# C_2023267EN.01001701.xml

| 28.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 267/17 |
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28.7.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 267/17

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P9_TA(2023)0029

Preparation of the EU-Ukraine Summit

European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2023 on the preparation of the EU-Ukraine Summit (2023/2509(RSP))

(2023/C 267/02)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, |
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having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (1), and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the EU and Ukraine, signed in 2014 (AA/DCFTA), |
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having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (1), and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the EU and Ukraine, signed in 2014 (AA/DCFTA),

| — | having regard to the application for EU membership by Ukraine on 28 February 2022, the Commission communication of 17 June 2022 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2022)0407) and the subsequent European Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022, |
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having regard to the application for EU membership by Ukraine on 28 February 2022, the Commission communication of 17 June 2022 entitled ‘Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union’ (COM(2022)0407) and the subsequent European Council conclusions of 23 and 24 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and to the Rome Statute, |
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having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and to the Rome Statute,

| — | having regard to the joint statement following the 23rd EU-Ukraine Summit of 12 October 2021, |
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having regard to the joint statement following the 23rd EU-Ukraine Summit of 12 October 2021,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022, |
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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the Russian Federation has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law; whereas the geopolitical situation in Europe has fundamentally changed, which necessitates bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU; whereas Ukraine has suffered from Russian aggressions ever since protests broke out in November 2013 against the decision by the then President to suspend the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement; |
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A.

whereas the Russian Federation has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law; whereas the geopolitical situation in Europe has fundamentally changed, which necessitates bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU; whereas Ukraine has suffered from Russian aggressions ever since protests broke out in November 2013 against the decision by the then President to suspend the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement;

| B. | whereas Russia’s forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas thousands of civilians, including hundreds of children, have already been murdered and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law; whereas on 30 September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of the partly Russian-occupied Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, in addition to its previous annexation of the Crimean peninsula; |
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B.

whereas Russia’s forces have conducted indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas thousands of civilians, including hundreds of children, have already been murdered and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; whereas this inhumane conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies is in total disregard of international humanitarian law; whereas on 30 September 2022, Russia unilaterally declared its annexation of the partly Russian-occupied Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, in addition to its previous annexation of the Crimean peninsula;

| C. | whereas Ukraine’s political leadership and its people have shown remarkable determination to maintain the functioning of state institutions and public services despite the war; |
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C.

whereas Ukraine’s political leadership and its people have shown remarkable determination to maintain the functioning of state institutions and public services despite the war;

| D. | whereas the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit is due to take place on 3 February 2023 in Kyiv; whereas this summit provides a prime opportunity not only to discuss the situation on the ground and Ukraine’s current priorities, including financial and military support, accountability for Russian war crimes, crimes against humanity and crime of aggression, global outreach, restrictive measures and food and energy security, but also to take action needed for Ukraine to continue its reform effort, as stipulated in the AA/DCFTA and the seven priorities indicated in the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 and those leading towards EU membership; |
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D.

whereas the 24th EU-Ukraine Summit is due to take place on 3 February 2023 in Kyiv; whereas this summit provides a prime opportunity not only to discuss the situation on the ground and Ukraine’s current priorities, including financial and military support, accountability for Russian war crimes, crimes against humanity and crime of aggression, global outreach, restrictive measures and food and energy security, but also to take action needed for Ukraine to continue its reform effort, as stipulated in the AA/DCFTA and the seven priorities indicated in the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 and those leading towards EU membership;

| E. | whereas the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in force since 2014 has already led to a substantial intensification of political dialogue and to the strengthening of political association and economic integration, and has opened up new prospects for sectoral cooperation; |
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E.

whereas the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in force since 2014 has already led to a substantial intensification of political dialogue and to the strengthening of political association and economic integration, and has opened up new prospects for sectoral cooperation;

| F. | whereas the Council, in its conclusions of 13 December 2022 on enlargement and stabilisation and association process, invited the Commission to prepare a roadmap outlining the next steps to ease Ukraine’s access to the EU single market, using the full potential of the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine; |
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F.

whereas the Council, in its conclusions of 13 December 2022 on enlargement and stabilisation and association process, invited the Commission to prepare a roadmap outlining the next steps to ease Ukraine’s access to the EU single market, using the full potential of the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine;

| G. | whereas on 17 June 2022 the Commission published its opinion on Ukraine’s application for EU membership and recommended granting EU candidate status to Ukraine on the understanding that certain reform measures such as on the rule of law and the fight against corruption be taken; whereas the Council, in its conclusions of 13 December 2022, recalled that the Commission had been invited to report on the fulfilment of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinion of 17 June 2022 as part of its regular enlargement package in 2023, and took note of the Commission’s intention to provide an update in spring 2023 instead; |
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G.

whereas on 17 June 2022 the Commission published its opinion on Ukraine’s application for EU membership and recommended granting EU candidate status to Ukraine on the understanding that certain reform measures such as on the rule of law and the fight against corruption be taken; whereas the Council, in its conclusions of 13 December 2022, recalled that the Commission had been invited to report on the fulfilment of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinion of 17 June 2022 as part of its regular enlargement package in 2023, and took note of the Commission’s intention to provide an update in spring 2023 instead;

| H. | whereas there is no ‘fast-track’ for EU membership, and accession remains a complex, merit-based and structured process and requires effective implementation of reforms and the transposition of the acquis; whereas each country’s progress on the path to accession is assessed on its own merit and that of its reform process; whereas however, that does not exclude a fast start to the process as a manifestation of the EU’s commitment to Ukraine in the new geopolitical context created by the Russian aggression; whereas the EU’s capacity to absorb new members will play an important role in future accessions; |
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H.

whereas there is no ‘fast-track’ for EU membership, and accession remains a complex, merit-based and structured process and requires effective implementation of reforms and the transposition of the acquis; whereas each country’s progress on the path to accession is assessed on its own merit and that of its reform process; whereas however, that does not exclude a fast start to the process as a manifestation of the EU’s commitment to Ukraine in the new geopolitical context created by the Russian aggression; whereas the EU’s capacity to absorb new members will play an important role in future accessions;

| I. | whereas decentralisation and strong local self-government have become a cornerstone of Ukraine’s democracy and are an important factor in Ukraine’s resilience during the war; whereas having municipalities lead on local reconstruction is critical to ensuring that national and international funds for reconstruction flow to where they are most needed; |
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I.

whereas decentralisation and strong local self-government have become a cornerstone of Ukraine’s democracy and are an important factor in Ukraine’s resilience during the war; whereas having municipalities lead on local reconstruction is critical to ensuring that national and international funds for reconstruction flow to where they are most needed;

| 1. | Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine and unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; |
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1.

| 2. | Reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who continue proving extraordinary courage and resilience under the unabated threats and attacks since 24 February 2022 and over the last nine years of Russian aggressions against Ukraine; |
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2.

| 3. | Fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law; reiterates, in this regard, its condemnation of Russia’s illegal annexations of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine, as well as of the Crimean peninsula; |
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3.

| 4. | Underlines the urgent need for accountability for Russia’s war crimes, crimes against humanity and for the crime of aggression against Ukraine; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to take a leading role and actively support the establishment of a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute Russia’s crime of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of an international register of damage; expresses its full support to the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the situation in Ukraine and alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; urges Ukraine to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC and its amendments and formally become a member of the ICC in order to support international efforts to establish accountability for serious international crimes; |
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4.

| 5. | Continues to call for the EU institutions and the Member States, as well as the EU’s partners, to provide Ukraine with all necessary political, military, economic, infrastructure-related, financial and humanitarian support; expects the Member States to use the upcoming EU-Ukraine Summit to strengthen their commitment; |
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5.

| 6. | Underlines the continued need to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine and calls on the EU and Ukraine to discuss the needs of the approximately 8 million Ukrainians who have fled the war and are temporarily residing in EU Member States; welcomes, in this context, the recent extension of the Temporary Protection Directive (2) until March 2024; underlines the need to prioritise the situation of children and women, in particular pregnant women, single parents and victims of trafficking, as well as to join efforts to return forcibly deported Ukrainians to Ukraine and to reunite families of children forcibly adopted from Ukraine; |
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6.

| 7. | Calls on the Member States to increase and accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine, in particular the provision of weapons, in response to clearly identified needs; expresses its support for the latest decisions to provide Ukraine with modern infantry fighting vehicles, armoured personnel carriers, air defence systems and the relevant ammunition and urges the Member States to speed up the delivery of military support and equipment to Ukraine; welcomes the decision of the governments of several EU Member States, the US, the UK and Canada to deliver modern main battle tanks to Ukraine; insists that the training of Ukrainian crews in operating these tanks begin immediately and calls for consideration to be given to delivering Western fighter jets and long-range missile systems as a next step; |
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7.

| 8. | Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to support the 10-point peace plan presented by President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and to work towards establishing an international coalition to implement that plan and to engage with Ukraine on the topic of future security guarantees, such as those proposed in the Kyiv Security Compact; |
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8.

| 9. | Supports the establishment of the military assistance mission to train the Ukrainian armed forces on EU soil; recognises the current work of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine and welcomes the recent adjustment of its mandate in order to support Ukrainian authorities in facilitating the investigation and prosecution of any international crimes committed by the Russian armed forces and mercenaries in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; |
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9.

| 10. | Welcomes the signature on 16 January 2023 of the Memorandum of Understanding and the Loan Facility Agreement for the unprecedented support package of EUR 18 billion for Ukraine in 2023 through the Macro-Financial Assistance Plus instrument as well as the swift disbursement of the first instalment on 17 January 2023; emphasises the importance of continued and swift implementation of commitments for financial and technical assistance in order to ensure Ukraine’s macroeconomic stability, restore critical infrastructure and maintain essential public services, in particular with a view to the continued Russian attacks against civilian infrastructure that endanger a substantial number of Ukrainian citizens at risk of having no access to basic services such as water, heating and electricity; emphasises the need for responsible, transparent and efficient use of EU and other international financial assistance and stresses the importance of reinstalling Ukraine’s public procurement system by fully restoring the ProZorro system; |
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10.

| 11. | Calls for the upcoming EU-Ukraine Summit to be used to prioritise the need for an EU comprehensive recovery package for Ukraine, which should be focused on the country’s immediate, medium- and long-term relief, reconstruction and recovery and further help to strengthen the growth of the economy once the war is over; recalls that the recovery package should be jointly led by the EU, international financial institutions and like-minded partners, with the substantial involvement of the G7; recommends that Ukrainian local self-government representatives contribute to the design of recovery measures; recommends the establishment of a clear and transparent mechanism for involving Ukrainian civil society in key decision-making processes, and calls for continued support for civil society; underlines the importance of environmental and transparency conditions for the reconstruction effort; insists on the implementation of the most relevant environmental reforms, as well as the establishment of effective safeguards for the protection of the environment during the development and reconstruction of Ukraine; calls for the recovery package to be supported by the necessary EU budget capacity; |
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11.

| 12. | Reiterates its call to identify a proper legal base to allow the use of frozen Russian Central Bank assets, as well as assets of Russian oligarchs, to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine; supports the establishment of a special international monitoring mission to record the environmental consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine with a view to establishing a basis upon which to obtain specific compensation from Russia; |
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12.

| 13. | Welcomes the European Council’s decision to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine; underlines that accession to the EU must take place in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, based on respect for the relevant procedures and conditional upon the fulfilment of the established criteria, in particular the so-called Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, and remains a merit-based process that requires adoption and implementation of relevant reforms, in particular in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, a market economy and implementation of the EU acquis; |
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13.

| 14. | Reaffirms its commitment to Ukraine’s membership of the European Union; believes that it represents a geo-strategic investment in a united and strong Europe; reiterates that Ukraine’s application for EU membership equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision in today’s context of the brutal Russian war of aggression and sends a clear political message that Ukraine has irreversibly chosen a European path, which will be supported by its European partners; |
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14.

| 15. | Welcomes the European ambitions of the people of Ukraine and therefore urges Ukraine’s political leaders and authorities to harness the momentum and vigorously pursue the EU-related reform agenda, taking into account the priorities indicated by the Commission in its opinion on Ukraine’s application for EU membership; |
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15.

| 16. | Invites the authorities of Ukraine to unambiguously demonstrate their political determination to act on the European ambitions of their people by significantly enhancing progress with substantial reforms in order to effectively fulfil the criteria for EU membership as soon as possible; highlights, in this respect, the need to protect the independence of all anti-corruption institutions, enhance media freedom, strengthen the efficiency and accountability of the judiciary, address the shortcomings in the functioning of law enforcement bodies and ensure political and party pluralism both within and outside Ukraine’s Parliament; calls on Ukraine to refrain from passing legislation that is not compatible with the EU acquis or that endangers achievements in the reform process and the fight against corruption; |
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16.

| 17. | Calls on those attending the forthcoming summit between the EU and Ukraine to work towards the start of accession negotiations and to support a roadmap outlining the next steps to enable Ukraine’s accession to the EU single market, focusing on providing tangible benefits for Ukrainian society and citizens from the start of the process, based on a step-by-step approach; calls on the Commission to present a bold and ambitious plan for these negotiations and for Ukraine’s rapid, stepwise integration into EU policies and programmes, accompanied by a roadmap for each step in the process; calls for an innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the Association Agreement in force and the accession negotiation process; |
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17.

| 18. | Calls on the Ukrainian Government to continue to strengthen local self-government, a reform that has received significant national and international acclaim, and to embed the success of the decentralisation reform in the overall architecture of Ukraine’s repair, recovery and reconstruction processes; |
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18.

