79184 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 188 / Friday, September 27, 2024 / Proposed Rules 

1The BSA, as amended, is the popular name for 

a collection of statutory authorities that FinCEN 

administers that is codified at 12 U.S.C. 1829b, 

1951–1960 and 31 U.S.C. 5311–5314, 5316–5336, 

and includes other authorities reflected in notes 

thereto. Regulations implementing the BSA appear 

at 31 CFR chapter X. 

2Pursuant to Treasury Order 180–01, the 

authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 

(Secretary) to administer the BSA, including, but 

not limited to, 31 U.S.C. 5318A, has been delegated 

to the Director of FinCEN. Treasury Order 180–01 

(Jan. 14, 2020). 

3 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)–(b)(4). 

4 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5). 

5FinCEN, Proposal of Special Measure Against 

ABLV Bank, AS as a Financial Institution of 

Primary Money Laundering Concern, 83 FR 6986 

(Feb. 16, 2018), available at https://www.fincen.gov/ 

sites/default/files/federal_register_notices/2018-02- 

16/2018-03214.pdf. 

6See ECB, Press Release, ECB determined ABLV 

Bank was failing or likely to fail (Feb. 24, 2018), 

available at https://www.bankingsupervision.

europa.eu/press/pr/date/2018/html/ 

ssm.pr180224.en.html. 

7 In January 2023, the FCMC was integrated into 

the Bank of Latvia. Latvijas Banka, Press Release, 

As of 1 January, the FCMC will be integrated into 

Latvijas Banka (Dec. 28, 2022), available at https:// 

www.bank.lv/en/news-and-events/news-andarticles/press-releases/16285-as-of-1-january-thefcmc-will-be-integrated-into-latvijas-banka. 

8See id. 

9See Nasdaq, ECB Withdraws Credit Institution’s 

License of ABLV Bank, AS in Liquidation (July 12, 

2018), available at https://

view.news.eu.nasdaq.com/view?id=

bd5ccbdd7886f3040713f0c5eb9193353&lang=en. 

10See Reuters, Latvian bank regulator approves 

liquidation of ABLV Bank (June 12, 2018), available 

at https://www.reuters.com/article/business/ 

latvian-banking-regulator-approves-liquidation-ofablv-bank-idUSKBN1J82E0/. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

31 CFR Part 1010 

RIN 1506–AB39 

Proposal of Special Measure Against 

ABLV Bank, AS as a Financial 

Institution of Primary Money 

Laundering Concern; Withdrawal 

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network (FinCEN), Treasury. 

ACTION: Withdrawal of finding and 

notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: This document withdraws 

FinCEN’s finding that ABLV Bank AS 

(ABLV) is a financial institution of 

primary money laundering concern and 

the related notice of proposed 

rulemaking seeking to impose the fifth 

special measure regarding ABLV, 

pursuant to section 311 of the USA 

PATRIOT Act (section 311). Because of 

material subsequent developments that 

have mitigated the money laundering 

risks associated with ABLV, FinCEN has 

determined ABLV is no longer a 

financial institution of primary money 

laundering concern that warrants the 

implementation of a special measure 

under section 311. 

DATES: The finding and notice of 

proposed rulemaking, published at 83 

FR 6986 (Feb. 16, 2018), are withdrawn 

as of September 27, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Mail: Global Investigations 

Division, Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network, P.O. Box 39, Vienna, VA 

22183. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The 

FinCEN Resource Center at 1–800–767– 

2825 or electronically at frc@fincen.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

On October 26, 2001, the President 

signed into law the Uniting and 

Strengthening America by Providing 

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 

and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 

Public Law 107–56 (the ‘‘USA PATRIOT 

Act’’). Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act 

amended the anti-money laundering 

provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act 

(BSA) 1 to promote the prevention, 

detection, and prosecution of 

international money laundering and the 

financing of terrorism. Section 311 of 

the USA PATRIOT Act (section 311), 

codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A, grants the 

Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) 

authority, upon finding that reasonable 

grounds exist for concluding that one or 

more financial institutions operating 

outside the United State is of primary 

money laundering concern, to require 

domestic financial institutions and 

financial agencies to take certain 

‘‘special measures’’. The authority of the 

Secretary to administer the BSA and its 

implementing regulations has been 

delegated to the Director of FinCEN.2

The five special measures enumerated 

under section 311 are safeguards that 

may be employed to defend the U.S. 

financial system from money laundering 

and terrorist financing risks. The 

Secretary may impose one or more of 

these special measures in order to 

protect the U.S. financial system from 

such threats. Through special measures 

one through four, the Secretary may 

impose additional recordkeeping, 

information collection, and information 

reporting requirements on covered 

domestic financial institutions and 

domestic financial agencies— 

collectively, ‘‘covered financial 

institutions’’.3 Through special measure 

five, to the Secretary may prohibit, or 

impose conditions on, the opening or 

maintaining in the United States of 

correspondent or payable-through 

accounts by covered financial 

institutions.4

II. Procedural History and Subsequent 

Events 

A. Finding and Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking 

On February 16, 2018, FinCEN issued 

a notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM) that (1) set forth FinCEN’s 

finding that ABLV, a commercial bank 

located in Riga, Latvia, was, at that time, 

a foreign financial institution of primary 

money laundering concern and (2) 

proposed imposing special measure five 

under section 311, prohibiting covered 

financial institutions from opening or 

maintaining in the United States 

correspondent accounts for, or on behalf 

of, ABLV.5

B. Subsequent Developments 

In light of significant developments 

since FinCEN issued that NPRM, 

FinCEN has now determined that ABLV 

is no longer a financial institution that 

is of primary money laundering 

concern. 

1. ABLV Lost Its License, Ceased 

Banking Operations, and Is Undergoing 

Irrevocable and Supervised Liquidation 

On February 23, 2018 (one week after 

FinCEN issued its NPRM), the European 

Central Bank (ECB) determined that 

ABLV—as well as its subsidiary ABLV 

Bank Luxembourg—was failing or likely 

to fail, noting that, following issuance of 

FinCEN’s NPRM, ABLV had 

experienced an abrupt wave of deposit 

withdrawals and increasing lack of 

access to U.S. dollar funding.6 As a 

result, the ECB instructed the Latvian 

supervisory authority, the then-named 

Financial and Capital Markets 

Commission (FCMC),7 to impose a 

moratorium on ABLV in order to 

provide the bank time to stabilize 

operations. A similar moratorium was 

placed upon ABLV’s subsidiary in 

Luxembourg.8 In addition, on July 11, 

2018, ECB formally withdrew ABLV’s 

banking license.9

As a consequence of the ECB’s 

determination and subsequent action by 

relevant national authorities, ABLV and 

its subsidiary began winding up shortly 

afterwards. On June 12, 2018, ABLV— 

with the approval of FCMC—entered 

irrevocable liquidation, formally 

changing its name to ABLV Bank-inLiquidation.10 By July 12, 2018, ABLV 

no longer operated as a depository 

institution. On January 29, 2019, 

Luxembourg’s main financial regulatory 

authority, the Commission de 

Surveillance du Secteur Financier 

(CSSF), issued a fine against ABLV Bank 

Luxembourg of Ö250,000, the maximum 


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11See CSSF, Administrative penalty imposed on 

the credit institution ABLV Bank Luxembourg S.A. 

(Jan. 29, 2019). 12See CSSF, Dissolution and judicial liquidation: 

ABLV Bank Luxembourg S.A.—Appointment of 

liquidators (July 2, 2019). 13Notably, Latvian authorities ultimately 

confirmed that, having reviewed the bank’s records, 

they found evidence to support FinCEN’s findings 

in the NPRM concerning the complicity of ABLV 

owners, shareholders, and senior leadership in the 

use of the bank for money laundering purposes. 

14OCCRP, Latvian Prosecutors Charge Bankers 

with Laundering 2.1B Euro (July 29, 2022), available 

at https://www.occrp.org/en/news/latvianprosecutors-charge-bankers-with-laundering-21beuro. 

15European Bank Authority, Final Report on Joint 

ESMA and EBA Guidelines (July 2, 2021), pp. 38– 

40, available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/ 

default/files/document_library/Publications/ 

Guidelines/2021/EBA-GL-2021-06%20

Joint%20GLs%20on%20the%20

assessment%20of%20suitability%20(fit&propoer)/ 

1022127/Final%20report%20on%20joint

%20EBA%20and%20ESMA%20GL%20

on%20the%20assessment%20of%20suitability.pdf. 

16Cabinet of Ministers Republic of Latvia, Saeima 

Imposes the Ban on Servicing Shell Companies 

(Apr. 27, 2018), available at https://www.mk.gov.lv/ 

en/article/saeima-imposes-ban-servicing-shellcompanies. 17Office for Prevention of Laundering of Proceeds 

Derived from Criminal Activity, Annual Report for 

2018 (Mar. 31, 2019), available at https://fid.gov.lv/ 

uploads/files/English%20version/Annual_Report_

2018_EN.pdf. 18See supra note 7. 

19Cabinet of Ministers Republic of Latvia, Latvian 

Financial Sector Update, No. 15 27 June 2019 (June 

27, 2019), available at https://www.mk.gov.lv/en/ 

media/1678/download. 

20Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism and 

Proliferation Financing Act, available at https://

likumi.lv/ta/id/178987#p3. 

21Regulation on the Assessment of the Suitability 

of the Executive and Supervisory Board Members 

and Key Function Holders, available at https://

www.bank.lv/images/pielikumi/tiesibu-akti/ 

Normativie_noteikumi_nr_94_ENG_Regulation_on_

the_Assessment_of_the_Suitability_of_MB_KFH_

FCMC_No94.pdf; ECB, Guide to fit and proper 

assessments (Dec. 2021), pp. 14–22, available at 

https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/ 

pub/pdf/ssm.fit_and_proper_guide_

update202112∼d66f230eca.en.pdf. 

allowable by law, on the finding that, 

inter alia, ABLV had failed to comply 

with obligations established under 

Luxembourg’s AML/CFT legal 

requirements.11 Shortly afterward, the 

Luxembourg courts ordered ABLV Bank 

Luxembourg dissolved.12

Significantly, since July 2018, ABLVin-Liquidation has undergone a strictly 

supervised liquidation process, closely 

monitored by the Government of Latvia, 

which ensures AML/CFT compliance. 

Throughout the process (which is at an 

advanced stage), Latvian authorities 

have kept FinCEN apprised of ABLV’s 

liquidation with updates on the 

authorities’ role in: (1) supervising the 

liquidation; (2) approving updates to the 

liquidation methodologies for verifying 

creditors and ensuring AML/CFT and 

sanctions compliance; (3) reviewing the 

liquidators’ submitted reports; and (4) 

monitoring ABLV creditors’ claims.13

Further, under liquidation, ABLV has 

engaged in minimal ongoing activity, 

continues to exist as a legal entity to 

solely conclude liquidation, and is 

conducting, and subject to, ongoing 

efforts to identify additional past illicit 

activity. Notably, the ongoing efforts to 

identify additional past illicit activity— 

comprised of administrative and 

criminal investigations by relevant 

Latvian authorities into the activities of 

the bank and its shareholders— 

underscore the gravity with which 

Latvian authorities are treating the 

matter. Of note, those investigations 

have already resulted in criminal 

charges against the owners and senior 

managers of ABLV,14 ensuring that any 

potential future application for a bank 

license in Latvia or other EU member 

states by these individuals would elicit 

the heightened scrutiny established by 

the relevant EU rules.15

Given the revocation of ABLV’s 

licenses, significant efforts to identify 

and address past illicit activity, and the 

advanced stage of liquidation of ABLV, 

ABLV-in-Liquidation is no longer a 

financial institution of primary money 

laundering concern. 

2. Marked Systemic Improvements to 

the Latvian AML/CFT Regime and 

Oversight 

In parallel with targeted efforts 

relating to ABLV, the Government of 

Latvia has also made notable progress 

with a series of meaningful legal and 

regulatory reforms in its financial sector 

since issuance of FinCEN’s NPRM that 

have substantially reduced non-resident 

deposit activity, a principal source of 

FinCEN’s money laundering concern, 

and strengthened both its AML/CFT 

authorities and institutional capacity. In 

particular, in April 2018, the 

Government of Latvia took the first of 

many actions to remediate AML/CFT 

regime weaknesses and compliance 

failures by prohibiting most transactions 

with shell companies.16 Shortly 

afterwards, in November 2018, the 

Government of Latvia reorganized the 

Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) from 

under the Prosecutor General’s Office, 

granting the FIU independence and 

autonomy.17 Finally, in 2019, the 

Government of Latvia adopted a series 

of legal and regulatory reforms to its 

AML/CFT regime. Those reforms 

extended the scope of the financial 

regulator—formerly the FCMC, which 

was absorbed by the Bank of Latvia in 

January 2023 18—to increase AML/CFT 

supervision in the financial and capital 

markets sectors. The Government of 

Latvia also amended the Law on the 

Prevention of Money Laundering and 

Terrorism and Proliferation Financing 

in several ways, including: (1) 

introducing a fit-and-proper-person test 

for banking senior management and 

compliance employees; (2) requiring 

termination of the pending business 

relationship for any customer who fails 

due diligence; (3) prohibiting the 

opening and maintaining of anonymous 

accounts; (4) expanding the definition of 

‘‘beneficial ownership’’ to include 

indirect control; (5) clarifying Know 

Your Customer (KYC) and Customer 

Due Diligence (CDD) requirements 

through adding additional industries 

subject to KYC/CDD and introducing 

ongoing monitoring and verification of 

source of wealth; (6) requiring the State 

Revenue Service to provide information 

on politically exposed persons, their 

relatives, and close associates; (7) 

mandating Enhanced Due Diligence 

(EDD) for customers from high-risk 

jurisdictions; (8) expanding 

requirements for suspicious transaction 

reports; and (9) authorizing the FCMC 

(now Bank of Latvia) to revoke banking 

licenses or otherwise suspend economic 

activity.19

In 2021, the Government of Latvia 

implemented further changes to its Law 

on the Prevention of Money Laundering 

and Terrorism and Proliferation 

Financing, including: (1) expanding the 

scope of AML/CFT regulations and 

oversight to cover additional types of 

businesses and legal entities; (2) 

including real estate agents and brokers 

as entities obligated to follow AML/CFT 

requirements; (3) requiring continuous 

and ongoing training for those entities 

with AML/CFT obligations; (4) requiring 

that beneficial owners cannot have been 

convicted of international crimes or 

crimes against the state; (5) expanding 

upon the risk assessment triggers used 

by financial institutions; and (6) 

adopting new tools and software to 

assist with due diligence and the filing 

for suspicious transaction reports.20

The Government of Latvia and the 

ECB have also added additional rules to 

assess the suitability of individuals to 

own or run a bank (i.e., fit-and-proper 

person tests).21 These rules now 

consider whether criminal charges have 

been filed against prospective bank 

officials and owners, irrespective of 

final verdict, and how such allegations 

might affect the bank’s reputation. 

As a result of these and other efforts 

by the Government of Latvia, the share 

of non-resident deposits in Latvia’s 

financial sector—one of the principal 

risk factors in Latvia’s private sector that 

existed at the time of publication of the 


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79186 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 188 / Friday, September 27, 2024 / Proposed Rules 

NPRM—has decreased steadily from 

2016 to the present. 

III. Withdrawal of the Finding and 

NPRM 

For the reasons set forth above and 

taking into account the Government of 

Latvia’s significant efforts to reform its 

AML/CFT regime, FinCEN is satisfied 

that ABLV no longer poses a money 

laundering threat to the U.S. financial 

system. Therefore, FinCEN hereby 

withdraws its finding that ABLV is of 

primary money laundering concern and 

the related NPRM published on 

February 16, 2018, seeking to impose 

special measure five regarding ABLV. 

Andrea M. Gacki, 

Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network. 

[FR Doc. 2024–22299 Filed 9–26–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–02–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Part 52 

[EPA–R01–OAR–2024–0193; FRL–12285– 

01–R1] 

Air Plan Approval; Connecticut; State 

Implementation Plan Revisions 

Required by the 2015 Ozone NAAQS 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) is proposing to approve 

State Implementation Plan (SIP) 

revisions submitted by the State of 

Connecticut for the 2015 ozone National 

Ambient Air Quality Standard 

(NAAQS). These revisions (1) certify the 

adequacy of the SIP to satisfy the 

nonattainment new source review 

(NNSR) permitting requirements of the 

Clean Air Act (CAA) for the 

reclassification of the Greater 

Connecticut area to moderate 

nonattainment for the 2015 ozone 

NAAQS, and (2) certify the emission 

statement program satisfies the 

requirements of CAA section 

182(a)(3)(B) for the initial 

nonattainment designations and the 

reclassification to moderate 

nonattainment for the 2015 ozone 

NAAQS. This action is being taken in 

accordance with the CAA. 

DATES: Written comments must be 

received on or before October 28, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, 

identified by Docket ID No. EPA–R01– 

OAR–2024–0193 at https://

www.regulations.gov, or via email to 

creilson.john@epa.gov. For comments 

submitted at Regulations.gov, follow the 

online instructions for submitting 

comments. Once submitted, comments 

cannot be edited or removed from 

Regulations.gov. For either manner of 

submission, the EPA may publish any 

comment received to its public docket. 

Do not submit electronically any 

information you consider to be 

Confidential Business Information (CBI) 

or other information whose disclosure is 

restricted by statute. Multimedia 

submissions (audio, video, etc.) must be 

accompanied by a written comment. 

The written comment is considered the 

official comment and should include 

discussion of all points you wish to 

make. The EPA will generally not 

consider comments or comment 

contents located outside of the primary 

submission (i.e., on the web, cloud, or 

other file sharing system). For 

additional submission methods, please 

contact the person identified in the FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. 

For the full EPA public comment policy, 

information about CBI or multimedia 

submissions, and general guidance on 

making effective comments, please visit 

https://www.epa.gov/dockets/ 

commenting-epa-dockets. Publicly 

available docket materials are available 

at https://www.regulations.gov or at the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

EPA Region 1 Regional Office, Air and 

Radiation Division, 5 Post Office 

Square—Suite 100, Boston, MA. EPA 

requests that, if possible, you contact 

the person listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section to 

schedule your inspection. The Regional 

Office’s official hours of business are 

Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 

4:30 p.m., excluding legal holidays and 

facility closures due to COVID–19. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob 

McConnell, Air Quality Branch, U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, EPA 

New England Regional Office, 5 Post 

Office Square, Suite 100 (Mail code 5– 

MI), Boston, MA 02109–3912, telephone 

number (617) 918–1046, email: 

mcconnell.robert@epa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Throughout this document whenever 

‘‘we,’’ ‘‘us,’’ or ‘‘our’’ is used, we mean 

EPA. 

Table of Contents 

I. Background 

a. NNSR Certification 

b. Emission Statement Certification 

II. Summary and Evaluation of Connecticut’s 

SIP Revisions 

a. NNSR Certification 

b. Emission Statement Certification 

III. Proposed Action 

IV. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews 

I. Background 

On May 22, 2023, the Connecticut 

Department of Energy and 

Environmental Protection (CT DEEP) 

submitted three revisions to its State 

Implementation Plan (SIP). We are 

proposing action on two of these 

revisions in this notice as described 

below. 

a. NNSR Certification 

The first SIP revision certifies the 

adequacy of the SIP to satisfy the NNSR 

permitting requirements of the CAA for 

the reclassification of the Greater 

Connecticut area to moderate 

nonattainment for the 2015 ozone 

NAAQS. 

Effective November 7, 2022, the EPA 

reclassified the Greater Connecticut 

nonattainment area to moderate 

nonattainment for the 2015 ozone 

NAAQS (see 87 FR 60897). Although CT 

DEEP had previously submitted and 

EPA had approved a NNSR certification 

for the 2015 ozone NAAQS initial 

classification of marginal nonattainment 

for the Greater Connecticut 

nonattainment area (see 87 FR 38284, 

July 28, 2022), EPA’s reclassification 

requires that the state recertify the 

adequacy of its NNSR program under 

the moderate nonattainment area 

requirements. With one exception, 

explained in more detail below, EPA 

retained the NNSR requirements for its 

implementation of the 2015 ozone 

NAAQS. 

The minimum SIP requirements for 

NNSR permitting programs for the 2015 

ozone NAAQS are codified in 40 CFR 

51.165. These NNSR program 

requirements include those promulgated 

in the ‘‘Phase 2 Rule’’ implementing the 

1997 8-hour ozone NAAQS (See 70 FR 

71612, November 29, 2005) and the 

2008 ozone implementation rule. 

Additionally, although the 2015 ozone 

implementation rule included a 

provision to explicitly allow for interpollutant trading for meeting the 

emissions offset requirement for ozone, 

this provision was subsequently vacated 

by Sierra Club v. Environmental 

Protection Agency, 21 F.4th 815 (D.C. 

Cir. 2021). Under the Phase 2 Rule, the 

SIP for each ozone nonattainment area 

must contain NNSR provisions that: set 

major source thresholds for nitrogen 

oxides (NOX) and volatile organic 

compounds (VOCs) pursuant to 40 CFR 

51.165(a)(1)(iv)(A)(1)(i) through (iv) and 

(a)(1)(iv)(A)(2); classify physical 

changes at a major source if the change 

would constitute a major source by itself 

pursuant to 40 CFR 

51.165(a)(1)(iv)(A)(3); consider any 

significant net emissions increase of 


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