alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
MANDATE

Court of Appeals 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-12-01087-CV

ARNOLD J. WEBRE, JR. AND JO KATHRYN GROSS, Appellants

V.

RAY BLACK, JR., GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF ARNOLD J. WEBRE, SR., AN 

INCAPACITATED PERSON, Appellee

Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2 of Harris County. (Tr. Ct. No. 394,381).

TO THE PROBATE COURT NO. 2 OF HARRIS COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before this Court, on the 13th day of January 2015, the case upon appeal to revise 

or to reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these words:

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed 

by the trial court on October 25, 2012. After submitting the

case on the appellate record and the arguments properly 

raised by the parties, the Court holds that there was reversible 

error in the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, the Court 

reverses the trial court’s judgment and remands the case to 

the trial court for further proceedings.

The Court orders that the appellee, Ray Black, Jr., 

Guardian of the Estate of Arnold J. Webre, Sr., an 

Incapacitated Person, pay all appellate costs.
The Court orders that this decision be certified below 

for observance.

Judgment rendered January 13, 2015.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices 

Massengale and Huddle. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice 

Radack.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court 

in this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

March 27, 2015 

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

 CLERK OF THE COURT
Exhibit
      32.1





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





I,
      Steven
      D. Eversole, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to
      Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on
      Form
      10-Q of Kentucky
      USA Energy, Inc. ,
      for the
      fiscal quarter ended July 31, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of
      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the
      information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material
      respects the financial condition and results of operations of Kentucky
      USA Energy, Inc..





Date:
                September 22, 2008
            By:
            /s/
                Steven D. EversoleSteven
                D. EversoleChief
                Executive Officer
**Exhibit 23.1****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No.333-139495) pertaining to the Cal Dive International, Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan, and theCal Dive International, Inc. 2006 Long-Term Incentive Plan of our report dated February 28, 2007,with respect to the consolidated and combined financial statements of Cal Dive International, Inc.and subsidiaries, included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2006./s/ Ernst & Young LLPHouston, Texas
# C_2019125EN.01000101.xml

| 4.4.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 125/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.4.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 125/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.9130 — Société Générale/Commerzbank EMC Business)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2019/C 125/01)

On 11 February 2019, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32019M9130. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32019M9130. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---
Exhibit








Exhibit 10.5E


CHS LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN     
Plan Appendix




Fiscal 2016-2018 RETURN ON ADJUSTED EQUITY GOALS


	
				
	Performance Targets
	CHS ROAE
	Description
	Award as % of Target Goal

	Superior Performance Maximum
	20.0%
	Superior Performance Goal
	400%

	Maximum
	14.0%
	Maximum Performance Goal
	200%

	Target
	10.0%
	Target Performance Goal
	100%

	Threshold
	8.0%
	Minimum Performance Goal
	50%






Note: Compensation earned for any Performance Period is mathematically interpolated when
performance results occur between the three ROAE Performance Targets.


RETURN ON ADJUSTED EQUITY EXPLANATION


	
			
	ROAE
(percentage determined by dividing three year adjusted year-end earnings by three year adjusted beginning year equity)
	=
	

Three year Adjusted Year-End Earnings
(earnings minus preferred stock dividends)

	

Three year Adjusted Beginning Year Equity
(beginning year equity minus preferred stock)






* Equity is the difference between total assets and total liabilities in the balance sheet.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3133 

Relating to certain Indian land-related takings claims of the Grand Traverse 

Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan and its individual 

members. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 21, 2015 

Mr. BENISHEK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

Relating to certain Indian land-related takings claims of the 

Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 

of Michigan and its individual members. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL REFERENCE AND REPORT. 

4 Pursuant to the findings and conclusions contained 

5 in the Report issued by the chief judge of the U.S. Court 

6 of Federal Claims, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 

7 pay, out of money not otherwise appropriated, to the 

8 Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3133 IH

1 of Michigan for the benefit of itself and its members, the 

2 sum of $llll. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C., ss.1350 AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Sunrise Holdings Limited
(the "Company") for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:





1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents in all material respects the
financial condition and results of operations of Sunrise Holdings
Limited.








Date: July
      30, 2010
            
            
            /s/
      Xuguang SunXuguang Sun, Chief Executive Officer and
  President
**Exhibit
      32.1**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Cavalier Holdings, Inc. (the "Company")
      on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Leo
      Mentzelopoulos, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
      as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
      knowledge:




(1)
      the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)
      the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


Date:
                August 14, 2008
            
            /s/ Leo
              MentzelopoulosLeo
                  Mentzelopoulos
              President
              (Principal
                Executive Officer and Principal Financial
                Officer)




This
      certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-Q pursuant to Section 906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required
      by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). Such
      certification will not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing
      under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to
      the
      extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.
#### JOY v. MARSHALL FIELD &. CO.

No. 1252.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

June 9, 1932.

J. W. Chancellor, of Bowie, for appellant.

Fred J. Dudley *&*Associates, of Dallas, :for appellee.

BARCUS, J.

This is an appeal from the order of the trial court overruling appellant’s plea of privilege. The material facts are without dispute. Appellant has maintained a residence for himself and wife and children for more than thirty-five years at Terrell in Kaufman county. He has for many years been engaged in the compress business, and owns compresses located at a number of towns in Texas and Oklahoma. For many years, and up to the. time of trial of this case, he maintained an ofiice in Dallas county, Tex., and in said ofiice he had a bed where he usually slept when he spent his nights in Dallas. At each of his compresses he maintained an office and also a bed therein where he slept if he spent a night at any of said places. He always voted, if at all, in Kaufman county. His wife and children lived there. He maintained his only residence in Texas for his family in Kaufman county. He spent on an average of about one or two days every two .weeks in Dallas. He was constantly on the road visiting his various compresses, making the round every two or three weeks.

The sole question involved is whether said state of facts constituted Dallas his domicile o.r residence within the meaning of article 1995 of the Revised Statutes. Our courts from the earliest decisions have held that domicile and residence, within the meaning of the venue statute, are one and the same thing. Brown v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 432; Pittsburg Water Heater Co. v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417, 282 S. W. 576.

The fact that appellant transacted business in Dallas county, and in so doing spent a considerable portion of his time there, did not make said county his domicile or residence within the venue statute. In Blucher v. Milsted, 31 Tex. 621, almost the identical facts were there involved as are revealed by this record, and the court there stated: “The plaintiff seems to have had the opinion that if defendant was transacting business in Brownsville, in Cameron county, he could be sued there, notwithstanding he had a domicile in Nueces county. But such is not the ease.”

To the same effect is the holding in Strohl v. Pinkerton, 1 White *&*W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. page 217, § 470. There is no suggestion in the record in this case that appellant at any time lived with his family in Dallas county or that his family at any time lived, resided, or had their domicile in Dallas county. On the other hand, the evidence shows without controversy that for more than thirty-five years appellant had maintained a residence and domicile in Terrell, Kaufman county, Tex., for himself and family. Under this state of the record it was error for the trial court to overrule appellant’s plea of privilege.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the trial court is directed to transfer this cause to the county court of Kaufman county.
##### 



UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 
 FORM 8-K
 
 CURRENT REPORT
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): August 28, 2007
 LL&E ROYALTY TRUST
  Texas
    
    1-8518
    
    76-6007940(State or other jurisdiction of 
incorporation or organization)
    
    (Commission
File Number)
    
    (I.R.S. Employer
Identification No.)
 The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A., Trustee
Global Corporate Trust
919 Congress Avenue
Austin, Texas 78701
 (800) 852-1422
 Not Applicable
 see
 o
    
    Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)
 o
    
    Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR
240.14a-12)
 o
    
    Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17
CFR 240.14d-(b))
 o
    
    Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR
240.13e-4(c))




---



##### 



ITEM 2.02. Results of Operation and Financial Condition.
  ITEM 9.01. Financial Statements and Exhibits.
 (d)
    
    Exhibits.
 99.1
    
    LL&E Royalty Trust Press Release dated August 28, 2007.




---



##### 



SIGNATURES
  LL&E Royalty TrustBy:
    The Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A.,as TrusteeBy:
    /s/ Mike UlrichName:
    Mike UlrichTitle:
    Vice President   Exhibit Number
    
    Description99.1
    
    
    Press Release dated August 28, 2007.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-16-00803-CR

Robert Adrian RENDON,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 5521

Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE BARNARD, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED. 

SIGNED December 13, 2017.

_____________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
#### TANNER et al. v. DRAKE.

No. 974.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

Feb. 5, 1932.

Bonner, Bonner & Childress, of Wichita Falls, for plaintiffs in error.

Blanton, Blanton & Blanton, of Abilene, for defendant in error.

HICKMAN, C. J.

This case grew out of a ease of the same style, Tanner v. Drake, 47 S.W.(2d) 452, this day decided by us. After judgment had been rendered in that1 case in the court below in favor of defendant in error against plaintiffs in error for $17,500 as damages for personal injuries, the appellee filed an affidavit and bond in attachment and caused writs of attachment to issue thereunder, which were levied upon property belonging to plaintiff in error Campbell-Byrd Corporation. Thereafter an order was entered in the court below foreclosing the purported attachment lien against said property afid ordering that same be sold as under execution, and this writ of error was prosecuted for the purpose of having this foreclosure order reviewed.

