2023 IL 128077

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 128077) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

JOHNNY ENGLISH, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 15, 2023.

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, and 

Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice O’Brien dissented, with opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Petitioner Johnny English filed a motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 

5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). The trial court denied petitioner’s motion on August 

3, 2020, which made his notice of appeal due in the circuit court by September 2, 
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2020. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court that was file-stamped 

on September 10, 2020. The envelope containing the notice of appeal had a postage 

meter stamp dated September 1, 2020. Under this court’s version of the mailbox 

rule (Ill. S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. July 1, 2017)), the notice of appeal was timely if the 

postage meter stamp is accepted to prove the “time of mailing.” The appellate court 

dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the postage meter 

stamp was insufficient to prove that petitioner mailed his notice of appeal before 

the due date. 2021 IL App (1st) 201016-U, ¶¶ 38-41. 

¶ 2 We allowed petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). For the following reasons, we agree with the 

appellate court and hold that the sole means of establishing “time of mailing” under 

Rule 373 in the case of a pro se incarcerated litigant is by certification as described 

in Rule 12(b)(6) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017)). Thus, we affirm the 

appellate court’s judgment. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Because this case involves only a question of the appellate court’s jurisdiction 

to hear petitioner’s appeal, we recite only those facts relevant to our disposition. 

The facts of the offense and sentencing are fully set out in the appellate court’s 

decision affirming petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal (People v. 

English, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1090 (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 23)). 

¶ 5 In 1995, then-18-year-old petitioner was charged with, among other things, 

armed robbery, first degree murder, and attempted first degree murder for his 

involvement in the death of Frank Klepacki and the shooting of Casey Klepacki. 

After a bench trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offenses. Petitioner was 

sentenced to an extended term of 70 years in prison for first degree murder, to be 

served concurrently with 30-year sentences for attempted first degree murder and 

armed robbery. Defendant filed a direct appeal, an initial postconviction petition 

(People v. English, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1174 (table) (unpublished order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23)), and a successive postconviction petition (People v. 

English, 403 Ill. App. 3d 121 (2010)), all to no avail. 
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¶ 6 On July 10, 2020, petitioner filed the pro se motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition underlying this appeal. Petitioner argued that his sentence 

was unconstitutional based on changes in the law regarding the sentencing of 

juvenile and young adult offenders. On August 3, 2020, the trial court denied 

petitioner’s motion for leave to file in a written order. 

¶ 7 Defendant filed a notice of appeal, which was file-stamped by the clerk on 

September 10, 2020. The envelope containing the notice of appeal bears a postage 

meter stamp with the date of September 1, 2020. Also with the notice of appeal was 

a “Notice of Mailing/Filing,” which provided: “I, Johnny English, state that I have 

mailed the attached successive postconviction petition on August 20, 2020 by 

depositing the said in the mail drop box at Graham Correctional Center Mail Drop 

Box.” The notice also stated that the notice of appeal was mailed to the State and 

circuit clerk of Cook County at provided addresses. 

¶ 8 On September 18, 2020, the Office of the State Appellate Defender was 

appointed to represent petitioner on appeal. As part of the appointment order, the 

trial court stated that the notice of appeal was filed on September 10, 2020, which 

was “timely per proof of service.” Citing the trial court’s order, petitioner, in his 

opening brief in the appellate court, stated that his notice of appeal was timely filed 

“pursuant to the mailbox rule.” 

¶ 9 The appellate court disagreed. The court held that it was without jurisdiction to 

consider petitioner’s appeal “absent the certification of proof of service” described 

in section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2021 IL App (1st) 201016-U, ¶ 38. 

The court noted the amendments to Rule 373, which eliminated postmarks as proof 

of mailing “ ‘entirely, even legible ones.’ ” Id. ¶ 36 (quoting People v. Tolbert, 

2021 IL App (1st) 181654, ¶ 20). The court concluded that “a postmark alone is 

insufficient to confer jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 37. The court dismissed petitioner’s 

appeal. Id. ¶ 42. This court granted petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Petitioner argues that the postage meter stamp showing that he placed his notice 

of appeal in the mail prior to the due date was sufficient to prove that he filed his 
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notice of appeal timely, thereby establishing jurisdiction in the appellate court. 

Petitioner concedes that he did not file a certificate as required by our Rules 373 

and 12(b)(6) but argues that equity requires that we accept the dated postage meter 

stamp as the “time of mailing.” The State concedes that petitioner placed his notice 

of appeal in the mail prior to the due date but argues that petitioner’s proof of 

mailing was insufficient under Rule 12. The sole issue is whether a dated postage 

meter stamp is sufficient to prove “time of mailing” under our rules, which is the 

only way the appellate court could have obtained jurisdiction in this case. 

¶ 12 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 13 “The determination of whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to consider 

an appeal is a question of law, which we review de novo.” People v. Vara, 2018 IL 

121823, ¶ 12. The construction of our rules is also a question of law subject to 

de novo review. People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 22. Our rules are to be 

interpreted in the same manner as statutes. In re Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 294 

(2010). Our rules “have the force of law” and are “not aspirational.” Bright v. Dicke, 

166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995). The primary concern is to give effect to our intent, most 

often through the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the rule. People v. Glisson, 202 

Ill. 2d 499, 504 (2002). When a rule is “plain and unambiguous, we may not depart 

from [its] terms by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions [this court] 

did not express, nor may we add provisions not found in the [rule].” Rosenbach v. 

Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24. 

¶ 14 B. Supreme Court Rules Governing the 

 Filing of a Notice of Appeal

¶ 15 The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step in the 

perfection of an appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). Rule 606(b) provides 

that “the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 

days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. 

July 1, 2017). Rule 373 provides that the “time of filing” is the date the notice of 

appeal is “actually received” by the clerk of the circuit court. Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 373, 

612(b)(18) (making Rule 373 applicable to criminal appeals) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

Under this court’s version of the mailbox rule, if the notice of appeal is received by 
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the clerk after the due date, “the time of mailing by an incarcerated, self-represented 

litigant shall be deemed the time of filing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. July 1, 2017).

Rule 373 further provides that “[p]roof of mailing shall be as provided in Rule 12.” 

Id. 

¶ 16 Rule 12(b)(6) provides: 

“Service is proved *** 

 * * * 

 *** in case of service by mail by a self-represented litigant residing in a 

correctional facility, by certification under section 1-109 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure of the person who deposited the document in the institutional mail, 

stating the time and place of deposit and the complete address to which the 

document was to be delivered.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires a person “having knowledge 

of the matters stated in a pleading, affidavit or other document” to 

“subscribe to a certification in substantially the following form: Under penalties 

as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 

the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true 

and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief 

and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily 

believes the same to be true.” 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2018). 

When completed, the verification has the “same force and effect as though 

subscribed and sworn to under oath.” Id.

¶ 17 C. Our Precedent on the Mailbox Rule 

¶ 18 We have twice construed the provisions constituting our mailbox rule. In 

Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 216 

(2009), we held that a cover letter that listed a date within the time for filing was 

insufficient proof under Rule 373 to prove the “time of mailing.” We noted that the 

letter did not contain “an affidavit or a certificate and nothing [was] certified or 

sworn to.” (Emphasis in original) Id. This court reasoned that, while Rule 373 
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relaxed the 30-day deadline where a party elects to mail their notice of appeal, the 

party must comply with Rule 12 to do so. Id. This court concluded that where there 

is “no proof of mailing on file, there is nothing in the record to establish the date 

the document was timely mailed to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court.” Id.

The import of Secura is that litigants cannot supply proof of mailing in ways other 

than those expressly listed in Rules 373 and 12. 

¶ 19 In Huber v. American Accounting Ass’n, 2014 IL 117293, ¶¶ 17, 19, we 

similarly rejected the plaintiff’s contention that a label from an Automated Postal 

Center (APC), described as a self-service kiosk within a United States Post Office 

lobby, was sufficient to establish proof of mailing under Rules 373 and 12. This 

court focused on the fact that the label showed only the date of sale, not the date of 

mailing. Id. ¶ 18. This court continued that it did not need to address whether Rule 

12 allowed for other methods of proof of mailing because, at best, the APC label 

indicated that the plaintiff may have mailed his notice of appeal on time. Id. We 

must now resolve the question left open in Huber, which is whether Rules 373 and 

12 allow for any form of proof other than those expressly listed. 

¶ 20 D. Postmark Versus Postage Meter Stamp

¶ 21 Neither Secura nor Huber involved a postmark or postage meter stamp. Thus, 

we briefly discuss each and their relevance to this issue. A postmark is “ ‘an official 

postal marking on a piece of mail; specif : a mark showing the name of the post 

office and the date and sometimes the hour of mailing and often serving as the 

actual and only cancellation.’ ” Wickman v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 

387 Ill. App. 3d 414, 417 (2008) (quoting Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary 1772-73 (1993)). The United States Postal Service (USPS) defines a 

postmark as “an official Postal ServiceTM imprint applied in black ink on the

address side of a stamped mailpiece. A postmark indicates the location and date the 

Postal Service accepted custody of a mailpiece, and it cancels affixed postage.”

U.S. Postal Serv., Handbook PO-408–Area Mail Processing Guidelines, § 1-1.3 

(2008), https://d1ocufyfjsc14h.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/po-408_area_

mail_processing_guidelines_3-08_7.92_mb.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q44C-29UE].

¶ 22 A “postage meter” is in the category of “postage evidencing systems,” defined 

as “a device or system of components a customer uses to print evidence that postage 
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required for mailing has been paid.” Domestic Mail Manual, Mailing Standards of 

the United States Postal Service, U.S. Postal Serv., § 604.4.1.1, https://pe.usps.

com/text/dmm300/604.htm#ep1080496 (last visited Apr. 26, 2023) [https://perma.

cc/5XPB-UTD3] (hereinafter DMM). “Private meter postmarks are official 

postmarks imprinted under license from the United States Postal Service [citation], 

and metered mail is entitled to all privileges applying to the various classes of mail.” 

Bowman v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 507 N.E.2d 342, 

344 (Ohio 1987) “The USPS licenses private parties to use postage meters

manufactured by certain companies, including Pitney Bowes, Inc., to place a mark 

on mailed items indicating postage has been paid, provided the licensees agree to 

abide by all the rules and regulations governing the use of the meters.” Chevron 

U.S.A., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 2007 WY 43, ¶ 12, 154 P.3d 331; DMM 

§ 604.4.2.1. 

¶ 23 “The United States Postal Service requires the date shown on private meter 

postmarks to be the actual date of deposit of mail (or the next scheduled collection 

day).” Bowman, 507 N.E.2d at 344; DMM § 604.4.6.2. “If the wrong date appears, 

a .00 postage meter impression with the correct date is stamped on the envelope by 

the post office.” Bowman, 507 N.E.2d at 344; DMM § 604.4.5.1. “Otherwise, 

metered mail is not canceled or postmarked by the Postal Service.” Bowman, 507 

N.E.2d at 344. An entity may be denied use of a postage meter if it fails to comply 

with these mailing standards. DMM § 604.4.2.4. 

¶ 24 As just discussed, postage meters are heavily regulated within the USPS. The 

DMM has been incorporated into the Code of Federal Regulations and, thus, has 

the force and effect of law. 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (2021); People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 

495, 508 (2006) (“administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of 

law”). We take judicial notice of the DMM. See Pierce v. Board of Education of 

Chicago, 69 Ill. 2d 89, 93-94 (1977). 

¶ 25 We agree with the vast majority of courts, including our appellate court, that a 

legible date on a postage meter stamp is of similar evidentiary value as a postmark. 

See Tolbert, 2021 IL App (1st) 181654, ¶ 14 (“Given the similarities between 

postmarks and postage meters, a determination regarding the evidentiary 

sufficiency of postmarks would lend support to a similar finding with respect to 

postage meters.”); Lozier Corp. v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, 829 
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N.W.2d 652, 660 (Neb. 2013) (“We believe these regulations are sufficient to 

qualify a postage meter stamp as satisfactory evidence of the date of mailing.”). To 

the extent courts have held otherwise, largely because a private entity could 

manipulate the date on the postage meter stamp (see Smith v. Idaho Department of 

Labor, 218 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Idaho 2009)), those concerns are not present in the 

case of an incarcerated litigant who has no access to the postage meter itself. Thus, 

we accept as fact that petitioner placed his notice of appeal in the institutional mail 

on September 1, 2020, a day before it was due in the circuit court. 

¶ 26 E. Petitioner Failed to Comply With Our Rules 

¶ 27 That leaves the question of whether petitioner complied with our rules. Our 

appellate court is split on whether a postmark or postage meter stamp can prove 

“time of mailing.” Some decisions have restrained their analysis to the plain 

language of our rules. In People v. Lugo, 391 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998 (2009) (quoting 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)), the court noted the mandatory nature of Rule 

373’s provision that “ ‘[p]roof of mailing shall be as provided in Rule 12(b)(3).’ ” 

(Emphasis in original.) The court continued that Rule 12 allows for proof of mailing 

only by certificate or affidavit of mailing. Id. The rule does not provide for proof in 

any other form. Id. The court concluded that, “if proof of mailing must be by 

certificate or affidavit of mailing, then it cannot be by postmark, as a postmark is 

neither a certificate nor an affidavit of mailing.” Id.; see also Tolbert, 2021 IL App 

(1st) 181654, ¶ 19 (“We agree with the reasoning in Lugo, which for its conclusion 

relied on well-settled principles of statutory construction.”). 

¶ 28 The appellate court in People v. Hansen, 2011 IL App (2d) 081226, ¶ 13, found 

the Lugo court’s interpretation of Rules 373 and 12 to be “too literal and narrow.” 

The court reasoned that, where “there is a timely and legible postmark, an affidavit 

or a certification of mailing is a corroborative redundancy.” Id. ¶ 14. 

“Requiring a court to overlook a clearly legible postmark showing that a 

document was processed by a disinterested third party, such as the post office, 

on or before the date by which the document was required to be mailed is to 

disregard the best, most competent evidence of the latest date of mailing 

consistent with the ‘pro-mailing policy of Rule 373.’ ” Id. (quoting Harrisburg-
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Raleigh Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 126 Ill. 2d 326, 341-42 

(1989)). 

See also People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 21 (holding that the 

petitioner “timely filed his notice of appeal because the post office, a disinterested 

third party, legibly postmarked the envelope within the 30-day filing deadline for 

the notice of appeal”).

¶ 29 We agree with the former line of cases and conclude that petitioner failed to 

comply with Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, the appellate court was correct that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider his appeal. Petitioner concedes that he did not file a 

“certification under section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure *** stating the 

time and place of deposit and the complete address to which the document was to 

be delivered.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017). Under our rules, that is 

the sole method for proving “time of mailing.” Secura, 232 Ill. 2d at 215-16. 

¶ 30 To accept petitioner’s argument would require us to graft onto Rule 12(b)(6) an 

exception that does not exist. Petitioner relies largely on equity and fairness, 

suggestive of grounds for a proposed rule amendment, but he does not attempt to 

argue compliance with the rule. If we enforce our rules only in some cases or adjust 

them to “fit the exigencies of the moment,” we would provide litigants with little 

incentive to follow our rules. Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d 

490, 494-95 (2002). 

¶ 31 We also decline petitioner’s request that we follow federal and out-of-state 

authority. We recognize that the federal system by rule allows for a postmark to 

serve as evidence of the date of mailing. See Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(c)(1)(A)(ii) 

(providing that a notice of appeal is timely if placed in the institutional mail prior 

to the due date accompanied by “evidence (such as a postmark or date stamp) 

showing that the notice was so deposited”). However, as petitioner recognizes, our 

task here is to interpret our rules given their “ ‘plain and ordinary meaning.’ ” 

People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 19 (quoting Hall v. Henn, 208 Ill. 2d 325, 

330 (2003)). As laid out above, our rules are clear and unambiguous. Petitioner 

does not argue otherwise. We have historically declined to resort to sources outside 

of the plain language of a rule or statute when the language is clear and 

unambiguous. Board of Education of Rockford School District No. 205 v. Illinois 

Educational Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. 2d 80, 88 (1995). In short, resort to 
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outside sources such as foreign authority is “ ‘meant to clean up ambiguity, not 

create it.’ ” Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc., 2021 IL 126249, ¶ 48 

(quoting Milner v. Department of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011)). Because 

our rules are unambiguous, we decline to consider the proposed foreign authority. 

¶ 32 We reject the notion that a straightforward application of our rules leads to harsh 

or absurd results. To the contrary, Rules 373 and 12(b)(6) provide incarcerated 

pro se litigants with a guaranteed method to prove that their notice of appeal was 

timely placed in the institutional mail. In fact, Rule 373 was amended to remove 

reliance on postmarks because of “problems with the legibility of post marks” and 

“delay in affixing them in some cases.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 373, Committee Comments

(rev. July 1, 1985). In other words, our rules transitioned from an uncertain form of 

proof reliant on a third party to a certain form of proof reliant only on the litigant. 

¶ 33 Further ameliorating any perceived harshness in our rules is a remedy that can 

be invoked when a notice of appeal is not timely filed. Our rules provide two 

avenues depending on how much time has elapsed after a notice of appeal’s due 

date. First, Rule 606(c) provides: 

“[O]n motion supported by a showing of reasonable excuse for failing to file a 

notice of appeal on time filed in the reviewing court within 30 days of the 

expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal, *** the reviewing court 

may grant leave to appeal and order the clerk to transmit the notice of appeal to 

the trial court for filing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

Second, the reviewing court may also grant leave to appeal if, “within six months 

of the expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal,” an appellant files a 

motion in the reviewing court “supported by a showing by affidavit that there is 

merit to the appeal and that the failure to file a notice of appeal on time was not due 

to appellant’s culpable negligence.” Id.

¶ 34 Unfortunately, neither petitioner nor appointed appellate counsel utilized these 

safety nets, even though the untimeliness of petitioner’s notice of appeal was 

readily apparent. On December 1, 2020, within the six-month window in Rule 

606(c), appointed counsel filed in the appellate court a motion for extension of time 

to file the record on appeal. The motion clearly set out that the final judgment 

appealed from was entered on August 3, 2020, and that petitioner’s notice of appeal 
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was filed on September 18, 2020. 1 Petitioner’s notice of appeal was due on 

September 2, 2020. Petitioner’s counsel had to have been aware that the notice of 

appeal was not filed with the clerk within 30 days of the trial court’s order denying 

petitioner leave to file his successive postconviction petition. Also, because the 

record does not contain a certificate that complies with Rule 12(b)(6), petitioner 

could not rely on the mailbox rule in Rule 373. Therefore, had appointed counsel 

acted promptly, a motion could have been filed in the appellate court requesting 

that the court grant leave to appeal. 

