UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4776

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER SHANE JENKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Loretta Copeland 

Biggs, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00367-LCB-1)

Submitted: May 31, 2016 Decided: July 20, 2016

Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Graham Tod Green, Angela Hewlett Miller, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Christopher Shane Jenkins appeals his prison sentence after 

pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 

The district court imposed a sentence of 40 months in prison, 

which was above Jenkins’ advisory Guidelines range of 27 to 33 

months. Jenkins’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal but raising the issue of whether 

the district court erred in varying upwards and imposing a 

sentence 7 months above the top end of the Guidelines range. 

Jenkins has filed a pro se supplemental brief also challenging 

the upward variance and making two arguments. We affirm.

We review “the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of 

‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside, or 

significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. 

Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We “must first ensure that the 

district court committed no significant procedural error, such 

as failing to . . . adequately explain the chosen sentence—

including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines 

range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is procedurally 

reasonable, we consider its substantive reasonableness, 

“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances, 
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including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” 

Id. If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, we “may 

consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due 

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) 

factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. 

The district court “must make an individualized assessment 

based on the facts presented when imposing a sentence, 

apply[ing] the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific 

circumstances of the case and the defendant, and must state in 

open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen 

sentence.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “In imposing a variance sentence, the 

district court must consider the extent of the deviation and 

ensure that the justification is significantly compelling to 

support the degree of the variance.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation of 

its sentence need not be lengthy, but the court must offer some

individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and 

rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on 

§ 3553.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The “court’s stated rationale must be tailored to the particular 

case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate 

review.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that Jenkins’ 

sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable, and the 

district court did not err or abuse its discretion in sentencing 

him above his Guidelines range. The district court made an 

individualized assessment based on the facts presented, applied 

the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific circumstances of 

the case and the defendant, and adequately explained the 

particular reasons supporting its sentence. We therefore give 

due deference to the court’s reasoned and reasonable decision 

that the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence. See United 

States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 357 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). We have also reviewed 

Jenkins’ pro se supplemental brief and conclude that his 

arguments are without merit. To the extent that he is arguing 

that he should have received advance notice of the Government’s 

request for a variance, no such notice is required. See

Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713-14 (2008).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record and 

have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that 

counsel inform his or her client, in writing, of his or her 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 
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frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED