IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-683

No. COA22-126

Filed 18 October 2022

Gaston County, Nos. 20CRS60100, -60101

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

BRANDON KEITH HUNTER

Appeal by Defendant from order entered 12 August 2021 by Judge F. Donald

Bridges in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 

September 2022.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Caden 

William Hayes, for the State-Appellee.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel 

Shatz, for Defendant-Appellant.

COLLINS, Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant Brandon Keith Hunter appeals from the trial court’s order denying

Defendant’s motion to suppress and judgment entered upon Defendant’s plea of no 

contest to possession of a schedule II controlled substance, possession of 

non-marijuana drug paraphernalia, and failure to stop at a stop sign. Defendant 

contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because there 

was no probable cause to search and seize items from Defendant’s car. Because 
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Officer Stanley did not conduct a search within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment when he shined a flashlight into Defendant’s vehicle and because it was 

immediately apparent that the plastic baggie in plain view was contraband, we affirm

the trial court’s order and judgment. 

I. Procedural History and Factual Background

¶ 2 On the evening of 19 October 2020, Officers Steven Hoyle and Heath Stanley

were patrolling near Glenn Street in Gaston County when they observed a car, driven 

by Defendant, roll through a stop sign. The officers activated their emergency lights 

and sirens, and the car continued to roll for approximately 200 feet before coming to 

a stop. Stanley approached the passenger side of the car, initiated conversation with 

Defendant, and shined his flashlight around “[Defendant]’s area, the center console 

area, passenger area and behind [Defendant]’s seat” to look for weapons or 

contraband. While Stanley was doing so, Hoyle returned to the police car “to do a 

warrant check of the vehicle and do a warrant check of the vehicle and Mr. Hunter’s 

license.”

¶ 3 Stanley continued speaking with Defendant and shining the flashlight through 

the car windows for a “couple of minutes” before seeing a plastic baggie between 

Defendant’s seat and the door. Officer Stanley suspected the plastic baggie contained 

“illegal narcotics and crack-cocaine” because it had a “white rock substance inside”

and had the “tie ripped off.” Defendant was detained, and the plastic baggie
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retrieved. The officers suspected the contents of the baggie was crack-cocaine, and 

the contents “later field tested positive.”

¶ 4 Defendant was indicted for possession of a schedule II controlled substance, 

possession of non-marijuana drug paraphernalia, and failure to stop at a stop sign. 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Defendant had done nothing other 

than run a stop sign; that Officer Stanley deliberately extended contact with 

Defendant to continue a warrantless search of Defendant’s car; and that even if 

Officer Stanley observed the plastic baggie in plain view, it did not give rise to 

probable cause to search the vehicle. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 5 Defendant entered a plea of no contest to possession of a schedule II controlled 

substance, possession of non-marijuana drug paraphernalia, and failure to stop at a 

stop sign, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial 

court sentenced Defendant to 6 to 17 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 24 months 

of supervised probation. Defendant timely appealed. 

II. Discussion

¶ 6 Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress because Stanley lacked probable cause to search the car, and the stop was 

inappropriately pretextual.

¶ 7 “The standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is 

whether competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether 
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the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Jackson, 368 N.C. 75, 78, 

772 S.E.2d 847, 849 (2015) (citations omitted). “The trial court’s findings of fact 

regarding a motion to suppress are conclusive and binding on appeal if supported by 

competent evidence.” State v. Edwards, 185 N.C. App. 701, 702, 649 S.E.2d 646, 648 

(2007) (citations omitted). “Unchallenged findings of fact are binding on appeal.” 

State v. Fizovic, 240 N.C. App. 448, 451, 770 S.E.2d 717, 720 (2015) (citation omitted). 

“Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review.” State v. 

Sutton, 259 N.C. App. 891, 893, 817 S.E.2d 211, 213 (2018) (citation omitted).

A. Probable Cause

¶ 8 Defendant first contends that Stanley lacked probable cause to search the 

vehicle and seize the plastic baggie of contraband.

¶ 9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 

seizures. State v. Pasour, 223 N.C. App. 175, 176, 741 S.E.2d 323, 324 (2012) (citation 

omitted); State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984) (citation 

omitted). “[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but 

unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . A search occurs when the government 

invades reasonable expectations of privacy to obtain information.” State v. Ladd, 246 

N.C. App. 295, 301, 782 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2016) (citations omitted). “Officers who 

lawfully approach a car and look inside with a flashlight do not conduct a ‘search’ 
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 144, 

446 S.E.2d 579, 587 (1994) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (holding that 

an officer’s initial stop of defendant’s vehicle was valid, and shining his flashlight into 

the car and changing his position to see what was inside, did not violate any Fourth 

Amendment rights); State v. Whitley, 33 N.C. App. 753, 236 S.E.2d 720 (1977). 

Moreover, “[v]iewing an article that is already in plain view does not involve an 

invasion of privacy and, consequently, does not constitute a search implicating the 

Fourth Amendment.” State v. Alexander, 233 N.C. App. 50, 55, 755 S.E.2d 82, 87 

(2014) (citations omitted). 

¶ 10 “When an officer’s presence at the scene is lawful, . . . he may, without a 

warrant, seize evidence which is in plain sight and which he reasonably believes to 

be connected with the commission of a crime.” State v. Crews, 286 N.C. 41, 45, 209 

S.E.2d 462, 465 (1974) (citations omitted). Under the plain view doctrine, a 

warrantless seizure is lawful if 

(1) the officer was in a place where he had a right to be 

when the evidence was discovered; (2) the evidence was 

discovered inadvertently; and (3) it was immediately 

apparent to the police that the items observed were 

evidence of a crime or contraband.

State v. Newborn, 279 N.C. App. 42, 2021-NCCOA-426, ¶ 37 (emphasis and citation 

omitted). “Our courts have defined the term immediately apparent as being satisfied 

where the police have probable cause to believe that what they have come upon is 
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evidence of criminal conduct.” State v. Green, 146 N.C. App. 702, 706, 554 S.E.2d 834, 

836 (2001) (ellipses, quotation marks, and citation omitted).

¶ 11 Here, the trial court made the following relevant and unchallenged findings of 

fact:

4. As Officers Hoyle (driving) and Stanley (passenger) were 

on Glenn Street, they got behind a blue Chevrolet PT 

Cruiser being driven by the defendant.

5. The Chevrolet PT Cruiser rolled through a duly erected 

(sic) providing reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.

6. The officers activated their blue lights and siren. 

7. The PT Cruiser continued to roll forward for 200 feet . . . 

where he stopped.

8. Officers approached the vehicle: Officer Hoyle on the 

driver side and Officer Stanley on the passenger side.

9. Officers got the Defendant’s ID, and the Defendant 

provided a bill of sale on the vehicle and engaged the 

defendant about the sale of the vehicle.

10. During the conversation, Officer Stanley continually 

shined his flashlight inside the vehicle.

11. Officer Hoyle went back to the vehicle to do a record 

check/license check on the Defendant.

12. Officer Stanley remained engaged and talking to the 

defendant and continued to shine the flashlight inside the 

vehicle.

13. On the third pass through with the flashlight into the 

back seat of the vehicle, Officer Stanley caught a glimpse 

of what appeared to be a white plastic bag he deduced to be 

possibly a controlled substance, either crack or powder 

cocaine. 

14. Stanley communicated to Officer Hoyle what he saw in 

the vehicle.
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15. Stanley went to the driver side of the car and removed, 

searched and detained the Defendant. 

16. Officer Stanley then opened the back driver-side door, 

reached down to the floorboard and extracted a plastic bag 

that upon closer examination appeared to contain powder 

or rocklike substance and deduced that the substance was 

cocaine and field tested the substance whereupon it tested 

positive.

Upon these facts, the trial court concluded as follows:

1. Even if there was a purposeful interior (sic) of the vehicle 

with the use of a flashlight and even though the item found 

was not obviously apparent, nevertheless it was discovered 

by Officer Stanley with the naked eye, with the use of a 

flashlight without opening the door or going inside the 

vehicle.

2. Officer Stanley was immediately able to recognize that 

the plastic baggie and rock-like substance was contraband.

3. Although there was some lapse of time between the time 

of the initial stop and when the defendant was extricated 

from the vehicle, it does not appear that the officers 

prolonged the stop in order to do a search not related to the 

stop of the vehicle.

4. Thus, the search was not unreasonable.

5. That the purpose of the stop, even if it was pretextual, 

was lawful because it was conducted after a violation of a 

traffic law.

6. Thus, there was no violation of State or Federal law and 

the [s]top on the defendant was Constitutional and valid. 

¶ 12 The trial court’s findings show that Hoyle and Stanley watched Defendant roll 

through a duly erected stop sign, supporting the conclusion that the traffic stop was 

lawful. The facts further show that after Defendant stopped, Stanley approached 
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Defendant’s car and engaged Defendant in conversation while shining a flashlight 

into the interior of Defendant’s car. While doing so, Stanley spotted a white plastic 

baggie. Stanley did not conduct a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment when he lawfully approached Defendant’s car and looked inside with a 

flashlight. See Brooks, 337 N.C. at 144, 446 S.E.2d at 587. Furthermore, Stanley did 

not conduct a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he 

observed the plastic baggie in plain view. The findings of fact support the trial court’s 

conclusion that “the search was not unreasonable.”

¶ 13 Moreover, the trial court found that upon observing the plastic baggie, Stanley 

“deduced [it] to be possibly a controlled substance, either crack or powder cocaine.” 

This finding supports the trial court’s conclusion that Stanley was “immediately able 

to recognize that the plastic baggie and rock-like substance was contraband.” See 

Crews, 286 N.C. at 45, 209 S.E.2d at 465. Because Stanley was in a place where he 

had a right to be when the baggie was discovered, the baggie was discovered 

inadvertently, and Stanley had probable cause to believe that the baggie and its 

contents were contraband, Stanley was authorized to seize the baggie without a 

warrant. See Newborn, 2021-NCCOA-426 at ¶ 37. Accordingly, the findings of fact 

support the trial court’s conclusion that “there was no violation of State or Federal 

law . . . .”

B. Pretextual Stop 
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¶ 14 Defendant contends “[f]or preservation purposes” that the traffic stop of 

Defendant’s vehicle was inappropriately pretextual.

¶ 15 As Defendant concedes, both the United States Supreme Court and our North 

Carolina Supreme Court have ruled that an officer’s subjective motive for a stop has 

no bearing on the Fourth Amendment analysis. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 

806, 813 (1996); State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 635-36, 517 S.E.2d 128, 131-32 

(1999). 

In analyzing federal constitutional questions, we look to 

decisions of the United States Supreme Court[,] . . . [and] 

decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court construing 

federal constitutional . . . provisions, and we are bound by 

those interpretations. We are also bound by prior decisions 

of this Court construing those provisions, which are not 

inconsistent with the holdings of the United States 

Supreme Court and the North Carolina Supreme Court.

Johnston v. State, 224 N.C. App. 282, 288, 735 S.E.2d 859, 865 (2012) (citing State v. 

Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 421, 628 S.E.2d 735, 749 (2006), and In re Civil Penalty, 324 

N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989)).

III. Conclusion

¶ 16 The trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Judges DIETZ and CARPENTER concur.