COURT OF APPEAL S OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judg es Benton, Cole man and Willis

HUDSON VENETIAN BLIN D SERVICE, INC. AND PENNSYLV ANIA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 16 11-98-2 PER CURIAM MAY 18, 1999 DONALD A. HUDSON

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Bradford C. Jaco b; Taylor & Wa lker, P.C., on brief), for appellants. (Andrew J. Reinhardt; Kerns, Kastenbaum & Reinhardt, on brief), for appellee.

Hudson Venetian Blind Service, Inc. , and its insurer (hereinafter referred to as “employe r”) contend that the Workers’ Compensation Commission erred in holding that Donald A. Hudson proved (1) that he su ffers from a polyneurop athy or a peripheral neuropathy based upon the opinion of Dr. Robe rt J. DeLorenzo; (2) that his condition was caused by exposure to chemic als at work; (3) that he suff ers from a compen sable occupa tional disease rather than a gradually incurr ed, noncompensab le, cumulative exposure to chemical solvents; (4) th at a June 1, 1995 ex tender spill incident caused his condition; and (5) that he was totally di sabled since March 1, 1996, and, th erefore, was not obli gated to market his

*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - residual capacity. Up on reviewing th e record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appe al is withou t merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission ’s decision. See Rule 5A:27. I., II. and IV. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bl dg. Corp. v. Mullins , 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 39 0 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). Factual findings made by the comm ission will be up held on appeal if supported by cr edible evidence. See James v. Capitol Steel
Constr. Co. , 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 48 7, 488 (1989). Moreover, “[t] he actual determ ination of causat ion is a factual finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to suppor t the finding.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick , 7 Va. App. 684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). Dr. DeLorenzo, chief neurolog ist at the Medi cal College of Virginia Hospital (“MC V”), a neurology profes sor, and the Director of the Neuroscience Research Facili ty, testified that he talked to Hudson on severa l occasions, performed a one and one- half hour history and comple te physical and neurol ogical examination of Hudson, review ed Hudson’s MCV medical ch art for approx imately four to five hours at vari ous intervals, spent another hour reading Hudson’s initial evalua tions, and another tw o hours revi ewing all of his laboratory testing. In his de bene esse deposition, Dr.- 3 - DeLorenzo opined that Hudson suff ers from “a periph eral neuropathy with both sensor y and motor compon ents, as well as evidence of central nervous sy stem damage . . . probab ly . . . in the spinal cord . . . called a my elopathy.” Dr . DeLorenzo test ified that to a reasonable degree of medical certai nty the damage to Hudson’s nervous system was caus ed by his unpr otected exposu re to paint solvents and chemicals in the workplace. Dr. DeLorenz o opined that Hudson’s condition could have been caused by “one or two very large exposures in the workplace, which it’s my understa nding that that happened . . . or [by] chro nic accumula tion.” Dr . DeLorenzo stated that Hudson ’s condition was probably due to both causes and was “[d]efinitel y not” due to an idio pathic cause. Dr.

DeLorenzo’s De cember 13, 1996 letter re port was consistent with the opinions he expressed in his deposition. As fact finder, th e commission was enti tled to accept Dr. DeLorenzo’s opin ions and to reject any co ntrary medical opinions. “Questions raised by conflicting medi cal opinions mu st be decided by the comm ission.” Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co. , 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1 989). Dr. DeLore nzo’s opinions provide credible evidence supporting the commission’s finding that Hudson suffers from a polyneuropathy or peripheral neuropathy caused by exposure to paint solvents and ch emicals in his workplace. “The fact that there is co ntrary evidence in the record is of no cons equence if there is cr edible evidence to- 4 - support the co mmission’s finding.” Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks , 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 40 7 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). Furthermore, whether Hudson’s condition was caused by a single exposure or prol onged high exposure to chemical solvents in the workplace is immate rial. Dr. DeLorenzo st ated that Hudson’s condition was attr ibutable to eith er situation or both. Based upon Hudson's test imony and Dr. DeLorenzo’s op inions, the commission properly concluded that “t he particular event on June 1, 1995 produced a defi nitive change in [Hudso n’s] condition, such that it suddenly and unexpectedly produced the myriad effects in [Hudson’s] central nerv ous system that sign ificantly al tered his condition.”

III. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb , 257 Va. 190, 511 S.E.2d 102 (1999), is dispositive of this issue. In Webb , the Supreme Court held that a florist’s allergic contact dermatitis was compensable as an occupational disease because it was caused by a reaction to allergens in certain flowers encountered in the claimant’s job as a florist, not by cumulative trauma induced by repetitive motion. See id. at 192, 511 S.E.2d at 102. “‘[W]hether a worker has suffered an impairment that constitutes a compensable disease is a mixed question of law and fact.’ Thus, the Commission’s finding on that question is not- 5 - conclusive but is a proper subject for judicial review.” Id. at 196, 511 S.E.2d at 104. In determining whether Hudson’s condition qualifies as an occupational disease, we must consider the nature and cause of the impairments. See id. at 197, 511 S.E.2d at 105. Here, credible medical evidence, including the medical records and opinions of Dr. DeLorenzo, proved that Hudson’s polyneuropathy or peripheral neuropathy was caused by the reaction of his body to unprotected high exposure to paint solvents and chemicals in the workplace, whether over an extended period of time or over several large exposures. No evidence established that Hudson’s condition was caused by cumulative trauma induced by repetitive motion. Accordingly, the commission did not err in holding that Hudson’s condition is a compensable occupational disease within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

V. The commission held that Hudson proved he had been totally disabled since March 1, 1996, and, therefore, had no obligation to market a residual work capacity. In so ruling, the commission found as follows: The record establishes that [Hudson] is severely disabled by his neurological problems, such that he is essentially limited to sitting in a chair, and talking on the telephone. Moreover, Dr. [Richard] Waller persuasively testified that he doubts- 6 - whether [Hudson] can perform such activities under stress, which he defined as “any type of complex intellectual functioning, or maybe interpersonal interactions, I guess outside the context of his family.” The testimony of Dr. Waller and Dr. DeLorenzo, who opined that Hudson was totally disabled from work and that his condition would not improve, constitutes credible evidence supporting the commission’s findings. Based upon their testimony, coupled with evidence of Hudson’s age, his significant neurological deficits and brain impairments, and his work history, the commission did not err in concluding that Hudson proved that he had been totally disabled since March 1, 1996, and therefore, was not obligated to market his residual capacity. For these reas ons, we affirm the co mmission’s decision. Affirmed.