AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed April 11, 2013. 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05
- 12
- 00829
- CR No. 05
- 12
- 00830
- CR WESLEY MONTGOMERY ADAMS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee On Appeal from the 195 th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11
- 15962
- N 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Lang

- Miers, Murphy , and Fillmore Opinion by Justice Fillmore Following the denial of his m otion to suppress, Wesley Montgomery Adams pleaded guilty to the offenses of burglary of a habitation and theft of property of a value of $1500 or more but less than $20,000. The trial court deferred findin gs of guilt and placed Adams on community supervi sion. On appeal, Adams c ontends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain him . We affirm. We limit recitation of the background and facts of this case because these matters are well known to the parties. We issue this memorandum opinion because the law to be applied is well settled . See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.2 Background Adams was charged with burglary of a habitation and theft of property of a value of $1500 or more but less than $20,000. Prior to trial, Adams filed a motion to suppress all evidence “obtained illegally,” contending his stop and detention was without probable cause or reasonabl e suspicion. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court heard evidence that i n March 2011, the city of Coppell had a rash of car burglaries , and police officers were working “ different hours ” to try to apprehend the offender s. At 12:19 a. m. on March 9, a police dispatch went out concerning a burglary in progress in a neighborhood near North Moore and Parkway Boulevard

. The dispatch reported that two or three suspects were seen running in an unknown direction. 1 Coppell police officer Tona rd Warmsley was less than a half

- mile from the neighborhood and , along with four or five other officers, responded to the call. Warmsley testified the neighborhood had only two entrances/exits, both of which came out onto Parkway Boulevard.
H e and some of the other officers established a perimeter around the neighborhood while the remaining officers roamed inside the neighborhood in search of the burglars. Within one to three minutes of receiving the dispatch, Warmsley sa w a car exitin g the neighborhood . The car was occupied by two people and was the only one in the area. Warmsley followed the car, which stopped at a stop sign at North Moore a nd Parkway Boulevard. The car stopped with its front wheels beyond the white line perpendicular to the stop si gn and almost into the crosswalk

. Believing the driver committed a traffic violation, Warmsley activated his lights and c onducted a traffic stop.

1 Warmsley testified the call reported two suspects; another officer testified the call reported three suspects.3 Warmsley approached the vehicle’s passenger side while officer Anthony Maurer approached the driver side. As he approached, Warms le y saw the passenger lean over as if he were putting something under the seat or reaching for something. The passenger then rolled down the window, and Warmsley noticed bot h men were sweating and breathing deeply , although it was a “very cold” night. Warmsley said it appeared that they had just engaged in “physical activity” that caused them to sweat. Warmsley had the passenger , a 16

- year - old juvenile, get out of the car and began to ask him questions. The pas senger admitted he a nd Adams had been “car

- hopping,” or walking through the neighborhood checking car doors to see if they were unlocked and, if so, entering the cars and taking “what [they] could.” The passenger said he only took cigarettes, but Adams took “several things.” T he passenger told Warmsley that he and Adams had just come from a garage attached to a home. Warmsley arrested t he passenger for possession of stolen property. While Warmsley talked to the passenger, Maurer talked to Adams, the driver of the car

. Aft er several minutes, Maurer arrested Adams on a traffic violation and then read Adams his Miranda 2 warnings. Adams agreed t o show Maurer the locations of the bur glaries he had been involved in and directed Maurer to the neighborhood where Adams was seen le a ving minutes earlier. Adams identified several cars in various alleys that he and the passenger attempted to burglarize. After both suspects were placed under arrest, police performed an inventory of the vehicle driven by Adams and found a safe containi ng five Texas Instrument calculators, a Canon Zoom Lens camera, a Tom

- Tom GPS, a Sirion stereo faceplate, a Cobra 950 radar detector, an i Pod Nano, cigarettes, four $1 bills, and three gift cards to retail outlets.

2 Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).4 At the concl usion of the evidence, Adams made two arguments in support of his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal stop and detention . First, Adams argued police officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him because his vehicl e did not enter the crosswalk, which he contends is required to violate section 544.010(c) of the Texas Transportation Code

. Second, Adams argued police officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that he was recently involved in a burglary offense and, therefore, his stop and detention w ere without justification

. After hearing the evidence and arguments, the trial court denied Adams ’s motion to suppress. Analysis On appeal, Adams raises the same two issues that he raised in th e trial court. Because we conclude W armsley articulated specific facts and circumstances which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts and circumstances, constitute reasonable suspicion that Adams was or had been involved in crimina l activity , and Warmsley was therefore justified in detaining him , we begin our analysis there

. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we view all of the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the ruling

. State v. Garcia

- Cantu , 2 53 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we infer the necessary factual findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the record evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling ) supports these implied fact findings. Id . Thus, w e afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especia lly when its implicit fact finding is based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id

. This same highly deferential standard applies regardless of whether the trial court has granted or denied a motion to suppress evidence. Id . Thus, the party that prevaile d in5 the trial court “ is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. ” Id

. We review de novo the trial court’s application of the law. Id

. A law enforcement officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Foster v. State , 326 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). To stop or brief ly detain an individual, an officer must be able to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Terry , 392 U.S. at 27 ; see also Foster , 326 S.W.3d at 613. Specifically, the police officer must have some minimal level of objective justi fication for making the stop, that is, when the officer can “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; see also Foster , 326 S.W.3d at 613. In making a reasonable suspicion determination, we disregard the subjective intent of the officer making the stop and consider solely, under the totality of the circumstances, whether there was an objective basis for the st op. See Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 4 92

– 9 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A police office r has reasonable suspicion to detain a person if he has specific , articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably t o conclude th at the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Kerwick , No. PD

1837

- 11, 2013 WL 690840, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2013).
T his case has facts strikingly similar to those in Sanders v. State , 992 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo ), pet. ref’d , 16 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J. dissenting). In Sanders , police officers were working in a particular area of Amarillo where there had been

numerous burglaries. At about midnight, a police dispatche r advis ed the officers of an attempted6 burglary in the area by two male subjects who fled north on foot in an alley. Id . at 743. An officer proceeded to the scene and , when he was three or four blocks away, encountered a vehicle with two person s in it heading away from the crime scene but in the same direction as the two suspects fled. Id . at 743

– 44. The officer stopped the vehicle. The stop was made two or three minutes after receiving the dispatch call. Id . at 744. After stopping the vehi cle, the police ultimately arrested Sanders and charged him with possession of marijuana. The officer in Sanders testified there was “very, very little” traffic in that area at midnight and the vehicle he stopped was the only one in the area. Id . He also said it was not unusual for burglary suspects to park a couple of blocks away from the building or residence, commit the burglary, and then go to the vehicle on foot and drive away. Id

. Sanders argued he was illegally detained and any incriminating ev idence acquired as a result of his initial detention should be suppressed

. After hearing the evidence, t he trial court denied Sanders’s motion to suppr ess evidence, and the Amarillo C ourt of Appeals affirmed that decision. Id . at 743. In reaching its de cision, t he appellate court analyzed several cases and noted the similarity between the facts in the case before it and two other cases, Brooks v. State , 830 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 1992, no pet.), and Flores v. State , 967 S.W.2d 481 (Tex . App.

— Houston [14 th Dist] 1998, no pet.).
In Brooks , the police responded to a reported burglary in progress at an apartment complex and stopped the defendant driving out of the complex to ask what he was doing at the scene of the reported burglary . 830 S.W.2d at 819. After running a driver’s license check, the officer found the defendant had outstanding traffic warrants and arrested him. Id . The appellate court concluded that, under the facts, the stop was not illegal, noting the officer s ’ test imony that it was not uncommon for burglary suspects to be leaving or even gone when officers arrive at the7 scene , and it is “customary to stop and investigate anyone leaving the immediate area of a burglary in progress.” Id . at 821.
In Flores , an officer was responding to a midnight police dispatch concerning an assault at a bar and stopped the defendant’s vehicle as it was leaving the bar’s parking lot. 967 S.W.2d at 482. The vehicle was occupied by several Hispanic juveniles. The officer stopped the vehicle, not because she suspected its occupants of participating in the assault, but because she recalled a rash of burglaries that detectives believed had been committed by Hispanic juveniles. Id . Consequently, the officer wanted to investigate why the juveniles were out so late at night exiting the parking lot of an adult bar and determine whether they had been involved in burglary activity. Id. As the officer approached the car, she recognized the defendant as having been reportedly involved in an ea rlier disturbance in which a vehicle was stolen. Id . at 482

– 83. She arrested the defendant and charged him with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The defendant sought to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the stop of the vehicle. Id . at 483

. T he appellate court found the stop reasonable under the facts and circumstances

. Id . at 484. The Amarillo C ourt of Appeals noted in Sanders that all three cases involved officers responding to a report of a crime and then observing a vehicle leaving t he area of the reported crime, yet in none of the cases was an occupant identified as having been at the very location of the reported crime before the vehicle was stopped. Sanders , 992 S.W.2d at 748

– 49. T he Amarillo C ourt of Appeals then set out specific facts in its case supporting reasonable suspicion , including that the dispatch call came shortly before midnight, a time when there was “very, very little” traffic in the area; the call reported an attempted burglary in an area that had been the

s cene of multiple recent burglaries; two suspects reportedly were involved; the persons departed in a northerly direction; the officer believed that burglars often parked a getaway car near the8 residence or building to be burglarized and then walked back to their car after the crime; the officer encountered the Sanders’ s vehicle within two to three minutes after receiving the dispatch; the officer observed no other cars in the area; Sanders’s car contained two people , the same number that had reportedly bee n involved in the crime ; and the vehicle was heading away from the crime scene in the same direction that the suspects had fled on foot

. Id . at 749. The

court c oncluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s suspicion that the
occup ants of the vehicle could have been involved in illegal activity was reasonable and was based on articulable facts and circumstances. Id

. Here, as in Sanders , the officer articulated more than a hunch that Adams was involved in the burglary in progress t hat had just been dispatched. The dispatch call came after midnight directing officers to a neighborhood with limited ingress and egress. The area was dark and quiet, and no other cars were in the area when Warmsley saw Adams’s vehicle leaving the area j ust one to three minutes after Warmsley received the dispatch call. The call reported two suspects, according to Warmsley, and the vehicle contained two occupants. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Warmsley articulated specific facts and circumstances which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts and circumstances, constituted reasonable suspicion that Adams was or had been engaged in criminal activity , thus justifying the stop and detention

. Therefore, the trial cou rt did not abuse its discretion in denying Adams ’s motion to suppress. We resolve Adams’s second issue against him . Given this disp osition, we need not address his first issue. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.1.9 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47

120829F.U05 /Robert M. Fillmore/ ROBERT M. FILLMORE JUSTICE10 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
WESLEY MONTGOMERY ADAMS, Appellant
No. 05

- 12

- 00829

- CR V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11

- 15962

- N. Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore; Justices Lang

- Miers and Murphy participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 11 th day of April, 2013.

/Robert M. Fillmore/ ROBERT M. FILLMORE JUSTICE11 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
WESLEY MONTGOMERY ADAMS, Appellant
No. 05

- 12

- 00830

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11

- 15982

- N. Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Lang

- Miers and Murphy part icipating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 11 th day of April, 2013.

/Robert M. Fillmore/ ROBERT M. FILLMORE JUSTICE