NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0762n.06 No. 09-1287 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. M ARIE J EA NE TTE M ASO N , Defendant-

Appellant
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEF ORE: BOG G S, C OLE, and C LA Y, Ci r c uitJudg e s. COLE, Circuit Jud ge. Def endant- Appellant Marie M ason pl eade d g uilty to three c riminal counts related t o the arson of Ag riculture H all at Michig an State Univer sity in Dece mber 1999 a

nd the ar son of commer cial log g ing e quipment in Mesick, Michig an in J anuary 2000. Mason now
a pp e a ls h e r 2 62 -m on th s e nte nc e on fo ur ba ses, con tendin g that: ( 1) he r s e nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly
unrea sonable; (2) the g overnme nt brea ched he r plea ag ree ment; (3) statutory

sentenc e dif

fe renc es in fede ral a

rson crimes violate equal protec tion; and (4) the rule of lenity should have be en applied to her c ase. F or the followingrea sons, we AF F IRM
. I. BACKG ROUND M a s o n is p art o f th e E arth L ib e r a ti o n F r o n t ( “ E L F ” ) , a mo v e me n t c o mm itte d to stopping
commerc ial, rese arc h, and other activities that its members consider harmful t o t h e natur al environment. The g roup enc ourag es ac tions that viol ate f eder al and state criminal laws a nd oftenNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 2 - acc omplishes its g oals throug h politically motivated violence desig ned to intimidate or coe rce the g e ne ra l c ivi lia

n p op ulatio n, pr ivate bu sin e ss, and g ov e rnme nt. Ar so n is on e of the mos t f

re qu e ntl y employ ed for

ms of EL F a ction. Ma so n a nd he r c o- c on sp ir a tor s le arn e d th a t A g ri c ulture Hal l at M ic hig an St a te Un ive rs ity (“MSU”) rec eived g overnme nt f unding for plant g enetic rese arc h, and on Dec ember 30, 1999, they discussed committing a

rson i n o rd er t o destroy

rese arc h rec ords and f

acilities. On De cembe r 31, 19 99 , Maso n and a c o- c on sp ir a tor se t f ir e to A g ri c ult

ur e Ha ll, c a

us ing$1 .1 mil lio n in

pr op e rt y damag e. Responding firef ighte rs fa ced a

substantial risk of phy sical injury in ex tinguishing the fl ame s. The ne x t day , J anuar y 1, 2000, Mason and he r co- conspirator s set fire to c ommercia l logg ing equipment that was pa

rked a long a

road near Mesick, Michig an. Mason admitted that the ar son was mot ivate d b y

a de sir e to i nti mid a te , c oe rc e , a nd de te r g ov e rnme nt a g e nc ie s, pr ivate or g anizatio ns , an d t h e g e n e r a l p u

b l i c f r o m c o n d u c t i n g o r s u p p o rt i n g t h e c o m m e r c i a l l o g g i n g i n d u s t r y. Pursuant to a plea a g ree ment with the g overnme nt, Mason pleade d g uilty to (1) conspira cy to c omm it a

rs on in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S.C. § 844( n) , b a se d o n b oth fi re s; ( 2) a g g ra

vate d a rs on in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) and (2) , based on the MSU fire; and ( 3) ar son in v i o l at ion of U.S.C. § 844(i), based on the log g ing eq u i p m en t fi re. A s part of he r plea ag ree ment, Mason admitted her r ole in the ar sons and her participation in twelve prior acts of pr operty destruction on behalf of EL F. Ma son also ack n o wl ed ged t h at she ha d committed betwee n $2.5 and $7 million worth o f proper

ty destruction on beha lf of EL F a nd that the offe nses cha

rg ed involved, or w ere intended to promote, a

“fe dera l crime of te rror ism” as def ined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g) (5).No. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 3 - I n r e tur n, the g ov e rnme nt p ro mis e d, a mon g oth e r thi ng s, “ no t to a dv oc a te fo r a se nte nc e to imprisonment of g reater than 240 months, even if the final adjusted a dvisory SentencingGuideline rang e propose [d] a hig her se ntence ,” and not “to appea l any sentenc e to imprisonment of at lea st 180 months.” (Plea Ag ree ment, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 101, at 12-13.) The Uni te d

St a te s Pr o b a ti o nan d

Pr e tr ia l S e r

v ic e s O f f ic e is s u e d anA me n d e d

Pr e s e ntence I nvestig ation Report (“ PSR ”). Using the 2008 version of the United States Sentenc ing Guidelines (“U .S.S.G.” or “Guide lines”), the PSR calc ulated Mason’s base offense level at twe nty -four . The of fe ns e l e v e l w a s t h e n i n c r e a s e d b y t w e l v e p u r s u an t t o U
. S
. S
. G
. § 3 A 1
. 4 ( a ) b e c a u s e t h e of

fe ns e involved or wa s intended to promote a fede ral act of terror ism, increase d by

three beca

use Mason held a lea dership role in the offe nse, incre ased by t wo b ec au se there wer e multiple counts, and
r e d u c e d b y t h r e e f

o r a c c e p t an c e o f

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. T h i s yi e l d e d ana d j u s t e d o f f e n s e l e v e l o f

t h i rt yeig ht. Mason had zero c riminal history points, which would ordinarily yield a cr iminal hist ory categ ory of I , resulting in a Guidelines ra ng e of 235 to 293 months. Be cause Mason qualified f or the U.S.S.G. §3A 1.4(b) terror ism a djustment, however, he r cr iminal hist ory cate g ory was incr ease d to cate go ry VI. T he PSR t here fore calc ulated Mason’ s adjusted Guidelines ra ng e at 360 to 480
months ’ i mpr iso nme nt. The district c ourt overr

uled Mason’s objection to the terror ism a djustment b ec au s e h er admissions in t he plea

ag ree ment made it clea

r that the a djustm en t applied. The c ourt noted, howeve r, that the a djustment was without gr adation a n d d ec l ined to apply the full twelve- level enhanc ement, opting to sentence Mason at off ense le vel thirty -two rather than thirty -eig ht. The cour t also found that the ter

rorism adjustment’s eff

ect of incre asing Mason’s cr iminal hist ory fromNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 4 - cate g o r y Ito c a te g o r

y V Id id n o t c a u s e ano v e r s tate me n t o f

h e r c r im in a l h is to r

y b e c a u s e s h e h ad
a dmi tte d in

he r p le a a g re e me nt t o p art ic ipatin g in a lon g lis t of

un c ha rg e d c ri me s. At the sentenc ing he aring , the g overnme nt presente d extensive, cumulative evidenc e of the fa c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe fi re s; E L F ’s “ ra dic a l” natur e and its c la ime d r e sp on sib ili ty for other acts of a rson; and Mason’ s continued involvement in violent protests. The g overnme nt ph ra se d it s se nte nc e re c omm e nd a tio n a s f oll ow s: Now, the g o v er n ment has re commended a sentenc e of 240 months, y our Ho no r, wh ic h w e kn ow is sig nif ic antl y be low

the a dv iso ry

g uid e lin e ra

ng e . T hat is ba se d o n a

numbe r o f c on sid erat io ns but, o f c ours e the g ov e rnme nt c ome s at th is fr om a dif fe re nt p e rs pe c tiv e tha

n th e Court

do e s. T h e g o v e r

n me n t– [r e a c h e d ] th e s e r e c o mm e n d a ti o n s a s p art t h r o u g h[s ic ] a ne g oti a tin g pr oc e ss, a ba

rg a ini ng pr oc e ss wit

h the de fe nd ant, wh a t is it wor th t o th is district, what was it wor

th to the Easter

n District of Michig an, Southern District of I ndiana, g lobally

what is it worth to the aff

ecte d districts to have to compromise other ong oing inve stigative activities. Ther e is a n element of marke t ethic, marke t motive that comes into a ne g otiated g overnme nt r ecommendation, and Irea liz e that . . . the Court doesn’t have that consideration at all. I ’m just e x plaining to the Court why we are rec ommending a

sentenc e that is so fa r b el o w the bottom of the advisory g uid e lin e ra

ng e . B a se d u

po n a ll the fa c ts and c ir c ums tanc e s o f o ur inv e sti g a tio n, pa st and pre sent, it made sense for the g overnme nt to bind it self to not advoca te for a sentenc e in excess of 20 y ear s, 2 4 0 m o n t hs, and we are g oing to stick by that even though a rguably we mig ht have g rounds not to. We are g oing to stick b y that promise, and the g overnme nt is not advoc at i n g fo r a sentence in excess of 240 months
. As [ defe nse co u n s el ] p o i n t s o u ti nh i s s en t en ci n g m em o , an d we ac kn o wl ed ge in ours, if the C o u rt dec ides in the exercise of its full dis cre tion to im pose that se nte nc e , w hil e it w ou ld b e te n y e ars , 1 20 months be low the g uid e lin e s, it w ou ld s til l be the mos t on e ro us se nte nc e imp os e d in a c a se of thi s sor

t to date . So ba se d o n a ll of those considera

tions a nd purely from the g overnme nt’s law en forc ement perspe ctive, we think a sentenc e of 240 months would be a ppropriate
.No. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 5 - (Sentenc ing H r’gTr., Dist. Ct. Docket No. 201, at 70-71.) Mason did not object at sentenc ing to a ny of the g ov e rnme nt’ s st a te me nts
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc e d M a so n to 24 0 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt o n th e c on sp ir a c y c ount, 262 months’ imprisonment on the ag g ravated ar son count, and 180 m o n t h s ’ i mprisonment on the
ar s o nc o u n t , a l l t o b e s e r

v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y. Ma so n ti me ly

fi le d th is a

pp e a l. II. AN AL YSI S A. Subst ant ive Re as ona ble ne ss 1. Standard of Review This court re views a district c ourt’s sentenc ing de termination for reasona bleness under

a d ef er ential abuse -of- discretion standa rd. United States v. Studabake r , 5 7 8 F
. 3 d 4 2 3 , 4 3 0 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007)). The rea sonablene ss inquiry ordinarily includes both proce dural a nd substantive components. Id. at 4 3 0 -3 1 (c i t i n g Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). H oweve r, bec ause Ma son does not challe n ge the proc edura l
re as o n ab leness of he r sentenc e, this court nee d only consider the substantive component. United States v. Tristan-Madrigal , 601 F.3d 629, 632 ( 6th Cir. 2010).

“ Th e e sse nc e of

a su bs tanti ve -r e a so na

ble ne ss c la im is whe the r the le ng th of the se nte nc e is ‘g reater than ne cessa

ry ’ to ac hieve the se ntencing g oals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 632- 3 3
. “ A s e n t e n c e i s s u

b s t an t i v e l y u n r e a s o n a

b l e i f t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rts e l e c t s t h e s e n t e n c e ar b i t r ar i l y, bases the sentenc e on impermissible f actor s, fails to c onsider pertinent § 3553(a) fac tors or g ives an
unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor.” Id. at 633. Although revie w for substantiveNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 6 - rea sonabl eness must take the totality of the c ircumstance s into account, id. , a sente nce w ithin the Guidelines rang e “warr ants a pre sumption of reasona bleness,” United States v. He rrera-Zuniga , 571 F.3d 568, 590 ( 6th Cir. 2009).

2. Discussion Mason ar g ues t hat her sentenc e is substantively unrea sonable be cause the district court: (1) failed to avoid un wa rr an t ed sentence dispar ities; (2) mecha nically applied the U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 te rr or ism a dju stm e nt; and

(3 ) b a se d it s se nte nc e pr ima ri ly on punis hme nt. ( a) Failure to avoid sentenc e disparities M a s o nar g u e s t h a th e r

s e n t e n c e i s u n r e a s o n a

b l e b e c a u s e f i f t e e no t h e r

d e f e n d an t s wh os e
c ri me s c a us e d mo re fi na

nc ia l da ma g e th an hers re c e ive d s e nte nc e s o f n o mo re tha n 1 56 months ’ imprisonment. As this court has previously stated, “‘ it is poi ntless’ for de fenda nts who rec eive within-Guidelines sentenc es to raise unwar rante d-disparity

claims.” United States v. Vassar , 3 46 F. Ap p ’x 1 7 , 2 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g United St ates v. Shrake , 515 F.3d 743, 748 ( 7th Cir. 2008)).

“ Th e Gu ide lin e s e xist to he lp e ns ur e that sim ila rl y -s itu a te d de fe nd ants are punis he d sim ila rl y . T hu s, ‘[s] entenc ing dispa

rities are at their e bb when t h e Guidelines ar e followe d.’” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Boscarino , 4 37 F .3 d 6 34 , 6 38 (7 th C ir . 2 00 6) ). Mo re ov e r, the se nte nc ing dis pa ri tie s in thi s
case are war

rante d beca

use most of the defe ndants to whom Mason ana logizes coope rate d with law enfor ceme nt and receive d the benefit of substantial-assistanc e motions that lowered the ir Guideline rang es. Cf. United States v. Phinazee , 515 F.3d 511, 520 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (re cog nizi ng cooper ation and substantial-assistance motions as a basis for war rante d sentenc ing disparities). I t is also unclea rNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 7 - whether the sentenc ing c ourts applied the ter rorism adjustment to th o s e d e f endants. B eca

use the other defe ndants wer e not similarly situated, Mason’s a

rgument nece ssarily

fails. ( b) Application of terroris m adjustment U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 Ma so n th e n c on te nd s th a t he r s e nte nc e is unr e a so na ble be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

imp ro pe rl y applied the terror ism a djustment. Rely ing on Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85 (2007), and Spears v. United States , 129 S. Ct . 840 (2009), Ma son argues that the district cour t should have de c lin e d to a

pp ly the a dju stm e nt b e c a

us e the Se nte nc ingCom mis sio n p ro mul g a te d th e te rr or ism adjustment p u rs u ant to cong ressional dire ctive, not pursuant to empiric al re sear ch. This ar g ument
m i sc on str ue s K imbrough and Sp e ar

s . Although those case s established that a district c ourt has dis c re tio n to va

ry c a te g or ic a lly fr om the Gu ide lin e s bas e d on poli c y dis a g re e me nts , ne ith e r c a se he ld that a dis tr ic t c ourt

is required

to vary
. See U

nite d States v. Barron , 557 F.3d 866, 871 ( 8th Cir. 2009) (noting that neither Sp e ar s nor Kimbrough “ ho ld[s ] that a dis tr ic t c ourt mu st

disag ree with any sentenc ing guideline, whethe r it ref lects a policy

judgme nt of Congr ess or the Commission’s ‘c ha ra c te ri sti c ’ e mpi ri c a l a

pp ro a c h” ); ac c or

d U nite d S tates v . A gu ila r-Hu e rta , 576 F.3d 365, 367- 68 (7 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; United States v. Huffstatler , 5 71 F .3 d 6 20 , 6 23 -2 4 ( 7th Cir . 2 00 9) ; cf. United States v. Kosack, 366 F. App’ x 642, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding t h at s en tence s imposed after Kimbrough and bef

ore Sp e ar s —and there fore befor e the clar ification that cate g orica l varianc e base d on policy disag ree ment is permissible—should be aff irmed if ther e is “no ba s i s t o assum e that the d i s trict court wa s unawa re of its authority ” to var

y cate g orica lly). Althoug h the district court’s state me nt t

hat a dmi ssi on s in

Ma so n’ s p le a

a g re e me nt “ re qu ir e ” th e app lic a tio n o f t he te rr or ism adjustment might by

itself g ive pau s e, t he cour t’s further

explanation—that the PS R and theNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 8 - indictment contained sufficient alleg ations to support the terr orism adjustment and that it was awa re of its discretion under Kimbrough and Sp e ar s —in dic a te s th a t the dis tr ic t c ourt un de rs too d it s authority to disag ree with the terror ism adjustment, but chose not to do so. Th e re c or d doe s not sup po rt Ma so n’ s fur the r co nte nti on that th e dis tr ic t c ourt me c ha nic a lly applied the terror ism a djustment a nd g ave that adjustment undue weig ht. The dis t ri ct court
rec og nized that the terror ism adjustment did not provide gra dation and then, rathe r than incr easing Mason’s off

ense le vel by

twelve a nd sentenc ing her at offe nse l evel thirty -eig ht, decide d to sentence her at offense level thirty -two.

( c) Failure to consider factors beyond punishme nt Mason also asse rts that her se ntence is substantively unrea sonable be cause the district court ignor ed her

arguments on various fac tors and base d its sentencingdeter mination solely

on the nee d to punish. This arg ument fails bec ause the district court discussed the releva nt § 3553(a) f

actor s and did not give unr easona

ble weig ht to any

one fa ctor. Ma so n’ s argume nt t

ha t g e ne ra l de te rr e nc e ha s n o c or re latio n w ithse nte nc e le ng th a nd sh ou ld not have b e e n c o n s id e r e d f a il s . T h e d is tr ic t c o urt s p e c if ic a ll y s tate d th a t it h a d c o n s id e r e d and reje cted the a

rgument, and this court has he ld that g ener al deter renc e is an a

ppropriate consideration at sentenc ing. See Phinazee , 515 F.3d at 515-16. Th e se nte nc ingtr ans c ri pt b e lie s Ma so n’ s ne xt c on te nti on —th a t the dis tr ic t c ourt

e sse nti a lly lumped toge ther spec ific dete rre nce a nd the potential for r ehabilitation, and ther efor e did not g ive due weig ht to these two fac tors. The district cour t discussed g ener al d eterrenc e and stated that the sentenc e imposed nee ded to send a clea r sig nal that Mason’s c rimes wer e so v i o l ati ve of soc ietalNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 9 - norms that those convicted would be incarce rate d for a substantial period of time. The district court then discussed spec ific deterre nce and s tated that it did not believe Mason’s assertions that she wa s surprised at the scale of the MSU explosi on and that she ha d not violated the terms of he r bond by
c on ta c tin g oth e r e nv ir on me nta lis t c ri min a ls. Mason also ar g ues that the district c ourt ignor ed her a rgument at sentenc ing that there w as
no ne e d fo r sp e c if

ic de te rr e nc e be c a

us e the se c ri me s we re c omm itt e d wh ile Ma so n wa s invo lve d w ith
on e pa rt ic ula r c o- c on sp ir a tor , F ra

nk Am br os e (h e r e x-hu sb and ), and a ft e r t he se tw o in div idu a ls
se pa rate d, neithe r e ng a g e d in

any su c h il le g a l a c tiv ity

a g a in. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt do e s n ot a

pp e ar t o have a ddresse d this arg um en t direc tly in imposi ng the sentenc e. Howe ver, “ district courts often (per missibl y ) re ject def endants’ se ntencingargument s i n d i rec tly when they

provide a ffirmative
re a so ns fo r i mpo sin g a

se nte nc e , an d we have ne ve r r e qu ir e d d istri c t c ourt s to re sp on d d ir e c tly to
ever y sentenc ing a

rgument.” United St ates v. Stee by , 350 F. App’x 50, 52 (6th Cir. 2009). Acc ording to the PSR , Ambrose a

nd Mason’s re lationship lasted fro m 1 9 9 9 to 2006, and by concludingthat Ma so n h a d c on ta c te d o the r e nv ir on me nta l- a c tiv ist c ri min a ls in viol a tio n of the te rm s of he r b on d in 2008, the di strict court seems to have implicitly reje cted Ma son’s argument that she wa s not involved in any illega l behavior a fter she and Ambrose separ ated. Finally , Mason fa

ults the district court’s re liance on te stimony at sentenc ing that she had contac ted individuals involved in criminal a c tivity while on bond and ther efor e wa s likely to reoff end. This argument fails bec ause the district court has a uthority to rec eive a

nd consider a

broad spe ctrum of information for sentenc ing pur poses. See18 U.S.C. § 3661.No. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 10 - For the re asons expressed a

bove, we conclude that Mason has not over come the pr esumption that her se ntence is substantively rea sonable. B. V iol at ion of P le a A gr e e m e nt Ma so n n e xt as se rt s th a t th e g ov e rnme nt v iol a te d h e r ple a a g re e me nt in two ins tanc e s: f ir st,
a t th e ini tia l se nte nc inghe ari ng , a nd se c on d, thr ou g h it s b ri e f o n a pp e a l. B oth

a sse rt ion s f

a il. 1. Initial Sentencing (

a) Standard of Review This court ordinar ily

employ s de novo re view in deter mining whether the g overnme nt has violated t he terms of a plea ag ree ment. See United States v. Que sada , 607 F.3d 1128, 1131 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ). Ho we v er , wh en a de fe n d an t fa i l s t o o b j ec tt o a p u rp o rt edv i o l at i o nat t h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, revie w is for plain e rror . Se e Un ite d S tates v . S wan be rg , 370 F.3d 622, 627 ( 6th Cir. 2004). “‘W h en re v i ew ing a

claim under

a plain er ror standa rd, this Court may

only reve rse if . . . (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain; (3) which aff ecte d the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously aff

ecte d the fairness, i nteg rity or publ ic reputation of t he judi cial proc eeding s.’” Id. at 627 (q u o t i n g United States v. Barne s , 278 F.3d 644, 646 ( 6th Cir. 2002)). “Plain er ror may be committed by the g overnme nt as well as by the district court.” Id. ( b) Discussion “Plea ag ree ments are to be enforce d acc ording to their t erms.” Un ite d Sta te s v . M on c iv ais , 492 F.3d 652, 662 ( 6t h C i r. 2007) “[W] hen a ple a re sts in any signific ant deg ree on a promise or ag ree ment of the prose cutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Sa nto be llo v . Ne w York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). “B eca use a de fenda

ntNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 11 - ob ta ins a pl ea ag re e me nt o nly a t th e e xpe ns e of

his c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts , ‘ pr os e c uto rs are he ld t o meticulous standards of

perf ormanc e.’” Mo nc iv ais , 4 9 2 F. 3 d at 6 6 2 (q u o t i n g United States v. Vav al , 404 F.3d 144, 152- 53 (2d Cir. 2005)). Ambiguities in a plea ag ree ment will be construed a g ainst the g overnme nt. Id. I n it s p le a

a g re eme nt wi th M a so n, the g ov e rnme nt a g re e d, a mon g oth e r t hin g s, “ no t to
a dv o c a t e f

o r a s e n t e n c e t o i mp r i s o n m e n t o f g r e a t e r th an 2 4 0 m o n t h s . ” ( P l e a A g r e e m e n t, D ist . Ct
. Docke t No. 101, at 12.) Mason asser ts that, a lthough the g overnme nt a dhere d to the letter of the plea ag ree ment and re commended a sentenc e of 240 months, it s vigor ous advoca cy during the sentenc ing he ari ngvio late d th a t a g re e me nt n on e the le ss. First, Mason a lleg es that the g overnme nt advocated for a sentenc e in excess of 240 months by pre s e n ti n g e v id e n c e a t th e s e n te n c in g h e ar in g o f f a c ts th a t th e PS R an d s ti p u lati o n s in the plea ag ree ment had already

established. In Mo nc iv ais , this c ourt distinguished betwee n “advoc acy , on one h an d , an d p r o v id in g th e d is tr ic t c o u rt w it h r e le v an t f

a c tu a l in f o r mati o n , o n th e other ha nd.” Id. at 664. The conduct in this case undoubtedly constituted advoca cy , beca use the g overnme nt was not providing any new fac tual information to the district court. Cf. United States v. Mondragon , 228 F.3d 9 7 8 , 9 8 0 (9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( p ro s ec u t o r a dv o ca t edwh en h i s co m m en t s “d i d n o tp ro v i d e t h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge with any new information or correc t any fac tual inacc urac ies”). Howeve r, t hat fact is not dispos itive be c a us e the ple a

a g re e me nt a llo we d th e g ov e rnme nt t o a dv oc ate fo r a se nte nc e up to 2 40 mon ths
. Fur thermore , there is e vidence that advoca cy was wa rra nted in this case be cause Mason was se eking
a s en t en ce fa r b el o w t h e go v ern m en t ’s l o we r l i m i to f a cc ep t ab i l i t y , 1 8 0 m o n t h s , an d p u rs u i n g a nonfrivolous, disparity -base d strat egy t o do so. Although Ma son argues that the g overnme ntNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 12 - prese nted more e vidence than necessar y under the circ umstances to persua de the dist rict cour t to meet but no t e xce e d it s ta

rg e t of 24 0 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt, sh e ha s p ro vid e d n o s up po rt fo r t his contention. Indeed, the adjusted Guidelines rang e that the di strict court ultimately settled on was 210- 26 2 mo nth s; at th a t r ang e , it wa s a pp ro pr iate fo r the g ov e rnme nt to a dv oc ate fo r a se nte nc e c los e r t o 240 months than 210 and to prese nt evidence in support of its posit ion. The g overnme nt’s advoca cy in this case did not constitute err or. While some courts have conclude d that the g overnme nt’s advoca cy violated a plea ag ree ment, those ca ses involved promises not to rec ommend a sentence at all. See, e .g. , Mondragon , 22 8 F .3 d at 98 0; Un ite d S tates v . R e wis , 96 9 F .2 d 9 85 , 9 88 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 2) (h old ingthat th e g ov e rnme nt b re a c he d it s p romise “ no t to
rec ommend what sente nce should be imposed” whe n it included in s en t en ci n g memoranda a “‘diatribe’ a

bout [ the def

endant’ s] noncooperation and how noncoope ration must be deter red to stave off t h e enc roac hing c riminal element” ). In contra st, the circumstanc es in this case—that the g overnme nt could not advocate for mor e than 240 months but would not support a sentenc e less than 180 months, that Mason was targ eting a sente nce be low 180 months, and that the adjusted Guidelines
ra ng e e nc omp a sse d s e nte nc e s b e low 24 0 mo nth s—

jus tif ie d th e g ov e rnme nt’ s a c tio ns . Second, Mason contends that the gover nment violated t he plea ag ree ment by discussing the sentenc ing- rec ommendation provision of t he plea ag ree ment in a way that, in effe ct, urg ed the district court to disreg ard i t
. Specifica lly she ar g ues that, by

commenting multipl e times on the district
c ourt ’s se nte nc ingdis c re tio n, e mph a sizi ng that its “ mark e t e thi c , mark e t mot ive ” wa s in c on tr a st w ith the district court’s motives, empha siz ing how its recommendation was “so fa r below” the GuidelinesNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 13 - rang e, and obliquely

sug g esting that Mason had violated the plea agr ee ment, the g overnme nt undermined a

nd eff ectively urg ed the district cour

t to disreg ard its sentenc ing r ecommendation. The g overnme nt is not required to suppor t enthusiastically

an agree d-upon re commendation. Un i t ed States v. Benc himol , 471 U.S. 453, 455-56 (1985). H oweve r, satisfying ple a agree ment obligations “‘re quires more t h an l i p service on a prose cutor’s pa rt[; S upreme Court case law] proscr ibes not only expli cit repudiation of the g overnme nt’s assura nces, but must in the intere sts of fairne ss be rea d to forbid end- runs ar ound them.’” Mo nc iv ais , 4 9 2 F. 3 d at 6 6 2 (q u o t i n g United States v. Saxe na , 229 F.3d 1, 6 ( 1st Cir. 2000)) (interna l quotation marks and bra ckets omitted). M ason analog izes to United States v. Canada , 960 F.2d 263 ( 1st Cir. 1992), in which the First Circuit held that the g overnme nt had brea ched its a g ree ment to rec ommend a 36-month sentenc e when it fa iled to make the r ecommenda tion ex plicitly , its “ref

ere nces to the a g ree ment wer e g rudg ing and apolog etic,” a

nd it urg ed the district court to impose “a le ng thy period of inc arc eration.” Id. at 269. T h e Canada court he ld that the g overnme nt had only “paid ‘ lip service’ to the neg otiated
a g re e me nt” and

that, “ [w]hi le a

pr os e c uto r n or

ma lly ne e d n ot p re se nt p ro mis e d r e c omm e nd a tio ns to the court with a

ny particula

r deg ree of enthusiasm, it is i mproper f or the prose cutor to inject mate rial
rese rvations about the a g ree ment to which the g overnme nt has committed itself.” Id. at 2 7 0
. The prosec utor, the cour

t continued, “wa s not at liberty to cut off the g overnme nt’s ag ree ment at the knees” and must “re fra in[ ] from conspicuously undermining its ag ree d position.” Id. T h e p r o s e c u to r ’ s s tate me n ts in th is c a s e d o n o t r is e to th e le v e l o f “ in je c t[ in g ] m ater ial
rese rvations about the ag ree ment” found in Canada
. Viewingthe colloquy in full, we ar e not of the view that the g overnme nt was attempting to a void upholdingits part of the ba rg ain. This is bolsteredNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 14 - by the fact that the prosecutor i n Mason’s case e x plicitly rec ommended 240 months, a fa ct that was not present in Canada
. Cf

. , e.g. , B a r n es , 2 78 F .3 d at 64 8 ( ho ldi ngthat th e pr os e c uto r’ s f a ilure to expressly make a n ag ree d-upon re commendation bre ache d the plea a g ree ment). 2. Appeal Mason also ar g ues that the g overnme nt’s appellate brief, which “attempts t o j u s tify ” the district court’s 262-month sentenc e, is “in vi olation of t he plea ag ree ment.” (Appe llant Reply Br . 2.) Mason’s a

tt empt to char acte rize the g overnme nt’s defe nse of a sentenc e on appe al as “ advocating f or”
a c e rt a in s e nte nc e ne c e ssa

ri ly fa ils . O n a

pp e a l, t he iss ue is not wh a t th e a

pp ro pr iate se nte nc e sh ou ld be, but whethe r the sentence was i mposed in violation of l aw. Def endingthe leg ality

of a se ntence is not the same as advocating for a particula r sentenc e. The g overnme nt must be allowed to take the p o s i t i o n t h a t a s e n t e n c e t h a t i s h i g h e r t h an i t s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n w a s n o n e t h e l e s s i mpo se d in
acc ordanc e with the law.No. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 15 - C. Equa l P r ot e c ti on C lai m T h e M S U f

i r e c r e a t e d

a s u b s t an t i a l r i s k

o f p e r s o n a l i n

j u r y, b u t d i d n o t a c tu a l l y c a

u s e i n j u r y. The statutory penalty for this ty pe of arson—c ausing risk of injury but not actual injury

—is harsher under 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) , the provision g overningarson of a fe dera lly

funded building , than under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the provision g overningarson of a building used in inter state commer ce. Ma son contends that this dist inction violates equal prote ction, and thus that she should have been se ntence d under the lesser pe nalties of § 844(i). Be cause Mason did not object to her se ntence on e q u a l- p r o te c tion g rounds at the district cour t level, we revie w her

claim for pla in error
. See U nited States v. De dman , 527 F.3d 577, 591 ( 6th Cir. 2008). This court a

pplies a rational-basis revie w to leg islative distinctions th at d o n o t involve “a suspect classification based on rac e or other forbidden g rounds.” United States v. Dunham , 295 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2002)
. A classification subjec t to rational-ba sis r eview violates equa l protection if it is not rationally

related to a leg itimate gove rnment purpose
. See W arren v. Ci ty of Athens , 411 F.3d 697, 710 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Ma so n’ s argume nt f

a ils be c a us e the dif

fe re nc e in p un ish me nt u

nd e r § 84 4( i) and § 8 44 (f

) i s rationally related to the leg itimate gove rnment intere st of protec ting g overnme nt-funded institutions and employ ees of

those institut ions. Cf. United States v. Batchelde r , 442 U.S. 114, 124-25 (1979) (h old ingthat th e imp os iti on of dif fe re nt i mpr iso nme nt terms und e r d if fe re nt, but pa

rt ia lly
ov e rl a pp ing , f ir e arm -p os se ssi on

statut e s d oe s n ot v iol a te equal pr ote c tio n) . T he ars on statut e is simil ar to other

statutes that protec t gove rnment prope rty , see, e .g. , 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 666, 1361, andNo. 09-1287

USA v. M ason

- 16 - U.S.S.G. pr ovisions that impose harshe r pena lties for har m to the gove rnment, see, e .g. , U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7. D. Rule of Leni ty F ina lly , M a so n c on te nd s th a t th e dif fe re nc e s in

punis hme nt u

nd e r § 84 4( f) and

§ 8 44 (i )
re nd e r t hat st a tut e a mbi g uo us su c h that the d ist ri c t c ourt sh ou ld h a ve a

pp lie d th e ru le of

le nit y to sentenc e her

under the lesser pe nalties of § 844(i). This c ourt revie ws questions of statutory interpre tation de novo. United St ates v. Suarez , 263 F .3 d 4 68 , 4 76 (6 th C ir
. 20 01 ). Ho we ve r, be c a us e Ma so n r a ise s th e iss ue fo r t he fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l, plain-er ror a naly sis applies. Id. The rule of lenity

“‘a p p l i es o nly

when, a fter c onsulting traditional ca nons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambig uous statute.’” Burgess v. United States , 553 U.S. 124, 135 (2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Uni t ed

S t a t es v. Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994)). The sections at issue ar e not ambig uous beca

use t heir plain lang uag e indicate s that § 844(f) g overns a rson of a fede rally funded bu ild ing , w hil e § 844 (i ) g ov e rn s ar so n of a bui ldi ng us e d in in te rs tate c omm e rc e . A lth ou g h f e de ra lly funded b u il d in g s ma

y a ls o b e u s e d in inte r s tate c o mm e r c e s u c h th a t a d e f e n d an t— s uch as Mason—could be c harg ed under both provisions for the same arson, this overla p in cover ag e does not rende r t he st atute ambiguous. See B atchelder , 442 U.S. at 121- 22 (“[T]hat [a statute] provides dif fe re nt p e na lti e s for e sse nti a lly the same c on du c t is no jus tif ic a tio n f or takin g lib e rt ie s w ith
un e qu ivo c a l st a tut or

y langua g e .” ). Ma so n’ s r

ule of le nit y argume nt t

he re fo re fa ils
. III . C ON CL USI ON F or the pr e c e din g re a so ns , M a so n’ s se nte nc e is AF F IRM ED
.