UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4066

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

SILAS JUNIOR MOBLEY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 11-4606

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee, 

v. 

MARVIN SUNTATE MOBLEY, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:09-cr-00189-RJC-2; 3:09-cr-00189-

RJC-DCK-3) 

Submitted: April 23, 2012 Decided: May 14, 2012
2

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Randolph Marshall Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina; Andrew B. 

Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellants. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, 

Richard L. Edwards, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, 

North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
3

PER CURIAM: 

Silas Junior Mobley (“Silas”) and Marvin Suntate 

Mobley (“Marvin”) were convicted after a jury trial of one count 

each of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent 

to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) and 

21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and one count each of attempted 

possession with the intent to distribute at least 500 grams of 

cocaine and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 

(2006), 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. The 

district court sentenced both Silas and Marvin to terms of life 

imprisonment on the conspiracy counts and concurrent terms of 

120 months’ imprisonment on the attempt counts, and they now 

appeal. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Marvin argues that the motion to withdraw filed by his 

trial counsel was erroneously denied. Because the magistrate 

judge, rather than the district court, issued the ruling denying 

the motion to withdraw, Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure governs. Rule 59(a) requires that a party 

object to a magistrate judge’s determination on “any matter that 

does not dispose of a charge or defense” within fourteen days 

after being served with a copy of the written order or after the 

oral order is stated on the record. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a). 
4

“Failure to object in accordance with this rule waives a party’s 

right to review.” Id. 

In this case, the magistrate judge entered the ruling 

denying the motion to withdraw filed by Marvin’s counsel. The 

record does not indicate that Marvin ever objected to the 

magistrate judge’s ruling before the district court. 

Accordingly, Marvin has waived appellate review of this issue. 

Id.; United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 93-94 (4th Cir. 

1984) (“We do not believe . . . that the [Federal Magistrates] 

Act can be interpreted to permit a party . . . to ignore his 

right to file objections with the district court without 

imperiling his right to raise the objections in the circuit 

court of appeals.”). 

Next, both Silas and Marvin contend that the district 

court’s instructions to the jury regarding its finding on drug 

quantity contravened this court’s decision in United States v. 

Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311-15 (4th Cir. 2005). Because Silas 

and Marvin did not object to the district court’s drug quantity 

instructions at the time they were given, we review this claim 

for plain error only. United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 

249 (4th Cir. 2007). After a review of the record and the 

parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not 

commit error—plain or otherwise—under Collins because the 

court’s instructions directed the jury to determine the drug 
5

quantity reasonably foreseeable to Silas and Marvin

individually, as opposed to the conspiracy as a whole. 

Marvin also challenges the district court’s imposition 

of the statutory minimum sentence of life imprisonment on the 

conspiracy count, arguing that the court erred in concluding 

that his 1997 South Carolina state conviction qualified as a 

predicate felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A). 

We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the 

term “felony drug offense” used in § 841(b)(1)(A). United 

States v. Burgess, 478 F.3d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 2007). 

A “felony drug offense” is “punishable by imprisonment 

for more than one year under any law of the United States or of 

a State . . . that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to 

narcotic drugs.” 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(44) (West Supp. 2011). 

Marvin asserts that his 1997 conviction does not qualify as a 

felony drug offense because he was sentenced for the conviction 

under South Carolina’s Youthful Offender Act (“YOA”), S.C. Code 

Ann. § 24-19-50 (2005), to five years in the custody of the 

state’s youthful offender division, suspended, and a three-year 

term of probation. 

We conclude that the district court properly 

determined that the 1997 conviction was a predicate felony drug 

offense under § 841(b)(1)(A). The conviction was for possession 

of cocaine base, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(A) 
6

(2002), and was punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. 

The fact that Marvin was given a sentence under the YOA for that 

conviction simply has no legal significance. See United 

States v. Williams, 508 F.3d 724, 726-30 (4th Cir. 2007)

(upholding a youthful offender offense as an armed career 

criminal predicate). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments. 

We construe Silas’ pro se letter as a motion seeking leave to 

file a pro se supplemental brief and deny the motion. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED