J-S04009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 803 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 804 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 805 EDA 2022
J-S04009-23

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Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 806 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 807 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-S04009-23

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JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

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: No. 808 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON 

Appellant

:

:

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:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 809 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016, 

CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2023

In these consolidated appeals, James Elijah Dickson (Appellant) appeals 

pro se from the orders dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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This Court previously recited the underlying facts:

During the evening of April 16, 2016, [Appellant] was 

hanging out at the home of his cousin, Alphonso Liverpool. Also 

at the home were Ziyon Laboy, Levi Almonte, Joel Almonte, Edwin 

Laboy, and Christine Chromiak [(Chromiak)]. At some point, the 

group decided to walk over to [Appellant’s] home at 637 East 

Westmoreland Street in Philadelphia. Along the way, they ran into 

Kenny Stowe [(Stowe)]. [Appellant] told Liverpool that he did not 

want Stowe to come over, and threatened that if Stowe did, he 

would kill Stowe and Liverpool. However, Stowe remained 

persistent about going to [Appellant’s] home with the group, so 

[Appellant] eventually relented and allowed Stowe to come over.

Once at the home, the group ate, drank alcohol, and smoked 

marijuana and PCP. Stowe began to argue with [Appellant], so 

[Appellant] ejected Stowe from his home; however, [Appellant] 

allowed Stowe to return approximately twenty minutes later.

Once Stowe returned, he again argued with [Appellant], 

prompting [Appellant] to eject Stowe from his home a second 

time; however, like before, [Appellant] allowed Stowe to 

eventually reenter the home.

At some point, a transgender individual came over, and 

[Appellant] went upstairs with the individual. After the individual 

left, Stowe told [Appellant] to “stop messing with boys,” and called 

[Appellant] a faggot. [Appellant] then told Liverpool to get Stowe 

out of his home, or he would kill them both. At the time, 

[Appellant] had a shotgun in his hand and proceeded to point it in 

Liverpool’s direction and pull the trigger; however, it was not 

loaded. [Appellant] then asked Liverpool and Joel Almonte to 

come upstairs with him, and there, Almonte admitted to unloading 

the shotgun earlier that evening because he felt unsafe in the 

home with the loaded gun. Almonte then went back downstairs, 

but Liverpool remained upstairs with [Appellant]. While the pair 

was upstairs, [Appellant] told Liverpool that the people downstairs 

were trying to kill him. Liverpool tried to convince [Appellant] 

otherwise, and eventually told him that he would go downstairs to 

see what was going on. Once downstairs, Liverpool warned Stowe 

that they had to leave immediately, but Stowe refused to leave, 

so Liverpool left alone.
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After Liverpool left, [Appellant] walked down the stairs with 

the shotgun, and shot Stowe, who was standing in the living room, 

in the head. Ziyon Laboy ran to the door; however, before he 

escaped, [Appellant] shot him twice in the arm. [Appellant] next 

shot Edwin Laboy [(Laboy)], who was also in the living room at 

the time, in the head. After seeing [Appellant] shoot [] Laboy, 

Levi Almonte made his escape through the front door. Joel 

Almonte and [] Chromiak ran into the kitchen and hid in two 

different corners. [Appellant] followed the pair into the kitchen 

with the shotgun in his hands, and eventually pointed the gun at 

Almonte. Almonte thereafter smacked the gun and ran away from 

the scene. After Almonte escaped, [Appellant] shot Chromiak 

three times.

After the shootings concluded, [Appellant] called 911. While 

he remained on the line with the authorities, he barricaded himself 

in his home when police arrived. Police therefore secured the 

perimeter and called in the SWAT team. While members of the 

SWAT team were on the roof of [Appellant’s] home, [Appellant] 

shot through the roof at them. Eventually, [Appellant] exited his 

home without incident and was taken into custody. Once 

[Appellant] had left the home, officers entered the premises and 

found the bodies of Stowe, [] Laboy, and Chromiak. In addition, 

police recovered numerous spent shotgun casings and a 

camouflage-printed shotgun at the scene, as well as unspent 

shotgun casings on [Appellant’s] person.

Commonwealth v. Dickson, 216 A.3d 413 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1-4) (citation omitted).

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous crimes at seven 

separate dockets. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial in May 2017. 

Attorneys Wendy Ramos and Mythri Jayaraman (Trial Counsel) represented 

Appellant. The trial court found Appellant guilty of four counts of simple 

assault; three counts of first-degree murder; two counts each of attempted 

murder, aggravated assault on a police officer, aggravated assault, and

recklessly endangering another person; and one count each of persons not to 
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possess a firearm and possession of an instrument of crime. On May 24, 2017,

the trial court sentenced Appellant to three consecutive terms of life 

imprisonment. Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the trial 

court denied.

Appellant filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence. Dickson, supra. Appellant did not petition the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court for allowance of appeal. The PCRA court explained:

On August 23, 2019, [Appellant timely] filed a pro se “Motion for 

a New Trial on the Ground of After-Discovered Evidence,” which 

the court deemed to be a petition (“Initial Petition”) under the ... 

PCRA[]. [See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 

521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“any petition filed after the judgment of 

sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.” 

(citation omitted)).] On November 20, 2019, [Appellant] filed a 

motion to proceed pro se. The court held a Grazier[1] hearing on 

January 17, 2020, and granted [Appellant’s] motion to proceed 

pro se.

On November 23, 2020, [Appellant] filed an amended PCRA 

petition.... Apparently having changed his mind about 

representing himself, [Appellant] filed a motion for appointment 

of counsel on April 26, 2021. However, at a video hearing on July 

9, 2021, [Appellant] withdrew his request for counsel. On October 

4, 2021, [Appellant] filed a supplemental amended PCRA 

petition.... 

____________________________________________

1 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998) (“When a 

waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the post-conviction and appellate 

stages, an on-the-record determination should be made that the waiver is a 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one.”); cf. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (providing

“when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is 

unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel 

to represent the defendant on the defendant’s first petition for post-conviction 

collateral relief.”).
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PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/22, at 4 (original footnotes omitted; one footnote 

added).

On December 14, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA petition on the basis that the claims lacked merit or were 

waived. Motion to Dismiss, 12/14/21. The Commonwealth also averred:

On July 16, 2021, in response to [Appellant’s] discovery motion, 

the Commonwealth provided [Appellant] by mail: (1) two [crime] 

scene photographs taken by personnel from the [Philadelphia] 

medical examiner’s office, and (2) criminal histories of decedents 

[] Laboy, [] Chromiak, and [] Stowe. 

Id. at 2 (citing Commonwealth’s correspondence, Exhibit “A”); see also id.

at 5 n.1 (explaining Exhibit “A” consisted of “two photographs depicting the 

folded knife referenced in the medical examiner crime scene notes”).

On December 20, 2021, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant did not 

respond. The court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on March 2, 2022.

On March 10, 2022, Appellant timely filed seven notices of
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appeal at each of the seven trial court dockets.

2

 This Court consolidated the 

appeals sua sponte. On March 16, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

The order cautioned Appellant that “any issues not contained in a concise 

statement of errors ... will be deemed to have been waived.” Order, 3/16/22 

(some capitalization modified). Appellant timely filed a pro se Rule 1925(b) 

concise statement on March 29, 2022 (Concise Statement).

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s notices of appeal were identical, and the caption listed all seven 

trial court dockets (with no distinguishing marks). Appellant’s notices of 

appeal implicate Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018)

(requiring appellants to file separate notices of appeal from single orders that 

resolve issues on more than one docket) (overruled in part by

Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (holding that 

“where a timely appeal is erroneously filed at only one docket, [Pa.R.A.P.] 

902 permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to allow correction of the 

error, where appropriate.”)). 

In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc), 

this Court emphasized that “Walker only required an appellant to file 

a ‘separate’ notice of appeal for each lower court docket the appellant was 

challenging,” and “Walker made no mention of case numbers on a notice of 

appeal.” Id. at 1148 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we held that 

[b]ecause Johnson appealed from four docket numbers and filed 

four notices of appeal, Johnson has complied with Walker. The 

fact that each notice of appeal listed all four docket numbers does 

not invalidate his notices of appeal, and we decline to quash his 

appeals.

Id. (overruling Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142, 1144 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (“a notice of appeal may contain only one docket number” under 

Walker)). Instantly, we conclude the “fact that each [of Appellant’s seven] 

notice[s] of appeal listed all [seven] docket numbers does not invalidate his 

notices of appeal[.]” Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1148.
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Appellant presents ten issues for our review:

A. Whether the PCRA court made a plain error, an error of law, by 

its conclusions in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, dated May 10, 

2022[, to the extent it stated] that “In any event, the evidence 

of a knife found on Mr. Stowe’s body was not material to any 

issues in the case[”;] and [“]since [Appellant] failed to proffer 

evidence to show that the Commonwealth suppressed evidence 

of the knife[,] Appellant’s Brady[3] claim premised upon the 

knife was properly rejected[”;] and that Appellant never raised 

a claim in the PCRA court asserting that [the] Commonwealth 

withheld exculpatory evidence regarding cell-phones the claim 

is waived? The PCRA court abused its discretion when there 

would have been no prejudice because Appellant did present 

such facts in the PCRA court.

B. [Whether] the PCRA court committed an error of law by 

denying the petitions for post conviction relief based upon 

discovery of exculpatory evidence of a knife, withheld by police 

at the crime scene, and cell-phones and a false, staged crime 

scene[?]

C. [Whether] the PCRA court committed an error of law by 

denying Appellant an evidentiary hearing to present the 

fabrications within the crime scene photographs, to 

demonstrate that the crime scene were [sic] staged by the 

crime scene police agents[?]

D. [Whether] the PCRA court committed an error of law by 

denying the petition for post conviction relief based on 

ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel[?]

E. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for [his] failure to present the 

Pennsylvania Castle Doctrine defense in conformance as being 

attacked in Appellant’s home by gang members and dealer[s] 

with [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 505(b)(2.1) and other portions of 18 

Pa.C.S. § 505 ..., which is a procedural statute?

____________________________________________

3 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also Commonwealth

v. Cam Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 75 (Pa. 2009) (“Under Brady, the prosecution’s 

failure to divulge exculpatory evidence is a violation of a defendant’s 

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.”).
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F. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for interfering with Appellant’s 

fundamental right to finish testifying on Appellant’s own behalf 

at trial?

G. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to investigate and call 

as a witness police officer Donna Jaconi, the crime scene unit 

agent concerning the weapon, the knife, and cell-phones not 

being put on property receipts, and the inconsistencies within 

the crime scene photographs?

H. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to investigate and call 

police officer Alvin Outlaw as a witness?

I. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to introduce the 

criminal histories of decedents?

J. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to cross-examine police 

officer Stephen Cross[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (footnote added; some capitalization and punctuation

modified).

Critically, Appellant did not raise any of his issues in his Concise
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Statement.4It is axiomatic that “any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b)

statement will be deemed waived for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. 

Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) 

statement will be deemed waived.”)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) 

(“Issues not included in the Statement ... are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

To the extent Appellant vaguely claimed in his Concise Statement,

“numerous issues of Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness,” the claim is undeveloped 

and insufficient to preserve the various assertions of ineffectiveness Appellant 

presents in his statement of questions. See Concise Statement, 3/29/22, at 

2. This Court has instructed that an appellant’s

concise statement must properly specify the error to be addressed 

on appeal. In other words, the Rule 1925(b) statement must be 

____________________________________________

4 Appellant’s Concise Statement states, in pertinent part:

 

Brady[] violations. The crime scene unit police agents withheld 

[]suppressed evidence at the crime scene favorable to [Appellant

that was] “material” exculpatory, and impeachment evidence[.] 

The knife w[as] exculpatory, and the [] cell-phones were 

impeachment evidence....

* * *

Ineffective assistance of counsel, numerous issues of Trial 

Counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Concise Statement, 3/29/22, at 2 (paragraph numbering omitted; some 

capitalization modified). Appellant did not expound on his claim(s) of Trial 

Counsel’s ineffectiveness. 
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specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issue 

an appellant wishes to raise on appeal. A concise statement [that] 

is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on 

appeal is the functional equivalent of no concise statement at all. 

The court’s review and legal analysis can be fatally impaired when 

the court has to guess at the issues raised. Thus, if a concise 

statement is too vague, the court may find waiver. 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations, 

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

The PCRA court determined that Appellant’s vague ineffectiveness claim

resulted in waiver. The PCRA court explained:

[Appellant’s] claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness completely fails 

to specify any specific claims of ineffectiveness that [Appellant]

intends to raise on appeal. For that reason, his claims of trial

counsel ineffectiveness are waived. Commonwealth v. Parrish, 

224 A.3d 682, 700 (Pa. 2020) (a Rule 1925(b) statement that 

“generically and capaciously encompassed every conceivable 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel contained in the 

amended PCRA petitions” was waived for failure to comply with 

Rule 1925(b)).

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/22, at 11. We agree.

We are mindful that Appellant is pro se. While “this Court is willing to 

liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no 

special benefit upon the appellant.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 

496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005). “To the contrary, any person choosing to 

represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume 

that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Id.

Accordingly, Appellant has waived his ineffectiveness issues. See Bonnett, 

supra; Hansley, supra.
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Our review further reveals that Appellant preserved in his Concise 

Statement only one of the issues he presents in his statement of questions;

namely, his Brady claim.5 See n.5, supra.

Appellant asserts the PCRA court erred by rejecting his claim that the 

Commonwealth committed a Brady violation. According to Appellant, the 

Commonwealth failed to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence of the

knife police discovered on Stowe’s body and cellphones. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 13-25. Appellant claims he has established “not only the element[]s 

necessary for a successful Brady claim, but also ... that the crime scene unit 

police agents[] actually concealed the ... knife[] and cell-phones.” Id. at 21. 

