NEAL

D. B ARNARD, M.D., Plaintiff,
v . DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURI TY, De fe nd ant. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT

F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 06-1393 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (F ebrua ry 9, 2009) This is a Fre edom of Information Ac t (“F OIA”) and Privac y Act ca se brought by

Nea l D. B arn ard a g a ins t th e De pa

rtme nt o f H ome land

Se c ur ity , s e e kin g to o bta in r e c or ds re late d to him that could explain why

he has be en deta ined, questioned, a nd/or sear ched in a irports duringand afte r his international trips beg inning in January 2003. This is the second time the Court has been c alled on to re solve this case. O n J anuar y 29, 2008, the Court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of

Def endant, f inding that it had pr operly withheld seven pa g es of r ecor ds identified as responsive to Plaintiff’s F OIA/Privacy Act re quests. J ust five day s after issuing that dec ision the parties notified the Court that Defe ndant had located additional re sponsive rec ords. At the reque st of the par

ties, the Court entere d a stay to allow Def

endant to proc ess the additional
rec ords and or dere d the par ties to file a Status Report indicatingwhether , in light of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, ther e re mained any disputes conce rningthe additional re cords. The pa rt ie s su bs e qu e ntl y

no tif ie d th e Court

that th e y we re a ble to n arr owbut no t e lim inate the ir dis pute s. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court e nte re d a no the r b ri e fi ngsc he du le fo r d isp os iti ve mot ion s, which incor

porate d at Plaintiff’s re quest a re consideration moti on based on “ newly discovere dAs a pre liminary matter, Court strictly

adher es to the text of L ocal Civil Rule 7(h)(1) 1 and “a ssumes that fac ts identified by the moving pa

rty in its st atement of

materia l fac ts are admitted, unless such a f

act is controve rted in the stateme nt of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” L CvR 7(h)(1). Ac cording ly , the Court shall either r efe r to Plaintiff’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“Pl.’s Stmt.”) or De fenda nt’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“D ef.’ s Stm t.”), un le ss a pa rt y dis pute s a

pr of fe re d f a c t and cites to contra

ry evidenc e in the re cord. The Court shall also cite to evidenc e in the re cord, where appropr iate, to provide infor mation not covere d by the par ties’ statements of material fa cts. The Court finds that ther e is no g enuine dispute ove r the fac tual issues that are materia l to resolution of this case. 2 evidenc e.” After thoroug hly

consideringthe par

ties’ submissions, i ncluding Def endant’ s two in
c am e ra decla

rations, and a ll applicable c ase la w, statutory

authority , and the e ntire re cord of the
case as a whole, the Court shall GRANT De fenda nt’s [39] Motion for Summary J udg ment and DENY Plaintiff’s [40] consolidated Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment and Motion for Reconsider ation, for the r easons that f ollow. I. BACKG ROUND As pr e vio us ly

de sc ri be d in

the Court ’s fi rs t Me mor and um O pin ion , Pl a int if

f c la ims to have be en deta ined, questioned, a nd/or sear ched at various airpor ts before or af

ter international trips on approxim ately

17 occa sions between January 2003 and January

2007. SeeMem. Op. at 2 (Jan. 29, 2008), Docke t No. [27] . Seekingto discover the r ecor ds underlying his traveling difficulties, Plaintiff beg an filingFOIA/Privacy Act re quests. Id. Plaintiff initi ally

sent a F OIA/Privacy

Act re quest to United States Customs and B order Protection (“CB P”) re questing “all re cords a bout me that are in I BI S or any other sy stem used by [CB P] at any and a ll p or ts o f e ntr y to t he Un ite d St ate s. ” De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 1. CB P e rr on e ou sly 1 pr oc e sse d Pl a int if

f’ s r e qu e st a s a

“ tr ave le r r e dr e ss c omp la int ,” and inc or re c tly a dv ise d h im t oNeither party disputes that I CE and CBP ar e compone nts of the Depa rtment of 2 Homeland Sec urity , the named D efe ndant in this case. Plaintiff filed an Ame nded Complaint on October 10, 2006, a Second Amende d 3 Complaint on J anuar

y 9, 2007, and a T hird Amende d Complaint (the operative complaint) on J une 9, 2008. Def endant ha s subsequently

explained that I CE did not ini tially disclose the existence of 4 the se re c or ds to P la int if

f b a se d o n th e (c )( 1) e xclu sio n o f F OIA, wh ic h a uth or ize s a

n a g e nc y to e xclu de re c or ds fr om d isc los ur e wh e n “ [an ] inv e sti g a tio n o r p ro c e e din g inv olv e s a po ssi ble violation of criminal law a nd there is reason to be lieve that the subjec t of the investig ation or pr oc e e din gis una

wa re of its pe nd e nc y , a

nd dis c los ur e of

the e xiste nc e of

the re c or ds c ou ld rea sonably

be expected to inter fer e with enf orce ment proce eding s.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)( 1) (i nte rn a l pu

nc tuatio n o mitte d) ; Se e als o De f. ’s Mo t., Ex. 5 ¶ 1 0 ( Se c on d D e c l. o f R . M c Gi nn is) (explaining I CE’s decision to invoke Section 552(c )(1) ). Althoug h Plaintiff expresses frustra tion with I CE’s initial response, seeP l
. ’s M o t . at8 (r ef erri n g t o i tas a l i e) , P l ai n t i ff d o es n o tal l ege that I CE improperly

invoked this ex clusion and, in any event, it is immaterial to resolution of the 3 seek the reque sted rec ords from Immigration and Customs Enforc ement (“ I CE”). Id. ¶ 2. F or 2 purp os e s o f c lari ty , th e Court sh a ll s e pa

ra te ly dis c us s th e fa c ts p e rt a ini ngto I CE a nd CB P. A. IC

E Plaintiff submit ted a F OIA/Privacy Act re quest to I CE by

letter dated Marc h 21, 2006, reque sting “ any

rec ords cr eate d from January 1, 2002[,] to the prese nt that were prepa red,
re c e ive d, tr ans mitte d, c oll e c te d a nd /or ma int a ine d b y

[I CE] r e latin g to [f

if te e n s pe c if

ic a lly
enumer ated a

rea s.]” Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 3. After failingto rec eive a

timely response , Plaintiff filed an administrative appe al on May 16, 2006. Ba

rnar d Dec l. ¶ 27. On August 5, 2006, I CE advised Plaintiff that it did not locate a ny responsive r ecor ds. Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 4. Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this case on August 7, 2006. By letter dated Novembe r 16, 3 2006, I CE informed Plaintiff that it located six page s of re cords r esponsive to his reque st but that they wer e exempt from disclosure, in their e ntirety , based on F OIA Exempti ons 2, 7(A), 7( C), and 7(E)
. Id. ¶ 6. The pa rties both moved for summar y judgme nt on the dispositi ve issue of 4re ma ini ngdis pute s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. 4 whether I CE properly

withheld the re cords in their e ntirety
. Def endant a rgued that the r ecor ds were proper ly withheld, and re lied on the dec laration of Marsha ll Fields, Chief of the F OIA/Privacy Act Section, Information Disclosure Unit, at I CE. SeeDe f. ’s [14] M ot. , E x. A ( he re ina ft e r “ F ie lds De c l.” ). Mr . F ie lds e xpla ine d th a t Pla int if f “ is the subject of a

n open and pe nding c riminal investigation” and that “[r]elease of any information perta ining to this investigation could rea sonably be expected to inter fer e with this open and pendingcriminal investig ation.” Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff conce ded that De fenda nt could “prope rly

withhold portions of the rec ords if they pe rt a in t o a

n o ng oin g inv e sti g atio n. ” Me m. O p. at 8 ( Jan. 29 , 2 00 8) . Pl a int if f n e ve rt he le ss argued that De fenda

nt failed to mee t its burden of showingthat there was a n ong oing investigation of Plainti ff be cause Mr. Fie lds’s decla ration wa s not based on his persona l knowledg e. SeePl. ’s [16] M ot. at 8- 13 . Pl a int if f a lso argue d th a t D e fe nd ant h a d n ot m e t it s burden of demonstratingthat it could not seg reg ate a ny non-exempt information in the rec ords. Id. at 13-14. T h e C o urt re

j ec t edP l ai n t i ff

’s fi rs tar gu m en tco n ce rn i n g M r. Fi el d s ’s p er s o n al kn o wl ed ge be c a us e his state me nts we re ma de “ ba se d u po n [hi s] pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e , r e vie w o f d oc ume nts kept in the cour se of business, a nd information conve y ed to [him ] i n the cour se of [his] officia l duties.” F ields Dec l. ¶ 4. Be cause he wa s “familiar with the proce sses used to sea rch f or the
rec ords at issue, and be cause he [] revie wed the r ecor ds himself,” the Court found that he was “compe tent to testify

as to the information contained in those re cords.” Mem. Op. at 11 (Jan. 29, 2008). With respect to Plaintiff’s sec ond argument conce rningthe seg reg ation of non-e x empt5

inf or matio n, the Court

a g re e d w ithPla int if

f t hat D e fe nd ant h a d p ro vid e d a n in a de qu a te explanation as to why

non-exempt information could not be seg reg ated. B eca use there wer e a lim ite d numb e r o f p a g e s at is su e , a nd be c a us e De fe nd ant a

rgue d th a t a

mor e fu lso me seg reg ability

explanation would divulge infor mation properly

withheld based on the exemptions Def endant ha d invoked, the Court orde red D efe ndant to produce the re cords f or an in c am e ra revie w. Id. at 13. Def endant submitted the re cords to the Court on January 23, 2008, which included se ven (n ot t he pr e vio us ly

ide nti fi e d s ix) p a g e s. De fe nd a nt a lso su bmi tte d a de c lara tio n f ro m G lor ia Marsha ll, the Unit Chi ef of the Information Disclosure Unit, at I CE. SeeD e f
. ’ s [2 5 ] N o ti c e , E x. 1 (her einaf

ter “ First Mar shall Dec l.”). Ms. Mar shall expl ained that Mr. F ields was no long er
e mpl oye d at I CE, and

that sh e re vie we d th e re le va nt f ile s to loc a te the six pa g e s o f r e c or ds to submit t o the Court. Id. ¶ 6. In the cour se of he r re view, she discove red a seventh pa g e that wa s not previously

identified in Mr. F ields’s dec laration. Id. Acc ording ly , Ms. Marshall under took an indepe ndent re view of the seven pa g es and “ deter mined that all rec ords ar e exempt from disclosure . . . for

the re asons explained in the Fields De clar ation. Id. F oll ow ingthe Court ’s in
c am e ra re vie w o f t

he re c or ds , th e Court

a g re e d w ith

De fe nd ant t

hat th e re e xiste d n o r e a so na bly seg reg able non- exempt information and, on J anuar y 29, 2008, the Court g rante d Def endant’ s Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt a

nd de nie d Pl a int if

f’ s Cr os s- Mo tio n f

or Sum mary

Judg me nt. On Fe bruar

y 4, 2008, Def

endant f iled a Notice and Motion to St ay explaining that it had discovere d additional rec ords re sponsive to Plainti ff’ s FOIA/Privacy Act re quests. SeeDef

.’s [29] Mot. for a Stay

at 1. Def endant e x plained that it revie wed its files to submit the I CE rec ords in response to the Court’s or der f or in c am e ra revie w and “ discovere d that it might not haveRather than join De fenda nt’s Motion for a Stay , Plaintiff decided to f ile his own Motion 5 for a Stay (for the same r easons identifie d in Defe ndant’s motion), which he submitt ed on Fe bruar y 5, 2008. See Pl.’s [ 30] Mot . for a Stay at 1-3. 6 proper ly proce ssed Plaintiff’s J uly 20, 2005 [FOI A] request.” Id. at 1. Def endant f urther explained that CBP had er roneously treated Plaintiff’s FO I A/Privacy Act re quest as a “ trave ler’s complaint,” and did not

proce ss the reque st under its FOIA/Privacy Act proc edure s. Id. at 2. Def endant notified Plaintiff of this deve lopment prior to the Court’s J anuar y 29, 2008 decision, but ne ith e r p art

y br ou g ht i t to the atte nti on of the Court . 5 Def endant a lso submit ted a se cond dec laration from Gloria Mar shall. Id. , Ex . A (her einaf ter “ Second Mar shall Dec l.”). Ms. Mar shall expl ained that “ [P ]l aintiff is no long er the subject of the ope n and pendingcriminal investig ation orig inally cited in the F ields decla

ration,” a fa ct that she did not lear n until Februa

ry 1, 2008 (af

ter the Court ha d issued its decision). Id. ¶ 7. Ne ve rt he le ss, Ms. Mars ha ll a sse rt e d th a t th e se ve n p a g e s o f r e c or ds we re sti ll p ro pe rl y wi thh e ld b y

I CE p ur su ant t o F OIA E xemp tio n 7 (A ) b e c a us e dis c los ur e of

the re c or ds wo uld
ne g ativ e ly

a ff e c t oth e r on g oin g inv e sti g a tio ns : FOIA [Ex emption 7(A)] is no longer applicable with respec t to the investigation noted in the Fie lds Decla

ration [concer

ning Plaintiff], howeve r, I have be en informed that disclosure of information related to [P] laintiff could have a neg ative imp a c t on oth e r o ng oin g inv e sti g a tio ns . A c c or din g ly , F OIA [E xemp tio n 7 (A )] i s still applicable to the seven pa g es of I CE rec ords . . . . Id. The Court g rante d a stay on Fe bruar

y 6, 2008. See2/6/08 Min. Order. The Court ordere d Def endant to proc ess the additional re sponsive rec ords and e ither re lease them to Plainti ff or prepa re a Vaughn Index reg ardingthe same. Id. Duringthe pende ncy of the stay , I CE obtained twenty -five a dditional pag es of r esponsive re cords f rom the I CE Special Ag ent in Charg e off ice.Th e se re c or ds sh a ll b e dis c us se d b e low in t he c on te xt of

CB P. 6 7 Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 14. Fourtee n of the pa g es belong ed to CBP and we re f orwa rded to that c omponent for r eview. Id. ¶ 1 6. Withre sp e c t to the oth e r e le ve n p a g e s, I CE r e le a se d s e ve n o f t he m to 6 Plaintiff and withheld the re maining f our. Id. I CE invoked FOIA Exempti ons 2, 7(A), 7( C), and 7 ( E ) t o w i th h o l d

th e f o ur p a g e s o f r e c o r d s i nth e i r

e n t i r e ty. B. CBP As discussed above , CBP incorre ctly proce ssed Plaintiff’s initial J uly 20, 2005 FOIA/Privacy

Act re quest. Once CBP discovere d its mi stake, CB P searc hed the Tr easur y Enforc ement Communications Sy stem (“TECS”) on January 17, 2008, and discove red 82 pa g es of re sponsive rec ords. Id. ¶ 17. CBP used the se arc h terms “Ne al,” “ Ba rnar d,” “B erna

rd,” a nd “07/10/53.” Id. CBP proce ssed the re cords a nd rele ased 80 of

them with reda ctions on Fe bruar y 5, 2008. Id. ¶ 18. CBP withheld one pa g e in full and re lease d one pag e in full. Id. CBP then discovere d one additional TECS rec ord and r elea sed that docume nt to Pl aintiff with re dactions on April 1, 2008. Id. ¶ 19. In a dd iti on

to T ECS , CB P se arc he d th e Autom a te d T arg e tin g Sy ste m - Pa sse ng e r ( “ AT SP”), as we ll as rec ords maintained at CBP Headqua rters, a nd the Ports of Entry

for Tor onto and Washington-Dulles. Id. ¶ 2 0. Th e AT S- P sy ste m w a s se arc he d o n Jan ua ry 29 , 2 00 8, and

a g a in on April 8, 2008, “to ensur e that the se arc h was c omprehe nsive.” Id. ¶ 21. CBP used the se arc h terms “Ne al,” “ Ba

rnar d,” “B erna

rd,” a nd “07/10/53.” Id. The port of Washington-Dulles
rec ords wer e sea

rche d on Fe bruar

y 15, 2008, and the por

t of Toronto re cords we re se arc hed on April 1, 2008. Id. ¶ 22. CBP did not locate a ny responsive r ecor ds at Washington-D ulles, and discovere d 5 responsive r ecor ds at the Toronto port of entry . Id. As a

re su lt o f t

he se se arc he s,8

CBP located a

total of 229 pag es of r esponsive re cords ( not including the pr evious 82 pag es that had bee n proce ssed on Fe bruar y 5, 2008). Id. ¶ 23. CBP proce ssed the 229 pag es of r ecor ds on April 17, 2008. Id. ¶ 24. 82 pag es we re rele ased w ith redac tions, 11 pag es we re r elea sed in full, and 136 pag es we re w ithheld in full. Id. On April 23, 2008, CBP provided Plaintiff with two Vaughn i n d i c e s i d e n t i f yi n g F O IA exemptions 6, 7(A), 7( C), and 7(E) , as the ba sis for withholding infor mation. Id. ¶ 25. CBP later dropped its asser

tion of FOIA Exempti on 7(A), but no a dditional documents were rele ased beca use they wer e all subjec t to other exemptions. Id. ¶ 26. CBP there afte r provided Plaintiff with two revised indice s ref lectingthis chang e. Id. As explained above, I CE refe rre d an additional 14 pag es of r ecor ds to CBP for re view on J une 6, 2008. Id. ¶ 2 7. On June 16 , 2 00 8, CB P r e le a se d 1 3 p a g e s o f r e c or ds to P la int if f w ith reda ctions, and found the r emainingpag e to be unr esponsive to Plaintiff’s FO I A/Privacy Act reque sts. Id. On

June 20 , 2 00 8, CB P pr ov ide d Pl a int if f w ithtw o f

ina l Vaughn indices
acc ounting f

or all docume nts processe d by CBP. Id. ¶ 28; Pl.’s Resp. St mt. ¶ 28 (clar ifying that the Vaughn indices did not include a de scription of the four pag es of withheld I CE rec ords). On Ap ri l 29 , 2 00 8, the pa

rt ie s c on fe rr e d a

nd “ e xplor e d w ay s to re so lve thi s c a se informally

without further litig ation.” [34] Status Report at 2 (May 1, 2008). Althoug h the parties we re a

ble to narr ow their disputes, they wer e unable to eliminate them. Id. Acc ording ly , the par ties repor ted that their re maining disputes c oncer ned the f ollowing e x emptions invoked by Def endant to withhold the followinginformation:
! Ex emption 6: Names and positions of fe dera l employ ees w ithin P laintiff’s prese nce, a

nd names of third pa

rties within Plainti ff’ s prese nce ! Ex emption 7(A): L aw e nforc ement tec hniques and proc edure s to the9 extent that the ex emption is invoked in connection with a c riminal investigation into P laintiff’s ac tiviti es ! Ex emption 7(C): Names of fede ral e mploy ees w ithin P laintiff’s pre sence ! Ex emption 7(E): Inspection proc edure s witnessed by Plaintiff Id. The pa

rties then proc eede d to brief a second r ound of dispositive moti ons. The par ties filed Cross-Motions for Summary J udg ment, Oppositions, and Replies. The par ties’ brief ing incorpora ted a Motion for Rec onsideration brought by Plaintiff in response to the re velation that he wa s not the subject of a n investigation at the time of the Court’s initial decision on J anuar y 29, 2008. De fe nd ant a lso fi le d, in t

he c on te xt of

the se mot ion s, tw o s e pa

rate Mo tio ns fo r L e ave to file in c am e ra decla

rations in support of its Motion for Summ ary J udg ment. Plaintiff filed a consolidated Opposition to these motions, and Def endant f iled a consolidate d Reply . The Court g rante d Def

endant’ s Motions for L eave on J anuar y 22, 2009, and De fenda

nt timely delivere d the decla rations to Chambers on January 23, 2009. Acc ording ly , the par ties’ Cross-Motions for Summary J udg ment are fully

briefe d and ripe for de cision. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. FOIA In revie wing a motion for summary judgme nt under F OIA, the Court must conduct a de
novo revie w of the r ecor d. See5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B ). In the FO I A context, “ de novo revie w require s the Court to ‘asce rtain whe ther the a g ency has sustained its burden of demonstratingthat the documents re quested . . . a re e x empt from disclosure under [] FOI A.’” Assassinati on Arc hiv es &Re

se arc h Ct r. v. Cent. Intelligenc e Age ncy , 334 F.3d 55, 57 ( D.C. Cir. 2003)10

(qu o t i n g Summers v . Dep’ t of Justice , 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 ( D.C. Cir. 1998)). Summary judgme nt is proper whe n “the plea dings, the discovery [i f any] and disclosure mater ials on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts only

when ther e is sufficie nt evidence such that a r easona ble juror c ould find for the party opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Un de r F OIA, a ll und e rl yingfa c ts a nd inf e re nc e s a re ana ly zed in t he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to the FOIA re quester; a s such, only afte r an a g ency

seekingsummary

judgme nt proves that it has fully discharg ed its FOIA obligations is s ummary judgme nt appropriate. Mo or e v . A sp in , 9 16 F. S u p p 3 2 , 3 5 (D
. D. C
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g W eisberg v. D ep’t of Justice , 705 F.2d 1344, 1350 ( D.C. Cir. 1983)). In opposing a

motion for summary

judgme nt, a par

ty must offer mor e than c onclusory statements. See B roaddrick v. E xec . Office of President , 139 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (D.D .C. 2001) (c i t i n g Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)). Indeed, a plaintiff pursuing an ac tion under F OIA must establish that the ag ency has improper ly

claimed a

n exemption as a matter of la w or that the a g ency

has fa iled to seg reg ate a

nd disclose all nonexempt information in the requested doc uments. Se e Pe rry -T orre s v . D e p’ t of Sta te , 4 04 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D.D.C. 2005). Congr ess ena cted F OIA for the purpose of introducingtranspar ency to gove rnment activities. See Ste rn v. Fed. B ureau of Inve stigati on , 7 37 F .2 d 8 4, 88 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 4) . Co ng re ss
rema ined sensitive, howeve r, to the nee d to achieve balanc e betwe en this objective a nd the
vu lne ra bil ity of “ le g iti mate g ov e rnme nta l and pr ivate int e re sts [that] c ou ld b e ha rm e d b y re le a se of ce rtain ty

pes of infor

mation.” Criti cal Mass Energy Project v. Nuc lear Regulatory Comm’n ,11

97 5 F .2 d 8 71 , 8 72 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 2) ; see also Summe rs v. Dep’ t of Justice , 140 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Ac cording ly , FOIA provides nine e x emptions pursuant to which an a g ency may withhold requested inf

ormation. See5 U .S. C. § § 5 52 (a )( 4) (B ), (b )( 1) -( 9) . T he a g e nc y mus t de mon str ate the validity

of any exemption t hat it asserts. See id. ; Bec k v. D ep’t of Justice , 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 ( D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[c]onsist ent with the purpose of the Act, the bur den is on the ag ency to justi fy

withholding re quested doc uments”). In addition, summary judgme nt may

be g rante d on the basis of the a g ency ’s ac company ing a ffidavits or de clar ations if they descr ibe “the justifications for nondisclosure w ith reasona bly specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logic ally

falls within the claimed e x emption, and ar e not controve rted by either c ontrary evidenc e in the re cord nor evidenc e of a g ency

bad fa ith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 ( D.C. Cir. 1981). These a ffidavits may be submitted by

an off icial who coordinated the sea

rch, a nd need not be from ea ch individual who par ticipated in the sea

rch. See SafeCard Servs. v. Se c. &Exc h. Comm’n , 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 ( D.C. Cir. 1991). An ag ency

also has the bur den of de tailing what proportion of the infor mation in a document is non-exempt and how that mater ial is dispersed throug hout the document. Mead Data Cent. Inc. v . U.S. Dep’ t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 261 ( D.C. Cir. 1977). Any non-exempt information that is rea sonably seg reg able f

rom the re quested re cords must be disclosed. Ogelsby v. U.S. De p’t of Army , 79 F.3d 1172, 1178 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). In addition, district courts are
re qu ir e d to c on sid e r s e g re g a bil ity iss ue s su a s

po ntee ve n w he n th e pa

rt ie s h ave no t sp e c if

ic a lly raised suc h claims. Trans-Pac. Policing Agree ment v. U .S. Customs Serv. , 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999).12

B. Privacy

Act The Privac y

Act of 1974 r egulates the c ollection, maintenanc e, use, a nd dissemination of an individual’s per sonal information by ag encie s within the feder al g overnme nt. See5 U.S.C. § 552a(e ). The A ct provides that a ny ag ency that reta ins a sy stem of re cords “ shall maintain . . .
on ly su c h in fo rm atio n a

bo ut a n in div idu a l a s is re le va

nt a nd ne c e ssa ry to a c c omp lis h a

purp os e of the a g ency

require d to be ac complished by statute or executive or der of the President.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1). To pr ovide for ope nness and a ccounta bility , the Act e nsures that “ upon
re qu e st b y

any ind ivi du a l to g a in a c c e ss t o h is r e c or d o r t o a ny inf or ma tio n p e rt a ini ngto h im which is containe d in the sy stem,” the a g ency shall provide the individual with acc ess to revie w such re cords. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1). F inally , subject to ce rtain exceptions, the Privacy Act state s th at di sc los ur e of

re c or ds sh a ll b e lim ite d. 5 U .S. C. § 55 2a (b ) ( “ [n]o a g e nc y sh a ll d isc los e any rec ord which is conta ined in a sy stem of re cords by any means of c ommunication to any person, or to another a g ency , except pursuant to a wr itten reque st by , or with the prior written
c on se nt o f, the ind ivi du a l to wh om t he re c or d p e rt a ins ” ). On e of the se e xce pti on s, ho we ve r, is that an a g e nc y

sh a ll d isc los e su c h r e c or ds that w ou ld b e re qu ir e d to be dis c los e d p ur su ant t o FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)( 2). In actions see king doc uments under both F OIA and the Priva cy Act, a de fenda

nt ag ency must show that the information is properly subject to both FOIA and Privacy Act exemptions. See M

artin v. Office of Spec ial Counsel , 8 19 F .2 d 1 18 1, 11 84 (D .C. Cir. 1987). III . D ISC USS ION In c on sid e ri ngthe pa

rt ie s’ Cr os s- Mo tio ns fo r S umm ary Judg me nt, the Court

sh a ll a dd re ss the ade quacy

of De fenda

nt’s sear ch for

rec ords, the exemptions invoked by Def endant that13

re ma in i n d isp ute , a

nd De fe nd ant’ s se g re g a

bil ity ana ly sis . T he Court

sh a ll the n a dd

re ss Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsider ation based on ne wly discovere d evidenc e. Ultimately , the Court c on c lud e s th at D e fe nd ant h a s me t it s b ur de n o f s ho wi ngthat it pr op e rl y c omp lie d w ithits obligations under FO I A and the Priva cy Act, and that Plainti ff ha s not met its burden of showing how newly

discovere d evidenc e wa

rra nts reconside ration of the Court’ s J anuar y 29, 2008 decision. A. Defendant Has D emonstrated That It Conducted An AdequateSearch for Re cords In deter mining the a dequac y

of a F OIA sea

rch, the Court is guided by principles of
rea sonablene ss. Ogelsby v . Army , 920 F.2d 57, 68 ( D.C. Cir. 1990). To obtain summary judgme nt on the issue of the a dequac y of the re cords se arc h, an ag ency must show “viewingthe fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to t he re qu e ste r, that . . . [it ] ha s c on du c te d a ‘s e arc h r e a so na

bly calc ulated to uncove r re levant docume nts.’” Ste inb e rg , 2 3 F. 3 d at5 5 1 (qu o t i n g W

eisberg v. Dep’ t of Justice , 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 ( D.C. Cir. 1984)). To mee t its burden, the ag ency may submit affidavits or dec larations that ex plain both in reasona ble detail and in a

non-conc lusory fashion the sc ope and me thod of the ag ency ’s sea rch. Perry v . Block, 6 84 F .2 d 1 21 , 1 26 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 2) . In th e a

bs e nc e of c on tr ary e vid e nc e , s uc h a ff

ida vit s o r d e c laratio ns are su ff ic ie nt t o demonstrate a

n ag ency ’s compliance with the FOIA. Id. at 12 7. An a g e nc y mus t sh owthat it made a “g ood faith ef

