### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Ma rc h 10 , 200 9 S es sio n
ROBE RT DANIEL S a nd PEGG Y DANIELS , v. MI CHAEL D. WRAY

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Cannon County No. 453 Hon. J. Mark Roger s, Jud ge

No. M2008- 01781-COA-R 3-CV - F iled May 21, 2009

Plaintiff filed this action for da mag es for injuries sustained i n an automobile ac cident. De fenda nt
ans we re d, de nyinglia

bil ity , a nd su bs e qu e ntl y fi le d a Te nn . R. Civ. P. 15 to a me nd and make c la im for pe rsonal injuries and pr operty damag e as a

result of the acc ident. The Trial Court allowed the amendment as to pr operty damag es, but r efuse d to a llow de fenda nt to asser

t the claim for pe rsonal inj ur ie s o n th e g ro un ds int e r a lia that th e statut e of lim itatio ns ha d r

un on the pe rs on a l in

jur y c la im prior to the filing of the Motion to Amend. The prope rty damag e cla im was settled, but the re fusal to a llo w the a me ndme nt h as been appea le d to thi s Co ur t. We ho ld t

hat th e Tr ia l Co ur

t a bu se d it s dis c re tio n in

re fu sin g to a llo w the a me ndme nt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci rcu itCo ur t R e ve r se d and Re m ande d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., and J OHN W. M C C L AR TY , J ., joined.

R o b e rtP

. G r i t t o n , M u r f

r e e s b o r o , T e n n e s s e e , f

o r A p p e l l an t , M i c h a e l D

. W r ay.
Alan M. Sowell and Nathaniel K. Cherr y , Nashville, Tennes s ee, f or Unnamed Appellee , Direc t G e n e r a l In s u r an c e C o mp an y.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Plainti ffs filed a

Complaint on November 10, 2005, alleg ing that on Febr uary 23, 2005, defe ndant’s vehic le collided with their ve hicle and that Ms. Daniels rec eiv ed s erious and disabling injuries a

nd also sued for

proper ty damag e.
On Dec ember

22, 2005, defe ndant answe red, de ny ing he was ne g lige nt, and asser ted the af firmative defe nse of compar ative fault. L ater defe ndant filed a Motion to Amend on Novembe r 9, 20 06 , s e e kin g to a dd

a c ounte rc la im, wh ic h c ha rg e d th at pla int if

fs we re ne g lig e nt i n th e ir operation of their vehicle , that he wa s injured as a result, and soug ht damag es.
Pla int if fs op po se d d e fe nd ant’s Mo tio n, a sse rt ingde fe nd ant’ s ans we r w a s f ile d in Dec ember

2005, but defe ndant did not seek to a mend same to add a c ounterc laim until November 2006. Plaintiffs claimed undue de lay , and that they would be p re

j u d i ce d with the amendment
occur ring so close to trial.

The Tr ial Court entere d an Or der D eny ing D efe ndant’s Motion to Amend, finding that pl a int if

fs ’ c ou ns e l ha d b e e n no tif

ie d by de fe nd ant’ s c ouns e l in De c e mbe r 2 00 5 th a t he wo uld be asse rting a cla im for damag es, but that the s tatute of limit ations on claims for personal injuries as to the acc ident ran on Fe bruar y 23, 2006. Fur

ther, that depositions we re taken in Aug ust 2006, but the Motion to Amend was not filed unt il November 2006. The Court found that at the time the Motion to Amend was hea rd, the c ase ha d not y et bee n set for tria l, and no medica l proof had been taken.

Th e Court state d tha t it ha d co ns ide re d a ll a pp lic a ble statut e s, ru le s and

a uth or iti e s, and conclude d that the amendme nt should be denied be cause it was untimely due to the undue de lay in f il in g th e a me n d me n t an d u n d u e p r e ju d ic e to th e p la in ti f

f

. T h e Co u rt f

o u n d s p e c if

ic ally that plaintiffs wer e p re

j u d i ced be cause they

could have prepa

red diff ere ntly for the de positions i f the
a me ndme nt h a d b e e n f

ile d e arl ie r. Th e Cou

rt , h ow e ve r, did

a llo w d e fe nd ant t o ame nd to a dd a c la im for pr operty

damag e, since the statute of limitations for proper ty damag es had not y et run.
Plaintiffs entere d a volunt ary nonsuit as t o their claims, prior to trial, and the par ties enter ed an a g ree d Orde r of Compromise an d Settlement of Def endant/Counter- Plaintiff’s Counterclaim for Property Damag e, st ating that the counterclaim for proper ty damag e wa s settled
and wa s d ism iss e d w ithpr e

jud ic e . T he Court

the n e nte re d a

n O rd e r d ismis si ng pl aint if fs ’ c la ims ag ainst defe ndant without prejudice . This appea l ensued.

The issue pre sented on a

ppeal is whe ther the Trial Court erre d in denying de fenda nt’s Motion to Amend, when the parties had not y et completed discovery , had not taken medical proof,
and the c a se wa s n ot s e t f

or tr ia l?-3- Defen d an t argue s the Trial Court er red in de ny ing his Motion to Amend, which soug ht to add his counterc laim for per sonal inju ry d amage s. He pointed out that he a lleg ed
c omp arativ e fa

ult in h is t ime ly

ans we r, and

no tif ie d p la int if

fs by le tte r t

hat he int e nd e d to a sse rt

a counter claim as early as Decembe r 2005, and thus plaintiffs had noti ce of the cause of action and the pa rt ie s’ re sp e c tiv e fa

ult s w e re a t is su e . De fe nd ant a rgue s th e de lay

in f ili ngma de no dif

fe re nc e in the taking of the discove ry depositions, as fault was c lear ly the m ain i ssue, and that at the time the amendment wa s sought discove ry had not bee n completed a nd the ca se wa s not set for trial. Appellee argues the Tr ial Court’s g rant or denial of a motion to amend is w ithin the Court’s sound discretion, and should be reve rsed only upon a showing of abuse

. Me rri ma n v . S mi th , 599 S.W .2d 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

We h a ve pr e vio us ly

e xpla ine d th e a

bu se of dis c re tio n sta

nd ard and c ha ra c te ri zed it
a s “ a re vie w- c on str a ini ngsta

nd ard that c a lls fo r le ss i nte ns e a pp e llate re vie w” and , th e re fo re , le ss likelihood the trial court' s decision wil l be re verse d. State ex re l. Jones v . Looper , 86 S.W .3d 189, 19 3 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0)

. Our Sup re me Court a lso dis c us se d th e a

bu se of dis c re tio n s tand a rd

in Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) , wher ein it was stated:

Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court' s ruling “will be upheld so long
as re asonable minds can disag ree as t o propriety of t he decision made.” A trial cour t
a bu se s it s d isc re tio n o nly

wh e n it “ a pp lie [s] an inc or

re c t le g a l st and ard , o r r e a c he [s]
a de c isi on wh ic h is a g a ins t log ic or

re a so nin g tha

t c a us e [s] an in

jus tic e to t

he pa rt y complaining .” The abuse of discretion standa

rd does not per

mit the appellate c ourt to substit ute its judgment for that of the trial c ourt. Eldridge, 42 S.W .3d at 85.

The gr an t o r

d e n ia l o f a mo ti o nto a me n d

a p le a d in g is d is c r e ti o n ar

y w it h th e tr ia l court. Harris v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc. , 7 2 6 S. W. 2 d 9 0 2 , 9 0 4 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 7 )

. G e n e r a ll y , “trial courts must g ive the propone nt of a motion to amend a f ull chan ce t o b e h ear d on the motion and must consider the motion in light of the amendment policy embodied in Rule 15.01 of the Te nnessee Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure that ame ndme nts mus t be fr e e ly a llo we d; and , in the e ve nt t

he mot ion

to amend is denied, the t rial cour t must give a

rea soned explanation for its action.” He nd e rso n v . B us h Bros. & Co. , 8 68 S.W. 2d 23 6, 23 8 (T e nn

