1 A g et is a di vo r ce do cu men t , wh ich ac co r di ng t o Je wis h L aw , mu st be pr es en t ed by a

hus ba nd to h i s wi f e to ef f ect the i r di vorce . The

ess en tia l text of the g et i s qui

te sh ort: "You are hereby permi tt ed to all men," i.e ., the w i f

e i s n o l ong er a marr i ed wom an , an d the l aw s of adul tery no longer apply

. The get also returns to t he wi fe the l egal righ ts which a h

usban d holds in regard to hi s wi fe i

n a Jewi sh m arriage. SECOND DIVISION March 15, 2011

No. 1-09- 1986 JODI ANN SCHNEI DER, ) Appeal from the ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Pl ai ntif f -Ap pel l ee, ) Coo k C oun ty ) v. ) No. 06 CH 6157 ) EARL M. SCHNEID ER, ) Ho no r ab le ) Ba r

ba r a R iley, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judg e Pres i di ng. JUS TI CE HARR IS deliver ed t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Pre si di n g J usti ce Cu n n i n gh am an d J usti ce Con n orscon cu rre d i n th e j udgm

en t. OPINION This ap pea l conc er ns a single iss ue: whet her t he t rial co ur t er re d in gr ant ing sanc t ions agains t t he appell

ant, E arl Schnei

der. E arl and Jodi Schn

eider were married i

n a Jewi sh
cerem ony i n 1985 an d recei ved a ci vi l di ssolution of thei

r marriage i

n 2002. However, the two remai ned m arried i n the ey es of Orthodox Jewi sh l

aw becaus e Earl would not give J odi a get 1 whi ch would release her f

rom thei r Jewi sh m

arriage an d allow he

r to ma rry an ot her Jew. After pur suing no nlegal r emedies , Jo di fil ed a n act ion ag ainst Ea rl o n Mar ch 28 , 2 006 , se ekingNo. 1-09- 1986

2

sp ec ific p er fo rman ce o f a k et ub ah , o rJe wis h ma rr iag e c o nt r ac t , t ha t t he t wo ha d s ign ed at t he ir weddi ng an d whi ch sh e argued compel

le d Earl to grant her a get in the even t t hei r marriage en de d. T he pa r t ies filed nu mer o us ple ad ing s a nd mo t io ns b efo r e t he t r ial c o ur t an d, in ne ar ly
eve ry filing, Ea rl r ep ea t ed t he s ame ar gu ment s a bo ut t he ina pp licab ility o f In re Marriage of Goldman , 196 Ill . App. 3d 785 (1990), a case upon whi ch Jodi reli ed. The trial

court granted
sum ma ry j udgme nt in fav or o f J odi on Septemb er 19, 2008, and that judgm ent in cl uded an
aw ar d fo rat t o rne y fee s a nd co st s, aft er wh ich Jo di file d a pe t it io n fo rfee s p ur su an t t o I llino is Supr eme Cour t Ru le 137 (eff. Feb 1, 19 94). Ear l then pro ceeded to fi le objections to Jodi’s pet itio n and s ubse que nt amendment s, a ll of which re pea t ed his e ar lier failed ar gument s abo ut t he inap plica bility o f Goldman . The tri al cou rt sp ec i f i cal l y gra nte d Jodi attorn ey f ee s a s a sa nc ti on pu r su an t t o Ru le 1 37 o n Ju ne 3, 20 09
. E ar l filed a mo t io n t o r ec o nsid er , in w hic h he ag ain repeat ed hi s Goldman argumen t and whi ch the trial

court deni

ed on Jul y 13, 2009. He then

fi le d t he inst ant app eal, ar guing t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d in gr ant ing Rule 1 37 s anct ions. Fo r t he followi ng reasons, we f

in d that t he trial

court did n

ot abuse i ts discretion in

awardin g Jodi atto rney fees as a san ction pursuan

t t o Rule 137. JURISDICTION The t rial co ur t ent er ed a final j udg ment in t he inst ant cas e o n July 13, 200 9, and
res pon dent f i l ed hi s n oti ceof appe al on J ul y 28, 200 9. A

cc ordi ngl y , thi s c ourt h

asj urisd i cti on pu rsua n t to Il l i n oi s S up re me C our

t Ru l es 30 1 a n d 3 03 gov

er n i n g a pp ea l s f rom f i n al j udgm en ts en tered b elow. Ill . S. Ct. R. 30 1 (ef f . Feb . 1, 1994 ); R . 303 (e f f . May 30, 200 8).No. 1-09- 1986

3 BACK GROUND On Marc h 28 , 2006, p l ai

ntif f Jodi An n Sc hn eider sued h

er ex-hu sb and, Earl

Sch ne i der, for spe cific per for mance in t he cha ncer y divisi on o f the circu it co ur t of Co ok Co unt y, alleging that E arl had a contract ual obl igation to give her a “get.” Jod i an d Earl had m

arried on August 25 , 19 85 , an d s ig ne d a ke t ub ah , o rJe wis h ma rr iag e c o nt r ac t , as pa rt o f t he irwe dd ing ce r emo ny. Jodi attached a copy

of the ketubah to her compl ai nt. The ketubah cons is

ts of a two- page documen t, o ne page wri

tt en i n A ramai c and the other an Engl

is h transl ation. The ketubah pro vides, in pertinen

t par t, as foll

ows:

“ The s ai d B ride groom

made th e f oll owi n g dec l arati

on to hi s bri de: Be t ho u my w ife a cc o r din g t o t he law o f Mo se s a nd I sr ae l. I fait hfu lly pr o mise t ha t I will be a t rue hu sba nd un t o t he e; I will hono r a nd che rish t hee; I will wor k fo r t hee; I will pro t ect and support t hee an

d wil l provi de all that i s neces sary

for thy due sustenan ce as i t beseem eth a Jewi sh h

usban d to do. I also take upon my self al l s uch f urther obli

gations f or t hy ma in tenance, as are prescri

bed b y our religi

ous stat ute. And t he sa id B r ide ha s p ligh t ed he rt r o t h u nt o him in affect ion and sincer ity and ha s t hus t ake n upo n her self the ful fi ll me nt of al l the duties i

ncum ben t o n a Jewi

sh wi fe.No. 1-09- 1986

4 The co venant of mar riag e wa s du ly execut ed a nd wi tnes sed thi s da y , acc ordi ng to the usa ge of Israe l .” Ea rl filed to disso lve the marr iage u nder Illinois law o n Sep t ember 1 5, 200 0, and t he ci rcuit court o f L ake County en tered a judgm

ent for di ssolution of m

arriage on M arch 4, 2002. Al though Jodi an

d Earl were di

vorced in the ey es of the State of Ill

in ois, they remai ned m arried under Ort hodox Jewish l

aw. In t hi s tradition, o nl

y a h usband can di

vorce his wife and h

e does so by p et it io ning a r ab binic al c o ur t ( Be it Din ) t o iss ue t he ge t , wh ich t he wife mus t t he n p hysic ally
acc ept in or der for t he divo rc e t o be co mplet e. If a hu sband re fuses t o g ive his wife a ge t , t he wife beco mes kno wn as “agu nah, ” o r “cha ined. ” I f an agu nah we re t o mar ry ag ain, t his seco nd
ma rriage would not be recognized under Jewi sh l aw and tradi

tion and the

wif e would b e seen as ad ul terou s. A ny ch i l dre n of the se con d m arr i ag e w oul d b e c ons i dered

“ mam zeri m ,” or il le giti ma te. In her com

pla in t, Jo di a ll eged that Earl was en

gaged to and cohabi

tating wi th another
wo man and r efuse d t o g ive Jo di a ge t in or der t o ha ra ss her and d eny her t he r ight t o be
rem arr i ed un der J ew i sh

l aw . Sh e f urth er a l l eg ed tha t, pu rs ua nt to In re Marriage of Goldman , 196 Ill . App. 3d 785 (1990), t he ketubah that she and Earl

had si gned duri ng thei r marriage ce r emo ny fo rmed a b ind ing co nt r ac t t ha t r eq uir ed E ar l t o giv e h er a g et in t he ev en t t ha t t he ir civil m ar riag e wa s disso lved. Jo di finall y alleged t hat her only re co ur se a gainst Ea rl wa s t he fil ing o f a suit for spe cific per for mance a nd as ked t hat t he co ur t or der Ea rl t o g ive her a get and t hat t he co ur t or der Ea rl t o p ay Jo di’s at t or ney fees a nd co st s in the spe cific per for mance a ct ion.No. 1-09- 1986

5

On A pril 27, 2006, Earl fi

le d a m ot ion to dismi

ss Jodi ’s com

pla in t pursuant to section 2- 615 of t he Co de o f Civil

Pr oc edu re (t he Co de) (7 35 I LCS 5/ 2- 615 (Wes t 200 6) ). In his mo t ion, Ea rl alleged t hat t he langu age of t he ke t ubah d id no t re quir e E ar l to give Jo di a ge t . I n add itio n, Ear l al l eg ed tha t the tri al cou rt lac ke d j urisd

i cti on ov er th e acti on b ec au se

of the se pa rati on of church a nd state. Earl al so acknowledge d that t he Goldman deci sion in volv ed the sam

e ketubah langua ge a s t he inst ant cas e but ar gue d t hat t he de cision w as d istingu ishable beca use of t he follow ing fact ual differe nces : ( 1) t he wife in Goldman ha d in clu de d a co un t fo rsp ec ific per for mance in her divo rc e pe t itio n; (2 ) in Goldm an, the ke tub ah i ss uearos e p rior to th e entr

y of a judg ment o f disso lut ion o f divor ce; a nd ( 3) an evide nt iary hear ing was held in Goldman , in wh i ch rab bi s te sti f i ed tha t be ca us e the h usba nd wa s u si ng hi s ref us al to gi ve a g et a s a mea ns of
ex t o r t ing co nc es sio ns f

r o m his w ife a nd be ca us e t he hu sba nd ha d a ba nd o ne d h is w ife, t he ge t did
n ot n ee d to b e v

ol un tar i l y gi v en . Ea rl ’s moti on to dism i ss di d n ot i n cl ude a n y ci tati on s to au t ho r it y. On Jul y 12, 2006, t he presidi

ng j udge of the chancery di vi sion transferred the ins

tant ca se to the domestic rela

tions di vi si on of the ci

rcuit court o f Cook County. On F ebruary 28, 2008, Jodi sub mi tt ed i nterrogat ories to Earl. Earl n ever responded. On May 5, 2008, t he trial

court ordered Earl to giv e Jodi a get. The court’s han dwritten ord er pro vided as foll

ows: “This ca use co ming on befo re t his Co ur t on P et itio n of t he Peti ti one r ‘ Com pl ai nt f or Sp ec i f i c Pe rf orm an ce ,’ an d b ei ng set f orNo. 1-09- 1986

6 hear ing t his day o n Pet itio ner ’s P et itio n; and t he co ur t being ad v i se d th at th e P eti ti on er ’s attor n ey h as re ce i v ed a m oti on to su bs ti tute a ttorn ey an d m oti on to [ i l l eg i

bl e] a nd di sm i ss set f or 5/ 15/ 08, but not app ear ing o n t he Ju dge ’s Bo ok , a nd no one app ear ing for t he Re spo ndent , a nd t he Co ur t being ad vised a nd being pr ese nt ed a ll paper s t ende re d t o t he Pe t itio ner ’s at t or ney and be i ng f urthe r adv i sed , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. That the Petitioner’s Peti tion f or Specif ic Performan

ce is granted. 2. The Responden

t is h ereby ordered t o sign

a form whi ch gr ant s t he Pe t itio ner a Je wish Divo rc e, and a llows a Rabbi t o s t and in hi s place at the proceeding. 3. Th e R es pon dent s ha l l si gn the f orm i ns tan ter, upon pr es en t at io n t o him. 4. No co st for t he ‘g et ’ will be [illegible] aga inst t he Re sp on den

t an d th e P eti ti on er sh al l pa y th e f ee s a ss oci ati on wi th th e p repa ra ti on of th e g et. 5. Thi s m atter i s take

n of f cal l .” On that sam

e day , the trial

court entered a second h andwri tt en order vacati

ng i ts earli erNo. 1-09- 1986

7

or der g rant ing specif

ic performance. T his second or der no ted that Jodi’s at to rney saw Earl’s atto rney in the court house hal

lwa y a nd adv is ed hi m that the m

atter was set for a hea

rin g but that
no one had app eare d on Ea

rl ’sbeha l f
. On May 8, 2008, Jodi fi

le d a m ot ion to dis qualif

y Stanl ey Kapl an, Earl’ s brother-in

-law, as Earl’ s atto rney . In her m ot ion, Jodi

alle ged that Kaplan h

ad been suspen ded from the practice of l aw se v eral ti mes i n th e p ast f ew yea rsan d h ad en gage d i n i m prope r f i n an ci al de al i n gswi th Earl duri ng th at sam e peri od of ti me. On May 23, 2008, Earl fi

le d a m ot ion f or substitution of j udge pursuant to section 2- 100 1(a ) of the Code (7 35 I LC S 5/

2-1 001 (a)(Wes t 200 6)) . The tri al cou rt de ni ed Ear l ’s moti on on August 28, 2008. The court’s August 28, 2008, o rder also stated that Jodi withdrew, wi thout pr eju di ce , he rmo t io n t o di sq ua lify S t an ley K ap lan as E ar l’s at t o rne y. Earl h ad al so fi le d a m ot ion to ame

nd hi s m ot ion to dismi

ss an d on Septembe

r 4, 2008, th e tr i al cou rt gra n ted Ea rl ’s moti on . In

h i s a men de d m oti on , Ea rl re i terate d th e s am e a rgum en ts abo ut t he inapp licabili

t y of t his co ur t ’s de cision in Goldman t hat he r aised in his fi rst mot ion. On S ept ember 1 9, 200 8, Jo di fil ed a mot ion in limine se ek i ng to pre cl ude Ear l f rom testify in g or presenting e

vi dence on h

is beh al f at a trial

in the in stant case. In her m

ot ion, Jodi arg ue d that b ec au se

Ear l ha d f ai l ed to res pon d to J odi ’s

Fe br ua ry 28, 200 8, req

ue st f or in terr ogat ories, despite Jod i’s Sept emb er 3, 20 08, not ice to co mpl y wi th discovery an

d request for co mpliance pu rsu ant t o I lli nois S upr eme Co ur t Rule 2 01K ( eff. Ja n. 1 , 1 996 ), Ea rl sho uld be pr ec lud ed fr o m pr es en t ing t es t imo ny o rev ide nc e a t t r ial. Jo di fu rt he rar gu ed t ha t Jo di w o uldNo. 1-09- 1986

8

suffer unfair p re

judice if Ea rl we re allowe d t o t est ify or pr ese nt evidenc e wit hou t co mplyi ng wit h J o di ’s r ep ea t ed r eq ue st s fo rdi sc o ve ry. That same day, the trial court ent ered an or der denyi ng Earl’s am

ended motion to dism

iss and g ra nt ing Jo di’s mo t ion fo r su mmary judgment . T he o rd er furt her dire ct ed E ar l to sec ur e t he ge t . T he co ur t sp ec ifica lly o r de r ed E ar l t o sig n a fo rm, wh ich au t ho r ize d a r ab bi t o st an d in Ea rl’s p lace w hile Jod i pet itio ned a ra bbinical cou rt t o g ive her a get , in t he co ur t ’s pr ese nce a nd Earl ref used to do so. Fin

ally , the court awarded Jodi attorney f ees and di rected her to prepare a petition for such fees. Jodi f i l ed h er peti tion f or attorney

f ees on October 3, 2 008. O n N ovem ber 3, 200 8, Earl fi le d a m ot ion to strike an

d dis mi ss Jodi ’s peti

tion f or at to rney

fees . In hi s m

ot ion, Earl

alle ged that t he trial

court descri

bed Earl ’s conduct i

n the case as “l ousy” duri

ng a h earin g on Septembe

r 19, 2008, and that this was not a basi s f

or awarding attorney f

ees and c osts. E arl f

urther all eged tha t the tri al cou rt lac ke d a

uthori ty to aw ard Jod i attorn ey f ee s. J odi f i l ed an am en de d pe ti ti on f or atto rney fees on Novem

ber 10, 2008. On Novem

ber 18, 2008, the trial

court granted Jodi l

eave to amen

d her petition for fe es and al lowed Earl

28 day s to respo nd. Earl f il ed a m ot ion to strike an

d dis mi ss Jodi ’s am

ended peti ti on on De cem b er 17 , 20 08 . In

h i s m oti on , Ea rl al l eg ed th at th e c our t l acke d j uri sd

i cti on to aw ar d fe es and t hat , in t he a lt er nat ive, t he ma t t er wa s ba rr ed by t he d o ct rine o f res judicata . Earl also re it er at ed his e ar lierar gu ment s a bo ut t he ina pp licab ility o f Goldman
. Me an wh ile, o n D ec emb er 3, 20 08 , E ar l se cu r ed a g et fo rJo di.No. 1-09- 1986

9

On Fe br ua ry 5, 2 009 , Jod

i f i l ed a m em oran dum of l aw di scus si ng the appl i ca bi l i ty of
sa nc ti ons un der Il l i noi s S upr em e C ourt R ule 1 37 ( ef

f . F eb . 1, 1 994 ). L ater th at m onth, on Fe br ua ry 18 , 20 09 , E ar l filed a mo t io n t o ame nd his D ec emb er 20 08 mo t io n t o dis miss
. I n his motion to amen

d, Earl argued that Jodi’s

cl ai ms were tim e-barred. On Fe

bruary 24, 2009, Jodi fil ed a pet itio n t o a mend o r su pplement her plead ings, see king t o u pda t e her bill ing st at ement fi le d with the c ourt detail

in g atto rney

fees and costs i

ncurred i n the i nstant case. On March 16, 2009, Earl fi led an am ended and supplem

ental m ot ion to st rike and di smi

ss Jo di’s pe t itio n for at t or ney fees. In his amend ed a nd su pplement al mot ion, Ea rl re iter at ed t he arg um en ts th at he h ad rai se d e arl i er. Na mel y , Ea rl al l eg ed tha t the trial cou rt lac ke d j urisd

i cti on over the case an

d reiterated that t he Goldman deci sion wa s disti

ngu i shab l e f rom th e ca se a t bar. On Marc h 24 , 2009, J

odi f i l ed a s econ

d peti tion to ame nd or s uppl em en t her p l eadi

ngs . In this second petition, Jodi provided the court with an updated bi ll in g statement of al

l a tt orney f ees and costs i

ncurred i n the i nstant case to date. On March

25, 2009, Earl fi

le d a reply

to Jodi’s cl ai m f or sanctions pursuan

t t o Rule 137. Earl’s reply contains the sam

e argume nts that he m

ade i n each of his earlie

r fi li ngs wi th the trial court . Specif

ic ally , Earl argued that the court la cked j urisdi

ction an d that t he Goldman case was in applic abl e. Th e tri al cou rt de ni ed Ear l ’s moti on to s

tri kean d di sm i ss Jod i ’s am en de d f eepe ti ti on on March 30, 2008, and s et the matter for a heari ng on Jun e 3, 2009. On May

22, 2009, Jodi fi

le d a t hir d p et it io n t o ame nd o rsu pp leme nt he rple ad ing s, up da t ing t he billing st at eme nt s o f allNo. 1-09- 1986

10

attorney f ees and costs i

nc urred to da

te. On Jun e 3, 2009, the tr ia

l c ourt hel

d a heari ng on Jodi ’s peti

tion f or at to rney

fees pursuant t o Rule 137. After hearing argumen t from both sides, the t rial cour t st ated as follows: “I do fi nd that this

entire ac tion f rom the very

begi nni ng was sanc t ionable. The only pu rp os e I can imagine is t o ha ra ss and
cau se d istr ess. Tha t ’s t he o nly reaso n I c an imagine. I t hink I’ve been prett y c le ar about t hi s righ t along. Isn’ t t hi s the case wh ere I said t hat t he o nly wor d t hat wo uld d esc ribe t his was ‘ lou sy’?” The tria l court al so en

tered the f

oll owi ng h andwri tten order:

“ Thi s [ i l l eg i

bl e] c om i ng on b ef ore Thi s C ourt f or det er minatio n of fee s du e t he Pe t itio ner , Jo di Sc hneider , a nd t he court ha vi ng h eard a rgum en t, and be i ng s o advi sed , IT IS HER

EBY O RDER

ED 1. T ha t t his C o ur t find s t ha t t he en t ire pr o ce ed ing is
sa n cti on ab l e a n d th e R es pon den t’s acti on s were don e s olel

y to ha rass and cau se d

i stres s to the Pe

titi oner. 2. The Court havi

ng determi

ned that sanctions under 137 are appro priate and warrant ed, t he court enters judgmen t against Ea rl M. Sc h n ei der i n th e a moun t of $5 4,5 16 .22 , pu

rsua n t to [i l l egi bl e] 137 .”No. 1-09- 1986

11

On Jun e 18, 2009, Earl f

il ed a m ot ion to stay the en

forcem ent of the trial

court ’s Jun

e 3, 200 9, or der . I n t his mot ion, Ea rl alleged t hat t he amo unt of t he judg ment a gainst him should be reduced becaus e an un

nam ed port ion of

the fee s awarded as sa

nctions were dis charged as prepe ti ti on d ebts i n E arl ’s ch ap ter 7ba nk ruptcy ca se . A ttorn ey A riel W ei ss be rg f il ed thi s m oti on on be ha l f of Ear l ; h oweve r, the re cord

con tai ns no i nd i ca ti on th at W ei ss be rg f i l ed noti ceof appe aran ce b ef oreth e tr i al cou rt. On Ju ne 22 , 2 009 , Jo di fil ed a pet itio n for inter im att or ney fees a nd co st s. I n her pet itio n, Jo di asse rt ed t hat she ha d limi t ed mea ns t o r esp ond t o E ar l’s late st mot ion and re que st ed t hat t he
co ur t gr ant her an inte rim awar d o f $10 ,0 00 “t o leve l the p laying fi eld and t o e nable t he Peti tion er to prese

nt a credi tabl e def en se to the

Res ponde nt’s pleadi ngs .” On Jun e 26, 2009, Earl f

il ed a m ot ion to reconsi der and va cate the trial

court ’s Jun

e 3, 2009, order. Earl

attached a re

port of proce edi

ngs f rom a Septem ber 19, 20 08, heari

ng b ef ore Judg e Ri l ey . At the

he ari ng, th e tri al court ask ed Ear l ’sattorney

wh y Earl would not si

gn a f orm allowi ng Jodi to pursue a get. Earl’s couns el off ered no answer to the court ’s question. Af ter hearin g arguments from both sides, the trial court r uled as f ollows: “THE COURT: I don’t bel ie ve thi s i s res adj udic ata [ sic ]
an d I d on’ t thi nk i t’s a 1 401 moti on ei

the r. Th e m oti on f or sum ma ry j udgme nt and j udgme

nt on the ple adi

ngs is granted. MR. M ORR

IS [Counsel

f or Jodi]: Than

k y ou, your Honor. I would ask then

that sin ce Dr. Schnei

der is standi ng he re,No. 1-09- 1986

12 he sig n t he se pa pe r s no w s o we do n’t ha ve t o ch as e t his ma n. Will the Court direct it righ

t now? MR. KAPLAN [Co unse l for E ar l]: I f the Co ur t pleas e, he has a righ t not to. W e h

ave a righ t to ha ve f urth er proce edi

ng s, n ot
n ec es sa ri l y b ef oreth i s C our

t. TH E C OUR T: Sign. MR. KA PLAN: Pardon m

e? TH E C OU

RT : I’ m orderi n g h i m to s i gn i t. MR. MOR RIS : He re it is. Sign. MR. KAPLAN: He’s n

ot going to sign it, Judge. He has a right not t o s ign it a nd he ha s a r ight also t o a ppe al this d ecisio n. TH E C OU

RT : Th en h e c an tak e i t b ack a f ter h e s i gns i t. MR. KA PLAN: No, he can ’t. No, he can ’t take it back, Jud ge, beca use if she go es a nd pr oc eed s and get s t he Ge t , t hen t he appe al i s m oot. MR. MORRIS: Then

how is hi s cl ie nt harm ed? TH E C OUR T: It ’s a q ues t ion o f lousy. Pu t t hat in the record, lousy, l

ousy, l ousy b ehav

ior, whi ch I see al l da y l ong, but th i s is a good ex am pl e of i t. A s to f ee s, f ee s a re g ran ted exce pt f or th e c ost ofNo. 1-09- 1986

13 origi na l l y f i l i ng th e pl eadi ng.” On Ju ly 10, 2 009 , E ar l fi

led a r eply to Jo di’s ans wer t o his mo t ion t o r eco nsider and
v ac ate th e order of

Ju n e 3 , 20 09 . In

h i s rep l y , Ea rl repe ate d h

i s a rgum en t th at Goldman is di sti ngu i shab l e an d i na ppl i cab l e to the case a

t bar. The trial court deni

ed Earl’ s m

ot ion to reconsi der on Jul y 13, 2009, af

ter hearin g oral
ar gu men t o n t he mat t er . E ar l t he n file d t his t imely a pp ea l. AN AL YSIS Ea rl’s main brief o n app eal did no t co nt ain a st at ement of jur isdict ion as re quir ed by Ill in ois Suprem

e Court Rule 341(h)(4) (eff . July 1, 2008). His b

rief al so did n

ot in cl ude an appen di x as re qui re d b y Il l i n oi s S up re me C our

t Ru l e 3 42 (e f f . J an . 1, 20 05 ). Th i s c our

t sua sponte iss ue d a n o r de rdir ec t ing E ar l t o file a n a men de d b r ief t ha t co mplie d w it h t he I llino is suprem e court r ule s. Earl f

il ed an am ended b rief , with appen

dix, and we wi

ll proceed to consider E ar l’s ar gu men t s o n app ea l. On appeal, Earl argues that the trial court ’s ass essm

ent of san ctions un der Rul e 137 was i m prop er. Spe cif

i cal l y , Ea rl arg ue s th at the tri al cou rt i m prop erl y i m pos ed sa nc ti ons be ca us e of Earl ’sref usa l to grant Jodi

a get, i.e ., on t he bas is of his ac t ions no t his plead ings. In a ddit ion, Earl argues that som

e port ion of

Jodi’s atto rney fees were dis charged i

n hi s chapter 7 ban

kruptcy
case. W e w i l l

not ov ertu rn a tri al cou rt’ s r ul i ng on R ule 1 37 s an

cti ons ab sent a n a buse of di scre tion
. Dunn v. Patterson , 3 95 I ll. App. 3d 9 14, 923 (2 009 ). Rule 1 37 p ro vides in pe rt inentNo. 1-09- 1986

14

part as foll

ows: “The s ignat ur e o f an at t or ney or par t y cons t itu t es a cer t ifi cat e by him that he has re ad t he plea ding, mot ion o r o t her pap er ; t hat t o t he best of h is knowle dge, in

form ation, and b elie f f

ormed af ter re aso nable inquir y it is well gr ou nded in fact and is w ar ra nt ed by exist ing law o r a go od -fait h ar gument for t he ext ensio n, modif i ca ti on, or reve

rs al of ex i sti ng l aw , an d that i t i s n ot in terp osed for any i

mproper pur pose, such as to harass o r to cause unne cessary

del ay or needle ss i

ncrease i n the cost of liti

gation. *** I f a p lea din g, mo t io n, o ro t he rpa pe ris s ign ed in vio lat io n o f t his rule, the cou rt, upon motion or upon its own ini tiative, m ay i mpose upon the person who si

gned i t, a represented part y, or both, an app ro pr iate sanc t ion, which may include a n or der t o p ay to t he ot her party or parties the am ount o f reas onabl

e expenses i

ncurred be caus e of

the f i l i ng of the p l eadi

ng, m otion or other pa

per, in cl udin g a reasonabl

e atto rney fee.” Il l. S. Ct. R. 137 (eff

. Feb. 1, 1994)
. Rul e 137 i s not a mean

s by whi ch trial court s shoul

d puni sh l iti gants whose argum

ents do not succeed; i

nstead, i t is a tool whi

ch they can em ploy to prevent f

uture abuse of the j udic ia l proces s or di sci

pli ne i n the ca se of

pas t abu ses . Dunn , 395 Ill. App. 3d at 923- 24. A pa rt y’sNo. 1-09- 1986

15

honest bel

ie f that his case was

well grounded i

n l aw and f act is n ot enough to avoid Rul

e 137
san cti ons. Id. at 9 24. Ra

the r, the p arty ’s

pleadi ng s m us t meet an

obj ec ti ve sta nd ard of
reas onab l eness . Id. In t he inst ant cas e, Ea rl re pea t edly arg ued t hat t his co ur t ’s de cision in In re Marriage of Goldman , 1 96 I ll. App. 3d 7 85 ( 199 0) , u po n which Jo di re lied, w as inap plicable and dist inguishable o n its fac t s. B y our co unt , E ar l raised t his same ar gument in six diff er ent ple ad ing s be gin ning wit h his init ial mo t io n t o dis miss Jo di’ s c o mpla int an d e nd ing wit h his r ep ly to Jod i ’s answ er to h

i s m oti on to rec ons i der an

d vac atethe

orde r of Ju ne 3, 2 009 . In

each of these pleadi

ngs, Earl used sim

il ar language and argumen

t with mi ni mal if any citation to case l aw. A nd e ach tim e, Jodi f i l ed the appropri ate res

pons i ve pleadi ngs . Eve n though th

e tri al court de nied Ea rl’ s mo t io n t o dis miss ba se d u po n his r ea ding o f Goldman , E ar l co nt inu ed t o r ais e t his
argu men t as a def ense to ea ch an d ev er y acti on th at J odi an d th e tr i al cou rt took i n an atte m pt to brin g the case at bar to resolution. Although not relevan t t o t he i ssue of Rule 137 sanctions, which deal onl

y wi th pleadings, mot ions, and o ther paper s fi led with the t rial court , Ea rl’s counsel repeatedly

rais ed the sam

e Goldman argu

men ts a t oral argu men t b ef oreth e tr i al cou rt. Because Earl again

raises h is Goldman arg

um en ts on appe al , h ere

i n th e c onte xt of attempting to demons

trat e that hi s pl eadi

ngs were reas onabl

y based i n the l aw and f act, we exam in e the Goldman dec ision and its a pplicability t o t he ca se a t bar . I n Goldman , t he hus band and wi fe h ad signed a ketubah

as part of their m

arriage ce remony and, i n he r petition f

or divorce, th e wi f e i n cl uded a c oun t f or spe ci f i c p erf orm an ce re qu esti n g th at th e h us b an d g ra n t h er a g et.No. 1-09- 1986

16

Goldman , 1 96 I ll. App. 3d a t 787 -8 8. The ket ubah a t issue in Goldman bo r e e ss en t ially t he sa me wordi ng as the ketub ah i n the i nstant ca se. Id. The t rial co ur t held an e vident iary hear ing o n t he is sue of wh

ether the ketubah was

an en forceabl e contract and determi

ned the ketubah

was enf orceabl e an

d requ i red a h usb and to gi

ve his wi f e a ge t upon term

i na tion of the m arriage. Id. at 788 -9 1. In a wr itt en o rd er , t he t rial co ur t disso lved t he pa rt ies’ marr iage a nd o rd er ed t he hus band to giv e hi s wi f e a ge t. Id. at 7 91. Th e ord

er s pe cif i cal l y prov i de d that the tri

al cou rt wa s n ot ordering a Be it Di

n to grant t he get; i

nstead, i t merel y requi red the husb and “

to trut hf ull y a nswer al l qu esti on s put to h

i m an d ‘ to pa rti ci pa te i n th e v er b al an d p h y si ca l acts n ec es sa ry to v al i da te the GET.’ ” Id. The husba nd in Goldman appealed, arguin g that t he ketubah

was not a contract ; that even if i t was a co nt ra ct , it was t oo vagu e t o s upp or t spe cific per for mance; a nd t hat t he o rd er dire ct ing hi m to secure the g et vi ola ted hi s consti

tution al ri ghts
. Id. On appeal, this court determi ned that the ma nifes t weigh t o f the ev

ide nce presen

ted to the trial

court establ

is hed that the parties intend ed t he ke t ubah t o be a binding co nt ra ct and t hat t heir mar riag e wo uld be g ove rne d by Jewi sh l aw. Id. at 792. In additi on, “The un contro verted expert testim ony pres ented at trial establ is hed that Orthodo x Jewish l aw requires

the husb and to obtain an d deliv er to hi s wi fe an Orthodo x get upon dis soluti on of the m arriage.” Id. at 793 . E ven t hou gh ge ner ally a husband
m us t gi v e h i s wi f e a get v ol un tar i l y , the ev i den ce

pr es en ted to th e tr i al cou rt e sta b l i sh ed th at a cer t ain amou nt of c oe rc ion wa s ac cep t able whe re t he hus band ha d aba ndo ned his w ife and ref use d to cohabi

t or support he

r as h e had prom

i sed und er the terms of the k etub ah
. Id.No. 1-09- 1986

17

Thi s court also determi

ned that the trial

court ’s order directi

ng the h usban d to secure a get di d not vi ola

te the h usb and’s constituti onal ri ghts
. Id. at 794. First, “the order ha[d] [a] secular purpose of enf

orcing a c ontract between the parti es.” Id. Sec ond , t he main pur po se o f the order wa s se cul

ar an d the tria l court did not i

nten d the order to advance or i

nh i bi t reli gion. Id. An d third, by

appl yi ng pri nci ple s of contract law to the dispute between the parties, the trial court avoid

ed ex ces si ve en tang l em en t wi th rel i gion. Id. at 795. F i

na l l y , be caus e “ [e]x

pert t est imony est ablished t hat t he ge t pr oc edu re was sec ular in natu re and d id no t re quir e [ t he husb and] to engage i

n an y a ct of worship or to express any reli gious b elie f,” this court found that the trial court ’s order did n

ot violate the husb and’s

righ ts under the free e

xerci se clause. In the i nstant case, Earl

repeatedly

stressed that the Goldman ca se wa s d i sti ng ui sh ab l e on its f acts and that any

court order directin

g hi m to secure a get would vi olate hi s constitutional rights. We address Earl’s constitut ional argument fi

rst. Earl never provided any citation to case l aw or the constituti onal provisions u

pon w hi ch he rel i ed i n s upport of thi s arg um en t. In add itio n, fo r t he r eas ons st at ed in Goldman , we do not bel ie ve that an order directi

ng Earl to sign a f orm a uthori zi ng a rab bi to stand i n h i s stea d at a proc eedi

ng w here Jodi would peti

tion f or a get violates Earl’s constitut ional rights. Ea rl ’s argu men ts th at Goldman i s disti

ngu i shab l e on i

ts f acts a re wi thout m eri t. Earl highlighte d t he fo llowing fac t ual differe nces in his pleadings : ( 1) t he wife in Goldman had included a co unt for spe cific per for mance in her divo rc e pe t itio n; (2 ) in Goldm an, the ketubah i ssue arose

prior to the en

try of a j udgm en t of dissol uti on of di vorce ; a nd ( 3) an evi den tia ryNo. 1-09- 1986

18

hear ing was held in Goldman , in w hic h r ab bis t es t ified t ha t be ca us e t he hu sba nd wa s u sing his
re fusal t o g ive a ge t as a means o f ext or t ing co nces sions fro m his wife and bec aus e t he hus band had ab andoned h

is wif e, the get did not need to be vol untaril y gi ven . The fi

rst t wo dif

feren ces are de minimi

s . In the i nstant case, Earl

fi le d the petition f

or divorce, and thus we c ann ot expect Jo di t o ha ve so ught spe cific per for mance in t hat pr oc eed ing. I ndee d, beca use it w as E ar l who f i l ed th e p eti ti on , i t wou l d h av e b een re as on ab l e f

or Jodi to as su me th at E arl wou l d s eek to dis solv e the m arriage un der both Ill

in ois ci vi l l aw and Orthodox Jewi sh l aw. T he lac k o f an ev ide nt iar y hea r ing un de rdiffe r en t cir cu mst an ce s mig ht pr o vid e a ba sis fo rdis t ing uis hing t his c o ur t ’s de cis io n fr o m Goldman . However, the facts i n thi s case m

ake that
ar gu men t un pe r su as ive he r e. T he bla me fo rlac k o f an ev ide nt iar y hea r ing ca n be pla ce d s o lely upon Ear l ’s f ai l ure to res pon d a nd ac t i n a cc orda nc e w i th c ourt r ule. J odi f i l ed a re que st f

or int er r o ga t o r ies in Fe br ua ry 20 08 , se ek ing an sw er s t o qu es t io ns s uc h a s t ho se ad dr es se d in Goldman , nam

el y, Earl ’s i ntent in signi ng the ketubah , Earl’s i

ntent that Ort hodox Jewi sh l aw govern the m

arriage contract, and Earl’ s current ma rital status, t o nam

e a fe w. Earl ne

ver re sp on de d to J

odi ’s re qu est f or i n ter rog ator i es , de sp i te J odi ’s Se ptem b er 3, 2 00 8, n

oti ce to comply wi

th discover y and request for co mpl iance. The t rial court ultim ate ly grant ed Jo di’s motion in li mi ne seeki ng to bar Earl from presentin g test im ony or ot her evidence at t rial on these i ss ue s b ec au se

he f ai l ed to com pl y wi th d i sc ove ry . Ea rl di d n ot f i l e a moti on to rec ons i der or vacate t hat or der. No post trial m ot ion was presented to the tr ial cour t t o vacate t hat or der. T hus, i n th e i n terest of f ai rnes s, we ca n n ot f i n d th at Goldman is dist inguishable mer ely becau se t heNo. 1-09- 1986

19

tria l court he re en tered j udgm

en t bas ed on

the p l eadi

ngs and di d not con duct an unn ece ssa ry evi dentia ry h earin g . Eve n aft er t he t rial co ur t issued its S ept ember 1 9, 200 8, or der dire ct ing Ea rl t o s ign a f orm al l owi n g Jodi to pu rsue a g et, Ea rl con ti n ue d to pre ss

h i s a rgum en ts th at Goldman di

d n ot ap ply. On ce t he t r ial c o ur t ha d d et er mined t he iss ue o f sp ec ific p er fo rman ce , E ar l emp lo yed his Goldman ar gu men t as a d efe nse t o t he t r ial c o ur t ’s o r de rgr an t ing Jo di a t t o rne y fee s. E ve ryt ime Jo di pr ese nt ed t he co ur t wit h a pe t itio n for fees, Ea rl wo uld file a re spo nsive plea ding r aising t he
sam e Goldman argumen

t. Jo di woul

d then respond an

d fi le a supplem

ental petition updati

ng he r request for fees to incl

ude att orney fees

and costs incurred in respondin g to Earl’s latest ple adi ng, and Earl

would f il e another response rai si

ng the sam

e Goldman ar gu men t . T his c ycle
con ti nu ed f or s evera l month s u nti l the trial cou rt f i na l l y deni ed Ear l ’s moti on to rec ons i der on Jul y 13, 200 9. Bec aus e Earl

rai sed the s am e b ase l ess argum en t repea tedl y i n re spon se to Jodi ’sev ery fi li ng, even af

ter t he trial court’s judgmen t o n the meri

ts, we can see no reason for t hese pleadi ng s exc ep t “ to ha

ras s or to ca us e u nn ec es sa ry de l ay or nee dles s i

nc rease i n th e c ost of l i ti ga ti on. ” Il l . S. Ct. R. 137(ef

f . F eb . 1, 1 994 ). Acc ordi

ngl y , we f i nd tha t the trial cou rt di d n ot abuse i ts di scre tion i n gr an tin g Rul e 137san cti ons a gai nst Earl
. Dunn , 395 Ill . App. 3d at 923. E ar l ar gu es o n app ea l t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t ’s o r de rgr an t ing sa nc t io ns w as ba se d n o t o n his plead ings but on his c ond uct befo re t he co ur t . I n sup po rt of t his arg ument , E ar l po ints t o t he Septembe r 19, 2008, hearin

g where the trial

court calle d hi s conduct “l ousy.” A t t he Jun e 3,No. 1-09- 1986

20

2009, he ari

ng to determ

i ne the appropriatenes s of R ul e 137 sa

nctions, the trial

court stated: “I do fi nd that this

entire ac tion f rom the very

begi nni ng was sanc t ionable. The only pu rp os e I can imagine is t o ha ra ss and
cau se d istr ess. Tha t ’s t he o nly reaso n I c an imagine. I t hink I’ve been prett y c le ar about t hi s righ t along. Isn’ t t hi s the case wh ere I said t hat t he o nly wor d t hat wo uld d esc ribe t his was ‘ lou sy’?” We agree that i

t would be an

abuse of dis cretion f

or a t rial court to award Rule 137
san cti ons b ase d upon

a party ’scond

uct b ef ore the c ourt. Krautsack v. Anderson , 223 Ill . 2d 541, 562 (200 6) (“Because Rule 137 addresses the pleadin gs, motions and ot her papers a li tigant files, t he rul e d o es no t pr o vid e a sa nc t io n a ga ins t all a ss er t ed ins t an ce s o f ba d- fa it h c o nd uc t by a l i tig an t or the l i tig an t’s a ttorney duri ng th e cours e of

l i tig ati on.”);Kensington’s Wine Auctioneers &

Brokers, Inc. v. John Hart Fine Wine, Ltd. , 392 Il l . Ap p. 3d 1, 1 6 (200 9) (f

ail ure to appear be f ore the c ourt is

not an appropri ate b asis f or gran tin g Rul e 137san cti ons)
. While it would li kel y ha ve avoid ed s ome conf usi on had th e tri al

court detai

l ed wh i ch pleadi ngs were fil ed t o ha ra ss and cau se d istr ess, as d iscuss ed a bove , t he r eco rd sup po rt s t he t rial co ur t ’s finding that Ru le 137 sanctions were appropr iate. When the trial cour t denied Earl’s m

ot ion to dismi

ss and agai n when the court granted summ ary judgme

nt in fav or o f J odi, the trial

court found that Earl’s Goldman ar gument s lack ed mer it. Neve rt heless, Ea rl co nt inued t o file plead ings re pea t ing this sam e argume nt num erous time s i

n response to every

ple adi ng that Jodi f

il ed. Such f il in gs constitute th

e sort of ha rass i ng p l eadi ngs that Ru l e 137wasi

nten ded to prev

en t. If Ea rlNo. 1-09- 1986

21

reasonably

bel iev ed that the tr ial

cour t err ed in

rejecting h

is Goldman ar gument s, he sho uld have appealed those decisions. Earl also argues that some of h is fees were dis charged i

n hi s chapter 7 ban

kruptcy case. Sp ec i f i ca l l y , Ea rl as se rtsth at th e tr i al cou rt sh oul d h av e ded uc ted th e s um of $4 ,40 4.1 7 f

rom i ts Jun e 3, 20 09, award of

attorney f ees pursuan t to Rule 137. In supp ort of this arg

um en t, Earl points to several

fi li ngs i n hi s ban kruptcy case, wh

ic h he states are att ached to hi s brief. No such do cu men t s w er e in clu de d in E ar l’s ame nd ed br ief o rin t he ap pe nd ix he filed in r es po nse t o t his court ’s request. Nor was any of thi s evi

dence i ncl uded i n the record presented bef ore t he trial
cou rt. In addi ti on, Ear l of f ers thi s c ourt n o ac cou nti ng ex pl ai ni ng how he arr i ve d a t the su m of $4 , 40 4. 17
. Ac co r din gly, we de cline t o co nsid er t his p ur po rt ed ev ide nc e a nd ar gu men t o n app ea l. Ioerger v. Halverson C

onstruction Co. , 232 Ill . 2d 196, 208 (2008) (decli ni ng to consider
evi den ce on appe al that wa s n

ot part of the rec ord be f

ore the tri al court). Acco rd ingly, the t rial co ur t did no t abus e its discr et ion in gr ant ing Rule 1 37 s anct ions agai nst Earl
. Dunn , 395 Ill . App. 3d at 923. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reas ons, the judgm ent of the ci

rcuit court o f Cook County is af fi rmed. Af fi rmed.