discretion. 2 See Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 

601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). "The State is required to give 

adequate notice to the accused of the various theories of prosecution." 

State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Taylor), 116 Nev. 374, 377, 997 P.2d 

126, 129 (2000) (citing Alford v. State, 111 Nev. 1409, 906 P.2d 714 

(1995)). The information "standing alone must contain the elements of the 

offense intended to be charged and must be sufficient to apprise the 

accused of the nature of the offense so that he may adequately prepare a 

defense." Laney v. State, 86 Nev. 173, 178, 466 P.2d 666, 669 (1970); see 

also NRS 173.075(1); NRS 173.085; Simpson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 

Court, 88 Nev. 654, 659, 503 P.2d 1225, 1229 (1972). 

Petitioner argues that the language in the information 

alleging that he committed murder by "shooting at and/or into the body" of 

the victim "after challenging [the victim] to a fight" was not sufficient to 

adequately inform him of the State's challenge-to-fight theory of first 

degreemurder under NRS 200.450. We agree. In order to be found guilty 

of murder in the first degree under a challenge-to-fight theory, the State 

must prove that (1) petitioner and another person came to previous 

concert and agreement to fight, (2) petitioner gave or sent a challenge to 

fight to that other person or authorized any other person to give or send 

the challenge, (3) a fight actually ensued, (4) and a person died as a result 

of that fight. See NRS 200.450; see also The American Heritage Dictionary 

of the English Language 656 (5th ed. 2011) (defining fight as "[a] 

2We focus on Pimentel's request for a writ of mandamus as he has 

not asserted a claim that challenges the district court's jurisdiction. See 

NRS 34.320 (providing that writ of prohibition is available to halt 

proceedings occurring in excess of a court's jurisdiction). 

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confrontation between opposing groups in which each attempts to harm or 

gain power over the other, as with bodily force or weapons" (emphasis 

added)). The charge contained in the information in this case does not (1) 

allege that petitioner entered into an agreement to fight, (2) identify the 

other party to that agreement, (3) allege that a fight actually resulted 

from petitioner's challenge to the victim, (4) or allege that the victim's 

death was a result of such a fight. We conclude that the district court 

manifestly abused its discretion by finding the information to be sufficient 

and denying petitioner's pretrial petition because the challenged theory of 

first-degree murder is not sufficiently plain, concise, and definite to 

apprise the petitioner of the nature of the offense and therefore amounts 

to surplusage. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition GRANTED IN PART AND DIRECT THE 

CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

instructing the district court to strike the language "and/or after 

challenging ROBERT HOLLAND to a fight" from the information. 

J. 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. Carolyn Ellsworth, District Judge 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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