But little needs to be written. The procedure is without precedence. There was no suit pending upon which to base an attachment. A final judgment had been rendered prior to the filing of the affidavit and bond and issuance of the writ. Attachment is purely a statutory remedy, and there is no statutory provision for the issuance of a writ of attachment after judgment. It must be issued during the progress of the trial, with a single judgment awarding a money recovery and a foreclosure of the attachment *456lien. Appellee in open court confessed error and did not file any briefs. ■

It is our order that the foreclosure order appealed from be reversed and here rendered in favor of plaintiffs in'error.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. TODD GRAVES, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-4099 (D.C. No. 2:16-CR-00494-TS-2) (D. Utah)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , MATHESON , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This matter is before the court on th e government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver contained in defendant Todd Graves’s plea agreemen t. Graves pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a fir earm. Pursuant to th e plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his convicti on or sentence, provided his sentence was within the statutory maximu m and not above the advisory guideline range determined by the district court to apply. Graves’s sentence was below the statutory maximum and within the advisory guidelines range. Nevertheless, he filed a notice of appeal.

* This panel has determined unanim ously that oral argument would not materially assist in the dete rmination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cas e is therefore ordered submitt ed without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding pre cedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It ma y be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 18, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 The government filed a motion to enfo rce the plea agreement pursuant to United States v. Hahn , 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). In response, Graves’s counsel did not pr ovide any reason why the appeal waiver should not be enforced. This court gave Graves an opportunity to file a pro se response to the motion to enfor ce, but he has not done so. We have reviewed the motion and the r ecord, and we conclude that Graves’s proposed appeal falls within the scope of the appeal waiv er and that nothing in the record indicates that he di d not knowingly and voluntarily waive his appellate rights or that enforcing the waiver would re sult in a miscarriag e of justice. See id. at 1325 (describing factors this court considers to determine whether to enforce an appeal waiver). Accordingly, we grant the motion to enfo rce the appeal waiv er and dismiss the appeal.

Entered for the Court Per Curiam
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3251 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3251

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to exclude coverage of 
       advance care planning services under the Medicare program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 28, 2015

 Mr. King of Iowa introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
 the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to exclude coverage of 
       advance care planning services under the Medicare program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE OF ADVANCE CARE PLANNING SERVICES 
              UNDER THE MEDICARE PROGRAM.

    Section 1862(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395y(a)) is 
amended--
            (1) in paragraph (24), by striking the ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (25), by striking the period and inserting 
        ``; or''; and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (25) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(26) which are advance care planning services, other than 
        under section 1812(a)(5).''.
                                 <all>
```
## UNITED STATES ARMY COUR T OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before SALUSSOLIA, SALADINO, and ALDYKIEWICZ Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v. Specialist JORDAN T. ELIE United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20160112

Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division Jeffery D. Lippert an d Lanny J. Acosta, Jr ., Military Judges Colonel Russell N. Parson, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Major Julie L. Borchers, JA; Captain Oluwaseye Awoniyi, JA (on brief).

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colon el Wayne H. Williams, JA (on bri ef).

4 April 2019

-------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY DISPOSITION ON FURTHER REVIEW

--------------------------------------------------------------

Per Curiam:

This case comes before us agai n under Article 66, Uniform Cod e of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 866 [UCMJ] following a rehe aring on senten ce. When we originally reviewed this case, we set aside appellant’s convict ion for attempted abusive sexual contact (Article 80, UCMJ) and aff irmed one spec ification of sexual assault (Article 120, UCMJ) afte r reviewing the military judge’ s erroneous propensity instruction through the lenses of United States v. Hills

, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016), United States v. Hukill , 76 M.J. 219 (C.A. A.F. 2017), and United

States v. Guardado , 77 M.J. 90 (C. A.A.F. 2017). United States v. Elie , ARMY 20160112, 2018 CCA LEXIS 17 (Army Ct. Cri m. App. 16 Jan. 2018). In remanding

the case to the convening author ity, we authori zed a rehearing on the Article 80 offense as well as on sentencing. Id. at *11.

On remand, the conven ing authority dismiss ed the Article 80 of fense. Appellant opted to have the military judge sit as a general cou rt-martial for his sentence rehearing for the Article 120 offe nse. The military j udge sentencedELIE—ARMY 20160112

2 appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for twenty-f our months, forfeiture of all pay and allowa nces, and reduct ion to the grad e of E-1.

We have reexamined this case, to include the assignments of err or originally raised by appellant in his 14 April 2017 bri ef and matters pers onally raised by appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon

, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A . 1982). Having conducted a complete re view of the case, we stand by our origin al resolutio n of these

matters.

CONCLUSION

The findings of guilt y and the sentence im posed at the rehearin g are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court FOR THE COURT: