Filed 10/14/20 P. v. Hunter CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDDIE LAVELL HUNTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

B303723

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA295125-03)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
2

On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill 

No. 1437, which, effective January 2019, amended Penal Code1

sections 188 and 189 (stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3), significantly 

modifying the law relating to accomplice liability for murder. 

Also enacted was section 1170.95, subdivision (a) which provides 

in relevant part, “A person convicted of felony murder or murder 

under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a 

petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the

petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on 

any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:

[¶] . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or 

second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in 

lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first 

degree or second degree murder.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

In 2006, Eddie Lavell Hunter, Jr., was charged with first 

degree murder, two counts of attempted murder and possession 

of a firearm by a minor. In 2009, he entered a plea of no contest 

to one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of 

attempted murder. He also admitted allegations that the crimes 

were committed for the benefit of a gang and that a principal was 

armed with a firearm. He is currently serving a sentence of 

imprisonment of 24 years, four months.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

On January 7, 2019, Hunter filed a petition for 

resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. On March 14, 2019, 

the People filed their response to the petition. On December 13, 

2019, the trial court denied the petition. The minute order 

states: “As to defendant Hunter, he is ineligible because he was 

convicted by plea of manslaughter and therefore was not 

convicted of murder in either the 1st or 2nd degree. The 

underlying theory of liability used in the trial of his co-defendant 

is evidence of the theory of liability applicable to him and 

precludes him from being able to make the prima facie case 

necessary for the relief listed in Penal Code section 1170.95. For 

that reason, the petition is denied.”

Hunter appeals, contending the trial court erred in 

excluding defendants convicted of voluntary manslaughter where, 

as here, they originally faced trial for murder under a theory of 

natural and probable consequences. Hunter argues that he 

indeed “accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial at which [he] could be 

convicted of first degree or second degree murder” as set forth in 

the statute.

We agree with the trial court that only defendants 

convicted of murder are eligible for relief under the plain 

language of the statute. In doing so, we do not write on a blank 

slate. In People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, Division 

6 of this District concluded that the language of the statute 

unequivocally applies to murder convictions only. “There is no 

reference to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. To be eligible 

to file a petition under section 1170.95, a defendant must have a 

first or second degree murder conviction. The plain language of 

the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions.” 

(Id. at p. 887.) Similarly, in People v. Flores (2020) 
4

44 Cal.App.5th 985, the Fourth District held that the plain 

language of the statute limited relief to only those defendants 

convicted of murder. (Id. at p. 993; see also People v. Turner

(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 436 [defendants who plead to 

voluntary manslaughter to avoid trial for murder on natural and 

probable consequences theory ineligible for relief]; People v. Lopez

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, 

S258175 [statute limits relief to convictions for murder; 

attempted murder is excluded].)

Hunter argues the plain language of the statute puts no 

restriction on the type of plea a defendant accepts as long as he or 

she could have been convicted of murder at trial under the felony 

murder rule or on a natural and probable consequences theory. 

We are not persuaded; such an interpretation contravenes the 

legislative purpose of the statutory amendments. As the caselaw 

cited above recounts in detail, the legislative history 

demonstrates the Legislature resolved to limit and reform 

murder convictions obtained on the theories of felony murder and 

natural and probable consequences. Hunter had to have been 

convicted of murder on one of these theories, whether by trial or 

plea, to be eligible for relief.

In light of our conclusion that section 1170.95 affords relief 

to only those convicted of first or second murder, we do not reach 

Hunter’s second argument that he satisfied the second 

requirement of section 1170.95, to wit, that he was prosecuted 

under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine.
5

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, J.

We concur:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.