FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF THE 

COLUMBIA/WILLAMETTE INC.;

PORTLAND FEMINIST WOMEN’S

HEALTH CENTER; ROBERT CRIST,

M.D.; WARREN M. HORN, M.D.;

ELIZABETH NEWHALL, M.D.; JAMES

NEWHALL, M.D.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

No. 06-35733 v.

D.C. No. AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE  CV-95-01671-REJ ACTIVISTS; ADVOCATES FOR LIFE

MINISTRIES; MICHAEL DODDS; OPINION

TIMOTHY PAUL DRESTE; JOSEPH L.

FOREMAN; BRUCE EVAN MURCH;

DONALD TRESHMAN; CHARLES

WYSONG; MICHAEL BRAY; ANDREW

BURNETT; DAVID CRANE; CHARLES

ROY MCMILLAN; CATHERINE

RAMEY; DAWN MARIE STOVER,

Defendants-Appellants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Robert E. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 6, 2007—Portland, Oregon

Filed February 11, 2008

Before: Edward Leavy, Raymond C. Fisher and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

1881
Opinion by Judge Fisher

1882 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
COUNSEL

Maria T. Vullo (argued), Julie Fink, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,

Wharton & Garrison LLP, Seattle, Washington; Carol J.

1884 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
Bernick, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Portland, Oregon;

Roger K. Evans, Planned Parenthood Federation of America,

Inc., New York, New York, for the plaintiffs-appellees. 

Christopher A. Ferrara (argued), American Catholic Lawyers

Association, Fairfield, New Jersey; Richard Thompson,

Thomas More Law Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for the

defendants-appellants. 

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge: 

At what all surely must hope is the conclusion of this long

running litigation, we must address an issue of some importance under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b) relating to the award of post-judgment interest to the plaintiffsappellees on the punitive damages judgment they obtained

against the defendants-appellants. This is a cautionary tale for

all whose judgments on appeal are subject to the requirements

of Rule 37(b). 

In an earlier appeal, we reduced the punitive damages

because we concluded they were excessive under the Supreme

Court’s Due Process Clause jurisprudence. We accordingly

directed the district court on remand to enter a judgment for

the damage amounts we specified, assuming the plaintiffs

opted not to have a new trial. Because our mandate did not

contain instructions about the allowance of post-judgment

interest as required by Rule 37(b), we are now called upon to

decide whether the district court had the authority to award

post-judgment interest from the date of its original judgment,

as modified in its final judgment, or only from the date of that

final judgment. We hold that our failure to specify the accrual

date for post-judgment interest in our mandate precluded the

district court’s order that interest would run from the date of

the original judgment. 

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION 1885
We conclude, however, that our omission of post-judgment

interest was inadvertent, and we therefore recall the earlier

mandate and amend it to provide for post-judgment interest

from the date of the original judgment. In so doing, we caution that in the future, Rule 37(b)’s requirements as to the

terms of our mandates should be noted and adhered to.

BACKGROUND

In 1995, four individual physicians and two clinics that provide medical services, including abortions, to women (collectively, “Physicians”) brought suit against American Coalition

of Life Activists and 13 others (collectively, “ACLA”) for

violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act

(“FACE”), 18 U.S.C. § 248, and the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.

The underlying facts giving rise to this long history of litigation are fully described in our en banc opinion, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of

Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062-66 (9th Cir. 2002) (en

banc) (hereinafter PPCW V). 

The jury found for Physicians on all counts and awarded a

total of $526,336.14 in compensatory damages under FACE,

$108.5 million in punitive damages under FACE and $11.8

million in compensatory damages (after trebling) under

RICO. See id. at 1066 n.4. On February 22, 1999, the district

court entered judgment against ACLA in the full amount of

the jury’s verdict (“Original Judgment”). The Original Judgment also provided that “[e]ach plaintiff shall recover the

aforementioned damages with interest thereon at the rate as

provided by law, 28 U.S.C. § 1961.” 

ACLA appealed the judgment, which we affirmed on

rehearing en banc except as to punitive damages. Id. at 1088.

We remanded for the district court “to consider in the first

instance whether the award is appropriate in light” of In re

Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001), which clarified

1886 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
the constitutional limitations on punitive damages awards. Id.

at 1086. On remand, the district court entered judgment reinstating the punitive damages award in full and awarding postjudgment interest on the entire award from the date of the

Original Judgment (“Revised Judgment”). 

ACLA again appealed. We reduced the punitive damages

award to a total of $4.7 million and remanded for the “district

court to order a new trial unless [P]hysicians accept a remittitur in accord” with the amounts we specified. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of

Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereinafter

PPCW VIII). The parties did not address post-judgment interest. Neither did our opinion or mandate. 

Physicians accepted the remittitur. On July 10, 2006, the

district court entered judgment and awarded post-judgment

interest on the entire award from the date of the Original

Judgment (“Final Judgment”). ACLA appealed, challenging

the district court’s authority to award post-judgment interest

from the date of the Original Judgment because our mandate

in PPCW VIII contained no instructions about the allowance

of post-judgment interest. 

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to hear ACLA’s timely appeal from

a final judgment. 8 U.S.C. § 1291. Because this case involves

the proper construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1961 and Federal Rule

of Appellate Procedure 37(b), our review is de novo. See

AT&T v. United Computer Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th

Cir. 1996).

DISCUSSION

I

As a preliminary matter, ACLA contends that the district

court’s award of post-judgment interest on the entire damages

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION 1887
award from the date of the Original Judgment rather than the

date of the Final Judgment was improper. We do not address

this contention, because it is barred from reconsideration by

the law of the case. “Nothing is before this court but what is

subsequent to the mandate.” Atlas Scraper & Eng’g Co. v.

Pursche, 357 F.2d 296, 297 (9th Cir. 1966) (quoting Himley

v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 314 (1809)). In PPCW V, we

affirmed the district court’s “judgment in all respects but for

punitive damages.” 290 F.3d at 1088. We necessarily

affirmed the compensatory damages awards and postjudgment interest on those damages. Accordingly, ACLA’s

present appeal is limited to review of the district court’s

award of post-judgment interest on the punitive damages

award only. All other issues were finally decided in PPCW V

and PPCW VIII. 

II

ACLA’s argument relies on two premises. First, ACLA

contends that Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304

(1948), and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b)

deprive a district court of authority to award post-judgment

interest from the date of an original judgment when the appellate court’s mandate directs the entry of a particular, modified

money judgment and contains no instructions about the allowance of post-judgment interest. Second, ACLA contends that

PPCW VIII directed the entry of a particular, modified money

judgment without mention of post-judgment interest. Therefore, the district court was bound by our mandate and could

award post-judgment interest on the punitive damages award

only from the date of the Final Judgment, not the date of the

Original Judgment. ACLA is correct. 

A

Assessing ACLA’s first premise requires that we unravel

the relationship between 28 U.S.C. § 1961 and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990),

1888 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
which together govern the calculation of post-judgment interest, and Briggs and Rule 37(b), which together forbid the district court to award post-judgment interest in excess of our

mandate.1 The district court’s award of post-judgment interest

is valid only if it complies with § 1961 and conforms to our

mandate. 

[1] Section 1961 provides for the mandatory award of postjudgment interest “on any money judgment in a civil case

recovered in a district court.” See Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d

835, 842 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)). Postjudgment interest must run from the date of a judgment when

the damages were “supported by the evidence” and meaningfully “ascertained.” See Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 835-36; AT&T, 98

F.3d at 1210; Tinsley v. Sea-Land Corp., 979 F.2d 1382, 1383

(9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We may reverse and remand a

judgment without concluding that it is erroneous or unsupported by the evidence. See Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians and

Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 703 (9th Cir. 1996).

When the legal and evidentiary basis of an award is thus preserved, post-judgment interest is ordinarily “computed from

the date of [the judgment’s] initial entry.” Perkins v. Standard

Oil Co. of Cal., 487 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1973); see Guam

Soc’y, 100 F.3d at 702-03. 

Kaiser and § 1961 explain how to determine the accrual

date of post-judgment interest in the first instance. Briggs and

Rule 37(b), on the other hand, limit the power of the district

court to award post-judgment interest from any date other

than the date of entry of judgment on remand when that is

1We have never squarely considered the interaction of § 1961, Kaiser,

Briggs and Rule 37(b). Our holding here is consistent with that of the

other courts of appeals. See, e.g., SEB SA v. Sunbeam Corp., 476 F.3d

1317, 1319-21 (11th Cir. 2007); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso,

371 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2004); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 318 F.3d

1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2003); DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills

Electro Minerals Corp., 997 F.2d 1340, 1341-43 (11th Cir. 1993); Gele v.

Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1980). 

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION 1889
what our mandate requires. In Briggs, the district court

entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict after granting a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

See 334 U.S. at 305. Without making provision for postjudgment interest, the court of appeals reversed and directed

that judgment be entered on the verdict. See id. Relying on the

principle that “an inferior court has no power or authority to

deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court,” the

Supreme Court held that the district court could not award

post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict because

“the trial court had no power to enter judgment for an amount

different than directed.” Id. at 306. Briggs reflects the settled

principle that once we have instructed the district court on a

matter, it must faithfully carry out our command and go no

further. See Newhouse v. Robert’s Ilima Tours, Inc., 708 F.2d

436, 441-42 (9th Cir. 1983). 

[2] Rule 37 was promulgated as a reminder of the Briggs

rule. See Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 37 (1967).

When we “modif[y] or reverse[ ] a judgment with a direction

that a money judgment be entered in the district court, [our]

mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of

interest.” Fed. R. App. P. 37(b). When our mandate lacks such

instructions, the district court “ha[s] no power to enter judgment for an amount different than directed.” Briggs, 334 U.S.

at 306. It cannot award post-judgment interest from the date

of the original judgment because to do so would enlarge the

particular, modified money judgment that we have directed be

entered. Our mandate binds the district court even if we

should have awarded post-judgment interest consistent with

Kaiser and § 1961, but mistakenly failed to do so. 

[3] Our canvass of the law has not disclosed a published

case in this circuit — or in any other — where the district

court was allowed to deviate from a mandate that directed the

entry of a particular, modified money judgment and contained

no instructions on post-judgment interest by awarding interest

from the date of entry of the original judgment. None of the

1890 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
cases Physicians cite is to the contrary. For example, in Kaiser itself, the district court’s judgment was affirmed, so Rule

37(a), not Rule 37(b), was applicable. See 494 U.S. at 830.

When we affirm a money judgment in a civil case, “whatever

interest is allowed by law is payable from the date when the

district court’s judgment was entered.” See Fed. R. App. P.

37(a). Rule 37(b) governs only when our mandate “modifies

or reverses a judgment with a direction that a money judgment be entered in the district court.” When the court of

appeals remands to the district court to determine the amount

of a damages award, then the mandate does not direct the

entry of a money judgment. The Briggs and Rule 37(b) limitations on district court authority are therefore not implicated,

and the district court is free to award post-judgment interest

subject only to the substantive requirements of Kaiser and

§ 1961 regarding the date damages were meaningfully ascertained. This was the circumstance in the cases Physicians cite,

so the appropriate date of accrual was the date of the original

judgment. See Guam Soc’y, 100 F.3d at 695; AT&T, 98 F.3d

at 1208; Tinsley, 979 F.2d at 1383; Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984); Twin City

Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc., 676 F.2d

1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v.

D’Urso, 371 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, Briggs and Rule 37(b) limit only the power of

the district court to deviate from the mandate. We remain free

to amend our judgments or recall our mandates to award postjudgment interest as appropriate under Kaiser and § 1961. In

the other cases Physicians cite, it was the appellate court, not

the district court, that corrected its previous mandate to provide expressly for post-judgment interest from the date of the

original judgment. See Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg.,

S.A., 842 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1983)

(per curiam), abrogated on others grounds, Kaiser, 494 U.S.

at 834-35; Perkins, 487 F.2d at 674; Dunn v. HOVIC, 13 F.3d

58, 59 (3d Cir. 1993); Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION 1891
Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 96 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993); Coal Res., Inc. v.

Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 1263, 1275 (6th Cir. 1992).

Physicians contend that our circuit’s precedent does not

require such a strict reading of Briggs and Rule 37(b) and

devote considerable attention to Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v.

Greyhound Corp., 616 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1980) (Mt. Hood II).

In an earlier appeal, we had remanded for consideration of

whether the Clayton Act’s statute of limitations had been

equitably tolled. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound

Corp., 583 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1978) (Mt. Hood I). Our mandate did not address post-judgment interest. On remand, the

district court held that equitable tolling applied and awarded

post-judgment interest from the date of the original judgment

on both the portion of the award that did not depend on equitable tolling theory and the portion that did. See Mt. Hood II,

616 F.2d at 406. We subsequently affirmed. Id. at 407. 

Physicians would have us infer from Mt. Hood II that the

Ninth Circuit construes Briggs and Rule 37(b) differently

from every other circuit. We do not agree, because Mt. Hood

II, properly understood, speaks to neither. First, an earlier

appeal had already affirmed the portion of the damages award

that was not dependent on any tolling theory, see id. at 395,

406, so Rule 37(a), not Rule 37(b), governed post-judgment

interest on those damages. Second, Mt. Hood I did not direct

the entry of a particular, modified money judgment, but simply remanded to the district court to assess the equitable tolling theory. See Mt. Hood II, 616 F.2d at 395; Mt. Hood I, 583

F.2d at 469. Thus, Rule 37(b)’s limitation on the district

court’s authority to award post-judgment interest was simply

inapplicable in Mt. Hood II.

Physicians may have been led astray by language in Mt.

Hood II suggesting that we take an expansive approach to the

award of post-judgment interest. See Mt. Hood II, 616 F.2d at

406-07; see also Handgards, 743 F.2d at 1299 & n.26 (recognizing circuit split). However, that language was addressed to

1892 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
the substantive legal question in Mt. Hood II — when a judgment is legally sufficient to support the award of postjudgment interest — a question Kaiser’s “meaningful ascertainment” standard later conclusively resolved. See Kaiser,

494 U.S. at 835-36; Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

269 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2001). Our decision in Mt. Hood

II merely anticipated the analytical framework provided by

Kaiser, and did not — nor could it — contravene Briggs and

sanction the district court’s deviation from our mandate. 

[4] In sum, we hold that when we modify or reverse a judgment with a direction that a particular money judgment be

entered on remand, and our mandate does not contain instructions about the allowance of post-judgment interest, Briggs

and Rule 37(b) forbid the district court to award postjudgment interest from the date of the original judgment, even

when such an award would otherwise be appropriate under

Kaiser and § 1961. 

B

ACLA is correct that PPCW VIII modified the district

court’s Revised Judgment as to the amount of punitive damages and then directed that a particular money judgment be

entered on remand. PPCW VIII “arrive[d] at a sum for each

defendant to pay each plaintiff.” 422 F.3d at 963. We reduced

the punitive damages award and then specified the exact

amount of “remitted damages per plaintiff, per defendant.”

Id. at 967. Although we remanded for the district court to

order a new trial unless Physicians accepted the remittitur, id.

at 965, the conditional nature of our order does not make

Briggs or Rule 37(b) any less applicable. It was enough that

we directed the particulars of the money judgment the district

court was to enter absent a new trial. 

Physicians urge that we follow Stewart v. Donges, 20 F.3d

380 (10th Cir. 1994), and conclude that Briggs and Rule 37(b)

do not govern this case because the district court’s Original

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION 1893
Judgment specifically included an award of post-judgment

interest. See id. at 382-83. On this reasoning, PPCW V also

implicitly affirmed the award of post-judgment interest on the

punitive damages award. Therefore, Physicians argue, PPCW

VIII’s mandate implicitly contained an award of postjudgment interest from the date of the Original Judgment. 

We do not find Stewart to be apposite. Rule 37(b) actually

had no bearing there because the court of appeals had previously “remanded the case for calculation of the exact amount

[of attorney’s fees] to be awarded.” Id. at 381 (emphasis

added). We, on the other hand, directed the district court on

remand to enter a particular, modified money judgment —

which is what the plain language of Rule 37(b) covers. Moreover, Physicians’ contention is inconsistent with the allocation

of judicial authority contemplated by Briggs and Rule 37(b).

When we modify or reverse a judgment with a direction that

a money judgment be entered in the district court, “the mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of interest.” Fed. R. App. P. 37(b) (emphasis added). It is the court

of appeals — not the district court — that is charged with setting the date that interest accrues on the damages we have

specified. 

III

[5] We accept ACLA’s argument that the district court

deviated from our mandate in PPCW VIII by awarding postjudgment interest on the reduced punitive damages award

from the date of the Original Judgment rather than the date of

the Final Judgment. That does not end the matter, however,

because we may recall our mandate and direct that postjudgment interest run from a date appropriate under Kaiser

and § 1961. See, e.g., Perkins, 487 F.2d at 674; Aerojet-Gen.

Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Assoc., 478 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir.

1973). 

1894 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
A

We first must determine whether PPCW VIII’s reduced

punitive damages award was meaningfully ascertained as of

the Original Judgment. The Supreme Court has explained that

“the purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the

successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the

loss from the time between the ascertainment of the damage

and the payment by the defendant.” Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 835-

36 (internal quotation omitted). Under Kaiser, post-judgment

interest may run only from the date of a judgment later determined to be supported by the evidence. It may not run from

a legally insufficient judgment, or one where the “damages

have not been ‘ascertained’ in any meaningful way.” Id. at

836. As between two judgments, both of which sufficiently

ascertain the damages, equitable principles favor selecting the

judgment which more fully compensates the prevailing party.

See AT&T, 98 F.3d at 1211. “[D]etermining from which judgment interest should run ‘requires an inquiry into the nature

of the initial judgment, the action of the appellate court, the

subsequent events upon remand, and the relationship between

the first judgment and the modified judgment.’ ” Guam Soc’y,

100 F.3d at 702 (quoting Bailey v. Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d

149, 154 (6th Cir. 1988)). 

[6] We agree with Physicians that we should have awarded

post-judgment interest from the date of the Original Judgment

because the basis for the punitive damages award had already

been meaningfully ascertained. As in Guam Society, our decision in PPCW V vacated the district court’s original judgment

so that it could consider intervening case law. Compare Guam

Soc’y, 100 F.3d at 702, with PPCW V, 290 F.3d at 1086.

PPCW V did not conclude that the district court’s award was

erroneous or unsupported by the evidence. Likewise, in

PPCW VIII, we reduced the punitive damages award solely

because the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in the Original Judgment was excessive under the Due

Process Clause. See 422 F.3d at 962. However, the legal and

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION 1895
evidentiary basis of the original punitive damages award —

the jury’s finding that ACLA had violated FACE — remained

unaltered. Indeed, we expressly rejected ACLA’s renewed

challenges to its liability. See id. at 966-67. PPCW VIII thus

permitted the district court’s original judgment to stand to the

extent that it comported with constitutional limitations on

punitive damages awards. See Tinsley, 979 F.2d at 1383; Perkins, 487 F.2d at 676.

[7] Because the punitive damages award was meaningfully

ascertained as of the Original Judgment, Physicians are entitled under § 1961 to post-judgment interest from that date.

C

Our opinion in PPCW VIII should have included instructions about the allowance of post-judgment interest, as Rule

37(b) requires. We therefore turn to the question of remedy.

[8] The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 37 state that “a

party who conceives himself entitled to interest from a date

other than the date of entry of judgment in accordance with

the mandate should be entitled to seek recall of the mandate

for determination of the question.” The parties in Turner, 702

F.2d at 754, and Perkins, 487 F.2d at 674, confronted with a

mandate silent on the allowance of post-judgment interest, did

just that. We recalled and amended our mandate in both cases

to allow the district court to enter judgment for the amount of

post-judgment interest appropriate under § 1961 without running afoul of Briggs and Rule 37(b). 

[9] Our authority to recall a mandate “cannot be questioned” and “may be exercised for good cause and to prevent

injustice.” Aerojet-Gen., 478 F.2d at 254 (internal quotation

marks omitted). There is good cause here for recalling PPCW

VIII’s mandate to award post-judgment interest from the date

of the Original Judgment. Physicians should have been

awarded post-judgment interest on the punitive damages

1896 PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION
award from the date of the Original Judgment. Our error is no

reason to deny Physicians the interest to which they are statutorily entitled. 

[10] That said, we recognize ACLA’s contention that Physicians should have sought recall of the mandate as soon as

they realized that our mandate did not contain instructions

about the allowance of post-judgment interest. However, we

also recognize that our precedent in this area has not been

entirely clear, and that we should have addressed postjudgment interest in our mandate. To avoid any injustice,

therefore, we recall and amend our mandate to include

instructions regarding the allowance of post-judgment interest

as follows: On the reduced punitive damages award, postjudgment interest is to run from February 22, 1999, the date

of the Original Judgment. 

[11] Henceforth, we expect that litigants in this circuit will

clearly understand that if we modify or reverse a judgment

with a direction that a money judgment be entered in the district court, our mandate must contain instructions about the

allowance of post-judgment interest. Fed. R. App. 37(b). If

our mandate omits such instructions, a party that believes it

is entitled to interest from a date other than the date of entry

of judgment on remand must expeditiously seek reform of the

mandate. 

Mandate shall issue in accordance with this opinion. Each

party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 

REMANDED.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. AMERICAN COALITION 1897