Filed 3/15/22 In re Elena A. CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re ELENA A. et al.,

Persons Coming Under the

Juvenile Court Law.

 B313654

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04757)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTHA C.,

 Defendant and Respondent,

DAVID A.,

Defendant and Appellant.
2

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.

Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant David A.

Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Respondent Martha C.

_____________________

After David A. (father) pled no contest to allegations that 

he had abused his two children and their mother, the juvenile 

court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting father 

from contacting all three of them. Father appeals that 

restraining order, contending that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion because it relied upon “nebulous” statements regarding 

father’s purported stalking activities and because it erroneously 

denied his request to call the children as witnesses at the 

evidentiary hearing.

A juvenile court may issue a restraining order enjoining 

anyone from disturbing the peace of a parent or child if a failure 

to issue such an order might jeopardize their safety. The record 

here unambiguously demonstrates that father severely 

traumatized both of his children and their mother over a period 

of many years. The documented incidents of domestic violence 

with mother were long-standing and predated both children. 

Later, he abused mother in front of the children, and, after 

separation, began abusing the children during weekend visits, 

which he admitted as part of his no contest plea. Indeed, both 

children were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder due 

to father’s physical and verbal abuse and they were still receiving 

psychological treatment at the time of the restraining order 
3

hearing. Their therapists opined that visitation with father 

would be detrimental to their mental health.

Given substantial evidence of the severe and ongoing 

psychological trauma he caused to both of his children and the 

mother, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a 

restraining order.

Although the record contains a statement from father’s 

counsel that he intended to call the children as witnesses at the 

contested hearing, it does not reflect either that the juvenile court 

affirmatively denied his request, or what the juvenile court’s 

reasoning for rejecting such testimony might have been. Father 

has therefore failed to provide us with an adequate record to 

review, and he essentially concedes this point in his opening 

brief. Further, in light of the overwhelming evidence of father’s 

abuse and traumatization of his two children, the juvenile court 

would not have erred in refusing to order their testimony under 

the circumstances.

Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. The Family

Father had two children with his wife, Martha C. (mother). 

Elena A. was born in 2008, and Gabriel A. followed in 2012. 

1 Father did not designate the record in the prior appeal as 

part of the record in this appeal, instead citing to portions of the 

prior record in his opening and reply briefs. A request for judicial 

notice would have been more appropriate. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 

455, 459.) In any event, both sides cite to the prior record, so in 

an abundance of caution we will take judicial notice of the record 

in the prior appeal on our own motion. 
4

When mother and father divorced in 2016, mother took sole 

physical custody of both children. Father shared legal custody 

and had the right to regular visitation.

B. Initial Investigation into Abuse Allegations

On June 6 and 9, 2019, the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) 

received multiple referrals alleging that the children showed 

signs of physical abuse after returning from weekend visits with 

father. The children reportedly came home with bruises, 

scratches, and bloody noses. Gabriel disclosed that father “hit 

him . . . on his back and on his body.” When the children began 

resisting visits with father, father roughly forced them into his 

car, causing bruising on their backs. The children told one of the 

reporting parties that they had also witnessed domestic violence 

between their parents.

When the Department interviewed the children, they

reported that father physically abused them as a form of 

discipline. They said that father once pulled on Gabriel’s ear so 

hard that the skin broke, causing his ear to bleed. The 

Department found a corresponding scar on Gabriel’s left ear lobe. 

The children also stated that father had locked Gabriel into a 

dark closet and, when Gabriel tried to escape, father “barricaded 

the door with his own body” to keep him trapped. The children 

said that father would “force feed” Gabriel, attempting to force 

him “to eat his food within 10 seconds.” And Elena said that 

father “pulled her by the hair and threatened to discipline [her] 

in the same manner father disciplines [Gabriel].” The children 

both reported being fearful of their father.
5

The children also confirmed that they had witnessed father 

physically abuse their mother. Gabriel reported that he had once 

seen father “choke” mother while holding her against the wall.

Mother admitted that father had been physically and 

verbally abusive since they first began dating in 2004. She said 

that he had continued to push, shove, and sexually assault her 

after their 2016 separation, with the most recent incident taking 

place in November 2018. Mother had attempted to move away 

from father to place distance between them, but claimed that 

when father “threat[ened] to remove the children from her care if 

mother did not provide him with [her] new home address,” she 

buckled and gave him the family’s new address. She said that 

father would “make . . . unannounced visits to her home to 

continue to intimidate her and the children.” When she 

attempted to obtain a restraining order against father, her 

application was denied.

C. Jurisdiction Petition

On July 26, 2019, the Department filed a petition 

requesting jurisdiction alleging that the children were subject to 

dependency jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), 

(b)(1), and (j) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2

On September 23, 2019, at the jurisdiction hearing, father 

pled no contest to an amended version of the jurisdiction petition, 

which alleged three counts.3 Count a-1 alleged that father 

2 Subsequent undesignated statutory citations are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.

3 Father filed an appeal from jurisdiction and disposition 

orders pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835. We 

dismissed that appeal in an order filed June 10, 2020 (B302181).
6

“inappropriately disciplined” Gabriel with a litany of physical 

abuse, including “str[iking] [him] with . . . father’s hands, fists 

and objects,” “pull[ing] and dragg[ing] [Gabriel] by [his] ear[,] 

causing [Gabriel’s] ear to bleed and sustain a scar to [his] left ear 

lobe,” and “put[ting] [Gabriel] in a closet for an extended period of 

time.” Count b-2 alleged that father also inappropriately 

disciplined Elena by “pull[ing] [her] hair” and “threaten[ing] to 

hit [her].” Finally, count b-3 alleged that father “ha[d] a history 

of engaging in physical altercations [with mother] in the presence 

of the children,” including by choking her, holding her against a 

wall, and pushing her.4

The juvenile court ordered mother to retain physical 

custody of the children and removed the children from father, but 

it allowed him to have monitored visitation.

D. Children Refuse Visitation with Father

On December 5, 2019, the Department reported that it had 

been unable to facilitate visitation between children and father, 

as the children repeatedly stated that they did not want to see 

him. Elena told interviewers that she “does not wish to see her 

father nor speak with him,” because “father [is] not very loving” 

and “father pretends to be a nice guy but he’s actually mean.” 

Gabriel shared that he struggled with “visions of dark shadows at 

night, episodes of urinating on himself, and difficulty showering 

alone.” He said that he was scared of father, and feared that 

father would remove him from mother’s home.

Initially, the Department was concerned that mother was 

coaching the children. Accordingly, it instructed all personnel to 

4 The amended petition struck all allegations that mother 

failed to protect the children.
7

conduct interviews with the children outside of the home and 

away from mother. Despite these precautions, the children 

continuously protested the Department’s efforts at facilitating

visitation. On October 7, 2019, the children repeated that they 

did not want to see their father. On October 16, the children 

continuously cried at the suggestion that they visit their father. 

Elena cried, “Why won’t anyone believe me?” When the 

Department finally convinced the children to see father on 

November 20, 2019, father was asked to leave after just 15 

minutes because Elena burst into tears, “curled herself in a ball,” 

and “turned her face from . . . father.”

Both children were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress 

disorder due to father’s physical abuse. One therapist 

recommended against visitation, stating that the entire family 

experienced anxiety and fear about father. Gabriel’s therapist 

opined that visits with father would put him at risk of triggering 

symptoms and be detrimental to his health.

Although mother had enrolled in the protective services 

required by her case plan, she struggled to overcome the trauma 

inflicted by years of abuse at father’s hands. She reported that 

she “live[d] in fear continuously,” and was afraid that father “will 

break into their home and take the children away and kill her.” 

Mother confessed that she had given father her current address 

in an attempt to stop his endless stream of harassing phone calls, 

which she claimed had gotten her fired from her job.

On December 5, 2019, at an appearance progress hearing, 

the juvenile court revoked visitation rights with Gabriel, 

concluding that visits with Gabriel would be detrimental to him. 

Although the court allowed father to have weekly visitation with 

Elena, she consistently refused to visit him.
8

On March 3, 2020, the Department submitted a status 

review report recommending that mother retain custody. It 

opined that mother “has displayed protective capacities to ensure 

the safety of the children, evidenced by[, inter alia, her] efforts to 

obtain a restraining order against father.” The Department also 

made an unfavorable risk assessment of father, citing his 

infrequent cooperation with the Department, failure to 

“demonstrate new skills needed to protect the children,” and the 

fact that he had not been able to repair his bond with the 

children since the case started.

E. Continuance due to COVID-19 Pandemic

The next review hearing was scheduled to be held on 

March 23, 2020. However, due to the onset of the COVID-19 

pandemic, the hearing was continued for almost one year, until 

February 26, 2021.

On February 26, 2021, the Department submitted its next 

status review report. Father had begun cooperating with the 

department and had completed parenting classes. Mother had 

completed her services and was working hard to create a 

protective environment for the children. However, mother still

struggled with traumatic flashbacks due to “what [the family] 

went through with father.”

Although mother said that she would support the children 

if they decided that they wanted to see father, they both 

continued to refuse to see him. On February 21, 2020, for 

example, Gabriel told interviewers that he “d[id]n’t want to see 

[father], he’s mean, he hits me, and my mom doesn’t hit me.” He 

said that whenever he saw someone who looked like father, he 

“g[ot] scared and start[ed] speed walking.” On April 21, 2020, 

Elena echoed Gabriel, stating that she did not want any form of 
9

contact with her father because he “[i]s scary, he hurts my 

brother and me a lot and that’s not right.” The children’s 

therapists both agreed that visits with father would be 

detrimental to the children’s mental health.

Despite lingering issues with father, the Department 

concluded that mother had successfully provided a safe home for 

the children. It recommended that the juvenile court terminate 

jurisdiction and return the children to mother’s sole physical

custody, with the option for monitored visitation with father 

when the children were ready for it.

F. Temporary Restraining Order

On April 29, 2021, mother filed her second request for a 

temporary restraining order (TRO).

5 In addition to father’s long 

history of domestic violence and physical abuse, mother alleged 

that on three separate occasions in 2020, she saw a car that she 

believed to be father’s following her through her neighborhood.

She also claimed that, during the 2019-2020 school year,

Gabriel’s teacher reported that she saw a man attempting to pick 

up Gabriel after school, and that she refused to release Gabriel to 

that man. Mother additionally alleged that both Gabriel and his 

maternal aunt had seen what they believed to be father’s car 

outside the family house on two occasions in March 2021.

On April 27, 2021, Gabriel corroborated this account with 

the Department, telling an interviewer that he was scared to do 

5 In a prior order, the juvenile court issued a temporary 

stay-away order between the parents but did not rule on mother’s 

request for a TRO, instead continuing the matter to a contested 

hearing on April 29, 2021. Mother filed a second, identical TRO 

request on the day of the contested hearing, as her first TRO 

request had presumably expired.
10

his homework near any windows in case his father drove by the 

house and saw him.

In a last minute information submitted to the juvenile 

court, the Department reported that mother had been receiving 

calls from unknown or private numbers attempting to confirm 

her address and obtain information about her and the children’s 

schedules. The information also reported that, on April 26, 2021, 

Elena told interviewers that she will be “extremely happy” when 

their case closes, because she “wo[uld]n’t have to see [father], he’s 

caused [her] family a lot of pain and fear.”

At the contested hearing on April 29, 2021, minors’ counsel 

informed the court that the children had specifically asked to be 

put on the restraining order, as “[t]hey are concerned about 

father knowing where they live and potentially stalking 

[mother].”

The juvenile court granted mother’s request and issued the 

requested TRO over father’s objections, reasoning that it was an 

appropriate measure because “at this point in time, the kids are 

afraid.”

G. Permanent Restraining Order and Termination of 

Jurisdiction

The juvenile court initially set a contested hearing for 

May 12, 2021, to determine whether a permanent restraining 

order should be issued against father.

Father attempted to submit hundreds of pages of 

screenshots from his phone’s Google Maps application and 

printouts of a tracking device that he had allegedly installed on 

his car. He claimed that these documents showed that he had 

not driven anywhere near mother’s house or the children’s school 

over the claimed time periods.
11

The juvenile court explained to father’s counsel that such 

documents would be considered inadmissible hearsay if he could 

not provide a foundation for them by, for example, retaining an 

expert who could attest to the manner in which these devices 

record a person’s location information. The court granted an 

additional continuance to June 9, 2021, to give father’s counsel

the opportunity to perfect this evidence.

Father also asked the juvenile court to order mother and 

the children to be present in court to be available for in-person 

testimony, due to father’s “belie[f] that the children have been 

coached by [mother] and will be susceptible to this if the hearing 

is conducted” virtually.

On June 9, 2021, the matter proceeded to a contested joint 

hearing to determine whether a permanent restraining order 

should issue against father, and whether dependency jurisdiction 

should be terminated.

Minors’ counsel asked the juvenile court to terminate 

jurisdiction only if it granted the permanent restraining order. 

She later explained that “[i]n light of the anticipation of the 

supervision of this case concluding, the children became fearful.” 

She informed the court that the children “want[ed] the 

restraining order, and want[ed] some means of protection past 

when this court’s supervision concludes.”

Because the children’s position on terminating jurisdiction 

depended on the issuance of a permanent restraining order, the 

juvenile court first turned to the matter of the restraining order. 

After hearing preliminary arguments, the juvenile court rejected 

all of father’s exhibits consisting of the Google Maps screenshots 

and tracking device printouts, as he had not retained the 

suggested expert or laid any other foundation that could render 
12

them admissible. It also informed father that, pursuant to 

Evidence Code section 352,6 it would disallow the excessive 

number of witnesses on the list he had submitted. Father’s 

counsel stated that because “the court has indicated and denied 

my request, previously, for me to call the children, over our 

objection,” his only witnesses would be mother and father.

During the hearing on June 10 and 23, 2021, father and 

mother testified. Father denied surveilling mother and the 

children, denied knowing where they lived, and denied 

instructing anyone to follow them on his behalf. Mother testified 

regarding the three times in 2020 when she saw a dark car

following her, and clarified that she had seen father driving the 

car on two occasions.

Mother testified that she had attempted to obtain a 

restraining order against father multiple times, but had been 

unsuccessful. After mother saw father following her by car in 

February of 2020, she said that she wanted to get a restraining 

order but was told that she couldn’t pursue one at that time, and 

that she would not be granted one because she did not have 

photographs or other proof that he had been following her. When 

she tried to get a restraining order later that year, she said that 

again the “answer was, no. There’s a pandemic going on. When I 

would try to go to court, it was closed. They wo[uld]n’t see me.” 

She testified that she was finally able to request the present 

restraining order by phone in March of 2021.

6 “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability 

that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time 

or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing 

the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
13

At the end of mother’s testimony, the juvenile court asked 

father for his next witness. Father’s counsel said that he had no 

further witnesses to call.

After hearing further argument on both the restraining 

order and on the termination of jurisdiction, the juvenile court 

terminated jurisdiction and issued a custody order giving mother 

sole physical and legal custody. The court ordered monitored 

visitation, but noted that “these children are old enough that they 

are not going to be physically forced to visit.”

