MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2021 ME	28

Docket: Ken-20-163

Argued: February	9,	2021

Decided: May	13,	2021

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STEPHEN	DOANE

v.

DEPARTMENT	OF	HEALTH	AND	HUMAN	SERVICES

CONNORS,	J.

[¶1]	 Stephen Doane,	MD, appeals	from	a	judgment of	the	Superior	Court	

(Kennebec	 County,	 Murphy, J.)	 affirming,	 pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80C and	

5 M.R.S.	 §	 11007(4)(A) (2021),	 a	 decision	 by	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	

Human	Services	excluding	him	from	participation	in	and	reimbursement	from	

Maine’s	Medicaid	program,	MaineCare.		We	affirm	the	decision	of	the	Superior	

Court.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		The	following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	Department’s	final	decision,	

which	adopted	the	findings	of	fact	made	by	the	presiding	hearing	officer	in	his	

recommended	 decision,	 and the	 procedural	 facts	 are	taken	 from	the	 court’s
2

record.	 	 See Palian	 v.	 Dep’t	 of	 Health	 and	 Hum.	 Servs.,	 2020	 ME	 131,	 ¶	 3,

242 A.3d 164.

A. The	Board’s	2015	Censure	Decision	and 2012	Consent	Agreement

[¶3]	 On	 March	 10,	 2015,	 Dr.	 Doane	 was	 censured	 by	 the	 Board	 of	

Licensure	 in	 Medicine	 based	 on his prescription	 practices	 leading	 up	 to	 the	

death,	by	apparent	overdose, of	a patient in May	2012.

1

[¶4]	 Although	the	Board	voted	to	allow	Dr.	Doane	to	retain	his	medical	

license,	it	imposed	serious	restrictions	on	his	ability	to	practice	medicine.		He	

was	required	to	have	a	“practice	monitor”	review	all	of	the cases	in	which	he	

prescribed	controlled	substances	and	report	to	the	Board	every	four months.

[¶5]	These	restrictions	were in	addition	to previous restrictions	imposed	

by	a	2012	consent	agreement following	the	death	of	a	different patient who,	in	

2011, had	 also	died	 of	 an	 apparent	drug	 overdose.	 In	 entering	 that consent	

agreement, Dr.	 Doane	 conceded	 that	 the	 conduct	 at	 issue, “if	 proven,	 could	

 1 By	unanimous	vote,	the	Board	found	that	Dr.	Doane	had	failed	to	conduct	all	required	aspects	

for	 evaluation	 of	 the	 patient;	 failed	 to	 create	a	written	 treatment	 plan;	 failed	 to	 discuss	with	 the	

patient	the	 risks	 and	 benefits	 of	 the	 use	 of	 controlled	 substances;	 failed	 to	 implement	 a	 written	

agreement	outlining	patient	responsibilities,	including	urine/medication	serum	level	screening,	pill	

counts,	the	number	and	frequency	of	all	prescription	refills,	and the	reasons	for	which	drug	therapy	

would	 be	 discontinued;	 and	 failed	 to	 keep	 accurate	 and	 complete	 medical	 records.	 	 The	 Board	

unanimously	found	that	Dr.	Doane	demonstrated	incompetence	in	his	treatment	of	the	patient	and,

by	a	five-to-one	vote, found	that	he	had	committed	unprofessional	conduct	by	failing	to	appropriately	

follow	up	on	and	respond	to	information	obtained	from	other	doctors	and	reporters,	as	well	as	from	

events	that	occurred	in	his	own	office, regarding	his	patient’s	overdose	on	the	medications	that	he	

had	prescribed.
3

constitute	grounds	for	discipline	and	the	denial	of	his	application	to	renew	his	

Maine	 medical	 license	 for	 unprofessional	 conduct	 pursuant	 to	 32 M.R.S.	

§ 3282-A(2)(F).”2 Pursuant	to the	consent agreement,	among	other	things, he	

could “no	longer	prescribe controlled	medications	for	pain,	including	all	opioids	

and	 benzodiazepines,	 except	 for	 patients	 in	 skilled	 nursing	 facilities	 or	

long-term	care	 facilities,	patients	in	hospice	care,	or	patients	with	metastatic	

cancer.”

B. The	Department’s	2015	Decision	to	Terminate	Dr.	Doane’s Participation	

in	MaineCare

[¶6] In	 a	 letter	 dated	 April	 9,	 2015,	 approximately	 one month	 after	

Dr. Doane’s censure	and	the	imposition	of	additional restrictions	by	the	Board,	

the	Department	notified	him that	it was	terminating	his	participation	in	medical	

assistance	 programs,	 most	 significantly	 for	 this	 appeal, MaineCare.3	 	 The	

 2	 	 The	 consent	 agreement	 recited	 that	 the	 Board	 had	 sufficient	 evidence	 from	 which	 it	 could	

conclude	that	Dr.	Doane	failed	to	adhere	to	the	Board’s	rules	on	the	use	of	controlled	substances	for	

treatment	 of	 pain	 by	 “failing	 to	 obtain	 patient	 A’s	 previous	 medical	 records	 prior	 to	 prescribing	

controlled	 medications	 to	 patient	 A;	 failing	 to	 access	 and	 review	 the	 [prescription	 monitoring	

program]	prior	to	prescribing	the	amount	and	dosage	of	controlled	medications	to	patient	A;	failing	

to	recall	the	telephone	message	regarding	patient	A	and	her	recent	hospitalization	and	accompanying	

respiratory	 distress	 prior	 to	 prescribing	 medications	 to	 patient	 A;	 and	 increasing	 the	 dosage	

(doubling),	frequency,	and	total	amount	(doubling)	of	narcotics	prescribed	to	patient	A	only	four	days	

after	 initially	 prescribing	 fifteen	 days’	 worth	 of	 narcotics	 to	 patient	 A,	 which	 was	 done	 without	

obtaining	patient	A’s	previous	medical	records	or	reviewing	the	[prescription	monitoring	program].”

3		Because	the	basis	for	termination	was	grounded	in	state	and	federal	Medicaid	and	MaineCare	

regulations,	and	no	other	program	has	been	identified	by	the	parties	on	appeal,	we	do	not	discuss	

further	any	other	medical	assistance	programs.
4

Department	stated	that	it	took this action pursuant	to	the	MaineCare	Benefits	

Manual,	 10-144	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 101,	 ch.	 I,	 §§	 1.03-6,	 1.19-1,	 1.19-3	 (effective	

January 1, 2014),

4 and	 the	 “authority	 granted	 [to	 it] in	 the	 Code	 of	 Federal	

Regulations.”	 	 The	 Department	 relied	 specifically	 on	 section	 1.19-1(M),	 (O),	

and (R)	of	the	Manual,	which	provides for	sanctions based	on	the	violation	of	

any	law,	regulation, or	code	of	ethics	governing	the	conduct	of	occupations	or	

professions	of	regulated	industries;	failure	to	meet	standards required	by	state	

or	 federal	 law	 for	 participation;	 and	 formal	 reprimand	 or	 censure	 by	 an	

association	of	the	provider’s	peers	for	unethical practices.		See	id. §	1.19-1(M),	

(O),	(R).5

[¶7]	Dr.	Doane	requested an	informal	review	of	the	termination	decision,	

which	 is	 the	 first	 step	 of	 the	 multi-tiered	 framework	 for	 an	 administrative	

appeal	 under	 the	 Manual.	 	 See	 id. §	 1.21;6 Palian,	 2020	 ME	 131,	 ¶	 5,	

242 A.3d 164.	 	 The	 Department	 affirmed	 its	 decision	 by a	 letter	 dated	

September 11, 2015.

 4	 	The	locations of	 various	MaineCare	Benefits	Manual	 sections	have changed	during	 the	 time	

relevant	to	this	appeal,	but	no	such	changes impact	this	appeal.	 The	parties	do	not	contend	that	any	

changes in	 the	Manual	affect	 our	 analysis.		 The	 relevant	sections	 are	 currently	located	at	 10-144	

C.M.R.	ch.	101,	ch. I,	§§	1.03-10,	1.20-1,	1.20-3	(effective	Sept.	17,	2018).

5		Currently	located	at	10-144	C.M.R.	ch.	101,	ch.	I,	§	1.20-1(M),	(O),	(R) (effective	Sept. 17,	2018).

6 Currently	located	at	10-144	C.M.R.	ch.	101,	ch.	I,	§	1.23	(effective	Sept.	17,	2018).
5

C. Doane	I

[¶8]	 On	September	23,	2015,	Dr.	Doane	filed	a	complaint	in	the	Superior	

Court	seeking	a	declaratory	judgment	that	the	Department	lacked	jurisdiction	

to	 terminate	 his	 MaineCare	 participation and	 contending that	 the	 District	

Court—not	 the	 Department—had exclusive	 jurisdiction	 over	 licensing	

decisions pursuant	 to	 4	 M.R.S.	 §	 152(9)	 (2021)	 and	 M.R. Civ. P.	 80G.	 	 The	

Superior	Court	agreed	with	Dr.	Doane	that	the	Department	lacked	jurisdiction,	

and	 the	 Department’s	 administrative	 proceedings	 were	 stayed	 pending	 the	

resolution	of	the	Department’s appeal of	the	Superior	Court’s	decision.		Doane	

v.	Dep’t of	Health	&	Hum. Servs., No.	CV-15-168, 2016	Me.	Super.	LEXIS	125,	at *3	

(June	30,	2016).

[¶9]	On	appeal,	we ruled that	the	Department	had jurisdiction.	 See	Doane	

v.	Dep’t	of	Health	&	Hum.	Servs., 2017	ME	193,	¶¶	31-32,	170	A.3d	269	(Doane I).

In	 so	 concluding,	 we	 noted “the	 functional	 distinctions	 between	 a	 [Board]	

license	 revocation	 and	 a	 [Department]	 termination	 of	 participation	 in	 a	

program	through	a	provider	agreement.”		Id. ¶ 29.

D. Further	Administrative	and	Judicial	Review	of	the	Department’s	Decision

[¶10] With	 the	 administrative	 process	 revived	 after	 the	 issuance	 of	

Doane I, in	 2018,	 the presiding officer	 for	 the	 Department issued	 his	
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recommendation	following	an	evidentiary	hearing	that	had	been	held	in	2016	

prior	to	the	stay.		In	his	findings of	fact,	the	presiding officer	acknowledged	the	

Board’s	previous	findings	of	serious	professional	deficiencies but	nevertheless	

recommended	reversal	of	the	Department’s	decision	to	terminate	Dr.	Doane’s	

participation	in	MaineCare.

[¶11]	 The	 acting	 Commissioner	disagreed	 with	 the	 presiding	 officer’s	

recommendation. In	 a	 decision	 dated	 October	 10,	 2018,	 the	 acting	

Commissioner	stated:

I	hereby	adopt	 the	 findings	 of	 fact	but	 I	do	NOT	accept	 the	

Recommendation	of	 the	Hearing	Officer.	 Instead,	 for	 the	reasons	

set	 forth	 below,	 I	 find	 that	 the	 Department	 was	 correct	 when	 it	

terminated	 Stephen	 Doane,	 M.D.,	 from	 participation	 in	 the	

MaineCare program.

Pursuant	 to	 the	 MaineCare	 Benefits	 Manual,	 Chapter	 I,	

section	 1.19-2(A),	 the	 Department	 has	 independent	 authority	 to	

exclude	 a	 provider	 from	participation	in	 the	MaineCare	program	

based	 on	 its	 consideration	 of	 factors	 set	 forth	 in	

section 1.19-3(A)(1).	 This	authority	arises	out	of	the	Department’s	

administration	 of	 the	 MaineCare	 program	 which	 provides	

reimbursement	 for	 medical	 services	 provided	 to	 vulnerable	

low-income,	disabled,	and	high-risk	populations.	 The	Department	

properly	 exercised	 its	 authority	 to	 exclude	 Dr.	 Doane	 from	

participation	in	the	MaineCare	population	by	basing	the	exclusion	

on	 the	undisputed	 serious	and	multiple	incidents	 of	professional	

incompetence	by	Dr.	Doane	over	an	extended	period	of	time	as	set	

forth	 in	 [the	 Board’s	 censure	 decision	 and	 preceding	 consent	

agreement].
7

[¶12] On	November	9,	2018,	Dr.	Doane	filed	a Rule 80C	petition	in	the	

Superior	Court.		The	court	affirmed	the	Department’s decision, and	Dr.	Doane

timely	appealed.		See 5	M.R.S.	§	11008 (2021);	M.R.	App. P.	2B(c).

