# C_2023132EN.01011501.xml

| 14.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/115 |
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14.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/115

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P9_TA(2022)0345

The EU’s strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa

European Parliament recommendation of 5 October 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa (2021/2206(INI))

(2023/C 132/16)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 entitled ‘The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU’, and in particular paragraph 28 thereof regarding access to and respect for sexual and reproductive health and rights, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 entitled ‘The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU’, and in particular paragraph 28 thereof regarding access to and respect for sexual and reproductive health and rights,

| — | having regard to the final joint statement of 18 February 2022 of the sixth European Union-African Union Summit entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’, |
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having regard to the final joint statement of 18 February 2022 of the sixth European Union-African Union Summit entitled ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 June 2018 on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 June 2018 on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on EU-African security cooperation in the Sahel region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa (1),

| — | having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted on 21 March 2022, |
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having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted on 21 March 2022,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development (2), |
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having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on a new EU-Africa Strategy — a partnership for sustainable and inclusive development (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2021 on the situation in Somalia (3), |
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having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2021 on the situation in Somalia (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on the situation in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya (4), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on the situation in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2022 on the political crisis in Sudan (5), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2022 on the political crisis in Sudan (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the situation in Ethiopia (6), |
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having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the situation in Ethiopia (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in Tigray (7), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the humanitarian situation in Tigray (7),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on the political situation in Uganda (8), |
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having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on the political situation in Uganda (8),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2019 on the situation of LGBTI people in Uganda (9), |
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having regard to its resolution of 24 October 2019 on the situation of LGBTI people in Uganda (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 on Eritrea, notably the case of Dawit Isaak (10), |
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having regard to its resolution of 8 October 2020 on Eritrea, notably the case of Dawit Isaak (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2016 on the situation in Eritrea (11), |
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having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2016 on the situation in Eritrea (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2017 on South Sudan (12), |
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having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2017 on South Sudan (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2016 on Djibouti (13), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 May 2016 on Djibouti (13),

| — | having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467 and 2493 on women, peace and security, |
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having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467 and 2493 on women, peace and security,

| — | having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535 on youth, peace and security, |
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having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535 on youth, peace and security,

| — | having regard to the resolutions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of May 2014 on protection against violence and other human rights violations against persons on the basis of their real or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity and May 2017 on the situation of human rights defenders in Africa, |
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having regard to the resolutions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of May 2014 on protection against violence and other human rights violations against persons on the basis of their real or imputed sexual orientation or gender identity and May 2017 on the situation of human rights defenders in Africa,

| — | having regard to the guidelines on freedom of association and assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights during its 60th ordinary session in May 2017, |
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having regard to the guidelines on freedom of association and assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights during its 60th ordinary session in May 2017,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 March 2020 on the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2020-2024 (JOIN(2020)0005), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 25 March 2020 on the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2020-2024 (JOIN(2020)0005),

| — | having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2015-2019, and in particular action 22(b) thereof, which outlines the responsibility of the European External Action Service, the Commission, the Council and the Member States to develop and implement an EU policy on transitional justice, |
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having regard to the EU action plan on human rights and democracy for 2015-2019, and in particular action 22(b) thereof, which outlines the responsibility of the European External Action Service, the Commission, the Council and the Member States to develop and implement an EU policy on transitional justice,

| — | having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, |
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having regard to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction and the Convention on Cluster Munitions,

| — | having regard to the agreement signed at the third Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration in Nairobi, Kenya on 1 April 2022, |
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having regard to the agreement signed at the third Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration in Nairobi, Kenya on 1 April 2022,

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2628 of 31 March 2022, which reconfigured the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), |
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having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2628 of 31 March 2022, which reconfigured the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS),

| — | having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, |
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having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

| — | having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, |
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having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, |
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having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989,

| — | having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, |
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having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

| — | having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York, |
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having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 25 September 2015 entitled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in New York,

| — | having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief of 1981, |
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having regard to the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief of 1981,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 on an EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world (14), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 February 2020 on an EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world (14),

| — | having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, |
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having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

| — | having regard to the report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia of 3 November 2021 and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report of 11 March 2022 on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Afar and Amhara regions of Ethiopia conducted between September and December 2021, |
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having regard to the report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia of 3 November 2021 and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report of 11 March 2022 on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the Afar and Amhara regions of Ethiopia conducted between September and December 2021,

| — | having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 17 December 2021 establishing an international commission of human rights experts to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of violations and abuses committed since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia, |
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having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolution of 17 December 2021 establishing an international commission of human rights experts to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of violations and abuses committed since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia,

| — | having regard to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan of 12 September 2018, |
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having regard to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan of 12 September 2018,

| — | having regard to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute background paper of December 2020 entitled ‘The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: an assessment’, |
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having regard to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute background paper of December 2020 entitled ‘The European Union Training Mission in Somalia: an assessment’,

| — | having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0207/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0207/2022),

| A. | whereas the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 establish a new strategy for the Horn of Africa and give new impetus to the EU’s partnership with the region, which is of primary strategic relevance for the Union; |
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A.

whereas the Council conclusions of 10 May 2021 establish a new strategy for the Horn of Africa and give new impetus to the EU’s partnership with the region, which is of primary strategic relevance for the Union;

| B. | whereas the Horn of Africa is a strategically important region for the EU in political, economic and commercial terms, with which Europe has long-standing political and economic ties; whereas the Horn of Africa has the potential to grow in economic and political terms, but is facing a number of critical hurdles, including the COVID-19 crisis, the adverse impact of climate change, increasing water scarcity and food insecurity, desertification and deforestation, low resilience to natural disasters, population growth and urbanisation, combined with limited job creation and deep inequalities, a lack of proper infrastructure, instability and political challenges, among others; whereas democracy, good governance, accountability, the rule of law, human rights, gender equality and inclusive and participative societies are preconditions for peace and regional stability; |
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B.

whereas the Horn of Africa is a strategically important region for the EU in political, economic and commercial terms, with which Europe has long-standing political and economic ties; whereas the Horn of Africa has the potential to grow in economic and political terms, but is facing a number of critical hurdles, including the COVID-19 crisis, the adverse impact of climate change, increasing water scarcity and food insecurity, desertification and deforestation, low resilience to natural disasters, population growth and urbanisation, combined with limited job creation and deep inequalities, a lack of proper infrastructure, instability and political challenges, among others; whereas democracy, good governance, accountability, the rule of law, human rights, gender equality and inclusive and participative societies are preconditions for peace and regional stability;

| C. | whereas the countries of the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, South Sudan and Djibouti) face common risks and threats, including the immediate and long-term impacts of climate change, jihadist terrorism, ethnic tensions and problems of weak governance; whereas all countries in the region are characterised by persistent fragilities due to ongoing conflicts and grave human rights violations perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, including the enrolment of child soldiers, targeted attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and the practice of sexual violence against women and girls; whereas impunity for war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law remain the norm, while the pursuit of justice for victims has largely proved elusive; whereas in December 2021, the UN Human Rights Council established the UN Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia to investigate possible war crimes and other violations; |
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C.

whereas the countries of the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, South Sudan and Djibouti) face common risks and threats, including the immediate and long-term impacts of climate change, jihadist terrorism, ethnic tensions and problems of weak governance; whereas all countries in the region are characterised by persistent fragilities due to ongoing conflicts and grave human rights violations perpetrated by all parties to the conflict, including the enrolment of child soldiers, targeted attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and the practice of sexual violence against women and girls; whereas impunity for war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law remain the norm, while the pursuit of justice for victims has largely proved elusive; whereas in December 2021, the UN Human Rights Council established the UN Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia to investigate possible war crimes and other violations;

| D. | whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas the humanitarian situation across Ethiopia remains dramatic owing to conflict, drought and large-scale internal displacement; whereas a humanitarian truce was announced by the federal government on 24 March 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which has been cut off by the conflict; whereas hostilities in the northern region of Ethiopia resumed on 24 August 2022; whereas despite remaining very brutal, the conflict in Ethiopia has now entered a different phase, given the public commitment to a negotiated solution under an African Union-led framework made by both parties to the conflict; whereas the construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built on the upstream Nile by Ethiopia continues to cause tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries; |
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D.

whereas the overall stability of the Horn of Africa has further deteriorated since the start of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region in November 2020, and is jeopardised by difficult political transitions ongoing in a number of countries; whereas the humanitarian situation across Ethiopia remains dramatic owing to conflict, drought and large-scale internal displacement; whereas a humanitarian truce was announced by the federal government on 24 March 2022 in order to facilitate the provision of aid to Tigray, which has been cut off by the conflict; whereas hostilities in the northern region of Ethiopia resumed on 24 August 2022; whereas despite remaining very brutal, the conflict in Ethiopia has now entered a different phase, given the public commitment to a negotiated solution under an African Union-led framework made by both parties to the conflict; whereas the construction and second filling phase of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam built on the upstream Nile by Ethiopia continues to cause tensions between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries;

| E. | whereas the EU is a major, long-standing and reliable partner for peace, security, sustainable development and humanitarian assistance in the region, and whereas due consideration must be given to this partnership for peace, security, democracy, sustainable development and humanitarian aid; whereas existing regional organisations and other initiatives such as the African Union and Combined Joint Task Force are also leading actors in addressing the Horn of Africa’s security concerns; |
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E.

whereas the EU is a major, long-standing and reliable partner for peace, security, sustainable development and humanitarian assistance in the region, and whereas due consideration must be given to this partnership for peace, security, democracy, sustainable development and humanitarian aid; whereas existing regional organisations and other initiatives such as the African Union and Combined Joint Task Force are also leading actors in addressing the Horn of Africa’s security concerns;

| F. | whereas the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference took place on 20 and 21 June 2022; whereas the Chinese Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, who was present at the meeting offered Beijing’s unconditional support for the resolution of conflicts in the region, while calling for the countries there to be independent from foreign interference; |
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F.

whereas the first China-Horn of Africa Peace, Governance and Development Conference took place on 20 and 21 June 2022; whereas the Chinese Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, who was present at the meeting offered Beijing’s unconditional support for the resolution of conflicts in the region, while calling for the countries there to be independent from foreign interference;

| G. | whereas the humanitarian situation in South Sudan is deteriorating as a result of tensions and conflicts, local inter-communal violence and recurrent floods; whereas the UN estimated that Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya needed urgent humanitarian assistance of USD 4,4 billion in 2022 in order to reach 29,1 million people; whereas as of April 2022, only 5 % of those needs had been met by the international community; whereas the drought has already caused the deaths of some 3 million livestock animals across southern Ethiopia and in the arid regions in Kenya, and around 30 % of households’ herds have died in Somalia; whereas the locust invasion in East Africa is the worst in 25 years for Ethiopia and Somalia and the worst in 70 years for Kenya and poses a major threat to food security in the region; whereas about 568 000 children were admitted for severe acute malnutrition treatment in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia from January to June 2022, and around 6,5 million children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in these three countries; whereas the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group currently estimates that between 23 and 26 million people could face high levels of acute food insecurity by February 2023 due primarily to the drought in the region if the October to December rains fail; whereas experts have predicted that more frequent cross-border movements of locusts between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia will further exacerbate an already precarious food security situation; whereas the disastrous consequences of the war in Ukraine, with food, fuel and commodity prices having now reached unprecedented levels, are exacerbating the serious food crisis in the countries of the Horn of Africa; |
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G.

whereas the humanitarian situation in South Sudan is deteriorating as a result of tensions and conflicts, local inter-communal violence and recurrent floods; whereas the UN estimated that Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya needed urgent humanitarian assistance of USD 4,4 billion in 2022 in order to reach 29,1 million people; whereas as of April 2022, only 5 % of those needs had been met by the international community; whereas the drought has already caused the deaths of some 3 million livestock animals across southern Ethiopia and in the arid regions in Kenya, and around 30 % of households’ herds have died in Somalia; whereas the locust invasion in East Africa is the worst in 25 years for Ethiopia and Somalia and the worst in 70 years for Kenya and poses a major threat to food security in the region; whereas about 568 000 children were admitted for severe acute malnutrition treatment in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia from January to June 2022, and around 6,5 million children are expected to suffer from acute malnutrition in these three countries; whereas the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group currently estimates that between 23 and 26 million people could face high levels of acute food insecurity by February 2023 due primarily to the drought in the region if the October to December rains fail; whereas experts have predicted that more frequent cross-border movements of locusts between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia will further exacerbate an already precarious food security situation; whereas the disastrous consequences of the war in Ukraine, with food, fuel and commodity prices having now reached unprecedented levels, are exacerbating the serious food crisis in the countries of the Horn of Africa;

| H. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic left the region with health, socio-economic and political challenges by deepening poverty, increasing inequality and exacerbating structural and entrenched discrimination, with a devastating impact on human rights and civil liberties, particularly for minority groups and vulnerable people; whereas in this context some governments have used COVID-19 legislation to repress human rights; |
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H.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic left the region with health, socio-economic and political challenges by deepening poverty, increasing inequality and exacerbating structural and entrenched discrimination, with a devastating impact on human rights and civil liberties, particularly for minority groups and vulnerable people; whereas in this context some governments have used COVID-19 legislation to repress human rights;

| I. | whereas the Horn of Africa remains a region of origin, transit and destination for major migration flows to other countries in the wider region as well as to the EU; whereas poverty and insecurity feed off each other and are two of the most important drivers of mass population displacement in the Horn of Africa, particularly among young people; whereas there are over 7,7 million migrant workers in East Africa and the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda hosting the highest number of international migrants in search of better economic opportunities and better livelihoods; |
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I.

whereas the Horn of Africa remains a region of origin, transit and destination for major migration flows to other countries in the wider region as well as to the EU; whereas poverty and insecurity feed off each other and are two of the most important drivers of mass population displacement in the Horn of Africa, particularly among young people; whereas there are over 7,7 million migrant workers in East Africa and the Horn of Africa with Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda hosting the highest number of international migrants in search of better economic opportunities and better livelihoods;

| J. | whereas political tensions, conflicts, natural disasters and the consequences of climate change are at the root of the considerable refugee and displaced populations in most regions; whereas the humanitarian and security situation in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons remains precarious; whereas Kenya is home to the Dadaab refugee camp, one of the largest in the world, which hosts over 220 000 registered Somali refugees fleeing civil war and climate hardship; whereas tensions between Kenya and Somalia are on the rise over the management of the camp, while refugees continue to have to survive in difficult conditions, depending on the support of the UN for their livelihoods; |
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J.

whereas political tensions, conflicts, natural disasters and the consequences of climate change are at the root of the considerable refugee and displaced populations in most regions; whereas the humanitarian and security situation in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons remains precarious; whereas Kenya is home to the Dadaab refugee camp, one of the largest in the world, which hosts over 220 000 registered Somali refugees fleeing civil war and climate hardship; whereas tensions between Kenya and Somalia are on the rise over the management of the camp, while refugees continue to have to survive in difficult conditions, depending on the support of the UN for their livelihoods;

| K. | whereas the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are turning into areas of increasing concern, where regional and international actors have considerable and often diverging economic and security interests at a global crossroads and choke point for commodities trading, with more than 12 % of global seaborne cargo and 40 % of Asia’s trade with Europe transiting through the Red Sea; whereas stability, maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are crucial for ensuring global energy flows and European energy security, as approximately 6,2 million barrels of crude oil and other petroleum products transit through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait every year (around 9 % of global seaborne shipments), 3,6 million of which are destined for Europe; whereas the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the country will further increase the relevance of this trade route; whereas while pursuing the green and sustainable transitions of the European Green Deal, the short-term need to reduce dependency on Russia and diversify suppliers will make freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden even more crucial in geostrategic terms; whereas consideration must be given to the importance of the Red Sea region regarding stability in the Horn of Africa, its significance as a trade and connectivity axis and its concerns, which are shared by the EU, over stability and freedom of navigation; |
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K.

whereas the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are turning into areas of increasing concern, where regional and international actors have considerable and often diverging economic and security interests at a global crossroads and choke point for commodities trading, with more than 12 % of global seaborne cargo and 40 % of Asia’s trade with Europe transiting through the Red Sea; whereas stability, maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are crucial for ensuring global energy flows and European energy security, as approximately 6,2 million barrels of crude oil and other petroleum products transit through the Bab-el-Mandeb strait every year (around 9 % of global seaborne shipments), 3,6 million of which are destined for Europe; whereas the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing conflict in the country will further increase the relevance of this trade route; whereas while pursuing the green and sustainable transitions of the European Green Deal, the short-term need to reduce dependency on Russia and diversify suppliers will make freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden even more crucial in geostrategic terms; whereas consideration must be given to the importance of the Red Sea region regarding stability in the Horn of Africa, its significance as a trade and connectivity axis and its concerns, which are shared by the EU, over stability and freedom of navigation;

| L. | whereas the 11th ministerial meeting of the Horn of Africa initiative took place at the EU-AU Summit, with Team Europe members also attending for the very first time; whereas the initiative has mobilised over USD 4,5 billion from its three development partners: the EU, the African Development Bank and World Bank Group; whereas since 2019, the EU has supported 64 projects in the Horn of Africa under the EU Trust Fund, focusing mainly on greater economic and employment opportunities and improved governance and conflict prevention; |
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L.

whereas the 11th ministerial meeting of the Horn of Africa initiative took place at the EU-AU Summit, with Team Europe members also attending for the very first time; whereas the initiative has mobilised over USD 4,5 billion from its three development partners: the EU, the African Development Bank and World Bank Group; whereas since 2019, the EU has supported 64 projects in the Horn of Africa under the EU Trust Fund, focusing mainly on greater economic and employment opportunities and improved governance and conflict prevention;

| M. | whereas gender discrimination and other forms of inequality remain entrenched in many countries in the region, including gender-based violence and high levels of conflict-related sexual violence, limited access to sexual and reproductive health, early and forced marriages, the exclusion of pregnant girls from schools, and the practice of female genital mutilation, which remains a long-held custom in the countries of the Horn of Africa; |
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M.

whereas gender discrimination and other forms of inequality remain entrenched in many countries in the region, including gender-based violence and high levels of conflict-related sexual violence, limited access to sexual and reproductive health, early and forced marriages, the exclusion of pregnant girls from schools, and the practice of female genital mutilation, which remains a long-held custom in the countries of the Horn of Africa;

| N. | whereas LGBTIQ people continue to face harassment, arrest, prosecution and gender-based violence and sometimes even risk being killed for their real or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity or expression and sex characteristics; whereas with the exception of Djibouti, consensual sexual acts between same-sex persons are criminalised in all countries of the Horn of Africa; whereas this criminalisation is used to legitimise discriminatory treatment towards LGBTIQ people and whereas repealing discriminatory criminal provisions is a necessary first step towards protecting LGBTIQ people from violence; whereas none of the countries in the Horn of Africa have legal provisions in place to legally recognise trans persons or protect intersex persons from intersex genital mutilation; |
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N.

whereas LGBTIQ people continue to face harassment, arrest, prosecution and gender-based violence and sometimes even risk being killed for their real or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity or expression and sex characteristics; whereas with the exception of Djibouti, consensual sexual acts between same-sex persons are criminalised in all countries of the Horn of Africa; whereas this criminalisation is used to legitimise discriminatory treatment towards LGBTIQ people and whereas repealing discriminatory criminal provisions is a necessary first step towards protecting LGBTIQ people from violence; whereas none of the countries in the Horn of Africa have legal provisions in place to legally recognise trans persons or protect intersex persons from intersex genital mutilation;

| O. | whereas as of 1 April 2022, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with the primary objective of handing over to the Somalian national army forces in 2024; whereas the tasks of the new mission include, inter alia, reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab, helping to strengthen the Somali joint security and police forces, ensuring the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somalia, and supporting the peace and reconciliation efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia and the member countries of the federation; whereas UN Security Council Resolution 2608 on piracy, which was the basis for the EU naval force Operation Atalanta, has not been renewed and, as a result, access to Somali territorial waters is restricted; whereas the security situation is fragile and giving cause for concern, with the terrorist group al-Shabaab remaining active; whereas elections were held 12 months behind schedule; whereas the country is facing increasing financial difficulties that are compromising its ability to pay; whereas EU financial aid has been suspended since September 2020 because of failure to complete the electoral process, although direct support for vulnerable populations is continuing; whereas according to humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the prices of wheat and oil have increased by 300 % in a number of regions in Somalia, which imports 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia; whereas according to the UN, over 38 % of Somalia’s population was suffering from severe food insecurity as of March 2022; |
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O.

whereas as of 1 April 2022, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), with the primary objective of handing over to the Somalian national army forces in 2024; whereas the tasks of the new mission include, inter alia, reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab, helping to strengthen the Somali joint security and police forces, ensuring the gradual transfer of security responsibilities to Somalia, and supporting the peace and reconciliation efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia and the member countries of the federation; whereas UN Security Council Resolution 2608 on piracy, which was the basis for the EU naval force Operation Atalanta, has not been renewed and, as a result, access to Somali territorial waters is restricted; whereas the security situation is fragile and giving cause for concern, with the terrorist group al-Shabaab remaining active; whereas elections were held 12 months behind schedule; whereas the country is facing increasing financial difficulties that are compromising its ability to pay; whereas EU financial aid has been suspended since September 2020 because of failure to complete the electoral process, although direct support for vulnerable populations is continuing; whereas according to humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the prices of wheat and oil have increased by 300 % in a number of regions in Somalia, which imports 90 % of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia; whereas according to the UN, over 38 % of Somalia’s population was suffering from severe food insecurity as of March 2022;

| P. | whereas the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608 limits the access of Operation Atalanta to Somalian territorial waters; |
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P.

whereas the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608 limits the access of Operation Atalanta to Somalian territorial waters;

| Q. | whereas China has appointed a special envoy for Horn of Africa affairs; whereas China has increased its military and diplomatic presence in and economic cooperation with countries in the region; |
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Q.

whereas China has appointed a special envoy for Horn of Africa affairs; whereas China has increased its military and diplomatic presence in and economic cooperation with countries in the region;

| R. | whereas there has been a political stalemate in Sudan since the coup of 25 October 2021 and very difficult negotiations between civilians and the military; whereas the security situation in Darfur, which has seen renewed outbreaks of violence since November 2021, is very worrying; whereas Sudan faces a dire economic situation, coupled with the suspension of payments from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund pending a viable political solution and the establishment of a civilian government, as well as the suspension of financial aid from the Commission, although direct aid to the population has been maintained; whereas Russia’s planned military base will afford it strategic access to the Red Sea; |
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R.

whereas there has been a political stalemate in Sudan since the coup of 25 October 2021 and very difficult negotiations between civilians and the military; whereas the security situation in Darfur, which has seen renewed outbreaks of violence since November 2021, is very worrying; whereas Sudan faces a dire economic situation, coupled with the suspension of payments from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund pending a viable political solution and the establishment of a civilian government, as well as the suspension of financial aid from the Commission, although direct aid to the population has been maintained; whereas Russia’s planned military base will afford it strategic access to the Red Sea;

| S. | whereas over 10 years since South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 2018 has been delayed; whereas President Salva Kiir intends to hold general elections in 2023 in accordance with the deadline set out in the peace agreement; whereas the political and military fragmentation of the country, both between and within different political groups, military factions and ethnic groups, is giving cause for concern; |
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S.

whereas over 10 years since South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 2018 has been delayed; whereas President Salva Kiir intends to hold general elections in 2023 in accordance with the deadline set out in the peace agreement; whereas the political and military fragmentation of the country, both between and within different political groups, military factions and ethnic groups, is giving cause for concern;

| T. | whereas the political landscape in Kenya is deeply polarised; whereas general elections were held on 9 August 2022; whereas the country is struggling economically as a result of the global consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and accumulated debt; whereas Kenya could play a constructive role in regional peace and security; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Kenya twice this year, once on 10 September 2022, as part of a regional tour to Kenya, Mozambique and Somalia, and once on 29 January 2022 to formally launch the EU-Kenya strategic dialogue, for which the economy, trade and investment have been identified as the key priorities; |
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T.

whereas the political landscape in Kenya is deeply polarised; whereas general elections were held on 9 August 2022; whereas the country is struggling economically as a result of the global consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and accumulated debt; whereas Kenya could play a constructive role in regional peace and security; whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy visited Kenya twice this year, once on 10 September 2022, as part of a regional tour to Kenya, Mozambique and Somalia, and once on 29 January 2022 to formally launch the EU-Kenya strategic dialogue, for which the economy, trade and investment have been identified as the key priorities;

| U. | whereas the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was re-elected for a sixth term following the elections held on 14 January 2021; whereas on 30 November 2021, a military operation was launched in Ituri and North Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in response to a series of attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces, a Daesh-affiliated armed terrorist group with roots in Uganda; |
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U.

whereas the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was re-elected for a sixth term following the elections held on 14 January 2021; whereas on 30 November 2021, a military operation was launched in Ituri and North Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in response to a series of attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces, a Daesh-affiliated armed terrorist group with roots in Uganda;

| V. | whereas President Isaias Afwerki of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice has led Eritrea since its independence in 1993; whereas the democratisation process that began with the adoption of the Eritrean Constitution in 1997 has since stalled; whereas the Eritrean regime has clamped down on most fundamental freedoms and the human rights situation is giving cause for great concern; whereas Eritrea is one of the least developed countries (LDCs); whereas its two principal donors are the Global Fund and the European Commission, with the EU currently channelling EUR 20 million into a road improvement project in Eritrea through the Emergency Trust Fund, after having decommitted more than EUR 100 million in 2021 as a result of Eritrea’s involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia; |
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V.

whereas President Isaias Afwerki of the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice has led Eritrea since its independence in 1993; whereas the democratisation process that began with the adoption of the Eritrean Constitution in 1997 has since stalled; whereas the Eritrean regime has clamped down on most fundamental freedoms and the human rights situation is giving cause for great concern; whereas Eritrea is one of the least developed countries (LDCs); whereas its two principal donors are the Global Fund and the European Commission, with the EU currently channelling EUR 20 million into a road improvement project in Eritrea through the Emergency Trust Fund, after having decommitted more than EUR 100 million in 2021 as a result of Eritrea’s involvement in the conflict in northern Ethiopia;

| W. | whereas Djibouti is in an eminently strategic position on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, one of the busiest maritime corridors in the world, which controls access to the Red Sea, thus facilitating a growth model centred on the development of infrastructure (ports and railways); whereas on 9 April 2021, the incumbent President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh won the elections for the fifth consecutive time; whereas Djibouti is at the epicentre of the crisis sweeping round from the Sahel to the Middle East and, while a stable country, its immediate environs are unstable; whereas consideration must be given to Djibouti’s significant military involvement with ATMIS in the fight against al-Shabaab Somali terrorists; |
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W.

whereas Djibouti is in an eminently strategic position on the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, one of the busiest maritime corridors in the world, which controls access to the Red Sea, thus facilitating a growth model centred on the development of infrastructure (ports and railways); whereas on 9 April 2021, the incumbent President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh won the elections for the fifth consecutive time; whereas Djibouti is at the epicentre of the crisis sweeping round from the Sahel to the Middle East and, while a stable country, its immediate environs are unstable; whereas consideration must be given to Djibouti’s significant military involvement with ATMIS in the fight against al-Shabaab Somali terrorists;

1.   Recommends that the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:

The impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on the Horn of Africa

| (a) | undertake a comprehensive evaluation of previous EU strategies and commitments towards the Horn of Africa in order to identify lessons learned and to recalibrate the EU engagement in the region accordingly; recognise that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has worrying immediate and long-term consequences for the Horn of Africa, and that as a response, the EU must adjust its engagement with the region; respond to the fact that — as a consequence of Russia’s illegal action — the overall security situation in the region is negatively affected; address the fact that Russia has already well-established, multifaceted links and influence in the region, including through investments (both civilian and military) and the deployment of paramilitary groups such as the Wagner Group in Sudan, and recognise that these actions have the potential to further destabilise neighbouring areas; counter the Russian attempts to orchestrate misinformation and disinformation campaigns in the region aimed at fomenting anti-EU sentiment by setting up a comprehensive EU public communications strategy to counter and overcome Russian efforts, combined with concrete action and commitments that take into account the needs of the local population; condemn the spread of narratives justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as exemplified by the Sudanese General Hemetti’s statement of 23 February 2022, when he falsely claimed that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was to ‘protect’ Russia; scale up EU diplomatic, political, financial and humanitarian engagement with the AU, its regional components, and individual countries by putting in place concrete action which demonstrates the EU’s commitment to the region in order to foster local and regional approaches to prevent further regional instability, reduce their vulnerability to foreign influence, and address and respond to the negative consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; immediately deepen diplomatic engagement with the governments in the region to discuss and clarify the devastating short, medium and long-term impacts of the Russian objectives and operations in the region; acknowledge that the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the Russian naval blockade, disrupts supply chains and severely impacts the food security of the Horn of Africa, both in the short and medium term, as around 90 % of its wheat is imported from the Russian Federation and Ukraine; take account of the fact that at least 20 million people were already at risk of famine due to unprecedented drought in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and the locust swarm crisis; significantly scale up EU support and assistance to the Horn of Africa to obviate the risk of famine or difficulties in accessing food; recognise the funding gaps for the region for the next six months, namely USD 437 million according to the World Food Programme and USD 130 million according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and do its utmost to help plug these gaps and go beyond the EUR 21,5 million in additional EU humanitarian aid already committed; |
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(a)

undertake a comprehensive evaluation of previous EU strategies and commitments towards the Horn of Africa in order to identify lessons learned and to recalibrate the EU engagement in the region accordingly; recognise that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has worrying immediate and long-term consequences for the Horn of Africa, and that as a response, the EU must adjust its engagement with the region; respond to the fact that — as a consequence of Russia’s illegal action — the overall security situation in the region is negatively affected; address the fact that Russia has already well-established, multifaceted links and influence in the region, including through investments (both civilian and military) and the deployment of paramilitary groups such as the Wagner Group in Sudan, and recognise that these actions have the potential to further destabilise neighbouring areas; counter the Russian attempts to orchestrate misinformation and disinformation campaigns in the region aimed at fomenting anti-EU sentiment by setting up a comprehensive EU public communications strategy to counter and overcome Russian efforts, combined with concrete action and commitments that take into account the needs of the local population; condemn the spread of narratives justifying Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as exemplified by the Sudanese General Hemetti’s statement of 23 February 2022, when he falsely claimed that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was to ‘protect’ Russia; scale up EU diplomatic, political, financial and humanitarian engagement with the AU, its regional components, and individual countries by putting in place concrete action which demonstrates the EU’s commitment to the region in order to foster local and regional approaches to prevent further regional instability, reduce their vulnerability to foreign influence, and address and respond to the negative consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; immediately deepen diplomatic engagement with the governments in the region to discuss and clarify the devastating short, medium and long-term impacts of the Russian objectives and operations in the region; acknowledge that the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the Russian naval blockade, disrupts supply chains and severely impacts the food security of the Horn of Africa, both in the short and medium term, as around 90 % of its wheat is imported from the Russian Federation and Ukraine; take account of the fact that at least 20 million people were already at risk of famine due to unprecedented drought in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia and the locust swarm crisis; significantly scale up EU support and assistance to the Horn of Africa to obviate the risk of famine or difficulties in accessing food; recognise the funding gaps for the region for the next six months, namely USD 437 million according to the World Food Programme and USD 130 million according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, and do its utmost to help plug these gaps and go beyond the EUR 21,5 million in additional EU humanitarian aid already committed;

Guiding principles

| (b) | fully recognise the potential and the strategic relevance of the region, and develop a truly strategic vision for cooperation and engagement by continuously working to implement and adapt the Horn of Africa strategy in the light of recent developments in the region, giving new impetus to a mutually beneficial relationship based on coherent, timely and effective consultations and common values, interests and prospects; move from an obsolete donor recipient mentality to a partnership on an equal footing between the EU and the Horn of Africa countries in order to create the conditions for sustainable and peaceful development in the region; |
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(b)

fully recognise the potential and the strategic relevance of the region, and develop a truly strategic vision for cooperation and engagement by continuously working to implement and adapt the Horn of Africa strategy in the light of recent developments in the region, giving new impetus to a mutually beneficial relationship based on coherent, timely and effective consultations and common values, interests and prospects; move from an obsolete donor recipient mentality to a partnership on an equal footing between the EU and the Horn of Africa countries in order to create the conditions for sustainable and peaceful development in the region;

| (c) | coordinate EU initiatives and support with African counterparts by favouring African ownership of the programmes, thus helping to find African solutions to African problems; adopt, in this regard, a conditionality approach, including on security issues, based on the more for more and less for less principle; note that development aid is sometimes used inefficiently and occasionally misused by governments of the recipient countries; facilitate the strengthening of a bottom-up approach, where local communities and civil society organisations can work to build their own capacities and prepare, coordinate and organise themselves better to become more resilient; |
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(c)

coordinate EU initiatives and support with African counterparts by favouring African ownership of the programmes, thus helping to find African solutions to African problems; adopt, in this regard, a conditionality approach, including on security issues, based on the more for more and less for less principle; note that development aid is sometimes used inefficiently and occasionally misused by governments of the recipient countries; facilitate the strengthening of a bottom-up approach, where local communities and civil society organisations can work to build their own capacities and prepare, coordinate and organise themselves better to become more resilient;

| (d) | coordinate efforts in the region with the AU and its regional components, most notably the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as with the UN and other like-minded international and regional organisations, financial institutions and individual countries; maintain support for ongoing missions in the area that help these efforts, including EU common security and defence policy missions, in order to contribute to a collective response designed to achieve stability and development; encourage the UK to coordinate with the EU in its efforts in the region; |
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(d)

coordinate efforts in the region with the AU and its regional components, most notably the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as with the UN and other like-minded international and regional organisations, financial institutions and individual countries; maintain support for ongoing missions in the area that help these efforts, including EU common security and defence policy missions, in order to contribute to a collective response designed to achieve stability and development; encourage the UK to coordinate with the EU in its efforts in the region;

| (e) | adopt a proactive, inclusive and cooperative approach based on constructive engagement with countries and actors present in the Horn of Africa, sharing EU best practices and experience in integrating matters relating to security, economic development and financial, social and cultural issues to foster effective cooperation across the region and in the maritime domain, while also acting as a facilitator of dialogue with all parties involved, in particular through the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa; |
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(e)

adopt a proactive, inclusive and cooperative approach based on constructive engagement with countries and actors present in the Horn of Africa, sharing EU best practices and experience in integrating matters relating to security, economic development and financial, social and cultural issues to foster effective cooperation across the region and in the maritime domain, while also acting as a facilitator of dialogue with all parties involved, in particular through the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa;

Regional peace and security

| (f) | recognise that insecurity and instability in the Horn of Africa represents a serious threat to the economic and social prospects of the whole of Africa, as well as to the EU’s and regional security concerns; contribute to regional security and stability with an integrated approach, fostering the link between humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace through civilian conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict resolution, mediation, capacity-building and reconciliation activities; mainstream youth inclusion and the full, equal and meaningful representation and active participation of women in peace and security issues, including through the support and implementation of the UN Agendas on Youth, Peace and Security and on Women, Peace and Security, formulating concrete short and medium-term commitments and identifying how this will be measured and reported objectively; support African-owned processes within the AU, IGAD and the East African Community, and address the root causes of conflicts, extremism and radicalisation such as extreme poverty and inequality, the consequences of climate change namely scarce resources such as arable land and water, and long-standing border disputes through political, financial, operational and logistical support; strengthen the EU-AU strategic partnership as regards conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping; strengthen the cooperation with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities in this regard; endorse the concept of human security as a complement to state security approaches which puts measures and institutions at the service of its people; support the necessary clearance of and tackle the contamination caused by landmines, cluster munitions and other explosives, which prevent social and economic development and have a disproportionate impact on children, women and marginalised groups; |
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(f)

recognise that insecurity and instability in the Horn of Africa represents a serious threat to the economic and social prospects of the whole of Africa, as well as to the EU’s and regional security concerns; contribute to regional security and stability with an integrated approach, fostering the link between humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace through civilian conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict resolution, mediation, capacity-building and reconciliation activities; mainstream youth inclusion and the full, equal and meaningful representation and active participation of women in peace and security issues, including through the support and implementation of the UN Agendas on Youth, Peace and Security and on Women, Peace and Security, formulating concrete short and medium-term commitments and identifying how this will be measured and reported objectively; support African-owned processes within the AU, IGAD and the East African Community, and address the root causes of conflicts, extremism and radicalisation such as extreme poverty and inequality, the consequences of climate change namely scarce resources such as arable land and water, and long-standing border disputes through political, financial, operational and logistical support; strengthen the EU-AU strategic partnership as regards conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacekeeping; strengthen the cooperation with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities in this regard; endorse the concept of human security as a complement to state security approaches which puts measures and institutions at the service of its people; support the necessary clearance of and tackle the contamination caused by landmines, cluster munitions and other explosives, which prevent social and economic development and have a disproportionate impact on children, women and marginalised groups;

| (g) | address the possible insecurities and tensions arising from Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the sharing of Nile waters with Sudan and Egypt located downstream; call on the three countries to return to the negotiating table and work with them to find a diplomatically negotiated solution within the appropriate forums under the auspices of the AU and IGAD, taking into account Ethiopia’s interest in generating hydropower as well as the concerns of riparian states vis-à-vis water security, and overcoming the risks related to unilateral attitudes towards the use of shared environmental resources; take account of the fact that the effects of climate change pose a major challenge to the Horn of Africa and require the region to cooperate closely in the production of sustainable energy as well as resource sharing, and recognise that the European Green Deal offers important opportunities for cooperation; provide financial and technical assistance as well as share innovative technologies, best practices and lessons learned with our African partners in order to reap the benefits of the green transition and the water-food-energy nexus, and increase investment in the region’s transition, including integrated infrastructure such as transnational energy grids; |
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(g)

address the possible insecurities and tensions arising from Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the sharing of Nile waters with Sudan and Egypt located downstream; call on the three countries to return to the negotiating table and work with them to find a diplomatically negotiated solution within the appropriate forums under the auspices of the AU and IGAD, taking into account Ethiopia’s interest in generating hydropower as well as the concerns of riparian states vis-à-vis water security, and overcoming the risks related to unilateral attitudes towards the use of shared environmental resources; take account of the fact that the effects of climate change pose a major challenge to the Horn of Africa and require the region to cooperate closely in the production of sustainable energy as well as resource sharing, and recognise that the European Green Deal offers important opportunities for cooperation; provide financial and technical assistance as well as share innovative technologies, best practices and lessons learned with our African partners in order to reap the benefits of the green transition and the water-food-energy nexus, and increase investment in the region’s transition, including integrated infrastructure such as transnational energy grids;

| (h) | coordinate with international partners and organisations to provide timely and sufficient humanitarian aid and assistance to the countries affected by conflicts, extreme drought and other natural disasters and by the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which has contributed to soaring food and fuel costs and disrupted global supply chains; recognise the linkages between the climate crisis, peace and conflicts and the need for peace building and climate adaptation and mitigation efforts to address these, and address climate security as a core element of any comprehensive regional strategy; take the lead in convening the donor community for an exceptional pledging conference for the Horn of Africa in order to avoid the region being hit by hunger once again; |
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(h)

coordinate with international partners and organisations to provide timely and sufficient humanitarian aid and assistance to the countries affected by conflicts, extreme drought and other natural disasters and by the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which has contributed to soaring food and fuel costs and disrupted global supply chains; recognise the linkages between the climate crisis, peace and conflicts and the need for peace building and climate adaptation and mitigation efforts to address these, and address climate security as a core element of any comprehensive regional strategy; take the lead in convening the donor community for an exceptional pledging conference for the Horn of Africa in order to avoid the region being hit by hunger once again;

| (i) | acknowledge the positive impacts of the commitment shown by the EU and its international partners through missions and operations such as Operation Atalanta, the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia and the EU Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security, both by preventing piracy attacks before they happen and reducing the success rate of those that do, and deplore the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608, which unfortunately limits the access of the operation to Somalian territorial waters; commend the positive results already achieved by the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia in the area of civilian law enforcement, and ensure that the mission has the means and personnel it needs to be effective; call on the Member States to show adequate commitment to ATMIS and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, both in terms of personnel and means, in order to empower the Somali armed forces to enable them to take ownership of security in the country while fully complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law; underline the need for the EU to confirm its position as a credible partner for Somalia, supporting ATMIS as a part of an integrated approach adopted in coordination with common security and defence policy missions in Somalia, the European Peace Facility (EPF), humanitarian aid operations and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument; |
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(i)

acknowledge the positive impacts of the commitment shown by the EU and its international partners through missions and operations such as Operation Atalanta, the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia and the EU Programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security, both by preventing piracy attacks before they happen and reducing the success rate of those that do, and deplore the failure to renew UN Security Council Resolution 2608, which unfortunately limits the access of the operation to Somalian territorial waters; commend the positive results already achieved by the EU Capacity-Building Mission in Somalia in the area of civilian law enforcement, and ensure that the mission has the means and personnel it needs to be effective; call on the Member States to show adequate commitment to ATMIS and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, both in terms of personnel and means, in order to empower the Somali armed forces to enable them to take ownership of security in the country while fully complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law; underline the need for the EU to confirm its position as a credible partner for Somalia, supporting ATMIS as a part of an integrated approach adopted in coordination with common security and defence policy missions in Somalia, the European Peace Facility (EPF), humanitarian aid operations and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument;

| (j) | express concern about the persistent activity of radical militant Islamist terrorist groups operating across the Horn of Africa and in neighbouring countries, most notably al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and Daesh, which are highly adaptable and able to gain a lasting foothold among the population; call on the EU and its Member States to focus on the spread of jihadism in the region and provide tailored and effective assistance to the countries affected in countering both the immediate effects of this expansion and the complex root causes that lead to extremism, radicalisation, violence, terrorism and the susceptibility to recruitment; recognise that the relevance and capability to operate of terrorist organisations in the region are further strengthened by the permeability of national borders, and support national and regional efforts to increase border security; work in cooperation with individual countries and regional organisations, most notably the East African Community, IGAD and the Eastern Africa Standby Force, in order to adopt a regional approach to fighting terrorism and addressing its root causes; |
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(j)

express concern about the persistent activity of radical militant Islamist terrorist groups operating across the Horn of Africa and in neighbouring countries, most notably al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and Daesh, which are highly adaptable and able to gain a lasting foothold among the population; call on the EU and its Member States to focus on the spread of jihadism in the region and provide tailored and effective assistance to the countries affected in countering both the immediate effects of this expansion and the complex root causes that lead to extremism, radicalisation, violence, terrorism and the susceptibility to recruitment; recognise that the relevance and capability to operate of terrorist organisations in the region are further strengthened by the permeability of national borders, and support national and regional efforts to increase border security; work in cooperation with individual countries and regional organisations, most notably the East African Community, IGAD and the Eastern Africa Standby Force, in order to adopt a regional approach to fighting terrorism and addressing its root causes;

| (k) | provide tailored and request-driven support to the AU, its regional components and individual countries in their efforts to improve the conditions for security and stability; maintain the support provided via the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument’s policy of capacity-building in support of security and development and the EPF, in particular to Operation Atalanta and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, and ensure that it complies with the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and fully respects human rights and humanitarian law, obligations of ex ante risk assessment, permanent monitoring of the supply of military technology to third country actors and effective transparency provisions including the traceability and proper use of the material delivered to partners under the EPF, in order to help build an accountable, robust and reliable security sector; fully exploit the potential of the EPF in this regard and ensure continuity with the former African Peace Facility in terms of the quality and quantity of funding of African-led initiatives; ensure that all EPF financing commitments entered into with the Horn of Africa before Russia’s criminal invasion of Ukraine are fulfilled; ensure the funding of the civilian component of ATMIS; |
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(k)

provide tailored and request-driven support to the AU, its regional components and individual countries in their efforts to improve the conditions for security and stability; maintain the support provided via the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument’s policy of capacity-building in support of security and development and the EPF, in particular to Operation Atalanta and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, and ensure that it complies with the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and fully respects human rights and humanitarian law, obligations of ex ante risk assessment, permanent monitoring of the supply of military technology to third country actors and effective transparency provisions including the traceability and proper use of the material delivered to partners under the EPF, in order to help build an accountable, robust and reliable security sector; fully exploit the potential of the EPF in this regard and ensure continuity with the former African Peace Facility in terms of the quality and quantity of funding of African-led initiatives; ensure that all EPF financing commitments entered into with the Horn of Africa before Russia’s criminal invasion of Ukraine are fulfilled; ensure the funding of the civilian component of ATMIS;

Democracy, human rights and the rule of law

| (l) | fully support democratic transitions, the rule of law, state-building processes and an open political space that is suitably adapted to different local contexts; support strategies to foster inclusive reconciliation processes with the aim of establishing credible and representative institutions that provide for the participation of the various communities; engage in particular with Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan to scale up efforts to include under-represented communities and women in high-level politics and governing bodies and assist partner countries in addressing disaffection towards and a lack of trust in national authorities through confidence-building measures; stand ready to deploy, whenever necessary, EU election observation missions to support electoral processes before and during elections; recognise the potential of parliamentary diplomacy as a tool to foster dialogue and build a holistic partnership between the EU, the AU and individual countries; |
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(l)

fully support democratic transitions, the rule of law, state-building processes and an open political space that is suitably adapted to different local contexts; support strategies to foster inclusive reconciliation processes with the aim of establishing credible and representative institutions that provide for the participation of the various communities; engage in particular with Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan to scale up efforts to include under-represented communities and women in high-level politics and governing bodies and assist partner countries in addressing disaffection towards and a lack of trust in national authorities through confidence-building measures; stand ready to deploy, whenever necessary, EU election observation missions to support electoral processes before and during elections; recognise the potential of parliamentary diplomacy as a tool to foster dialogue and build a holistic partnership between the EU, the AU and individual countries;

| (m) | work in partnership with the EU’s African counterparts and increase cooperation with civil society to identify and address the main challenges and priorities in the region, including human dignity and rights, democratic and fundamental rights, rule of law challenges and mitigating the COVID-19 health crisis; call on national authorities to abide by the Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and to respect media freedom, including by ensuring that media outlets can operate independently; express concern about the persistent violence and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, expression and sex characteristics; call on the national authorities to repeal discriminatory provisions, including through a review of their criminal codes; enhance their support to human rights defenders in the region; show flexibility in making use of all of the tools at their disposal and fully implement the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, ensuring internal protection mechanisms are upheld and coordinating in granting visas to those seeking to leave the country; call on national authorities in the region to provide a working environment conducive to civil society, as well as specific legislative measures to recognise and protect human rights defenders and prevent their harassment and arbitrary detention; recognise the link between corruption and widespread violations of human rights and strengthen EU support to combat corruption in the region; scale up the delivery of life-saving and life-sustaining assistance to help people and communities impacted by the drought while working to enable communities to pursue self-reliance and build resilience against future shocks; call on governments across the region to ensure that humanitarian workers can access people in need of assistance; |
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(m)

work in partnership with the EU’s African counterparts and increase cooperation with civil society to identify and address the main challenges and priorities in the region, including human dignity and rights, democratic and fundamental rights, rule of law challenges and mitigating the COVID-19 health crisis; call on national authorities to abide by the Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and to respect media freedom, including by ensuring that media outlets can operate independently; express concern about the persistent violence and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, expression and sex characteristics; call on the national authorities to repeal discriminatory provisions, including through a review of their criminal codes; enhance their support to human rights defenders in the region; show flexibility in making use of all of the tools at their disposal and fully implement the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, ensuring internal protection mechanisms are upheld and coordinating in granting visas to those seeking to leave the country; call on national authorities in the region to provide a working environment conducive to civil society, as well as specific legislative measures to recognise and protect human rights defenders and prevent their harassment and arbitrary detention; recognise the link between corruption and widespread violations of human rights and strengthen EU support to combat corruption in the region; scale up the delivery of life-saving and life-sustaining assistance to help people and communities impacted by the drought while working to enable communities to pursue self-reliance and build resilience against future shocks; call on governments across the region to ensure that humanitarian workers can access people in need of assistance;

| (n) | mainstream transitional justice into its conflict management approach in the region; prioritise, as part of the EU’s support for transitional justice efforts, locally and nationally driven processes as well as local and regional experts; step up the EU’s engagement with partner countries and with international and regional organisations to support the fight against impunity and promote truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence; |
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(n)

mainstream transitional justice into its conflict management approach in the region; prioritise, as part of the EU’s support for transitional justice efforts, locally and nationally driven processes as well as local and regional experts; step up the EU’s engagement with partner countries and with international and regional organisations to support the fight against impunity and promote truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recurrence;

| (o) | call on governments to take action to protect women’s and girls’ rights to equality, health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights and education, and to allow them to live free from gender-based violence and discrimination, ensuring a gender-sensitive approach in order to bridge the increasing gender gap during crises and conflicts; commend the progress made in improving access to healthcare in the region, such as in Kenya and Uganda, in particular access to life-saving HIV treatment and access to other sexual and reproductive health services, and strengthen the EU’s support for sexual and reproductive health and rights, which are indispensable for achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals and gender equality; streamline actions against female genital mutilation in all of the EU’s external activities, as reiterated in Parliament’s resolution of 12 February 2020, paying particular attention to the Horn of Africa, which has the highest prevalence of female genital mutilation in the world, including in its most severe forms; call on the national authorities in the Horn of Africa to implement laws to ban female genital mutilation and ensure those laws are respected; scale up initiatives to involve women in politics to encourage better policy-making and help put an end to female genital mutilation and forced marriage; |
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(o)

call on governments to take action to protect women’s and girls’ rights to equality, health, including sexual and reproductive health and rights and education, and to allow them to live free from gender-based violence and discrimination, ensuring a gender-sensitive approach in order to bridge the increasing gender gap during crises and conflicts; commend the progress made in improving access to healthcare in the region, such as in Kenya and Uganda, in particular access to life-saving HIV treatment and access to other sexual and reproductive health services, and strengthen the EU’s support for sexual and reproductive health and rights, which are indispensable for achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals and gender equality; streamline actions against female genital mutilation in all of the EU’s external activities, as reiterated in Parliament’s resolution of 12 February 2020, paying particular attention to the Horn of Africa, which has the highest prevalence of female genital mutilation in the world, including in its most severe forms; call on the national authorities in the Horn of Africa to implement laws to ban female genital mutilation and ensure those laws are respected; scale up initiatives to involve women in politics to encourage better policy-making and help put an end to female genital mutilation and forced marriage;

Sustainable and inclusive economic development — society

| (p) | take note of the region’s demographic development and recognise the role of young people and women in achieving sustainable economic development; strengthen EU support in the field of access to education and vocational training, and the upskilling and reskilling of the workforce, according to the needs of the labour market; insist that empowering and offering real prospects to the younger generations and women could bring multiple benefits to the whole region; support capacity-building for local vaccine manufacturing and assist in strengthening local health systems and supporting structural reforms in the health sector; urge national authorities to ensure universal access to healthcare based on the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment; take note that terrorism and jihadism play a major role in preventing economic growth in the whole of the Horn of Africa; take note of al-Shabaab’s economic presence in the Horn of Africa through charcoal smuggling and the extortion of farmers, businesses and aid organisations; provide technical support to empower the diaspora in Europe to step up business relations with the region, notably by allowing remittances to be sent through legal, transparent and trusted channels; |
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(p)

take note of the region’s demographic development and recognise the role of young people and women in achieving sustainable economic development; strengthen EU support in the field of access to education and vocational training, and the upskilling and reskilling of the workforce, according to the needs of the labour market; insist that empowering and offering real prospects to the younger generations and women could bring multiple benefits to the whole region; support capacity-building for local vaccine manufacturing and assist in strengthening local health systems and supporting structural reforms in the health sector; urge national authorities to ensure universal access to healthcare based on the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment; take note that terrorism and jihadism play a major role in preventing economic growth in the whole of the Horn of Africa; take note of al-Shabaab’s economic presence in the Horn of Africa through charcoal smuggling and the extortion of farmers, businesses and aid organisations; provide technical support to empower the diaspora in Europe to step up business relations with the region, notably by allowing remittances to be sent through legal, transparent and trusted channels;

| (q) | recognise that climate change seriously affects the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region; scale up common actions in the fight against climate change, in particular in mitigation, adaptation, resilience and disaster risk management; share the benefits of the European Green Deal, enshrined in the European Climate Law, with our partners and support them in adopting their own climate transition agendas by sharing best practices and aligning EU initiatives in this field with existing African initiatives; pay special attention to the human and food security implications of climate change and the need for the EU and its partners to conduct a climate-proof security and defence policy in line with the ambitions of the EU’s Climate Change and Defence Roadmap as part of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence; work together with African counterparts in adopting new and innovative ways to fully unleash the region’s potential, including by exchanging best practices and adopting new technologies for sustainable agriculture that would empower local entrepreneurship, with the ultimate aim of reducing the dependency on imports of food and agricultural products and stimulating inclusive and sustainable economic growth; support the calls of LDCs for the provision of specific financing for losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change and support the reconstruction of the regions affected and their economic revival by adopting additional special measures for the funding of reconstruction and recovery; consider encouraging the Member States to further use targeted debt suspension, relief or cancellation on a case-by-case basis for the most vulnerable LDCs and small island developing states, with the specific purpose of contributing to the fight against climate change as part of a wider international framework; |
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(q)

recognise that climate change seriously affects the Horn of Africa, with far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region; scale up common actions in the fight against climate change, in particular in mitigation, adaptation, resilience and disaster risk management; share the benefits of the European Green Deal, enshrined in the European Climate Law, with our partners and support them in adopting their own climate transition agendas by sharing best practices and aligning EU initiatives in this field with existing African initiatives; pay special attention to the human and food security implications of climate change and the need for the EU and its partners to conduct a climate-proof security and defence policy in line with the ambitions of the EU’s Climate Change and Defence Roadmap as part of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence; work together with African counterparts in adopting new and innovative ways to fully unleash the region’s potential, including by exchanging best practices and adopting new technologies for sustainable agriculture that would empower local entrepreneurship, with the ultimate aim of reducing the dependency on imports of food and agricultural products and stimulating inclusive and sustainable economic growth; support the calls of LDCs for the provision of specific financing for losses and damages associated with the adverse effects of climate change and support the reconstruction of the regions affected and their economic revival by adopting additional special measures for the funding of reconstruction and recovery; consider encouraging the Member States to further use targeted debt suspension, relief or cancellation on a case-by-case basis for the most vulnerable LDCs and small island developing states, with the specific purpose of contributing to the fight against climate change as part of a wider international framework;

| (r) | promote coordination and work with the relevant Commission directorates-general in order to ensure that the revision of the EU’s trade policy brings about sustainable economic growth for the region, notably by making the trade and sustainable development chapters of free trade agreements fully enforceable; note that efforts are needed to prevent human rights infringements and environmental abuses by EU-based corporations operating in the Horn of Africa and ensure that the forthcoming Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is fit for purpose and brings about actual progress in terms of human rights and the environment for local communities; take particular care to assess and prevent any violation linked to the EU’s own policies, projects and funding in the region, including by creating a complaints mechanism for individuals or groups whose rights may have been violated by EU activities in these countries; urge public financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank, together with the Commission, to make sure that EU investments are aligned with the international environmental and climate goals, in particular the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and are used to steer a just climate transition along the lines of the European Green Deal objectives; ensure that no investment in the region should finance sectors that fuel the climate crisis, primarily fossil fuel industries; |
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(r)

promote coordination and work with the relevant Commission directorates-general in order to ensure that the revision of the EU’s trade policy brings about sustainable economic growth for the region, notably by making the trade and sustainable development chapters of free trade agreements fully enforceable; note that efforts are needed to prevent human rights infringements and environmental abuses by EU-based corporations operating in the Horn of Africa and ensure that the forthcoming Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is fit for purpose and brings about actual progress in terms of human rights and the environment for local communities; take particular care to assess and prevent any violation linked to the EU’s own policies, projects and funding in the region, including by creating a complaints mechanism for individuals or groups whose rights may have been violated by EU activities in these countries; urge public financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank, together with the Commission, to make sure that EU investments are aligned with the international environmental and climate goals, in particular the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and are used to steer a just climate transition along the lines of the European Green Deal objectives; ensure that no investment in the region should finance sectors that fuel the climate crisis, primarily fossil fuel industries;

| (s) | devote particular attention to widespread, locally-owned projects, especially in the most remote areas, that are less invasive from an environmental point of view but more effective in improving people’s lives, i.e. off-grid solar power systems, irrigation systems, water purification and sanitation systems, and ensure that EU investments in sustainable energy in Africa primarily benefit the local population with the objective of ending energy poverty; call on the EU to help farmers in the Horn of Africa to reduce their dependency on mineral fertilisers and find agronomic alternatives through its external and development policy to address the climate and environmental impacts of fertilisers; urge the Member States to work with the Commission to prioritise partnerships with domestic companies in LDCs that pursue sustainable and inclusive business models; |
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(s)

devote particular attention to widespread, locally-owned projects, especially in the most remote areas, that are less invasive from an environmental point of view but more effective in improving people’s lives, i.e. off-grid solar power systems, irrigation systems, water purification and sanitation systems, and ensure that EU investments in sustainable energy in Africa primarily benefit the local population with the objective of ending energy poverty; call on the EU to help farmers in the Horn of Africa to reduce their dependency on mineral fertilisers and find agronomic alternatives through its external and development policy to address the climate and environmental impacts of fertilisers; urge the Member States to work with the Commission to prioritise partnerships with domestic companies in LDCs that pursue sustainable and inclusive business models;

Migration

| (t) | point out that the Horn of Africa is home to some of the main countries of origin, transit and destination for significant migratory flows to other countries in the region as well as the EU; adopt an approach to cooperation on migration that is holistic, conflict-sensitive and context-specific and that puts humans first, in line with the Khartoum Process, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the work of the Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration for the East and Horn of Africa, taking into account the different drivers of migration in the region and the persistent vulnerabilities of migrants, upholding the rights of migrants and refugees and recognising the benefits of circular migration and regional mobility in the wider region; work with the EU’s partners to resume the activities of the Khartoum Process to reconfigure it in such a way that reflects the current reality and the various limitations on travel; develop a long-term partnership that focuses on safe, orderly and regular migration; find a sustainable solution with partner countries in the Horn of Africa to mitigate the consequences of migration towards European external borders; foster enhanced cooperation on border security and the fight against cross-border criminal activities, including human trafficking and illicit trade in weapons and cultural heritage; ensure that all migration cooperation and readmission agreements with the region strictly comply with international human rights and refugee law, in particular the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto; ensure that the financial resources mobilised through the EU Trust Funds focus on projects capable of addressing the root causes of migration in the long term; |
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(t)

point out that the Horn of Africa is home to some of the main countries of origin, transit and destination for significant migratory flows to other countries in the region as well as the EU; adopt an approach to cooperation on migration that is holistic, conflict-sensitive and context-specific and that puts humans first, in line with the Khartoum Process, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the work of the Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration for the East and Horn of Africa, taking into account the different drivers of migration in the region and the persistent vulnerabilities of migrants, upholding the rights of migrants and refugees and recognising the benefits of circular migration and regional mobility in the wider region; work with the EU’s partners to resume the activities of the Khartoum Process to reconfigure it in such a way that reflects the current reality and the various limitations on travel; develop a long-term partnership that focuses on safe, orderly and regular migration; find a sustainable solution with partner countries in the Horn of Africa to mitigate the consequences of migration towards European external borders; foster enhanced cooperation on border security and the fight against cross-border criminal activities, including human trafficking and illicit trade in weapons and cultural heritage; ensure that all migration cooperation and readmission agreements with the region strictly comply with international human rights and refugee law, in particular the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto; ensure that the financial resources mobilised through the EU Trust Funds focus on projects capable of addressing the root causes of migration in the long term;

| (u) | provide immediate assistance and long-term support to the countries hosting and assisting refugees in order to secure their protection; facilitate the resettlement of displaced persons and internally displaced persons; coordinate diplomatic efforts to call on the governments of countries in the region involved in ongoing conflicts to halt indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and to protect the civilian population, including taking all steps to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons are protected and given full access to humanitarian aid, including food, water and shelter; provide support to countries in the region to mainstream efforts with a view to supporting the appropriate reforms to ensure better management of pastoral mobility and reduce economic vulnerability during crises such as droughts in order to better control the factors that contribute to tensions and conflicts involving pastoral communities; |
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(u)

provide immediate assistance and long-term support to the countries hosting and assisting refugees in order to secure their protection; facilitate the resettlement of displaced persons and internally displaced persons; coordinate diplomatic efforts to call on the governments of countries in the region involved in ongoing conflicts to halt indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and to protect the civilian population, including taking all steps to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons are protected and given full access to humanitarian aid, including food, water and shelter; provide support to countries in the region to mainstream efforts with a view to supporting the appropriate reforms to ensure better management of pastoral mobility and reduce economic vulnerability during crises such as droughts in order to better control the factors that contribute to tensions and conflicts involving pastoral communities;

Regional integration

| (v) | adopt a Team Europe approach in the region, working with the AU, regional organisations and a wide spectrum of partners and actors, including from the private sector, in supporting African-owned initiatives; keep monitoring and supporting the Horn of Africa Initiative, in which the EU is a strategic partner, and its objective of crowding in capital to support connectivity and unlock opportunities in the region, creating jobs, mitigating emerging risks, strengthening resilience and paving the way for better neighbourly relations; |
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(v)

adopt a Team Europe approach in the region, working with the AU, regional organisations and a wide spectrum of partners and actors, including from the private sector, in supporting African-owned initiatives; keep monitoring and supporting the Horn of Africa Initiative, in which the EU is a strategic partner, and its objective of crowding in capital to support connectivity and unlock opportunities in the region, creating jobs, mitigating emerging risks, strengthening resilience and paving the way for better neighbourly relations;

| (w) | acknowledge that safe and efficient infrastructure is key to consistent, sustainable and fair development in the region; fully exploit the potential of new EU-sponsored initiatives aimed at enhancing regional integration and connectivity; increase consultation and coordination with African counterparts in the definition of specific projects to be developed in the Global Gateway framework, building on the positive outcomes of the sixth EU-AU Summit; properly illustrate the Global Gateway as a greener, fairer and more sustainable long-term plan, especially in comparison with the alternatives proposed by other actors; support countries in the region seeking to join the World Trade Organization and support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, and continue supporting and strengthening the AU, the East African Community and IGAD to promote economic cooperation, increase regional integration and foster stability and diplomacy; recognise that the prospects for stabilisation and sustainable development of the Horn of Africa are deeply interlinked with those of neighbouring regions; consider developing an EU strategy for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden; |
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(w)

acknowledge that safe and efficient infrastructure is key to consistent, sustainable and fair development in the region; fully exploit the potential of new EU-sponsored initiatives aimed at enhancing regional integration and connectivity; increase consultation and coordination with African counterparts in the definition of specific projects to be developed in the Global Gateway framework, building on the positive outcomes of the sixth EU-AU Summit; properly illustrate the Global Gateway as a greener, fairer and more sustainable long-term plan, especially in comparison with the alternatives proposed by other actors; support countries in the region seeking to join the World Trade Organization and support the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area, and continue supporting and strengthening the AU, the East African Community and IGAD to promote economic cooperation, increase regional integration and foster stability and diplomacy; recognise that the prospects for stabilisation and sustainable development of the Horn of Africa are deeply interlinked with those of neighbouring regions; consider developing an EU strategy for the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden;

Influence of third actors

| (x) | underline their concern regarding the increasingly prevalent and multifaceted influences and rivalries of third parties that do not share the EU’s values and objectives in the region, including China and Russia, which are operating with ambitions to promote strictly bilateral interests; recognise that the increasing presence of these actors in the region, particularly in the economic, energy, security — including maritime security — and military spheres, also through propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at magnifying the role they are playing there, while undermining the actions of their competitors, including the EU, jeopardises regional peace, European efforts and assistance, and the EU’s role as a privileged partner; consider taking all the appropriate action to counter these interferences; promote the EU’s support through a holistic approach to the region, fostering economic cooperation and conflict prevention as opposed to the approach of third actors, which is aimed at exacerbating a fragmented environment and escalating geopolitical concerns; take stock of China’s consistent and multisectoral investments in the region, while assessing the consequences thereof, including the increased dependency of African states, and addressing China’s rising presence and influence; call on Turkish authorities to align with EU policies and to better coordinate efforts with EU initiatives, most notably the EU Training Mission in Somalia, in order to be more effective and achieve better outcomes in terms of security and stability, thereby ushering in a swift and genuine democratic transition; strengthen coordination with African counterparts in defining the priority areas to which EU investments should be devoted, and pledge sufficient resources to achieve this; take note of third parties’ military build-up in the region, most notably Russia’s advanced plans to construct a naval base in the Sudanese coast facing the Red Sea, and the Chinese inauguration of a military base in Djibouti in 2017; pay particular attention to the increasing activities of private security companies, such as the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group, which is operating in Sudan, hampering the democratic transition and exploiting domestic weaknesses at the expense of local populations, in order to avoid the similar negative repercussions witnessed in other regions, and work closely with the AU and the individual countries of the Horn of Africa to create and operationalise an efficient, accountable and reliable national security apparatus in each country; call on all EU Member States to ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; assess the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on EU influence in the region; |
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(x)

underline their concern regarding the increasingly prevalent and multifaceted influences and rivalries of third parties that do not share the EU’s values and objectives in the region, including China and Russia, which are operating with ambitions to promote strictly bilateral interests; recognise that the increasing presence of these actors in the region, particularly in the economic, energy, security — including maritime security — and military spheres, also through propaganda and disinformation campaigns aimed at magnifying the role they are playing there, while undermining the actions of their competitors, including the EU, jeopardises regional peace, European efforts and assistance, and the EU’s role as a privileged partner; consider taking all the appropriate action to counter these interferences; promote the EU’s support through a holistic approach to the region, fostering economic cooperation and conflict prevention as opposed to the approach of third actors, which is aimed at exacerbating a fragmented environment and escalating geopolitical concerns; take stock of China’s consistent and multisectoral investments in the region, while assessing the consequences thereof, including the increased dependency of African states, and addressing China’s rising presence and influence; call on Turkish authorities to align with EU policies and to better coordinate efforts with EU initiatives, most notably the EU Training Mission in Somalia, in order to be more effective and achieve better outcomes in terms of security and stability, thereby ushering in a swift and genuine democratic transition; strengthen coordination with African counterparts in defining the priority areas to which EU investments should be devoted, and pledge sufficient resources to achieve this; take note of third parties’ military build-up in the region, most notably Russia’s advanced plans to construct a naval base in the Sudanese coast facing the Red Sea, and the Chinese inauguration of a military base in Djibouti in 2017; pay particular attention to the increasing activities of private security companies, such as the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group, which is operating in Sudan, hampering the democratic transition and exploiting domestic weaknesses at the expense of local populations, in order to avoid the similar negative repercussions witnessed in other regions, and work closely with the AU and the individual countries of the Horn of Africa to create and operationalise an efficient, accountable and reliable national security apparatus in each country; call on all EU Member States to ratify the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries; assess the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on EU influence in the region;

| (y) | reinforce strategic communications through effective and fact-based public information campaigns in order to be more present at a local level and inform about EU actions, objectives and sponsored initiatives in the region to increase the EU’s visibility and underline the objective of generating added value for local communities, sustainable development, peace and security and inclusive growth, while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties; mandate the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to focus on regional activities and enhance the EU’s visibility, its presence and engagement with all countries in the region to foster closer relations; ensure greater transparency and visibility of the work of the EU Special Representative, ensuring that the EU Special Representative prioritises conflict resolution, human rights and democracy support in her engagement with her interlocutors from the region and engages proactively with civil society actors, human rights defenders and voices of dissent, which may be under threat or targeted by the local authorities; |
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(y)

reinforce strategic communications through effective and fact-based public information campaigns in order to be more present at a local level and inform about EU actions, objectives and sponsored initiatives in the region to increase the EU’s visibility and underline the objective of generating added value for local communities, sustainable development, peace and security and inclusive growth, while also countering disinformation and false narratives from third parties; mandate the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to focus on regional activities and enhance the EU’s visibility, its presence and engagement with all countries in the region to foster closer relations; ensure greater transparency and visibility of the work of the EU Special Representative, ensuring that the EU Special Representative prioritises conflict resolution, human rights and democracy support in her engagement with her interlocutors from the region and engages proactively with civil society actors, human rights defenders and voices of dissent, which may be under threat or targeted by the local authorities;

Country-specific issues

| (z) | in addressing the following specific issues relating to the countries of the Horn of Africa: |
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(z)

in addressing the following specific issues relating to the countries of the Horn of Africa:

Djibouti

| (i) | recognise the geostrategic importance of Djibouti; take note of Djibouti’s positive contribution to peace, security and regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa, in particular in hosting the logistical platform of Operation Atalanta and the military presence of EU Member States; point out that construction projects in Djibouti are being largely funded by China with estimated infrastructural investment of USD 9,8 billion; express concern over the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti for long-range military projection and over China’s takeover of the strategic port of Doraleh and Djibouti’s rising public foreign debt, contracted through loans from China; engage with the country, which is at the crossroads of one of the most transited migration routes in the world, in assisting its efforts to host refugees from the region and the implementation of its global and regional commitments; share EU know-how and best practices in water management, as Djibouti is one of the world’s most arid countries experiencing extreme drought; express regret at the fact that no independent media has been authorised to broadcast from Djibouti; call for protection for the sources of the independent Djiboutian media, which have no choice but to broadcast and express themselves from abroad; |
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(i)

recognise the geostrategic importance of Djibouti; take note of Djibouti’s positive contribution to peace, security and regional cooperation in the Horn of Africa, in particular in hosting the logistical platform of Operation Atalanta and the military presence of EU Member States; point out that construction projects in Djibouti are being largely funded by China with estimated infrastructural investment of USD 9,8 billion; express concern over the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti for long-range military projection and over China’s takeover of the strategic port of Doraleh and Djibouti’s rising public foreign debt, contracted through loans from China; engage with the country, which is at the crossroads of one of the most transited migration routes in the world, in assisting its efforts to host refugees from the region and the implementation of its global and regional commitments; share EU know-how and best practices in water management, as Djibouti is one of the world’s most arid countries experiencing extreme drought; express regret at the fact that no independent media has been authorised to broadcast from Djibouti; call for protection for the sources of the independent Djiboutian media, which have no choice but to broadcast and express themselves from abroad;

Eritrea

| (ii) | condemn the total alignment of Eritrea with the Russian narrative and propaganda, and express concern that Eritrea could become a platform for Russian influence in the Horn of Africa; call on Eritrean authorities to cease their military involvement in the Ethiopian civil conflict, while also facilitating a peace agreement between Ethiopian federal authorities and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front that would include the termination of the group’s missile attacks on Eritrean soil; call on Eritrean authorities to take concrete steps towards internal reconciliation and to release all political prisoners without condition, including the Swedish-Eritrean writer and journalist David Isaak, who has been detained since 2001; constantly monitor the internal situation, and consider a gradual and commensurate reduction of EU sanctions if tangible and objective improvements are made; |
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(ii)

condemn the total alignment of Eritrea with the Russian narrative and propaganda, and express concern that Eritrea could become a platform for Russian influence in the Horn of Africa; call on Eritrean authorities to cease their military involvement in the Ethiopian civil conflict, while also facilitating a peace agreement between Ethiopian federal authorities and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front that would include the termination of the group’s missile attacks on Eritrean soil; call on Eritrean authorities to take concrete steps towards internal reconciliation and to release all political prisoners without condition, including the Swedish-Eritrean writer and journalist David Isaak, who has been detained since 2001; constantly monitor the internal situation, and consider a gradual and commensurate reduction of EU sanctions if tangible and objective improvements are made;

Ethiopia

| (iii) | support all diplomatic efforts towards ending the ongoing conflict within Ethiopia, an important player in the Horn of Africa, both at a national level and, in particular, through the AU’s mediation track, which is going to announce a trio of high-level mediators, chaired by the High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, in order to prioritise agreement on a permanent ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access to all areas and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and to facilitate accountability and internal reconciliation; insist that the national dialogue must be as inclusive, broad and transparent as possible, including representatives from civil society and opposition parties, in order to fulfil the goal of being a true catalyst for reconciliation; coordinate support between the relevant national and international institutions and the Ethiopian Government in the resumption of health, education and other public facilities and services, including relief services to internally displaced persons and populations affected by conflict; take note of the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report on crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray; welcome the establishment of an international commission of human rights experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) by the UN Human Rights Council to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into allegations of violations and abuses committed in Ethiopia since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict, working as a complement to the Ethiopian Inter-Ministerial Taskforce (IMTF) on accountability and the findings of the Joint Investigation Team, published in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report in November 2021; support transitional justice to hold the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for the serious crimes they have committed in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, in particular by supporting the role of all institutions involved, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court; take note of some positive developments in the country, such as the humanitarian truce of 24 March 2022 and the release of some political prisoners, increased humanitarian access during the truce, and public declarations by the Ethiopian Government and Tigrayan leadership that they would commit to AU-led peace talks; carefully assess the developments in Ethiopia with a view to taking further measures if the situation deteriorates; at the same time, continue to call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the launch of peace talks without delay and explore the possible role of the EU in the mediation process; be ready to gradually reinstate budget support and EU assistance if certain conditions are met, inter alia the cessation of hostilities, full and unhindered humanitarian access across Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, accountability for the crimes committed in the context of the conflict and the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the country; |
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(iii)

support all diplomatic efforts towards ending the ongoing conflict within Ethiopia, an important player in the Horn of Africa, both at a national level and, in particular, through the AU’s mediation track, which is going to announce a trio of high-level mediators, chaired by the High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, in order to prioritise agreement on a permanent ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access to all areas and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces, and to facilitate accountability and internal reconciliation; insist that the national dialogue must be as inclusive, broad and transparent as possible, including representatives from civil society and opposition parties, in order to fulfil the goal of being a true catalyst for reconciliation; coordinate support between the relevant national and international institutions and the Ethiopian Government in the resumption of health, education and other public facilities and services, including relief services to internally displaced persons and populations affected by conflict; take note of the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch report on crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray; welcome the establishment of an international commission of human rights experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) by the UN Human Rights Council to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation into allegations of violations and abuses committed in Ethiopia since 3 November 2020 by all parties to the conflict, working as a complement to the Ethiopian Inter-Ministerial Taskforce (IMTF) on accountability and the findings of the Joint Investigation Team, published in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights/Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report in November 2021; support transitional justice to hold the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for the serious crimes they have committed in the context of the conflict in Ethiopia, in particular by supporting the role of all institutions involved, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the UN Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court; take note of some positive developments in the country, such as the humanitarian truce of 24 March 2022 and the release of some political prisoners, increased humanitarian access during the truce, and public declarations by the Ethiopian Government and Tigrayan leadership that they would commit to AU-led peace talks; carefully assess the developments in Ethiopia with a view to taking further measures if the situation deteriorates; at the same time, continue to call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the launch of peace talks without delay and explore the possible role of the EU in the mediation process; be ready to gradually reinstate budget support and EU assistance if certain conditions are met, inter alia the cessation of hostilities, full and unhindered humanitarian access across Ethiopia, including in the Tigray region, accountability for the crimes committed in the context of the conflict and the withdrawal of Eritrean troops from the country;

Kenya

| (iv) | underline Kenya’s potential as a key actor in the Horn of Africa in political and economic terms for enhancing regional stability and playing a constructive role in achieving peace and security; support the commitment to a renewed strategic partnership with Kenya; deepen EU-Kenya relations by exploiting the full potential of the EU-Kenya Strategic Dialogue; welcome the decision to deploy an EU Election Observation Mission for the presidential elections in August 2022; commend the peaceful resolution of the electoral dispute following the presidential elections and note the responsible role that the Kenyan courts played in it; call on the Kenyan authorities to properly assess the upcoming final Electoral Observation Mission report and draw the necessary conclusions in order to further reform and improve the country’s electoral processes; commend Kenya’s efforts to collaborate on environmental challenges, welcoming in particular the approval by the UN Environment Assembly meeting in Nairobi in March 2022 of a resolution to end plastic pollution and forge an international legally binding agreement by 2024; |
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(iv)

underline Kenya’s potential as a key actor in the Horn of Africa in political and economic terms for enhancing regional stability and playing a constructive role in achieving peace and security; support the commitment to a renewed strategic partnership with Kenya; deepen EU-Kenya relations by exploiting the full potential of the EU-Kenya Strategic Dialogue; welcome the decision to deploy an EU Election Observation Mission for the presidential elections in August 2022; commend the peaceful resolution of the electoral dispute following the presidential elections and note the responsible role that the Kenyan courts played in it; call on the Kenyan authorities to properly assess the upcoming final Electoral Observation Mission report and draw the necessary conclusions in order to further reform and improve the country’s electoral processes; commend Kenya’s efforts to collaborate on environmental challenges, welcoming in particular the approval by the UN Environment Assembly meeting in Nairobi in March 2022 of a resolution to end plastic pollution and forge an international legally binding agreement by 2024;

Somalia

| (v) | point out that the precarious security situation in Somalia is giving cause for great concern and, if not firmly contained, could become a major factor in destabilising the entire Horn of Africa and even areas further afield; welcome the conclusion of the Somalian presidential elections and the peaceful transfer of power; call on the newly elected president to form an inclusive cabinet and on the new government to make progress on critical national priorities, including addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the country; evaluate the resumption of support from Europe; welcome the benefits of EU involvement in Somalia; underline the obvious added value of advisory missions to command structures and thus encourage the involvement of European participants in EU Training Mission operations; fully support efforts by ATMIS to promote human rights in Somalia and peacekeeping efforts against al-Shabaab, which is threatening the security of democracy and the rule of law in the country; work together with AU and Somali institutions to revise the mandate of ATMIS, focusing on institution building, and providing sufficient financial support through the EPF; coordinate efforts with the AU and IGAD to stimulate a process of nation building within Somalia that puts civil society at its core; ensure that the revision of ATMIS is carried out in parallel with the gradual reinforcement of Somali armed forces and civilian security apparatus, which should become the final guarantors of security in the country; consult with the Somali authorities with the aim of identifying new forms of bilateral cooperation with the EU to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to guarantee maritime security and avoid any risk of piracy re-emerging within its territorial waters; support a thorough assessment of the performance of ATMIS troops in the light of efforts to prevent crimes perpetrated by regular armies in Somalia; |
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(v)

point out that the precarious security situation in Somalia is giving cause for great concern and, if not firmly contained, could become a major factor in destabilising the entire Horn of Africa and even areas further afield; welcome the conclusion of the Somalian presidential elections and the peaceful transfer of power; call on the newly elected president to form an inclusive cabinet and on the new government to make progress on critical national priorities, including addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the country; evaluate the resumption of support from Europe; welcome the benefits of EU involvement in Somalia; underline the obvious added value of advisory missions to command structures and thus encourage the involvement of European participants in EU Training Mission operations; fully support efforts by ATMIS to promote human rights in Somalia and peacekeeping efforts against al-Shabaab, which is threatening the security of democracy and the rule of law in the country; work together with AU and Somali institutions to revise the mandate of ATMIS, focusing on institution building, and providing sufficient financial support through the EPF; coordinate efforts with the AU and IGAD to stimulate a process of nation building within Somalia that puts civil society at its core; ensure that the revision of ATMIS is carried out in parallel with the gradual reinforcement of Somali armed forces and civilian security apparatus, which should become the final guarantors of security in the country; consult with the Somali authorities with the aim of identifying new forms of bilateral cooperation with the EU to strengthen Somalia’s capacity to guarantee maritime security and avoid any risk of piracy re-emerging within its territorial waters; support a thorough assessment of the performance of ATMIS troops in the light of efforts to prevent crimes perpetrated by regular armies in Somalia;

South Sudan

| (vi) | take note of the extension of the mandate of the government for another two years, but underline its obligation to make progress on the implementation of the peace agreement and to prepare for free and fair elections; fully support the early implementation of the peace agreement in South Sudan through the main monitoring structures such as the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, working closely with the AU and IGAD; coordinate with and support other international and regional actors in South Sudan, such as the AU, IGAD, the UN and the Troika (the US, UK and Norway), to continue with robust engagement in pressuring the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity to keep implementing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in particular its pre-transitional tasks including women’s representation, as detailed in the agreement; |
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(vi)

take note of the extension of the mandate of the government for another two years, but underline its obligation to make progress on the implementation of the peace agreement and to prepare for free and fair elections; fully support the early implementation of the peace agreement in South Sudan through the main monitoring structures such as the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, working closely with the AU and IGAD; coordinate with and support other international and regional actors in South Sudan, such as the AU, IGAD, the UN and the Troika (the US, UK and Norway), to continue with robust engagement in pressuring the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity to keep implementing the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in particular its pre-transitional tasks including women’s representation, as detailed in the agreement;

Sudan

| (vii) | reiterate the condemnation of the military coup of October 2021 and the violence committed in the ensuing crackdown; coordinate with other actors in the region to put pressure on the military to establish a clear timetable for the reinstatement of civilian rule, leading to fair, open and transparent general elections as soon as possible; take note of the military’s declared intention to hand over power to the civilian authorities, and call for this transition to be implemented without any undue delay; call on the civilian political authorities to increase coordination and cooperation in order to present clear plans to ensure a peaceful transition; underline that a swift solution is needed, since any further delay would exacerbate the deterioration of the economy and the humanitarian situation throughout the country, and would aggravate the already immense challenges that the people of Sudan are facing; support civil society and activists on the ground and call for the liberation of detained peaceful activists and political prisoners; reiterate their firm support for the ongoing efforts of the Tripartite Mechanism to help reconcile the differences between the Sudanese parties and initiatives, facilitate the restoration of the transition to democracy and smooth its path towards civil and democratic transformation; emphasise that a transitional justice process needs to be launched in order to bring perpetrators of human right violations to justice and lay the groundwork for national reconciliation; enhance EU action on the ground in terms of humanitarian aid and direct support for the population, improving the living conditions of local communities, while also reducing exposure to Russian and Chinese influences; express deep concern over the planned establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, which would have negative repercussions for the peace and security of the Red Sea; |
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(vii)

reiterate the condemnation of the military coup of October 2021 and the violence committed in the ensuing crackdown; coordinate with other actors in the region to put pressure on the military to establish a clear timetable for the reinstatement of civilian rule, leading to fair, open and transparent general elections as soon as possible; take note of the military’s declared intention to hand over power to the civilian authorities, and call for this transition to be implemented without any undue delay; call on the civilian political authorities to increase coordination and cooperation in order to present clear plans to ensure a peaceful transition; underline that a swift solution is needed, since any further delay would exacerbate the deterioration of the economy and the humanitarian situation throughout the country, and would aggravate the already immense challenges that the people of Sudan are facing; support civil society and activists on the ground and call for the liberation of detained peaceful activists and political prisoners; reiterate their firm support for the ongoing efforts of the Tripartite Mechanism to help reconcile the differences between the Sudanese parties and initiatives, facilitate the restoration of the transition to democracy and smooth its path towards civil and democratic transformation; emphasise that a transitional justice process needs to be launched in order to bring perpetrators of human right violations to justice and lay the groundwork for national reconciliation; enhance EU action on the ground in terms of humanitarian aid and direct support for the population, improving the living conditions of local communities, while also reducing exposure to Russian and Chinese influences; express deep concern over the planned establishment of a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, which would have negative repercussions for the peace and security of the Red Sea;

Uganda

| (viii) | recognise the important role played by Uganda in the mediation process that brought about the peace agreement in South Sudan; welcome the contribution of the Ugandan armed forces to ATMIS, and coordinate with the country with a view to the future of the mission; support the new parish model and other endeavours to fight poverty through a grassroots approach; express regret at the conditions under which the presidential elections of January 2021 were conducted and call on Ugandan national authorities to promote an open political space conducive to fair and transparent elections, while also refraining from limiting access to media and social media; underline the fact that the right to free and prior informed consent of indigenous people and local communities is enshrined in international law and call on the Ugandan national authorities to uphold all fundamental human rights on all occasions; express concern, in this regard, about the severe human rights violations reported in the East African Crude Oil Pipeline project as well as the associated risks of irreversible harm to the environment and climate; call on the EU to urgently adopt the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive in order to hold European companies accountable when their activities are linked to such violations; |
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(viii)

recognise the important role played by Uganda in the mediation process that brought about the peace agreement in South Sudan; welcome the contribution of the Ugandan armed forces to ATMIS, and coordinate with the country with a view to the future of the mission; support the new parish model and other endeavours to fight poverty through a grassroots approach; express regret at the conditions under which the presidential elections of January 2021 were conducted and call on Ugandan national authorities to promote an open political space conducive to fair and transparent elections, while also refraining from limiting access to media and social media; underline the fact that the right to free and prior informed consent of indigenous people and local communities is enshrined in international law and call on the Ugandan national authorities to uphold all fundamental human rights on all occasions; express concern, in this regard, about the severe human rights violations reported in the East African Crude Oil Pipeline project as well as the associated risks of irreversible harm to the environment and climate; call on the EU to urgently adopt the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive in order to hold European companies accountable when their activities are linked to such violations;

2.   Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, for information, to the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the UN.

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(1)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 24.

(2)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 80.

(3)  OJ C 224, 8.6.2022, p. 99.

(4)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 114.

(5)  OJ C 336, 2.9.2022, p. 14.

(6)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 132.

(7)  OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 205.

(8)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 154.

(9)  OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 54.

(10)  OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 50.

(11)  OJ C 50, 9.2.2018, p. 57.

(12)  OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 92.

(13)  OJ C 76, 28.2.2018, p. 35.

(14)  OJ C 294, 23.7.2021, p. 8.

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