78906 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 187 / Thursday, September 26, 2024 / Notices 

minutes, time permitting, and shall 

proceed at the discretion of the 

Advisory Council chair. Individuals 

with disabilities, or others who need 

special accommodations, should 

indicate their needs along with their 

request. 

Jose ́ Javier Rodrı ́guez, 

Assistant Secretary for Employment and 

Training, Labor. 

[FR Doc. 2024–22101 Filed 9–25–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–FN–P 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration 

[Docket No. OSHA–2024–0003] 

Ballard Marine Construction Lower 

Olentangy Tunnel Project; Grant of 

Permanent Variance 

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration (OSHA), Labor. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: In this notice, OSHA grants a 

permanent variance to Ballard Marine 

Construction (Ballard) related to work in 

compressed air environments. 

DATES: The permanent variance 

specified by this notice becomes 

effective on September 26, 2024 and 

shall remain in effect until the 

completion of the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project or until modified or 

revoked by OSHA. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Information regarding this notice is 

available from the following sources: 

Press inquiries: Contact Mr. Frank 

Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office of 

Communications, U.S. Department of 

Labor; telephone: (202) 693–1999; 

email: meilinger.francis2@dol.gov. 

General and technical information: 

Contact Mr. Kevin Robinson, Director, 

Office of Technical Programs and 

Coordination Activities, Directorate of 

Technical Support and Emergency 

Management, Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration, U.S. Department 

of Labor; telephone: (202) 693–1911; 

email: robinson.kevin@dol.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Copies of this Federal Register 

notice. Electronic copies of this Federal 

Register notice are available at http://

www.regulations.gov. This Federal 

Register notice, as well as news releases 

and other relevant information, also are 

available at OSHA’s web page at http:// 

www.osha.gov. 

I. Overview 

On April 11, 2023, Ballard Marine 

Construction (Ballard or the applicant), 

submitted under section 6(d) of the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 

1970 (the Act), 29 U.S.C. 655, and 29 

CFR 1905.11 (Variances and other relief 

under Section 6(d)) an application for a 

permanent variance from several 

provisions of the OSHA standard that 

regulates work in compressed air, 

1926.803 of 1926 subpart S— 

Underground Construction, Caissons, 

Cofferdams, and Compressed Air, and 

an interim order allowing it to proceed 

while OSHA considers the request for a 

permanent variance (OSHA–2024– 

0003–0002). This notice addresses 

Ballard’s application for a permanent 

variance and interim order for 

construction of the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project in Columbus, Ohio only 

and is not applicable to future Ballard 

tunneling projects. 

This notice addresses Ballard’s 

application for a permanent variance 

and interim order from the provisions of 

the standard that: (1) require the use of 

the decompression values specified in 

decompression tables in appendix A of 

subpart S (29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)); and 

(2) require the use of automated 

operational controls and a special 

decompression chamber (29 CFR 

1926.803(g)(1)(iii) and (xvii), 

respectively). 

OSHA reviewed Ballard’s application 

for the variance and interim order and 

determined that they were appropriately 

submitted in compliance with the 

applicable variance procedures in 

Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety 

and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act; 29 

U.S.C. 655) and OSHA’s regulations at 

29 CFR 1905.11 (Variances and other 

relief under section 6(d)), including the 

requirement that the applicant inform 

workers and their representatives of 

their rights to petition the Assistant 

Secretary of Labor for Occupational 

Safety and Health for a hearing on the 

variance application. 

OSHA reviewed the alternative 

procedures in Ballard’s application and 

preliminarily determined that the 

applicant’s proposed alternatives, on the 

whole, subject to the conditions in the 

request and imposed by the interim 

order, provide measures that are as safe 

and healthful as those required by the 

cited OSHA standards. On March 27, 

2024, OSHA published a Federal 

Register notice announcing Ballard’s 

application for permanent variance, 

stating the preliminary determination 

along with the basis of that 

determination, and granting the interim 

order (89 FR 21274). OSHA requested 

comments on each. 

OSHA did not receive any comments 

or other information disputing the 

preliminary determination that the 

alternatives were at least as safe as 

OSHA’s standard, nor any objections to 

OSHA granting a permanent variance. 

Accordingly, through this notice OSHA 

grants a permanent variance, subject to 

the conditions set out in this document. 

A. Background 

The information that follows about 

Ballard, its methods, and the Lower 

Olentangy Tunnel Project comes from 

the Ballard variance application. 

Ballard is a contractor for the Lower 

Olentangy Tunnel Project (the project), 

that works on complex tunnel projects 

using innovations in tunnel-excavation 

methods. The applicant’s workers 

engage in the construction of tunnels 

using advanced shielded mechanical 

excavation techniques in conjunction 

with an earth pressure balanced microtunnel boring machine (TBM). Using 

shielded mechanical excavation 

techniques, in conjunction with precast 

concrete tunnel liners and backfill 

grout, TBMs provide methods to achieve 

the face pressures required to maintain 

a stabilized tunnel face through various 

geologies and isolate that pressure to the 

forward section (the working chamber) 

of the TBM. 

Ballard asserts that it bores tunnels 

using a TBM at levels below the water 

table through soft soils consisting of 

clay, silt, and sand. TBMs are capable of 

maintaining pressure at the tunnel face, 

and stabilizing existing geological 

conditions, through the controlled use 

of a mechanically driven cutter head, 

bulkheads within the shield, groundtreatment foam, and a screw conveyor 

that moves excavated material from the 

working chamber. The forward-most 

portion of the TBM is the working 

chamber, and this chamber is the only 

pressurized segment of the TBM. Within 

the shield, the working chamber 

consists of two sections: the forward 

working chamber and the staging 

chamber. The forward working chamber 

is immediately behind the cutter head 

and tunnel face. The staging chamber is 

behind the forward working chamber 

and between the man-lock door and the 

entry door to the forward working 

chamber. 

The TBM has twin man-locks located 

between the pressurized working 

chamber and the non-pressurized 

portion of the machine. Each man-lock 

has two compartments. This 

configuration allows workers to access 

the man-locks for compression and 

decompression, and medical personnel 


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1The decompression tables in Appendix A of 

subpart S express the working pressures as pounds 

per square inch gauge (p.s.i.g.). Therefore, 

throughout this notice, OSHA expresses the p.s.i. 

value specified by 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5) as p.s.i.g., 

consistent with the terminology in appendix A, 

table 1 of subpart S. 

2See the definition of ‘‘Affected employee or 

worker’’ in section VII.C of this Notice. 

3The previous tunnel construction variances 

allowed further deviation from OSHA standards by 

Continued 

to access the man-locks if required in an 

emergency. 

Ballard’s Hyperbaric Operations 

Manual (HOM) for the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project indicates that the 

maximum pressure to which it is likely 

to expose workers during project 

interventions for the three tunnel drives 

is 27 pounds per square inch gauge 

(p.s.i.g.). The applicant will pressurize 

the working chamber to the level 

required to maintain a stable tunnel 

face, which for this project Ballard 

estimates will be up to a pressure not 

exceeding 27 p.s.i.g., which does not 

exceed the maximum pressure specified 

by the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 

1926.803(e)(5).1 Ballard is not seeking a 

variance from this provision of the 

compressed-air standard. 

Ballard employs specially trained 

personnel for the construction of the 

tunnel. To keep the machinery working 

effectively, Ballard asserts that these 

workers must periodically enter the 

excavation working chamber of the TBM 

to perform hyperbaric interventions 

during which workers would be 

exposed to air pressures up to 27 p.s.i.g, 

which does not exceed the maximum 

pressure specified by the existing OSHA 

standard at 29 CFR 1926.803(e)(5). 

These interventions consist of 

conducting inspections or maintenance 

work on the cutter-head structure and 

cutting tools of the TBM, such as 

changing replaceable cutting tools and 

disposable wear bars, and, in rare cases, 

repairing structural damage to the cutter 

head. These interventions are the only 

time that workers are exposed to 

compressed air. Interventions in the 

excavation working chamber (the 

pressurized portion of the TBM) take 

place only after halting tunnel 

excavation and preparing the machine 

and crew for an intervention. 

During interventions, workers enter 

the working chamber through one of the 

twin man-locks that open into the 

staging chamber. To reach the forward 

part of the working chamber, workers 

pass through a door in a bulkhead that 

separates the staging chamber from the 

forward working chamber. The manlocks and the working chamber are 

designed to accommodate three people, 

which is the maximum crew size 

allowed under the permanent variance. 

When the required decompression times 

are greater than work times, the twin 

man-locks allow for crew rotation. 

During crew rotation, one crew can be 

compressing or decompressing while 

the second crew is working. Therefore, 

the working crew always has an 

unoccupied man-lock at its disposal. 

Ballard asserts that these innovations 

in tunnel excavation have greatly 

reduced worker exposure to hazards of 

pressurized air work because they have 

eliminated the need to pressurize the 

entire tunnel for the project and thereby 

reduce the number of workers exposed, 

as well as the total duration of exposure, 

to hyperbaric pressure during tunnel 

construction. These advances in 

technology have substantially modified 

the methods used by the construction 

industry to excavate subaqueous tunnels 

compared to the caisson work regulated 

by the current OSHA compressed-air 

standard for construction at 29 CFR 

1926.803. 

In addition to the reduced exposures 

resulting from the innovations in 

tunnel-excavation methods, Ballard 

asserts that innovations in hyperbaric 

medicine and technology improve the 

safety of decompression from 

hyperbaric exposures. These 

procedures, however, deviate from the 

decompression process that OSHA 

requires for construction in 29 CFR 

1926.803(f)(1) and the decompression 

tables in appendix A of 29 CFR 1926, 

subpart S. Nevertheless, according to 

Ballard, their use of decompression 

protocols incorporating oxygen is more 

efficient, effective, and safer for tunnel 

workers than compliance with the 

decompression tables specified by the 

existing OSHA standard. 

Ballard contends that the alternative 

safety measures included in the 

application provide Ballard’s workers 

with a place of employment that is at 

least as safe as they would be under 

OSHA’s compressed-air standard for 

construction. Ballard also provided 

OSHA a project-specific HOM (OSHA– 

2024–0003–0003) for the Lower 

Olentangy Tunnel Project that requires 

specialized medical support and 

hyperbaric supervision to provide 

assistance to a team of specially trained 

man-lock attendants and hyperbaric or 

compressed-air workers to support their 

assertions of equivalency in worker 

protection. 

OSHA included all of the above 

information in the Federal Register 

notice announcing Ballard’s variance 

application and did not receive any 

comments disputing any of that 

information, including the safety 

assertions made by Ballard in the 

variance application. 

II. The Variance Application 

Pursuant to the requirements of 

OSHA’s variance regulations (29 CFR 

1905.11), the applicant has certified that 

it notified its affected workers 2 of the 

variance application and request for 

interim order by posting, at prominent 

locations where it normally posts 

workplace notices, a summary of the 

application and information specifying 

where the workers can examine a copy 

of the application. In addition, the 

applicant has certified that it informed 

its workers of their right to petition the 

Assistant Secretary of Labor for 

Occupational Safety and Health for a 

hearing on the variance application. 

III. OSHA History of Approval of 

Nearly Identical Variance Requests 

OSHA has previously approved 

several nearly identical variances 

involving the same types of tunneling 

equipment used for similar projects 

(tunnel construction variances). OSHA 

notes that it granted several subaqueous 

tunnel construction permanent 

variances from the same provisions of 

OSHA’s compressed-air standard (29 

CFR 1926.803(e)(5), (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and 

(g)(1)(xvii)) that are the subject of the 

present application: (1) Traylor JV for 

the completion of the Blue Plains 

Tunnel in Washington, DC (80 FR 16440 

(March 27, 2015)); (2) Impregilo, Healy, 

Parsons, Joint Venture (IHP JV) for the 

completion of the Anacostia River 

Tunnel in Washington, DC (80 FR 50652 

(August 20, 2015)); (3) Tully/OHL USA 

Joint Venture for the completion of the 

New York Economic Development 

Corporation’s New York Siphon Tunnel 

project (79 FR 29809 (May 23, 2014)); 

(4) Salini-Impregilo/Healy Joint Venture 

for the completion of the Northeast 

Boundary Tunnel in Washington, DC 

(85 FR 27767, (May 11, 2020)); (5) 

McNally/Kiewit SST Joint Venture for 

the completion of the Shoreline Storage 

Tunnel Project in Cleveland, Ohio (88 

FR 15080, March 10, 2023); (6) TraylorShea Joint Venture for the completion of 

the Alexandria River Renew Tunnel 

Project in Alexandria Virginia and 

Washington DC (88 FR 15080, March 10, 

2023); and (7) Ballard Marine 

Construction for the completion of the 

Bay Park Tunnel Project (89 FR 8442, 

February 7, 2024). The proposed 

alternate conditions in this notice are 

nearly identical to the alternate 

conditions of the previous permanent 

variances.3 OSHA is not aware of any 


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permitting employee exposures above 50 p.s.i.g., 

based on the composition of the soil and the 

amount of water that will be above the tunnel for 

various sections of this project. The current 

permanent variance includes substantively the 

same safeguards as the variances that OSHA granted 

previously even though employees will not be 

exposed to pressures higher than 27 p.s.i.g. 

4 In 1992, the French Ministry of Labour replaced 

the 1974 French Decompression Tables with the 

1992 French Decompression Tables, which differ 

from OSHA’s decompression tables in appendix A 

by using: (1) staged decompression as opposed to 

continuous (linear) decompression; (2) 

decompression tables based on air or both air and 

pure oxygen; and (3) emergency tables when 

unexpected exposure times occur (up to 30 minutes 

above the maximum allowed working time). 

5See, e.g., Dr. Eric Kindwall, EP (1997), 

Compressed air tunneling and caisson work 

decompression procedures: development, problems, 

and solutions. Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 

24(4), pp. 337–345. This article reported 60 treated 

cases of DCI among 4,168 exposures between 19 

and 31 p.s.i.g. over a 51-week contract period, for 

a DCI incidence of 1.44% for the decompression 

tables specified by the OSHA standard. Dr. 

Kindwall notes that the use of automatically 

regulated continuous decompression in the 

Washington State safety standards for compressedair work (from which OSHA derived its 

decompression tables) was at the insistence of 

contractors and the union, and against the advice 

of the expert who calculated the decompression 

table and recommended using staged 

decompression. Dr. Kindwall then states, 

‘‘Continuous decompression is inefficient and 

wasteful. For example, if the last stage from 4 

p.s.i.g. . . . to the surface took 1h, at least half the 

time is spent at pressures less than 2 p.s.i.g. . . ., 

which provides less and less meaningful bubble 

suppression . . . .’’ In addition, Dr. Kindwall 

addresses the continuous-decompression protocol 

in the OSHA compressed-air standard for 

construction, noting that ‘‘[a]side from the tables for 

saturation diving to deep depths, no other widely 

used or officially approved diving decompression 

tables use straight line, continuous decompressions 

at varying rates. Stage decompression is usually the 

rule, since it is simpler to control.’’ 

injuries or other safety issues that arose 

from work performed under these 

conditions in accordance with the 

previous variances. 

IV. Applicable OSHA Standard and the 

Relevant Variance 

A. Variance From Paragraph (f)(1) of 29 

CFR 1926.803, Requirement To Use 

OSHA Decompression Tables 

OSHA’s compressed-air standard for 

construction requires decompression in 

accordance with the decompression 

tables in Appendix A of 29 CFR 1926, 

subpart S (see 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1)). 

As an alternative to the OSHA 

decompression tables, the applicant 

proposes to use newer decompression 

schedules (the 1992 French 

Decompression Tables) that rely on 

staged decompression and supplement 

breathing air used during 

decompression with air or oxygen (as 

appropriate).4 The applicant asserts 

decompression protocols using the 1992 

French Decompression Tables for air or 

oxygen as specified by the Integrated 

Pipeline Tunnel Project-specific HOM 

are safer for tunnel workers than the 

decompression protocols specified in 

appendix A of 29 CFR 1926 subpart S. 

Accordingly, the applicant commits to 

following the decompression 

procedures described in that HOM, 

which requires Ballard to follow the 

1992 French Decompression Tables to 

decompress compressed air workers 

(CAWs) after they exit the hyperbaric 

conditions in the working chamber. 

Depending on the maximum working 

pressure and exposure times, the 1992 

French Decompression Tables provide 

for air decompression with or without 

oxygen. Ballard asserts that oxygen 

decompression has many benefits, 

including (1) keeping the partial 

pressure of nitrogen in the lungs as low 

as possible; (2) keeping external 

pressure as low as possible to reduce the 

formation of gas bubbles in the blood; 

(3) removing nitrogen from the lungs 

and arterial blood and increasing the 

rate of nitrogen elimination; (4) 

improving the quality of breathing 

during decompression stops so that 

workers are less tired and to prevent 

bone necrosis; (5) reducing 

decompression time by approximately 

33 percent as compared to air 

decompression; and (6) reducing 

inflammation. 

In addition, the project-specific HOM 

requires a physician, certified in 

hyperbaric medicine, to manage the 

medical condition of CAWs during 

hyperbaric exposures and 

decompression. A trained and 

experienced man-lock attendant is also 

required to be present during hyperbaric 

exposures and decompression. This 

man-lock attendant is to operate the 

hyperbaric system to ensure compliance 

with the specified decompression table. 

A hyperbaric supervisor, who is trained 

in hyperbaric operations, procedures, 

and safety, directly oversees all 

hyperbaric interventions, and ensures 

that staff follow the procedures 

delineated in the HOM or by the 

attending physician. 

B. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(iii) of 

29 CFR 1926.803, Automatically 

Regulated Continuous Decompression 

Ballard seeks a permanent variance 

from the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 

1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires 

automatic controls to regulate 

decompression. As noted above, the 

applicant is conducting the staged 

decompression according to the 1992 

French Decompression Tables under the 

direct control of the trained man-lock 

attendant and under the oversight of the 

hyperbaric supervisor. 

Breathing air under hyperbaric 

conditions increases the amount of 

nitrogen gas dissolved in a CAW’s 

tissues. The greater the hyperbaric 

pressure under these conditions and the 

more time spent under the increased 

pressure, the greater the amount of 

nitrogen gas is dissolved in the tissues. 

When the pressure decreases during 

decompression, tissues release the 

dissolved nitrogen gas into the blood 

system, which then carries the nitrogen 

gas to the lungs for elimination through 

exhalation. Releasing hyperbaric 

pressure too rapidly during 

decompression can increase the size of 

the bubbles formed by nitrogen gas in 

the blood system, resulting in 

decompression illness (DCI), commonly 

referred to as ‘‘the bends.’’ This 

description of the etiology of DCI is 

consistent with current scientific theory 

and research on the issue. 

The 1992 French Decompression 

Tables, proposed for use by the 

applicant, provide for stops during 

worker decompression (i.e., staged 

decompression) to control the release of 

nitrogen gas from tissues into the blood 

system. Studies show that staged 

decompression, in combination with 

other features of the 1992 French 

Decompression Tables such as the use 

of oxygen, result in a lower incidence of 

DCI than the use of automatically 

regulated continuous decompression.5

In addition, the applicant asserts that 

staged decompression administered in 

accordance with its HOM is at least as 

effective as an automatic controller in 

regulating the decompression process 

because the HOM requires a hyperbaric 

supervisor who directly supervises all 

hyperbaric interventions and ensures 

that the man-lock attendant, who is a 

competent person in the manual control 

of hyperbaric systems, follows the 

schedule specified in the 

decompression tables, including stops. 

C. Variance From Paragraph (g)(1)(xvii) 

of 29 CFR 1926.803, Requirement of 

Special Decompression Chamber 

The OSHA compressed-air standard 

for construction requires employers to 

use a special decompression chamber of 

sufficient size to accommodate all 

CAWs being decompressed at the end of 

the shift when total decompression time 

exceeds 75 minutes (see 29 CFR 

1926.803(g)(1)(xvii)). Use of the special 

decompression chamber enables CAWs 

to move about and flex their joints to 

prevent neuromuscular problems during 

decompression. 

Space limitations in the TBM do not 

allow for the installation and use of an 

additional special decompression lock 

or chamber. The applicant proposes that 


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6Anderson HL (2002). Decompression sickness 

during construction of the Great Belt tunnel, 

Denmark. Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 

29(3), pp. 172–188. 

7Le Pe ́chon JC, Barre P, Baud JP, Ollivier F 

(September 1996). Compressed air work—French 

Tables 1992—operational results. JCLP Hyperbarie 

Paris, Centre Medical Subaquatique Interentreprise, 

Marseille: Communication a l’EUBS, pp. 1–5 (see 

Ex. OSHA–2012–0036–0005). 

8Section 18 of the OSH Act, Congress expressly 

provides that States and U.S. territories may adopt, 

with Federal approval, a plan for the development 

and enforcement of occupational safety and health 

standards. OSHA refers to States and territories 

which have developed and are operating their own 

job safety and health programs as ‘‘States with 

OSHA-approved State Plans.’’ Their programs must 

be at least as effective in providing safe and 

healthful employment and places of employment as 

the Federal standards (29 U.S.C. 667). 

9These State variances are available in the docket 

for the 2015 Traylor JV variance: Exs. OSHA–2012– 

0035–0006 (Nevada), OSHA–2012–0035–0005 

(Oregon), and OSHA–2012–0035–0004 

(Washington). 

it be permitted to rely on the man-locks 

and staging chamber in lieu of adding a 

separate, special decompression 

chamber. Because only a few workers 

out of the entire crew are exposed to 

hyperbaric pressure, the man-locks 

(which, as noted earlier, connect 

directly to the working chamber) and 

the staging chamber are of sufficient size 

to accommodate all of the exposed 

workers during decompression. The 

applicant uses the existing man-locks, 

each of which adequately 

accommodates a three-member crew for 

this purpose when decompression lasts 

up to 75 minutes. When decompression 

exceeds 75 minutes, crews can open the 

door connecting the two compartments 

in each man-lock (during 

decompression stops) or exit the manlock and move into the staging chamber 

where additional space is available. The 

applicant asserts that this alternative 

arrangement is as effective as a special 

decompression chamber in that it has 

sufficient space for all the CAWs at the 

end of a shift and enables the CAWs to 

move about and flex their joints to 

prevent neuromuscular problems. 

V. Decision 

After reviewing the proposed 

alternatives, OSHA has determined that 

the applicant’s proposed alternatives, on 

the whole, subject to the conditions in 

the request and imposed by this 

permanent variance, provide measures 

that are as safe and healthful as those 

required by the cited OSHA standards 

addressed in section IV of this notice. 

In addition, OSHA has determined 

that each of the following alternatives 

are at least as effective as the specified 

OSHA requirements: 

A. 29 CFR 1926.803(f)(1) 

The applicant has proposed to 

implement equally effective alternative 

measures to the requirement in 29 CFR 

1926.803(f)(1) for compliance with 

OSHA’s decompression tables. The 

HOM specifies the procedures and 

personnel qualifications for performing 

work safely during the compression and 

decompression phases of interventions. 

The HOM also specifies the 

decompression tables the applicant 

proposes to use (the 1992 French 

Decompression Tables). Depending on 

the maximum working pressure and 

exposure times during the interventions, 

the tables provide for decompression 

using air, pure oxygen, or a combination 

of air and oxygen. The decompression 

tables also include delays or stops for 

various time intervals at different 

pressure levels during the transition to 

atmospheric pressure (i.e., staged 

decompression). In all cases, a 

physician certified in hyperbaric 

medicine will manage the medical 

condition of CAWs during 

decompression. In addition, a trained 

and experienced man-lock attendant, 

experienced in recognizing 

decompression sickness or illnesses and 

injuries, will be present. Of key 

importance, a hyperbaric supervisor, 

trained in hyperbaric operations, 

procedures, and safety, will directly 

supervise all hyperbaric operations to 

ensure compliance with the procedures 

delineated in the project-specific HOM 

or by the attending physician. 

Prior to granting the seven previous 

permanent variances to Traylor JV, IHP 

JV, Tully/OHL JV, Salini-Impregilo/ 

Healy JV, McNally/Kiewit SST JV, 

Traylor Shea JV, and Ballard Marine Bay 

Park Tunnel New York, OSHA 

conducted a review of the scientific 

literature and concluded that the 

alternative decompression method (i.e., 

the 1992 French Decompression Tables) 

Ballard proposed would be at least as 

safe as the decompression tables 

specified by OSHA when applied by 

trained medical personnel under the 

conditions imposed by the permanent 

variance. 

Some of the literature indicates that 

the alternative decompression method 

may be safer, concluding that 

decompression performed in accordance 

with these tables resulted in a lower 

occurrence of DCI than decompression 

conducted in accordance with the 

decompression tables specified by the 

standard. For example, H.L. Anderson 

studied the occurrence of DCI at 

maximum hyperbaric pressures ranging 

from 4 p.s.i.g. to 43 p.s.i.g. during 

construction of the Great Belt Tunnel in 

Denmark (1992–1996).6 This project 

used the 1992 French Decompression 

Tables to decompress the workers 

during part of the construction. 

Anderson observed 6 DCI cases out of 

7,220 decompression events and 

reported that switching to the 1992 

French Decompression tables reduced 

the DCI incidence to 0.08% compared to 

a previous incidence rate of 0.14%. The 

DCI incidence in the study by H.L. 

Anderson is substantially less than the 

DCI incidence reported for the 

decompression tables specified in 

appendix A. 

OSHA found no studies in which the 

DCI incidence reported for the 1992 

French Decompression Tables were 

higher than the DCI incidence reported 

for the OSHA decompression tables.7

OSHA’s experience with the previous 

seven variances, which all incorporated 

nearly identical decompression plans 

and did not result in safety issues, also 

provides evidence that the alternative 

procedure as a whole is at least as 

effective for this type of tunneling 

project as compliance with OSHA’s 

decompression tables. The experience of 

State Plans 8 that granted variances 

(Nevada, Oregon and Washington) 9 for 

hyperbaric exposures occurring during 

similar subaqueous tunnel-construction 

work provide additional evidence of the 

effectiveness of this alternative 

procedure. 

B. 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(iii) 

The applicant developed, and 

proposed to implement, an equally 

effective alternative to 29 CFR 

1926.803(g)(1)(iii), which requires the 

use of automatic controllers that 

continuously decrease pressure to 

achieve decompression in accordance 

with the tables specified by the 

standard. The applicant’s alternative 

includes using the 1992 French 

Decompression Tables for guiding 

staged decompression to achieve lower 

occurrences of DCI, using a trained and 

competent attendant for implementing 

appropriate hyperbaric entry and exit 

procedures, and providing a competent 

hyperbaric supervisor and attending 

physician certified in hyperbaric 

medicine to oversee all hyperbaric 

operations. 

In reaching this conclusion, OSHA 

again notes the experience of previous 

nearly identical tunneling variances, the 

experiences of States with OSHAapproved State Plans, and a review of 

the literature and other information 

noted earlier. 


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78910 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 187 / Thursday, September 26, 2024 / Notices 

10These state variances are available in the 

docket: Exs. OSHA–2012–0035–0006 (Nevada), 

OSHA–2012–0035–0007 (Oregon), and OSHA– 

2012–0035–0008 (Washington). 

C. 29 CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(xvii) 

The applicant developed, and 

proposed to implement, an effective 

alternative to the use of the special 

decompression chamber required by 29 

CFR 1926.803(g)(1)(xvii). The TBM’s 

man-lock and working chamber appear 

to satisfy all of the conditions of the 

special decompression chamber, 

including that they provide sufficient 

space for the maximum crew of three 

CAWs to stand up and move around, 

and safely accommodate decompression 

times up to 360 minutes. Therefore, 

again noting OSHA’s previous 

experience with nearly identical 

variances including the same 

alternative, OSHA preliminarily 

determined that the TBM’s man-lock 

and working chamber function as 

effectively as the special decompression 

chamber required by the standard. 

Based on a review of available 

evidence, the experience of State Plans 

that granted variances (Nevada, Oregon, 

and Washington) 10 for hyperbaric 

exposures occurring during similar 

subaqueous tunnel-construction work, 

and the information provided in the 

applicant’s variance application, OSHA 

is granting the permanent variance. 

Pursuant to Section 6(d) of the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 

1970 (29 U.S.C. 655(d)), and based on 

the record discussed above, the agency 

finds that when Ballard complies with 

the conditions of the following order, 

the working conditions of the workers 

are at least as safe and healthful as if it 

complied with the working conditions 

specified by paragraphs (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), 

and (g)(1)(xvii) of 29 CFR 1926.803. 

Therefore, Ballard must: (1) comply 

with the conditions listed below under 

‘‘Conditions Specified for the 

Permanent Variance’’ for the period 

between the date of this notice and 

completion of the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project; (2) comply fully with all 

other applicable provisions of 29 CFR 

part 1926; and (3) provide a copy of this 

Federal Register notice to all employees 

affected by the conditions, including the 

affected employees of other employers, 

using the same means it used to inform 

these employees of the application for a 

permanent variance. Additionally, this 

order will remain in effect until one of 

the following conditions occurs: (1) 

completion of the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project; or (2) OSHA modifies or 

revokes this final order in accordance 

with 29 CFR 1905.13. 

VI. Description of the Specified 

Conditions for the Permanent Variance 

The conditions for the variance are set 

out in the Order at the end of this 

document. This section provides 

additional detail regarding the 

conditions in the Order. 

Condition A: Scope 

The scope of the permanent variance 

limits coverage to the work situations 

specified. Clearly defining the scope of 

the permanent variance provides 

Ballard, Ballard’s employees, potential 

future applicants, other stakeholders, 

the public, and OSHA with necessary 

information regarding the work 

situations in which the permanent 

variance applies. To the extent that 

Ballard exceeds the defined scope of 

this variance, it will be required to 

comply with OSHA’s standards. This 

permanent variance applies only to the 

applicant, Ballard, and only to the 

remainder of construction work on the 

Lower Olentangy Tunnel Project. 

Condition B: List of Abbreviations 

Condition B defines abbreviations 

used in the permanent variance. OSHA 

believes that defining these 

abbreviations serves to clarify and 

standardize their usage, thereby 

enhancing the applicant’s and its 

employees’ understanding of the 

conditions specified by the permanent 

variance. 

Condition C: Definitions 

The condition defines a series of 

terms, mostly technical terms, used in 

the permanent variance to standardize 

and clarify their meaning. OSHA 

believes that defining these terms serves 

to enhance the applicant’s and its 

employees’ understanding of the 

conditions specified by the permanent 

variance. 

Condition D: Safety and Health 

Practices 

This condition requires the applicant 

to develop and submit to OSHA an 

HOM specific to the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project at least six months 

before using the TBM for tunneling 

operations. The applicant must also 

submit, at least six months before using 

the TBM, proof that the TBM’s 

hyperbaric chambers have been 

designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, 

marked, and stamped in accordance 

with the requirements of ASME PVHO– 

1.2019 (or the most recent edition of 

Safety Standards for Pressure Vessels 

for Human Occupancy). These 

requirements ensure that the applicant 

develops hyperbaric safety and health 

procedures suitable for the project. 

The submission of the HOM enables 

OSHA to determine whether the safety 

and health instructions and measures it 

specifies are appropriate to the field 

conditions of the tunnel (including 

expected geological conditions), 

conform to the conditions of the 

variance, and adequately protect the 

safety and health of the CAWs. It also 

facilitates OSHA’s ability to ensure that 

the applicant is complying with these 

instructions and measures. The 

requirement for proof of compliance 

with ASME PVHO–1.2019 is intended 

to ensure that the equipment is 

structurally sound and capable of 

performing to protect the safety of the 

employees exposed to hyperbaric 

pressure. The applicant has submitted 

the HOM and proof of compliance with 

ASME PVHO–1.2019. 

Additionally, the condition includes a 

series of related hazard prevention and 

control requirements and methods (e.g., 

decompression tables, job hazard 

analyses (JHA), operations and 

inspections checklists, incident 

investigation, and recording and 

notification to OSHA of recordable 

hyperbaric injuries and illnesses) 

designed to ensure the continued 

effective functioning of the hyperbaric 

equipment and operating system. 

Condition E: Communication 

This condition requires the applicant 

to develop and implement an effective 

system of information sharing and 

communication. Effective information 

sharing and communication are 

intended to ensure that affected workers 

receive updated information regarding 

any safety-related hazards and 

incidents, and corrective actions taken, 

prior to the start of each shift. The 

condition also requires the applicant to 

ensure that reliable means of emergency 

communications are available and 

maintained for affected workers and 

support personnel during hyperbaric 

operations. Availability of such reliable 

means of communications enables 

affected workers and support personnel 

to respond quickly and effectively to 

hazardous conditions or emergencies 

that may develop during TBM 

operations. 

Condition F: Worker Qualification and 

Training 

This condition requires the applicant 

to develop and implement an effective 

qualification and training program for 

affected workers. The condition 

specifies the factors that an affected 

worker must know to perform safely 

during hyperbaric operations, including 

how to enter, work in, and exit from 

hyperbaric conditions under both 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 187 / Thursday, September 26, 2024 / Notices 78911 

11See 29 CFR 1904 Recording and Reporting 

Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (http://

www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_

document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); 

recordkeeping forms and instructions https://

www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/forms. 

normal and emergency conditions. 

Having well-trained and qualified 

workers performing hyperbaric 

intervention work is intended to ensure 

that they recognize, and respond 

appropriately to, hyperbaric safety and 

health hazards. These qualification and 

training requirements enable affected 

workers to cope effectively with 

emergencies, as well as the discomfort 

and physiological effects of hyperbaric 

exposure, thereby preventing worker 

injury, illness, and fatalities. 

Paragraph (2)(e) of this condition 

requires the applicant to provide 

affected workers with information they 

can use to contact the appropriate 

healthcare professionals if the workers 

believe they are developing hyperbaricrelated health effects. This requirement 

provides for early intervention and 

treatment of DCI and other health effects 

resulting from hyperbaric exposure, 

thereby reducing the potential severity 

of these effects. 

Condition G: Inspections, Tests, and 

Accident Prevention 

Condition G requires the applicant to 

develop, implement, and operate a 

program of frequent and regular 

inspections of the TBM’s hyperbaric 

equipment and support systems, and 

associated work areas. This condition 

helps to ensure the safe operation and 

physical integrity of the equipment and 

work areas necessary to conduct 

hyperbaric operations. The condition 

also enhances worker safety by reducing 

the risk of hyperbaric-related 

emergencies. 

Paragraph (3) of this condition 

requires the applicant to document 

tests, inspections, corrective actions, 

and repairs involving the TBM, and 

maintain these documents at the jobsite 

for the duration of the job. This 

requirement provides the applicant with 

information needed to schedule tests 

and inspections to ensure the continued 

safe operation of the equipment and 

systems, and to determine that the 

actions taken to correct defects in 

hyperbaric equipment and systems were 

appropriate, prior to returning them to 

service. 

Condition H: Compression and 

Decompression 

This condition requires the applicant 

to consult with the designated medical 

advisor regarding special compression 

or decompression procedures 

appropriate for any unacclimated CAW 

and then implement the procedures 

recommended by the medical advisor. 

This proposed provision ensures that 

the applicant consults with the medical 

advisor, and involves the medical 

advisor in the evaluation, development, 

and implementation of compression or 

decompression protocols appropriate for 

any CAW requiring acclimation to the 

hyperbaric conditions encountered 

during TBM operations. Accordingly, 

CAWs requiring acclimation have an 

opportunity to acclimate prior to 

exposure to these hyperbaric conditions. 

OSHA believes this condition will 

prevent or reduce adverse reactions 

among CAWs to the effects of 

compression or decompression 

associated with the intervention work 

they perform in the TBM. 

Condition I: Recordkeeping 

Under OSHA’s recordkeeping 

requirements in 29 CFR part 1904 

regarding Recording and Reporting 

Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, the 

employer must maintain a record of any 

recordable injury, illness, or fatality (as 

defined by 29 CFR part 1904) resulting 

from exposure of an employee to 

hyperbaric conditions, or any other 

work condition, by completing the 

OSHA Form 301 Incident Report and 

OSHA Form 300 Log of Work-Related 

Injuries and Illnesses. The applicant did 

not seek a variance from this standard 

and therefore Ballard must comply fully 

with those requirements. 

Examples of important information to 

include on the OSHA Form 301 Injury 

and Illness Incident Report (along with 

the corresponding questions on the 

form) are: 

Q14 

• the task performed; 

• the composition of the gas mixture 

(e.g., air or oxygen); 

• an estimate of the CAW’s workload; 

• the maximum working pressure; 

• temperature in the work and 

decompression environments; 

• unusual occurrences, if any, during 

the task or decompression 

Q15 

• time of symptom onset; 

• duration between decompression 

and onset of symptoms 

Q16 

• type and duration of symptoms; 

• a medical summary of the illness or 

injury 

Q17 

• duration of the hyperbaric 

intervention; 

• possible contributing factors; 

• the number of prior interventions 

completed by the injured or ill CAW; 

and the pressure to which the CAW was 

exposed during those interventions.11

Condition J below adds additional 

reporting responsibilities, beyond those 

already required by the OSHA standard. 

The applicant is required to maintain 

records of specific factors associated 

with each hyperbaric intervention. The 

information gathered and recorded 

under Condition J, in concert with the 

information provided under Condition I 

(using OSHA Form 301 Injury and 

Illness Incident Report to investigate 

and record hyperbaric recordable 

injuries as defined by 29 CFR 1904.4, 

1904.7, and 1904.8 -.12), enables the 

applicant and OSHA to assess the 

effectiveness of the permanent variance 

in preventing DCI and other hyperbaricrelated effects. 

Condition J: Notifications 

Under the notifications condition, the 

applicant is required, within specified 

periods of time, to notify OSHA of: (1) 

any recordable injury, illness, in-patient 

hospitalization, amputation, loss of an 

eye, or fatality that occurs as a result of 

hyperbaric exposures during TBM 

operations; and in-patient 

hospitalization, amputation, loss of an 

eye or fatality that occurs during other 

operations must also be reported 

pursuant to 29 CFR 1910.39(a); (2) 

provide OSHA a copy of the hyperbaric 

exposures incident investigation report 

(using OSHA Form 301 Injury and 

Illness Incident Report) of these events 

within 24 hours of the incident; (3) 

include on OSHA Form 301 Injury and 

Illness Incident Report information on 

the hyperbaric conditions associated 

with the recordable injury or illness, the 

root-cause determination, and 

preventive and corrective actions 

identified and implemented; (4) provide 

the certification that affected workers 

were informed of the incident and the 

results of the incident investigation; (5) 

notify OSHA’s Office of Technical 

Programs and Coordination Activities 

(OTPCA) and the OSHA Area Office in 

Columbus, Ohio within 15 working days 

should the applicant need to revise the 

HOM to accommodate changes in its 

compressed-air operations that affect 

Ballard’s ability to comply with the 

conditions of the permanent variance; 

and (6) provide OTPCA and the OSHA 

Area Office in Columbus, Ohio, at the 

end of the project, with a report 

evaluating the effectiveness of the 

decompression tables. 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
78912 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 187 / Thursday, September 26, 2024 / Notices 

12Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(f). 

13See Appendix 10 of ‘‘A Guide to the Work in 

Compressed-Air Regulations 1996,’’ published by 

the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive 

available from NIOSH at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ 

docket/archive/pdfs/NIOSH-254/compReg1996.pdf. 

It should be noted that the 

requirement for completing and 

submitting the hyperbaric exposurerelated (recordable) incident 

investigation report (OSHA 301 Injury 

and Illness Incident Report) is more 

restrictive than the current 

recordkeeping requirement of 

completing OSHA Form 301 Injury and 

Illness Incident Report within 7 

calendar days of the incident 

(1904.29(b)(3)). This modified, more 

stringent incident investigation and 

reporting requirement is restricted to 

intervention-related hyperbaric 

(recordable) incidents only. Providing 

rapid notification to OSHA is essential 

because time is a critical element in 

OSHA’s ability to determine the 

continued effectiveness of the variance 

conditions in preventing hyperbaric 

incidents, and the applicant’s 

identification and implementation of 

appropriate corrective and preventive 

actions. 

Further, these notification 

requirements also enable the applicant, 

its employees, and OSHA to assess the 

effectiveness of the permanent variance 

in providing the requisite level of safety 

to the applicant’s workers and based on 

this assessment, whether to revise or 

revoke the conditions of the permanent 

variance. Timely notification permits 

OSHA to take whatever action may be 

necessary and appropriate to prevent 

possible further injuries and illnesses. 

Providing notification to employees 

informs them of the precautions taken 

by the applicant to prevent similar 

incidents in the future. 

Additionally, this condition requires 

the applicant to notify OSHA if it ceases 

to do business, has a new address or 

location for the main office, or transfers 

the operations covered by the 

permanent variance to a successor 

company. In addition, the condition 

specifies that the transfer of the 

permanent variance to a successor 

company must be approved by OSHA. 

These requirements allow OSHA to 

communicate effectively with the 

applicant regarding the status of the 

permanent variance and expedite the 

agency’s administration and 

enforcement of the permanent variance. 

Stipulating that the applicant is 

required to have OSHA’s approval to 

transfer a variance to a successor 

company provides assurance that the 

successor company has knowledge of, 

and will comply with, the conditions 

specified by the permanent variance, 

thereby ensuring the safety of workers 

involved in performing the operations 

covered by the permanent variance. 

VII. Order 

As of the effective date of this final 

order, OSHA is revoking the interim 

order granted to the employer on March 

27, 2024 (89 FR 21274) and replacing it 

with a permanent variance order. Note 

that there are not any substantive 

changes in the conditions between the 

interim order and this final order. 

OSHA issues this final order 

authorizing Ballard to comply with the 

following conditions instead of 

complying with the requirements of 29 

CFR 1926.803 (f)(1), (g)(1)(iii), and 

(g)(1)(xvii). These conditions are: 

A. Scope 

The permanent variance applies only 

when Ballard stops the tunnel-boring 

work, pressurizes the working chamber, 

and the CAWs either enter the working 

chamber to perform an intervention (i.e., 

inspect, maintain, or repair the 

mechanical-excavation components), or 

exit the working chamber after 

performing interventions. 

The permanent variance applies only 

to work: 

1. That occurs in conjunction with 

construction of the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project, a tunnel constructed 

using advanced shielded mechanicalexcavation techniques and involving 

operation of a TBM; 

2. In the TBM’s forward section (the 

working chamber) and associated 

hyperbaric chambers used to pressurize 

and decompress employees entering and 

exiting the working chamber; and 

3. Performed in compliance with all 

applicable provisions of 29 CFR part 

1926 except for the requirements 

specified by 29 CFR 1926.803 (f)(1), 

(g)(1)(iii), and (g)(1)(xvii). 

4. This order will remain in effect 

until one of the following conditions 

occurs: (1) completion of the Lower 

Olentangy Tunnel Project; or (2) OSHA 

modifies or revokes this final order in 

accordance with 29 CFR 1905.13. 

B. List of Abbreviations 

Abbreviations used throughout this 

permanent variance includes the 

following: 

1. CAW—Compressed-air worker 

2. CFR—Code of Federal Regulations 

3. DCI—Decompression Illness 

4. DMT—Diver Medical Technician 

5. TBM—Earth Pressure Balanced 

Micro-Tunnel Boring Machine 

6. HOM—Hyperbaric Operations 

Manual 

7. JHA—Job hazard analysis 

8. OSHA—Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration 

9. OTPCA—Office of Technical 

Programs and Coordination 

Activities 

C. Definitions 

The following definitions apply to 

this permanent variance, Ballard’s 

project-specific HOM, and all work 

carried out under the conditions of this 

permanent variance. 

1. Affected employee or worker—an 

employee or worker who is affected by 

the conditions of this permanent 

variance, or any one of his or her 

authorized representatives. The term 

‘‘employee’’ has the meaning defined 

and used under the Occupational Safety 

and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 

et seq.). 

2. Atmospheric pressure—the 

pressure of air at sea level, generally 

14.7 pounds per square inch absolute 

(p.s.i.a.), 1 atmosphere absolute, or 0 

pounds per square inch gauge (p.s.i.g.). 

3. Compressed-air worker—an 

individual who is specially trained and 

medically qualified to perform work in 

a pressurized environment while 

breathing air at pressures not exceeding 

27 p.s.i.g. 

4. Competent person—an individual 

who is capable of identifying existing 

and predictable hazards in the 

surroundings or working conditions that 

are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous 

to employees, and who has 

authorization to take prompt corrective 

measures to eliminate them.12

5. Decompression illness—an illness 

(also called decompression sickness or 

‘‘the bends’’) caused by gas bubbles 

appearing in body compartments due to 

a reduction in ambient pressure. 

Examples of symptoms of 

decompression illness include, but are 

not limited to: joint pain (also known as 

the ‘‘bends’’ for agonizing pain or the 

‘‘niggles’’ for slight pain); areas of bone 

destruction (termed dysbaric 

osteonecrosis); skin disorders (such as 

cutis marmorata, which causes a pink 

marbling of the skin, or in people with 

darker skin tones, the rash will appear 

as a marbled or lacy dark brown or 

purplish color); spinal cord and brain 

disorders (such as stroke, paralysis, 

paresthesia, and bladder dysfunction); 

cardiopulmonary disorders, such as 

shortness of breath; and arterial gas 

embolism (gas bubbles in the arteries 

that block blood flow).13

Note: Health effects associated with 

hyperbaric intervention, but not considered 

symptoms of DCI, can include: barotrauma 

(direct damage to air-containing cavities in 

the body such as ears, sinuses, and lungs); 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 187 / Thursday, September 26, 2024 / Notices 78913 

14Also see 29 CFR 1910.146(b). 15Adapted from 29 CFR 1926.32(m). 

nitrogen narcosis (reversible alteration in 

consciousness that may occur in hyperbaric 

environments and is caused by the anesthetic 

effect of certain gases at high pressure); and 

oxygen toxicity (a central nervous system 

condition resulting from the harmful effects 

of breathing molecular oxygen (O2) at 

elevated partial pressures). 

6. Diver Medical Technician— 

Member of the dive team who is 

experienced in first aid. 

7. Earth Pressure Balanced Tunnel 

Boring Machine—the machinery used to 

excavate a tunnel. 

8. Hot work—any activity performed 

in a hazardous location that may 

introduce an ignition source into a 

potentially flammable atmosphere.14

9. Hyperbaric—at a higher pressure 

than atmospheric pressure. 

10. Hyperbaric intervention—a term 

that describes the process of stopping 

the TBM and preparing and executing 

work under hyperbaric pressure in the 

working chamber for the purpose of 

inspecting, replacing, or repairing 

cutting tools and/or the cutterhead 

structure. 

11. Hyperbaric Operations Manual—a 

detailed, project-specific health and 

safety plan developed and implemented 

by Ballard for working in compressed 

air during the Lower Olentangy Tunnel 

Project. 

12. Job hazard analysis—an 

evaluation of tasks or operations to 

identify potential hazards and to 

determine the necessary controls. 

13. Man-lock—an enclosed space 

capable of pressurization, and used for 

compressing or decompressing any 

employee or material when either is 

passing into, or out of, a working 

chamber. 

14. Medical Advisor—medical 

professional experienced in the physical 

requirements of compressed air work 

and the treatment of decompression 

illness. 

15. Pressure—a force acting on a unit 

area. Usually expressed as pounds per 

square inch (p.s.i.). 

16. p.s.i.—pounds per square inch, a 

common unit of measurement of 

pressure; a pressure given in p.s.i. 

corresponds to absolute pressure. 

17. p.s.i.a.—pounds per square inch 

absolute, or absolute pressure, is the 

sum of the atmospheric pressure and 

gauge pressure. At sea-level, 

atmospheric pressure is approximately 

14.7 p.s.i.a. Adding 14.7 to a pressure 

expressed in units of p.s.i.g. will yield 

the absolute pressure, expressed as 

p.s.i.a. 

18. p.s.i.g.—pounds per square inch 

gauge, a common unit of pressure; 

pressure expressed as p.s.i.g. 

corresponds to pressure relative to 

atmospheric pressure. At sea-level, 

atmospheric pressure is approximately 

14.7 p.s.i.a. Subtracting 14.7 from a 

pressure expressed in units of p.s.i.a. 

yields the gauge pressure, expressed as 

p.s.i.g. At sea level the gauge pressure 

is 0 p.s.i.g. 

19. Qualified person—an individual 

who, by possession of a recognized 

degree, certificate, or professional 

standing, or who, by extensive 

knowledge, training, and experience, 

successfully demonstrates an ability to 

solve or resolve problems relating to the 

subject matter, the work, or the 

project.15

20. Working chamber—an enclosed 

space in the TBM in which CAWs 

perform interventions, and which is 

accessible only through a man-lock. 

D. Safety and Health Practices 

1. Ballard must implement the 

project-specific HOM submitted to 

OSHA as part of the application (see 

OSHA–2024–0003–0003). The HOM 

provides the minimum requirements 

regarding expected safety and health 

hazards (including anticipated 

geological conditions) and hyperbaric 

exposures during the tunnelconstruction project. 

2. Ballard must demonstrate that the 

TBM on the project is designed, 

fabricated, inspected, tested, marked, 

and stamped in accordance with the 

requirements of ASME PVHO–1.2019 

(or most recent edition of Safety 

Standards for Pressure Vessels for 

Human Occupancy) for the TBM’s 

hyperbaric chambers. 

3. Ballard must implement the safety 

and health instructions included in the 

manufacturer’s operations manuals for 

the TBM, and the safety and health 

instructions provided by the 

manufacturer for the operation of 

decompression equipment. 

4. Ballard must ensure that there are 

no exposures to pressures greater than 

27 p.s.i.g. 

5. Ballard must ensure that air or 

oxygen is the only breathing gas in the 

working chamber. 

6. Ballard must follow the 1992 

French Decompression Tables for air or 

oxygen decompression as specified in 

the HOM; specifically, the extracted 

portions of the 1992 French 

Decompression tables titled, ‘‘French 

Regulation Air Standard Tables.’’ 

7. Ballard must equip man-locks used 

by employees with an air or oxygen 

delivery system, as specified by the 

HOM for the project. Ballard is 

prohibited from storing in the tunnel 

any oxygen or other compressed gases 

used in conjunction with hyperbaric 

work. 

8. Workers performing hot work 

under hyperbaric conditions must use 

flame-retardant personal protective 

equipment and clothing. 

9. In hyperbaric work areas, Ballard 

must maintain an adequate firesuppression system approved for 

hyperbaric work areas. 

10. Ballard must develop and 

implement one or more job hazard 

analysis (JHA) for work in the 

hyperbaric work areas, and review, 

periodically and as necessary (e.g., after 

making changes to a planned 

intervention that affects its operation), 

the contents of the JHAs with affected 

employees. The JHAs must include all 

the job functions that the risk 

assessment indicates are essential to 

prevent injury or illness. 

11. Ballard must develop a set of 

checklists to guide compressed-air work 

and ensure that employees follow the 

procedures required by the permanent 

variance (including all procedures 

required by the HOM approved by 

OSHA for the project, which this 

permanent variance incorporates by 

reference). The checklists must include 

all steps and equipment functions that 

the risk assessment indicates are 

essential to prevent injury or illness 

during compressed-air work. 

12. Ballard must ensure that the safety 

and health provisions of this projectspecific HOM adequately protect the 

workers of all contractors and 

subcontractors involved in hyperbaric 

operations for the project to which the 

HOM applies. 

E. Communication 

1. Prior to beginning a shift, Ballard 

must implement a system that informs 

workers exposed to hyperbaric 

conditions of any hazardous 

occurrences or conditions that might 

affect their safety, including hyperbaric 

incidents, gas releases, equipment 

failures, earth or rockslides, cave-ins, 

flooding, fires, or explosions. 

2. Ballard must provide a powerassisted means of communication 

among affected workers and support 

personnel in hyperbaric conditions 

where unassisted voice communication 

is inadequate. 

(a) Ballard must use an independent 

power supply for powered 

communication systems, and these 

systems have to operate such that use or 

disruption of any one phone or signal 

location will not disrupt the operation 

of the system from any other location. 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
78914 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 187 / Thursday, September 26, 2024 / Notices 

16See 29 CFR 1904 (Recording and Reporting 

Occupational Injuries and Illnesses) (http://

www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_

document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9631); 

recordkeeping forms and instructions https://

www.osha.gov/recordkeeping/forms. 

(b) Ballard must test communication 

systems at the start of each shift and as 

necessary thereafter to ensure proper 

operation. 

F. Worker Qualifications and Training 

Ballard must: 

1. Ensure that each affected worker 

receives effective training on how to 

safely enter, work in, exit from, and 

undertake emergency evacuation or 

rescue from, hyperbaric conditions, and 

document this training. 

2. Provide effective instruction on 

hyperbaric conditions, before beginning 

hyperbaric operations, to each worker 

who performs work, or controls the 

exposure of others, and document this 

instruction. The instruction must 

include: 

(a) The physics and physiology of 

hyperbaric work; 

(b) Recognition of pressure-related 

injuries; 

(c) Information on the causes and 

recognition of the signs and symptoms 

associated with decompression illness, 

and other hyperbaric interventionrelated health effects (e.g., barotrauma, 

nitrogen narcosis, and oxygen toxicity); 

(d) How to avoid discomfort during 

compression and decompression; 

(e) Information the workers can use to 

contact the appropriate healthcare 

professionals should the workers have 

concerns that they may be experiencing 

adverse health effects from hyperbaric 

exposure; and 

(f) Procedures and requirements 

applicable to the employee in the 

project-specific HOM. 

3. Repeat the instruction specified in 

paragraph (G) of this condition 

periodically and as necessary (e.g., after 

making changes to its hyperbaric 

operations). 

4. When conducting training for its 

hyperbaric workers, make this training 

available to OSHA personnel and notify 

the OTPCA at OSHA’s national office 

and OSHA’s Columbus, Ohio Area 

Office before the training takes place. 

G. Inspections, Tests, and Accident 

Prevention 

1. Ballard must initiate and maintain 

a program of frequent and regular 

inspections of the TBM’s hyperbaric 

equipment and support systems (such as 

temperature control, illumination, 

ventilation, and fire-prevention and firesuppression systems), and hyperbaric 

work areas, as required under 29 CFR 

1926.20(b)(2), including: 

(a) Developing a set of checklists to be 

used by a competent person in 

conducting weekly inspections of 

hyperbaric equipment and work areas; 

and 

(b) Ensuring that a competent person 

conducts daily visual checks and 

weekly inspections of the TBM. 

2. Ballard must remove any 

equipment that is found to constitute a 

safety hazard until Ballard corrects the 

hazardous condition and has the 

correction approved by a qualified 

person. 

3. Ballard must maintain records of all 

tests and inspections of the TBM, as 

well as associated corrective actions and 

repairs, at the job site for the duration 

of the tunneling project and for 90 days 

after the final project report is submitted 

to OSHA. 

H. Compression and Decompression 

Ballard must consult with its 

attending physician concerning the 

need for special compression or 

decompression exposures appropriate 

for CAWs not acclimated to hyperbaric 

exposure. 

I. Recordkeeping 

In addition to completing OSHA Form 

301 Injury and Illness Incident Report 

and OSHA Form 300 Log of WorkRelated Injuries and Illnesses, Ballard 

must maintain records of: 

1. The date, times (e.g., time 

compression started, time spent 

compressing, time performing 

intervention, time spent 

decompressing), and pressure for each 

hyperbaric intervention. 

2. The names of all supervisors and 

DMTs involved for each intervention. 

3. The name of each individual 

worker exposed to hyperbaric pressure 

and the decompression protocols and 

results for each worker. 

4. The total number of interventions 

and the amount of hyperbaric work time 

at each pressure. 

5. The results of the post-intervention 

physical assessment of each CAW for 

signs and symptoms of decompression 

illness, barotrauma, nitrogen narcosis, 

oxygen toxicity or other health effects 

associated with work in compressed air 

for each hyperbaric intervention. 

J. Notifications 

1. To assist OSHA in administering 

the conditions specified herein, Ballard 

must: 

(a) Notify the OTPCA and the OSHA 

Area Office in Columbus, Ohio at 

www.osha.gov/contactus/byoffice of any 

recordable injury, illness, or fatality (by 

submitting the completed OSHA Form 

301 Injury and Illness Incident 

Report) 16 resulting from exposure of an 

employee to hyperbaric conditions, 

including those that do not require 

recompression treatment (e.g., nitrogen 

narcosis, oxygen toxicity, barotrauma), 

but still meet the recordable injury or 

illness criteria of 29 CFR 1904. The 

notification must be made within 8 

hours of the incident or 8 hours after 

becoming aware of a recordable injury, 

illness, or fatality; a copy of the incident 

investigation (OSHA Form 301 Injuries 

and Illness Incident Report) must be 

submitted to OSHA within 24 hours of 

the incident or 24 hours after becoming 

aware of a recordable injury, illness, or 

fatality. In addition to the information 

required by OSHA Form 301 Injuries 

and Illness Incident Report, the 

incident-investigation report must 

include a root-cause determination, and 

the preventive and corrective actions 

identified and implemented. 

(b) Provide certification to OTPCA 

and the OSHA Area Office in Columbus, 

Ohio within 15 working days of the 

incident that Ballard informed affected 

workers of the incident and the results 

of the incident investigation (including 

the root-cause determination and 

preventive and corrective actions 

identified and implemented). 

(c) Notify the OTPCA and the OSHA 

Area Office in Columbus, Ohio within 

15 working days and in writing, of any 

change in the compressed-air operations 

that affects Ballard’s ability to comply 

with the conditions specified herein. 

(d) Upon completion of the Lower 

Olentangy Tunnel Project, evaluate the 

effectiveness of the decompression 

tables used throughout the project, and 

provide a written report of this 

evaluation to the OTPCA and the OSHA 

Area Office in Columbus, Ohio. 

Note: The evaluation report must contain 

summaries of: (1) The number, dates, 

durations, and pressures of the hyperbaric 

interventions completed; (2) decompression 

protocols implemented (including 

composition of gas mixtures (air and/or 

oxygen), and the results achieved; (3) the 

total number of interventions and the number 

of hyperbaric incidents (decompression 

illnesses and/or health effects associated 

with hyperbaric interventions as recorded on 

OSHA Form 301 Injuries and Illness Incident 

Report and OSHA Form 300 Log of WorkRelated Injuries and Illnesses, and relevant 

medical diagnoses, and treating physicians’ 

opinions); and (4) root causes of any 

hyperbaric incidents, and preventive and 

corrective actions identified and 

implemented. 

(e) To assist OSHA in administering 

the conditions specified herein, inform 

the OTPCA and the OSHA Area Office 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 187 / Thursday, September 26, 2024 / Notices 78915 

in Columbus, Ohio as soon as possible, 

but no later than seven (7) days, after it 

has knowledge that it will: 

(i) Cease doing business; 

(ii) Change the location and address of 

the main office for managing the 

tunneling operations specified herein; 

or 

(iii) Transfer the operations specified 

herein to a successor company. 

(f) Notify all affected employees of 

this permanent variance by the same 

means required to inform them of its 

application for a permanent variance. 

2. This permanent variance cannot be 

transferred to a successor company 

without OSHA approval. 

OSHA hereby grants a permanent 

variance to Ballard Marine Construction 

for the 

completion of the Lower Olentangy 

Tunnel Project in Columbus, Ohio. 

VIII. Authority and Signature 

Douglas L. Parker, Assistant Secretary 

of Labor for Occupational Safety and 

Health, 200 Constitution Avenue NW, 

Washington, DC 20210, authorized the 

preparation of this notice. Accordingly, 

the agency is issuing this notice 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 655(d), Secretary 

of Labor’s Order No. 8–2020 (85 FR 

58393, Sept. 18, 2020), and 29 CFR 

1905.11. 

Signed at Washington, DC, on September 3, 

2024. 

Douglas L. Parker, 

Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational 

Safety and Health. 

[FR Doc. 2024–22002 Filed 9–25–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–26–P 

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 

Networking and Information 

Technology Research and 

Development Request for Information 

on a National Plan for Cyber-Physical 

Systems Resilience 

AGENCY: Networking and Information 

Technology Research and Development 

(NITRD) National Coordination Office 

(NCO), National Science Foundation. 

ACTION: Request for information. 

SUMMARY: On behalf of Office of Science 

and Technology Policy (OSTP), the 

NITRD National Coordination Office 

seeks public input for the creation of a 

National Plan for Cyber-Physical 

Systems Resilience Research (the Plan). 

The goal of the plan is to shape a wholeof-government research and 

development (R&D) plan related to 

cyber-physical resilience across systems 

that may be local, regional, or national 

in scope. As defined in the President’s 

Council of Advisors on Science and 

Technology (PCAST) Report, Strategy 

for Cyber-Physical Resilience: Fortifying 

Our Critical Infrastructure for a Digital 

World, cyber-physical systems are 

defined as physical systems that rely on 

computing technologies for sensing, 

analysis, tracking, controls, 

connectivity, coordination, and humansystem interaction. The National 

Climate Resilience Framework defines 

resilience as the ability to prepare for 

threats and hazards, adapt to changing 

conditions, and withstand and recover 

rapidly from adverse conditions and 

disruptions. From the perspective of the 

RFI, the system recovery period and 

performance are acceptable from a 

social and technical perspective. These 

definitions will be used for the purposes 

of this RFI, but respondents are 

welcome to provide alternate definitions 

if cyber-physical systems have a 

different meaning in their industry or 

field, along with the scientific rationale 

for specific use-cases. The Plan is 

scheduled to be released in 2025. 

DATES: Interested persons are invited to 

submit comments on or before 11:59 

p.m. (ET) on October 26, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Comments submitted in 

response to this RFI may be sent by any 

of the following methods: 

• Email: CPSR-ftacRFI@nitrd.gov; 

Email submissions should be machinereadable and not be copy-protected. 

Submissions should include ‘‘RFI 

Response: Cyber-Physical Systems 

Resilience R&D Plan’’ in the subject line 

of the message. 

• Mail: Attn: Melissa Cornelius, 2415 

Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 

22314, USA. 

Instructions: Response to this RFI is 

voluntary. Each individual or institution 

is requested to submit only one 

response. Submissions must not exceed 

10 pages in 12 point or larger font, with 

a page number provided on each page. 

Responses must include the name of the 

person(s) or organization(s) filing the 

comment and the following statement: 

‘‘This document is approved for public 

dissemination. The document contains 

no business-proprietary or confidential 

information. Document contents may be 

reused by the government in the 

National Cyber-Physical Systems 

Resilience R&D Strategic Plan and 

associated documents without 

attribution.’’ 

Responses to this RFI may be posted 

online at https://www.nitrd.gov/. 

Therefore, we request that no business 

proprietary information, copyrighted 

information, or sensitive personally 

identifiable information be submitted as 

part of your response to this RFI. 

In accordance with FAR 15.202(3), 

responses to this notice are not offers 

and cannot be accepted by the 

Government to form a binding contract. 

Responders are solely responsible for all 

expenses associated with responding to 

this RFI. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

David Alexander, David Corman, Kristin 

Ludwig, Melissa Cornelius, Martin 

Stanley at CPSR-ftacRFI@nitrd.gov or 

(202) 459–9674. Individuals who use a 

telecommunications device for the deaf 

(TDD) may call the Federal Information 

Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339 

between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., eastern time, 

Monday through Friday, except for U.S. 

Federal Government holidays. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

(PCAST) released its report, Strategy for 

Cyber-Physical Resilience: Fortifying our 

Critical Infrastructure for a Digital 

World. The report makes 

recommendations to formulate a 

National Plan for Cyber-Physical 

Resilience Research. The goal is to 

enable focused research across Federal 

programs that increase the likelihood of 

successful research results, but more 

importantly help ensure that such 

results will transition into practice. In 

response to this, the Fast-Track Action 

Committee (FTAC) on Cyber-Physical 

Systems Resilience (CPSR) is 

developing a National Cyber Physical 

Systems Resilience (R&D) Strategic Plan 

(the Plan) which will define research 

needs that will strengthen our national 

capability to cyber-physical resilience; 

identify the gaps; and define research 

needs, and investment priorities 

spanning across multiple time horizons. 

The Plan will coordinate cross-agencies 

priorities. Responsible innovation in 

cyber physical resilience could provide 

significant benefits for the American 

people especially as systems need to 

adapt to emergent behaviors or 

operating conditions far exceeding 

design specifications. 

Information Requested: This RFI 

seeks input to shape a whole-ofgovernment effort on research and 

development that will strengthen cyberphysical resilience. 

In the context of this RFI, we refer to 

threats to include cybersecurity, 

physical, natural disasters including 

extreme weather events or other hazards 

such as earthquakes, and the potential 

for adversary use of AI to disrupt 

systems as well as deceive human 

operators of critical infrastructure 

systems. 

Threat-agnostic approaches for 

resilience are of special interest. As part 

of the input, we are primarily concerned 

with the ability of cyber-physical 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES