### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 09 -0 00 60 -C V

______________________________ ESTATE OF RONNI E WREN, Appellant

V. AL BA STI NEL L IAND SUE B ASTI NEL L I , Appellee s

On Appea l from the 6th J udicial District Court

Fa nnin County , Texas Trial Court No. 37071

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C

. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Me mor and

um O pin ion

by Chi e f Jus tic e Mo rr iss ConcurringOpinion by

J ustice Moseley2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Al and S u e B astinelli rented two se lf-storag e units from the now de cea sed Ronnie Wren under a written re ntal ag ree ment that insulated Wren from li ability for any theft l oss sustained by the B a s ti n e ll is “ u n le s s th e s a me is d u e to th e . . . g r o s s n e g li g e n c e ” o f Wr e n . T h e n, two succe ssive criminal ac ts were direc ted at the B astinellis’ units. I n April 2005, the Bastinellis’ locks wer e cut off of both units, but nothing wa s stolen from the units at t hat t ime. Although O ffice r Mar k J ohnson made a repor

t of t his initial incident, t he Bastinellis wer e not informed of this break-in a nd did not know that their lock ha d been taken and their prope rty left unprotec ted. Ther eaf ter, someone broke into one of the B astinellis’ units and took proper ty including a

ntiques, art, books, and f

urniture. The Ba stinellis s ued, obtained a jury finding of Wren’s g ross neg lige nce that prox imatel y caused the damag es, and r ecove red judg ment ag ainst the Estate of Wre n in the amount of $8,870.00. The Estate appea ls on gr ounds that the trial court err ed in e x cluding cer tain evidenc e and that the e vid e nc e wa s in su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shre c ov e ry . We r e ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt b e c a us e we hold that, althoug h (1) the trial court did not err in e x cluding either the statements Wren made to Joh ns on

or the e -m a ils fr om Wr e n to his da ug hte r, (2 ) no ev ide nc e su pp or te d th e fi nd ingof

g ro ss neg lige nce. ( 1) The Trial Court Did Not Err in E xcluding Either the Statements W ren Madeto Johnson or the E-mails from W

ren to His Daughter On appe a l, th e E s tate c o mp la in s th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in f a il in g to a d mi t e - ma ils a nd testimony fr o m J o h n s o nt h at n ega t edt h e r eq u i re d s u b j ec t i v e- i n t en tel em en to f gr o s s n eglig ence —the3

Estate conte nds that they wo u l d d emonstrate Wre n believed that police wer e conta cting the Ba stinellis and that a manag er’ s lock was plac ed on the unit af ter the f irst break-in. We f

ind that the tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y e xclu de d a s h e ars ay

John so n’ s te sti mony

and the e -m a ils

. The a dmission or ex clusion of evidenc e is a matter within t h e sound discre tion of the trial court. Daniels v. Y

ancey , 1 7 5 S

. W

. 3 d 8 8 9 , 8 9 5 (T ex . Ap p . — T ex ar k an a 2 0 0 5 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g City of Brownsville v. Alvarado , 8 9 7 S. W. 2 d 7 5 0 , 7 5 3 ( T e x. 1 9 9 5 ) )

. T h u s , w e r e v iew for abuse of discretion the tria l court’s de cision in ex cluding Wren’s re ported stateme nts. Id. A trial cour t abuses its discr etion when it a cts without r eg ard f or any g uiding r ules or princ iples. Holtzman v. Holtzman , 9 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d

7 2 9 , 7 3 4 (T ex . Ap p . — T ex ar k an a 1 9 9 9 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( ci t i n g Downer v. Aquam arine Op e ra tor s , 701 S.W .2d 238 (Tex. 1985)). Duri n g c r o s s - e xa mi n a ti o n o f Jo h n s o n , th e E s tate e s ta b li s h e d th a t Jo h n s o n ta lk e d to Wren about the cr iminal act. B efor e the questioning elicited the substance of the c onversation, counsel for the B astinellis objected on t h e b as i s o f hearsay and Rule 601(b) of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. When the hear say

objection was sustaine d, counsel for the E state agree d to make an of fer of proof at a late r time. Hea rsay “is a stateme nt, other than one made by the declara nt while t estifying at the trial or h e ar in g , o f

f e r e d in e v id e n c e to p r o v e th e tr u th o f th e matt e r a s s e rte d.” T EX . R. E V ID . 801(d). Counsel for the Estate claimed the e vidence was not hea rsay beca use it relate d to Wren’s thenexis ting state of mind. See T EX . R. E V ID . 8 0 3 (3 ). Statements admitted under this rule, howeve r,I n order to preser

ve er ror r eg arding a

trial court’ s decision to exclude evidenc e, the 1 complaining party must c omply with Rule 103 of the Texas Rules of Evidence by making an “of fer of proof ” which se ts forth the substance of the prof fer ed evide nce. T EX . R. E V ID . 103(a) (2). 4 “ are us ua lly

sp on tane ou s r e mark s a

bo ut p a in o r s ome oth e r s e ns a tio n, ma de by the de c lara

nt w hil e the sensation . . . is being experience d.” Power v. Kelley , 70 S.W .3d 137, 141 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)

. Statements that g o bey ond the dec lara nt’s emotional state to descr ibe past acts do not f

it within this e x ception to the hear say rule. Me ne

fe e v . S tat e , 211 S.W .3d 893, 905 (T ex . Ap p . — T ex ar k an a 2 0 0 6 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Gl ov e r v . S tat e , 1 0 2 S. W. 3 d 7 5 4 , 762–63 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

2002, pet. re f’d) ). We examine the purported substanc e of Johnson’s testimony to deter mine whether

the trial court e rre d in excluding this evidence

. I nstead of a question-and- an s wer

offe r of pr oof fr om 1 Jo hn s o n , t he Es ta te ’s c ouns e l si mpl y state d th a t John so n’ s te sti mony wo uld sh ow“ Ronnie Wre n to ld him that he believed the police we re c ontacting the tenants a nd that Ronnie Wren had plac ed a manag er’ s lock on the pre mises.” The B astinellis specifica lly disag ree d and told the trial cour t that J ohnson, a witness for

the B astinellis, would not ha ve testified in acc ordanc e with the Estate’ s offe r of proof . The Estate declined the trial court’ s invitation t o question J ohnson o u t s i d e o f the jury ’s prese nce on the se matters. B eca use the rec ord does not conta in J ohnson’s testimony , and conf lict

a s to t he su bs tanc e of

the te sti mony

e xiste d, we c ann ot c on c lud e , w ithc on fi de nc e , th a t th e Es ta te could establish entitlement to admit Wren’s statements using the Rule 803(3) he arsa y exception. Fur ther, it appe ars that these statements abou t t h e Ap ri l incident wer e made to J ohnson after theThe B astinellis also objected that Johnson’s testim ony would violate the De ad Man’ s Rule. 2 Rul e 60 1( b) of

the Te xas R

ule s o f E vid e nc e state s: I n civil actions by

or ag ainst executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgme nt ma

y be rende red for or

ag ainst them as such, ne ither par ty shall be allowe d to testify ag ainst the others a s to any oral statement by the testator, intestate or wa rd, un le ss t hat te sti mony

to t he or a l st a te me nt i s c or

ro bo ra te d o r u nle ss th e wi tne ss i s c a l l e d a tt h e t r i a l t o t e s t i f

y t h e r e t o b y t h e o p p o s i t e p art y. T EX . R. E V ID . 60 1( b) . Joh ns on wa s n ot a pa rt y to t he lit ig a tio n a

nd did no t othe rw ise have an in te re st in the suit. The statute was inapplicable as to him. See Ad am s v . B arry , 5 6 0 S. W. 2 d 9 3 5 , 9 3 7 ( T e x. 19 78 ); Tuttl e v. Simpson , 7 35 S.W. 2d 53 9, 54 2–43 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 19 87 , n o w ri t) . B e c a

us e we de termined the tria l court did not e rr in excluding the evide nce on he arsa y g rounds, we ne ed not further addre ss this i ssue.

5 theft, whic h o c c u r

r e d mo n th s la

te r . T h u s , th e te s ti mo n y

f r o m Jo h n s o nw o u ld

n o t r e f e r to Wren’s spontaneous stateme nt of his the n-existi ng state of mind during the theft, but rather Wren’ s version

o f p a s te v e n t s . A s s u c h , t h e t r i a l c o u rt d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n e x c l u d i n g J o h n s o n ’ s t e s t i m o n y. 2 The Estate also soug ht admission of two e-ma ils written by Wren to his daug hter whic h rea d, “I foun d my w o r

k s h e e t f o r A p r il 1 3 an d it a

p p e ar s I p u t a ma

n a g e r lo c k o n it b e c a

u s e it had the cust omer lock missing ,” and “ J ason g ave the Ba stinellis’ contact info and [the police] said they

wo uld c on ta c t th e m. Ja so n [th e mana g e r] s a id h e c ou ld h and le it a nd [the po lic e ] sa id t

he y wo uld contac t them.” The Estate claimed the e-ma ils should also be admitte d u n der the state-of -mind exception to the hear say

rule. The letters wer e both written a fter suit wa s filed and, by admission of Wren’s wife, in a

nticipation of litigation. Thus, rathe r than spontaneous stateme nts about Wren’s6

state of mind exist ing at the time of the theft, these e-ma ils depicted his version of pa st events, and

w o u l d n o tqu a l i f

y u n d e r R u l e 8 0 3 ( 3 ) a s e x c e p t i o n s t o h e ar s ay. Next, the Est ate sought t o admit the e-ma ils under the business re cords he arsa y exception. Rule 803(6) e x empts from hea rsay a data c omp ilatio n, in any fo rm , of a c ts, e ve nts , c on dit ion s, op ini on s, or d ia g no se s, ma de a t or

ne ar t he tim e by , o r f

ro m in fo rm a tio n tr ans mit ted by , a pe rs on wi th kn ow le dg e , if ke pt in the c ours e of a re g ula rl y c on du c te d b us ine ss a c tiv ity , a nd if it wa s th e re gular pr a c tic e of that bu sin e ss a c tiv ity

to m a ke the

. . . d a ta compilation . . . unless the source of information or the method or circ umstances of pr e pa ratio n in dic a te la c k o f t

ru stw or thi ne ss. T EX . R. E V ID . 80 3( 6)

. E- ma ils wr itt e n in pr e pa ra tio n of lit ig a tio n ind ic a te a la c k o f t ru stw or thi ne ss and do not qua lify as business rec ords under the above r ule. Se ssu ms v . S

tat e , 129 S.W .3d 242, 249 (T ex . Ap p . — T ex ar k an a 2 0 0 4 , p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Freem an v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. , 53 S.W .3d 710, 714–15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)). Her e, ther e wa s no testimony sug g esting that rec ords similar to the e-ma ils wer e kept in the ordinary course of busi ness. The e-mails were prepa red a fter Wre n rec eived notice of a c laim and contained the subject line “ Suit.” By Wren’s wife’ s admission, they wer e cre ated specific ally to pr epar e for defe nse of the Ba stinellis’ claims and, thus, could not qualify

as business re cords f

or evide ntiary purposes. We c onclude that the tr ial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the e- mails constituted inadmissi ble hea rsay . This point of er ror is over

ruled.7

( 2) No EvidenceSupported the Finding of Gross Negligence The Estate asser

ts that the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

i n s u ff i cient to support the jury fi nd ingof g ro ss n e g lig e nc e . B e c a

us e we are bo un d b y

statut or y and c a se law d e fi nit ion s o f g ro ss

ne g lig e nc e , a

nd be c a us e the statut or

y de fi nit ion of g ro ss n e g lig e nc e wa s su bmi tte d to the jur

y in t his

case and is not attacke d as beinginapplicable, w e ag ree . The test for

leg al suffic iency

is “whethe r the evidence at t rial would enable rea sonable a nd fair- minded people to re ach the verdic t under re view.” City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). When assessing the Estate’ s “no evidence” challeng e to the leg al suffic iency of the evidenc e, we will consider only the evidenc e and infere nces that tend to suppor t the finding of g ross neg lige nce an d wi l l disreg ard a ll evidence and infe renc es to the contra ry . Hooper v

. Smallwood , 2 70 S.W. 3d

23 4, 24 0 (T ex . Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 08 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Kin de r M or ga n N. T e x . P i p e l i n e, L

. P

. v . J

u stiss , 2 02 S.W .3d 427, 437 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (c iting Brad for d v . V e nto , 48 S.W .3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2001)). As long as the evidenc e falls within the zone of reasonable disag ree ment, we will not substitut e our judg ment for that of the juror. Hooper , 270 S.W .3d at 240. On t he other hand, if there was a complete absence of evidence of a vital fa ct, if the c ourt

was barr ed by

rules of la

w or of e vidence from g iving we ight to the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a vital fa ct, if the e vidence offe red to pr ove a vital fa ct was no more than a mer e scintilla, or if the evidenc e c o n c lu s iv e ly

established the opposite of the vital fac t, a no-e vidence point will be sustained.8

J us tis s , 202 S. W.3d at 437 (citing Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez , 977 S.W .2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998)). More than a sc intill a of e vidence exis ts if it furnishes some rea sonable ba sis for differ ing c onclusions by

rea sonable minds a

bout the exis tence of a vital fa ct. Id. (citing Ro c or In t'l, Inc. v . Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. , 77 S.W .3d 253, 262 (Tex. 2002)). When the fac tual sufficie ncy of the e vidence is challeng ed, we deter mine whether

the ver dict was ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Hooper , 270 S.W .3d at 240 (c iting Do w Che m. Co. v . F

ra nc is , 4 6 S. W.3 d 2 37 , 2 42 (T e x. 20 01 ); In re Estate of Stee d , 152 S.W .3d 797, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) ). In conducting this fac tual sufficie ncy analy sis, we weig h all the evidenc e, and w ill only set aside the ve rdict if it is so contrary to the over

whelming weig ht of the evide nce that the verdic t is clearly wrongand unjust. J

us tis s , 202 S

. W

. 3 d at 437 (c i t i n g Ma r. Ov e rse as Cor p. v . E lli s , 9 71 S.W. 2d

40 2, 40 7 ( Te x. 19 98 ); Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 17 5, 17 6 ( Te x. 19 86 )) . Si nc e we are no t a fa c t- fi nd e r, we wi ll n ot p a ss o n th e wi tne sse s’ c re dib ili ty

or substitut e our judg ment for that of the jury , even if

the evidenc e would cle arly support a diffe rent result. Id. (c i t i n g Golden Eagle Arc hery, I nc. v. J ackson , 1 16 S.W. 3d

75 7, 76 1 ( Te x. 20 03 ); El lis , 971 S.W .2d at 407).Alth o u gh a defe ndant “c annot be g rossly neg lige nt without being ne g lige nt,” evidenc e of 3 sim ple ne g lig ence is no t eno ug h to pr ov e e ith e r t he ob je c tiv e or su bje c tiv e e le me nts of

g ro ss neg lige nce. Driskill v. Ford Motor Co. , 269 S.W .3d 199, 206 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (c i t i n g Trevino v. Lightni ng La yd o w n , In c. , 7 82 S.W. 2d 94 6, 94 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 90 , w ri t de nie d) ); see Universal Servs. Co. v. Ung , 904 S.W .2d 638, 641 (Tex. 1995). Either e lement may be proven by circ umstantial e vidence , howeve r. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender , 968 S.W .2d 917, 921 (Tex. 1998). Whil e we have se ri ou s do ub ts that the pa rt ie s c on te mpl a te d a ll o f t his wh e n th e y

a g re e d to 4 a contra ct that used the term “g ross neg lige nce,” if they contemplated a

ny thing a bout it, the facts ar e that they did use the term a

nd that term is define d in this way . We are bound by the def inition. 9 Gr os s n e g lig e nc e inc lud e s b oth an o bje c tiv e and

su bje c tiv e e le me nt. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & 3 R EM . C ODE ANN . § 41.001(11) ( Ver non 2008). I t i s an ac t or omission “which when vie wed objectively

from the standpoint of t he actor at the t ime of i ts occur renc e invol ves an ex treme de g ree of risk, consider ing the probability and mag nitude of the potential harm to others.” Id. “ Extr e me risk” is not “a r emote possibility of injury or eve n a hig h probability of minor har

m, but rather the likelihood of serious injury to the plaintiff.” Lee Lewis Constr ., Inc. v . Harrison , 70 S.W .3d 778, 785 (Tex. 2001). Also, the ac t or omission m ust also be one whe re “ the ac tor has ac tual, subjective

awa re ne ss o f t

he ri sk inv olv e d, bu t nev e rt he le ss pr oc e e ds wi th co ns c iou s indi ff e re nc e to t

he ri g hts , safe ty , or we lfare of others.” Id. Thus, the risk must be p ro v en wi t h two elements, a likelihood

e le me nt a nd a se ri ou sn e ss- of

-i njur y e le me nt; and

the pr oo f m

us t sh owthe a c tor

is a wa re of bo th

e le me nts
. 4 The B astinellis’ storag e unit was broken into in April 2005. W ren ow ned and ope rate d the storag e fac ility

. The evidenc e established that he was a war e a c riminal actor br oke the lock on theJohn so n te sti fi e d th a t it wa s n ot t

he re sp on sib ili ty of the po lic e to c on ta c t st or a g e un it 5 owner s to notify

them about the incident. 10 Ba stinellis’ unit and that Wren, despite havingthe B astinellis’ telephone numbe rs , failed to c ontact the m. As a re sult, the unit was without a lock for se vera l months. Fr om this flowed the theft of the 5 Ba stinellis’ property

in J uly 2005. Gi ven the e vidence , a re asonable jury could have deter

mined that failing to contact the Ba stinellis or otherwise providing for se curity for their unit involved a high likelihood of loss or damag e. The jury could also have found that Wren wa s subjectively awa re of the risk but did not

car e about it. Ag

ru im U. S. , Inc. v . Clar

k , 1 79 S.W. 3d

76 5, 76 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A mari llo 20 05 , p e t. d en i ed ) ( qu o t i n g Di am on d Sh am ro c k Re fin ing Co. v . H

all , 168 S.W .3d 164, 173 (Tex. 2005)). Th is satisfies the hig h-likelihood-of-loss ele ment. Missing, howe ver, a

re the elements of serious harm and W ren’ s awa rene ss of a prospect for serious har

m. Whi le there is proof that much prope rty was lost—and we do not minimi ze the impact of that lo s s to th e B a s ti n e ll is

—th e lo s s w a s n o t o f th e ty p e r e qu ir e d b y T e xa s Su p r e me Court pr e c e de nt. As that c ourt ha s sa id, “ [e]xtr e me ri sk ” a lso re qu ir e s “ the lik e lih oo d of se ri ou s in jur y to the plaintiff,” a

risk of which the defe ndant must have be en aw are . Harrison , 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t7 8 5

. It is insufficient to show a hig h likelihood of minor harm. Id. An analog ous situation was prese nted in the ca se of Hironymous v. A llison , 893 S.W .2d 578 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied)

. I n that case , owner s of personal proper ty sued the manag er of

a storag e wa

rehouse for wr ong ful sale of their property , including a ppliances, dishes, a

ndSee M oriel , 879 S.W .2d at 24 (reci t i n g ru l e that ser ious harm must be “indepe ndent and 6 quali t atively

differ ent from the sor

t of injuries that ty

pically result from ba d faith or br eac h of contra ct.”) 11 fu rniture. Id. a t 5 8 0

. I na d dr e s s in g th e s e r io u s h ar m e le me n t, th e c o u rt s tate d th a t, w h il e “[o] ne mig ht i nte rp re t th e c omp le te los s of any pr op e rt y to be the mos t ser iou s har m poss ibl e ,” the ite ms lost were r eplac eable , and the proper ty loss c ould not be considere d serious harm. Id. at 584 (c iting Transp. Ins. Co. v. M

oriel , 879 S.W .2d 10, 23 (Tex. 1994). Rejecting the owner s’ contention that 6 the lost property

included pre cious memorabilia, the court reiterated t hat “[ t] o support a finding of g ross neg lige nce . . . the appe llants [ must] have subje ctively understood the e x istence of the risk of losing diff

icult-to-re place materia l goods a nd irrepla cea

ble memora

bilia.” Id. Be cause there was no evidenc e th at t h e warehouse owner s “had a ny idea of the enor mity of the [property

owner s’] potential loss,” and we re not told of the spe cial contents of the war ehouse, the y could not be found g rossly neg lige nt. Id. As in Hironymous , th is r e c or d c on ta ins no pr oo f that los s of the pr op e rt y wo uld c on sti tut e a g rievous injury

or t hat t he ty

pe of proper

ty involved was irr eplac eable . There is also no proof that Wre n w a s awa

re of the va lue or natur e of the pr op e rt y sto re d in the un its

. F or

that r e a so n, the re is no proof to esta

blish “g ross neg lige nce” as def ined by statute and binding case law. We reve rse the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re nder a judgme nt that t h e Bastinellis take

n o t h i n g. J o s h R

. M o r r i s s , III Chief J ustice12 CONCURRI

NG OPI NI ON Al tho ug h I c on c ur

wi th t he c on c lus ion

a t w hic h o ur

le arn e d Ch ie f Jus tic e ha s arr ive d in thi s matter a nd applaud his scholarly draf ting of the opi nion, I do so reluc tantly beca use t he re sult here seems to vi olate the “tain’t fair” rule. Despite my retice nce, w e ar e oblig ated to follow the la w, not look to the results we believe to be fair and then attempt to justify the m eans we t ook to achieve that end. Most people (law y ers a nd laity alike) g ener ally

think of g ross neg lige nce a s being the common-law de finition set out in Bu rk Ro y alt yCo. v . W

all s , 61 6 S. W.2 d 9 11 (T e x. 19 81 ): Gross neg lige nce, to be the g round for exemplary

damages , s hould be that entire want of car e which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the re sult of a conscious indiffer ence to the right or welfare of t he person or per sons to b e a ff e c te d b y it. Id. at 920. Howeve r, the c ommon-sense de finiti o n a bove is cha

ng ed by statute (T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 41.001(11) ( Ver non 2008)): “Gr oss neg lige nce” means a n act or omission: (A ) wh ic h w he n v ie we d o bje c tiv e ly fr om t he sta nd po int of the a c tor a t th e tim e of its occur

renc e involves an e x treme de g ree of risk, considering the proba bility and mag nitude of the potential ha rm to others; and (B ) of which the actor has actual, subjective a war eness of

the risk involved, but never theless proc eeds w ith c onscious indiffer ence to the rig hts, sa fety , or we lfare of oth e rs .13

Glaring ly absent fr om the statutory definition is the qualifier “to be the g round for exemplary damag es.” I n this case, a

phrase which is g ener ally employ ed in t h e tort rea lm to determine whe ther punitive damag es ca

n be re cover ed (in a ddition to actual damag es) is i njected by contra ct to a circ umstance unde r which no r ecove ry for misfeasa nce is possible unless g ross neg lige nce is shown. There fore , eac h of t he elements (including “extreme risk” ) is incorporated into elements which a re

ne c e ssa ry to b e pr ov e n. “ [A] g ro ss n e g lig e nc e fi nd in g m ay be up he ld o n a

pp e a l on ly

if the re is some evidenc e that a) the defe ndant’s conduct cre ated an extreme risk of har m, and b) the de fenda

nt

was aware of the e x treme r isk.” W al-Mart Stores v. Alex ander , 868 S.W .2d 322, 326 (Tex. 1993). We then must look at what constitutes “extreme risk.” The harm to be a nticipated fr om the conduct must be e x traordina ry h ar m such as “ death, g rievous phy sical injury , or financ ial ruin.” Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel , 879 S.W .2d 10, 24 (Tex. 1994); Celanese Ltd. v. Chem. W aste Mgmt., Inc ., 75 S.W .3d 593, 600 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. re f’d)

. Whe n th e e le me nt o f e xtre me ri sk (a lon g wi th the a c tua l, sub je c tiv e awa

re ne ss o f t

hat r isk by the miscrea

nt) is require d to be prove n, it would seem that the only way that a cla imant would be

a ble to r e c ov e r f

ro m th e op e rator

of a se lf -s tor a g e un it wou ld be to s ho w t hat so me thi nga s v a lua

ble

a s th e c ro wn

jewels w e re sto re d in

the fa c ili ty , th a t th e op e rator of the se lf -s tor a g e un it w a s f

ull y

awa re that the immensely

valuable items we re store d, and y et the oper ator a cted wi t h conscious ind if fe re nc e to t

he da ng e rs inv olv e d, oc c a sio nin g g re a t lo ss.14

No me nti on

wa s ma de a t tr ia l or

on a pp e a l of the fai r n oti c e do c tr ine re g ard ingthi s heig htened standa

rd of liability

. D r es s e r

I n d u s . v . P a g e P e tr oleum , 8 5 3 S. W. 2 d 5 0 5 , 5 0 8 ( T e x. 1993). Howe ver, e ven if the discla imer of liability had bee n contained in the c ontrac t in such a fa sh ion a s to br ing imm e diate a tte nti on to i tse lf and thu s c omp ly

wi th t he fa ir no tic e do c tr ine , it

is do ub tf ul t hat any lay man w ou ld c omp re he nd

tha t th e pr a c tic a l e ff

e c t wou ld b e to t ota lly

e xcu lpate the self- storag e fa cility

operator from virtua l l y an y liability whatsoeve r. Afte r all, people do not g e ne ra lly sto re pr op e rt

y su ff ic ie ntl y va lua ble to o c c a sio n e xtre me ri sk in a se lf -s tor a g e fa c ili ty . M os t people would be lieve that such a limit ation would excuse only acc idental tortious c onduct, ra ising the standar d to the conscious indiffe renc e of the conseque nces. Th e iss ue s w hic h a

ri se con cern in g th e e le vatio n o f t he sta nd ard of lia bil ity to g ro ss neg lige nce by

contra ct appe ar to be rar e in appe llate opinions. Alert pra ctitioners re prese nting

va ri ou s la nd lor ds or

ba ile e s m ay

c omm e nc e its wi de r u se in d ra ft ingfutur e c on tr a c ts, e ff e c tiv e ly

su bs tanti a lly

re du c ingthe e xpe c te d s tand ard of c are wh ic h th e pu

bli c g e ne ra lly

a ssume s to be in place

. Apply ing the statutory definition of gr o s s neg lige nce to the c ircumstance s at hand c an be compar ed to supply ing the courts with shoe s that will not fit. Although the shoes pinch and bind,

we a re f orce d to wear

them. All this is said as a premise to urge a cha ng e in the statutory

definition of “g ross neg lige nce” to the eff ect that the c urre nt de finition a pplies when used as a predic ate to the r ecove ry of punitive15

damag es, but to exclude the “e x treme r isk” fac tor when only actua l damag es a re soug ht to be

rec overe d.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: Dec ember 21, 2009 Date D ecide d: J anuar y 20, 2010