alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.1
ORBITAL ATK, INC.
Description of Non-Employee Directors’ Cash and Equity Compensation, Effective as of August 10, 2017
Only non-employee directors receive compensation for service on the Company’s Board of Directors.
On August 10, 2017, Orbital ATK’s Board of Directors approved the following non-employee director compensation, effective immediately as of the election of directors to the Board at the annual meeting of stockholders on that date:
		
	•
	an award of restricted stock valued at $110,000 at the time of grant upon initial election to the Board and upon re-election at each subsequent annual meeting of stockholders (increased from $100,000);


		
	•
	an annual cash retainer of $75,000, with no additional fees paid for Board and committee meetings attended (no change to the previously-approved amount);


		
	•
	an annual cash retainer of $100,000 for the independent non-executive Chairman of the Board (Ronald R. Fogleman; increased from $90,000);


		
	•
	an annual cash retainer of $25,000 for the chair of the Audit Committee (increased from $18,500);


		
	•
	an annual cash retainer of $15,000 for the chair of the Compensation and Human Resources Committee, $15,000 for the chair of the Governance Committee and $15,000 for the chair of the Markets and Technology Committee (each retainer increased from $12,500); and


		
	•
	an annual cash retainer of $13,500 for each member of the Audit Committee, $7,500 for each member of the Compensation and Human Resources Committee, $7,500 for each member of the Governance Committee, $7,500 for each member of the Markets and Technology Committee and $2,500 for each member of the special subcommittee of the Markets and Technology Committee (no changes to the previously-approved amounts).


Cash amounts are paid annually in a lump sum upon election or re-election at the annual meeting of stockholders.
Directors who spend a significant part of a day on Company business issues beyond the normal scope of board member responsibilities receive an additional $1,000 per diem payment, plus expenses. The per diem is paid at the discretion of the Company’s Chief Executive Officer. Non-employee directors are also reimbursed for tuition and related expenses for continuing director education courses.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-22-00325-CR

MARK WRIGHT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 432nd District Court

of Tarrant County (1658302D)

September 7, 2023

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was error in the trial court’s Count Three judgment. We affirm the trial court’s Count 

One judgment (burglary of a habitation with intent to commit another felony, namely 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon). The trial court’s Count Three judgment is 

modified to delete the words “Yes, not a firearm” under the heading “Findings on 

Deadly Weapon.” It is ordered that the trial court’s Count Three judgment is affirmed 

as modified.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Elizabeth Kerr__________________

 Justice Elizabeth Kerr
United States 

Office of 

Personnel Management 

The Federal Government’s Human Resources Agency

Benefits Administration Letter 

Number: 08-306 Date: October 14, 2008 

Subject: 2009 FEHB Withholdings and Contribution Rates 

The official Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program withholdings and contribution 

rates for 2009 are available in a PDF file format on the OPM web site at 

www.opm.gov/insure/health/09rates/index.asp . These are the only rates agency payroll providers 

should use to update their systems and are effective for pay periods beginning after December 31, 

2008. 

The FEHB withholdings and contribution rates also are available in an ASCII and Excel file format. 

If you are a subscriber to "FINPAY" listserv, you will receive these files. If you are not a FINPAY 

subscriber and want these files, please email us at finance@opm.gov using “Want FEHB Rates” as 

the subject. We will email you the rate files. 

If you have questions about this letter, we recommend sending an email to finance@opm.gov. 

You also may call us on 202-606-0606. 

 

 

 Keith Willingham 

 Associate Chief Financial Officer 

 Center for Financial Services
Exhibit 23.1CONSENT OF T.J. SMITH & COMPANY, INC.      We hereby consent to the use of our report dated March 1, 2007 regarding Torch Energy RoyaltyTrust and to the reference to our firm included in this Form 10-K/A.         T.J. SMITH & COMPANY, INC.           By: /s/ T. J. Smith T.J. Smith  Houston, Texas
#### Anna Alessi, Plaintiff, *v.*Joseph Alessi, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Suffolk County,

January 15, 1958.

*Selkowe, Johnson, Zimbalist $ Romanoff*for plaintiff.

*Munley <& Meade*for defendant.

L. Barron Hill, J.

This is an application for an order of commitment of the defendant for failure to pay a fine of $900 imposed under a previous order of this court dated October 10, 1957. The fine and purge order contains a direction, that it be served on the defendant personally. This has not been done. If it cannot be done, the plaintiff’s remedy is,to move to resettle the order, not to disregard it. The cases cited by plaintiff are not in point. They are concerned with personal service of the basic order, i.e., the order which fixes the alimony and directs its payment. This subject is controlled by section 1172 of the Civil Practice Act. Here we are dealing with the directions in an order which establish the conditions for committing the defendant in this particular case. It is not a statute. It is a term of the order itself. On the subject of personal service of the basic order it might be well to point out that the case *(Bishock*v. *Bishock,*280 App. Div. 830), which approved service on defendant’s attorney, makes no mention of section 1172 of the Civil Practice Act, particularly to the last sentence thereof, which calls for personal service of an uncertified copy on the husband. This amendment was adopted in an attempt to clarify the conflict existing in previous decisions' of the appellate courts (see Twelfth Annual Report of N. Y. Judicial Council, 1946, p. 243). Without some discussion of the problem or some allusion to the relevant statute, it is not apparant how this isolated decision can be accepted as reversing all previous holdings on the subject. Supporting the personal service view prior to the amendment, which will be noted did not change the personal service requirement, but only the need to have the served copy certified, see *Tucci*v. *Tucci*(230 App. Div. 737); *270*Matzke*v. *Matzke*(185 App. Div. 533) and especially the opinion in *Shusterman*v. *Shusterman*(184 Misc. 1060, affd. 269 App. Div. 788), which collates most of the existing cases on the question at that time. Accordingly, the motion is denied. Submit order.
# C_2006224EN.01000602.xml

| 16.9.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.9.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Full Court) of 11 July 2006 — Commission of the European Communities v Edith Cresson

(Case C-432/04) (1)

1

(Article 213(2) EC - Article 126(2) EA - Breach of the obligations arising from the office of Member of the Commission - Deprivation of the right to a pension)

(2006/C 224/11)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Commission of the European Communities (represented by: H. P. Hartvig and J. Currall, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Edith Cresson (represented by: G. Vandersanden, L. Levi and M. Hirsch, avocats)

Defendant:

Intervener in support of the defendant: French Republic (represented by: E. Belliard, C. Jurgensen and G. de Bergues, Agents)

Intervener in support of the defendant:

Re:

Action under the third subparagraph of Article 231(2) EC and the third subparagraph of Article 126(2) of the Euratom Treaty — Forfeiture of pension rights of a former Commissioner — Breach of the obligations arising from the office of Commissioner

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Declares that Mrs Édith Cresson acted in breach of the obligations arising from her office as a Member of the Commission of the European Communities, for the purposes of Article 213(2) EC and Article 126(2) EA, in relation to the appointment of Mr René Berthelot and as regards the terms under which he worked; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that Mrs Édith Cresson acted in breach of the obligations arising from her office as a Member of the Commission of the European Communities, for the purposes of Article 213(2) EC and Article 126(2) EA, in relation to the appointment of Mr René Berthelot and as regards the terms under which he worked;

| 2. | As to the remainder, dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

2.

As to the remainder, dismisses the action;

| 3. | Orders the Commission of the European Communities, Mrs Édith Cresson and the French Republic to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Commission of the European Communities, Mrs Édith Cresson and the French Republic to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 300, 4.12.2004.

1

---
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3375 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3375

  To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to extend the 
   period during which a firearms licensee is required to wait for a 
  response from the national instant criminal background check system 
before being allowed to transfer a firearm to a prospective transferee.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 29, 2015

   Mrs. Lowey (for herself, Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney of New York, Mr. 
Cicilline, Mr. DeSaulnier, Ms. Frankel of Florida, Ms. Lee, Mr. Engel, 
    Mr. Honda, Mr. Beyer, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, and Mr. Serrano) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                             the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to extend the 
   period during which a firearms licensee is required to wait for a 
  response from the national instant criminal background check system 
before being allowed to transfer a firearm to a prospective transferee.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF THE FIREARMS TRANSFER WAITING PERIOD.

    Section 922(t)(1)(B)(ii) of title 18 United States Code, is amended 
by striking ``3'' and inserting ``14''.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendment made by this Act shall take effect 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### Abraham Iscovitz et al., Plaintiffs, *v.*Robert H. Fisher et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Bronx County,

February 1, 1957.

*659
      *James F. Reynolds*for plaintiffs.

*John G. O’Malley*for Raymond Fisher and another, defendants.

*Bernard Lefkowits*for Sal Fusco, defendant.

Feasgis X. Coxloít, J.

Plaintiffs seek a judgment declaring that defendants had no right to construct a wall on, or to change the grade of a strip of land owned by defendants Fisher. In addition they seek a mandatory decree directing the removal of the wall and the grading.

Admittedly, there is no express provision in any deed conferring any easement upon plaintiffs or their predecessors in title over any part of defendants’ property. Plaintiffs claim that such an easement is to be implied from the fact that both parcels of land at one time belonged to a common owner and from the alleged fact that the use of the strip of land belonging to defendants is necessary to the proper enjoyment of plaintiffs’ building. The court finds, however, that the use of defendants’ strip of land is not necessary to the enjoyment of plaintiffs’ property but is, at most, a convenience. Nor is any easement of light and air over defendants’ strip of land to be implied *(Pica*v. *Cross County Constr. Corp.,*259 App. Div. 128, 131). Furthermore, the common owner parted with the property now owned by defendants Fisher, prior to the time she divested herself of the property now owned by plaintiffs. The general rule is that *“*When there has once been a severance of the unity of title by a conveyance of a portion of a tenement, the grantee of the residue can take nothing by implication except what may have been reserved by the grantor.” (28 C. J. S., Easements, § 31, pp. 688-689.) This rule has been followed in this State *(Root*v. *Conkling,*199 App. Div. 90; *Stuyvesant*v. *Early,*58 App. Div. 242, 245). Implications of easements apply only over land still retained by the common grantor, and do not extend over property no longer belonging to the common grantor at the time he conveys the parcel claimed to possess the easement. (See 3 Tiffany on Real Property [3d ed.], § 779.)

Nor do plaintiffs make out an easement by prescription. There has been no adverse and exclusive user by plaintiffs and their predecessors in title for a period of 15 years. Whatever user there was was not adverse or exclusive. Furthermore, plaintiffs *660own their property less than 11 years and the deed to them does not purport to transfer any rights of their grantor over the strip of land in question (cf. *Rogoff*v. Neal *Vanderbilt Sons Corp.,*263 App. Div. 841).

Judgment is directed in favor of defendants declaring that plaintiffs possess no easement over the strip of land here involved and have no right to have the wall removed or the grading undone. The foregoing represents the decision of the court.

Submit judgment on two days ’ notice.
Exhibit 34.1



| |  |  |  |                                
| |  |  |  | -------------------------------
| |  |  |  | LOGO                           
| |  | 
| |  |  |  | Baker Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP
| |  |  |  | One Towne Sq, Ste 600          
| |  |  |  | Southfield, MI 48076-3710      
| |  |  |  | tel 248 372 7300               
| |  |  |  | fax 248 368 8950               
| |  |  |  | bakertilly.com                 

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

To the Board of Directors of VW Credit, Inc. and

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Indenture
Trustee:

We have examined VW Credit, Incs (the Company) compliance with the servicing criteria set forth in Title 17,
Section 229.1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commissions Regulation AB for the Companys Volkswagen Auto Lease Trust 2012-A (the Trust) asset backed securitization transactions except for the servicing criteria set
forth in Sections 229.1122(d)(1)(ii)-(iv), 229.1122(d)(2)(vi), 229.1122(d)(4)(ix)-(xiii), and 229.1122(d)(4)(xv), which the Company has determined are not applicable to the activities it performs with respect to the asset backed securities
transactions being serviced as of December 31, 2012 and for the period from June 21, 2012 (date of issuance) through December 31, 2012 (the Reporting Period). Management is responsible for the Companys compliance
with those servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the Companys compliance based on our examination.

Our
examination was conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Companys compliance with the servicing
criteria specified above and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing selected asset-backed transactions and securities of the Trust, testing selected servicing activities
related to the Trust, and determining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and performed those selected activities in compliance with the servicing criteria. Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the selected transactions
and servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this report. Our procedures were not designed to determine whether errors may have occurred either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances
or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report for the selected transactions or any other transactions. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not
provide a legal determination on the Companys compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, VW Credit, Inc. complied, in all
material respects, with the aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for the reporting period ended December 31, 2012.

/s/ Baker
Tilly Virchow Krause, LLP

Southfield, Michigan

March 22, 2013
Exhibit31.1

Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Certification
(Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Certification).

CERTIFICATION

I, Angelo Del Giudice, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form
10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Barclays Dryrock Issuance Trust (the “Exchange
Act periodic reports”);

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken
as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and
other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic
reports;

4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by the
servicers and based on my knowledge and the compliance reviews conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statements required in this
report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their
obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing
criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed
securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18
have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance
described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on
information provided to me by the following unaffiliated party: U.S. Bank National Association.

Date: March 25, 2022







|By: | /s/
Angelo Del Giudice                                                                                    
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    | Name: Angelo Del Giudice*                                                                                 
|    | Title: Chief Financial Officer                                                                            
|    | Barclays Bank Delaware                                                                                    
|    |                                                                                                           
|    | *Angelo Del Giudice is the senior officer in
	charge of the servicing function of Barclays 	Bank
	Delaware
|   
|
No. 72-6122.

#### Duvall *v.*United States.

Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied.

Mr. Justice Douglas would grant certiorari.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2469

RONNIE LYNN MOSS,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

MAXIMUS FEDERAL SERVICES; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES; TODAY'S OPTIONS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:13-cv-00562-JAG)

Submitted: March 18, 2014 Decided: May 2, 2014

Before SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronnie Lynn Moss, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Ronnie Lynn Moss seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order dismissing without prejudice the particularized complaint 

he filed in his challenge to the denial of a Medicare claim.

The complaint was dismissed after Moss failed to comply with the 

court’s direction to allege additional facts and provide 

documentation demonstrating his exhaustion of administrative 

remedies. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final 

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and 

collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 

545-46 (1949). The order Moss seeks to appeal is neither a 

final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order, 

as Moss may be able to save his action by filing an amended 

complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the district 

court. Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 

F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss the 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

DISMISSED
SANITIZED
SANITIZED
SANITIZED
SANITIZED
SANITIZED