# C_2023283EN.01001801.xml

| 11.8.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 283/18 |
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11.8.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 283/18

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P9_TA(2023)0053

An EU strategy to boost industrial competitiveness, trade and quality jobs

European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2023 on an EU strategy to boost industrial competitiveness, trade and quality jobs (2023/2513(RSP))

(2023/C 283/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘An SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe’ (COM(2020)0103), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘An SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe’ (COM(2020)0103),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘A New Industrial Strategy for Europe’ (COM(2020)0102), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘A New Industrial Strategy for Europe’ (COM(2020)0102),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe’ (COM(2020)0301), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe’ (COM(2020)0301),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 September 2020 entitled ‘A Capital Markets Union for people and businesses — new action plan’ (COM(2020)0590), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 24 September 2020 entitled ‘A Capital Markets Union for people and businesses — new action plan’ (COM(2020)0590),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe’s recovery’ (COM(2021)0350), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe’s recovery’ (COM(2021)0350),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Strategic dependencies and capacities’ (SWD(2021)0352), |
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having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Strategic dependencies and capacities’ (SWD(2021)0352),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Annual Single Market Report 2021’ (SWD(2021)0351), |
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having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Annual Single Market Report 2021’ (SWD(2021)0351),

| — | having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Towards competitive and clean European steel’ (SWD(2021)0353), |
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having regard to the Commission staff working document of 5 May 2021 entitled ‘Towards competitive and clean European steel’ (SWD(2021)0353),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 entitled ‘Implementation of the Updated New Industrial Strategy for Europe: aligning spending to policy’ (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 entitled ‘Implementation of the Updated New Industrial Strategy for Europe: aligning spending to policy’ (1),

| — | having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 (2), |
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having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 (2),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 1 February 2023 entitled ‘A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age’ (COM(2023)0062), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 1 February 2023 entitled ‘A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age’ (COM(2023)0062),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 entitled ‘The social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine — reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act’ (3), |
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having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 entitled ‘The social and economic consequences for the EU of the Russian war in Ukraine — reinforcing the EU’s capacity to act’ (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe (4), |
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having regard to its resolution of 5 October 2022 on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2020 on a new industrial strategy for Europe (5), |
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having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2020 on a new industrial strategy for Europe (5),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 November 2018 on a future EU industrial policy strategy, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 November 2018 on a future EU industrial policy strategy,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2019 on an EU industrial policy strategy: a vision for 2030, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2019 on an EU industrial policy strategy: a vision for 2030,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 November 2020 on a recovery advancing the transition towards a more dynamic, resilient and competitive European industry, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 November 2020 on a recovery advancing the transition towards a more dynamic, resilient and competitive European industry,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2020 on making the recovery circular and green, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2020 on making the recovery circular and green,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the EU’s industrial strategy should enable European industry to foster the green and digital transitions and at the same time defend its open strategic autonomy, preserve its competitiveness on the global market, maintain a high level of employment and quality jobs in Europe and strengthen its ability to innovate and produce in Europe; |
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A.

whereas the EU’s industrial strategy should enable European industry to foster the green and digital transitions and at the same time defend its open strategic autonomy, preserve its competitiveness on the global market, maintain a high level of employment and quality jobs in Europe and strengthen its ability to innovate and produce in Europe;

| B. | whereas in a changing geopolitical world, it is vital to strengthen European industrial competitiveness, to reduce European dependence on third countries for critical and strategic materials, products and technologies, as well as to provide for affordable, clean and secure energy for its industries; |
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B.

whereas in a changing geopolitical world, it is vital to strengthen European industrial competitiveness, to reduce European dependence on third countries for critical and strategic materials, products and technologies, as well as to provide for affordable, clean and secure energy for its industries;

| C. | whereas the global race to shape the future of clean energy technology manufacturing is accelerating, stoked by massive public interventions, such as the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), by global powers; |
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C.

whereas the global race to shape the future of clean energy technology manufacturing is accelerating, stoked by massive public interventions, such as the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), by global powers;

| D. | whereas the reinforcement of EU open strategic autonomy requires a combination of different solutions, including reducing energy and material use, boosting EU manufacturing and production capacities, investments in strategic sectors and research and development, and diversifying suppliers through sectoral partnerships and alliances, and trade and technology councils with partner countries; |
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D.

