J-E04001-17

2018 PA Super 52

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYLEESIA KITCHEN,

Appellant No. 148 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 9, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006204-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., 

SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 09, 2018

Appellant, Tyleesia Kitchen, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

6-23 months’ incarceration, followed by an aggregate term of two years’ 

probation, imposed after she was convicted for drug offenses and, most 

pertinent to this appeal, false identification to law enforcement (“False ID”), 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4914. Appellant claims the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence that she was “informed” that she was “the subject of an 

official investigation of a violation of law” when she falsely identified herself. 

Id. After careful review, we agree, and reverse Appellant’s conviction for 

False ID, vacate the corresponding sentence, but otherwise leave the 

remainder of Appellant’s judgment of sentence intact. 

The trial court summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:
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Philadelphia Police Officer Thomas Dempsey, assigned to 

the 35th District, testified that on June 2, 2015, at approximately 

3:00 a.m., he performed his tour of duty in the 5531 North 5th

Street area of the city of Philadelphia. Officer Dempsey stated 

that he was traveling northbound on 5th Street in a patrol car with 

his partner, Officer Hanton, approaching Duncannon [street] when 

he came into contact with [Appellant] operating a white Nissan 

Altima with New York tag GSD4632. He observed [Appellant] 

head westbound on Duncannon at 5th Street and then make a 

right-hand turn onto 5th Street, heading northbound, without 

using a turn signal. Officer Dempsey activated his lights and 

sirens and pulled [Appellant] over approximately three to four (3-

4) blocks up at 5531 North 5th Street for failing to signal on the 

turn. Officer Dempsey stated that he then approached the driver's 

side of the vehicle and that [Appellant] was the only person in the 

vehicle. 

Officer Dempsey testified that he asked [Appellant] for her 

license, registration, and insurance. [Appellant] was unable to 

provide any form of identification and notified Officer Dempsey 

that the car was rented. [Appellant] could not produce any 

documents to prove a rental agreement. Subsequent to failing to 

give Officer Dempsey any of the requested identification, 

[Appellant] gave him the name of "Chelsea Thomas" with a date 

of birth of 12/21/90. [Appellant] provided Officer Dempsey with 

a TD Bank credit card with the name "Chelsea Thomas" and a 

social security number. Officer Dempsey stated that from his 

investigation, the name "Chelsea Thomas" came back with a 

suspended license. Officer Dempsey stated that he and his 

partner then decided to live stop the vehicle for the suspended 

license. Officer Dempsey testified that he and his partner followed 

procedure: they notified the Parking Authority, removed 

[Appellant] from the vehicle, and performed a search incident to 

the live stop of the vehicle to "make sure there was [sic] no 

dangerous things in the vehicle and to inventory anything of the 

driver, money that was there, whatever was valuable, just to 

cover all of my bases."

Officer Dempsey testified that upon searching the vehicle 

pursuant to the live stop, he noticed a 12-ounce green can of 

Mountain Dew in the driver's seat cup holder, which he testified 

caught his eye because it was larger than usual, looked swollen,

and there was no condensation. Officer Dempsey testified that he 

possesses ample experience discovering narcotics hidden inside 

soda cans; during his years on the force, he has uncovered 
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approximately fifteen (15) to twenty (20) false cans, most of them 

soda cans, and only one of them was empty and did not contain 

narcotics. From this experience, Officer Dempsey stated that he 

has made several narcotics arrests where narcotics were hidden 

in false cans.

Officer Dempsey testified that he touched the can and felt 

that it was rock hard[,] which further indicated from his 

experience that this was a false can. Officer Dempsey proceeded 

to pick up the can and to unscrew the top, which revealed that the 

can was indeed false; inside the can were seventy-six (76) small 

baggies with an off-white chunky substance, crack cocaine. 

Officer Dempsey stated that he arrested [Appellant] and placed 

her in the back of his vehicle. He continued his search of the 

vehicle pursuant to live stop procedure and discovered a driver's 

license with a different name under the brake pedal on the driver's 

side floor area. Officer Dempsey ran the discovered driver's 

license through the system to find that name also had a 

suspended license.

Officer Dempsey testified that he continued with the live 

stop and [was] completing paperwork when Officer Snell arrived 

as backup. Officer Snell completed an inventory search of the 

trunk of [Appellant]'s vehicle in Officer Dempsey's presence. 

Upon opening the trunk, Officer Dempsey observed a clear 

sandwich bag with eighty-four (84) zip tie baggies with crack 

cocaine, an off-white chunky substance inside them. Officer 

Dempsey stated that in total he recovered one hundred and sixty

(160) baggies of crack cocaine later placed on Property Receipt 

No. 31976333. The false Mountain Dew can was placed on 

Property Receipt No. 3197634. A search incident to arrest 

recovered one hundred and forty-five dollars ($145) in US 

currency from [Appellant]'s front pants pocket later placed on 

Property Receipt No. 3197635. Officer Dempsey stated that the 

vehicle was live stopped and [Appellant] transported to the 35th 

District for processing.

Officer Dempsey testified that the identification was found 

on the driver's side floor area under the brake pedal. Officer 

Dempsey stated that the name of the driver's license was 

[Appellant]'s, Tyleesia Kitchen, and had a date of birth of 7/10/90 

with a picture matching what [Appellant] looked like on the day in 

question. Officer Dempsey stated that this information was 

inconsistent with the information provided by [Appellant] when he 

first asked her for her identification. He explained that [Appellant]
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first gave him the name "Chelsea Thomas" which, through further 

investigation, he believed to be [Appellant]'s girlfriend. Officer 

Dempsey restated that he determined that both "Tyleesia Kitchen" 

and "Chelsea Thomas" did not have valid licenses.

Officer Dempsey further testified that in his nine years on

the job he has seen fifteen to twenty (15 -20) false cans. Officer 

Dempsey stated that most of these cans are soda cans and that 

he has also observed "Fix-A-Flat cans, a Pringles can, but the 

majority are soda cans." Officer Dempsey stated that he has 

found narcotics in these false cans fourteen (14) out of fifteen (15) 

times, specifying only one occasion where a false can was empty. 

Officer Dempsey testified that the can in the instant case caught 

his eye before he touched it. He stated, "[i]t looked like it was 

swelled up. There was no water dripping off of it as if it was cold. 

It was swelled-up looking and that caught my eye and that's why 

I touched it. I immediately felt it was rock hard."

When asked to describe the area where [Appellant]'s vehicle 

was stopped, Officer Dempsey testified that it was at 5th and Olney 

where [Appellant] pulled over to the right, placing her vehicle only 

partially in a parking spot. Officer Dempsey stated that 

[Appellant]'s vehicle was interfering with traffic as half of 

[Appellant]'s vehicle was sticking out in the north bound [sic] lane 

causing cars to have to go partly in the southbound lane to get 

past her. Officer Dempsey described the area as heavily 

populated and busy. Officer Dempsey stated that this area is well[ 

]known by police to be a common site for loud music, narcotics 

calls and arrests.

On cross-examination, Officer Dempsey affirmed that 

[Appellant]'s car had New York plates and that it was rented. 

[Appellant] told Officer Dempsey that "Chelsea rented it." 

Because [Appellant] did not refer to herself in the first person, 

Officer Dempsey stated "that was one of the things that stuck out 

because either she was talking about herself in the third person 

or she just messed up." When asked to review the notes of 

testimony from the preliminary hearing, marked as Defense 

Exhibit 1 (D-1), Officer Dempsey affirmed that he stated that 

there were no cars parked on 5th Street, there were plenty of 

spots, and that [Appellant] had pulled over in a legal parking spot. 

Officer Dempsey further affirmed that he answered in the 

affirmative at the preliminary hearing when asked if it was not 

until he had removed [Appellant] from the vehicle and actually 

picked up the can that he realized it was a false can. 
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Officer Dempsey testified that after he determined that

Chelsea Thomas had a suspended license, he removed [Appellant]

from the car and placed her in the police car, un-handcuffed and 

shut the police car door. Officer Dempsey affirmed that he began 

the inventory search of the vehicle once he verified that 

[Appellant] had a suspended license. Officer Dempsey explained 

that he believed [Appellant] to be "Chelsea Thomas" because she 

provided that name and the social security number.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/15/16, at 2-6 (footnote and citations omitted).

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance (PWID), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); possession 

of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16); and False ID. Appellant

filed a timely suppression motion on August 4, 2015. On October 7, 2015, 

the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion, conducted a non-jury 

trial, and found Appellant guilty on all counts. On December 9, 2015, the trial 

court sentenced Appellant to 6-23 months’ incarceration and 2 years’ 

probation for PWID, and a concurrent term of 12 months’ probation for False 

ID. The court imposed no further penalty for Appellant’s possession 

conviction. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 5, 2016, and

a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on February 25, 2016. 

The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) statement on June 15, 2016.

A panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on 

January 12, 2017. On January 26, 2017, Appellant filed a timely application 

for en banc reargument. On March 10, 2017, this Court granted en banc

reargument, and simultaneously withdrew the January 12, 2017 

memorandum affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
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Appellant now presents the following question for our review: “Was not 

the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction for false identification to law 

enforcement where the police officers never informed [A]ppellant that she was 

the subject of an official investigation?” Appellant’s Substituted Brief at 3.

Our standard of review of sufficiency claims is well settled:

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of 

law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict 

when it establishes each material element of the crime charged 

and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in 

contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human 

experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient 

as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court 

is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted).

In essence, Appellant’s claim challenges the trial court’s interpretation 

of the False ID statute, which reads as follows:

A person commits an offense if he furnishes law enforcement 

authorities with false information about his identity after being 

informed by a law enforcement officer who is in uniform or 

who has identified himself as a law enforcement officer that the 

person is the subject of an official investigation of a 

violation of law.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a) (emphasis added). False ID constitutes a misdemeanor 

of the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(b). 

Appellant argues that the police must expressly inform an individual 

that they are “the subject of an official investigation of a violation of law[,]” 
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for that individual’s subsequent presentation of false identification to 

constitute a crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a). The Commonwealth disagrees,

contending that an individual can be so “informed” by the attendant 

circumstances, including the conduct of the investigating officer, and that no 

spoken pronouncement is required by the statute. Commonwealth’s 

Substituted Brief at 7-9.

The trial court adopted the Commonwealth’s position. It found that 

Appellant was informed that she was subject to an investigation by “the 

surrounding circumstances of the traffic stop[,]” which the court concluded, 

“implied there was an official investigation of a violation of law prior to the 

presentment of false identification.” TCO at 11. The trial court distinguished 

the facts of this case from this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Barnes, 

14 A.3d 128 (Pa. Super. 2011). The Commonwealth supports the trial court’s 

reasoning, arguing that the statute “does not require a verbal pronouncement, 

or any particular method of informing.” Commonwealth’s Substituted Brief 

at 5. Appellant argues that the trial court’s interpretation of the False ID 

statute was rejected by our Supreme Court’s decision In re D.S., 39 A.3d 968 

(Pa. 2012).

Here, the police did not make an express statement to Appellant that 

she was under investigation prior to her presentment of false credentials. 

There is also no question before us whether Appellant’s credentials were false, 

or whether the police were in uniform. Appellant does not dispute that a 

reasonable person would likely understand that they were under investigation 
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given the attendant circumstances of this case. Accordingly, there are no 

facts in dispute, and the matter before us is a pure question of law regarding 

the interpretation of the legislature’s use of the term, “informed[,]” in the 

False ID statute. Under such circumstances, “our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of [review] is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Crawley, 

924 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. 2007).

When interpreting a statute, the court must ascertain and 

effectuate the intent of the legislature and give full effect to each 

provision of the statute if at all possible. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a); 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 423 Pa. Super. 264, 266, 620 A.2d 

1213, 1214 (1993); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 384 Pa. 

Super. 454, 460, 559 A.2d 63, 66 (1989), appeal denied, 523 Pa. 

640, 565 A.2d 1165 (1989). In construing a statute to determine 

its meaning, courts must first determine whether the issue may 

be resolved by reference to the express language of the statute, 

which is to be read according to the plain meaning of the words. 

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). See Commonwealth v. Berryman, 437 

Pa. Super. 258, 649 A.2d 961 (1994) (en banc).

When construing one section of a statute, courts must read 

that section not by itself, but with reference to, and in light of, the 

other sections because there is a presumption that in drafting the 

statute, the General Assembly intended the entire statute to be 

effective. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922. See Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 

536 Pa. 271, 307, 639 A.2d 421, 439 (1994); Commonwealth 

v. Berryman, supra at 268, 649 A.2d at 965. Statute headings 

may be considered in construing a statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1924. 

However, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under 

the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); 

Commonwealth v. Reeb, 406 Pa. Super. 28, 34, 593 A.2d 853, 

856 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 665, 610 A.2d 45 (1992).

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 663 A.2d 746, 748 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

Our first impression of the express language of the False ID statute 

coincides with Appellant’s interpretation. The statute does not specifically
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state that a person may be “informed” of an investigation by inference alone. 

In crafting the False ID statute, the legislature immediately modified the term 

“informed” with the phrase, “by a law enforcement officer[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

4914(a). The use of the term “informed” in this context strongly suggests 

that the legislature intended a statutory element akin to a formal notice 

requirement, rather than imposing an additional mens rea element focused on 

the accused’s inferential knowledge about the presence of an investigation at 

the time he or she presents false credentials. Our review of the relevant 

caselaw confirms this view. 

In Barnes, a police officer stopped a vehicle for having air fresheners 

hanging from the rear view mirror. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(c) (prohibiting 

“any object or material hung from the inside rearview mirror”). When the 

officer asked the passenger, Barnes, for his identification, Barnes offered a 

false name and birthdate. The officer ran a computer check on the given 

name, and no matching record was found. When the officer asked Barnes for 

his name again, Barnes replied with the same fake name and a different 

birthdate, but that information also did not check out. At that point, the officer 

informed Barnes that he was under investigation. Barnes then repeated the 

fake name and birthdate. 

The Commonwealth charged Barnes with False ID. However, the trial 

court granted his motion for habeas corpus, thereby dismissing the charge, 

on the basis that “the official investigation element [of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a)] 

cannot be satisfied solely by an investigation of the individual's providing false 
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information as to his identity.” Barnes, 14 A.3d at 131. On appeal, this Court

agreed with that determination. Id.

The Commonwealth argued, alternatively, that Barnes was the subject 

of an investigation into the Section 4524(c) violation or potential drug crimes. 

We also rejected that argument, reasoning:

The Commonwealth further suggests that the circumstances 

surrounding the traffic stop provided Officer Reeder grounds for 

an official investigation for a violation of law. The Commonwealth 

cites the presence of the air fresheners, which are recognized as 

useful in masking the odor of narcotics, the high crime area, and 

the fact that neither the driver nor [Barnes] could produce any 

actual identification. Assuming, for purposes of this discussion, 

that the circumstances of the stop provided grounds for an 

investigative detention, we would agree that the statute would be 

violated by the provision of false information after being provided 

proper notice. However, the stumbling block to the 

Commonwealth's argument is Officer Reeder's admission that the 

investigation he referenced in notifying [Barnes] that he was now 

the subject of an official investigation was the failure to provide 

truthful information. Officer Reeder was asked, “So your official 

investigation was involving that he was giving you a false name?” 

To this question, Officer Reeder replied, “Yes, after the second 

time.” Going back to our initial point of discussion, if [Barnes] 

was not yet under official investigation for a violation of law when 

asked for his name and DOB, the provision of false information 

was not a violation of law. Thus, that failure to provide true 

information cannot constitute the basis for the official 

investigation of a violation of law. Officer Reeder may very well 

have been investigating [Barnes’] provision of false information 

regarding his identity; however, such investigation was not for a 

violation of law pursuant to Section 4914.

Barnes, 14 A.3d at 131–32 (emphasis added). The Barnes Court then

rejected the Commonwealth’s final argument that the attendant 

circumstances imposed a duty on Barnes to answer the officer’s inquiries 
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truthfully. We dismissed that claim for want of any legal authority outside the 

“parameters set forth in Section 4914.” Id. at 132.

We find no support in our Barnes decision for the Commonwealth’s 

interpretation of Section 4914(a), and at least some modicum of support for 

Appellant’s claim. Barnes is technically off-point in that it did not concern 

any legal determination regarding the form of the notice given. Indeed, the 

officer in that case specifically told Barnes that he was under investigation 

before Barnes offered false credentials for the third time. The only False ID 

violation at issue in Barnes appears to be the false statement Barnes made 

after he was specifically and verbally informed that he was under 

investigation. However, the Barnes Court did note that, “[l]iterally read, the 

statute in question does not make it illegal to provide to a law enforcement 

authority false information as to one's identity unless and until one is first 

apprised that he is the subject of an official investigation of a violation 

of law.” Id. at 131 (emphasis added).1 

Our Supreme Court’s decision in D.S. provides more recent and 

compelling support for Appellant’s stricter interpretation of Section 4914(a). 

In that case, while investigating an armed robbery, plainclothes officers 

approached D.S. and two other individuals in a park, as D.S. matched the 

robbery victim’s description of his assailant. D.S., 39 A.3d at 970. The police 

____________________________________________

1 The term “apprise,” means to “inform or tell (someone).” The New Oxford 

American Dictionary 76 (1st ed. 2001) (emphasis added). This dovetails with 

the Barnes Court’s reference to “proper notice” elsewhere in the opinion. 

Barnes, 14 A.3d at 131. 
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ordered D.S. and his cohorts to put their hands in the air, and then demanded 

their names, ages, and addresses. Id. D.S. responded with a fake name. 

Id. The officers did not identify themselves as police, nor did they specifically 

and/or verbally inform D.S. that he was under investigation. Id. 

Nevertheless, D.S. was charged with, and ultimately adjudicated delinquent 

of, a False ID offense. 

On appeal, D.S. argued, “the evidence was insufficient to support his 

adjudication of delinquency ... because the officers failed to identify 

themselves or advise D.S. that he was the subject of an official 

investigation prior to D.S.[’s] providing police with a false name.” Id. at 

971 (emphasis added). This Court initially “upheld the adjudication of 

delinquency[,]” reasoning that “although there was no direct evidence that 

the police officers affirmatively identified themselves, or indicated they were 

investigating a robbery, the totality of the circumstances established that D.S. 

was aware of these facts when he provided the police with a false name and 

birthdate.” Id. (summarizing the Superior Court’s memorandum). 

However, our Supreme Court reversed that decision, reasoning:

Upon review, we find the language used by the General 

Assembly in Section 4914 is clear and free from ambiguity. As 

noted above, a person violates the statute if he furnishes law 

enforcement authorities with false information about his identity 

“after being informed by a law enforcement officer who is in 

uniform or who has identified himself as a law enforcement officer 

that the person is the subject of an official investigation of a 

violation of law.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914. Under the plain language 

of the statute, three conditions must be satisfied before an 

individual will be found to have violated the statute by providing 
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false information about his identity. First, if the law enforcement 

officer is not in uniform, the officer must identify himself as a law 

enforcement officer. Second, the individual must be informed by 

the law enforcement officer that he is the subject of an official 

investigation of a violation of law. Third, the individual must have 

furnished law enforcement authorities with false information after 

being informed by the law enforcement officer that he was the 

subject of an official investigation of a violation of law.

We cannot agree with the Commonwealth's suggestion that 

an individual may be “informed” of an officer's identity and/or 

purpose by surrounding circumstances. In stating that an 

individual violates Section 4914 when he provides false 

information to law enforcement authorities “after being 

informed by a law enforcement officer” that he is the 

subject of an official investigation, the General Assembly 

made clear its intent that such information must be 

provided to the individual by the law enforcement officer. 

While the word “informed” might in other contexts carry 

the broader meaning the Commonwealth suggests, here it 

is linked to the law enforcement officer, indicating that the 

information conveyed must come from the law 

enforcement officer.

In short, there is no language in the statute to suggest that 

the General Assembly intended that an individual's knowledge 

could be derived from the surrounding circumstances. 

Accordingly, the Superior Court's holding to the contrary in the 

case sub judice was erroneous, and, indeed, inconsistent with its 

subsequent interpretation in Barnes.

D.S., 39 A.3d at 974–75 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis added). 

Thus, not only is D.S. directly on point for the issue before us, it 

supports Appellant’s interpretation of Section 4914(a), contradicts the 

interpretation offered by the Commonwealth, and resolves any ambiguity left 

in the wake of our decision in Barnes. In order to sustain a conviction for 

False ID, the Commonwealth must prove that the individual was told by police 
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that he or she was under investigation, and that must occur prior to the 

individual’s presentment of false identity information.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argues further that it was not the 

“surrounding circumstances,” but “the uniformed officer’s conduct[,]” which 

informed Appellant that she was under investigation. Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 8-9. This further parsing of the D.S. decision and the text of Section 

4914(a) is unconvincing. The uniformed officer’s conduct is a “surrounding 

circumstance” that preceded Appellant’s presentment of false identification.

We note that the Commonwealth’s loose interpretation of Section 

4914(a) appears to mirror Former Justice Eakin’s dissenting opinion in D.S. 

If there is any doubt about the meaning and effect of the Majority’s decision

in that case, such doubt should have been resolved by Justice Eakin’s 

characterization of the D.S. Majority’s position: “I disagree with the Majority 

that an individual cannot be informed of an officer's identity or purpose in 

ways other than a formal scripted pronouncement.” D.S., 39 A.3d at 975 

(Eakin, J., dissenting).

In sum, we conclude that Appellant’s sufficiency claim is meritorious. 

As such, we reverse her conviction for False ID, and vacate the corresponding 

sentence. As our decision does not appear to upset the trial court’s sentencing 

scheme,2 we decline to remand for resentencing. 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court ordered Appellant’s sentence of 1 year probation for False ID 

to run concurrent to the 2-year probationary tail attached to her sentence for 

PWID. As such, Appellant’s aggregate sentence is not affected by our 

decision. 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, reversed in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

President Judge Gantman, Judge Bowes, Judge Panella, Judge Lazarus, 

Judge Olson, Judge Stabile and Judge Dubow join this opinion.

Judge Shogan files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/9/18