COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Petty, AtLe e and Senior Judge Clements

WILLIAM THOMAS, III MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2066-15-3 PER CURIAM MAY 31, 2016 ELIZABETH FAYE OWENS THOMAS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF WASHINGTON COUNTY C. Randall Lowe, Judge (Robert M. Galumbeck; Galumbeck, Dennis & Kegley, on brief), for appellant. (David L. Scyphers; Scyphers & Au stin, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication. William Thomas, III (husband) ap peals a final decree of divorce that incorporated the terms of a premarital agreement. Husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the premarital agreement. Upon reviewing the record a nd briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accord ingly, we summarily affirm the d ecision of the trial court. See

Rule 5A:27.

BACKGROUND On September 1, 2000, husband and Elizabeth Fa ye Owens Thomas (wife) entered into a premarital agreement (the premarital agreement) . The premarital agreement included a spousal support waiver and addressed th e parties’ property rights. On September 2, 2000, husband and wife married. On July 15, 2009, the parties separated. On February 9, 2011, wife filed a co mplaint for divorce and a ttached a copy of the premarital agreement. Husband filed an answer and counterclaim. He challenged the validity ofUNPUBLISHED- 2 - the premarital agreement. Wife subsequently fi led an amended complaint and again attached the premarital agreement. She asked that the premarital agreement be incorporated into an order.

Husband filed an amended answer and counterclai m. He still challenged the validity of the premarital agreement. On March 24, 2014, the parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing regarding the enforceability of the premarital agreement. On April 3, 2014, the trial court issued a letter opinion, which upheld the validity of the premarit al agreement. It found that husband entered into the premarital agreement voluntarily. It noted that husband could read and write and had an opportunity to review the premar ital agreement before he signed it. Husband argued that the premarital agreement did “not exclude considerati on of equitable distribu tion.” The trial court disagreed and stated, “A cogent reading of the document clearly demonstrates that the parties shall have full access and control of their prop erty, including any prof its earned during the marriage, expressly free of clai ms of the other party.” On Ma y 7, 2014, the trial court entered an order incorporating its April 3, 2014 letter opinion. The order states that the parties’ premarital agreement is enforceable. The parties took evidence by deposition a nd submitted memoranda to the trial court regarding their respective positi ons. The parties disagreed ab out the interpretation of the premarital agreement and its impact on equitable di stribution. Prior to the marriage, wife owned property that was titled solely in her name. Du ring the marriage, wife sold that property and purchased another piece of propert y, which also was titled solely in her name. Husband argued that the property acquired during the marriage was marital property because of contributions he made to both properties. Husband asserted that the premarital agreement affected title only and

not classification or dist ribution. He believed that equitable distribution should apply to all of the property. On the other hand, wife argued that the trial court already held that the premarital- 3 - agreement was enforceable and that the premarital agreement stated that property titled in a party’s sole name was his/her separate property. She further asserted that the premarital agreement provided that any jointly titled ma rital property should be divided equally. On June 11, 2015, the trial court issued a letter opini on. The trial court agreed with wife and her interpretation of the premarital agreement. It held that the property titled solely in wife’s name was wife’s separate property, according to th e terms of the premarital agreement. It further found that the jointly titled pr operty should be sold and divide d equally between the parties, pursuant to the premarital agreement and C ode § 20-107.3. On November 25, 2015, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce, which incor porated the trial court’s letter opinions. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS Husband argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the premarital agreement. 1 He asserts that the premarital agreement specific ally includes a waiver of spousal support and inheritance rights, but not a wa iver of equitable distribution. Accordingly, husband contends Code § 20-107.3 applies and the tria l court should have divided th e parties’ property, regardless of title, in accordance with the statute. “On appeal, the Court re views a trial court’s interpretation of a contract de novo .” Plunkett v. Plunkett, 271 Va. 162, 166-67, 624 S.E .2d 39, 41 (2006) (citing Eure v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp

. , 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002)). “Antenuptial agreements, like marital property settle ments, are contracts subject to the rules of construction applicable to contracts ge nerally, including the a pplication of the plain meaning of unambiguous contractual terms. ” Pysell v. Keck, 263 Va. 457, 460, 559 S.E.2d 677,

1 Husband does not challenge the vali dity of the premarital agreement.- 4 - 678 (2002) (citing Southerland v. Estate of Southerland, 249 Va. 584, 588, 457 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1995)). “When a contract is clear and unambiguous, it is the court’s duty to in terpret the contract, as written.” Stacy v. Stacy, 53 Va. App. 38, 44, 669 S.E.2d 348, 351 (2008) (en banc) (quoting Palmer & Palmer Co., LLC v. Waterfront Ma rine Constr., Inc., 276 Va. 285, 289, 662 S.E.2d 77, 80 (2008)). “According to the rules of construc tion, ‘courts cannot read into contracts language which will add to or take away the meaning of words already contained therein.’” Rutledge v. Rutledge, 45 Va. App. 56, 64, 608 S.E.2d 504, 508 (2005) (quoting Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)). “The contract must be read as a single document. Its meaning is to be gathered from all its associated parts assembled as the unitary expression of the agreement of the parties.” Berry v. K linger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983). The premarital agreement included several sec tions regarding the pa rties’ property. It started by saying, in pertinent part: WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that each has accumulated his and her own separate property a nd estate, prior to the marriage, which shall forever constitute such persons’ own separate estate without claim therein by the other party; and, WHEREAS, each party has agreed to waive any right, title, interest or claim in or to the properties of the other party, as owned or held by either of them prior to the marriage . . . . In Section III, the parties ag reed that each party “shall separa tely retain all rights in her [or his] own property, both real and personal, tangible or intangible, whether now owned or hereafter acquired . . . .” The pr emarital agreement further explai ned that each party “shall have the full, absolute and unrestricted power and right to lease, manage, sell or dispose of her [or his] own property in any manner, and to receive all moneys, rents, issu es and profits therefrom, free from any claim that may be made by” the other party.- 5 - In Section V, the parties ag reed that “[p]roperty hereafte r acquired by the parties hereto shall be owned in that matter specified on the document of title thereto.” This section of the premarital agreement further explained that if ther e was “no document of title, then an agreed memorandum of title between the part ies shall determine ownership.” Section V also stated that if there was no title or memorandum of title, then there was a “conclusive presumption that such property is owned as co-tenants without regard to the source of funds applied for the purchase thereof, with each party holding a one-half interest in such property.” In Section VI, the premarital agreement states, “Nothing cont ained herein shall affect the rights of the parties to hereafter acquire jo intly held property.” Contrary to husband’s argume nts, the premarital agreement explains how the parties’ property will be divided. If a party owned pr operty prior to the marriag e, or if property was titled solely in his/her name, then the property remained that party’s separate property. If property was jointly titled, then the pr operty is divided between the parties. The trial court determined that Section III of the premarital agreement controlled the property titled in wife’s name and held that it would remain her sole and separate property, “regardless of any claim made by Mr. Thomas.” Section V further suppo rts this ruling because the property was titled solely in wife’s name, so according to the terms of the premarital agreement, she would continue to own it. In addition, Section VI st ates, “nothing contained herein shall effect the rights of the parties to hereafter acqui re or convey separate property, without claim or interest therein by the other.” Husband correctly states that the parties did not waive equitable distribution in the premarital agreement. However, the premarita l agreement limited the trial court in its application of Code § 20-107.3 because the term s of the premarital agreement provided that property owned before the marriage and property tit led solely in one party’s name was separate- 6 - property. The trial court considered the factor s in Code § 20-107.3 when it divided the parties’ jointly titled marital property. The trial court discussed each factor in its letter opinion dated June 11, 2015, prior to dividing th e marital property equally. The terms of the premarital agreement are clear and unambiguous. The trial court did not err in its interpretation of the premarital agreement to the divi sion of the parties’ property.

Wife asks this Court to award her attorn ey’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. See O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). On consideration of the record before us, we deny her request fo r an award of attorney ’s fees and costs she incurred on appeal.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.