alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 186 (Wednesday, September 25, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 78303]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-21778]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[DA 24-949; FR ID 246811]

Disability Advisory Committee; Announcement of Meeting

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission announces the fifth and final 
meeting of the fifth term of its Disability Advisory Committee (DAC or 
Committee).

DATES: Friday, October 18, 2024. The meeting will come to order at 9:00 
a.m. Eastern Standard Time.

ADDRESSES: The DAC meeting will be held in the Commission Meeting Room 
at FCC Headquarters, located at 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Molly Burgdorf, Deputy Designated 
Federal Officer, Federal Communications Commission, (202) 418-2173, or 
email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This meeting is open to members of the 
general public. The meeting will be webcast with sign language 
interpreters and open captioning at: www.fcc.gov/live. In addition, a 
reserved amount of time will be available on the agenda for comments 
and inquiries from the public. Members of the public may comment or ask 
questions of presenters via [email protected].
    Requests for other reasonable accommodations or for materials in 
accessible formats for people with disabilities should be submitted via 
email to: [email protected] or by calling the Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530. Such requests should include a 
detailed description of the accommodation needed and a way for the FCC 
to contact the requester if more information is needed to fill the 
request. Requests should be made as early as possible; last minute 
requests will be accepted but may not be possible to accommodate.
    Proposed Agenda: At this meeting, the DAC is expected to (1) 
discuss reports and recommendations from the working groups on quality 
Telecommunications Relay Services for individuals with multiple 
disabilities, online gaming accessibility for individuals who are blind 
or have low vision, and the use of artificial intelligence to caption 
live video programming; and (2) address any other topics relevant to 
the DAC's work.

Federal Communications Commission.
Joshua Mendelsohn,
Acting Chief, Disability Rights Office, Consumer and Governmental 
Affairs Bureau.
[FR Doc. 2024-21778 Filed 9-24-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
```
* Judge Ervin was assigned to the panel in this case but died

prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by

a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-1662

LAMARR BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN ASSOCIATION, Local

1248, AFL-CIO,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge.

(CA-98-1389)

Submitted: August 24, 1999 Decided: October 15, 1999

Before ERVIN* and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lamarr Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Charles S. Montagna, MONTAGNA,

KLEIN & CAMDEN, L.L.P., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
* Although the district court’s judgment is marked as “filed”

on April 15, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was

entered on the docket sheet on April 16, 1999. Pursuant to Rules

58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is the

date that the judgment was entered on the docket sheet that we take

as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson

v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Lamarr Brown appeals the district court judgment granting summary judgment to the Appellee and dismissing his complaint alleging

that his union local engaged in unfair labor practices under 29

U.S.C. § 158 (1994). We have reviewed the record and the district

court dismissal order and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Brown v. International Longshoreman Ass’n Local 1248, No. CA-98-1389 (E.D. Va.

Apr. 16, 1999).* We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

══════════ No. WR

- 28,073

- 02

══════════ EX PARTE JAMES HARRY REYOS , App lican t

═══════════════════════════════════════ On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus In Cause No. A

- 14,583

- B In the 7 0 th District Court Ector County

═══════════════════════════════════════ Y EAR Y , J., filed a concurring opinion

. Applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty

- eight years’ imprisonment in 198 3

. His conviction was affirmed by the Eighth Court of Appeals the following year. Rey o s v. State , No. 08

- 83

- 0026

- CR (Tex. App

. — El Paso, Nov. 21, 1984)

. Applicant made this applicat ion this year, in 2023, on the grounds that new evidence proves he isREYOS

– 2

actually innocent. Today the Court grants Applicant post

- conviction habeas relief based on his claim of actual innocence. In my view, Applicant has satisfied the burden established in Ex parte Elizondo , 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The new fingerprint evidence alone is enough to reach that conclusion. Where my thinking differs is that the Court declares Applicant to be “actuall y innocent” by virtue of meeting this standard alone. For reasons that I have expressed before, I disagree with the Court ’ s use of the term “actually innocent” when granting relief under Elizondo ; simply satisfying the Elizondo burden is not enough to
prov e literal “actual innocence.” See Ex parte Cacy , 543 S.W.3d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Yeary, J., concurring) ( “ The Elizondo standard, on its face, does not really focus on innocence per se . It is, instead, an exceedingly high burden by which an appl icant must show that, if newly available evidence were added to the evidentiary mix, no reasonable jury would have found the State ’ s case to have been compelling enough to defeat the systemic presumption of innocence.”). Because I am persuaded Applicant ha s met his burden under Elizondo , I respectfully concur.

FILED : October 4, 2023 DO NOT PUBLISH
# C_2022427EN.01004001.xml

| 9.11.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 427/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 427/40

---

EUROPEAN HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTING JOINT UNDERTAKING

Publication of the final accounts for the financial year 2021

(2022/C 427/40)

The complete version of the final accounts may be found at the following address:

https://eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/documents_en?f%5B0%5D=document_title%3AAnnual%20Accounts%202021

---
**EXHIBIT 32.01**

** **

**Section 1350 Certification**

** **

**In connection with this quarterlyreport of ML Systematic Momentum FuturesAccess LLC (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (this “Report”), I, Justin C. Ferri,Chief Executive Officer, President and Manager of Merrill Lynch AlternativeInvestments LLC, the manager of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:**

** **

1. This Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2. The information contained in this Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: August 14,  2009 |                                            |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
|                        |                                            |
| By                          | /s/JUSTIN  C. FERRI                             |   |
|                        | Justin  C. Ferri                                |   |
|                        | Chief Executive  Officer, President and Manager |   |
| ** **                  | **(Principal Executive Officer)**               | ** ** |

 

----
EXHIBIT 23

                    AUDITOR'S CONSENT AND REPORT ON SCHEDULES



Board of Directors and
Stockholders
Photo Control Corporation



We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Photo Control Corporation for the year ended December 31, 1996, of
our report, dated January 31, 1997, appearing in the Company's 1996 Annual
Report to Shareholders. We also consent to the incorporation by reference of
such report in the registration statements on Form S-8 for the Photo Control
Stock Option Plan.

In the course of our audit of the financial statements referred to in our
report, dated January 31, 1997, included in the Company's 1996 Annual Report to
Shareholders, we also audited the supporting schedule listed in Item 14(a)(2) of
this Annual Report on Form 10-K. In our opinion, the schedule, when considered
in relation to the basic financial statements taken as a whole, presents fairly
in all material respects the information set forth therein.



                                    VIRCHOW KRAUSE, & COMPANY, LLP


January 31, 1997
Minneapolis, Minnesota
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                         2,890
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  8,282
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         1,586,098
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,707,290
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          0
<BONDS>                                        855,292
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     806,996
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,707,290
<SALES>                                        185,824
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               185,824
<CGS>                                          97,803
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  97,803
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (16)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             38,108
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                49,929
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            49,929
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (401)
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   49,528
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  1.20
        


</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0105

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

JEB EUGENE MARQUIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including November 13, 2023, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 6 2023

10/06/2023