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36 An appellate court has jurisdiction in a criminal case only where a notice of 

appeal is filed within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment appealed from. Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. July 1, 2017). A notice of appeal is considered filed when it 

is received by the clerk except, as in this case, when a notice of appeal is received 

by the clerk after the due date. Ill. S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. July 1, 2017). Then, the “time 

of mailing” is the “time of filing.” Id. To prove the “time of mailing,” an 

incarcerated pro se litigant must submit a “certification under section 1-109 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure *** stating the time and place of deposit and the complete 

address to which the document was to be delivered.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 

1, 2017). Petitioner here failed to file the appropriate certification. His notice of 

appeal was considered filed when it was received by the circuit court on September 

10, 2020, eight days after the due date. The appellate court was correct that it lacked 

jurisdiction.

¶ 37 Appellate court judgment affirmed. 

¶ 38 Appeal dismissed. 

1

In the appellate court’s decision, the date the notice of appeal was file-stamped is listed as 

September 18, 2020. The 0 in the 10 on the file stamp is smudged, but the remaining documents 

filed with the notice of appeal, including the envelope with the postage meter stamp, establish that 

the notice of appeal was file-stamped by the clerk on September 10, 2020. 
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¶ 39 JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting: 

¶ 40 The undisputed facts of this case are extremely straightforward and can be 

summarized in three sentences. The incarcerated, self-represented petitioner’s 

notice of appeal was due September 2, 2020. The incarcerated, self-represented 

petitioner “placed his notice of appeal in the institutional mail on September 1, 

2020, a day before it was due.” Supra ¶ 25. The incarcerated, self-represented 

petitioner’s mailing failed to include a certification, under penalty of perjury, 

stating when he placed his notice of appeal in the institutional mail.

¶ 41 The legal question presented by these facts is equally straightforward—Does 

section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2018)) 

operate to invalidate a timely notice of appeal solely because the proof of mailing 

lacks specific wording to certify, under penalty of perjury, when and to whom the 

notice of appeal was mailed? In reviewing these undisputed facts, the majority 

answers the legal question in the affirmative, concluding that the appellate court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s appeal because petitioner “failed to file 

the appropriate certification” (supra ¶ 36) despite expressly finding that the notice 

of appeal was placed in the institutional mail “a day before it was due” (supra ¶ 25).

This conclusion is not mandated by either the Code of Civil Procedure or our 

supreme court rules and does not comport with this court’s commitment to provide 

access to justice for all people, especially the poor and the vulnerable. Furthermore, 

even if the majority’s assertion that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 373 (eff. July 1, 

2017) mandates a certification in order to perfect a notice of appeal, the majority’s 

conclusion is inconsistent with respect to how this court has previously reviewed 

violations of other supreme court rules. Specifically, the majority’s decision applies 

a type of strict liability standard upon an incarcerated, self-represented litigant’s 

violation, whereas other types of violations, committed by trial judges or attorneys 

of this state, are excused via harmless-error review or the doctrine of substantial 

compliance. It is for these reasons, I dissent.

¶ 42 At the outset, I would note that the instant case requests that we examine 

petitioner’s “proof of mailing” even though there is no actual dispute as to when 

petitioner mailed his notice of appeal. The envelope containing petitioner’s notice 

of appeal bears a legible postage meter stamp with the date of September 1, 2020. 

The majority thoroughly and convincingly explains the reliability of a postage 
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meter stamp2 in proceeding to “accept as fact that petitioner placed his notice of 

appeal in the institutional mail on September 1, 2020, a day before it was due in the 

circuit court.” Supra ¶ 25. The State even concedes that petitioner placed his notice 

of appeal in the mail prior to the due date. These undisputed facts provide context 

as to why the majority’s draconian and narrow analysis of Rule 373 and Rule 

12(b)(6) is incorrect. Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 373, 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 43 This court has previously explained the reason that “proof of mailing” pursuant 

to Rule 12 is required in order to take advantage of the “mailbox rule” under Rule

373. “If there is no proof of mailing on file, there is nothing in the record to establish 

the date the document was timely mailed to confer jurisdiction on the appellate 

court.” Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 

216 (2009). Here, unlike in Secura, we know exactly when the notice of appeal was 

mailed to the circuit court—September 1, 2020. 3 Thus, the precise question 

presented under the undisputed facts of the instant case is whether “proof of 

mailing,” as set out in Rule 12(b)(6), is required to be examined where there is no 

actual dispute as to when petitioner actually mailed his notice of appeal. I would 

answer this question in the negative. 

