NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ARIANNE B., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0181

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. JD15447

JS17904

The Honorable Alison S. Bachus, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, L.L.C., Mesa

By Clark Jones

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Carol A. Salvati

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
ARIANNE B. v. DCS, A.B.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell1 delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Acting Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Margaret H. Downie 

joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Arianne B. appeals a juvenile court order terminating her 

parental rights to her daughter A.B. On appeal, she argues the juvenile 

court erred in finding two statutory grounds for termination and that

termination was in A.B.’s best interests. Because reasonable evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s findings that Arianne was unable to discharge 

her parental responsibilities due to chronic substance abuse under Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(3) (Supp. 2015) and that 

termination was in A.B.’s best interests, we affirm. 

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 A.B. was exposed to methamphetamine at birth in 2006 and 

taken into care. Although Arianne later regained custody of A.B., she had 

only parented her for seven months when Arianne consented to A.B. being

placed under the guardianship of her maternal grandmother, see A.R.S. § 

14-5204 (2012) (court appointment of guardian of minor), because Arianne 

was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for her second driving while 

intoxicated conviction. In 2014, Arianne sought to revoke the maternal 

grandmother’s guardianship. In March 2014, A.B.’s guardian ad litem filed 

a dependency petition; the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) soon

thereafter substituted in as the petitioner. Five months later, Arianne 

committed her third DUI offense and was sentenced to another 2.5 years of

imprisonment.

 

1The Honorable Jennifer B. Campbell, Judge of the Arizona 

Superior Court, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article 

VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to 

sustaining the juvenile court's findings. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 2008).
ARIANNE B. v. DCS, A.B.

Decision of the Court

3

¶3 In March 2015, DCS filed both a motion (in the dependency

action) and a petition (given that A.B. had not yet been found dependent as 

to Mother) to terminate Mother’s parental rights. In April 2015, the juvenile 

court found A.B. dependent as to Arianne, when she denied the allegations 

but submitted the matter to the court, and the superior court adopted a case 

plan of severance and adoption. At the contested severance adjudication,

DCS presented evidence of Arianne’s significant history of alcohol and 

methamphetamine abuse. Arianne testified she had maintained sobriety

during her incarceration, but admitted her last and longest period of 

sobriety was, primarily, during the time she was incarcerated. A

psychologist who had examined Arianne testified that “sobriety in a 

controlled setting does not generalize” and the recidivism rate for 

individuals with Arianne’s methamphetamine use pattern was 

“enormously high.” A psychologist who evaluated A.B. testified that A.B. 

was “very well-adjusted in her placement” with her maternal grandmother.

¶4 The juvenile court terminated Arianne’s parental rights under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (inability to discharge parental responsibilities due to 

substance abuse) and A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) (length of incarceration), and

found that termination was in A.B.’s best interests. See Michael J. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000) 

(termination requires a juvenile court to find at least one statutory basis for 

termination and that termination is in child’s best interests).3 

DISCUSSION

I. Inability to Discharge Parental Duties Due to Substance Abuse

¶5 Arianne argues the juvenile court erred in finding there was 

clear and convincing evidence that she was unable to discharge her parental 

duties because, at the time of the severance hearing, she had maintained her 

sobriety for nineteen months during her incarceration and planned to

maintain her sobriety after her release. See A.R.S. § 8-537(B) (2014) (finding 

of statutory ground for termination must be based on clear and convincing

evidence). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining

the termination order, see Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 

 

3Although the juvenile court also terminated the parental 

rights of A.B.’s father under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (out-of-home placement for 

nine months or longer and parent has substantially neglected or willfully 

refused to remedy circumstances that caused out-of-home placement), he is 

not a party to this appeal.
ARIANNE B. v. DCS, A.B.

Decision of the Court

4

93, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009) (citation omitted), Arianne has shown 

no error. 

¶6 We will affirm the juvenile court’s termination order when, as 

here, it is supported by reasonable evidence. Id. (“The juvenile court . . . is 

in the best positon to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.”) (quotations and 

citations omitted). The juvenile court can terminate parental rights under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) when a parent’s history of chronic abuse of alcohol or a 

controlled substance renders the parent unable to discharge his or her 

parental responsibilities and the juvenile court finds “there are reasonable 

grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period.” Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) “temporary abstinence 

from drugs and alcohol does not outweigh [a parent’s] significant history 

of abuse.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 283, 288, ¶ 17, 378 P.3d 

725, 730 (App. 2016) (quotations and citations omitted). 

¶7 The juvenile court properly found that Arianne had a history 

of chronic substance abuse. The juvenile court weighed several factors, 

including Arianne’s thirty-year history of abusing alcohol, her three DUI 

convictions, her use of methamphetamine over an eight-year period, her 

use of methamphetamine less than two months before her third DUI, that 

A.B. was exposed to methamphetamine at birth, and that Arianne’s longest 

period of sobriety was when she was incarcerated. The juvenile court did 

not err in concluding Arianne’s abuse of alcohol and methamphetamine 

was “chronic” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Jennifer S., 240 

Ariz. at 288, ¶ 17, 378 P.3d at 730 (“Chronic substance abuse is long-lasting 

but not necessarily constant substance abuse.”) (citation omitted). 

¶8 Reasonable evidence also properly supports the juvenile 

court’s findings that Arianne’s substance abuse made her unable to 

discharge her parental responsibilities. At the time of the severance hearing, 

A.B. was nine years old. The juvenile court found that Arianne had been 

A.B.’s primary caretaker for less than a year of A.B.’s life and Arianne 

admitted that substance abuse had impacted her ability to parent A.B.

Moreover, for seven of A.B.’s nine years of life, she had been in the care of 

her maternal grandmother. 

¶9 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Arianne’s abuse of 

alcohol and methamphetamine would continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period. Although Arianne argues the juvenile court 

“ignored” her testimony on her sobriety and only “relied” on DCS’s 
ARIANNE B. v. DCS, A.B.

Decision of the Court

5

evidence, the juvenile court’s order states that it “carefully considered all of 

the testimony and admitted exhibits.” See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 

55-56, ¶ 18, 97 P.3d 876, 880-81 (App. 2004) (appellate court presumes trial 

court has considered evidence presented before making a decision) (citation 

omitted).

¶10 The juvenile court weighed Arianne’s history of alcohol and 

drug abuse, including her inability to maintain sobriety outside of a 

controlled setting. The juvenile court also noted Arianne’s support system 

for maintaining sobriety after her release from prison would be “essentially 

the same” as when she had previously been released and then relapsed. 

Arianne also admitted that after her release, she planned to continue to

interact with her “triggers,” including people with whom she had 

previously abused methamphetamine. Thus, reasonable evidence supports 

the juvenile court’s determination that Arianne’s substance abuse would 

continue for a prolonged and indeterminate time. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29, 231 P.3d 377, 383 (App. 2010)

(severance of father’s parental rights who had a cycle of drug abuse for 

decades affirmed; a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over a 

parent’s “uncertain battle with drugs”) (citation omitted).

¶11 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in terminating 

Arianne’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). See Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. 

at 288-89, ¶¶ 18-25, 378 P.3d at 730-31 (decades long substance abuse, 

including previous failed efforts to maintain sobriety and evidence of a high 

risk of relapse, supported termination of mother’s parental rights under

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)). Therefore, we need not address Arianne’s argument 

that the superior court erred in terminating her parental rights based on the 

length of her felony sentence under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). See Michael J., 196 

Ariz. at 251, ¶ 27, 995 P.2d at 687 (if appellate court affirms one statutory 

basis, it need not address other statutory bases for termination). 

II. Best Interests Analysis

¶12 Arianne next argues the juvenile court erred in finding that 

termination of her parental rights was in A.B.’s best interests because DCS

failed to establish that termination would provide an affirmative benefit to 

A.B. or that continuing the parental relationship would produce a specific 

detriment. See Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 8, 376 

P.3d 699, 701 (App. 2016) (DCS must prove affirmative benefit or that 

severance eliminates a detriment if parental rights continue) (citations 

omitted). Again, we disagree.
ARIANNE B. v. DCS, A.B.

Decision of the Court

6

¶13 The juvenile court made several findings demonstrating an 

affirmative benefit to A.B. The juvenile court found A.B. was “thriving” in 

her placement with her maternal grandmother, who had been A.B.’s 

primary caregiver for years, see supra ¶ 2, and who was willing to adopt 

A.B. See Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 

1290, 1291 (App. 1998) (immediate availability of adoptive placement and 

whether placement meets child’s needs support termination). Furthermore, 

after considering testimony that A.B. had anxiety and a “need for 

permanency and consistency,” the juvenile court found termination would 

benefit A.B. because it would assure she would remain in a stable and drugfree home. The juvenile court also weighed the detriment of prolonging 

A.B.’s anxiety and the significant likelihood that Arianne’s substance abuse 

would resume. 

¶14 Arianne additionally argues that termination of her parental 

rights would be detrimental to A.B. because of their significant bond. This

argument attempts to have this court reweigh the evidence, and we decline 

to do so. See Dominque M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 9, 376 P.3d at 701 (mother’s 

claim DCS failed to show termination was in children’s best interests 

because she shared a bond with her children improperly sought to have 

appellate court reweigh evidence). Accordingly, reasonable evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s determination that termination was in A.B.’s 

best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the reasons discussed, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Arianne’s parental rights to A.B.