alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 322 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 16105 Swingley Ridge Road in Chesterfield, 

Missouri, as the ‘‘Sgt. Zachary M. Fisher Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 322 EH

1 SECTION 1. SGT. ZACHARY M. FISHER POST OFFICE. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 16105 Swingley Ridge Road in 

4 Chesterfield, Missouri, shall be known and designated as 

5 the ‘‘Sgt. Zachary M. Fisher Post Office’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Sgt. Zachary M. Fish10 er Post Office’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 24, 

2015. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 322 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostM. Fisher Post Office’’. in Chesterfield, Missouri, as the ‘‘Sgt. Zachary al Service located at 16105 Swingley Ridge Road
#### KING v. STATE.

No. 17010.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 14, 1934.

Gilbert C. Smith, of Anson, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for robbery; punishment assessed at five years in the penitentiary.

The indictment charges the offense. The record is before this court without bills of exception or'statement of facts. In such condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed. ,
Exhibit 32.2









CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


RULE 13A-14(B) OR RULE 15D-14(B)


OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED, AND


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the quarterly report for the three month period ended June 30, 2009 on Form 10-Q of Consolidation Services, Inc. (the “Company”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John C. Francis, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(a)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(b)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Dated: August 7, 2009


CONSOLIDATION SERVICES, INC.








By:              /s/ John C. Francis


John C. Francis


Chief Financial Officer





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Consolidation Services, Inc. and will be retained by Consolidation
Services, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### WILSON v. STATE.

No. 18875.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 17, 1937.

Arthur C. Gonzalez, of Del Rio, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for assault with intent to rape, punishment being IS years in the penitentiary.

The assault was alleged to have been made upon a colored girl about 13 years old. Appellant entered a plea of guilty. The State’s evidence upon said plea showed that appellant entered a house at night where the girl was sleeping, took her from the bed and carried her from the house, and made repeated efforts to have intercourse with her. She resisted, and screamed, and finally got away from him. Appellant’s only defense was that he was drunk and did not remember what he did. The court submitted the issue of drunkenness in mitigation of the punishment. The evidence supports the judgment.

From a misunderstanding of words apparently prosecutrix at one time in her testimony said that appellant penetrated her person, but it is clear from her testimony as a whole that she did not claim that appellant succeeded in effecting penetration. However, attorney for appellant requested the court to charge the jury that appellant could not be convicted of assault to rape if he penetrated her person. The court properly refused the requested instruction. Subdivision 9, art. 753, C.C.P., provides as follows : “A verdict is not contrary to the law and evidence, within the meaning of this provision, where the defendant is found guilty of an offense of inferior grade to, but of the same nature as, the offense proved.”

The judgment is affirmed.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3048 

To provide an exemption from rules and regulations of the Bureau of Consumer Financial protection for community financial institutions, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 14, 2015 

Mr. WILLIAMS (for himself and Mr. LUCAS) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To provide an exemption from rules and regulations of the 

Bureau of Consumer Financial protection for community 

financial institutions, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Community Financial 

5 Institution Exemption Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. EXEMPTION FOR COMMUNITY FINANCIAL INSTITU7 TIONS. 

8 Section 1022(b) of the Consumer Financial Protec9 tion Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5512(b)) is amended— 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3048 IH

1 (1) in paragraph (3), by amending the heading 

2 to read as follows: ‘‘GENERAL EXEMPTIONS’’; 

3 (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as para4 graph (5); and 

5 (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the fol6 lowing: 

7 ‘‘(4) SPECIFIC EXEMPTION FOR COMMUNITY FI8 NANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 

9 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Community financial 

10 institutions shall be exempt from all rules and 

11 regulations issued by the Bureau. 

12 ‘‘(B) EXCEPTION.—The Bureau may re13 voke an exemption provided under subpara14 graph (A) with respect to a specific rule or reg15 ulation and a specific class of community finan16 cial institutions if the Bureau makes a detailed, 

17 written finding that such class of community fi18 nancial institutions has engaged in a pattern or 

19 practice of activities that have been detrimental 

20 to the interests of consumers and are of a type 

21 that the specific rule or regulation is intended 

22 to address. 

23 ‘‘(C) EFFECTIVE DATE; EFFECT ON PRIOR

24 RULES.— 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3048 IH

1 ‘‘(i) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This para2 graph shall take effect with respect to 

3 rules and regulations issued or modified 

4 after the date of enactment of this para5 graph. 

6 ‘‘(ii) EFFECT ON PRIOR RULES.—This 

7 paragraph shall not prohibit the Bureau 

8 from modifying a rule or regulation issued 

9 prior to the date of enactment of this para10 graph with respect to community financial 

11 institutions if the effect of such modifica12 tion is to expand a current exemption or to 

13 reduce the costs and the regulatory burden 

14 associated with complying with such rule 

15 or regulation. 

16 ‘‘(D) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this 

17 paragraph, the term ‘community financial insti18 tution’ means an insured depository institution 

19 or credit union with less than $10,000,000,000 

20 in consolidated assets.’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

130573 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

6700 LIMITED, a/k/a LIBERTY PARK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 130573 

 COA: 264821 

Macomb CC: 04-003743-CZ 

CITY OF STERLING HEIGHTS, STERLING 

HEIGHTS ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, 

and T.J. FIORE’S CRUSHED CONCRETE, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 7, 2006 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0724 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 31, 2006 

 Clerk
Exhibit 32.1

                      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     This  certification  is being filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as
adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002.  This
certification  is  included  solely  for  the  purpose  of  complying  with  the
provisions  of Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act and is not to be used for
any other purpose.  In connection with the accompanying  Qarterly Report on Form
10-Q of Aspen  Racing  Stables,  Inc. for the quarter  ended April 30, 2008,  I,
Trixy  Sasnyiuk-Walt,  hereby  certifies  in my  capacity as an officer of Aspen
Racing Stables, Inc. that to my knowledge:

     1.   The Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of Aspen Racing  Stables,  Inc. for
          the quarter ended April 30, 2008, fully complies with the requirements
          of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The  information  contained  in the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-Q of
          Aspen  Racing  Stables,  Inc.  for the quarter  ended April 30,  2008,
          fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
          results of operations of Aspen Racing Stables, Inc.

Date:    June 12, 2008                  /s/ Trixy Sasnyiuk-Walt
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Trixy Sasnyiuk-Walt, President
                                        and Chief Executive Officer
                                        (Principal Executive, Financial
                                        and Accounting Officer)
#### PREACHER v. STATE.

No. 19685.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 1, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1938.

Martin & Shipman, of Abilene, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Conviction is for transporting intoxicating liquor in dry area. The punishment, a fine of $50 and confinement in the county jail for a period of six months, and also a fine of $1 for speeding on a public highway.

The information contained three counts. The first count charged him with transporting malt liquor containing alcohol in excess of one-half of one percent by volume. The second count charged a former conviction of appellant for a similar offense. The third count charged him with driving an automobile upon the public highways of Taylor County in excess of forty-five miles per hour.

At his trial, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charges contained in the information, took the witness stand and testified that he knew it was against the law to sell beer in Taylor County and knew the officers had been trying to catch him but he evaded them. However., they did catch him and he was guilty.

The jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment as above indicated.

Appellant’s only contention is that by his plea of guilty he did not admit that Taylor County was a dry area. That the state was required to prove such fact, but had failed to do so. Hence, he maintains that the conviction under the first count cannot be sustained. We are unable to agree with him.

Article 518, C.C.P., provides:

> “A plea of guilty in a misdemeanor case may be made either by the defendant or his counsel in open court. In such case, the defendant or his counsel may waive a jury, and the punishment may be assessed by the court, either upon or without evidence, at the discretion of the court.”

A similar question as the one here presented was before this court in the case of Burton v. State, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 334, 16 S.W.2d 828, and was decided adversely to appellant’s contention. See, also, Johnson v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 625, 48 S.W. 70.

The judgment is accordingly affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

We have re-examined the record in the light of the motion for rehearing filed by the appellant and have reached the conclusion that the proper disposition of the appeal was made upon the original submission. The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

September 10, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 133573 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 133573 COA: 275279 Delta CC: 06-007546-FH DONNIE EUGENE CRABTREE, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal th e February 15, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is consider ed, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

d0830 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 10, 2007

Clerk
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

 

CERTIFICATIONS

 

I, William H. Channell, Jr., certify that:

 

1.               I have reviewedthis quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Channell Commercial Corporation;

 

2.               Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.               Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.               The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a)              Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b)             Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

c)              Disclosed in thisreport any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reportingthat occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.               The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

 

a)              All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

 

b)             Any fraud, whether ornot material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

 
| Date: November 21, 2005 | By:    | /s/ William H. Channell, Jr. |   |
|------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|
|                         |   | William H. Channell, Jr.     |
|                         |   | Chief Executive Officer           |

 

----
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                         INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT



The Board of Directors
and Stockholders
Pinkerton's, Inc.:



We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form
S-8 No. 33-68492, No. 33-41795, No. 33-36200 and No. 33-93902 of Pinkerton's,
Inc. of our reports dated February 20, 1997, relating to the consolidated
balance sheets of Pinkerton's, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 27, 1996 and
December 29, 1995 and the related consolidated statements of operations, changes
in stockholders' equity and cash flows and related schedule for the three years
ended December 27, 1996, December 29, 1995 and December 30, 1994, which reports
appear herein or are incorporated herein by reference.


                               /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP



Los Angeles, California
March 14, 1997
[No. 25505-7-II.

Division Two.

November 22, 2000.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. William M. Hargrave, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Mason County, No. 99-1-00246-6, James B. Sawyer II, J., entered January 13, 2000. *Reversed*by unpublished opinion per Hunt, J., concurred in by Armstrong, C.J., and Bridgewater, J.
Order entered November 13, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-01112-CV

DUAL COMMERCIAL, LLC D/B/A PGI COMMERCIAL LLC, Appellant

V.

CINCINNATI CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-05795-E

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s November 9, 2018 agreed motion for an extension of time 

to file a brief. We GRANT the motion to the extent that appellant shall file a brief by 

December 17, 2018.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
RECORD OF COMMUNICATIO N TO: File SUBJECT State concurrenc e wit h Prpp

o ( H PHON E CALL QOISCUSSION Q FIEL D D OTHER (SPECIFY! (Rkcord o f ite m checke d • b FROM : Stephe n A . Gilretn , Chie f ALN M Remedial Sectio n sed Remed

yat Jacksonvill e an d Re TRI P QCONFEBENCE ove) DATE 9-24-90 TIME 3:0 0 EM ager s Road

Garycalle d i nresponse t o botha previou s "lette r (date dSept . 18 , 1990 ) an d an earlie r cal l i nthe dayfrom Steve Gi l rei n t o Mik e Bates . At issu e was the use o f a soi l cap/cover and the use o f a "warnin g grid " between the waste and th e fi11 . The State ha d earlie r concurre d wit hal l aspects o f the remedyi na lette r date d September 7 , 1990 , fromMik e Bates to Steve Veal e wit hthe exceptio n o f the cove r issue . I t was the States ' contentio n tha t a cap was not necessaryan d woul d hinde r natura l degradatio n processes , especiall yultra-viole t light . Subsequen t t o reviewin g EPA' s rational e (Se e Sept . 18 , 199 0 letter ) and after a short discussion , GaryMarti n sai d that the State woul d agre e t o the use o f a soi l cover . Specifically , it was agree d that a warnin g ari dwoul d not be utilize d an d tha t the soi l fil l woul d be referred t o as a soi l "cover " not a soi l "cap " i nthe ROD . It was furthe r stated that the EP Aremed ywoul d allo wto r unrestricte d residentia l usage , as "ion g as the integrit yo f the cove r was kep t intact . Gar ysai d tha t th e enforceabitit yo f deed restriction s was currentl ybein g reviewe d byADPC&E' s lega l staff . < N i n v- i CM 0 0

CONCLUSIONS , ACTIO N TAKE N ORREQUIRE D

1 INFORMATIO NCOPIE S TO : EP A Far m 1300 4 (7-72) "IPLACC * CP AHQ FOR M «100- < WHICH MA Y•E uico UNTIL SUPPL Y1 1 CXHAUSTCO
.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FERNANDO LEMUS

- HERNANDEZ , AKA Agapito Fernando Lemus

- Hernandez,

Petitioner,

v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 20

- 71546 Agency No. A09 8

- 916

- 915

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted May 4, 202 1 Submission withdrawn May 25, 2021 Resubmitted September 10, 2021 Portland, Oregon Before: W. FLETCHER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK, * * District Judge.
Fernando Lemus

- Hernandez petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his applications for withholding of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

SEP 10 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the following reasons, we deny the petition.
1. Lemus

- Hernandez applied for withholding of removal based on membership in a particular social group (“PSG”) consisting of “nuclear family members of landowners in Guatemala.” To demonstrate membership in a PSG, an applicant must prove, inter alia , that the group is “ socially distinct within the society in question.” Matter of M

- E

- V

- G

- , 26 I

. & N

. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). “To have the ‘social distinction’ necessary to establish a particular social group, there must be evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group .” Matter of
W

- G

- R

- , 26 I

. & N

. Dec. 208, 217 (BIA 2014 )

. While Lemus

- Hernandez testified that a “criminal organization” targeted his family because of its large landholdings,
the IJ appropriatel y concluded that he did not offer sufficient evidence that Guatemalan society perceives either landowners in general or his family in particular as a distinct group. See Cordoba v. Barr , 962 F.3d 479, 483 (9th Cir. 2020). (“[The BIA has] emphasized that ‘ the persecutors’ perception is not itself enough to make a group socially distinct, and persecutory conduct alone cannot define the group. ’ ” ( quoting Matter of M

- E

- V

- G

- , 26 I

. & N

. Dec. at 242)).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusions (1 ) that
Lemus

- Hernandez does not face a sufficient risk of torture to qualify for CAT3

relief, and (2) that such conduct would not be carried out with the consent or acquiescence of the Guatemalan government.
PETITION FOR REVIE W DENIED.