### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-15-00698- CV

Joan H. Hu ghes, Appellan t

v. Arm adill o P ropert ies for Lin a Robert s, Appellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 1 O F B ELL COUNTY NO. 82,8 88, H ONO RAB LE JEANNE P ARKER, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

J oan H. Hug hes appea ls pro se from the county court’s final judgme nt in forc ible entry and detainer , which orders her to vacate residential proper ty that she was leasing from
L ina Roberts. F or the following rea sons, we af firm the county

court’s judg ment.

BACK GR OUND The term of the written residential lease betwee n Hughe s an d R o berts was from May 1 , 2 0 1 4 , t o October 31, 2014, with an automatic rene wal on a month-to-month basis afte r October 31, 2014. On J uly 27, 2015, appellee Armadillo Properties, the proper ty manag er for
L ina Roberts, hand delivere d written notice to Hug hes of Roberts’s intent not to rene w the lease ,notify ing Hug hes that the lea se would end on Aug ust 31, 2015, and reque sting that Hug hes vacate

the prope rty

on or bef ore tha t date. Hug hes fa iled to do so.

1
I n September 2015, Armadillo Properties filed an eviction case in justice cour t , seeking possession of the lease d proper ty and contending that Hug hes was unlawfully holding over

on the lease d proper

ty afte r Aug ust 31, 2015. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510 (addr essing eviction case s);

see also Tex. Prop. Code § 24.011 (authorizing parties to be repr esente d by nonlawy er agent in “evic tion s u i t s i n justice court for nonpay ment of rent or holding over bey ond a renta l term”)

. Following a trial, the j usti ce co u rt enter ed an eviction j udg ment in favor of Armadillo Properties, order ing Hug hes to vacate the proper ty

. Hug hes appea led the judgme nt to county court. After a trial de novo, the county court enter ed a fi n al judgme nt in forc ible entry and detainer in favor of Armadillo Properties, order ing Hug hes to vacate the proper ty

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.10. This
appea l followed.

By J uly 2015, the term of the lease was on a month-to-month ba sis. I n that situation, the 1 written lease betwee n the parties provided the following time period for either party to provide notice of termination:
I f this lease automatically rene ws on a month-to-month basis, i t will continue to rene w on a month-to-month basis until either party provides writ t en notice of termination to the other party and the notice of termination will b e ef fe ct i v e: . . . (1) on the la st day

of the month following the month in which the notice is g iven. The notice provided in J uly by Armadillo Properties, t h e p ro p erty manag er for Roberts, then complied with this provision for an ef fec tive date of

termination at the e nd of Aug ust. 2ANALYSIS Although Hug hes filed an aff idavit of indige nce, she has failed to reque st the
repor ter’s rec ord. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c) (addr ess i n g when no repor ter’s rec ord filed due to appellant’ s fault). The repor ter’s rec ord was due in Dec ember 2015, and this Court, by letter dated April 26, 2016, notified Hug hes that the repor ter’s rec ord was overdue and provided h er with the opportunity to make arra

ng ements for the record. See id. (re quiring court to g ive appe llant notice and “re asonable opportunity to cure ”). Thus, we consider this appea l without the repor ter’s rec ord. See id. (authorizing court , when no repor ter’s rec ord has been filed beca use appellant failed to
reque st rec ord, to “conside r and decide those issues or points that do not require a repor ter’s rec ord for a decision” afte r providing appellant with notice and opportunity to cure ). We are also mindful that the only

issue in an eviction action is the right to actua l possession of t he premises. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e) ; W ilhelm v. Fede ral Nat’l Mo r tg. Ass’n , 349 S.W .3d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2011, no pet.).

“A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorney s and must comply with applicable laws and rules of proce dure.” Ami r-Sharif v. Mason , 243 S.W .3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W .2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Strange v. Continental C a s. Co. , 126 S.W .3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied) ). “[P] ro se appellants are held to the same standard as parties repr esente d by counsel to avoid gi ving unrepr esente d parties an advanta g e over repr esente d parties.” Stewart v. Texas He a l t h & Human Servs. Comm’n , No. 03-09-00226- C V, 2 0 1 0 Tex. App. L EXI S 9787, at *2 n.1 (Tex. Ap p . — Au stin Dec

. 9, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, Hug hes was require d to comply with the

3applicable rules of pr ocedur e, including the re quirements that an a ppellant’s brie f “state concise ly all issues or points prese n t ed fo r re v iew” and “conta in a clea r and concise arg ument for the

co n t en t i o n s made, with appropr iate citations to authorities and to the rec ord.” Tex. R. App. P

. 38.1(f) , (i). Hug hes’s appellate briefs are in the form of letters to this Court with attachme nts. To the extent the documents attache d to her letters are not in the rec ord, we may not consider them

on appea l. See Tex. R. App. P. 34.1 (desc ribing contents of appellate rec ord); Save Our Springs All., Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs , 304 S

. W

. 3 d 871, 892 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (“We are limit ed to the appellate rec ord provided.” ); Burke v. Insurance Auto A u ct i o n s C orp. , 169 S.W .3d 771, 775 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pe t. denied) ( noting that doc uments that are cited in br ief and attache d as appendic es g ener ally may not be consider ed by

appellate courts if they are
not formally included in rec ord on appea l). Fur ther, the letters do not comply wi th the applicable rules of pr ocedur e: Hug hes complains about the actions and attitude of the trial judg e towar d her, the condition of the lease d proper ty , and char g es to her such as her utilit y bill, but she fails to identify
any sp ecific alleg ed reve rsible err or by the county court or g ener ally to provide substantive
arg uments or citations to authorities or the r ecor d. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1(f) , (i).

Thus, holding Hug hes to the same standard as parties repr esente d by counsel, we conclude that she has waiv ed any issues that she m ay have by inadequa te briefing. See id. ; Davis

v. American Express Bank , No. 03-12-00564- CV, 2014 Tex. App. L EXI S 9 6 6 2 , at *7 (Tex. Ap p . — Au stin Aug

. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A ppellate issues must be support ed b y

ar gu m en t and authority , and if they are not so supported, they are waived.” (citing Trenholm

4v. Ratcliff , 646 S.W .2d 927, 934 (T ex . 1 983)); Lee v. Kaufman , No. 03-10-00148- CV, 2011 Tex. Ap p . L E XIS 6969, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug

. 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding points of err or waived that wer e not supported “with arg uments, leg al authority , or citations
to the rec ord”)

. Nonethele ss, we will attempt to addre ss her ar g uments as best as we can. See Stewart , 2010 Tex. App. L EXI S 9787, at *2 n.1 (addr essing pro se appellant’ s “complaints as best

we c an”)

. Hug hes appea rs to a rg ue that this c ase is one of re taliation by Armadillo Properties under section 92.331 of the P ro p er t y C o d e and that she acc ording ly was entitled to possession of the lease d proper

ty

. See Tex. Prop. Code § 92.331 (add re ssing reta liation by landlord); C o llege Station Terrace Pines Apts. v. Laird , Nos. 07-14-00137- CV & 07-14-00147- CV, 2016 Tex. App. L EXI S 1340 , at * 1 1

– 1 3 (Tex

. App.—Amar illo Fe b. 9, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( d is c u s s ing alleg ations of wrong ful eviction and reta liation by landlord). Wit hout a rep o r te r ’ s r e c o r d , howeve r, we are unable to deter mine what evidenc e, if any , was prese nted to the county court that would s u pport a finding of reta liation. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c) (limiti ng issues or points on ap p ea l t o t h ose that do not require repor ter’s rec ord when no repor ter’s rec ord is filed due t o appellant’ s fault); Laird , 2016 Tex. App. L EXI S 1340, at *11–13 (discussing evidenc e supporting
reta liation finding ); see also In re Spiegel , 6 S.W .3d 643, 646 (Tex. App.—Amar illo 1999, no pet.) (“Wit hout a repor

ter’s rec ord we do not know what, if any , evidenc e was prese nted to the trial court.” ). Thus, we cannot c onclude that Hug hes pre sented evidenc e that proved reta liation or that the county

court e rre d in awa

rding possession of the lea sed prope rty to Armadillo Properties. See Benne tt v. Cochran , 96 S.W .3d 227, 230 (Tex. 2002) (“The court of appea ls was corr ect in holding

5that, absent a complete rec ord on appea l, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial

court’s j u dg ment.”); Hebisen v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist ., 217 S.W .3d 527, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“Where there is no repor ter’s rec ord and no finding s of fac t, we assume the t rial court hear d sufficie nt evidenc e to make all neces s ary finding s in support of its judgment.” ).

CONCLUSION

For these re asons, we a ffirm the c ounty court’s judg ment. 2

__________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Goodwin a nd Bour land Affir med Filed: September

20, 2016

I n its briefing , Armadillo Properties asks this Court to awa rd it damag es pursuant to Texas 2 R u l e of Appellate Procedur e 45. See Tex. R. App. P. 45 (authorizing awa rd of “just damag es” i f appellate court deter

mines that appea l is frivolous). We decline to do so. See Bake r Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Hennig Prod. Co. , 164 S.W .3d 438, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (noting that g ranting sanctio n s i s discretionar y if appellate court deter mines appea l is frivolous). 6