UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 

COLORADO, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MARCUS ALLEN MURPHY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 23-1099 

(D.C. No. 1:23-MJ-00055-LTB-1) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before EID, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Marcus Allen Murphy, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s order 

summarily remanding his criminal case to Colorado state court. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Murphy filed a notice of removal (Notice) in federal district court. The 

Notice involved a criminal case filed against him in Colorado state court. 

Mr. Murphy alleged he was a licensed attorney in Colorado and admitted to practice 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 30, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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before the federal courts in Colorado. He also alleged he was being “unlawfully & 

unconstitutionally incarcerated, without Warrant or Indictment, on Excessive Bail of 

$35K, for 46-days since Wed., Jan. 25, 2023 . . . as the result of a self-help, 

non-judicial botched-Eviction by an out-of-state slumlord & felon-burglar 

maintenance-man/super.” R. at 4. 

Mr. Murphy asserted two statutory bases for removal—28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1442(a)(3) and 1443. Section 1442(a)(3) authorizes removal of civil actions or 

criminal prosecutions filed in state court against “[a]ny officer of the courts of the 

United States, for or relating to any act under color of office or in the performance of 

his duties.” In pertinent part, § 1443(1) authorizes removal of state civil actions or 

criminal prosecutions “under certain conditions, in light of Title I of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1968,” Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 215 (1975).1

1

 In full, § 1443 provides: 

Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in 

a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the 

United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is 

pending: 

(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of 

such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of 

citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction 

thereof; 

(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for 

equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be 

inconsistent with such law. 

 Although the Notice referred to both subsections of § 1443, the record and 

Mr. Murphy’s appellate filings suggest that only § 1443(1) is relevant to removal in 

this case. Therefore, we, like the district court, focus on § 1443(1). 

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Mr. Murphy asserted removal was proper under § 1442(a)(3) because he “is a 

Federal court-officer, who was in the performance of his official-duties, while 

protecting the Presidential-Motorcade during the Marshall-fire tour of Boulder, 

Colorado,” in January and February of 2022. R. at 4–5. And he asserted removal 

also was proper under § 1443 because the Colorado state court was denying his 

constitutional rights to due process, a speedy trial, and equal protection. He 

requested an evidentiary hearing to determine if removal would be permitted. 

The district court entered an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4) summarily 

remanding the case to state court. Section 1455 is titled “Procedure for removal of 

criminal prosecutions,” and § 1455(b)(4) provides: “The United States district court 

in which such notice [of removal] is filed shall examine the notice promptly. If it 

clearly appears on the face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that 

removal should not be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary 

remand.” 

The district court provided two alternative grounds for summary remand. 

First, the court determined Mr. Murphy failed to comply with § 1455(a), which 

requires that a notice of removal must “contain[] a short and plain statement of the 

grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served 

upon [the defendant],” § 1455(a).2

 Second, the court concluded Mr. Murphy 

articulated no basis for removal under either § 1442(a)(3) or § 1443(1). As to 

2

 Mr. Murphy did not provide copies of any documents served on him in state 

court or attach anything to his Notice. 

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§ 1442(a)(3), the court found Mr. Murphy’s criminal case was unrelated to any 

alleged duties performed as a federal court officer in January 2022 in service of the 

Presidential motorcade. Turning to § 1443(1), the court concluded Mr. Murphy’s 

factual allegations did not meet either prong of the test for § 1443(1) removal: 

(1) that he had been denied rights due to his race, as required under Johnson, 

421 U.S. at 219; or (2) that he could not enforce his federal rights in the state 

criminal proceeding because of “a pervasive and explicit state or federal law,” 

id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the district court ordered 

summary remand. 

Mr. Murphy filed a timely appeal from the remand order. 

II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION3

 We must begin by addressing our appellate jurisdiction. “The authority of 

appellate courts to review district-court orders remanding removed cases to state 

court is substantially limited by statute.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 

Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007). One such statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which 

generally serves as a jurisdictional bar to appellate review of remand orders unless 

the removal was pursuant to either § 1442 or § 1443: 

An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is 

not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a 

3

 We ordered Mr. Murphy to address any legal basis for this court’s 

jurisdiction over his appeal. He has responded, and we have considered his response. 

Because Mr. Murphy asserts he is a licensed attorney, we decline to construe his pro 

se filings liberally. See Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). Even if 

we did, it would not alter the outcome of this appeal. 

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case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 

or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise. 

§ 1447(d).4

But “[d]espite the seemingly unqualified language of the first clause of 

§ 1447(d), its prohibition on appellate review applies only if the district court 

remands on grounds permitted by § 1447(c).” Miller v. Lambeth, 443 F.3d 757, 759 

(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute provides: 

A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the 

notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment 

it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall 

be remanded. 

§ 1447(c). The “two categories of remand” within § 1447(d)’s “prohibition on 

appellate review . . . are remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for 

defects in removal procedure.” Miller, 443 F.3d at 759. “Thus, we have jurisdiction 

to review a remand order only if (1) the remand was for a reason other than lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal procedure or (2) the ‘except’ 

clause of § 1447(d) gives us jurisdiction.” Id.

We need not decide whether the district court’s first ground for remand 

involves defects in removal procedure that would fall within § 1447(d)’s bar to 

4

 Although § 1447(d) does not contain the word “jurisdiction,” the Supreme 

Court and this court have viewed the section as a jurisdictional limitation. See, e.g., 

Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 636 (2009) (framing issue 

concerning § 1447(d)’s bar to appellate review as involving “jurisdiction”); City of 

Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 2017) (same). 

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appellate review.5

 Instead, we conclude Mr. Murphy removed the case “pursuant to” 

§ 1442 and § 1443 and therefore § 1447(d)’s “except” clause gives us jurisdiction to 

review both grounds for remand. 

In BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 

1532, 1536 (2021) (“BP”), the Supreme Court considered the following question: 

“Does 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) permit a court of appeals to review any issue in a district 

court order remanding a case to state court where the defendant premised removal in 

part on the federal officer removal statute, § 1442, or the civil rights removal statute, 

§ 1443?” To answer that question, the Court first examined whether the defendants 

had removed the case under § 1442.6

 The Court observed that “[t]o remove a case, a 

defendant must comply with . . . § 1446,” which “requires the defendant to provide 

affected parties and courts with a notice stating its grounds for removal.”7

 141 S. Ct. 

5 Compare, e.g., § 1455(b)(4) (directing district court to “promptly” review 

notice of removal of criminal case and to order “summary remand” if “removal 

should not be permitted”) with Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 

192, 197 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding, in civil case, that “[b]ecause § 1447(c) provides 

that a remand based on a defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be 

effected by granting a timely filed motion, an order granting an untimely motion or 

entered without a motion at all does not fall within the scope of § 1447(c) and 

therefore is not barred from review by § 1447(d)”). 

6

 The defendants in BP had relied only on § 1442, but it is clear from the 

question presented and the Court’s discussion that the Court’s analysis and 

conclusions also apply to removals based on § 1443. See 141 S. Ct. at 1538 (noting 

§ 1447(d) extends appellate review to “orders . . . remanding a ‘case . . . removed 

pursuant to section 1442 or 1443’” (quoting § 1447(d)). 

7

 Section 1446 provides the procedure for removal of a civil case. Compliance 

with § 1446 effects removal and prevents the state court from proceeding further. 

See BP, 141 S. Ct. at 1539 (“[I]t is generally the defendant’s actions under § 1446 

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at 1538. The Court then concluded that “[t]o remove a case ‘pursuant to’ § 1442 or 

§ 1443 . . . just means that a defendant’s notice of removal must assert the case is 

removable ‘in accordance with or by reason of” one of those provisions.” Id. (first 

quoting § 1447(d), then quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). “[T]he 

defendants’ notice of removal did just that by citing § 1442 as one of its grounds for 

removal.” Id. Turning back to the question presented, the Court concluded that once 

the notice of removal cited § 1442 as a ground for removal “and the district court 

ordered the case remanded to state court, the whole of its order became reviewable on 

appeal.” Id. The Court further explained that even the frivolous assertion of § 1442 

or § 1443 as a ground for removal is sufficient to fall within § 1447(d)’s “except” 

clause. See id. at 1542 (rejecting argument that frivolous addition of § 1442 or 

§ 1443 to other grounds for removal would “invite gamesmanship . . . with an eye to 

ensuring appellate review down the line if the case is remanded”). 

BP is consistent with the approach we have long taken to determine whether a 

case is removed pursuant to § 1442 or § 1443. In Colorado v. Lopez, 919 F.2d 131, 

that ‘effect the removal,’” and “[o]nce a defendant complies with § 1446, a state 

court may not proceed ‘further unless and until the case is remanded.” (quoting 

§ 1446(d))). In contrast, under § 1455’s procedural rules for removal of criminal 

prosecutions, state proceedings may continue up until judgment: “The filing of a 

notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State court . . . from 

proceeding further, except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless 

the prosecution is first remanded.” § 1455(b)(3). We see no reason to distinguish 

BP based on this difference. Section 1455(b)(4) and (5) clearly require the federal 

district court to remand the case if warranted, which indicates that removal has 

occurred (at least for § 1447(d) purposes) notwithstanding continued proceedings in 

state court.

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132 (10th Cir. 1990), we relied on § 1447(d) to exercise jurisdiction to review the 

merits of a district court’s order remanding a criminal prosecution to state court 

because the defendant had “filed a petition for removal pursuant to . . . § 1443.”8

 We 

did so again recently in Lopez v. Cantex Health Care Centers II, LLC, No. 23-2038, 

2023 WL 7321637 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 2023) (unpublished), relying on BP. See 

id. at *2 (“Because Appellants asserted § 1442 as a ground for removal, we have 

jurisdiction to review the remand order.”). We take that same approach here. In his 

Notice, Mr. Murphy stated he “submits this Notice of Removal from the [state court] 

per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1443.” R. at 4. We conclude that was a sufficient assertion 

that his case was removable “in accordance with or by reason of” those statutes, BP, 

141 S. Ct. at 1538 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore have jurisdiction 

over “the whole of [the district court’s] order” and proceed to the merits. Id.9

8

 Although not always citing Lopez, we have on many occasions applied its 

test, which implicitly deems that removal is “pursuant to” § 1442 or § 1443 if the 

defendant simply asserts either statute as a ground for removal. See, e.g., First Union 

Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 229 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting only that the 

defendant had “cit[ed] [§ 1443(1)] as his basis for removal”); Colorado v. Carrillo, 

644 F. App’x 826, 826 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Because Carrillo expressly relied on § 1443 

in his notice of removal, we possess jurisdiction.”). 

9

 In Miller v. Lambeth, decided in 2006, we took a different approach to 

resolving our jurisdiction, concluding that “a bald citation to § 1443” was insufficient 

and instead “review[ed] the record to determine whether [the removing party had] 

alleged a basis for removal under § 1443.” 443 F.3d at 760. When faced with 

conflicting precedent, we should follow the earlier case. See United States v. Suggs, 

998 F.3d 1125, 1137 (10th Cir. 2021) (“In cases of conflicting circuit precedent our 

court follows earlier, settled precedent over a subsequent deviation therefrom.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Lopez constitutes such earlier settled precedent. 

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III. MERITS

Having established our jurisdiction under § 1447(d) to review both grounds for 

remand the district court relied on, we may resolve this appeal on waiver principles. 

Mr. Murphy has not challenged the district court’s first ground for remand—that he 

failed to comply with § 1455(a)’s procedural requirements. He has therefore waived 

appellate review of that ground. See Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286 

(10th Cir. 2020) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or 

waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And because the § 1455(a) ground for 

remand was an alternative and adequate ground, Mr. Murphy’s waiver of any 

challenge to it means he necessarily loses on appeal. See Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. 

Comm’rs, 543 F.3d 597, 613 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here a district court’s 

disposition rests on alternative and adequate grounds, a party who, in challenging that 

disposition, only argues that one alternative is erroneous necessarily loses because 

the second alternative stands as an independent and adequate basis, regardless of the 

correctness of the first alternative.”). 

Finally, Mr. Murphy alternatively requests a writ of mandamus to challenge 

the remand order. But mandamus is not available to obtain appellate review of a 

remand order even where § 1447(d)’s general prohibition on appellate review applies. 

See In re Stone Container Corp., 360 F.3d 1216, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting 

request for review of remand order by way of mandamus rather than appeal because 

“[a] remand order terminates the litigation in federal court and therefore . . . is 

appealable as a ‘final decision’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291—unless § 1447(d) forecloses 

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appeal.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1220 (“[A] 

remand order is always final and may be reviewed by appeal when it may be 

reviewed at all.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court’s Order For Summary Remand. We grant 

Mr. Murphy’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees. We 

deny his Emergency Motion to Seal Case Records and All Files. 

Entered for the Court 

Veronica S. Rossman 

Circuit Judge 

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