| 19. | Welcomes Ukraine’s significant progress in aligning with the EU single market and calls for the swift adoption of the priority action plan for an enhanced 2023-2024 implementation of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA; calls for the prolongation of Regulation (EU) 2022/870 on temporary trade liberalisation (3), as well as for an urgent review of possible further transport liberalisation measures; |
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19.

| 20. | Welcomes the EU-facilitated ‘roam like at home’ agreement between EU and Ukrainian telecommunications companies for the benefit for Ukrainian refugees and welcomes its prolongation; calls for the Ukrainian telecommunications market to be integrated into the EU telecommunications market; |
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20.

| 21. | Calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen strategic communication and provide relevant information on the mutual benefits and opportunities of enlargement both in Ukraine and in the Member States in order to further increase support and improve understanding of the accession process; calls on the Commission and the Member States to improve the visibility of EU funding and its tangible results in Ukraine; insists that Ukrainian civil society and the EU play an active role in the implementation of these objectives; |
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21.

| 22. | Welcomes Ukraine’s active participation in the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative and calls for this political initiative to be further strengthened, as an important platform for regional cooperation and the exchange of reform experiences between partner countries seeking either closer cooperation with the EU or EU membership; |
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22.

| 23. | Calls on the EU institutions to extend the opportunities for Ukrainian officials to study and observe the work of the EU institutions; encourages bilateral parliamentary meetings between the parliaments of the Member States and that of Ukraine; calls on the EU and its Member States to continue to provide educational opportunities for Ukraine’s young people, civil servants and diplomats, among others; calls for procedures to be launched for the establishment of the Eastern Partnership Academy for Public Administration; |
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23.

| 24. | Calls on the Member States to adopt the 10th package of sanctions against Russia as soon as possible and to proactively submit proposals for the further development of sanctions by including new sectors and individuals; urges all Member States to continue to show unity in the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine; calls on all partners, in particular EU candidate countries and potential candidates, to align with the sanctions packages; |
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24.

| 25. | Calls for the list of individuals and entities targeted by the sanctions to be expanded to include Russian companies still present on EU markets, such as Lukoil and Rosatom, and those involved in forced deportations, the illegal imprisonment of Russian civic activists and political opposition members, the illegal ‘referendums’ in Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, and the illegal ‘elections’ in Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as all members of State Duma parties who hold offices in elected parliaments at all levels, including at regional and municipal levels, and the members of the Russian propaganda media disseminating anti-Ukrainian and pro-war sentiments; calls on the Council to enlarge the list of individuals sanctioned to include individuals from the list proposed by Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation; urges, at the same time, Ukraine to adopt the Ukrainian Magnitsky law; calls for a ban on the direct or indirect import, purchase or transfer of diamonds, whether in raw or processed form, originating from the Russian Federation; |
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25.

| 26. | Reiterates its call for an immediate and full embargo on imports of fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, and for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines to be completely abandoned, in order to stop financing Putin’s war machine with EU money; calls for the restrictive measures against Belarus to be strengthened; urges the Council, in cooperation with international partners, to decrease the price cap on oil that originates in or is exported from Russia; |
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26.

| 27. | Calls on the Commission and EU supervisory authorities to closely monitor the effective and comprehensive implementation of all EU sanctions by the Member States and to address any circumvention practices, including closing the existing loopholes; condemns those third countries that have helped Russia and Belarus to circumvent the imposed sanctions and asks the Commission and the Member States to consider measures against those third countries; |
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27.

| 28. | Condemns the recent decision of the International Olympic Committee to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete in qualifications for the Paris 2024 Olympic Games under a neutral flag, which runs counter to those countries’ multifaceted isolation and will be used by both regimes for propaganda purposes; |
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28.

| 29. | Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to strengthen the international isolation of the Russian Federation, including with regard to its membership in international organisations and bodies to refrain from holding any formal events on the territory of the Russian Federation, reducing the level of diplomatic relations with Moscow; |
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29.

| 30. | Condemns Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and, in order to mitigate the risk of a nuclear or radiological incident, supports the proposal to set up a nuclear safety and security protection zone around it, as proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency; |
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30.

| 31. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to work strategically and to proactively counter hybrid threats and to prevent Russia’s interference in political, electoral and other democratic processes in Ukraine and beyond, in particular malicious acts aimed at manipulating public opinion and undermining European integration; calls on the EU and its Member States to increase resilience against disinformation and disruptive campaigns designed to undermine democratic processes and create divisions in Ukraine; |
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31.

| 32. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. |
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32.

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(1)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(2)  Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12.).

(3)  Regulation (EU) 2022/870 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on temporary trade-liberalisation measures supplementing trade concessions applicable to Ukrainian products under the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (OJ L 152, 3.6.2022, p. 103).

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