### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-31240

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. RANDEL J. MASON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:
Randel Mason appeals his conviction for wire fraud and his sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment and $757,792.20 in restitution. He argues that the district court committed plain error by failing to advise him during his guilty plea colloquy of his right to court-appointed co u n s e l if financially eligible, as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He also argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel by denying his motion, filed five weeks before his scheduled sentencing date, to substitute appointed counsel f o r his retained counsel. We AFFIRM Mason’s conviction, but VACATE his sentence and REMAND for re-sentencing. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Janu ary19 , 20 12
Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240
I.
M a so n is a b u ild in g c o n t ra cto r a n d th e fo rm e r o w n e r o f M a so n C o n stru ctio n C o m p a n y , In c., w h ich b u ilt re sid e n tia l h o m e s. M a so n C o n stru ctio n b u ilt h o m e s in fiv e to se v e n sta g e s. U p o n co m p le t i o n o f e a ch

sta g e , M a so n C o n stru ctio n su b m itte d a d ra w o n its lin e o f cre d it to its fin a n cin g

co m p a n y , N a tio n a l C ity M o rtg a g e ( n o w P N C M o rtg a g e ). T o re ce iv e th e se d ra w s, M a so n C o n stru ctio n su b m itte d a co m p le tio n ce rtifica tio n a n d a n in sp e ctio n ce rtifica tio n sig n e d b y a n in d e p e n d e n t in sp e cto r. The conduct relevant to Mason’s conviction involved Mason and his longtime office assistant and co-defendant, Tammy Dixon. In August 2005, Mason and Dixon crossed the line, submitting false documentatio n t o N a tional City Mortgage. B y t h i s s c h e m e , M a s on and Dixon fraudulently obtained $825,943.60.
In December 2009, Mason and Dixon were charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1343, and twenty-nine counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
Mason made his initial ap p e a r a nce before the magistrate judge on January 11, 2010, with retained cou n s e l, David Williams. On April 12, 2010, Williams filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, which the magistrate judge denied on April 14. Thereafter, Mason appeared before the district court with Williams on the morning of June 3 , 2 0 1 0, to enter a guilty plea. The district court, however, continued the hearing until that afternoon after Mason said he

was confused about the plea. T h e district co u rt re co n v e n e d th e h e a rin g th a t

a fte rn o o n , b u t h a d to re sch e d u le it u n til J u n e 2 3 , 2 0 1 0 , b e c a u s e a fte r th e district c o u r t cla rifie d th e m a x im u m p o ssib le se n te n ce u n d e r th e p le a

a g r e e m e n t , M a so n in d ica te d th a t h e d id n o t k n o w w h a t to d o in lig h t o f m o re fu lly u n d e rsta n d in g th e co n se q u e n ce s o f h is p le a

. Before the conclusion of that hearing, M a s o n i ndicated that he intended to plead guilty because he did not think he could afford a long trial:

2 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

T H E D E F E N D A N T : I’m so rry , b u t I

— I d o n ’ t m e a n to w a ste th e C o u rt’s tim e . I ju st re a lly d o n ’t k n o w w h a t to d o

. T H E C O U R T : Y o u ’re n o t w a stin g a n y b o d y ’s tim e

. T h a t’s w h a t I'm p a id to d o

. A n d I d o n ’t d o p ie ce w o rk , so I w a n t y o u to b e a b so lu te ly

co m fo rta b le a n d a ssu re d o f w h a t y o u ’re d o in g

. S o w e ’ll ju st p u t th is

o ff to a n o th e r tim e

.

. . . .
T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y o u r H o n o r, I d o n ’ t m e a n to

. . . B u t n o o n e
e v e r in te rv ie w e d m e , a n d n o o n e e v e r h e a rd m y sid e o f th e s t o r y

. B u t y e t, y o u k n o w , I d o n ’t w a n t to g o to ja il o r

— y o u k n o w , I m e a n , I h a v e a se rio u s p ro b le m w ith th is b e ca u se I d id n ’ t c r e a t e th is p ro b le m

. T H E C O U R T : W e ll, th a t’s — th e n d o n o t p le a d g u ilty . If y o u — T H E D E F E N D A N T : B u t I ca n ’t a ffo rd a lo n g tria l. T H E C O U R T : W e ll, I’m n o t su re h o w lo n g th e tria l w ill b e

. L e t’s te n ta tiv e ly se t th is f o r 1 0 : 0 0 o n J u n e 2 3 , a t w h ich tim e y o u
ca n m a k e u p y o u r m in d w h a t y o u w ish to d o . O k a y ?
Although Mason did not enter a guilty plea on June 3, he d i d f i le a documen t e n t itled “Understanding of Maximum Penalty and Constitutional Rights” (Understanding of Constitutional Rights), which he had signed on April 30, 2010. In that document, Mason averred that he understood his “right to be represented by counsel (a lawyer) of [ h i s] choice, or if [he could not] afford counsel, [his] right to be represented by court-appointed counsel at no cost to [him].” O n J u n e 1 7 , 2 0 1 0 , W illia m s file d a se co n d m o tio n to w ith d ra w a s M a so n ’s

co u n se l, citin g a b re a k d o w n in h is a b ility to co m m u n ica te w ith M a so n th a t, h e

a sse r t e d , re n d e re d e ffe ctiv e re p re se n ta tio n im p o ssib le

. T h e district co u rt d id

n o t ru le o n th is m o tio n u n til th e h e a rin g o n J u n e 2 3 , 2 0 1 0

. A t th a t h e a rin g th e district co u rt a sk e d M a so n a b o u t h is re la tio n sh ip w i t h W i llia m s. M a so n

re sp o n d e d th a t h e w a s n o w sa tisfie d w ith W illia m s:

3 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

T HE COUR T : Y o u w e re o rig in a lly sch e d u le d fo r a g u ilty p le a to d a y , b u t I g a th e r y o u w a n t to ch a n g e a tto rn e y s? T H E D E F E N D A N T : N o , sir. M r. W illia m s a n d I h a v e sp e n t q u ite

a lo n g tim e th is w e e k

. I th in k I h a v e a b e tte r fe e l n o w fo r w h a t’s g o in g o n

. T H E C O U R T : A ll rig h t. S o te ll m e ; a re w e n o w a g re e d th a t M r. W illia m s ca n re p re se n t y o u ? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : Y o u ’re su re y o u ’re sa tisfie d w ith th a t? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir, I’m sa tisfie d

.
B e fo re a cce p tin g M a so n ’s g u ilty p le a , th e district co u rt a g a in so u g h t a n d

re ce iv e d M a so n ’s a ss u r a n c e th a t h e w a s sa tisfie d w ith W illia m s’s

re p re se n ta tio n :

T H E C O U R T :

. . . A ll ri g h t

. M r

. M a so n , le t’s ta lk fra n k ly

. T h is is th e p o in t a t w h ich I u su a lly a sk : H a v e y o u h a d a ll th e tim e th a t y o u n e e d to d iscu ss th is w ith y o u r la w y e r? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : Y o u h a v e ? A re y o u su re y o u h a v e ? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : A n d y o u a re sa tisfie d w ith h im a s a la w y e r? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : A re y o u su re , b e c a u s e

— te ll m e a b o u t w h y , h o w y o u ca m e b a ck to b e lie v in g h e w a s a g o o d la w y e r fo r y o u

. THE D E F E N D A N T : I n e v e r th o u g h t h e w a sn ’t a g o o d lawyer

. I ju st w a s co n fu se d

. I m e a n , w e ca m e in w ith o n e p le a a g re e m e n t
a n d t h e n I g u e ss I g o t b lin d sid e d w ith a n o th e r o n e , a n d I d id n ’t q u ite u n d e rsta n d th e c o n se q u e n ce s. A n d w e ju st re a lly w e re n ’t

co m m u n ica tin g v e ry w e ll. T H E C O U R T : B u t y o u a re n o w ? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. H e sa t d o w n a n d w e ta lk e d a t le n g th , a n d I th in k I u n d e rsta n d , y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : A re y o u su re y o u u n d e rsta n d w h a t’s h a p p e n in g ? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : A n d y o u a re su re th a t y o u w a n t to k e e p M r. W illia m s? T H E W IT N E S S [sic]: Y e s, sir.

4 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

T h e district co u r t th e n p ro ce e d e d to co n d u ct th e p le a -ta k in g ce re m o n y

re q u ire d b y R u le 1 1 o f th e F e d e ra l R u le s o f C rim in a l P ro ce d u re

. H o w e v e r, th e district co u rt d id n o t o r a lly a d v ise M a so n o f th e rig h t o f a fin a n cia lly e lig ib le
d e fe n d a n t to h a v e co u rt-a p p o in te d co u n se l re p re se n t h im a t tria l a n d e v e ry

o th e r sta g e o f th e p ro ce e d in g s. M a so n p le a d e d g u ilty to co u n ts 6 a n d 2 7

. T h e district co u rt a cce p te d M a so n ’s p le a

. O n A u g u st 2 0 , 2 0 1 0 , M a so n file d a le tte r re q u e stin g “th e co u rt to a p p o in t

a n a tto rn e y w h o ca n h e lp m e .” M a so n e x p la in e d th a t h e w a s “n o t w o rk in g w e ll

w ith

. . . W illia m s o n [h is] se n te n cin g h e a rin g ” a n d th a t h e w a s co n fid e n t th a t “W illia m s [d id ] not want to spend too much time with [ h i m] because of [his] inability to pay promptl y

. ” A l m o st a m o n th la te r, th e district co u rt d e n ie d
M a so n ’s re q u e st w ith o u t re a so n s. T h e d istrict co u rt se n te n ce d M a so n o n N o v e m b e r 1 8 , 2 0 1 0

. A cco rd in g to th e ca lcu la tio n s in M a so n ’s P re se n te n ce In v e stig a tio n R e p o r t (P S R ), M a so n ’s

g u id e lin e s se n te n cin g ra n g e w a s 2 7 to 3 3 m o n th s. A fte r a le n g th y h e a rin g o n th e a m o u n t o f lo ss ca u se d b y M a so n ’s fra u d , th e d istrict co u rt a d o p te d th e P S R ’s

ca lcu la tio n s, a n d se n te n ce d M a so n to 3 0 m o n th s’ im p riso n m e n t o n e a ch co u n t,
to ru n co n cu rre n tly

. T h e distr i c t co u rt o rd e re d M a so n to p a y $ 7 5 7 ,7 9 2 .2 0 in

re stitu tio n to th e v ictim m o rtg a g e co m p a n y

. T h e district co u rt a lso im p o se d a th re e -y e a r te rm o f su p e rv ise d re le a se fo r e a ch co u n t, to ru n co n cu rre n tly

. A fte r filin g a tim e ly n o tice o f a p p e a l, W illia m s file d a m o tio n to w ith d ra w

a n d to h a v e co u n se l a p p o in te d to re p re se n t M a so n o n a p p e a l. M a so n th e n file d

a fin a n cia l a ffid a v it u n d e r se a l. T h e d istrict co u rt d e te rm in e d th a t M a so n w a s fin a n cia lly u n a b le to re ta in co u n se l, g ra n te d W illia m s’s m o tio n to w it h d r a w ,

a n d o rd e re d th a t co u n se l b e a p p o in te d to re p re se n t M a so n

.

5 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

II. A . M a s o n ’s C h a lle n g e to h is G u ilty P le a M a so n first a sk s u s t o o v e r tu rn h is g u ilty p le a

. H e a rg u e s th a t th e d istrict co u rt co m m itte d re v e rsib le e rro r b y fa ilin g to a d v ise h im o f h is rig h t to

co u rt-a p p o in te d co u n se l, if fin a n cia lly e lig ib le , d u rin g h is g u ilty p le a co llo q u y ,

a s re q u ire d b y F e d R . C rim . P . 1 1 (b )(1 )(D ).
B e ca u se M a so n d id n o t ra ise th is issu e in th e d istrict co u rt, w e re v ie w fo r
p la in e rro r. F e d

. R

. C rim

. P

. 5 2 (b ) (“A p la in e rro r th a t a ffe cts su b sta n tia l rig h ts

m a y b e co n sid e re d e v e n th o u g h it w a s n o t b ro u g h t t o t h e co u rt’s a tte n tio n .”);
U n ited S ta tes v

. V

o n n , 5 3 5 U .S

. 5 5 , 5 9 (2 0 0 2 ). M a so n th e re fo re b e a rs th e b u rd e n

o f p ro v in g (1 ) e rro r, (2 ) th a t is p la in , a n d (3 ) th a t a ffe cts h is su b sta n tia l rig h ts. V o n n , 5 3 5 U .S

. a t 6 2

– 6 3 ; U n ited S ta tes v

. O la n o , 5 0 7 U .S

. 7 2 5 , 7 3 3

– 3 4 (2 0 0 3 ).
W e a re n o t co n fin e d to co n sid e rin g o n ly th e re co rd o f th e p le a p ro ce e d in g , b u t “m a y co n su lt t h e w h o le re co rd w h e n co n sid e rin g th e e ffe ct o f a n y e rro r o n

su b sta n tia l rig h ts.” V o n n , 5 3 5 U .S

. a t 5 9

. If M a s o n s a tisfie s th e first th re e
p ro n g s o f th e p la in e rro r a n a ly sis, w e p ro ce e d to th e fo u rth p ro n g , w h ich a ffo rd s

u s “th e d iscretio n to re m e d y th e e rro r— d iscre tio n w h ich o u g h t to b e e x e rcise d

o n ly if th e e rro r se rio u sly a ffe ct[s] th e fa irn e ss, in te g rity o r p u b lic re p u ta tio n o f ju d icia l p ro ce e d i n g s

. ” P u ck ett v

. U n ited S ta tes , 1 2 9 S

. C t. 1 4 2 3 , 1 4 2 9 (2 0 0 9 ) (in te rn a l q u o ta tio n m a rk s o m itte d ).
M a so n h a s sa tisfie d p ro n g o n e

. In relevant part, Rule 11 requires a district court, before accepting a guilty plea, to “add r e s s the defendant personally in open court,” during which address it “must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands

. . . the right to be represented by counsel—and if necessary have the court a p p o i n t c ounsel—at trial and at

every other stage of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(D). In this case, during the Rule 11 plea-taking ceremony, the district court did not orally advise

6 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

Mason of his righ t , i f financially eligible, to court-appointed counsel. The government nevertheless maintains that the district court satisfied Rule 11 by advising Mason that, should he proceed to trial, Williams would represent him 1

or, alternatively, by accepting from Mason his signed copy of the Understanding

o f Constitutional Rights document. Neither of these facts satisfies the p l a i n language of Rule 11. Rule 11( b ) ( 1 ) (D) requires district courts to inform defendants of their right to court-appointed counsel, if necessary, not merely to counsel. And Rule 11 expressly requires district courts to “address the defendant personally in open court” concerning certain specifie d rights, not merely to accept a defendant’s written acknowledgment of his understanding of
those rights. T h e d ist r i c t c o u rt’s fa ilu re to sa tisfy R u le 1 1 ’s e x p re ss

re q u ire m e n ts w a s e rro r. 2

At Mas on’s abor ted ple a hear ing on June 3, 2010, the dist ric t cour t advis ed him: “If 1

we had a tri al, the wi tnes se s wo uld have to tes tif y in your pr es ence and in the pr es ence of Mr

. Willi ams , wh o coul d obje c t to any evide nce off ere d by the Go vernm ent. He coul d put on evide nce in your behalf

. He coul d sub poe na wi tnes se s fr om anyw here

. . . Do you unde rs tand that ?” On June 23, 2010, bef ore acc ept ing Mas on’s guilty ple a, the dis tri ct cour t advis ed him : “If we had a t r i al, the wi tnes se s wo uld com e to cour t and tes tif y in your pr es ence , in the pr es ence o f M r

. Willi ams , wh o coul d cro ss -exam ine them , objec t to evide nce

. . . put on evide nce in your behalf , sub poe na w itne ss es f rom anyw here

. . . . Und ers too d? ”

The dis se nt wo uld find no err or here on t h e bas is of our hold ing in Uni ted States v. 2 Sanc hez , 650 F.2 d 7 4 5 , 748 (5t h Cir. 1981) , that wh ere a def enda nt is rep res ente d by app oint ed couns el at his guilty ple a coll oquy, a dis tri ct cour t doe s not violat e Rule 11 if it info rm s the def

enda nt of his right to couns el at all st ages of the pr oce edi ngs, but not “th at this right [is ] a right to app oint ed couns el. ” Sanc hez is dis tinguis hable beca use Mas on wa s rep res ente d by ret ai n e d , n o t a pp oint ed, couns el at his ple a hear ing. Mo re im por tant ly, Sanc hez ’s hold ing doe s not sur vive the 2002 ame ndm ents t o Ru le 11. Sanc hez ground ed its hold ing in a pr ovis ion of the text of Rule 11 that has sin ce been del ete d: “Rule 11( c ) ( 2 ) [t he pr ecur so r to the pres ent Rule 11( b)( 1)( D) ], by its own language , lim its the nece ss ity for such

a char g e t o s i tuat ions wh ere ‘th e def enda nt is not rep res ente d by an att orne y’ at the ple a pr oce edi ng.” Id. The dis se nt wo uld avoid the forc e of the del eti on of this clause by res ort ing to the Advis ory Com mi tte e Not es per tine nt to the 2002 ame ndm ents to Rule 11, wh ich ass ert that thos e ame ndm ents we re “int e n d e d to be st ylis tic only, excep t as note d below .” That

com me nt in the Notes canno t, how ever, alte r the plai n text of the cur rent vers ion of Rule 11. “[ I]t is that Ru l e w h i c h by its ter ms governs ,” not expr es sio ns of the dr aft ers ’ inte nt in the Advis ory Com mi tte e Not es

. Johns on v. Uni ted States , 520 U. S. 461, 466 (199 7); see al so Tom e
7 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

M a so n sa tisfie s p ro n g tw o a s w e ll. “‘P la in ’ is sy n o n y m o u s w ith ‘cle a r’ o r,

e q u iv a le n tly , ‘o b v io u s.’” O la n o , 5 0 7 U .S

. a t 7 3 4

. B e ca u se th e re q u ire m e n ts o f
R u le 1 1 a re e x p licit, a n d a re v ie w o f th e tra n scrip t sh o w s th a t th e m a n d a to ry

a d v ice w a s n o t g iv e n , the district court’s error in failing to adhere to Rule 11 was obvious. Accordingly, we must determine whether the district court’s error affected Mason’s substantial rights. It is w e ll-se ttle d th a t, “[a ]s a g e n e ra l ru le , a n e rro r

a ffe cts a d e fe n d a n t’s su b sta n tia l rig h ts o n ly if th e e rro r w a s p re ju d icia l.”
U n ited S ta tes v

. G o n za lez-R o d rig u ez , 6 2 1 F .3 d 3 5 4 , 3 6 3 (5 th C ir. 2 0 1 0 ). “E rro r is p re ju d icia l if th e re is a re a so n a b le p ro b a b ility th a t t h e re su lt o f th e
p ro ce e d in g s w o u ld h a v e b e e n d iffe re n t b u t fo r th e e rro r.” Id

. T o p re v a il,
th e re fo re , M a so n “m u st s h o w a re a so n a b le p ro b a b ility th a t, b u t fo r th e e rro r, h e w o u ld n o t h a v e e n te re d th e p le a .” U n ited S ta tes v

. D o m in g u ez B en itez , 5 4 2
U .S

. 7 4 , 8 3 (2 0 0 4 ). M o re o v e r, “[t]h e p ro b a b ility o f a d iffe re n t re su lt m u st b e

su fficie n t to u n d e r m i n e co n fid e n ce in th e o u tco m e o f th e p ro ce e d in g s.” G o n za lez-R o d rig u ez , 6 2 1 F .3 d a t 3 6 3

. Applying these principles, we h o l d t h a t the district court’s error did not affect Mason’s substantial rights. M a so n ’s stro n g e st e v id e n ce th a t th e d istrict

co u rt’s e rro r ca u se d h im to p le a d g u ilty is h is e x ch a n g e w ith th e d istrict co u rt

v. Uni ted States , 513 U. S. 150, 167–68 (199 5) (S cali a, J., conc urr ing in par t and conc urr ing in the judgm ent) ( expla ining that “ [i] t is the wo rd s of the Rules t hat have been autho rit ativel y ado pt ed— by this Court , or by Congres s if it mak es a st atut ory change” and that altho ugh the Not es are subm itt ed to the Court and Congres s, “ther e is no cer taint y that either we or th ey read [t hem ], nor is ther e any pr oce dur e by wh ich we for mal ly endo rs e or dis clai m them

. That being so , the Not es canno t, by so me pow er inher ent in the dr aft sm en, change the me aning that the Rules wo uld othe rw ise bear .” ). Altho ugh we have, as the dis se nt poi nts out, rec entl y cit ed the rele vant por tio n of Sanc hez wi th app roval, se e Uni ted States v. Sauc edo- Rio s , 439 F.Ap p’x 316, 317 (5t h Cir. 2011) (p er cur iam ) (unp ublis hed) , that cas e is not pr ece dent ial. Nor doe s i t a p p e a r that Sanc hez ’s vitali ty aft er the 2002 ame ndm ent wa s call ed into ques tio n in Sauc edo- Rio s

. Nor wa s Sauc edo- Rio s ’s reli ance on Sanc hez nece ss ary to its hold ing, beca use the pane l als o held that the def enda nt fai led to sat isf

y the sub st antia l right s pr ong of the plai n
err or tes t. Id.
8 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

a t h is J u n e 3 , 2 0 1 0 h e a rin g

. A fte r d e cid in g n o t to p le a d g u ilty , M a so n la m e n te d

to th e district co u rt th a t “n o o n e e v e r in te rv ie w e d m e , a n d n o o n e e v e r h e a rd m y sid e o f th e sto ry . B u t y e t, y o u k n o w , I d o n ’t w a n t to g o to ja il o r— y o u k n o w , I

m e a n , I h a v e a se rio u s p ro b le m w ith th is b e ca u se I d id n ’t cre a te th is p ro b le m .”
A fte r th e d istrict co u rt re sp o n d e d , “th e n d o n o t p le a d g u ilty ,” M a so n o b je cte d , “B u t I ca n ’t a f

f o r d a l o n g tria l.” A s M a so n w o u ld h a v e it, th is sta te m e n t d e fin itiv e ly p ro v e s th a t h e w o u ld h a v e d e cid e d to p ro ce e d to tria l rig h t th e n a n d
th e re if o n ly h e c o u l d h a v e a ffo rd e d tria l co u n se l. T h is in te rp re ta tio n w o u ld , in d e e d , b e q u ite p o w e rfu l if th e o n ly re co rd e v id e n ce w e re th e tra n scrip t o f th e J u n e 3 h e a rin g

. B u t th e re m a in d e r o f th e re co rd p re clu d e s M a so n ’s
in te rp re ta tio n

. Most fatal to Mason’s position, the record reveals that Mason was aware of his right to appointed trial counsel notwithstanding the district court’s error. M o r e t h a n a m o n th b e fo re h is first a tte m p t to p le a d g u ilty , Mason signed th e Understanding of Constitutional Rights d o c u m ent, a sim p le d o cu m e n t, w ith
b a re ly o v e r a p a g e o f d o u b le -sp a ce d te x t, th a t p la in ly sta te s th a t h e u n d e rsto o d
h is rig h t to a co u rt-a p p o in te d a tto rn e y i f h e co u ld n o t a ffo rd h is o w n

. B y

a ffix in g h is sig n a tu re to th a t d o cu m e n t, M a so n “sta te [d ] th a t I u n d e rsta n d

. .

. [m ]y rig h t to b e re p re se n te d b y co u n se l (a la w y e r) o f m y ch o ice , o r if I ca n n o t

a ffo rd co u n se l, m y rig h t to b e re p re se n te d b y co u rt-a p p o in te d co u n se l a t n o co st
to m e .” M a so n ’s re ta in e d a tto rn e y a lso sig n e d th e d o cu m e n t. R e co g n izin g th e d ifficu lty th a t th is d o cu m e n t p o se s fo r h is p o sitio n , M a so n a rg u e s th a t a lth o u g h
th e d o cu m e n t re fle cts h is u n d e rsta n d in g o f h is rig h t to co u rt-a p p o in te d co u n se l fo r h is g u ilty p le a h e a rin g , it d o e s n o t d e m o n stra te th a t h e w a s a w a r e o f h is rig h t to a p p o in te d tria l co u n se l

. H e a sse rts th a t th is w a s h is u n d e rsta n d in g
g iv e n th a t th e d o cu m e n t “w a s p re p a re d in co n n e ctio n w ith a p le a h e a rin g ” a n d

n o w h e re e x p licitly sta te s th a t t h e rig h t to a p p o in te d co u n se l e x te n d s to tria l.

9 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

W e a re u n co n v in ce d . M a so n co u ld n o t h a v e re a so n a b ly re a d th e d o cu m e n t a s

re fe rrin g to h is rig h t to a p p o in te d co u n s e l o n ly in co n n e ctio n w ith h is g u ilty

p le a , a n d n o t tria l, b e ca u se th e o th e r co n stitu tio n a l rig h ts h e a ck n o w le d g e d in
th a t d o cu m e n t p e rta in to tria l, n o t h is g u ilty p le a

. M o re o v e r, th e r e a re m a n y in d ica tio n s in th e re co rd th a t M a so n ’s g u ilty

p le a w a s v o lu n ta ry

. B e fo re a cce p tin g M a so n ’s p le a o n J u n e 2 3 , 2 0 1 0 , th e district co u rt tw ice re q u e ste d a n d o b ta in e d h is a ssu ra n ce th a t h e w a n te d to

p le a d g u ilty

. A t th e h e a rin g , M a so n tw ice in d ica te d th a t h e u n d e rsto o d w h a t

w a s o ccu rrin g

. T h e district co u rt fo u n d h im co m p e te n t to e n te r h is p le a . A n d

a lth o u g h M a so n h a d p re v io u sly e x p re sse d d issa tisfa ctio n w ith W illia m s, h is

a tto rn e y , h e re p e a te d ly re a ssu re d th e district co u rt b e fo re p le a d in g g u ilty th a t h e w a s h a p p y w ith W illia m s re p re se n tin g h im , a n d w a s su re h e w a n te d to k e e p h im a s h is la w y e r. T h e fo llo w in g co n v e rsa tio n is illu stra tiv e : T H E C O U R T : A n d y o u a re sa tisfie d w ith [W illia m s] a s a la w y e r? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : A re y o u su re , b e ca u se

— te ll m e a b o u t w h y , h o w y o u
ca m e b a ck to b e lie v in g h e w a s a g o o d la w y e r fo r y o u

. T H E D E F E N D A N T : I n e v e r th o u g h t h e w a sn ’t a g o o d la w y e r. I ju st

w a s co n fu se d

. I m e a n , w e ca m e in w ith o n e p le a a g re e m e n t a n d th e n I g u e ss I g o t b l i n d s id e d w ith a n o th e r o n e , a n d I d id n ’t q u ite

u n d e rsta n d th e co n se q u e n ce s. A n d w e ju s t re a lly w e re n ’t

co m m u n ica tin g v e ry w e ll. T H E C O U R T : B u t y o u a re n o w ? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. H e sa t d o w n a n d w e ta lk e d a t le n g th , a n d I th in k I u n d e rsta n d , y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : A re y o u su re y o u u n d e rsta n d w h a t’s h a p p e n in g ? T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. T H E C O U R T : A n d y o u a re su r e th a t y o u w a n t to k e e p M r. W illia m s? T H E W IT N E S S [sic]: Y e s, sir.

G iv e n th a t M a s o n k n e w a b o u t h is rig h t to a p p o in te d co u n se l fro m th e U n d e rsta n d in g o f C o n stitu tio n a l R ig h ts d o cu m e n t, a n d th a t h e u n e q u iv o ca lly

10 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

re ite ra te d th a t h i s p le a w a s v o lu n ta ry a n d th a t h e w a s sa tisfie d w ith h is

a tto rn e y , w e co n clu d e th a t th e re w a s n o “re a so n a b le p ro b a b ility t hat , b u t fo r th e

e rro r, h e w o u ld n o t h a v e e n te re d th e p le a .” D o m in g u ez B en itez , 5 4 2 U .S

. a t 8 3

. T o b e su re , th e d istrict co u rt sh o u ld h a v e co m p lie d w ith R u le 1 1 a t M a so n ’s p le a

co llo q u y a n d , in a p e rfe ct w o rld , th e d istrict co u rt a lso w o u ld h a v e re sp o n d e d to M a so n ’s sta te m e n t th a t h e co u ld n o t a ffo rd a lo n g tria l b y a d v isin g h im o f h is rig h t to co u rt-a p p o in te d co u n se l. Nonethel e ss, Mason understood his right to have a lawyer appointed and repeatedly asserted that he wanted to plead guilty and that he was satisfied with Williams’s representation. The district court’s
Rule 11 error did not, therefore, affect Mason’s substantial rights. Mason’s conviction must stand. B. Mason’s Right to Choice of Counsel at Sentencing
M a so n n e x t a rg u e s th a t th e d istrict co u rt v io la te d h is S ix th A m e n d m e n t rig h t to ch o ice o f co u n se l b y d e n y in g h is re q u e s t t o h a v e co u n se l a p p o in te d to

re p re se n t h im a t se n te n cin g

. M a so n m a d e h i s re q u e st in th e fo rm o f a le tte r file d o n A u g u st 2 0 , 2 0 1 0 , fiv e w e e k s b e fo re th e o rig in a l d a te o f h is se n te n cin g h e a rin g , a n d a lm o st th re e fu ll m o n th s b e fo re h is a ctu a l se n te n cin g h e a rin g

. In
h is le tte r M a so n re q u e ste d th a t th e d istrict co u rt “a p p o in t a n a tto rn e y w h o ca n h e lp m e ,” in p a rt b e ca u se h e w a s “n o t w o rk in g w e ll w ith [h is re ta in e d a tto rn e y ]
W illia m s o n [h is] se n te n cin g h e a rin g ” a n d b e ca u se h e w a s co n fid e n t th a t

“ W illia m s [d id ] not want to spend too much time with [him] because of [his ] inability to pay promptly.” T h e d istrict co u rt d e n ie d M a so n ’s re q u e st w ith o u t

re a so n s a lm o st a m o n th la te r. We review de novo the district court’s denial of Maso n ’s request for appointed counsel. M a so n ’s a rg u m e n t tu rn s o n th e p ro p e r in te rp re ta tio n o f h is
S ix th A m e n d m e n t rig h ts. T h a t is a q u e stio n o f la w , w h ich w e re v ie w d e n o v o

. S ee, e.g ., U

n ited S ta tes v

. W

h ite , 4 6 5 F .3 d 2 5 0 , 2 5 4 (5 th C i r

. 2 0 0 6 ) ( “T h e

11 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

a p p lica tio n o f th e S ix th A m e n d m e n t

. . . is a q u e stio n o f la w th a t w e re v ie w d e

n o v o .”).
The Si xt h Amendment gu a ra n te e s th a t “[i]n a ll crim in a l p ro se cu tio n s , t he

a ccu se d sh a ll e n jo y th e rig h t

. . . to h a v e th e A ssista n ce o f C o u n se l f o r h is
d e f e n ce .” U .S

. C o n st. a m e n d

. V I. The Supreme Court has interpreted thi s provision as affording indigent defendants the right to court-appointed counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938); see also Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U

. S

. 3 35, 342–45 (1963) (holding that the right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel is made obligatory o n the States by the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court has also held that t h e S i x t h Amendment generally guarantees criminal defendants the distinct right to representation by
the counsel of their choice. See Powell v. Alabama , 28 7 U

. S

. 45, 53 (1932). However, “the rig h t to co u n se l o f ch o ice d o e s n o t e x te n d to d e fe n d a n ts w h o

re q u ire co u n se l to b e a p p o in te d fo r th e m .” U n ited S ta tes v

. G o n za lez-L o p ez , 5 4 8
U .S

. 1 4 0 , 1 5 1 (2 0 0 6 ). T h is is b e ca u se th e right to court-appointed counsel guarantees the right to adequate representation, not representation by a particular attorney. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States , 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989). Before consi d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e s e S i x th Amendment rights entitled Mason
to substitute appointed for retained counsel, we must determine whether Mason effectively asserted his Sixth Amendment rights. The parties have not cited to

any case that discusses what a defendant who is represented by retained counsel
must do to invoke his right to appointed counsel, and we are unawa r e o f a ny binding precedent on this issue. We a r e c o gnizant that too lax of a standard 3

The governm ent argues that Mas on’s requ es t fai led to com ply wi th Uni ted States v. 3 Cano , 519 F.3d 512, 51 6 ( 5 t h Cir. 2008) , wh ich st ates the rule that a def enda nt’ s requ es t to rep res ent him se lf mus t be “cl ear and un e q u i v o c a l.” Cano is inap pos ite here beca use the def enda nt is not wa iv ing his cons tit utio nal right to couns el, but as ser ting his Sixth Ame ndm ent right s to choi ce of couns el and cour t- app oin t e d couns el. See Brow n v.
12 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

might encourage gamesmanship because a defendant coul d make a vague request for appointment of new counsel, and if that request is ignored or denied, wait and see if subsequent proceedings conclude favorably f o r him before deciding whether or not to challenge the denial of his request. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to define the parameters of the standard in this case. On these facts, we conclude that Mason effectively invoked his Sixth Amendment rights.
He unambiguously, and in writing, requested appointed counsel. In his letter
to the district court, Mason asked “the court to appoint an attorney who can help me.” The district court i n terpreted Mason’s letter as a request for a courtappointed lawyer, describing the letter in its order as “defenda n t ’ s motion to appoint counsel.” Nor could the district court have reasonably construed Mason’s request as a request for hybrid representa t i o n because Mason cited several reasons that, he asserted in his letter, made “it necessary to request a change ” (emphasis added). Because Mason asserted his Sixth A m endment rights, we must decide whether the Sixth Amendment entitled him to substitute appointed counsel.
We have not previously addressed whether a f i n a n c i a l l y eligible defendant
has a Sixth Amendment right to replace his retained counsel with courtappointed counsel. We therefore must turn for guidance to our pr e c edents governing analogous situations. Under o u r p r e c edents, a defendant who is already represent e d b y appointed counsel is not entitled to have the court appoint substitute counsel unless he can demonstrate “good cause, s u c h as a conflict of interest, [or] a complete breakdown in communication.” United States

v. Young , 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 19 7 3 )

. W e a p ply this good cause

W a i n w r i g h t , 665 F.2d 607, 610 (5t h Cir. 1982) (en banc) (ob se rving that the reas on for requ iring an unequi vocal requ es t to pr oc e e d p r o s e is that the def enda nt is wa iving his

cons tit utio nal right to ass ist ance of coun s e l ). Mo reo ver, even ass umi ng ar guendo that this rule ap pli es , Mas on sat isf ied it be caus e h is requ es t wa s clea r and unequi vocal.

13 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

requirement because the only S i x t h Amendment right that could entitle an indigent defendant to a new attorney is the right to effective assistance of
counsel. See id. If an indigent’s current appointed counsel is constitutionally adequate, he has “no cognizable complaint.” Caplin & Drysdale , 491 U.S. at 624. By contrast, a defendant n e e d n ot show good cause to replace existing counsel with new retained counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantees such a defendant
the freedom to secure representation by any lawyer he should choose, provided that none of the recognized exceptions to the right to choice of counsel applies. See Wheat v. United States , 486 U. S

. 1 5 3, 159 (1988) (listing exceptions to the right); Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at 151–52 (same).
In our view, Mason’s situation is m o r e a kin to that of a defendant requesting permission to substitute new retained cou n s e l t h an that of a defendant asking for a different court-appointed lawyer. When Mason asked the distric t c o u r t to appoint an attorney to assist him he had not yet exercised his right to appointed counsel. Therefore, Mason still r e t a i n ed his Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel. See id. at 151 (“[T]he rig h t to co u n se l o f
ch o ice d o e s n o t e x te n d t o d e f e n d a n ts w h o re q u ire co u n se l to b e a p p o in te d fo r th e m .”). Consistent with that right, Ma s o n c o u l d have substituted any new retained counsel he wished. It follows that one of the constitutionally protected choices Mason could have made was to invoke his right as an indigent to courtappointed counsel. Because Mason retained the right to choice o f c o u n s el, he 4

was n ot required to show good cause to substitute appointed counsel. As we

In the usua l cas e, rem and wo uld be requ ired for the dis tri ct cour t to inquir e into the 4 def enda nt’ s fina ncial eligibi lity for app oint ed couns el. That inquir y is unnec es sar y here , how ever, beca use acc ord ing to the PSR,“ [M aso n] and his wi fe have zero ass ets , unse cur ed deb t
excee ding $300,000, and a negati ve net monthl y cas h flo w of $8,0 00,” and there is noth ing in the rec ord to ref

u t e thes e amo unts

. Uns urp ris ingly, wh en the dis tri ct cour t cons ide red Mas on’s fina ncial eligibi lity for app oint ed app ellat e couns el, it fou nd h i m eligibl e, and app oint ed Mas on’s pr es ent couns el. On thes e fac ts , ther e can be no doub t that M a s o n w as fina ncial ly e ligible f

or cour t- app oint ed couns el.

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h a v e explained, the good cause standard applies when a defendant seek s n e w appointed counsel bec a u s e a defendant is entitled to a new appointed lawyer only if he can show constitutionally inadequate representation. See Young , 482 F.2d at 995. Here, however, Mason was not already represented by appointed counsel when he requested appointed counsel. The dissent finds “baffling” our conclusion that Mas o n ’ s r equest for appointed counsel implicated his constitutional right to choice of counsel. In the dissent’s view, that right exten d s o n ly to defendants who desire to retain new counsel. To support this narrow articulation of the right, the dissent selectively quotes from the Supr e m e C o u rt’s opinions in Gonzalez-Lopez and Caplin & Drysdale

. I n G onzalez-Lopez , the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment
entitles “a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.” 548 U.S. at 144. In C a p l in & Drysdale , the Court wrote that the right to choice of counsel “does not go beyond ‘the individual’s right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of . . . counsel.’” 491 U.S. at
626 ( q u o t i n g Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors , 473 U.S. 305, 370 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Read in context, however, these statements say nothing about whether the right to choice of counsel extends to a defendant in Mason’s situation. When Gonzalez-Lopez limited the right to “a defendant who does not require appoi n ted counsel,” it was merely reiterating the established rule that defendants who req u i r e a p p o inted counsel have no right to choose which lawyer the state appoints. See Caplin & Drysdale , 491 U.S. at 624 (“The [ S i x th] Amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the righ t t o adequate representation, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint” under the distinct Sixth Amendment right to choice o f c o u n s e l )

. The dissent’s quotation from Caplin & Drysdale is likewise irrelevant to this case. There, the Court wrote that the choice of counsel right “does not go b e y o n d ‘ the individual’s right to spend his own money’” as

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support for its holding that the S i x t h A m e ndment does not create a right for criminal defendants to expend forfeitab l e a s s e ts to retain their preferred
counsel. Id. at 626–28. The Court was simply enunciating the principle, stated explicitly in its next sentence, that “[a] defendant has no Sixth Amendment right
to spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney.” Id. at 626 (emphasis added). Thus, neither Gonzalez-Lopez nor Caplin & Drysdale affects

our concl u s i o n that Mason retained his Sixth Amendment right to choice of
counsel because he was initially represented by private counsel. M o s t o f t h e remainder of the dissent’s critique is inapplicable to our reasoning because it follows from the false premise that Mason had no right to choice of counsel. Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to the Sixth A m e ndment right to choice of counsel, a criminal defendant is not required to show good ca u s e to substitute appointed for retained counsel, provided of course that he can establish financial eligibility. Our holding accords with a recent Ninth Circuit 5
decision. See United States v. Rive r a
- C o r o na , 618 F.3d 976, 979–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a defendant need not show good cause to replace retained with a p p ointed counsel because of the defendant’s “qualified right to choice of counsel”). The First Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion, but in a case in which it devoted scant attention to the issue presented here

— p r obably
b e c ause the defendant did not argue that he had a per se right to sub s t i t u t e appointed counsel, but that the district court erred by failing to inquire into an

We rec ognize that the Sixth Ame ndm ent right to choi ce of couns el is q u a lif ied , not 5 abs olut e. The Sup rem e Court has held that a def enda nt may not ins ist on rep res enta tio n by

a non- att orne y or an att orne y dis qualif ied by a conf

lict of intere st , and that a tri al cour t may balanc e the right to choi ce of c o u n s e l a g a i n s t the need s of fai rnes s and the dem ands of its cale ndar

. See Go nza le z- Lope z , 548 U. S. a t 1 51–52. Thes e excep tio ns, how ever, are not app lica ble here

. The dis tri ct cour t did not me ntio n the dem ands of its c a l e ndar in denyi ng Mas on’s requ es t, and that conc ern wo uld not se em to be im pli cat ed in this cas e beca use Mas on
mo ved fo r subs tit utio n o f couns el five we ek s bef ore hi s s ched uled sent enci ng hearing. None of the othe r excep tio ns are pr es ent beca use Mas on has ask ed the cour t to app oint couns el, not for p erm iss ion to sub st itut e a p art icula r att orne y.
16 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

alleged conflict of interest between the defendant and his attorney. See U n ited S ta tes v . M

o ta -S a n ta n a , 3 9 1 F .3 d 4 2 , 4 5

– 4 7 (1 st C ir. 2 0 0 4 ).
We conclude that the district court violated Mason’s Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel by denying his motion to replace Willia m s with new

c o u n sel for sentencing. Moreover, because Mason was financially eligible, he 6

was entitled to court-appointed c o u n s e l

. R e
- s e n t encing is required here because 7

t he Supreme Court has squarely held that deprivation of the right to choice o f
counsel is not subject to harmless error review. See Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at
148–50 (holding that “erroneous de p r i v a t i on of the right to counsel of choice

The dis se nt mi sc ons tru es the right to couns el of choi c e i n acc usi ng us of “ta k[ ing] 6 Go nza le z- Lope z muc h too far .” The dis se nt tre ats Go nza le z- Lope z as if its fac ts es tabl ish the

cons tit utio nal flo or for dem ons tra ting a violat ion of the right

. But Go nza le z- Lope z is just one
exam ple of a violat ion of a def enda nt’ s right to choi ce of couns el. What mat ter s is that Mas on has sho wn that he pos se ss ed the right and that none of the rec ognized excep tio ns app ly to him

. The dis se nt att ack s a st raw man wh en he cri tic izes our opi nion for “s ki p[ ping] the role 7 of th e [tr ial] judge” and giving def enda nts the green light to “at w ill change lawyer s m idw ay in the pr oce edi ng.” Ou r rulin g doe s no suc h thing. While it is tru e that the Sixth Ame ndm ent right t o c hoic e o f couns el pr eclu des im pos itio n of a good c aus e s tand ard on d efe ndant s, t rial

cour ts ret ain “w ide lati tud e” to balanc e “th e right to couns el of choi ce agains t

. . . the dem ands of [t heir ] cale ndar [s ]. ” Go nza le z- Lope z , 548 U. S. at 152. Thus, wh en a def enda nt ass ert s the right “m idw ay in the pr oce edi ng,” a tri al cour t may deny the requ es t if a cont inuanc e for new
couns el wo uld dis rup t the cour t’s s ched ule. See, e .g. , Uni ted Sta tes v. Jones , 662 F.3d 1018, 1024–25 (8t h Cir. 2011) (f i n d i n g no abus e of dis cre tio n in the dis tri ct cour t’s deni al of def enda nt’ s requ es t for a cont inuanc e to ret ain new couns el the we e k b e f o r e tri al)

. In this

cas e, the dis tri ct cour t gave no indi ca t i o n t hat it wa s denyi ng Mas on’s mo tio n due to
sc hedu ling pr oblem s. Indeed , that reas on w o u ld not se em to app ly here beca use Mas on requ es ted the change five we ek s b e f ore his se nten cing wa s sc hedu led to occ ur and thr ee
mo nths be for e M aso n’s ac tual se nten cing hear ing. The dis se nt’ s reli ance on Uni ted States v. Di lw orth is ther efo re mi sp lace d. 524 F.2d 4 7 0 ( 5 t h Cir. 1975)

. The dis se nt cit es Di lw orth to sup por t the cri tic ism that we are givin g “[ m] ore eff

ect

. . . to Mas on’s expr es sio n of dis sat isf act ion than the cour t has given [t o sim ilar expr es sio ns] in the pas t. ” B u t D i l w o rth is inap pos ite beca use it me rely illus tra tes the

unrem a r k a b l e p r opo sit ion that a cour t may balanc e the qualif ied right to choi ce of couns el agains t sc hedu ling dem ands

. Ou r hold ing i s als o f

ully cons ist ent wi th our pr ior d ecis ion in Uni ted States v. Di nitz , 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir . 1976) , w hich the dis se nt als o cit es

. In Di nitz , w e explai ned th at “w e
mus t plac e th[ e] qualif ied right to choo se one’ s ow n couns el agains t the back dr op of judic ial dis cre tio n.” Id. at 1219. We do not quarr el wi th this pr incip le, wh ich is given eff ect thr ough the es tabl ish ed excep tio ns to the Sixth Am endm ent right t o c hoic e o f couns el.
17 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

. . . qualifies as [a] structural e r r o r , ” w hich is not subject to review for harmlessness (internal quotation marks omitted)). 8
The dissent ’ s oft-repeated theme is that it is unjustifiable to remand for re-sentencing where, as here, the record is bereft of evidence of any deficiencies
in Mason’s representation by his retained counsel. Eminent jurists agree. See
id. a t 1 5 2

– 6 2 (Alito, J., dissenting) (joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.) (arguing that some showing of prejudice is required to establish a Sixth Amendment choice of counsel violation and that such violations should be subject to harmless error review)

. Y et for better or worse, this position only commanded a minority of Justice s in Gonzalez-Lopez , and is not currently the law. 9

We mak e clea r that wh ile Go nza le z- Lope z requ ires re- se nten cing given the violat ion

8 of Mas on’s right to choi ce of couns el, it doe s not, by its elf , com pel ou r ante ced ent conc lus ion that Mas on wa s depri ved of that Sixth Ame ndm ent right. We reac h that conc lus ion beca use ther e is no bas is in pr ece dent or pr incip le for exten ding the right to def enda nts wh o se ek to rep lace ret ained couns el wi th new ret ained couns el but not to financia lly eligibl e def enda nts wh o s eek t o r epl ace ret ained c ouns el wi th cour t- app oint ed couns el.

The dis se nt indu lges in pol icy argum ent, cri tic izing our dec isi on for “m ak [ing] tro uble 9 for [t rial ] judges .” That line of cri tique conf use s our role as judges

. Ou r so le tas k in this cas e is to ans we r the legal q ues tio ns pr es ente d. If our inte rp ret atio n of the Cons tit utio n and b i n d i ng pr ece dent requ ires us to enunc iate a cons tit utio nal right that may im pos e s o m e add itio nal burd ens on t rial c ourt s, t hen so be it

. Right s, by thei r natur e, have cos ts

. Never thel es s, it is wo rth obs erving that the dis se nt both mi ss tat es and overs tat es the pr act ical cons equenc es of th is d ecis ion. Firs t, the dis se nt ass ert s that defe ndant s “m ay now uni l a te ra ll

y for ce sub st itut ion of cour t- app oint ed couns el at any tim e wi thou t any d e m ons tra tio n that thei r pr es ent couns el is unable or unw illing to cont inue rep res enti ng them ” (em phas is add ed)

. Not tru e. On ly def enda nts wh o can dem ons tra te fina ncial eligibi lity to the d ist ric t cour t are ent itle d to s ubs tit ute co urt -ap poi nted couns el, and the dis tri ct co urt

r e t a i n s t h e dis cre tio n to deny a requ es t for sub st itut ion wh ere one of the excep tio ns to the choi ce of couns el right ap pli es

. Sec ond, the dis se nt wa rns that our dec isi on “s upp lies def enda nts wi th a rel i a b le del aying tac tic , beca use new couns el wi ll near ly alw ays requ ire a cont inuanc e to get up to sp eed .” In fac t, as a del aying tac tic , our dec isi on wi ll be use les s, or at the very mo st un reli able to def enda nts , beca use unde r es tabl ish ed Sixth Am endm ent pr incip les , a dis tri ct cour t may deny a mo tio n to sub st itut e couns el if a cont inua n c e i s n e c es sar y as an exerc ise of its “w ide lati tud e” to balanc e “th e right to couns el of choi ce ag a i n s t

. . . the dem ands of its cale ndar .” Go nza le z- Lope z , 548 U. S. at 152 ( cit ing Mo rri s v. Sl ap py , 461 U. S. 1, 11– 12 ( 1983) ). Finally, the dis se nt cont ends that the “f act -bo und char act er” of our hold ing that Mas on
18 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

We are sympathetic to the dissent’s frustration, which was also expressed by the dissenting Justices in Gonzalez-L o p e z

. For Mason, our decision may represent the very definition of a hollow victory. There is nothing to guarantee Mason a lighter sentence the second time around, and it is possible that he even could receive a harsher sentence. Alas, we are duty-bound by higher authority.
Because Mason’s Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel has been abridged, remand is obligatory. Mason is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
III.
W e A F F I R M M a s on’s conviction, but VACATE his sentence and R E M A N D for re-sentencing.

e f f e c t i v ely invok ed his Sixth Ame ndm ent right s wi ll leave dis tri ct cour ts gues sin g as t o wh ethe r amb iguous let ter s are requ es ting app oint ed c ouns el or me rely expr es sin g dis sat isf act ion wi th the def

enda nt’ s cur rent rep res enta tio n by ret ained couns el. This is a valid

conc ern. We agree that dis tri ct court s would benef it fr om a clea r st andar d regar ding wh at a def enda nt lik e Mas on mus t say to invok e his Sixth Ame ndm ent right s. This ques tio n wa s not
we ll- brie fed , how ever, a n d we are ther efo re loat h to dec ide it in this cas e. Mo reo ver, the pr es ent lack of clar ity is not a dir e pr oblem

. Mo st com mun icat ions , as the com mun icat ion in this cas e, wi ll eit her unam biguous ly requ es t or unam biguous ly fai l to requ es t cour t- app oint ed

couns el, and cour ts can err on the sid e of caut ion wi th res pec t to t r uly amb iguous

com mun icat ions by requ es ting clar ifi cat ion. We mus t als o em phas ize that th i s d e c i sio n app lies only to the narr ow c l a s s of cas es in wh ich a def enda nt wh o is fina ncial ly eligibl e for app oint ed couns el is nevert heles s rep res ente d by ret a in ed couns el, and then beco me s unhap py wi th his ret ained couns el and requ es ts a cour t- app o i n t e d l a w y er. Pres uma bly beca use it is

rar e for an indi g e n t d e fen dant to be able to ret ain couns el and beca use man y def enda nts (r ightly or wr ongly) are convin ced that they w i l l rec eive bett er rep res enta tio n fr om pr ivate rat her than app oint ed c o u n s el, the sit uatio n governe d by this cas e has , app aren tly, rar ely aris en, as r efl ect ed by t he dea rth of c ontr ollin g or eve n p ers uas ive autho rit y on poi nt.
19 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

REAVLEY, J., Dissenting:
I would affirm because the patient district judge committed no error. Mason had the assistance of his retained counsel from his initial appearance in
court through his sentencing, a n d h e makes no contention that this representation was ineffective. Yet the panel m ajority finds that Mason was denied the right to replace his counsel, and orders a re-sentencing.
I. The panel first faults the judge for failing to inform Mason of his right to court-appointed counsel at the June 23 hearing. With retained counsel present and after all that had been said by defendant about his counsel, it w a s not

necessary for the court to raise the right to have appointed counsel. Rule 11 does

r e quire the information to be given “if necessary.” However the rule b e construed, I could find no error for a judge not s t a t ing the right to appointed counsel under those circumstances, when it could imply to defendant the court’s lack of confidence in present counsel.
In United States v. Sanchez , we held that Rule 11 did not inflexibly require

a district court “to personally inform [the defendant] t h a t he was entitled to appointed counsel at all stages of the proceedings.” Rule 11’s current paragraph 1 (b)(1)(D) was at that time numbered (c)(2), and it began with the qualifying phrase “if the defendant is not represented by an attorney

. . . .” That phrase 2

was removed in the general restyling and restructuring of the Rules of Criminal

650 F.2d 745 , 748 (5t h Cir

. 1981)

. 1

Com pa re Fed. R. Crim

. P. 11(b )( 1)( D) ; wi th Fed. R. Crim

. P. 11(c )( 2), U. S. C.A. (We st , 2 2001)

. 20 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 20 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

P r o c e d u re undertaken in 2002. The change was not intended to alter paragraph 3 (c)(2)’s substance. 4
We recently relied on Sanchez in our unpublished opinion in United States

v. Saucedo-Rios

. The district court in that case had “faile d t o i n f o rm [the 5 defendant] that he had the right to court-appointed counsel.” We found no 6
violation of Rule 11. The omitte d a d v i c e would not have been helpful, we explained, because the defendant “was, in fact, represented by court-appointed counsel throughout the proceedings in the district court.” We cited Sanchez for 7
the proposition that “Rule 11 limits the necessity for such a charge to situations where the defendant is not represented by an attorney at the plea proceeding.” 8
I agree with Saucedo-Rios ’s interpretation of paragraph (b)(1)(D) to allow some discretion to forgo advice regarding appointed counsel, and the omission here was certainly harmless.
II. Mason’s com p l a i n t is that he was not given an appointed lawyer in

response to his letter to the court on August 2 0

. M o r e e f fect is given by this panel to Mason’s expression of dissatisfaction than the court has given in the past. See United States v. Dilworth , 524 F.2d 4 7 0 (5 Cir 1976). Mason’s t h
request was denied by the c o u r t , understandably after what had been said at the June 23 hearing and having no reason to th i n k M a s o n would not receive

Fed. R. Cr im

. P. 11, Advis ory Com mi tte e N ote s, 200 2 Am endm ents

. 3

The Advis ory Com mi tte e’s note s for the 2002 ame ndm ents expla in that the changes 4 mad e to Rule 11 we re “int ende d to be st yli s t i c o n l y, excep t as note d below .” The dis cus sio n fol low ing t hat st atem ent mak es no m enti on of sub st antive c hanges t o p aragr aph (c )( 2).

No. 09- 50987, 201 1 W L 368 4500, *1 ( 5th Cir. , Aug. 22, 2011) ( unpub lis hed)

. 5

Id. 6

Id. 7

Id. ( cit ing Sanc hez , 650 F.2d at 748 ( inte rnal quot atio n m ark s om itt ed) ). 8

21 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 21 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

competent representation from h i s a t torney. And that representation did continu e w ithout objection. Sentencing was set for September 28 but was continued u n til November 18 upon motion by the attorney Williams. On that date the defenda n t a p peared with Williams and sentencing was completed

w i t h o ut any complaint about or from counsel. I submit that there can be no legitimate objection to this judge’s performance.
But the majority holds that by denying Mason’s letter r e q u e sting appointed counsel, t h e d i strict court somehow deprived Mason of “[his] Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel

. . . .” I find this conclusion baffling. The panel cites only the Supreme Court decision stating that right to c h o i c e o f
counsel entitles “a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who w i l l r epresent him.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez

. It “does not go 9 beyond the individual’s right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and
assi s t a n c e of

. . . counsel.” Chaplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States

. 1 0
Mason never sought to r e p l a c e Williams with a new retained lawyer, and he never asked for time or assistance to find another retained lawyer.
T h e only right that Mason’s letter at mid-case could possibly implicate was h i s c o nstitutional right to a publicly paid attorney incident to his right t o effective assistance of counsel. When a defendant with an appointed attorney wishes to rep l a c e t h e attorney with a different appointed attorney, we require
the defendant to show good cause. United States v. Young. We require that 1 1 showing because “those who do not have the means to hire their own l a wyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented

. . . .” 1 2

548 U. S. 140 , 144, 126 S

. Ct. 255 7, 2561 (200 6). 9

491 U. S. 617, 626, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652 (198 9) (int erna l quot atio n mar ks om itt ed)

. 1 0

482 F.2d

. 993, 995 ( 5th Cir. 197 3). 1 1

Cha pl in & D rys dal e , 91 U .S

. at 624, 109 S

. Ct. at 2652. 1 2

22 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 22 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

Mason’s position is equivalent. The only cognizable ground on which he can be constitutionally e n t i tled to representation at public expense is that he cannot otherwise secure constitutionally effective representation. Surely establishing that requires some showing that his retained counsel’s assistance would likely fall short of the constitutional minimum. The panel majority does not think so. It takes the view that “Because Mason retained the right to choice of counsel, he

was not required to show good cause to substitute appoi n t e d counsel.” Mason did not “retain” the right t o c h oice of counsel in any way that sets him apart from a defendant who has accepted appointed counsel. Mason did not assert the right to choice of counsel, and the fact that he could have bears not at all on whether the district court should have appointed a lawyer to replace Williams. Parties to judicial trials may not at will chang e lawyers midway in the proceeding. This court considered the right to choose counsel in United States

v Dimitz , 538 F.2nd 1214 (1976), beginning with the Supreme Court opinion in
Powell v Alabama , 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932). We explained that the qualified right to choose one’s own counsel must be placed against the backdr o p o f j u dicial discretion. The judge has discretion i n d e c iding whether to allow changes in counsel considering the defendant’s choice and all circumstances. This panel skips the role of the judge and the need for cause to justify the change, and then

s w eeps aside my concerns, by declaring its decision to be the comman d o f t h e Supreme Court in Gon z a l e z -Lopez

. The panel takes Gonzalez-Lopez much too far. There the defendants chosen lawyer was removed unlawfully by the court and, despite repeated requests by the defendant, that chosen lawyer was denied him. Here, after hearings and accommodations for Mason, he writes a letter to the judge and despite all that went before and the continued representation by the same lawyer, we hold that this indication of Mason’s preference was enough
to nullify the sentence. What this panel does is p romote the right to choose counsel to give the defendant the decision on whom shall be his counsel at every

23 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 23 Date Filed: 01/19/2012No. 10-31240

stage of the case, except for changing appointed counsel. I find no justification for that exaggeration of Gonzalez-Lopez

. This decision m akes trouble for judges. Defendants who have already hired constitutionally adequate counsel may now unilaterally force substitution

o f court-appointed counsel at any time without any demonstration that their present counsel is unable or unwilling to con t i n u e representing them. This supplies defendants with a r e l i able delaying tactic, because new counsel will nearly always require a continuance to get up to speed. The fact-bound

c h a racter of the majority’s holding that Mason’s letter effectively asserte d h i s rights adds to the difficulties. Defendants in criminal cases are understandably anxious about the amount of time and attention their attorneys devote to their

cases. Many express the i r w o rries in letters directed to the presiding judge. Every time a defendant expresses dissatisfaction w i t h r e tained counsel, the district court will have to wonder whether the defendant’s communication is one that requires the court to choose between substituting appointed counsel or risking that every subsequent proceeding in the case will have to be done over again. Finally, I respectfully suggest to my Fifth Circuit colleagues that we not order resentencing unless the legal rights of a defen d a n t r e quire that. Resentencing burdens the marshals to transport and attend the defendant and then imposes on a busy district judge to repeat the sentencing.

24 Case: 10-31240 Document: 00511731148 Page: 24 Date Filed: 01/19/2012