alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-3273

___________________________ United States of America, lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee ,

v. Mikato Fulks, lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
.

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

____________ Submitted: March 4, 2022 Filed: March 15, 2022 [Unpublished]

____________ Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Mikato Fulks appeals after the district court 1 revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison. His counsel has moved to withdraw, and

1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas.has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), suggesting that the

district court erred in relying on a certified copy of a state court criminal judgment to find that Fulks violated his conditions of release, and that the revocation sentence was unreasonable. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on a certified copy of the judgment for Fulks’s state court controlled-substance conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Goodon , 742 F.3d 373, 375-76 (8th Cir. 2014). We also conclude that Fulks’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable, as there is no indication that the court overlooked a relevant factor, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors. See United States v. Miller , 557 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review); United States v. Larison , 432 F.3d 921, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2006). The sentence was within the advisory sentencing guidelines range and below the statutory limit, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The district court also explained that it had considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Wohlman , 651 F.3d 878, 887 (8th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm.

______________________________

-2-
<PAGE>

                                  Exhibit 10.4
                             Amendment to Agreement
                             ----------------------

  This Amendment is made by and between Pitt-Des Moines, Inc. ("Company") and
Richard A. Byers ("Employee") as of the date last written below.

  Whereas the Company and Employee entered into an agreement dated May 9, 1991,
a copy of which is attached hereto;

  Whereas the Company declared a 3 for 2 stock split effective March 28, 1997 as
to its shares of common stock which may have an effect on the above-referenced
agreement; and

  Whereas the Board of Directors of the Company, in effecting said stock split,
directed that the value and number of shares provided for in such agreements be
amended to reflect said stock split.

 Now therefore, intending to be legally bound, the parties hereto agree as
follows:

  A.  The number 2,447,578 in Section 7.01 of the above-referenced agreement
shall be restated to be 3,671,367.

  B.   The price of Thirty Dollars ($30.00) in Section 7.01 of the above-
referenced agreement shall be restated to be Twenty Dollars ($20.00).

  C.   The number Fifteen Thousand (15,000) in Section 7.01 of the above
referenced agreement shall be restated to be 22,500.

  D.   The above-referenced agreement is otherwise unchanged and remains in full
force and effect.

 Witness the signatures of the parties.  Executed in Duplicate.


Attest:                      Pitt-Des Moines, Inc.



/s/  R. F. Gisler            /s/  T. R. Lloyd
-----------------            ----------------
By:                          By:



Witness:


/s/  L  Russell            /s/  R. A. Byers
---------------            ----------------
                           Richard A. Byers


                           Dated:     September 3, 1997
                                  ---------------------
# Official Journal C 156/2006

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 156 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 495 July 2006 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 156

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 495 July 2006

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Information |
| | Commission |
| 2006/C 156/1 | Euro exchange rates | 1 |
| 2006/C 156/2 | Summary information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1/2004 of 23 December 2003 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production, processing and marketing of agricultural products | 2 |
| 2006/C 156/3 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4184 — Boeing/Carmen) (1) | 6 |
| 2006/C 156/4 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4195 — Inchcape/Lind) (1) | 6 |
| 2006/C 156/5 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4062 — SKF/SNFA) (1) | 7 |
| 2006/C 156/6 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4210 — Agravis Raiffeisen/Baywa/DR Graub) (1) | 7 |
| 2006/C 156/7 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4246 — Merrill Lynch/Farallon/Barcelo/Playa) (1) | 8 |
| 2006/C 156/8 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4205 — Aleris International/Corus Group) (1) | 8 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Information

Commission

2006/C 156/1

Euro exchange rates

1

2006/C 156/2

Summary information communicated by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1/2004 of 23 December 2003 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises active in the production, processing and marketing of agricultural products

2

2006/C 156/3

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4184 — Boeing/Carmen) (1)

6

2006/C 156/4

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4195 — Inchcape/Lind) (1)

6

2006/C 156/5

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4062 — SKF/SNFA) (1)

7

2006/C 156/6

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4210 — Agravis Raiffeisen/Baywa/DR Graub) (1)

7

2006/C 156/7

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4246 — Merrill Lynch/Farallon/Barcelo/Playa) (1)

8

2006/C 156/8

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.4205 — Aleris International/Corus Group) (1)

8

---

| | III   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | Commission |
| 2006/C 156/9 | ARGO Programme 2006 | 9 |

III   Notices

Commission

2006/C 156/9

ARGO Programme 2006

9

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### BIDA v. KING et al.

No. 1044.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

April 9, 1931.

Rehearing Denied May 7, 1931.

M. McCullough, of Eastland, for appellant.

L. H. Flewellen, of Ranger, for appellees.

BARCUS, J.

Appellant filed this suit on a note executed by F. N. King, payable to Adams & Co., a partnership, composed of H. G. Adams and T. O. Bray. Appellant sought’ judgment against appellees Adams & Co. as indorsers on said note. Adams & Co. sold the note to E. U. Ford, and their name is signed on the reverse side as indorsers. At the time they indorsed and sold the note to E. L. Ford, they and Ford, in connection therewith-and as a part thereof, signed a written agreement to the effect that Adams & Co. were not to be in anyway liable for the payment of said note either as indorsers or otherwise. Appellees Adams & Co., alleged that appellant at the time he purchased the note from E. L. Ford had actual knowledge of the written agree- • ment between them and Ford, and that appellant was not, therefore, as against them, a holder of said note in due course for value.

The cause was tried to the court and resulted in judgment being entered denying appellant any recovery against Adams & Co., and it is from this portion of the judgment the appeal is perfected. Appellant seasonably requested the trial court to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which said court failed to do, and appellant excepted and assigns error to the action of the trial court in failing to file same.

The issue as to whether appellant at the time he purchased the note knew of the written agreement made between appellees Adams & Co. and Ford, and whether appellant had actual knowledge that appellees’ indorsement upon said note was a limited one, were sharply contested issues of fact; the testimony relative thereto being irreconcilable. It seems now to be the well-settled law that, where a cause is tried to the court and the evidence is conflicting on any material issue, it is reversible error for the trial court, when timely requested, to fail to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law. G., H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Stewart & Threadgill (Tex. Com. App.) 257 S. *W.*526. In the cited case, many authorities were collated and this question definitely determined. Said case has since said time been numerously cited with approval.

Because of the action of the trial court in refusing to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded.
The Honorable Daniel M. Friedman, United States Circuit Judge 1

for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.

 The Honorable Donald D. Alsop, Senior Judge, United States

2

District Court for the District of Minnesota.

___________

No. 96-1099

___________

Howard R. Fletcher; Georgene *

Fletcher, *

*

Appellants, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Randy J. Zellmer; the Law Firm * [UNPUBLISHED]

of Johnson, Anderson & Zellmer, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: November 18, 1996

 Filed: January 8, 1997

___________

Before BEAM, FRIEDMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges. 1

___________

PER CURIAM.

Howard and Georgene Fletcher appeal the district court's entry of

2

judgment for defendants Randy J. Zellmer and the Johnson, Anderson &

Zellmer law firm in this legal malpractice action. The district court

concluded that the appropriate state statute of limitations barred certain

of appellants' causes of action, and that appellants had failed to create

issues of material fact on the remaining causes of action. After carefully

reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the district

court's conclusions were correct. Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir.

R. 47B.
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
[No. 18673-3-III.

Division Three.

December 26, 2000.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Sabree Charlene Grisby, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 98-1-00765-0, Craig J. Matheson, J., entered August 20, 1999. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Sweeney, J., concurred in by Brown, A.C.J., and Schultheis, J.
EX-31 Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications.

 

I, Nicholas Galeone, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reportson Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of the UBS-Barclays Commercial MortgageTrust 2012-C2 (the “Exchange Act periodic reports”);

 

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports,taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicingand other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the ExchangeAct periodic reports;

 

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statementsrequired in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicershave fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

 

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicingcriteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteriafor asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange ActRules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any materialinstances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably reliedon information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:

 

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer,CWCapital Asset Management LLC, as Special Servicer, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, U.S. Bank National Association,as Certificate Administrator, U.S. Bank National Association, as Custodian, Pentalpha Surveillance LLC, as Operating Advisor, CoreLogicCommercial Real Estate Services, Inc., as Servicing Function Participant, and National Tax Search, LLC, as Servicing Function Participant.

 

Dated: March 25, 2020

 

/s/ Nicholas Galeone

 

President

(senior officer in charge of securitizationof the depositor)
#### Ida Blumenthal, Respondent, *v.*New York Life Insurance Company, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

January 30, 1958.

*485
      *Lee M. Gammill*and *John H. Carroll*for appellant.

*Melvel W. Bnitow*and *Allan Sturim*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

The locking of the bumpers was accidental, but it caused insured no injury. It is what insured did after that that caused his death. Plaintiff’s bill of particulars states: *“*in attempting to separate the two cars after the accident, the decedent put too much strain on his heart in attempting to separate the said cars, and in doing so, caused his heart to stop operating and to drop dead instantaneously from heart failure”. Thus, it is evident insured’s death resulted from his willful act and not from the accidental locking of the bumper's. His attempt to unlock the bumpers was not inextricably connected with the accident since the accident had not created an emergency of a compelling nature justifying his action. *(Burr*v. *Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Assn.,*295 N. Y. 294, 305; *Wilcox*v. *Mutual Life Ins. Co.*265 N. Y. 665; *Allendorf*v. *Fidelity & Cas. Co.,*250 N. Y. 529; *Fane*v. *National Assn. of*Ry. Postal Clerks, 197 App. Div. 145; *Niskern*v. *United Brotherhood,*93 App. Div. 364; *Schecter*v. *Equitable Life Assur. Soc.,*275 App. Div. 958.)

The order should be reversed, with $10 costs and defendant’s motion for summary judgment granted.

Hecht, J. P., Aurelio and Tilzer, JJ., concur.

Order reversed, etc.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 9, 2021

No. 04-21-00490-CR

IN RE Santiago GONZALEZ

From the County Court at Law No. 12, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 512239

Yolanda T. Huff, Judge Presiding

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

O R D E R

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Irene Rios, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

On November 5, 2021, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, complaining that the 

trial court has failed to rule on his article 11.072 writ of habeas corpus application. TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 11.072 § 6(a). This court is of the tentative opinion that a serious question 

concerning the relief sought requires further consideration. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(b). The 

respondent and the real party in interest may file a response to the petition in this court no later 

than November 29, 2021.

It is so ORDERED on November 9, 2021.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:__________________________

 MICHAEL A. CRUZ, 

 CLERK OF COURT

1

 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 512239, styled Ex parte Gonzalez, pending in the County Court at Law 

No. 12, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Yolanda T. Huff presiding.

FILE COPY
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Patrick F. Williams, certify that:



| | 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the annual report on Form 10-K/A of Sientra, Inc.; and
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |  |  |  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date:    April 30, 2018 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Patrick F. Williams
|                        |  |  |  |  |  | Patrick F. Williams    
|                        |  |  |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3177 

To simplify the application used for the estimation and determination of 

financial aid eligibility for postsecondary education. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 23, 2015 

Mr. HECK of Nevada (for himself, Mr. ROE of Tennessee, Mr. POLIS, Mr. 

POCAN, Mr. KLINE, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, Mr. WALBERG, Mr. MESSER, 

Mr. GROTHMAN, Ms. STEFANIK, Mrs. DAVIS of California, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. SABLAN, Ms. BONAMICI, Mr. TAKANO, Ms. CLARK of Massachusetts, Mr. DESAULNIER, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. BUCSHON, and Mr. KELLY

of Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To simplify the application used for the estimation and determination of financial aid eligibility for postsecondary education. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Simplifying the Appli5 cation for Student Aid Act’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3177 IH

1 SEC. 2. USING DATA FROM SECOND PRECEDING YEAR. 

2 Section 480(a)(1)(B) of the Higher Education Act of 

3 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087vv(a)(1)(B)) is amended to read as 

4 follows: 

5 ‘‘(B) Notwithstanding section 478(a) and 

6 beginning not later than the second January 1 

7 after the date of enactment of the Simplifying 

8 the Application for Student Aid Act, the Sec9 retary shall provide for the use of data from the 

10 second preceding tax year to carry out the sim11 plification of applications (including simplifica12 tion for a subset of applications) used for the 

13 estimation and determination of financial aid 

14 eligibility. Such simplification shall include the 

15 sharing of data between the Internal Revenue 

16 Service and the Department, pursuant to the 

17 consent of the taxpayer.’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### Robert R. Kaufman, Plaintiff, *v.*Peter Tripp et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

April 18, 1958.

*Francis A. Toomey*for plaintiff.

*Gelfand é Shedler*for Peter Tripp, defendant.

Thomas A. Aurelio, J.

This is an application to quash a subpoena duces tecum and to give testimony upon a trial. It appears, however, that the subpoena was issued to be used in connection with an examination before trial, it being intended as a subpoena to produce, only. The subpoena is directed to a *255corporation only and is not in compliance with section 413 of the Civil Practice Act. Service thereof is also contested. However, the subpoena is contested on the merits. It seeks the production of records which are hearsay, or evidence of opinion. The objections are timely and must be sustained in all respects.

The motion is granted and the subpoena is vacated.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(b) OR RULE 15d-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES

EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Yankee Holding Corp. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended September 29, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Craig W. Rydin, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) or 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Craig W. Rydin     
|Craig W. Rydin         
|Chief Executive Officer
|November 8, 2007
## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 15 - 00279 - CR JUAN MORA, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2014 - 402,039; Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding July 20 , 2017 

### CONCURRING OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. While I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the majority that the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s objection to the testimony of his common - law wife, Chandra Stewart, after she asserted spousal immunity pursuant to Rule 504(b) of the Te xas Rules of Evidence , I concur in the result . Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-60690 Summary Calendar

ARTHUR JOHN MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus RONALD JAMES; MICHAEL MORRIS; ROBERT SWOPE; KHURSHID YUSUFF, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 5:98-CV-188-BrS

-------------------- March 15, 2002 Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Arthur John Miller (“Miller”), federal inmate #88057-020, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights suit filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Miller argues that the defendants violated his constitutional rights when he was unjustly placed on Inmate Financial Responsibility Program Refuse status. Miller alleges that his prison status affected his prison privileges and eligibility for certain jobs.No. 01-60690 -2- The district court did not err in dismissing Miller’s complaint as frivolous because Miller failed to demonstrate any constitutional violations. See Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons , 65 F.3d 48, 49-50 (5th Cir. 1995); see also McGhee v. Clark , 166 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1999). The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.