UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-10

HENRY LOUIS WALLACE, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

GERALD J. BRANKER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. 

Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cv-00464-RJC) 

Argued: October 29, 2009 Decided: December 2, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Michael wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined.

ARGUED: Ann Bach Petersen, GLOVER & PETERSEN, PA, Chapel Hill, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Steven Mark Arbogast, NORTH 

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. ON BRIEF: James R. Glover, GLOVER & PETERSEN, PA, 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, 

Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge: 

 In January 1997 Henry Louis Wallace was convicted in 

North Carolina of nine counts of first-degree murder, eight 

counts of first-degree rape, one count of second-degree rape, 

two counts of first-degree sexual offense, two counts of seconddegree sexual offense, one count of assault on a child under the 

age of twelve, and five counts of robbery with a dangerous 

weapon. He was sentenced to death on each of the murder counts. 

After exhausting his state remedies, Wallace petitioned a 

federal district court in North Carolina for a writ of habeas 

corpus, which the court denied. We granted a certificate of 

appealability on two of Wallace’s claims: (1) that pretrial 

publicity and the state court’s denial of his motion for a 

change of venue deprived him of an impartial jury and (2) that 

delayed administration of Miranda warnings rendered his 

confessions involuntary and therefore inadmissible. After 

considering these claims, we affirm the district court’s denial 

of the writ. 

I. 

A. 

 The North Carolina Supreme Court described the facts 

of the nine murders for which Wallace was convicted as follows: 

 The State presented evidence tending to show that 

defendant [Henry Louis Wallace] murdered nine women in 

the Charlotte area over a two-year period. Defendant 

2 
was identified as a suspect in three of the later 

murders by a palmprint found on the car of one of the 

victims. As will be detailed below, defendant was 

arrested on an outstanding larceny charge and 

interrogated by police. He confessed to the murders 

of Shawna Hawk, Audrey Spain, Valencia Mack, Betty 

Baucom, Brandi Henderson, and Deborah Slaughter. The 

State presented the following evidence: 

Caroline Love Murder

 

 On 15 June 1992, Caroline Love was living in an 

apartment with Sadie McKnight, defendant’s girlfriend. 

That night, after completing her shift at the 

Bojangles’ restaurant on Central Avenue in Charlotte, 

Love asked the night manager if she could buy a roll 

of quarters to do her laundry. The night manager 

exchanged a roll of quarters for a ten-dollar bill, 

and Love left the premises. As Love walked toward her 

apartment, her cousin, Robert Ross, saw her walking, 

offered her a ride, and drove her home. Ross watched 

as Love entered her apartment. 

 A few days later, Love’s employer contacted 

Love’s sister, Kathy Love (Kathy), and informed her 

that Love had not come to work in two days. Kathy went 

to Love’s apartment and left a note. However, the 

next day, Kathy was again informed Love had not come 

to work. Kathy then contacted defendant, whom she 

knew, to find Love’s roommate, McKnight. Kathy, 

McKnight, and defendant went to the police station to 

file a missing person’s report. Later, Kathy went 

into Love’s apartment. She noticed that some of the 

furniture had been moved and that some of the sheets 

from Love’s bed were missing, but there was no 

evidence of Love’s whereabouts. During the 

investigation of the missing person’s report, 

Investigator Tony Rice of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 

Police Department determined that the roll of quarters 

Love bought prior to leaving work on 15 June 1992 was 

missing from her apartment. Love was not found as a 

result of the missing person’s report. 

 On 13 March 1994, defendant confessed to the 

murder of Caroline Love. At trial, the State 

introduced redacted versions of defendant’s taperecorded confession. In the confession, defendant 

stated that he made a copy of McKnight’s house key and 

3 
went to the apartment when neither McKnight nor Love 

was there. Defendant heard Love enter the apartment. 

He indicated to Love that he was in the bathroom and 

would leave as soon as he came out. Upon coming out 

of the bathroom, however, defendant went into the 

living room where Love was watching television and 

kissed her on the cheek. Love promised not to tell 

McKnight about the kiss if defendant promised not to 

do it again. Defendant then put his arms around Love 

in a manner similar to a wrestling choke hold. 

Defendant confessed that there was a scuffle, that 

Love scratched him on his arms and face, and that he 

kept holding Love until she passed out. Defendant 

then moved Love to her bedroom, removed her clothes, 

tied her hands behind her back with the cord of a 

curling iron, and placed tape over her mouth. 

Defendant had oral sex and sexual intercourse with 

Love, during which she was semiconscious. While 

engaged in intercourse with Love, defendant continued 

to apply the choke hold until Love’s body became limp. 

Defendant stated he could tell she was still alive 

because he could feel her heart and pulse. 

Afterwards, defendant strangled Love to death. 

 Defendant further confessed that he left the 

apartment to move his car closer to the stairwell and 

then returned to the apartment with a large orange 

trash bag. Defendant wrapped Love’s body in a bed 

sheet and put the body inside the trash bag. . . . 

Defendant carried the bags down the stairs, placed 

them in the backseat of his car, and then drove 

around Charlotte trying to find a place to dump 

Love’s body. Defendant . . . dumped the bag into the 

woods. The following day, defendant drove back to the 

location because he feared the orange bag would be 

noticeable from the road. Defendant stated that he 

removed the body from the orange trash bag and then 

moved the body into a shallow ravine. Defendant also 

admitted taking a roll of quarters from Love’s 

dresser. 

 Later on 13 March 1994, after defendant’s 

confession, defendant directed Rice and other 

investigators to the site where he had dumped Love’s 

body. Subsequently, Dr. Michael Sullivan, a forensic 

pathologist and medical examiner . . . went to . . . 

recover Love’s skeletal remains. Dr. Sullivan 

4 
performed an autopsy on those remains. . . . Dr. 

Sullivan determined that the cause of death was 

homicide by means of strangulation. 

Shawna Hawk Murder

 In February 1993, Shawna Hawk was living with her 

mother, Sylvia Denise Sumpter, in Charlotte. Hawk was 

a paralegal student at Central Piedmont Community 

College and worked at a Taco Bell restaurant . . . 

where defendant was her manager. On 19 February 1993, 

Sumpter arrived home . . . . Hawk’s car was not 

there, but Sumpter saw Hawk’s coat and purse in a 

closet. This seemed unusual because it was very cold 

outside, Hawk never went anywhere without her purse, 

and Sumpter had seen Hawk earlier in the day wearing 

the coat. Sumpter called Hawk’s boyfriend, Darryl 

Kirkpatrick, to ask if he had seen Hawk, but 

Kirkpatrick said he had not. 

 Sumpter then learned that Hawk was to have picked 

up her godson from daycare but had not done so. 

Sumpter looked through Hawk’s purse and noticed that 

her keys were not there and that some money was 

missing. . . . Kirkpatrick and Sumpter decided to file 

a missing person report and called the police. 

Subsequently, Kirkpatrick walked through the house 

looking in each room. He entered a bathroom 

downstairs and noticed the shower curtain outside the 

bathtub. When Kirkpatrick pulled the shower curtain 

back, he saw Hawk curled up and submerged in 

water . . . . Emergency personnel arrived, tried to 

resuscitate Hawk, and then transported her to the 

hospital, where she was pronounced dead. 

 On 20 February 1993, Dr. Sullivan performed an 

autopsy on Hawk’s body. . . . Based on his 

observations, Sullivan opined that the cause of Hawk’s 

death was ligature strangulation. 

 Defendant confessed that he stopped by Hawk’s 

home to see her and that they talked for a while. As 

defendant was leaving, Hawk gave him a hug. Defendant 

then told Hawk he wanted her to have sex with him. 

Defendant took Hawk to her bedroom, told her to remove 

her clothing, and told her to perform oral sex on him, 

which she did. Then, defendant performed oral sex on 

Hawk. The two then engaged in sexual intercourse. 

5 
Defendant admitted that Hawk was afraid and cried the 

whole time. Afterwards, defendant told Hawk to put her 

clothes on, and he took her into the bathroom. 

Defendant placed Hawk in a choke hold, with her head 

between his arms, until she passed out. Defendant 

then filled the bathtub with water and placed Hawk in 

it. Defendant also admitted taking fifty dollars from 

Hawk. 

Audrey Spain Murder

 On 23 June 1993, [Audrey] Spain was to report to 

work at 6:30 pm at a Taco Bell restaurant . . . . 

Spain did not show up for work. Mark Lawrence, 

Spain’s manager, thought it was unusual for Spain not 

to come to work, so he drove by Spain’s apartment that 

evening. Lawrence saw Spain’s car in the parking lot. 

Lawrence then called Spain and left a message on her 

answering machine. 

 The next morning, 24 June 1993, Lawrence rode by 

Spain’s apartment and again saw her car in the 

lot. . . . Spain did not show up for work that 

evening. . . . Lawrence called 911. Thereafter, 

officers periodically rode by the apartment and 

knocked on the door, but got no response. 

 On 25 June 1993, maintenance personnel from the 

apartment complex entered the apartment . . . and 

discovered Spain’s body on the bed. . . . 

 On 26 June 1993, Dr. Sullivan conducted an 

autopsy on Spain’s body . . . . Dr. Sullivan opined 

that the cause of death was strangulation. 

 Defendant confessed that he went to Spain’s house 

and that they smoked marijuana together. Defendant 

admitted that his motive for visiting Spain was 

robbery. He stated that he put Spain in a choke hold 

in her living room and inquired about the combination 

for the safe at her workplace, but she said she did 

not know the combination. Defendant also asked about 

money in her personal bank account, but she said she 

did not have any money . . . . 

 Defendant said he did not remember asking Spain 

to remove her clothes. Spain begged defendant not to 

hurt her, but defendant maintained the choke hold 

6 
until Spain passed out. Defendant then dragged Spain 

into her bedroom and had intercourse with her. 

Afterwards, defendant took Spain into the bathroom, 

where he put her into the shower to wash off any 

evidence. Defendant placed Spain into her bed and 

tied a T-shirt and bra around her neck. Before 

leaving, defendant took Spain’s keys and Visa credit 

card. He used the Visa card to purchase gas. 

Defendant returned to Spain’s apartment to make phone 

calls so it would seem as though she had not died on 

the day defendant killed her.

Valencia Jumper Murder

 In August 1993, Valencia Jumper was a senior at 

Johnson C. Smith University in Charlotte, studying 

political science. She also worked at Food Lion . . . 

and at Hecht’s . . . . On 9 August 1993, a friend of 

Jumper’s, Zachery Douglas, spoke with Jumper on the 

phone about meeting later that night. Subsequently, 

Douglas arrived at Jumper’s apartment in the early 

morning hours of 10 August 1993 and noticed smoke 

coming from her apartment . . . . 

 As firefighters arrived on the scene . . . 

firefighter Dennis Arney entered the kitchen and 

noticed that a burner on the stove had been left on. 

Based on examinations at the fire scene, the 

information provided by firefighters, and the observed 

pattern the fire traveled, the investigators believed 

the fire originated from a pot left burning on the 

stove. Firefighters found Jumper’s body in the 

bedroom of her apartment. 

 On 10 August 1993, Sullivan performed an autopsy 

on Jumper’s body. . . . [H]e found no soot in 

Jumper’s airway, indicating there was no significant 

inhalation of smoke during the fire. After learning 

there was no carbon monoxide in Jumper’s blood, Dr. 

Sullivan listed thermal burns as the cause of death. 

After defendant’s confession, Dr. Sullivan reexamined 

the Jumper autopsy and amended the cause of Jumper’s 

death. Dr. Sullivan testified that the cause of 

Jumper’s death was strangulation. 

 Defendant confessed to Jumper’s murder . . . . 

On the night in question, defendant stated that he 

stopped by Jumper’s apartment and that they talked for 

7 
a while and then defendant left. Defendant later 

returned to Jumper’s apartment and asked her to call 

McKnight because they had gotten into a fight. When 

Jumper reached toward the phone, defendant put her in 

a choke hold. Defendant told Jumper to go to the 

bedroom. Jumper begged defendant not to hurt her and 

stated she would do anything he wanted. Jumper 

removed her clothes. Defendant and Jumper engaged in 

oral sex and sexual intercourse. Afterwards, while 

Jumper was putting her clothes back on, defendant put 

a towel around her neck and choked her until she 

passed out. Defendant stated that Jumper started 

bleeding from the nose, so he kept the pressure on the 

towel for about five minutes until he felt no pulse. 

Then defendant wiped his fingerprints from certain 

areas of the apartment. Defendant went into the 

kitchen and noticed a bottle of rum, so he took the 

bottle to the bedroom and poured the rum on Jumper’s 

body, on the bed, and on the floor nearby. Defendant 

then went back into the kitchen, opened a can of 

beans, put the beans in a pot on the stove, and turned 

the stove on high. Defendant took the battery out of 

the smoke detector. Defendant went back into the 

bedroom, lit a match, and threw it on Jumper’s rumsoaked body before leaving the apartment. Defendant 

returned to the apartment twenty minutes later. When 

he saw smoke rushing out the door, he left and went 

home. Defendant admitted taking jewelry from Jumper’s 

body and pawning it in a local pawn shop.

Michelle Stinson Murder

 In September 1993, Michelle Stinson, age twenty, 

lived in an apartment in Charlotte, with her two young 

sons. On 15 September 1993, Stinson’s friend, James 

Mayes, stopped by her apartment to visit . . . . 

Mayes knocked on the front door, but no one answered. 

Mayes heard the children knocking on the window and 

telling him their mother was sleeping on the kitchen 

floor . . . . Mayes had turned to leave when the 

oldest child came out the back door and grabbed him. 