fort to conduc t a sea

rch f or the re quested re cords, usingmethods which ca n be re asonably

expected to produc e the infor mation reque sted.” Ogelsby , 9 20 F .2 d at 68 ; se e als o Campbell v. De

p’t of Justice , 164 F.3d 20, 27 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). An ag ency ’s sea rch ne ed not be exhaustive, merely

rea sonable. See W

. Ctr. for Journalism v. Inte rnal Reve nue Serv

. , 1 16 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 , 8 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Shaw v. State Dep’ t , 5 59 F . Su pp . 1 05 3, 10 57 (D .D .C.Plaintiff’s Third Amende d Complaint di d not contain a c laim conce rningthe ade quacy 7 of De fe nd ant’ s se arc h f

or re sp on siv e re c or ds , b ut P la int if f’ s Cr os s- Mo tio n n e ve rt

he le ss a sse rt s one. A plaintiff ma

y not ordinarily

move for summar

y judgme nt on a claim he or she neve r raised. See, e .g. , Sharp v. Rosa Me xicano, D.C., LLC, 496 F. Supp. 2d 93, 97 n.3 (D.D .C. 2000) (“ [the ] pla int if

f m ay no t, t hr ou g h s umm ary

jud g me nt b ri e fs , r a ise the ne w c la ims
. . . b e c a us e [t he] plaintiff did not raise them in his complaint, and did not file an amended c omplaint”). The Court sh a ll n e ve rt

he le ss a dd

re ss P la int if

f’ s c la im, in i ts d isc re tio n, be c a us e it h a s b e e n f

ull y briefe d by

the par ties and it does not require an examination of any evidenc e outside the scope of the pre sent rec ord. 14 1983)). Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment includes a pe rfunc tory , two-par ag raph argument conce rningthe ade quacy of De fenda

nt’s sear ch for

responsive r ecor ds. SeePl. ’s Mo t. at 37. In addition to some boilerplate languag e about f ailing to identify

specific files that wer e
sear ched or

identifying the particula

r per sons who perf

ormed the se arc hes, Plaintiff argues that Def endant “ has demonstrated the inade quacy of its searc hes by

consistently

supplementing the administrative re cord . . . w ith the results of subsequent se arc hes for responsive r ecor ds.” Id. The Court is unpersua ded. 7 De fe nd ant s ub mitte d s uf

fi c ie nt a nd no n- c on c lus or

y de c lara tio ns fr om R e ba

Mc Gi nn is, th e U n i tC h i e f

o f th e In f o r m at i o nD i s c l o s ur e U n i ta tIC E , an d S h ar i S u z u k i , th e C h i e f

o f F O IA Appea ls at CBP, descr ibing the r easona bleness of D efe ndant’s sea rche s. SeeDef

.’s Mot., Ex . 3 (h e re ina ft e r “ Mc Gi nn is D e c l.” ); id. , E x. 8 ( he re ina ft e r “ Suzuki D e c l.” ). F or e xamp le , M s. McGinnis descr ibed the sea rch pe rfor med at the loca l I CE Special Ag ent in Charg e off ice whe re I CE b e lie ve d it

wa s li ke ly

that r e sp on siv e re c or ds wo uld be ma int a ine d, and

tw o e le c tr on ic
sear ched usingTECS and the I RS. SeeMcGinnis Dec l. ¶ 19; Def.’ s Opp’n, Ex. 3 ¶ 6 (here inafter

“ Se c on d M c Gi nn is D e c l.” ). Ms. Suzuki d e sc ri be d th e se arc he s th a t w e re pe rf or me d in the TE CS and ATS-P databa ses, seeSuz uki Decl. ¶ ¶ 7-11, a nd at the ports of e ntry

at Toronto and15

Washington-Dulles, id. ¶ 1 2. Ms. Suzuki a lso ide nti fi e d th e se arc h te rm s u se d to se arc h th e se elec tronic data

bases, including“Ne al,” “ Ba rnar d,” “B erna

rd,” a nd “07/10/53.” Id. ¶¶

6, 10 . B oth decla rants identified howmany pag es of r ecor ds were found at e ach loc ation, and the number and po rt ion s o f d oc ume nts re le a se d to Pla int if f a ft e r p ro c e ssi ng . M c Gi nn is D e c l. ¶ 19 ; Su zuk i D e c l. ¶¶ 5- 16. Plaintiff raises no spec ific objec tions to t he for eg oing se arc hes or se arc h terms beyond the
argume nt t

hat D e fe nd ant’ s f

a ilu re to l oc a te a ll o f t

he re sp on siv e do c ume nts in i ts i nit ia l se arc h is somehow evide nce that its searche s were unrea sonable. The Court rejec ts that ill og ical ar g ument beca use, as De fenda

nt emphasizes, “the fa ct that Def endant suppleme nted its production of documents is a testame nt to Defe ndant’s appr eciation of its obli g ation under the FOIA to produce documents.” D ef.’ s Opp’n at 26. Plaintiff fa ils to cite a single case wher e a c ourt found that an ag ency conducte d an inade quate se arc h simply beca use it undertook multiple searc hes to find responsive r ecor ds. To the contra ry , an inquiry

reg ardingthe ade quacy

of an a g ency ’s sea

rch require s a cour

t to focus on the ac tual sear ch or se arc hes, not on the re su lts of the same
. See W eisberg v. D ep’t of Justice , 7 05 F .2 d 1 34 4, 15 1- 52 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 3) . F or thi s r e a so n, c ourt s routinely uphold the sufficie ncy

of any ag ency ’s sea

rch e ven whe n additional rec ords ar e located afte r multiple searc hes. See, e .g. , Jame s v. CBP , 549 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5, 7-8 (D .D.C. 2008). Her e, Plaintiff is unable to raise a ny infirmity with Defe ndant’s dec larations, which indicate that Def endant made a “g ood faith ef fort to conduc t a sea

rch f or the re quested re cords, usingmethods which ca n be re asonably

expected to produc e the infor mation reque sted.” Perry v . Block, 684 F.2d at 127. Accor dingly , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and deny Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment with respec t to the adequa cy ofThe Court notes that De fenda nt invoked other e x emptions that Pl aintiff does not 8 dispute. The Court has limited its analy sis in thi s Memorandum Opinion to only those are as that re ma in i n d isp ute be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. 16 De fe nd ant’ s se arc h f

or re sp on siv e re c or ds
. B. Defendant Has D emonstrated That It Properly Inv oked F OIA and Privac

y Ac t Exe mptions To W

ithhold Information Responsive to Plaintif f’s FOIA/Privac

y Ac t Re qu ests As explained above, the parties’ rema ining disputes on summary judgme nt conce rn the following exemptions invoked by Def endant to withhold the followinginformation:
! Ex emption 6: Names and positions of fe dera l employ ees w ithin P laintiff’s prese nce, a

nd names of third pa

rties within Plainti ff’ s prese nce ! Ex emption 7(A): L aw e nforc ement tec hniques and proc edure s to the extent that the ex emption is invoked in connection with a c riminal investigation into P laintiff’s ac tiviti es ! Ex emption 7(C): Names of fede ral e mploy ees w ithin P laintiff’s pre sence ! Ex emption 7(E): Inspection proc edure s witnessed by Plaintiff [34] Status Report at 2 (May 1, 2008). As ref

lected in their

submissi ons to the Court, the parties 8
a lso dis pute De fe nd ant’ s r e lia nc e on Pr iva c y Ac t E xemp tio ns (j )( 2) and (k )( 2) . T he Court

sh a ll addre ss eac h of the for eg oing ide ntified exemptions, i n turn.

1. FOIA Exempti on 6 F OIA E xemp tio n 6 pe rm its an a g e nc y to w ithho ld i nf

or matio n c on ta ine d w ith in

“ pe rs onne l and

me dic a l f

ile s and sim ila r f ile s th e dis c los ur e of

wh ic h w ou ld c on sti tut e a c le arl y
unwar rante d invasion of per sonal privac y .” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)
. Se e als o Na t’ l A rc hiv es & Re c or ds Ad mi n. v . F av ish , 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004); Dep’ t of Justice v. Re porters Comm. for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess , 4 89 U. S. 7 49 , 7 73 -7 4 ( 19 89 ). Th e te rm “ sim ila r f ile s” is b ro a dly17

interpre ted, such that Exemption 6 protects from disclosure all information that “a pplies to a particula r individual” in the abse nce of a public intere st in disclosure. State Dep’ t v. W ashington Post Co. , 4 56 U. S. 5 95 , 6 02 (1 98 2) (“ In s um, we do no t th ink that Co ng re ss m e ant t o li mit Ex emption 6 to a narr ow class of files containingonly

a discre te kind of per sonal information. Rather, the e x emption was intended to c over de tailed Gover nment rec ords on an individual which ca n be identified a s applying to that individual.”) (interna l quotation and citation omitted). Acc ording ly , it is notthe nature of the files in whic h the information is containe d, but rather the balanc e of public a

nd private inter ests that deter mines the exemption’s scope. W as hingto n P os t , 456 U.S. at 599-600. Ex emption 6 “tilt[ s] t he bala nce ( of disclosure inter ests ag ainst privacy interests) in fa

vor of disclosure,” and cr eate s a “he avy burden” for a

n ag ency invoking Exemption 6. Morley v

. Cent. IntelligenceAgenc

y , 508 F.3d 1108, 1128 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). Thus, in consideringwhether Ex emption 6 applies, the Court must “first deter mine whether

disclosure of the [i nformation at issue] ‘would compromise a substantial, as opposed to demi nim is , privac y interest.’” Multi Ag Me dia LLC v . D e

p’ t of Ag ric ultur e , 5 1 5 F. 3 d

1 2 2 4 , 1 2 3 0 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Em

ployee s v. Horner , 879 F.2d 873, 874 ( D.C. Cir. 1989)). F or this purpose, “[a] subst antial privac y

interest is any

thing g reater than a demi nim is privac y interest.” Id. at 12 30 -3 1. In a dd iti on , f

or purp os e s o f b a lanc ing , it is s ig nif ic ant t hat “ [t]he pu

bli c ’s int e re st i n disclosure of pe rsonnel files de rives fr om the purpose of the [FOIA] – the preser

vation of ‘the citizens’ rig ht to be informed a bout what their g overnme nt is up to.’” Bec k v. D ep’t of Justice , 9 9 7 F. 2 d 1 4 8 9 , 1 4 9 2 -9 3 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773 (interna l quotation marks omitted)). While FOIA’s purpose “is furthe red by disclosure of of

ficial18

information that ‘sheds lig ht on an ag ency ’s per formanc e of its statutory duties,’” “ [i ]nformation that “re veals little or nothing a bout an ag ency ’s own conduc t’ does not furthe r the statutory purpose; thus the public has no c og nizable interest in the re lease of such infor mation.” Id. at 1 4 9 3 (qu o t i n g Reporters Comm. , 489 U.S. at 773). In th is c a se , CB P invo ke d E xemp tio n 6 to w ithho ld t he name s a

nd po sit ion s o f a ll fede ral e mploy ees that have be en in Plaintiff’s pre sence and the names of any third parties that have be en in Plaintiff’s pre sence . Def .’s Mot. at 13. Ms. Suz uki expl ained in her decla ration th atth es e i n d i v i d

u al s h av e ap ri v ac y

i n t er es ti nav o i d i n g “u n n ec es s ary , un o ff i ci al qu es t i o n i n g, hara ssment and stigmatiz ation.” Suzuki Decl. ¶ 26. In terms of a public interest, Ms. Suzuki explained that disclosing this information “doe s not shed light on how CB P perfor ms its s tatutory duties.” Id. Plaintiff initi ally

takes issue with Ms. Suz uki’s analy sis of the privac y interests at stake
. Although Plaintiff doe s not dispute that indivi duals g ener ally have a privac y interest that encompa sses their name s and addr esses, see Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Employ ees v . Horner , 879 F.2d 873, 876 ( D.C. Cir. 1989), Plaintiff contends that the fe dera l employ ees who have be en in P la int if f’ s p re se nc e no lon g e r h ave any pr iva c y int e re st b e c a

us e the y “ re g ula rl y ho ld themselves out within the public ambit by interac ting with millions of airport trave lers as pa rt of the ir e mpl oy me nt, a ll the wh ile we ari ngba dg e s o r o the r f or ms o f i de nti fi c a tio n in dic a tin g the ir
names a nd titles.” Pl.’s Mot. at 27. P laintiff emphasizes that he is alre ady awa re of “more than two dozen individuals employ ed by Def endant a lrea dy

. . . .” Id. Consequently , Plaintiff believes that “Def

endant simply

cannot a rgue that fe dera l officials who a re se en daily

by tho us and s o f t

ra ve le rs have a

pr iva c y int e re st, e sse nti a l to the ir oc c up a tio n, in t

he se c re c y

of the ir19

identities.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. Pla int if f’ s argume nt i s f

or e c los e d b y

a lon g lin e of

c a se s r e c og nizi ngthat in div idu a ls maintain an intere st in their privacy even where some information is known about them publicly
. See Kimbe rlin v. Dep’t of Justice , 139 F.3d 944, 949 ( D.C. Cir. )) (“ althoug h g overnme nt officia ls, as we ha

ve stated be fore , may

have a ‘somewhat dimini shed’ pr ivacy interest, they

‘do not surrende r all rig hts to personal privac y when they

acc ept a public a

ppointment’”) ( quoting Quinon v. FBI

, 86 F.3d 1222, 1230 ( D.C. Cir. 1996)). Se e als o Nat’l Archives &Rec ords Admin.
v . F av ish , 5 41 U. S. 1 57 , 1 70 -1 71 (2 00 4) (e xpla ini ngthat F OIA r e c og nize s a surv ivi ngfa

mil y members’ rig ht to personal priva cy with respec t to their close re lative’s death, including hig hp ro fi l e d ea th s s u ch as th e a s s as s i n at i o n s o f P re s i d en tJ o h nF. Ke n n ed y an d M art i nLu th er

Ki n g, Jr.) ; Con su me rs’

