Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2013-459

JULY TERM, 2014

Alan M. Tsefrekas } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,

 v. } Family Division

}

}

Nancy Tsefrekas } DOCKET NO. F863-11-12 Cndm

Trial Judge: Linda Levitt

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

In this pro se appeal from a final divorce judgment, wife contends that the trial court 

erred in denying her motion to dismiss for improper service. We affirm. 

The record discloses the following material facts. On November 1, 2012, husband filed a 

complaint for divorce. The complaint included a request for temporary custody of the parties’ 

minor children, and an order enjoining wife from interfering with husband’s personal liberty.

The trial court record indicates that personal service on wife was completed on November 19, 

2012, and an Acceptance of Service was filed that day, indicating that wife accepted service of 

the summons and complaint and notice of hearing, scheduled for December 7, 2012. The form is 

dated November 19, 2012, and signed by wife.

The record further discloses that, on the same date that she accepted service, wife—who 

had since moved out-of-state—appeared at the court to file a motion for emergency relief 

seeking the removal of certain livestock from the marital home. That motion was docketed as a 

motion in the divorce case, and a hearing was set for December 7, 2012.

On November 26, 2012, the court denied the motion “as to [the] emergency” and 

rescheduled the noticed hearing to December 10, 2012. A notice of hearing was sent to wife 

indicating that the previously scheduled December 7, 2012 hearing had been cancelled, and that 

a hearing had been set for December 10, 212, on matters pertaining to “Establish[ing] Parental 

Rights and Resp.,” “Establish[ing] Parent-Child Contact,” and “Property Division.” 

On November 28, 2012, husband filed his own emergency motion for relief, asserting 

that wife had forcibly entered the marital residence to remove personal property. The docket 

entries indicate that the court intended to consider the motion on the scheduled hearing date. 

On December 6, 2012, wife filed a motion to continue the hearing, stating that she lacked 

the funds to both fly back to Vermont and obtain an attorney, and that an attorney was necessary 

to protect both her property interests and her interests as the children’s custodian. Husband’s 
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counsel opposed the motion, which the court denied, ruling that wife could participate by 

telephone. 

At the December 10, 2012 hearing, husband appeared with counsel while wife 

participated by telephone, representing herself. The court reviewed with wife a proposed 

temporary order submitted by husband granting wife primary physical and legal parental rights 

and responsibilities for the parties’ minor children, granting husband sole use of the marital 

home, and providing that husband would safely store wife’s property until she could retrieve it. 

Wife renewed her request for a continuance at the start of the hearing, asserting that husband had 

been “saving up for a lawyer for five months” while she had been supporting the children. The 

court noted that it would set a support hearing in the near future, and again denied the motion. 

During the ensuing proceeding, the court and parties discussed arrangements for wife to pick up 

her personal belongings, wife restated her concern about the lack of an attorney to protect her 

“children’s interests and my own financial interest,” and additional information was adduced 

about husband’s employment and wife’s ownership of certain income-producing properties in 

California. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court reaffirmed wife’s temporary custody of 

the children, and indicated that a support hearing would be set for January. 

The court held a child support hearing on January 17, 2013, in which wife again appeared 

by telephone, issued a temporary support order that day, and scheduled a further support hearing 

for February 2013. In late January, an attorney entered an appearance for wife, and shortly 

thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that wife had not received a copy of the summons 

and complaint. Wife submitted an affidavit in support of the motion, stating that she had 

appeared personally at the court on November 19, 2012 to file her emergency motion for relief, 

had signed the Acceptance of Service provided by the clerk, but had not received the summons 

and complaint.* Husband opposed the motion. 

In a written ruling in March 2013, the court denied the motion. The court ruled that, even 

if the service here was defective, the defect was waived by wife’s participation in the hearing on 

December 10, 2012. See, e.g., Eddins v. O’Neil, 145 Vt. 364, 366 (1985) (reaffirming principle 

that “all defects of service . . . are cured by a full, unrestricted appearance” (quotation omitted)). 

Wife’s attorney was subsequently granted permission to withdraw, and wife later filed a pro se 

motion for reconsideration of the court’s order denying the motion to dismiss. The court denied 

the motion. In October 2013, following a contested hearing, the court issued a final judgment of 

divorce. This pro se appeal followed. 

Wife contends that the court erred in finding that her participation in the December 

hearing was sufficient to constitute a waiver of any defect in service. She asserts that proper 

service cannot be waived by her participation in the hearing because she had not actually 

 

*

In her affidavit, wife states that she apparently signed the acceptance of service form in 

the midst of filing a relief from abuse complaint against husband, and she repeats that argument 

on appeal. Because the record reflects that wife filed the motion for emergency relief described 

above on November 19, and did not file a request for relief from abuse until November 26, 

giving wife the benefit of any doubts, we infer that she meant that she signed the acceptance of 

service form at the time she filed the non-RFA emergency motion for relief described above. A 

hearing on wife’s November 26 relief from abuse petition, and husband’s reciprocal RFA 

petition against wife, was set for December 6. Neither party appeared, and the trial court 

dismissed the petition. 
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received the summons and complaint and did not understand that she was participating in a 

hearing relating to husband’s divorce complaint. She claims that she thought the Acceptance of 

Service and hearing were solely related to her emergency motion for relief.

The record supports the trial court’s ruling. First, wife acknowledged signing the 

Acceptance of Service, which was strong prima facie evidence that she had been personally 

served with the summons and complaint at that time, in compliance with the service-of-process 

rule. See V.R.F.P. 4(b)(2)(B)(iii) (service of process in family court proceeding involving 

minor children may be effected by personal service); Latimer v. Latimer, 522 S.E.2d 801, 802 

(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (observing that “[a] return of process, including an acceptance of service, is 

strong or at least prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein” and subject to rebuttal only by 

clear and unequivocal evidence (quotation omitted)). 

Second, as the trial court noted, wife filed a continuance motion prior to the December 

hearing, which plainly showed that she had received the hearing notice identifying the subject 

matter of the hearing as relating to parental rights and responsibilities, parent-child contact, and 

property, all matters plainly related to a divorce proceeding, not merely a motion for emergency 

relief. In addition, wife’s continuance motion itself contained the caption and docket number in 

the pending divorce action. Further, wife affirmatively raised issues at the hearing concerning 

her need for an attorney to protect her interests relating to marital property and child custody,

indicating an awareness of the divorce action and the nature of the proceeding. We note, as well, 

that at the later child support hearing in January 2013, wife suggested that she had not been 

“properly served with process” but did not claim that she had never actually received the 

summons and complaint. Thus, contrary to wife’s claim, the record amply supports the trial 

court’s finding that even if wife did not receive the summons and complaint on November 19,

she was fully aware of the nature of the proceeding in which she appeared on December 10. 

Accordingly, we find no basis to disturb the judgment. 

Affirmed. 

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________

Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Beth Robinson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________

Geoffrey W. Crawford, Associate Justice