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Filed 9/30/24 Sayyedalhosseini v. Rostami CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

SONIA SAYYEDALHOSSEINI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROSTAM ROSTAMI,

Defendant and Respondent.

C097939

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2022-

70011827-CU-HR-GDS)

SONIA SAYYEDALHOSSEINI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

FARIBA FARINFAR,

Defendant and Respondent.

C097940

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2022-

70011828-CU-HR-GDS)
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This consolidated appeal arises out of a contentious and long-running dispute 

among neighbors living in the same apartment complex in Folsom. Plaintiff Sonia 

Sayyedalhosseini (Sonia), proceeding as a self-represented litigant, challenges the orders 

denying her petitions for a civil harassment restraining order against defendants Rostam 

Rostami (Rostam) and Fariba Farinfar (Fariba) under Code of Civil Procedure section 

527.6.1 Finding no error, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We briefly summarize the pertinent facts and procedure.

The Parties 

Sonia and her husband (Seyed)2 are originally from Iran. At all relevant times, 

they lived in an apartment complex in Folsom. 

Rostam and Fariba (husband and wife) are also originally from Iran. They lived in 

the same apartment complex as Sonia and Seyed. Rostam and Fariba were the “front 

door neighbor[s]” of Sonia and Seyed. Their apartment was across the hall on the second 

floor of the apartment building. 

Prior Petitions for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order

In October 2020, Sonia and Seyed obtained four temporary civil harassment 

restraining orders against Rostam and Fariba, in four separate cases. These restraining 

orders were based on allegations that Rostam and Fariba had threatened (on several 

occasions) to kill Sonia and Seyed with a gun and knife. 

Two months later, in December 2020, Sonia and Seyed filed petitions for a civil 

harassment restraining order against a former friend of theirs, Hengameh Hatami

(Hengameh), who was also originally from Iran and lived in Folsom. In February 2021, 

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2

 Seyed’s full name is Seyed Saeid, Zamanieh Shahri. 
3

Sonia and Seyed filed additional petitions for a civil harassment restraining order against 

Hengameh. The allegations in support of those petitions are summarized in an 

unpublished opinion issued by this court in April 2023. (See Z.S. v. H.H. (Apr. 27, 2023, 

C094845, C094846, C094847, C094848) [nonpub opn.] 2023 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis 

2485.)3 Among other things, Sonia and Seyed alleged that Hengameh wanted to kill 

them after their friendship had broken down due to a series of events they described as 

“shameful,”4 and that Hengameh provoked the “Rostami family” to threaten to kill them 

with a gun and knife. (Id. at p. *2.) In July 2021, the trial court granted the petitions and 

issued civil harassment restraining orders against Hengameh. (Id. at p. *9.)

Mediation Agreement

Meanwhile, in March 2021, the parties entered into a mediation agreement. As 

part of that agreement, Sonia and Seyed agreed to dismiss their petitions for civil 

harassment restraining orders against Rostam and Fariba and to pay them attorney fees 

and costs in the amount of $2,300. For their part, Rostam and Fariba agreed to “waive 

malicious prosecution against Seyed and Sonia” for all incidents arising prior to the date 

3

 On the court’s own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior unpublished opinion. 

(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

4

 With respect to the so-called “shameful” incidents, Sonia and Seyed explained as 

follows: “[W]hen [Sonia] was waiting for [Seyed’s] immigration visa, [Hengameh] told 

her that she should divorce [Seyed] and marry someone who needed a green card and 

would pay her money. They also stated [Hengameh] told [Seyed] she wanted to be his 

girlfriend, and they could keep the relationship quiet. Finally, they stated [Hengameh]

paid $165 for [Seyed’s] green card fee but charged [Seyed] $16,500. As a result of these 

incidents, [Seyed] and [Sonia] stated they cut communications with [Hengameh] in May 

2016, and ‘[s]ince that time she started accusations to us in Iranian community to 

discredit us.’ The Iranian community, however, did not believe [Hengameh], they 

reported [Hengameh’s] accusations to [Seyed] and [Sonia], and the community cut off 

communications with [Hengameh], ‘and we think this situation led to [Hengameh] 

become overwhelmed and provoked Rostami family to threaten to kill us.’ ” (Z.S. v. 

H.H., supra, 2023 Cal. App. Unpub. Lexis at pp. *3-*4.) 
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of the agreement. The parties also agreed to (among other things) stay away from each 

other and to have no contact. 

Current Petitions for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order

In November 2022, Sonia filed separate (but substantively identical) petitions for a 

civil harassment restraining order against Rostam and Fariba, claiming that they had 

violated the terms of the mediation agreement. In support of her petitions, Sonia 

explained that Rostam and Fariba were her “front door neighbor” and that they “came 

behind their window” and displayed a “big knife” to her and Seyed and threatened to cut 

their “neck[s] from ear to ear.” Sonia further explained that this “life threatening 

incident” occurred after one of her neighbors called the police and falsely reported that 

there was shouting and screaming coming from her apartment. According to Sonia, this 

“fabricated report” was an example of the “Rostami family and their circle’s accusations 

to harass and assault” her and Seyed in retaliation for the filing of the prior petitions for a 

civil harassment restraining order. 

In an attachment to her petitions, Sonia explained that she and Seyed immediately 

went to the police department following the “false, fake, and fabricated” report. Sonia 

further explained: “When [Seyed and I] came back from the Folsom Police Department 

to our property, after we parked our car and we wanted to go upstairs, Rostam Rostami 

and his wife, Fariba Farina, who are our front door neighbor, came behind their window 

and showed us big knife and threatened us to cut our neck from ear to ear.” 

As part of her petitions, Sonia described other purported instances of harassment 

that (in her view) violated the terms of the mediation agreement. These incidents (which 

were reported to the police) included Rostam giving Sonia a suspicious letter that was not 

addressed to either her or Seyed, Rostam ripping the sender’s address off a package 
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belonging to Sonia,5 and the “Rostami family” calling the police and falsely claiming that 

Sonia and Seyed took a picture of them. Sonia’s petitions sought protection for herself 

and Seyed from both Rostam and Fariba. 

After the trial court granted Sonia’s requests for temporary restraining orders and 

scheduled a hearing regarding the issuance of permanent restraining orders, Rostam and 

Fariba filed separate (but substantively identical) responses to Sonia’s petitions. They 

denied the allegations of harassment and asked for an award of attorney fees and costs. 

According to Rostam and Fariba, Sonia’s allegations of harassment were fabricated, 

including the allegations she made in her prior (i.e., October 2020) petitions for a civil 

harassment restraining order. 

The Hearing and Challenged Ruling

In January 2023, a hearing was held on both of Sonia’s petitions. During the 

hearing (and after the parties were sworn), the trial court asked Sonia if there was any 

direct evidence other than her declaration that she wanted to submit in support of her 

allegation that Rostam and Fariba “came behind the[ir] window” and showed her a big 

knife and threatened to cut her throat. Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:

“[SONIA]: When . . . [Seyed and I] were coming back from the police department 

to our house, Rostami and his wife came behind the window and showed me a big knife 

and said that we gonna cut your throat from your ear to ear.

“THE COURT: Okay. How far away was that, and what window are you talking 

about?

“[SONIA]: They live right across from me, so I can see them.

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 In connection with this allegation, Sonia explained: “Recently, someone threatened 

our family in Iran in their residential address which was mentioned on the package that 

Rostami ripped it off. They threatened our family that [Seyed] and Sonia will be killed in 

their apartment because they changed their religion from Islam to Christianity.” 
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“THE COURT: How far away is it?

“[SONIA]: Five feet. Five feet.

“THE COURT: And they were behind their window?

“[SONIA]: Well, no. Yes, it was behind their own window, but I could see them 

clear.

“THE COURT:· Okay. Is there anything else you wanted to add just on that 

issue?

“[SONIA]: I have a witness regarding all this incident, and her name is Judge 

Debra Lobre.

“THE COURT: Thanks. Is there anything else? Judge Lobre was not a witness.

“[SONIA]: Exhibit 28, 29, 30.

“THE COURT:· Okay. Thank you. Thank you, then that’s enough.”

When asked, both Rostam and Fariba denied threatening Sonia with a knife. 

Rostam also testified that his apartment did not have a window facing Sonia’s apartment, 

explaining that the windows of the parties’ respective apartments faced the parking lot. 

In response, Sonia accused Rostam of “lying,” but did not present any evidence 

contradicting his contention about the windows or any direct evidence corroborating her 

allegations about the knife and threat of harm. 

In denying the petitions, the trial court found that Sonia had “failed to prove her 

case by clear and convincing evidence.” The court awarded attorney fees in favor of 

Rostam and Fariba in the aggregate amount of $1,000, consisting of an award of $500 in 

each case. Thereafter, Sonia indicated that she had “objections,” but the court told her 

“the case [was] over” and the hearing concluded without further discussion.

Appeals and Consolidation Order 

Sonia filed a timely notice of appeal in both cases. In March 2023, we issued an 

order consolidating the cases on appeal for all purposes, including hearing and decision. 
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DISCUSSION

I

Petitions for a Civil Harassment Restraining Order

Sonia argues the trial court erred by denying her petitions for a civil harassment 

restraining order. She claims the trial court erroneously refused to “accept” (i.e., admit) 

relevant evidence, and did not provide her the opportunity to “state the evidence” at the 

hearing on the petitions. According to Sonia, “the evidence which was neither allowed to 

be stated nor admitted” was sufficient to support the issuance of civil harassment 

restraining orders. As we next explain, we see no basis for reversal.

A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“The Legislature enacted section 527.6 in 1978 in order ‘to protect the individual’s 

right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California 

Constitution.’ [Citations.] The provision was intended to ‘ “establish an expedited 

procedure for enjoining acts of ‘harassment’ ” ’ in order ‘ “to provide quick relief to 

harassed persons.” ’ ” (Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 677.) “The quick, injunctive 

relief provided by section 527.6 ‘lies only to prevent threatened injury’—that is, future 

wrongs. [Citation.] The injunctive relief is not intended to punish the restrained party for 

past acts of harassment.” (Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509, 520 (Yost); see 

Olson, at p. 673 [“section 527.6 provides a specialized procedure for a petitioner who has 

suffered harassment within the meaning of the statute to expeditiously seek a limited 

judicial remedy — injunctive relief to prevent threatened future harm”].) After finding 

harassment, upon a showing of good cause, the court may include named family or 

household members in the restraining order. (§ 527.6, subd. (c).)

“To provide quick relief, ‘[a] request for the issuance of a temporary restraining 

order without notice under this section shall be granted or denied on the same day that the 

petition is submitted to the court.’ [Citation.] If a request is submitted too late in the day 

for effective review, the temporary restraining order must be granted or denied the next 
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business day. [Citation.] Subject to the provisions governing continuances, a hearing on 

the petition shall be held ‘[w]ithin 21 days, or, if good cause appears to the court, 25 days 

from the date that a petition for a temporary order is granted or denied.’ ” (Yost, supra,

51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 520-521.) “The respondent may file a response that explains, 

excuses, justifies, or denies the alleged harassment, or may file a cross-petition under this 

section.” (§ 527.6, subd. (h.)

“ ‘Harassment’ ” is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or 

a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously 

alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course 

of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial 

emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the 

petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) “ ‘Course of conduct’ ” is defined as “a pattern of 

conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a 

continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing 

telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by 

any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice 

mail, facsimile, or email. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the 

meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) 

A person who has suffered harassment as defined by section 527.6 may “seek a 

temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment.” (§ 527.6, 

subd. (a)(1).) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and 

may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) “This provision has been 

interpreted to mean hearsay evidence, such as a declaration or police report, is admissible 

during hearings conducted pursuant to section 527.6. [Citations.] Under this less formal 

approach to the admission of evidence, ‘[b]oth sides may offer evidence by deposition, 

affidavit, or oral testimony, and the court shall receive such evidence, subject only to 

such reasonable limitations as are necessary to conserve the expeditious nature of the 
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harassment procedure set forth by . . . section 527.6.’ ” (Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 

521.)

“If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment 

exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) “Clear and 

convincing” evidence requires a finding of “high probability.” (Conservatorship of O.B.

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998 [where clear and convincing proof is required, the proponent 

must convince the trier of fact that it is “highly probable that the facts which he asserts 

are true”].)

“ ‘In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the 

party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is 

misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence 

supports the judgment. . . . [¶] Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of 

proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a 

finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the 

question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and 

unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 

determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The 

appellate court cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; it 

must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of the 

judgment. [Citation.] ‘ “All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the 

respondent.” ’ ” (Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 

Cal.App.4th 828, 838.)

B. Analysis

Sonia argues reversal is required because the evidence which the trial court 

“wrongly refused” to admit was sufficient to support the issuance of civil harassment 

restraining orders against Rostam and Fariba. We are unpersuaded. Initially, we note 

that Sonia’s appellate briefing fails to identify what specific evidence the trial court 
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erroneously refused to admit. Further, while Sonia asserts the trial court did not give her 

“permission” or an opportunity to “state the evidence,” the record belies that assertion.

At the hearing on the petitions, Sonia was given the opportunity to testify and introduce 

direct evidence regarding the incident giving rise to her petitions. And the evidence in 

the record does not compel a finding in favor of Sonia as a matter of law. Sonia’s 

evidence was not uncontradicted and unimpeached. Nor was it of such a character and 

weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support 

a finding of harassment. The record reflects that Rostam and Fariba unequivocally 

denied Sonia’s allegations of harassment, including at the hearing on Sonia’s petitions. 

Further, there was evidence that the parties’ respective apartments were on the second 

floor of the apartment building and did not have windows facing each other. For her part, 

Sonia did not offer any evidence (either at the hearing or in connection with her posthearing briefing) showing that the apartments did, in fact, have windows facing each 

other. Nor did Sonia offer any evidence from a third-party witness corroborating her 

allegations regarding the display of a knife and threat of harm. And it is unclear from the 

evidence Sonia presented as to how she was able to see and hear Rostam and Fariba 

during the purported incident in question. In short, on the record before us, we cannot 

conclude that the trial court erred in denying Sonia’s petitions for a civil harassment 

restraining order. 

We find no merit in Sonia’s suggestion that the trial court was required to credit 

her evidence regarding the “life threatening” incident, which primarily consisted of her 

sworn statements. Because Rostam and Fariba offered evidence contradicting those 

statements, the underlying cases were essentially a credibility contest. It is apparent that 

the court resolved that credibility issue against Sonia, and there is no basis to disturb that 

determination on appeal. (See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 319, 334 [questions as to the credibility of witnesses are matters for the trial court 

to resolve].) “Venerable precedent holds that, in a bench trial, the trial court is the ‘sole 
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judge’ of witness credibility. . . . The fact finder’s determination of the veracity of a 

witness is final.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.) This is 

because “[f]act finders see and hear witnesses. The finder of the facts has a view 

appellate courts lack. That view is better.” (Ibid.)

II

Request for Statement of Decision

We reject Sonia’s suggestion that reversal is required because the trial court failed 

to issue a statement of decision in response to her request. Sonia cites no authority 

requiring a court to issue a statement of decision under the circumstances presented. The 

only authority Sonia relies upon to support her argument is section 632, which provides, 

in pertinent part: “The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and 

legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the 

request of any party appearing at the trial. The request must be made within 10 days after 

the court announces a tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar 

day or in less than eight hours over more than one day in which event the request must be 

made prior to the submission of the matter for decision.” (§ 632, italics added.) 

Even were we to assume that section 632 requires a trial court to issue a statement 

of decision in a civil harassment case if a timely request is made, Sonia’s request was not 

timely. The hearing on Sonia’s petitions for a civil harassment restraining order was held 

on January 27, 2023. At the end of the hearing, the court denied the petitions. Because 

the hearing/trial was concluded within one calendar day, a request for a statement of 

decision had to be made prior to the end of the hearing. Sonia did not request a statement 

of decision until January 30. Because Sonia’s request was untimely, she cannot claim the 

failure to issue a statement of decision was error. (See Khan v. Medical Board (1993) 12 

Cal.App.4th 1834, 1840.) 
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III

Request for Sanctions on Appeal

In their respective respondent’s briefs, Rostam and Fariba request (without 

elaboration) that we impose monetary sanctions on Sonia. In support of their requests, 

they cite section 907, which provides: “When it appears to the reviewing court that the 

appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the costs on appeal such 

damages as may be just.” Although Rostam and Fariba both note in their briefing that 

they “reserve” the right to file a separately noticed motion for sanctions pursuant to rule 

8.276 of the California Rules of Court,6 neither did so. 

We decline to consider imposing monetary sanctions against Sonia. The requests 

for sanctions are procedurally defective because they fail to comply with rule 8.276, 

which requires the filing of a separate noticed motion with accompanying declaration 

supporting the amount of the sanction being sought, filed no later than 10 days after the 

deadline for the filing of the reply brief. Given the lack of compliance with rule 8.276, 

we deny the requests for sanctions. (See Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento (2014) 231 

Cal.App.4th 837, 858-859; Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907, 919.)

6

 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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DISPOSITION

The orders denying Sonia’s petitions for a civil harassment restraining order are 

affirmed. Rostam’s and Fariba’s requests for monetary sanctions are denied. Rostam 

and Fariba shall recover their costs on appeal. (Rule 8.278(a).)

 /s/

Duarte, J.

We concur:

 /s/

Robie, Acting P. J.

 /s/

Mauro, J.