Er ic H . H old er, Jr. , is autom ati cal ly s ub sti tut ed as t he res po nd ent in

bo th o f t he ab ov e- * cap tio ne d c ase s p urs uant t o F ed era l R ule of Ap pe llate P roc ed

ure 43 (c) (2)
. 07-3796-ag; 08-4840-ag Luna v. Holder; Thompson v. Holder
UNITED STA TES COU RT OF AP PEALS FO R T HE SE CO ND CI RC UI T

_______________________________ August Term, 2009 (Argued: June 15, 2010 Decided: September 3, 2010)
Do ck et N os . 0 7-3 79 6-a g, 08 -48 40 -ag

_______________________________ W ORKLIS LU

NA, Pe tit ion er , v. ERIC H. HO LD ER , J R. , Unit ed St ate s A tto rne y G en era l, Respondent
.

_______________________________ TASMANNANTHO NY THO MPSON, Pe tit ion er , v. ERIC H. HO LD ER , J R. , Unit ed St ate s A tto rne y G en era l, * Respondent
.

_______________________________ CALAB RESI, POOLE R, and CHIN, Ci rcu it J ud ges.

_______________________________-2-

Th e g ov ernm ent ha s m ov ed to d ism iss the ab ov e-c ap tio ne d p eti tio ns fo r re vie w a s
untim ely . B eca

us e th e REA L I D A ct d id n ot d ive st d ist ric t co urt s o f h ab eas jur isd ict ion to consider pet itioner s’ clai ms that they were prevent ed by circumstances beyond t heir contr ol from filing timely petit ions for review, we need notdecide whetherthe 30-day fili ng requirement would otherwise vi olate the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, whil e, in the circumstances of the case s before us, we lack jur isdicti on to review pet itioner s’ final order s of
rem ov al, dis tri ct c ourts ret ain jur isd ict ion

ov er p eti tio ne rs’ cla im s th at the y w ere un ab le t o f ile a timely petition for r eview because of cir cumstances created by t he government or ineffective assista nce of counsel. Accordingl y, petiti oners may seek relief pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
an d w e tr an sf

er the pe tit ion s to the dis tri ct c ourt p urs uant t o 2 8 U .S .C . § 16 31 so that th eym ay have the opportunity to do so.
W ORKLIS LU NA, pro s e . TASMANNANTHO NY THO MPSON, pro s e . BREND EN P. HOGAN and JENNIFER R. KHOURI, Office of Immigration Litigat ion, U.S. Department of Justice, for Re sp on de nt. JENNIFER CH ANG NE W ELL (Lee Gelernt, on thebr ief ) Am erican Civi l Liberti es Union, for amicus Am erican Civi l Liberti es Union.

________________________________ PO OL ER , C irc uit

Ju dg e: Petitione rs Worklis Luna and Tasmann Anthony Thom pson have filed peti tions for review of final orders of removal issued by the Board of Imm igrati on Appeals (“BIA”). The government has moved to dism iss the pet itions as untimely. Petitioner s Luna and Thompson-3-

co nc ed e th at the ir p eti tio ns are untim ely , b ut a lle ge that ci rcum stanc es b ey on d th eir co ntr ol – ineffective assi stance of counsel a nd circumstance s create d by the government, respect ively – prevented t hem f

rom f iling ti mely petitions for revi ew. Section 1252(b) (1) of Title 8 of the Unit ed States Code re quires tha t a “peti tion for review must be filed not lat er than 30 days a fter the date of the final order of removal.” This 30- day filing requi rement is jurisdi ctional a nd not subjectto equitabl e tolli ng. Ru iz- Mar tin ez v . Muk as ey , 516 F.3d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2008) ( citing Malvosin v . INS, 268 F.3d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2001)). Pri or to 2005, an ali en who m issed the 30- day deadline c ould stil l file a peti tion for a writ of habeas cor

pus pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Luya Liu v. INS , 293 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2002) (ci ting IN

S v . S t. C yr , 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001)). After the enac tment of the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a), 199 Stat. 231 ( May 11, 2005), however, a pet ition for review became the exclusi ve means available for chal lenging a final or der of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) , (b)(9). I n Ru iz- Mar tin ez , w e h eld

that th e p rov isi on s o f t

he RE AL ID Ac t eli m inatin g h ab eas jur isd ict ion ov er f ina l or de rs o f r em ov al, co m bin ed wi th t he 30 -day d ead lin e, did not faciall y violate t he Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 516 F.3d at 105-06. However, Ru iz-

Mar tin ez did no t ru le o ut t

he po ssi bil itythat th e 3 0-d ayde ad lin e co uld
am ount t o a

su sp en sio n o f t

he wr it a s ap pli ed

to an in div idu al p eti tio ne r. I n th ese ap pe als , w e ar e pre sented wi th t he iss ue of

wh eth er the 30 -day f

ili ngreq uir em ent vi olates the Su sp en sio n C lau se in cases i n which the ali en misses the deadline because of ineffective ass istance of counsel or circumstances cre ated by the government. Because we conclude that the REAL ID Act did not div est fe de ral co urt s o f h ab eas jur isd ict ion to c on sid er s uc h c lai m s, we ne ed no t de cid e whe the r the 30-day fili ng requirement would otherwis e violate the Suspension Claus e. Therefore, we-4-

ho ld t hat whil e, in t

he cir cum stanc es o f t

he cas es b ef

ore us , w e la ck

jur isd ict ion

to r ev iew pe tit ion ers ’ f

ina l or de rs o f r em ov al, dis tri ct c ourts ret ain jur isd ict ion

ov er p eti tio ne rs’ cla im s th at they were unable to file a ti mely petition for revie w because of circumstances cre ated by the go ve rnm ent or

ine ff ect ive ass ist an ce o f c ouns el. Ac co rdi ng ly, pe tit ion ers m aysee k re lie f pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and we trans fer the petit ions to the di strictcourt pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 so that they may have the opportunit y to do so. BACKGROUND I. Luna v. Holder, 07-3796-ag In D ece m be r 20 06 , L un a, a n ati ve an d c iti zen of the Do m ini can

Re pu bli c, wa s ch arg ed

in a N oti ce t o App ear

wi th r em ov ab ili ty p urs uant t o th e Im m igr ati on an d N ati on ali ty A ct ( “INA” ) Section 237(a) (2)(B)(I ), based on his c onviction for a cont rolled subs tance viol ation, and Sect ion 23 7(a )(2 )(A )(i ii) , b ase d o n h is c onvic tio n f or an a gg rav ate d f

elo ny . In a h ear ingbe fo re an imm igrati on judge (“IJ ”) in Napanoch, New York, Luna, appeari ng pro s e , argu ed that he wa s a Un ite d S tat es c iti zen

ba sed on his fathe r’s natur ali zat ion . In May 20 07 , th e IJde ter

m ine d th at Luna had not derive d citize nship from his father, that his r emovability had been est ablished by clear and c onvincing evide nce, that he was s tatutor ily inel igible for var ious forms of relief, and that he ha d n ot e sta

bli sh ed a pr im a fa cieclaim for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Tortur e. Accordingly, t he IJ order ed Luna removed to the Dominican Republic. Throu ghco un sel , L un a ap pe ale d to the BI A, arguin g th at the IJ s ho uld have ter m inated his
rem ov al p roc eed ing s p en din g a de cis ion on a m oti on to v acate h is c rim ina l co nv ict ion in s tat e court. By an orderissued July 20, 2007, t he BIA dismissed Luna’s appeal. On September 5, 2007, Luna, pro s e and detained a t the Buffalo Federal Detent ion-5-

Facilit y in Batavia, New York, filed a pet ition for revi ew of the BIA’s decision. Luna sought “an en lar ge m ent of

tim e to fi le a

pe tit ion fo r re vie w” be cau se o f h is atto rne y’s “n eg lec t, s ud de n los s o f i nte res t, and

giv ing[Lun a th e] fa lse im pre ssi on that he wo uld

su bm it a ll the ne ces sar

y papers and cont inue to repr esent [Luna].” That sam e m onth, the go ve rnm ent m ov ed to d ism iss the petit ion for review, noti ng that the pe tition ha d been filed sixt een days after t he expirat ion of the 30 -day f

ili ngpe rio d p res cri be d b y 8 U. S. C. § 1 25 2(b )(1 ). I n O cto be r 20 07 , L un a re sp on de d to the motion, explaini ng that his former attorney had sent a l etter notto Luna, but to his mother. The attorney’ s lette r, which Luna atta ched to his opposi tion papers , stated t hat he did not be lieve that he coul d make any argum ents in a pet ition for revi ew that would warrantreversal of the BI A’ s d eci sio n and

inf orm ed Luna that th e d ead lin e f

or f ili nga p eti tio n f

or r ev iewwa s Aug us t 20, 2007. Luna asserte d that he “shoul d have been notified by c ounsel at hi s place of detent ion to m ak e su

re that [ Luna ] r ece ive d th e co rre sp on de nc e in a ti m ely m anne r, whic h w ou ld [ have ] all ow [e d h im ] t o f

ile his pe tit ion

wi thi n th e th irty-d ayfi lin g d ead lin e. ” II. Thompson v. Holder, 08-4840- ag In S ep tem

be r 20 07 , T ho m

ps on , a nativ e an d c iti zen

of Jam aic a, wa s ch arg ed

in a No tic e to Appear with re movability pursuant t o INA Section 237(a)( 2)(A)(ii ), based on his c onvictions fo r tw o c rim es i nv olv ingm ora l turpi tud e n ot aris ingout of a si ng le s ch em e o f c rim ina l misconduct, and Section 237(a) (2)(A)(i ii), base d on his convict ion for an aggravat ed felony. Thom pson, appearing pro s e before an IJ in Hart ford, Connecticut, filed no applicati ons for rel ief . In Jan uary 2 00 8, the IJ f

ound him rem ov ab le o n th e ag gravated fe lony c harge an d o rde red him rem oved to Jamaica. Thompson appealed to the BIA, asserting thathe was denied his r ight to c ouns el and

that he wa s in

no cent of the cri m es u

nd erl yin g h is c onvic tio ns ; th e B IAdis m iss edPrior to June 2008, Thom pson was detained a t a facilit y in Brooklyn, Connectic ut. 1 In March 2009, i t came to this Court’s attenti on that Thompson had been removed from 2 the United Stat es and was livi ng in Jamaica. In May 2009, in r esponse to an i nquiry from the Court, the government maintained thatthe petit ion should be dis missed as untimely but ack no wl ed ge d th at this Co urt ret ain s juris dic tio n o ve r th e p eti tio n d esp ite Th om ps on ’s r em ov al. Se e N ken v. Ho lde r , 1 29 S. Ct . 1 74 9, 17 61 (20 09 ) (“ [A ]l ien s who are rem ov ed m ayco nti nu e to pursue thei r petit ions for review, and t hose who prevail c an be afforded effective reli ef by facilitat ion of their re turn, along wit h restora tion of the imm igrati on status t hey had upon rem ov al. ”). -6- his appeal on Apri l 28, 2008. In August 2008, the BIA deni ed Thompson’s m otion for a stay of
rem ov al p en din g a

m oti on to r eo pe n to see k C AT rel ief , c on clu din g th at the re w as l itt le lik eli ho od

the m oti on

wo uld be grante d. On

Se pte m be r 9, 20 08 , th e B IAde nie d T ho m ps on ’s motion to reopen. On Oc tob er 1 , 2 00 8, Th om

ps on fi led a “m oti on

ask ingfo r ti m e to ap pe al, ” whic h w as do ck ete d in

thi s C ourt a s a p eti tio n f

or r ev iew ; th e co ns tru ed

pe tit ion ch all en ge d th e B IA ’s A

pri l 28, 2008 order. Thompson explained, inter a lia , th at h e h ad be ende tai ne d in

the Wyatt De tentio n F aci lity in

Ce ntr al F all s, Rh od e Is lan d, sin ce J un e 2 00 8, an d th at h e w as “ un ab le t o

1 ge t [ his ] l eg al d oc um ents at th is f aci lity[ .] IT S [ sic ] P RO HI BI TE D. ” The government subsequently fil ed a motion to dismiss the petit ion for review as unt imely. 2 III. Amicus Ameri can Civil Liberti es Union In February and August2009, we ordered the appointment of pro bono counsel as amicus
curia e an d d ire cte d b rie fi ngon the fo llo wi ngiss ue : [W ]h eth er the re i s m eri t to anas- ap pli ed Su sp en sio n C lau se c ha lle ng e f or a pe tit ion er who lac ke d anyrea so na ble op po rtunit

y to fi le a pe tit ion fo r re vie w during the 30- day filing peri od because of circumstances cr eated by the government, or because of attorney error, i n light of our opini on in [Ru izMar tin ez v . Mu ka sey , 516 F.3d 102 (2008)].-7-

Th e Am eri can

Ci vil Li be rti es Unio n (“ AC LU ”)’ s Im m igr ants’ Ri ghts P roj ect

wa s su bs eq ue ntl y appointed as a micus counsel in both appeal s. DI SC US SI ON I. Th e S us pe ns ion

Cl au se o f t

he U. S. Co ns tit

uti on pro vid es t

hat “the Pr ivi leg e o f t

he Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or I nvasion the publ ic Sa fet y may re qu ir e i t. ” U .S . Co ns t. art. I, § 9 , c l. 2. “B ec au se of t ha t C laus e, so me jud ici al i nte rve nti on

in d ep ort ati on

cas es i s unq

ue sti on ab ly r eq

uir ed bythe Co ns tit

uti on .” St. Cy r , 533 U.S. at 300 (internal quotati on marks om itted) . However, “the substi tution of a
co llater al r em ed

y whic h is ne ith er i na de qu ate no r in ef fe cti ve to t est

the leg ali ty o f a

pe rso n’s de tentio n d oe s n ot c on sti tut e a s us pe ns ion of the wr it o f h ab eas co rpu s. ” Ru iz- Mar tin ez , 516 F.3d at 114 (quoting Sw ain v. Press ley , 4 30 U. S. 37 2, 38 1 (1 97 7)) ; Bo um ed ien e v. Bu sh , 553 U. S. 72 3, __

_, 12 8 S . C t. 2 22 9, 22 62 (20 08 ) (“ [T ]h e q ue sti on be co m es whe the r th e st atute str ipp ingjur isd ict ion

to i ssu e th e writ

av oid s th e S us pe ns ion

Cl au se m an date b eca

us e C on gre ss ha s p rov ide d a de qu ate su bs tit ute pro ced

ure s f or h ab eas co rpu s. ”). In the imm igrati on context, Congress has long sought t o limit habeas revi ew while at the same tim e ensuring t hat alie ns have an alt ernate forum in which to seek re view of final orders of
rem ov al. Pr ior

to 1 99 6, anali enco uld

ch all en ge a re m ov al o rde r ei the r in a p eti tio n f

or r ev iew filed in the cour t of appeals or i n a petiti on for a writ of habeas corpus in the dist rict cour t. Se e Ru iz- Mar tin ez , 516 F.3d at 113. In 1996, Congress ena cted the Anti terror ism and Eff ective Death Penalty Act ( “AEDPA”) and the Illegal Imm igrati on Reform and Imm igrati on Responsibili ty Act (“II RIRA”), both of which amended the jurisdict ional provi sions of the INA,-8-

8 U.S.C. § 1101, et s eq . Section 401 of AEDPA, entitled “Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus,” repea led, inter a lia , 8 U. S. C. § 1 10 5a (a) (10 ) (1 99 4), wh ich ha d p rov ide d th at “any alien he ld in custody pur suant to an or der of deportati on may obtain judicial r eview thereof by habeas corpus pr oceedings.” Sect ion 306(a)( 1) of IIRIRA provided thatfinal orders of
rem ov al w ou ld b e su

bje ct t o ju dic ial rev iewpursu ant to the pro ced ure go ve rni ngrev iewof

fi na l agency orders in 28 U.S.C. § 158. Se e 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Secti on 306(b)(9) c ontained a consolidat ion provisi on known as a “zipper” clause, Reno v. American-Arab Anti- Discriminati on Comm ., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), which consolida ted all “ [j]udicial revi ew of all questions of law and fact . . . aris ing from” rem oval proceedi ngs into one act ion in the cour t of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2000). Fina lly, IIRIRA eli minated judicial r eview of final orders of
rem ov al a ga ins t al ien s co nv ict ed of cer tai n c rim ina l of

fe ns es. 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (a) (2) (C ) (2 00 0). In IN S v . S t. C yr , th e S up rem e C ourt, rel yin g o n “ the lon gs tan din g ru le r eq uir inga cl ear statem ent of

co ng res sio na l intent to rep eal ha be as j uri sd ict ion ,” 53 3 U .S . at 29 8, he ld t hat ne ith er AEDPA nor IIRIRA had eliminated habeas corpus re view over final orde rs of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, id . at 31 4. Whil e S ect ion 40 1 o f A ED PAha d re pe ale d th e g rant of ha be as jur isd ict ion

in 8 U. S. C. § 1 10 5a (a) (10 ), “ [n ]e ith er the tit le n or t he tex t [ of

Se cti on 40 1] m ak es
any m entio n o f 2 8 U .S .C . § 22 41 .” Id. at 309. Likewise, t he Court concluded t hat the provi sions limiting judici al revie w in Section 306 of IIRIRA did not re present a c lear and unambiguous repeal of habeas j urisdict ion, reasoni ng that “[i]n the imm igrati on context, ‘j udicial r eview’ and ‘ha be as c orp us ’ have his tor ica llydis tin ct m ean ing s. ” Id . at 31 1. Th e C ourt n ote d th at i f i t w ere clear t hat St. Cyr – a cri minal alien subjectto the jur isdicti on-stri pping provisi on in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (C) – could rai se his cla ims in another forum, it m ight be pers uaded to inte rpret t heAlthough the peti tioner i n St. Cy r wa s a c rim ina l al ien , th e S eco nd Ci rcu it s ub seq

ue ntl y 3 held that habeas juri sdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2241 existed for non-cri minal aliens as well
. Li u , 293 F.3d at 40 (“The Court’ s decision i n St. Cy r do es n ot s ug ge st, expre ssl y o r im pli cit ly, that it s ho ldi ngthat C on gre ss d id n ot r ep eal § 2 24 1 b y anypro vis ion of AE DP A o r II RI RAap pli es o nly to criminal ali ens.”). -9- “zi pp er” cla

us e in 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (b) (9) as p rec lud ingha be as r ev iew . “ But th e ab sen ce o f s uc h a f orum , c ou

ple d w iththe lac k o f a

cle ar, un am

biguo us , and

expre ss s tat em ent of

co ng res sio na l int ent to pre clu de jud ici al c on sid eratio n o n h ab eas of su chanim

po rtant q ue sti on of law , s tro ng ly
co un sel s ag ain st a do pti nga co ns tru cti on that w ou ld r ais e se rio us co ns tit uti on al q ue sti on s. ” Id . at 314. 3 In response t o the Supreme Court’s decisi on in St. Cy r , C on gre ss p ass ed the RE AL ID Ac t, § 10 6, wh ich

am en de d v ari ou s su

bs ect ion s o f 8 U. S. C. § 1 25 2 to expli cit ly p rec lud e h ab eas
rev iewun de r 28 U. S. C. § 2 24 1. At the sam e ti m e, to avo id t he “se rio us co ns tit

uti on al q ue sti on s” identified by t he Supreme Court in St. Cy r , Congress rest ored judici al revie w in the courts of appeals over“constitutional cl aims or questions of law” for all a liens, inc luding cri minal aliens who had been barred from seeking judici al revie w under IIRIRA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Af ter the RE AL ID Ac t, i t is no w c lear th at “ a p eti tio n f or r ev iewfi led

wi th an appropriat e court of appeals in accordanc e with [8 U.S.C. § 1252] [ is] the sole and e xclusive
m ean s f or j ud ici al r ev iewof

anord er o f r em ov al, ” id. § 1252(a)(5) , and that habea s review is no lon ge r av ail ab le f

or c lai m s “aris ingfr om

any a cti on

tak enor p roc eed ingbro ug ht t o re m ov e an ali enfr om

the Un ite d S tat es, ” id . § 1252(b)(9). I n Ru iz- Mar tin ez , w e h eld

that th e REA L I D A ct did no t, o n it s f

ace , v iol ate the Su sp en sio n C lau se b eca us e C on gre ss h ad

pro vid ed anad eq uate and effective substi tute for habeas r eview in the form of a petition for revi ew, and that the 30-The government argues that pe titione rs could have fil ed a motion to reopen with the 4 BIA and then, if the BIA denied the motion, petitioners could have filed a pe tition for r eview of the order de nying the motion to reopen within 30 days. For sever al reasons , we do not believe that a motion to reopen i s an adequate a nd effective substitute under the Suspension Clause. First, the re is no aut omatic stay of removal while a motion to reopen is pendi ng. The granting of a st ayis d isc ret ion ary , 8 C. F. R. § 1 00 3. 2(f ), and the m oti on

to r eo pe n is autom ati cal ly terminated if the ali en is removed while the motion is pending, id. § 1 00 3. 2(d); Xue Yong Zhang v. Ho lde r , – F.3d –, No. 09-2628-ag, 2010 WL 3169292, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2010). A pro ced ure that al low s th e g ov ernm ent to un ilater all y te rm inate a pe tit ion er’ s cl aim

fo r re lie f at any time does not meet the require ments of the Suspension Clause. Boumediene , 1 28 S. Ct . at 2259 (adequate a nd effective substitute to habeas cannot be “subj ect to manipulation” ). Moreover, “[t]he BIA’s deci sion to granta motion to reopen is pure ly discre tionary.” Bu rger v . Go nz ale s , 498 F.3d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 2007). A mechanism f or review tha t “is wholly a discret ionary one” i s “an insufficient r eplacement” for habeas. Boumediene , 128 S. Ct. at 2273- 74. -10- day filing peri od gave an alie n a “reasonabl e opportunit y” to seek re view of a final order of removal. 516 F.3d at 105-06, 114-17. Here, however, we are faced wit h a different situa tion than i n Ru iz- Mar tin ez . P eti tio ne rs
co uld no t have rai sed

the ir c lai m s re gardi ngthe tim eli ne ss o f t he ir p eti tio ns be fo re the BI A because thei r claims arose afterthe entry of the final orders of removal. Nor could they have raised suc h claims in a timely petiti on in this Courtbecause they onl y arose upon the e xpirati on of the 30-day period wit hin which they coul d have filed a ti mely petition for revie w. Thus, if the REAL ID Act is interpret ed as precl uding habeas re view over peti tioners’ claims, there is no forum in which petit ioners coul d seek reli ef. 4 Mo reo ve r, p eti tio ne rs r ais e p rec ise ly t he typ e o f c on sti tut ion al c lai m s f or whic h h ab eas review, or an ade quate and effective subs titute , is most essential . An ineffective assist ance of
co un sel cla im

is a co ns tit uti on al c lai m

that ar ise s und er the Du e P roc ess Cl au se o f t he Fi ft h Am en dm ent. Om ar

v. Muk as ey , 517 F.3d 647, 650 (2d Cir. 2008). Likewise , a claim that the government prevented a pet itionerfrom filing a timely petit ion for review cal ls into ques tion-11-

whether the government has provided an adequate and effective substi tute under t he Suspension Clause and, ther efore, whether ther e has been a suspe nsion of the writ. See Boumediene , 128 S. Ct . at 22 59 (ho ldi ngthat th e writ “m us t no t be su

bje ct t o m an ipu lat ion

bytho se who se p ow er i t is d esi gn ed

to r est rai n” ); Bo un ds v. Sm ith , 4 30 U. S. 81 7, 82 2 (1 97 7) ( “[ T] he state and its of fi cer s
m ayno t ab rid ge or i m

pa ir p eti tio ne r’s rig ht t o a pp ly t o a fe de ral co urt

fo r a writ of ha be as corpus.” (quot ing ExPa rteHu ll , 3 12 U. S. 54 6, 54 9 (1 94 1)) ). I f p eti tio ne rs l ack a f orum in wh ich to r ais e su chcla im s, the n w e ar e co nf ronted sq uarel y w iththe “se rio us co ns tit uti on al questions” r aised by the Supr eme Court in St. Cy r . 533 U.S. at 315. W e are mindful of the Supreme C ourt’s admonition in St. Cy r that “i f an o the rw ise
acc ep tab le c on str

uc tio n o f a

statut e w ou ld r ais e se rio us co ns tit uti on al p rob lem s, an d whe re an alt ern ati ve int erp ret ati on

of the statut e is ‘f

air ly p os sib le, ’ w e ar e o bli gated to c on str ue the statut e to avo id s uc h p rob lem s. ” Id. 29 9-3 00 . H ere , th e q ue sti on is whe the r pe tit ion ers ’ cl aim s th at circumstances beyond the ir contr ol prevente d them from filing timely petit ions for review can be accurate ly descri bed as “ari sing from” their removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)( 9), or whether such cl aims m ay still be brought in a pe tition unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2241. If a petition for review is t he “sole and exc lusive means” for petiti oners to make their cl aims regarding the timeliness of their pe titions for review, and if we are jur isdicti onally barr ed from considering such claims because of the 30-da y filing requir ement, then we would have to decide whethe r the 30 -day d ead lin e, as a

pp lie d to pe tit ion ers , w ou ld c on sti tut e a s us pe ns ion of the wr it o f h ab eas
co rpu s. Be cau se w e co nc lud e th at the RE AL ID Ac t can b e co ns tru ed to p res erv e h ab eas jurisdi ction over pe titione rs’ cla ims, however, we need not decide thatquestion. II.-12-

W e begin our st atutory ana lysis with t he text of the st atute it self. United States v. Nelson , 27 7 F .3 d 1 64 , 1 86 (2d

Ci r. 2 00 2). Se cti on

12 52 (a) (5) of

Ti tle 8 o f t

he Un ite d S tat es C od e, as
am en de d b y th e REA L I D A ct, pro vid es: Notwithstanding a ny other provi sion of law (statutory or nonst atutory) , including section 2241 of Titl e 28, or any otherhabeas corpus pr ovision, and sec tions 1361 and 1651 of such title , a petiti on for review filed with an appropriat e court of appeals in a ccordance wit h this sect ion shall be the sole and e xclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entere d or issued underany provision of this chapt er, except a s provided in s ubsection ( e) of this sect ion. Se cti on 12 52 (b) (9) states : Judicial review of all quest ions of law and fact, includi ng interpr etation a nd applicat ion of constitut ional and st atutory pr ovisions, ar ising from any action tak enor p roc eed ingbro ug ht t o re m ov e an ali enfr om

the Un ite d S tat es u

nd er this su bc ha pte r sh all be av ail ab le o nly in j ud ici al r ev iewof

a f ina l or de r un de r th is section. Exceptas otherwise provided in t his secti on, no court shal l have jur isd ict ion , b y h ab eas co rpu s und er s ect ion 22 41 of Ti tle 28 or anyoth er h ab eas corpus provis ion, by secti on 1361 or 1651 of such titl e, or by any otherprovision of law (statutory or nonstatut ory), to re view such an orderor such questi ons of law or fact. The ACLU urges us to read these provisions a s applying only t o review of final orders of
rem ov al and

no t to co llater al i ssu es s uc h a s th os e p res ented bype tit ion ers . W e ag ree that pe tit ion ers ’ cl aim s re gardi ngthe tim eli ne ss o f t he ir p eti tio ns canno t be ch ara cte riz ed as a ch all en ge to an “ ord er o f r em ov al” un de r S ect ion 12 52 (a) (5) . T he cla im s d id n ot aris e unti l af ter the ir o rde rs o f r em ov al b ecam e f ina l an d c ou ld n ot h av e b een rai sed be fo re the BI A, no r w ou ld
rev iewof su chcla im s re qu ire any in qu iryint o th e v ali dit y o f t he rem ov al o rde rs o r th e ag en cy ’s act ion s in ord eri ngpe tit ion ers ’ re m ov al. Section 1252(b) (9) contai ns somewhat broader language, appl ying to any cla im “arising fr om ” p eti tio ne rs’ rem ov al p roc eed ing s. If we we re t o a do pt an e xp an siv e inter pre tat ion of thi s-13-

pro vis ion , p eti tio ne rs’ cla im s w ou ld f all wi thi n it s sc op e. Pe tit ion ers ’ cl aim s “aris e” f rom the ir
rem ov al p roc eed ing s in

the sen se t

hat if pe tit ion ers ha d n ev er b een pla ced in r em ov al pro cee din gs , th eywo uld

no t have so ug ht r ev iewin t his Co urt , and

we wo uld

no t be co nf

ronted wi th q ue sti on s re gardi ngthe tim eli ne ss o f t he ir p eti tio ns fo r re vie w. In o the r w ord s, if the phras e “ar isi ngfr om ” is int erp ret ed to m ean “b ear inga b ut- fo r ca

us al r elatio ns hip to, ” th enpe tit ion ers ’ cla im s ar e b arr ed

by Se cti on 12 52 (b) (9)
. Alternati vely, the phra se “aris ing from” could be interpret ed as a catc h-all pr ovision de sig ne d to en co m

pa ss a ll c lai m s ch all en gin g re m ov al o rde rs, in o the r w ord s, all cla im s o ve r wh ich the co urt s o f a

pp eal s h av e ex clu siv e juris dic tio n und er S ect ion 12 52 (a) (5) . T he statut ory lan gu ag e su

pp ort s th is i nte rpr etatio n. Th e “z ipp er” cla us e is a su

bs ect ion of Se cti on 12 52 (b) , entit led “R eq uir em ents f

or r ev iewof

ord ers of rem ov al, ” whic h a

pp lie s o nly

“[ w] ithres pe ct t o review of an or

de r o f re mo va l un de r su

bs ect ion (a) (1) .” 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (b) (em ph asi s ad de d);
seeSt. Cy r , 5 33 U. S. at 3 13 (“[ Se cti on 12 52 (b) (9) ], byits own te rm s, do es n ot b ar h ab eas jurisdi ction over [cla ims] not su bje ct t o ju dic ial rev iewun de r § 1 25 2(a )(1 ).” (em ph asi s in ori gin al) ). Th is n arr ow er i nte rpr etatio n f ind s su pp ort in t he leg isl ati ve his tor

y o f t he RE AL ID Ac t as well. The House Conference Reportstates t hat “sect ion 106 [of the REAL ID A ct] would not pre clu de ha

be as r ev iewov er c ha lle ng es t o d ete nti on that ar e in de pe nd ent of

ch all en ge s to
rem ov al o rde rs. Ins tea d, the [A ct] wo uld eli m inate h ab eas rev iewon ly o ver ch allenges to
rem ov al o rd

ers .” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005), reprinted i n 2005 U.S.C.C.A .N. 240, 300 (emphasis added). The Report al so evidences a n intent by Congres s to avoid the Suspension Clause chall enges rais ed by the Supreme Court in St. Cy r , m ak ingcle ar that th e REA L I D A ctTh e g ov ernm ent ar gu es t hat w e sh ou ld r eq

uir e p eti tio ne rs, as a

pru de nti al m att er, to 5 ex haus t t he iradmin is tr at iv e r eme di es be for e s ee ki ng re li ef p ur su an t t o 2 8 U. S. C. § 22 41 . Cl ai ms arising a fter the BIA has iss ued a final orderof removal m ay be raise d with the BIA by filing a motion to reopen. In re Compean , 2 5 I. & N . D ec. 1, 3 (A .G . 2 00 9). Pr ev iou sly we have he ld that exhaust ion before the BIA is appr opriate t o “avoid any premature int erference with t he agency’s proc esses,” to “ afford[] the parti es and courts the benefit of the agenc y’s expert ise,” and to allow the agency to “compile a rec ord which i s adequate for judi cial re view.” ArangoAradondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1994) (i nternal quot ation marks omitted). None of the se f act ors co un sel in f

av or o f r eq

uir ingex ha

us tio n o f a dm ini str ati ve rem ed ies he re. Be cau se pe tit ion ers ’ cl aim s ar os e af ter the BI A e nte red

its fi na l or de r of

rem ov al, the re i s n o d an ge r th at a ha be as p eti tio n und er 2 8 U .S .C . § 22 41 wo uld int erf ere wi th t he ag en cy ’s p roc ess es. Mo reo ve r, the BIA has no parti cular exper tise in de ciding cla ims that concern the fil ing of a petiti on for review in thi s Court. Finall y, the distr ict court– unlike thi s Court – has the ability t o develop a factual recor d, obviating t he need for the BIA to do so. -14- was intended “t o give every al ien a fair opportunity to obta in judici al revie w while restor ing ord er and co mm on sen se t o th e ju dic ial rev iewpro ces s. ” Id . at 17 4; see also id. at 175 (“[ S] ect ion

10 6 w ou ld g ive ev ery

ali enon e d ayin t

he co urt of ap pe als , s ati sf

yin g c on sti tut ion al concerns.”)
. Given our obligat ion to construe the statute to avoid c onstitut ional probl ems and Congress’s cl ear inte nt to avoid suc h problems, we have no difficulty concluding t hat Section 1252(b)(9) pr ecludes habea s review only overdirect c hallenges t o final orders of removal. Because, as expla ined above, peti tioners’ claims regarding the timeliness of theirpetiti ons do not
co ns tit ute a ch all en ge to t

he un de rly ingord ers of

rem ov al, pe tit ion ers m aysee k re lie f f or s uc h claims in the dist rict cour t pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 5 Th is c on clu sio n is in l ine wi th t ho se o f o ur s ist er c irc uit s, wh ich have he ld t

hat di str ict
co urt s re tai n h ab eas jur isd ict ion ov er c lai m s th at are c oll ate ral to o r in de pe nd ent of rem ov al orders. See Nnadika v. Att’ y Gen. , 48 4 F .3 d 6 26 , 6 32 (3d Ci r. 2 00 7) ( Af

ter the RE AL ID Ac t, jur isd ict ion

un de r 28 U. S. C. § 2 24 1 s til l ex ist s f or c lai m s th at d o n ot “ dir ect ly i m pli cat e th e o rde rIn an Aug us t 27 , 2 01 0 le tte r su bm itt ed pursu ant to Fe de ral Ru le o f A pp ell ate Pr oc ed

ure 6 28(j), the government notified this Courtof a recently- decided Ninth Cir cuit case , Singh v. Napolitano , No. 07-16988, 2010 W L 3293696 (9th Cir., Aug. 23, 2010). On August 31, 2010, the Court-appoi nted amicus counsel, ACLU Imm igrants’ Rights Project , responded to t he government’s lette r. In Singh v. Napolitano , th e N int h C irc uit req uir ed the pe tit ion er, as a prudential matter, to exhaust hi s administrative remedies before seeking re lief pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at *3. For the r easons discus sed in footnote 5, su pra , we disagree wit h the Ninth Circuit ’s reasoni ng. Th e g ov ernm ent co nc ed es t hat f ed era l co urt s h av e th e autho rity to dir ect the BI A t o re 7 issue final or ders of removal. See, e.g. , Dearinger ex rel . Volkova v. Reno , 2 32 F. 3d 10 42 (9t h Cir. 2000) (re quiring the government to reenterthe BIA’s orderand restar t the 30-day fil ing pe rio d). -15- of rem ov al” ); Madu v. Att’y Gen. , 4 70 F. 3d 13 62 , 1 36 6 (1 1th

Ci r. 2 00 6) ( cla im

that no rem ov al ord er w as e nte red

did no t se ek rev iewof

rem ov al o rde r); He rn an de z v. Go nz ale

s , 424 F.3d 42, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (REAL ID Act does not “preclude habeas revi ew over challe nges to detent ion that are independent of chall enges to removal orders .”) (quoti ng H.R. Rep. No. 109-72 at 2873)). Further, in Singh v. Go nz ale s , th e N int

h C irc uit he ld t hat a c lai m

that in ef fe cti ve co un sel prevented t he filing of a timely petiti on for review could be br ought in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 pe tit ion . 4 99 F. 3d

96 9, 97 9 (9 th C ir. 20 07 ). 6 Of co urs e, pe tit ion ers ’ ul tim ate go al i s to see k re vie w o f t he ir r em ov al o rde rs, an d th is the y c ou ld n ot d o in

a h ab eas pe tit ion

un de r th e p lai n m ean ingof Se cti on 12 52 . H ab eas rev iew thus would be limited to t he narrow questi on of whether ineffective assi stance of counsel or circumstances cre ated by the government prevented petit ioners from filing a timely petiti on for
rev iew , and

the on ly r eli ef

that pe tit ion ers co uld

see k w ou ld b e an

ord er d ire cti ngthe BI A t o reissue t he final order of removal so thatthe 30-day per iod within which t o file a timely petit ion for review would begin to run anew. See Singh , 499 F.3d at 979. “In otherwords, a successful 7W e d o n ot e xp res s any o pin ion on wh eth er t

he dis tri ct c ourt s ho uld

ord er the BI A t o 8 rei ssu e th e re m ov al o rde rs o r on the m eri ts o f p eti tio ne rs’ ch all en ge s to the ir und erl yin g o rde rs of rem ov al. -16- ha be as p eti tio n in

thi s ca se w ill lea d to no thi ngm ore than ‘a day in co urt ’ f or [ pe tit ion ers ], wh ich is c on sis tent w ithCo ng res sio na l intent un de rly ingthe RE AL ID Ac t.” Id
. 8 Having determined that habe as review is availabl e for petiti oners’ cl aims regarding the timeliness of their appeal, the appl ication of the 30- day filing deadli ne does not rai se Suspension Clause concerns . Thus, we lack juri sdiction t o hear thei r petit ions for review. Ru iz- Mar tin ez , 516 F.3d at 105-06. III . Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, we are required t o transfer a ca se to anothercourt when (1) we lack juri sdiction ove r the case ; (2) another court would ha ve had juris diction atthe time of the filing; and (3) transfer is in the int erest of just ice. Ru iz v . Mu ka sey , 5 52 F. 3d 26 9, 27 3 (2 d C ir. 20 09 ). B eca

us e w e co nc lud e th at the dis tri ct c ou rts – b ut n ot t

his Co urt – h av e juris dic tio n to
rev iewpe tit ion ers ’ cl aim s, the fi rst tw o p ron gs are m et. Tr an sf er p urs uant t o S ect ion

16 31 is i n the inter est of justic e because it“would expedite . . . r eview” of petiti oners’ cl aims. Id. at 276. Additionall y, because Thompson was removed to Jam aica duri ng the pendency of this appeal, he lik ely wo uld be barre d f

rom fi lin g a ne w p eti tio n in

the dis tri ct c ourt. Se cti on 22 41 “re qu ire s that the applicant must be ‘in c ustody’ when the appl ication for habe as corpus is filed.” Carafas
v. La Va lle e , 3 91 U. S. 23 4, 23 8 (1 96 8). Tr an sf err ingthe pe tit ion

all ow s T ho m

ps on to p urs ue his cla im s.-17-

Th e o nly rem ain ingqu est ion

is whic h d ist

ric t co urt ha s juris dic tio n o ve r pe tit ion ers ’ cla im s. Whil e th e g en era l ru le i s th at v enue is p rop er i n “ the dis tri ct o f c on fi ne m ent,” Ru ms fel d
v. Pa dil la , 5 42 U. S. 42 6, 44 3 (2 00 4), thi s ru le “d oe s n ot a pp ly whe n a

ha be as p eti tio ne r challenges something oth er than h is p res ent phys ica l co nf ine m ent.” Id. at 438 (emphasis added). Here, petit ioners do not c hallenge t he fact of their det ention, but r ather the ir rightto review of the ir r em ov al o rde rs. Thus , th eir cla im s ar e n ot “ co re [ ha

be as] ch all en ge s” o f t

he typ e su

bje ct t o the “dist rict of confinement” rule. Id . at 335. I nstead, we look to “ tradit ional venue considerat ions” to deci de where to tr ansfer the peti tions. Brad en v. 30 th J

ud ici al C irc uit Co ur t , 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973). Relevant factor s include “( 1) where all of the material events t ook place; ( 2) where the r ecords and witne sses pert inent to pet itioner ’s clai m are likely to be found; and (3) the c onvenience of the forum for both the respondent a nd the petit ioner.” He nd ers on v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 128 n.25 (2d Cir. 1998) (quot ing Brad en , 4 10 U. S. at 4 93 -94 ) (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed ). Fo r se ve ral rea so ns , w e co nc lud e th at v enue is p rop er i n th e d istric ts i n whic h p eti tio ne rs’
rem ov al p roc eed ing s w ere co m ple ted . F irs t, v enue fo r any e ve ntu al p eti tio n f or r ev iewwi ll l ie in the Second Circ uit. Se e 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (b) (2) . If we we re t o f

ind ve nu e p rop er o n th e b asi s of so m e o the r pr inc ipl e, it i s p os sib le that w e w ou ld h av e to trans fe r th e p eti tio ns to a dis tri ct
co urt outsi de of

thi s C irc uit , whic h w ou ld n ot b e b ound byour de cis ion

in t his cas e. If

that co urt were to conclude that itdid not have jur isdicti on over petit ioners’ c laims, then our decisi on – which is based on t he availabi lity of habeas r eview – would be severe ly comprom ised. Second, it is conve nient for both the government and petitione rs to li tigate t he matter entire ly within one Circuit, r ather tha n bouncing around to di fferent courts atdifferent stages of the pr oceedings.-18-

This way, all li tigati on will occur wit hin the Second Circ uit, which will aid in the e fficient resoluti on of petitioner s’ clai ms. Finally, because peti tioners’ claims concern the fili ng of a petiti on for review in the Sec ond Circuit, t he locus of the event s always will be in the Second Circuit, eve n if some m ateria l events occ urred els ewhere. Be cau se Lun a’s rem ov al p roc eed ing s w ere co m ple ted in N ap an oc h, Ne w Y ork , v enue is pro pe r f or Lun a’s pe tit ion

in t he No rth ern

Di str ict of Ne w Y ork . T ho m

ps on ’s r em ov al pro cee din gs we re c om

ple ted in H art fo rd, Co nn ect icut; thu s, ve nu e is pro pe r f or T ho m ps on ’s pe tit ion in t he Di str ict

of Co nn ect icut. CO NC LU SI ON Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the peti tion for revie w in Docket No. 07-3796-ag is he reby TRANS FERRE D to the United St ates Distr ict Court for the Northern Distr ict of New York, and the petit ion for review in DocketNo. 08-4840-ag is her eby TRANS FERRE D to t he Un ite d St ate s D istric t C ourt f

or t he Di str ict

of Co nn ect icut. P eti tio ne r L un a’s rem ov al i s STAYE D pe nd ingthe res olutio n o f h is p eti tio n in the dis tri ct c ourt.