II.	 DISCUSSION

[¶13]	 	 Dr.	 Doane	 argues	 the	 following: (1)	 the	 Legislature	 did	 not	

articulate	sufficient	guidance	when	it	delegated	authority	to	the	Department	to	

regulate	MaineCare	 pursuant	 to	 22	M.R.S.	 §	 42	 (2021)	 and	 22	M.R.S.	 §	 3173	

(2021);	 (2)	 the	 Department’s	 decision	 to	 exclude	 him	 is	 precluded	 by	 the	

Board’s	 decision	 not	 to	 withdraw	 or	 suspend	 his	 license; (3) there	 was	

insufficient	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	Department’s	final	decision;	 and	 (4)	 the	

acting	Commissioner provided	insufficient	reasoning	for	her decision.

[¶14]	 We	disagree.

A. Standard	of	Review

[¶15]	 	 “When	 the	 Superior	 Court	 acts	 in	 an	 intermediate	 appellate	

capacity	 pursuant	 to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C,	we review	 the	 administrative	agency’s	

decision	 directly	 for	 errors	 of	 law,	 abuse	 of	 discretion,	 or	 findings	 not	

supported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	record.”		Manirakiza	v.	Dep’t	of	Health	

&	Hum.	Servs.,	2018	ME	10,	¶	7,	177	A.3d	1264	(quotation	marks	omitted).		“We	

review	questions	of	law	de	novo,” Palian,	2020	ME	131,	¶	10,	242	A.3d	164,	but
8

we	will not	substitute	our	judgment	for	that	of	the	Department, AngleZ Behav.

Health	Servs.	v.	Dep’t	of	Health	& Hum.	Servs.,	2020	ME	26,	¶	12,	226	A.3d	762.

B. Vagueness and	Excessive	Delegation

[¶16] Dr.	 Doane	 first	 argues that	 the	 statutes authorizing	 the	

Department’s	 action	 are insufficiently	 specific.	 This argument	 invokes	 two	

constitutional	doctrines—that	a	statute	is	void	if	it	is	too	vague	or	if	it	delegates	

too	much	authority	to	the	administering	body.		While	these	concepts overlap,	

see	 Uliano	 v.	 Bd.	 of	 Env’t Prot.,	 2009	 ME	 89,	 ¶	 15,	 977 A.2d 400,	they have	

different	sources	of	authority	and	emphases.

[¶17]	 A goal	of	both	doctrines	is	to	avoid	arbitrary	decision-making.		See	

Lentine	v.	Town	of	St.	George,	599	A.2d	76,	78	(Me.	1991);	Superintending	Sch.

Comm. v.	 Bangor	 Educ.	 Ass’n.,	 433	 A.2d	 383,	 387 (Me.	 1981).	 	 A	 “void	 for	

vagueness”	claim	is	based	on	the	due	process	protections	set	forth	in	the	United	

States and	Maine	Constitutions	and focuses	 on	the	need	 for adequate	notice.

See Town	of	Baldwin	v.	Carter,	2002	ME	52,	¶	10,	794	A.2d	62 (“[T]hose	subject	

to	 sanction	 by	law	[must]	be	 given	 fair	 notice	 of	 the	 standard	 of	 conduct	 to	

which	 they	 can	 be	 held	 accountable.” (quotation	 marks	 omitted)). An	

“excessive	delegation”	claim is based	on	the	separation	of	powers	clause	of	the	

Maine	Constitution, which precludes a	 statutory	delegation to	a regulator	 so	
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broad	or	amorphous	that	it amounts to	a	surrender	of	legislative	authority	to	

the	executive	branch.		See	Me. Const.	art.	III	§	2;	Lewis	v.	Dep’t of	Hum. Servs.,	

433	 A.2d	 743,	 747	 (Me.	 1981)	 (“We	 have	 consistently	 endorsed	 the	

fundamental	 constitutional	 requirement	 that	 legislation	 delegating	

discretionary	 authority	 to	 administrative	 agencies	 must	 contain	 standards	

sufficient	to	guide administrative	action.”).

[¶18]	 Here,	Dr.	Doane does	not	complain	that	he	lacked	notice	as	to	the	

type	of	conduct	that	would	expose	him	to	sanctions,	including termination from	

participation	in	MaineCare.		The	Department	regulations	and	Manual	are	clear.	

Rather,	 he	 argues that	 the	 authorizing	 statutes	 are	 too	 broad,	 so	 that	 the	

Department	 improperly	 acted	 in a	 legislative	 capacity when	 it	 issued	 its

regulations.		We	therefore	analyze	his	claim	as	asserting	excessive	delegation.

[¶19]	 Dr.	Doane is	correct	in	noting	that	the	language	contained	in	the	

authorizing	statutes	is	broad.	 Title	22	M.R.S.	§	42(1) provides:

The	 department	 shall	 issue	 rules	 and	 regulations	 considered	

necessary	and	proper	for	the	protection	of	life,	health	and	welfare,	

and	the	successful	operation	of	the	health	and	welfare	laws.	 The	

rules	 and	 regulations	 shall	 be	 adopted	 pursuant	 to	 the	

requirements	of	the	Maine	Administrative	Procedure	Act.

Title	22	M.R.S.	§	3173 provides, in	relevant	part:

The	 department	 is	 authorized	 to	 administer	 programs	 of	 aid,	

medical	 or	 remedial	 care	 and	 services	 for	 medically	 indigent	
10

persons[,]	[and] .	.	.	[t]he	department	is	authorized	and	empowered	

to	 make	 all	 necessary	 rules	 and	 regulations	 consistent	 with	 the	

laws	 of	 the	 State	 for	 the	 administration	 of	 these	 programs	

including,	but	not	limited	 to,	establishing	conditions	 of	eligibility	

and	types	and	amounts	of	aid	to	be	provided,	and	defining	the	term	

“medically	indigent,”	and	the	type	of	medical	care	to	be	provided.

[¶20]	 At	 first	 blush,	 these	 statutes	 seem	 to	 provide	 few	 limits	 on	 the	

Department’s	ability	to	enact	whatever	regulations	it	might	choose,	triggering	

excessive-delegation	 concerns.	 	 But	 a	 more	 in-depth	 review	 shows	 that	

sufficient	limitations	and	safeguards	are	in	place	for	the	statutory	framework	

to	pass	constitutional	muster.

