Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A04-1404-IF-187 | June 22, 2015 Page 1 of 9

APPELLANT PRO SE

Eric D. Smith

Pendleton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Cynthia L. Ploughe

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eric D. Smith,

Appellant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee.

June 22, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

33A04-1404-IF-187

Appeal from the Henry Circuit Court

The Honorable Bob A. Witham, 

Judge

Cause Nos. 33C03-1402-IF-373,

33C03-1402-IF-374

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Eric D. Smith, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief from 

judgment and his petition for post-conviction relief. Smith raises two issues 

which we revise and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 

relief from judgment; and 

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition for 

post-conviction relief.

We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 27, 2000, Smith was ticketed for disobeying a traffic signal under cause 

number 33I01-0007-IF-06910. He failed to appear for the bench trial on 

September 14, 2000, and the court ordered him to pay eighty-one dollars. 

[3] On July 15, 2000, Smith was ticketed for speeding in cause number 33I01-0008-

IF-08089. The case reached disposition on November 4, 2000, and Smith failed 

to pay the resulting fine of eighty-one dollars. 

[4] In February 2014, Smith filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to 

Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8) under both cause numbers. He alleged that he just 

learned of the cases by contacting the trial court about traffic violations, that he 

was innocent of the charges, that he had been serving in the United States 

Army in Korea and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, that somebody had stolen his car 

and driver’s license and must have impersonated him, and that he never 

received any notice. On March 5, 2014, the State filed its response to Smith’s 
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motions, and on March 10, 2014, the court denied Smith’s motion for relief 

from judgment as to each cause number. 

[5] That same month, Smith filed a petition for post-conviction relief under both 

cause numbers, asserting that he was not given notice of any charges or court 

hearings, was not afforded counsel, was innocent of the charges, and was a 

victim of identity theft. 

[6] An entry in the chronological case summary for each cause number states: 

“Post Conviction Relief is available to defendants who have been convicted of a 

crime. These cases involve infractions which are civil in nature and not crimes. 

Accordingly, Post Conviction Relief is not available to the defendant in these 

cases.” Appellant’s Appendix at 6, 56. 

[7] On April 9, 2014, Smith filed a notice of appeal of the court’s denial of his 

motions for relief from judgment and petitions for post-conviction relief. 

Discussion

[8] Initially, we observe that Smith is proceeding pro se. Such litigants are held to 

the same standard as trained counsel and are required to follow procedural 

rules. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. 

I.

[9] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Smith’s 

motion for relief from judgment. We review a trial court’s ruling on Rule 60 

motions for abuse of discretion. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 
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N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind. 2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s 

judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences 

supporting the judgment for relief. Wagler v. West Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 980 

N.E.2d 363, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 134 

S. Ct. 952 (2014). When reviewing the trial court’s determination, we will not 

reweigh the evidence. Id.

[10] Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) “affords relief in extraordinary circumstances which are 

not the result of any fault or negligence on the part of the movant.” Dillard v. 

Dillard, 889 N.E.2d 28, 34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Goldsmith v. Jones, 761 

N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh’g denied). “On a motion for relief 

from judgment, the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both 

necessary and just.” Id. at 33 (quoting G.B. v. State, 715 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1999)). A trial court must balance the alleged injustice suffered by the 

moving party against the interests of the party who prevailed and society’s 

interest in the finality of judgment. Wagler, 980 N.E.2d at 371.

[11] Smith’s motions requested reversal pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8) and he 

cites Rule 60(B)(8) on appeal. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) provides in part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a 

party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment 

by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) any ground for a motion to correct error, including without 

limitation newly discovered evidence, which by due diligence could 

not have been discovered in time to move for a motion to correct 

errors under Rule 59;
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(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(4) entry of default or judgment by default was entered against such 

party who was served only by publication and who was without actual 

knowledge of the action and judgment, order or proceedings;

* * * * *

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, 

other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and 

(4).

[12] “The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5), (6), (7), and 

(8), and not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was 

entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4).” Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). “A 

movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a 

meritorious claim or defense.” Id. A meritorious defense for the purposes of 

Rule 60(B) is “one that would lead to a different result if the case were tried on 

the merits.” Butler v. State, 933 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting 

Bunch v. Himm, 879 N.E.2d 632, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). “Absolute proof of 

the defense is not necessary, but there must be ‘enough admissible evidence to 

make a prima facie showing’ that ‘the judgment would change and that the 

defaulted party would suffer an injustice if the judgment were allowed to 

stand.’” Id. (quoting Bunch, 879 N.E.2d at 637). “The trial court’s residual 

powers under subsection (8) may only be invoked upon a showing of 

exceptional circumstances justifying extraordinary relief.” Brimhall v. Brewster, 

864 N.E.2d 1148, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (citation omitted).
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[13] Smith argues that he filed his motions in a reasonable time, that exceptional 

circumstances were shown to justify relief, and that his motions demonstrated a 

meritorious defense. He asserts that someone impersonated him and he was 

outside of Indiana on military duty at the time of the offenses. He contends 

that the decision of the trial court conflicts with a decision from the Noblesville 

City Court that granted his identical motion for relief in another cause, and that 

the trial court did not balance his hardship and alleged injustice against the 

interest of the State and society in general, nor did it conduct a hearing to 

determine if he was indigent. The State argues that Smith’s account for the 

delay is inadequate, the delay has prejudiced the State, and Smith has failed to 

prove his claim. 

[14] With respect to the State’s argument that Smith’s motion is untimely, a motion 

under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) must be filed “within a reasonable time.” Trial Rule 

60(B). Determining what is a reasonable time period depends on the 

circumstances of each case, as well as the potential prejudice to the party 

opposing the motion and the basis for the moving party’s delay. Parham v. 

Parham, 855 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. In his motions 

for relief from judgment, Smith stated that he “just learned of this case by 

contacting the trial court about traffic violations . . . .” Appellant’s Appendix at 

7, 57. However, he did not specifically state when he contacted the traffic 

court. 

[15] Additionally, Smith did not meet his burden of demonstrating that relief was 

justified. His military records do not indicate where he was in May or July 
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2000, the dates of his infractions. Absent any further evidence, there is nothing

in the record other than Smith’s self-serving arguments to support his claims 

that he was not the person who disobeyed a traffic signal or was caught 

speeding. Accordingly, because he did not present a meritorious defense, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion 

for relief. 

[16] To the extent Smith argues that the trial court erred because it imposed a fine 

and did not conduct a hearing to determine if he was indigent, we observe that 

Smith’s adjudication was civil in nature, and a trial court is not required to 

conduct an indigency hearing where there is no chance that a party will be 

imprisoned for non-payment. See Pridemore v. State, 577 N.E.2d 237, 238 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1991) (holding that traffic infractions are civil proceedings in nature 

and that there can be no imprisonment), reh’g denied; see also Ladd v. State, 710 

N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that when restitution is ordered 

as part of an executed sentence, an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay is 

not required, and in such a situation, restitution is merely a money judgment, 

and a defendant cannot be imprisoned for non-payment).

[17] We also do not find any merit in Smith’s argument that, because the 

Noblesville City Court granted him relief in a case involving similar issues, the 

trial court here was required to do the same. The decision of one trial court is 

not binding on another trial court. See Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. United 

Minerals, Inc., 686 N.E.2d 851, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), reh’g denied, trans. 

denied. In the Noblesville court’s order granting relief from a judgment, the 
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court stated that it had verified that Smith was incarcerated on September 26, 

2001, which was presumably the date of the infraction, and based on this 

verification, the court granted relief. Unlike the Noblesville court, the trial 

court here was not able to verify Smith’s whereabouts on the date of his 

infractions. That difference justifies the dissimilar outcomes. Additionally, the 

Noblesville court’s verification that Smith was incarcerated on September 26, 

2001, is not relevant here as that date is at least ten months after the latest 

disposition at issue. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to grant relief 

based upon that court’s decision. We cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying Smith’s motion for relief from judgment.

II.

[18] The next issue is whether the post-conviction court erred in denying Smith’s 

petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction rules contemplate a 

narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions. Reed v. 

State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 2006). Smith cited Post-Conviction Rule 1 

which provides that “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, 

a crime by a court of this state . . . may institute at any time a proceeding under 

this Rule to secure relief.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(a) (emphasis added).

[19] The violations of the motor vehicle code that Smith was accused of committing 

were disregarding a traffic control device and speeding. Both constitute 

infractions and not crimes. “[T]raffic infractions are civil, rather than criminal, 

in nature and the State must prove the commission of the infraction by only a 
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preponderance of the evidence.” Rosenbaum v. State, 930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Consequently, we cannot say that Ind. PostConviction Rule 1 provides a remedy.1

 See State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402, 403-

406 (Ind. 1997) (concluding that the proceedings for a violation of the failure to 

yield the right-of-way statute are civil and the defendant who had been found to 

have failed to yield the right-of-way, a class C infraction, and ordered to pay a 

fine of seven dollars had not been criminally prosecuted for his actions).

Conclusion

[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Smith’s motion 

for relief from judgment and petition for post-conviction relief. 

[21] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

1 We acknowledge that in Strong v. State, 29 N.E.3d 760, 765-766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), this court held that 

traffic infractions are classified as criminal for purposes of appeal under Ind. Appellate Rule 2(G) and that a 

defendant should be entitled to the benefit of Post-Conviction Rule 2 as in other criminal appeals. Unlike in 

Strong, Smith did not appeal the determination that he committed an infraction, but filed a motion for relief 

from judgment and a petition for post-conviction relief under Post-Conviction Rule 1. Thus, we do not find 

Strong instructive.