[Cite as Juanita Fowler 

Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2019-Ohio-1238.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JUANITA FOWLER LIFE CARE : 

CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., 

 : 

 Plaintiff, 

 : No. 106989 

 v. 

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND : 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

 : 

[Appeal by Sue Fadil, Administrator of 

the Estate of Juanita Fowler], : 

 Plaintiff. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: REVERSED; REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 4, 2019 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-17-876347 

 

Appearances: 

Amy C. Baughman, for appellant. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Rebecca L. 

Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

Appellant Sue Fadil (“Fadil”), Administrator of the Estate of Juanita 

Fowler (“Fowler”), appeals from an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 

Pleas dismissing an administrative appeal filed by Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 

d.b.a. Life Care Center of Westlake (“LCCW”), on behalf of Juanita Fowler, as her 

designated Medicaid authorized representative, for lack of jurisdiction. LCCW had 

filed an appeal in the common pleas court on Fowler’s behalf, challenging a decision 

by appellee Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”) that upheld the 

denial of Medicaid long-term nursing care benefits to Fowler. For the reasons that 

follow, we reverse the decision of the common pleas court. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

In March 2015, Fowler was admitted to LCCW’s facility, where she 

received long-term nursing care. On June 30, 2015, Fowler executed a designation 

of authorized representative, authorizing LCCW to “[t]ake any action that may be 

needed to ensure that I receive or continue to receive [Medicaid] benefits.” In 

August 2015, LCCW applied for Medicaid benefits with the Cuyahoga County 

Department of Job and Family Services on Fowler’s behalf. Fowler was denied 

benefits on the ground that the value of her resources exceeded the Medicaideligibility limits. Fowler allegedly owned three life insurance policies valued at 

$2,983.91. LCCW requested a state hearing on Fowler’s behalf, appealing the denial 

of Medicaid benefits to Fowler. 
A state hearing on Fowler’s Medicaid eligibility was held in November 

2016. The state hearing decision affirmed the denial of Medicaid benefits to Fowler, 

and LCCW appealed the decision to the Director of ODJFS. The administrative 

appeal decision affirmed the state hearing decision, concluding that the life 

insurance policies were a countable resource for Medicaid purposes and that Fowler 

was ineligible for Medicaid. 

On February 22, 2017, LCCW filed a notice of appeal of the 

administrative appeal decision “on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant Juanita Fowler, 

as his [sic] Designated Medicaid Authorized Representative” in the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas. 

Fowler died on September 26, 2017. On February 28, 2018, the 

common pleas court dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that 

LCCW, “as merely the administratively-designated authorized representative of Ms. 

Fowler, cannot perfect an appeal to this court pursuant to R.C. 5101.35 and 119.12 

from an agency decision concerning Ms. Fowler’s Medicaid eligibility.” The 

common pleas court reasoned: 

Pursuant to R.C. 5101.35(E), only the appellant may pursue a judicial 

appeal of an administrative appeal decision issued by ODJFS. 

Authorized representatives are not included in the definition of 

“appellant” for the purposes of R.C. 5101.35, nor are they permitted by 

federal Medicaid law to initiate judicial appeals. See R.C. 5101.35(A)(2) 

and 42 C.F.R. 435.923(B). 

As [LCCW] filed this appeal on behalf of the applicant, Ms. Fowler, no 

appeal has been perfected. This case is therefore dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction. 
LCCW, “on behalf of Appellant Juanita Fowler, as her Designated 

Medicaid Authorized Representative,” appealed the decision of the common pleas 

court to this court, raising the following sole assignment of error for review: 

The court of common pleas erred in dismissing Ms. Fowler’s appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction and the dismissal is inconsistent with this court’s 

holding that a designated authorized representative has standing to 

bring an appeal of a Medicaid denial on behalf of the applicant. 

On April 2, 2018, this court, sua sponte, entered an order holding the 

appeal in abeyance pending its decision in Tiggs v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family 

Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106022, 2018-Ohio-3164. On August 9, 2018, the 

court issued its decision in Tiggs, and this case was thereafter returned to the active 

docket. 

On August 3, 2018, Fadil, LCCW’s business manager, was appointed 

the administrator of Fowler’s estate. On August 23, 2018, LCCW filed a motion to 

substitute Fadil, in her capacity as the administrator of Fowler’s estate, as the 

appellant in this appeal. This court granted the motion to substitute. 

Law and Analysis 

Fadil argues that the common pleas court erred in dismissing 

Fowler’s appeal of the administrative appeal decision for lack of jurisdiction. 

ODJFS, in turn, asserts that the common pleas court “correctly 

dismissed the appeal” because “no proper applicant filed any document.” ODJFS 

contends that an “authorized representative” designation allows a person or 
organization to act on behalf of a Medicaid applicant or recipient only at the agency 

level, not to file an appeal in court on behalf of a Medicaid applicant or recipient. 

This court previously addressed this issue in Tiggs, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 106022, 2018-Ohio-3164. In Tiggs, this court held that a long-term 

care nursing facility, which had been designated as a resident’s Medicaid authorized 

representative, had standing to file an appeal on behalf of the resident in the 

common pleas court to challenge the termination of his Medicaid benefits. 

In that case, Tiggs had executed a “designation of authorized 

representative form,” naming The Willows, the long-term care nursing facility in 

which Tiggs resided, as his Medicaid authorized representative. He authorized The 

Willows to “take any action that may be needed to ensure that I receive or continue 

to receive [Medicaid] benefits.” Id. at ¶ 27. On appeal to this court, ODJFS argued 

that the common pleas court had erred in concluding that The Willows could bring 

an appeal in court challenging the termination of Tiggs’s Medicaid benefits. Id. at 

¶ 10, 19. This court disagreed. As the court explained: 

 In the instant case, appellant argues that pursuant to the relevant 

Medicaid federal regulations, an authorized representative can only act 

on behalf of the Medicaid recipient at the agency level, not in 

subsequent litigation at the trial court level. The trial court disagreed 

with appellant and found that The Willows, as Tiggs’s authorized 

representative, was capable of representing Tiggs in “all Medicaidrelated matters,” which included the appeal of the administrative 

agency decision before the trial court. * * * 

[W]e find that the trial court’s determination that Tiggs authorized the 

Willows to represent him in all Medicaid-related matters, including the 

appeal to the trial court, was not a misinterpretation of 42 C.F.R. 

435.923(b) or Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 5160. * * * 
“A personal representative is said to ‘stand in the shoes’ of the 

represented person.” Estate of Oscar Hunter v. Ohio Dept. of Job & 

Family Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105851, 2018-Ohio-1969, ¶ 7, 

citing McDonald v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 76808, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3621, 18 (Aug. 10, 2000). In the 

instant case, we find that the Medicaid eligibility claim, which is the 

substantive claim for relief presented at the trial court, was properly 

advanced by the party in interest, Tiggs through his authorized 

representative, The Willows. “A claim brought on behalf of a 

represented person depends on the represented person’s standing to 

bring an action because the represented person is the real party in 

interest.” Hunter at ¶ 7, citing Civ.R. 17(A). 

In support of the trial court’s interpretation, we note the plain 

reading of R.C. 5101.35(A)(2), which states that an “[a]ppellant” who 

may appeal an administrative agency’s decision to the trial court 

“means an applicant, participant, former participant, recipient, or 

former recipient of a family services program who is entitled by federal 

or state law to a hearing regarding a decision or order of the agency that 

administers the program.” Furthermore, we note that Ohio Adm.Code 

5160:1-2-08(C)(1) states that “[a]n individual may designate an 

authorized representative, in writing, to stand in place of the individual 

and act with authority on behalf of the individual.” 

* * * 

 Based on the foregoing analysis, we cannot say that the trial 

court erred in its statutory interpretation when it found The Willows, 

as Tiggs’s authorized representative, had standing to the appeal to the 

trial court. Accordingly, The Willows had authority to appeal to the 

trial court under R.C. 5101.35[.] 

Id. at ¶ 19-28. 

ODJFS has not identified any basis upon which to distinguish Tiggs

from this case. Accordingly, we find Tiggs to be controlling and, for the reasons set 

forth therein, we reverse the trial court’s decision regarding dismissal for lack of 

jurisdiction. Fadil’s assignment of error is sustained. 

Judgment reversed; remanded. 
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR