Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

COREY L. SCOTT GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

J.J., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A04-1401-JV-18

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge

The Honorable Gary K. Chavers, Magistrate

Cause No. 49D09-1310-JD-3028

September 3, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
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Case Summary

J.J. was adjudicated delinquent for the act of Robbery, as a Class B felony if 

committed by an adult.1 He appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional decree awarding his 

wardship to the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”). We affirm. 

Issue

J.J. presents one issue for review: whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

committing him to the DOC. 

Facts and Procedural History

Fourteen-year-old J.J. and eighteen-year-old Stanley Knight (“Knight”) found a gun, 

which they planned to use to rob an individual they would select at random. (Tr. 9, 12.) J.J. 

subsequently purchased ammunition for the gun so that they could carry out the robbery. (Tr. 

12.) On October 6, 2013, J.J. and Knight approached Wendy Justus (“Justus”) while she was 

jogging on the Monon Trail in Marion County. (Tr. 8.) Knight pointed the gun at Justus’s 

head, forced her to the ground, and demanded that she give up her property. (Tr. 8, 43.) J.J. 

and Knight took Justus’s cell phone, headphones, and canister of mace, and then fled. (Tr. 

8.) When Indianapolis Police Department officers apprehended J.J. shortly thereafter, J.J. 

was in possession of the gun, a box of ammunition, and the mace. (Tr. 11.) 

On October 7, 2013, the State alleged that J.J. had committed the following acts that, 

if committed by an adult, would constitute: Robbery, as a Class B felony; Confinement, as a

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1 (2013). 
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Class B felony; Dangerous Possession of a Firearm, as a Class A misdemeanor; and Carrying 

a Handgun without a License, as a Class A misdemeanor. (Appellant’s App. 20.) 

On October 29, 2013, the juvenile court accepted J.J.’s admission agreement and 

entered a true finding of Robbery, as a Class B felony if committed by an adult. (Appellant’s 

App. 50.) The State dismissed the other allegations. (Appellant’s App. 50.) The juvenile 

court ordered J.J. to submit to a psychological evaluation and set a disposition hearing for a 

later date. (Tr. 52.). 

At the disposition hearing on November 20, 2013, an officer from the Marion County 

Juvenile Probation Department (the “Probation Department”) recommended that J.J. be 

released on probation with electronic monitoring, followed by home detention. (Tr. 34; 

Appellant’s App. 84.) The Probation Department also recommended that J.J. receive 

extensive therapy and counseling services for the substance abuse and mental health issues 

identified during his psychological evaluation. (Appellant’s App. 84.) The juvenile court 

took the testimony and recommendations under advisement and set a follow-up hearing. (Tr. 

51-52.)

On November 27, 2013, the juvenile court determined that the Probation Department’s 

recommendations were inconsistent with community safety. (Tr. 56; Appellant’s App. 88.) 

The court ordered the Probation Department to seek out-of-home placement for J.J. at a 

specific residential facility in Pennsylvania. (Tr. 56; Appellant’s App. 88.) 

After the hearing, the Probation Department issued an addendum report stating that 

J.J. was not accepted into the Pennsylvania facility due to a prior suicide attempt and 
4

hallucinations. (Appellant’s App. 96.) However, the Probation Department reported that J.J. 

was accepted into a program at Resource, a residential treatment facility in Indianapolis. 

(Appellant’s App. 96.) 

On December 18, 2013, the juvenile court held a final disposition hearing and 

awarded wardship of J.J. to the DOC. (Tr. 63; Appellant’s App. 15.) The court found that 

“while being consistent with public safety[,] this is the least restrictive and appropriate 

alternative available to the Court at this time.” (Tr. 64.) J.J. filed an emergency motion for 

reconsideration on December 23, 2013. (Appellant’s App. 100.) The court denied his 

motion. (Appellant’s App. 103.) 

J.J. now appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional decree. 

Discussion and Decision

The choice of a specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent is within the 

sound discretion of the juvenile court. D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005). This discretion is subject to the statutory considerations of the safety of the 

community, the welfare of the child, and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. 

Id. We may overturn the juvenile court’s disposition order only if the court abused its 

discretion. D.E. v. State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the juvenile court’s judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 

and circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom. Id.
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It is Indiana’s policy to “ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are 

treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.” I.C. § 31-10-2-

1(5). To effectuate this policy, Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 sets forth several factors the 

juvenile court must consider when entering a dispositional decree. The statute provides that, 

if consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the court shall

enter a dispositional decree that: (1) is in the least restrictive (most family like) and most 

appropriate setting available, and is close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best 

interest and special needs of the child; (2) least interferes with family autonomy; (3) is least 

disruptive of family life; (4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the 

child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and (5) provides a reasonable opportunity for 

participation by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian. I.C. § 31-37-18-6. 

Without question, the statute requires the juvenile court to select the least restrictive 

placement in most situations. K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

However, the statute contains language that indicates that a more restrictive placement might 

be appropriate under certain circumstances. Id. at 386-87. Specifically, the statute requires 

the least restrictive placement only “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the 

best interest of the child.” I.C. § 31-37-18-6; K.A., 775 N.E.2d at 387.

The juvenile court awarded wardship of J.J. to the DOC. J.J. contends that

commitment to the DOC is not the appropriate or least restrictive option available to the 

court. (Appellant’s Brief 4.) He argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion because 

the court failed to follow the Probation Department’s home-based disposition 
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recommendations or place J.J. at the Resource facility. (Appellant’s Brief 4.) J.J. also cites 

his age, absence of prior delinquent history, and good grades as factors that weigh in favor of 

a less restrictive placement. (Appellant’s Brief 10.) 

Here, J.J. purchased ammunition for a gun with the plan to rob an individual at 

gunpoint. J.J. and Knight then used the gun to threaten and rob a randomly-selected 

individual on the Monon Trail, “a location where people . . . citizens go for various reasons 

including for exercise, for social contact.” (Tr. 63.) At the second disposition hearing, the 

court determined that the Probation Department’s “recommendation for [J.J.] to be returned 

to his guardian’s home . . . is not a recommendation that is consistent with the safety of the 

community.” (Tr. 56.) The court specifically asked that J.J. be referred to an out-of-state 

residential facility, to which J.J. was not accepted. (Tr. 56; Appellant’s App. 96.) At the 

final hearing, the court did not accept the Probation Department’s alternative placement at a 

local facility and found that, due to the nature of the delinquent act, commitment to the DOC 

was “consistent with public safety and the best interest of the child.” (Tr. 63.) 

It is well settled that there are times when commitment to a suitable public institution 

is in the best interest of the juvenile and society. J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 29 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008). “In some instances, confinement may be one of the most effective rehabilitative 

techniques available.” B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157, 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) 

(upholding the juvenile court’s order of wardship of B.K.C. to the DOC after fourteen-yearold B.K.C. was adjudicated delinquent for the act of Robbery, as a Class B felony if 

committed by an adult, for robbing a restaurant at gunpoint with an older accomplice). In 
7

this case, J.J. was adjudicated delinquent after committing a “very concerning,” dangerous 

act. (Tr. 63.) Under these circumstances, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its 

discretion in awarding wardship of J.J. to the DOC.

Affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and PYLE, J., concur.