UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

MARK MOFFETT, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 14-3075 

(D.C. No. 6:12-CV-01443-SAC) 

(D. Kan.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Mark Moffett, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the district court 

that affirmed the Commissioner’s decision to deny his application for disability 

insurance benefits. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g), we affirm. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 30, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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 Mr. Moffett alleged disability beginning April 1997. His insured status 

expired in December 2002. Mr. Moffett previously applied for disability benefits and 

was found not disabled in a 2000 decision. The relevant period for this case therefore 

spans from May 2000, after the previously adjudicated period, to December 31, 2002, 

the date Mr. Moffett’s insured status expired. 

 Mr. Moffett had a hearing on his application before an administrative law 

judge (ALJ). The ALJ determined that Mr. Moffett had the following severe 

impairments: status post left ankle fracture with open reduction and internal fixation, 

and degenerative arthritis of the left ankle secondary to that fracture. The ALJ also 

noted that Mr. Moffett had been diagnosed with an affective disorder of major 

depression and alcohol abuse disorder. The ALJ found, however, that Mr. Moffett 

retained the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, with some 

additional restrictions. Although the ALJ determined that Mr. Moffett could not 

return to his past relevant work, he concluded that he was not disabled because he 

could perform other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. 

The Appeals Council denied review, and the district court affirmed the ALJ’s 

decision. This appeal followed. 

 Mr. Moffett’s pro se appellate brief is inadequate as he does not support his 

arguments with citations to the record or any legal authorities and therefore fails to 

comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A). See id. (providing 

that an appellant’s opening brief “must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the 
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reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the 

appellant relies”). Although his brief is deficient, we have considered the arguments 

he raises that were raised before the district court. See Berna v. Chater, 101 F.3d 

631, 632 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The scope of our review . . . is limited to the issues the 

claimant properly preserves in the district court . . . .”). We conclude, however, that 

Mr. Moffett has failed to identify any reversible error in the district court’s decision 

upholding the ALJ’s denial of benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s 

judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its 

Memorandum and Order dated February 20, 2014. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Timothy M. Tymkovich 

 Circuit Judge