UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6473

PATRICK L. BOOKER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; GREENVILLE 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; BRANDY P. SULLIVAN; TAMMY CHILDS; 

SHAWNEE PEEPLES; KELLY P. KAROW,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

GREENVILLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. 

(8:12-cv-00985-TMC)

Submitted: August 29, 2014 Decided: September 9, 2014

Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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Patrick L. Booker, Appellant Pro Se. Russell W. Harter, Jr., 

CHAPMAN, HARTER & HARTER, PA, Greenville, South Carolina; Paul 

L. Agnew, Abbeville, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Patrick Booker, a South Carolina prisoner, filed a 

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), alleging, in pertinent 

part, that the South Carolina Department of Social Services 

(“SCDSS”) and its agents, Brandy Sullivan, Shawnee Peeples, and 

Tammy Childs, violated his substantive and procedural due 

process rights when they temporarily removed his daughter, J.J., 

from the custody of her mother. The district court granted 

summary judgment to each defendant and denied Booker’s 

subsequent Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. Booker now appeals 

both orders. We affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting 

summary judgment. Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607 (4th 

Cir. 2010). Summary judgment shall be granted when “there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is 

a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district 

court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence 

presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 

(1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, 
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nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the 

nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 

312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Booker claimed that Peeples violated his due process 

rights by taking emergency custody of J.J. in the absence of 

prior notice, a court order, or exigent circumstances. However, 

having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Peeples 

had an appropriately founded belief that J.J. and her siblings 

were in immediate danger, namely of being re-exposed to 

narcotics by their mother or other family members. See Weller 

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. for the City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387, 

391-92 (4th Cir. 1990). Under such circumstances, no prior 

notice of the emergency removal was required. Id. 

Further, we agree with the district court that 

Sullivan was entitled to absolute immunity from Booker’s claim 

that she made intentional misstatements when preparing and 

presenting a petition for J.J.’s retention in SCDSS’s custody. 

Vosburg v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 

1989). Although not addressed by the district court, we also 

conclude that Sullivan’s absolute immunity extends to her 

alleged failure to notify Booker of J.J.’s removal and the 

resulting probable cause hearing. See Pusey v. City of 

Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1993); see also
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Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 

1992).

Finally, we conclude that Booker’s claims regarding 

Childs’ conduct in the wake of J.J.’s removal failed to suggest 

a violation of his substantive due process rights and, 

therefore, that Childs was rightly granted qualified immunity. 

To survive summary judgment, Booker was required to produce 

evidence that Childs was more than merely negligent but, 

instead, unjustifiably intended to injure Booker’s right to 

maintain a relationship with J.J. See Huggins v. Prince 

George’s Cnty., 683 F.3d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 2012); Patten v. 

Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 834 (4th Cir. 2001). Booker’s sparse, 

factually unsupported allegations against Childs fell well 

short.

Because the district court properly granted summary 

judgment and did not abuse its discretion in denying Booker’s 

Rule 59(e) motion, we affirm the district court’s orders. We 

grant Booker’s motion for leave to file a supplemental pro se 

brief and dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED