SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3468-15T2

OZTURK HUSSEYIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LONGVIEW APARTMENTS, LLC,

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued May 16, 2017 – Decided June 6, 2017

Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, 

Bergen County, Docket No. SC-380-16.

Ozturk Husseyin, appellant, argued the cause

pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff appeals dismissal of his Special Civil Part Small 

Claims complaint. We affirm.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-3468-15T2

Plaintiff's appellate brief and appendix contain facts and 

documents that were not presented to the trial court. The facts 

and evidence relevant to this appeal are set forth in the 

transcript of the trial before Judge Keith A. Bachmann on March 

7, 2016.1

Plaintiff filed a Small Claims Complaint in the Special Civil 

Part.2 Plaintiff alleged that defendant Longview Apartments, LLC 

(Longview) improperly towed his vehicle.3 According to plaintiff, 

Longview instructed a towing company to tow his vehicle because 

it was not parked in plaintiff's assigned parking spot. Plaintiff 

claimed that Longview illegally towed his car because plaintiff 

had permission to park in space number eight. 

 

 

1 Rule 2:5-4(a) specifies the material that constitutes the record 

on appeal. Appellate courts will not consider evidentiary material

that is not part of the record below. See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 

N.J. 36, 45 n.2 (2015).

2 Plaintiff previously filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part 

seeking reimbursement for the same towing fee that is the subject 

of this appeal. Plaintiff originally sued a towing company and 

an individual employed by Longview Apartments, LLC. We do not

have a transcript of the Special Civil Part judge's disposition 

of plaintiff's earlier complaint. During the trial before Judge 

Bachmann, defense counsel advised that plaintiff's earlier 

complaint was tried before a different judge who dismissed that 

complaint with prejudice as to the towing company and without 

prejudice as to the individual who was an employee of defendant.

3 Longview is the garden apartment complex where plaintiff resides.
3 A-3468-15T2

According to plaintiff's testimony, he departed the apartment 

complex around 11:30 a.m. and returned about 1:00 p.m. Plaintiff

told the judge that he left his car in parking space eight, rather 

than space six, which was his assigned spot, because another 

vehicle was parked in plaintiff's parking space. Plaintiff claimed 

he had permission from a neighboring tenant to park in space number 

eight. Although plaintiff testified that he paid a towing company 

to retrieve his vehicle, plaintiff failed to submit evidence as 

to the amount of money paid. 

On cross-examination, counsel for Longview marked for 

identification the written lease agreement signed by plaintiff. 

Pursuant to the agreement, plaintiff was assigned parking space 

six. Longview's attorney also marked for identification a warning 

letter, entitled "Notice to Cease," addressed to plaintiff

demanding that he cease using two parking spaces at the apartment 

complex. Plaintiff admitted receiving the letter, but denied he 

ever used two parking spaces. During cross-examination, plaintiff

denied that the vehicle preventing him from parking in space number 

six was his own grey Volvo. Plaintiff testified on crossexamination that he had to park his green Expedition in space 

number eight because a small compact car was parked in space number 

six, and that he had permission to use space number eight. When 

shown a copy of the lease agreement for apartment number eight, 
4 A-3468-15T2

plaintiff conceded that the apartment lease for the neighboring 

tenant did not provide an assigned parking space. 

At the close of plaintiff's case, Longview's attorney made a 

motion to dismiss the complaint. Longview argued plaintiff failed 

to sustain his burden of proof as to both liability and damages. 

Longview noted that plaintiff failed to present testimony 

supporting the fee paid for the recovery of the vehicle. Longview 

emphasized that plaintiff never established he was parked in an 

authorized space at the time the vehicle was towed. Longview

maintained plaintiff failed to substantiate that it requested the 

vehicle be towed. Lastly, Longview contended plaintiff never 

submitted proof that if Longview directed the towing of the 

vehicle, such towing was illegal. 

Although the plaintiff's case was closed, the judge permitted 

plaintiff to provide additional documents for the court's 

consideration. Judge Bachmann marked the towing company receipt 

as P-1 for identification. The judge also considered a notice 

issued to tenants, marked as P-2 for identification, advising 

tenants that "[p]arking in another tenants [sic] reserved space 

is a violation of the lease and grounds for eviction." 

In granting Longview's motion to dismiss, the judge concluded 

he had no proof of damages and "very little proof on liability." 

As for the towing receipt, Judge Bachmann ruled the document 
5 A-3468-15T2

constituted hearsay. Absent an individual from the towing company 

testifying in court, the judge was unable to ascertain fundamental 

information. For example, the judge could not determine who 

authorized the towing company to tow plaintiff's vehicle. Nor 

could the judge conclude whether the amount charged for retrieval 

of plaintiff's vehicle was excessive or inconsistent with any 

written contract for towing services. The judge was unable to 

determine if the charges were the result of a delay on the part 

of plaintiff in retrieving his vehicle. Because plaintiff had the 

burden of proof and failed to meet that burden as to damages and 

liability, the judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint.

Our scope of review of a final judgment entered by a Special 

Civil Part judge is exceedingly narrow. Because the Special Civil 

Part judge was the finder of fact, and because he had an 

opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses, we 

defer to the judge's factual determinations provided they are 

supported by substantial credible evidence. Rova Farms Resort, 

Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). We do not 

weigh evidence anew, rather we determine whether there is adequate 

evidence in the record to support the judgment rendered by the 

trial judge. Cannuscio v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N.J. Super.

342, 347 (App. Div. 1999). If the trial court's determination 

meets this standard, our "task is complete and [we] should not 
6 A-3468-15T2

disturb the result," even if we "might have reached a different 

conclusion were [we] the trial tribunal." Ibid. (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

Considering plaintiff's arguments, both written and oral, in 

light of the aforementioned standard of review, we affirm the 

Special Civil Part's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for the 

reasons stated in Judge Bachmann's ruling from the bench on March 

7, 2016. We add only the following comments.

First, we considered the documents included in plaintiff's 

appellate appendix even though the documents were not presented

to the judge. Nothing in the improperly annexed documents changed 

the facts considered by Judge Bachmann. The documents merely 

confirmed plaintiff's medical appointment on the date that his car 

was towed and identified other medical conditions suffered by 

plaintiff. Further, the handwritten statement from the tenant 

occupying apartment eight, purportedly allowing plaintiff to use 

her parking space, was belied by D-5 marked for identification at 

trial. The document marked D-5 was the lease agreement for

apartment eight and substantiated that the neighboring tenant had 

no parking space to offer plaintiff. This document, coupled with 

the document marked P-2 for identification, provided further 

evidence that plaintiff's parking in space number eight was 

impermissible. 
7 A-3468-15T2

Second, plaintiff failed to articulate specific errors 

allegedly committed by the judge. In his appellate brief, 

plaintiff claimed, "Judge Bachmann did not relax the court and 

evidence rules that are commonly done in Small Claims Court, . . 

. and failed to consider the circumstantial evidence that no one 

other than Defendant landlord could have been responsible for the 

wrongful tow of the Plaintiff's vehicle." Based upon our review 

of the record, we find Judge Bachmann did consider evidence 

allegedly supporting plaintiff's claims notwithstanding the 

objection made by Longview's attorney. Despite relaxation of the

evidence rules governing the Small Claims Section of the Special 

Civil Part, N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2)(A), we find no error in the judge's 

decision. Neither the towing company nor the neighbor who 

purportedly gave permission to plaintiff to park in space number

eight were in court to establish whether the evidence was probative 

and trustworthy. See Penbara v. Straczynski, 347 N.J. Super. 155, 

162-63 (App. Div. 2002).

Affirmed.