# Official Journal C 323/26 A

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 323 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6526 August 2022 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 323

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6526 August 2022

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022 |
| 2022/C 323/01 | Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on Involvement of Organised Civil Society in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans — How can we improve it? | 1 |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022 |
| 2022/C 323/02 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on State aid rules applicable to health and social services — SGEI in a post-pandemic scenario. Thoughts and proposals on the Commission evaluation to amend the 2012 legislative package (own-initiative opinion) | 8 |
| 2022/C 323/03 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The role of Civil Society Organisations as guardians of the common good in the post-pandemic recovery and reconstruction of EU societies and economies (own-initiative opinion) | 13 |
| 2022/C 323/04 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on making packaging a safe, affordable and eco-friendly industry (own-initiative opinion) | 19 |

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022

2022/C 323/01

Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on Involvement of Organised Civil Society in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans — How can we improve it?

1

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022

2022/C 323/02

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on State aid rules applicable to health and social services — SGEI in a post-pandemic scenario. Thoughts and proposals on the Commission evaluation to amend the 2012 legislative package (own-initiative opinion)

8

2022/C 323/03

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The role of Civil Society Organisations as guardians of the common good in the post-pandemic recovery and reconstruction of EU societies and economies (own-initiative opinion)

13

2022/C 323/04

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on making packaging a safe, affordable and eco-friendly industry (own-initiative opinion)

19

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022 |
| 2022/C 323/05 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Global Gateway (own-initiative opinion) (JOIN(2021) 30 — final) | 27 |
| 2022/C 323/06 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A competition policy fit for new challenges (COM(2021) 713 final) | 34 |
| 2022/C 323/07 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy (COM(2021) 778 final) | 38 |
| 2022/C 323/08 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — An EU Strategy on Standardisation — Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green and digital EU single market (COM(2022) 31 final) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards the decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables (COM(2022) 32 final — 2022/0021(COD)) | 43 |
| 2022/C 323/09 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The next generation of own resources for the EU Budget (COM(2021) 566 final), Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (COM(2021) 569 final — 2021/0429 (APP)), Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021) 570 final — 2021/0430 (CNS)) | 48 |
| 2022/C 323/10 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050
  (COM(2022) 34 final) | 54 |
| 2022/C 323/11 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a European approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability(COM(2021) 770 final) — Proposal for a Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts(COM(2021) 773 final) | 62 |
| 2022/C 323/12 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA(COM(2021) 782 final — 2021/0411 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on automated data exchange for police cooperation (Prüm II), amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council(COM(2021) 784 final — 2021/0410 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum(COM(2021) 890 final — 2021/0427 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders(COM(2021) 891 final — 2021/0428 (COD)) | 69 |
| 2022/C 323/13 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation (COM(2021) 759 final — 2021/0394 (COD)), and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 2003/8/EC, Council Framework Decisions 2002/465/JHA, 2002/584/JHA, 2003/577/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA, 2009/829/JHA and 2009/948/JHA, and Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards digitalisation of judicial cooperation (COM(2021) 760 final — 2021/0395 (COD)) | 77 |
| 2022/C 323/14 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — A more inclusive and protective Europe: extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime (COM(2021) 777 final) | 83 |
| 2022/C 323/15 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Drugs Agency(COM(2022) 18 final — 2022/0009 (COD)) | 88 |
| 2022/C 323/16 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Sustainable Carbon Cycles (COM(2021) 800 final) | 95 |
| 2022/C 323/17 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 (COM(2021) 805 final/2 — 2021/0423 (COD)), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (COM(2021) 804 final — 2021/0424 (COD)) and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen (COM(2021) 803 final — 2021/0425 (COD)) | 101 |
| 2022/C 323/18 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the New EU Urban Mobility Framework (COM(2021) 811 final) | 107 |
| 2022/C 323/19 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — State of the Energy Union 2021 — Contributing to the European Green Deal and the Union’s recovery (pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action) (COM(2021) 950 final) | 112 |
| 2022/C 323/20 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/25/EC as regards the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organisation (COM(2022) 53 final — 2022/0036 (COD)) | 119 |
| 2022/C 323/21 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy (COM(2022) 108 final) | 123 |
| 2022/C 323/22 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks (COM(2022) 135 final — 2022/0090 (COD)) | 129 |
| 2022/C 323/23 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1628 as regards the extension of the empowerment of the Commission to adopt delegated acts (COM(2022) 113 final — 2022/0080 (COD)) | 133 |
| 2022/C 323/24 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources (COM(2022) 145 final — 2022/0096 (COD)), and Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources (COM(2022) 162 final — 2022/0096 (COD)) | 134 |
| 2022/C 323/25 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending and correcting Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to alleviate the consequences of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine on fishing activities and to mitigate the effects of the market disruption caused by that military aggression on the supply chain of fishery and aquaculture products (COM(2022) 179 — 2022/0118 COD) | 135 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022

2022/C 323/05

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Global Gateway (own-initiative opinion) (JOIN(2021) 30 — final)

(JOIN(2021) 30 — final)

27

2022/C 323/06

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A competition policy fit for new challenges (COM(2021) 713 final)

(COM(2021) 713 final)

34

2022/C 323/07

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy (COM(2021) 778 final)

(COM(2021) 778 final)

38

2022/C 323/08

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — An EU Strategy on Standardisation — Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green and digital EU single market (COM(2022) 31 final) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards the decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables (COM(2022) 32 final — 2022/0021(COD))

(COM(2022) 31 final)

(COM(2022) 32 final — 2022/0021(COD))

43

2022/C 323/09

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The next generation of own resources for the EU Budget (COM(2021) 566 final), Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (COM(2021) 569 final — 2021/0429 (APP)), Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021) 570 final — 2021/0430 (CNS))

(COM(2021) 566 final)

(COM(2021) 569 final — 2021/0429 (APP))

(COM(2021) 570 final — 2021/0430 (CNS))

48

2022/C 323/10

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050
  (COM(2022) 34 final)

8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050

(COM(2022) 34 final)

54

2022/C 323/11

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a European approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability(COM(2021) 770 final) — Proposal for a Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts(COM(2021) 773 final)

(COM(2021) 770 final)

(COM(2021) 773 final)

62

2022/C 323/12

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA(COM(2021) 782 final — 2021/0411 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on automated data exchange for police cooperation (Prüm II), amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council(COM(2021) 784 final — 2021/0410 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum(COM(2021) 890 final — 2021/0427 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders(COM(2021) 891 final — 2021/0428 (COD))

(COM(2021) 782 final — 2021/0411 (COD))

(COM(2021) 784 final — 2021/0410 (COD))

(COM(2021) 890 final — 2021/0427 (COD))

(COM(2021) 891 final — 2021/0428 (COD))

69

2022/C 323/13

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation (COM(2021) 759 final — 2021/0394 (COD)), and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 2003/8/EC, Council Framework Decisions 2002/465/JHA, 2002/584/JHA, 2003/577/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA, 2009/829/JHA and 2009/948/JHA, and Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards digitalisation of judicial cooperation (COM(2021) 760 final — 2021/0395 (COD))

(COM(2021) 759 final — 2021/0394 (COD))

(COM(2021) 760 final — 2021/0395 (COD))

77

2022/C 323/14

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — A more inclusive and protective Europe: extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime (COM(2021) 777 final)

(COM(2021) 777 final)

83

2022/C 323/15

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Drugs Agency(COM(2022) 18 final — 2022/0009 (COD))

(COM(2022) 18 final — 2022/0009 (COD))

88

2022/C 323/16

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Sustainable Carbon Cycles (COM(2021) 800 final)

(COM(2021) 800 final)

95

2022/C 323/17

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 (COM(2021) 805 final/2 — 2021/0423 (COD)), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (COM(2021) 804 final — 2021/0424 (COD)) and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen (COM(2021) 803 final — 2021/0425 (COD))

(COM(2021) 805 final/2 — 2021/0423 (COD))

(COM(2021) 804 final — 2021/0424 (COD))

(COM(2021) 803 final — 2021/0425 (COD))

101

2022/C 323/18

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the New EU Urban Mobility Framework (COM(2021) 811 final)

(COM(2021) 811 final)

107

2022/C 323/19

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — State of the Energy Union 2021 — Contributing to the European Green Deal and the Union’s recovery (pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action) (COM(2021) 950 final)

(COM(2021) 950 final)

112

2022/C 323/20

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/25/EC as regards the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organisation (COM(2022) 53 final — 2022/0036 (COD))

(COM(2022) 53 final — 2022/0036 (COD))

119

2022/C 323/21

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy (COM(2022) 108 final)

(COM(2022) 108 final)

123

2022/C 323/22

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks (COM(2022) 135 final — 2022/0090 (COD))

(COM(2022) 135 final — 2022/0090 (COD))

129

2022/C 323/23

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1628 as regards the extension of the empowerment of the Commission to adopt delegated acts (COM(2022) 113 final — 2022/0080 (COD))

(COM(2022) 113 final — 2022/0080 (COD))

133

2022/C 323/24

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources (COM(2022) 145 final — 2022/0096 (COD)), and Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources (COM(2022) 162 final — 2022/0096 (COD))

(COM(2022) 145 final — 2022/0096 (COD))

(COM(2022) 162 final — 2022/0096 (COD))

134

2022/C 323/25

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending and correcting Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to alleviate the consequences of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine on fishing activities and to mitigate the effects of the market disruption caused by that military aggression on the supply chain of fishery and aquaculture products (COM(2022) 179 — 2022/0118 COD)

(COM(2022) 179 — 2022/0118 COD)

135

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EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/1

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Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Involvement of Organised Civil Society in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans — How can we improve it?’

(2022/C 323/01)

At its plenary session of 18 and 19 May 2022 (meeting of 18 May), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following resolution by 197 votes with 4 abstentions.

1.   Introduction

| 1.1. | In its February 2021 resolution (1), the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) assessed the participation, by consultation, of social partners and civil society organisations in the design of National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs), as well as the quality of their involvement. These plans were submitted by Member States to the European Commission (EC) in order to benefit from the support of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the centrepiece of the temporary recovery instrument NextGenerationEU (NGEU). Despite Article 18(4)(q) of the RRF Regulation (2), the main conclusion of the EESC was that the involvement of organised civil society (OCS) was largely insufficient in a majority of Member States. Furthermore, it appeared that consultations, often initiated by social partners and civil society organisations (CSOs), were generally viewed as mere formalities without any real capacity to influence the content of the plans. The Committee urged the European institutions and national governments to correct this situation in the implementation, monitoring and adjustment of the plans. In addition, the EESC continues to stress the importance of organised civil society also being better prepared to respond to this need to increase its involvement. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | In the aforementioned resolution and in various opinions, the EESC has also expressed its agreement with the investment objectives and the guidelines for the reforms of the RRF, which should aim at achieving a change of production model towards a climate-neutral and digitalised economy, carried out through fair transition processes that ensure the protection of workers and the regions concerned, the redeployment of workers and the regeneration and renewal of the productive fabric. In the Committee’s view, the investments and reforms set out in the NRRPs should promote the improvement of business productivity and economy in the Member States, the strengthening of the innovative industrial fabric through support for SMEs and social economy enterprises, and the enhancement of social cohesion, which can also be achieved through the development and implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | Just as the European economy was recovering from the economic recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the public health measures taken to combat it, and seeking to overcome the supply distortions and inflationary pressures that the pandemic had produced in the global economy, an unexpected external shock created a new political and economic scenario full of difficulties and risks: the invasion of Ukraine by the army of the Russian Federation. The EESC has strongly condemned this as a severe violation of international rules and agreements in force (3). It threatens European and global security, is causing enormous human suffering, material destruction and environmental damage, and has radically changed the European and global economic framework. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | In March, year-on-year inflation in the euro area reached 7,5 %, the highest since the adoption of the euro, and energy price inflation reached 44,7 %. Moreover, a prolonged war in Ukraine could lead to shortages of fossil fuels, on which we still depend, and of other raw materials and food products, making the development of prices and growth unpredictable, with huge impact on poorest countries, i.e. in Africa and Middle East. Stagflation is a real risk for the economies of Europe and other regions of the world. The objectives of the measures and instruments of the Green Deal, which aims at climate-neutrality for Europe by 2050, may also be affected. The geopolitical implications of the war will affect the entire food value chain, industry, defence and trade in Europe and globally, the corresponding EU policies in these and other fields, and also the ongoing reflection on the Future of Europe and the levels of integration we collectively want to achieve as European nations and citizens. A revision of EU’s financial tools taking should therefore be considered in the light of this new scenario. Besides, the situation created by the war in Ukraine will affect the implementation of the NRRPs, which will need to be carried out in a manner consistent with the new economic policy objectives that will be set to address the risks and challenges of the new situation. These worsening scenarios imply a stronger and more united European ‘Whatever it takes’. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | Through this resolution, the EESC aims to assess whether Member States have addressed the identified shortcomings with regards to the involvement of social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation of the NRRPs, and how their participation in the implementation of the plans is developing. To this end, the EESC’s European Semester Group has collected the views of the OCS through a questionnaire sent to the members of the group. The questionnaire includes 21 questions on social partner and CSOs involvement regarding the content and the implementation of NRRPs, and the impact of the green and digital transition on the economy and society of Member States. In total, responses to the questionnaire were received from 21Member States (4). In addition, this consultation was also carried out via round tables, organised jointly with the OSC and/or the national economic and social councils, in seven Member States between autumn 2021 and the end of March 2022. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

2.   Method

| 2.1. | The data and information required for this report were collected between October 2021 and April 2022. In total, 23 national contributions (responses to the questionnaire and/or the holding of a round table) were received. Consultations took place on the basis of members’ own knowledge, and involved social partners and CSOs. In some countries, national economic and social councils or equivalent bodies were involved, and in others, government representatives were also consulted. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Due to various reasons, not all the NRRPs have been approved by the European Commission, while some Member State had not yet moved beyond the implementation phase during our consultation. Therefore, some Member States could only partially or not at all respond to the questionnaire. In order to complement the missing information, this resolution also draws upon external sources, such as publications from think tanks, comparative research studies and national debates. Besides, the questionnaire was also sent out to a few European civil society organisations, parts of the EESC Liaison Group (5) and other representatives of the three groups of the EESC. The additional information, aimed at drawing a complete picture of the situation, is clearly distinguished in this resolution (6). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The 21 questions that formed the basis for the consultations are grouped into the following four sections:






  — | Section I: What is the opinion of organised civil society on the content of the plans, their investment objectives and the proposed reforms? |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.3.

