UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

________________________

No. ACM 39292

________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

William R. JONES

Colonel (O-6), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

________________________

Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary

Decided 14 November 2018

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Military Judge: Joe W. Moore.

Approved sentence: Dismissal and confinement for 12 months. Sentence 

adjudged 17 March 2017 by GCM convened at Shaw Air Force Base, 

South Carolina.

For Appellant: Major Patricia Encarnación Miranda, USAF; Major Meghan Glines-Barney, USAF.

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Kubler, USAF; Major Clayton H. O’Connor, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.

Before MAYBERRY, JOHNSON, and MINK, Appellate Military Judges.

Chief Judge MAYBERRY delivered the opinion of the court, in which 

Senior Judge JOHNSON and Judge MINK joined. 

________________________

This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as 

precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

________________________

MAYBERRY, Chief Judge:

Appellant was found guilty in accordance with his pleas of one specification 

of wrongful possession of child pornography in violation of Article 134, Uniform 
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

2

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934. Appellant was sentenced to 

a dismissal and confinement for 12 months. The convening authority approved 

the sentence as adjudged.

Appellant asserts three assignments of error (AOEs): (1) whether the omission of Prosecution Exhibit (PE) 6 renders the record of trial (ROT) incomplete;

(2) whether the sentence is inappropriately severe; and (3) whether the military judge’s denial of Appellant’s motion for a continuance effectively denied 

Appellant full assistance from his confidential expert.

1 We find no prejudicial 

error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In January 2016, an investigator assigned to the South Carolina Attorney 

General’s Office identified a computer within his jurisdiction that had accessed 

a peer-to-peer network searching for suspected child pornography files. After 

reviewing three files and confirming they contained images of minors engaged 

in sexually explicit conduct, the investigator opened a case. The location of the 

computer was later determined to be Appellant’s home on Shaw Air Force Base

(AFB). The investigator contacted the Air Force Office of Special Investigations 

(AFOSI) on Shaw AFB and turned the case over to them.

AFOSI obtained search authorization and went to Appellant’s home on

11 February 2016. Appellant also gave consent to search his home, and ultimately AFOSI seized a total of six devices: a laptop computer, a desktop computer, an external portable hard drive (found in Appellant’s home office), another external portable hard drive (found in Appellant’s garage), a thumb 

drive, and Appellant’s personal cell phone. Appellant provided the password 

for both the cell phone and the desktop computer. All six devices were sent to 

the Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory (DCFL) for examination. Child 

pornography was found on five of the devices and child erotica was found on 

one device. Additionally, the laptop contained a classified personal storage 

folder (.pst).

2

Additionally, the DCFL analysis identified a number of programs on Appellant’s laptop relevant to the images and videos contained on the various 

devices seized from Appellant’s home:

 

1 The second and third AOEs are raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 

431 (C.M.A. 1982).

2 The .pst file came from a Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network with dates 

that corresponded to the timeframe Appellant was deployed to Jordan. There was a 

separate AFOSI investigation involving this matter which did not result in charges in 

this case. Because the file was on the laptop at issue here, Appellant asserts it impacted his expert consultant’s ability to review the evidence involved in the case. 
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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 A Picasa program used to organize pictures and videos on Appellant’s 

laptop. In the preview database file portion of that program, thumbnail 

versions of original full size photos are created. Thousands of images of 

child pornography were found in the Picasa folder.

 An Advanced Renamer program which is an organizational tool that 

allows files to be renamed en masse. There were 197 files found in this 

program including titles associated with child pornography images

whose file names had been manipulated by using this program.

 A “clean.bat” file which was a batch file containing instructions to delete 

the contents of the Microsoft Office “recent folder” (removing traces of 

activity on the computer) for the profile “Me.” This file was created by 

the “Me” profile user, and there was evidence the file had been run on 

the laptop.

 A “pass.txt” file that primarily contained usernames and passwords for 

various accounts but it also contained instructions for a DOS [Disk Operating System] command line using a function of the copy command to 

merge files. Specifically, it directed “copy decoy.jpeg [joint photographic 

experts group (compressed graphic)] plus hidden. RAR [compressed file 

similar to a zip file] into a file called decoy.jpeg.” This would cause the 

RAR file to “disappear” behind the .jpeg. Conversely, if you opened that 

file using WinRAR, which was present on the laptop, it would ignore 

the .jpeg image and only open the RAR file.

 “KillDisk” and “Advanced Eraser” which are both programs that wipe 

data. They are promoted as secure deletion tools that physically overwrite data to make it unrecoverable. 

The analysis of Appellant’s desktop computer also identified the presence 

of a “clean.bat” file and a wiping program called “Eraser” which was configured 

so that it did not wipe the contents of the Recycle bin found on the external 

hard drive found in Appellant’s garage. Analysis of the external hard drive

found in the garage established a file titled “De82” in the “Recycler” folder 

which stored deleted files. This file was determined to have originally been a

folder titled “Recovered” with a sub-folder titled “LSM Main” which contained 

additional subfolders with pictures and videos containing child pornography. 

The forensic analysis established that the “LSM Main” folder went from the 

“MUI”3folder on the laptop to the “Recovered” folder (a user created name) on 

the external hard drive and then that folder was moved to the recycle bin. 

 

3 MUI stands for Multi-user Interface. The forensic expert testified that in the default 

installation of Windows XP Home, the MUI folder would only contain an executable 

program and would normally be otherwise empty.
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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Finally, the DCFL analysis addressed the Windows registry function called 

“shell bags.” Shell bags are created when a file is opened on any computer using 

Windows Explorer (sometimes referred to as “My Computer”), and they contain 

the name, size, location, dates, and times of every folder that was ever opened 

by the user on a computer or on removable media. When a file is deleted, the 

shell bag is not removed. The DCFL forensic analysis found evidence of child 

pornography files within the content of numerous shell bags on the Appellant’s 

computers.

During the guilty plea inquiry, Appellant stated that he was looking at pornography online in the fall of 2015 and on other occasions. Appellant stated 

that he was looking for adult pornography and used various search methods, 

one involving the use of a BitTorrent4 program. Appellant described this program as one that would connect his computer to servers wherever they may be

and download those files to his computer. Sometimes Appellant would use the 

“top downloads this week or month” search option and other times he would 

enter a particular search term into the program including “teen,” “hot women,” 

“young girls,” “hussyfan,” and “y-gold.” Furthermore, Appellant admitted that 

he knew his searches had a “high potential” of downloading child pornography.

Appellant’s searches were saved to a folder within his Windows directory entitled “MUI,” a location that would not be readily apparent to his wife and family 

members. Appellant indicated that many of the images he downloaded included individuals he estimated ranged from as young as 10 years of age to 

those in their early 20’s. Sometimes, but not always, Appellant deleted the images after downloading and viewing them. Appellant asserted that he knowingly possessed digital images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct 

but not sexual acts. Finally, Appellant quantified the volume of child pornography he possessed to be in the “single digit percentile” of the overall pornography he possessed.

After the presentation of the defense sentencing case, the Government 

sought to admit additional rebuttal evidence pursuant to Mil.R.Evid. 404(b)—

specifically the existence of a classified .pst email file. This was offered to rebut 

the evidence presented as to Appellant’s efficacy as a commander while deployed. Without going into any details as to the nature of the classified materials, the evidence offered was that the .pst file was found on the laptop in 

 

4 An investigator later described the BitTorrent network as an automated system that 

allows users all over the network to share files. The advantage of the system is that it 

can get pieces of common files from different users which allows a faster download. 

The multi-source download is not useful for law enforcement because they would not 

know what piece of the file came from a specific user so they use a single-source download from the internet protocol (IP) address identified by BitTorrent as having accessed

“files of interest” (generally contraband). 
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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Appellant’s home office, connected to a private network internet, which was 

not a proper means of classified storage. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Impact of Missing Prosecution Exhibit

1. Additional Background

During the pre-sentencing phase of the trial, the military judge admitted 

PE 6, a digital video disk (DVD) containing the DCFL Report. Because the exhibit contained contraband, it was ordered sealed. A sanitized version of the 

document was included in the ROT as Appellate Exhibit (AE) XV. AE XV did 

not include the images of child pornography contained in the contraband version and certain lines of text that were not relevant to the charges before the 

court had been redacted.

5 The Government’s forensic expert witness referred 

to AE XV throughout his direct examination. 

The military judge also admitted, without objection, PE 7, an external hard 

drive containing 7,371 contraband images found on five of the devices seized 

from Appellant’s home. 

Additionally, the Government indicated they wanted to offer evidence of 

child erotica images found on devices seized from Appellant’s home pursuant 

to Mil. R. Evid. 404(b). Their basis was that it rebutted the tenor of Appellant’s 

guilty plea inquiry that the vast majority of the images and videos were not 

sought by Appellant or intentionally possessed. The Government forensic expert testified that he found “tens of thousands” of images of child erotica on 

Appellant’s iphone, laptop, desktop, thumb drive, and the external hard drive 

found in Appellant’s garage, mixed in with the child pornography on those devices. Additionally, the external hard drive found in Appellant’s home office 

contained evidence of more than 19,715 deleted images of child erotica. The 

MUI folder on Appellant’s desktop computer contained a folder titled “jailbait”—which the forensic expert testified was a “colloquial term that refers to 

girls who are under the age of 18, who are attractive and might be desirable, 

but if you were to actually engage in sex with them, it would send you to jail.” 

Ultimately, the Government offered PE 9 containing nine “jailbait” images 

from Appellant’s desktop. The Defense objected on the basis they were not relevant and Appellant had “already pled guilty to knowledge and possession of 

child pornography.” The military judge overruled the objection, pointing out 

 

5 Some of the redacted text referred to evidence of child erotica found on five of the 

devices. The child erotica evidence would become relevant later during the sentencing 

phase of the trial.
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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that the Government was not bound by the Appellant’s version of events to 

which he pled guilty. 

The military judge authenticated the ROT on 3 May 2017, and the case was 

docketed with this court on 19 July 2017. Appellant filed his AOEs on 29 May 

2018, asserting the ROT was incomplete due to the omission of PE 6. The Government’s answer to the AOEs filed on 12 July 2018 asserts the ROT is substantially complete based on the content of PE 7, which contains all the contraband images relevant to Appellant’s trial, and AE XV, which is the sanitized

copy of the DCFL report.

The Government also filed three motions with this court on 12 July 2018: 

a Motion to Attach Document (Redacted); a Motion to Attach Document (Sensitive); and a Motion for Leave to File Attachment Under Seal. The attachments were a DVD and an affidavit from the lead trial counsel verifying the 

DVD contains the same report admitted at trial as PE 6. 

Appellant’s counsel filed a reply brief on 19 July 2018 asserting the DVD 

and affidavit are insufficient to substantially comply with the requirements of 

R.C.M. 1104(d). Additionally, counsel identified discrepancies with some of the 

file names found in PEs 6 and 7.

This court denied the motion to attach because the proffered matters did 

not comply with R.C.M. 1104(d). No further action was taken by the Government to reconstitute the record. 

2. Law

The issue of whether a ROT is complete is a question of law that we review 

de novo. United States v. Stoffer, 53 M.J. 26, 27 (C.A.A.F. 2000). A ROT that is 

missing exhibits may be substantially incomplete. Id. (holding that the record 

was substantially incomplete for sentencing when all three defense sentencing 

exhibits were missing). However, “insubstantial” omissions from a ROT do not 

render the record incomplete. See United States v. Henry, 53 M.J. 108, 111 

(C.A.A.F. 2000) (holding that four missing prosecution exhibits were insubstantial omissions when other exhibits of similar sexually explicit material 

were included). “Insubstantial omissions from a record of trial do not raise a 

presumption of prejudice or affect that record’s characterization as a complete 

one.” Id. “[A] substantial omission renders a record of trial incomplete and 

raises a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut.” United 

States v. Harrow, 62 M.J. 649, 654 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006) (citation omitted), aff'd, 65 M.J. 190 (C.A.A.F. 2007). We must approach the question of what 

constitutes a substantial omission on a case-by-case basis. United States v. 

Abrams, 50 M.J. 361, 363 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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3. Analysis

In Stoffer, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) concluded the 

absence of three defense exhibits was a substantial omission and did not approve the punitive discharge. 53 M.J. at 28. However, in accordance with 

Abrams, the holding in Stoffer must be limited to the facts of that case. Stoffer

involved the introduction of three defense exhibits that were admitted without 

any further identification as to what the exhibits were or what was contained 

within them, and the exhibits were never referred to again after their introduction or otherwise identified in the ROT. 53 M.J. at 27. Holding that they 

could not “presume” what information was contained in the exhibits and finding the Government had failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice from

the exhibits’ absence in the ROT or show their omission to be harmless error, 

the court did not approve the bad-conduct discharge. Id. However, this case is 

distinguishable from Stoffer because the facts of the case at hand are substantially different. This case is more similar to Henry where the absence of prosecution exhibits was found insubstantial because other matters within the record contained similar material. See Henry, 53 M.J. at 111.

Here, the Government offered PE 6 (unredacted DCFL report containing 

21 images) and PE 7 (removable hard drive with a total of 7,371 images of 

suspected child pornography found on five of Appellant’s devices) simultaneously. Shortly thereafter, the Government provided AE XV, the sanitized

DCFL report, which their forensic expert witness referred to throughout his

lengthy testimony—78 pages of the total 306 pages of transcript in this case. 

The redacted report did not contain the images, but did contain the file names 

of the images that had been redacted from the report. 

After a review of the entire ROT, we are confident that the missing exhibit 

is an insubstantial omission and the record is complete. Specifically, having 

reviewed the images contained on PE 7, the content of the sanitized DCFL 

report, and the verbatim transcript of both Appellant’s guilty plea and the testimony of the Government’s forensic expert witness, we find the record contains sufficient information regarding the results from the forensic analysis of 

Appellant’s devices to allow us to fully perform our appellate review function 

pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant did not refer to any specific image 

during his guilty plea, and the Charge did not refer to any image by name.

Accordingly, we find any error in the omission of PE 6 in this case to be harmless.

B. Sentence Severity

We review sentence appropriateness de novo. United States v. Lane, 64 

M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006). We may affirm only so much of the sentence as we 

find correct in law and fact and determine should be approved on the basis of 
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the entire record. Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). “We assess sentence 

appropriateness by considering the particular appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offense[s], the appellant’s record of service, and all matters contained in the record of trial.” United States v. Sauk, 74 M.J. 594, 606 (A.F. Ct. 

Crim. App. 2015) (en banc) (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Anderson, 67 M.J. 703, 705 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (per curiam)). While we 

have great discretion in determining whether a particular sentence is appropriate, we are not authorized to engage in exercises of clemency. United States 

v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 144–48 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

On appeal, Appellant relies on the same evidence and argument that he 

made at trial and in his clemency submission: that his conduct over a sixmonth span of time should not define his more than 30 years of service, and 

that the consequences of the dismissal are not warranted. The evidence established an elaborate and deliberate system by which Appellant obtained, organized, renamed and hid child pornography images. Appellant’s efforts to minimize both the quantity and severity of the images he possessed is not supported 

by the evidence, and his assertion that the absence of distribution on his part 

amounts to mitigation is misplaced. Having given individualized consideration 

to Appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offense, Appellant’s record of 

service, and all other matters contained in the ROT, we conclude that the sentence is not inappropriately severe.

C. Denial of Continuance

Appellant asserts that the military judge’s denial of the motion for a continuance denied Appellant’s forensic computer expert sufficient time to examine the evidence, thereby resulting in inadequate preparation for trial. We disagree. 

1. Additional Background

Charges were preferred on 29 June 2016 and referred to trial on 11 October 

2016. On 21 October 2016, Appellant submitted a resignation for the Good of 

the Service and on 11 November 2016 requested to withdraw the resignation 

request and replace it with a Retirement in Lieu of Court-Martial (RILO). 

On 4 November 2016, Appellant’s trial defense counsel filed a request for 

appointment of an expert consultant in digital forensics. The request did not 

include travel prior to the trial. On 14 November 2016, Appellant filed a resignation in lieu of court-martial.

6 On 3 January 2017, the expert witness request 

 

6 In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, 

¶ 8.15.3 (6 Jun. 2013), when a RILO has been submitted, a court-martial may not proceed beyond the acceptance of pleas at arraignment without permission to proceed. 
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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was approved. On 23 January 2017, defense counsel filed a supplemental request for the expert to travel to Shaw AFB to review the contraband evidence. 

On 30 January 2017, trial counsel, defense counsel, and the defense computer forensic expert scheduled logistics for the defense expert to review computer files at Shaw AFB. The defense expert offered the weeks of 20 February 

and 27 February as his availability, and the parties agreed on the week of 27 

February. The trial on the merits was scheduled to begin on 13 March 2017. 

On 13 February 2017, Appellant was arraigned, and Appellant deferred 

entry of his pleas and his forum selection. The trial court received briefs addressing a defense request for a Bill of Particulars, but otherwise the Defense 

raised no additional issues; specifically, the Defense did not ask for a continuance or otherwise raise a concern about the defense expert’s ability to review 

the computer files. 

On 17 February 2017, the Defense filed its motion for a continuance. On 23 

February 2017, the Government received permission to proceed to trial while 

the RILO was pending. On 28 February 2017, defense counsel supplemented 

their motion asserting receipt of an additional 230 pages of discovery and 

alerted the military judge as to possible difficulties in contacting some government witnesses based on past experience in other trials. The Defense claimed 

the defense expert would not have enough time to prepare for trial. Although 

the presence of classified information on the contraband was known to the Defense, there was no reference to any restrictions for reviewing the devices due 

to classified information contained in either continuance motion.

The Government responded on 27 February 2017 and supplemented their 

response on 28 February 2017, informing the military judge that the date for 

reviewing the evidence was the defense expert witness’s first availability and 

that nine witnesses, including civilians, and eleven Brigadier Generals and 

Colonels as potential panel members all had travel plans arranged for them to 

be at Shaw AFB for trial on 13 March 2017. 

On 1 March 2017, the military judge denied defense counsel’s motion for a 

continuance. On 6 March 2017, the Defense moved for reconsideration of the 

denial, asserting there was insufficient time for their expert to complete his 

analysis of the contraband (based in part on the possibility of technical issues)

and indicating the choice of forum may change to judge alone. The Government 

opposed the motion, asserting the additional time the Defense now indicated 

they needed exceeded that originally requested, and that the Defense had not 

availed themselves of the Government’s offer to approve additional funding. 

On 8 March 2017, the military judge issued his ruling on the request for reconsideration, delaying the trial for one day, but otherwise denying the motion. 
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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The Defense raised no further motions for continuance. On 9 March 2017, Appellant’s RILO was denied. 

2. Law

We review a military judge’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Weisbeck, 50 M.J. 461, 464 (C.A.A.F. 1999). A military judge has the authority, “for reasonable cause, [to] grant a continuance 

to any party for such time, and as often, as may appear to be just.” Article 40, 

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 840. “Reasonable cause” includes insufficient opportunity 

to prepare for trial. See R.C.M. 906(b)(1), Discussion. Whether or not to grant 

a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the military judge. Id. To 

warrant relief, an appellant must show prejudice as a result of the denial of a 

motion for continuance. United States v. Wellington, 58 M.J. 420, 425 (C.A.A.F. 

2003).

In United States v. Miller, the CAAF identified 12 factors to consider when

determining if denial of a motion for continuance is an abuse of discretion: 

surprise, nature of any evidence involved, timeliness of the request, substitute testimony or evidence, availability of witness 

or evidence requested, length of continuance, prejudice to opponent, moving party received prior continuances, good faith of 

moving party, use of reasonable diligence by moving party, possible impact on verdict, and prior notice.

47 M.J. 352, 358 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (citation omitted).

3. Analysis

 The military judge’s written ruling addressed the factors articulated in 

Miller. With regard to the three most relevant factors to Appellant’s request—

surprise, timeliness, and prejudice—the military judge found:

a. Surprise: I do not find surprise to be a significant factor under 

the present facts. . . . [The] 229 pages of discovery . . . consists 

largely of a [sic] the NCMEC [National Center for Missing and 

Exploited Children] report and the finally published AFOSI report. . . . [T]he issues in this case will largely turn on the extent 

to which images found on various digital media constitute child 

pornography and whether the accused was in knowing possession of them. That being the case, the digital media themselves 

and the impressions of the respective experts as to how they 

came about will likely be of far more importance than the matters typically found in an AFOSI report. 

b. Timeliness of the request: While the length of time spent on 

the final approval of the expert request is disappointing to say 
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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the least, neither party informed the Court of this difficulty or 

sought any intervention on my part during the approximately 

six weeks it was pending, when any concerns as to the request 

could have potentially been resolved without the necessity of a 

continuance. Additionally, no concerns were voiced as to the timing of the defense expert’s review of the evidence in relation to 

the trial date. While the government bears significant responsibility for the relatively short time available to the defense to consult with their expert, that responsibility is largely negated by 

the defense’s acquiescence with the dates provided and the failure of the defense to involve the court sooner.

. . . .

d. Prejudice to the opponent: . . . The defense has not demonstrated how they will be prejudiced by failure to continue the 

case. While they claim they are left with a mere 8 “duty days” 

until trial, they provide no basis for the implicit assumption that 

trial preparation cannot occur on weekends. Furthermore, there 

is no basis for concluding their expert will not be able to do precisely what he was employed to do, boil down the voluminous 

evidence into meaningful opinions and equip the defense to 

meaningfully confront the government expert, who incidentally 

has been available for the defense to interview for months.

AE VII, ¶16.

The military judge concluded the continuance was not required in the interests of justice and encouraged the Government to cooperate with the Defense regarding approval of additional on-site preparation by the expert witness in light of the classified material limitations. The military judge acknowledged the possibility of being compelled to reconsider his ruling. On reconsideration, the military judge indicated that the possibility of a judge alone election was too speculative and found no basis to speculate on technical issues 

impeding the analysis. If such issues arose, he anticipated having to reconsider 

the continuance yet again. Ultimately, the military judge found the Defense 

failed to show why the additional day of consultation would not be sufficient 

for them to adequately prepare. 

Appellant asserted multiple ways in which he was prejudiced by the denial. 

We are not persuaded. Final arrangements for the defense expert to view the 

contraband material the week of 27 February (his preferred date) had been 

made two weeks before the 13 February 2017 arraignment, at which time the

Defense made no mention of a need for a continuance, and in fact gave no indication to the military judge that there was any issue whatsoever regarding 
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39292

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their ability to prepare for trial. The continuance motion filed four days later 

relied on information that was known at the time of the arraignment. Furthermore, defense counsel were both aware of the presence of classified .pst files on 

at least one of the devices. The military defense counsel as well as the expert 

possessed the requisite clearance to view the files. Issuance of the “permission 

to proceed” memo cleared any potential impediments to the scheduled trial, 

making the expert’s review of the evidence a very tight timeline—but one that 

could have and should have been expected based on the fact that the schedule 

was self-imposed. After the expert reviewed the evidence, there were no further 

requests for a continuance, and the defense counsel vigorously cross-examined 

the Government’s expert in the sentencing phase. We agree with the military 

judge’s assessment that the overall processing of the defense expert witness 

request was “disappointing,” and while it did create a lag in trial preparation 

activities, it did not result in an inability to adequately prepare for trial. In the 

absence of demonstrated prejudice, we find no relief warranted.

III. CONCLUSION

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(c). Accordingly, the findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court