Che c k bo ok v . U .S . D e p’ t of He alt h &Hu ma n S

e rv s. , 2 0 0 9 U
. S
. Ap p . LE X IS 16 42 at * 2 1 ( D. C. C ir . Jan . 3 0, 20 09 ) ( ho ldi ngthat pr iva c y int e re sts outw e ig he d p ub lic int e re sts even though “the public is alre ady familiar” with cer

tain aspec ts of the re quested data). Applying this principle, courts in this district have consistently reje cted the a

rgument that Plaintiff now advanc es. See, e .g. , Taylor v. Dep’ t of Justice , 268 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D .C. 2003) (“the fac t th atth e r equ es t o r m i gh tb e ab l e t o fi gure o u ts o m e o r a l l o f t h e i n d i v i d u al s ’ i d en t i t i es th ro u gh oth e r m e ans , o r t

he fa c t th at th e ir

ide nti tie s h ave a lr e a dy

be e n d isc los e d, do e s n ot d imi nis h th e ir privac y interests in not havingthe documents disclosed” ). Plaintiff’s arguments conce rningthe privac y interests of third pa

rties is even more
c ur so ry and un pe rs ua siv e . Pl a int if

f a rgue s th a t “ Con g re ss e na c te d th e (b )( 6) e xemp tio n, in particula r, to protec t ‘intimate details’ of a ‘hig hly persona l’ nature . . . The names of third pa rt ie s, su c h a s [Pla int if

f’ s] tr ave l c omp anio ns , in [Pla int if f’ s] pr e se nc e do no t f

a ll i nto thi s20

c ate g or y . Pl .’ s Mo t. at 27 . Pl a int if f a lso argue s th a t “ De fe nd ant c an p oint to no su c h s imi lar f ile from which inf

ormation about the ba

re na mes and positions of fede ral e mploy ees or the names of third parties mig ht be disclosed that would invade the re alm of protec ted information.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 9. Pla int if f’ s argume nts fa il b e c a

us e the re is n o q

ue sti on that E xemp tio n 6 is d e signe d to protec t the names of individuals, re g ardle ss of the par ticular file in whic h they

may be found. See W ashington Post Co. , 4 56 U. S. at 60 2 ( “ In s um, we do no t th ink that Co ng re ss m e ant t o li mit Ex emption 6 to a narr ow class of files containingonly

a discre te kind of per sonal information. Rather, the e x emption was intended to c over de tailed Gover nment rec ords on an individual which ca n be identified a s applying to that individual.”) (interna l quotation and citation omitted); Judicial W

atch, Inc . v. FDA , 449 F.3d 141, 152 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (explaining that Exemption 6 protec ts “not just files, but also bit s of per sonal information, such a s names and a ddresse s, the
re l ea s e o f w h i ch wo u l d

‘c re at e ap al p ab l e t h re att o p ri v ac y ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Carter v. U.S. De p’t of Commerce , 830 F.2d 388, 391 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)). Acc ording ly , the Court finds that the privac y interests of the individuals re fer ence d in the withheld documents ar e not insubstantial and have not been e liminated beca use they may be kn own in so me c a pa c ity to P la int if

f. Th e Court

mus t no w r e vie w whe the r t he se pr iva c y

int e re sts
are outweig hed by

the public intere st in the information associate d with them. As set forth a

bove, Ms. Suzuki asser

ted that the re quested infor mation “does not shed light on how CB P perfor

ms its s tatutory

duties,” Suzuki Dec l. ¶ 26, which is the only rele vant public interest at issue. Se e Re po rte rs C om m. for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess , 489 U.S. at 775 (holding that the only

rele vant public intere st in disclosure “is the extent to which disclosure would ser veTh e Court no te s th at Pla int if

f p re vio us ly

re pr e se nte d th a t he did

no t se e k th is 9 information for public pur poses, but rathe r, “to put an e nd to these inconve nient and embar rassinginterruptions to my trave l schedule. . . .” SeePl.’s Mot., Ex . 1 ¶ 25 (Af fid. of N. Ba rnar d). 21 the ‘c ore pur

pose of the F OIA,’ whic h is ‘contribut[ing] significa ntly to public understandingof the oper ations or ac tiviti es of the g overnme nt.”). Plaintiff ar g ues that “the rele ase of the responsive doc uments would shed light on De fenda nt’s activities related to airport se curity , as well as how a

nd to what extent Defe ndant has a llowed the privatiz ation of g overnme nt fu nc tio ns .” Pl. ’s Re ply

at 16 . T he Court

dis a g re e s. Plaintiffs’ asser

ted public intere sts bear no r elationship to the information Plaintiff has reque sted, and Plaintiff off ers no plausible ne x us betwee n the names of fede ral e mploy ees a

nd thi rd -p art ie s who have be en in Plaintiff ’s presenc e and how the public w ould learn a bout CBP’s
secur ity functions and pr ivatization efforts. Where, a s here , the nexus between the information
s o u gh tan d

th e a s s ert edp u

b l i c i n t er es ti s l ac k i n g, th e a s s ert edp u b l i c i n t er es t s wi l l n o to u twe i gh leg itimate privacy

interests. See Painting & Drywall W ork Prese rv. Fund, Inc . v. HUD , 936 F.2d 1 3 0 0 , 1 3 0 3 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 1 ) ( “a t t en u at edp u b l i c i n t er es ti nd i s cl o s ure ” d o es n o to u twe i gh signific ant privac y

interests); Schwaner v. D ep’t of Air Force , 898 F.2d 793, 800 ( D.C. Cir. 1990) (“ the public intere st is grounde d in a nexus between the information soug ht and the ce ntral purposes of F OIA”)
. Moreove r, “infor mation about private c itiz ens . . . that re veals little or 9 nothing a bout an ag ency ’s own conduc t” does not ser ve a r eleva

nt public interest under

FOIA. Re po rte rs Com m. for

Fr e e do m o

f Pre ss , 489 U.S. at 773. Although Plaintiff f

ails to disti ng uish the controlling c ase la w set for th above, he relies on the inapposite 1971 dec ision of Getman v . NLRB , 450 F.2d 670, 675 ( D.C. Cir. 1971). SeePl.’s22

Mot. at 26-27. In that case , a g roup of law profe ssors soug ht a list of employ ee na mes and addre sses to complete a

study on NL RB voting and wa nted to use the list to “fac ilitate scheduling of interview s with employ ees be fore and af ter c erta in elections.” 450 F .2d at 671. One of the purp os e s o f t

he stu dy wa s “ to c on sid e r t

he fe a sib ili ty

of c ha ng ingB oa

rd ru le s to e lim inate
unnece ssary

g rounds for c halleng es to elec tions, so as to streamline the entire proce ss.” Id. at 675. The District of Columbia Circuit found that “[t]he public interest need f or such a n
em p i ri ca l i n v es t i gat i o ni n t o th e a s s u mp t i o n s un d er l yi n g th e B o ar d ’s re gu l at i o no f c am p ai gn tactics ha s for some time bee n rec og nized by labor lawscholars [and] [ t] his particular study has been r eviewe d and supported by virtually ever y major scholar

in the labor lawfield.” Id. at 675. Getman does not support Plaintiff’s claims in this case be cause Plaintiff is not conducting any sort of study

that would shed lig ht on Defe ndant’s statutory duties. To the contra

ry , as the Court discussed above , Plaintiff is unable to identify any non-attenuated public intere st that would overc ome the priva cy interests of the individuals who have bee n in Plainti ffs’ pr esenc e and whose identities Pl aintiff see ks to ascer tain. As the D.C. Circuit has noted, in the a bsence of an identifiable public interest in the information, the court “ne ed not linge r over the balanc e; something . . . outwe ighs nothingever y time.” Bec k, 9 9 7 F. 2 d

at1 4 9 4 (qu o t i n g Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fe d. Employe es v. H orner , 879 F.2d 873, 879 ( D.C. Cir. 1989)). Ac cording ly , the Court shall g rant De fenda

nt’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and deny

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment with respec t to FOIA Exempti on 6. 2. FOIA Exempti ons 7(A), 7( C), and 7(E) Ex emption 7 protects fr om disclosure “r ecor ds or information compiled f or law enfor ceme nt purposes,” but only to the extent that dis closure of such re cords would c ause a n23

e nume rate d h arm . 5 U. S.C. § 5 52 (b )( 7) . T o p ro pe rl y a sse rt Exe mpt ion

7, an a g e nc y

mus t f ir st
e sta bli shthe re c or ds at is su e we re c omp ile d f or law e nf or c e me nt p ur

po se s. I f t

his sh ow ingis made, a n ag ency must then satisfy

the re quirements of one of the sub-pa rts of Exemption 7. See Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. D ep’t of Justice , 331 F.3d 918, 926 ( D.C. Cir. 2003). I CE invoked Ex emptions 7(A), 7(C), a nd 7(E) to withhold four pa g es of r ecor ds called “Signif icant Incident Reports.” McGinnis Dec l. ¶¶ 19, 24. CBP invoked Exemptions 7(C) and 7(E) to withhold names of fede ral e mploy ees w ithin P laintiff’s pre sence and the inspec tion proce dures witnesse d by

Plaintiff. Suz uki Decl. ¶ ¶ 27-31. i. Def

endant ha s demonstrated that the rec ords wer e compiled f or law enf orce ment purposes At the outse t th e Court

no te s th a t, whe re an a g e nc y “ sp e c ia lize s in

law e nf or c e me nt, its decision to invoke exemption 7 is entit led to defe renc e.” Cam pb e ll v. De

p’t of Justice , 164 F.3d 2 0 , 3 2 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Pratt v. W ebster , 673 F.2d 408, 419 ( D.C. Cir. 1982)). Ne ve rt he le ss, the “ de fe re nti a l” sta nd ard of re vie w that th e Court

a pp lie s to thi s d e te rm inatio n is not “vac uous.” Id. Instead, the a g ency ’s dec larations “must establish a rational ‘ne x us betwee n the investig ation and one of the ag ency ’s law e nforc ement duties,’ a nd a conne ction betwee n an ‘individual or incident and possible se curity risk or violation of fe dera l law.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Pratt , 673 F.2d at 420-21). As the D .C. Circuit ex plained in Cam pb e ll , “ [t]he fa c t th a t in fo rm a tio n is sto re d in a [doc ume nt] w ithan o ff

ic ia l- so un din g la

be l is ins uf

fi c ie nt s tand inga lon e to u ph old nondisclosure;” “ [a] t a minimum, t he [ag ency] m ust demonstrate the r elationship betwee n a
rec ord and its label a

nd betwee n the label a

nd a law e nforc ement purpose .” Id. In this case, ther e is no question that I CE and CBP per form law e nforc ement ac tiviti es. Ms. McGinnis expl ains that “I CE is the larg est investigative arm of [the De partment of24

Homeland Sec urity ], and is responsible for identify ing a nd eliminating vulner abilities within t he nation’s borde rs . . . .” Mc Ginnis Decl. ¶ 23. I CE is “tasked with pre venting any activities that threaten national sec urity and public saf

ety by targ eting the people, mone y and mater ials that support illega l enterpr ises.” Id. Simi larly , Ms. Suz uki expl ains that CBP “is a law enfor ceme nt ag ency with enforc ement re sponsibili ties for ove r 400 F eder al statutes, on beha lf of over 40 differ ent fe dera l ag encie s.” Suzuki Dec l. ¶ 28. CBP’s “mission is to protect the borde rs of the United States ag ainst terror ists and the instruments of terror , enfor ce the customs and immigration laws of the United States, a nd foster our

Nation’s ec onomy

by fac ilitating lawf

ul international tra de and tr avel.” Id. Th e re is a lso no qu e sti on

that th e re c or ds ide nti fi e d b y De fe nd ant c ou ld

bear the appropr iate nexus betwee n I CE and CBP’s law e nforc ement ac tiviti es and a possible violation of fede ral law . For

example, Ms. McGinnis ex plains that the information conta ined in the four pag es at issue c omprise one or more Sig nificant Incident Reports whe rein ther e is information “re levant to other ong oing inve stigations.” McGinnis Dec l. ¶ 24. Se e als o Se c on d M c Gi nn is Decl . ¶ 1 3. As for

th e C BP r ecor ds , M s. S uz uk i ex pl ain s t hatth e el ect ron ic s y st ems th at C BP
sear ched f

or re sponsive rec ords “maintain r ecor ds directly related to law enf

orce ment activities and ar e all used f

or law e nforc ement purpose s.” Id. S p e c i f i c a l l y, TE CS is an o ve ra

rc hin g law e nf

or c e me nt i nf

or matio n c oll e c tio n, ri sk

a sse ssm e nt, and information sharing environment; ATS-P’s purpose is to assist C BP per sonnel in making de cisions about whether a passe ng er or

cre w member

should rece ive a dd iti on a l sc re e nin g pr ior to a rr iva l in or de pa rt ur e fr om t he Un ite d St a te s b e c a

us e the trave ler may

pose a greater risk for

violation of U.S. law. Id. Ms. Suz uki also indicates that the r esponsive re cords located at the por t of Toronto “a

re use d for law enfor ceme nt purposes.” Id.25

Plaintiff argues that the De fenda nt’s threshold showingis insufficient bec ause D efe ndant has fa iled to establish a link betwee n “Plaintiff and a possible security

risk or violation of law f or any of the seve nteen a irport incidents . . . .” Pl.’s Mot. at 29. Althoug h Plaintiff’s argument lacks mer it to the ex tent he is sug g esting that he must be the tar g et of the inve stigation in order fo r D e fe nd ant t o r e ly

on thi s e xemp tio n, Pla int if

f i s c or re c t th a t D e fe nd ant h a s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y descr ibed the “ong oing inve stigations” nece ssary to justi fy relianc e on Exemption 7. For example, Defe ndant provides no de tail conce rningthe “size, scope, a nd direc tion of [t he] investigation,” see Boy d v. Criminal Div. of the United States Dep’ t of Justice , 475 F.3d 381, 386 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Alyesk a Pipeline Serv . Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agenc y , 856 F.2d 309, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1988)), whic h would allow a de termination as to whethe r there is a nexus between its law enfor ceme nt duties and the investig ations to which it refe rs. Althoug h Def endant’ s relianc e on Exemption 7 i s cer tainly plausible g iven the desc ription of their law e nforc ement activities and the ty

pes of r ecor ds where the information re sponsive to Plainti ff’ s FOIA/Privacy Act re quests was located, Exempti on 7 require s more than labe ls and plausible conc lusions. See Cam pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 32. Def endant’ s submissi ons to the Court appea r to ac knowledg e this deficie ncy , as Def endant r epea

tedly emphasizes that “no fur

ther de scription [of the documents] can be plac ed on the public re cord w ithout dis closing prec isely the information that the a pplication of the exemptions is intended to protect.” Def .’s [41] Mot. for L eave at 2. Se e als o Def .’s [42] Motion f o r L e av e at 2 ( “ D e f

e n d an t w is h e s to s u

p p le me n t [ it s ] d e c la

r a ti o n s b y s u b mi tt in g . . . [an ] in
c am e ra decla

ration [that] will provide the Court with additional fac tual context to further support th e F OIA e x em p t i o n s cl ai m edb y I C E an d C BP
. Ne i th er

