Filed 6/4/24 In re Luis N. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re LUIS N., a Person 

Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

 B326735

 (Los Angeles County Super. 

 Ct. No. 22LJJP00432A)

 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SAMMY N.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Jennifer W. Baronoff, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Affirmed.
2

Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

* * * * * *

The father in this dependency case challenges the juvenile 

court’s exertion of jurisdiction over his then-five-year-old son 

based on the father’s inappropriate physical discipline. The 

father also challenges the portion of the court’s case plan

requiring him to participate in mental health services. While the

father’s challenge to the jurisdictional finding is both not 

justiciable and is moot, and his challenge to the dispositional 

order is both moot and forfeited, we nevertheless reach the merits 

of his challenges and conclude that they lack merit. Thus, we 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Family

Sammy N. (father) and Rosalie S. (mother) share one child 

together—Luis N., born March 2017. In a 2017 order issued upon 

the termination of jurisdiction in an earlier dependency case, the 

juvenile court had ordered father and mother to share joint legal 

custody of Luis, and granted mother sole physical custody of Luis,

with father entitled to monitored visitation of four hours per 

week.1 

1 Father has three other children; mother has seven other 

children who elected to live with their own father in Las Vegas, 

Nevada because they did not want to “be around” father. 
3

II. Father’s Abusive Conduct Against Mother

Father has physically abused mother for years.

In 2017, father “punctured a tire” of mother’s vehicle while 

mother—then nine months pregnant with Luis—was inside the 

vehicle. This is the incident that gave rise to the 2017 order 

placing Luis in mother’s physical custody and limiting father to 

monitored visits; the juvenile court exerted dependency 

jurisdiction, and terminated its jurisdiction with the 2017 exit 

order requiring that father’s visits be monitored due to his lack of 

“substantial progress” in the court-ordered domestic violence 

treatment program, parenting classes, and individual counseling.

In 2019, father “assaulted” mother by “forcefully push[ing]” 

her to the ground, causing her “face to strike the ground”; Luis 

and father’s children were nearby. This incident also gave rise to 

another dependency proceeding. 

In 2021, a criminal court issued a criminal protective order

protecting mother from father for a period of ten years. Father 

regularly violated this order by showing up at her home, 

threatening her, and demanding to see Luis.

Father also emotionally abused mother. 

He would drive by her home each day, look in the windows 

of her home, and send her text messages indicating he knew 

where she was at any given time. When mother expressed her 

desire to move with Luis to Las Vegas to be near her other 

children, father threatened that if she left, she would “be sorry.” 

Knowing that one of mother’s children committed suicide, father 

would “manipulate” mother by threatening to “hang himself” and 

warning that it would be her “fault.”

Father has an extensive criminal history which spans 

thirty years (from 1991 to 2021) and which includes convictions 
4

for inflicting corporal injury against a spouse and committing 

battery on a spouse. 

III. The Incident Giving Rise to the Current Dependency 

Proceeding

In July 2022, father came to mother’s home to replace a 

window he had jumped through and shattered the year before. 

Father wanted to visit with Luis after repairing the window, but 

mother refused because it was 10 o’clock at night, Luis was not 

feeling well, and Luis needed to go to bed. Angered, father went 

to his car and shattered one of his car’s windows with a brick. 

When mother began recording a video of this incident on her cell 

phone, father “chased” her and “punched” her hand to dislodge 

the phone. Luis witnessed the entire incident. He saw “blood 

splattered everywhere” on the car and screamed at father, “Don’t 

hit my mom!” Father fled when maternal grandmother called the 

police. Mother’s hand swelled and bruised.

IV. Father’s Use of a Belt on Luis

In an interview with a social worker from the Los Angeles

County Department of Children and Family Services (the 

Department) days after the July 2022 incident, Luis reported 

that father disciplines him by hitting him with a belt and 

proceeded to demonstrate how—by pantomiming pulling his arm 

back and swinging it forward, while saying, “‘Like this.’” Luis 

also shared that father’s use of the belt leaves marks, although 

the social worker did not at the time of the interview personally 

observe any marks or bruises indicative of excessive discipline, 

abuse, or neglect. Luis stated that mother disciplines him by 

spanking him on his bottom with an open hand. 
5

V. Father’s Aggravated Interactions with the 

Department and Minimization of Responsibility 

In his initial communications with the Department, father 

became “escalated,” interrupted the social worker, and hung up 

during multiple calls. When the Department was finally able to 

communicate with father in September 2022, he blamed one of 

mother’s children for breaking the window he had come to repair,

claimed he simply “panicked” when he discovered that he had 

locked his keys in the car while it was running, and denied 

punching mother’s hand or hearing Luis exclaim not to hit her. 

Father acknowledged there were previous incidents of domestic 

violence but believed they should not “be held against him” 

because he had “done his time.” 

VI. The Petition

In October 2022, the Department filed a petition asking the 

juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over Luis on the 

grounds that (1) father and mother “have a history of engaging in 

violent altercations” in Luis’s presence, citing the July 2022 

incident as well as the incidents giving rise to the prior 2017 and 

2019 proceedings involving Luis’s half-siblings, which places Luis 

“at risk of serious physical harm, damage, [or] danger” (thereby 

rendering jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j)2); 

and (2) father “physically abused” Luis “by striking [his] body 

with a belt causing marks to the child,” which “was excessive and 

caused the child unreasonable pain and suffering” and places him 

“at risk of serious physical harm, damage, physical abuse and 

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 
6

failure to protect” (thereby rendering jurisdiction appropriate 

under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)). 

The Department re-interviewed the family in November 

2022. Father asserted that the Department’s allegation of 

physical abuse was a “false statement” and that his form of 

discipline was to have Luis stand in a corner for a few minutes 

and to then discuss the reason for the “timeout” with Luis and 

what he “learned.” Father stated that mother “would not have let 

[him] hit [his] son with a belt or anything,” but if he “was ever to 

hit [his] son,” it would be with “an open hand on the butt.” 

Mother told the Department that she was only aware of one 

instance when father spanked Luis. Luis changed his story, 

reporting that father disciplines him by sending him to the corner 

when he does not listen. 

VII. Combined Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing

The juvenile court held a combined jurisdictional and 

dispositional hearing on January 19, 2023. The court exerted 

jurisdiction over Luis on each ground alleged in the Department’s 

petition, but amended the allegation regarding father’s use of a 

belt on Luis to eliminate the phrase “physically abused” and 

replace it with “inappropriately physically disciplined.” The court 

explained that it sustained that allegation based on Luis’s initial 

report to the Department that “he’s disciplined by his father by 

being hit with a belt” and that Luis “motioned his arms” to 

demonstrate that act. 

The court removed Luis from his father’s custody, placed

him with mother, and issued a case plan for each parent. 

Specifically, father was ordered to provide six random drug and 

alcohol tests, complete domestic violence and anger management 

courses, participate in individual counseling, and engage in
7

mental health services—namely, undergo a psychological 

assessment and psychiatric evaluation, as well as take all 

psychotropic medications that may be prescribed to him. His 

counsel objected only to the drug and alcohol testing and anger 

management course. 

VIII. Father’s Appeal

Father filed this timely appeal. 

IX. Post-Appeal Developments3

While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court on July 

21, 2023, terminated jurisdiction over Luis and issued an exit 

order granting mother sole legal and physical custody. Father 

was granted visitation with Luis for nine hours every other week, 

but the court ordered that the visitation be monitored because 

father had not completed his domestic violence course or 

individual counseling and had not undergone the mental health 

services. Father separately appealed that order. 

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, father argues that (1) the juvenile court’s 

jurisdictional finding based on inappropriate physical discipline 

is not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the court had no 

basis to order mental health services as part of his case plan. 

I. All of Father’s Arguments Are Not Justiciable, 

Forfeited and/or Moot

A. Father’s challenge to the single jurisdictional 

finding is not justiciable

Because the juvenile court’s exertion of jurisdiction over 

Luis rests on two bases based on father’s conduct (namely, 

3 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of the 

orders documenting these post-appeal developments. (Evid. 

Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) 
8

father’s domestic violence against mother and his inappropriate 

discipline of Luis), and because father attacks only one of those 

two bases, nothing we decide here will affect the juvenile court’s 

dependency jurisdiction over Luis because the unassailed basis 

independently supports that jurisdiction. This renders father’s 

challenge academic, and hence nonjusticiable. (In re I.J. (2013) 

56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.); accord, In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 

886, 896 [“‘[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional 

finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate’”]; 

In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 329 [appeal is not 

justiciable where “no effective relief could be granted . . . , as 

jurisdiction would be established regardless of the appellate 

court’s conclusions with respect to any such [challenged] 

jurisdictional grounds”].)

Father urges us to overlook the nonjusticiability of his 

challenge because the single jurisdictional finding he challenges 

“‘could be prejudicial to [him] or could potentially impact the 

current or future dependency proceedings,’” or “‘“could have other 

consequences for [father], beyond jurisdiction.”’” (In re D.P. 

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283, 285 (D.P.).) Specifically, father 

argues that the finding of inappropriate physical discipline had a 

prejudicial impact because, in his view, it is “reasonably 

probable” that this finding “was the predominant factor leading 

to the” juvenile court’s dispositional order limiting father to 

monitored visits. We disagree. At the time this third dependency 

case began, an exit order already existed limiting him to 

monitored visitation based on his domestic violence toward 

mother and his refusal to address it; that was why the court 

ordered monitored visitation as part of the dispositional order in 

this case (which is the third to involve domestic violence). What 
9

is more, father’s claim that he was prejudiced by being limited to 

monitored visits in the dispositional order rings hollow given that 

he does not even challenge that aspect of the dispositional order 

on appeal. 

B. Father’s challenge to the dispositional order is 

forfeited

Because father never objected to the juvenile court’s 

imposition of mental health services when it announced father’s 

case plan (while objecting to other aspects of the plan), father has 

forfeited his challenge to that aspect of the plan. (In re Daniel B.

(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672 [an appellant forfeits a challenge 

to a ruling “‘if an objection could have been but was not made in 

the trial court’”]; see also In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 

883, 886 [parent forfeited challenge to adequacy of adoption 

assessment by failing to object below].) Father urges that 

substantial evidence challenges cannot be forfeited, but this is 

irrelevant because father is challenging the reasonableness of 

these services against the backdrop of the case, not the 

substantiality of evidence. 

C. Both of father’s challenges in this appeal are 

moot due to the subsequent termination of jurisdiction 

Because father’s challenge to one of the two jurisdictional 

findings is aimed at terminating jurisdiction based on that 

finding, and because a parent is no longer required to complete a 

case plan after jurisdiction terminates, the juvenile court’s 

subsequent termination of jurisdiction in this case means that 

this court can no longer grant father any effective relief. This 

renders father’s appeal moot. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276 

[“A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a] 
10

court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to 

grant him any effect[ive] relief”’”].) 

Father urges us to overlook this mootness because (1) the

court’s sustaining of the allegation that Luis experienced

“unreasonable pain and suffering” from father’s inappropriate 

physical discipline “reasonably could impact future family court 

custody determinations,” and (2) the court terminated 

jurisdiction over Luis in part because father had not completed 

the mental health services portion of his case plan. Again, we 

disagree. The allegation regarding “unreasonable pain and 

suffering” is unlikely to have any effect on future family court 

custody determinations because it is the proverbial drop in the 

bucket compared to the deluge of findings and criminal 

convictions regarding father’s repeated incidents of domestic and 

other violence. And father’s assertion that the juvenile court’s 

termination of jurisdiction in this case was based upon his failure 

to complete mental health services is entirely speculative—and, 

again, somewhat hollow given that father himself has been 

asking for the termination of jurisdiction for wholly different 

reasons from the very beginning of this case. 

* * *

Notwithstanding these significant procedural defects, we 

will reach the merits of father’s challenges. 

II. Challenge to Inappropriate Physical Discipline 

Jurisdictional Finding

Dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) of section 

300 requires proof, as relevant here, that “[t]he child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm . . . , as a result of the failure or inability of

the child’s parent . . . to adequately protect [him].” (§ 300, subd. 
11

(b)(1).) Where, as here, the parent’s alleged failure to supervise 

arises from his resort to inappropriate physical discipline, the 

Department must prove that (1) the parent engaged in 

inappropriate physical discipline that (2) gives rise to a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm. 

(Ibid.; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820, overruled on 

other grounds in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622.) Because 

parents in California have “‘“a right to reasonably discipline 

[their] child and may administer reasonable punishment”’” (In re 

D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 640-641 (D.M.)), the juvenile 

court must assess whether the discipline at issue has crossed the 

line separating reasonable and appropriate parental discipline 

(which will not support dependency jurisdiction) from 

inappropriate “parental discipline” (which will). (Id. at p. 641.) 

Whether that line has been crossed in a particular case “turns on 

three considerations: (1) whether the parent’s conduct is 

genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the punishment is 

‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was ‘warranted by 

the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of punishment 

was reasonable or excessive.’” (Ibid.) 

We review a challenge to a jurisdictional finding for 

substantial evidence. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) That is, 

we “‘“determine if there are sufficient facts to support the 

findings”’” of the juvenile court by “‘“review[ing] the record in the 

light most favorable to the court’s determinations”’” and 

“‘“draw[ing] all reasonable inferences from the evidence to 

support”’” the court’s findings. (Ibid.) We may not reweigh the 

evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve 

evidentiary conflicts. (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 

111, 135-136.)
12

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that father’s use of a belt to discipline five-year-old Luis, leaving 

marks on his body, was inappropriate physical discipline that 

subjected Luis to serious physical harm or, at a minimum, a

substantial risk of such harm. (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 

Cal.App.4th 428, 437-438 [parent’s use of a belt on a three year

old’s body that left marks on one occasion; jurisdiction 

appropriate]; see also In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 

[“[s]mall children are not to be hit with hard objects, especially to 

the point of leaving black and blue bruises”].) 

Father responds with four arguments.

First, father argues that Luis did not provide enough 

details to enable the juvenile court to conclude that the use of a 

belt was inappropriate physical discipline. Specifically, father 

complains that the Department did not present evidence on how 

frequently father used a belt on Luis, the circumstances under 

which father used the belt, what types of marks resulted from the 

belt, where they were on his body, and whether they caused him 

pain. While helpful, such detail is not mandatory. Luis’s report 

relayed that father disciplined him with a belt hard enough to 

cause marks when Luis was five years old; the juvenile court 

could reasonably infer from this report that this type of physical

discipline—on a five year old—was not warranted, and that the

use of the belt caused Luis pain. This means that father did 

more than inflict a “spanking to the buttocks” (§ 300, subd. (a)), 

and more than the types of discipline found insufficient to 

warrant dependency jurisdiction in other cases (e.g., In re Joel H. 

(1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1191, 1201 [parent spanked child on 

butt with open hand]; In re Isabella F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 
13

128, 131-133, 138-139 [parent scratched daughter’s face and 

earlobe with fingernails during a one-time altercation].) 

Second, father argues that there is insufficient evidence 

that Luis suffered “serious physical harm.” That is not required. 

The statute requires only a showing of substantial risk of such 

harm, and for good reason: Courts should not be required to wait 

for a child to suffer serious physical harm when the risk of that 

harm is substantial. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773 [“‘The court 

need not wait until a child is . . . injured to assume jurisdiction’”]; 

In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843 [same].) 

Third, father argues that Luis’s initial report of abuse, by 

itself, is insufficient to establish that the abuse happened in light 

of Luis’s later recantation and his parents’ denials of abuse. 

Father is wrong. (DeNike v. Mathew Enterprise, Inc. (2022) 76 

Cal.App.5th 371, 381-382 [“The testimony of a single witness may 

constitute substantial evidence as long as it is not physically 

impossible or inherently improbable”]; In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 

Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [“Evidence from a single witness, even a 

party, can be sufficient to support the trial court’s findings”]; 

Evid. Code, § 411.) For this reason, we decline father’s invitation 

to reweigh the evidence. And even if we accepted it, we see no 

reason to depart from the juvenile court’s implicit rejection of 

father’s account that he—as a man who has a documented history 

of resorting to punching and slapping people and using objects to 

damage property—nevertheless takes the uncharacteristically 

calm approach of discussing Luis’s mistakes with him. (In re T.V. 

(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a 

good predictor of future behavior”]; In re E.B. (2010) 184 

Cal.App.4th 568, 576 [“‘[P]ast violent behavior in a relationship is 

“the best predictor of future violence”’”], overruled on other 
14

grounds in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 

7.) 

Fourth and lastly, father argues that the Department—by 

alleging a violation of subdivision (b) of section 300 rather than 

subdivision (a)—somehow sidestepped the express limitation in 

subdivision (a) that “‘serious physical harm’ does not include 

reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks.’” (§ 

300, subd. (a).) Father is wrong for the simple reason that we 

have already held that this limitation applies to all of section 

300’s subdivisions—not only subdivision (a). (D.M., supra, 242 

Cal.App.4th at p. 640.) Further, the analysis set forth above 

accounts for this limitation and still concludes that substantial 

evidence supports the jurisdictional finding.

III. Challenge to the Mental Health Services Portion of 

the Case Plan

A juvenile court “‘has broad discretion to determine what 

would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a 

dispositional order accordingly.’” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 297, 311 (Briana V.).) In that vein, the court may 

make “all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, 

conduct, maintenance, and support of the child.” (§ 362, subd. 

(a).) Thus, a court’s decision to require a parent to participate in 

court-ordered services will not be reversed unless that decision is

arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (Briana V., at p. 311; In 

re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 851.) 

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 

father to complete a psychological assessment and psychiatric 

evaluation and to take all prescribed medications. Father has a 

history of abusing mother in the presence of Luis and the other 

children, which resulted in criminal convictions, subjected him to 
15

a protective order and custody order, and triggered dependency 

proceedings that provided him access to services to treat his 

underlying issues. The record also indicates that father engaged 

in domineering and manipulative behavior aimed at controlling 

mother. Despite these interventions, father’s unhealthy conduct 

persisted and Luis also became a victim of father’s uncontrolled 

aggression. The risk of harm persists given that father flatly 

denies this conduct. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 

[“‘[d]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether 

persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without 

court supervision’”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 

197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].) 

Based on these circumstances, the court acted well within its 

discretion when it ordered father to participate in mental health 

services to address the root of his behavior. 

Father responds with three arguments.

First, he argues that there was no evidence he suffered any 

conditions requiring mental health services, which is

demonstrated by the fact that the Department did not seek 

dependency jurisdiction on the basis of any mental illness. (See § 

300, subd. (b)(1).) The law is well settled, however, that a 

parent’s case plan need not be tethered to a specific jurisdictional 

allegation. (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [“The 

problem that the juvenile court seeks to address need not be 

described in the sustained section 300 petition”]; In re K.T. (2020) 

49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25 [juvenile court’s “broad discretion” permits 

it to “formulate disposition orders to address parental deficiencies 

when necessary to protect and promote the child’s welfare, even 

when that parental conduct did not give rise to the dependency 

proceedings”].) Rather, in determining what type of services 
16

would best serve the child’s interests, the juvenile court “may 

consider the evidence as a whole.” (Briana V., at p. 311.) The 

evidence as a whole in this case supports the trial court’s 

dispositional order.

Second, father argues that the juvenile court failed to set 

forth an explanation supporting its order requiring him to 

participate in mental health services. This argument lacks merit 

because specific findings are not required absent a statute so 

requiring (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 

1242, 1273; cf. Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations 

Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112, 123 [when statute “mandates a 

specific finding,” “failure to make such a finding renders” the 

decision “fatally defective”]; In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 

1069, 1078 [same]), and section 362 here does not so require

(accord, In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 76-77 

[upholding juvenile court’s bypass of reunification services 

though it did not make specific findings that reunification would 

be detrimental to minor]). 

Third and lastly, father argues for the first time in his 

reply brief that upholding the juvenile court’s order in this case is 

tantamount to authorizing mental health treatment in every

dependency case. Because the mental health services ordered by 

the court have a grounding in father’s domineering,

manipulative, and violent behavior aimed at controlling mother, 

we are unpersuaded that our holding will justify services in all 

cases, including cases without such conduct.
17

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST