F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

T I MOTHY G AN TT , Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v.
C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES ; R I CK L ANE , #116702; J OS E L. R EYES , #21778; A L G ONZAL ES , #15614; L O U IS T R OV AT O ; W I L L I E W I L L I AMS ,

Defendants-A

ppellees

. No. 11-55000

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-05979- OD W-C W

M I CH A EL S MI TH , Plaintif f-Appellant ,

v.
C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES ; R I CK L ANE , #16702; J OS E L. R EYES , #21778; A L G ONZAL ES , #15614; L O U IS T R OV AT O ; W I L L I E W I L L I AMS ,

Defendants-A

ppellees

. No. 11-55002

D.C. No. 2:09-cv-08565- OD W-C W

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ce ntr a l D istri c t of

Ca lif or nia Otis D. Wright, District J udg e, PresidingG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

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T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Argued and Submitted F e br ua ry 11 , 2 01 3—Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia
Filed Ma y 31, 2013
B e fo re : A le x Kozi ns ki, Chi e f Jud g e , A nd re w J. K le inf

e ld
and B arr y G. Silv e rm an, Cir c uit

Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Silverman; Di sse nt b y

Judg e Kl e inf

e ld

SUMMAR

Y *

Civil Rights The pa nel re verse d the district court’s judg ment in favor of def endants the City

of L os Ang eles a

nd others and
rema nded for a new trial in these consolidate d actions broug ht under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after pla intiffs’ murder convictions wer e vac ated.
Plaintiffs were rele ased f rom jail after , o n re t ri al, a ke y ey ewitness re cante d testimony that was alleg edly obtained as
a re sult of c oerc ive and abusive investigative techniques. The panel he ld that in plaintiffs’ § 1983 ac tions, the district court
e rr e d in ins tr uc ti ng the jur

y a bo ut t he le ve l of

c ulp a bil ity require d for a

deliberate fabr ication of evidenc e cla im under the Four teenth Amendme nt. The panel held that the cour t misled the jury

when it appe are d to equate t h e shocks-the-G AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 3

conscie nce sta

ndar d wi th an intent to injure. Moreove r, the pa ne l he ld t

hat th e ins tr

uc tio na l e rr or

wa s not h arm le ss beca use g iven the evidence, a rea sonable juror

could have conclude d that defe ndants used investig ative tec hniques that
wer e s o c o e r c iv e an d

a b u s iv e th a t t

h e y s h o u ld h av e known that those technique s would yield false inf ormation.
Th e pa ne l hel d that at re tr ia l th e dis tr ic t c ourt a dd iti on a lly should consider whe ther a Br a dyinstruction was wa rra nted and should also g ive a c orre cted c onspiracy instruction. Dissenting, Judge Kleinfe ld stated the fa brication of
e v id e n c e ju

r y in s tr u c ti o n w a s h ar

ml e s s b e c a

u s e the fa br ic a tio n c la im s ho uld

no t ha ve g on e to t

he ju ry a t a ll. J udg e Kleinfe ld stated that there was no e vidence that police exerted their pr essure on the key witness i n o rder to make him testify

to what the police be lieved to be f alse.

CO UN SEL Emmanuel C. Akudinobi (argued ) and Chijioke O. Ikonte, L aw Of fice s of Akudinobi & Ikonte, L os Ang eles, California , fo r t he Pla int if

fs -A pp e lla nts

. Carmen A. T rutanich, Cit y Attorney , L isa S. Ber g er ( argued)
and Amy Jo F ie ld, De puty

City Attor

ne y s, Of fi c e of the City Atto r n e y , L o s A ng e le s, Ca lif

or nia , f or De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.G AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

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A f ul l r ecoun t i ng of

t he f ac t s o f t he un derl y i ng cr i me and addi t i onal 1 aspec t s o f

t he i nvest i gat i o n are contai ned i n t he 2 0 0 4 op i ni o n.

OP IN ION
SI L VERMAN, Circuit J udg e:
Pla int if f- Ap pell ants Ti mot

hy Ga ntt and Mic ha e l Smi th
wer e tried a

nd convicted o f t he August 19, 1992 murder of Kalpesh V ardha

n. An Arthur An derse n Consulti ng em p l o y ee , Va rd h an wa s s t ab b edt o d ea t h i n a pa rk i n g gar age in d ow nto wn

L os An g e le s. Th is i s the se c on d ti me thi s matter ha s co m e before us. I n 2004, we r ever sed the de nial of Gantt’s fede ral habeas petition and remanded the case for an evide ntiary

hear ing. Gantt v. Roe , 3 89 F .3 d 9 08 , 9 16 (9 th Cir. 2004). That re sulted in the issuance of the writ, a r etrial 1 and, af ter th e k ey

witness rec anted his testimony , the dismiss al o f all charg es with prejudice during the cour se of the trial. Smith won release in 2009 on a habe as pe t i t i on. The instant appe al conc erns the unsucce ssful lawsuits under 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 f

ile d b y Ga ntt and S mi th f oll ow ingthe ir rele ase. The case proce eded to tria l and resulted in a ver dict fo r t he de fe nd ants on

a ll c la ims . O n a

pp e a l, G antt

and Smith
c ha lle ng e c e rt a in j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns and e vid e nti ary

ru lin g s. We r e ve rs e and

re mand fo r a ne w tri a l.
BACK GR OUND
Duri ngthe orig ina l c ri min a l tr ia l th a t r e su lte d in Appell an t s ’ c o n v i ct i o n s , t h re e w i t n es s es at t em p t edt o co n n ect Ga ntt and Smit h to the mur de r. Th e so le a lle g e d e y e wi tne ss to the crime w as a loc al ca r burg lar named David Rosemond, whom the police picked up two months after the murder

on a burgla ry char g e. Rosemond claimed he was in the pa rkingG AN TT V

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D ep ut y D i st ri ct A t t o rney G race test i f i ed t hat R o semo nd s ai d t he 2 d et ect i ves had i nf

o rme d R o semo nd o f t he $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 reward put up b y t he C i t y of Los A ng el es an d A rthur A nd er s en C ons ul t i ng becau s e h e wa s rel uct ant t o t est i f

y , and i nst ruct ed hi m not t o s ay anyth ing a b o ut t he reward in c o urt

. U l t i m at el y , R o semo nd was awarde d a po rt i o n of t he $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 t o t al f

o r hi s t est i m o ny
. H o w ever, i t ap p ears t hat t he co urt
o v e rr u le d a c o lo ra b le he a rs a y o b je c tio n to G ra c e ’s testim o n y a s to R o se m o n d ’s sta te m e n ts. S inc e n o e x c e p tio n a p p lied , t h is w a s im p ro p e rly
a d m itt e d , an d w e d o no t co n sid e r it. g ara g e onth e mo r

n in gV ar dh anw a s k il le d , lo o k in g to s te al
car radios to financ e a dr

ug habit. He testified th at he saw Ga ntt be a tin g up the vic timand Smith sta nd ingne xt to the m, ho ldi nga g un . Ro se mon d d id no t in terve ne or c a ll f or he lp but, afte r t he assailants had fled, he appr oache d the sce ne and took the dying vic tim’s ATM car d.

L APD homicide detec tiv es J o se Rey es and Rick L ane, both Defe ndant-Appellees her e, interr og ated Rosemond. Ros e mon d te sti fi e d th a t, at th e tim e he was take n into c u s t o dy, h e h a d

b e e naw ak e f

o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y tw o d ays straight on a cr ack bing e and w as still under the influenc e when he made his identifications

. Over the cour se of the h o u rs -l o n g i n t erro gat i o n , t h e d et ec t i v es t h re at en edt o ch ar ge him with the murder if he did not provide information: “The y said if I didn’t g ive them something , that Iwould g o down for it.” Ros e mon d a lso te sti fi e d a s f oll ow s: 2

It w a s s o m e d a

y s
. It w a s n ’ tj u s to n e d ay
. It wa s l ik e, Ido n’ t kn ow , f our o r f ive or six h o u rs i n t h at l i t t l e ro o m
. An d t h en Iwo u l d

go back to my

cell and the y would bringme bac k the next day

and as kme more que stions and show me picture s. I t wa s kind of like tryingG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

6

to s c are me . I

do n’ t kn ow if th a t w a s th e ir intention. Additionally , Rosemond told Rey es and L ane that he believe d Gantt had onc e robbe d him, but thi s statement did not make it into their repor

ts or the chronolog ical log, or come ou t at tr ia l. D ur ingthe fi rs t tr ia l, R os e mon d te sti fi ed on c ro ssexamination that he bore no animosity towards Ga

ntt and had
no re a so n to have any

bia se d v ie w o f h im. The District Attorney ’s offic e initially reje cted the c ase, in p art , b e c a

us e of c on c e rn s a

bout R os e mon d’ s c re dib ili ty and g rantingRosemond immuni ty . The e vidence was subsequently

revie wed by a differ ent prosec utor who dec ided to go f orwa rd with the case afte r re -interview ing Rosemond.
The sec ond witness was Ke vin Shorts, a CP A at Ar thur Ander sen, who claimed he saw Gantt and Smit h n ea r t he
sc e ne of the c ri me aro un d th e tim e of the mur de r. Sho rt s to ld L ane a nd Rey es that he sa

w Gantt driving a vehic le on the six th floor of the g ara g e and that he was ab l e t o see G antt’s fa c e re fl e c te d in

a re ar- vie w m ir

ro r f or a matte r o f s e c on ds

. He i d e n t i f

i e d G an t tf r o ma p h o t o ar r ay
. H o w e v e r , Sho rt s initially identified an individual by the name of

Ray mond Wi l s o n as t he ac complice who w as standingoutside the
ve hic le , b e fo re ide nti fy

ingSmith. Whil e pa

rk e d o n th e sixth floor of th e g ar a g e r e a d in g h is ma il , Sh o rts d id n o t h e ar any scr ea m ing or

sounds of an attack or strug g le; nor did he see Ros e mon d. Sho rt s col le c te d a $2 0, 00 0 r e wa

rd fo r h is t e s t i m o n y.
T h e t h i rdwi t n e s s wa s J o s e C u b i as , t h e p ark i n g gar age attendant on duty . Cubias did not wi t n es s t h e cr ime either, but he did see a

car with two bl ack me n exit the g ara g e. HeG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 7

te sti fi e d th a t he re c a lle d th e ve hic le becau se it w a s th e on ly
no -p ay tic ke t th a t day

—th e c ar w a s in

the g ara g e fo r o nly approximately

fi v e minutes and, there fore , no fee was c ha rg e d. Cub ia s id e nti fi e d th e ve hic le fr om a c ompo si te sketch a nd initially was able to say Gantt’s photo resembled the driver

. Th e on ly ph y sic a l e vid e nc e po te nti a lly linki ng Ga

ntt to the cr ime was a

matchbook fr om an Indian re stauran t in the L os An g e le s ar e a , whi c h wa s found on his pe rs on a t th e tim e of his arr est. The prosec ution’s the ory was that this item was lifted from Va

rdhan’ s person at the time of the cr ime. The matchbook con t ai n ed a ha ndwritten phone numbe r, but the handwr iting ana ly sis could not conclusively l i n k i t to the victim. The 19-dig it phone n umber c onnecte d to an individual in Bang ladesh who di d n ot rec og nize Vardha n’s
name or ph oto . T he man’ s son, wh o wor ke d at the re sta

ur ant, also did not recognize Va rdhan from the photo. In 2004, we held that the prose cutors had violate d Brady by fa ili ngto dis c los e that the se ind ivi du a ls h a d n ot r e c og nize d th e vic tim

. Ga ntt , 389 F.3d at 910–11. We reve rsed the de nial of Ga ntt’s fede ral ha

beas pe tition on t h e gro unds that g iven the
weakness of the pr osecution’s evidence and the state ’s relianc e on the matc hbook, these Brady violations were not harmless a

nd could well have altere d the outcome of the ca se. Id . at 915–16. Our de cision did not reac h any of Ga ntt’s o th e r c la im s
. We r e ma

n d e d th e c a s e f

o r ane v id e ntiary he ari ngto d e te rm ine wh e the r t he dis c los ur e vio latio ns ha d in fac t occur

red. Id . at 916. O n re m an d , the district court g rante d Gantt’s habea s petition, a nd a retria l w as sche duled.

I n th e mi d d le o f

th e r e tr ia l i n2 0 0 8 , Ro s e mo n d r e c anted his or ig ina l te sti mony , wh ic h ha d pinne d the mur de r o n G antt and Smith. The prosec ution moved to dismiss all char g esG AN TT V

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G on za l es , LAPD ’ s h omi ci de u n i t s u p er v i s or du r i n g t h e i n v es t i g at i on 3 of t h e mu r de r , s e r v e d a s Re y e s a n d L a n e ’ s i mme di a t e s u pe r v i s or
. As
com mandi ng of

f i cer f or t he di vi s i on, L i eut ena nt T r ovat o s uper vi s ed G o nz ales. a g a ins t G antt

wi th preju dic e , a

nd he wa s r e le a se d. Smit

h subsequently p ro secute d a wr it of habea s corpus a nd was rele ased in 2009.
Ga ntt and Smit h file d s e pa

rate Se c tio n 1 98 3 a c tio ns , which we re c onsolidated fo r d iscovery and trial. Ga

ntt’s Se c on d A me nd e d Co mpl a int state d th e foll ow ingc la ims under 42 U .S.C. §§ 1983, 19 8 5 : (1) malicious prose cution; (2) due proce ss violation based on Brady vio latio ns , f a ilure to prese rve or

analy ze evidence , and fabr ication of e vidence ; (3)
rec kless indiffer ence to civil rights; (4) c onspiracy under § 198 5; ( 5) c on sp ir a c y

to v iol a te Ga

ntt ’s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts under § 1983; a

nd (6) Mo ne ll li a

b il it y
. H e n ame d as defe ndants retire d detec tives L ane a nd Rey es, the County

of L os An g e le s, the City

of L os An g e le s, Al Go nza le s, L ie ute na nt L ou is T ro vato, L APD Chi e f Wi lli e Willi ams, Deputy D.A. Sterling Norris, a

nd D.A. I nvestig ator Edwa rd Boyer. 3
Th e Smith Co mpl a int , f ile d o ve r s ix mo nth s late r i n November

2009, ag ainst the City

of L os Ang eles, L ane, Rey es, Gonz al es, L ieutenant Tr ovato, and LAPD Chief Wil l iams, stated the followingclaims: (1) malicious prosec ution; (2) due proce ss violations premised on the nondisclosure of Brady and Gi gli o evidenc e; (3) failure to gather, prese rve, a

n d / o r di sclose mater ial exculpatory evidenc e; (4) fabr ication of e vidence ; (5) unc onstitut ionally sug g estive line-up and identification proc edure s; (6) Mo ne ll liability ; (7)
re c kle ss i nd if

fe re nc e to c ivi l r ig hts ; (8) fa ilure to int e rv e ne toG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 9

preve nt civil rights violations; and (9) c onspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. On April 9, 2009, t he cour t gr anted a

motion for judgme nt on the p l e a d i n g s a s t o t h e C o u n t y o f L o s A n g e l e s , D e pu ty D. A. No rr is, and

D. A. I nvesti g a tor

B oy e r, c iti nga

bs olute pr os e c uto ri a l im mun ity

and ru lin g tha

t Mo ne ll l i abil ity

does
no t a pp ly to a c ounty in s uc h c ir c ums tanc e s.
The c ase w as divided into individual l i abil ity , Mo ne ll lia bil ity , a nd pu ni tiv e dama g e s p ha se s. Ga ntt and Smit h dis mi s s e d th e ir c la im s a g a in s t G o n za le s , Wi ll ia ms , and Tro vato , a

nd wi thd re w the ir § 1 98 5 c on sp ir a c y

c la ims

. Ad dit ion all y , Smithwi thd re w h is c la im f

or re c kle ss indiffer ence to civil rights viol ations, as well as his claim for fa ilure to i nte rv e ne to p re ve nt c ivi l r ig hts v iol a tio ns . T hu s, the c a se pr oc e e de d on the ma lic iou s pr os e c uti on , du e pr oc e ss and fa brication of evidenc e, Brad y /G igl io , failure t o gat her and pre serve evidenc e, unconstitutional id entification, conspirac y

to violate consti tutional rig hts under § 1985, and Mo ne ll liability

claims ag ainst Def

endants L ane, Rey es, and the City of L os Ang eles. A jury re t u rn ed a ver dict for the De fe nd ants on

a ll the se c la ims

. JU RI SDI CT ION AN D ST AN DA RD OF RE VI EW We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1291. “The standard of

revie w for a

n alleg ed er

ror in jury

instructions depends on the nature of the c laimed er ror.” Jenk

ins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 22 F.3d 206, 210 ( 9th Cir. 1994). “A district court’s f ormulation of the jury

instructions is revie wed f or abuse of discretion. I f, howe ver, the instructions are challeng ed as a

misstatement of the l aw, they are then revie wed de novo.” Duran v. City of Maywood , 2 2 1 F.3dG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

10 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (pe r cur iam ) (inter nal quotation marks and c itation om i t t ed). I ncomplete instructions ar e treated as leg al errors and revie wed de novo as we ll. Dang v. Cro ss , 422 F.3d 800, 804–06 ( 9th Cir. 2005).
“W e have stressed that jury instructions must fairly

and adequately

cover the issues prese nted, must c orre ctly state the law, and must not be misleading .” Id

. a t 8 0 4 ( a lte ration, qu otatio n ma

rk s, c itatio n o mitte d) . “F ur the r, ‘[a ] part

y is
e nti tle d to an in str

uc tio n a bo ut h is o r h e r the or

y of the c a se if it is supported by

law and h as foundation i n the evidenc e.’” Id

. at 8 0 4

– 0 5 (q u o t i n g Jones v . W illiams , 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)). The re must be a suff icient evidentiar

y foundation t o support g iving the instruc tion. Y an Fang Du v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 697 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2012) (c iting Mende z v. C nty. of San Bernardino , 540 F.3d 1109, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2008)). “ Whether there is sufficient evide nce to support a n instruction is reviewe d for a buse of discr etion.” Id . (citations omitted).

“ I f, ho we ve r, the e rr or in the jur y ins tr uc tio n is ha

rm le ss, it does not warr ant re versa l.” Dang , 4 2 2 F

. 3 d a t8 0 5

. “ In evaluating jury

instructio n s , prejudicia l error results when, looking to the instruct i o n s as a whole, the substance of the applicable law was [ not] fairly and cor rec tly cover ed.” Swinton v. Potomac Corp. , 270 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 2001) (alter ation in orig inal; internal quot ation marks and citations omitted). Harmless e rror revie w for a

civil jury

tr i al i s as fo llo ws :
An e rr or in i ns tr uc tin g the jur

y in a ci vil c a se re quires re versa l unless the err or is more probably t h an not harmless. Bec ause w e pr e sume pr e

jud ic e wh e re c ivi l trial er ro r i sG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 11

conce rned, the burden shifts to t he def endant to d em o nstrate that it is more proba ble than
no t th a t th e jur

y wo uld have re a c he d th e same verdic t had it been pr operly instructed.
Cle m v. Lom e li , 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (interna l
c itatio ns and

qu otation

mark s o mitte d) . “ Pr e

jud ic e is a lso g e ne ra lly mor e lik e ly

tha n n ot i f ‘ no thi nga

bo ut t h[e jur y ’s ] ve rd ic t ind ic a te s that the re su lt wo uld have be e n t he sam e wi t h out the err or.’” Id

. (q u o t i n g Ca b a lle r o v

. Ci tyof Con c or d , 956 F.2d 204, 207 ( 9th Cir. 2009)).

DI SCU SSIO N
1. F abrication of E vidence
The district cour

t erre d in instructing the jur y about the l evel of culpability

require d for a

deliberate fa

brication of
e v i d e n c e c l a i mu n d e r

t h e F o u rt e e n t hA m e n dm e n t

. In Dev ereaux v. Abbe

y , 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (e n banc) , we he ld that “there is a clea rly established constitutional due proce ss rig ht not to be subjected to cr iminal charg es on the basis of fa lse evidenc e that was deliberately fabr icated by

the g overnme nt.” Id . at 10 74 –7 5. We s tate d that in or de r t o establish deliberate fa

brication of evidenc e, a pla intiff
must, a t a minimum , point to evidence that su p p o rts at least one of the followingtwo pr op os iti on s: ( 1) De fe nd ants con tin ue d th e ir investigation of [ the pl aintiff] despite the fa ct that they knew or shou l d have known that he was inn ocent; or ( 2) De fenda nts used investigative techniques that wer e so coe rcive and abusive that they

k n ew or should haveG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

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kn ow n th a t thos e te c hn iqu e s wou ld y ie ld f a lse information.
Id . at 1076. Plaintiffs addu ced no e vidence to support the first theory , so they

on l y could be rely

ing on the second Dev ereaux ba sis

. Re g arding the re qu ir e d le ve l of c ulp a bil ity , d ue pr oc e ss violations under the Four

teenth Amendme nt occur

only when officia l conduct “sh o c k s th e c o n s cienc e,” W ilkinson v. Torres , 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010) , but what t h at m eans “depe nds on the context,” Tennison v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco , 5 70 F .3 d 107 8, 10 89 (9 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; se e als o Cnt y . o f Sa c ra me nto v . Le wis , 5 2 3 U

. S

. 8 3 3 , 8 4 6 ( 1 9 9 8 )

. In W ilkinson , w e e xpla ine d th a t:
Where a ctual deliber ation is pr actica l, then an office r’s “ deliberate indiffer ence ” may suffice to shock the consc ience. On t he other hand, wher e a law enforce ment office r m akes a snap judgme nt be cause of an esca lating s ituation, his conduct may

only be fou n d t o shock the conscie nce if

he ac ts with a purpose to har m unrelated to le g itimate la w enforce ment ob je c tiv e s.
610 F.3d at 554 (citations omitted). And in Tennison , w e a lso made c lear

that actingwith “de l i b erate indiffer ence to or rec kless dis re gard f

or an a ccuse d’s rig hts” was “ consistent wi th t he sta nd ard impo se d in

the su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss c on te xt, in wh ic h g ov e rnme nt a c tio n ma y vio late du e pr oc e ss if it ‘shocks the consc ience .’” 570 F .3d at 1089.G AN TT V

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T he i ns t r uct i ons quot ed i n t hi s opi ni on ar e t ake n f r om t he f i nal wr i t t en 4 j ur y i ns t r uct i ons
. T her e ar e i mm at er i al var i anc es bet ween t he wr i t t en s et
o f i nst ruct i o ns and t he t rans cri p t reco rding t he co urt ’ s verba l i nst ruct i o ns to the ju ry. The re levant portion of the instruc tion the court g ave the jur y wa s a s f oll ow s:
Coercive and abusive investigati ve techniques violate a per son’s 14th amendment [right] to due process whe n they s h o ck the consci e n c e , th a t i s , th e c o n d u c t o f th e p o li ce o f f i c e r i s i n t e n d e d

t o i n j u r e i ns o m e w ay, un jus tif ie d b y any go ve rnme nta l in te re st. Torture is an exa mple of a c oerc ive and abusive investig ative tec hnique.
Deliber ate indiffe renc e is the conscious or
rec kless disreg ard o f t he conse quence s of
on e ’ s a c ts o r

o mi s s io n s
. I t e n ta il s s o me th ing
mo re than neg lige nce but is satisfied by something le ss than acts or o missions for the
ve ry purp os e of c a

us ingha rm or wi th kn ow le dg e that ha

rm wi ll r e su lt. 4
Th is e xplanatio n o f t

he law w a s c on fu sin g and mis le a din g in two related re spects. F irst, it failed t o s t at e the intent-toinjure a n d deliberate-indiffe renc e standa rds in a cle ar dis jun c tiv e format , so th a t a re a so na ble jur or wo uld understand e ach of

these satisfies the broa der “ shocks-theconscie nce” standard. Second, i t included only torture a s an example o f what would satisfy the “shoc ks-the-c onscienc e standard.” Had the court g iven only the sec ond para g raph a s an instruction on the leve l of culpability , t h er e would be noG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

14

e rr or
. No ne of the pr of

fe re d ev ide nti ary

ba se s f or thi s c la im involved “a sna

p judgme nt beca

us e of a

n esca lating
s i t uation,” W

ilkinson , 6 1 0 F

. 3 d

a t5 5 4 , s o t h e c o urtc ou ld have sim ply omi tte d th e int e nt- to- inj ur e (o r p ur po se -t o- ha

rm ) standard a ltoge ther. Instead, t h e cour t misl ed the jury

when it appear ed to equate the “shoc ks-the-c onscienc e” sta n d ard with an intent to injure.
Th e qu e s ti o n is w h e th e r th e in s tr u c ti o n a l e r

r or wa s harmless. The district c ourt rec og nized that there was sufficie nt evidence to subm i t t h e cla im to the jury . On our own independe nt revie w of the evidence, we conc ur that there was suff icient evi d en ce t o instruct the jury on the claim of fabr ication of evidence . Rosemond testified that the de te c tiv e s thre a te ne d to c ha rg e him wi th t he mur de r if he did not provide information. The manner and cir cumstance s of Rosemond’s interrog ation also support the conc lusion that t h e r e w a s s u f

f i c i e n te v i d e n c e t o s e n d

t h i s c l a i mt o th e j ur

y: “[Q:] Did any

of the off icer s show y ou some materia ls where th e y to ld y o ud o n ’ t s ay

w e s h o w e d

y o u this?

. . . . [A :] I would say y es.” Fur

thermore , L ane and Rey es did not think Rosemo n d was still under the influenc e duringthe interrog ation, but he testified that he had bee n awake for
a pp ro xima te ly

tw o da y s str a ig ht on a c ra c k bin g e , a nd wa s in fa c t st ill high whe n he ma de his ide nti fi c a tio ns . Are a so na ble juror could ha

ve conc luded that the “ De fe ndants used investigative techniques that were so coer cive a nd abusive that th e y
. . . s ho uld

have kn ow n th a t th os e te c hn iqu e s w ou ld yield false inf

ormation.” Dev ereaux , 263 F.3d at 1076. The question was triable and for the jury to resolve.
As th e d is tr ic t c o u rt i ts e lf r e c o g n iz e d , th e p la intif fs produce d enoug h proof of their cla im o f fa

brication of evidenc e both to survive a motion for judgment a s a matter ofG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 15

law and to have the jury

instructed on that theor

y . I t theref

ore follows that the er

roneous jury instructions c annot be dee med harmless for

lack of proof. Ac cording ly , we r ev erse and
re mand fo r a ne w tri a l on

the fa br ic a tio n o f e vid e nc e c la im.
2
. BradyCl aim
W e have he ld i n n o unc e rt a in t e rm s th a t Brady ’s require me n t to d is c lo s e materia l exculpatory and imp e a c hme nt e vid e nc e to t he de fe ns e a

pp lie s e qu a lly

to prosec utors and police off icer s. Tennison , 570 F.3d at 1087.

“Brady suppression occur s when the g overnme nt f ails to turn
over e ven evide nce that is known only to police investigators and not to the prosec utor.” Y ou ngblo od

v . W est V irg ini a , 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006) (pe r cur iam) (c itation and quotation marks omitted). “To state a c laim under Brady , the plaintiff must alleg e that (1) th e wi t h held evidenc e wa s favor able e ither bec ause it was exculpatory or could be used to impeach, ( 2) the e vidence was suppr essed by the g overnme nt, and (3) the n o ndisclosure pre judiced the plaintiff.” Smith v. Almada , 640 F.3d 93 1 , 9 3 9 (9th Cir. 20 11 ); accord M

ilke v. R yan , N o
. 07

- 9 9 0 0 1 , 2 0 1 3 WL 979127, at *13 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013)

. The district cour

t declined, without explanat i o n , to give an instruction on the Brady claim. That c laim was pre mised
on the po lic e of

fi c e rs ’ fa ilure to dis c los e that Ro se mon d to ld them that he had be en robbe d by Gantt in the past. Plaintiffs contend that they

could have used that information to show Rosemond’s animosity

towards Ga

ntt and there by

impeach his story

. Howeve r, it is possible that the cour t rea soned that the poli ce cannot be faulted f or fa iling to see the mitigating
v a l u e o f R o s e m o n d ’ s s t a t e m e n ta b o u tt h e p r i o r

r o b b e r y. I nd e e d, the c ourt

may hav e c on c lud e d th e po lic e re a so na blyG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

16

P l ainti f

f

- A p p ell an t s co m p l ain that J u d g e W right w as b i ase d ag ainst 5 t he m . W e fi nd no rea so n to rea ssi gn t his m att er. M i nd f ul t ha t t his was a d i f f i cul t case t o try, w e respe ct f ul l y remind t he d i st ri ct co urt and t he p a rtie s to m a inta in a n a tm o sp h e re o f m u tua l re sp e c t an d c ivility. viewe d it a s mo r e in c r im in a ti n g th anmi ti g a ti n g b y s h o w ing both Gantt’s prope nsity

to rob and h is familiarity with the person he purported to identify

. At any retria l in this matter, the cour t should consider whe ther a Bradyins tr uc ti on is
wa rr an t edan d

ex p l ai ni t s ru l i n g.
3. Conspi racy U nder 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Def endants c oncede that the conspira cy instruction was
err oneous, but argue har ml essness. The court g ave a n instruction for a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim, but Plaintiffs were pro s ec u t i n g a § 1983 cla im. I f a ne w trial is to be held, the
corr ect c onspiracy

instruction must be give n.
4
. Re mai n i n g As s i g n men ts o f E rr o r a n d Cl a i ms Plaintiff-Appellants’ r emainingassig nment s of er ror either la ck merit or the claims are not suppor ted by sufficie nt evidenc e in the rec ord, such that any claim ed instructional
e rr or wa s h arm le ss— or

bo th. B e c a

us e we fi nd

reversi ble instructional err or in this case a nd rema nd for a new tria l, we need not r

ule on the cla imed err o rs in the district court’s
e vid e nti ary

ru lin g s. Ho we ve r, if Pla int if fs a g a in se e k to us e a po lic e -p ra c tic e s e xpe rt , th e c ourt may not excl ud e thi s testimony wi t h out first allowing Plaintiffs to make a prof fer and then g iving spe cific r easons f or the e x clusion. 5G AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 17
CO NC LU SION
Acc ording ly , we RE VE RSE and REMAND f

o r a new trial limit ed to the spec ific cla ims outl ined above

.

KLEINFE L D, S en i o r C i rc u i tJ u d ge, d i s s en t i n g:
G an tt an d Sm it hd id n o t g e t a

f a ir tr ia l. We th e r e f

o re c a us e d th e ir c onvic tio ns to be va c a te d. Th e e vid e nc e a g a ins t the m w a s w e ak, so wh e n o ne of the pr os e c uto r’ s th re e ma in witnesses cha

ng ed h i s story

in the middle of Gantt’s sec ond trial, the prose cutor dismissed. Both a re nowfre e, and f

urther prosec ution is barr ed. Their g uilt or innocenc e, a n dthe fa ir ne ss o f t he ir fi rs t c ri min a l tr ia l, a

re no lon g e r b e fo re us
. What we have befor e us are their civil lawsuits aga inst the two police officer s who i nstigated t he prosecution. The trial judge let the fa

brication of evidenc e cla im g et to the jury , and g ave some arguably

confusing or er

roneous instructions. Any such trial er

ror, thoug h, was ha

rmless, bec ause plai n tiffs lacke d a prima f

acie case
. That is not to s u gges t that Gantt and Smith were tre ated fairly in the criminal proce eding s, or that they committed the murder. F rom all we c an tell from the rec ord, the two police de te c tiv e s tho ug ht Ga

ntt and Smith ha d mur de re d Ka lp e sh Var dhan, and d i d all they could, rig htly

and wr ong ly , to ge t them convicted f

or it. The evidence ag ainst Gantt and Smith, though, w as ver

y thin, and, whateve r the poli ce de tectives thought, the pr osecutor did not think he could pr ove murde r once a key witnes s chang ed his story . One of the three wi tne sse s, the a c c ounta

nt, wa s sh aky

on the identi fi c a tio ns
.G AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

18
Th e s e c o n d , th e o n e w h o c h an g e d h is s to r y in th e mi d d le of the se c on d tri a l, wa s a thie f in the g ara g e to ste a l car s te re os
. He was not ve ry cre dible, both be cause he was a thief, and beca use (thoug h the prosec utors and police hid this from de fe ns e c ouns e l) , h e pr ob abl y ha d a g ru dg e a g a ins t G antt

. Th e thi rd wi tne ss, the pa

rk ingg ara g e a tte nd ant, se e ms t o me to be as supportive of the def ense a s of the prose cution. On the one ha

nd, he wa s t h e best witness for puttingGantt and Sm i th in the ga

rag e at the r ight time, but on the other hand, their parking g ara g e ticket put the m the re for wh at s o unds li k e to o s h o rt a

ti me to lo c a te , r o b , an d

k il l t h e v ic ti m. T he only phy sical evidence w as a matchbook Gantt had f rom an I ndian re staurant, use d by the prosecution to sugg est that the non-Indian def

endants too k it from the ethnica lly I ndian vic tim

. Th e matc hb oo k tur ne d out to be a fa lse le a d b e c a us e no on e c ou ld es ta

bli sh that th e I nd ian v ic timha d e ve r b e e n to the restaur ant. The prosec ution hid from the defe nse in the first trial the evide nce that it was a fa lse lead.
But the thinness of the evidence for murder doe s not e sta bli shfa br ic a tio n o f e vid e nc e , the th e or y the ma jor ity
acce p t s. The tort theory would be, basic ally , that the prosec utors and poli ce kne w Gantt and Smith were innocent
and pr os e c ute d th e m any

wa y , a nd c re a te d f a lse e vid e nc e wi th wh ic h to do it. Gan tt and Smith f a ile d to e sta

bli sha pr ima fac ie ca se for

fabr ication of e vidence

. Any inadequa cy

in the fa b rication of evidenc e jury ins tr uc tio n w a s h arm le ss, be c a us e the fabri c a tio n c la im should not have g one to the jury at all. The c onsti t u t i o nal violation claimed is that the police de nied due proc ess of law to G antt and Smith b y fa br ic a tin g e vid e nc e . T he su pp os e dly fab r ic a te d e v id e n c e w a s th e c ar

s te r e o th ie f

’ s id e n ti f ic a ti o n.G AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 19

T he A m eri can H eri t age D i ct i o nary 48 4 (2d

. co l l

. ed

. 19 8 5 ). 1

D eve r eaux v. A bb ey , 26 3 F.3d 10 7 0 (9t h C i r. 20 0 1 ) ( en b anc). 2

I d. a t 1073. 3

I d. a t 1074–75. 4 “F abric ation” mea

ns cre ating something in order to dece ive. 1 The interr og ation techniques use d on Rosemond, the car stereo th ie f

, ma y h av e v io late d h is r igh ts b u t th a t is not en o u g h to e s ta

b li s h th a t G an tt ’ s an d Sm it h ’ s r igh ts were vio late d. Th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e that the po lic e e xer te d th e ir pressure on Rosemond in o rd er to make him testify to what the police be lieved to be f alse.
Ha d o ne of

the po lic e me n g on e to an Ind ian r e sta ur ant, ob ta ine d a

matc hb oo k, and

pla nte d it in G antt ’s poc ke t, i n order to tie him to the ethnically I ndian victim, that would be fab ri ca t ion of evidenc e. Or had the c ar ster eo thief told the police that Ga

ntt and S m ith were not the men he sa w, and they told him, “testify that he was, or we’ll frame y ou for the murder,” that would be fa bri ca t ion of evidenc e. The due pr oc e ss v iol a tio n c on sis ts, e sse nti a lly , of cr e a tin g fa lse evidenc e to fra

me someone f

or a c rime.
We s po ke to what “ fa

br ica tion o f e vid e nc e ” me ans in Dev ereaux

v. Abbe y , an en ba

nc ca se a ri s ing out of

the 2 Wen a t c h e e “ s e xu a l a

b u s e ‘ w i t c hh u n t ’ i nw h i c h4 3 a d ult s wer e c h ar g e d

w it ho v e r 2 9 , 0 0 0 c o un ts o f

s e xual molestation.” We held t hat “ther e is a c lear ly established 3 constitutional due process right not to be subject to cr iminal
c ha rg e s o n th e basi s of fa lse e vid e nc e that w a s d e lib e ra te ly fabr icated by

the g overnme nt.” We deemed suc h fabr ication 4G AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

20

I d. at 10 7 5 (di scus si ng Pyl e v. Kans as , 31 7 U

. S. 21 3 (19 4 2 ))

. 5

I d. a t 1076. 6

I d. 7

I d. 8

I d. a t 1077. 9 compar able to know ing use of perjure d testimony , the subject of the Supreme Court decision in Pyle v . Kansas

. 5
Yet the “fa

brication” claim was unsucce ssful as a matter of law e ven in the Wenatche e witch hunt. We held that, even though the leng thily interrog ated children who denied having been sexually molested wer e pressure d for hours unt i l t h ey chang ed th ei r stories to what the inve stigating de tective a nd
so c ia l w or

ke rs wa nte d th e m to say , th e vic timof th e fa lse char g es “ha [d] not a dduced or pointed to any evidenc e in the
re c or d to su

pp or t” a fa br ic a tio n c la im. He wou l d have ha d 6 to s h o w e ith e r t hat th e de fe nd ants c on tin

ue d inve sti g atin ghim even thoug h t h ey “knew or should have known that he wa s innocent,” or

that their tec hniqu es “w ere so coer cive a nd
a bu siv e tha

t th e y kn e w o r s ho uld

have kn ow n th a t th os e techniques would yield false inf ormation.” We held that the

7 “cr itical element” of the “ coer cive a nd ab u s i v e” claim was that the def

endants “ knew or

should have known that they
wer e elicitingfalse a ccusations.” We held t hat improper 8 inv e sti g a tio n “ is o ne thi ng , inte nti on a lly fa br ic a tin g fa lse evidenc e is quite a

nother.” Even pre ssuring child witnesses

9 for long periods of time to chang e their stories wa s not enoug h to g et past summary judgme nt, beca

use the victim of the fa lse cha

rg es lac ked evide nce that the investigators knewG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES 21

I d. 10

D eve r eaux v. A bb ey , 26 3 F.3d 10 7 0 ( 9 th C i r. 20 0 1 ) ( en b anc); 11 C un ni ng ha m v. Ci t

y of W enat chee , 34 5 F.3d 80 2 (9t h C i r. 20 0 3 ). or sh ou l d h av e kn o w nt h a th e “ w a s i n n o c e n t , ” o r th a tth e ir improper tec hniques “would yield false inf ormation.” 10
Under Dev ereaux , p re ssu ri ngthe car s te re o th ie f t o implicate Gantt and Smith did not entitl e them to trial, much less setting a side a jury

verdic t for fa

brication of evi d ence , beca use the police did not know (nor do we) that th ey we re innocent, or that the interrog ation techniq u es would yield a false ide ntification. As for the sug g estion that if he could not identify Gantt and Smith as the perpe trators, they would “put it on” him, they

did not know that Gantt, Smit h, or the c ar stereo thief

was in n o ce n t , so the coe rcive threat is not “fa brication” under Dev ereaux
. I n G antt ’s and

Smit h’ s c a se , th e re wa s n o w itc h hun t. There is no particular

rea son to think t hat Gantt and Smith are inn oc e nt, muc h le ss t

hat th e po lic e kn e w the y

we re
. Th e re is
no showing that the police be lieved the identific ation the ca r stereo thief

made wa s false. H e himself has not claimed that he lied twenty y ear s ag o, just that he can no long er r emember and had not be en wearing his g lasses. We held in the We natche e witch hunt ca ses that the plaintiffs we re not e nti tle d to g e t to tr ia l on the ir fa br ic a tio n o f e vid e nc e c a se s. 11 A f or tio ri , the fa

r l ess coercive questioning a nd the lack of any rea son to infer a

fra meup of a

n innocent man did not entitle Gantt and Smit h to put their fabr ication ca se bef ore a jury . Her e the plaintiffs were mistakenly permitted to try their ca ses, and the jur

y retur n ed v erdicts that a corr ect a pp lic a tio n o f l aw wo uld have c omp e lle d r e g ard le ss o f t he irG AN TT V

. C I T Y O F L O S ANGEL ES

22
verdic ts. The fab ri ca t i o n of evide nce c laim is no more than
a c la im that fa lse e vid e nc e , not k no wn by the pr os e c uti on

to be fa lse , w a s u se d to c on vic t th e m.
Be cause the fabrication of evidenc e cla im should not have g one to trial at a ll, there be ing no pr ima fac ie ca se, we need not rea ch the que stions about the corre ctness of the instructions. The ca se wa s put to the jury , which re ache d the leg ally require d conclusion despite the poor instructions. The publication of today ’s dec ision vastly expands the application
o f § 1 9 8 3 t o f

a i l e d p r o s e c u t i o n s , i nqu i t e a

d an g e r o u s w ay. Now police pr essure on a witness to tell what the police b eli eve to be the truth arguably opens the door to a

§ 1983 claim. We sh o u l d affirm on the fabr ication of e vidence
c la ims , th e ba sis fo r t

he re ve rs a l.