With respect to the restraining order, father argued that 

because he had completed his case plan, which included anger 

management and domestic violence classes, the domestic violence 

issues that led to dependency jurisdiction were no longer 

relevant. The juvenile court disagreed, concluding that “the fact 

that I’m having this [restraining order] hearing is an indication 

. . . that the issues have not been ameliorated.”

The juvenile court noted that although father “ha[d] 

completed his programs . . . it appears that there has been no real 

change. The children are still fearful of the father, and do not 

want to have anything to do with him.” Further, the juvenile 

court relied upon the allegations of domestic abuse that the court 

sustained in the initial jurisdiction petition, and on the court’s

finding that the person “who appears to be stalking [mother] . . . 

when I look at all of the evidence, it’s most likely [father], based 

upon the evidence of the mother, of his children, of the school.” 

Accordingly, the juvenile court entered a three-year restraining 

order prohibiting father from contact with mother and the 

children, apart from court-ordered visitation.

Father timely appealed.
14

DISCUSSION

A. The Juvenile Court Properly Issued a Permanent 

Restraining Order Against Father

Father argues that we should vacate the restraining order

because the evidence brought against him did not support its 

issuance. He contends that his no contest plea to the abuse 

allegations that led to dependency jurisdiction could not provide a 

basis for the permanent restraining order, as he had not engaged 

in any violent conduct in the two years since the allegations were 

sustained.

After the Department has filed a section 300 petition 

requesting dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court may issue 

a restraining order pursuant to section 213.5. Under section 

213.5, subdivision (a), the juvenile court may issue an order 

enjoining any person from disturbing the peace of the child, as 

well as that of the child’s parent or caregiver. The movant need 

not provide “ ‘evidence that the restrained person has previously 

molested, attacked, struck, sexually assaulted, stalked, or 

battered the child.’ [Citation.] Nor does it require evidence of a 

reasonable apprehension of future abuse.” (In re C.Q. (2013) 219 

Cal.App.4th 355, 363.) Instead, the juvenile court may issue a 

section 213.5 restraining order if it determines that “ ‘ “failure to 

make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the petitioner.” ’ ” 

(Ibid.)

“In reviewing the issuance of a restraining order under 

[section 213.5], ‘we view the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable 

inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination.’” (In re 

Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 996-997.) While “[s]everal 

courts have applied the substantial evidence standard in 
15

reviewing the issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5” 

(In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465), others have 

applied both the substantial evidence and abuse of discretion 

standards. (See, e.g., In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 

866 [“appellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard to 

determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual findings 

in support of a restraining order and the abuse of discretion 

standard to determine whether the court properly issued the 

order”].) “The practical differences between these two standards 

in this context are not significant.” (In re N.L., supra, at p. 1466.)

The record in this case demonstrates that father had

severely traumatized his children. Father had a long history of 

domestic violence with mother, predating both children. He 

abused mother in front of the children, and, after he and mother 

separated, began abusing the children during weekend visits. 

Both Elena and Gabriel had been diagnosed with post-traumatic 

stress disorder due to father’s physical and verbal abuse. They 

were still receiving psychological treatment for this condition at 

the time of the restraining order hearing. Each of the children’s 

therapists had advised that visitation with father would be 

detrimental to their mental health. (In re A.M. (2019) 37 

Cal.App.5th 614, 619 [restraining order was appropriate where 

“there was sufficient evidence that any contact between [a father 

and his daughter] would jeopardize her emotional and 

psychological safety”].)

Although father eventually completed a series of violence 

prevention classes and expressed remorse for the pain he had 

caused to his family, he was unable to successfully complete one 

visit with the children in two years. Elena and Gabriel 

repeatedly expressed fear of father and insisted that they did not 
16

want to visit with him, even when the Department made efforts 

to counteract any potential coaching from mother. (Compare 

with In re N.L., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1468-1469 

[vacating a restraining order where the Department’s reports 

indicated the child’s recent interactions with the restrained 

parent were favorable, and the child said that she enjoyed 

visiting the restrained parent] and In re C.Q., supra, 219 

Cal.App.4th at p. 364 [same, where children “stated they want 

visits with their father and are not afraid of him”].) Under these 

circumstances, the juvenile court had ample reason to conclude 

that contact with father could jeopardize the children’s safety.

Father also argues that mother’s allegations about him

following the family at their home and at the children’s school 

were “strikingly vague, speculative and devoid of evidentiary 

support.” Whatever may be said about the stalking allegations 

and father’s positive progress, these positive steps do not 

ameliorate the terrible and lingering past trauma he inflicted on 

mother and his children.

Under either standard of review, the juvenile court 

properly issued a permanent restraining order against father.

B. The Record Does Not Adequately Support Father’s 

Claim that the Juvenile Court Denied Father’s 

Request to Call the Children as Witnesses

Father also claims that the court erroneously denied his 

request to call the children as witnesses during the hearing.7 He 

7 Father suggests that this error also affects the orders

terminating jurisdiction and awarding full custody to mother, 

arguing that the matter should be remanded to the juvenile court 

for a new hearing at which father could solicit the children’s 

testimony on these issues. However, he has not adequately 
17

argues that this denial violated his constitutional rights to 

confrontation.

The record supporting this contention is ambiguous. 

Whereas father’s trial counsel asserted that the juvenile court 

had previously denied his request to “cross-examine”the 

children, the record does not reflect any argument regarding that 

issue or the juvenile court’s ruling. Indeed, father’s opening brief 

concedes that “[t]he record does not reflect that the court 

addressed [the] request[ ].” While it is true that the juvenile 

court indicated at the time of the hearing that it would exercise 

its discretion under section 352 of the Evidence Code to exclude 

many of father’s witnesses, it did not specifically address father’s 

request to have the children testify. And, when the juvenile court 

specifically asked father whether he would like to call additional 

witnesses at the conclusion of mother’s testimony, father 

answered that he would not call additional witnesses and moved 

to proceed to closing arguments.

As the appellant, father bears the burden of providing an 

adequate record. (In re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 

613, 622 [“Under well-established rules of appellate procedure, 

. . . the appellant[ ] has the burden to provide an adequate record 

on appeal”].) Because the record before us does not unequivocally 

briefed this argument; his briefs assert, without citation to legal 

authority, that father was entitled to receive the children’s 

testimony regarding various “statements appear[ing] in the social 

worker’s report for the section 364 hearing.” Accordingly, these 

claims are abandoned. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.

(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700 [“When an issue is 

unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be 

deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is 

unnecessary”].)
18

demonstrate that the juvenile court denied father’s request, he 

has failed to establish error. (People v. Accredited Surety & 

Casualty Co. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 891, 900 [“ ‘ “Failure to 

provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be 

resolved against [the appellant]” ’ ”]; see also In re Jaime R. 

(2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 772 [a parent asserting a violation of 

a fundamental constitutional right “ ‘the parent must also show 

there was a “determinative difference” in the outcome of the 

proceeding by reason of the parent’s lack of counsel, such that the 

proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair to the parent’ ”]; 

Ward v. Litowsky (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 437, 440 [“If appellant 

wished us to consider whether the alleged [error] prejudicially 

affected the [proceedings], [he] should have presented us with a 

record which included [it]”].)8

8 Even were we to reach the merits of this argument, we 

would reject it. A parent’s right to call their child as a witness in 

a dependency case is not absolute. (In re Jaime R., supra, 90 

Cal.App.4th at p. 771.) To the contrary, the juvenile court may 

refuse to honor such a demand if it would traumatize or 

psychologically damage the child, and the child’s testimony is 

unnecessary. (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1087.) 

Father’s speculation that the children could have testified in his 

favor with regard to the permanent restraining order is 

contradicted by the overwhelming evidence that his children 

feared him and continuously expressed that they did not want 

any contact with him.
19

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CRANDALL, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.