United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 18-1443

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Gayle Zimmerman

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration; Betty Judkins, In her

individual and official capacity

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

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Submitted: December 20, 2018

Filed: December 27, 2018

[Unpublished]

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Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.
Former Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration employee Gayle

Zimmerman appeals after the district court dismissed her Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1

§ 1981 employment discrimination and retaliation claims astime-barred, and declined

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. Upon de novo 2

review, we conclude that Zimmerman’s Title VII and section 1981 claims were

properly dismissed. See Humphrey v. Eureka Gardens Pub. Facility Bd., 891 F.3d

1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review). First, we agree with the district

court that Zimmerman’s claims were untimely because she did not file her complaint

in this action within 90 days after she received her right-to-sue letter, see Richter v.

Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2012) (in Title VII action, if

agency dismisses charge and notifies complainant of right to sue, then complainant

has 90 days to bring civil action in federal court), or within four years after her

employment wasterminated, see Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co., 541 U.S. 369,

371-75, 382-83 (2004)(discussing statutes of limitation applicable to § 1981 claims). 

We further agree with the district court that the Arkansas savings statute did not apply

to Zimmerman’s federal claims. See Beck v. Caterpillar, Inc., 50 F.3d 405, 406-07

(7th Cir. 1995) (when timeliness of purely federal claim filed in federal court is

measured by federal statute of limitations, state savings statute does not apply). In

addition, we ascertain no basis for equitable tolling of the statutes of limitation. See

Garfield v. J.C. Nichols Real Estate, 57 F.3d 662, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1995) (voluntary

dismissal without prejudice does not tollstatute of limitations). Finally, we conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Zimmerman’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district

The Honorable James M. Moody Jr., United States District Judge for the

1

Eastern District of Arkansas.

Zimmerman also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Age 2

Discrimination in Employment Act, but she does not challenge the dismissal of those

claims on appeal. See Ahlberg v. Chrysler Corp., 481 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2007)

(points not meaningfully argued on appeal are waived).

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court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claim if court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); Crest Constr. II, Inc. v.

Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 359 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm.

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