. 19 93 ). Al tho ug h pe rm iss ion to a me nd sh ou ld b e lib e ra lly g rante d, the dec ision “will not be rever sed unless abuse of discre tio n h as b ee n shown.” W elch v

. Thuan , 882 S.W .2d 792, 793 (Tenn. Ct. App.1994). Fa ctors the Tr ial Court should consider whe n decidingwhether

to all o w am endments i nclude “ [u] ndue dela y in filing; lac k of notice to the opposing pa

rty ; bad fa ith by

the moving pa

rty , repe ated f

ailure to c ure de ficienc ies by previous
a me n dments, undue pre

judice to the opposing party , and futility of ame ndment.” Mer ri man v. S mith , 599 S.W .2d 548, 559 (Tenn. Ct. App.1979).

I n Branch v. W

arren , 5 27 S.W. 2d

89 (T e nn . 1 97 5) , th e Sup re m e C o u r t d i s c u s s e d Ru le 1 5

. 0 1 o f t h e T en n es s ee R u l es o f C i v i l P ro ce d

u re , s t at i n g:-4- The ne w Rules of C ivil Procedur e, in this reg ard “come not to destroy the old law, but to fulfill.” They

wer e desig ned to simplify and ease the burde n of proc edure
u n d er t h e s o m et i m es h ar s h an d t ec h n i ca l ru l e s o f c o m m o nl aw p l ea d i n g. Acc ording ly , Rule 15.01 provides that leave (to amend) shall be fr eely g iven when justice so require s. This proviso in the rules su b s t an tially lessens the e x erc ise of pre- trial discre tion on the part of a trial judge

. I ndeed, the statute (§ 20-1505, T.C.A.) wh i ch co n fe rred a mea sure of discretion on trial judg es wa s repe aled a nd Rule 15 stands in its pl ace and st ead. That rule needs no construction; it means pre cisely what is say s, that “leave shall be f ree ly g iven.”

Id

. at 91-92. L ater , in Ga rd ine r v . W or d , 731 S.W .2d 889, 891 (Tenn. 1987) , the Court rea ffirme d that trial courts we re r equire d to be libera l in allowing pretria l motions to amend. In a ca se dec ided by this Court which recog nized that liberality was re quired, a

plaintiff wa s al l o wed to amend a complaint three months be fore trial, and three y ear s afte r the complaint was first filed. See W eston v. Community Baptist Church , 2007 WL 394644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2007). T his Court stated:

I n the case before us, the church was long a war e that Ms. Weather ly

and, later , her h ei rs s o u gh tre tu rn o f t h e m o n ey t h e W ea t h er l y s h adp ro v i d edt o p ay o ff t h e m o rt gage on the land. The churc h was a lso long a war e that the Weather ly s relied in par t on the amendment of

the chur ch' s constitution t hat provided f or re turn of th e m oney

or tr ans fe r o f t

he land to t he Weathe rl y s u

po n th e oc c ur

re nc e of sp e c if ie d c i r c ums tanc e s. Throug hout the litigation the chur ch conte nded the money was a g if t

. I n her amendment to the c omplaint, Ms. W eston ag ree d with the churc h that the money was a gi ft , b u tal l ege d

i twa s co n d i t i o n edo nt h e c i rc u m s t an ce s d es cr i b edi nt h e c h u rc h 's
r e v i s i o nt o i t s c o n s t i tu t i o n

. N o n e w e v i d e n c e w a s r e qu i r e d t o r e s o l v e t h e i s s u e

. In other wor ds, the amendme nt did not im plicate a dditional evidence of which the churc h had bee n unawa

re a nd did not chang e the r elief soug ht. See Hunt v. Temc o, Inc. , 452 S.W .2d 879, 888 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969)( lat e-f iled amendment a sserting quantum meruit theory of rec overy for first time pe rmitted beca use (1) same e vidence could have been used to support either qua ntum meruit or contra ct pleading s and (2) the measur e of da

mag es wa s the same f

or ea ch theor

y ). Consequently , we c an find
no prejudice to the churc h' s ability to de fend the lawsuit due to the amendment of the
c o mp l a i n t

. T h e c h u r c h w a s u n a b l e t o p o i n tt o an y.

I n the case befor e us, the same evidenc e would have been used if the ame ndment had been a llowed, bec ause the issue of who was at fault i n this acc ident was the pivotal issue from the
ou tse t. P la int if

fs a dmi tte d th e y

ha d n oti c e fr om t

he be g inn ing that def

e nd ant fe lt the y

we re a t f a ult and that he intended to f

ile a claim ag ainst them. Thus, while the Court f ound it significa

nt that the de po sit ion s o f t

he pa rt ie s h a d a lr e a dy

be e n ta ke n, fa ult wa s th e on ly

iss ue ex pl or e d d

ur ingtho se depositions. The rec ord does not demonstrate that plaintiffs wer e pre judiced in a “ wasted” discovery
or prepa rations for depositions, or that they would have pr epar ed diffe rently if the counte rcla im had been f iled.Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 8- 1- 11 4 s ta te s: " A c ounte rc la im o r t hir d- pa rt y Com pla int or c ro ss1 claim is not barre d by

th e ap p l i ca ble statute of limitations or any statutory limit ation of time, howeve r cha

rac terized, if it was not barr ed at t h e t ime the claims asse rted in the Complaint were interposed.” Whil e appe llee sug g ests the reason for this statute is to allow a counter claim wher e a plaintiff waits until the last p o s s i b l e d at e to bring an ac tion before the statute expires, clea rly the statut e is n ot l imi te d to su c h th e or e tic a l f a c ts.

-5- There was a lso no showing that plaintiffs w ere prejudice d by the delay of def endant’ s so ug ht a me nd men t, as dis c ov e ry

wa s st ill g oin g on , a

nd the c a se ha d n ot y e t be e n s e t f or tr ia l. Clearly , the Trial Court base d its ruling on the fact that the statute of limitations as to personal injury claims had run. T he Tr i al C o u rt specif ically listed this as a basis for its decision, and a llowed defe ndant to file a c ounterc laim for prope rty damag e. B ut the s tatute of li mitations i s not one of the fa c tor s li ste d to c on sid e r i n mak ing su c h de te rm inatio ns , a nd fu rt he r, su c h c ou ld h a ve be e n th e c a se e ve n if the c ounte rc la im w a s p art of the or ig ina l ans we r, if

pla int if fs ha d f ile d th e ir c la ims on

the la st day befor e t h e s tatute ra

n. I t was inappropr iate for the Trial Court to re ly

upon the statute of 1 lim itatio ns statut e a s a

ba sis to de ny

de fe nd ant' s Mo tio n to Am e nd . T he Tr ia l Co ur t sp e c if ic a lly found that the fac tors of bad faith, futility , etc., had no applica bility here . The other

fac tors relied up on by the Court , i. e . und ue de lay a nd pr e jud ic e to p la int if

fs , a re no t su pp or te d b y the re c or d. Thus , the Tr ia l Cour

t cle arl y “ a

pp lie d an inc or

re c t leg a l stand ard ” , an d “r e a c he d a de c isi on wh ic h is a g a ins t logic or re asoning that cause d an injustice to the par ty complaining .” See Eldridge . We hold the Trial Court abuse d its discr etion in f ailing to a llow de fenda

nt to amend his answer , and re verse the Trial Court' s ruling on this issue.

The cause is r emande d for further proce eding s consistent with this Opinion, and the
c o s to f t h e a p p e a l i s a s s e s s e d

t o t h e u n n a m e d

a p p e l l e e , D i r e c tG e n e r a l In s u r an c e C o mp an y.

_________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.