whereas the reinforcement of EU open strategic autonomy requires a combination of different solutions, including reducing energy and material use, boosting EU manufacturing and production capacities, investments in strategic sectors and research and development, and diversifying suppliers through sectoral partnerships and alliances, and trade and technology councils with partner countries;

| E. | whereas the Union’s industrial strategy should also ensure the correct functioning of the single market, avoid market distortions and create a level playing field inside and outside the EU; whereas it also needs strong single market surveillance and enforcement in order to give a competitive edge to EU companies and lead the global transition to a climate-neutral, resource-efficient and circular economy; |
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E.

whereas the Union’s industrial strategy should also ensure the correct functioning of the single market, avoid market distortions and create a level playing field inside and outside the EU; whereas it also needs strong single market surveillance and enforcement in order to give a competitive edge to EU companies and lead the global transition to a climate-neutral, resource-efficient and circular economy;

| F. | whereas not all Member States have the same fiscal space for State aid; whereas an uncoordinated response by the European Union and the Member States, which have varying fiscal space for State aid, could create a risk of fragmentation of the single market; whereas a very large majority of State aid approved under the Temporary Crisis Framework was notified by only two Member States; |
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F.

whereas not all Member States have the same fiscal space for State aid; whereas an uncoordinated response by the European Union and the Member States, which have varying fiscal space for State aid, could create a risk of fragmentation of the single market; whereas a very large majority of State aid approved under the Temporary Crisis Framework was notified by only two Member States;

| G. | whereas the Commission’s plan acknowledges that in order to respond to the current challenges, the EU should give faster access to sufficient funding, using private funding, State aid, EU funds and a new European Sovereignty Fund which could support the European industrial strategy; |
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G.

whereas the Commission’s plan acknowledges that in order to respond to the current challenges, the EU should give faster access to sufficient funding, using private funding, State aid, EU funds and a new European Sovereignty Fund which could support the European industrial strategy;

| H. | whereas Parliament should always play the role of budgetary authority in any budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency for the remainder of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF); |
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H.

whereas Parliament should always play the role of budgetary authority in any budgetary environment in order to ensure democratic accountability and transparency for the remainder of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF);

| I. | whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has shown us that peace in Europe cannot be taken for granted; whereas its consequences, including the rises in energy prices as well as inflation, have created an unprecedented economic turmoil and a cost-of-living crisis in Europe, the evolution of which is highly uncertain; |
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I.

whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has shown us that peace in Europe cannot be taken for granted; whereas its consequences, including the rises in energy prices as well as inflation, have created an unprecedented economic turmoil and a cost-of-living crisis in Europe, the evolution of which is highly uncertain;

| J. | whereas energy-intensive industry, which employs 8 million workers in Europe, is facing high energy prices, with gas prices being around six times higher than the average over the previous 10 years, and more than four times higher than in the United States; |
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J.

whereas energy-intensive industry, which employs 8 million workers in Europe, is facing high energy prices, with gas prices being around six times higher than the average over the previous 10 years, and more than four times higher than in the United States;

| K. | whereas education, vocational training and higher education have a global and relevant impact on the quality of jobs and on the future of European industry in the context of open strategic autonomy and the green and digital transitions; whereas the university community plays a key role in terms of innovation and research in industry; |
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K.

whereas education, vocational training and higher education have a global and relevant impact on the quality of jobs and on the future of European industry in the context of open strategic autonomy and the green and digital transitions; whereas the university community plays a key role in terms of innovation and research in industry;

| L. | whereas the Union has the objective to achieve at least 80 % coverage of collective bargaining in the Member States, in line with the Directive on Adequate Minimum Wages (6); |
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L.

whereas the Union has the objective to achieve at least 80 % coverage of collective bargaining in the Member States, in line with the Directive on Adequate Minimum Wages (6);

| M. | whereas industry requires stable and predictable rules to ensure a level playing field and to combat unfair practices from third countries and from within the Union; whereas the EU should continue to promote an open economy based on fair competition within Europe and in its relations with its international partners; |
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M.

whereas industry requires stable and predictable rules to ensure a level playing field and to combat unfair practices from third countries and from within the Union; whereas the EU should continue to promote an open economy based on fair competition within Europe and in its relations with its international partners;

| N. | whereas this includes consolidating the EU’s partnerships with Latin America, and ratifying the agreements with Chile, New Zealand and Mexico; whereas it also includes ratifying the outstanding bilateral agreement with Mercosur, provided that pre-ratification commitments on climate change, deforestation and other concerns are satisfactory; whereas it also means monitoring further negotiations and the possible conclusion of the agreement with Australia and pushing for negotiations to begin on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan as well as to further advance our partnership of equals with Africa following the European Union — African Union summit of 2022; whereas EU trade policy should aim to ensure that our free trade agreements come with strong sustainable development chapters, which include sanctions enforceable as a last resort, strong labour standards in line with International Labour Organization conventions, and environmental and climate change commitments; |
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N.

whereas this includes consolidating the EU’s partnerships with Latin America, and ratifying the agreements with Chile, New Zealand and Mexico; whereas it also includes ratifying the outstanding bilateral agreement with Mercosur, provided that pre-ratification commitments on climate change, deforestation and other concerns are satisfactory; whereas it also means monitoring further negotiations and the possible conclusion of the agreement with Australia and pushing for negotiations to begin on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan as well as to further advance our partnership of equals with Africa following the European Union — African Union summit of 2022; whereas EU trade policy should aim to ensure that our free trade agreements come with strong sustainable development chapters, which include sanctions enforceable as a last resort, strong labour standards in line with International Labour Organization conventions, and environmental and climate change commitments;

| O. | whereas the EU is a world leader in research and innovation, including industrial innovation, owing to its world-leading institutions, engineering companies and highly skilled labour force; |
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O.

whereas the EU is a world leader in research and innovation, including industrial innovation, owing to its world-leading institutions, engineering companies and highly skilled labour force;

| 1. | Welcomes the Commission communication of 1 February 2023 entitled ‘A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age’; believes that the European industrial strategy should be designed both for securing European leadership in clean energy technologies and for improving the existing industrial base and supporting its transformation in the future to provide high-quality jobs and economic growth for all Europeans in order to achieve the objectives of the Green Deal; |
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1.

| 2. | Stresses the importance of enhancing the EU’s manufacturing capabilities in key strategic technologies, such as solar and wind energy, heat pumps, electricity grids, batteries, long-duration energy storage, electrolyser manufacturing for renewable hydrogen and pre-fabricated sustainable building materials; |
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2.

| 3. | Underlines the importance of the Commission fully developing the Transition Pathways, setting out the actions and support measures needed to ensure all sectors maintain their competitiveness, while decarbonising in order to contribute to the Union’s climate and Green Deal objectives; |
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3.

| 4. | Asks the Commission and the Council to take into account the following considerations in order to ensure that the plan achieves the objectives of open strategic autonomy and the green and digital transitions, is truly European, ensures Europe’s competitiveness, strives to develop industrial capacity throughout the Union and protects the single market’s integrity, while ensuring that jobs remain in Europe and Europeans are in possession of adequate skills to cope with the current challenges; |
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4.

A predictable and simplified regulatory environment

| 5. | Stresses that the Transition Pathways must enhance long-term investor certainty and regulatory predictability, and serve as guidelines for future policy actions, which, in turn, must orient future industrial and investment decisions; |
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5.

| 6. | Calls on the Commission to elaborate an effective strategy to redeploy, relocate and re-shore industries in Europe, diversifying supply chains and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, taking into account the positive spill-over effects across Member States; |
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6.

| 7. | Notes that European standards will be used to promote the roll-out of strategic technologies; believes that European standards play a very important role in the functioning of the single market and can enhance the competitiveness of European industry, reduce costs and improve safety, as well as increase productive and innovative efficiency; emphasises the importance of a strong European presence in the international standardisation bodies; |
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7.

| 8. | Calls on the Commission to tailor its industrial strategy for competitiveness to the scaling-up and commercialisation of strategic technologies in the Union to bridge the gap between innovation and market deployment, by providing risk financing for early-stage technology and demonstration projects, and by developing early value chains to provide support to commercial-scale, zero-emission technologies and other environmentally sustainable products above others; |
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8.

| 9. | Highlights the need to ensure fast permitting procedures and predictability to set up new projects aiming to use clean and renewable energy sources and improving the sustainability of existing ones as quickly as possible, while reducing the administrative burden to a minimum and in full compliance with the regulatory framework; in this context, encourages the Commission and the Member States to process applications for supporting measures related to the planning, construction and operation of such projects as rapidly as possible; |
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9.

| 10. | Takes note of the Commission’s proposal for a Critical Raw Materials Act; recalls the importance of secure access to critical raw materials as a prerequisite for the ecological and digital transformation, for achieving our climate targets, for competitive value chains in Europe and for strengthening strategic independence; further recalls the need for building up recycling and stable secondary markets as well as for research for substitution of critical raw materials; insists on fully exploiting the potential of domestic resources respecting adequate standards; strongly believes that strategic European projects need faster and more transparent permitting, access to new funding and a coherent policy framework; |
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10.

| 11. | Underlines the importance of a just transition aimed at maintaining quality jobs and employment in Europe through increased industrial competitiveness; calls for adequate measures to support the re-industrialisation and prevent the de-industrialisation of European regions through strategic interregional investment projects and through development plans for vulnerable regions, particularly regions in transition, in rural and remote areas; |
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11.

| 12. | Insists that the Commission should carry out a sovereignty test in its impact assessment in order to assess the potential impact of European legislation and funds on the creation of new undesirable dependencies, in particular dependencies on non-market economies and unreliable partners; asks the Commission also to screen key existing legislation within the regulatory fitness and performance programme in that regard; |
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12.

Energy and dependencies

| 13. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure energy supplies for next winter and to come up with additional and ambitious plans, to take all necessary measures to accelerate production capacities for affordable, secure and clean energy to be made available to our industries and to increase energy savings and energy efficiency measures; welcomes, in this context, the Commission’s intention to reform the electricity market design; |
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13.

| 14. | Underlines the importance of kick-starting the hydrogen market, while working towards clean hydrogen, by assessing the role of its various types, making its production faster and less bureaucratic, and developing a plan to create the needed infrastructure as a matter of urgency; |
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14.

| 15. | Insists on the importance of predictability, certainty and long-term signals to investors and other economic agents for facilitating and boosting the vital changes across the economy; |
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15.

| 16. | Stresses the importance of enhancing the EU’s open strategic autonomy by boosting its capabilities in the key strategic technologies identified in the Commission communication entitled ‘A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age’, as well as other technologies which are fundamental for European industrial competitiveness, such as the Key Enabling Technologies; welcomes the launch of the European Solar Photovoltaic Industry Alliance and of the European Clean Tech Platform at the end of 2022; |
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16.

Regulatory burden

| 17. | Reiterates the need to reduce unnecessary administrative burdens for companies, especially SMEs and start-ups, while maintaining the highest standards for consumers, workers and health and environmental protection; continues to support the ‘one in, one out’ principle to reach this goal; |
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17.

| 18. | Supports the introduction by the Commission of a competitiveness test as part of its preparation of new legislation, bearing in mind that any assessment should also take into account the protection of and safeguards for workers and social rights; considers that, to help achieve the Union’s policy objectives, the measures proposed in the context of this plan should, where relevant, take advantage of and inspire innovation-friendly regulation, in line with the innovation principle, to support a faster and more intensive transformation of the Union’s substantial knowledge assets into innovation; |
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18.

Faster access to sufficient funding and the European Sovereignty Fund

| 19. | Highlights that new political initiatives, objectives and tasks funded through the EU budget, including both EU-wide and cross-border projects, must be financed with additional fresh money; highlights the MFF mid-term revision as a timely and unique opportunity to incorporate any new funds into the EU budget; |
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19.

| 20. | Calls on the Commission to carry out a clear assessment of the costs and investment gaps, also taking into account the IRA and its impact on the Union as a whole and in individual Member States; |
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20.

| 21. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to make EU funding conditional on relevant requirements linked to public policy objectives, in particular social, environmental and financial requirements, and respect EU labour rights, standards and improved working conditions, which should be fulfilled by beneficiaries for as long as they receive public support, while ensuring fair and open competition, a level playing field between our companies, and respect for the fundamental principles on which our single market is based; |
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21.

| 22. | Underlines that the recent geopolitical challenges the Union has been facing demonstrate that the EU must take all necessary measures to ensure its open strategic autonomy, including in defence; |
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22.

| 23. | Highlights the need to reinforce the InvestEU programme in the upcoming MFF mid-term revision, in line with the Green Deal objectives; recalls the importance of reviewing the InvestEU Regulation (7) in order to broaden the scope of capital support and create an additional window for investments in strategic sectors in order to help enterprises besides SMEs, as well as to support those which have suffered from the impacts of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the energy crisis, inflation and those which could be impacted further by the IRA; insists on the importance of reducing bureaucracy and streamlining application processes to increase absorption capacity; |
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23.

| 24. | Considers it essential for the proposal on the new European Sovereignty Fund to be based on this assessment so that it responds to real needs, maps existing funds, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the current MFF, and utilises, to the greatest extent possible, existing funds that have not been utilised yet and to provide fresh money; insists that the fund must not be financed at the expense of cohesion funds or funds which have already been committed; |
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24.

| 25. | Highlights that new own resources are a key enabler for the Union to implement its policy priorities; stresses that the introduction of such new own resources would assure sustainable financing of the EU budget on a long-term basis in order to avoid new EU priorities being financed to the detriment of existing EU programmes and policies; believes that introducing new own resources as agreed in the legally binding Inter Institutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 will achieve lasting benefits; in this respect, urges the Commission and the Member States involved in the negotiations on the enhanced cooperation to do their utmost to reach an agreement on the financial transaction tax before the end of June 2023; asks, in addition, the Commission to be even more ambitious and come forward with proposals for new genuine own resources; |
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25.

| 26. | Considers that the European Sovereignty Fund should strengthen our open strategic autonomy in a comprehensive way and the green and digital transitions in a comprehensive way, that it should be integrated into the MFF as part of the in-depth revision of the current MFF, and should also mobilise private investments; |
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26.

| 27. | Considers, furthermore, that the fund should finance cross-border energy infrastructure, avoiding lock-in effects on fossil fuels, as well as funding renewable energy production and energy efficiency, reinforcing the path towards the European Green Deal, as well as cybersecurity, industrial competitiveness, the circular economy, food security and sustainable development; |
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27.

| 28. | Considers that the fund should also increase European investments across the Union in key strategic sectors, including, among others, health, raw materials and space; considers that these investments are key to increase our open strategic autonomy and reduce our dependencies in strategic sectors; |
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28.

| 29. | Considers that one of the fund’s objectives is also to avoid the fragmentation caused by national schemes and ensure a truly united European response to the current crisis; highlights the multiple advantages of operating through the EU budget rather than through uncoordinated national State aid provision; stands firmly against any attempt to make State aid rules flexible while not providing a European solution to all Member States that do not have large fiscal capacities to rely on massive State aid; |
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29.

| 30. | Insists that any new fund should be established according to the ordinary legislative procedure and be incorporated into the MFF, thereby ensuring full oversight by Parliament; considers that the MFF ceilings should be adjusted to accommodate all new funds, political initiatives, objectives or tasks funded through the EU budget; notes, in this context, that the EU budget is currently suffering from inflationary pressure; |
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30.

| 31. | Calls on the Commission and the Council to reinforce the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) to support short-time work schemes, workers’ income and workers that would be temporarily laid-off because of the increase in energy prices; |
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31.

| 32. | Stresses that the Member States should unleash the full potential of the existing green public procurement instruments to empower all levels of governance to make smart and strategic procurement choices and strengthen the EU’s industrial base; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to issue strategic guidance on public procurement as soon as possible; urges the Commission to develop policy solutions to encourage more sustainable procurement; considers, in this context, that the use of social and environmental award criteria by contracting authorities should be extended, as it would help to stimulate the sustainable transition in a harmonised and coordinated manner across the Member States; calls on the Commission to strongly enforce the social clause of the existing EU Public Procurement Directive (8); recalls that according to current EU law, it should also be possible to include clauses ensuring compliance with collective agreements without breaching Union law on public contracts; |
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32.

| 33. | Is convinced that, to date, the potential for integration of innovative, social and environmental considerations of the EU Public Procurement Directive on public procurement have only partially been exploited in the EU; calls on the Member States and the Commission to make the best use of the existing rules for fostering the production and use of products made in the EU; calls for using this Directive, including innovation partnerships, to regain sovereignty over essential sectors, help foster a socially and environmentally sustainable economy, strengthen local businesses, and particularly SMEs; |
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33.

| 34. | Encourages the Commission and the Member States to pay particular attention to the energy-intensive sectors in the REPowerEU chapters currently being developed; believes the financial support for the transition of this sector should be strengthened, if needed, in order to ensure their competitiveness and sustainability in the context of high energy prices; |
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34.

State aid

| 35. | Is deeply convinced that the strong regulation of State aid in the single market is an essential part of Europe’s economic well-being, as it facilitates robust competition on a level playing field free of distortions; |
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35.

| 36. | Stresses that EU State aid rules should be simplified and should allow for flexibilities in order to achieve Europe’s strategic objectives; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s preparatory work on a Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework, including for companies producing strategic items, such as transformative technologies, clean innovative technologies, and for energy purposes; stresses that any flexibility should be targeted, temporary, proportionate and consistent with EU policy objectives; |
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36.

| 37. | Supports the Commission in proposing a framework on tax incentives that do not distort the single market; |
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37.

| 38. | Stresses, however, that uncoordinated State aid rules across Europe would hamper economic recovery and jeopardise the existence of the single market; believes that State aid controls are intended to enhance consumer welfare and preserve the level playing field; |
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38.

| 39. | Believes that the Commission must take into account the potential effect of any reform of State aid rules on the single market; |
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39.

| 40. | Is worried about the processing time required for setting up Important Projects of common European interest, as well as about the long waiting time for Commission decisions on State aid notifications; calls on the Commission to reform and streamline the notification system so that any notification is completed within six months at the latest; |
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40.

| 41. | Acknowledges the contribution of the EC Merger Regulation (9) to the proper functioning of the internal market and calls on the Commission to continue promoting and enforcing its core principles; at the same time, urges the Commission to accelerate efforts to deliver on its commitment to reviewing its notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of EU competition law, in order to adapt it to reflect increased global competition in selected key strategic sectors; |
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41.

Enhanced quality jobs and skills

| 42. | Stresses that the European industrial strategy should contribute to strengthening the European model of a social market economy; stresses the importance of promoting gender equality and equal opportunities in this context; |
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42.

| 43. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to make sure that the EU industrial plan can help to achieve the just transition and its objectives, including the creation of quality jobs with fair working conditions and good pay, the promotion of collective bargaining and respect for collective agreements; |
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43.

| 44. | Highlights the importance of access to training and the reskilling of workers in industries and sectors that need to undergo fundamental changes with a view to a green and digital transition; stresses that qualifications and certified competences provide added value to workers, improving their position on the labour market, and can be transferred in labour market transitions; calls for public policy on skills to be oriented towards the certification and validation of qualifications and competences; |
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44.

| 45. | Welcomes the contribution of the plan to delivering a highly skilled workforce for European industry by strengthening the relevance of skills, using local pacts for skills, while supporting the development of one-stop shops and local hubs for skills development, and its ambition to harness talent within the EU, and to enhance cross-border labour mobility, as well as to attract skilled labour from non-EU countries via the European Talent Pool; calls on the Commission to put forward a plan to improve Europe’s attractiveness as a place of employment for engineers and academics; |
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45.

