UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6815

SALRAMON GONZALES, a/k/a Alex Ramirez,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

ENNIS T. OATES,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (5:12-hc-02045-D)

Submitted: July 30, 2015 Decided: October 16, 2015

Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Salramon Gonzales, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Salramon Gonzales seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for 

reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on 

his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012); 

Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85.

In United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015), we 

“address[ed] the question ‘whether, in light of Reid . . . and 

Gonzales v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), [a habeas applicant]’s 
3

appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his Rule 60(b) 

motion as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion is subject to 

the certificate of appealability requirement.’” Id. at 396. We 

held that no certificate of appealability is required for this 

Court to “address the district court’s jurisdictional 

categorization of a Rule 60(b) motion as a successive habeas 

petition.” Id. at 398. 

Importantly, McRae abrogates the COA requirement only in 

the narrow situation where the district court construes a Rule 

60(b) motion as a successive habeas petition. See id. at 400 n.7 

(noting that McRae represents “an abrogation of only a small 

part of Reid’s reasoning” and that “Reid’s reasoning remains 

almost entirely intact”). Applying Reid and McRae here, we hold

that appellate review of the district court’s order denying 

Gonzales’ Rule 60(b) motion is subject to the COA requirement. 

The district court did not recharacterize Gonzales’ postjudgment 

filing as a successive § 2254 petition, and it otherwise did not 

reject the motion on jurisdictional grounds. See Allen v. 

Mitchell, 276 F.3d 183, 187 n.3 (4th Cir. 2001) (“statute of 

limitations established by § 2244(d) is not jurisdictional”). 

For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Gonzales has 

not demonstrated he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 
4

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED