NUMBERS 13-17-00215-CR & 13-17-00250-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RONALD DOUGLAS NEVELS, Appellant,

 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 319th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

In two separate but related causes, appellant Ronald Douglas Nevels was 

convicted of possession of cocaine, a state-jail felony, see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 

ANN. § 481.115(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.), and failure to comply with sex 

offender registration requirements, a third-degree felony, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
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art. 62.102 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Nevels argues on appeal that the 

trial court’s oral pronouncement of a “sanction” controls over the written order revoking 

his community supervision. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In trial court cause number 09-CR-1906-G (appellate cause number 13-17-00215-

CR), Nevels was charged by information with possession of cocaine. See TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a). In 2009, he pled guilty to the offense pursuant to a plea 

agreement. Nevels’s sentence of two years in state jail was suspended and he was 

placed on community supervision for three years.

In trial court cause number 11-CR-1515-G (appellate cause number 13-17-00250-

CR), Nevels was charged by indictment with failure to comply with registration 

requirements. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102. In 2011, he pled guilty to 

this offense pursuant to a plea agreement. Nevels’s sentence of five years in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice was suspended and he 

was placed on community supervision for five years.

Over the course of the next several years, the State filed three motions to revoke 

community supervision in trial court cause number 09-CR-1906-G and two motions to 

revoke community supervision in trial court cause number 11-CR-1515-G, alleging 

various violations of his community supervision, including multiple instances of testing 

positive for cocaine and failing to report to his community supervision officer. Nevels 

pleaded true to all the allegations in all the motions to revoke. On each motion to revoke, 

Nevels was continued on community supervision.
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In February of 2017, the State filed another motion to revoke in both cause 

numbers. On April 17, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the most recent motions to 

revoke. The following exchanges occurred:

[State]: So we are giving Mr. Nevels another chance. The 

recommendation is the substance abuse caseload, Coastal 

Bend Outpatient Program, zero tolerance, a drug patch, a 

one-year extension, and a sixty-day jail sanction.

. . . .

[Trial Court]: All right. Based upon the defendant’s pleads [sic] of true and 

the evidence submitted, I’m going to find the allegations true. 

I am going to revoke the defendant’s probation. I’m going to 

sentence him on—is the first one a state jail felony?

. . . .

[Trial Court]: Then I’m going to sanction him—off the record

(Discussion off the record)

[Trial Court]: All right. Then I’ll sanction him to one year on the state jail on 

Cause Number 09-CR-1906-G, and I’ll sanction him to three 

years confinement on the 11-CR-1515-G. I’ll allow these 

sentences to run concurrent with each other, and I’ll give the 

defendant credit for any time he spent in jail prior to today’s 

date. Okay. That will be the order for the Court. I know I did 

not follow the recommendations of the State, but obviously as 

I said before, it is a motion to revoke; so just advise your client 

accordingly, okay?

The written judgment for trial court cause number 09-CR-1906-G reflects that 

Nevels’s community supervision was revoked and that he was sentenced to one year in 

state jail. The written judgment for trial court cause number 11-CR-1515-G reflects that 

Nevels’s community supervision was revoked and that he was sentenced to three years 

in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This appeal 

ensued.
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II. ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT

In both cause numbers, Nevels argues that the trial court’s oral pronouncement of 

a sanction controls over the written judgment and that the judgment should be modified 

to delete the revocation of his community supervision.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Usually, the written order of the court controls over an oral announcement. See 

Eubanks v. State, 599 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ex parte Bolivar, 386 

S.W.3d 338, 345–346 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2012, no pet.). However, the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that “when there is a variation between the oral 

pronouncement of sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence, the oral 

pronouncement controls.” Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). 

We have interpreted Coffey and its progeny to be limited to situations in which there are 

“oral and written variations in sentencing.” Cross v. State, No. 13-11-00041-CR, 2011 

WL 3840505, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication); see Ex parte Bolivar, 386 S.W.3d at 345 (“A written order 

revoking community supervision controls over an oral pronouncement by the trial judge.”).

B. Discussion

Nevels argues that the trial court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence was 

inconsistent with the written judgment. More specifically, Nevels argues that the written 

judgment indicates that his community supervision has been revoked in both cause 

numbers whereas the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence merely indicated that 

he intended to sanction Nevels but keep him on community supervision. Accordingly, 

Nevels asserts that the final written judgment should be modified to reflect the trial court’s 
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oral pronouncement of sanction. The State argues that Nevels did not raise any 

objections to the trial court and furthermore that there is no inconsistency between the 

sentence and the written judgment. We agree with the State.

We find no inconsistency between the oral pronouncement and the written 

judgment. The trial court clearly informed the parties of his decision to “revoke the 

defendant’s probation.” The trial court followed this by stating, “Then I’ll sanction him to 

one year on the state jail on Cause Number 09-CR-1906-G, and I’ll sanction him to three 

years confinement on the 11-CR-1515-G.” According to Nevels, the trial court was using 

“sanction” as a term of art to imply a continuation of community supervision. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.001(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). 

However, the State argues that the trial court simply misspoke when it used the word 

“sanction.”

We agree with the State because the record indicates that the trial court intended 

to revoke Nevels’s community supervision, and there is nothing in the record suggesting 

that the trial court intended to keep Nevels on community supervision. For example, the 

trial court told the parties that he was revoking Nevels’s probation and never said anything 

to indicate that he changed his mind. Furthermore, the State itself recommended that 

Nevels be continued on community supervision, but the trial court specified that it “did not 

follow the recommendations of the State.” Also, right after proclaiming that he intended 

to revoke Nevels’s probation, the trial court pronounced the sentences of one year in state 

jail and three years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice, to run concurrently, on Nevels’s two cause numbers; these sentences were 

consistent between oral pronouncement and the written judgment. Therefore, we find no 
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inconsistency; the written judgment accurately reflects the trial court’s oral 

pronouncement of revoking Nevels’s community supervision and sentencing him to one 

year in state jail and three years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. See Coffey, 979 S.W.2d at 328. We overrule Nevels’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

 NORA L. LONGORIA

 Justice 

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

20th day of September, 2018.