[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11491

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CAROL PORTWOOD-BRAUN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-02151-CPT

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11491

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Carol Portwood-Braun appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of PortwoodBraun’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to 

whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether 

the correct legal standards were applied. See Winschel v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Id. “We will affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported 

by substantial evidence, even if the preponderance of the evidence 

weighs against it.” Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 

F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021). Under this limited standard of 

review, we must not make fact-findings, re-weigh the evidence, or 

substitute our judgment for that of the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). See id. We review de novo the district court’s 

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22-11491 Opinion of the Court 3

determination about whether substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s decision. See id. 

A person who applies for Social Security DIB benefits must 

first prove that she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). The 

Social Security Regulations outline a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ must evaluate (1) whether the 

claimant engaged in substantial gainful work; (2) whether the 

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the severe impairment meets or equals an impairment in the Listings of Impairments; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether, in 

the light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, other jobs exist in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. “If the claimant cannot make the adjustment to other 

work, the ALJ will determine that the claimant is disabled.” Phillips 

v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004), superseded on 

other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.

Applying the five-step evaluation process, the ALJ first determined that Portwood-Braun had engaged in no substantial 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11491

gainful activity since the alleged onset date. The ALJ then determined that Portwood-Braun suffered from the following severe 

impairments: scoliosis, disc bulging, left lateral disc osteophyte 

complex, radiculopathy, lumbar strain, disc herniation, and sciatica. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Portwood-Braun had no 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled a listed impairment.

The ALJ next determined that Portwood-Braun had the RFC 

to perform light work with specified limitations.1 Given 

1 The ALJ concluded that Portwood-Braun had the capacity to perform light 

work with these exceptions:

[T]he claimant can lift and/or carry 10 pounds occasionally, 5 

pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for 4 hours in an 8 hour 

day; sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour day. The claimant requires a 

sit/stand option with an alternating interval of 1-2 hours. The 

claimant can occasionally push and/or pull with the upper extremities, climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, and reach[] 

above shoulder level with both arms. The claimant can frequently reach waist to chest with both arms, handle with both 

hands, finger with both hands, and feel with both hands. The 

claimant cannot climb ladders and scaffolds, kneel, crouch, or 

crawl. The claimant must avoid working around high, exposed places. The claimant can occasionally work around extreme cold; extreme heat; wetness and humidity; vibration; 

pulmonary irritants; and moving mechanical parts.

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22-11491 Opinion of the Court 5

Portwood-Braun’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that she would be unable to perform her past work as a physical therapist or as a director 

of rehabilitation. Considering Portwood-Braun’s age, education, 

work experience, and RFC -- together with the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) -- the ALJ determined that Portwood-Braun 

could perform other work in the national economy. Accordingly, 

the ALJ concluded that Portwood-Braun was “not disabled.” 

Portwood-Braun administratively appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied 

Portwood-Braun’s request for review. The ALJ’s decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner. The district court 

affirmed. 

On appeal, Portwood-Braun focuses only on step five in the 

sequential evaluation process: whether she can perform other 

work in the national economy. 

At step five, whether the claimant can adjust to other work 

in the national economy is to be determined in one of two ways: 

by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“grids”) or by relying on a VE. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239-40. The “grids” establish 

a matrix for identifying whether jobs requiring certain 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11491

qualifications exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 

See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1983). When a 

claimant’s qualifications correspond to the specified job requirements, the “grids” direct a finding about whether the claimant is 

considered disabled. Id. at 462. But when a “claimant is unable to 

perform a full range of work at a given [RFC] or when a claimant 

has non-exertional impairments that significantly limit basic work 

skills,” the ALJ must consult a VE and may not rely exclusively on 

the “grids.” See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1242-43. 

Portwood-Braun argues that the ALJ erred by failing to direct the VE to exclude from the available job numbers those jobs 

that are performed at a sedentary level of exertion. PortwoodBraun contends that -- within each category of jobs labeled as 

“light” in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) -- some 

jobs may exist that are, in reality, performed only at a sedentary 

level of exertion. According to Portwood-Braun, if the VE’s job 

numbers in this case included only positions actually performed at 

a sedentary level, the “grids” mandate a finding that she is disabled. 

We disagree. 

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22-11491 Opinion of the Court 7

First, Portwood-Braun’s assertion that the “grids” mandated 

a finding of disabled is without merit. Because Portwood-Braun is 

unable to perform a full range of light work, the “grids” alone cannot dictate whether Portwood-Braun was disabled. See Phillips, 

357 F.3d at 1242-43. The ALJ was, instead, required to rely on the 

VE’s testimony in determining whether Portwood-Braun could 

perform work in the national economy. See id. 

Moreover, nothing evidences that the available jobs identified by the VE included only sedentary jobs. The ALJ’s hypothetical directed the VE to assume that the hypothetical individual had 

the RFC to perform light work with Portwood-Braun’s limitations. 

In response to the ALJ’s hypothetical, the VE identified three jobs 

that a person with Portman-Braun’s qualifications and limitations 

could perform: each of those jobs is classified by the DOT as “light” 

work. See DOT 739.687-026 (filter assembler), 727.687-054 (final 

inspector), 205.367-054 (survey worker). Portman-Braun offers no 

legal authority to support her speculative assertion that the VE’s 

job numbers might still include positions that are in fact sedentary 

despite being classified by the DOT as “light” work. And -- even if 

the VE’s job numbers did include some jobs that may be performed 

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11491

at a sedentary level -- Portwood-Braun offers no legal authority 

demonstrating how that information would alter the ALJ’s disability determination. 

On appeal, Portman-Braun relies chiefly on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Distasio v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Distasio, however, presents circumstances materially different 

from those involved in this case. In Distasio, the VE testified that 

a person with the claimant’s abilities could perform only sedentary 

jobs in the national economy: testimony that contradicted the 

ALJ’s determination that the claimant could perform light work. 

47 F.3d at 349-50. The Ninth Circuit thus determined that the 

Commissioner’s decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 350. Here -- unlike in Distasio -- the ALJ’s disability 

determination was supported by the VE’s testimony identifying positions classified by the DOT as “light” work that a person with 

Portwood-Braun’s limitations could perform. 

Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s denial of 

DIB; we affirm.

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22-11491 Opinion of the Court 9

AFFIRMED.2

2 On appeal, Portwood-Braun says that -- because she turned 55 years old during the pendency of this appeal -- the grids now direct a finding of “disabled.” 

Portman-Braun’s current age, however, is not pertinent to our decision about 

whether the ALJ’s disability determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record that was then-before the agency. See Wilson v. Apfel, 179 

F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We review the decision of the ALJ as to 

whether the claimant was entitled to benefits during a specific period of time, 

which period was necessarily prior to the date of the ALJ’s decision.”). 

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