UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PATSY T. DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 97-1719

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.

James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-95-587-2)

Submitted: July 31, 1998

Decided: September 2, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Luicus M. Cheshire, Sr., CHESHIRE & PARKER, Hillsborough,

North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States

Attorney, Gill P. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney, Arthur J.

Fried, General Counsel, Charlotte Hardnett, Principal Deputy General

Counsel, John M. Sacchetti, Acting Associate General Counsel, Mary

Ellen Russell, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Patsy T. Davis appeals from a district court order adopting the

report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and upholding the

determination of the Commissioner of Health and Human Services

that Davis was not disabled at any time prior to June 30, 1973, when

her insured status expired. Because we find that substantial evidence

supported the Commissioner's decision, we affirm.

In 1988, Davis filed an application for disability insurance benefits

alleging that she suffered from a multiple sclerosis-caused disability

beginning on January 2, 1971. After a hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge ("ALJ") determined that, although Davis's condition precluded her from performing her past work, she was not disabled,

because there were significant other jobs that she could perform. The

Appeals Council denied Davis's request for review, and therefore, the

ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Davis

then filed a civil action in the district court, and the court affirmed the

Commissioner's decision. Davis now appeals.

Davis contends first that the ALJ erred in basing part of his determination that Davis's complaints of pain were not credible on the fact

that Davis did not seek medical attention from June 1971 until 1978.

According to Davis, she did not seek treatment, because there was no

cure for multiple sclerosis, and she was trying to convince herself that

she was not disabled. However, at that point in time, Davis had not

yet been definitively diagnosed. In addition, information regarding the

types of medications, treatments, and other methods used to alleviate

symptoms are "important indicator[s] of the intensity and persistence"

of symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (1997); see also Mickles v.

Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 930 (4th Cir. 1994) (inconsistency between

claimant's allegations of severity of condition and actual treatment

sought is probative of credibility). Finally, the ALJ considered the

failure to seek medical treatment as only one factor in his decision.

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The ALJ is required to make credibility determinations about allegations of pain or other nonexertional disabilities. See Hammond v.

Heckler, 765 F.2d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1985). Such decisions must refer

specifically to the evidence informing the ALJ's conclusions. Id. In

this case, the ALJ conducted the proper analysis in a comprehensive

fashion and cited substantial evidence to support his finding.

The ALJ noted that Davis's daily activities, infrequent medical

attention, and treatment for relief of pain did not support Davis's

claims of disabling pain and fatigue. For instance, Davis testified to

substantial daily activities during the relevant time period. In addition,

Davis was able to walk without an assistive device, she did not rely

on pain medication or other treatment, and she did not return to her

doctor for medical attention until 1978. Because the ALJ listed a specific evidentiary basis for the determination that Davis was not credible, the ALJ was justified in discounting Davis's complaints of pain

and fatigue.

Davis also argues that the ALJ contradicted himself and asked

improper hypothetical questions of the vocational expert, when he

presented one scenario that incorporated Davis's subjective complaints and one that did not. The ALJ's questions were entirely

proper. By presenting a hypothetical, the ALJ was not making findings of fact. After the hearing, the ALJ determined that the scenario

which did not contain Davis's testimony about disabling fatigue and

pain before 1973 most closely fit the evidence of record.

Given the medical evidence, the properly supported credibility

determination that Davis's condition was not as severe as claimed, the

testimony of the vocational expert, and the other relevant evidence of

record, we find that the Commissioner's decision was supported by

substantial evidence. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th

Cir. 1990) (standard of review). We, therefore, affirm. We deny

Appellant's motion to file an attachment to her brief, because the evidence offered was not submitted below. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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