*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 97-50488

__________________

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; MARY SANTONASTASSO, Acting

Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance; NANCY GIST,

Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance, an agency of

the United States Department of Justice; DAN MORALES, Attorney

General,

Defendants-Appellees,

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS,

Intervenor-Appellee.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas, Austin

______________________________________________

March 9, 1998

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This action stems from the certification and later withdrawal

of certification made by the Attorney General of the State of Texas
2

with respect to the triggering mechanism for alternate or

reallocated funding as provided in § 104(b)(9) of Pub. L. No. 104-

134, wherein Congress allocated grant money to implement the Local

Law Enforcement Block Grants Program. The appellant, Dallas

County, Texas, sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the

district court, contending that it was entitled to funds under the

reallocation funding scheme devised by Congress to avoid extreme

disparities in funding when the governmental entities charged with

reporting crimes in a given area are not the governmental entities

primarily responsible for the costs of prosecution and

incarceration of those crimes. The district court dismissed Dallas

County’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The

district court recognized the withdrawal of certification by the

Attorney General of the State of Texas and found that there was no

certification that would trigger the reallocation formula.

Accordingly, the district court determined that Dallas County’s

action was moot.

On appeal, Dallas County’s basic contention is that there is

a live controversy still pending because the triggering events for

the reallocation formula occurred. It argues that, notwithstanding

the Attorney General’s withdrawal of certification, the admitted

facts in the initial certification letter automatically triggered

the reallocation funding distribution. Dallas County also argues

that the Bureau of Justice Assistance lacked the authority to
3

accept the Attorney General’s subsequent letter withdrawing

certification.

In our de novo review, we have considered all the arguments

advanced by Dallas County, the briefs of all the parties, and the

record on appeal. After such review, we can only conclude that the

district court’s disposition of this case was correct and that

additional writing would serve no useful purpose in light of the

cogent and succinct reasons set forth by the district court in its

order of June 2, 1997. We thus affirm essentially for the same

reasons set forth by the district court.

AFFIRMED