| 46. | Calls for the EU industrial plan to create synergies and connections with mainstream education policies owing to the high impact of this sector; stresses the need to coordinate with the European strategy for universities in order to foster cooperation with the industrial ecosystem, in particular through the implementation of strategic research and innovation actions; stresses the importance of vocational training in order to have qualified staff with green and digital skills in industries; |
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46.

| 47. | Emphasises the need for the plan to contribute to reaching the objectives and targets for 2030, as set out in the Digital Decade policy programme, including through creating access to employment for young people who are not in education, employment or training (NEETs) and people with lower skill levels; |
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47.

| 48. | Draws attention to the fact that while general training uptake in the EU has been increasing steadily, it is still considerably below the target for 60 % of the adult population participating in training every year by 2030, also owing to a lack of interest and a perceived lack of need for it; stresses that skills-based compensation systems are a useful tool to increase training uptake; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Open and fair trade for resilient supply chains

| 49. | Recalls that one in five jobs in the Union depends on exports; calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to promote new economic partnerships with democratic countries, so the Union and its partners can, among other things, face climate change and the consequences of the Russian aggression together; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Calls on the Commission to assess current dependencies and find alternative sources to diversify Europe’s supply chains for critical technologies and raw materials, and highlights the need to coordinate better as well as joint efforts to create resilient supply chains in order to meet the EU’s industrial needs; takes note of the upcoming proposal for a critical raw materials act; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Welcomes the instruments adopted during this mandate to fight against unfair practices by trading partners, notably on public procurement and foreign subsidies; calls on the Commission to make full use of them; calls, moreover, on the Commission to adopt a stronger stance on tackling unfair global competition, such as that caused by unjustified State aid; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Calls further on the Commission to propose a ‘new generation of partnerships in the world’, which would make full use of the EU’s economic and political leverage with its current trading partners to ensure the Union gets the most for its industry exports and imports, while promoting its values and standards, not least human rights and the European Green Deal; calls on the Commission to use all Europe’s trade policy instruments to promote its prosperity by seeking and creating new trade partnerships and to safeguard the single market from distortions from non-EU countries; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Urges the Commission to ensure that these partnerships support the transition to green industry in the EU and in partner countries; |
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53.

| 54. | Stresses the need for an urgent reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to ensure its effectiveness, preserve the rules-based global trade system, avoid a subsidy race and unfair competition, and make sure we have a functioning dispute settlement body to enforce the rules agreed on multilaterally; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Underlines the importance of implementing the provisions of the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation more quickly in order to create resilience and strengthen strategic supply chains; |
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55.

The US Inflation Reduction Act

| 56. | Expresses concerns about the provisions of the US IRA, which discriminate against EU companies and urges the Commission to work with the US Administration to find a solution that is WTO-compatible within the Inflation Reduction Act Task Force; recognises, however, the act’s objective to promote clean production and innovation in clean technologies, and to accelerate climate efforts; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly assess the potential impact of the IRA on European industry and its competiveness, taking into consideration the current challenges as regards stretched supply chains and the high costs of energy, transport and raw materials; |
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57.

| 58. | Notes that some components of the US IRA and the large amount of funding mobilised might pose challenges for transatlantic trade and investment; |
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58.

| 59. | Calls on the Commission to work with the USA to make the IRA’s implementation as compatible with European interests as possible; calls on the Commission to ensure, in particular, that the EU is covered by the exceptions provided for in the IRA for countries which participate in free trade cooperation and that European products are eligible for tax credits the same way as US products; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Calls on the Commission to work with like-minded countries to influence the implementation of the IRA, especially in strategic sectors for the European economy; underlines that the EU should be ready to file a complaint against the IRA through the dispute settlement system if the assessment shows that the IRA continues to be discriminatory in its implementation; |
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60.

o

o o

| 61. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and candidate countries, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Court of Auditors, the European Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, for distribution to subnational parliaments and councils, the Council of Europe and the United Nations. |
| --- | --- |

61.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0329.

(2)  OJ L 323, 19.12.2022, p. 4.

(3)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0219.

(4)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0347.

(5)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 43.

(6)  Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 33).

(7)  Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30).

(8)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65).

(9)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1).

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