UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, HERRING, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Sergeant TERRANCE T. JOHNSON 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140297 

Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division 

Rebecca K. Connally, Military Judge 

Colonel R. Tideman Penland Jr., Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel Alison C. Martin, Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial) 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Lozano, JA; Captain Heather L. 

Tregle, JA; Captain Matthew L. Jalandoni, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel A.G. Courie, III, JA; Major Cormac M. Smith, 

JA; Captain Linda Chavez, JA (on brief). 

19 December 2016 

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

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Per Curiam: 

 A panel of officer members convicted appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one 

specification of maltreatment of a subordinate and three specifications of abusive 

sexual contact, in violation of Articles 93 and 120, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 893 and 920 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The panel sentenced 

appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for one year, forfeiture of all pay 

and allowances, and a reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority 

approved the sentence as adjudged. 

 This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

asserts two assignments of error, only one of which-dilatory post-trial processing-
JOHNSON—ARMY 20140297 

2

warrants discussion and relief.* We have considered the six assignments of error 

personally raised by the appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 

431 (C.M.A. 1982), and find they lack merit. 

 

The convening authority took action 380 days after the sentence was adjudged 

in this case, at least 326 days of which we attribute to the government. Although 

appellant does not identify how the post-trial delay caused prejudice, and although 

we find no due process violation in the post-trial processing of appellant’s case, we 

must still review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unjustified 

dilatory post-trial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 

219, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] 

required to determine what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all 

the facts and circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and 

unreasonable post-trial delay.”); see generally United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 

362-63 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney, 68 M.J. 613, 617 (Army Ct. Crim. 

App. 2010); United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2000). 

The record in this case consists of 8 volumes and the trial transcript is 1001 

pages. The staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR) was completed on 17 

December 2014 and served on appellant ninety-three days later, on 20 March 2015. 

The government provides no explanation for the overall delay in post-trial 

processing or the delay in serving the SJAR. The staff judge advocate did not 

address either of these delays in her addendum to the SJAR. Under the 

circumstances of this case, we find the delay in post-trial processing unreasonable. 

Relief in this case is appropriate, as the delay between announcement of sentence 

and action could “adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and 

integrity of military justice system . . . .” Ney, 68 M.J. at 617. Accordingly, we 

provide relief in our decretal paragraph. 

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. We affirm only so much of the sentence as extends to a bad-conduct 

discharge, confinement for eleven months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 

reduction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property, of which 

appellant has been deprived by virtue of this decision setting aside portions of the 

 

*

 In the other assignment of error, appellant, relying upon the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), asserts the military judge 

committed plain error when she instructed the panel using a negligence standard for 

maltreatment of a subordinate. We find the holding in Elonis inapplicable to the 

offense of maltreatment. See United States v. Chance, ARMY 20140072, 2016 CCA 

LEXIS 241 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 18 Apr. 2016) (mem. op.). 
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3

findings and sentence are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58a(b), 58b(c), and 

75(a). 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: