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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43578

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEAN DANIEL CARNELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 605

Filed: July 18, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 

Order on restitution and judgment, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Sean Daniel Carnell appeals from the district court’s order requiring him to pay 

restitution to an insurance company arguing that, despite the plain language of the statute, an 

insurance company is not a “victim” within the meaning of the statute. We affirm the district 

court’s order on restitution.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following his guilty pleas, Carnell was convicted of robbery, aggravated battery, first 

degree arson, battery with the intent to commit a serious felony, and aggravated assault. The 

district court imposed sentences of twenty-five years, with ten years fixed; fifteen years 

determinate; twenty-five years, with five years determinate; twenty years, with fifteen years 

determinate; and five years determinate, respectively. Carnell appealed, asserting these 
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sentences were excessive. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. See State 

v. Carnell, Docket No. 42400 (Ct. App. April 27, 2015). 

At the sentencing hearing, the State requested approximately $138,000 in restitution; the 

court left restitution open for thirty days. Carnell did not object to the amount of restitution, only 

that restitution was to be paid to an insurance company. The State argued that the insurance 

companies qualified as victims pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. The district court issued an 

order for restitution and judgment, ordering Carnell to pay $138,000 to the insurance companies. 

Carnell appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Code Section 19-5304(2) authorizes a sentencing court to order a defendant to pay 

restitution for economic loss to the victim of a crime. The decision of whether to order 

restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of a trial court, guided by consideration 

of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7), and by the policy favoring full compensation to 

crime victims who suffer economic loss. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 

(Ct. App. 2002); State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). Thus, 

we will not overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Richmond, 

137 Idaho at 37, 43 P.3d at 796. 

When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 

conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the 

issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such 

discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; 

and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 

115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 

III.

ANALYSIS

In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding restitution to the 

insurance company. Idaho Code Section 19-5304(1)(e)(iv) unambiguously includes in the 

definition of victim any person or entity who suffers economic loss because such person or entity 

has made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant to a contract. A plain 

reading therefore includes third parties who incurred a loss pursuant to a contractual obligation to 
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make payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim. Without such a contractual 

obligation, the third party is not a victim as defined in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv). Such third-party 

victims could include insurance companies or any other party that makes payments to or on 

behalf of the directly injured victim pursuant to a contract. State v. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 

297, 160 P.3d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 2007). Moreover, this Court has relied on I.C. § 19-

5304(1)(e)(iv) to hold that insurance companies that paid benefits for damage inflicted by a 

defendant’s criminal actions were victims entitled to recover their economic loss. Cheeney, 144 

Idaho at 297, 160 P.3d at 454 (citing State v. Taie, 138 Idaho, 878, 879, 71 P.3d 477, 478 (Ct. 

App. 2003)).

Here, the district court recognized this decision was a matter of discretion, and the 

decision is consistent with the applicable legal standards. The district court determined the 

insurance company was a victim entitled to compensation because it suffered economic loss 

when it paid benefits to the victims of Carnell’s actions. Thus, the district court’s decision is 

consistent with the policy of the restitution statute to make the victim whole. The district court’s 

order granting restitution is affirmed.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly concluded the insurance company was properly defined as a 

victim pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304. We affirm the district court’s order on restitution and 

judgment.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.