[Cite as Altercare Newark S., Inc. v. Glasmeier, 2021-Ohio-3456.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ALTERCARE NEWARK SOUTH, INC., : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

LOIS GLASMEIER, et al., : Case No. 2021 CA 0018 

 : 

 Defendants - Appellants : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County 

Municipal Court, Case No. 20 CVF 

00673 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: September 29, 2021 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

ADAM R. TODD JAROD B. ROSE 

Florey Todd, LTD. Schaller, Campbell & Untied 

5 E. Long Street, Suite 600 32 N. Park Place, P.O. Box 309 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 Newark, Ohio 43058 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Mark Glasmeier appeals from the February 16, 2021 

Final Judgment Entry of the Licking County Municipal Court granting the Motion for 

Summary Judgment filed by defendant-appellee Altercare Newark South, Inc. and 

granting judgment in favor of defendant-appellee and against plaintiff-appellant Mark 

Glasmeier and Lois Glasmeier, jointly and severally, in the amount of $13,547.00 plus 

interest. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} At all relevant times, appellant Mark Glasmeier was the son of Lois 

Glasmeier. Appellee Altercare Newark South, Inc. operates a licensed nursing home in 

Muskingum County, Ohio. Appellant arranged for his mother to receive care in appellee’s 

facility. 

{¶3} At the time that Lois Glasmeier was admitted to appellee’s facility, appellant, 

as her representative, on October 30, 2018 signed an Admission Agreement. The 

Agreement stated, in relevant part, as follows: 

{¶4} 2. Exhibits. You agree to abide by all of the terms and conditions of the 

following exhibits, which are hereby incorporated into this Agreement by reference: 

Exhibit A-Potential for Discharge & Personal Guarantee of Payment;”... 

{¶5} YOU HAVE READ ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, 

INCLUDING THE EXHIBITS, AND YOU HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASK 

QUESTIONS REGARDING THOSE TERMS. 

YOU DO FOR YOURSELF, AND YOUR HEIRS, ADMINISTRATORS AND 

EXECUTORS, AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT IN CONSIDERATION 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 3 

OF FACILITY’S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RENDERING OF SERVICES TO THE 

PATIENT. 

{¶6} Exhibit A (Potential for Discharge & Personal Guarantee of Payment) states 

as follows: 

{¶7} Facility cannot continue to provide services without payment. If the 

facility is not paid timely and in full by someone, then it will seek to discharge the 

Patient. 

{¶8} Many people wish to make sure that care and services to their loved ones 

are maintained when the Patient does not have the resources to pay for care. 

Circumstances that may cause non-payment may include, for example when an 

insurance company no longer provides payment when rehabilitation care has concluded 

or when Medicaid eligibility has not been maintained or approved. Thus, they agree to 

make payments on their loved ones’ behalf in those instances. 

{¶9} BY SIGNING BELOW, THE PERSONAL GUARANTOR IS AGREEING TO 

VOLUNTARILY PERSONALLY GUARANTEE PAYMENT TO FACILITY, BE JOINTLY 

AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR ALL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES RECEIVED BY THE 

PATIENT, AND TO MAKE ALL PAYMENTS WHEN THEY COME DUE. THE 

PERSONAL GUARANTOR UNDERSTANDS THAT HE OR SHE IS NOT REQUIRED BY 

LAW OR FACILITY TO PERSONALLY GUARANTEE PAYMENT. THE PERSONAL 

GUARANTOR AGREES THAT THIS GUARANTEE WILL CONTINUE UNTIL ALL 

FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS TO FACILITY HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL. 

{¶10} Appellant signed the same as guarantor. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 4 

{¶11} On March 16, 2020, appellee filed a complaint for breach of contract against 

appellant and Lois Glasmeier, for breach of personal guarantee against appellant and for 

unjust enrichment against Lois Glasmeier. Appellee, in its complaint, alleged that it had 

provided nursing care and services to Lois Glasmeier and that the defendants had 

breached the Admission Agreement by refusing to make full payment. Appellee further 

alleged that appellant Mark Glasmeier had breached the personal guarantee and that it 

was unjust for Lois Glasmeier to retain the benefit of its services without payment. 

Appellee sought judgment against appellant and Lois Glasmeier, jointly and severally, in 

the amount of $13,547.00 plus interest. 

{¶12} On August 3, 2020, appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 

12(B)(6), arguing that the text of Exhibit A was invalid under both federal and Ohio law. 

Appellee filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on August 24, 2020 

and appellant filed a response on September 1, 2020. The trial court, pursuant to a 

Judgment Entry filed on October 12, 2020, denied the motion. Appellant then filed an 

answer on October 27, 2020. 

{¶13} Appellee, on November 30, 2020, filed a Motion for Default Judgment 

against Lois Glasmeier only. The trial court, as memorialized in a Judgment Entry filed on 

December 14, 2020, granted the motion and scheduled a hearing on damages for 

January 14, 2021. On January 11, 2021, appellee filed an affidavit to support an award 

of damages against Lois Glasmeier. 

{¶14} On January 12, 2021, appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 

arguing again that under federal statutes and regulations as well as state regulations, the 

agreement requiring appellant to be personally liable for the payments of the resident. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 5 

Lois Glasmeier, was void. Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 19, 

2021. 

{¶15} Via a Judgment Entry filed on January 20, 2021, the trial court granted a 

default judgment in favor of appellee and against Lois Glasmeier only in the amount of 

$13,5437.00 plus interest. On January 25, 2021, appellee filed a memorandum in 

opposition to appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant filed a reply on 

February 3, 2021 and, on February 10, 2021, filed a memorandum in opposition to 

appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

{¶16} The trial court, as memorialized in a Final Judgment Entry filed on February 

16, 2021, granted appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted appellee 

judgment against appellant and Lois Glasmeier, jointly and severally, in the amount of 

$13,547.00. 

{¶17} Appellant now appeals, raising the following assignment of error on appeal: 

{¶18} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING 

APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 56 

BY HOLDING THAT APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO HOLD APPELLANT MARK 

GLASMEIER JOINT (SIC) AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE COSTS OF LOIS 

GLASMEIER’S NURSING CARE INCLUDING INTERST (SIC) THEREON, AND COSTS 

OF THIS ACTION.” 

I 

{¶19} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred in 

granting appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment by holding that appellee is entitled to 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 6 

hold him jointly and severally liable for the costs of Lois Glasmeier’s nursing care including 

interest thereon and the costs of this action. We disagree. 

{¶20} Summary Judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of 

Civ.R. 56. Said rule was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. 

Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 1996-Ohio-211, 448, 663 N.E.2d 639: 

Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be 

granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material 

fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds 

can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly 

in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party 

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State ex rel. 

Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, 

citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4O.O3d 

466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274. 

{¶21} As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we must stand 

in the shoes of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same standard and 

evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 

N.E.2d 212 (1987). 

{¶22} As explained by this court in Leech v. Schumaker, 5th Dist. Richland No. 

15CA56, 2015-Ohio-4444, ¶ 13: 

It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the 

burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 7 

Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 

(1986). 

The standard for granting summary judgment is delineated 

in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293: “* * * a party 

seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot 

prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis 

for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) 

of the nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its 

initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion the 

nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving 

party must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed 

in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has 

no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party 

fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be 

denied. However, if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the 

nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to 

set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the 

nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 

be entered against the nonmoving party. The record 

on summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 

opposing party. Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37 Ohio 

St.2d 150. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 8 

{¶23} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, specifically contends that, under 

both federal and state law, he, as a third-party, cannot be held liable for the debts of his 

mother Lois Glasmeier, a patient at appellee Altercare’s nursing facility. 

{¶24} There is no dispute that appellee is a skilled nursing facility. 

{¶25} One component of the federal-statutory scheme, provides that “[w]ith 

respect to admissions practices a nursing facility must * * * not require a thirdparty guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of admission (or expedited 

admission) to, or continued stay in the facility.” 42 U.S.C. 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii), skilled nursing 

facilities and nursing facilities cannot “require a third party guarantee of payment to [its] 

facility as a condition of admission (or expedited admission) to, or continued stay in, [its] 

facility.” 42 U.S.C. Section 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii). “Similar language appears in [42 

U.S.C. 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii)], which govern skilled nursing facilities that accept 

Medicare.” Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 116, 85 A.3d 947 (2014). 

{¶26} Somewhat more restrictively, the Code of Federal Regulations provides, in 

its relevant part, as follows: 

(3) The facility must not request or require a third-party guarantee of 

payment to the facility as a condition of admission or expedited admission, 

or continued stay in the facility. However, the facility may request and 

require a resident representative who has legal access to a resident's 

income or resources available to pay for facility care to sign a 

contract, without incurring personal financial liability, to provide facility 

payment from the resident's income or resources. 

(Emphasis added.) 42 C.F.R. 483.15(a)(3). 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 9 

{¶27} Finally, Ohio's regulation provides, in its relevant part, as follows: 

{¶28} (C) A provider of a [nursing facility] shall not: * *

(4) Require a third party to accept personal responsibility for paying the 

facility charges out of his or her own funds. However, the facility may require 

a representative who has legal access to an individual's income or 

resources available to pay for facility care to sign a contract, without 

incurring personal financial liability, to provide facility payment from the 

individual's income or resources if the individual's medicaid application is 

denied and if the individual's cost of care is not being paid by medicare or 

another third-party payor. A third-party guarantee is not the same as a thirdparty payor (i.e., an insurance company), and this provision does not 

preclude the facility from obtaining information about medicare and 

medicaid eligibility or the availability of private insurance. The prohibition 

against third-party guarantees applies to all individuals and prospective 

individuals in all certified [nursing facilities] regardless of payment source. 

This provision does not prohibit a third party from voluntarily making 

payment on behalf of an individual. 

{¶29} This provision permits a nursing home to sue for payment of fees assumed 

voluntarily by a guarantor. 

{¶30} The federal and state regulations governing these types of agreements 

generally, allow nursing homes to enter into voluntary third-party guarantees. However, 

the regulations provide that a nursing home cannot make a third-party guarantee a 

requirement for admission or for a continued stay in the facility. As noted by the court in 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 10 

Village at the Greene v. Smith, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 28762, 2020-Ohio-4088, ¶ 24 

both federal and Ohio law strictly forbid imposing personal liability on a resident's 

representative who does not voluntarily agree to assume that responsibility. In SWA, Inc. 

v. Straka, 2003-Ohio-3259, the court cited to 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1395i-3(c)(5)(A); OAC 

5101:3-3-02(E)1 in holding that federal statute and state regulation preventing a nursing 

home from requiring a guarantor to sign the nursing home admission agreement as a 

condition of admission did not preclude nursing home from bringing an action to force a 

guarantor to pay nursing home fees. 

{¶31} In the case sub judice, there is no evidence in the record that appellee 

Altercare made any representations that a guarantor was necessary to admit Lois 

Glasmeier. The guaranty, which was in bold and all caps, clearly and conspicuously 

provides as follows: 

{¶32} BY SIGNING BELOW, THE PERSONAL GUARANTOR IS AGREEING TO 

VOLUNTARILY PERSONALLY GUARANTEE PAYMENT TO FACILITY, BE JOINTLY 

AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR ALL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES RECEIVED BY THE 

PATIENT, AND TO MAKE ALL PAYMENTS WHEN THEY COME DUE. THE 

PERSONAL GUARANTOR UNDERSTANDS THAT HE OR SHE IS NOT REQUIRED BY 

LAW OR FACILITY TO PERSONALLY GUARANTEE PAYMENT. THE PERSONAL 

GUARANTOR AGREES THAT THIS GUARANTEE WILL CONTINUE UNTIL ALL 

FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS TO FACILITY HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL. 

{¶33} “A guaranty is a promise by one person to pay the debts of 

another.” Valspar Corp. v. Nguyen, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 11 CAE 12 0116, 2012-

1 Now OAC 5160-3-02(C)(4). 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 11 

Ohio-2710, 2012 WL 2261010, ¶ 15, citing 52 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Guaranty and 

Suretyship, Section [2]. A personal guaranty agreement is reviewed under the law of 

contracts and a reviewing court should give the contract's language its plain and ordinary 

meaning unless some other meaning is evidenced within the document. Id., 

citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978). 

Ohio law recognizes guaranty contracts as valid. Birdsall v. Heacock, 32 Ohio St. 177 

(1877). 

A contract of guaranty is “[a] collateral engagement for the 

performance of the undertaking of another, and it imports the existence of 

two different and distinct obligations—one being that of the principal debtor 

and the other that of the guarantor. The obligation of a guarantor is collateral 

and secondary to the obligation of the principal debtor. * * * The principal 

debtor is not a party to the guaranty, and the guarantor is not a party to the 

principal obligation. The undertaking of the former is independent of the 

promise of the latter; and the responsibilities which are imposed by the 

contract of guaranty differ from those which are created by the contract to 

which the guaranty is collateral.” 52 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Guaranty and 

Suretyship, Section 3, 239–240. 

Valspar at ¶ 21. 

{¶34} Parties to a guaranty are presumed to have read and understood the terms 

of the guaranty he or she signed. Ranieri at ¶ 28, quoting Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Power 

Eng. Group, Inc., 112 Ohio St.3d 429, 2007-Ohio-257, ¶ 10. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 12 

{¶35} By signing the Admission Agreement and Exhibit A, which clearly and 

unambiguously provided that appellant was not required by law or the facility to personally 

guaranty payment, appellant voluntarily agreed to voluntarily make payments on his 

mother’s behalf. The guarantee expressly states in bold and all caps above the signature 

line that it was voluntary. There is no evidence that the guarantee was requested or 

required. Appellee Altercare provided services in the amount of $13,547.00 to appellant’s 

mother in accordance with the terms of the parties’ agreement and relying upon the 

guarantee. Appellant does not dispute that he and his mother have not paid for the 

services. We find, therefore, that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment 

in favor of appellee Altercare. 

{¶36} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s sole assignment of error is, therefore, 

overruled. 

 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 0018 13 

{¶37} The judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is, therefore, affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, P.J. 

Hoffman, J. and 

Delaney, J. concur.