2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-1-2012

Irving Jones v. Camden Board of Education

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1323

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1323

___________

IRVING COURTLEY JONES,

Appellant

v.

CAMDEN CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-02398)

District Judge: Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr.

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 1, 2012

Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and BARRY, Judges

(Opinion filed: October 1, 2012) 

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Irving Courtley Jones appeals from the order entered on January 24, 2012, which 

dismissed his complaint with prejudice. We will affirm.

I.
2

Jones was hired by the Camden County Board of Education (Board) as a per diem 

substitute teacher. He worked from September 2009, until he was terminated in March 

2010, following an altercation with a student allegedly engaged in disruptive behavior. 

During the course of the altercation, a desk was overturned, landing on another student’s 

foot. There were no injuries. Jones was suspended for conduct unbecoming a teacher

and thereafter terminated.

Jones filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 

alleging unlawful termination by the Board because of his race. Jones is of AfricanAmerican descent; he asserted no additional facts in support of his claim, merely 

describing the incident that led to his termination. The EEOC dismissed Jones’ 

complaint, reporting that it was unable to conclude a statutory violation had occurred, and 

notified Jones of his right to sue. 

Thereafter, Jones commenced this action pro se, alleging race and gender 

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e-17; age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 

of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; disability discrimination under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117; and violation of the 

Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. The 

Board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). The District Court dismissed Jones’ complaint, concluding that (1) Jones failed 

to set forth facts that would support a claim based on race, age, gender, or disability; (2) 
3

Jones’ claims of age, gender, and disability discrimination were barred for failure to 

exhaust his administrative remedies; (3) Jones did not have standing to litigate an IDEA 

claim; and (4) amendment of Jones’ claims would be futile.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary. See

McMullen v. Maple Shade Twp., 643 F.3d 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2011). We must accept as true 

all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw reasonable inferences in 

favor of the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly

III.

, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007)).

Jones does not present a cogent legal argument to this Court. It is well settled that 

if an appellant fails to comply with the requirements to set forth an issue raised on appeal 

and to present an argument in support of it, “the appellant normally has abandoned and 

waived that issue on appeal and it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.” Kost v. 

Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc. v. 

Gordon & Breach, Sci. Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1011 (3d Cir. 1991); Al-Ra’Id v. 

Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that pro se litigants are not excepted from 

the requirements). Accordingly, despite our liberal construction of Jones’ brief, Haines v. 
4

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we conclude that he has waived consideration of the 

District Court’s legal analysis.1

Absent waiver, we would affirm the District Court’s analysis, supplemented in the 

following manner. The District Court correctly concluded that (1) Jones failed to set 

forth any facts that would support a claim of discrimination under Title VII, see Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; see also, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (stating that 

a plaintiff must establish that he was “treated . . . less favorably than others [by his 

employer] because of a protected trait” and that the employer “had a discriminatory 

intent”) (internal quotations omitted); (2) Jones failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies for his age, gender, and disability discrimination claims, see Antol, 82 F.3d at 

1295; see also supra note 1; (3) Jones did not have standing to litigate an IDEA claim, 

see, e.g., Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey

 1 There is one exception. Jones is critical of the District Court’s reliance on 

Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997), cited in support of its conclusion that 

Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies relevant to his age, gender, and 

disability discrimination claims. Although there are cases more on point than Robinson, 

we find no error in the District Court’s conclusion. Jones did not pursue these claims 

before the EEOC first as he was required to do. Accordingly, the District Court properly 

dismissed these claims. See, e.g., Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996) 

(dismissing a gender discrimination claim where the plaintiff pursued only a disability 

, 417 F.3d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 2005) 

(“[The IDEA statutory] language strongly suggests that Congress intended to provide a 

private right of action only to disabled children and their parents.”); and (4) because 

Jones made no attempt to remedy the defects in his complaint, despite notice and his 

familiarity with the pleading requirements, granting him an opportunity to amend his 
5

complaint would be futile, see Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (citing Foman v. Davis

IV.

, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

 

discrimination claim before the EEOC).