In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-3515

JENNIFER HITCHCOCK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANGEL CORPS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:11-cv-00276—Roger B. Cosbey, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2013—DECIDED JUNE 11, 2013

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Jennifer Hitchcock

alleges that Angel Corps, a home care agency, fired

her because she was pregnant, in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Angel Corps proffered

multiple explanations for why Hitchcock was fired, all

revolving around a bizarre incident involving the death

of a 100-year-old potential client. After both parties
2 No. 12-3515

consented to adjudication of the matter before the magistrate, he granted Angel Corps’s motion for summary

judgment. We find that this was error. Hitchcock submitted evidence that the supervisor who fired her expressed animus towards pregnant women and treated

Hitchcock differently after learning she was pregnant,

only a few weeks before she was fired. Angel Corps’s

many explanations for Hitchcock’s termination were

shifting, inconsistent, facially implausible, or all of the

above. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Angel Corps’s explanations were lies, and that

Hitchcock was fired because she was pregnant. So we

reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Since Angel Corps moved for summary judgment, we

construe the facts in the light most favorable to

Hitchcock to the extent that there is a material dispute.

Angel Corps is a non-medical home care agency that

performs personal care services for its clients. In October 2008, Hitchcock was hired as a client services supervisor, which generally required her to perform new

client admissions and assess the new client’s needs to

help Angel Corps determine what services ought

to be provided.

In late January 2010, Hitchcock learned that she was

pregnant. She told a few co-workers in late February

or early March, and word got to her immediate supervisor after about a week. During a meeting with the

supervisor on March 25 (at which point Hitchcock was
No. 12-3515 3

only three months pregnant), the supervisor asked Hitchcock whether she was “quitting” after she gave birth.

Hitchcock said it was too early to say, and that such a

big decision could not be made for a few more months.

The supervisor said Hitchcock needed to make a decision “as soon as possible” so as to have “continuity of

care for our clients,” and Hitchcock said she would

give a minimum of 30 days’ notice.

After this conversation, the supervisor began to significantly increase Hitchcock’s workload. She started

directing all client problems to Hitchcock even if the

client insisted on speaking with the supervisor, a

change from past practice. She made Hitchcock complete certain monthly reports for which the supervisor

was previously responsible, assemble “new admission

packets” that were previously handled by an administrative assistant, and perform certain marketing duties

that a separate marketing director was already charged

with doing. She also began to meet with Hitchcock on a

weekly basis to “scrutinize” her progress for the week,

which also had never been done before she learned of

Hitchcock’s pregnancy. The supervisor levied these

increased responsibilities even though she had long

been aware that Hitchcock could not work more than

40 hours a week because of child care issues, which

meant that Hitchcock had to do more work in a

shorter amount of time. As a result, Hitchcock felt it

was “nearly impossible” to complete these tasks.

Hitchcock also proffered evidence of her supervisor’s

attitude towards pregnancy through an affidavit of a
4 No. 12-3515

former co-worker. According to the co-worker’s affidavit, shortly after the supervisor became aware of her

pregnancy in early 2009, the supervisor said that

because she already had two children and seemed to

have enough “trouble” with them, she needed to “think

about how much trouble” she would have with three

children regarding her “attendance,” and said, “If I were

you I would have an abortion.” (The co-worker was

eventually fired, but for reasons that are irrelevant to

this suit.)

The event that Angel Corps claims was the cause

for Hitchcock’s firing occurred on April 5. That day, Hitchcock went to the home of a new client to do an intake

and assessment. She was originally scheduled to visit her

on March 31 but she called in sick and had to postpone

the visit. The client was 100 years old and living with

her son. When Hitchcock went into the home, she

first went through the paperwork with the son, during

which he expressed his “vehement” refusal to allow

any medical agency into his home, said that “all doctors

are pill pushers” and that his mother would never be

put on any medication or see a doctor because he did

not trust them. (Recall that Angel Corps technically

does not provide medical services.) The son then said

that his mother had been refusing nourishment and

fluids the last few days, so Hitchcock recommended

that he reach out to a hospice for end-of-life care. The

son reiterated his opposition to medical care.

After completing the paperwork, Hitchcock asked to

see his mother. The son “reluctantly” led her to the bed-
No. 12-3515 5

room, opened the door, and walked to the bedside

while Hitchcock was positioned in the doorway. From

that vantage point, Hitchcock could only see the

mother’s backside which was covered with a sheet, and

the son stood between Hitchcock and his mother the

entire time. The son began pointing to areas of the room

to explain where her clothes and other items were

stored, which Hitchcock perceived was an attempt to

divert her attention from the mother. From the doorway, Hitchcock tried to look for signs of breathing or

the client’s own volitional movement and saw none.

Hitchcock also saw brown stains on the pillow case

and asked the son if that was blood, but the son said it

was simply the Ensure that he tried to give her that

morning, which he said she spat out. At that moment,

the son stepped towards Hitchcock, turned off the light,

and shut the door, backing Hitchcock into the hallway.

Hitchcock felt like she had just stepped “into a horror

movie” and feared for her safety. Contributing to her

fear was the son’s apparent hostility to medical care

and also what Hitchcock perceived was mental instability. She quickly thanked the son, said that a caregiver

would be sent the next day, and left.

Shaken and distraught, Hitchcock drove straight to

the Angel Corps office, a 10-to-15 minute drive, and

went directly to her supervisor. Hitchcock relayed everything to her, including the son’s odd behavior (there

is vigorous dispute about whether the evidence shows

that Hitchcock specifically told the supervisor that

she feared for her safety, but this fact turns out to

be unnecessary to our analysis). The supervisor asked
6 No. 12-3515

Hitchcock if she should call emergency personnel, and

Hitchcock said yes, because the client “was possibly

dying, or already dead.” The supervisor contacted

Adult Protective Services (“APS”) and left a message.

APS called her back 30 minutes later and directed the

supervisor to call 911, and the supervisor called the

police. An ambulance was sent, and it was confirmed

that the client had died. The supervisor then told Hitchcock to enter the client’s admission into the computer;

according to Hitchcock, though admission paperwork

may be completed early on, the admission itself is not

“complete” until it is entered into the computer. On

April 16, Angel Corps suspended all of Hitchcock’s

client visits pending its investigation into the incident,

which eventually revealed, among other things, that the

client had been dead for two or three days by the time

Hitchcock visited her. On May 3, Hitchcock was fired.

In the Disciplinary Action Form that was completed

and signed by Hitchcock’s supervisor the day she was

fired, the supervisor wrote, under “Reason For Disciplinary Action,” “On 4/5/10 this employee completed

a full admission on an expired client.” Under “Corrective

Steps Taken,” she wrote, “Angel Corps and its management staff feel that as a result of this employee’s actions

she compromised the health and safety of this client.

According to policy and procedure this action will

result in an immediate termination.” In the supervisor’s

affidavit in this case, she tried to explain this language

as follows: 

Had [the client] been living at the time Hitchcock

did her assessment (such as when Hitchcock was
No. 12-3515 7

originally scheduled to assess [the client on March 31])

Hitchcock would have compromised the health

and safety of [the client] by not conducting a proper

assessment and by not attending to or taking steps

for Angel Corps [to] attend to obvious problems of

[the client], such as the dried liquid on her mouth.

An affidavit from a co-owner of Angel Corps explained

that Hitchcock was fired because she “performed a deficient assessment on a potential client who had already

passed away, and there was no justification or extenuating circumstances for her actions.” It did not explain

how the assessment was “deficient.”

Hitchcock sued Angel Corps for firing her on the basis

of her pregnancy, in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), et seq. The parties

consented to adjudication by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Angel Corps moved for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted.

We now consider Hitchcock’s appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper if the “movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review a ruling granting

summary judgment de novo. Arizanovska v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 682 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012).

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII

to prohibit employment discrimination “because of or on
8 No. 12-3515

the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). “Generally speaking,

there are two ways of proving such a claim: the ‘direct’

method of proof and the ‘indirect’ method of proof.”

Collins v. Amer. Red Cross, ___ F.3d __, No. 11-3345, 2013

WL 856512, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013). “Under the

direct method, a plaintiff must provide either direct

or circumstantial evidence that the employer had a discriminatory motivation. And under the indirect method,

a plaintiff must satisfy the well-worn requirements of

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Id.

(citations omitted). Having recited the above standards,

we hasten to join in the growing chorus of opinions in

this circuit, signed onto by a majority of active judges,

that have expressed frustration with the confusing

“snarls and knots” of this ossified direct/indirect

paradigm, and that have suggested a more straightforward analysis of whether a reasonable jury could

infer prohibited discrimination. See Coleman v. Donahoe,

667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring)

(“By now, . . . the various tests that we insist lawyers use

have lost their utility. . . . In order to defeat summary

judgment, the plaintiff one way or the other must

present evidence that she is in a class protected by the

statute, that she suffered the requisite adverse action

(depending on her theory), and that a rational jury

could conclude that the employer took that adverse

action on account of her protected class, not for any noninvidious reason. Put differently, it seems to me that

the time has come to collapse all these tests into one.”);

Naficy v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 514 (7th
No. 12-3515 9

Cir. 2012) (citing Coleman concurrence with approval);

Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 680 (7th Cir.

2012) (“the direct and indirect methods for proving and

analyzing employment discrimination cases . . . have

become too complex, too rigid, and too far removed

from the statutory question of discriminatory causation”); Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 313-14

(7th Cir. 2012) (discussing Coleman concurrence and

applying a more streamlined, collapsed version of the

direct/indirect tests); see also King v. Acosta Sales and

Marketing, Inc., 678 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2012) (“the

burden-shifting approach may cause more confusion

than can be justified by its benefits”).

Hitchcock formally disclaims reliance on the “indirect”

method of proof so technically we are to confine our

analysis to whether Hitchcock has proffered sufficient

evidence of a discriminatory motivation under the

“direct” method. But whether we officially apply the

“direct” method or a more straightforward analysis

of discriminatory causation (there is little discernible

difference in this case), we find that a genuine issue

of material fact exists for trial.

A. There is Sufficient Evidence that Angel Corps’s

Proffered Explanations for Firing Hitchcock

Were Pretextual

In this case it makes sense to first analyze whether

there is evidence that Angel Corps’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for firing Hitchcock were pretextual, that is, phony. See Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d
10 No. 12-3515

1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Pretext means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 672

(7th Cir. 2008) (pretext can be evidence of discrimination under direct method). After all, if there is no evidence of pretext, then Angel Corps’s non-discriminatory

justifications for firing Hitchcock must be believed,

which necessarily precludes liability under Title VII. Cf.

Scruggs v. Garts Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir.

2009) (“The prima facie case and pretext analyses often

overlap, so we have said that we can proceed directly

to the pretext inquiry if the defendant offers a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.”).

We count at least four potentially different explanations given for Hitchcock’s firing. Two explanations

were given on May 3, 2010, when Hitchcock was fired:

that Hitchcock “completed a full admission on an expired client” and that Hitchcock’s “actions compromised

the health and safety of this client.” The supervisor’s

affidavit proffers another: that Hitchcock would have

compromised the health and safety of the client had

she been alive by failing to deal with the “dried liquid

on her mouth” and by failing to take other unspecified

steps. The affidavit from one of Angel Corps’s owners

proffers yet another: that Hitchcock “performed a

deficient assessment on a potential client who had

already passed away.”

We find these shifting explanations to be sufficiently

inconsistent or otherwise suspect to create a reasonable inference that they do not reflect the real reason for
No. 12-3515 11

Hitchcock’s firing. See Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. College,

420 F.3d 712, 726 (7th Cir. 2005) (“One can reasonably

infer pretext from an employer’s shifting or inconsistent

explanations for the challenged employment decision.”).

A rational juror could find the supervisor’s explanation

that Hitchcock “would have” compromised the health

and safety of the client to be suspect because it never

specifies what Hitchcock did wrong (and neither does

the respondent brief’s post-hoc, vague explanation

that Hitchcock’s “failure to do a full admission compromised the health and safety of other potential clients”).

But more importantly, it contradicts the plain language

on the Disciplinary Action Form which the supervisor

herself filled out, that Hitchcock directly “compromised

the health and safety of this client” (emphasis added).

Perhaps the supervisor’s affidavit was merely trying

to clarify the language on the Form, since it is

impossible to “compromise the health and safety” of

someone who is already dead (and the supervisor well

knew by May 3 that the client was already dead at the

time Hitchcock visited). But a reasonable juror could

also find the explanation on the official Form itself to be

so ludicrous that Angel Corps is not to be believed. See,

e.g., Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., LLC, 636 F.3d 312, 315

(7th Cir. 2011) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not

require employers to have ‘just cause’ for sacking a

worker, but an employer who advances a fishy reason

takes the risk that disbelief of the reason will support

an inference that it is a pretext for discrimination.” (citation

omitted)); Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 290

(7th Cir. 1999) (employee’s firing for “theft” because he
12 No. 12-3515

took a few potato chips from a co-worker’s open bag in the

break room where the co-worker did not object to the

taking, defied “any common understanding of the term”

and so lacked credibility). Whether the Form’s language

is simply a product of bureaucratic imprecision, or

whether the subsequent affidavit is instead a post-hoc

attempt to cover tracks, we leave to the jury to decide.

As for the Form’s explanation that Hitchcock was

fired because she “completed a full admission on

an expired client,” that explanation is undermined by

Hitchcock’s testimony that the supervisor herself told

Hitchcock to enter the admission into the computer

(which “completes” it according to Hitchcock, and

we defer on summary judgment to Hitchcock’s characterization of what “completes” means in Angel Corps

parlance) after the supervisor knew that the client was

dead. Cf., e.g., Stalter, 195 F.3d at 290 (employer’s explanation that employee was fired for stealing chips could

be pretextual when the employer knew that the person

from whom the chips were “stolen” was fine with it).

Moreover, the Form’s explanation concerning the assessment seems inconsistent with the co-owner’s criticism

of Hitchcock’s assessment for being “deficient” (for

unexplained reasons).

Angel Corps’s brief attempts to make sense out of

these disparate explanations, but it does so by piling

on additional ever-evolving justifications that may cause

a reasonable juror to wonder whether Angel Corps can

ever get its story straight. See Zaccagnini v. Charles Levy

Circulating Co., 338 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (consid-
No. 12-3515 13

ering new explanations raised in summary judgment

briefs, observing, “the consistency of the explanation

provided by an employer at the time of an employment

decision . . . is evidence of the veracity of the employer’s

explanation at summary judgment”). The brief’s clearest

argument is that Hitchcock was fired for failing to immediately call 911 after leaving the house, which we do

not deny would have probably been the best course

of action. But the question is whether this explanation

actually reflects why Angel Corps fired Hitchcock on

May 3, 2010, not whether it provides an adequate posthoc justification now. See, e.g., Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-

Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681, 693

(7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e find IUPUI’s post hoc explanations, delay, exaggeration, and unusual conduct more

than enough to create a question of fact concerning the

legitimacy of its explanations for Peirick’s termination.”).

We find that a reasonable juror could believe that this

was not Angel Corps’s actual motivation. The failure

to immediately call 911—an explanation that could

have been easily expressed—is not mentioned on the Disciplinary Action Form, and it is not even mentioned in

the part of the supervisor’s affidavit that attempts to

explain why Hitchcock was fired. See Norman Aff. ¶ 20;

Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chi., 95 F.3d 627, 634

(7th Cir. 1996) (“Coca-Cola’s failure to express this explanation earlier despite several opportunities to do

so” was “compelling” evidence of pretext). Hitchcock’s

failure to immediately call 911 does not even flunk the

test that the supervisor herself set forth elsewhere in

her affidavit: “if a Client Services Supervisor observes a
14 No. 12-3515

medical issue with a client they are either to attempt to

address the problem or to inform me or someone at Angel

Corps so that we may provide the client with the appropriate

assistance.” Norman Aff. ¶ 3 (emphasis added). The

latter alternative requirement was satisfied when Hitchcock went straight to her supervisor with the issue after

leaving the client’s home (indeed, the fact that she did

exactly what she was supposed to is another reason why

a juror could reasonably disbelieve Angel Corps). See, e.g.,

Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 275

(7th Cir. 1996) (employer’s claim that it fired an employee for falsifying records could be pretextual when

the company’s code could not reasonably be read to

support an interpretation that the employee had actually falsified records). Furthermore, even after Hitchcock told the supervisor that the client was “possibly

dying, or already dead,” the supervisor herself did not

call 911 immediately but instead called APS, left a

voicemail, then waited for another 30 minutes before

APS explicitly instructed the supervisor to reach out to

emergency services. Whether the supervisor actually

cared about Hitchcock’s failure to call 911 immediately

is therefore an open question.

The brief also explains that Hitchcock “completed

an assessment that was so deficient it did not reveal

that [the client] had been dead for days,” but again,

nothing in the record suggests this was the reason Hitchcock was fired. To be fair, perhaps that is what the coowner meant when he said vaguely that Hitchcock

“performed a deficient assessment on a potential client

who had already passed away” (where he failed to
No. 12-3515 15

explain exactly how it was “deficient”). We leave to the

jury to resolve this ambiguity by deciding whether that

was what he meant, or whether he was just providing

a conclusory explanation devoid of meaning to distract

from some other reason for firing her. See, e.g., Emmel,

95 F.3d at 635 (although a generic lawyerly explanation

for the plaintiff’s firing “may have seemed clever at

the time, a jury could see it as an attempt to stonewall”).

Both the magistrate judge and Angel Corps suggest

that the above is a “mere quibble over language,” and

emphasize that all of the above explanations at least

share a single consistency: the April 5 incident. It may

very well be that the April 5 incident was an embarrassment to Angel Corps, and that Hitchcock’s mere involvement in that incident was enough to get her fired, even

if Angel Corps could not put its finger on precisely

what Hitchcock did wrong that day. And if that were

the true reason for Hitchcock’s firing, however unfair,

foolish, or arbitrary that may seem, it would not be a

Title VII violation, and a reasonable jury may well arrive

at that conclusion. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 852 (we do

not ask in Title VII cases whether the reason for firing

was “inaccurate or unfair,” or whether the employer

was “wrong about its employee’s performance, or may

be too hard on its employee”); Van Antwerp v. City of

Peoria, Ill., 627 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 2010) (no Title VII

violation if explanation was a mere “error, oddity, or

oversight”). But a reasonable jury might also conclude

that Angel Corps did not “honestly believe[] the reasons

it has offered to explain the discharge.” Coleman, 667

F.3d at 852. Hitchcock has therefore proffered sufficient

evidence of pretext.
16 No. 12-3515

B. A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude that Angel

Corps’s Real Reason for Firing Hitchcock Was

Her Pregnancy

Of course, a showing of pretext alone is not enough;

the plaintiff must also show that the explanations are

a pretext for the prohibited animus. See Van Antwerp, 627

F.3d at 298; Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d

466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The plaintiff then bears the

burden to show that the stated reason is a pretext for a

decision really made on prohibited criteria.”). Here

we find sufficient evidence to support this showing. If

Hitchcock’s evidence is to be believed, which it must be

at this stage, the supervisor asked Hitchcock if she was

“quitting” (not whether she intended to take maternity

leave) based solely on her pregnancy, and explicitly

recommended to the co-worker that the co-worker get

an abortion because her pregnancy would lead to “attendance” problems. See Hasan v. Foley & Lardner LLP,

552 F.3d 520, 529 (7th Cir. 2008) (“ ‘behavior toward

or comments directed at other employees in the protected group’ is one type of circumstantial evidence that

can support an inference of discrimination” (citation

omitted)). Animus towards pregnant women may be

inferred based on these comments; specifically, a belief

that pregnancy disqualifies women from effectively

participating in the workforce. Angel Corps argues

that “[t]he fact that [the supervisor] asked Hitchcock

if she intended to return to work after her pregnancy

demonstrates that Angel Corps intended to retain her,

all things being equal.” (The magistrate judge provided

a similarly benign gloss on the supervisor’s statement,
No. 12-3515 17

noting that the supervisor “asked [Hitchcock] whether

she was going to continue her employment at Angel

Corps after she gave birth.”) But according to Hitchcock’s affidavit, her supervisor asked her if she was

“quitting.” The difference may be subtle, but it is significant in terms of reflecting animus, and we do not

construe the record in favor of the party moving for

summary judgment. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Donlen Corp.,

173 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1999) (comments

including, “If you have another baby, I’ll invite you to

stay home,” and “Gina, you’re not coming back after

this baby,” could have been interpreted by a reasonable

jury as animus, even if they could also be interpreted

as an innocent joke).

Angel Corps asserts that we have “repeatedly held”

that these types of statements “do not constitute evidence of pregnancy discrimination,” citing Ilhardt v. Sara

Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1997). But Ilhardt only

said that “statements expressing doubt that a woman

will return to work full-time after having a baby do not

constitute direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination.”

Id. at 1156 (emphasis added); see also id. (referring

to “direct” and “circumstantial” evidence separately).

Here, the supervisor’s potentially offensive statements

are at least circumstantial evidence of pregnancy discrimination, because they can be a manifestation of precisely

the kind of prejudiced belief that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was designed to combat—the stereotype

that women, particularly mothers, belong in the home.

See Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,

286 n. 19 (1986); Sheehan, 173 F.3d at 1045 (“Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is part of discrimina-
18 No. 12-3515

Hitchcock’s Statement of Facts emphasizes that, with the 1

exception of the comment on March 25, her supervisor seemed

to actively avoid any workplace conversation concerning

her pregnancy, in contrast to her co-workers, who all “congratulated me when they heard the news and shared in my

joy,” “ask[ed] how my pregnancy was going, when my next

doctor’s appoint[ment] was going to be, and if I had morning

sickness yet.” To the extent that Hitchcock suggests that

failure to display such enthusiasm ought to be construed as

animus, we disagree. Many pregnant women reasonably

believe that inquiries from co-workers or supervisors into the

details or status of their pregnancy are both inappropriate

and intrusive, even while others like Hitchcock may enjoy

them. So we do not consider relevant the supervisor’s unwillingness to engage in such conversations on other days.

tion against women, and one of the stereotypes involved

is that women are less desirable employees because

they are liable to become pregnant. This was one of

Congress’ concerns in passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.”); cf., e.g., Hackett v. Clifton Gunderson, L.L.C.,

No. 03 C 6046, 2004 WL 2445373, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1,

2004) (“Though statements voicing doubt that an employee will return to work after having a baby do not

constitute direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination,

these same statements may suffice under the McDonnell

Douglas framework.” (citation omitted)). We think that

a reasonable juror could interpret the supervisor’s comment as reflecting this belief.

1

Furthermore, the supervisor’s immediate change in

treatment towards Hitchcock after learning of her pregnancy, especially the substantial increase in Hitchcock’s
No. 12-3515 19

workload involving the sudden and anomalous shifting

of multiple responsibilities from other employees, also

evidences discriminatory animus. See, e.g., Coleman, 667

F.3d at 861 (evidence of retaliation where, among other

evidence, within a month after the plaintiff filed complaints, the plaintiff received “a new and unpleasant

work assignment”). Angel Corps emphasizes the fact

that Hitchcock’s increased workload still remained

within the scope of her official job description, but

that misses the point. The point is that Hitchcock was

treated significantly differently—and in a manner that

a reasonable jury could find deviated anomalously

from standard practice—after the supervisor learned of

her pregnancy. We are unaware of any case suggesting

that differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited

category never suggests animus so long as the treatment

is technically permissible under the cold terms of an

official job description (especially a job description as

vague and limitless as the one in this case, which

included doing “[o]ther duties as assigned by [the] Client

Services Director”). Cf. Rodgers v. White, 657 F.3d 511, 518

(7th Cir. 2011) (“Formal job titles and rank are not

dispositive; an employer cannot ‘insulate itself from

claims of racial discrimination’ by making formalistic

distinctions between employees.” (citation omitted)).

Lastly, the supervisor’s offensive comment to Hitchcock and her sudden change in treatment towards her

occurred a little over a month before she was fired. And

it occurred less than two weeks before the incident

which, a reasonable jury could find in light of all the

evidence above, provided a convenient hook for the

supervisor to concretely express her discriminatory
20 No. 12-3515

intent. See Fleishman v. Continental Cas. Co., 698 F.3d

598, 605 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]solated comments are not

probative of discrimination unless they are ‘contemporaneous with the discharge or causally related to the discharge decision-making process.’ ” (emphasis added,

citation omitted)); cf. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860 (“When

temporal proximity is one among several tiles in an

evidentiary mosaic depicting retaliatory motive, . . .

suspicious timing can sometimes raise an inference of a

causal connection.” (citation and internal alterations

omitted)); Loudermilk, 636 F.3d at 315 (“Suspicious timing

may be just that—suspicious—and a suspicion is not

enough to get past a motion for summary judgment.

Occasionally, however, an adverse action comes so

close on the heels of a protected act that an inference

of causation is sensible.”).

In sum, we find that the evidence provides a sufficient

basis for a rational jury to conclude that Hitchcock

was fired because she was pregnant. Naturally, Angel

Corps disputes several of the critical factual assertions made by Hitchcock. We leave it to the jury to

decide whom to believe.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, we REVERSE the magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of the defendant and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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