NUMBER 13-24-00312-CV

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

 

IN THE INTEREST OF W.C. AND R.Z., CHILDREN

 

ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5 

OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Silva

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Appellant K.Z.1 appeals the trial court’s judgment involuntarily terminating her

parental rights with respect to minor children W.C. and R.Z.2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 

§ 161.001. We affirm.

1 We refer to appellant and the children by initials in accordance with the rules of appellate

procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). 

2 The trial court’s judgment also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of R.Z.’s biological

father, who is not a party to this appeal.
2

I. ANDERS BRIEF

K.Z.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that he has

diligently reviewed the entire record but has concluded that there are no “arguable

grounds” to advance on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Porter v.

Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a 

parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for

appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief.”). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements

of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable

grounds for advancing an appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically

advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record

references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”).

Counsel has informed this Court in writing that he has: (1) notified K.Z. that he has

filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided K.Z. with a copy of the Anders

brief; (3) informed K.Z. of her rights to file a pro se response,3 to review the record before

filing that response, and to seek review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) supplied K.Z. with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Anders, 

3 In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that pro se responses are

not required to comport with all rules of appellate procedure “because its purpose is not to permit the court

of appeals to decide the case on the merits; it is intended only to alert the appellate court to any matters

that the defendant believes might be arguable in a brief on the merits.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,

409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). 
3

386 U.S. at 744. An adequate amount of time has passed, and K.Z. has filed neither a 

motion for pro se access to the record nor a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 

488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have

reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and we have found no reversible error. See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of

Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs

and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). We have specifically

reviewed the trial court’s findings under parts (D) and (E) of family code § 161.001(b)(1),

and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to

those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (holding

that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court

detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D)

or (E) of the Family Code”).

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

K.Z.’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see

also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 & n.17 (“[T]he defense attorney is required to file

a motion to withdraw at the same time that he files an Anders brief.”). However, when an
4

Anders brief is filed in a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed

counsel extends to “all proceedings in [the Supreme Court of Texas], including the filing

of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for

withdrawal, a motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id.

Counsel is permitted to withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client

has no grounds to seek further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not

constitute good cause. Id.

Here, counsel’s motion does not show “good cause” for withdrawal other than his

inability to identify any nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s motion to

withdraw is denied.4 See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.5

CLARISSA SILVA

 Justice 

 

Delivered and filed on the

30th day of August, 2024. 

 

4 The Texas Supreme Court has noted that, in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations

[in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders

brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). 

5 All other pending motions, if any, are dismissed as moot.