Opinion filed July 28, 2022

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-22-00070-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.R., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 220th District Court

Comanche County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DV17119

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental rights of Appellant to 

one of his children. Because the trial court rendered judgment against Appellant 

before he had an opportunity to present any evidence, we reverse and remand.

Issues Presented

Appellant, who represents himself in this appeal, presents four points of error 

in his brief: (1) a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) a challenge to the 

admission of an exhibit, (3) a challenge to the testimony of a deputy sheriff, and (4) a 

challenge to the trial court’s rendition of judgment before Appellant had a chance to 

present any evidence. Appellee, A.C.R.’s mother, asserts that Appellant has waived 
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his issues in this court because Appellant’s brief “is deficient in its entirety as to all 

four points of error.” We do not agree with the mother’s contention, and we note 

that the briefing rules are to be construed liberally. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9. While 

Appellant’s brief is not a model brief, we are able to discern the issues presented in

his brief and decide the case. See id.

Background Facts

The record shows that, after Appellant was convicted of the offense of 

indecency with a child by sexual contact and was sentenced to imprisonment for 

twenty years, A.C.R.’s mother filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s rights to 

A.C.R. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(L)(iv), (b)(1)(Q) (West 2022).

The final hearing on termination commenced six months after the mother filed her

petition and eight months after a jury convicted Appellant in the criminal proceeding.

Appellant represented himself at the termination hearing and had subpoenaed 

several witnesses to testify on his behalf. Some of those witnesses were properly

served and appeared for trial. After the Rule was invoked, the trial court swore-in 

the parties and the witnesses that were present and then sequestered the witnesses as 

required by the Rule. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 267. 

The mother began the presentation of her case in chief by offering into 

evidence a certified judgment of Appellant’s July 15, 2021 conviction for indecency 

with a child by sexual contact, which was admitted into evidence over Appellant’s 

objection.1

 The mother’s first witness was Ernest Hastings, a peace officer who had 

previously been a criminal investigator for the Comanche Police Department. As 

such, Investigator Hastings was involved in the investigation of the indecency 

offense. The victim of that offense was Appellant’s older daughter—who was 

1

We note that Appellant’s appeal of his conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact 

remains pending in this court.
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sixteen years old at the time of the offense. Investigator Hastings testified about the 

specifics of his investigation with respect to A.C.R.’s older sister. He also testified 

that, according to A.C.R., Appellant took pictures of A.C.R. “like this, and she spread 

her legs and spread her labia.” During Appellant’s cross-examination of Investigator 

Hastings, the trial court intervened and instructed Appellant that the proceeding 

before the court at that time was a family law proceeding, “not a fishing expedition 

nor a chance to relitigate the criminal proceeding” that was pending on appeal.

The second witness to testify was the mother. She testified, among other 

things, that she believed it would be in A.C.R.’s best interest for Appellant’s parental 

rights to be terminated. Appellant’s cross-examination of the mother was 

argumentative, and the trial court repeatedly instructed Appellant to ask questions

and to stop arguing. The cross-examination digressed, and the following exchange 

occurred: 

[APPELLANT]: Wow. You used to be an honest woman. 

THE COURT: Mr. [Appellant’s last name] --

[APPELLANT]: No, Your Honor. This whole proceeding is 

pointless.

THE COURT: That is fine. Stop. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have 

heard sufficient evidence to establish a directed verdict, based on 

paragraphs C and D under paragraph 10 of the petition. There is 

sufficient evidence before the Court that does not --

[APPELLANT]: Your Honor, I want to postpone this --

THE COURT: Stop talking. There is no disputable fact that 

[Appellant] was, in fact, convicted of the sexual offense under Texas 

Penal Code 21.11 of the Penal Code, and he was sentenced to 20 years, 

or more than two years, in a Texas Department of Criminal Justice 

Institution Division. Your request for termination is granted. 

[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Thank you, Judge.

The hearing concluded at that point.
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Without holding another hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating 

the parental rights of Appellant. In the order, the trial court found two grounds for 

termination: (1) that Appellant had been convicted for being criminally responsible 

for the death or serious injury of a child under Section 21.11 of the Texas Penal Code 

and (2) that Appellant had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in 

his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care 

for the child for not less than two years from the date that the mother’s petition was 

filed. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(L)(iv), (b)(1)(Q). The trial court also found, 

pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights 

would be in A.C.R.’s best interest. Appellant later filed a pro se notice of appeal.

Analysis

Appellant contends in his fourth point of error that the trial court erred “in not 

allowing all the witness[e]s before rendering a verdict.” We agree. 

A trial court is not authorized to render judgment against a defendant before 

the defendant has had an opportunity to present evidence. Producer’s Constr. Co. v. 

Muegge, 669 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. 1984) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 262, 265); In re 

Estate of Luthen, No. 13-12-00638-CV, 2014 WL 4795038, at *9 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). The mother does not 

dispute this tenet. Instead, she asserts that Appellant failed to preserve his complaint 

for appellate review.

Generally, complaints must be preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1. And a complaint regarding the exclusion of evidence is usually 

preserved by an offer of proof. See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2). “This rule does not 

apply, however, when the trial court refuses to permit the appellant to present any 

evidence.” In re J.R.K., No. 06-10-00121-CV, 2011 WL 3242264, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana July 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Furthermore, it has been held 

that when a trial court ends the trial and renders judgment in open court, “the losing 
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party’s objections are to the court’s judgment or the effect thereof, and they need not 

be recited in open court.” Tobola v. State, 538 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1976, no writ). We cannot agree with the mother’s contention that we 

should overrule Appellant’s fourth point of error because he failed to preserve it for 

review.

Here, not only did the trial court prohibit Appellant from presenting any 

evidence, it also prohibited Appellant from objecting to the trial court’s ruling and 

from making any offer of proof before the trial court rendered its judgment. The 

trial court abruptly halted the trial before the plaintiff had rested her case in chief;

prohibited the defendant from talking and, thus, from pursuing an objection or offer 

of proof; and rendered judgment for the plaintiff without permitting the defendant to 

call any witnesses to dispute the plaintiff’s evidence. There is no question that 

Appellant should have been permitted to present evidence on his behalf in response 

to the mother’s efforts to terminate his parental rights. See Muegge, 669 S.W.2d at 

719. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it rendered judgment in favor of the 

mother without providing Appellant an opportunity to present evidence and call his 

witnesses to testify. 

With respect to any issue of harm caused by the trial court’s error, the trial 

court’s error prevented Appellant from being able to properly present his case on 

appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(2); Luthen, 2014 WL 4795038, at *10. The 

record shows, at the very least, that the question of A.C.R.’s best interest was a 

disputable issue of fact and that Appellant was prevented from presenting any 

evidence on that issue. We sustain Appellant’s fourth point of error. 

We do not address Appellant’s remaining points of error as they are not 

dispositive of this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. However, to the extent that 

Appellant asserts in his first point of error that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support the trial court’s judgment, we note that the mother offered into evidence a 
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certified copy of the judgment of Appellant’s conviction and that she testified that 

termination would be in A.C.R.’s best interest. 

This Court’s Ruling

We reverse the trial court’s order of termination, and we remand this cause 

to the trial court for further proceedings. Any proceeding on remand must be

commenced within 180 days of this court’s mandate. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

July 28, 2022

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.