¶ 44 Rule 373, as originally written, expressly permitted proof of mailing to be 

“evidenced by a post mark affixed in and by a United States Post Office.” See Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). In 1981, this court amended Rule 373 to require 

proof of mailing by an attorney’s certificate or a nonattorney’s affidavit. See Ill. S. 

Ct. R. 373 (eff. Feb. 1, 1981). As the committee comments to Rule 373 state, in 

part:

“As originally adopted the rule provided that the time of mailing might be 

evidenced by the post mark affixed by a United States Post Office. Because of 

problems with the legibility of post marks, and delay in affixing them in some 

cases, the rule was amended in 1981 to provide for the use of affidavits of 

mailing or United States Postal Service certificates of mailing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 

373, Committee Comments (rev. July 1, 1985). 

2

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “a legible date on a postage meter stamp is of similar 

evidentiary value as a postmark.” Supra ¶ 25.

3

In Secura, the only evidence submitted of the date of mailing was a date written on a cover 

letter.
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A later amendment revised the rule “to make the method of proof of mailing 

consistent with practice under Rule 12.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 373, Commentary (rev. Dec. 

17, 1993). 

¶ 45 Significantly, there is nothing in Rule 373 or the comments or commentary to 

Rule 373 that affirmatively bars the use of a postmark or postage meter stamp as 

proof of mailing when the postmark or postage meter stamp’s date is legible and

undisputed by the parties, as is the case here. Moreover, Rule 373 expressly 

provides: “If received after the due date, the time of mailing by an incarcerated, 

self-represented litigant shall be deemed the time of filing.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. July 1, 2017). Here, the undisputed time of mailing is September 

1, 2020. Did petitioner (who is indigent, incarcerated, and self-represented) certify 

the time of mailing under penalty of perjury—no, he did not. But it is undisputed 

that he did in fact mail his notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of a final 

judgment or order, which is the only required jurisdictional step in the perfection 

of an appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 46 Simply put, I do not believe that this court’s amendments to Rule 373 were 

intended to require courts to ignore reality—a legible and undisputed date, 

processed and affixed by the United States Postal Service, on a document that was 

mailed by an incarcerated, self-represented litigant. See Evans v. Cook County 

State’s Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 35 (holding, “when a plain or literal reading of 

the statute leads to absurd results or results that the legislature could not have 

intended, courts are not bound to that construction, and the literal reading should 

yield” (citing People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (2003)). 4 Instead, the 

amendments to Rule 373 were expressly intended to address a scenario that the 

instant case does not present us with—problems of illegible postmarks/postage 

meter stamps and late-placed postmarks/postage meter stamps. The appellate court 

in People v. Hansen, 2011 IL App (2d) 081226, ¶ 14, succinctly and correctly 

explained: 

“ ‘[B]efore a postmark [is] stamped on an envelope, the envelope must be 

placed in the mail. If the postmark is timely, then it is immaterial when the 

4

Our rules are to be interpreted in the same manner as statutes. In re Denzel W., 237 Ill. 2d 285, 

294 (2010).
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envelope was actually placed in the mail.’ [Citation.] It is axiomatic that, if there 

is a timely and legible postmark, an affidavit or a certification of mailing is a 

corroborative redundancy. Requiring a court to overlook a clearly legible 

postmark showing that a document was processed by a disinterested third party, 

such as the post office, on or before the date by which the document was 

required to be mailed is to disregard the best, most competent evidence of the 

latest date of mailing consistent with the ‘pro-mailing policy of Rule 373.’

[Citation.]” 

¶ 47 Likewise, I do not believe that this court’s amendments to Rule 373 were 

intended to make it more difficult for incarcerated, self-represented litigants to 

exercise their fundamental constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction. See 

Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 19 (holding 

“[c]riminal defendants in Illinois have a fundamental right to appeal their 

convictions and sentences after a final judgment”). Yet, that is the plain and broad 

effect of the majority’s decision today requiring “proof of mailing” to be strictly 

examined where there is no actual dispute as to when petitioner actually mailed his 

notice of appeal. Stated another way, the majority’s decision is in direct 

contradiction with this court’s mandate to provide access to justice for all people, 

especially the poor and the vulnerable. Although the majority rejects the notion that 

its decision will lead to harsh or absurd results, the facts of this case demonstrate 

otherwise.

¶ 48 Here, it is undisputed that petitioner placed his notice of appeal in the 

institutional mail “a day before it was due.” Supra ¶ 25. It also is important to note 

that petitioner attempted to comply with our rules when doing so. Included with 

petitioner’s notice of appeal was a “Notice of Mailing/Filing” (Notice), which 

stated the date he was depositing the mail in the “mail drop box of Graham 

Correctional Center mail drop box.” The Notice was signed by petitioner. The 

Notice also identified and listed the parties who were being served with the notice 

of appeal. The office of the state’s attorney and the appropriate circuit clerk’s office 

were two of the parties listed on the Notice, with respective addresses for each. 

However, the Notice failed to include a certification, under penalty of perjury, that 

the above information was true and correct. And it is solely upon this last sentence 

that the majority’s entire decision rests. Simply put, I can find no better example of 

a harsh and absurd result given the undisputed facts of this case. 
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¶ 49 The majority contends, however, that its decision does not make it more 

difficult for incarcerated, self-represented litigants to exercise their fundamental 

right to an appeal. Citing Rules 373 and 12(b)(6), the majority notes that 

incarcerated, self-represented litigants now have “a guaranteed method to prove 

that their notice of appeal was timely placed in the institutional mail.” Supra ¶ 32. 

I do not disagree with the general premise that litigants can now guarantee 

timeliness via certification. What happens, however, in scenarios such as the instant 

case where an incarcerated, self-represented litigant fails to strictly comply with the 

certification requirement but (1) he places his notice of appeal in the institutional 

mail within 30 days of the entry of a final judgment or order, (2) he includes a 

“Notice of Mailing/Filing” that is signed and contains all relevant factual

information, (3) there is a legible postage meter stamp verifying the date of mailing, 

and (4) the parties do not dispute this date? The majority’s conclusory reliance upon 

the general premise that litigants can now guarantee timeliness via certification 

ignores this reality and also misses this straightforward point—this decision will 

result in fewer incarcerated, self-represented appeals due to the fact that the 

majority has now authorized dismissal on the basis of a litigant’s failure to strictly 

comply with certification, even in cases where it is undisputed that the litigant 

timely mailed his notice of appeal. The majority cannot escape this fact. In other 

words, incarcerated, self-represented litigants no longer must simply mail their 

notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of a final judgment or order. They now 

must mail their notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of a final judgment or 

order and they must strictly comply with all certification requirements. The 

majority’s decision shifts Illinois away from a per se “mailbox rule” model and 

instead moves it to a “mailbox rule + strict certification” model. Simply put, this 

decision does not serve the interests of access to justice. The notion that the 

majority’s decision broadly makes things easier for incarcerated, self-represented 

litigants to exercise their fundamental right to appeal is not true, as was 

demonstrated by the experience of the incarcerated, self-represented litigant in the 

instant case.

¶ 50 Further, the majority takes petitioner and his counsel to task for failing to file a 

motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal. Supra ¶ 34. This reasoning prompts 

the question—why would an incarcerated, self-represented litigant file a motion for 

leave to file late notice of appeal when he believes his original notice of appeal was 

timely filed? Furthermore, the majority’s reasoning ignores the well-settled 
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principle that petitioner could not file a pro se motion for leave to file a late notice 

of appeal once counsel was appointed to represent him (counsel was appointed on 

September 18, 2020). “[A] defendant possesses ‘no right to some sort of hybrid 

representation, whereby he would receive the services of counsel and still be 

permitted to file pro se motions.’ ” People v. James, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1202, 1205 

(2006) (quoting People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836 (1996)); see also People 

v. Stevenson, 2011 IL App (1st) 093413, ¶ 30. I offer no comment about the 

effectiveness of counsel’s conduct, as that matter is not before this court.

¶ 51 As the highest court of this state, we continuously and rightfully promote equal 

access to justice for all litigants across Illinois. Our actions, however, must match 

our words. The majority’s decision fails to recognize the limitations that are 

particular to incarcerated, self-represented litigants. The situation of prisoners 

seeking to appeal without the aid of counsel is unique. First, and foremost, such 

litigants lack freedom of movement. They cannot simply walk to the circuit court 

or google “how do I appeal my case.” They often lack access to legal authority, 

materials, and forms due to lockdowns or restrictions on law library time. They are 

also subject to a prison mail system that labors with severe delays. Unskilled in law, 

unaided by counsel, and unable to leave the prison, they are left to their own devices 

to navigate a complex system consisting of hundreds of rules and ever-evolving 

case law. The system is so complex that we require seven years of postsecondary 

education and the subsequent passing of a two-day exam in order to stand before a 

court on another’s behalf. Even then, it often takes attorneys several years of 

seasoning before they find themselves sitting “first-chair” during a trial. Petitioner 

overcame all these obstacles but for certifying, under penalty of perjury, that the 

information contained in his Notice was true and correct. To ignore the reality of 

these facts, along with (1) the fact that petitioner placed his notice of appeal in the 

institutional mail a day before it was due, (2) the steps he took (supra ¶¶ 7-8) to 

attempt to comply with the intricacies of our rules, and (3) the legible postage meter 

stamp that objectively and undisputedly establishes the date of mailing, is an unjust 

interpretation of our rules and hampers our commitment to ensuring that all litigants 

in Illinois, including the poor and vulnerable, have equitable access to justice. 

¶ 52 Finally, with these facts in mind, I would like to express my concern that the 

majority’s decision creates an inconsistent standard when examining violations of 

our supreme court rules. Specifically, the majority’s decision in the instant case 
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applies a type of strict liability standard upon an incarcerated, self-represented 

litigant’s violation, whereas other types of violations, committed by trial judges or 

attorneys practicing in this state, are often excused via harmless-error review or the 

doctrine of substantial compliance. For example, this court in People v. Glasper, 

234 Ill. 2d 173, 201 (2009), reviewed whether a trial court’s failure to comply with 

Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 1997)), as it existed at that time, 

required a court to presume prejudice and automatically reverse the defendant’s 

conviction, or whether the error was subject to harmless-error review. Notably, 

Rule 431(b) at the time provided that the trial court “ ‘shall ask’ ” each potential 

juror if he or she understands certain bedrock principles of our judicial system. 

Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 187 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 1997)). In 

determining that the court’s failure to ask such questions was subject to harmlesserror review, we expressly held that “[t]he violation of a supreme court rule does 

not mandate reversal in every case.” Id. at 193. 

¶ 53 Likewise, in People v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 147, 152 (2007) (quoting Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 608(a)(9) (eff. Dec. 13, 2005)), we found that defense counsel’s violation 

of a supreme court rule providing that a court reporter “ ‘shall take the record of the 

proceedings’ ” does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Emphasis omitted.) In People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. 2d 154, 163, 165 (1996) (quoting 

Ill. S. Ct. R. 434(d) (eff. May 1, 1995)), we held that a trial court’s violation of a 

supreme court rule providing that defendant “ ‘shall be allowed’ ” a certain number 

of peremptory challenges did not require per se reversal of a conviction. Later, in 

People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 26-27 (2007), we determined that harmless-error 

review was appropriate where the defendant alleged that his sixth amendment right 

to a fair trial (U.S. Const., amend. VI) was violated when he was denied one of the 

seven peremptory challenges afforded to him pursuant to supreme court rule. In 

People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 193 (1992), we found that the State’s violation of 

a supreme court rule involving discovery was harmless and did not require 

automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction. In People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 

119, 132 (1987), we held that a trial court’s failure to provide the defendant with 

one particular admonishment prior to waiving counsel was not fatal to the 

defendant’s waiver of counsel because the trial court “substantially complied with 

the [r]ule.”
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¶ 54 Similarly, we have applied the same type of reasoning and analysis to statutory 

violations committed by trial courts. In People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 519 

(2009), we found that a trial court’s failure to admonish the defendant of potential 

immigration consequences prior to entry of his guilty plea, despite an Illinois statute 

providing that the trial court “shall give” said admonishments, did not automatically 

require a court to allow the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In In re 

M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶¶ 14, 21 (quoting 705 ILCS 405/5-810(2) (West 2008)), we 

found that a trial court’s failure to hold a hearing within 60 days of the filing of a 

motion for a proceeding to be designated as an extended juvenile jurisdiction prior 

to commencement of trial, despite an Illinois statute providing that “ ‘the hearing 

shall be held within 60 days of the filing of the motion’ ” did not void the 

defendant’s subsequent adult sentence. 

¶ 55 In none of the above cases did this court apply a strict liability standard to rule 

violations committed by trial judges or practicing attorneys. Yet here, the majority 

has chosen to require strict, technical compliance with Rules 373 and 12(b)(6) 

regardless of the fact that petitioner is an incarcerated, self-represented litigant who 

not only undisputedly mailed his notice of appeal before the due date but also 

attempted to comply with the intricacies of our rules. Again, petitioner included all 

relevant information in the Notice, including the date he was depositing the notice 

of appeal in the institutional mail. He merely failed to certify, under penalty of 

perjury, that the information in the Notice was true and correct. At best, petitioner 

complied with our rules, as the time of mailing is not in dispute. At worst, petitioner 

substantially complied with our rules. 

¶ 56 Accordingly, a plain and logical reading of our rules requires that petitioner’s 

appeal be heard on the merits. Furthermore, our continued commitment to ensuring 

fair and equitable access to justice demands it.