NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ADAM PAUL BLOMDAHL, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0574 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-000575-001

The Honorable Jennifer C. Ryan-Touhill, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Kathyrn A. Damstra

Counsel for Appellee

Michael J. Dew Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Michael J. Dew

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Voice for Crime Victims, Phoenix

By Thomas E. Lordan

Counsel for Crime Victim

FILED 11-1-2022
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Adam Paul Blomdahl appeals the superior court’s restitution 

order requiring him to pay various expenses to the victim’s mother, J.G.,

and the Victim Compensation Bureau of Maricopa County (“VCB”). For 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2016, Blomdahl was indicted on one count of firstdegree murder for causing the death of J.G.’s 42-year-old daughter and two 

counts of aggravated assault for seriously injuring other victims. J.G. 

applied for and received funds from the VCB to help pay for funeral 

expenses, mental health treatment, and related travel costs. As a condition 

of the application, J.G. agreed to repay the VCB if she received any funds 

from a civil lawsuit or insurance reimbursement to cover expenses for 

which she had already been paid. 

¶3 J.G. sued Blomdahl in August 2018, alleging various claims 

for negligence (wrongful death) and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. She sought $1,000,000 in damages. In October, J.G. signed a 

settlement agreement and release (“Release”) with Blomdahl’s insurance 

provider in exchange for payment of $30,000. The Release stated that it 

covered “any and all claims for damages,” and that the victim “waive[d] 

and assume[d] the risk” of any future damages and claims.

¶4 In 2019, a jury found Blomdahl guilty as charged. See State v. 

Blomdahl, 1 CA-CR 19-0655, 2021 WL 1184315, at *1, ¶¶ 5-6 (Ariz. App. Mar. 

30, 2021) (mem. decision). The superior court sentenced him to consecutive 

terms of life in prison for the murder count and 12 years each for the 

aggravated assault counts. Id. at ¶ 6. The court ordered that Blomdahl pay 

restitution to the victims for all economic losses and that the issue would 

remain open for 10 years. 

¶5 In June 2021, J.G. filed a motion seeking $1,224.96 in 

restitution for trauma counseling and related travel costs. At a status 
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

3

hearing in August, Blomdahl raised concerns that the Release eliminated, 

in whole or in part, her right to receive criminal restitution. The superior 

court scheduled the matter for oral argument. J.G. filed a memorandum, 

which included an affidavit from the attorney who handled her civil case

avowing in part there was no understanding that any portion of the 

settlement for J.G. was meant to include criminal restitution. 

¶6 The VCB also submitted a request for restitution, seeking

$10,393.55 for expenses it had paid on J.G.’s behalf. At a subsequent

hearing, a VCB representative testified that victims’ compensation does not 

cover payments for pain and suffering, and that a victim would only have 

to repay the VCB if funds received from a settlement covered the expenses 

that had been advanced to the victim. Blomdahl did not dispute the 

amounts requested; instead, he asserted there was insufficient evidence to 

determine whether the restitution sought by J.G. and the VCB had already 

“been paid” by the $30,000 settlement. The court continued the hearing to 

allow the parties to submit evidence on whether all of the $30,000 was for 

pain and suffering. 

¶7 J.G. submitted a second memorandum, which included her 

own affidavit explaining her understanding that the settlement was for her 

pain and suffering. J.G. argued that Blomdahl now had the burden of

presenting evidence to demonstrate the merit of his arguments for the right 

to an offset. At the October 2021 hearing, without offering any evidence, 

Blomdahl asserted he had made J.G. whole and thus the VCB needed to 

seek restitution from her because she was contractually bound to reimburse 

the VCB. Because J.G.’s memorandum was filed shortly before the hearing, 

the court told Blomdahl he could have additional time to respond. The 

court noted that it was inclined to agree with J.G.’s arguments and invited 

Blomdahl to respond to the assertion that he now had the burden to prove 

his right to an offset. 

¶8 In his response, Blomdahl argued in part that J.G. could be 

seeking a double recovery. He asked for 120 days to conduct a “complete 

investigation” to address whether J.G. had to reimburse the VCB. Because 

the Release did not describe what damages the funds paid were intended 

to cover, and J.G.’s contract with VCB obligated J.G. to repay funds received 

from a civil lawsuit, Blomdahl reasoned that the VCB “must collect” from 

her only. 

¶9 The court ordered Blomdahl to pay restitution of $1,224.96 to 

J.G. and $10,393.55 to the VCB, finding sufficient evidence that the 

settlement proceeds were “100% attributable to pain and suffering.” The 
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

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court explained that based on the legal authority, affidavits, and receipts

J.G. submitted, she met her burden of proof. The court rejected Blomdahl’s 

argument that it should presume the proceeds were meant to cover J.G.’s 

expenses, finding that he bore the burden of proving J.G. was made whole 

by the settlement. The court concluded that Blomdahl provided no

evidence supporting his position as to how the civil settlement should be 

characterized. It also found no good cause to give Blomdahl the additional 

120 days he requested to investigate, noting Blomdahl based the request on 

speculation, he had already been given ample time to find supporting 

evidence, and nothing prevented him from contacting the insurance 

company about the nature of the settlement throughout the restitution 

proceeding. Blomdahl timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

¶10 We review restitution orders for an abuse of discretion, 

viewing the evidence bearing on the restitution claim in the light most 

favorable to sustaining the court’s order. State v. Lewis, 222 Ariz. 321, 323-

24, ¶ 5 (App. 2009). The Arizona Constitution entitles crime victims to 

receive prompt restitution from the person convicted of criminal conduct 

that caused the victim’s loss or injury. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). The 

State has the burden to prove a restitution claim by a preponderance of the 

evidence. State v. Quijada, 246 Ariz. 356, 364, ¶ 22 (App. 2019). A person 

convicted of a criminal offense must pay restitution to any victim that has 

suffered an “economic loss,” which includes “lost interest, lost earnings and 

other losses that would not have been incurred but for the offense.” A.R.S. 

§§ 13-105(16), -603(C). Economic loss does not include “damages for pain and 

suffering, punitive damages, or consequential damages.” A.R.S. § 13-105(16)

(emphasis added).

¶11 Restitution is intended to provide reparation to the victim, 

with the hope to make the victim whole. State v. Iniguez, 169 Ariz. 533, 536 

(App. 1991). Restitution also aims to serve as a rehabilitative tool, forcing 

the convicted person to recognize the specific consequences of his criminal 

activity, and to accept responsibility for those consequences. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 27.1; State v. Moore, 156 Ariz. 566, 567 (1988); State v. Merrill, 136 Ariz. 300, 

301 (App. 1983). “[T]he goals and methods of restitution in a criminal case 

differ from those of damages in a civil action.” See Iniguez, 169 Ariz. at 536. 
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

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A. J.G. Restitution Order

¶12 Blomdahl argues that no evidence supports the restitution 

order because the superior court misapplied the governing law. And given 

that the Release is silent on the damages it was meant to compensate, 

Blomdahl argues the court erred in concluding it was entirely for noneconomic losses. He also contends the court’s consideration of extrinsic 

evidence violated the parol evidence rule. 

¶13 Arizona courts are not foreclosed from ordering restitution 

simply because a victim has received compensation in a civil action.

Iniguez, 169 Ariz. at 536. Because civil damage payments may not be fully 

compensatory, a victim’s release of civil liability does not prevent a 

restitution award in the criminal case. Id. Thus, when a victim who 

requests restitution has received a separate civil settlement, the trial court 

must determine what portion of the settlement, if any, covers economic 

losses. Id. at 538-39. 

¶14 The primary issue presented to the superior court was 

whether the civil settlement paid to J.G. was for economic or non-economic 

damages. If a portion of the settlement was compensation for J.G.’s 

economic losses, the court had to ensure that she did not receive a 

“windfall” from Blomdahl by “double-dipping of both civil and criminal 

liability.” Id. at 537. Any “economic” portion of the settlement had to be 

credited against the restitution order. Id. at 538. But if the settlement was 

only for pain and suffering, a “non-economic” payment, Blomdahl had no 

right to a credit against the amount awarded to J.G. 

¶15 In its ruling, the superior court explained that after the State 

met its burden of proof, Blomdahl had “the burden of proving [J.G.] has 

already been made ‘whole’ by her civil settlement and is not entitled to 

additional funds via restitution.” Blomdahl does not challenge the court’s

handling of the burden of proof, but even assuming the court erred, the 

restitution order was still supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution because the 

only evidence presented supported a finding that the civil settlement was 

for pain and suffering. 

¶16 Next, Blomdahl argues that the court’s consideration of 

extrinsic evidence, specifically, “in the form of the personal injury 

attorney’s affidavit, violated the parol evidence rule.” Because Blomdahl

failed to raise this issue in the superior court, he has waived it absent a 

showing of fundamental error. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 138, ¶¶ 1-2 
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

6

(2018). Blomdahl does not contend that the court’s consideration of the 

affidavit constituted fundamental error. Instead, he argues he was “taken 

aback” by the court’s willingness to rely on the attestations in the “hearsay 

affidavit,” and if he had known the court would base its ruling on the “onesided opinion” he would have disputed such statements. 

¶17 The court’s consideration of the attorney’s affidavit did not 

constitute error, much less fundamental error. Blomdahl was given 

multiple opportunities to contest the affidavit with his own evidence, but 

he chose not to. To the extent Blomdahl suggests that in-person testimony 

from the attorney was required, he does not tell us when he raised that 

point in the superior court. Nor does he provide legal authority supporting

his contention that the parol evidence rule applies in deciding the meaning 

of a contract in a restitution proceeding. Thus, the court acted in its 

discretion in considering the affidavits submitted by J.G. and counsel in her 

civil case.

¶18 Finally, we also reject Blomdahl’s contention that the court 

abused its discretion in denying his request for more time to investigate. 

See State v. Barreras, 181 Ariz. 516, 520 (1995). Blomdahl was given ample 

time to gather evidence and information to support his position and has 

made no showing of prejudice. See id. (noting that denial of a continuance 

request will be overturned only if it “substantially prejudiced” the 

defendant). 

B. VCB Restitution Order 

¶19 Blomdahl argues that because J.G. was contractually liable to 

reimburse the VCB from the settlement proceeds, the court improperly 

ordered that it was his obligation, in the form of restitution. He points to 

her application for compensation, which stated that she would reimburse 

VCB for “payments from the offender . . . for which I have already received 

payment from this Program.” (Emphasis added.) Between August 2016 and 

December 2019, the VCB provided J.G. with compensation to assist with

expenses related to her daughter’s burial, as well as J.G.’s mental health 

counseling and related travel costs. As noted, Blomdahl did not provide 

any evidence or facts contesting or challenging J.G.’s evidence that the 

settlement proceeds covered only pain and suffering. Thus, even assuming 

Blomdahl has standing to compel the VCB to demand repayment from J.G., 

nothing in the record shows J.G. breached her repayment obligation. 

Because J.G.’s settlement proceeds did not cover the expenses that the VCB 

paid on her behalf, it is not seeking repayment from J.G., which means the 

superior court properly concluded that the VCB’s restitution claim would 
STATE v. BLOMDAHL

Decision of the Court

7

have to be paid by Blomdahl. The court did not err in ordering that he pay 

the VCB $10,393.55 in restitution. 

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm the superior court’s restitution orders.