervous system was caused by his unprotected exposure to paint 

solvents and chemicals in the workplace. Dr. DeLorenzo opined 

that Hudson’s condition could have been caused by “one or two very 

large exposures in the workplace, which it’s my understanding that 

that happened . . . or [by] chronic accumulation.” Dr. DeLorenzo 

stated that Hudson’s condition was probably due to both causes and 

was “[d]efinitely not” due to an idiopathic cause. Dr. 

DeLorenzo’s December 13, 1996 letter report was consistent with 

the opinions he expressed in his deposition. 

 As fact finder, the commission was entitled to accept Dr. 

DeLorenzo’s opinions and to reject any contrary medical opinions. 

“Questions raised by conflicting medical opinions must be decided 

by the commission.” Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 

310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989). Dr. DeLorenzo’s opinions 

provide credible evidence supporting the commission’s finding that 

Hudson suffers from a polyneuropathy or peripheral neuropathy 

caused by exposure to paint solvents and chemicals in his 

workplace. “The fact that there is contrary evidence in the 

record is of no consequence if there is credible evidence to 
- 4 - 

support the commission’s finding.” Wagner Enters., Inc. v. 

Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). 

 Furthermore, whether Hudson’s condition was caused by a 

single exposure or prolonged high exposure to chemical solvents in 

the workplace is immaterial. Dr. DeLorenzo stated that Hudson’s 

condition was attributable to either situation or both. Based 

upon Hudson's testimony and Dr. DeLorenzo’s opinions, the 

commission properly concluded that “the particular event on June 

1, 1995 produced a definitive change in [Hudson’s] condition, such 

that it suddenly and unexpectedly produced the myriad effects in 

[Hudson’s] central nervous system that significantly altered his 

condition.” 

III. 

 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in A New Leaf, Inc. v. 

Webb, 257 Va. 190, 511 S.E.2d 102 (1999), is dispositive of this 

issue. In Webb, the Supreme Court held that a florist’s 

allergic contact dermatitis was compensable as an occupational 

disease because it was caused by a reaction to allergens in 

certain flowers encountered in the claimant’s job as a florist, 

not by cumulative trauma induced by repetitive motion. See id.

at 192, 511 S.E.2d at 102. 

 “‘[W]hether a worker has suffered an impairment that 

constitutes a compensable disease is a mixed question of law and 

fact.’ Thus, the Commission’s finding on that question is not 
- 5 - 

conclusive but is a proper subject for judicial review.” Id. at 

196, 511 S.E.2d at 104. In determining whether Hudson’s 

condition qualifies as an occupational disease, we must consider 

the nature and cause of the impairments. See id. at 197, 511 

S.E.2d at 105. 

 Here, credible medical evidence, including the medical 

records and opinions of Dr. DeLorenzo, proved that Hudson’s 

polyneuropathy or peripheral neuropathy was caused by the 

reaction of his body to unprotected high exposure to paint 

solvents and chemicals in the workplace, whether over an 

extended period of time or over several large exposures. No 

evidence established that Hudson’s condition was caused by 

cumulative trauma induced by repetitive motion. Accordingly, 

the commission did not err in holding that Hudson’s condition is 

a compensable occupational disease within the meaning of the 

Workers’ Compensation Act. 

V. 

 The commission held that Hudson proved he had been totally 

disabled since March 1, 1996, and, therefore, had no obligation 

to market a residual work capacity. In so ruling, the 

commission found as follows: 

The record establishes that [Hudson] is 

severely disabled by his neurological 

problems, such that he is essentially 

limited to sitting in a chair, and talking 

on the telephone. Moreover, Dr. [Richard] 

Waller persuasively testified that he doubts 
- 6 - 

whether [Hudson] can perform such activities 

under stress, which he defined as “any type 

of complex intellectual functioning, or 

maybe interpersonal interactions, I guess 

outside the context of his family.” 

 The testimony of Dr. Waller and Dr. DeLorenzo, who opined 

that Hudson was totally disabled from work and that his 

condition would not improve, constitutes credible evidence 

supporting the commission’s findings. Based upon their 

testimony, coupled with evidence of Hudson’s age, his 

significant neurological deficits and brain impairments, and his 

work history, the commission did not err in concluding that 

Hudson proved that he had been totally disabled since March 1, 

1996, and therefore, was not obligated to market his residual 

capacity. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission’s decision. 

Affirmed.