P l ai n t i ff n o r t h e p u

b l i c h as kn o wl ed geIn acc ordanc e with the D.C. Circuit’s guidance to “make a s much as possible of the in 10 c am e ra su

bmi ssi on ava ila ble to t he op po sin g pa

rt y ” a s is a pp ro pr iate , th e Court

ha s a lso revie wed De fenda

nt’s two in c am e ra submissi ons to determine whe ther a ny portions may

be appropr iately

disclosed to Plaintiff and place d on the public docke t. See A rmstrong v. Exe cutive Office of the Preside nt , 97 F.3d 575, 580 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court has de termined that no 26 [of] these fa cts.”). T he in c am e ra decla rations also provide a dditional details ex plaining why De fe nd ant h a s n ot d e sc ri be d th e se inv e sti g a tio ns in a ny g re a te r d e ta il i n D e fe nd ant’ s p ub lic submissi ons. See, e .g. , Dec l. dated June 20, 2008 ¶ 9. Ba sed in part on De fenda nt’s failure to describe these ong oing inve stigations in sufficient detail, and De fenda

nt’s related explanation that it could provide no furthe r deta ils of the investigations on the public recor d without revea ling the inf ormation it seeks to protec t from disclosure, the Court g rante d Def endant lea

ve to file two in c am e ra decla rations. See Arieff v. U.S. Dep’ t of the Navy , 7 12 F .2 d 1 46 2, 14 69 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 3) (e xpla ini ngthat in c am e ra aff idavits are, “ when ne cessa ry , part of a

trial judg e’s pr ocedur al ar senal” ). Se e als o Boyd v

. Criminal Divisi on of the United States Dep’ t of Justice , 475 F.3d 381, 382 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (“ in
c am e ra revie w may

be par ticularly appropr iate if the a g ency aff idavits do not describe the documents and justifications for withholding in suffic ient detail to demonstrate that the claimed
e xemp tio n a

pp lie s . . . ” ). Al tho ug h th e Court is a wa re that in c am e ra decla

rations should be avoided unless truly

nece ssary , see, e .g. , Phillippi v. Cent. Intelligenc e Age ncy , 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976), whe re, a s here , an ag ency indicates that no a dditional information
conce rningan investig ation may be publicly

disclosed without reve aling prec isely the information that the ag ency seeks to withhold, the re ceipt of in c am e ra de c lara tio ns is appropr iate. See, e .g. , Billingt on v. U.S. De p’t of Justice , No. 92-0462, Mem. Op. & Orde r at 1-4 (Jul y 24, 2003), aff’d

258 Fe d. App’x 348, 349 (2007). 10portion of the dec larations may be disclosed without re vealingthe information De fenda nt seeks to p ro te c t. Plaintiff argues that “[b]aseless airport de tentions are not the ty pe of inve stigatory 11 activities for which Cong ress soug ht to ex empt rec ords from disclosure under [Ex emption 7] ,” Pl.’s Mot. at 29, and that Plainti ff ha s only been “ g ener ally

monitor[ ed] rather

than the subjec t of an ac tual “ag ency

investigation,” Pl.’s Mot. at 30. These ar g uments are based on spe culation about the natur e of the investigations refe renc ed in Def endants’ public submissions. The Court fi nd s th at th e inv e sti g atio ns de sc ri be d in De fe nd ant’ s in c am e ra decla rations ar e of the ty

pe that are appropr iately

subject to Exempti on 7. 27 Havingconsidere d Def

endant’ s two in c am e ra decla rations, the Court finds that Def endant ha s satisfied its burden with re spect to the Exemption 7 threshold showing. Mr. Jac ks ta ’s in c am e ra de c laratio n c on ta ins a ve ry de ta ile d d e sc ri pti on

of the do c ume nts wi thh e ld by Def endant a nd contains cor

respondingdescr iptions ex plaining why eac h of the doc uments or sets of docume nts cannot be f urther disc ussed on the public re cord w ithout revea ling infor mation that Def endant se eks to withhold from public disclosure. SeeJ acksta Dec laration ¶¶ 34-39. A second in c am e ra decla

ration explains the nexus betwee n Def endant, the doc uments at issue, and the pa st a nd on g oin g inv e sti g atio ns that ha ve be e n r e fe re nc e d in

De fe nd ants ’ p ub lic su

bmi ssi on s. See J une 20, 2008 De cl. ¶¶ 6- 12. Acc ording ly , based on the evidenc e in the re cord, which includes De fenda

nt’s public submissi ons and the two in c am e ra decla rations, the Court finds that Def endant ha s met the threshold burde n for invokingEx emption 7 and shall proce ed to examine whether Def endant ha s proper ly

invoked sub-par

ts 7(A), 7(C), a

nd 7(E). 11 ii. FOIA Exempti on 7(A) Ex emption 7(A) a

uthorizes the withholding of “ rec ords or infor mation compiled for law enfor ceme nt purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enfor ceme nt rec ords or information . . . could rea sonably be expected to inter fer e with enf orce ment proce eding s.” 528

U. S.C. § 5 52 (b )( 7) (A ). Exe mpt ion 7( A) is p ro pe rl y

inv ok e d w he re “ dis c los ur e (1 ) c ou ld
rea sonably

be expected to inter fer e with (2) e nforc ement proc eeding s that are (3) pe nding or
rea sonably

anticipated.” Mapother v. D ep’t of Justice , 3 F.3d 1533, 1540 ( D.C. Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that relianc e on this exempti on is proper, D efe ndant must make at lea st a minimum showing conce rning“the impac t of the disclosures” if the docume nts were disclosed. Sussman v. United States Marshals Serv. , 494 F.3d 1106, 1114 ( D.C. Cir. 2007). In th is c a se , M s. Mc Gi nn is e xpla ine d th a t th e fo ur pa g e s o f S ig nif

ic ant I nc ide nt R e po rt s
wer e prope rly

withheld in their entirety beca use, “[a]lthough Plaintiff is no longe r the subjec t of the open a

nd pendingcriminal investig ation orig inally cited in the F ields Dec laration, the inf or matio n r e late d to Pla int if f i n th e fo ur

pa g e s o f t

he Sig nif ic ant I nc ide nt R e po rt s c on ta in information re lated to other on- g oing inve stigations.” McGinnis Dec l. at ¶ 24. She fur ther explained that “[i] t has bee n conveyed to me that the r elea se of suc h information could have a neg ative impact on the othe r ong oing inve stigations and, theref ore, the rele ase of

such information could re asonably be expected to inter fer e with those investig ations.” Id. Plaintiff argues that De fenda nt has failed to e stablish the possibil ity of interf ere nce w ith a pendingor anticipated investig ation. SeePl.’s Mot. at 31. I n particula r, Plaintiff argues that (1) the Fie lds declar ation that Def endant initially

submitt ed for

purposes of the parties’ first round of summary judgme nt motions was “ demonstrably false” and (2) that the sec ond decla ration
su bmi tte d b y

Ms. Mars ha ll, a s w e ll a s th e de c lara tio n s ub mitte d b y

Ms. Mc Gi nn is, c on ta in inadmissible hearsa

y . SeePl. ’s Op p’ n at 5. Th e Court is n ot p e rs ua de d b y

e ith e r o f t

he se
argume nts . Al tho ug h th e re le va

nc e of Pla int if f’ s f ir st a rgume nt i s n ot a

pp are nt, the argume nt i tse lf isPlaintiff also takes issue with the fa ct that the F ields decla ration submitted by 12 De fe nd ant i de nti fi e d s ix pa g e s o f r e sp on siv e re c or ds wh e re a s, in f a c t, t he re we re se ve n p a g e s in Def endant’ s possession at the time. SeeMa rs ha ll D e c l. ¶

6. Th is d isc re pa

nc y wa s d isc us se d in the Court’s J anuar

y 29, 2008, seeMem. Op. at 14 n.9, a nd the Court finds this discrepanc y to be imm ate ri a l to re so lvi ngthe pa rt ie s’ pr e se nt C ro ss- Mo tio ns fo r S umm ary Judg me nt. 29 specious. As De fenda

nt corre ctly

observe s, “Plaintiff ig nores the r eality that he wa s the subject of a c riminal investigation in Februa ry 2007 [when the Fie lds declar ation was submitted] but , due to the passag e of time, in F ebrua ry 2008, he wa s no longe r the subjec t of that investigation.” Def .’s Opp’n at 5. Accor dingly , the individuals who have submitted dec larations in support of Def endant’ s prese nt summary judgme nt submiss ions have a ll recognized that Pl aintiff is no longe r the subjec t of an investig ation. See, e .g. , McGinnis Dec l. ¶ 24 (ac knowledg ing that

“ Pla int if f [i s] no lon g e r t

he su bje c t of the op e n a

nd pe nd ingc ri min a l inve sti g a tio n o ri g ina lly cited in the F ields Dec laration” but expl aining that there are “other ong oing inve stigation” that could be a ffe cted by

the re lease of the infor

mation at issue). To the e x tent Plaintiff invites the Court to f ind e vid e nc e of

ba d f a ithdu e to t

he se c ha ng e d c ir c ums tanc e s, the Court e xpre ssl y declines Plaintiff’s invitation. 12 Plaintiff’s second a

rgument conce rninginadmissible hearsa y in Ms. Marshall’s sec ond de c laratio n a

nd Ms. Mc Gi nn is’ s d e c laratio n is ba se d o n th e same argume nt t hat th e Court reje cted in its J anuar

y 29, 2008 Memorandum Opinion. SeeMem. Op. at 8-12. A t that time, Plaintiff took issue with the Fields dec laration submi tted by Def endant in support of its summary judgme nt motion. Id. at 8. Mr. F ields stated in his declar ation that Plaintiff “is the subject of a n op e n a nd pe nd ingc ri min a l inve sti g atio n” and that “ [r]e le a se of

any inf or matio n p e rt a ini ngto t

his investigation could rea sonably be expected to inter fer e with this open and pe nding c riminal investigation.” Fields De cl. ¶ 22. On summar y judgme nt, Plainti ff a

rgued that De fenda

nt failed30

to meet its burden of showingthat there was a n ong oing inve stigation of Plainti ff be cause Mr. Fields’s de clar ation was not base d on his personal knowle dg e. SeePl.’s [ 16] Mot . at 8-13. The Court re je c te d th at a

rgume nt b e c a

us e Mr . F ie lds ’s state me nts we re ma de “ ba se d u po n [hi s] persona l knowledg e, re view of doc uments kept in the course of business, and infor mation conveyed to [him ] i n the cour se of [his] officia l duties.” Fie lds Decl. ¶ 4. B eca use he w as “fa miliar with the proce sses used to sea rch f or the re cords at issue, and bec ause he has re viewed the re cords himself,” the Court found that he w as “c ompetent to testify as to the information contained in those r ecor ds.” Mem. Op. at 11. Simi larly , Ms. Marshall’s sec ond decla ration is “base d on [her] personal knowledg e and
e xpe ri e nc e , r e vie w o f d oc ume nts ke pt i n th e c ours e of bu sin e ss, and

inf or matio n c onve y e d to [her] i n the cour se of [her] officia l duties.” Second Mar shall Dec l. ¶ 4. Reg ardingthe investigations at issue, she states that she “ rec eived of ficial notification that plaintiff is not l ong er the subject of the open and pe nding c riminal investigation origina lly cited in the F ields Dec laration,” but that she has “be en informe d that disclosure of inf ormation related to plaintiff could have a neg ative impact on other ong oing inve stigation.” Id. ¶ 7
. Ms. McGinnis made sim ila r s tate me nts in h e r d e c laratio n. He r d e c laratio n is ba se d o n h e r “ fa mil iar[i ty ] wit

h th e fa c ts of this case [and] persona l knowledg e and e x perie nce, r eview of documents kept in the c ourse of bu sin e ss, and

inf or matio n c onve y e d to [he r] i n th e c ours e of [he r] o ff ic ia l dutie s. ” Mc Gi nn is De c l. ¶ 4. She fu

rt he r s tate s th at sh e ha s “ be e n in fo rm e d th a t th e re is i nf or matio n r e late d to [P ]l aintiff conta ined in the ‘I CE Significa nt I ncident Reports’ that is also releva nt to other ong oing inve stigations,” and that “[i] t has bee n conveyed to [her] that the relea se of suc h information could have a neg ative impact on the othe r ong oing inve stigations and, theref ore, the31

rele ase of such information could rea sonably be expected to inter fer e with those investig ations.” Id. ¶ 24. As the Court previously

explained, a dec lara

nt in a FOIA ca se satisfies the pe rsonal knowledg e re quirement in Rule 56(e ) “‘ if in his declar ation, [he] attests to his personal knowledg e of the proce dures use d in handling [a F OIA] request and his fa miliarity with the documents in question.’” Madison Mec h., Inc. v . Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Adm in. , No. 99- 2 8 5 4 , 2 0 0 3 U. S
. Di s t . L E XIS 4 1 1 0 at* 1 7 (D
. D. C
. M ar . 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Spannus v. De p’t of Justice , 813 F.2d 1285, 1289 ( 4th Cir. 1987)). B eca use a de clar ant is deeme d to have pe rsonal kn ow le dg e if

he ha s a g e ne ra l f amil iari ty wi th t he re sp on siv e re c or ds and pr oc e dure s u se d to identify those rec ords, the dec lara nt is not required to indepe ndently verify the information contained in e ach r esponsive re cord. See, e .g. , Londrigan v. Fed. Bureau of Inv estigation , 670 F.2d 1164, 1174 ( D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining that a n ag ent prope rly

stated in his affidavit that “one of the source s whose identity was withheld by

the FB Ihad spec ifically

reque sted confide ntiality ” bec ause that information was c ontained in a r ecor d the ag ent re viewed, e ven though the ag ent did not independently verify that the source had ac tually reque sted confide ntiality). P l a i n t i f f o n c e a g a i nar g u e s th atth e th e s e d e c l ar a t i o n s c o n t a i ni n a dm i s s i b l e h e ar s ay, althoug h Plaintiff now focuse s on the fac t that the decla rants we re told cer

tain information rather than obtaining the information fr om a re view of r eleva nt documents. The Court finds this to be a distinction wit hout a diffe renc e. F OIA dec lara nts may include stateme nts in their declar ations based on infor

mation they

have obta ined in the cour se of their officia l duties. See, e .g. , Thompson v. Exe c. Office for United States Attorney s , 2008 U.S. Dist L EXI S 95515 at *12-*13Plaintiff asserts that, “[f]or all [P laintiff] or this C ourt know[] , [t he] source [of the 13 information set for

th in these dec larations] may have be en a c onversation overhea rd at the w ater c oo le r i n D e fe nd ant’ s O ff ic e of Inv e sti g a tio ns .” Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 7. B e c a us e bo th d e c lara

nts explain that they

rec eived infor

mation while “per forming[t heir] official duties,” Plaintiff’s conce rns in this reg ard a

re misguided. Plaintiff argues that De fenda nt must establish t hat the withheld information “would” 14 interfe re w ith an investigation, seeP l
. ’s Op p ’n at1 2 , b u tth atar gu m en ti s b el i edb y th e l an gu age of the statute a

nd undermined by

Plaintiff’s inability

to cite any

leg al authority

in support of such a proposition. 32 n.4 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2008) (findinga dec laration admissibl e whe re it wa s based on the individual’s “re view of [the Def endant’ s] official files and r ecor ds, [her] own personal kn ow le dg e , a

nd the inf or matio n [sh e ] ac qu ir e d in

pe rf or min g he r o ff

ic ia l dutie s” ); Hornes v. Exe c. Office of United States Attorney s , 2007 U.S. Dist. L EXI S 33129 at *11 (D.D.C. May 4, 2 0 0 7 ) ( “ [ th e d e c l ar an t ’ s ] s t at e m e n t s ar e b a s e d o nh i s p e r s o n a l kn o w l e d g e , h i s r e v i e wo f [ a g e n c y] officia l files and re cords a nd information that he a cquire d in perfor ming [his] officia l duties . . . De c laratio ns pr ov ide d b y sim ila rl y sit uate d o ff ic ia ls h ave lon g be e n r e c og nize d a s a c c e pta ble in F OIA c a se s” ) ( int e rn a l c itatio n a nd qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d)
. Th e Court the re fo re re

je c ts 13 P l a i n t i f f ’ s ar g u m e n tth atth e d e c l ar at i o n s s u b m i t t e d b y D e f e n d an tc o n t a i ni n a dm i s s i b l e h e ar s ay. De sp ite thi s f

ind ing , th e Court

a lso fi nd s th a t D e fe nd ant’ s su bmi ssi on s o n th e pu

bli c
rec ord ar e insuffic ient to meet its burden of showinghow the re lease of the withheld infor mation could interfe re w ith ongoinginvestigations. See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)( A) (e ncompassing information that “c ould rea sonably be expected to inter fer e with enf orce ment proce eding s”). 14 Neve rtheless, the Court g rante d Def endant lea

ve to submit two in c am e ra decla rations for the
re a so ns e xpla ine d a

bo ve . H avin g c on sid e re d th e m, t he Court fi nd s th a t D e fe nd ant h a s me t it s burden of showing how the re lease of the withheld infor mation could interfe re w ith ongoing33

investigations and enfor ceme nt proce eding s. In particula r, the in c am e ra decla

ration date d J une 20, 2008, explains how disclosure of the withheld infor mation could interfe re w ith, and jeopar dize, the ongoingand future investigations. SeeJ une 20, 2008 De cl. ¶ 6. B ased on the pr e se nt r e c or d, wh ic h in c lud e s th e se c on d d e c laratio n o f M s. Ma rs ha ll, the de c laratio n o f M s. McGinnis, and the June 20, 2008 in c am e ra decla ration, the Court finds that De fenda nt has met its burden to show how the re lease of the infor mation could rea sonably

be expected to inter fer e with ongoinginvestigations. According ly , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s Motion for Summary Judg me nt a

nd de ny Pla int if f’ s Mo tio n f

or Sum mary

Judg me nt w ithre sp e c t to Ex emption 7(A). iii
. F OIA E xemp tio n 7 (C ) Pur su ant t o F OIA E xemp tio n 7 (C ), an a g e nc y may wi thh old inf or matio n w ith in do c ume nts “ c omp ile d f

or la w e nf or c e me nt p ur

po se s” that “ c ou ld r e a so na bly be e xpe c te d to
c on sti tut e an unw arr ante d inva sio n o f p e rs on a l pr iva c y .” 5 U .S. C. § 55 2( b) (7 )( C) . T o e va luate thi s e xemp tio n, the Court mus t ba lanc e the pr iva c y int e re sts inv olv e d a g a ins t th e pu bli c int e re st in disclosure. See Safe Card Servs., Inc . v. SEC , 9 26 F .2 d 1 19 7, 12 05 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) ; United Sta te s D e p’ t of J us tic e v . R e

po rte rs C om m. for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess , 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989). In te rm s o f p ub lic int e re sts , “ the on ly pu bli c int e re st r e le va

nt f or purp os e s o f E xemp tio n 7 (C ) i s one that foc uses on ‘the c itiz ens’ r ight to be inf ormed a bout what their g overnme nt is up to.’” Davis v. D ept’ of Justice , 9 6 8 F. 2 d 1 2 7 6 , 1 2 8 2 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Reporters Committee for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess , 489 U.S. at 773. This inquiry is simi lar to the inquiry

perf ormed for Ex emption 6, but Ex emption 7(C) applies only to documents that have been “ compiled for la w enfor ceme nt purposes.” 5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(7).34

In this case, I CE invoked Ex emption 7(C) to protect the na mes of the Spec ial Ag ents and thi rd -p art ie s a

pp e ari ngin t

he Sig nif ic ant I nc ide nt R e po rt s. Mc Gi nn is D e c l. ¶ 25 . With r e sp e c t to the Special Ag ents, Ms. McGinnis expl ained that “ [t ]hey wer e, and still are , in positi ons of
acc ess to information re g ardingofficia l law enf orce ment investigations. I f there identities are rele ased, the y

could bec ome targ ets of unwa rra nted har assment.” Id. As fo r t hir d p art ie s, Ms. McGinnis explained that they are individuals who
wer e, and possibly

still are , subjects of investig ations or who provide d information or other

cooper ation to the g overnme nt [ and who] could be humiliated by

beingidentified in conne ction with a cr iminal investigation; they c ou ld b e c ome targ e ts o f h ara ssm e nt o r p hy sic a l da ng e r. Al so re le a se of

the ir i d e n t i t i e s w o u l d

c o n s t i tu t e anun w ar

r an t e d i n v a s i o no f

th e i r p e r s o n a l p r i v a c y. Id. Ms. McGinnis also asserte d that no public interests would be se rved by rele asingthe names of these g overnme nt employ ees or third parties. Id. Simi larl y , CB P invo ke d E xemp tio n 7 (C ) t o w ithho ld n ame s o f f e de ra l e mpl oy e e s. Ms. Suz uki expl ained that the pr ivacy interest in the information withheld by Def endant r elates to the p ro t ec t i o no f f

ed er al p er s o n n el an d

th i rdp art i es “f

ro mun n ec es s ary , un o ff

i ci al qu es t i o n i n g, ha ra ssm e nt a

nd sti g matizatio n. ” Suzuki D e c l. ¶ 30 . In c on tr a st, Ms. Suzuki e xpla ins that r e le a se of this information would not “shed lig ht on how CBP perf orms its statutory

duties.” Id. On the one side of this balancingequation, Plaintiff ar g ues that Exemption 7(C) “does not
e xemp t di sc los ur e of

inf or matio n th at is or

ha s b e e n ma de pu

bli c .” Pl. ’s Mo t. at 33 . B e c a us e Plaintiff is “alrea dy

familiar with the publicly -display ed name s and positions of more than two dozen fede ral off

icials,” the “ privac y

interest is far

from its apex, and closer to its nadir.” Pl.’s Mot. at 33. The Court re

jected the same a

rgument in the context of the Ex emption 6 inquiry above. SeeSection I I I .B.1, supra (c oll e c tin g c a se s a nd e xpla ini ngthat in div idu a ls d o n ot l os e35

their privac y

interests simply

beca use they are known to the public). More over, the names of third-par ties in law enfor ceme nt rec ords ar e almost alwa y s exempt from disclosure. Se e Sa fe c ar d Servs., I nc. v. SE C , 9 26 F .2 d 1 19 7, 12 06 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) (“ [w]e no w h old c a te g or ic a lly

that, unless acc ess to the names a nd addre sses of private individuals appea ringin files within the ambit of Exempti on 7(C) is nece ssary in order to c onfirm or re fute c ompelling e vidence that the ag ency is eng ag ed in illeg al ac tivity , such information is ex empt from disclosure ”). Se e als o Sussman v. U.S. M

arshals Serv. , 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that Ex emption 7(C) protec ts “the privac y interests of a ll persons mentioned in law e nforc ement re cords, whe ther they be investig ators, suspec ts, witnesses, or informa nts,” and their na

mes are “g ener ally

exempt from disclosure . . .”). A ccor dingly , the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show that the ind ivi du a ls n ame d in

the re c or ds wi thh e ld b y

De fe nd ant l a c k a

n in su bs tanti a l pr iva c y

int e re st. On the oth e r s ide of

the ba lanc inge qu a tio n, Pla int if f a rgue s th a t th e re is a

pu bli c int e re st in the names of the se fe dera l employ ees a nd third parties be cause it would revea l “‘what the Gover nment is up to,’ namely

basele ss monitoring of the a ctivities of private c itiz ens.” Pl.’s M o t . at3 2 (c i t i n g Pratt , 673 F.2d at 421). Plaintiff contends that “when, as he re, D efe ndant eng ag es in monitoring a ctivities not necessa rily stemming fr om its st atutory responsibilities . . ., a F OIA/ PA r e qu e ste r m ay

take on an im po rt ant w a tc hd ogro le that is re c og nize d a s a pu bli c i n t er es t . ” P l
. ’s Op p ’n at1 4 (c i t i n g Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violenc e v. U .S. Dep’ t of the Tre as ur y , 9 81 F . Su

pp . 2 0, 24 (D .D .C. 19 97 )) . In o rd e r t o r e ly on thi s a sse rt e d p ub lic int e re st, howeve r, Plaintiff “‘must produc e evide nce that would warr ant a be lief by a re asonable person that the alleg ed Gove rnment impropriety may have oc curr ed’ in orde r to g ain disclosure.” Sussman , 4 9 4 F. 3 d

at1 1 1 5 (qu o t i n g Fa v ish , 541 U.S. at 174). Where, a s here , a plaintiff r elies36

on ly on “ his ba re and un de ve lop e d a lle g a tio ns ” of a g e nc y imp ro pr ie ty , a

be lie f b y a re a so na ble person that improprie ty

might have occur

red is “not wa

rra nted.” Id. The Court there fore finds that no public interest outweig hs the privac y interests of the individuals identified in the withheld rec ords. Acc ording ly , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt a

nd de ny Pla int if f’ s Cr os s- Mo tio n f

or Sum mary

Judg me nt w ith respe ct to Ex emption 7(C).

iv. FOIA Exempti on 7(E) Exe mpt ion

7( E) pr ote c ts f

ro m di sc los ur e law e nf

or c e me nt r e c or ds that “ wo uld dis c los e techniques a

nd proce dures f

or law e nforc ement investig ations . . . or would disclose guidelines fo r l aw e nf

or c e me nt i nv e sti g atio ns . . . if su c h d isc los ur e c ou ld r e a so na bly be e xpe c te d to ri sk circ umvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)( E). Information that re lates to law e nforc ement techniques, policie s, and proc edure s is properly withheld under this exemption. See Boyd v

. BATFE , 5 70 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 56 , 1 58 (D .D .C. 20 07 ); Morley v . Cent. IntelligenceAgenc y , 4 53 F. Supp. 2d 137, 156 (D.D.C. 2006). I CE i nv ok e d F OIA E xemp tio n 7 (E ) t o w ithho ld t he fo ur Sig nif ic ant I nc ide nt R e po rt s in their entire ty . See Mc Gi nn is D e c l. ¶ 26 . M s. Mc Gi nn is e xpla ine d th a t di sc los ur e of the se re po rt s would “disclose tec hniques, proce dures a nd g uidelines for la

w enf orce ment investigations or prosec utions, where suc h disclosures could r easona bly be expected to r isk circumvention of [the] law.” Id. She also explained that, with respec t to this case , I CE employ ed ce rtain law e nforc ement tec hniques desig ned to obtain information about [P ]l aintiff in furthe ranc e of the g overnme nt’s criminal investig ation of [P ]l aintiff. The se tec hniques involved coope rative a rra ng ements betwe en I CE and other a g encie s and inter- ag ency communications prompting spe cific a ctions on the pa rt of a g e nc y e mpl oye e s. Th e dis c los ur e of the se te c hn iqu e s c ou ld a dv e rs e ly aff ect f uture investig ations by

g iving potential subjec ts of investigations theThe Court notes that De fenda nt also invoked Exempti on 2 to withhold much of the 15 information also subject to Exemption 7(E), but that Plainti ff ha s not challeng ed De fenda nt’s application of Exemption 2. SeeDe f. ’s Mo t. at 17 -1 8; S uzuki D e c l. ¶ 21 . A c c or din g ly , e ve n if De fe nd ant whe re fo un d to have imp ro pe rl y a sse rt e d E xemp tio n 7 (E ), the inf or matio n w ou ld s til l be appr opriately

withheld based on Exemption 2. 37 ability to anticipate the c ircumstance s under whic h such tec hniques could be employ ed in investig ations where they may be tar g ets and identify

such techniques a s they

are beingemploy ed. Id. Simi larl y , CB P invo ke d E xemp tio n 7 (E ) t o p re ve nt d isc los ur e of inf or matio n th a t w ou ld “re veal CB P’s investigative techniques,” including “ CBP examination and inspection proce dures, inter

nal re porting require ments and instructions on how to proce ss international trave lers, which c ould be used by potential violators to develop counte rmea sures to eva de detec tion, inspection and targ eting methods.” Suzuki Dec l. ¶ 31. Ms. Suz uki expl ains that further descr iptions of the withheld information “would divulg e to Plaintiff the examination and ins pe c tio n p ro c e dure s, int e rn a l r e po rt ingre qu ir e me nts and ins tr uc tio ns on

ho w t o p ro c e ss international traveler s” which is “the very information that CBP see ks to protect.” Id. F i n a l l y, Ms. Suzuki e xpla ins that D e fe nd ant i s a sse rt ingExe mpt ion 7( E) a s to the do c ume nts the mse lve s, and not just the contents of the doc uments, beca use “the documents in and of the mselves ar e law enfor ceme nt techniques.” Id. They “ar e the mea

ns by which law e nforc ement ac tiviti es ar e coordinated and r eporte d” and the ir disclosure would
reve al CBP targ eting , examination and inspection proce dures a nd ty pes of a ny int ra and int e r- a g e nc y

c oo rd inatio n, wh ic h w ou ld p e rm it p ote nti a l vi olator s to whom the documents may be disclosed, to under stand the pre cise steps take n by CBP [and] thus facilitating the deve lopment of counter measure s to evade de te c tio n, ins pe c tio n a

nd targ e tin g me tho ds
. Id. 1538

Ac c or din g to P la int if

f, De fe nd ant’ s a

bo ve de sc ri pti on s a

re no t su ff

ic ie ntl y sp e c if ic to justify its reliance on Ex emption 7(E). SeePl.’s Mot. at 34. P laintiff ar g ues that De fenda nt
c ann ot p ro pe rl y

re ly on “ [c]ate g or ic a l de sc ri pti on [s] of re da c te d mate ri a ls c ou

ple d w ith cate g orica l indication[ s] of anticipated conse quence s of disclosure.” Id. (qu o t i n g King v. Dep’t of Justice , 8 30 F .2 d 2 10 , 2 24 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 7) ). Th e Court dis a g re e s. Th e D. C. C ir c uit re c e ntl y
re c og nize d ( in t

he c on te xt of

CIA p ro c e dure s a

nd po lic ie s) that an a g e nc y

may pr op e rl y wi thh old information from disclosure wher e, as he re, it would provide insig ht into it s investigatory or pr oc e dura l te c hn iqu e s: Th e CIA’ s se c ur ity

c le ara nc e te c hn iqu e s invo lve a

g e ne ra l pr oc e ss a

pp lie d to a ll background investig ations of its office rs. An ag ency may seek to block the dis c los ur e of

int e rn a l a g e nc y

mate ri a ls r e latin g to guid e lin e s, te c hn iqu e s, so ur c e s, and proc edure s for lawenfor ceme nt investigations and prosec utions, even whe n the mater ials have not be en compiled in the c ourse of a spec ific investig ation . . . I t is se lf -e vid e nt t hat in fo rm atio n r e ve a lin g se c ur ity c le ara nc e pr oc e dure s c ou ld rende r those proc edure s vulnerable and we aken the ir eff ectivene ss at uncover ing ba c kg ro un d in fo rm atio n o n p ote nti a l c and idate s. Morley v . CIA , 508 F.3d 1107, 1129 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (interna l citation and quotation marks omitted). See also Piper v . Dep’ t of Justice , 294 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30 (D.D .C. 2003) (appr oving ag ency ’s withholding of

poly g raph te st information beca use disclosure “ has the potential to allow a cunningcriminal to extrapolate a pa tter or method to the F BI ’s questioning technique” ), aff’d 22 2 F e d. Ap p’ x 1 (2 00 7) ; Fisher v. De p’t of Justice , 772 F. Supp. 7, 12 (D.D .C. 1991) (appr oving F BI ’s dec ision to wit hhold information conce rninglaw enf orce ment techniques that “could a lert subjects in druginvestigations about techniques used to a id the FB I ”), aff’d , 968 F.2d 92 ( D.C. Cir. 1992). Ba sed on this leg al authority , the Court finds that Def endant’ s descr iption of the withheld information and the r easons why disclosure would a llow circ umvention of the law a re suf ficiently descr iptive.39

Plaintiff’s other a

rgument is a familiar one , arguing that the various inspec tion procedur es witnessed by

Plaintiff and others may

no longe r be w ithheld beca use they have be en made public. SeePl.’s Mot. at 35 (“[t] he inspec tion procedur es witnessed by [P laintiff]–which include detention, sea

rche s, markingof trave l documents, use of a computer database , and inclusion on a ‘no fly ’ list–are c ommon knowledg e to the g ener al public . . . [and] Defenda nt has not shown that dis c los ur e of

the ins pe c tio n p ro c e dure s e mpl oy e d u po n [Pla int if

f] c ou ld r e du c e or

nu lli fy the ir
e ff e c tiv e ne ss” ). Pla int if

f a rgue s th at [t]he se pr oc e dure s, name ly de te nti on , s e arc he s, mark ingof tr ave l do c ume nts , u se of a c omputer data

base, a nd inclusion on a ‘no fly ’ list, are r outinely conducte d befor e air port trave lers all over

the country

and [are] commonly

depicted in the me dia
. . . th e wi de sp re a d k

no wl e dg e of

a ir po rt ins pe c tio n p ro c e dure s ma ke s it highly un lik e ly that r e le a sin g inf

or matio n a bo ut t he m w ou ld e na

ble c ri min a ls t o avoid future detec tion. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. The Court ag ain re

jects this argument. All of the tec hniques descr ibed in the ca ses above–se curity

clea ranc e proc edure s, poly g raph e x aminations, druginvestiga tory techniques–a

re known to the public to some extent. There is no princ iple of which the Court is aware that
re qu ir e s an a g e nc y

to r e le a se a ll d e ta ils c on c e rn ingthe se a nd sim ila r t e c hn iqu e s si mpl y

be c a us e some aspec ts of them are known to the public. Acc ording ly , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt d e ny

Pla int if f’ s Cr os s- Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt w ith respe ct to Ex emption 7(E).

3. Privacy

Act Exemptions (j)(2), (k)( 2) Section (j)(2) of the Privac y Act exempts from mandatory disclosure sy stems of rec ords “maintained by

an ag ency

or compone nt thereof

which per forms as its principal f unction any
a c tiv ity pe rt a ini ngto t

he e nf or c e me nt o f c ri min a l la

ws , in c lud ingpo lic e e ff

or ts t o p re ve nt,Whil e De fenda nt should have included the se ar g uments in its M otion for Summary 16 J udg ment brief, the Court shall, in it s discretion, consider them beca

use both parties ha

ve had a fu l l o p p o rt un i ty

t o fu l l y ad dre s s th em i nth ei r b ri ef i n g. 40 c o n tr o l , o r

r e d u c e c r i m e o r

t o a p p r e h e n d c r i m i n a l s . . . . ” 5 U
. S
. C
. § 5 5 2 a ( j ) ( 2 )
. S i m i l ar l y,
se c tio n ( k) (2 ) o f t

he Pr iva c y

Ac t e xemp ts a

ny sy ste m of

re c or ds wi thi n a

n a g e nc y fr om t he a c c e ss provision of the Privacy

Act if the sy stem of re cords c onsists of “investigatory materia l compiled for law enfor ceme nt purposes,” othe r than the material within the scope of the (j) (2) e x emption. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(2)
. Pla int if f c or re c tly ob se rv e s th at D e fe nd ant d id n ot i de nti fy any Pr iva c y Ac t e xemp tio ns in its Moti on for Summary

J udg ment, seePl. ’s Mo t. at 21 , a nd that an a g e nc y

c ann ot w ithho ld inf or matio n b a se d o n F OIA i f t he inf or matio n is su

bje c t to dis c los ur e un de r t he Pr iva c y

Ac t: [i ]n order to withhold these documents fr om [ a re quester’ s] t win Privacy Ac t/F OIA r e qu e st, the n, [the a g e nc y ] mus t de mon str a te that th e do c ume nts fa ll within some ex ception under eac h Act. I f a F OIA exemption covers the documents, but a Privac y Act exemption does not, the documents must be r e l e a s e d un d e r th e P r i v a c y

A c t ; i f a P r i v a c y A c te x e mp t i o nb u tn o ta

F O IA exemption applies, the documents must be relea sed under FOIA. Martin v. Office of Spec ial Counsel , 819 F.2d 1181, 1184 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)). Realizing its omissi on, howeve r, De fenda nt set forth the ba sis for its withholdi ng under the Privacy

Act in its Opposition, and submi tted a sec ond decla ration fr om Ms. McGinnis and a decla ration fr om L aure nce Ca stelli, as support. Ms. McGinnis expl ains the I CE rec ords 16
re qu e ste d b y

Pla int if f w e re loc ate d w ith in t

he Tr e a sury

En fo rc e me nt C omm

un ic a tio ns Sy ste ms (“TE CS”) and the Investig ations Record Sy stem (“I RS”) Privacy Act sy stems of rec ords. See Second McG innis Decl. ¶ 9. She f urther e x plains that rec ords from both of the se sy stems “ar e exempt from disclosure . . . [as] s et forth in the TECS and I RS sy stem of re cords notice s that41

have be en published in the F eder al Reg ister . . . .” Id. (citing66 Fe d. Reg . at 53029, 53007- 53008). Simil arly , Ms. Castelli ex plained that the CB P recor ds that were located usingthe Automated Ta

rg eting Sy stem (“AT S”) ar e exempt from disclosure unde r the Privac y Act. See Def. ’s O pp ’n, Ex . 4 ¶ 4 ( Decl . o f L . C ast ell i) (ci ti ng 72 Fed. Re g. 43 ,6 50 ). A s fo r al l o th er C BP
rec ords, Ms. Castelli ex plains that they wer e either

located usingTECS, which is ex empt from the disclosure pr ovisions of the Privacy Act, or the y

wer e not maintained in a sy stem of re cords retrie vable by

Plaintiff’s name or

persona l identifier (a

nd thus not subject to the disclosure provisions of the Privacy

Act). See5 U.S.C. § 552a(5) (e x plaining that disclosure under the Pr iva c y Ac t a pp lie s to re c or ds loc ate d w ith in “ a g ro up of re c or ds
. . . f

ro m w hic h in fo rm a tio n is retrie ved by

the name of

the individual or by

some identifying numbe r, sy mbol, or other identifying pa

rticular a ssigne d to the individual.”). Plaintiff offer s two rea sons as to why these doc uments should neverthe less be disclosed. First, Plaintiff asser

ts that Defe ndant fa iled to invoke any Privacy Act exemptions in “the
a dmi nis tr ativ e re c or d, ” and the re fo re is p re c lud e d f

ro m do ingso no w. Pl. ’s Re ply a t 11 . T his argument fails bec ause the re is no re quirement that a n ag ency administratively

invoke an exemption i n order

to later re ly

on it in federa l court. See H odes v. U .S. Dep’ t of Housing & Urba n D e v e l. , 532 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114 n.2 (D.D .C. 2008) (Kollar- Kotelly , J .) (holdingthat an ag ency could invoke an e x emption that was not previously asser ted in its letters with the F OIA/ Pr iva c y

Ac t r e qu e ste r) ; Sc iba v . B d. of G ov e rn or of F e d. Re se rv e Sy s. , No. 04-1011, 2005 U
. S
. D i s t . LE X IS 6 0 0 7 , at* 6 n . 3 ( D
. D
. C
. M ar . 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 ) ( “ ana g e n c y o n l y w a i v e s F O IA Ex emptions by

failingto claim them in the orig inal proce eding s befor e the district cour t”). Second, Plaintiff ar g ues that the e x emptions under sec tions (j) and (k) of the Privac y ActAl tho ug h A TS i s n ot s e pa rate ly name d in the re g ulatio ns c ite d a

bo ve , th a t e le c tr on ic 17 sy stem has bee n considere d part of T ECS for purposes of a Privacy Act exemption. See72 F .R. 43 56 7 ( e xpla ini ngthat th e De pa rtme nt o f H ome land