[¶21]	 We	 start	 with	 the	 premise	 that when	 evaluating	 the	

constitutionality	of	a	statute	we “will,	if	possible,	construe	 [it]	to	preserve	its	

constitutionality.”		Friends	of	Me.’s	Mountains.	v.	Bd.	of	Env’t Prot.,	2013	ME	25,	

¶	21,	61	A.3d	689	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶22]	 Greater	 flexibility	is	 also	 allowed	with	 respect	to	delegations	 of	

authority	to	state	agencies	by	the	acts	of	the	Legislature	than	to delegations of	

authority	to	boards	and	committees	by	municipalities.	 See Uliano, 2009	ME	89,

¶	26,	977	A.2d	400.		This	is	because the	“state’s	delegation	of	authority	to	an	

executive	agency	.	.	.	is	subject	to	the	Maine	Administrative	Procedure	Act	[APA]	

and	 its	 procedural	 protections.”	 	 Id. In	 Uliano, we	 noted that	 because	 the	

Department	 of	 Environmental	 Protection	 is	 required	 to	 promulgate	 rules	
11

complying	with	the	APA	that are “subject	 to	 public	 notice,	modification,	 and	

judicial	 review,”	 these	 regulatory	 processes provided	 significant	 protection	

against	abuse.		Id. ¶	28;	see	also	Bangor	Educ.	Ass’n,	433 A.2d	at	387	(“Especially	

where	it	would	not	be	feasible	for	the	Legislature	to	supply	precise	standards,	

the	presence	of	adequate	procedural	safeguards	may	be	properly	considered	in	

resolving	 the	constitutionality	of	 the	delegation	of	power.”);	State	v.	Boynton,	

379	 A.2d	 994,	 995	 (Me.	 1977)	 (“[T]he	 presence	 of	 adequate	 procedural	

safeguards	 to	 protect	 against	 an	 abuse	 of	 discretion	 by	 those	 to	 whom	 the	

power	 is	 delegated	 compensates	 substantially	 for	 the	 want	 of	 precise	

guidelines	and	may	be	properly	considered	in	resolving	the	constitutionality	of	

the	 delegation	 of	 power.”).	 	 The	 possibility	 of	 arbitrary	 administrative	

decision-making	common	to	both	void-for-vagueness	and	excessive-delegation	

concerns	is	assuaged	by	the	formal	APA	rulemaking	process.

[¶23]	 Also,	because	the	 subject	matter	of	 the regulation	 at	issue	 here	

concerns	public	health	and	safety,	a	wide	amount	of	rulemaking	latitude	may	

be	necessary. See	Kovack	v.	Licensing	Bd., 157	Me.	411,	418,	173 A.2d	554,	558

(1961)	 (“As	 compared	 to	 a	 delegation	 of	 authority	 to	 regulate	 businesses	

generally,	 the	[L]egislature	 may	 be	 less	 restricted	 when	 it	 seeks	 to	 delegate	

authority	 of	 a	 legislative	 nature	 to	 an	 administrative	 body	 created	 for	 a	
12

particular	 purpose,	 such	 as	 the	 care	 of public	 health.”	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted)).	 	 This	 point	 is	 driven	 home	 by	 two	 decisions rejecting	 an	

excessive-delegation	claim	involving	22	M.R.S.	§	42.	 See Lewis, 433 A.2d 743;

Ne. Occupational Exch., Inc. v. State,	540 A.2d	1115	(Me.	1988).

[¶24]	 In	 Lewis,	 the	 plaintiff	 contended	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 specific

standards	within	 the	enabling	legislation,	section	42,	made	 the	Department’s	

adoption	of	the	Maine	State	Plumbing	Code	an	unconstitutional	delegation	of	

authority. 433	 A.2d	 at 746.	 	In	 rejecting	 that argument,	 we	 considered	 the	

entire	 legislative	 scheme,	 noting	 “that	 the	 Department	 of	 Human	 Services	 is	

charged	with	 the	general	responsibility	 of	supervising	 the	interests	of	health	

and	 life	 of	 the	 citizens	 of	 the	 State” and	 that	 “[s]uch	 responsibility	 quite	

obviously	 includes	 the	 prevention	 and	 control	 of	 disease	 and	 irresponsible	

human	 waste	 disposal.”	 	 Id. at 746-47 (quotation	 marks	 omitted). The	

delegation	 of	authority	 to	promulgate	plumbing	and	 sewage	 regulations	was	

constitutional	because	it	was	contained	within	a	general	statutory	scheme,	was	

confined	to	a	clearly	defined	area,	and	resulted	in regulations	that	were	limited	

to	 what	 was	 necessary	 and	 proper.	 	 Id.	 at	 747-48.	 	 We	 concluded that	 a	

legislative	delegation	is	not	excessive when	“the	legislation	clearly	reveals	the	

purpose	 to	 be	 served	 by	 the	 regulations,	 explicitly	 defines	 what	 can	 be	
13

regulated	for	that	purpose,	and	suggests	the	appropriate	degree	of	regulation.”		

Id. at 748.

[¶25] In	Northeast	 Occupational	 Exchange, we	 applied	this three-part	

test	from	Lewis	to	decide	whether	the	Community	Mental	Health	Services	Act,	

34-B M.R.S.	 §§	 3601-3606 (1988), was	 an	 unconstitutional	 delegation of	

authority.		540 A.2d	at 1116-17.	 We	rejected	the	claim that	the	delegation	was	

unconstitutional,	reasoning	that	the	clear	purpose	of	the	Act	was	“to	encourage	

an	increased	availability	of	and	participation	in	local	community	mental	health	

services”; the	Act	clearly	defined	the	services	that	could	be	regulated for	that	

purpose; and, because the	rules	promulgated	under	the	Act	were	subject	to	the	

APA, there	was an	appropriate	degree	of	regulation	to compensate	for	the	lack	

of	precise	guidelines.		Id.

[¶26] In	the	instant case,	the	latitude that	the Legislature	has	bestowed	

upon	the	Department	is	further	informed	by	MaineCare’s	role	within	the	federal	

Medicaid	framework.		As	the Manual notes,	“The	Maine	Department	of	Health	

and	 Human	 Services . . . is	 responsible	 for	 administering	 MaineCare	 in	

compliance	 with	 Federal	 and	 State	 statutes[] and	 administrative	 policies.”		

10-144	C.M.R.	 ch.	 101,	 ch.	 I,	§ 1.02-1 (effective	 Sept.	 17,	 2018). The	 federal	

government	 appropriates	 money	 to	Maine	 to	 furnish	 medical,	 rehabilitation,	
14

and	other	assistance	“on	behalf	of	families	with	dependent	children	and	of	aged,	

blind,	or	disabled	individuals,	whose	income	resources	are	insufficient	to	meet	

the	costs	of	necessary	medical	services.”		42 U.S.C.S.	§ 1396-1	(LEXIS	through	

Pub.	L.	No.	116-344).		Maine	must	adhere	to	federal	requirements	for	the	use	of	

the	 appropriated	 funds.	 	 See 42	 U.S.C.S.	 § 1396a (LEXIS	 through	 Pub.	 L.	 No.	

116-344).		For	instance,	federal	law	requires	Maine	to	“comply	with	provider	

and	 supplier	 screening,	 oversight,	 and	 reporting	 requirements,”	

id. § 1396a(a)(77),	 (kk),	 and	 to	 notify	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	

Services	and	the	state	licensing	board	“whenever	a	provider	of	services	or	any	

other	person	is	terminated,	suspended,	or	otherwise	sanctioned	or	prohibited	

from	participating	under	 the	State	plan,”	id. §	1396a(a)(41).		As	we	noted	in	

Doane	I:

Some	 providers,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 federal	 Medicaid	

regulations,	must	or	may	be	excluded	from	the	Medicaid	program	

by	 the	 federal	 Office	 of	 Inspector	 General. See 42	 C.F.R.	

§§ 1001.101,	1001.201–1001.951	(2016).	 The	Inspector	General’s	

office	 must	 exclude	 from	 participating	 in	 the	 Medicaid	 program	

providers	who	have	been	convicted	of	certain	types	of	crimes,	see	

id. §	1001.101,	and	may exclude	from	participation	providers	who	

have	committed	other misconduct,	including	providers	who	have	

had	their	state	professional	licenses	revoked	or	suspended,	see	id.

§§ 1001.201-1001.951.	 	 The	 federal	 regulations	 are	 not	 to	 be	

“construed	to	limit	a	State’s	own	authority	to	exclude	an	individual	

or	 entity	 from	 Medicaid	 for	 any	 reason	 or	 period	 authorized	 by	

State	law.” 42	C.F.R.	§	1002.2(b)	(2016) (redesignated	as	42	C.F.R.	

§	1002.3(b) by	82	Fed.	Reg.	4100	§	36 (Jan.	12,	2017)).
15

2017	ME	193,	¶	22, 170	A.3d	269 (emphasis	in	original).

7

[¶27] In	sum,	while	the	amount	of	discretion	the	Legislature	can	bestow	

upon	a	state	agency	is	not	boundless,	latitude	must	be	given	in	areas	where the	

statutory	enactment	of	detailed	specific	standards	is	unworkable.	 When	the	

subject	matter	is	public	health,	agency	regulations	are	subject	to	APA	review,	

and	the	scope	of	the	regulatory	authority is	limited by	context,	purpose,	and	a	

comprehensive	federal	 regulatory	 regime.	 Department	 regulations	 that	 call	

for	 potential	 exclusion	 from	 a	 medical	 assistance	 program	 based	 on	

incompetence	and	failure	to	comport	with	professional	standards	should	not	

surprise	a	physician-participant	and	fall	squarely	within	the	goals	articulated	

by	the	Legislature	in	the	authorizing	statutes	for	the	protection	of	life,	health,

and	welfare; the	successful	operation	of	the	health	and	welfare	laws; and	safe	

care	for	the	medically	indigent population.		See 22	M.R.S.	§	42(1).

 7		By	federal	law,	generally	speaking,	individuals	eligible	for	medical	assistance	under	Medicaid	

may	choose	any	“qualified”	provider.		42	U.S.C.S. §	1396a(a)(23)	(LEXIS	through	Pub. L.No.	116-344).

The	definition	of	“qualified”	is	not	included	in	the	federal	statute.		Federal	regulations provide	that	

states	 may	 set	 “reasonable	 standards	 relating	 to	 the	 qualifications	 of	 providers,”	 42 C.F.R.	

§ 431.51(c)(2)	(2019),	and	“qualified”	is	interpreted	to	mean	capable of	performing	needed	medical	

services	in	a	professionally	competent,	safe,	legal,	and	ethical	manner, Planned	Parenthood	of	Ind.	Inc.	

v.	 Comm’r	 of	 the	 Ind.	 State	Dep’t	 of	Health,	 699	 F.3d	962,	 978	 (7th Cir. 2012).	 	Thus,	 states	 have	

“considerable	 discretion”	 in	 establishing	 qualifications	 based	 on	 professional	 competency	 and	

patient	care.		Planned	Parenthood	of	Kan.	&	Mid-Missouri	v.	Andersen,	882	F.3d	1205,	1230	(10th	Cir.	

2018);	see	also Dube	v.	Dep’t	of	Health	& Hum.	Servs.,	97	A.3d	241,	248	(N.H.	2014)	(noting	that	states	

have	“considerable	authority”	to	establish	qualifications).
16

C. Issue	Preclusion

[¶28]	 Dr.	 Doane	 next	 contends	 that	 the	 Board	 made	 a factual	

determination that he	 was	 competent	 and	 met	 minimum	 professional	

standards; that	the	Department	must	accept	this	finding; and	that	the	finding	

requires	 the	 Department	 to	 continue	 his	 participation	 in	 MaineCare. This	

argument	misapprehends	the	distinct	roles	played	by	the	two	agencies.

[¶29]	 	 We review	 de	 novo	 whether	 issue	 preclusion,	 also	 known	 as	

collateral	estoppel,	applies to	the	Board’s	decision.		Portland	Water	Dist.	v.	Town	

of	 Standish,	 2008	 ME	 23,	 ¶	 7,	 940	 A.2d	 1097.	 	 The	 doctrine “prevents	 the	

relitigation	 of	 factual	 issues	 already	 decided	 if	 the	 identical	 issue	 was	

determined	 by	 a	 prior	 final	 judgment,	 and	 the	 party	 estopped	 had	 a	 fair	

opportunity	and	incentive	 to	litigate	 the	issue	in	a	prior	proceeding.”		Id. ¶	9	

(quotation	marks omitted).		The	doctrine	can	apply to	administrative	agencies.		

See Fitanides	 v.	 Perry,	 537 A.2d 1139,	 1140	 (Me.	 1988) (“Absent	 a	 specific	

contrary	statutory	provision,	an	adjudicative	determination	of	a	legal	or	factual	

issue	by	an	administrative	tribunal has	the	same	effect	of	issue	preclusion	as	a	

court	judgment	if	the	administrative	proceeding	resulting	in	that	determination	

entailed	 the	essential	elements	 of	adjudication.” (quotation	marks	 omitted)).		

The	Restatement	(Second)	of	Judgments	§	36	cmt. f	(Am.	L.	Inst.	1982) notes,	
17

however, that	 “a	 prior	 determination	 that	 is	 binding	 on	 one	 agency	 and	 its	

officials	may	not	be	binding	on	another	agency	and	its	officials .	.	.[i]f	the	second	

action	involves	an	agency	or	official	whose	functions	and	responsibilities	are	so	

distinct	 from	 those	 of	 the	 agency	 or	 official	 in	 the	 first	 action	 that	 applying	

preclusion	would	interfere	with	the	proper	allocation	of	authority	between [the	

two	agencies].”

[¶30]		Applying	these	principles	here,	we	conclude	that the	Department	

and	the	Board	serve	distinct	functions	and	that	the	issue	decided	by	the	Board	

was	not	identical	to	that	before	the	Department.

1. Distinct	Functions

[¶31]		We	noted	the	differences	between	the	functions	of	the	Board	and	

the	Department	in	Doane	I, 2017	ME	193,	¶	29,	170	A.3d	269.		The	Board	is	a	

licensing	authority.		It	is	composed	primarily	of	physicians,	see 32	M.R.S.	§	3263	

(2021), sets	standards	of	practice	for	physicians, and	investigates	complaints,	

see 32	 M.R.S.	 §	 3269	 (2021).	 	 Its	 investigations	 of	 complaints	 can	 result	 in	

various	 restrictions on	a	physician’s	license	or in	consent	agreements,	which	

are	designed	both	to	protect	the	general	public	and	to	rehabilitate	or	educate	

the	licensee.		See 32	M.R.S.	§ 3282-A(1) (2021).
18

[¶32]	 	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Department	 is	 a	 procurer	 of	 services.	 	 It	

administers	the	Medicaid	program,	among	other	activities,	and	is	“authorized	

to	 administer	 programs	 of	 aid,	 medical	 or	 remedial	 care	 and	 services	 for	

medically	indigent	persons.”		22	M.R.S.	§	3173.		“To	implement	the MaineCare

program,	 the	 Department	 contracts	 with	 health	 care	 providers,	 who	 bill	 the	

Department for	 MaineCare-covered	 services	 pursuant	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 those	

contracts,	 Department	 regulations,	 and	 federal	 law.”	 	 AngleZ Behav. Health	

Servs., 2020	ME	26,	¶	2,	226	A.3d	762;	see 42	U.S.C.S. §	1396a	(LEXIS	through	

Pub.	L.	No.	116-344).

[¶33]		As	we	held	in	Doane	I,	the	Board’s	licensing	function	is	not	the	same	

as	the	Department’s	procurement function.		2017	ME	193, ¶	16,	170	A.3d	269.	

We	noted	that	“the	dispute	[in	Doane	I]focuse[d] not	on	Doane’s	medical	license	

but	 on	 his	 capacity	 to	 participate	in	 and	 receive	 compensation	 from	Maine’s	

Medicaid	 program,	 MaineCare.”	 Id.	 	 The	 state exercises	 its	 police	 power	 to	

regulate	 the	 medical	 profession	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 general	 public through	the	

Board’s	 professional	licensing.	 	Id. ¶	 29.	 The	Department’s	 decision-making	

relates	 only	 to	 those	 citizens	 receiving	 services	 through	 MaineCare,	 and	 in	

keeping	with	that	goal,	making	 the	best	use	 of	 state	 funds	 received	 from	 the	

federal	government.		Id. ¶¶	29-30.
19

2. Different Issues

[¶34]	 Dr.	Doane	next	argues that	in	order	to	determine	that	he	was	fit	to	

practice	medicine,	“the	[Board]	necessarily	had	to	conclude	that	in	2015,	he	was	

a	‘competent	and	honest	practitioner’	who	satisfied	the	‘minimum standards	of	

proficiency	in	the	[medical]	profession.’”		To	support	this	proposition,	he	cites

10	M.R.S.	§	8008	(2021),	which	provides:

The	 sole	 purpose	 of	 an	 occupational	 and	 professional	

regulatory	 board	 is	 to	 protect	 the	 public	 health	 and	 welfare.	 A	

board	carries	out	this	purpose	by	ensuring	that	the	public	is	served	

by	 competent	 and	 honest	 practitioners	 and	 by	 establishing	

minimum	standards	of	proficiency	in	the	regulated	professions	by	

examining,	 licensing,	 regulating	 and	 disciplining	 practitioners	 of	

those	 regulated	 professions.	 Other	 goals	 or	 objectives	 may	 not	

supersede	this	purpose.

[¶35] As	a	 threshold	matter,	 the	Board’s	censure	decision	includes	no	

affirmative or express	finding	that	Dr.	Doane	is	fit	to	serve	any	population,	let	

alone	the constituency	served	under	MaineCare.		The	Board	specifically	found	

that	Dr.	Doane	demonstrated	incompetence	in	his	opioid	prescription	practice	

and	 imposed	 sanctions,	 although	 not	 the	 sanction	 of	 license	 revocation.		

Although we	 can	 reasonably	 infer	 that	 the	 Board	 implicitly	 concluded that

Dr. Doane could	 meet	 minimum	 standards	 of	 proficiency with	 monitoring,	

frequent	reporting, and	a practice	limited	to	certain	discrete	populations,	this	
20

implicit	 finding	 is	 not	 an	 issue	 identical	 to	 the Department’s determination

whether	to	continue	a	physician’s participation	in	MaineCare.

