J-S50029-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

JULIAN ABRON

Appellee No. 684 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order February 5, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010497-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the February 5, 

2016 order purporting to acquit Julian Abron of all charges upon which he 

had been convicted following a non-jury trial. Because the trial court lacked 

authority to acquit Abron after having entered a verdict of guilty that was 

supported by sufficient evidence, we vacate and remand for further 

proceedings.

This case involved the alleged intimidation of an assault victim by 

Abron and others, including his co-defendant, Mark Easley. The trial court 

set forth a detailed factual history, which we adopt and incorporate herein. 

See Opinion, 8/11/16, at 2-11 (“1925(a) Op.”).

On February 5, 2016, the trial court conducted a non-jury trial. At the 

conclusion of the trial, after hearing argument from counsel for both 
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defendants and the Commonwealth, the trial court made the following 

statement on the record:

I don’t think there’s enough for VUFA, so that’s out. 

However, based on the entirety of the evidence, there is 

enough for retaliation and the intimidation charges, 

charges three and four and one, which was conspiracy for 

those charges.[1]

N.T., 2/5/16, at 127. After discussing sentencing and possible bail 

revocation,2the trial court excused the parties and called a brief recess. Id.

at 129.

Following the recess,3the trial court returned to the bench and stated:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4952(a)(1), 4953(a), and 903(a), respectively. We 

note that while the trial court did not use the term “guilty” in its findings, all 

parties appear to agree that the trial court found Abron guilty of the 

aforementioned charges.

2 The docket entry for the verdicts indicates that after the court found 

Abron guilty, it then: (1) ordered a presentence investigation; (2) heard an 

oral motion from the Commonwealth to revoke bail, which it denied; (3) 

heard an oral motion from Abron to reconsider adjudication, which it 

granted; (4) found Abron not guilty on all charges; and (5) vacated Abron’s 

electronic monitoring and cancelled sentencing.

3

In its motion for reconsideration, the Commonwealth averred that, 

after denying the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke bail, the trial court 

ordered a “staggered release” so the victim, Maneia Singleton and her 

Mother could leave before Abron. The Commonwealth claims that Singleton 

and her Mother asked to address the court before leaving, stating “how they 

felt they were mistreated by the Philadelphia Police Department and the 

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office.” Cmwlth.’s Mt. to Reconsider Am. 

Verdict, 2/18/16, at 3. According to the Commonwealth, the trial court then 

called Abron back into the courtroom, called the attorneys to sidebar, and 

stated that it had reconsidered its verdict. Id. Based on the transcript of 

proceedings, we cannot determine whether the court’s discussion with 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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THE COURT: Step up Mr. Abron. The Court is 

reconsidering its decision in the matter of Julian Abron. 

The court has reasonable doubt as to the identification of 

this defendant alone because of the description given by 

the complaining witness in the grand jury investigation 

notes during at which time [sic] she said that he was light 

skinned. Clearly, he is not light skinned today nor was he 

in the picture or photo, nor was he ever light skinned. I 

can see that with my own eyes. Not guilty on this matter.

THE COMMONWEALTH: Please just note the 

Commonwealth’s objection for the record.

THE COURT: Yes.

Id.

On February 18, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 

reconsider, which the trial court denied without a hearing on February 19, 

2016. On March 2, 2016, the Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal.

The Commonwealth raises one issue on appeal: “Did the trial court err 

in arresting judgment and vacating the guilty verdict where the evidence 

was legally sufficient to prove intimidation of a witness, retaliation against a 

witness, and criminal conspiracy?” Cmwlth.’s Br. at 2.

The Commonwealth first argues that the trial court lacked the 

authority to reconsider and vacate Abron’s verdict sua sponte.

4

 The 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Singleton and her mother occurred before or after the court announced that 

it had reconsidered its verdict.

