UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4967

CURTIS LEE STYLES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem.

N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-90-277-WS)

Submitted: May 19, 1998

Decided: September 2, 1998

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HALL,

Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,

North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States

Attorney, Paul A. Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney,

Michael Chandler, Third Year Law Student, Winston-Salem, North

Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Curtis Styles pled guilty in 1991 to conspiring to possess with

intent to distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846

(1994), and was sentenced to a term of seventy months imprisonment

and five years supervised release. He began serving his term of supervised release in 1996 and was subsequently convicted in North Carolina state court of possessing with intent to sell and deliver cocaine.

Because the new criminal conduct was a violation of the conditions

of Styles' supervised release, the district court revoked his supervised

release and sentenced him to a term of fifty-one months imprisonment

consecutive to his state sentence. Styles appeals claiming that the

court's acceptance of the sentencing guidelines recommendation,

when the court was under no obligation to do so, constitutes an abdication of discretion. We disagree.

At the revocation hearing, Styles asserted that the court had broad

discretion in fashioning a sentence because Styles' original conviction

occurred in 1990 when no revocation table existed. 1 Styles also

requested that his sentence be concurrent with the state sentence he

was currently serving.2 The government opposed a concurrent sentence. The court considered Styles' argument, but the court found the

sentence recommended in the guidelines revocation table to be appropriate and reasonable.3 Our review of the record indicates that the

court was aware that it did not have to sentence Styles within the

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1 See United States v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that a defendant is to be sentenced under guideline in effect on date

of sentencing).

2 See United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 641 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that Guidelines policy statements are not binding in revocation proceedings).

3 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 7B1.4, p.5. (1997).

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guideline range of the revocation table or impose a consecutive sentence; however, it found such a sentence appropriate and sentenced

Styles accordingly. Thus, the district court exercised its discretion in

sentencing Styles to a consecutive fifty-one month sentence of

incarceration.4

Finally, Styles appeals a discrepancy between the district court's

oral sentence given in his presence and its written order of judgment.

When there is a conflict between a written order of sentence and an

oral sentence, the latter is controlling, and the proper remedy is for

the district court to correct its written judgment so that it conforms to

its oral pronouncement.5 Because the written order is incorrect, we

must remand the case to the district court so that it can correct its

written order to reflect the oral sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

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4 See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), p.s.

5 See United States v. Morse, 344 F.2d 27, 30 (4th Cir. 1965); Rakes

v. United States, 309 F.2d 686, 687-88 (4th Cir. 1962).

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