Se c ur ity is c ur re ntl y ame nd ingits re g ulatio ns to s pe c if

ic a lly e xemp t r e c or ds in A TS f ro m th e Pr iva c y

Ac t, whic h h ave be e n unti l now consider ed par

t of TECS). 42 are on ly a pp lic a ble wh e re an a g e nc y

he a d h a s p ro mul g ate d a

n e xemp tio n und e r t

he Pr iva c y

Ac t, and that De fenda

nt’s Opposition only

cites to provisions of the F eder al Reg ister. SeePl. ’s Re ply at1 1 -1 2 (c i t i n g Doe v . FBI , 9 36 F .2 d 1 34 6, 13 51 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) ). Pla int if f’ s a rgume nt f a ils beca use re g ulations have, in fa ct, bee n promulg ated to exempt these ele ctronic sy stems from the disclosure provisions of the Privac y Act. See31 C.F.R. 1.36; 49 C.F.R. 1507.3. 17 Acc ording ly , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and deny Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment with respec t to Privacy Act Exemptions (j)(2) and (k) (2). C. De fe nd an t H as De mo ns tra te d Th at I

t Co nd uc te d a Prop e r S

e gr e ga bil ity An aly sis Whil e ag encie s may

proper ly withhold certa in materials under FOIA’s enume rate d
e xemp tio ns , th e y

mus t r e le a se “ any

re a so na bly se g re g a ble po rt ion s” of

re sp on siv e do c ume nts once the y have r edac ted the exempted information. See 5 U .S. C. § 55 2( b) . T he se g re g a bil ity require ment is of such g reat import that thi s Court has an af firmative duty

to eng ag e in its own seg reg ability

analy sis, reg ardle ss of Plaintiff’s pleading s. See Billingt on v. De p’t of Justice , 233 F.3d 581, 586 ( D.C. Cir. 2000). The que stion of seg reg ability is “subjective ba sed on the nature of the doc ument in question, and an a g ency must provide a re asonably detailed justification rathe r than c onclusory

statements to support its claim that the non-exempt material in a doc ument is not reasona

bly seg reg able. Mead D ata Cent. Inc. v. U .S. Dep’ t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Althoug h the ag ency ’s justification need not c ompromise the nature of the43

wi thh e ld i nf

or matio n, its e xplanatio n s ho uld a t le a st d e ta il what pr op or tio n o f t he inf or matio n in a docume nt is non-exempt and how that material is disperse d throug hout the document. See Me ad Da ta , 566 F.2d at 261. F o r th e i n f o r m at i o nw i th h e l d

b y IC E , M s . M c G i n n i s s t a t e s th a ts h e c o n d u c t e d a “ l i n e - b ylin e ” re vie w a

nd de te rm ine d th at “ no po rt ion of tho se fo ur

(4 ) p a g e s w e re se g re g a

ble ” be c a us e the exempt and non-exempt information was inextricably intertwined. McG innis Decl. ¶ 27. She also deter

mined that disclosure of the “fe w non-e x empt words or phr ases” that wer e dispersed throughout the four pa g es would be me aning less and that the these words or phr ases constituted an “e x tremely small portion” of the withheld re cords. Id. In M s. Suzuki’ s Dec laration concer

ning the information withheld by CBP, she states that she a lso conducted a “line-by -line” r eview to “ identify information exempt from disclosure or f or which a dis c re tio na

ry wa ive r o f e xemp tio n c ou ld a pp ly .” Suzuki D e c l. ¶

32 . In M s. Suzuki’ s ju dg me nt, “any further rele ase of

the exempted materia ls could rea sonably lead to the identific ation of the individuals or other items that are proper ly protec ted by

the exemptions asserted.” Id. She a lso stated that any

non-exempt information in the documents is “inextricably intertwined” with the exempt information and “[t] he fe w non-e x empt words and phr ases that a re disper sed throug hout the re c or ds wi thh e ld i n f

ull , if dis c los e d, wo uld

be me anin g le ss a

nd wo uld no t se rv e the purp os e of F OIA – to open ag ency action to the lig ht of public scrutiny .” Id. ¶ 31. P l ai n t i ff ar gu es th atDe fe n d an t ’s d es cr i p t i o n s co n ce rn i n g s egr egab i l i ty ar e t o o “s we ep i n g” and not suffic iently

detailed. SeePl.’s Mot. at 35-36. The Court disag ree s. Unlike Def endant’ s
ear lier dec laration that the Court found lacking , seeMe m. O p. a t 13 (Ja n. 29 , 2 00 8) , b oth

Ms. McGinnis and Ms. Suzuki descr ibed the propor tion of non-exempt information and how it wasThe Court also notes that, for purposes of the parties’ first round of summar y judgme nt 18 motions, Defenda

nt asserte d that it could not seg reg ate a ny non-exempt information in the seven pag es of r ecor ds it withheld from disclosure and that the Court ordere d them produce d for a n in came ra revie w. SeeMem. Op. at 13-14 ( J an. 29, 2008). A fter r eviewingthem, the Court ag ree d with Defe ndant that it was cor rec t in its seg reg ability

assessment, which le nds further support for Def endant’ s seg reg ability

analy sis here. 44 dispersed throughout the withheld rec ords. See, e .g. , McGinnis Dec l. ¶ 27 (desc ribing the “extremely

small portion” of non-e x empt information); Suzuki Dec l. ¶ 31 (desc ribing the fe w non-exempt words or phra ses as disper sed throug hout the rec ords). More over, the Mr. J acksta ’s in c am e ra decla

ration provides a

very detailed de scription of the infor mation contained in the
rec ords withheld from disclosure , and includes his judg ment that no non-exempt information may be re lease d without revea ling the inf ormation that Def

endant se eks to withhold. See J acksta Dec l. ¶¶ 8-60. F inally , Def endant pr oduced Vaughn indices includinga desc ription of
e a c h d oc ume nt t

hat D e fe nd ant w ithhe ld f

ro m di sc los ur e and

c or re sp on din g e xplanatio ns a s to why the information wa s not relea sed to Plaintiff. See, e .g. , Pl.’s Mot., Ex s. 6, 7 ( Vaughn Indices). O n this recor d, the Court finds that Def endant ha s set forth a suf

ficiently detailed seg reg ability

analy sis. Cf. Stol t-Nielsen Transp. Grp. Lt d. v. United States , 534 F.3d 728, 733- 34 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (e mphasizi ng that “‘a n ag ency cannot justify

withholding an e ntire docume nt sim ply by sh ow ingthat it

c on ta ins so me e xemp t mate ri a l,’ ” but no t di sturb ingthe we llestablished pre cede nts allowing a n ag ency to withhold non-ex empt information that is, as her e, “i n ex tri cab l y

i n t ertwi n ed ” w i thex em p ti n fo rm at i o n ) ( qu o t i n g Mead D ata Cent., Inc. , 566 F.2d at 260). 18 Acc ording ly , the Court shall g rant De fenda nt’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and deny Pla int if f’ s Cr os s- Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt.There is some question as to whether Plaintiff could also proce ed pursua nt to Fede ral 19 Rule of Civil P roce dure 59( e), which authorizes a pa rty to move, within 10 day s after the entry of judgme nt, for a c ourt to alter or amend the judg ment. See, e .g. , Firestone v. Fire stone , 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court e ntere d a stay of its J anuar

y 29, 2008 decision on F e br ua ry 6, 20 08 , a

nd ins tr uc te d Pl a int if

f t o r a ise his mot ion

fo r r e c on sid e ratio n in

the pa rt ie s’ subsequent brie fs. Whether Plaintiff may still proce ed under

Rule 59 under these circ umstances is not a question the Court must decide, howe ver, be cause under e ither Rule 59 or Rule 60, Plaintiff is not entit led to relief from the Court’s January 28, 2009 decision for

the re asons explained in the tex t above. 45 D. Plain tif

f H as Fa ile d To De mo ns tra teTha t Th e Cou rt S ho uld Re c on sid e r I ts January 28, 2009 D ecision Plaintiff moves to have the Court re consider its January 29, 2008 decision base d on the “new ly discovere d evidenc e” that Plainti ff wa s not subject to an open a nd pendinginvestigation at the time of that de cision. SeePl.’s Mot. at 13-20. Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)( 2) allows a pa

rty to obtain relief f

rom a fina l judgment ba sed on new ly discovere d evidenc e whe n he or sh e de mon str ate s th at: (1) the ne wly

discovere d evidenc e conc erns f acts that e x isted at the time of trial or another dispositi ve proc eeding ; (2) the pa rty seekingrelief

was justifiably

ignor ant of the e vidence despite his or her due dilige nce; ( 3) the e vidence is admissibl e and of such importanc e that it probably would have c hang ed the outcome ; and (4) the ev i d en ce mu s tn o tb e m er el y cu mu l at i v e o r i mp ea ch i n g. See E pps v. Howes , 5 73 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 80 , 1 85 (D .D .C. 20 08 ). Th e Court ne e d n ot s e pa

rate ly 19 consider e ach of

these e lements bec ause the reve lation that Plainti ff wa s not subject to an investigation in J anuar

y 2008 would not have c hang ed the outcome of the Court’s January 28, 2009 decision. A s d e s c r i b e d

a b o v e , D e f e n d an to r i g i n a l l y

w i th h e l d s e v e np a g e s o f

r e c o r d s b a s e d

o nF O IA Exe mpt ion

7( A) and se ve ra l ot

he r e xemp tio ns . D e fe nd ant s ub mitte d th e de c lara tio ns of Mars ha ll Fields, who e x plained that Plaintiff “is the subjec t of an ope n and pendingcriminal46

inv e sti g atio n” and

that “ [r]e le a se of

any inf or matio n p e rt a ini ngto t

his inv e sti g a tio n c ou ld
rea sonably

be expected to inter fer e with this open and pe nding c riminal investigation.” Fields De c l. ¶ 22 . F oll ow ingthe Court ’s in c am e ra revie w of the r ecor ds, the Court found that there exis ted no re asonably

seg reg able non- exempt information and, on J anuar y 29, 2008, the Court g rante d Def

endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment and denie d Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judg me nt. On Fe bruar

y 4, 2008, Def

endant f iled a Notice and Motion to St ay explaining that it had discovere d additional rec ords re sponsive to Plainti ff’ s FOIA/Privacy Act re quests. SeeDef

.’s [29] Mot. for a Stay

at 1. Def endant a lso submit ted a de clar ation from Gloria Marsha ll, who explained that “[P ]l aintiff is no long er the subject of the ope n and pendingcriminal investig ation orig inally cited in the F ields decla

ration,” a fac t that she did not learn until Fe bruar y 1, 2008 (a ft e r t he Court ha d is su e d it s d e c isi on ). Se c on d M ars ha ll D e c l. ¶ 7 . N on e the le ss, Ms. Ma rs ha ll
a s s e rt e d th a tth e s e v e np a g e s o f

r e c o r d s w e r e s t i l l p r o p e r l y w i th h e l d b y IC E p ur s u an tt o F O IA Exe mpt ion

7( A) be c a

us e dis c los ur e of

the re c or ds wo uld

ne g a tiv e ly

a ff e c t oth e r ong oing inv e sti g atio ns : FOIA [Ex emption 7(A)] is no longer applicable with respec t to the investigation noted in the Fie lds Decla

ration [concer

ning Plaintiff], howeve r, I have be en informed that disclosure of information related to [P] laintiff could have a neg ative imp a c t on oth e r o ng oin g inv e sti g a tio ns . A c c or din g ly , F OIA [E xemp tio n 7 (A )] i s still applicable to the seven pa g es of I CE rec ords . . . . Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff argues that this new information “cast[s] doubt on . . . the Court’s primary fi nd ing s” be c a

us e “ the Court

re lie d o n th e no w c omp le te ly dis c re dit e d d e c laratio n o f M ars ha ll Fields a nd on the first dec laration of Gloria Mar shall . . . .” Pl.’s Mot. at 15. From that pre mise,47

Plaintiff asserts that, “[b]ecause there is no ongoinginvestigation of [P laintiff], Defenda nt may not withheld information from [Pl aintiff] by citing F OIA exemption (b)(7)( A).” Id. Plaintiff conclude s that “th[e] Court cannot be sur e of the validity of its determination that the e x empt and non-exempt portions were not se g reg able” and that this new e vidence “ca sts doubt on all of the FOIA exemptions claimed by Def endant.” Id. at 17 (e mphasis in origina l). Th e Court

is unp e rs ua de d b y

Pla int if f’ s a rgume nts . F OIA E xemp tio n 7 (A ) i s p ro pe rl y invoked when the rele ase of information in law enf

orce ment rec ords “c ould rea sonably be expected to interfe re w ith enforc ement proc eeding s.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (A). T here is no require ment that Plaintiff, as the re quester, ne cessa rily be the f ocus of the e nforc ement proce eding s. Defe ndant has e x plained that the f ocus of the r efe renc ed investig ations shifted over time, and althoug h Plaintiff was the subjec t of a c riminal investigation in Februa ry 2007 [when the F ie lds de c laratio n w a s su bmi tte d], h e wa s n o lo ng e r t he su bje c t of the inv e sti g a tio n in Fe bruar y 2008. SeeSecond McG innis Decl. ¶¶ 12-13. In order

for Plaintiff’s Motion for Re c on sid e ratio n to be c ogniza ble , Pl a int if

f w ou ld h ave to s ho w that it wa s ( and re ma ins ) improper f

or De fenda

nt to invoke Ex emption 7(A) to withhold the I CE rec ords at issue. The decla rations submitted by

Ms. Marshall and Ms. McG innis (and all other e vidence in the rec ord considere d by

the Court above) confirm that De fenda nt has proper ly

invoked Exempti on 7(A). See, e .g. , Second Mar shall Dec l. ¶ 7 (“I have be en informe d that disclsoure of inf ormation related to [ P] laintiff could have a neg ative impact on other ong oing inve stigations”); McGinnis Dec l. ¶ 13 (“ [d]isc los ur e of

[the re c or ds ] wo uld

a llo w the su

bje c t( s) , o r p ote nti a l su

bje c t( s) , o f t

ho se inv e sti g atio ns the a

bil ity to a lte r t he ir be havio r i n o rd e r t o c ir c umv e nt t he law a nd avo id de te c tio n” and

“ tip pin g of

f s uc h in div idu a ls a s to the e xiste nc e of the oth e r i nv e sti g a tio ns wo uldThe Court notes that Plaintiff re quested ora l argument on the par ties’ motions pursuant 20 to L ocal Civil Rule 7(f). The Court declines to hold an ora l hear ing, in its discre tion, because the parties ha ve fully briefe d the issues associated with their motions and the Court finds that oral argument would be cumulative. 48 enable those individuals the opportunity to destroy

evidenc e and intimidate witnesses . . .” ). Be cause Plaintiff is unable to raise a ny argument demonstratingthat Def endant’ s relianc e
on Exe mpt ion

7( A) wa s ( and

re ma ins ) i mpr op e r, the re is n o b a sis fo r t he Court to r e c on sid e r i ts J anuar y 29, 2008 decision. Ac cording ly , the Court shall deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsider ation. 20 IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set for

th above, the Court sha ll GRANT Def endant’ s [39] Motion for Summary J udg ment and DEN Y Plaintiff’s [40] consolidated Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment and Motion for Rec onsideration. The Court shall sua sponte file De fenda nt’s two in
c am e ra de c laratio ns un de r s e a l. T his c a se sh a ll b e dis mis se d in its e nti re ty . A n a

pp ro pr iate order acc ompanies this memorandum opinion. Date: Fe bruar

y 9, 2009 /s/ CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge