### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED July 20, 2023

Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1467 Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV 470 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

C ITY OF M AYVILLE ,
P LAINTIFF - A PPELLANT ,

V . V ILLAGE OF K EKOSKEE AND T OWN OF W ILLIAMSTOWN ,
D EFENDANTS - R ESPONDENTS .

APPEAL from a n order of the circuit court for Dodge County:
KRISTINE A. SNOW , Judge. A ffirmed

.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Fitzpatrick, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.23(3).
¶ 1 PER CURIAM. The City of Mayville (the “ City ” ) appeals a circuit

court order dismissing the City’s action for declaratory judgment against the TownNo. 2022AP1467

2 of Williamstown (the “ Town”) and the Village of Kekoskee (the “ Village”) following summary judgment proceedings

. The City argues that an intergovernmental agreement entered into by the Town and the Village is not
authorized by W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301 (2021

- 22) 1 and exceed s the scope of that

statute

. We reject the City’s arguments and affirm t he court ’s order

.
BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This is the parties’ second round of litigation on the issue of boundary agreements between the Town and Village ( sometimes referred to collectively as the “Respondents”)

. See City of Mayville v. DOA , 2021 WI 57 , 397 Wis. 2d 496, 960 N.W.2d 416 (“ Mayville I ” )

. The following facts are undisputed.

¶ 3 The City, the Town, and the Vi llage are all located in Dodge County. Id. , ¶3. The Village was inc o r p orated in 1958 from territory that had pre v iou s ly been p art of the Town. Id. In 2015, t he Village notified the Town that it was having difficulty seating a full V illage b oard, and as a result, was considering
dissolution. Id. , ¶4. Representatives from the Town and Village met several times to explore their options and ultimately de termined that the appropriate approach

was to consolidate the territories of the Town and Village through a cooperative plan under W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0307. Id. In 2018, the Town and the Village entered
into an Intragovernmental C ooperative P lan (“Cooperative Plan”)

. Id. , ¶¶5

- 6

.

1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021

- 22 version unless otherwise noted.No. 2022AP1467

3 ¶ 4 T he Wisconsin Department of Ad ministration (“the d epartment”) approved the Cooperative Plan; however, following that approval, the City filed a lawsuit challenging the d epartment’s approval. The cas e was litigated to our supreme court , which concluded th a t the d epartment erred as a matter of law in approving the Coope r ative Plan. See id. , ¶3 7

. Our supreme court in Mayville I
determined that , because the Cooperative Plan changed the City’s boundary line, the City was required to be a party to the Cooperative Plan under W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0307(2). Id

. , ¶2

. Because the court resolved the appeal on the ground that the City was require d to be a party to the Cooperative Plan, i t declined to address the parties’ arguments as to whether § 66.0307 “ permits municipalities to consolidate.” Id

. , ¶36 & n.14.

¶ 5 F ollowing the issuance of the decision in Mayville I , the Town and Village proceeded under a different stat ute, W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301(6) , enter ing in to an “Intergovernmental Cooper ati on Agreement” (“the Agreement ”) that include s a new boundary line agreement, the detai l s of which differ f r o m the Cooperative
Plan. Section 4 of the Agreement specifi e s the process to change the boundary
line , as follows. When the Village adop ts a “Triggering Ordinance,” the boundary line between the Town and Village would be adjusted ( as depicted in exhibits attached to the Agreement ) , and a “ major portion” of the Town ’s territory would
become part of the Village. Under the Agreement, a smaller portion of the Town
land

— the “Town remnant”

— would not become part of the Village as a result of
the initial boundary line change.

¶ 6 The Town r emnant consists of four parcels of property, totaling approximately 163 acres, with three owners

. T he circuit court found that “these four parcels are vacant, contain n o public improvements, and have no residents.”No. 2022AP1467

4 ¶ 7 The Agreement stat e s , in its Recitals, that the three owners of the
Town r em n ant have indicated a shared desire to annex their properties to the City. Accordingly, these parce ls are excluded from “the initial jurisdictional transfer” of
land from the Tow n to the Village to provide the opportunity for the parcels’

owners to pursue procedures to annex to the City, to the Village , or to another municipality, or, alternatively, “demonstrate a willingness and abilit y to remain independent.” Although not part of the ini tial juris dic t ional transfer, the Town remnant “may be subject to a subsequent jurisdictio nal transfer

. ” In Section 4 of the Ag reement, the Village makes two commitment s to the owners of the Town

rem nant following the Village’s adoption of the Triggering Ordinance : (1) the Village will provide s ervice s to the Town r em n an t for at least 90 days; and (2) the Village will provide a 6 0

- day period to allow the owners of the parcels in the
Town remnant the opportunity to exercise one of their options, during which the Village will not exercise any aut h ority it has to absorb the Town remnant.

¶ 8 Further under the Agreement, i f after 60 days the Town remnant has not been annexed to another municipality and has not , “in the opinion of the Village,” demon strated the willingness and ability to remain an independent Town

r emnant, then the Village may “ attach or annex said remnant parcels via any legal means set forth in Chapter 66 Wisconsin Statutes, including the adoption of an
ordinance under [ W IS

. S TAT

. ] § 66.0301(6)(e). ” 2

2 The portion of Section 4 that addresses the Town remnant provides : If the owners of the parcels [in the Town remnant] have not initiated procedures to annex said parcels to the City of Mayville, the Village, or another municipality, and have not otherwise, in the opinion of the Village, demonstrated their willingness and ability to remain an independent remnant Town within 60 days after the Village’s adoption of the Triggering (continued)No. 2022AP1467

5 ¶ 9 The Agreement also provides that, upon implementation through the Triggering Ordinance, all real, personal , and intangible property of the Town, and all its assets and liabilities, become those of the Village. Section 6 of th e Agreement also sets for th a process for the Town’s governing body to transition into the governing body of the Village. This process involves the sequential resignation of Village board members and the appointment of Town officials to fil l
these vacancies.

¶ 10 In 2021, t he Village adopted a Triggering Ordinance as provided in Section 4 of the Agreement, which resulted in a change of the boundary line and all Town territory

— with the exception of the Town remnant

— becoming part of the Village

. The City then filed this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Agreement is void because it exceeds the Respondents’ authority under W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301(6).

¶ 11 The City filed a motion for summary judgment seeking an order declaring that the Agreement is void and unenforceable. The circuit court denied the City’s motion, rejecting the City’s argument that the statutory scheme in W IS

. S TAT

. ch. 66 does not authorize the Agreement. The court explained that i t was not persuaded by the City’s argument that the purpose and effect of the boundary change provisions in the Agreement was to accomplish a “consolidation” that does

not satisfy the statutory requirements for a consolidation . Relying on our decision

Ordinance, or if the City of Mayville or other relevant municipality rejects or fails to act on said property owners’ annexation petition, the Villa ge may at any time following such 60

- day period attach or annex said remnant parcels via any legal means set forth in Chapter 66 Wisconsin Statutes, including the adoption of an ordinance under [ W IS

. S TAT

. ] § 66.0301(6)(e).No. 2022AP1467

6 in City of Kaukauna v. Village of Harrison , 2015 WI App 73, ¶¶8

- 10, 365
Wis. 2d 181, 870 N.W.2d 680, the circuit court determined that ch. 66 provides multiple processes to accomplish a munici p ality’s jurisdictional changes and that “§ 66.0301 boundary agreements were not limited to ‘minor’ adjustments, a n d such agreements could be used to effect ‘major’ ad j ustments to the boundaries between a village and town.”

¶ 12 The circuit court further concluded that the Agreement complie s with the requirements of W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301 and it rejected the City’s arguments that : (1) public policy dictates that an agreement cannot require V illage
board mem

bers to sequentially resign and appoint Town officials to the Village
board ; (2) the Agreement effectively created a boundary line between the Village and the City where none existed prior ; 3 and (3) the Agreement is not for a specified term, as required by § 66.030 1 (6)(b).

¶ 13 The circuit court entered an order denying the Cit y’s motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and dismissing the City’s action . The City appeals.

3 The City does not appear to renew this second argument o n appeal. We note that, in the course of arguing that the Agreement constitute s an unauthorized consolidation, the City asserts that the Triggering Ordinance adopted pursuant to Section 4 of the Agreement establishe s a common boundary line between the Village and the City where no boundary l ine previously existed, which the City summarily asserts “ exceed s the authority granted [ to the Respondents ] by [ W IS

. S TAT

. ] § 66.0301(6)(a)

. ” However, the City’s assertions do not appear to be advanced as a separate argument intended for resolution by this court. To the extent that the City means to make such an argument, it is insufficiently developed : the City makes no effort to explain this assertion by refer ence to facts, the language in § 66.0301(6)(a), or any other legal authority

. Thus, to the extent the City means to reassert this argument on appeal, we reject it as undeveloped. See State v. Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) ( we need not address undeveloped arguments)

.No. 2022AP1467

7 DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Applicable Principles of Law

. ¶ 14 We review a circuit court’s ruling on summary judgment de novo. Chapman v. B.C. Ziegler & Co. , 2013 WI App 127, ¶2, 351 Wis. 2d 123, 839
N.W.2d 425. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
W IS

. S TAT

. § 802.08(2)

. ¶ 15 This appeal requires us to interpret statutes and apply them to the undisputed facts in this case. “Statutory interpretation presents a question of law
that we rev iew de novo.” State v. Stewart , 2018 WI App 41, ¶18, 383 Wis. 2d 546, 916 N.W.2d 188. “[T] he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect. ” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty. , 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. “[ S ] tatutory interpretation ‘ begins with the language of the

statute. ’” Id. , ¶45 (quoted source omitted) . “ Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted me aning, except that technical or specially

defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning. ” Id

. Additionally, statutory language must be “ interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely

- related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid
absurd or unreasonable results .” Id

. , ¶46.

II. The City Fails to Show that the Agreement Eliminates Common Boundary Lines Between the Town and Vill age, Resulting in Consolidation

. ¶ 16 Because this case centers on the meaning of W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.030 1 (6), we first turn to the statutory language. See Kalal , 271 Wis. 2d 633,No. 2022AP1467

8 ¶45. Section 66.0301(6)(a) states in relevant part: “ Any 2 municipalities whose boundaries are immediately adjacent at any point may enter into a written agreement determining all or a portion of the common boundary line between the municipalities. ” For purposes of § 66.0301(6), a municipality means a city, village, or town. Sec. 66.0301(1)(c). Other provisions in § 66.0301 make clear that “determining” a common boundary line includes changing the boundary line, either temporarily during the term of the agreement or permanent l y. See § 66.0301(6)(a)2.

- ( b) (agreement may provide that specified boundary line

“ changes ” occur). The statute also makes clear that one consequence of changing a boundary line is to transfer municipal jurisdiction over the affected area. See § 66.0301 (6) (c).

¶ 17 T he City argues that the Agreement i s not authorized by W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301 because, rather than “determining ” a common boundary line between two municipalities , as provided in § 66.0301, the Agreement eliminate s a ll

common boundary line s between the Town and the Village. Consequently, the City contends, the Agreement result s in the consolidation of the Town and the Village , which may occur only under the procedural and substantive requirements
of the consolidation statutes, W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0229 or W I S

. S TAT

. § 66.0230, and is not authorized by § 66.0301

. This was the issue that the Mayville I court declined to resolve in interpreting substantially similar language in W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0307 , the statute at issue in Mayville I

. See § 66.0307(2) (a uthorizing agreement between municipalities to “determine the boundary lines between
themselves ”); § 66

. 0301 (6) (a uthorizing a greement between municipalities

“ determining all or a portion of the common boundary line between the municipalities ”).No. 2022AP1467

9 ¶ 18 The Respondents counter that: (1) W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301(6) allows agreements that merge two municipalities into one; and (2) because the Town remnant remains, as does a boundary line between the Town and Village, the Agreement does not eliminate the boundary lines between the two municipalities

or consolidate the m

. W e agree with the Respondents that the Agreement d oes not eliminate the bo undary line s between the Town and Village ; therefore , we need

not and do not address the parties’ ar guments as to whether a n a greement under § 66.0301 resulting in complete consolidation of municipalities is authorized
under that statute

. See Barrows v. American Fam. Ins. Co. , 2014 WI App 11, ¶9,
352 Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508 (2013) (“An appellate cou rt need not address every issue raised by the parties when one issue is dispositive.”); Maryland Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell , 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (“Typically, an appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible
grou nds.”).

¶ 19 In support of our conclusion , we first note that t his court has previously held that “major” boundary changes may occur pursuant to an agreement under W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301. In Kaukauna , a village and a town entered into an intergovernmental cooperation agreement under § 66.0301 that adjusted the boundary line, transferring additional land from the t ow n to the village, and that also allowed the two municipalities to share services. Other municipalities argue d that § 66.0301(6) does not authorize two municipalit i es to undertake a “major” boundary chang e. Kaukauna , 365 Wis. 2d 181, ¶ ¶1

- 3, 7

- 8

. We rejected this position, stating, “The plain language of W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301(6) ... does not limit the sco p e of boun dary changes to only ‘modest’ changes.” Id. , ¶1 ; s ee also id

. , ¶¶7

- 8. In sum, we declined the invitation of the other municipalities t o define how much of a boundary change is authorized underNo. 2022AP1467

10 § 66.0301(6), determining that there is no statutory authorit y to fashi on a br i gh t

line rule quantifying how much territory may be transferred throug h an intergovernmental cooperation agreement.

¶ 20 The Agreement in this case likewise result s in a “major” boundary change. A s a result of the Agreement’s boundary line determination, a substantial portion of the Town became part of the Village. But not all of the Town was
absorbed into the Vill age: the Town r emnant remained even after the boundary change

. Thus, under the Agr eement, the boundary line between the Town and the Village was not eliminated ; there is still a geographical divide between the two. Therefore, and c onsistent with a plain language interpretation of the statute, the Agreement “ determin [ed] all or a portio n of the common boundary line between the municipalities.” W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301(6).

¶ 21 The City argues that t he existence of the Town r emnant does not alter the conclusion that the Agreement resulted in consol idation of the municipalities. According to the City , bo undary changes often oc cur over a staggered time period and simply because the second T riggering O rdinance complet ing the physical consolidation of the Town and Village has not yet
occurred does not mean th at the Agreement did not consolidat e the Town and Village

. ¶ 22 However, a s the Respondents note, under the terms of the Agreement , any subsequent boundary change involving the Town remnant i s “delayed and optional , ” i.e. , part of a subsequ ent process that may or may not

occur. Upon expiration of the 60

- day period in which the Town remnant could become part of a nother municipality, t he A greement authorizes

— but does not require

— a second T riggering O rdinance to attach any part of the Town remnant toNo. 2022AP1467

11 the Village . Section 4 of the Agreement states that “ the Village may at any time following such 60

- day period attach or annex said remnant parcels via any legal means set forth in Chapter 66 Wisconsin Statutes, including the adoption of an ordi nance under [ W IS

. S TAT .] § 66.0301(6)(e). ” (Emphasis added.) The City has presented no authority or developed argument that, as a result of the Agreement, it is a foregone conclusion that the Town remnant will become part of the Village.

¶ 23 In its reply brief, the City contends that the Respondent s ’ argument is premised on the view “that consolidation involves only the physical transfer of territory

. ” The City asserts that c onsolidation of two municipalities “results not only in the co nsolidation of the territory of the respective municipalities, but also consolidation of municipal services and municipal government, which ... are provide d for under the terms of the Agreement.” The City continues:

Finally, in making this argument, the R espondents fail to address the fact that the resignation of Village officials and the appointment of [Town] offi cials to fill those vacancies resulted in the elim ination of the t own government of [ the Town]

. The Agreement and the implementation of the Agreement by enactment of the first Triggering Ordinance and the forced resignation of Town officials left these property owners and these lands [in the Town remnant] in a legal limbo.
(Footnote omitted.) The City fails to explain how the elimination of the T own government or the alternative modes of consolidation it alleges relate to the
express language of W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301(6), which allows what occur s under the Agreement

— namely, the determination or change in a boundary line b etween municipalities. We reject th e se argument s because they are both undeveloped and raised for the first time in the City’s reply brief rather than in its brief

- in

- chief.
See State v. Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (we need not address undeveloped arguments ); State v. Reese , 2014 WI App 27,No. 2022AP1467

12 ¶14 n.2, 353 Wis. 2d 266 , 844 N.W.2d 396 ( we need not address arguments raised
for first time in reply brief as the adverse parties have not been able to respond to those argumen ts ).

¶ 24 In sum, the City has failed to show that the Agreement eliminate s the boundary line s between the Town and Village , thereby resulting in consolidat ion
of the two municipalities . B ecause the City’s challenge to the Agreement is
pre mised on this argument, its challenge to the Agreement likewise fails.

III. The City Fails to Show that the Agreement E x c eed s the A u thority Granted the Respondents Under W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301

. ¶ 25 The City separately argues that the Agreement is void because it “exceeds the authority granted by [ W IS

. S TAT .] § 66.0301 ” in several respects. We address these arguments, rejecting each of them.

A. Section 6 of the Agreement

. ¶ 26 The Ci ty challenges Secti on 6 of the A greement, arguing that it
exceeds the authority granted by W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301 and “violates the public
po l icy of the S tate of Wisconsin.” Section 6 sets forth a process involving the sequential resignation of Village board members and the appointment of Town
officials to fill these vacancies , as follows :

Section 6: Post

- Boundary Change Village Board.
The current Town Board consists of three Supervisors, one of whom serves as Town Chairperson. The current Village Board consists of three Trustees, one of whom serves as Village Board President. The parties agree that as soon as practicable upon completion of the Boundary Change, the current Village Board members will sequentially resign from their respective positions, and the remaining Vi llage Board members will appoint the current Town Board members asNo. 2022AP1467

13 the resignees’ replacements. It is the intent of this Section that upon completion of this process, t he current Town Board members

— each of whom will reside in the Vill age after the Boundar y Change

— will serve as Village Board members, with the current Town Chairperson serving as Village Board President. This Agreement is void if this transition does not occur as described herein, unless both parties agree in writing otherwise.
After the i nitial appointments described in this section, all Village officer positions will be filled by either election or appointment, as appropriate pursuant to applicable law.
The City makes three specific argument s as to how this Section invalidates the Agreem ent under § 66.0301. As discussed below, none of these arguments are persuasive.

¶ 27 First, the City argues that , pursuant to sub sec . (2) of W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301, the purpose of agreements under § 66.0301 is to authorize two municipalities to contract “ for the receipt or furnishing of services or the joint exercise of any power or duty authorized by law.” See § 66.0301(2). The City argues that Section 6 of the Agreement e x ceeds the authority in § 66.0301 because
the sequential resignation and appointment process in that section does not relate to the receipt or furnishing of services or the joint exercise of powers granted to the Respondents under § 66.0301(2)

. ¶ 28 As a preliminary matter , we note that t his ar gument was not raised in the summary judgment proceedi ng s in the circuit court and need not be considered on review as part of an argument for reversal of the circuit court decision

. See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist. , 2 010 WI 86, ¶45 & n.21, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (explaining that issues not raised in the circuit court may be forfeited and supporting the proposition that appellate courts generally do not address forfeited issues).No. 2022AP1467

14 ¶ 29 T he City ’s argum ent also fails because the City cites no authority to support its ass ertion that a boundary agreement under sub sec. (6) of W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301 must also have the purpose in sub sec . (2) of sharing ser v ices or exercising joint powers or duties , nor does the statutory language of § 66.0301(2) and (6) compel such a conclusion. I n fact, i n Kauka u na , we rejected a similar argument. In th at case, the municipalities challenging the agreement argued that “§ 66.0301 permits only ‘ modest boundary changes incidental to’ the sharing of services between governments.” Kaukauna , 365 Wis. 2d 181, ¶7. We “easily reject[ed]” this argument because the statute did not support it. Id. We also rejected the argument that § 66.0301(6) “ [m] ust be re a d to allow only limited boundary changes necessa ry to accomplish the statute’s ‘ primary goal of shari n g services be t ween mu n ici p a li ties. ’ ” Id. , ¶8. W e further concluded that this argument would require us to read language into the statute that is not

there and that is contrary to the plain language of the statute, which permits agreements affecting “all or a portion of the common boundary line[s],” § 66.0301(6)(a), and allows for boundary changes to remain in place after any sharing of services between governments has ended,
se e § 66.0301(6)(b).

Id. Accordingly, we discern no valid basis for the City ’s argument that the Agreement exceeds the authority of § 66.0301 b ecause Section 6’s resignation and appointment process does not serve the purpose of sharing services or exercisin g joint powers or duties under sub sec

. (2) of that statute

. ¶ 30 Second, t he City argues that Section 6 of the Agreement violates public policy as reflected in W IS

. S TAT

. § 17.24 , a statute governing vacancies in village offices. Section 17.24 provides :

Except as provided in [ W IS

. S TAT

. §] 9.10, a vacancy in any elective village office may be filled byNo. 2022AP1467

15 appointment by a majority of the members of the village board for the residue of the unexpired term or until a special election is held, as ordered by the village board, or an office may remain vacant until an election is held. A vacancy in an appointive office shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
¶ 31 The City acknowledges that W IS

. S TAT

. § 17.24 re quires that vacancies on the Village board be filled by members of the Village board or , alternatively , by a special election called for that purpose. But the City argues that Section 6 of the Agreement “is not only illegal in that it contractually requir es Village officials to vote in a predetermined manner, but also because [it] violates the public policy established by the Legislature relating to the manner in which vacancies in Village office s are to be filled by appointment.”

¶ 32 The circuit court rejected the City’s challenge based on W IS

. S TAT

. § 17.24 , concluding that the appointment procedure outlined in § 17.24 “is precisely what occurred ” under Section 6 of the Agreement and that “i t was simply spelled out to provide for an o rderly transition.” The court explained :

Sect ion 6 provided that one [Village] board member would resign; the remaining two would appoint a new board member who was one of the Town

... board members. Then the next [Village] board member would resign, the remaining two would appoint, and so on until all three [Village] board members were replaced with the three Town

... board members. Although the [Agreement] contemplated the resignation of the existing

... Village [b] oard, and outlined how that would occur, that is because presumably those members already wanted to resign. The [A] greement couldn’t force those [Village] board members [to] resign and presumably any one of those [V] illage board members could have changed their min ds. This potential outcome was contempl ated with the following clause[:]

“ This Agreement is void if this transition does not occur as described herein, unless both parties agree in writing otherwise.” In other words, if a [V] illage board member changed their mind and refused to resign, the [Agreement] would terminate unless the parties reached [a] further agreement in writing. The Court does not agree that thisNo. 2022AP1467

16 procedure violated public policy for replacement of [V] illage board members underlying § 17.24

... . ¶ 33 The City does not explain how the circuit court’s conclusion is in

error, n or does it even discuss the court’s decision on this issue. It offers no developed argument as to how Section 6 of the Agreement violate s W IS

. S TAT

. § 17.24 or the public policies on which it is based

. 4 We decline to address the City’s undeveloped argument on this point. See Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d at 646

. ¶ 34 Third, the City argues that Section 6 exceeds the authority granted
b y W IS

. S TA T

. § 66. 0 301 because it denies the owners of the properties within the
Town rem n ant the right to petition and seek redress from their government , and it also prevents them from exercising their rights under Section 4 of the Agreement

to either become part of another municipality or demonstrate their willingness and ability t o remain an independent remnant of the Town. Because this argument was
not raised in the circuit court, we decline to address it as an argument for reversal

. See Schill , 327 Wis. 2d 57 2, ¶ 45 & n.21

.

B. Section 10 of the Agreement

. ¶ 35 The City argues that Section 10 of the Agr e ement renders the Agreement void because it “ establishes zoning and land regulations by contract ” rather than through statutory procedures gove rning zoning and land development.
The C ity contends that the Town’s con t inuing efforts to consolidate with the

4 The City further assert s, also without citation to authority, that any “action by a Village Board to fill a vacancy must be done in an open meeting, with notice of the potential action being listed on an agend a that must be published or otherwise provided to the general public.” Again, the City does not develop th i s assertion into an argument supported by record citations and pertinent legal authority and we therefore do not address it. See Pettit , 171 Wis. 2 d at 646.No. 2022AP1467

17 Village has a “singular purpose,” namely , “to avoid and eliminate the extraterritorial land division and zoning authority of [the City] .”

¶ 36 The Respondents argue that this court should not consider this argument because the City failed to raise it in the circuit court

. The Respondents note that this argument appears to be ba sed o n an affidavit that the City filed in the circuit court action nine days after the court issued a decision. The record does not reflect that any argument was made in the circuit court based on this affid avit, in a
motion for reconsideration or otherwise.

¶ 37 T he C ity acknowledg e s that “[ t ] his argument was not articulat e d in its summary judgment brief filed [ in circuit court ]

. ” Nevertheless , the C ity argues
that we should address this issue for three reasons. First, it contends that this “i ssue” was raised in the circuit court because “[t]he issue in this case is whether various provisions included within the A greement are authorized and permitted by [ W IS

. S TAT .] § 66.0301” and that “[t]his is one of those provisions.” We reject this argume nt. The City made very specific arguments to the circuit court regarding how, in its view, the Agreement is not authorized by § 66.0301 , and the
circuit court addressed those arguments. The distinct, very detailed argument that the City now raises regarding the zoning and land division issues is qualitatively
different from the specific argume nts it raised in the circuit court. Ac c o rdingly,
we conclude that the City’s fai l ure to raise this argument in the circuit court precludes our review of it on appeal as an argument for reversal

. ¶ 38 Next , the C ity contends that it failed to raise this specific challenge
in the circuit court b ec a us e doc u m ents confirming that the Town zoning code
would be “impos[ed]” on the Village were not recei ved until Ju l y 21, 2022 , when the Village Clerk responde d to a public records request. The C ity states that “byNo. 2022AP1467

18 th at d ate, all of the summary judg ment briefs had been submitted to the court in accordance with the [c]ourt’s scheduling order.” We are not persuaded by this argument for the following reasons.

¶ 39 First, as the City acknowledges in its brief

- in

- chief , Section 10 of the Agreement “provides for the continued application of the Town’s Comprehensive
Plan and [ the ] Town’s Zoning Code not only within the jurisd iction of the lands transferred from [the Town] to the Village [,] under the terms of the Triggering Ordinance, but to the unzoned land of the Village as well.” Thus, the City a ppears to have been aware through the exist ence of the Agreement

— prior to its summary judgment submissions

— of the facts forming the basis of its argument on appeal that Section 10 “establish [es] zoning and land division regulations by contract”
rather than establishing them through the statutes that the City now contends were not complied with here.

¶ 40 Second , even if the argument that the City now raises were somehow dependent on the Village’s July 21, 2022 response to a public records request, the City offers no explanation as to why it did not request an opportunity for additional briefing on this issue in the circuit court once it became aware of this
information. Accordingly, we reject the City’s arguments related to zoning and other land regulation requirements.

I V

. The City Fails to Show that the Agreement is Void Because it Does Not Limit the Term of the Agreement to a Period of Time Not Exceeding Ten Years.
¶ 41 As the City correctly notes, W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301(6)(b) provides that
the maximum term of an inter governmental agreement authorized under § 66.0301 is ten years and that when the agreement expires, all provisi on s of the agreement expire , except the boundary change, which remains in effect until subsequentlyNo. 2022AP1467

19 changed. Based on this provision, the C ity a rgues that, because the Agreement in this case does not contain a specified term , it is “both inconsistent with, and

c ontrary to, the requi r eme nts of § 66.0301(6)(b). ” The circuit court rejected this argument, explaining :

The [Agreement] was promulgated under the statute which allows for a 10 [

- ] year term. In the absence of a shorter term stated in the [Agreement], the [Agreement] is necessarily limited by the term of the statute. The Court agrees with [the Village and Town] that under the statute, after 10 years have elapsed boundary changes will remain in place, but other aspects of the agreement will terminate.

The Respondents ’ position is the same as the court’s : the term of the Agreemen t is the maximum term , and the Respondents did not i nclude a specific durational
term in the A greement because they chose to use the m a ximum statutory ten

- year
term

. ¶ 42 The C ity ’s only response to the circuit court’s and the Respondents’ position i s as follows : “That argument not only ignores the requirements of [ W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301] relating to the term of the contract, but basic rules governing contract law. If a contract does not include a specific term, then that contract is indefinite.” The City does not explain why the statutory ten

- ye ar term would not apply to the Agreement , does not provide any authority suggesting that a term
must be included in an agr eement under § 66.0301 , and d oes not otherwise develop its argument on this point. Because the court’s ruling is supported in law
and logic , and given that the City advances no developed argument to the contrary, we reject the City’s argument. See Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d at 646

.No. 2022AP1467

20 CONCLUSION

¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we conclude that the C ity has not shown that
the Agreement is contrary to W IS

. S TAT

. § 66.0301 ; therefore we affirm the circuit

court order dismissing the City’s action on summary judgment.

By the Court.

— Order affirmed

. This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(1)(b) 5

.