4 Abron argues that the Commonwealth has waived this argument 

because it failed to include it in its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925(b) statement. However, the trial court never ordered the 

Commonwealth to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Because “[t]he 

requirements of Rule 1925(b) are not invoked in cases where there is no 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Commonwealth contends that “a trial court has no more authority over a 

verdict in a non-jury trial than it does over a jury verdict” and, therefore, the 

trial court erred in vacating Abron’s convictions sua sponte. Cmwlth.’s Br. at 

8-9. In addition, the Commonwealth asserts that, even if the trial court 

could address the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte, the trial court 

erred because its decision was based on the weight, rather than the 

sufficiency, of the evidence. Finally, the Commonwealth argues that, in any 

event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Abron’s conviction.

Abron responds that the trial court’s decision was not sua sponte but 

instead was based on an oral motion. Abron further contends that “the trial 

court properly granted an arrest of judgment because the identification 

evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . 

Abron[] was one of the individuals involved in the . . . incident.” Abron’s Br. 

at 13. According to Abron, the trial court did not re-evaluate “the testimony 

presented or alter[] its determination of witness credibility to arrive at a not 

guilty verdict,” but instead determined that the identification of Abron by the 

victim, Maneia Singleton, was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Id. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

trial court order directing an appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement[,]” 

we will not conduct a waiver analysis. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 

A.3d 736, 745 n.7 (Pa.Super. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. 

Thomas, 451 A.2d 470, 472 n.8 (Pa.Super. 1982) (“[T]he lower court must 

order a concise statement of [errors] complained of on appeal and an 

appellant must fail to comply with such directive before this Court can find 

waiver . . . .”).
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Abron asserts that a trial judge may grant an arrest of judgment where the 

trial court determines that the evidence was insufficient.

Preliminarily, we must attempt to determine the basis for the trial 

court’s decision. A trial court has the authority to consider sufficiency post 

verdict, even if it was the fact-finder and even in the absence of a motion. 

See Commonwealth v. Stark, 584 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1990). Once it 

enters a guilty verdict, however, it may not sua sponte reconsider the weight 

of the evidence.5 See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 33 A.3d 89, 94 

(Pa.Super. 2011). Not surprisingly, Abron and the trial court characterize 

the court’s decision as an arrest of judgment based on insufficient evidence 

to sustain Abron’s convictions. The Commonwealth, in contrast, points to 

language in the trial court’s opinion that appears to focus on weight and 

credibility. See Cmwlth.’s Br. at 12-13.

Unfortunately, neither the transcript of proceedings nor the trial 

court’s Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion makes 

clear whether the court’s decision was based on weight or sufficiency. The 

opinion concludes that “all reasonable inferences deduced from the evidence 

were insufficient to establish all the elements of the offenses beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” 1925(a) Op. at 15 (emphasis added). In contrast, the 

opinion also states that because “[i]t was within the exclusive province of 

____________________________________________

5 This is not to say that Abron could not file a post-verdict motion 

challenging the weight of the evidence.
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the trial court as fact-finder to resolve conflicts in the testimony and to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence,” the court “did not abuse its 

discretion in arresting the judgment and vacating the guilty verdict on 

the weight of the evidence.” 1925(a) Op. at 12 (emphasis added). The 

trial court focused on Singleton’s credibility, concluding that “there was 

insufficient evidence to satisfy a guilty verdict because [Singleton]’s 

testimony was largely inconclusive as she was unable to identify [Abron] and 

her memory was unreliable.”6 Id. at 13. In addition, the trial court stated 

that the “police officer[’s] testimony was unreliable and inconsistent” and 

took issue with the show-up identification of Abron. Id. at 15. Because the 

trial court was not clear about whether it was arresting judgment based on 

insufficiency or weight of the evidence, we are constrained to examine each 

possibility in turn.

We first examine whether the trial court could have properly arrested 

judgment based on insufficiency of the evidence. Our standard of review for 

a sufficiency of the evidence claim is as follows:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at 

trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when 

viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the 

trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been 

____________________________________________

6 The standard of review set forth in the trial court’s opinion addresses 

standards for both sufficiency and weight of the evidence. See 1925(a) Op. 

at 11-12.
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established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of 

the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude 

every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is 

not within the province of this Court to re-weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. The Commonwealth’s burden may be met by 

wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a 

matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 141 A.3d 523, 525 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa.Super. 2012)).

A person may be convicted of intimidating a witness or victim if

with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct 

will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the 

administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or 

attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to:

(1) Refrain from informing or reporting to any law 

enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge 

concerning any information, document or thing 

relating to the commission of a crime.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(1). Additionally, we note that

[a]ctual intimidation of a witness is not an essential 

element of the crime. The crime is committed if one, with 

the necessary mens rea, “attempts” to intimidate a witness 

or victim. . . . The trier of the facts, therefore, could find 

that appellant attempted to intimidate his accuser and that 

he did so intending or, at least, having knowledge that his 

conduct was likely to, impede, impair or interfere with the 

administration of criminal justice. . . . The Commonwealth 

is not required to prove mens rea by direct evidence. 

Frequently, such evidence is not available. In such cases, 

the Commonwealth may rely on circumstantial evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 48 (Pa.Super.) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Collington, 615 A.2d 769, 770 (Pa. Super. 1992)) 

(emphasis in original), app. denied, 161 A.3d 791 (Pa. 2016).

A person may be convicted of retaliation against a witness or victim “if 

he harms another by any unlawful act or engages in a course of conduct or 

repeatedly commits acts which threaten another in retaliation for anything 

lawfully done in the capacity of witness, victim or a party in a civil matter.” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4953(a). 

A person may be convicted “of conspiracy with another person . . . to 

commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission 

he . . . agrees with such other person . . . that they or one or more of them 

will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. Thus, to sustain 

a conspiracy conviction, the Commonwealth must prove “(1) an intent to 

commit or aid in an unlawful act, (2) an agreement with a co-conspirator[,] 

and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. 

Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1162 (Pa. 2000). “Because it is difficult to prove an 

explicit or formal agreement to commit an unlawful act, such an act may be 

proved inferentially by circumstantial evidence, i.e., the relations, conduct or 

circumstances of the parties or overt acts on the part of the coconspirators.” Id.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict 
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Abron of the aforementioned offenses. Singleton’s prior statements, first to 

police and then to the grand jury, were admitted as substantive evidence 

under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803.1. In those statements, Singleton 

stated that, after reporting an assault to the police, Abron and his codefendant drove up to Singleton’s home—Singleton remembered the color 

and license plate of the vehicle. Cmwlth.’s Reproduced Record at 57, 78.7 

Singleton stated that when they exited the vehicle, she saw that one of them 

had a gun, which he then placed in the trunk. Id. at 58-59, 78. Singleton 

also stated that both men admonished Singleton and her fiancé for 

“snitching.” Id. at 58, 78. After Singleton reported this incident to the 

police, the men returned, again calling Singleton and her fiancé “snitches” 

and challenging her fiancé to a fight. Id. at 59-60, 78. Singleton also 

testified that one of the men brandished a gun, grabbing at the weapon 

while it was tucked into his waistband. Id. at 61, 79. Later that day when 

police stopped the vehicle, Singleton identified Abron, his co-defendant, and 

the vehicle. Id. at 63, 79. Because these identifications confirmed Abron as 

one of the men who intimidated and threatened her and her fiancé, we 

conclude that, despite the trial court’s post-verdict decision to discredit 

Singleton’s earlier statements, the evidence was sufficient to convict Abron. 

____________________________________________

7 The police statement and grand jury testimony were not submitted 

as part of the certified record, but were admitted as exhibits at trial. 

Accordingly, we cite the Commonwealth’s reproduced record.
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See Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874-75 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(concluding that victim’s out-of-court identification, along with other 

circumstantial evidence, was sufficient to convict appellant). 

The possibility remains, however, that the trial court’s ruling was 

based on weight, not sufficiency. Despite citing case law relating to 

sufficiency, the trial court appears to have based its decision largely on its 

post-verdict assessment of Singleton’s credibility. An issue “[d]irected 

entirely to the credibility of the Commonwealth’s chief witness . . . 

challenges the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Palo, 24 A.3d 1050, 1054 (Pa.Super. 2011). However, 

a trial court lacks the authority to vacate a guilty verdict based on the 

weight of the evidence in the absence of a defense motion. See 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 33 A.3d 89, 94 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Our decision in Robinson is instructive. There, following a non-jury 

trial, the trial court found Robinson guilty of theft by unlawful taking, 

sentenced Robinson to 18 months’ probation, but deferred restitution to 

allow “the Commonwealth to obtain accurate figures on the value of the 

stolen items.” Id. at 91. When the trial court convened a restitution 

hearing, “instead of determining restitution, the trial court sua sponte

vacated [Robinson]’s judgment of sentence and entered a verdict of not 

guilty. . . . because it had failed to give due consideration to the weight of 

[Robinson]’s character evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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We reversed, reinstated the verdict and judgment of sentence, and 

remanded for a restitution determination. After determining that the trial 

court acted sua sponte because no oral motion for an arrest of judgment 

appeared of record, we concluded that the trial court lacked the authority to 

modify the verdict because

[a] post-verdict court may not reweigh the evidence and 

change its mind as the trial court did herein. Although a 

post-verdict judge may question a verdict, his 

discretionary powers are limited to a determination of 

whether the evidence was sufficient to uphold the original 

verdict, and he may not alter the original verdict and 

substitute a new one. The trial court’s verdict must be 

accorded the same legal effect as a jury verdict. Post-trial, 

the court cannot re-deliberate as it is no longer the fact[-

]finder. Just as jurors are not permitted to testify as to 

the mental processes that led to their verdict, so is the 

trial court precluded from testifying as to its flawed 

thought process as a fact[-]finder.

Id. at 94 (internal citations omitted); see Commonwealth v. Parker, 451 

A.2d 767, 769-70 (Pa.Super. 1982) (concluding that trial court exceeded its 

authority in reconsidering facts and sua sponte changing verdict to not 

guilty).

Unfortunately, here again, the record is unclear. Both Abron and the 

trial court contend that Abron made an oral motion for reconsideration of the 

evidence. The Commonwealth, rather than affirmatively asserting that no 

such motion was made, instead contends that no such motion appears in the 

record. Based on our review, the only reference in the record to such a 

motion is the docket entry for the verdicts in this case. 
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Even if Abron made the motion and the trial court granted the motion 

based on the weight of the evidence, the trial court erred in granting Abron a 

discharge. It is well settled that where a trial court concludes that the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the proper relief is a new 

trial. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (Pa. 1994) (“A 

trial court will grant a new trial when it believes the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”) (quotation 

omitted). Accordingly, under these circumstances, if the trial court found 

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the proper remedy 

was to grant Abron a new trial.

If, however, Abron did not make the motion, then trial court sua 

sponte reweighed the evidence and exceeded its authority because absent a 

post-verdict motion challenging the weight of the evidence, “[a] post-verdict 

court may not reweigh the evidence.” Robinson, 33 A.3d at 94. 

Because we cannot determine whether a motion for reconsideration 

was properly before the court, we remand this matter for further 

proceedings. If the trial court determines that Abron moved the trial court 

for reconsideration because the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence, then the trial court may reweigh the evidence and determine 

whether Abron should receive a new trial.8 However, if the trial court 

____________________________________________

8 Given the state of the record, and the failure of the parties to 

address this issue on appeal, we do not address at this time whether a 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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determines that Abron did not move for reconsideration, then it improperly 

re-weighed the evidence following a finding of guilt because it lacked the 

authority to sua sponte change the verdicts. Under those circumstances, the 

trial court’s order changing the verdicts was a legal nullity, see 

Commonwealth v. Stark, 584 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1990), and the trial 

court should reinstate the original verdicts and schedule sentencing.

Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2017

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

determination that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence 

would be an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 

A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000).
Circulated 10/06/2017 08:11 AM