[¶36]	 	 The	 Manual	 lists	 the	 grounds	 for	 sanctioning	 a	 MaineCare	

provider.	 	 See 10-144	 C.M.R.	 ch. 101, ch.	 I, §§	 1.19-1(A)–(Y)	 (effective	

Feb. 13, 2011).8		Most	 of	 these	grounds	 for	sanction	do	not	involve	failure	 to	

meet	minimum	standards	of	proficiency.		See, e.g., id. §	1.19-1(A)	(fraudulent	

claims	 for	 services);	 id. §	 1.19-1(D)	 (failing	 to	 retain	 or	 disclose	 records	 of	

services	provided	to	MaineCare	members).		This	is	because,	as	noted	above,	the	

Department	is	concerned	with	risks	to	the	program	as	well	as	risks	to	the	health	

and	safety	of	the	specific	population	it	serves.		Grounds	for	termination	cited	in	

the	 Department’s	 termination	 decision,	 section	 1.19-1(M),	 and	 (R)	 of	 the	

Manual,	 were	 met:	 Dr.	 Doane violated	 the	 standards	 of	 his	 profession	 and	

suffered	formal	censure.		The	sanctions	available	to	the	Department	are	listed	

in	 its	 regulations,	 and	 in	 determining	 which	 sanctions	 to	 impose,	 the	

Department may	consider	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 offense,	 the	

extent	 of	 violations,	 the	 history	 of	 prior	 violations,	 and	 consideration	 of	

whether	a	lesser	sanction	would be	sufficient	to	remedy	the	problem,	among	

 8	 	 This	 provision	 is	 currently	 located	 at	 10-144	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 101,	 ch.	 I,	 §	 1.20-1	 (effective	

Sept. 17, 2018).
21

other	factors.		10-144	C.M.R.	ch. 101,	ch.	I,	§	1.19-3	(A)(1)(a)–(c),	(g)	(effective	

Feb. 13,	2011).9		Irrespective	of	any	implicit	Board	finding	that,	with	practice	

limitations, Dr.	Doane	met	minimum	standards	for	serving	certain	populations,

from	 the	perspective	 of	 the	interests	and	 regulations,	both	 state	and	 federal,	

governing	the	Department’s	administration	of	MaineCare,	Dr.	Doane fell	below	

the	 Department’s standards	 such	 that	 it	 could	 choose	 to	 terminate	 him.		

Although ensuring	professional	competency	is	an	important consideration in	

the	decision-making	of both	the	Board	and	the	Department,	the agencies may	

make different	 determinations	in	 accordance	with	 their	 own	 standards.	 See

Grant’s	Farm	Assocs.,	Inc.	v.	Town	of	Kittery, 554 A.2d	799,	803	(Me.	1989)	(“It	is	

therefore	 often	 the	case	 that	 an	applicant . . .	must	 simultaneously	persuade	

different	agencies	that	the	same	or	similar	standards	are	met.”	(citing Larrivee	

v.	Timmons,	549	A.2d	744,	747-48	(Me. 1988))).

D. Substantial	Evidence

[¶37]	 The	 Department	 terminated	 Dr.	 Doane’s	 participation	 in	

MaineCare based	on	“undisputed	serious	and	multiple	incidents	of	professional	

incompetence	 by	 Dr.	 Doane	 over	 an	 extended	 period	 of	 time.”	 	 Dr. Doane	

 9	 	 This	 provision	 is	 currently	 located	 at	 10-144	 C.M.R.	 ch.	 101,	 ch.	 I,	 §	 1.20-3	 (effective	

Sept. 17, 2018).
22

contends that	 this	 determination	was	not	 supported	by	 substantial	evidence	

and	constituted an	abuse	of	the	Department’s	discretion	because	the	evidence	

presented	at the	Department’s	hearing	did	not	 show that	he	currently	poses	

any	risk	to	MaineCare	patients.

[¶38]	 We review	an	“administrative	agency’s	decision	directly	for	legal	

errors,	 abuse	 of	 discretion,	 or	 unsupported	 factual	 findings.”	 	Forest	 Ecology	

Network	v.	Land	Use	Regul.	Comm’n,	2012	ME	36,	¶	28,	39	A.3d	74	(quotation	

marks	 omitted).	 	 In	 conducting	 such	 a	 review,	we “do[] not	 substitute	[our]	

judgment	 for	 that	 of	 an	 agency	 and	 must	 affirm	 findings	 of	 fact	 if	 they	 are	

supported	by	substantial	evidence	in	the	record.”		Int’l	Paper	Co.	v.	Bd. of	Env’t	

Prot.,	1999	ME	135,	¶ 29,	737	A.2d	1047.		“Substantial	evidence	exists	when	a	

reasonable	 mind	 would	 rely	 on	 that	 evidence	 as	 sufficient	 support	 for	 a	

conclusion.”	 	 Richard	 v.	 Sec’y	 of	 State,	 2018	 ME	 122,	 ¶	 21,	 192	 A.3d	 611	

(quotation	marks	 omitted).	 	 “Upon	 review	 of	 an	 agency’s	 findings	 of	 fact	we	

must	examine	 the entire	record	 to	determine	whether,	on	 the	basis	of	all	 the	

testimony	and	exhibits	before	it,	the	agency	could	fairly	and	reasonably	find	the	

facts	as	it	did.”		Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes	v.	Bd.	of	Env’t	Prot., 2010	ME	18,	¶ 13,	

989	A.2d	1128 (quotation	marks	omitted).
23

[¶39] The	Department	based	its	decision	to	exclude	Dr.	Doane	from	the	

MaineCare	program	on	its	determination	that	serious	incidents	of	professional	

incompetence	occurred	over	an	extended	period	of	time.		This	conduct	related	

to	Dr.	Doane’s	treatment	of	a	patient	between	2003-2012,	with	particular	focus	

on	events	in	2012	leading	up	to	his	patient’s	overdose.		The	presiding officer	

found,	 as	 the	 Board	 had	 previously, that	 Dr.	 Doane	 had	 “committed	

unprofessional	conduct,”	“demonstrated	incompetence	in	his	 treatment”	 of	a	

patient	 who	 “died	 of	 oxycodone	 and	 cyclobenzaprine	 intoxication,”	 and	

“violated	 Board	 Rule	 Chapter	 21,	 Section	 III,	 governing	 the	 use	 of	 controlled	

substances	for	the	treatment	of	pain” with	regard	to	the	same	patient	who	died	

of	an	overdose.		The	presiding officer’s	findings	of	fact,	which	the	Department	

adopted in	 its	 final	 decision,	 were	 supported	 by	 the	 testimony	 of	 the	

Department’s audit	 program	 manager, who	 issued	 the	 initial	 April	 2015	

decision	excluding	Dr. Doane	from	MaineCare.

[¶40]	 The	 Department’s	 audit program	 manager testified	 about	 the	

Board’s	investigation	into	Dr.	Doane’s	prescription	practices	leading	up	to	the	

death	 of	 his	 patient.	 	 He testified	 that	 Dr.	 Doane’s	 patient	 had	 been	 to	 the	

emergency	room	twice	as	a	result	of opiate	overdoses and that	an	emergency	

room	doctor	treating	the	patient	had	informed	one	of	Dr.	Doane’s	partners	that	
24

the	 patient	 was	 overmedicated	 and	 was	 taking	 opiates	 at	 dangerous	 levels.		

Instead	of	reducing	the	patient’s	medication	as	the	emergency	room	doctor	had	

recommended,	Dr.	Doane	increased	the	number of	pills	he	was	prescribing	to	

his	patient.	 The	Department’s	witness testified	that	Dr.	Doane’s	patient	died	on	

May	19,	2012,	in an	accidental	death	relating	to	“[o]xy	and	[cyclobenzaprine]	

intoxication.”	 	 He further	 testified	 that	 the	 Board	 found	 that	 the	 opiate	

treatment	Dr.	Doane	provided	for	his	patient	demonstrated	poor	judgment	and	

“decision-making	regarding	prescriptions	that	were	well	outside	the	standard	

of	care.”

[¶41]		Based	on	this	evidence,	the	Department	was	not	compelled	to	find	

that	it	could	not	terminate Dr.	Doane.	 See	Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes,	2010	ME	18,

¶ 14,	989	A.2d	1128 (“The	‘substantial	evidence’ standard	does	not	involve	any	

weighing	of	the	merits	of	evidence.	Instead	it	requires	us	to	determine	whether	

there	is	any	competent	evidence	in	the	record	to	support	a	finding.”).

[¶42]		In	the	end,	Dr.	Doane	is	not	contesting	the	Department’s	findings—

he	acknowledges	that	his	conduct	fell	below	professional	standards and	does	

not	 dispute	 that	 the	 Board	 censured	 him—a	 basis	 for	 the	 Department’s

sanction	in	its	own	right.		Instead,	as	he argued	with	respect	to	issue	preclusion,	

he	 asserts that	 because	 the	 Board	 did	 not	 revoke his	 license based	 on	 his
25

conduct,	 the	 Department	 cannot	 terminate	 his	 participation	 in	 MaineCare	

based	on	the	same conduct.		But	not	only	do	these	two	agencies	have	different	

functions,	 just	 as	 we	 do	 not	 substitute	 our	 judgment	 for	 an administrative	

decision-maker,	one	agency	is	entitled	to	reach	a	different	conclusion	based	on	

the	 same	 or	 similar	 evidence	 presented	 to	 another	 agency,	 as	 long	 as	 both	

conclusions	are	supported	by	the record evidence.	 The	Board	determined	that	

the	appropriate	action	to	 take	as	 to	Dr.	Doane’s	license	based	on	his	conduct	

was to	assign	him	a	practice	monitor and	impose	limitations	on his	practice.		

The	 Department	 determined	 that	 the	 appropriate	 action	 regarding	 his	

participation	 in	 MaineCare	 was	 termination.	 Each	 agency	 acted	 within	 the	

bounds	of	its	discretion.

E. Sufficient	Findings and	Conclusions

[¶43]	 Finally,	 Dr.	 Doane	 contends	 that	 the	 decision	 issued	 by	 the	

Department	violates	the	APA because	it	does	not	include	sufficient	findings	of	

fact.	 See 5	M.R.S.	§	9061	(2021)	(“Every	agency	decision	made	at	the	conclusion	

of	an	adjudicatory	proceeding	shall	be	in	writing or	stated	in	 the	record,	and	

shall	include	findings	of	fact	sufficient	to	apprise	the	parties	and	any	interested	

member	 of	 the	public	 of	 the	basis	 for	 the	decision.”).		The	presiding	 officer’s	

factual	 findings	 were	 comprehensive, and the	 acting	 Commissioner	 adopted	
26

them in	toto.		Dr.	Doane	argues that	the	acting	Commissioner’s	explanation	as	

to	why	she	imposed	 the	sanction	of	 termination	based	on	 those	 findings	was

too	terse.

[¶44]		The	acting	Commissioner’s	explanation was concise,	not	deficient.	

She	 noted	 that	 she	 accepted	 the	 presiding	 officer’s fact-finding, which	 was

based	in	turn	on	much	of	the	Board’s	fact-finding,	and	stated that	her decision	

was	 due	 to “the	 undisputed	 serious	 and	 multiple	 incidents	 of	 professional	

incompetence	by	Dr.	Doane	over	an	extended	period	of	time	as	set	forth	in”	the	

Board’s	 censure	 decision	 and	 consent	 agreement.	 	The	 gravity,	 number, and	

length	 of	 time	 over	 which	 the	 violations	 occurred	 are	 relevant	 factors	 in	

determining	 appropriate	 sanctions	 pursuant	 to the	 Manual.	 	 10-144	 C.M.R.	

ch. 101,	ch.	I,	§	1.19-3	(A)(1)(a)–(c)	(effective	Feb.	13,	2011).10		That	the	Board	

did	not	revoke	Dr.	Doane’s	license	based	on	 this	conduct	did	not	require	 the	

Department	to	provide	a	lengthy elaboration	of	its	conclusion	that	the	conduct	

warranted	termination	under	its	regulations.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

 10		Currently located	at	10-144	C.M.R.	ch.	101,	ch.	I,	§	1.20-3(A)(1)(a)–(c)(effective	Sept.	17,	2018).
27

Christopher	C.	Taintor,	Esq. (orally),	Norman,	Hanson	&	DeTroy,	LLC,	Portland,	

for	appellant	Stephen	Doane

Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General,	 and	 Thomas	 C.	 Bradley,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.

(orally),	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Maine	Department	

of	Health	and	Human	Services

Kennebec	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2018-74

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY