UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4202

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALFRED LAVORIS MOODY,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00419-D-1)

Submitted: November 23, 2021 Decided: November 29, 2021

Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. G. Norman Acker, III, Acting United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Alfred Lavoris Moody pled guilty to two counts of possession with the intent to 

distribute a quantity of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court sentenced Moody to 

78 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Moody argues that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. We affirm.

We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review 

entails consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 

Id. at 51. We have confirmed that Moody’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. See

United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).

To be substantively reasonable, the sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater 

than necessary” to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In 

assessing substantive reasonableness, we consider “the totality of the circumstances.” 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable if it “is within 

or below a properly calculated Guidelines range,” and this “presumption can only be 

rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

Moody argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater 

than necessary to accomplish the objectives of sentencing. We have reviewed the record 

and conclude that the district court properly evaluated the relevant § 3553(a) factors, 
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including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and 

characteristics, and the need for just punishment and deterrence, and appropriately 

balanced these factors against Moody’s mitigating arguments in imposing a sentence 

within the Guidelines range. Therefore, Moody failed to rebut the presumption of 

substantive reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines-range sentence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED