Filed 3/18/15 In re R.S. CA2/8 

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION EIGHT 

In re R.S., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B257103 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

L.B.S., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK79963) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Carlos E. 

Vazquez, Judge. Affirmed. 

Janice A. Jenkins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 

* * * * * * 
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 This appeal arises from an order of the juvenile court terminating jurisdiction over 

R.S., the child of appellant mother, and placing the child in a Kin-GAP1 legal 

guardianship with his paternal grandparents. At the April 2, 2014 hearing terminating 

dependency jurisdiction, the court ordered that mother was to have visitation with R.S. in 

any amount, with a minimum of two hours per month, and that the guardians would have 

discretion to liberalize or minimize the visitation schedule. Mother appeals, arguing the 

court’s order illegally vests the legal guardians with sole discretion over the visitation 

schedule. We affirm. 

FACTS 

 Given the narrow issue on appeal, we briefly summarize the facts for context, 

focusing on those limited facts and procedural issues material to our discussion. 

R.S. is one of two children mother had with father (the other child is R.S.’s older 

brother). Father is not a party to this appeal. Mother also has at least one other minor 

child who is a younger half sibling to R.S. In November 2009, the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g) as to R.S. and his 

older brother. Reunification services were provided to mother, but ultimately proved 

unsuccessful and were terminated in January 2013. The Department recommended R.S. 

be adopted by his paternal grandparents who were his caregivers. The grandparents were 

interested in adoption. 

After a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, the court 

ordered legal guardianship as the permanent plan. R.S.’s paternal grandparents were 

appointed his legal guardians with Kin-GAP assistance. The court decided not to 

terminate parental rights due in part to evidence showing R.S.’s bond to his siblings. 

At the April 2, 2014 hearing, the court signed the guardianship papers and 

terminated dependency jurisdiction. As to visitation the court ordered that mother was 

 

1 Kinship Guardianship Assistance Payment Program (Kin-GAP; Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 11360). 
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“to have visits with [R.S.] in any amount of at least two hours per month.” Mother did 

not state any objection on the record to the terms of the visitation order, except to confirm 

that mother’s visitation was to be unmonitored. The court reiterated that the visitation for 

mother was to be unmonitored. 

This appeal followed. Mother’s notice erroneously states the date of the relevant 

hearing from which the appeal is taken as April 20, 2014, instead of April 2, 2014. There 

was no hearing regarding R.S. on April 20 and the error is plainly a drafting error that 

caused no prejudice to respondent. We therefore reject respondent’s contention the 

appeal should be dismissed on this basis. 

DISCUSSION 

 Mother asks this court to reverse the juvenile court’s April 2, 2014 order, arguing 

that it illegally vests sole discretion in the legal guardians to determine when visitation 

will occur. We find that mother has forfeited this argument by failing to state any 

objection on the record. In any event, the visitation order is not improper. 

 It is a fundamental principle of appellate jurisprudence that ordinarily issues not 

timely preserved below by way of objection will be deemed forfeited. (People v. 

Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590.) The purpose behind this rule is “to encourage 

parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” 

(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 

in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) The rule applies in dependency matters. 

(In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502.) 

 Mother, represented by counsel, participated in the April 2, 2014 hearing. Mother 

agreed to the terms of the visitation order and failed to raise any objection to the court’s 

recitation of those terms on the record. Mother was not denied an opportunity to state a 

timely objection that the legal guardians (R.S.’s paternal grandparents) would have 

discretion to minimize or liberalize her visits with R.S. We conclude mother has 

forfeited her appellate argument on this ground. (People v. Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th 

580; In re Dakota S., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 494.) 
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 Notwithstanding the foregoing, an appellate court may excuse a forfeiture in 

appropriate circumstances. This discretion “should be exercised rarely and only in cases 

presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.] Although an appellate court’s discretion 

to consider forfeited claims extends to dependency cases [citations], the discretion must 

be exercised with special care in such matters.” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293, 

italics added.) 

 Mother contends her argument should be heard because it presents a pure issue of 

law and embraces an important issue, specifically an improper delegation of judicial 

authority. We disagree the court improperly delegated visitation. This is not a 

circumstance where the juvenile court unlawfully vested sole discretion in a third party or 

otherwise delegated its authority to the legal guardians to determine whether mother was 

entitled to any visitation at all. (See, e.g., In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196; In re 

Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497.) The court’s order clearly provides that mother 

is entitled to a minimum of two hours of unmonitored visitation each month. The court 

ordered mother was to have visits “in any amount of at least two hours per month,” and 

that after the case closed, “[t]he legal guardian may minimize or liberalize the visits.” 

The only reasonable interpretation of the order is that mother was entitled to a minimum 

of two hours unmonitored visitation per month, but the guardians could allow as many 

visits as they considered appropriate, and cut back on the visits, so long as mother had at 

least two hours with her son each month. 

 Mother’s reliance on In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426 is misplaced. There, 

the juvenile court, in its dispositional order, merely directed the Department to “create” a 

detailed written visitation schedule. (Id. at p. 439.) We reversed and remanded with 

directions to the juvenile court to specify the frequency and duration of visitation, 

explaining that a “visitation order must give some indication of how often visitation 

should occur.” (Ibid.) However, the specifics of the “time, place, and manner of 

visitation” may properly be left to the legal guardian. (In re Rebecca S. (2010) 

181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314.) 
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 The court here did provide a minimum framework regarding the frequency 

(monthly) and duration (at least two hours) of mother’s visits with R.S. The visitation 

order did not constitute an improper delegation of authority. (In re M.R. (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274.) 

 Moreover, to the extent mother confronts difficulties visiting R.S., mother may 

seek an order from the juvenile court enforcing her minimum of two hours of 

unmonitored visitation each month. Under the retained jurisdiction related to the 

guardianship, “any motions relating to that guardianship may properly be filed in the 

juvenile court.” (In re D.R. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 480, 486-487; see also Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 5.740(c) [“A petition to terminate a guardianship established by the juvenile 

court, to appoint a successor guardian, or to modify or supplement orders concerning the 

guardianship must be filed in juvenile court.”]; see also In re Twighla T. (1992) 

4 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 [affirming juvenile court’s order terminating dependency 

jurisdiction because record showed guardian exhibited cooperative attitude toward 

visitation by parent and if problems developed, parent had access to juvenile court based 

on its retained jurisdiction over guardianship].) 

DISPOSITION 

 The juvenile court’s order of April 2, 2014, is affirmed. 

 GRIMES, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

 RUBIN, Acting P. J. 

 FLIER, J.