# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 7 , 20 20 Decided January 7, 20 20

Before

DIANE P. WOOD
, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER
, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON
, Circuit Judge

No. 1 9

- 2448

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
, Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

v

.
CHARLES SHARPE, JR.
, Defendant

- Appell an t

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois

.

No. 4:18

- CR

- 40040

- SMY

- 1

Staci M. Yandle
, Judge

.

O R D E R
Charles Sharpe , Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of p roduction of c hild
p ornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) , and was sentenced to 282 months’ imprisonment to be followed by five years’ supervision

. Sharpe seeks to appeal his judgment and sentence , but h is lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and asks permission to withdraw from represent ation. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Sharpe has not responded to this motion. See C IR

. R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that this kind of appeal might involve. T he analysis in counsel’s brief appears thorough, so we limit our review to the subjects s he discuss es

. See United States v. Bey , 748 F.3 d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 19

- 2448 Page 2

Sharpe has told counsel that he does not want to contest his guilty plea
, but counsel nonetheless considers whether Sharpe could challenge the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of his guilty plea. W e have been clear , however, that counsel should not even explore challenges under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 unless the defendant “really wants to withdraw the guilty plea.” United States v. Konczak , 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Knox , 287 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2002)

.
Next, counsel ask s whether Sharpe might challenge his sentence on procedural grounds . A district court would commit procedural error by incorrectly calculating the G uidelines range or by treating the G uidelines as mand atory. See Gall v. United States
, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But here we could not conclude that the court miscalculated the G uidelines range. Sharpe had a criminal history category of I and a total offense level of 39 , yielding a Guidelines range of 26 2

– 327 months’ imprisonment , and he declined to object to these calculations.

C ounsel then explore s challeng ing the substantive reasonableness of Sharpe’s
sentence , and properly concludes that this challenge would be frivolous. A within

Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable

. S ee United States v. Cunningham , 883 F.3d 690, 701 (7th Cir. 2018)

. Counsel identifies no basis to disturb that presumption here , nor do we see one. The court also justified the sentence based on factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the nature
, circumstances , and seriousness of the offense ( the judge said this was “the most egregious case of child sexual exploitation that I have dealt with to dat e” ) and the need to protect the public and deter future bad conduct (this was Sharpe’s second sex

- related offense, separated by over thirty years).

Finally, counsel properly d etermines that she could not raise an y claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on Sharpe’s behalf, because she was his attorney in the district court . She also correctly points out that such a claim is best saved for collateral review because the record here is too undeveloped to support such a claim

. See Massaro v. United St ates , 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) ; United States v. Flores , 739 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 2014)

.

W e GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.