# Official Journal C 311/3 Se

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 311 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 613 September 2018 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 311

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 613 September 2018

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Court of Justice of the European Union |
| 2018/C 311/01 | Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union | 1 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice of the European Union

2018/C 311/01

Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

Official Journal of the European Union

1

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | COURT PROCEEDINGS |
| | Court of Justice |
| 2018/C 311/02 | Case C-162/18 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2018 by Wenger SA against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 23 January 2018 in Case T-869/16: Wenger v EUIPO | 2 |
| 2018/C 311/03 | Case C-276/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 24 April 2018 — KrakVet Marek Batko sp. K. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága | 2 |
| 2018/C 311/04 | Case C-323/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 16 May 2018 — Tesco-Global Áruházak Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága | 4 |
| 2018/C 311/05 | Case C-361/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Szekszárdi Járásbíróság (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Ágnes Weil v Géza Gulácsi | 5 |
| 2018/C 311/06 | Case C-362/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Székesfehérvári Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Hochtief AG v Fővárosi Törvényszék | 6 |
| 2018/C 311/07 | Case C-404/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 19 June 2018 — Jamina Hakelbracht, Tine Vandenbon, Instituut voor de Gelijkheid van Vrouwen en Mannen v WTG Retail BVBA | 8 |
| 2018/C 311/08 | Case C-406/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 20 June 2018 — PG v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal | 8 |
| 2018/C 311/09 | Case C-414/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 22 June 2018 — Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo v Banca d’Italia | 9 |
| 2018/C 311/10 | Case C-422/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 28 June 2018 — FR v Ministero dell’interno — Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione Internazionale presso la Prefettura U.T.G. di Milano | 10 |
| 2018/C 311/11 | Case C-424/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto (Italy) lodged on 27 June 2018 — Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza Croce Verde v Ulss 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto | 10 |
| | General Court |
| 2018/C 311/12 | Case T-356/15: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 —Austria v Commission (State aid — Aid planned by the United Kingdom in favour of Hinkley Point C nuclear power station — Contract for Difference, Secretary of State Agreement and Credit Guarantee — Decision declaring the aid compatible with the internal market — Article 107(3)(c) TFEU — Public interest objective — Promotion of nuclear energy — Need for State intervention — Guarantee Notice — Determination of the aid element — Proportionality — Investment aid — Operating aid — Right to submit observations — Public procurement procedure — Obligation to state reasons) | 12 |
| 2018/C 311/13 | Case T-774/16: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 — Consejo Regulador del Cava v EUIPO — Cave de Tain L’Hermitage, union des propriétaires (CAVE DE TAIN) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — Figurative EU trade mark CAVE DE TAIN — Earlier designation of origin CAVA — Concept of evocation of a protected designation of origin — Article 103(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013) | 13 |
| 2018/C 311/14 | Case T-377/18: Action brought on 20 June 2018 — Intercept Pharma and Intercept Pharmaceuticals v EMA | 13 |
| 2018/C 311/15 | Case T-406/18: Action brought on 3 July 2018 — de Volksbank v SRB | 14 |
| 2018/C 311/16 | Case T-442/18: Action brought on 18 July 2018 — Aeris Invest v ECB | 15 |
| 2018/C 311/17 | Case T-443/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Vogue Peek & Cloppenburg) | 17 |
| 2018/C 311/18 | Case T-444/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg) | 17 |
| 2018/C 311/19 | Case T-445/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg) | 18 |
| 2018/C 311/20 | Case T-446/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg) | 19 |
| 2018/C 311/21 | Case T-449/18: Action brought on 19 July 2018 — Ortlieb Sportartikel v EUIPO (Octogon) | 20 |
| 2018/C 311/22 | Case T-564/17: Order of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — So v Council and Commission | 20 |
| 2018/C 311/23 | Case T-568/17: Order of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — Korea National Insurance Corporation v Council and Commission | 21 |

V   Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Court of Justice

2018/C 311/02

Case C-162/18 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2018 by Wenger SA against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 23 January 2018 in Case T-869/16: Wenger v EUIPO

2

2018/C 311/03

Case C-276/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 24 April 2018 — KrakVet Marek Batko sp. K. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

2

2018/C 311/04

Case C-323/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 16 May 2018 — Tesco-Global Áruházak Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

4

2018/C 311/05

Case C-361/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Szekszárdi Járásbíróság (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Ágnes Weil v Géza Gulácsi

5

2018/C 311/06

Case C-362/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Székesfehérvári Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Hochtief AG v Fővárosi Törvényszék

6

2018/C 311/07

Case C-404/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 19 June 2018 — Jamina Hakelbracht, Tine Vandenbon, Instituut voor de Gelijkheid van Vrouwen en Mannen v WTG Retail BVBA

8

2018/C 311/08

Case C-406/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 20 June 2018 — PG v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

8

2018/C 311/09

Case C-414/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 22 June 2018 — Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo v Banca d’Italia

9

2018/C 311/10

Case C-422/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 28 June 2018 — FR v Ministero dell’interno — Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione Internazionale presso la Prefettura U.T.G. di Milano

10

2018/C 311/11

Case C-424/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto (Italy) lodged on 27 June 2018 — Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza Croce Verde v Ulss 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto

10

General Court

2018/C 311/12

Case T-356/15: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 —Austria v Commission (State aid — Aid planned by the United Kingdom in favour of Hinkley Point C nuclear power station — Contract for Difference, Secretary of State Agreement and Credit Guarantee — Decision declaring the aid compatible with the internal market — Article 107(3)(c) TFEU — Public interest objective — Promotion of nuclear energy — Need for State intervention — Guarantee Notice — Determination of the aid element — Proportionality — Investment aid — Operating aid — Right to submit observations — Public procurement procedure — Obligation to state reasons)

12

2018/C 311/13

Case T-774/16: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 — Consejo Regulador del Cava v EUIPO — Cave de Tain L’Hermitage, union des propriétaires (CAVE DE TAIN) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — Figurative EU trade mark CAVE DE TAIN — Earlier designation of origin CAVA — Concept of evocation of a protected designation of origin — Article 103(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013)

13

2018/C 311/14

Case T-377/18: Action brought on 20 June 2018 — Intercept Pharma and Intercept Pharmaceuticals v EMA

13

2018/C 311/15

Case T-406/18: Action brought on 3 July 2018 — de Volksbank v SRB

14

2018/C 311/16

Case T-442/18: Action brought on 18 July 2018 — Aeris Invest v ECB

15

2018/C 311/17

Case T-443/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Vogue Peek & Cloppenburg)

17

2018/C 311/18

Case T-444/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg)

17

2018/C 311/19

Case T-445/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg)

18

2018/C 311/20

Case T-446/18: Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg)

19

2018/C 311/21

Case T-449/18: Action brought on 19 July 2018 — Ortlieb Sportartikel v EUIPO (Octogon)

20

2018/C 311/22

Case T-564/17: Order of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — So v Council and Commission

20

2018/C 311/23

Case T-568/17: Order of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — Korea National Insurance Corporation v Council and Commission

21

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EN

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice of the European Union

| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/1 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/1

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Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2018/C 311/01)

Last publication

OJ C 301, 27.8.2018

Past publications

OJ C 294, 20.8.2018

OJ C 285, 13.8.2018

OJ C 276, 6.8.2018

OJ C 268, 30.7.2018

OJ C 259, 23.7.2018

OJ C 249, 16.7.2018

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

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V Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Court of Justice

| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/2 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/2

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Appeal brought on 28 February 2018 by Wenger SA against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 23 January 2018 in Case T-869/16: Wenger v EUIPO

(Case C-162/18 P)

(2018/C 311/02)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: Wenger SA (represented by: A. Sulovsky, Rechtsanwältin)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Swissgear Sàrl

By order of 5 July 2018 the Court of Justice (Seventh Chamber) held that there is no need to adjudicate on the present appeal.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/2 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/2

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 24 April 2018 — KrakVet Marek Batko sp. K. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-276/18)

(2018/C 311/03)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: KrakVet Marek Batko sp. K.

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the objectives of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax ([‘the VAT Directive’]), in particular the requirements for the prevention of jurisdictional conflicts between Member States and double taxation, referred to in recitals 17 and 62 thereof, and Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010, (2) in particular recitals 5, 7 and 8 and Articles 7, 13 and 28 to 30 thereof, be interpreted as precluding a practice of the tax authorities of a Member State which, by attributing to a transaction a qualification that differs both from the legal interpretation of the same transaction and the same facts that was carried out by the tax authorities of another Member State and from the response to the binding inquiry provided by those authorities on the basis of that interpretation, as well as from the confirmatory conclusion of both that those authorities reached in the tax inspection they carried out, gives rise to the double taxation of the taxable person? |
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1.

Must the objectives of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax ([‘the VAT Directive’]), in particular the requirements for the prevention of jurisdictional conflicts between Member States and double taxation, referred to in recitals 17 and 62 thereof, and Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010, (2) in particular recitals 5, 7 and 8 and Articles 7, 13 and 28 to 30 thereof, be interpreted as precluding a practice of the tax authorities of a Member State which, by attributing to a transaction a qualification that differs both from the legal interpretation of the same transaction and the same facts that was carried out by the tax authorities of another Member State and from the response to the binding inquiry provided by those authorities on the basis of that interpretation, as well as from the confirmatory conclusion of both that those authorities reached in the tax inspection they carried out, gives rise to the double taxation of the taxable person?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is that such a practice is not contrary to EU law, can the tax authorities of a Member State, taking into account Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, and EU law, unilaterally determine the tax obligation, without taking into consideration that the tax authorities of another Member State have already confirmed, on various occasions, first at the request of the taxable person and later in its decisions as a result of an inspection, the lawfulness of that taxable person’s actions?
  Or should the tax authorities of both Member States cooperate to reach an agreement, in the interests of the principle of fiscal neutrality and the prevention of double taxation, so that the taxable person has to pay [VAT] in only one of those countries? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is that such a practice is not contrary to EU law, can the tax authorities of a Member State, taking into account Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, and EU law, unilaterally determine the tax obligation, without taking into consideration that the tax authorities of another Member State have already confirmed, on various occasions, first at the request of the taxable person and later in its decisions as a result of an inspection, the lawfulness of that taxable person’s actions?

Or should the tax authorities of both Member States cooperate to reach an agreement, in the interests of the principle of fiscal neutrality and the prevention of double taxation, so that the taxable person has to pay [VAT] in only one of those countries?

| 3. | If the response to the second question is that the tax authorities of a Member State can change the qualification of a tax unilaterally, should the provisions of the [VAT Directive] be interpreted as meaning that the tax authorities of a second Member State are obliged to return to the taxable person required to pay VAT the tax determined by those authorities in response to a binding inquiry and paid in relation to a period closed with an inspection, so that both the prevention of double taxation and the principle of fiscal neutrality are guaranteed? |
| --- | --- |

3.

If the response to the second question is that the tax authorities of a Member State can change the qualification of a tax unilaterally, should the provisions of the [VAT Directive] be interpreted as meaning that the tax authorities of a second Member State are obliged to return to the taxable person required to pay VAT the tax determined by those authorities in response to a binding inquiry and paid in relation to a period closed with an inspection, so that both the prevention of double taxation and the principle of fiscal neutrality are guaranteed?

| 4. | How should the expression in the first sentence of Article 33(1) of the Harmonised VAT Directive, according to which the transport is carried out ‘by or on behalf of the supplier’, be interpreted? Does this expression include the case in which the taxable person offers as a seller, in an online shopping platform, the possibility for the buyer to enter into a contract with a logistics company, with which the seller collaborates for operations other than the sale, when the buyer can also freely choose a carrier other than the one proposed, and the transport contract is concluded by the buyer and the carrier, without the intervention of the seller?
  Is it relevant, for interpretative purposes — especially taking into account the principle of legal certainty — that by the year 2021 the Member States must amend legislation transposing the aforementioned provision of the [VAT Directive], so that Article 33(1) of that directive must also be applied in case of indirect collaboration in the choice of carrier? |
| --- | --- |

4.

How should the expression in the first sentence of Article 33(1) of the Harmonised VAT Directive, according to which the transport is carried out ‘by or on behalf of the supplier’, be interpreted? Does this expression include the case in which the taxable person offers as a seller, in an online shopping platform, the possibility for the buyer to enter into a contract with a logistics company, with which the seller collaborates for operations other than the sale, when the buyer can also freely choose a carrier other than the one proposed, and the transport contract is concluded by the buyer and the carrier, without the intervention of the seller?

Is it relevant, for interpretative purposes — especially taking into account the principle of legal certainty — that by the year 2021 the Member States must amend legislation transposing the aforementioned provision of the [VAT Directive], so that Article 33(1) of that directive must also be applied in case of indirect collaboration in the choice of carrier?

| 5. | Should EU law, specifically the [VAT Directive], be interpreted as meaning that the facts mentioned below, taken as a whole or separately, are relevant to examine whether, among the independent companies that carry out a delivery, expedition or transport of goods the taxable person has arranged, to circumvent Article 33 of the [VAT Directive] and thereby infringe the law, legal relationships that seek to take advantage of the fact that the VAT is lower in the other Member State:






  5.1. | the logistics company carrying out the transport is linked to the taxable person and provides other services, independent of transport, |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Should EU law, specifically the [VAT Directive], be interpreted as meaning that the facts mentioned below, taken as a whole or separately, are relevant to examine whether, among the independent companies that carry out a delivery, expedition or transport of goods the taxable person has arranged, to circumvent Article 33 of the [VAT Directive] and thereby infringe the law, legal relationships that seek to take advantage of the fact that the VAT is lower in the other Member State:

5.1.

the logistics company carrying out the transport is linked to the taxable person and provides other services, independent of transport,

| 5.2. | at the same time, the customer may at any time depart from the option proposed by the taxable person, which is to order the transport to the logistics company with which it maintains a contractual link, being able to entrust the transport to another carrier or personally collect the goods? |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

at the same time, the customer may at any time depart from the option proposed by the taxable person, which is to order the transport to the logistics company with which it maintains a contractual link, being able to entrust the transport to another carrier or personally collect the goods?

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(1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

(2)  Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax (OJ 2010 L 268, p. 1).

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/4 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/4

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 16 May 2018 — Tesco-Global Áruházak Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

(Case C-323/18)

(2018/C 311/04)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Tesco-Global Áruházak Zrt.

Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

Questions referred

| 1. | Is the fact that taxable persons under foreign ownership which operate a number of retail establishments through a single company and which are engaged in store retail trade in fact have to pay the special tax corresponding to the highest band of a steeply progressive tax rate, whereas taxable persons under domestic ownership operating as a franchise under a single banner — through stores which generally constitute independent companies — are in fact included in the exempt band or are subject to one of the lower tax rates following that band, with the result that the proportion of the tax paid by companies under foreign ownership of the total tax collected through the special tax is substantially higher than in the case of taxable persons under domestic ownership, compatible with the provisions of the FEU Treaty governing the principles of non-discrimination (Articles 18 TFEU and 26 TFEU), freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU), equal treatment (Article 54 TFEU), equal treatment as regards financial participation in the capital of companies or firms within the meaning of Article 54 TFEU (Article 55 TFEU), freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU), free movement of capital (Articles 63 TFEU and 65 TFEU) and equality of taxation of companies (Article 110 TFEU)? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is the fact that taxable persons under foreign ownership which operate a number of retail establishments through a single company and which are engaged in store retail trade in fact have to pay the special tax corresponding to the highest band of a steeply progressive tax rate, whereas taxable persons under domestic ownership operating as a franchise under a single banner — through stores which generally constitute independent companies — are in fact included in the exempt band or are subject to one of the lower tax rates following that band, with the result that the proportion of the tax paid by companies under foreign ownership of the total tax collected through the special tax is substantially higher than in the case of taxable persons under domestic ownership, compatible with the provisions of the FEU Treaty governing the principles of non-discrimination (Articles 18 TFEU and 26 TFEU), freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU), equal treatment (Article 54 TFEU), equal treatment as regards financial participation in the capital of companies or firms within the meaning of Article 54 TFEU (Article 55 TFEU), freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU), free movement of capital (Articles 63 TFEU and 65 TFEU) and equality of taxation of companies (Article 110 TFEU)?

| 2. | Is the fact that taxable persons which operate a number of retail establishments through a single company and which are engaged in store retail trade in fact have to pay the special tax corresponding to the highest band of a steeply progressive tax rate, whereas taxable persons under domestic ownership which are their direct competitors and which operate as a franchise under a single banner — through stores which generally constitute independent companies — are in fact included in the exempt band or are subject to one of the lower tax rates following that band, with the result that the proportion of the tax paid by companies under foreign ownership of the total tax collected through the special tax is substantially higher than in the case of taxable persons under domestic ownership, compatible with the provisions of the FEU Treaty governing the principle of the prohibition of State aid (Article 107(1) TFEU)? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is the fact that taxable persons which operate a number of retail establishments through a single company and which are engaged in store retail trade in fact have to pay the special tax corresponding to the highest band of a steeply progressive tax rate, whereas taxable persons under domestic ownership which are their direct competitors and which operate as a franchise under a single banner — through stores which generally constitute independent companies — are in fact included in the exempt band or are subject to one of the lower tax rates following that band, with the result that the proportion of the tax paid by companies under foreign ownership of the total tax collected through the special tax is substantially higher than in the case of taxable persons under domestic ownership, compatible with the provisions of the FEU Treaty governing the principle of the prohibition of State aid (Article 107(1) TFEU)?

| 3. | Must Articles 107 TFEU and 108(3) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that their effects extend to a tax measure which is intrinsically linked to a tax exemption (constituting State aid) financed by means of the tax receipts generated by the tax measure, inasmuch as the legislature has achieved the amount of budgetary revenue forecast, which was fixed before the introduction of the special tax on retail trade (based on the turnover of market operators), through the application of a progressive tax rate based on turnover and not through the introduction of a standard tax rate, meaning that the legislation deliberately seeks to grant a tax exemption to some market operators? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Must Articles 107 TFEU and 108(3) TFEU be interpreted as meaning that their effects extend to a tax measure which is intrinsically linked to a tax exemption (constituting State aid) financed by means of the tax receipts generated by the tax measure, inasmuch as the legislature has achieved the amount of budgetary revenue forecast, which was fixed before the introduction of the special tax on retail trade (based on the turnover of market operators), through the application of a progressive tax rate based on turnover and not through the introduction of a standard tax rate, meaning that the legislation deliberately seeks to grant a tax exemption to some market operators?

| 4. | Is a practice of the bodies of a Member State with responsibility for applying the law, whereby, during tax inspections commenced ex officio or subsequent court proceedings it is not possible — despite the principle of effectiveness and the obligation to disapply an incompatible provision of national law — to submit an application for a refund of tax set under a national tax provision which is contrary to EU law, on the ground that the tax authority or the court examines the issue of incompatibility with EU law only in special proceedings commenced on application by a party which may be brought prior to the ex officio procedure, whereas, as far as tax which has been set in breach of national law is concerned, there is nothing to prevent an application for a refund from being submitted in proceedings before the tax authority or a court, compatible with the principle of procedural equivalence and the principles of effectiveness and the primacy of EU law? |
| --- | --- |

4.

Is a practice of the bodies of a Member State with responsibility for applying the law, whereby, during tax inspections commenced ex officio or subsequent court proceedings it is not possible — despite the principle of effectiveness and the obligation to disapply an incompatible provision of national law — to submit an application for a refund of tax set under a national tax provision which is contrary to EU law, on the ground that the tax authority or the court examines the issue of incompatibility with EU law only in special proceedings commenced on application by a party which may be brought prior to the ex officio procedure, whereas, as far as tax which has been set in breach of national law is concerned, there is nothing to prevent an application for a refund from being submitted in proceedings before the tax authority or a court, compatible with the principle of procedural equivalence and the principles of effectiveness and the primacy of EU law?

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/5 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/5

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Szekszárdi Járásbíróság (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Ágnes Weil v Géza Gulácsi

(Case C-361/18)

(2018/C 311/05)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Szekszárdi Járásbíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Ágnes Weil

Defendant: Géza Gulácsi

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 53 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, if requested by one of the parties, the court of the Member State that delivered the decision must issue the certificate relating to the decision automatically, without examining if [the case] falls within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 53 of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, if requested by one of the parties, the court of the Member State that delivered the decision must issue the certificate relating to the decision automatically, without examining if [the case] falls within the scope of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the negative, is Article 1(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that a repayment action between members of an unregistered non-marital partnership fall within the scope of the rights in property arising out of a relationship deemed by the law applicable to such relationship to have comparable (legal) effects to marriage? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the negative, is Article 1(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 to be interpreted as meaning that a repayment action between members of an unregistered non-marital partnership fall within the scope of the rights in property arising out of a relationship deemed by the law applicable to such relationship to have comparable (legal) effects to marriage?

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/6

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Székesfehérvári Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Hochtief AG v Fővárosi Törvényszék

(Case C-362/18)

(2018/C 311/06)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Székesfehérvári Törvényszék

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Hochtief AG

Defendant: Fővárosi Törvényszék

Questions referred

| 1. | Are the basic principles and rules of EU law (in particular Article 4(3) TEU, and the requirement for uniform interpretation), as interpreted by the Court of Justice, especially in the judgment in Köbler, to be interpreted as meaning that the declaration of liability of the court of the Member State ruling at final instance for a judgment infringing EU law may be based exclusively on national law or on the criteria laid down by national law? If not, are the basic principles and rules of EU law, particularly the three criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in Köbler for declaring the liability of the ‘State’, to be interpreted as meaning that whether the conditions for liability of the Member State for infringement of EU law by the courts of that State are met is to be assessed on the basis of national law? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Are the basic principles and rules of EU law (in particular Article 4(3) TEU, and the requirement for uniform interpretation), as interpreted by the Court of Justice, especially in the judgment in Köbler, to be interpreted as meaning that the declaration of liability of the court of the Member State ruling at final instance for a judgment infringing EU law may be based exclusively on national law or on the criteria laid down by national law? If not, are the basic principles and rules of EU law, particularly the three criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in Köbler for declaring the liability of the ‘State’, to be interpreted as meaning that whether the conditions for liability of the Member State for infringement of EU law by the courts of that State are met is to be assessed on the basis of national law?

| 2. | Are the basic principles and rules of EU law (in particular Article 4(3) TEU and the requirement for effective judicial protection), particularly the judgments of the Court of Justice concerning the liability of the Member State delivered, inter alia, in Francovich and Others, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame and Köbler, to be interpreted as meaning that the force of res judicata attaching to judgments that infringe EU law delivered by courts of the Member State ruling at final instance precludes a declaration that the Member State is liable for damages? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Are the basic principles and rules of EU law (in particular Article 4(3) TEU and the requirement for effective judicial protection), particularly the judgments of the Court of Justice concerning the liability of the Member State delivered, inter alia, in Francovich and Others, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame and Köbler, to be interpreted as meaning that the force of res judicata attaching to judgments that infringe EU law delivered by courts of the Member State ruling at final instance precludes a declaration that the Member State is liable for damages?

| 3. | Are the principles of ‘effectiveness’ and equivalence established by Directives 89/665/EC, (1) 92/13/EC (2) and 2007/66/EC (3) and the judgments of the Court of Justice in Kühne & Heitz, Kapferer, Impresa Pizzarotti and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales to be interpreted as meaning that, in review proceedings, a party may no longer rely on the assessments contained in a judgment of the Court of Justice delivered in conclusion to preliminary ruling proceedings initiated by the court of second instance in the dispute in the main proceedings, given that those assessments were not taken into consideration in the dispute in the main proceedings, in particular in the case where the Member State court adjudicating at the highest instance dismissed the appeal in cassation brought against the judgment delivered in the dispute in the main proceedings on the ground that the party did not rely in due time on the assessments contained in the judgment of the Court of Justice? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Are the principles of ‘effectiveness’ and equivalence established by Directives 89/665/EC, (1) 92/13/EC (2) and 2007/66/EC (3) and the judgments of the Court of Justice in Kühne & Heitz, Kapferer, Impresa Pizzarotti and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales to be interpreted as meaning that, in review proceedings, a party may no longer rely on the assessments contained in a judgment of the Court of Justice delivered in conclusion to preliminary ruling proceedings initiated by the court of second instance in the dispute in the main proceedings, given that those assessments were not taken into consideration in the dispute in the main proceedings, in particular in the case where the Member State court adjudicating at the highest instance dismissed the appeal in cassation brought against the judgment delivered in the dispute in the main proceedings on the ground that the party did not rely in due time on the assessments contained in the judgment of the Court of Justice?

| 4. | Are the directives cited in the third question referred for a preliminary ruling, the case-law of the Court of Justice arising in particular from the judgments in Impresa Pizzarotti (C-213/13), Kapferer (C-234/04), Kühne & Heitz (C-453/00) and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08), concerning the admissibility of an action for review, and the basic principles established by the Court of Justice in Cases C-470/99, C-327/00 and C-241/06, concerning the time-limits laid down by national law for review procedures relating to public procurement, to be interpreted as meaning that national courts act properly in not taking into consideration — because relied on out of time by the party in the proceedings at second instance — the judgment of the Court of Justice delivered at the request of the court of second instance in the proceedings pending before it or a judgment of the Court of Justice which was not available in the official language of the Member State in question until the second instance, and in nonetheless dismissing as inadmissible the action for review brought by that party on the basis of judgments of the Court of Justice on which the party had relied but which were not taken into consideration, and facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments? |
| --- | --- |

4.

Are the directives cited in the third question referred for a preliminary ruling, the case-law of the Court of Justice arising in particular from the judgments in Impresa Pizzarotti (C-213/13), Kapferer (C-234/04), Kühne & Heitz (C-453/00) and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08), concerning the admissibility of an action for review, and the basic principles established by the Court of Justice in Cases C-470/99, C-327/00 and C-241/06, concerning the time-limits laid down by national law for review procedures relating to public procurement, to be interpreted as meaning that national courts act properly in not taking into consideration — because relied on out of time by the party in the proceedings at second instance — the judgment of the Court of Justice delivered at the request of the court of second instance in the proceedings pending before it or a judgment of the Court of Justice which was not available in the official language of the Member State in question until the second instance, and in nonetheless dismissing as inadmissible the action for review brought by that party on the basis of judgments of the Court of Justice on which the party had relied but which were not taken into consideration, and facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments?

| 5. | Are the directives cited in the third question referred for a preliminary ruling and the case-law of the Court of Justice arising in particular from the judgments in Impresa Pizzarottoi (C-213/13), Kapferer (C-234/04), Kühne & Heitz (C-453/00) and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08) to be interpreted as meaning that, in a case where a party to a dispute refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kempter (C-2/06) — to the effect that it does not need to rely on the judgments of the Court of Justice, the court being required to apply them of its own motion — the national courts act properly in not taking into consideration judgments of the Court of Justice, in accordance with national rules of procedure and contrary to the ruling given in the judgment [in Kempter], in such a way as not even to mention this fact in the decision terminating the proceedings or in the grounds thereof, and in nonetheless dismissing as inadmissible the action for review brought by that party on the basis of judgments of the Court of Justice on which the party had relied but which were not taken into consideration, and facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments? |
| --- | --- |

5.

Are the directives cited in the third question referred for a preliminary ruling and the case-law of the Court of Justice arising in particular from the judgments in Impresa Pizzarottoi (C-213/13), Kapferer (C-234/04), Kühne & Heitz (C-453/00) and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08) to be interpreted as meaning that, in a case where a party to a dispute refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kempter (C-2/06) — to the effect that it does not need to rely on the judgments of the Court of Justice, the court being required to apply them of its own motion — the national courts act properly in not taking into consideration judgments of the Court of Justice, in accordance with national rules of procedure and contrary to the ruling given in the judgment [in Kempter], in such a way as not even to mention this fact in the decision terminating the proceedings or in the grounds thereof, and in nonetheless dismissing as inadmissible the action for review brought by that party on the basis of judgments of the Court of Justice on which the party had relied but which were not taken into consideration, and facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments?

| 6. | Is the requirement of a sufficiently serious infringement laid down in the judgments in Köbler and Traghetti del Mediterraneo to be interpreted as meaning that such an infringement does not exist if the court ruling at final instance dismisses an action for review as inadmissible, in clear contravention of the established case-law, cited with maximum detail, of the Court of Justice (which is also supported by various legal opinions), without making any reference to that case-law or giving any reasons for that decision in the light of EU law, and, conspicuously, without examining or even alluding to the need to refer the case to the Court of Justice, notwithstanding the fact that, in order to justify that need, reference has also been made with maximum detail to the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice? In the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice in CILFIT (C-283/81), must the national court justify its decision in the case where, departing from the binding legal interpretation established by the Court of Justice, it dismisses an action for review as inadmissible and, in that regard, refuses to make a reference for a preliminary ruling without giving any reasons for doing so? |
| --- | --- |

6.

Is the requirement of a sufficiently serious infringement laid down in the judgments in Köbler and Traghetti del Mediterraneo to be interpreted as meaning that such an infringement does not exist if the court ruling at final instance dismisses an action for review as inadmissible, in clear contravention of the established case-law, cited with maximum detail, of the Court of Justice (which is also supported by various legal opinions), without making any reference to that case-law or giving any reasons for that decision in the light of EU law, and, conspicuously, without examining or even alluding to the need to refer the case to the Court of Justice, notwithstanding the fact that, in order to justify that need, reference has also been made with maximum detail to the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice? In the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice in CILFIT (C-283/81), must the national court justify its decision in the case where, departing from the binding legal interpretation established by the Court of Justice, it dismisses an action for review as inadmissible and, in that regard, refuses to make a reference for a preliminary ruling without giving any reasons for doing so?

| 7. | Are the principles of effective judicial protection and equivalence in Article 19 TEU and Article 4(3) TEU, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services laid down in Article 49 TFEU, and Council Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, as well as Directives 89/665/EEC, 92/13/EEC and 2007/66/EC, to be interpreted as [not precluding] the competent authorities and courts from dismissing one after another, in manifest disregard of the applicable EU law, the appeals brought by the applicant because it has been excluded from a public procurement procedure, appeals for which it is necessary to prepare, depending on the circumstances, numerous documents with considerable investment of time and money or to participate at hearings, while, although it is true that, in theory, liability may be declared for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions, the relevant legislation prevents the applicant claiming from the court compensation for harm suffered as a consequence of the unlawful measures? |
| --- | --- |

7.

Are the principles of effective judicial protection and equivalence in Article 19 TEU and Article 4(3) TEU, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services laid down in Article 49 TFEU, and Council Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, as well as Directives 89/665/EEC, 92/13/EEC and 2007/66/EC, to be interpreted as [not precluding] the competent authorities and courts from dismissing one after another, in manifest disregard of the applicable EU law, the appeals brought by the applicant because it has been excluded from a public procurement procedure, appeals for which it is necessary to prepare, depending on the circumstances, numerous documents with considerable investment of time and money or to participate at hearings, while, although it is true that, in theory, liability may be declared for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions, the relevant legislation prevents the applicant claiming from the court compensation for harm suffered as a consequence of the unlawful measures?

| 8. | Are the principles laid down in the judgments in Köbler, Traghetti del Mediterraneo and San Giorgio to be interpreted as meaning that compensation cannot be paid for damage caused by the fact that, in breach of the established case-law of the Court of Justice, a Member State court ruling at final instance has dismissed as inadmissible a review, requested by the party concerned in due time, in the course of which the latter would have been able to claim compensation for the costs incurred? |
| --- | --- |

8.

Are the principles laid down in the judgments in Köbler, Traghetti del Mediterraneo and San Giorgio to be interpreted as meaning that compensation cannot be paid for damage caused by the fact that, in breach of the established case-law of the Court of Justice, a Member State court ruling at final instance has dismissed as inadmissible a review, requested by the party concerned in due time, in the course of which the latter would have been able to claim compensation for the costs incurred?

| 9. | Where, in accordance with national law, review proceedings must be declared admissible by reason of the existence of a new decision of the Constitutional Court and in the interests of restoring constitutionality, is it not also necessary, in the light of the principle of equivalence and the content of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08), to declare review proceedings admissible in the case where, in the dispute in the main proceedings, account was not taken, pursuant to the provisions of national law relating to procedural time-limits, of a judgment previously delivered by the Court of Justice in another case, of a judgment of the Court of Justice delivered at the request of the court in the dispute in the main proceedings or of facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments? |
| --- | --- |

9.

Where, in accordance with national law, review proceedings must be declared admissible by reason of the existence of a new decision of the Constitutional Court and in the interests of restoring constitutionality, is it not also necessary, in the light of the principle of equivalence and the content of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08), to declare review proceedings admissible in the case where, in the dispute in the main proceedings, account was not taken, pursuant to the provisions of national law relating to procedural time-limits, of a judgment previously delivered by the Court of Justice in another case, of a judgment of the Court of Justice delivered at the request of the court in the dispute in the main proceedings or of facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments?

---

(1)  Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33).

(2)  Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ 1992 L 76, p. 14).

(3)  Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts (OJ 2007 L 335, p. 31).

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/8

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 19 June 2018 — Jamina Hakelbracht, Tine Vandenbon, Instituut voor de Gelijkheid van Vrouwen en Mannen v WTG Retail BVBA

(Case C-404/18)

(2018/C 311/07)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Arbeidsrechtbank Antwerpen

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Jamina Hakelbracht, Tine Vandenbon, Instituut voor de Gelijkheid van Vrouwen en Mannen

Defendant: WTG Retail BVBA

Question referred

Should European Union law and, more specifically, Article 24 of Directive 2006/54/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, be interpreted as precluding national legislation which affords protection against retaliation to persons who act as witnesses only to persons who, in the context of the investigation of a complaint, bring to the notice of the person with whom the complaint is lodged, in a signed and dated document, the facts which they have personally seen or heard and which relate to the situation which is the subject of the complaint filed or who appear as witnesses in legal proceedings?

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(1)  OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/8 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/8

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 20 June 2018 — PG v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

(Case C-406/18)

(2018/C 311/08)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Referring court

Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: PG

Defendant: Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal

Questions referred

| 1. | Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that it is possible for effective judicial protection to be guaranteed in a Member State even if its courts cannot amend decisions given in asylum procedures but may only annul them and order that a new procedure be conducted? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that it is possible for effective judicial protection to be guaranteed in a Member State even if its courts cannot amend decisions given in asylum procedures but may only annul them and order that a new procedure be conducted?

| 2. | Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Can Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 31 of Directive 2013/3[2]/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (known as the ‘Procedures Directive’) be interpreted, again in the light of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as meaning that legislation of a Member State which lays down a single mandatory time limit of 60 days in total for judicial proceedings in asylum matters, irrespective of any individual circumstances and without regard to the particular features of the case or any potential difficulties in relation to evidence, is compatible with those provisions?

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(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/9 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/9

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 22 June 2018 — Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo v Banca d’Italia

(Case C-414/18)

(2018/C 311/09)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo

Defendant: Banca d’Italia

Operative part of the order

Does Article 5(1), in particular subparagraphs (a) and (f), of Delegated Regulation 2015/63, (1) interpreted in the light of the principles referred to in that regulation, in Directive 2014/59, (2) Regulation No 806/2014 (3) and Article 120 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the fundamental rules of equal treatment, non-discrimination and proportionality laid down in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the prohibition on levying double contributions, preclude, for the purpose of calculating the contributions referred to in Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59, the application of the regime laid down for intragroup liabilities also in the case of a ‘de facto’ group or, in any event, in the case of interconnectedness between an institution and other banks forming part of the same system? Alternatively, in the light of the above-mentioned principles, may the preferential treatment reserved for liabilities arising in respect of promotional loans in Article 5 of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 also be applied, by analogy, to the liabilities of a ‘second-level’ bank vis-à-vis other banks in the (cooperative credit) system, or should that characteristic of an institution, in fact operating as a central bank within an interconnected and integrated group of small banks, including in its relations with the European Central Bank and the financial markets, give rise, under existing rules, to some form of adjustment to the financial data submitted by the national resolution authority to the relevant Community bodies and to the determination of the contributions payable by the institution to the resolution fund in respect of its actual liabilities and risk profile?

---

(1)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44).

(2)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).

(3)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/10

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 28 June 2018 — FR v Ministero dell’interno — Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione Internazionale presso la Prefettura U.T.G. di Milano

(Case C-422/18)

(2018/C 311/10)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale di Milano

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: FR

Defendant: Ministero dell’interno — Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale presso la Prefettura U.T.G. di Milano

Question referred

Are the principles of sincere cooperation and of the equivalence and effectiveness of judicial protection, referred to in Articles 4(3) TEU and 19(1) TEU, Article 47, first and second paragraphs, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive 2013/32/EU (1) (in particular, Articles 22 and 46), to be interpreted in the sense that (a) European Union law requires that, where national law provides for a right of appeal in proceedings concerning the rejection of an application for the grant of international protection, such an appeal should automatically have suspensory effect, and that (b) those principles preclude a procedure, such as that under Italian law (Article 35a(13) of Legislative Decree 25/2008, as amended by Legislative Decree 13/17, converted into Law No 46/17), under which the court seised by an asylum applicant — one whose application for asylum has been rejected by the competent administrative authority and by a court of first instance — is permitted to dismiss an application for the suspension of the adverse decision solely on the basis of the validity of the grounds of the appeal brought against that decision, where that decision has been given by the same court as is asked to rule on the suspension thereof, without any consideration of the risk of serious and irreparable harm?

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(1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/10 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/10

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto (Italy) lodged on 27 June 2018 — Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza ‘Croce Verde’ v Ulss 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto

(Case C-424/18)

(2018/C 311/11)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza ‘Croce Verde’

Defendants: Ulss 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 10(h) and recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that:






  (a) | ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 10(h) and recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that:

(a)

ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and

| (b) | transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles
  are covered by the exclusion laid down in the above-mentioned Article 10(h), or must they be among the services referred to in Articles 74 to 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles

are covered by the exclusion laid down in the above-mentioned Article 10(h), or must they be among the services referred to in Articles 74 to 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU?

| 2. | Must Directive 2014/24/EU be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, even in the absence of an actual emergency,






  (a) | ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Must Directive 2014/24/EU be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, even in the absence of an actual emergency,

(a)

ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and

| (b) | transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles
  are awarded as a priority to voluntary associations by means of direct contracting? |
| --- | --- |

(b)

transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles

are awarded as a priority to voluntary associations by means of direct contracting?

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(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

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General Court

| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/12 |
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3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/12

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Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 —Austria v Commission

(Case T-356/15) (1)

((State aid - Aid planned by the United Kingdom in favour of Hinkley Point C nuclear power station - Contract for Difference, Secretary of State Agreement and Credit Guarantee - Decision declaring the aid compatible with the internal market - Article 107(3)(c) TFEU - Public interest objective - Promotion of nuclear energy - Need for State intervention - Guarantee Notice - Determination of the aid element - Proportionality - Investment aid - Operating aid - Right to submit observations - Public procurement procedure - Obligation to state reasons))

(2018/C 311/12)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Austria (represented initially by: C. Pesendorfer and M. Klamert, and subsequently by G. Hesse and M. Fruhmann, acting as Agents, and by H. Kristoferitsch, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: É. Gippini Fournier, R. Sauer, T. Maxian Rusche and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

Intervener in support of the applicant: Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (represented by D. Holderer, acting as Agent, and by P. Kinsch, lawyer)

Interveners in support of the defendant: Czech Republic (represented by: M. Smolek, T. Müller and J. Vláčil, acting as Agents), French Republic (represented initially by: G. de Bergues, D. Colas and J. Bousin, and subsequently by D. Colas and J. Bousin, acting as Agents), Hungary (represented initially by: M. Fehér and M. Bóra, subsequently by B. Sonkodi, then by A. Steiner, acting as Agents, and by P. Nagy, lawyer, and finally by A. Steiner), Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent), Romania (represented initially by: R. Radu and M. Bejenar, and subsequently by M. Bejenar and C. R. Canţăr, acting as Agents), Slovak Republic (represented by: B. Ricziová, acting as Agent) and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (represented initially by: C. Brodie and S. Brandon, subsequently by C. Brodie, S. Simmons and M. Holt, then by C. Brodie, S. Simmons and D. Robertson, then by C. Brodie and D. Robertson, then by C. Brodie, and finally by C. Brodie and Z. Lavery, acting as Agents, and by T. Johnston, Barrister, and A. Robertson QC)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/658 of 8 October 2014 on the aid measure SA.34947 (2013/C) (ex 2013/N) which the United Kingdom is planning to implement for support to the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station (OJ 2015 L 109, p. 44), in which the Commission found that that State aid measure was compatible with the internal market within the meaning of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and authorised its implementation.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the Republic of Austria to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Republic of Austria to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

| 3. | Orders the Czech Republic, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Czech Republic, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 337, 12.10.2015.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/13

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Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 — Consejo Regulador del Cava v EUIPO — Cave de Tain L’Hermitage, union des propriétaires (CAVE DE TAIN)

(Case T-774/16) (1)

((EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - Figurative EU trade mark CAVE DE TAIN - Earlier designation of origin ‘CAVA’ - Concept of ‘evocation’ of a protected designation of origin - Article 103(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013))

(2018/C 311/13)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Consejo Regulador del Cava (Villafranca del Penedès, Spain) (represented by: C. Prat, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: E. Zaera Cuadrado and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Cave de Tain L’Hermitage (Tain l’Hermitage, France) (represented by J.-P. Stouls, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 September 2016 (Case R 980/2015-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Consejo Regulador del Cava and Cave de Tain L’Hermitage, union des propriétaires.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Consejo Regulador del Cava to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Consejo Regulador del Cava to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 6, 9.1.2017.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/13

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Action brought on 20 June 2018 — Intercept Pharma and Intercept Pharmaceuticals v EMA

(Case T-377/18)

(2018/C 311/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Intercept Pharma Ltd (Bristol, United Kingdom) and Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (New York, New York, Unites States) (represented by: L. Tsang, J. Mulryne, E. Amos and H. Kerr-Peterson, Solicitors and F. Campbell, Barrister)

Defendants: European Medicines Agency

Form of order sought

| — | annul the decision ASK-40399 communicated by the defendant to the applicants on 15 May 2018, to release some documentation under Regulation 1049/2001/EC; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision ASK-40399 communicated by the defendant to the applicants on 15 May 2018, to release some documentation under Regulation 1049/2001/EC; and

| — | order the defendant to pay the applicants legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the applicants legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the defendant erred in law by concluding that the ‘court proceedings’ indent of Article 4.2 of Regulation 1049/2001/EC was not engaged in the present case, on the basis that the documentation was not a document ‘prepared for the purpose of court proceedings’. As a matter of law, the defendant should have concluded that the exemption was engaged. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant erred in law by concluding that the ‘court proceedings’ indent of Article 4.2 of Regulation 1049/2001/EC was not engaged in the present case, on the basis that the documentation was not a document ‘prepared for the purpose of court proceedings’. As a matter of law, the defendant should have concluded that the exemption was engaged.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging further or in the alternative that the only legally permissible outcome of a proper balancing exercise, under the ‘commercial interests’ indent of Article 4.2 of Regulation 1049/2001/EC, would have been a decision not to release the documentation, in light of: (i) the compelling weight of the applicants’ private interest in avoiding disclosure; and (ii) the merely vague and generic public interest in disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging further or in the alternative that the only legally permissible outcome of a proper balancing exercise, under the ‘commercial interests’ indent of Article 4.2 of Regulation 1049/2001/EC, would have been a decision not to release the documentation, in light of: (i) the compelling weight of the applicants’ private interest in avoiding disclosure; and (ii) the merely vague and generic public interest in disclosure.

---

| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/14 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/14

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Action brought on 3 July 2018 — de Volksbank v SRB

(Case T-406/18)

(2018/C 311/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: de Volksbank NV (Utrecht, Netherlands) (represented by: M. van Loopik, A. Kleinhout, A. ter Haar and T. Waterbolk, lawyers)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Form of order sought

| — | annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 12 April 2018 on the calculation of ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund for 2018 (SRB/ES/SRF/2018/3); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 12 April 2018 on the calculation of ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund for 2018 (SRB/ES/SRF/2018/3);

| — | in the alternative, annul the abovementioned contested decision and declare Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/63 (‘the delegated regulation’) (1) partly or fully inapplicable, in accordance with Article 277 TFEU; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, annul the abovementioned contested decision and declare Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/63 (‘the delegated regulation’) (1) partly or fully inapplicable, in accordance with Article 277 TFEU;

| — | in any event, order the SRB to pay the costs of the present proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

in any event, order the SRB to pay the costs of the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging the breach of Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU, (2) Article 70(2) of Regulation 806/2014 (3) and Article 4(1) of the delegated regulation, by using incomparable data to determine the applicant’s net liabilities.






  — | It follows from the text and objectives of Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 70(2) of Regulation 806/2014 that the SRB should use data from the same point or period in time to calculate net liabilities in accordance with those provisions. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging the breach of Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU, (2) Article 70(2) of Regulation 806/2014 (3) and Article 4(1) of the delegated regulation, by using incomparable data to determine the applicant’s net liabilities.

—

It follows from the text and objectives of Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU and Article 70(2) of Regulation 806/2014 that the SRB should use data from the same point or period in time to calculate net liabilities in accordance with those provisions.

| — | It follows from the text and objectives of Article 4(1) of the delegated regulation, in the light of Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation 806/2014, that the SRB must use comparable data in order to ensure a fair calculation of the contribution based on a bank’s risk profile. |
| --- | --- |

—

It follows from the text and objectives of Article 4(1) of the delegated regulation, in the light of Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation 806/2014, that the SRB must use comparable data in order to ensure a fair calculation of the contribution based on a bank’s risk profile.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging, in the alternative to the first plea, the breach of Article 103(2) and 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU and of Article 290 TFEU because the delegated regulation, as applied by the SRB in the contested decision, exceeds the mandate provided to the European Commission, resulting in the inapplicability of the delegated regulation, in accordance with Article 277 TFEU.






  — | Contrary to Article 290 TFEU, the delegated regulation supplements essential elements of Directive 2014/59/EU. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging, in the alternative to the first plea, the breach of Article 103(2) and 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU and of Article 290 TFEU because the delegated regulation, as applied by the SRB in the contested decision, exceeds the mandate provided to the European Commission, resulting in the inapplicability of the delegated regulation, in accordance with Article 277 TFEU.

—

Contrary to Article 290 TFEU, the delegated regulation supplements essential elements of Directive 2014/59/EU.

| — | If Articles 4(1), 4(2) and 16(2) of the delegated regulation can only be interpreted as meaning that the SRB must use incomparable data, the delegated regulation is not in overall compliance with the text and objectives of Directive 2014/59/EU. |
| --- | --- |

—

If Articles 4(1), 4(2) and 16(2) of the delegated regulation can only be interpreted as meaning that the SRB must use incomparable data, the delegated regulation is not in overall compliance with the text and objectives of Directive 2014/59/EU.

| — | In so far as the delegated regulation sets rules on the calculation of the basic annual contribution, the delegated regulation exceeds the content of the mandate provided by Article 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU. |
| --- | --- |

—

In so far as the delegated regulation sets rules on the calculation of the basic annual contribution, the delegated regulation exceeds the content of the mandate provided by Article 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality by not properly taking into account the applicant’s covered deposits.






  — | The SRB’s calculation methodology is unsuitable to attain the objectives of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation 806/2014 and the delegated regulation. |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality by not properly taking into account the applicant’s covered deposits.

—

The SRB’s calculation methodology is unsuitable to attain the objectives of Directive 2014/59/EU, Regulation 806/2014 and the delegated regulation.

| — | The SRB’s calculation methodology also goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by the legislation. |
| --- | --- |

—

The SRB’s calculation methodology also goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by the legislation.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty by not properly taking into account the applicant’s covered deposits.






  — | The applicant could not have foreseen the SRB’s interpretation of the delegated regulation. |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legal certainty by not properly taking into account the applicant’s covered deposits.

—

The applicant could not have foreseen the SRB’s interpretation of the delegated regulation.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment by not properly taking into account the applicant’s covered deposits.






  — | The applicant has to pay a significantly higher Single Resolution Fund contribution than other banks with the same, or a similar, size and risk profile. |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of equal treatment by not properly taking into account the applicant’s covered deposits.

—

The applicant has to pay a significantly higher Single Resolution Fund contribution than other banks with the same, or a similar, size and risk profile.

---

(1)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44).

(2)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).

(3)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/15

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Action brought on 18 July 2018 — Aeris Invest v ECB

(Case T-442/18)

(2018/C 311/16)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Aeris Invest Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: S. Chimenos Minguella and G. Ferrer Gonzálvez, lawyers)

Defendant: European Central Bank

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | Annul European Central Bank Decisions LS/MD/18/141 and LS/PT/2018/9 of 8 May and 9 February 2018, respectively; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul European Central Bank Decisions LS/MD/18/141 and LS/PT/2018/9 of 8 May and 9 February 2018, respectively;

| — | Order the European Central Bank to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the European Central Bank to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The present application seeks the annulment of the European Central Bank (‘ECB’) Decision LS/MD/18/141 of 8 May 2018 concerning the confirmatory application for access to ECB documents, together with the previous European Central Bank Decision LS/PT/2018/9 of 9 February 2018 concerning the application for access to ECB documents.

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging a failure to give adequate reasons for the ECB’s decisions refusing access to the documentation concerned, as those decisions failed to give due consideration to the aims pursued by the Community legislature in establishing the right of natural and legal persons to access documents of the European institutions, in the context of a transparent procedure and in the light of the principles of good governance and citizen participation. Moreover, the arguments put forward by the ECB are general in nature. Similarly, the ECB has failed to take into account the fact that the disclosure of the documents requested can in no way affect the smooth progress of the decision-making procedure in the context of the resolution of credit institutions. Not only has the specific resolution procedure been concluded, but it is now under judicial review, so that the refusal of access makes that review more difficult for the Court itself. Lastly, the decisions fail to take into account the fact that access to the documentation requested is for the sole purpose of exercising the right to an effective remedy laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging a failure to give adequate reasons for the ECB’s decisions refusing access to the documentation concerned, as those decisions failed to give due consideration to the aims pursued by the Community legislature in establishing the right of natural and legal persons to access documents of the European institutions, in the context of a transparent procedure and in the light of the principles of good governance and citizen participation. Moreover, the arguments put forward by the ECB are general in nature. Similarly, the ECB has failed to take into account the fact that the disclosure of the documents requested can in no way affect the smooth progress of the decision-making procedure in the context of the resolution of credit institutions. Not only has the specific resolution procedure been concluded, but it is now under judicial review, so that the refusal of access makes that review more difficult for the Court itself. Lastly, the decisions fail to take into account the fact that access to the documentation requested is for the sole purpose of exercising the right to an effective remedy laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions infringe Article 4(1)(c) of Decision ECB/2004/3 on public access to European Central Bank documents, in so far as those decisions refuse the applicant access to the information requested on the ground that the documents are, in whole or in part, covered by a general presumption of non-accessibility as they are confidential documents covered by the professional secrecy applicable to the institutions. That general presumption of non-accessibility is not expressly provided for in the sector-specific legislation applicable and, if it did exist, it would not be applicable, as the exceptions to the right of access cannot be interpreted broadly and on the basis of analogy. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions infringe Article 4(1)(c) of Decision ECB/2004/3 on public access to European Central Bank documents, in so far as those decisions refuse the applicant access to the information requested on the ground that the documents are, in whole or in part, covered by a general presumption of non-accessibility as they are confidential documents covered by the professional secrecy applicable to the institutions. That general presumption of non-accessibility is not expressly provided for in the sector-specific legislation applicable and, if it did exist, it would not be applicable, as the exceptions to the right of access cannot be interpreted broadly and on the basis of analogy.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions breach Article 4(1)(c) of Decision ECB/2004/3, in so far as those decisions refuse the applicant access to the information requested on the ground that the documents are, in whole or in part, covered by the professional secrecy applicable to the institutions, when they are required in judicial proceedings and such refusal prevents or impedes the exercise of the public judicial function. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions breach Article 4(1)(c) of Decision ECB/2004/3, in so far as those decisions refuse the applicant access to the information requested on the ground that the documents are, in whole or in part, covered by the professional secrecy applicable to the institutions, when they are required in judicial proceedings and such refusal prevents or impedes the exercise of the public judicial function.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions breach Article 4(1)(a), second and sixth indents, of Decision ECB/2004/3, in so far as they assert that the disclosure of the information requested may prejudice the banking system in general. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions breach Article 4(1)(a), second and sixth indents, of Decision ECB/2004/3, in so far as they assert that the disclosure of the information requested may prejudice the banking system in general.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions breach Article 4(2), first indent, of Decision ECB/2004/3, in asserting that the disclosure of the documents and information requested may affect the business interests of Banco Santander and have an impact on future inspections. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decisions breach Article 4(2), first indent, of Decision ECB/2004/3, in asserting that the disclosure of the documents and information requested may affect the business interests of Banco Santander and have an impact on future inspections.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/17

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Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Vogue Peek & Cloppenburg)

(Case T-443/18)

(2018/C 311/17)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: P. Lange, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Hamburg (Hamburg, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Party applying for the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark Vogue Peek & Cloppenburg — Application for registration No 2 700 847

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 April 2018 in Case R 1362/2005-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/17

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Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg)

(Case T-444/18)

(2018/C 311/18)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: P. Lange, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Hamburg (Hamburg, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark Peek & Cloppenburg — EU trade mark No 270 439

Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 April 2018 in Case R 522/2006-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95.

---

| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/18

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Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg)

(Case T-445/18)

(2018/C 311/19)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: P. Lange, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Hamburg (Hamburg, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Party applying for the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark Peek & Cloppenburg — Application for registration No 2 791 416

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 24 January 2018 in Case R 1270/2007-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/19

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Action brought on 16 July 2018 — Peek & Cloppenburg v EUIPO — Peek & Cloppenburg (Peek & Cloppenburg)

(Case T-446/18)

(2018/C 311/20)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: P. Lange, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Peek & Cloppenburg KG, Hamburg (Hamburg, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Party applying for the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: EU word mark Peek & Cloppenburg — Application for registration No 4 295 069

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 April 2018 in Case R 1589/2007-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

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Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(2) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

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Infringement of Article 8(4)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Paragraph 15(3) of the German Law on trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(4) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 63 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009, read in conjunction with Rule 20(7)(c) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/20

---

Action brought on 19 July 2018 — Ortlieb Sportartikel v EUIPO (Octogon)

(Case T-449/18)

(2018/C 311/21)

Language of the application: German

Parties

Applicant: Ortlieb Sportartikel GmbH (Heilsbronn, Germany) (represented by: A. Wulf and K. Schmidt-Hern, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark (Representation of an octogon) — Application for registration No 16 047 466

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 April 2018 in Case R 1634/2017-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/20

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Order of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — So v Council and Commission

(Case T-564/17) (1)

(2018/C 311/22)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Third Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 338, 9.10.2017.

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| 3.9.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 311/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.9.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 311/21

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Order of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — Korea National Insurance Corporation v Council and Commission

(Case T-568/17) (1)

(2018/C 311/23)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Third Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 338, 9.10.2017.

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