Appellant maintains “there is a reasonable probability that, had the ... knife[] 

____________________________________________

5 Before addressing this claim, however, we note that Appellant’s brief does 

not comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), which requires the argument section of an 

appellate brief to 

be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued; and shall have at the head of each part - in distinctive 

type ... - the particular point treated therein, followed by such 

discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.

Id. (emphasis added). Appellant’s argument section headings do not

correspond to his ten issues listed in his statement of questions presented. 

Nevertheless, we address the merits of Appellant’s Brady claim to the best of 

our ability. See Pa.R.A.P. 105(a) (requiring liberal construction of appellate 

rules); but see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 

2011) (“The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate 

rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather, they 

represent a studied determination by our Court and its rules committee of the 

most efficacious manner by which appellate review may be conducted[.]”). 
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and cell-phones ... been disclosed to the Appellant[,] the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 14.

“When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, an appellate court must 

determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by the record and free

of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa. 

2022) (citation, quotations, and footnote omitted). With respect to Brady, 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:

To prove a Brady violation, [an a]ppellant must demonstrate 

that: (1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) which evidence 

was either exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to him 

and; (3) he was prejudiced by the concealment. In order to prove

prejudice, [a]ppellant must show a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1189 (Pa. 2014) (citations and 

quotations omitted).

Here, the PCRA court explained its rationale for rejecting Appellant’s

allegation of a Brady violation:

[Appellant] claims that the Commonwealth suppressed 

evidence of a knife that was found on the body of victim [] Stowe, 

as well as photographs of the knife taken by the Philadelphia 

Medical Examiner’s office. Initial Petition[, 8/23/19,] at p. 20.

[Appellant] claims that such evidence would have been relevant 

to [his] self-defense argument at trial. Id. at 14.

In support of his claim, [Appellant] presented evidence of 

a portion of a report from the medical examiner’s office stating 

that a knife was removed from the pants of Mr. Stowe. Initial

Petition[, 8/23/19,] Exhibit CP-4832 at p. 30. However, the 

Commonwealth avers that this report was provided to [Appellant] 

prior to the trial, and [Appellant] does not deny that allegation. 

Instead, he seems to aver that the actual knife was suppressed to 
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his prejudice. Initial Petition[, 8/23/19,] at p. 20. While 

[Appellant] also claims the Commonwealth suppressed 

photographs of the knife, he proffered no evidence to contradict 

evidence submitted by the Commonwealth establishing that 

compact discs containing photographs of the knife were sent to 

[Trial C]ounsel under cover of a letter from the assigned assistant 

district attorney dated April 28, 2017, several weeks prior to the 

trial. See Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss, [12/14/21,] 

Exhibit B. Since [Appellant] failed to proffer evidence to show that 

the Commonwealth suppressed evidence of the knife, his Brady

claim premised upon the knife was properly rejected. See

[Commonwealth v.] Simpson, 66 A.3d [253,] 264 [(Pa. 2013)] 

(“To demonstrate a Brady violation, [a]ppellant must show that: 

(1) the prosecution concealed evidence....”).

In any event, the evidence of a knife found on Mr. Stowe’s 

body was not material to any issues in the case. At the trial, 

[Appellant] testified that he committed the killings in self-defense

because he believed the victims were conspiring to kill him with 

the shotgun that he ultimately used to kill the victims. N.T. 

5/23/2017 at 148-55. At no point during [Appellant’s] testimony 

did he ever reference a knife or threat of a knife as a reason for 

his killings. See id. at 130-63; N.T. 5/24/2017 at 7-52. 

[Appellant] explicitly stated that the victims “ain’t have no weapon 

before I come down stairs.” N.T. 5/23/2017 at 155. Accordingly, 

given [Appellant’s] reasons for the murders as described in his 

testimony, the Commonwealth’s alleged concealment of a small

knife found in the pants of one of the three people [Appellant] 

admittedly killed with a shotgun could not have affected the 

outcome of the trial. Therefore, the knife does not give rise to a 

Brady violation. Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264.

[] Cellphones

[Appellant] also asserts that the Commonwealth withheld 

exculpatory evidence regarding cellphones. [Concise] 

Statement[, 3/29/22,] at ¶ 3. However, [Appellant] never raised 

this claim in the PCRA court. For that reason, the claim is waived.

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”)[.]

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/22, at 9-10.
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Our review discloses ample record and legal support for the PCRA court’s 

rationale. Thus, Appellant’s Brady claim does not merit relief.

For the above reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of 

Appellant’s first PCRA petition.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2023