IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 48079-4-II

Respondent,

v.

ADAM CHRISTOPHER DIAZ, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

WORSWICK, P.J. — Adam Christopher Diaz appeals his first degree criminal trespass 

convictions, asserting that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the 

convictions. Diaz also raises an issue in his statement of additional grounds for review (SAG) 

that would require examination of matters outside of the record on appeal, and thus, we do not 

address it. Finally, Diaz requests that we waive appellate costs in the event that the State 

prevails. Because sufficient evidence supports Diaz’s first degree criminal trespass convictions, 

we affirm. We exercise our discretion to waive appellate costs in this matter.

FACTS

Weatherly Inn is a senior residential retirement facility in Tacoma that provides assisted 

living and memory care services. On March 31, 2015, Diaz went to the Weatherly Inn to visit 

his grandmother, Jenny Renee Black, who lived at the facility in apartment 314. Diaz had visited 

Black at her Weatherly Inn apartment five or six times prior to March 31.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

November 8, 2016
No. 48079-4-II

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That same day, Annie Kimani was providing caregiving services to Thelma Gilmur, a 

Weatherly Inn resident who lived by herself in apartment 353. Kimani was in the process of 

assisting Gilmur from the bathroom to a recliner when she heard someone open and shut

Gilmur’s entrance door. Kimani said, “Hello,” but nobody responded. Report of Proceedings 

(RP) at 88. Two to three minutes later, Kimani went to see who had entered Gilmur’s apartment. 

As Kimani walked toward Gilmur’s entrance door, she saw a person exit the bathroom and 

quickly walk out of the apartment. Kimani did not see the person’s face, but saw that the person 

was approximately five feet eight inches tall and wearing a red jacket.

Also that same day, Dennis Gunnarson was at the Weatherly Inn visiting his parents-inlaw, who lived in apartment 309. Gunnarson was alone at the apartment when he heard the 

entrance door open and saw a young man with dark hair enter the apartment. The young man 

looked toward a bedroom in the apartment and did not seem to notice Gunnarson. Gunnarson 

asked the man, “May I help you?” RP at 100. The man told Gunnarson that he was looking for 

his grandmother’s apartment. After Gunnarson told the man that this was not his grandmother’s 

apartment, the man turned around and left the apartment. Police later showed Diaz’s driver’s 

license to Gunnarson, and Gunnarson identified Diaz as the man who had entered apartment 309.

Weatherly Inn general manager Sunya Grantham was notified that a dark-haired man 

wearing a red sweatshirt was entering residents’ apartments, and she instructed a staff member to 

call the police. Grantham saw someone matching the description of the man standing near the 

elevators; Grantham later identified the man as Diaz.

Grantham told Diaz that she had reports about someone entering residents’ apartments 

and about items missing from residents’ apartments. Diaz told Grantham that he did not know 
No. 48079-4-II

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anything about the missing items and that he was there visiting his grandmother. Diaz did not 

mention entering residents’ apartments. Grantham checked the visitor log book for March 31, 

and saw that Diaz did not sign in as required. Grantham told Diaz that he was trespassing and 

that he was no longer allowed on the property. Diaz stormed out of the building and yelled

profanities as he walked through the parking lot.

Tacoma Police Officer Albert Schultz stopped Diaz as he was attempting to drive from 

the Weatherly Inn parking lot. After being advised of his Miranda1rights, Diaz initially 

explained to Officer Schultz that he had been wandering into other apartments because he was 

looking for his grandmother. Diaz later told Officer Schultz that his grandmother resided in 

apartment 314 and that he did not enter other residents’ apartments. During a search of Diaz 

incident to his arrest, officers found a woman’s Rolex wristwatch wrapped in black latex gloves 

in Diaz’s front pants packet. An identical Rolex watch had been reported stolen from Weatherly 

Inn apartment 376 on March 28. Diaz told officers that he had purchased the watch for his 

daughter on March 29 at a pawnshop located at South Tacoma Way and 96th Street. Detectives 

later went to South Tacoma Way and 96th Street but did not locate any pawnshops there.

On July 23, 2015, the State charged Diaz by amended information with first degree 

possession of stolen property, three counts of first degree criminal trespass, and two driving 

offenses. With regard to the first degree criminal trespass charges, the State alleged that Diaz 

had unlawfully entered or remained in Weatherly Inn apartments 376, 353, and 309.

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
No. 48079-4-II

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The matter proceeded to a jury trial, at which witnesses testified consistently with the 

facts as stated above.2 During closing argument, the State conceded that it did not prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Diaz had unlawfully entered or remained in apartment 376.

3

 The jury 

could not reach a verdict on Diaz’s first degree possession of stolen property charge. The jury 

found Diaz not guilty of the first degree criminal trespass charge related to apartment 376 and 

guilty of the remaining charges. Diaz appeals from his first degree criminal trespass 

convictions.4

ANALYSIS

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Diaz contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his first 

degree criminal trespass convictions. Specifically, Diaz contends that the State failed to present 

evidence to support the knowledge element of the first degree criminal trespass charges. We 

disagree.

Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact, viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could find the elements of the charged crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414, 420-21, 5 P.3d 1256 (2000). 

We interpret all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the State’s favor. State v. Hosier, 

 

2 Although Diaz did not testify at trial, the statements attributed to him in the above facts came in 

through the testimony of Officer Schultz and Grantham.

3 The State did not move to dismiss this charge but instead requested that the jury return a not 

guilty verdict, which the jury did.

4 The other convictions are not part of this appeal.
No. 48079-4-II

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157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 (2006). And we consider direct and circumstantial evidence to be 

equally reliable. State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 201, 86 P.3d 139 (2004).

To convict Diaz of first degree criminal trespass, the State had to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in a building. RCW 

9A.52.070.5 “A person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’ in or upon a premises when he or she is 

not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain.” Former RCW 

9A.52.010(5) (2011). Under RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b):

A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when:

(i) he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by 

a statute defining an offense; or

(ii) he or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the 

same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute 

defining an offense.

Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the jury had ample 

evidence upon which to infer that Diaz’s unlawful entries into apartments 353 and 309 were 

made knowingly. When confronted by police, Diaz initially explained that he had entered other 

residents’ apartments looking for his grandmother. But Diaz later denied entering other 

residents’ apartments and stated that his grandmother lived in apartment 314. Black testified that 

Diaz had visited her at her apartment five or six times in the three-month period prior to the date 

of this incident. A person matching Diaz’s description entered apartment 353, ignored Kimani 

when she called out “hello,” and remained in the apartment for two to three minutes before 

quickly walking out. A person matching Diaz’s description, and later confirmed to be Diaz, also 

 

5 Under RCW 9A.04.110(5), “each unit of a building consisting of two or more units separately 

secured or occupied is a separate building.” The jury was so instructed.
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entered apartment 309. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Diaz knew that 

his grandmother lived in apartment 314 and, thus, his unlawful entries into apartments 353 and 

309 were made knowingly. Accordingly, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to 

support Diaz’s first degree criminal trespass convictions.

II. SAG

In his SAG, Diaz contends that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to timely 

subpoena a key witness. But we cannot address this claim in Diaz’s direct appeal because the 

record does not contain any information regarding the identity of this alleged witness, the

testimony this witness likely would have provided at trial, or defense counsel being made aware 

of this witness. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (“If a defendant 

wishes to raise issues on appeal that require evidence or facts not in the existing trial record, the 

appropriate means of doing so is through a personal restraint petition.”). Accordingly, we do not 

further address this issue.

III. APPELLATE COSTS

Finally, citing to State v. Sinclair, 192 Wn. App. 380, 367 P.3d 612, review denied, 185 

Wn.2d 1034 (2016), Diaz requests that we waive appellate costs due to his inability to pay such 

costs. In light of Diaz’s indigent status, and our presumption under RAP 15.2(f) that he remains 

indigent “throughout the review” unless the trial court finds that his financial condition has 

improved, we exercise our discretion to waive appellate costs in this matter. RCW 10.73.160(1).

We affirm Diaz’s convictions on two counts of first degree criminal trespass and exercise 

our discretion to waive costs on appeal.
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Worswick, P.J.

We concur:

Lee, J.

Sutton, J.