Mayes picked up the child and went back into the 

apartment through the back door. Mayes discovered 

Stinson lying on the kitchen floor with blood around 

her. Mayes picked up the phone but realized the cord 

had been cut or jerked out of the wall. Mayes took the 

8 
children and asked the neighbors to help him find a 

phone. He then called the police. 

 Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Stinson’s 

body on 16 September 1993. . . . Dr. Sullivan opined 

that the cause of Stinson’s death was stab wounds to 

the chest with strangulation as a contributing cause. 

 Defendant confessed that he stopped by Stinson’s 

apartment around 11:00 pm, with the intention of 

raping and murdering her. They talked for a while, 

and then defendant got ready to leave and they hugged. 

At that point, defendant told Stinson that he wanted 

to have sex with her and that he wanted her to remove 

her clothes. Stinson told defendant she was sick, but 

defendant did not believe her . . . . Defendant began 

to choke Stinson. Stinson then agreed to have sex 

with defendant and removed her clothes. Defendant 

told Stinson he wanted her to perform oral sex on him, 

but she stated she did not know how. Defendant 

responded, “well you’re about to learn.” Stinson then 

performed oral sex on defendant. After having sexual 

intercourse on the kitchen floor, defendant 

administered a choke hold until Stinson became 

unconscious. Defendant strangled Stinson with a towel 

he had retrieved from the bathroom. Stinson began to 

gasp for air, so defendant took a knife and stabbed 

her approximately four times. Defendant used a 

washcloth to wipe his fingerprints from a glass, the 

door, the phone, the wall, and the floor. Before 

defendant left the apartment, Stinson’s oldest son 

awoke and defendant told him to go back to bed. 

Defendant left through the back door, using a towel to 

avoid leaving fingerprints, and threw the knife and 

washcloth over a fence near the back of Stinson’s 

apartment.

Vanessa Mack Murder

 In February 1994, Vanessa Mack was living in an 

apartment in Charlotte with her two young daughters. 

She worked at Carolinas Medical Center. On 20 

February 1994, Barbara Rippy, the grandmother of 

Mack’s oldest daughter, went to Mack’s apartment to 

pick up Mack’s youngest daughter . . . . Rippy arrived 

at 6:00 am and went to the back door, but the door was 

ajar. Rippy called out, but Mack did not respond. As 

she entered, Rippy noticed Mack’s four-month-old 

9 
daughter lying on the couch, which she felt was 

unusual. Rippy entered the bedroom and saw Mack’s 

feet hanging off the side of the bed. . . . Rippy 

called 911. Rippy then picked up Mack’s daughter and 

went outside . . . . 

 Officer Jeffrey Bumgarner of the CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department found Mack lying on her 

bed. Bumgarner observed a towel around Mack’s neck 

and blood coming from her nose, ears, and the back of 

her head. Bumgarner also noticed a pocketbook, with 

its contents scattered on the bed. 

 Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Mack’s body 

on 21 February 1994. . . . Dr. Sullivan opined that 

the cause of Mack’s death was strangulation. 

 Defendant confessed that he had been in Mack’s 

neighborhood and had called to see if she was at home. 

When she answered, he hung up the phone. He then 

walked over to her apartment. Defendant admitted that 

his motives for going to see Mack were robbery, to 

support his cocaine addiction, and murder. Defendant 

stated that he tried to find a way to maneuver Mack 

into the position he needed in order to administer a 

choke hold, but she refused to give defendant a hug, 

so he asked for something to drink. When Mack turned 

her back, defendant pulled out a pillowcase he had 

brought with him and placed it around her neck. As 

Mack resisted, defendant put more pressure on the 

pillowcase and explained that this was a robbery. 

Defendant and Mack went into the bedroom, where 

defendant commanded Mack to give him all the money she 

had, including her . . . (ATM) card and . . . (PIN). 

After Mack gave defendant everything, he told her to 

remove her clothes, which she did. Defendant and Mack 

engaged in sexual intercourse. Afterwards, defendant 

told Mack to put her clothes back on. Defendant then 

tightened the pillowcase around Mack’s neck until she 

passed out. Defendant added another garment to keep 

the pillowcase from loosening. Defendant then checked 

on Mack’s baby and stayed until the baby went to 

sleep. . . . Later, defendant attempted to use the 

ATM card at several banks and discovered that the PIN 

given to him by Mack was not correct. 

10 
Betty Baucom Murder

 In March 1994, Betty Baucom lived in an apartment 

in Charlotte with her adopted daughter. On 9 March 

1994, Baucom, an assistant manager at the Bojangles’ 

restaurant . . . was scheduled to work, but she did 

not report to work. Baucom’s unit director, Jeffrey 

Ellis, called Baucom’s apartment several times but 

received no answer. . . . 

 The next morning, Ellis became increasingly 

worried because Baucom was again scheduled to work but 

did not report. Neither Baucom’s mother nor Baucom’s 

aunt had heard from Baucom. Ellis and another 

employee drove to Baucom’s apartment . . . . They 

knocked on the door and looked in the windows, and 

everything appeared normal . . . . Ellis and Baucom’s 

mother decided to contact the police department, and 

they identified Baucom as a missing person. 

 Officer Gregory Norwood of the CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department received a call on the 

morning of 10 March 1994 to respond to an apartment 

where a young woman had been found. She was not 

breathing . . . . Norwood discovered Baucom’s body 

lying facedown with a towel around her neck. . . . 

 Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Baucom’s 

body on 11 March 1994 . . . . He testified that the 

injuries were consistent with a struggle. Dr. 

Sullivan opined that the cause of Baucom’s death was 

strangulation. 

 Defendant confessed that he went to Baucom’s 

apartment and told her he needed to use the phone. 

Baucom let defendant into her apartment. They talked 

for a while. As defendant was getting ready to leave, 

he placed a choke hold on Baucom, and she fell to the 

floor. Defendant told her this was a robbery and 

demanded the alarm code, keys, and combination to the 

safe for the Bojangles’ restaurant . . . . Baucom was 

very upset, and she took approximately thirty minutes 

to produce the safe’s combination. Defendant then 

released the choke hold. Defendant remembered Baucom 

asking, “Why did you do that to me?” Defendant 

responded that he was a sick person and that he had 

hurt many people. Baucom then embraced defendant, 

said that she forgave him, and told him he needed 

11 
help. Defendant became enraged and grabbed Baucom by 

the throat, slammed her to the floor, and then 

scuffled with her. Defendant got Baucom to her feet 

and took her into the bedroom, where he told her to 

remove her clothes . . . . Defendant then told Baucom 

he wanted her to perform oral sex on him. She grabbed 

his penis and started pulling and scratching. 

Defendant and Baucom began to scuffle again . . . . 

Defendant was able to tighten the towel around 

Baucom’s neck until she was nearly unconscious. At 

this point, Baucom removed her clothes and engaged in 

sexual intercourse with defendant. Afterwards, 

defendant told Baucom to put her clothes back on. He 

then placed a towel around her neck and asked her if 

she had any money. Baucom gave defendant the money in 

her purse, and he took a gold chain from around her 

neck. 

 After strangling Baucom to death, defendant took 

her television and left in her car. Defendant sold the 

television for drugs. He then returned to Baucom’s 

apartment to make sure Baucom was dead and to take her 

VCR. While in Baucom’s apartment, defendant used a 

wet cloth to wipe off the phone, door knobs, and the 

wall on which some of the struggle took place. 

Defendant used money from Baucom’s purse, the gold 

chain, and the VCR to purchase more drugs. . . . 

Defendant then left [her] car in a parking lot, 

because he thought police were following him. 

Defendant stated that he wiped the interior and most 

of the exterior of the car, but forgot to wipe the 

trunk lid.

Brandi Henderson Murder

 In March 1994, Brandi Henderson was living in an 

apartment with her boyfriend, Verness Lamar Woods, and 

their ten-month-old son, T.W. On 9 March 1994, Woods 

was at the apartment taking care of T.W. because 

Henderson had a doctor’s appointment. As Henderson 

was leaving, defendant went to the apartment to say he 

was leaving town. Defendant stayed for only a few 

minutes and then left. Henderson returned during the 

afternoon . . . . When Woods left, Henderson and T.W. 

were alone in the apartment . . . . Woods returned to 

the apartment around midnight to find the front door 

unlocked, items scattered about the living room, and 

12 
the stereo missing. Woods then went through the 

apartment. He first came to T.W.’s bedroom where he 

turned on the light and saw T.W. sitting on the bed 

gasping for air with something white coming out of his 

mouth and a pair of shorts around his neck. Woods 

immediately ran to T.W. to remove the shorts . . . . 

Woods then realized that Henderson was lying facedown 

on the bed. Woods rolled her onto her back and saw 

that towels were tied around her neck and that her 

face was blue. Woods removed the two towels from 

Henderson’s neck and then called 911. He moved 

Henderson’s body from the bed to the floor and began 

administering CPR pursuant to instructions from the 

911 operator. When police officers arrived, it was 

obvious Henderson was dead. T.W. was taken to the 

hospital. 

 . . . Dr. Tom Brewer examined T.W. in the 

emergency room. Dr. Brewer testified that T.W. was 

awake, breathing, and had stable vital signs. 

However, his failure to pull away when struck with a 

needle was some evidence that he was not acting 

normally . . . . Dr. Brewer testified that he 

believed the ligature and T.W.’s injuries caused great 

pain and suffering. 

 Dr. Sullivan performed an autopsy on Henderson’s 

body on 10 March 1994. . . . Dr. Sullivan opined that 

the cause of death was strangulation. 

 Defendant confessed that he planned to murder 

Henderson on Tuesday morning, but when he arrived at 

the apartment, Woods was present. Defendant left the 

apartment, found Baucom’s apartment in the same 

apartment complex, and murdered Baucom. He returned 

to Henderson’s apartment the same night when he knew 

Woods would be at work. . . . Henderson and defendant 

talked for a while, and then defendant asked for 

something to drink. When Henderson reached into the 

cabinet, defendant choked her and told her to go into 

the bedroom. Henderson begged defendant to allow her 

to hold her son, but he said, “I don’t know if that 

would be a good idea for what we’re about to do.” 

Defendant told her this was also going to be a robbery 

and demanded money. Henderson gave defendant . . . 

approximately twenty dollars worth of coins and said 

there was no other money in the house. Defendant also 

told Henderson he would be taking the television and 

13 
stereo when he left. Defendant then told Henderson to 

remove her clothes, which she did. Henderson grabbed 

her son, laid him across her chest, and turned his 

head away so that he could not see what was going on. 

Defendant and Henderson started to have sexual 

intercourse in Henderson’s bedroom but moved to T.W.’s 

bedroom so he would not cry. Once in T.W.’s room, 

defendant and Henderson continued to have sexual 

intercourse, with T.W. lying across Henderson’s chest. 

Afterwards, defendant told Henderson to put her 

clothes back on . . . . Defendant went into the 

bathroom, got a towel, and wiped off everything. 

Thereafter, defendant folded the towel, put it around 

Henderson’s neck, and strangled her to death. 

Henderson’s body fell to the floor. Defendant picked 

up Henderson’s body and put it onto T.W.’s bed. He 

also tied the towel in a knot around her neck. T.W. 

started crying, so defendant gave him a 

pacifier. . . . Defendant then took another towel 

from the bathroom and tied it tight around T.W.’s neck 

so it would be difficult for him to breathe and so he 

would stop crying. T.W. stopped crying and laid down 

next to his mother’s body. Defendant then ran into 

the living room, disconnected the stereo, and loaded 

it into Baucom’s car. Defendant also took a 

television . . . . Defendant sold the television and 

stereo for $175.000 which he used to purchase crack 

cocaine.

Deborah Slaughter Murder

 In March 1994, Deborah Slaughter lived alone in 

an apartment in Charlotte. On 12 March 1994, 

Slaughter’s mother, Lovey Slaughter (Lovey), went to 

Slaughter’s apartment . . . . Lovey had a key to the 

apartment . . . . When Lovey arrived, she knocked on 

the door and got no response. She put the key into 

the lock and discovered the door was not locked. As 

Lovey walked through the door, she saw Slaughter’s 

body lying on the floor . . . . 

 Officer Ronnie Chambers of the CharlotteMecklenburg Police Department entered Slaughter’s 

apartment and found a purse with its contents 

scattered on the floor. Chambers then noticed 

Slaughter’s body lying on the floor faceup. There was 

white fabric in Slaughter’s mouth and a towel around 

14 
her neck. Chambers also observed several puncture 

wounds in Slaughter’s chest. 

 On 14 March 1994, Dr. Sullivan performed an 

autopsy on Slaughter’s body . . . . Dr. Sullivan 

opined that Slaughter’s death was caused by multiple 

stab wounds, with strangulation as a contributing 

factor in the death. 

 Defendant confessed that he went to Slaughter’s 

apartment to use drugs with her. . . . Defendant 

asked Slaughter to get him something to drink. As 

Slaughter turned around, defendant put a towel he 

brought with him around Slaughter’s neck and tightened 

it. Slaughter fell to her knees. Defendant stated 

that Slaughter then realized that defendant was the 

one who had killed two other girls in nearby 

apartments. Defendant told Slaughter to remove her 

clothes and perform oral sex on him. Defendant 

remembered Slaughter saying, “I don’t do that; you 

might as well go ahead and kill me.” Defendant 

tightened the towel and asked if she wanted to change 

her mind. Slaughter stated that she would not 

perform oral sex on defendant. Defendant engaged in 

sexual intercourse with Slaughter. Afterwards, 

defendant told Slaughter to put her clothes on. 

Defendant, knowing Slaughter carried a knife in her 

purse at all times, asked Slaughter to empty the 

contents of her purse . . . . Defendant kicked the 

knife away and then told Slaughter to open the wallet 

and give him everything in it. As Slaughter did this, 

defendant grabbed the knife. . . . Slaughter hit 

defendant and screamed for the police. Defendant then 

tightened the towel around Slaughter’s neck until she 

fell to the floor and started kicking. Defendant 

tightened the towel more and tried to sit on top of 

Slaughter’s legs to keep Slaughter from alerting the 

neighbors downstairs. Defendant went to the bathroom 

to retrieve another towel, which he tied with the 

first around Slaughter’s neck. Defendant stabbed 

Slaughter with the knife approximately twenty times 

in the abdomen. Defendant then washed the knife clean 

and wiped his fingerprints from it . . . . 

State v. Wallace, 528 S.E.2d 326, 331-40 (N.C. 2000). 

15 
B. 

 On the evening of March 12, 1994, two CharlotteMecklenburg police officers arrested Wallace on an outstanding 

larceny warrant. Wallace was a suspect in some of the murders 

described above at the time of his arrest. Rather than take him 

to the Intake Center, where arrestees on a single charge were 

typically taken, the officers took Wallace to the Law 

Enforcement Center for questioning about the murders. 

Investigators Mark Corwin and Darrell Price began questioning 

Wallace at around 6:43 p.m. To establish a rapport with 

Wallace, Corwin and Price asked him about his background, 

sports, and his military and employment history. The trial 

court found that the investigators did not elicit incriminating 

information during this initial period of questioning. Wallace 

voluntarily raised his drug addiction and his acquaintance with 

victims Brandi Henderson and Betty Baucom. The investigators 

provided Wallace with regular breaks, food, and drink during 

this first phase of questioning. Corwin testified that Wallace 

was held for three hours and fifteen minutes before being given 

Miranda warnings, though Wallace was not questioned continuously 

during this period due to several breaks. Corwin stated that 

the investigators waited to advise Wallace of his rights because 

they wanted to “establish[] a good enough rapport with [Wallace] 

so that he would continue to cooperate;” they did not “want to 

16 
throw up a roadblock in [the] interview process by mentioning 

attorneys and lawyers and remaining silent.” J.A. 1374, 1376. 

Corwin acknowledged, however, that “[o]nce we plan to start the 

interrogation process we have to advise them.” J.A. 1376. 

 At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 12, Corwin and 

Price read Wallace his Miranda rights. Corwin testified that 

Price read the rights from a standard form. Wallace indicated 

that he understood each right and initialed the form. Corwin 

also stated that Wallace read the rights aloud without 

difficulty and never indicated that he had trouble understanding 

them or needed further explanation. Price testified that 

Wallace was alert both before and after he signed the waiver. 

After the rights advisement and waiver, Corwin and Price asked 

Wallace more specific questions about his relationship with the 

murder victims. 

 Investigator Price left the room and Investigator C.E. 

Boothe entered. Boothe asked Wallace if he was involved in the 

deaths of Betty Baucom and Deborah Slaughter. Wallace responded 

that he knew the women but was not involved in their deaths. 

Boothe then told Wallace that fingerprints taken from Baucom’s 

car matched Wallace’s fingerprints. Boothe testified that 

Wallace did not respond to this statement, but that he became 

very emotional and formed tears when shown a prior arrest 

photograph of himself. Wallace told Boothe that he felt he was 

17 
being accused of murdering women. Boothe said that Wallace then 

discussed his drug addiction and his problems with his 

girlfriend, Sadie McKnight. As Wallace continued to cry, Boothe 

told Wallace he (Boothe) “felt he knew who [Wallace] needed to 

talk to.” J.A. 1554. Boothe was referring to “Jesus or to the 

Lord.” Id. Boothe then left the room to speak with Corwin and 

Price. 

 At around 5:07 a.m. on March 13, Investigator Tony 

Rice entered Wallace’s interview room. He also discussed 

Wallace’s drug addiction and relationship with McKnight. Rice 

asked if he could say a prayer. After Wallace agreed, Rice held 

Wallace’s hand and asked “our heavenly father” to “lead us, 

guide us, and direct us as we discuss this most serious issue,” 

and to “forgive us of our sins and cleanse us through the blood 

of Jesus.” J.A. 1855. Rice testified that it was not unusual 

for him to pray with arrestees during interrogations and that he 

made up this particular prayer. Rice said that Wallace cried 

after the prayer, breathed a “sigh of relief,” and wrote down 

the names of all his victims. J.A. 1640. According to Rice, 

the prayer’s purpose was to prompt Wallace to “start telling the 

truth” but not to “confess.” J.A. 1886. 

 After Wallace made his list, investigators asked if 

they could record his statements, and Wallace agreed. The 

recording started around 5:56 a.m., and Wallace gave detailed 

18 
confessions to the nine murders. Wallace took a break to sleep 

at around 7:30 a.m., and during the break the police went to a 

magistrate and obtained murder warrants. Afterwards, Wallace 

accompanied the police on a van ride to show them the locations 

of the bodies of Caroline Love and another woman, Sharon Nance.1 

In his statements recorded at the Law Enforcement Center and on 

the van ride, Wallace gave detailed confessions to each murder 

and repeatedly indicated that he had been advised of his rights 

but still wished to talk with the police. Wallace said that he 

had not been threatened or coerced and that he had “gotten the 

truth off . . . . Now these people’s families will know . . . . 

I’m grateful that it’s over now and I don’t have to live with it 

anymore.” J.A. 2181, 2189. 

 The trial court admitted the confessions, finding no 

evidence that Wallace was coerced or that he had ever expressed 

a desire to stop talking or speak with a lawyer. The court also 

found that the officers did not elicit any incriminating 

information prior to administering Miranda warnings. Although 

the trial court observed that at some point during the 

interrogation, Wallace requested to see his girlfriend and hold 

his daughter, the court concluded that the police did not 

 1

 The state chose not to prosecute the Sharon Nance murder 

with the nine others. Wallace v. Polk, No. 3:05cv464-C, 2008 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36679, at *25 n.2 (W.D.N.C. May 5, 2008). 

19 
interpret this request as a condition for giving a statement. 

Wallace said on tape that he did not view the arrangement of a 

final moment with his girlfriend as a mechanism to obtain a 

statement. He went on to say that he had “wanted to tell the 

story for a long time,” that if he had not “told [the police] 

. . . the killing would have continued and probably I would have 

killed myself as well.” J.A. 2183. 

C.

 On March 13, 1994, the day after Wallace’s arrest, the 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department held a press conference. 

Deputy Chief Jack Boger announced that the police “believe[d] 

they ha[d] the man responsible” for several murders and that the 

“community should feel some sense of relief.” J.A. 693. Boger 

also confirmed that Wallace had led police to the remains of 

Caroline Love. Deputy Chief Larry Snider told reporters at the 

press conference that Wallace was cooperating with the 

investigation. Snider also said that Wallace was a suspect in 

the murders of three other women. (There was no physical 

evidence linking Wallace to those murders, and he was never 

charged with them.) 

 Subsequent press coverage of Wallace’s arrest was 

extensive. It included a typical serial killer profile. Some 

of the press described past criminal investigations of Wallace, 

while other articles described the shocked reactions of those 

20 
who knew Wallace and considered him an “ordinary person.” J.A. 

514. Much of the press stemmed from criticism of the CharlotteMecklenburg police for failing to apprehend Wallace sooner given 

the similarity of the crimes, their proximity to one another, 

Wallace’s employment connection to several of the victims, and 

his past sex-crime charges. Commentators suggested that the 

police did not aggressively pursue an investigation because the 

victims were African American. The police responded by 

describing Wallace as someone who had “been around policemen 

enough to know how they worked” and who took “great pains” to 

remove physical evidence from crime scenes. J.A. 535. Two 

headlines labeled Wallace a “clever suspect” and a “charmer.” 

J.A. 535, 540. Some of the statements conveyed the police 

department’s conviction that Wallace was linked to several of 

the murders based on physical evidence recovered at the scenes. 

 On August 9, 1994, Wallace moved for a change of venue 

on the grounds that the extensive pretrial publicity surrounding 

his case presumptively rendered prospective jurors prejudiced 

against him. At the motion hearing in January 1995, Chief Boger 

confirmed that many of the police officers’ press statements 

were in response to public criticism. Boger said that some of 

the information released to combat criticism would otherwise 

have remained unavailable to the public until trial. Sergeant 

Rick Sanders testified that he was concerned about whether these 

21 
press statements might taint the trial and that the district 

attorney’s office discouraged further press conferences. 

Defense counsel offered the testimony of criminal justice 

professor Dr. Robert M. Bohm, who concluded from a poll he 

designed that a majority of the population from which the jury 

would be drawn had already deemed Wallace guilty. 

 In denying the motion to change venue in January 1995, 

the trial court acknowledged that Wallace “received widespread, 

and at times inflammatory coverage from the news media in 

Mecklenburg County and surrounding counties.” J.A. 1051. The 

court found that Wallace was the subject of sixty-four stories 

in the Charlotte Observer between March 13, 1994, and May 10, 

1994, and that local television stations aired roughly 174 

stories during the same period. Although some of the coverage 

was inflammatory and misleading, the court concluded that some 

of it was favorable to Wallace and much of it was factual and 

informative rather than inflammatory. The court characterized 

the statements of senior officers as “motivated in part [by] a 

desire to provide information to allay public fears, to quiet 

rumors, and to explain the conduct of the police department.” 

J.A. 1054. The court found “no evidence that any police 

representative knowingly released false information, or 

information known to be misleading.” J.A. 1054. Finally, the 

court concluded that Dr. Bohm’s survey was not probative of 

22 
prejudice. Because Mecklenburg County was large (a voting-age 

population of 350,000) and diverse, the court found it more 

likely that prospective jurors would base their conclusions on 

trial evidence than pretrial publicity. The court determined 

that voir dire examination was the most efficient means of 

remedying any prejudice of pretrial publicity. 

 During voir dire in October 1996, nine of Wallace’s 

twelve jurors admitted exposure to pretrial publicity about the 

case. All nine stated that their exposure was limited to the 

time period between the murders and Wallace’s arrest. Of the 

nine, three remembered nothing or were not asked what they 

remembered; the other six remembered only a few details, such as 

Wallace’s name or the fact that some of the victims worked at 

restaurants. All nine avowed to decide the case solely on the 

evidence at trial. 

D. 

 The jury found Wallace guilty of the nine murders and 

related crimes and recommended death sentences, which the trial 

court imposed. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed his 

convictions and death sentences on direct appeal. The supreme 

court rejected Wallace’s arguments that the denied motion to 

change venue and the admission of his confessions violated his 

constitutional rights. In November 2001 Wallace filed a motion 

for appropriate relief (MAR) in the Superior Court of 

23 
Mecklenburg County. After a three-day evidentiary hearing in 

August 2004, the MAR court denied Wallace’s claims. Wallace did 

not raise the pretrial publicity and Miranda claims before the 

MAR court, though he did raise these claims on direct appeal to 

the North Carolina Supreme Court in 2000. After the MAR court 

denied relief, the North Carolina Supreme Court denied his 

petition for certiorari on November 5, 2005. Wallace petitioned 

for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District Court of 

North Carolina on November 8, 2005. The district court rejected 

all of his claims. We granted a certificate of appealability on 

the pretrial publicity and involuntary confession claims. 

Wallace appeals. 

II. 

 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, a 

federal court exercising collateral review of criminal claims 

adjudicated on the merits in state courts accords great 

deference to a state court’s legal conclusions and factual 

findings. We must deny habeas relief unless the state 

adjudication: 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

24 
 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court’s decision is contrary to 

clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a 

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a 

question of law” or “confronts facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and 

arrives at a result opposite” to the Supreme Court’s. Williams 

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court unreasonably 

applies federal law when it “correctly identifies the governing 

legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a 

particular . . . case.” Id. at 407-08. A state court also 

unreasonably applies federal law when it “applies a precedent in 

a context different from the one in which the precedent was 

decided and one to which extension of the legal principle of the 

precedent is not reasonable,” or when it “fails to apply the 

principle of a precedent in a context where such failure is 

unreasonable.” Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 355 (4th Cir. 

2006) (internal citations omitted). Further, a state court’s 

factual findings are presumed correct and may be rebutted only 

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We 

review de novo a district court’s application of these 

principles. Robinson, 438 F.3d at 354. 

25 
 Wallace contends that the North Carolina state court 

reached decisions that were contrary to, and an unreasonable 

application of, federal law when it determined that (1) denying 

his motion to change venue based on pretrial publicity did not 

deprive him of an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, and 

(2) his confessions were voluntary and not obtained amidst 

circumstances calculated to undermine his free will. 

A. 

 Wallace argues that the pretrial publicity surrounding 

his arrest was so widespread and inflammatory that a jury drawn 

from the community should have been presumed partial regardless 

of responses given during voir dire. Supreme Court precedent 

sets a high bar for presumed prejudice on the basis of pretrial 

publicity. For a jury to be presumed partial by pretrial 

publicity, the publicity must involve coverage that is almost 

irrefutably incriminating and proximate in time to the trial, or 

the publicity must disturb the trial proceedings. The publicity 

must rise to a level that renders court proceedings “a hollow 

formality.” Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963). 

 In Rideau residents of a town with a population of 

150,000 were repeatedly exposed to a film clip of a defendant 

personally confessing to murder. Id. at 724. The Supreme Court 

presumed juror prejudice based on the spectacle of a broadcast 

confession by the defendant himself. Id. at 726. The clip was 

26 
shown two months before the defendant’s trial. Id. The Court 

also found presumed prejudice in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 

725 (1961), a case in which the defendant was the subject of a 

“barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and 

pictures” six months before his trial. The coverage reported 

that the defendant confessed to six murders and offered to plead 

guilty to avoid the death penalty. Id. at 725-26. The 

publicity also characterized the defendant as “remorseless and 

without conscience.” Id. at 726. The unabated publicity 

convinced the Court that jurors’ “statement[s] of impartiality 

[during voir dire] [could] be given little weight.” Id. at 728. 

 Other Supreme Court decisions indicate that jurors may 

be presumed prejudiced by publicity that infects the actual 

trial proceedings. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535-36 

(1965), the Court found presumed prejudice in a case of national 

notoriety in which the press attended and televised pretrial 

hearings, undermining the courtroom’s atmosphere of decorum with 

obtrusive cables, wires, and microphones. Similarly, in 

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court found 

presumed prejudice in the nationally known murder trial of Sam 

Sheppard. Not only was there pervasive publicity from the 

outset characterizing Sheppard as the murderer, but the press 

took on the air of theater. Reporters broadcasted a staged 

inquest presided over by the coroner and prosecutor and attended 

27 
by hundreds of spectators. Id. at 339. At trial the press was 

a constant presence inside and outside the courtroom. Jurors’ 

photographs were published. Id. at 345. The jury visited the 

murder scene in the presence of hundreds of reporters. The jury 

was not sequestered and was only admonished to avoid press 

coverage during the trial. Id. at 347, 353. 

 When pretrial publicity does not reach an amplitude 

that makes trial “a hollow formality,” voir dire examination is 

the trial court’s metric of juror partiality. Murphy v. 

Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). If voir dire “indicates no such 

hostility to [a defendant] by the jurors . . . as to suggest a 

partiality that could not be laid aside,” then pretrial 

publicity has not deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id.

at 800. Jurors are not expected to be “totally ignorant of the 

facts and issues involved,” and even a juror’s preconceived 

conclusion on guilt will not alone rebut the presumption of 

impartiality if the trial court is satisfied that the juror “can 

lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based 

on the evidence presented in court.” Id. (citing Irvin, 366 

U.S. at 723). Additionally, the Supreme Court has noted the 

distinction between “mere familiarity with [a defendant] or his 

past and an actual predisposition against him,” and between 

“largely factual publicity from that which is invidious or 

inflammatory.” Id. at 801 n.4. 

28 
 Wallace argues that the state court did not address 

his motion to change venue under the Supreme Court’s precedent 

governing presumed prejudice, but instead went straight to 

actual prejudice by discussing voir dire. Although the court 

did not explicitly address Rideau, Irvin, Estes, or Sheppard in 

its ruling, a “state court’s disposition of a claim need not 

include extended analysis to qualify as an ‘adjudication on the 

merits’ under section 2254(d).” Walker v. True, 401 F.3d 574, 

579 n.1 (4th Cir. 2005). The record indicates that the state 

court reasonably applied the Supreme Court’s preference for voir 

dire as the mitigating tool of pretrial publicity after 

implicitly finding that Wallace’s pretrial publicity did not 

meet the high bar required for presumed juror prejudice. After 

finding that the publicity was more factual than inflammatory, a 

distinction that the Supreme Court recognizes, Murphy, 421 U.S. 

at 801 n.4, the trial court went on to note that “jurors’ 

responses to the questions on Voir Dire are the best evidence of 

whether pretrial publicity was inflammatory or prejudicial.” 

J.A. 1055. The court concluded its ruling by noting Wallace’s 

“right to renew the motion, because of subsequent events or 

because of information elicited during Voir Dire.” J.A. 1056. 

This suggests the state court understood that further publicity 

shortly before jury selection might create presumed prejudice. 

29 
 The state court could reasonably conclude that the 

pretrial publicity did not make Wallace’s trial a hollow 

formality. In a case involving nine brutal, similar murders in 

a relatively short time span in the same geographic area, it 

would be a tall order to assemble a jury that had heard nothing 

about the case. Of course, the high-profile nature of Wallace’s 

case gave the trial court reason to consider his motion for 

changed venue even more carefully, and we are satisfied that the 

court did so. 

 Most importantly, the time gap between the bulk of the 

publicity and the trial was substantially longer in Wallace’s 

case than in Rideau. Wallace’s trial was nearly two years after 

the surge of publicity, whereas Rideau’s trial occurred less 

than two months after his broadcast confession. When it denied 

Wallace’s motion to change venue at the hearing in January 1995, 

the state court could have reasonably concluded that the 

prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity would dissipate by the 

time jury selection would begin in October 1996.2 Additionally, 

 2

 The North Carolina Supreme Court observed that although 

the trial court referenced the passage of time in its findings 

of fact, it did not explicitly rely on this rationale in denying 

the motion. State v. Wallace, 528 S.E.2d 326, 345 (N.C. 2000). 

We agree with the supreme court, however, that the trial court 

factored time into its conclusion as part of the “totality of 

the circumstances.” J.A. 1056. In rejecting the probative 

value of Dr. Bohm’s poll, the trial court explained that the 

“passage of time and the publicity or lack thereof after the 

(Continued) 

30 
prospective jurors in Wallace’s case, unlike those in Rideau, 

were not presented with Wallace’s taped confession in news 

broadcasts. 

 We also conclude that the state court did not make an 

unreasonable determination of the facts when it concluded that 

most of Wallace’s pretrial publicity was factual, not 

inflammatory. We must presume this factual finding correct, 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and Wallace has failed to rebut it by clear 

and convincing evidence. Although Wallace’s arrest was followed 

by some provocative and conclusory press – such as the serial 

killer profile and the portrayal of Wallace as a clever suspect 

who destroyed evidence – we agree that most of the coverage was 

factual. Much of it focused on the victims and the family and 

friends who mourned them. Although the coverage of Wallace’s 

prior arrests was certainly unfavorable, it was also factual. 

And even if Wallace was not charged with some of the crimes 

mentioned, the fact that police believed that he was connected 

to the crimes is not necessarily inflammatory. 

 While we do not discount the prejudicial effects of 

hasty and confident statements made by a police department 

facing public criticism, we also cannot discount the right of 

 

pole [sic] was taken, could amelierate [sic] or exacerbate the 

responses to the questions . . . .” J.A. 1055. 

31 
the department to communicate information to the public. Nor 

can we expect the press to discriminate between information that 

would be admissible and inadmissible at trial. In sum, the 

state court reasonably found that the pretrial publicity would 

not make Wallace’s trial a hollow formality and that voir dire 

would provide the best indicia of prejudice. Unlike the 

prospective jurors in Rideau and Irvin, Wallace’s jury pool did 

not encounter almost irrefutably incriminating information – 

such as a taped confession or a promised guilty plea – shortly 

before trial. Nor is there any indication that the publicity 

infected the trial itself as in Sheppard and Estes. 

B. 

 Wallace’s next claim is that the state court’s 

admission of his confessions was contrary to, and an 

unreasonable application of, federal law. The investigators’ 

delayed administration of Miranda warnings, Wallace argues, was 

a coercive tactic calculated to undermine his free will and 

render his confessions involuntary under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. 

 Wallace argues that the applicable Supreme Court 

precedent for this claim is Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 

(2004), rather than Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 

Although Seibert was decided after Wallace’s conviction became 

final, Wallace argues that the case did not announce a new rule 

32 
of constitutional law, but was rather a necessary consequence of 

Elstad. We need not decide this question because under either 

case, the state court reasonably applied the law to admit 

Wallace’s confessions. Both cases involved suspects giving 

incriminating statements before being advised of their Miranda

rights. Yet the state court here found that the police did not 

elicit incriminating information during the pre-warning period 

of questioning. Therefore, the question is whether the state 

court reasonably found under the totality of the circumstances 

that Wallace’s subsequent confessions were voluntary. Moran v. 

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 

 In Elstad the Supreme Court held that the failure to 

give Miranda warnings until after a suspect has given an 

incriminating statement does not necessarily render post-warning 

confessions inadmissible, provided that the post-warning 

statements are voluntary. 470 U.S. at 312. The Court 

underscored the “vast difference between the direct consequences 

flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence or 

other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect’s will 

and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a ‘guilty 

secret’ freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive 

question.” Id. Elstad voluntarily made an incriminating 

statement before police advised him of his rights. Id. at 315. 

The Court refused to extend Miranda to hold that “a simple 

33 
failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by ‘any’ 

actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine 

the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the 

investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed 

waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.” Id. at 

309. 

 In Seibert the Court addressed the consequences of a 

deliberate rather than inadvertent delay of Miranda warnings. A 

plurality held that when the delayed administration of Miranda

warnings is deliberate and elicits a confession, it is unlikely 

that subsequent warnings serve their purpose because suspects 

presumably conclude that the pre-warning statement is admissible 

regardless. 542 U.S. at 613. In concurrence, Justice Kennedy 

proposed that post-warning statements given after a deliberate 

delay should be excluded unless police employ curative measures, 

such as an additional warning explaining that the pre-warning 

statement is likely inadmissible. Id. at 622. Because no 

rationale in Seibert garnered a majority, and Justice Kennedy 

concurred on the narrowest grounds, his opinion may be treated 

as the Court’s holding. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 

193 (1977). 

 Both Elstad and Seibert focus on warnings given after 

police have already elicited an admission. The state court 

found that investigators Corwin and Price did not ask any 

34 
questions designed to elicit an incriminating response before 

administering warnings. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 

291, 300-01 (1980) (defining “interrogation” for Miranda

purposes as not only “express questioning,” but “words or 

actions on the part of police . . . that the police should know 

are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”). 

Wallace maintains that his statements regarding his drug abuse 

and acquaintance with Henderson and Baucom were incriminating 

because they were links in a chain of evidence against him, and 

that the police exploited these statements by immediately asking 

for more detail about Wallace’s connection to the victims after 

they gave him the Miranda warnings. The case that Wallace cites 

to support this argument, Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) is 

inapplicable. Reiner addressed the reasonableness of witnesses’ 

perceptions that their testimony is incriminating for the 

purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination. Id. at 20. The Court held that the privilege 

extends to answers “which would furnish a link in the chain of 

evidence needed to prosecute.” Id. Reiner thus speaks to what 

makes a statement sufficiently incriminating to allow a witness 

to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege; it does not define what 

constitutes interrogation for Miranda purposes. Interrogation 

is defined by police questioning and conduct designed to elicit 

35 
an incriminating response, not by a suspect’s belief as to what 

statements are incriminating. 

 Because Miranda warnings are not required unless there is 

both custody and interrogation, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966), 

Wallace’s argument that his post-warning suppression should have 

been suppressed must rest on the voluntariness of his waiver of 

his Miranda rights. A voluntary waiver is one that was “the 

product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 

intimidation, coercion, or deception” and was “made with full 

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and 

the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran, 475 

U.S. at 421. “Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances’ 

surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice 

and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly 

conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.” Id.

 Wallace argues that under Elstad the delayed administration 

of Miranda warnings was a circumstance calculated to undermine 

his free will and that it rendered his subsequent confession 

involuntary. In Wallace’s case, however, the state court’s 

finding of voluntariness despite the delay was not contrary to, 

nor an unreasonable application of, federal law. After properly 

finding that the police did not ask questions designed to elicit 

an incriminating response prior to giving the warnings (and that 

Miranda therefore did not apply to Wallace’s initial phase of 

36 
questioning), the state court properly applied federal law by 

assessing the voluntariness of his waiver under the totality of 

the circumstances. 

 Although the state court found that the pre-warning 

questioning of Wallace was not interrogation, it properly 

considered delay as a circumstance bearing on the voluntariness 

of Wallace’s post-warning waiver. Voluntariness factors include 

“both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 

interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 

(1973). The court found that the pre-warning period of 

questioning was not continuous because Wallace had regular 

breaks to access food, drink, and the restroom. There were no 

indications that Wallace was sleep-deprived or under the 

influence of any impairing substance during this time. 

Investigators Price and Corwin testified that Wallace read and 

initialed the Miranda form with comprehension and without 

hesitation, and that Wallace told them he had been read Miranda

rights before. The state court found that the police did not 

ask specific questions regarding Wallace’s relationship with the 

victims until after they gave the warnings. Wallace was allowed 

to sleep after his first detailed confession and before he 

accompanied police on the van ride, where he again waived his 

rights. The state court also found that Wallace did not view 

37 
his request to see his girlfriend and daughter as a condition 

for giving statements. 

 Given these factual findings, which Wallace did not 

rebut with clear and convincing evidence, we cannot say that the 

state court unreasonably found Wallace’s confessions voluntary 

despite the delay. Although the police clearly hoped that the 

pre-warning rapport they established with Wallace would continue 

after the warnings, federal law countenances this strategy. The 

Elstad Court noted that the Fifth Amendment is not “concerned 

with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from 

sources other than official coercion.” 470 U.S. at 304-05. The 

state court reasonably found that the delay did not amount to 

official coercion. 

 We also decline to hold that the state court 

unreasonably found that Investigator Rice’s prayer did not 

render Wallace’s confessions involuntary. The prayer was given 

after Wallace had been advised of his Miranda rights. The state 

court found that Wallace agreed to the prayer, expressed relief 

afterwards, and then gave detailed confessions to each murder. 

As with the delayed administration of warnings, the state court 

could reasonably find that the prayer was more in the nature of 

“moral pressure” than “official coercion.” Elstad at 305. 

38 
39 

III. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the state 

court’s decisions on Wallace’s pretrial publicity and confession 

claims were not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the district 

court’s order dismissing Wallace’s petition for writ of habeas 

corpus is 

AFFIRMED.