2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-25-2010

Hall-Ditchfield v. USA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-3052

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Recommended Citation

"Hall-Ditchfield v. USA" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 1826.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-3052

 

KATHLEEN E. HALL-DITCHFIELD, 

 Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 2:07-cv-01290)

District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 1, 2010

 

Before: BARRY, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: February 25, 2010)

 

OPINION

 

PER CURIAM

Kathleen Hall-Ditchfield, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order

dismissing her complaint in part, as well as the court’s later order granting summary
2

judgment in favor of the Government. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 

I.

Because the background of this case is familiar to the parties, we discuss it only

briefly here. In May 2007, Hall-Ditchfield filed a complaint in the District Court,

challenging the Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) rejection of her tax refund claims for

tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Government moved to dismiss the complaint,

arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Hall-Ditchfield had

failed to file a timely administrative claim for a tax refund with the IRS, as required by 26

U.S.C. § 6511. In an order entered on June 11, 2008, the court granted the motion in part,

dismissing Hall-Ditchfield’s claims relating to tax years 1999 and 2000. The court denied

the Government’s motion as to her claim for tax year 2001, concluding that there was

insufficient information to determine whether she had timely submitted an administrative

claim for that tax year. 

In August 2008, the court held a conference, at which the parties presented

evidence regarding the timeliness of Hall-Ditchfield’s administrative claim for tax year

2001. In May 2009, both parties moved for summary judgment. On June 9, 2009, the

court denied Hall-Ditchfield’s motion and granted the Government’s motion. In doing so,

the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over her claim for tax year 2001, for her

administrative claim for that tax year was untimely. The court further held that § 6511's

limitations period was not subject to equitable tolling. Hall-Ditchfield now appeals the
 Because the equitable tolling doctrine is inapplicable here, we need not determine 1

whether Hall-Ditchfield would be entitled to equitable tolling were it available. 

court’s June 11, 2008 and June 9, 2009 orders. 

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise

plenary review over a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss. Santiago v.

GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005), as well as its decision to

grant summary judgment. Atkinson v. Lafayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006). 

For substantially the reasons given by the District Court, we agree with its

disposition of Hall-Ditchfield’s claims. Although she argues that her claims should be

equitably tolled, that argument is foreclosed by United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347,

354 (1997), which held that § 6511's limitations period is not subject to equitable tolling.1

Despite her contention to the contrary, that doctrine’s inapplicability here does not violate

her First Amendment rights. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s June 11,

2008 and June 9, 2009 orders.