Case Number: DA 23-0105
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

CORNELL PRINCE,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 312 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 29th day of November, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3097 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3097

 To prohibit the payment of surcharges for commemorative coin programs 
     to private organizations or entities, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 16, 2015

   Mr. Amash (for himself, Mr. Ribble, Mr. Mulvaney, Mr. Jordan, Mr. 
  Labrador, Mr. Massie, Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, Mr. Gosar, Mr. 
   Bridenstine, Mr. Loudermilk, Mr. Sanford, Mr. Buck, Mr. Brat, Mr. 
 Chaffetz, Mr. Meadows, and Mr. Perry) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit the payment of surcharges for commemorative coin programs 
     to private organizations or entities, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Commemorative Coins Reform Act of 
2015''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON PAYMENT OF SURCHARGES TO NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES.

    Section 5134(f) of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read 
as follows:
    ``(f) Prohibition on Payment of Surcharges to Organizations Outside 
of the Federal Government.--
            ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law, no surcharges collected with respect to the sale of any 
        numismatic item may be paid to any organization outside of the 
        Federal Government, other than with respect to the costs of 
        producing and selling such item.
            ``(2) Payment of costs.--Surcharges collected in connection 
        with the sale of any numismatic item shall be used to recover 
        all numismatic operation and program costs allocable to the 
        program under which such numismatic item is produced and sold.
            ``(3) Excess deposited into treasury.--Amounts of 
        surcharges collected in excess of the amounts described in 
        paragraph (2) shall be transferred by the Fund to the general 
        fund of the Treasury for the purpose of deficit reduction.''.

SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY.

    Subsection (f) of section 5134, United States Code, as amended by 
this Act, shall apply with respect to any commemorative coin program 
established or numismatic item produced pursuant to an Act enacted on 
or after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2790 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2790

   To provide for pay parity for civilian employees serving at joint 
            military installations, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 16, 2015

   Mr. Smith of New Jersey introduced the following bill; which was 
      referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To provide for pay parity for civilian employees serving at joint 
            military installations, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Joint Base Pay Parity Act''.

SEC. 2. PAY PARITY FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EMPLOYEES EMPLOYED AT 
              JOINT BASES.

    (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
            (1) the term ``pay locality'' or ``locality'' has the 
        meaning given that term by section 5302 of title 5, United 
        States Code; and
            (2) the term ``locality pay'' refers to any amount payable 
        under section 5304 or 5304a of title 5, United States Code.
    (b) Pay Parity at Joint Bases.--Whenever 2 or more military 
installations are reorganized or otherwise associated as a single joint 
military installation, but the constituent installations are not all 
located within the same pay locality, all employees of the respective 
installations constituting the joint installation (who are otherwise 
entitled to locality pay) shall receive locality pay at a uniform 
percentage equal to the percentage which is payable with respect to the 
locality which includes the constituent installation then receiving the 
highest locality pay (expressed as a percentage).
    (c) Regulations.--The Office of Personnel Management shall 
prescribe regulations to carry out this section.
    (d) Effective Date; Applicability.--
            (1) Effective date.--This section shall be effective with 
        respect to pay periods beginning on or after such date (not 
        later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act) as 
        the Secretary of Defense shall determine in consultation with 
        the Office of Personnel Management.
            (2) Applicability.--This section shall apply to joint 
        military installations, whether so constituted before, on, or 
        after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### TAPIA et *ux. v.*ZARB.

No. 9291.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

March 21, 1934.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 1934.

G. Woodson Morris and C. B. Patterson, both of San Antonio, for appellants.

De Witt Murray, of Eloresville, for ap-pellee. •

SMITH, Justice.

The daughter of appellants, Galacion Tapia ánd wife, Francisca -Tapia, died df'the-family home in Floresville, in January, 1930. Desiring to inter the remains of their daughter in Floresville, the parents purchased a burial plot from the appellee, the manager of a local cemetery. Their agent called upon appellee, who pointed out and sold a particular plot to the agent for that purpose, and permitted the interment of the deceased in said plot.

Shortly afterwards appellee discovered that that plot had been previously sold to another family, which had buried one of its members therein. Appellee informed appellants of the mistake and asked their consent to the removr al of their daughter’s remains to another plot, without expense to appellants. Appellants refused their consent, and after notice to them and giving them an opportunity to be present at the ceremonies of disinterment and rein-terment, which they refused to attend, appel-lee proceeded to make the change. Whereupon, appellants sued appellee for actual and exemplary damages, alleging that by his conduct they had suffered physical pain and mental suffering. The case was tried to a jury, but upon a directed verdict the trial judge rendered judgment that appellants take nothing by their suit.

Appellants devote much of their brief to a learned and interesting discussion of the question of their right to maintain an action like this, for damages for profanation of their daughter’s grave. But as appellee se'ems to concede the right and does not contest appellants’ contention, there appears to be no occasion to discuss or pass upon the question here.

Appellants have not brought any assignments of error in their brief, but rest their appeal upon the one proposition that “the trial • court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant since the evidence as adduced by plaintiffs was sufficient to have entitled them to have their case go to the jury.” As a matter of practice, the proposition, standing alone as it does, is quite too general and indefinite to present any specific question for review in an appellate court, and this court could well disregard it and confine its consideration to fundamental matters 'apparent of record.

However, we have inspected appellants’ brief for the purpose of passing upon the issue of actual damages. The only evidence presented in the brief upon this issue is that embraced in- the testimony of a third party, to the effect that after the distressing event complained of he saw Mrs. Tapia, one of the appellants, in her home, and that she was “lying in bed, or sitting in a chair at that time,” that *465“she looked sick,” which the witness explained to mean that “she looked to him grieved.” That evidence was not sufficient to support a judgment for damages and the trial court did not err in so instructing the jury.