FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2021-3118

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WILLIAM FRANKLIN SCOTT JR,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

William E. Davis, Judge.

March 6, 2024

PER CURIAM.

William Franklin Scott, Jr., appeals his convictions for two 

counts of sexual battery on a person under twelve years by person 

eighteen years or older and three counts of lewd or lascivious 

molestation on a person under twelve years by a person eighteen

years or older. He argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for judgment of acquittal on four of the five counts 

because the only evidence offered in support of these charges was 

child hearsay and (2) the prosecutor made improper statements 

during rebuttal closing argument warranting reversal. We affirm

the second issue without further comment. We affirm the first 

issue for the reasons set forth below.
2

I

In each of the counts listed on the information, the State 

alleged separate acts as the basis of the charge. In the first count, 

the State alleged Scott digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina. 

Count II claimed Scott placed his mouth on the victim’s vagina. In 

Count III, the State claimed Scott intentionally touched the 

victim’s buttocks in a lewd or lascivious manner. And in Count V, 

it was alleged Scott touched the victim’s vagina with an object.

The victim was eight years old at the time of trial. She 

testified that she was in the first grade and five or six years old 

when the incident occurred. She described that Scott, who was her 

mother’s live-in boyfriend, touched her vagina with his hands, and

that she later told her mother what had happened. The State 

asked the victim whether Scott ever put his mouth on her vagina, 

and the victim answered in the affirmative. The victim could not 

recall at trial whether Scott’s hands ever penetrated her, whether 

it hurt when he touched her, or whether he touched her with 

anything other than his hands.

A recording of the victim’s forensic interview was admitted as 

evidence and published to the jury. During the interview, the 

victim claimed that Scott rubbed her buttocks and vagina, and 

when he rubbed her vagina, it would hurt. She stated that when it 

hurt, she told Scott to rub her on the outside because it did not 

hurt there. The victim explained that Scott had used a pink toy 

that vibrates and called the toy a “grownup toy.” The victim alleged 

that Scott had her rub his penis with her hand and that he told her 

he would give her a dollar if she was able to make white stuff come 

out. She further claimed that Scott had put his mouth on her 

vagina.

The nurse practitioner that conducted the victim’s physical 

examination testified that the victim made similar claims during 

the examination. Additionally, Scott’s residence was searched 

pursuant to a search warrant, and during the search, a pink sex 

toy was found.
3

At the conclusion of Scott’s trial, he was convicted as charged. 

He was sentenced to consecutive life sentences on each count and 

designated a sexual predator.

II

On appeal, Scott argues the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for judgment of acquittal because there was no 

corroborating evidence to support the child’s hearsay evidence and 

that child hearsay alone is insufficient to support his conviction. A 

trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is 

reviewed de novo, “with the evidence and all reasonable inferences 

from the evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to the 

State.” Kish v. State, 145 So. 3d 225, 227 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). “A 

trial court should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal 

‘unless there is no view of the evidence which the jury might take 

favorable to the opposite party that can be sustained under the 

law.’” Jackson v. State, 25 So. 3d 518, 531 (Fla. 2009) (quoting 

Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 996 (Fla. 2006)).

As an initial matter, we note that corroborating evidence 

exists to support most, if not all, of Scott’s convictions. Regardless, 

we would affirm because Appellant’s argument that child hearsay 

alone is not sufficient to support his conviction is misplaced.

Appellant relies on Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007), 

and Beber v. State, 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2004), both of which are 

distinguishable. This Court recently addressed similar issues and 

the applicability of those cases in Godbolt v. State, 319 So. 3d 773 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2021). In Godbolt, the defendant appealed his 

convictions arising from claims of molestation, claiming 

fundamental error occurred when he was convicted of lewd or 

lascivious molestation based only on child hearsay statements. Id.

at 774. During the CPT interview, which was played for the jury, 

the victim claimed the defendant had touched her buttocks with 

his penis while they were in the kitchen. Id. At trial, when the 

victim was asked whether the defendant ever used his private part 

to touch her, the victim stated that she could not remember. Id. at 

775. But the victim testified that she recalled speaking with the 

CPT interviewer and that what she told the interviewer was true. 

