Th e Honorable John D. Kelly died on October 21, 1998. This opinion i s 1 con sistent with his vote at the panel’s conference following oral argument o n September 22, 1998. The Honorab le James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern 2 District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-1416

___________ Leroy Smith, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Horace Watkins; The City of Eudora, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: September 22, 1998 Filed: November 5, 1998

___________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 1

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. Leroy Smith appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment i n 2 favor of the City of Eudora (City). We affirm.Smith did not raise any claims against Watkins in his individual capacity

. 3 Becaus e official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the municipality itself, th e only issues in this appeal relate to Smith’s claims against the City. -2- Th e City hired Horace Watkins as a full-time police officer on June 20, 1994

. On September 8, 1994, Watkins arrested Leroy Smith for fleeing a police officer. In the course of apprehending Smith, Watkins broke Smith’s hip. Smith brought thi s action against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on two grounds. First, he claimed that 3 the City had an unconstitutional policy of condoning Watkins’s use of excessive force. Second, he alleged that the City failed to train Watkins adequately.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. See Hossaini v. Western Missouri Med. Ctr. , 140 F.3d 1140, 1142 (8th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment should be granted if the evi dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The City would be liable for Watkins’s conduct only if it had a policy or custom that caused Smith’s injury. See Board of County C omm’rs v. Brown , 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997). In the absence of a written policy, Smith must identify a pattern o f widespread unconstitutional conduct that was so pervasive and well-settled that it had the effect of law. See Jane Doe A v. Special Sch. Dist. , 901 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990 ). Smith must show that the City “through its deliberate conduct . . . was th e ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Brown , 117 S. Ct. at 1388.
Smith co ntends that the City established a policy or custom of condonin g Watkins’s u se of excessive force by refusing to act on complaints about Watkins’ s conduct. The only evidence that such a policy existed before September 8, 1994, are the affidavits of Mabel Al exander, a dispatcher, and Ronald Nichols, a deputy sheriff. Alexander asserted that the Cit y had received complaints about unreasonable stops by-3-

Watkins before Smith’s arrest. Nichols averred that complaints had been mad e regarding unnecessary stops by Watkins “since 1991.” However, neither Alexander nor N ichols could identify specific complaints that put the City on notice of a widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct by Watkin s prior to Smith’s arrest. We recently held that two specific complaints and various rumo rs about an officer were not suff icient to establish a policy or custom of condoning unconstitutional conduct. See Andrews v. Fowler , 98 F.3d 1069, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that althoug h com plaints and rumors gave the municipality notice of the officer’s questionabl e conduct, they did not establish a widespread pattern of misconduct rising to the level of a policy or custom). In view of our holding in An drews and the standard enunciated by th e Supreme Court in Brown , the affidavits of Alexander and Nichols do not raise agenuine issue of material fact whether the City had a policy or custom of tolerating excessive force by Watkins at the time of Smith’s arrest.
Smith also claims that the City’s failure to train Watkins constituted a policy or custom that caused Smith’s injury. Although a plaintiff can make out a claim for failure to train by showing that city officials were deliberately indifferent to deficient training programs or special training needs, see City of Ca nton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1989) , Smith does not point to any evidence showing that the City’s trainin g procedures are deficient. Nor can he dispute that Watkins was qualified fo r his position when he w as hired in June of 1994. In Andrews , we found sufficient a trainin g pro gram consisting of attendance at a police academy and two weeks’ on-the-jo b training. See98 F.3d at 1076-77. See also Williams-El v. Johnson , 872 F.2d 224, 230 (8 thCir. 1989) (finding police academy and on-the-job training adequate fo r correctional officers with no prior experience). Watkins attend ed eight weeks of police training classes while serving as an auxiliary officer in D etroit, completed the Arkansas law enforcement training academy, and received more than 100 hours of police training while serving as an auxiliary officer for the State of Arkansas. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that he was inadequately trained.-4-

Smi thsupports his failure-to-train argument by showing that City official s received complaints about W atkins’s conduct yet failed to further train him on the use of excessive force . However, evidence that the City has requested investigations into compl aints about Watkins’s conduct since Smith’s arrest does not show that the City was deliber ately indifferent to Watkins’s need for special training at the time of th e arr est. As the Supreme Court stated in Canton , one officer’s shortcomings do no t suffice to attach liability to a municipality, beca use they could just as easily result from factors other t

han a faulty training program. 489 U.S. at 390-91. Smith has provided no e vidence of defects in the City’s training procedures, nor has he identified othe r officers who received inadequate training on the use of excessive force. The judgment is affirmed. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.