[Cite as Fernando v. Fernando, 2017-Ohio-9323.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Champa Fernando, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 16AP-788 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 15DR-450) 

Shanaka J. Fernando, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 29, 2017 

 

On brief: Petroff Law Offices, LLC, Ronald R. Petroff, and 

Michelle J. Askins, for appellee. 

On brief: Atkins and Atkins Attorneys at Law, Jacqueline 

Baumann, and Arianna Atkins, for appellant.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

DORRIAN, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Shanaka J. Fernando, appeals the October 19, 2016 

judgment entry and final decree of divorce entered by the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations. For the following reasons, we affirm in 

part and reverse in part. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Appellant and plaintiff-appellee, Champa Fernando, were married on 

January 6, 1996, and three children were born as issue of the marriage. On February 10, 

2015, appellee filed a complaint for divorce. On January 22, 2016, the parties submitted 

an agreed entry settling their personal property issues. On March 4, 2016, the parties 

submitted and the trial court accepted a document containing agreed joint stipulations 
No. 16AP-788 2 

and a divorce settlement memorandum. As relevant to the present appeal, the parties 

stipulated that, in addition to the marital residence located in Dublin, Ohio, they were 

joint owners of five properties located in Sri Lanka: one located in Seeduwa ("the Seeduwa 

property"), three located in Bollatha ("the Bollatha properties"), and one located in 

Colombo ("the Colombo property"). The parties stipulated appellee would retain the 

marital residence and appellant would be entitled to a share of the equity of the marital 

residence, as determined by the court. The parties also entered stipulations regarding 

their automobiles, spousal support, life insurance, retirement accounts, financial 

accounts, and custody of their children. 

{¶ 3} A hearing was conducted in early March 2016, with the final day of the 

hearing occurring on March 15, 2016. Following the hearing, on October 19, 2016, the 

trial court entered a judgment granting a final decree of divorce. With respect to the Sri 

Lankan properties, the divorce decree provided appellant would retain the Seeduwa 

property and the Bollatha properties. The decree further provided that the land portion of 

the Colombo property was appellee's separate property, and appellee would retain it. The 

court held the building located on the Colombo property was marital property, and each 

of the parties was entitled to one-half of the equity in that structure. The trial court also 

held appellee was entitled to half of the profits from the sale of another Sri Lankan 

property ("the Ja-Ela property") the parties previously owned, which appellant sold in 

2013. The decree further provided for division of the parties' automobiles and other 

assets and accounts, and for custody of the children. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 4} Appellant appeals and assigns the following six assignments of error for our 

review: 

[I.] The lower court in its Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce 

erred and abused its discretion by determining the parties' de 

facto termination of marriage date was after the date of the 

final hearing. 

[II.] The lower court in its Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce 

erred and abused its discretion by failing to make an equitable 

division of martial property when it excluded the value of the 

cars in the property division. 
No. 16AP-788 3 

[III.] The lower court in its Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce 

erred and abused its discretion by failing to make an equitable 

division of martial property when the court chose an arbitrary 

amount in determining the value of the Colombo property. 

[IV.] The lower court in its Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce 

erred and abused its discretion in determining the amount of 

rental income received by Appellee for purposes of property 

division. 

[V.] The lower court in its Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce 

erred and abused its discretion in including the proceeds of 

the Ja-Ela property in the division of property which resulted 

in an inequitable division of property. 

[VI.] The lower court in its Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce 

erred and abused its discretion in determining that the land 

located on the Colombo property was Appellee's separate 

property. 

III. Discussion 

A. Duration of the Marriage for Property Valuation 

{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court abused its 

discretion by holding that the parties' marriage terminated as of the date of the final 

judgment entry rather than the date of the final hearing. Appellant argues the trial court 

effectively found a de facto termination date that was contrary to the statutory 

presumption for when a marriage terminates for purposes of property valuation and the 

facts in this case. 

{¶ 6} "Because the value of an asset may change over time, the court must select a 

date as of which to value marital assets." Rossi v. Rossi, 8th Dist. No. 100133, 2014-Ohio1832, ¶ 29. See also Heyman v. Heyman, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-475, 2006-Ohio-1345, ¶ 31 

("The first step in making an equitable distribution of marital property is to determine the 

duration of the marriage."). R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a) creates a presumption that the term of 

a marriage for purposes of property valuation is the time from the date of the marriage 

through the date of the final hearing in an action for divorce. Meeks v. Meeks, 10th Dist. 

No. 05AP-315, 2006-Ohio-642, ¶ 50. If the court determines use of that date would be 

inequitable, however, it may select a termination date that it considers equitable. R.C. 

3105.171(A)(2)(b). "[A] trial court may use a de facto termination of marriage date when 
No. 16AP-788 4 

the evidence clearly and bilaterally shows that it is appropriate based upon the totality of 

the circumstances." Meeks at ¶ 50. The court has discretion whether to use the final 

hearing date or a de facto termination date and this decision is subject to review for abuse 

of discretion. Id.

{¶ 7} An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is "unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). "A 

decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support the 

decision." AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 

Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). An arbitrary decision is one that lacks adequate determining 

principle and is not governed by any fixed rules or standard. Porter, Wright, Morris & 

Arthur, LLP v. Frutta Del Mondo, Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-69, 2008-Ohio-3567, ¶ 11. 

An unconscionable decision may be defined as one that affronts the sense of justice, 

decency, or reasonableness. Id. 

{¶ 8} The final hearing in this case occurred on March 15, 2016. The trial court 

entered its final judgment granting the divorce on October 19, 2016. In the divorce 

decree, the court found the duration of the marriage was from January 6, 1996 until the 

date of filing of the divorce decree—i.e., October 19, 2016. The trial court did not declare 

any alternative termination date or duration of the marriage for purposes of property 

valuation. Thus, in effect, the court held that the duration of the marriage for purposes of 

property valuation and distribution was from January 6, 1996 until October 19, 2016. See 

Pierron v. Pierron, 4th Dist. No. 07CA3153, 2008-Ohio-1286, ¶ 1 ("Where a decree is 

silent about the date of distribution, the date the marriage terminates controls that 

issue."). 

{¶ 9} The majority of the property valuation and distribution issues presented in 

this case were not impacted by the trial court's determination of the marriage termination 

date. As discussed below, the trial court made its valuation and division of real property 

based on appraisals and evidence presented at trial. The parties stipulated to the values of 

their automobiles and the court found the parties had no joint financial accounts. The 

divorce decree provided each party would retain his or her respective life insurance policy, 

thus there was no need to determine a date for dividing the value of those policies. 

Similarly, the court found neither party owned any stocks, bonds, or mutual funds, so 
No. 16AP-788 5 

there was no need to determine an appropriate valuation date for distribution of those 

assets. However, the court found the parties' retirement accounts were marital property 

and ordered them to be equally divided. The trial court did not provide a specific date for 

valuation of those retirement accounts; therefore, the order effectively provided that they 

were to be divided equally based on the value as of the date of the final judgment entry. 

See Pierron at ¶ 1. Accordingly, we must consider whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by effectively holding that the termination date of the marriage for purposes of 

property valuation was the date of the final judgment entry, rather than the date of the 

final hearing. 

{¶ 10} As explained above, there is a statutory presumption that, for the purposes 

of property valuation, a marriage terminates as of the date of the final hearing, but a trial 

court may find a de facto termination date if using the date of the final hearing would be 

inequitable. Generally, a trial court may find a de facto termination date of a marriage at 

some point prior to the final hearing on the divorce petition, based on the facts and 

circumstances in the case. See Meeks at ¶ 50 ("Although there may be a de facto 

termination of the marriage prior to the date of the final divorce hearing, such 

termination must be clear and bilateral, not unilateral. Generally, trial courts use a de 

facto termination of marriage date when the parties separate, make no attempt at 

reconciliation, and continually maintain separate residences, separate business activities, 

and separate bank accounts."); Mantle v. Sterry, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-286, 2003-Ohio6058, ¶ 13 ("The applicable case law [regarding determination of a de facto termination 

date] simply requires the trial court to consider all facts relevant to the issue of whether 

the parties' marriage was irretrievably broken at some point in time prior to the final 

hearing date."). Factors to be considered in determining whether to declare a de facto 

termination date include "whether the parties made a clear and bilateral decision to 

separate, whether the marriage was irretrievably broken at the time of separation, 

whether the separation was friendly, whether the parties engaged in sexual relations after 

the date of separation, whether either party had begun to cohabitate with another 

following separation, and whether the parties maintained separate financial 

arrangements." Heyman at ¶ 33. The parties' agreed joint stipulations provided, in 

relevant part, that they were incompatible and had lived separate and apart for over one 
No. 16AP-788 6 

year without interruption and without cohabitation as of that date. These stipulations 

suggest the parties had made a clear and bilateral decision to separate and that the 

marriage was irretrievably broken at the time of the hearing in March 2016, if not earlier. 

The trial court's decision did not contain any discussion or analysis of the de facto 

termination date factors. 

{¶ 11} Additionally, as appellant notes on appeal, use of the date of the judgment 

entry as the marriage termination date for property valuation may create problems in 

equitably dividing marital property because the evidence presented at a hearing relates to 

the value of the property as of that time, not as of the eventual date of a final judgment 

entry. See Rossi at ¶ 30 (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to apply 

the date of final judgment entry as the termination date of the marriage and stating that 

"use of the date of final judgment as the marriage termination date in valuing and 

distributing marital property would be virtually unworkable"). 

{¶ 12} The trial court failed to specify a marriage termination date for purposes of 

property valuation, thereby effectively holding that the marriage terminated for purposes 

of property valuation as of the date of the final judgment entry. The trial court did not 

address the statutory presumption contained in R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a) or any equitable 

factors that might make an alternative date appropriate. Thus, the decision failed to set 

forth any reasoning process or determining principle to support the court's rejection of 

the statutory presumption and effective use of an alternate marriage termination date for 

purposes of property valuation. 

{¶ 13} Accordingly, we sustain appellant's first assignment of error. 

B. Issues Related to the Colombo Property 

{¶ 14} Next, we turn to appellant's third, fourth, and sixth assignments of error, 

which relate to the Colombo property. 

{¶ 15} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by 

concluding that the land portion of the Colombo property was appellee's separate 

property. 

{¶ 16} The Colombo property consisted of a plot of land, given by appellee's father 

in 2001 ("the Colombo land") and a multi-story, multi-unit building that was completed 

in 2010 ("the Colombo building"). Both appellant and appellee testified the Colombo 
No. 16AP-788 7 

building was constructed using marital funds. The trial court concluded the Colombo 

building was marital property, and neither party disputes that finding on appeal. The trial 

court further concluded the Colombo land was appellee's separate property. Appellant 

argues the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion. 

{¶ 17} In divorce proceedings, the court is required to determine what constitutes 

marital property and what constitutes separate property. R.C. 3105.171(B). Marital 

property does not include separate property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b). Separate property is 

defined by statute, in relevant part, as "[a]ny gift of any real or personal property or of an 

interest in real or personal property that is made after the date of the marriage and that is 

proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one spouse." R.C. 

3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii). The statute further provides that the commingling of separate 

property with any other type of property does not destroy its identity, unless the separate 

property is not traceable. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). When the parties contest whether an 

asset is marital or separate property, it is presumed to be marital property unless proven 

otherwise. Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1161, 2011-Ohio-6819, ¶ 11. 

The party requesting that an asset be classified as separate property bears the burden of 

tracing it to his or her separate property. Id. We review a trial court's determination of 

property as marital or separate under a manifest weight standard, and will affirm a trial 

court's determination if it is supported by some competent, credible evidence. Roush v. 

Roush, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1071, 2017-Ohio-840, ¶ 18, citing Banchefsky v. Banchefsky, 

10th Dist. No. 09AP-1011, 2010-Ohio-4267, ¶ 36. 

{¶ 18} Appellant testified at trial that he initially did not have a good relationship 

with appellee's parents, but by the time of the marriage and thereafter he was on good 

terms with them. He stated the Colombo land was given as a gift by appellee's father to 

benefit the family—i.e., appellee, appellant, and their children. Appellant testified it was 

his intention the couple would occupy part of the Colombo building after retiring. On 

appeal, appellant claims the Colombo land was intended to be a wedding gift to the 

couple, but that delivery of the gift was delayed until five years after the marriage because 

there were squatters living on the land. 

{¶ 19} Appellee testified the Colombo land was a gift from her father, received in 

December 2001, given solely to her. She stated that her father subdivided a plot of land 
No. 16AP-788 8 

and gave a portion to each of his daughters. Appellee testified that, although she and 

appellant had been married five years and had their first child at the time of the gift, it was 

intended solely to benefit her. Appellee stated she did not intend to reside on the 

Colombo land in retirement, and that the Colombo building was constructed to be leased 

to others for profit. Appellee testified the Colombo land was titled in her name alone. 

Appellee introduced a copy of the deed of gift from her father naming her as the recipient 

of the gift and an affidavit from her father, made in 2011, attesting the Colombo land was 

a gift to appellee and not to appellant. On cross-examination, appellee admitted the 

affidavit from her father was prepared around the time of a prior divorce filing, which she 

subsequently withdrew. 

{¶ 20} Appellant argues the trial court erred by concluding the Colombo land was 

appellee's separate property. Appellant claims the use of marital funds to maintain the 

property, build the Colombo building, and pay property taxes on the Colombo land 

demonstrate the Colombo land was marital property. Appellant claims the fact that the 

Colombo land is titled in appellee's name alone is not conclusive as to whether it is marital 

or separate property. Appellant argues the affidavit from appellee's father should be given 

little weight because it was prepared in anticipation of a divorce proceeding. Appellant 

further argues appellee was not a credible witness because she failed to provide certain 

information on her financial disclosures and tax returns. 

{¶ 21} Appellant also cites the decision of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals in 

Stacy v. Stacy, 11th Dist. No. 2004-A-0076, 2005-Ohio-5289, in support of his claim that 

the Colombo land was marital property. In Stacy, Ronald Stacy claimed the trial court 

erred by concluding that a vacant parcel of land given by his mother was marital property. 

Id. at ¶ 14. The lot was transferred by a quitclaim deed from Ronald's mother to Ronald 

and his then-wife Sherri. Ronald testified it was his idea to put his wife's name on the 

deed. Following the transfer, the property taxes on the lot were paid from marital funds. 

Ronald's mother testified it was her intention that the gift was solely for Ronald and that 

the lot was to be returned to her if the couple wanted to sell it. Id. at ¶ 17. The trial court 

concluded the lot was marital property, noting that the deed was prepared by legal 

counsel and that if Ronald's mother had intended it to be a gift solely to him, that could 

have been reflected by making the deed to Ronald alone. The court also noted the alleged 
No. 16AP-788 9 

restriction on sale of the property could have been included in the deed, but was not. The 

trial court concluded that testimony from Ronald and his mother was a self-serving 

attempt to retain a valuable asset. Id. at ¶ 19. Noting there was conflicting testimony 

regarding whether the gift was intended for Ronald or for the couple, the court of appeals 

affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding that Ronald failed to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence the gift was intended solely for him. Id. at ¶ 20. Appellant argues the 

present case is analogous to Stacy because the property taxes on the Colombo property 

were paid with marital funds. Despite this similarity, there is a substantial difference in 

the present case, in that the deed of gift conveying the Colombo land was made solely to 

appellee. Thus, we are not persuaded the reasoning of the Stacy decision applies in the 

present case. 

{¶ 22} The fact that appellee holds title to the Colombo land is not conclusive as to 

its identity as marital or separate property. R.C. 3105.171(H). See also Wolf-Sabatino at 

¶ 66. Although the trial court referred to that fact as strengthening appellee's claim of 

separate property, it did not rely solely on appellee's individual ownership of the property 

in reaching its conclusion. The court also found the deed, the trial testimony, and the 

affidavit from appellee's father clearly established his intent to give the Colombo land 

solely to appellee. To the extent appellant challenges the credibility of appellee's 

testimony or the affidavit from appellee's father, those issues were raised at trial and the 

court was able to consider them in evaluating and weighing the evidence. "It is the place 

of the trial court, not the reviewing court, to assess the credibility of the witnesses." 

Heyman at ¶ 18. Under the circumstances in this case, we conclude there was competent, 

credible evidence to support the trial court's conclusion and, therefore, the finding that 

the Colombo land was appellee's separate property was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. Compare Crowder v. Crowder, 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1124 (Aug. 5, 1999) 

(holding that even if lump sum mortgage payment and monthly mortgage payments on 

the marital residence made by appellant's father were considered gifts, there was no 

evidence they were given only to the appellant); Pettry v. Pettry, 81 Ohio App.3d 30, 34-

35 (10th Dist.1991) (holding that despite appellant's testimony that a down payment on 

the marital home was advanced by her parents, she failed to demonstrate the down 

payment was intended to be a separate gift to her, rather than a gift to the couple). 
No. 16AP-788 10 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sixth assignment of error. 

{¶ 24} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining the value of the Colombo property. As explained above, we 

conclude the trial court's determination that the Colombo land was appellee's separate 

property was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, in considering 

appellant's third assignment of error, we will evaluate whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining the value of the Colombo building, which it found to be marital 

property. 

{¶ 25} After determining what constitutes marital property and what constitutes 

separate property, the court is required to divide the marital and separate property 

equitably. R.C. 3105.171(B). With respect to marital property, R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) 

provides that marital property shall be divided equally, unless an equal division would be 

inequitable, in which case the property shall be divided in the manner the court 

determines equitable. The trial court must value the marital property to determine an 

appropriate division. See Raymond v. Raymond, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-363, 2011-Ohio6173, ¶ 22 ("To comply with its duty [under R.C. 3105.171(C)(1)], the trial court must value 

and divide all marital property in a divorce, and in most cases, the failure to do so 

amounts to an abuse of discretion. Although a trial court possesses broad discretion to 

determine the value of marital property, it may not omit valuation altogether.") (Citations 

omitted.). We review a trial court's determination of the value of marital property for 

abuse of discretion. Beagle v. Beagle, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-353, 2009-Ohio-6570, ¶ 11 ("A 

trial court has broad discretion to determine the value of marital property, and its 

determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); Grody 

v. Grody, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-690, 2008-Ohio-4682, ¶ 20 ("A trial court has broad 

discretion in developing a measure of value for property in a divorce case."). 

{¶ 26} "Although a trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the value of a 

marital asset, such discretion is not without limit. An appellate court's duty is not to 

require the adoption of any particular method of valuation, but to determine whether, 

based upon all the relevant facts and circumstances, the court abused its discretion in 

arriving at a value." Apps v. Apps, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1072, 2003-Ohio-7154, ¶ 38. "A 

trial court must have a rational evidentiary basis for assigning value to marital property." 
No. 16AP-788 11 

Id. See also Dach v. Homewood, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-502, 2015-Ohio-4191, ¶ 36 ("[A] 

domestic court has broad discretion to make divisions of property and if there is some 

competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's decision, there is no abuse of 

discretion."). 

{¶ 27} At trial, three sets of appraisals of the Sri Lankan properties, including the 

Colombo property, were admitted as evidence. Appellant submitted appraisals conducted 

in 2011 and a second set of appraisals conducted in 2015. Appellee submitted appraisals 

conducted on March 10, 2016. Although the parties had stipulated to the admission of 

appraisal reports on the Sri Lankan properties, appellant objected to appellee's March 10, 

2016 appraisals because they were conducted after the stipulations had been entered. The 

trial court overruled appellant's objection, but noted it would give the 2016 appraisals 

appropriate weight because the appraiser who prepared the reports was unable to testify 

in the proceedings. 

{¶ 28} In the divorce decree, the trial court generally found "the appraisal done 

and introduced by Defendant to be the most accurate appraisals." (Jgmt. Entry at 5.) All 

the appraisals of the Sri Lankan properties stated property values in Sri Lankan rupees. 

The parties stipulated to a conversion rate of 134.44 Sri Lankan rupees to one United 

States dollar. Based on that conversion rate, the trial court's determination of the values 

of the four Sri Lankan properties awarded to appellant under the property settlement 

matched the values contained in the 2015 appraisals submitted by appellant, rounded to 

the closest whole dollar. With respect to the Colombo building, however, the trial court's 

determination of value matched the value contained in the 2011 appraisal of the Colombo 

property submitted by appellant. The 2011 appraisal stated the Colombo building was 

worth 19,687,000 rupees, which would be $146,437.07 at the stipulated conversion rate. 

The 2015 appraisal stated the Colombo building was worth 21,000,000 rupees, which 

would be $156,203.51 at the stipulated conversion rate. In the divorce decree, the trial 

court concluded the Colombo building was worth $146,437.07, and that appellant was 

entitled to one-half of that value. The trial court also appears to have relied on the 2011 

appraisal in determining the value of the Colombo land and the total value of the Colombo 

property. 
No. 16AP-788 12 

{¶ 29} As noted above, a trial court must have a rational evidentiary basis for 

assigning value to marital property. Apps at ¶ 38. The trial court's discussion of the 

Colombo property does not contain any indication why the court found the 2011 appraisal 

of that property more persuasive than the 2015 appraisal, despite relying on the 2015 

appraisals in determining the value of all the other Sri Lankan properties. The trial court 

relied on the 2011 appraisal without explanation or justification to set the value of the 

Colombo building for purposes of division of the marital property. On remand, the trial 

court may provide a rational evidentiary basis for relying on the 2011 appraisal or 

consider the 2015 appraisal if it determines the same to be a rational evidentiary basis for 

the value of the Colombo property. 

{¶ 30} Accordingly, we sustain appellant's third assignment of error.1

{¶ 31} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining the rental income appellee received from the Colombo building 

and in distributing that income between the parties. We review a trial court's division of 

property for abuse of discretion. Roush at ¶ 18. 

{¶ 32} Both appellant and appellee testified at trial that the Colombo building was 

completed in 2010. Appellee testified the Colombo building had been consistently rented 

to a single family since 2010, and that she received approximately $10,000 per year in 

rental income from the Colombo building. Appellant testified he had not received any of 

the rental income from the Colombo building and he was seeking half of the 

approximately $60,000 appellee had received in rental income from the Colombo 

building during 2010 through 2016. Further, in an affidavit filed in opposition to 

appellant's request for attorney fees related to discovery, appellee attested she received 

$10,500 in rental income from the Colombo building in 2015. 

{¶ 33} In the divorce decree, the trial court found appellee had received 

$28,333.33 in rental income from the Colombo building from August 2010 through 

 

1 In her brief on appeal, appellee requests the court sustain the third assignment of error. She appears to 

argue the trial court should have relied on the 2015 appraisal in determining the value of the Colombo land, 

but further argues the Colombo building was only worth 14,000,000 rupees, or $104,135.67 at the stipulated 

conversion rate. It is unclear where appellee derived this proposed value, because it does not appear to be 

contained in any of the three appraisals of the Colombo property submitted to the trial court. Regardless, to 

the extent appellee seeks to challenge the trial court's determination of the value of the Colombo property, 

she did not file a notice of appeal from the judgment and any such challenge is not properly before this 

court. 
No. 16AP-788 13 

March 2016. The court further found no evidence had been given as to improvements or 

receipts for expenses. The court concluded appellant was entitled to one-half of the rental 

proceeds, or $14,166.67. The decision does not set forth the basis for the trial court's 

finding that appellee received rental income from the Colombo building that was less than 

half of the amount she testified to at trial. There does not appear to be any competent, 

credible evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination of appellee's 

rental income from the Colombo building. 

{¶ 34} Accordingly, we sustain appellant's fourth assignment of error 

C. Exclusion of Value of Automobiles from Property Division 

{¶ 35} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to include the value of two of the parties' automobiles in the property 

settlement. R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) provides that marital property shall be divided equally, 

unless an equal division would be inequitable, in which case the property shall be divided 

in the manner the court determines equitable. We review a trial court's division of marital 

property for abuse of discretion. Lorey v. Lorey, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-14, 2016-Ohio5949, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 36} In the divorce decree, the trial court held that appellee would retain, free 

and clear from any claim of appellant, a 2012 Honda Odyssey that was titled jointly in the 

parties' names. The trial court also held that appellant would retain, free and clear from 

any claim of appellee, a 2011 Honda Civic and a 2012 Honda Civic, one of which was titled 

jointly in the parties' names and one of which was titled in appellant's name. The trial 

court further expressly held that appellant would not be entitled to any equity in the 2012 

Honda Odyssey. Although the trial court did not expressly hold that appellee was not 

entitled to any equity in the two vehicles retained by appellant, it effectively reached this 

result by not providing for any transfer or offset of equity in the vehicles in the property 

settlement portion of the divorce decree. 

{¶ 37} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion because its decision 

was inconsistent with the parties' agreed joint stipulations and settlement memorandum. 

Under the joint stipulations, the parties agreed appellant would be entitled to retain all 

equity in the 2012 Honda Civic. The joint stipulations did not include any express 

provisions with respect to any equity in the 2012 Honda Odyssey or the 2011 Honda Civic, 
No. 16AP-788 14 

although it contained stipulations regarding the value of those vehicles. Appellant argues 

on appeal that "[t]he intent of the parties seems clear that by mentioning the values of the 

other two vehicles in the Settlement Memorandum but not the 2012 Honda Civic the 

parties intended for the lower court to distribute their values in the division of property." 

(Appellant's Brief at 22-23.) However, if this was the intent of the parties, they could have 

made it clear by stating in the settlement memorandum that each party would receive 

one-half the equity in those two vehicles. Under these circumstances, where the parties 

did not expressly provide in the agreed joint stipulations whether the equity in the 2012 

Honda Odyssey and 2011 Honda Civic was to be divided among the parties, we cannot 

conclude the trial court abused its discretion by effectively permitting each party to retain 

the equity in the vehicles they were awarded under the divorce decree. 

{¶ 38} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error. 

D. Proceeds of Sale of Ja-Ela Property 

{¶ 39} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court abused its 

discretion by holding appellee was entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the Ja-Ela 

property sale. Appellant argues the trial court failed to consider the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the proceeds of this sale and each party's use of marital funds 

to start individual businesses around the time of the sale. 

{¶ 40} The trial court concluded appellant sold the Ja-Ela property in 2013 for a 

profit of $34,960, and that appellee never received her half of the profits. The trial court 

included a payment of $17,480 to appellee in the property settlement to account for onehalf of the profits from the Ja-Ela property sale. 

{¶ 41} Appellant asserts he used the profits from the Ja-Ela property sale to start a 

chicken farming business, which ultimately failed, resulting in a financial loss. Appellant 

claims that around the same time, appellee used marital funds to start a business, which 

also ultimately resulted in a loss of funds. Appellant argues the trial court's award was 

inequitable because it failed to consider appellee's loss of marital funds through her 

business venture, which effectively offset appellant's use of the Ja-Ela profits for his 

business. 

{¶ 42} Appellee testified at trial that the Ja-Ela property had been purchased in 

2003, using funds from a home equity line on the marital residence. Appellee stated 
No. 16AP-788 15 

appellant sold the Ja-Ela property in 2013 and informed her he was using the money to 

start a business in Sri Lanka. Appellee testified that none of the proceeds were used to 

pay marital expenses. She requested the court award her one-half of the proceeds from 

the Ja-Ela sale. On cross-examination, appellee admitted she opened a business around 

the same time, using funds from her paychecks. Appellant testified that he used the 

proceeds from the sale of the Ja-Ela property to start a chicken farming business. He 

claimed appellee was generally aware he was starting a business, although she was not 

aware of specific details. Appellant stated the business failed due to a flood, resulting in a 

financial loss. Appellant argued appellee was not entitled to any of the proceeds from the 

Ja-Ela sale, which he used to fund his individual business, because appellee had incurred 

similar losses from her business venture using marital funds. 

{¶ 43} It is undisputed that the Ja-Ela property was marital property and that 

appellant unilaterally sold the property and used the proceeds to fund a business venture. 

While the divorce decree did not expressly address appellant's claim that appellee was not 

entitled to one-half the proceeds from the sale due to her use of marital funds for other 

business ventures, the transcript demonstrates the trial court was aware of this argument 

and could consider it in determining an equitable property settlement. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude appellant has failed to demonstrate the trial court acted 

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably in awarding appellee one-half of the 

proceeds of the Ja-Ela property sale. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

making this award. 

{¶ 44} Accordingly, we overrule appellant's fifth assignment of error. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain appellant's first, third, and fourth 

assignments of error, and overrule appellant's second, fifth, and sixth assignments of 

error. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, and remand the matter to that court for 

further proceedings consistent with law and this decision. 

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded. 

BRUNNER and HORTON, JJ., concur.