Id.
4

Distinguishing the facts in Godbolt from those presented in 

Baugh and Beber, this Court noted that the victims in those cases 

presented inconsistent trial testimony. Id. at 775. In Beber, the 

victim testified that the conduct in question never occurred, and in 

Baugh, the victim testified that she had made up the allegations. 

Id. at 775–76. But in Godbolt, the victim testified that she did not 

remember the incident but did remember telling the interviewer 

about the incident. Id. at 776–77. This Court affirmed Godbolt’s 

conviction stating, “Because the victim did not totally repudiate 

her pretrial statements—which the trial court determined carried 

the requisite safeguards of reliability for admission as substantive 

evidence—we cannot say that the evidence was insufficient to 

show that a crime was committed at all.” Id. at 777.

The facts here are very similar to those presented in Godbolt. 

A video of the CPT interview was played for the jury where the 

victim made numerous allegations. At trial, she did not remember 

many of the claims made, but she did not testify that the claims

did not occur or that she made them up. Rather, as was the case in 

Godbolt, she stated that she told the interviewer what happened 

and that she told her the truth. Additionally, the nurse 

practitioner testified that the victim relayed the same events to 

her when she performed her examination. Thus, under Godbolt, 

sufficient evidence was submitted to show Appellant committed 

the crimes charged.

Sufficient evidence exists to support Scott’s convictions. Thus, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scott’s motion 

for judgment of acquittal. We AFFIRM.

KELSEY and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur; TANENBAUM, J., concurs 

with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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5

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

To be clear, the appellant does not challenge on appeal the 

admissibility of the videotaped interview of the child victim, which 

occurred under the hearsay exception found in Florida Rule of 

Evidence (“FRE”) 90.803(23).1 The appellant instead contends that 

the victim’s otherwise admissible out-of-court statements about 

the appellant’s egregious abuse—by themselves—were not 

1 This manner of citation is purposeful. The hearsay rule, like 

most evidentiary rules, is procedural. See Glendening v. State, 536 

So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla. 1988); cf. Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 

Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1991) (defining court procedure 

as encompassing “the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, 

order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights 

or obtains redress for their invasion” (citation omitted)). The 

supreme court has exclusive authority to adopt such a procedural 

rule. See Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.8 (Fla. 

1978); see also Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 936 (Fla. 2008) 

(noting that article V, section 2, subsection(a) of the Florida 

Constitution “provides [the supreme court] with the exclusive 

authority to ‘adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all 

court’”); State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045, 1048 (Fla. 2005)

(explaining that a “statute which purports to create or modify a 

procedural rule of court is constitutionally infirm”). Even the 

supreme court’s adoption of a rule that “reflect[s] the prevailing 

public policy [enacted by the Legislature,] whether by design or by 

coincidence[,]” does not give the Legislature license to encroach on 

that exclusive authority. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005 n.8.; see also 

Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1992). The rules of 

evidence (with few exceptions), then, are not, functionally, a 

component of the Florida Statutes, which is the Legislature’s 

compilation of its own enacted substantive law. There is no sense, 

then, in citing to the Florida Statutes to reference the rules of 

evidence. Cf. In re Fla. Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 

1979) (adopting provisions of the Florida Evidence Code as rules of 

court “to the extent they are procedural); In re Amend. to Fla. 

Evidence Code, 404 So. 2d 743, 743 (Fla. 1981) (adopting 

amendments to Florida Evidence Code concerning court procedure 

“as part of the Rules of Evidence”).
6

sufficient evidence to support the appellant’s convictions. 

According to the appellant, the trial court should have granted his 

motion for judgment of acquittal.

The appellant’s theory for reversal has at its foundation the 

mistaken premise that “child hearsay alone is insufficient to 

support a conviction.” To support his argument, the appellant 

misuses the supreme court’s decisions in Moore, Green, Beber, and 

Baugh.2 Not one of those decisions stands for the proposition that,

in a sex-abuse case like this one, child hearsay—otherwise 

admissible under the exception set out in FRE 90.803(23)—should 

be treated any differently than other substantive evidence that has 

been admitted. All but the Moore decision involved an admitted 

pretrial statement by a child that later was recanted, and all of 

them (including Moore) hold that those subsequently recanted 

statements cannot, alone, serve as sufficient evidence to support a 

criminal conviction. None of them hold what the appellant 

attempts to argue.3

To prevail on his claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the 

appellant must demonstrate that there was not “substantial 

2 The citations for these four decisions are as follows: State v. 

Moore, 485 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1986); State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756 

(Fla. 1995); Beber v. State, 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2004); Baugh v. 

State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007).

3 Godbolt involved a fundamental-error analysis, but the 

decision still effectively makes this important distinction. See 

Godbolt v. State, 319 So. 3d 773, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“Because 

the victim did not totally repudiate her pretrial statements—

which the trial court determined carried the requisite safeguards 

of reliability for admission as substantive evidence—we cannot say 

that the evidence was insufficient to show that a crime was 

committed at all.”); see also F.B. v. State, 852 So. 2d 226, 230–31 

(Fla. 2003) (explaining that “an argument that the evidence is 

totally insufficient as a matter of law to establish the commission 

of a crime need not be preserved” because “[s]uch complete failure 

of the evidence meets the requirements of fundamental error—i.e., 

an error that reaches to the foundation of the case and is equal to 

a denial of due process”).
7

competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment.” 

Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666, 671 (Fla. 1975). Our 

assessment on this has both a quantitative component 

(“substantial”) and a qualitative component (“competent”). When 

determining whether the evidence rises to the level of 

“substantial,” our focus is on what amount of evidence can be 

legally acceptable to a juror. There must be more than a “scintilla” 

of evidence before a jury on a question of fact. Schuylkill & 

Dauphin Imp. Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871).

In turn, the question is not “whether there is literally no 

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly 

proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the 

onus of proof is imposed.” Id. It

means that there must be evidence which supports a 

substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can 

be reasonabl[y] inferred. It must do more than create a 

suspicion of the fact to be established, and must be such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.

Laney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Orange Cnty., 15 So. 2d 748, 

753 (Fla. 1943). 

When we look at the “competency” of the evidence, meanwhile, 

we consider the nature of the evidence itself. Simply put, “the 

evidence must accord with logic and reason” to be competent. 

Andrews v. C.B.S. Div., Maule Indus., 118 So. 2d 206, 210 (Fla. 

1960). For instance, when a witness testifies as to a fact based not 

on personal observation, but on his or her own inference from 

personal observation, the testimony is of questionable competence 

to prove the fact. Cf. Pa. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 338 

(1933) (explaining how a witness’s testimony that a collision 

occurred could not put that fact in dispute when the fact was not

“brought to [the witness’s] attention as a perception of the physical 

sense of sight or of hearing,” the witness made only “an inference 

to that effect drawn from observed facts which gave equal support 

to the opposite inference,” and “all the witnesses who were in a 

position to see testified that there was no collision”). A witness’s 

testimony in this situation—about his own conclusion “from what 

he himself observed”—can be said to “prove[] nothing” (i.e., should 
8

be deemed incompetent), “since it is not allowable for a witness to 

resolve the doubt as to which of two equally justifiable inferences 

shall be adopted.” Id. at 340; see also id. at 341 (explaining further 

how testimony about a fact based only on “an inference or 

inferences” cannot controvert testimony, based on personal 

observation, that is “inconsistent with such inferences”).

Another way to state the same principle is this: Evidence is 

not competent unless it has an indicia of reliability. Cf. Hadden v. 

State, 690 So. 2d 573, 578 (Fla. 1997) (“Moreover, we firmly hold 

to the principle that it is the function of the court to not permit 

cases to be resolved on the basis of evidence for which a predicate 

of reliability has not been established. Reliability is fundamental 

to issues involved in the admissibility of evidence.”). There is 

nothing inherently incompetent about hearsay evidence, including 

such evidence admitted in a criminal trial. Cf. Anderson v. State, 

655 So. 2d 1118, 1119–20 (Fla. 1995) (“declin[ing] to enunciate a 

blanket rule that no conviction can stand based solely on hearsay 

testimony”); see generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980);

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990); State v. Jones, 625 So. 

2d 821, 826 (Fla. 1993); Conner v. State, 748 So. 2d 950, 957 (Fla. 

1999); but cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) 

(explaining how admission of hearsay still could run afoul of the 

constitutional guarantee of confrontation); Fla. R. Evid. 90.802. 

Rather, hearsay can be competent evidence, provided there is a

demonstration of its reliability “by reason of something other than 

the hearsay itself.” Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 578.

According to the appellant, though, because the victim could 

not remember at trial some of the horrific details of the abuse she 

suffered—details necessary to support convictions on the more 

serious charges—the hearsay evidence of her prior statements 

about those details was not competent on its own to prove the 

abuse for which the evidence was submitted. But the victim’s prior 

statements were admitted under FRE 90.803(23), after the trial 

court made the requisite determinations of reliability.4 The 

4 That is, the victim’s statements were hearsay but admitted 

under an exception to the rule excluding hearsay. See Fla. R. Evid. 

90.802 (generally excluding hearsay, subject to specifically 

detailed exceptions); Fla. R. Evid. 90.803 (listing types of hearsay 
9

appellant does not challenge that admissibility on appeal. The 

evidence of those prior statements stands on its own, then, as 

competent evidence, regardless of whether the victim could 

separately testify to them at trial. Cf. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 

206, 210–11 (Fla. 1988) (rejecting “argument that the child must 

be found to be competent to testify [at trial] before the child’s outof-court statements may be” admissible as reliable hearsay, and 

noting that the requirement that the trial court find sufficient 

assurances of reliability itself “furnishes a sufficient guarantee of 

trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, obviating the necessity 

that the child understand the duty of a witness to tell the truth” at 

trial).

Getting back to the appellant’s reliance on Moore, Green, 

Beber, and Baugh: The common point across these decisions is that 

an out-of-court statement—otherwise determined to be 

competent—loses its competence as substantive evidence if the 

declarant of the statement either later recants or, while on the 

witness stand, directly contradicts the statement; and there also is 

no other evidence to demonstrate its reliability. See Moore, 485 So. 

2d at 1281–82 (holding that a recanted prior statement is not by 

itself capable of supporting a conviction); Green, 667 So. 2d at 761 

(same, absent “corroborating evidence” to reduce the risk of a 

conviction based on unreliable evidence); Beber, 887 So. 2d at 

1251–52 (holding that the victim’s out-of-court statement could not 

support defendant’s conviction for capital sexual battery where the 

victim directly contradicted that statement under oath at trial); 

Baugh, 961 So. 2d at 204 (holding that after the victim recanted 

her out-of-court statements regarding defendant’s conduct, the 

that are excepted from the rule of inadmissibility). Had the 

statements been given under oath and the victim subject to crossexamination at trial about those statements, the statements would 

not have been hearsay and not inadmissible as such. See Fla. R. 

Evid. 90.801(2); but cf. Green, 667 So. 2d at 760 (holding that 

statements given in a discovery deposition in a criminal case are 

not admissible as non-hearsay, prior-inconsistent statements 

under FRE 90.801(2)(a)). 
10

statements were “insufficient,” standing alone and absent 

“corroborating evidence,” to support the conviction).5

The victim did neither at trial: She neither recanted her prior 

out-of-court statements to child protection investigators—

recounted at trial through admissible hearsay—nor contradicted 

those statements during her testimony. Those out-of-court 

statements were competent to support the appellant’s sexual 

battery convictions, even if there was no other “corroborating” 

evidence introduced at trial. The statements also were clear and 

specific enough that they were “substantial” evidence, i.e., the jury 

reasonably could accept the statements as enough to conclude the 

appellant committed the crimes for which he was convicted. 

Because the victim’s out-of-court statements were “substantial 

competent evidence” that the appellant sexually battered her as 

charged, I concur in affirming the appellant’s convictions, along 

with the corresponding sentences.

_____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and A. Victoria Wiggins, 

Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Virginia Chester Harris, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

5 Indeed, as Moore demonstrates, this point applies even to 

out-of-court statements that are not hearsay. See 485 So. 2d at 

1280–81 (addressing grand jury testimony, admissible under FRE 

90.801(2)(a), that the witnesses subsequently recanted in 

deposition).