—

Section I: What is the opinion of organised civil society on the content of the plans, their investment objectives and the proposed reforms?

| — | Section II: How is the implementation of the plans, their investments and the reforms progressing? |
| --- | --- |

—

Section II: How is the implementation of the plans, their investments and the reforms progressing?

| — | Section III: Potential impact of NRRPs on the economy and society of Member States. |
| --- | --- |

—

Section III: Potential impact of NRRPs on the economy and society of Member States.

| — | Section IV: Involvement of social partners and civil society organisations in the implementation of the plan. |
| --- | --- |

—

Section IV: Involvement of social partners and civil society organisations in the implementation of the plan.

3.   Observations on the results of the consultations

3.1.   Section I: What is the opinion of organised civil society on the content of the plans, their investment objectives and the proposed reforms?

| 3.1.1. | With regard to the inclusion of proposals from organised civil society in the content of the NRRPs, the European Commission highlighted, in its analysis of the plans the specific proposals from stakeholders that are effectively reflected, for example, in the plans of Czechia (7), Germany (8), Cyprus (9), Austria (10), Portugal (11), or Slovakia (12). Latvia published, alongside its NRRP, the suggestions from partners, and included some in the plan. The consultations carried out in the context of this resolution showed that while a majority of civil society organisations in the Member States believe that the plan will be a success and support its green, digital and social objectives, it was however frequently mentioned that the social dimension is relatively undeveloped. Moreover, concerns were raised about the capacity of the Member States to manage RRF funds or to do so within an appropriate time frame, which may hinder the success of the plan. This is particularly true for the largest beneficiaries of the funds. The assessment of the plan’s capacity to build economic resilience is mixed. In particular, countries that receive relatively little funding do not expect the plan to contribute to long-term resilience of their economy. Finally, OCS largely regrets that its views on the priorities to be reflected in the plan were not sufficiently taken into account in the final version. OCS also repeatedly pointed out that many of the reforms contained in the NRRP were already envisaged in previous national reform programmes, independently of the RRF and its investment and reform objectives, which left little leeway for OCS to influence the content of the plan. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

3.2.   Section II: How is the implementation of the plans, their investments and the reforms progressing?

| 3.2.1. | On 15 December 2021, the Commission launched the RRF Scoreboard (13), as provided for in the RRF Regulation. It gives an overview of how the implementation of the RRF and of the national RRPs is progressing, but it does not reflect the extent to which Member States are effectively channelling funds to finance their projects. Therefore, some Member States, such as Austria, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain, disclose on their websites some information on how funds are being spend and measures implemented. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | The majority of the stakeholders consulted by early April 2022 indicated that it was still too early to provide a comprehensive overview of the implementation of the plan and their involvement in it. In some Member States, this is partly due to a slow implementation process or delay in the implementation and enforcement of the plan. However, OCS states that it has already expressed its views on the (potential) challenges that would arise during the implementation phase. In this respect, one of the main bottlenecks that was identified is the administrative capacity of the Member States, particularly at regional and local levels (as also underlined in the CEPS reflection paper published in March 2022 (14)). This is especially the case for the largest beneficiaries of the RRF funds. For this reason, many social partners and civil society organisations insist on greater involvement of local and regional communities. However, most stakeholders believe that the participation of OSC in the implementation of the NRRP at regional and local levels is ineffective. A second frequently mentioned bottleneck is the lack of information exchange between the national government and the social partners and civil society organisations, which could severely hamper their involvement in the implementation and monitoring phase. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

| 3.2.3. | Despite these identified challenges, according to an in-depth analysis of the EPRS published in March 2022 (15), on the one hand, several Member States, for example, Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Estonia, Finland, have made a general commitment to continue to engage with the social partners and civil society organisations during the implementation phase of the NRRP, and on the other hand, other countries, such as the Czechia, France, Italy, Portugal referred to a specific committee/body that will be responsible, among other things, for monitoring and supervising the achievement of progress, compliance with the milestones and objectives of the different strands, publicity activities and evaluation of the implementation reports. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

3.3.   Section III: Potential impact of NRRPs on the economy and society of Member States

| 3.3.1. | According a study conducted by the European Parliament Research Service (16), the RRF is expected to ‘trigger public investments, with the focus to increase real output, and enabling additional fiscal space, which should in turn allow already planned national expenditures based on the additionally principle’. The RRF would, on the one hand, lead to a substantial increase in GDP in the short and medium term through public and private investment demand, thus building up the capital stock which is necessary to generate, on the other hand, higher GDP in the medium and long term through employment growth, higher productivity and wages, and a positive output effect. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | The views of social partners and CSOs on the potential impacts of the NRRP on their country’s economy and society are rather fragmented. This perception varies notably according to the size the amounts of RRF funding allocated to each Member State. Indeed, in Member States that receive large amounts, the impact is perceived more positively than in Member States that receive relatively small amounts in relation to the size of their economy. Despite these disparities, the OCS generally views the impact of RRF funds and NRRP investments on reforms positively, as they provide an impetus for achieving the objectives of the twin transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

3.4.   Section IV: Involvement of social partners and civil society organisations in the implementation of the plan

| 3.4.1. | The participation of organised civil society in the implementation phase of the plan, in the few Member States where it has actually started, has taken place in different forms. The information provided by the stakeholders identified four categories of involvement: (1) Statutory; (2) through special NRRP working groups; (3) through stakeholder meetings; (4) no specific form of involvement planned. Compared to the conclusions drawn in 2021 about the obvious lack of involvement of OCS in the drafting phase of the plan, its involvement in the implementation phase is assessed more positively, although it is still far from satisfactory in all Member States. Indeed, it was pointed out that in some countries, initiatives specifically designed to involve OCS in the implementation of the NRRP are being promoted. Furthermore, with regard to the potential difference in involvement between the social partners, on the one hand, and civil society organisations, on the other, it appears, in general, that in the Member States there is either no involvement of either party or the involvement of both parties, without distinction. However, stakeholders in three (Austria, Greece and Portugal) of the 20 Member States consulted reported that there is a significant distinction in the involvement of these parties. In these countries, the social partners are more involved than CSOs. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | In this regard, a BusinessEurope survey (17) conducted in early 2022 showed that social partners are increasingly involved in the recovery plans, and this is reflected in a dissatisfaction rate of only 30 % regarding their role so far in the implementation of the plan, compared to 71 % last year regarding their role in the design of the plan. Besides, as underlined in Eurofound’s report (18) of March 2022, following the adoption of the plans, social partners stressed the importance of the country reports issued by the European Commission in the context of the European Semester (19), which framed the discussion on the implementation of national reforms and investments, allowing social partners to exchange ideas and contribute to the NRRPs using a sound baseline. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

4.   Conclusions

| 4.1. | In general, the final content of the plans is evaluated positively. In some cases, comments of OCS were taken into account in the finalised versions of the NRRPs. Overall, OCS supports the green, digital and social objectives of the NRRPs. Concerning the contribution to the green and digital transitions, positive views were expressed even though the impact of the NRRP is evaluated to be limited except for a few cases. Regrettably, it was often expressed that the social dimension of the plan was relatively underdeveloped despite the importance of this for the resilience aspect. The view was expressed that the transition requires more investment, especially given the current crisis. Despite the perceived improvements in some Member States, it remains difficult to answer conclusively whether participation in the implementation phase has improved, not least because the implementation of many NRRPs has been significantly delayed in many Member States. However, the social partners and civil society organisations stressed that the institutional social dialogue had improved in this phase. Indeed, for example in Spain, the social partners recognise that the framework of the RRF and the NRRP has contributed to important agreements on labour and pension reforms through tripartite social dialogue. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Despite the delay in the implementation of many NRRPs, good practices were identified in some Member States with regard to the implementation and monitoring of NRRPs. For example, in Austria, France, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden close and constructive cooperation between social partners, civil society organisations and the government, strengthened by transparency and ongoing dialogue, is an important tool for their involvement in the RRF. Moreover, in Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Italy and Spain, an RRF campaign website or government portal has been implemented with transparent information accessible to the public. In Italy, which is the main beneficiary of RRF funds, a Permanent Round Table Partnership (Tavolo permanente del partenariato) was established in November 2021 at government level, with specific working groups that critically monitor the direction and quality of NRRP implementation in terms of citizens’ expectations. This body is chaired by the Italian prime minister and coordinated by the president of the National Council for Economics and Labour (CNEL). In addition, a specific structured agreement was signed with the National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI) for developing dialogue and structured assistance in the implementation phases at local level relating to matters of their concern. Similarly, involvement of municipalities and other local actors is being encouraged in Italy with regard to administrative capacity. In Croatia, OCS is involved in the working groups preparing tenders for the implementation of the NRRP, and also in agreements with the Ministry of Tourism concerning measures under the plan for the tourism sector. Finally, in Portugal, OCS is involved in monitoring the implementation of the NRRP notably by analysing the results of the plan and the impact assessment reports. In this respect, a monitoring body, the National Monitoring Committee (CNA), has been created and includes, among others, representatives of social partners, universities and the social sector. These exchanges of good practices are encouraged and serve as an example for the other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | In many Member States, there are calls for better involvement of social partners and civil society organisations in the implementation phase of the NRRPs. Organised civil society calls for more transparency in the implementation and monitoring of the plans and asks that information be made publicly available and that dialogues around the NRRP with all relevant stakeholders be further encouraged. If this is lacking, there is a likelihood that key challenges would not be addressed correctly. Finally, in the majority of Member States, it remains to be seen whether the participation of OCS will be significantly improved during the implementation and monitoring phases of the plans, which are currently still too slow or delayed. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The Committee calls on the national governments of those Member States where the involvement of the social partners and civil society organisations (20) is still insufficient to remedy this situation as a matter of urgency and to comply with the rules laid down in the RRF Regulation. It calls on the Commission and the European Parliament to enforce compliance with the rules in force. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Notwithstanding the above, the EESC believes that the lack of effective and quality participation of organised civil society in the economic governance of the EU will not be resolved in a satisfactory manner until there is a reform of the European Semester which guarantees this via a directive or a regulation. The Committee draws attention to the fact that proper participation takes place when, in formal consultation processes based on legal rules and public and transparent procedures, civil society organisations are duly informed in writing, given sufficient time to analyse the government’s proposals and draft their own proposals, and the inclusion or rejection of these proposals is accompanied by a justification contained in public minutes or documents. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The Ukraine war and its immediate risks to the European and global economy do not call into question the objectives of the NRRPs but, on the contrary, in the Committee’s view, should encourage European institutions and national governments to speed up the implementation and enforcement of the plans, as well as the associated investments and reforms, and to push forward the EU Green Deal, in order to sustain growth and accelerate the decarbonisation of the energy system and the green strategic autonomy of the European Union. At the same time, the EU must do whatever is necessary to help the government and people of Ukraine, to provide adequate care for the millions of people who have been forced to seek refuge in EU countries, and to assist the most directly affected Member States in various sectors of their economies. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | Prior to the outbreak of the war, the total amount of national and NGEU funds was insufficient to achieve the objectives of the Green Deal and deliver the just and inclusive energy transition required, in particular the objective of replacing fossil fuels with clean and renewable energy production sources in line with the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In addition, there is now the pressing geopolitical need to end to the EU’s energy dependence on Russia. Moreover, it will lead to a strong increase in security and defence investments, which will weigh heavily on public budgets. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC therefore proposes:






  a) | the urgent adoption of a new EU Energy Strategy that promotes an effective connection of its energy networks, rapid replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, high energy efficiency and reduction of energy demand; |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.8.

a)

the urgent adoption of a new EU Energy Strategy that promotes an effective connection of its energy networks, rapid replacement of fossil fuels with renewable energy sources, high energy efficiency and reduction of energy demand;

| b) | considering the possibility of redirecting NRRP investments towards greater investment in clean and renewable energy while ensuring the strategic autonomy of the EU; |
| --- | --- |

b)

considering the possibility of redirecting NRRP investments towards greater investment in clean and renewable energy while ensuring the strategic autonomy of the EU;

| c) | that all Member States use their share of NRRP funds to finance new programmes in this direction, such as programmes for sustainable energy investments; |
| --- | --- |

c)

that all Member States use their share of NRRP funds to finance new programmes in this direction, such as programmes for sustainable energy investments;

| d) | that in the short term, European authorities and national governments should take all necessary measures, in both the production and consumption areas, to protect economies from the cascading effects of the war on the EU economy, which is severely disrupting food, energy and financial markets, with rising energy prices and supply chain disruptions; |
| --- | --- |

d)

that in the short term, European authorities and national governments should take all necessary measures, in both the production and consumption areas, to protect economies from the cascading effects of the war on the EU economy, which is severely disrupting food, energy and financial markets, with rising energy prices and supply chain disruptions;

| e) | assessing the creation of a new financial investment instrument and supporting the European Commission’s proposal contained in the REpowerEU Communication to accelerate the restructuring of the energy sector, in order to provide a more secure and sustainable strategic autonomy of the EU. To this end, the most appropriate model to be identified should be used, based on the best practices and results of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and the RRF. |
| --- | --- |

e)

assessing the creation of a new financial investment instrument and supporting the European Commission’s proposal contained in the REpowerEU Communication to accelerate the restructuring of the energy sector, in order to provide a more secure and sustainable strategic autonomy of the EU. To this end, the most appropriate model to be identified should be used, based on the best practices and results of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and the RRF.

| 4.9. | The conclusions of the UN IPCC 2022 are a further serious reminder of the inadequacies in the fight against climate change. The EESC calls on the European authorities to take these into account when adopting energy, industrial and economic policy initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC is aware of the enormous difficulties involved, in the current circumstances, in implementing an economic policy that simultaneously aims to reduce inflation and ensure economic growth, employment and the sustainability of public finances in the medium and long term. The European authorities, national governments and the ECB must act in close coordination and take the necessary steps to ensure that the withdrawal of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies is carried out in such a way as not to lead to a new recession. The EESC believes that the reform of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact should be undertaken by setting realistic deficit and debt targets, incorporating the golden rule of investment, and establishing flexible paths, according on the situation of each country, to achieving the targets for reducing public debt levels. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | Education and lifelong learning efforts for workers and the population in general are essential to ensure fair and inclusive green and digital transitions. Priority should be given to training and vocational guidance for workers affected by restructuring processes, but also to anticipating the needs arising from the different types of technological changes in the productive apparatus. Digitisation requires special attention in the case of people who, because of their age or other circumstances, have more difficulties in accessing digitised services. This part of the population must be guaranteed access to training and special support services to help them access all types of benefits and services. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  EESC Resolution on Involvement of Organised Civil Society in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans — What works and what does not? (OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 1).

1

Involvement of Organised Civil Society in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans — What works and what does not?

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17).

2

(3)  War in Ukraine and its economic, social and environmental impact (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 1).

3

(4)  NB: Before 1 April 2022, the Commission endorsed 23 plans (including the Swedish plan in late March 2022 that still needs to be approved by the Council). In early April, the Commission endorsed also the Bulgarian plan that, likewise, still needs to be approved by the Council (i.e. 24 plans endorsed so far by the Commission and 22 approved so far by the Council).

4

(5)  Liaison Group with European civil society organisations and networks.

5

(6)  The reports from the various Member States are analysed in the annex to this resolution. All this material is available on the Committee's website.

6

(7)  SWD(2021) 211 final.

7

(8)  SWD(2021) 163 final/2.

8

(9)  SWD(2021) 196 final.

9

(10)  SWD(2021) 160 final.

10

(11)  SWD(2021) 146 final.

11

(12)  SWD(2021) 161 final.

12

(13)  Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard.

13

(14)  Comparing and assessing recovery and resilience plans — Second edition, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).

14

(15)  Recovery and Resilience Plans: stakeholders’ views.

15

(16)  Recovery and Resilience Dialogue with the European Commission, 7 March 2022.

16

(17)  BusinessEurope Reform Barometer 2022.

17

(18)  Involvement of social partners in the national recovery and resilience plans.

18

(19)  Report on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social aspects in the annual sustainable growth survey 2022.

19

(20)  And other relevant stakeholders, for instance youth organisations as the EESC notably underlined in its opinion on How to guarantee decent work for young people and ensure the inclusion of NEETs through the proper elaboration of National Recovery Plans (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 27
  ).

20

How to guarantee decent work for young people and ensure the inclusion of NEETs through the proper elaboration of National Recovery Plans

).

---

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/8

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on State aid rules applicable to health and social services — SGEI in a post-pandemic scenario. Thoughts and proposals on the Commission evaluation to amend the 2012 legislative package

(own-initiative opinion)

(2022/C 323/02)

| Rapporteur: | Giuseppe GUERINI |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Giuseppe GUERINI

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 5.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 221/0/5 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

5.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

221/0/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) considers that various health and social services such as care (including home care), helping disadvantaged individuals and those with disabilities to break back into the labour market, childcare and social housing are fundamental when it comes to guaranteeing social cohesion in the ongoing period of post-pandemic recovery, humanitarian crisis and international tensions. European rules on state aid for these services are therefore fundamental. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC strongly endorses the Commission’s decision, in its evaluation of the current rules (1), to consider health and social services as a subgroup with autonomous features within the broader framework of services of general economic interest (SGEI). |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC would emphasise that the 2012 Almunia package laying down rules on state aid applying to SGEI was definitely useful in that it updated and simplified the previous rules which had been approved in 2005. The regulatory approach taken by this package should therefore be retained in future, simply updating certain matters, should the Commission decide to amend the current rules following the ongoing evaluation. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC would point out that within individual Member States, health services and almost all social care services are organised by region, county, town or even by group of towns in the case of larger urban areas. This means that user mobility between regions or counties in a given country is very limited; cross-border mobility of users is therefore a non-factor. There is no cross-border relevance, and so Article 107 TFEU on state aid does not apply to health and social services. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC would point out that national administrations are struggling to develop specific expertise on the entrustment acts which are a prerequisite for applying Commission Decision 2012/21/EU (2) (Exemption Decision on public service compensation) and Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 (3) on de minimis aid for SGEI. It would therefore be very useful if the Commission could set up a portal giving access to examples of legitimate entrustment acts for the various types of health and social services. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC encourages the exchange of good practices between Member States with similar legal traditions on the application of state aid rules to health and social services, with a view to encouraging more effective use of the discretion that Protocol No 26 to the TFEU accords to national administrations when it comes to establishing and implementing SGEI at local level. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC notes that the rule laid down in Decision 2012/21/EU, whereby public service compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover the costs except for ‘a reasonable profit’, requires further clarification: i) on how this reasonable profit should be determined in relation to the capital used to provide the service, considering the operating risk; ii) on how to establish the fixed and structural costs which are part of SGEI management costs; and iii) on the extent to which the distinctive nature of the services and organisational models typical of social economy entities could have a greater bearing when they manage and deliver services of general economic interest. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC believes that health and social services should be eligible for a de minimis ceiling over three fiscal years which is higher than the ceiling for SGEI generally allowed under Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 (EUR 500 000), as was clearly pointed out during the Commission’s public consultation. The role played by health and social services in terms of social cohesion would justify a higher ceiling than that currently in place. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   Introduction and background

| 2.1. | The topic of state aid for undertakings providing services of general economic interest and, for the purposes of this opinion, for organisations active in the narrower field of health and social services, is governed by the 2012 Almunia legislative package. This package replaced and updated the previous legal framework which dated back to 2005 (‘Monti-Kroes package’). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The Almunia package contains the following pieces of legislation:






  — | Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

—

Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest;

| — | Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the TFEU to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest; |
| --- | --- |

—

Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the TFEU to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest;

| — | Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union state aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (4); |
| --- | --- |

—

Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union state aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (4);

| — | Communication from the Commission on the European Union framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (2011) (5). |
| --- | --- |

—

Communication from the Commission on the European Union framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (2011) (5).

| 2.3. | The relevant legal framework has therefore been in place for almost a decade and, as the Commission points out, the Member States have made considerable use of it ever since it came into force, despite various operational problems which could justify further action by the EU legislator, not least given the considerable amount of time that has passed since the framework was approved. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | On this point, the Commission launched a broad stakeholder consultation to verify whether the current rules are effective and efficient, provide added value and are fit for purpose, with particular emphasis on health and social services. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The consultation ran from 31 July 2019 to 14 December 2019, in the form of a questionnaire prepared by the Commission. Fifty-one responses were sent in, from undertakings, confederations, trade unions, NGOs, private individuals and public administrations. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | Through this own-initiative opinion and in its capacity as a representative body of Europe’s economy and civil society, the EESC seeks to bring to the Commission’s attention a number of issues relating to applying the rules on state aid in the field of health and social services, with a view to the possible future revision of state aid rules targeting these sectors. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC acknowledges that devising rules governing state aid in the field of social and health services is a very complex process for the EU legislator, given the competing needs to strike a tricky balance between public support for activities contributing to objectives which are in the general interest and to safeguard free, unimpeded competition in the internal market. European regulation of state aid should also enable the public investment necessary for the development of social and health services infrastructure which will contribute to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC strongly endorses the Commission’s decision to consider health and social services as a subgroup with autonomous features within the broader framework of SGEI, due to the specific characteristics of these services and the unique objectives that those services aim to achieve. In the document on the evaluation of the current rules, the Commission in fact notes that ‘From a State aid perspective, health and social services form a subgroup of services of general (economic) interest’ (6). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC would emphasise that the 2012 Almunia package laying down rules on state aid applying to SGEI was definitely useful in that it updated the previous rules which had been approved in 2005, reducing the administrative and regulatory burden on national authorities intending to finance SGEI. The regulatory approach taken by this package should therefore be retained in future, simply updating and clarifying certain matters. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC considers that various health and social services such as care (including home care), helping disadvantaged individuals and those with disabilities to break back into the labour market, childcare and social housing are fundamental when it comes to guaranteeing social cohesion in the internal market, and are shared values of the Member States, as laid down in Protocol No 26 to the TFEU. These services are still more strategic and important in the ongoing period of post-pandemic recovery, international tensions and rising populism in the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC would point out that health and social services are, in some cases, provided at national level by means of non-economic activities which do not come under EU rules on state aid. At the same time, where these services are provided by means of economic activities, those activities have only minor cross-border relevance: they are largely rooted in local communities and are instrumental in ensuring social cohesion within a given country. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC would point out that health and social services are often provided by means of non-economic activities, in which case they do not come under EU rules on state aid (Article 107 TFEU). Moreover, even when they are provided in a market context, health and social services have an essentially local dimension with no real demand-side cross-border relevance. The local dimension is even more evident when social and health services are managed by social economy entities with the involvement of local communities, with a view to social cohesion and in the public interest. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | However, Commission practice and European case-law consider that the cross-border relevance of health and social services cannot in principle be excluded, due to the potential distortion of cross-border investment. While understanding the reasons underpinning this approach which seeks to fully safeguard the freedom of movement enshrined in the Treaties, the EESC would urge the Commission to provide appropriate guidelines on the cross-border relevance of health and social services. Specific, flexible provisions need to be devised for these services within the broader debate on the concept of cross-border relevance, which is itself an element of the concept of state aid as laid down in Article 107 TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC notes that even when social and health services do have a cross-border dimension, as in the case of the EU’s 37 cross-border urban areas coming under the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive (7), this is on the basis of physical proximity between border areas and in accordance with territorial subsidiarity principles. Therefore, more state aid would not substantially undermine cross-border competition between businesses. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC would point out that despite the useful clarity and simplification provided by the 2012 Almunia package, the legal concepts to be applied to SGEI are still objectively complex, not least given the greatly intertwined nature of the legal and economic assessments typical of the SGEI sector. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC would therefore ask the Commission to publish a guide updating the Guide to the application of the European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general interest (8), which has been very useful for stakeholders in previous years. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EESC feels that national authorities are less familiar with the specific rules on SGEI, as regards both public procurement and state aid, than with the corresponding ordinary rules on public procurement and state aid. Investing appropriately in training public administration staff, drawing partly on European resources, could therefore be beneficial for boosting the standard of these services and for ensuring increased compliance with EU law. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC would point out that in both the technical and operational domains, national administrations are struggling to develop specific, high-level expertise on the entrustment acts which are a prerequisite for applying Exemption Decision 2012/21/EU on public service compensation and, albeit in simplified terms, Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 on state aid (the higher de minimis ceiling of EUR 500 000 over three fiscal years). |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | On this point, it would therefore be very useful if the Commission could set up a portal giving access to examples of entrustment acts for the various types of health and social services considered to be legitimate and sufficiently well developed by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition. The exchange of good practices between Member States with similar legal traditions could also be very useful in this respect, encouraging more effective use of the discretion that Protocol No 26 to the TFEU accords to national administrations when it comes to establishing and implementing SGEI at local level. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | As is well-known, the rule laid down in Decision 2012/21/EU stipulates that the compensation granted to operators entrusted with public service obligations cannot exceed what is necessary to cover the costs except for ‘a reasonable profit’. It would be useful to further flesh out this concept with a view to achieving greater clarity on the following three issues: i) how should this reasonable profit be determined in relation to the capital used to provide the service in the light of the operating risk?; ii) establishing the fixed and structural costs which are part of the costs incurred when managing the SGEI; and iii) the extent to which the distinctive nature of the services and organisational models typical of social economy entities could have a greater bearing when they manage and deliver services of general economic interest. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | When defining the concept of ‘a reasonable profit’, the EESC points out that account should be taken of the characteristics of the undertaking in question, particularly when that undertaking keeps ploughing the profits back into its own activities and describes itself as a social economy entity or enterprise. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC believes that health and social services should be eligible for a de minimis threshold over three fiscal years which is higher than and different from the threshold for SGEI under Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 (EUR 500 000), as was clearly pointed out during the Commission’s public consultation. Such an increase is justified by the public and general interest role of social and health services and the limited impact of these activities on competition and trade between Member States. Increasing the de minimis threshold for social and health services would widen the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 360/2012, making the use of that regulation and its simplified forms more accessible. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The role played by health and social services in terms of social cohesion would justify a higher ceiling, which would have the triple advantage of: i) allowing more aid to be granted under the simplified and quicker framework on de minimis aid; ii) taking into account the return of inflation at macroeconomic level, which would suggest that more frequent revisions of the ceiling over three fiscal years are needed; and iii) recognising the supporting role played by many social economy entities. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC recognises the importance and role of SMEs and private companies involved in the management of social and health SGEIs on the basis of public procurement procedures run by local authorities. Here too, data and information on selection procedures for service providers, compensation and performance collected and circulated by national administrations could provide useful pointers. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | Lastly the EESC, as recognised by the Commission in its social economy action plan (9), considers that health and social services could also be supported indirectly by granting social economy organisations, which are very active in these sectors, better access to support measures for accessing financing and credit, along with specific incentives to employ workers deemed to be disadvantaged or to have a disability by the general regulation on state aid exemption. On this point, clear and flexible European rules authorising the reasonable cumulation and combination of different incentives for the same activities would be very useful. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

Brussels, 19 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  ARES-2019-3858696.

1

(2)  Commission Decision 2012/21/EU of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3).

2

(3)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest (OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8).

3

(4)  OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 4.

4

(5)  OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 15.

5

(6)  ARES-2019-3858696.

6

(7)  Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in crossborder healthcare (OJ L 88, 4.4.2011, p. 45).

7

(8)  SWD (2013) 53 final/2.

8

(9)  COM(2021) 778 final.

9

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/13

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The role of Civil Society Organisations as guardians of the common good in the post-pandemic recovery and reconstruction of EU societies and economies

(own-initiative opinion)

(2022/C 323/03)

| Rapporteur: | Ioannis VARDAKASTANIS |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Ioannis VARDAKASTANIS

| Plenary Assembly decision | 28/4/2021 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 03/5/2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18/5/2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 189/1/4 |

Plenary Assembly decision

28/4/2021

Legal basis

Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

03/5/2022

Adopted at plenary

18/5/2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

189/1/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | Civil society and social partners bridge the gap between policy-makers and the realities of those they represent. Engaging in dialogue with these stakeholders is thus an effective way for policy-makers to understand the varying needs of people belonging to different social groups. Furthermore, civil society encourage the participation of all in ‘civic democracy’ to impact issues that affect them. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | In the EU we see civil society and social partners operating at different levels. Some organisations operate at EU level, others at national level, and some at regional or local level. The scope of work at all levels is complementary. When it comes to advocacy work, the focus of EU compared to national organisations is often determined by how policy competences are split between EU and national level. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | Civil society working at grassroots level can also play a role in monitoring the implementation and impact of new policies and initiatives. However, civil society does not just impact policy decisions, it also exists to actually deliver services to the people they represent. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | During the COVID-19 pandemic and Europe’s slow recovery from the depths of this crisis, the roles of civil society and social partners have had to adapt. Even more focus than before has been placed on delivering vital services, protecting human rights and saving lives, while at the same time coping with challenges organisations faced in covering funding and supporting their own staff. Furthermore, with the pandemic came a number of new EU funding initiatives, which in turn required strong advocacy to ensure investment reached those most in need. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | We are currently seeing European civil society making a transition from the COVID-19 crisis to an entirely new crisis. Many civil society actors are now focusing their efforts on addressing the repercussions of an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by the Russian authorities. Many NGOs, for example, are now taking the lessons they learned in crisis management from the pandemic and using these to support Ukrainian refugees, collect emergency funds and help them flee the bloodshed currently underway in their country. They are also focusing their efforts on those in the rest of the EU most at risk of poverty, as fuel prices rise drastically and inflation booms. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The inclusion of civil society in the policy-making process is inseparable from the values of the EU, with Article 1 of the Treaty of the European Union stating that decisions should be ‘taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen’. There can be no room for the repression of social dialogue and civil society dialogue in the EU. Respect for these values should be a prerequisite for Member States to be eligible for EU funding. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EU should have zero tolerance when it comes to Member States (MS) in which the civic space is shrinking. A system in which civil society’s voice is being silenced, particularly those taking a critical view of how the government is operating, is one that is actively undoing the dynamic of policy-makers serving the interests of their citizens. It instead becomes a system where those in power act in their own interest alone. This approach is a threat to democracy within the EU and has no place within the values of Europe outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | Ensuring that MS uphold their EU values is not only about being open to engaging with civil society; it is also about facilitating the existence of civil society even when they are critical of your policies or politically opposed to you. There must be freedom and independence for all Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the EU. MS that accept dialogue only with specially selected and government-sympathetic organisations, as a box-ticking exercise, are as guilty of undemocratic practices as governments that do not engage with civil society at all. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | Policy-makers should ensure the meaningful participation of civil society, and not only at a superficial level. This means involving them in all parts of the decision-making process. It means hearing the views of civil society during the process of conceiving new legislation, projects or initiatives, and regularly consulting them as they take shape, and are adopted and then implemented. Too often civil society is asked for its opinion when legislation or projects are near completion. This makes it impossible for policy-makers to take on board any proposals and sets a precedent where civil society is simply expected to rubber stamp the proposals put before them. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | Policy-makers at all levels should make their consultation processes easy to find and to access. The EESC commends the EC’s system for public consultation in the sense that it is open to all CSOs, as well as individual citizens, and the fact that all of the consultations are systematically published on the same webpage (2). On the other hand, the EU-level consultations can at times be restrictive regarding the type of input they allow. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | There is potential for civil society to assist policy-makers in essential tasks such as monitoring. However, if the role of civil society in monitoring the implementation of new policies and initiatives is to be taken seriously, then the EU, national and local authorities should support the operational costs of these organisations. This is all the more important given the uncertainties around financing and project funding because of COVID, as well as increases in operating costs. In order to receive the best quality and most constructive support from civil society, it is essential that offering funding for operating and capacity building must not put into question the independence of CSOs. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | There are a number of measures the EU could take to embrace the input of civil society. It could start by defining a participatory status. It could also agree on guidelines and common standards on the right to association and civil dialogue to be implemented in all relevant processes, as well as adopting an interinstitutional agreement on civil dialogue. Recognising and promoting the role of associations and NGOs in the European Union framework would also be vastly beneficial to improving the partnership between policy-makers and civil society at EU level. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | CSOs also have their own set of responsibilities to live up to in the name of good policy-making. First of all, organisations should be constantly receptive to the reality of the people they represent, and make sure that their advocacy responds to their needs. It is particularly important to foster youth engagement in civil society and to ensure a future for the movement. It is also crucial for civil society to be constructive with their input, and clear with their recommendations, to assist in shaping new policies in a way they see best for their constituents. Input should not only focus on what is being done poorly, but also suggest concretely how improvements can be made. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | In this document the term ‘civil society’ also refers to social partners, although it must be noted that social partners operate in a unique and specific way in the protection of rights. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) also advocate on behalf of groups who cannot influence policy through suffrage, such as children, persons with disabilities denied their right to vote, or migrants and refugees, and foster their engagement in democracy. Dialogue between civil society and policy-makers is therefore key to understanding the needs of society and forming effective policy responses. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Independent and informed civil society organisations can offer invaluable input to policy-making. They can also play an essential role in monitoring the effectiveness of existing policies and initiatives. However, support for capacity building is critical. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The space for civil society is drastically shrinking in some parts of the European Union (EU), and the EU institutions must react strongly and uncompromisingly to these worrying developments. The inclusion of civil society in the policy-making process is inseparable from the values of the EU, with Article 1 of the Treaty of the European Union stating that decisions should be ‘taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen’. There can be no room for its repression. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The separation of policy competences between the EU and national, regional and local level has given rise to various levels of civil society representation. There are EU CSOs that deal specifically with policy areas in which the EU legislates, and others that operate at national, regional or local level. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Two of the main barriers faced by civil society at all levels tend to be the resistance of policy makers to engaging in dialogue and the lack of meaningful involvement at all stages of the decision-making process. Legal regulations should be put in place at European and national level to eliminate these kinds of attitudes. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | National and EU-level civil society is playing a crucial role in Europe’s post-pandemic recovery. One of the areas in which the two levels are coordinating is around how the EU Member States (MS) invest money from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which has the potential to greatly alter how our societies and economies look in the years and decades to come. However, this process has highlighted the insufficient commitment of many MS to meaningfully consulting civil society, with many CSOs cut out or at best only superficially involved in the design of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs). This was outlined in an EESC resolution in February 2021 (3). Furthermore, we saw this inadequate consultation of civil society despite the obligation to do so being outlined in Article 18 of the Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) establishing a Recovery and Resilience Facility. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   How civil society involvement can result in smarter policy-making

| 3.1. | Policy-makers at all levels are there to serve the interests of citizens, and not the other way around. Democracy can only function correctly when those making and implementing laws have their ear to the ground and understand what is needed by the people they represent. The existence of civil society and its active inclusion and meaningful participation in the decision-making process at all levels is essential for effective and intelligent governance. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | CSOs are entrusted with conveying messages from the people they represent, or with the promotion of public concerns, and channelling these into clear and coherent messages and policy recommendations. Engaging in dialogue with civil society is thus an effective way for policy-makers to understand the varying needs of people belonging to different social groups. It helps minimise the risk of overlooking any issues that might arise in the implementation of policies and can present insight and expertise that might otherwise be unavailable to policy-makers. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | While policy-makers are receptive to what voters want, one of the crucial roles of civil society is to represent groups who do not possess the right to vote. This is especially true of CSOs protecting the rights of children, persons with disabilities who have their right to vote denied, people under guardianship, and immigrants and refugees who are not entitled to vote in their country of residence. Civil society is there to stand up for the interests of such groups whose voices cannot be expressed through suffrage. They also encourage the participation of all in ‘civic democracy’ to impact issues that affect them. Without the existence of strong civil society, and their ability to foster engagement of people from these groups, many would risk being further overlooked by decision-makers. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | CSOs working at grassroots level, particularly national or local CSOs, can also play a role in monitoring the implementation and impact of new policies and initiatives. However, monitoring is an intensive task that often requires very technical knowledge. It is therefore essential that the EU and the MS support CSOs through funding and technical support to enable them to build capacity. Furthermore, the Commission should begin developing a strategy for monitoring how EU funds are used, a task that appears to be beyond the capacity of the Commission to handle alone. This strategy should outline clearly how the Commission plans to support partners that work alongside it in monitoring activities. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

4.   Role of EU-level civil society in the post-pandemic recovery

| 4.1. | EU-level civil society refers to actors who advocate towards the EU institutions and represent people living throughout all of the 27 MS and often far beyond. They play an essential role in advocating around the EU’s areas of competence, where it is necessary to enter into dialogue with EU-level policy-makers. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The following areas are ones on which EU civil society often focuses. These are policy areas either where the EU can propose legislation, or where MS can legislate at national level only when it does not contradict EU legislation already in existence: employment and social affairs; economic, social and territorial cohesion; agriculture; fisheries; environment; consumer protection; transport; trans-European networks; energy; justice and fundamental rights; migration and home affairs; public health; development cooperation and humanitarian aid. Civil society and social partners also currently focus on policy initiatives at EU level, such as the EU Pillar of Social Rights (5) and the European Green Deal (6). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Numerous barriers remain when it comes to advocacy by EU-level CSOs. As pointed out in the EESC’s information report SOC/639 (7), unlike other international organisations, the EU has not yet created a participatory status for European associations and NGOs. However, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to assembly and association, particularly on civic matters at all levels, including the European level (8).
  In the context of the COVID-19 recovery, EU civil society has been influencing and monitoring how EU funds are used to bring people out of this crisis. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

In the context of the COVID-19 recovery, EU civil society has been influencing and monitoring how EU funds are used to bring people out of this crisis.

| 4.4. | The use of EU funding, particularly in the form of the EUR 723,8 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility (9), has the potential to spur on a social and economic recovery from the COVID crisis. However, where the money is invested is a political choice. While the national plans for the spending of this money are drawn up by the MS, the European Commission (EC) has the responsibility of assessing and approving the plans. EU civil society has been busy alerting the EC about concerning proposals for funding in the national plans. They have highlighted the existing systemic problems that were revealed and magnified by the pandemic, such as under-investment in public health, social security and education systems, and pushing for the RRF to go towards resolving this. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Several NRRPs were adapted at the request of the EC, and there have been plans that have been either rejected or whose approval has been frozen (10). Civil society was instrumental in highlighting these areas of concern (11). EU funds must address the areas where we saw the biggest strains, the most fatalities and the most worrying breaches of people’s basic rights during the pandemic. This will include funding the transition away from institutional care facilities, particularly for persons with disabilities and older people, as well as better preparedness and resilience of emergency healthcare provision in order to avoid a repetition of the system of triage where certain groups were turned away from hospitals. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The EU funds are also there to support economic recovery and a return to work for people who lost their livelihood during the pandemic. It is estimated that 6 million jobs were lost in the EU alone due to COVID (12). However, not all people were affected equally by job loss. Social partners play a key role in shaping economic, labour and social policies that promote well-functioning labour markets and thus protect workers, including those most at risk of loss of income, as well as employers. EU-level civil society has also worked to ensure that investment is channelled towards those who were most affected. Civil society representing the interests of women, young people, persons with disabilities and people from ethnic minorities has a particularly important role to play in ensuring that money is directed to reskilling and supporting these groups. This is something CSOs have been doing by influencing the priorities and recommendations set out by the EC on the use of funds, the EU’s assessment of national plans, and monitoring of the way the funds are being spent in the MS alongside national and local CSOs. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EU is also embarking on the creation of a Health Union that will give it greater preparedness in the face of future health crises. The Health Union will see a number of changes to EU coordination in areas such as surveying medicine shortages and stocking in advance, testing and approving new medicines and treatments, and sharing life-saving devices across borders on the basis of need. Again, EU civil society has its role to play in ensuring the new plan will better protect those groups who were the most underserved by the EU and MS responses to the pandemic. These objectives were outlined in EESC opinion SOC/665 (13). The aims are to make sure the European Medicines Agency (EMA) establishes a European model for pricing medicines in a fair, accountable and transparent way. It will also involve pushing for the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control to have the mandate and resources to address health inequalities and ensure EU health responses are targeted to those classed as being most at risk, and in making sure health campaigns and public health information from the EU are made far more accessible and understandable to all people during future crises. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | Future crises are likely to be caused not only by viruses, but also or even primarily because of natural catastrophes caused by climate change. The EU has a key role to play in helping the MS to reduce their CO2 emissions, as well as to prepare for and jointly tackle growing problems we have witnessed over recent years such as flooding and wildfires. Environmental NGOs therefore have a role to play in assisting policy-makers in identifying the areas most in need of investment, and in suggesting solutions for better management of environmental disasters in a way that leaves nobody behind. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

5.   Role of national and local civil society in building back better

| 5.1. | In the EU context, there are a number of policy areas where the advocacy responsibility falls squarely on the shoulders of national and local CSOs. Just as with EU-level civil society, this comes down to the ways in which competences are shared between the EU and its MS. In partnership with EU civil society, national and local CSOs ensure that all policy areas are covered. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | The areas on which national and local CSOs thus typically focus are the following: public health; industry; culture; education, youth and sport; social protection, environmental protection, social service, legal support to victims, shelter for victims of violence, etc. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | Many issues made worse by COVID-19 fell into the hands of national, regional and local civil society. It was in the national context that decisions were made on rules to stop the spread of the virus, how emergency healthcare was provided, vaccination prioritisation, how education was continued for learners of all ages, and how workers who lost their jobs had their income protected. Their activities also included combatting misinformation on vaccines, and highlighting the risk of discrimination and increases in poverty among certain groups of people. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | It is perhaps national and local civil society that has the most crucial role to play in helping the EU to build back better, as they shape national and regional policies and provide essential services to their communities in the following areas:






  — | Ensuring the return to in-person education after the pandemic is inclusive of all learners; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.4.

—

Ensuring the return to in-person education after the pandemic is inclusive of all learners;

| — | Bridging the digital gap, particularly for marginalised groups; |
| --- | --- |

—

Bridging the digital gap, particularly for marginalised groups;

| — | Making sure policies facilitate quality employment for those who are currently the most likely to be cut off from the labour market, particularly young people, women, people from immigrant backgrounds and persons with disabilities; |
| --- | --- |

—

Making sure policies facilitate quality employment for those who are currently the most likely to be cut off from the labour market, particularly young people, women, people from immigrant backgrounds and persons with disabilities;

| — | Reinforcing social protection schemes and their ability to support all people in maintaining a dignified standard of living; |
| --- | --- |

—

Reinforcing social protection schemes and their ability to support all people in maintaining a dignified standard of living;

| — | Ensuring that national policies for long-term care and social services focus on community- and family-based alternatives to institutional care, where we saw the most fatalities during the pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

—

Ensuring that national policies for long-term care and social services focus on community- and family-based alternatives to institutional care, where we saw the most fatalities during the pandemic;

| — | Pushing for policies and investments that facilitate the inclusion of migrants and refugees in the labour market and in social protection systems; |
| --- | --- |

—

Pushing for policies and investments that facilitate the inclusion of migrants and refugees in the labour market and in social protection systems;

| — | Civil society is also key to improving economic and political conditions. Social partners in particular are crucial to strengthening the adequacy of income and fair working conditions through collective bargaining. |
| --- | --- |

—

Civil society is also key to improving economic and political conditions. Social partners in particular are crucial to strengthening the adequacy of income and fair working conditions through collective bargaining.

| 5.5. | The framework for civil society to formally engage in policy-making varies between MS. Some MS have national equivalents of the EESC, although the power accorded to them varies and is constantly changing. The EESC’s structure, formed around members representing three groups, employers, workers and ‘Diversity Europe’ is one that could be replicated with success at national, regional and local level.
  In collaboration with the work done by EU-level civil society, national CSOs have also been instrumental in shaping the way the Recovery and Resilience Facility is used in the MS. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

In collaboration with the work done by EU-level civil society, national CSOs have also been instrumental in shaping the way the Recovery and Resilience Facility is used in the MS.

| 5.6. | In its information report SOC/639 (14) and its resolution on national civil society involvement in the NRRPs (15), the EESC commended the agreement reached in December 2020 between the European Parliament and the Council on the Regulation establishing the RRF (16), in which Article 18 outlines the need for CSOs to participate, by consultation, in the drafting and implementation of NRRPs. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

| 5.6.1. | However, despite the reference to civil society engagement in the RRF Regulation, civil society was ironically not involved in defining the actual part of the Regulation regarding the involvement of civil society in the process. Furthermore, the Regulation never refers explicitly to CSOs as beneficiaries, contrary to SMEs for instance. This has created some problems as regards the involvement of CSOs in the implementation. This is paradoxical given that CSOs will be a crucial player during the COVID recovery. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.1.

| 5.6.2. | Furthermore, in practice, despite the guidance from the EC (17), the reality is that national CSOs had great difficulty influencing the outcomes of the NRRPs. One barrier was the seeming unwillingness of some national governments to include civil society in the drafting of their plans. Many governments did not actively involve civil society, requiring CSOs to openly appeal to national authorities to let them be involved. Even when they were involved, the time reserved for civil society consultation was largely insufficient. This hindered substantive debate and consideration of civil society’s input regarding the NRRPs. The result is that, while a large number of MS have shown proof of some form of civil society consultation, all too often national civil society was not truly involved in shaping the resulting plans. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.2.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Accession criteria, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/enlargement-policy/glossary/accession-criteria_en

1

(2)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations_en

2

(3)  https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/documents/resolution/involvement-organised-civil-society-national-recovery-and-resilience-plans-what-works-and-what-does-not.

3

(4)  Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17).

4

(5)  European Pillar of Social Rights, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/economy-works-people/jobs-growth-and-investment/european-pillar-social-rights_en

5

(6)  A European Green Deal, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

6

(7)  Creation of a European statute for associations and NGOs incorporating a precise definition of an NGO or a European association (information report), European Economic and Social Committee, https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/information-reports/creation-european-statute-associations-and-ngos-incorporating-precise-definition-ngo-or-european-association-information

7

(8)  Article 12

8

(9)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/recovery-coronavirus/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en

9

(10)  The Bulgarian plan was not approved and the Hungarian plan’s approval was frozen.

10

(11)  OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 1

11

(12)  COVID-19 has already wiped out 6 million jobs, EU study finds, Coronavirus pandemic News, Al Jazeera

12

(13)  OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 109

13

(14)  Creation of a European statute for associations and NGOs incorporating a precise definition of an NGO or a European association (information report), European Economic and Social Committee, https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/information-reports/creation-european-statute-associations-and-ngos-incorporating-precise-definition-ngo-or-european-association-information

14

(15)  OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 1.

15

(16)  OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17.

16

(17)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/document_travail_service_part1_v2_en.pdf

17

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/19

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on making packaging a safe, affordable and eco-friendly industry

(own-initiative opinion)

(2022/C 323/04)

| Rapporteur: | Matteo Carlo BORSANI |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Dirk JARRÉ |

Rapporteur:

Matteo Carlo BORSANI

Co-rapporteur:

Dirk JARRÉ

| Plenary Assembly decision | 21.10.2021 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) |
| Adopted in section | 11.3.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 201/1/5 |

Plenary Assembly decision

21.10.2021

Legal basis

Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI)

Adopted in section

11.3.2022

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

201/1/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | Packaging is an enabling-technology essential in most supply chains. Its impact goes far beyond its own eco-system and for this reason, it is essential to Europe’s economy and its Single Market and to support the recovery and foster sustainable economic growth. The EESC recommends that the EU Commission, and the national governments, in consultation with all stakeholders of the packaging industry, take initiatives along the entire life cycle of products to promote circular economy processes, encourage sustainable consumption and aim to ensure that waste is prevented and that the resources used are kept in the EU economy for as long as possible. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | In light of today’s societal challenges, representative organisations of industry and workers, governments, public bodies and non-governmental organisations should all find innovative solutions to increase the sustainability of the packaging industry, considering that circular packaging plays a pivotal role in protecting the planet. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | In addition, the Commission should strongly encourage the establishing of a European social dialogue between trade union federations and employers’ federations in the packaging sector. Such a European dialogue, well integrated at national and company levels, would provide the European Commission with the necessary support to design and implement its initiatives, and the social partners with a platform to negotiate a just transition. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC recommends ‘fit-for-purpose’ packaging be introduced as a new measure for all packaging, meaning that all packaging should be developed according to ‘eco-design’ principles: it must fit the product with minimum void space and weight, thus preventing over-packaging and under-packaging and the associated unnecessary waste and losses. This would also optimise the carbon footprint of transportation of packaged goods, allowing to the meeting of the emission targets set by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The scope of change has not yet trickled down sufficiently to stakeholders, therefore the ESSC demands that EU institutions take stronger responsibility and leadership in managing this process.
  This includes the presentation of the missing regulatory parts in a way that is easy to understand and implement, as well as supportive actions across the whole ecosystem, with a particular focus on the most sensitive entities, such as SMEs and private individuals. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

This includes the presentation of the missing regulatory parts in a way that is easy to understand and implement, as well as supportive actions across the whole ecosystem, with a particular focus on the most sensitive entities, such as SMEs and private individuals.

| 1.6. | The EESC encourages a holistic approach in assessing the overall role and impact of packaging: looking at packaging alone can negatively influence the regulatory framework and push companies to pursue strategies that are costly, inefficient and ultimately less sustainable. Essential elements to be taken into account are the safety and protection of packaged products with a particular reference to food and beverages (1), so that packaging is both sustainable and effective. In this regard, a sustainability-oriented approach in packaging design must not undermine these functionalities. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The European institutions should promote minimum standards to support European packaging companies in dealing with the objectives of the green and just transitions, also applying to all packaging entering the internal market from third countries. The EESC requests that policy makers ensure that the sustainability criteria in trade agreements is enforced and that imports include verification criteria regarding ILO convention on human and workers’ rights throughout the value chain of the packaging sector. This would provide for a level playing field in the market. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC urges that the Commission promote education, information and sensibilisation campaigns at EU level, to promote awareness on the importance of sustainability-oriented practices, at all the levels of the packaging life-cycle, orientating collective behaviour either in sustainable production, sustainable purchase choices, or the best practices in the disposal and recycling of the packaging. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | Future EU legislation and action should not focus solely on packaging itself, but on the whole chain: production, consumption and waste-treatment. The EESC recommends fostering investments in technological innovation by supporting the demand for and supply of renewable and high-quality recyclable materials. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | Packaging must support a circular economy, focusing on eco-design, existing well-established and recycling technologies and dispersion prevention. The EESC recommends the defining of efficient resource management strategies adapted to the nature of individual resources, based on common principles for resource management, conservation and restoration. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | Proper collection and recycling of packaging are essential to reduce any wasting of resources. In this regard, the EESC recommends that future EU packaging legislation strongly promote public policy and behaviour aimed at improving packaging waste sorting, collection and disposal. This will furthermore support the achievement of EU recyclability targets for all packaging material. The EESC also recommends the evaluation of Deposit Return Scheme initiatives (DRS) as a possible way to increase packaging recycling activities in some specific sectors. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC recommends the implementation of harmonised criteria for packaging recycling rules and collection schemes being used locally in Member States, including EPR (Extended Producers Responsibility) fee modulation, and ultimately for labelling of recyclable packaging. EU rules on packaging and packaged goods must be designed in compliance with the Single Market principles and support their harmonised implementation across the EU. It is essential that the European Commission ensures equal applicability and enforcement of the regulatory requirements of sustainability across the whole EU territory, avoiding fragmentation and internal technical barriers. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | Evidence-based policy measures are needed in order to ensure the best environmental outcome. In this regard the EESC recommends that the upcoming revision of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (PPWD) (2) enable further innovation by setting targets that are aligned with life-cycle thinking, are supported by strong data and scientific evidence and deliver the best overall environmental outcome, which also pays due attention to any impact on the products contained within the packaging. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The normative approach that national and EU institutions should take in this sector needs to involve all stakeholders in decision-making. It is essential that the regulatory framework in place be reliable and ensure legal certainty. Without this, enterprises tend to postpone investments or may make investments that are not aligned with regulatory demands. This would most definitely result in jeopardising the overall objectives and in wasted resources and job losses in the sector. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

| 1.15. | Research and innovation in new technologies, as well as the training of sectoral workers, should be fostered. In addition, social partners should work together to identify the new skills needs of the industry and with the public authorities develop and promote the training of employees in the production and disposal of packaging. |
| --- | --- |

1.15.

| 1.16. | The EESC recommends that future legislation also take into account the potentialities of digitalisation for transformative advancement in the packaging industry. |
| --- | --- |

1.16.

| 1.17. | Given the unique centrality of packaging in every sector of the economy, the European Commission should also set up an annual Forum on packaging and packaging waste, between stakeholders and European institutions representatives, to monitor the implementation of the Directive, to exchange information on the evolution of the industry and to identify and promote good practices in relation to sustainable packaging regulations. |
| --- | --- |

1.17.

| 1.18. | The European Commission is requested to organise a dialogue with the European Economic and Social Committee on the implementation of the recommendations put forward in this opinion and to exchange on the possibilities of cooperation in appropriate follow-up measures. |
| --- | --- |

1.18.

2.   The packaging ecosystem background and regulatory framework

| 2.1. | The packaging industry serves a wide variety of purposes in our daily lives: protection, promotion, information, convenience, utilisation, handling and waste reduction. Packaging, which is a key societal and business infrastructure, has enabled societal wellbeing and trade and is a necessary element in supporting the recovery and fostering sustainable economic growth. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The packaging industry operates within an increasingly complex ecosystem, which consists of many players, from the producers of raw materials used in the packaging, to retailers selling the packaged product, sectorial workers, consumers, companies and public authorities that manage the end-of-life of packaging waste. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The EU packaging industry is the world’s second largest and includes producers and users of glass, ferrous metals and aluminium, plastic, wood, and paper packaging products and it employs over 6,5 million people in Europe (3). The European consumer packaging market is expected to register a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4 % over the 2021–2026 forecast period. Technological innovation, sustainability and attractive economics are among the reasons for the remarkable expected growth in consumer packaging (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019), besides the overall aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, sets important policy goals to further advance the sustainable transition of the packaging value chain, which include:






  — | ensuring that all packaging in the EU market is reusable or recyclable in an economically viable manner by 2030, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.4.

—

ensuring that all packaging in the EU market is reusable or recyclable in an economically viable manner by 2030,

| — | defining measures to reduce packaging waste, |
| --- | --- |

—

defining measures to reduce packaging waste,

| — | promoting a robust single market for secondary raw materials to increase recycling. |
| --- | --- |

—

promoting a robust single market for secondary raw materials to increase recycling.

| 2.5. | These overall goals have been further detailed in the Circular Economy Action Plan 2.0 (5), which plans for the revision of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (PPWD). The latter, which came into force in 1994, is at the core of the present regulatory framework. Presently, the Commission is reviewing this directive — see the respective consultation (6) and the corresponding impact assessment (7) — with the general intention of reducing packaging waste) and replacing linear product and material flows (i.e. produce — use — waste) with circular flows. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

3.   Fostering the circular economy

| 3.1. | The packaging sector is crucial in Europe’s transition towards a circular economy given its capacity to recycle materials. More and more packaging materials are either being recycled or are themselves products of recycled materials from other manufacturing sectors. At the same time, it has the potential to close the loop of the circular economy by preventing the export of dubious waste materials (8) and denying access to European markets to importers of packaging that does not comply with environmental best practice. The issue of unfair competition from non-EU companies remains a major concern, especially for SMEs, which would be the first impacted on the market. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | In line with the Circular Economy Action Plan 2.0, all packaging should be re-used or recycled by 2030. Consequently, all packaging materials should be valued in the pursuit of the circular economy objective focusing on eco-design, existing well-established and new recycling technologies and strengthening measures to combat dispersion. A growing global population, coupled with increased per capita consumption, is placing increasing pressure on existing resources. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Fibre-based and other natural material-based packaging can support growth decoupled from resource use. It is made from renewable materials, whilst being durable, attractive, recyclable and biodegradable. Recent studies have indicated that fibre packaging can be recycled in excess of 25 times, demonstrating it is an essential component of the circular economy. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Likewise, aluminium and steel, as unique permanent materials, can also make a decisive contribution in supporting a circular economy. Through multiple recycling, products and packaging made from permanent materials such as metals or glass are kept in the material loop and can become resources for other products and packaging. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | Further measures are needed to support the uptake of bio-based polymers because only a few Member States are willing to support the required infrastructure for compostable packaging collection and composting. As regards plastics, it is necessary to support projects and investments in emerging innovative technologies, such as the recycling of mechanical or chemical plastics, while ensuring that they reduce the overall environmental impact in a life-cycle perspective. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The way consumers view and interact with packages is also changing. According to the European Consumer Packaging Perceptions Study, conducted independently by Perspectus Global, and commissioned by Pro Carton in 2021, almost two thirds of respondents claim to have changed the products they buy due to concerns about the packaging, and even more would be prepared to pay more for more environmentally friendly packaging. These trends can be further enhanced through awareness-raising and information campaigns. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | There is significant potential to increase the collection of packaging material, sorting, and recycling in Europe. At the same time, sustainable packaging can create significant environmental damage, if not correctly collected, disposed or recycled. While it is essential to push the packaging industry towards more sustainable practices, public authorities, waste management entities, civil society organisations, and consumers should also be directly involved in increasing the efficiency of waste collection, re-use and recycling. This aspect must be strongly promoted in future legislation and public policies in order to achieve the EU recyclability targets for all packaging materials, also in the view of helping reducing CO2 emissions, thus contributing to the EU’s green transition agenda. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | Many of the needed adjustments will be enabled by digitisation. Digital technologies provide the possibility for transformative advancements in the packaging industry as traceability, convenience, and tamper detection can be optimised. This goes hand in hand with improvements in operational performance, thus providing the ability to better serve customers and assisting in the design for circularity through smart packaging with sustainability at its core. In addition, smart packaging facilitates recycling by allowing easier access to information on the raw materials used in the packaging. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

4.   General comments

| 4.1. | Sustainability must continue to be one of the key priorities of the EU packaging industries. In line with requirements of the New Circular Economy Action Plan (9), the packaging industry should take initiatives along the entire life cycle of products. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Policies affecting the legislative framework in which the packaging industry operates, including rules on packaging waste, therefore have a major effect on all industries and social activities which utilise packaging. For instance, in relation to food packaging, it ensures safety and the protection of products, keeps food edible for longer, minimising food waste, and plays a key role in driving and maintaining access to affordable food for everyone. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | In light of today’s societal challenges, all stakeholders need to find innovative solutions to increase the sustainability of the packaging industry, considering that circular packaging plays a pivotal role in protecting the planet. All social actors must establish a clear dialogue respecting their own roles and competences in achieving the above targets. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | It is fundamental that, internally, single EU markets must ensure the equal applicability and enforcement of the regulatory requirements of sustainability across the whole EU territory, avoiding fragmentation and internal technical barriers. EU rules on packaging and packaged goods should be designed in compliance with Single Market principles and support their harmonised implementation across the EU. This requires enshrining core principles, targets and clear definitions in the body of the legislation and its implementing acts, thus preventing diverging national measures from occurring in the first place. Single Market implications of any national measures should not introduce restrictions to the free movement of packaging and packaged goods, which would be disproportionate and/or unnecessary from an environmental protection standpoint and could cause unfair EU market distortions. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Packaging’s contribution to economic, environmental and social sustainability is essential. Looking at packaging alone can also negatively influence the regulatory framework. In fact, products generally represent far greater resources and have a much higher inherent value than the packaging used to protect them. Thus, product losses due to underperforming packaging are likely to cause much greater adverse effects on the environment. For instance, in the food industry, 30 % (10) of all food produced worldwide is lost or wasted along the supply chain; an optimised packaging may be one of the solutions to reduce this rate. Food losses and waste — in supply chains and by consumers — account for around one-quarter of greenhouse gas emissions from food, namely 6 % of total global emissions (11). |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | Supporting the European packaging industry is important for many reasons. For example, although legislation exists to ensure packaging materials comply with environmental standards, European packagers also voluntarily decide to follow a number of guidelines, such as FSC certification for paper, board or wood packaging, in order to reduce emissions and promote environmental best practice. Non-European competitors, although required to comply with European legislation, may not adhere to these voluntary codes or the standards followed by European companies. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

The packaging sector needs a highly skilled workforce and more attractiveness for the younger generation. The sector must strive to continuously improve working conditions, while creating training options and focusing on motivating highly skilled and digital specialists to join the industry.

| 4.7. | Therefore, sectorial worker training, as well as a constant update of the due diligence process, are key to the packaging industry and should be promoted. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The double transition which will interest the EU economy in the next year will therefore also be a central priority in the packaging sector. In this regard, the ‘just transition’ mechanism should be taken into account in the new redefinition of the regulatory framework, to ensure that no one is left behind. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

5.   Specific comments

5.1.   Optimising packaging design helps prevent and reduce packaging waste

Packaging design is significant to define its environmental performance across the product life cycle. Well designed, responsibly sourced and efficiently produced packaging that is appropriately used and effectively recycled provides multiple benefits, minimising damage to products, extending their useful life, facilitating efficient storage, transportation and distribution, giving safe and convenient access to goods, being attractive and communicating vital information to the consumer. Therefore, packaging cannot be considered in isolation from its product, because its material, format and design are inextricably linked to the functionalities that packaging needs to fulfil for each specific product. Yet, while recognising that packaging functionality is essential, it is clear that resource-saving, sustainable packaging should be developed according to eco-design principles. This includes:

| — | minimising the use of raw materials, |
| --- | --- |

—

minimising the use of raw materials,

| — | maximising the use of recyclable and recycled materials (while respecting legal requirements), |
| --- | --- |

—

maximising the use of recyclable and recycled materials (while respecting legal requirements),

| — | increasing the efficiency of production processes, |
| --- | --- |

—

increasing the efficiency of production processes,

| — | optimising logistics management, |
| --- | --- |

—

optimising logistics management,

| — | enhancing awareness of the value and reusability of packaging, |
| --- | --- |

—

enhancing awareness of the value and reusability of packaging,

| — | improving packaging collection, treatment and recycling. |
| --- | --- |

—

improving packaging collection, treatment and recycling.

It is essential to take into account both sustainability and functionality of packaging.

Independently of the type of packaging used, over-packaging should be always avoided, especially in e-commerce and home-delivered products, where the ratio between packaging and products is 1:1. In this regard, attention should also be paid to research and innovative solutions that would decrease the environmental burden of packaging of delivered goods.

5.2.   Evidence-based policy measures are needed in order to ensure the best environmental outcome

Climate change challenges provide an opportunity for Europe to build a sustainable and future-oriented industrial base. As far as packaging is concerned, all upcoming policy initiatives should be based on scientific evidence and on a sound understanding of their real impact on the environment. It is strategically helpful to support the use of the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methodology as a tool to review the environmental impact of products throughout their entire life cycle.

5.3.   Fully recyclable and renewable packaging materials foster the development of a circular economy

Future EU legislation and action should support the demand for renewable and high-quality recyclable materials, which fosters further investment in packaging innovation. More specifically, EU legislation and action should not focus solely on packaging itself, but on the whole production chain: e.g. how the materials are sourced and processed, the resources and energy required in the production process, and how readily the material/product can be and is actually recycled. The EU should increase the availability and quality of recyclates, focusing also on the ability of a material to retain its inherent properties after recycling, and its ability to replace primary raw materials in future applications (12).

5.4.   Harmonisation of local collection and recycling schemes is critical for achieving packaging recycling targets

The EU has a goal to increase packaging waste recycling rates, but reaching it will also depend on how local authorities increase and improve collection.

When it comes to municipal waste recycling, rates vary widely across the European Union, and even in countries with similar recycling rates, the rules and methods of collection vary significantly. There is a need for greater harmonisation about recycling material rules and collection schemes being used locally in Member States, and harmonised criteria for EPR fee modulation and ultimately for labelling of recyclable packaging.

It is also crucial to evaluate specific targets for collection and recycling for some product categories like food service packaging for both commercial dine-in and takeaway. Through defining clear collection and recycling targets for retail, hospitality, catering, etc., as well as for municipalities, packaging littering can be reduced, consequently increasing the recycling rate.

5.5.   Deposit Return Schemes system (DRS)

The DRS can indeed incentivise the recycling and provide collection efficiencies for businesses that can reduce littering on a massive scale especially for some kinds of consumption, like drinks sold in plastic and glass bottles.

5.6.   The improvement of the quality of packaging collection boosts sustainability of the recycling industry

In order to support local authorities, it is essential to develop clear recycling guidelines and targeted communications, in consultation with the recycling industry, on how recyclable materials should be efficiently separated and presented for collection by householders.

Brussels, 19 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  In some industries, such as agro-food, packaging also plays an important role preventing the cross-contamination of food and beverages, thus averting the associated health risks.

1

(2)  Directive 94/62/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste (OJ L 365, 31.12.1994, p 10).

2

(3)  Eurostat.

3

(4)  linkhttps://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/europe-consumer-packaging-market.

4

(5)  https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en

5

(6)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12263-Reducing-packaging-waste-review-of-rules_en

6

(7)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say_en

7

(8)  For instance, some European countries export their plastic waste outside Europe. This should be avoided though a boosting of the EU internal recycle scheme, which would convert this waste into valuable recycled raw materials. (https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/12/loophole-will-let-uk-continue-to-ship-plastic-waste-to-poorer-countries).

8

(9)  https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en

9

(10)  Gerber, P.J., Steinfeld, H., Henderson, B., Mottet, A., Opio, C., Dijkman, J., Tempio, G. (2013). Tackling climate change through livestock — A global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO).

10

(11)  Food waste is responsible for 6 % of global greenhouse gas emissions –. https://ourworldindata.org/food-waste-emissions

11

(12)  European Parliament resolution of 10 February 2021 on the New Circular Economy Action Plan (2020/2077(INI)) (OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 11), paragraph 39.

12

---

III Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

569th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 18.5.2022-19.5.2022

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/27

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Global Gateway

(own-initiative opinion)

(JOIN(2021) 30 — final)

(2022/C 323/05)

| Rapporteur: | Dumitru FORNEA |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Violeta JELIĆ |

Rapporteur:

Dumitru FORNEA

Co-rapporteur:

Violeta JELIĆ

| Plenary Assembly decision | 9/12/2021 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | External Relations |
| Adopted in section | 12/4/2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19/5/2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 206/1/3 |

Plenary Assembly decision

9/12/2021

Legal basis

Rule 32(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

External Relations

Adopted in section

12/4/2022

Adopted at plenary

19/5/2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

206/1/3

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee welcomes the launch of the Global Gateway initiative, as it is convinced that the investments and cooperation projects of EU and non-state actors in the EU need to be better known and promoted around the world. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC is aware that there is a huge need for financial resources to effect the interconnection of critical global infrastructure and, in this respect, firmly believes that it is in the EU’s interest to coordinate investment and development cooperation through the Global Gateway with similar programmes of countries with which we share values and common strategic interests. Synergies with the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region (1) must be also achieved. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC notes the importance of communicating calls for tender, related administrative procedures, the implementation stage of projects and the results of EU and Member States’ action, and in this regard, in order to better understand the objectives and added value of this initiative, it is important that the European Commission propose a set of tools to enable access to key data, as well as parameterisation of relevant indicators to measure progress in implementing this strategy. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC believes that the relevant European institutions, in cooperation with the Member States and partner countries, will have to carry out an analysis of the priority needs for global infrastructure investments, taking into account the EU’s strategic and economic interests, but also having regard to the social, climate and ecological commitments of the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC believes it is important for the EU to focus on maintaining the functioning and development of physical connections between Europe and other parts of the world. Infrastructure that provides access to water, food and energy for the population is essential, and the entire ecosystem that makes it possible to achieve food security at global level must be given priority in the actions of the EU institutions and the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC notes with concern that the dramatic situation of the war in Ukraine requires us to adapt the EU’s financial instruments so that they are flexible and comprehensive enough to be used much more quickly when global crises arise, especially in the EU’s neighbourhood. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC urges that investments in priority corridors for transport, energy and electronic communications infrastructure be based on impact assessments that assess not only strategic considerations, including lessons learned from armed conflicts in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, Ossetia, Libya, etc., but also other issues relating to climate change, environment protection, human rights and social responsibility. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC recommends improving the reporting system for activities and projects implemented by EU state and non-state actors, by encouraging investment and project promoters to voluntarily register in the Global Gateway Portal, which will have to be designed on the basis of the latest digital technological solutions for data processing and communication. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC has emphasised in its opinions the importance of transnational partnerships between equals, which can limit dependencies, create links and provide lasting economic and social benefits for local communities in partner countries. This is only possible if the bottom-up approach is used to build strong local value-added production chains and to strengthen domestic markets in partner countries by creating high quality jobs as well as sustainable know-how transfers. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC welcomes the aim of offering fair financing on favourable terms in order to limit the risk of debt distress. To achieve this goal in a sustainable way, it has to be ensured that other kinds of dependencies will not arise. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC calls on the European institutions and the governments of the Member States to ensure that European values are respected and promoted through the implementation of projects registered under the Global Gateway brand. The respect for fundamental human rights, social and environmental impact assessment and compliance with transparency and due diligence procedures must be found in the sine qua non conditionalities for launching any project funded by EU state and non-state actors. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC agrees with the idea that companies interested in getting involved in the Global Gateway must have effective collaboration with Member States’ and the EU’s diplomatic corps, simplified access to financial resources and relevant information at regional level, as well as, wherever possible, one-stop-shop offices, to ease the EU private sector’s investments worldwide. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s intention to set up a board to coordinate the Global Gateway initiative. Professional management is necessary for achieving the complex proposed objectives of this investment strategy; in this connection, in order to improve the quality and relevance of the decisions that will be taken by this board, other members representing civil society organisations, including social partners, especially trade unions, as well as representatives from the world of business have to be involved. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The EESC notes the need for a clearer presentation of the multiple funding instruments that will be made available to beneficiaries by 2027. Given the complexity of the description of the funds that will be under the Global Gateway brand, made in the document published by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, it seems that a comprehensive and intelligent schematic representation of them is needed in order for them to be understood by all those interested. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | In 2013, on visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, launched two initiatives for transcontinental interconnections of the land and sea infrastructure: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Later, in 2014, after several attempts to create an integrated brand, it came to be known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (2). As it was initially described, the BRI was not just a transport corridor, but also an area where Chinese investment was promoted in the states participating in this initiative. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | A first response to the Chinese initiative came from Japan, which in 2015 proposed the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) (3), an initiative dedicated to beneficiaries in Asia, with a 5-year budget of USD 10 billion. In 2016, the PQI was expanded globally, and the allocated budget was raised to USD 200 billion. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The European Union and the major industrialised democratic states in the G7 have for seven years helplessly witnessed, without any reaction, the continued strengthening of China’s economic and political relations around the world through the BRI. By the time of the June 2021 G7 meeting in Cornwall, UK (4), where it was decided to create a global alternative — the Build Back Better World Initiative — China had already invested more than half of its total BRI funds earmarked for between now and 2027, i.e. USD 1,2 — 1,3 trillion, as estimated by Morgan Stanley Research. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | In the context of the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 26), held in Glasgow in November 2021, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom launched the Clean Green Initiative (5), which doubled the UK’s aid-funded green investments to more than GBP 3 bn over five years, as well as providing new guarantees to support clean infrastructure projects, including GBP 200 m for a new Climate Innovation Facility. The UK has announced a package of guarantees to multilateral development banks that are supposed to provide a major boost to investment in climate-related projects in India and across Africa. A new ‘Room to Run’ guarantee for the African Development Bank (6) is expected to unlock up to GBP 1,45 billion worth of new financing for projects across this continent, half of which will help countries adapt to the impact of climate change. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Back in the EU, on 12 July 2021 the Foreign Affairs Council decided to take action following the G7 meeting and called on the Commission to prepare a Global Connectivity Strategy (7), under a Team Europe banner, pulling together Member States and the EU, the EU institutions, and national financial institutions in a joint effort. This strategy was published on 1 December 2021 as the Global Gateway. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The European Commission document states that the Global Gateway supports investment in hardware and software infrastructure that respects key principles for the European Union: democratic values and high standards; good governance and transparency; equal partnerships; green and clean; security-focused; catalysing private sector investment. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The European Union made the decision to raise the profile of its investment in non-Member States, worldwide, by creating the Global Gateway initiative — an economic and investment strategy designed to be a diplomatic and communication instrument. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The aim of this initiative to offer fair financing on favourable terms in order to limit the risk of debt distress is welcomed by EU civil society organisations. To achieve this goal in a sustainable way, it has to be ensured that other kinds of dependencies will not arise. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | This is not an additional structure; it is neither administrative nor financial. It is a BRAND that must be accepted by all European financial institutions, development agencies and private companies in the Member States when creating investment projects in non-European Union countries, and they must comply with a system of requirements based on the EU’s core values. The conditions for use of the brand name, including cases where it is prohibited, need to be worked out, and the EESC is ready to contribute here. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Unlike China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which implements a Chinese international infrastructure plan with mainly national funding, with Chinese firms and in the framework of a top-down strategy, the Global Gateway is a bottom-up approach. It consequently starts from the genuine investment needs of non-EU partner countries that are willing to develop their infrastructure while respecting the key principles that underlie this strategy. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | Only quality projects are promoted, following an environmental and social impact assessment, at the same time taking into account the quality level of the equipment throughout the latter’s life cycle. This quality concept covers both the material aspect of each project (hardware components, engineering, construction process, skilled labour, etc.) and the financial aspect, through transparent tender procedures and an ethical financial process, together with the appropriate guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The Global Gateway is an equivalent to the American Build Back Better (8) and British Clean and Green initiatives. It remains to be clarified whether these two initiatives are to be considered in competition with or complementary to the Global Gateway, or in cooperation with both initiatives. From a civil society perspective, it is quite clear that coordination should be encouraged between the Global Gateway and other international cooperation for development strategies that are based on the same values. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | To be eligible, projects have to be designed around the idea of better ‘connectivity’ between the country concerned and the EU, among the people of that country or between the country concerned and its neighbours. This is indeed a goal that meets the modern requirements, as well as the capabilities of the Union. On one hand, the control of networks and routes is becoming increasingly more important than the control of areas. On the other hand, the EU itself can play a key role in ensuring a progressive, equitable cross-national partnership, and in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (9). That connectivity will cover either just hardware — roads, railways, ports, airports, etc.; a mixture of hardware and software — communication cable networks; or mainly software — education, research and development. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The broad concept of connectivity encompasses, for example, all type of investment in water resources — new wells, water distribution, agricultural irrigation and waste water management. Water resources will be key to an increasing number of countries, both through the effects of population growth and a warmer climate. Water connects people not only through water management infrastructures, but also, and in fact mainly, by providing waterways for maritime and inland navigation. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The Global Gateway ‘brand’ or ‘initiative’ will not add more money to existing and diversified European financial investment funds and structures. It is expected that the EU, under this banner, will mobilise infrastructure development investment of up to EUR 300 billion in the 2021-2027 period. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) (10) will be the main financial tool for mobilising investment under the Global Gateway, with up to EUR 135 billion, including a new initiative with the European Investment Bank that could bring EUR 25 billion of additional investment, in addition to grants of up to EUR 18 billion under the EU’s external assistance programmes. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | In addition to these funds are EUR 145 billion of planned investment volumes by European financial and development finance institutions. The guarantees it provides will be used for de-risking activities and the leveraging of private investment. This will be implemented through close cooperation between the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | At the sixth European Union-African Union summit (11) in Brussels on 17-18 February 2022, the Commission announced that from the total budget of the Global Gateway initiative, EUR 150 billion are dedicated to an Africa-Europe (12) investment package that will support common ambitions for 2030 and the AU 2063 Agenda (13), with the general objectives of building more inclusive, diversified and resilient economies. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | Further adding to this financial tool kit, the EU is exploring the possibility of establishing a European Export Credit Facility (14) to complement existing export credit arrangements at Member State level. The Global Gateway does not prioritise geographic investment areas. Nevertheless, main areas of interest will be the EU’s immediate neighbourhood — its Eastern flank, Mediterranean countries and Africa, the Black Sea and Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | Good projects will be given priority over location, also with regard to the PPP Risk Assessment Model (PFRAM) (15) and the Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) (16) based on EU institutions’ cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and avoiding duplication when implementing the various initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | The Global Gateway is an EU initiative and priority, but in certain conditions might take into consideration partnership with non-EU member countries such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom and India. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee shares the rationale behind the Council’s decision to launch a European strategy to raise the profile of specific investments made, and measures taken, by EU institutional, Member State and non-state players at global level. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC understands the focus on preventing and tackling pandemics in the health-related chapters and sees the current relevance of these issues. Nevertheless, a long-lasting impact has to be a priority and building resilient and easily accessible socio-medical infrastructures is a key aspect in this field. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The dramatic situation of the war in Ukraine shows us that these financial instruments must be designed to be flexible and comprehensive enough so that they can be used quickly in crisis situations that arise globally and especially in the vicinity of the European Union. Crises in the immediate vicinity are addressed as a matter of priority in order to minimise the threat to the security of the Member States, and this requires, among other things, the timely allocation of financial resources for urgent interventions to restore the functionality of interconnection infrastructure and of the essential public services for the population. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The Committee considers it important for the EU to focus on maintaining the functioning and development of physical connections between Europe and other parts of the world. Infrastructure that provides access to water, food and energy for the population is also essential, and the entire ecosystem that makes it possible to achieve food security at global level must be given priority in the actions of the EU institutions and the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The war between Russia and Ukraine is having a major disruptive impact on the supply chains of cereals and other agricultural commodities for the agri-food industry. The infrastructure developed through Global Gateway investment should also be harmonised with the EU’s strategic interests in the event of armed conflicts or other natural calamities and, from this perspective, ensuring the security of supply of essential raw materials must also be achieved through the intelligent design of distribution networks, logistics centres and warehouses. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The EESC supports the European Commission’s efforts to strengthen mechanisms and instruments for concrete action to bring the European Union to the forefront of global socioeconomic and political developments. In this regard, various experts argue that there is a need for an internationally coordinated monetary expansion (directly and indirectly) and the utilisation of the opened fiscal space to launch global economic development by financing public infrastructure investments and public or private productive investments, countervailing spatial disparities and serving socioeconomic and environmental sustainability (17). |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | Correct and complete reporting of all EU activities in various countries around the world has proved to be a real challenge, as long as there is no permanent, close coordination between the relevant players. In the context of the launch and implementation of the Chinese BRI, there has been a need for better communication on the EU’s contribution to the development of global interconnection infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | In order to better understand the objectives and added value of this initiative, it is important that in the coming period the European Commission propose a set of tools to allow access to key data, as well as parameterisation of relevant indicators to measure progress in implementing this strategy. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The Global Gateway is an initiative that will allow Team Europe to portray a better, more comprehensive image to the outside world. As a vehicle to consolidate European investment in third countries, the Global Gateway has to be equipped with a database that will ensure better access to relevant information on all the projects, budgets and partners involved. In this regard, the first step will be to design and maintain a Global Gateway website to provide a proper window for illustrating the associated measures, results and impact. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | To limit dependencies, forge links and therefore deliver lasting economic and social benefits for the local communities in the partner countries it is crucial to build a true partnership of equals. Achieving this is only possible if the bottom-up approach is used to build resilient local value-added production chains and strengthen the domestic markets in the partner countries by creating high quality jobs as well as sustainable know-how transfers. In the case of Africa, fostering the establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (18) could be an adequate step. To ensure that European values are respected, social impact assessments are fundamental and can be built on top of existing due diligence processes. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | The role of the private sector in co-financing Global Gateway investments is recognised by the European institutions. In order to strengthen private entities’ determination to become more involved and contribute to achievement of the specific objectives of this strategy, and to boost their interest in doing so, mechanisms should be quickly established to facilitate the certification and recognition of the efforts of private players that are involved in implementing this EU initiative. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

| 4.12. | Companies interested in getting involved in the Global Gateway need relevant information at regional level, effective collaboration with Member States’ and the EU’s diplomatic corps and, wherever possible, one-stop-shop offices, in order to facilitate the EU private sector’s investments worldwide. Furthermore, after successfully passing the environmental and social impact assessment, as well as the PFRAM and PIMA and showing a sustainable positive economic, social and ecological value for the EU and especially for the partner countries and in their cooperation with the financial institutions involved, the private sector should have simplified access to financial resources, with the most favourable conditions. |
| --- | --- |

4.12.

| 4.13. | The European Commission has announced its intention to set up a board to coordinate the Global Gateway initiative. The EESC welcomes this proposal, firmly believing that integrated governance of this strategy is very much needed for achieving results in a relatively short period of time. To improve the quality and relevance of the decisions that will be taken by this board, other members representing civil society organisations, including social partners, especially trade unions, as well as representatives from the world of business have to be involved. |
| --- | --- |

4.13.

| 4.14. | The Business Advisory Group mentioned in the joint communication could follow a too narrow approach by leaving out experts in the fields of investment priorities in development cooperation, health care, environmental protection and education and training. To ensure effective coverage of all topics of the Global Gateway programme this group shall include experts of these relevant fields. |
| --- | --- |

4.14.

Brussels, 19 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-strategy-cooperation-indo-pacific-0_en

1

(2)  https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html

2

(3)  https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000117998.pdf

3

(4)  https://www.g7uk.org/

4

(5)  https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-launches-new-initiative-to-take-green-industrial-revolution-global

5

(6)  https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/african-development-bank-launches-landmark-us-500-million-credit-insurance-deal-with-african-trade-insurance-agency-and-uk-reinsurers-18600

6

(7)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/12/a-globally-connected-europe-council-approves-conclusions/

7

(8)  https://www.whitehouse.gov/build-back-better/

8

(9)  https://sdgs.un.org/goals

9

(10)  https://ec.europa.eu/eu-external-investment-plan/about-plan/how-it-works-finance_en

10

(11)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/18/sixth-european-union-african-union-summit-a-joint-vision-for-2030/

11

(12)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway/eu-africa-global-gateway-investment-package_en

12

(13)  https://au.int/en/agenda2063

13

(14)  https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/february/tradoc_159438.pdf

14

(15)  https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/publicinvestment/pdf/PFRAM.pdf

15

(16)  https://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/publicinvestment/pdf/PIMA.pdf

16

(17)  https://www.longdom.org/open-access/relieving-inflation-or-palliative-selfdestruction-2168-9458-3-133.pdf

17

(18)  https://au.int/en/cfta

18

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/34

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A competition policy fit for new challenges

(COM(2021) 713 final)

(2022/C 323/06)

| Rapporteur: | Emilie PROUZET |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Emilie PROUZET

| Referral | European Commission, 20.12.2021 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 5.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 223/1/6 |

Referral

European Commission, 20.12.2021

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

5.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

223/1/6

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The communication highlights the ability of competition policy to adapt to new market circumstances, policy priorities and the needs of consumers. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) recognises that competition policy has helped to preserve and foster the economic prosperity of the EU, which is deeply committed to the principles of the social market economy. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s decision to prolong the State aid Temporary Framework stemming from the pandemic. It recognises, however, that these measures are too exceptional for them to be extended to the general framework and therefore become permanent. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | In 2022, while the Commission has again moved rapidly in adopting a temporary framework in relation to the war in Ukraine, it is imperative to ensure that businesses are actually able to benefit from it. The Temporary Crisis Framework must be able to complement the State aid instruments that are already available to the Member States, as well as the existing schemes under the national recovery and resilience plans. The EESC calls upon the Commission to provide guidelines in order to facilitate fast support by Member States’ governments to sectors that are seriously impacted by emergency situations, for instance through national aid measures such as guaranteed trade credit insurance or other financial instruments. The EESC also stresses that the need to ensure that the EU’s businesses can access the temporary measures hinges primarily on having accessible, non-restrictive eligibility conditions for the most impacted businesses. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | At this time of major uncertainty, the EESC wants to see a competition policy that is particularly geared towards delivering the transitions embarked on by the EU, which will require ambitious trade and investment policies, extraordinary public and private investments, innovation and a well-functioning single market. The EU and the Member States must now put in place a legal and financial framework that ensures a level playing field in the market for all stakeholders, regions and citizens. In this regard, the EESC stresses the need to achieve genuine equality of treatment between European players and vis-à-vis global players. The integrity of our internal market and its non-fragmentation are crucial here. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC believes that competition law must continue to be underpinned by rules and facts and that the independence of the Commission must be guaranteed. However, the policies adopted by the EU to ensure a just transition should be more clearly reflected in the competition rules and in their enforcement by the relevant officials in particular. The EESC calls on the Commission to gear its efforts as far as possible towards facilitating the dual transition of our economy and the competitiveness of our industry in a particularly unstable global market. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | Against this backdrop, achieving our strategic autonomy has never been more important. The EESC takes the view that the changes to competition law currently being considered should be assessed in the light of the needs identified in the Commission’s work on the 14 strategic European ecosystems. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC believes that further reforms are needed to incorporate sustainability, digital and resilience issues more specifically. Both the key concepts of EU competition law (e.g. relevant market) and the specific frameworks (such as de minimis and the GBER), as well as the implementation of these rules, should be adapted to the policy direction taken by the EU. Moreover, the EESC calls on the Commission to equip itself with the necessary tools to enable all sections of Europe’s economy, and in particular SMEs and services, to finance this dual transition. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | The EESC and all stakeholders agree that schemes providing exemptions from the general competition law framework have proved their worth since 2019 and the COVID-19 crisis. The speed with which DG COMP has taken decisions to avoid, as far as possible, distortions in the internal market should also be highlighted. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | We also support the approach taken by the European Commission aimed at avoiding a cliff edge for businesses, notably by extending the temporary framework to include recovery measures. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The EESC welcomes the new temporary framework adopted by the Commission to address the major ramifications of the war in Ukraine caused by Russian aggression. It also wonders about the impact of this new crisis on both the review of the Stability Pact and the requirements of a new recovery plan. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The EESC also recognises the value of the Commission communication in that it sets out the general framework for reviewing competition rules and the overall and strategic path to be followed in this exercise. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | But right now, the EU is facing the consequences of its strategic dependence on non-EU countries. We have to revitalise our internal market after the COVID-19 crisis and enable European businesses to strengthen their resilience and lead the dual transition, at a time when we will also have to deal with the multifaceted and uncertain fallout from the war in Ukraine caused by Russian aggression. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | A well-functioning single market and competition policy enable businesses to access a vast market in which everyone can compete on a level playing field, stimulating efficiency and innovation and providing an environment in which successful companies can grow and become global champions. The EESC therefore reiterates how important the integrity of the internal market is to our recovery plan. In this regard, we will follow with interest the deployment of the Single Market Emergency Instrument. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | Currently, the EU merger control regime sometimes seems to hinder the creation of world-class European companies capable of competing with US and Chinese businesses, on the pretext of not reducing competition in the internal market. The conditions governing access to public support for European businesses are much stricter than those applicable to our global competitors and thus hinder a genuine policy of supporting economic sectors. Finally, antitrust enforcement and the ban on abuse of dominant position seem to be still ill-suited to the new challenges posed by the digital economy and green transition. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | The Commission is currently pursuing a review of competition policy tools (merger, antitrust and State aid control) to ensure that they all remain fit for purpose, and complement its existing toolbox. In such turbulent times, our climate and digital objectives must now receive the maximum level of support. The EESC calls on the Commission to go further than ever before in adapting and harnessing the full suite of competition policy tools to the task of supporting the green and digital transitions and to equip itself with the instruments needed to compete globally in this context. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

3.   Adapting competition rules and enforcement to deliver on our ambitions

| 3.1. | The EESC believes that we have not gone far enough in the review of the competition framework as regards incorporating the European policy agenda on sustainability and the digital transition. Our competition law should be adapted both with regard to the very definition of the basic principles and in terms of assessing in practice the anti-competitive and positive effects. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | First and foremost, the key principles need to be reviewed. Thus, the assessment of whether or not a practice or agreement coming under competition law is legal depends on the market share of the operators in the relevant market. These concepts of ‘market share’ and ‘relevant market’ are key and the EESC calls on stakeholders to be extremely vigilant in their ongoing review as regards ensuring that those concepts reflect the operational realities of our businesses. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.2.1. | Thus, several paths should be explored. ‘Interchangeability of a product/service’ and ‘level playing field’ are concepts that should be adapted to the features of the digital market and the players in it. Moreover, the environmental characteristics of a product could be taken into account when assessing that ‘interchangeability’. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.3. | A second area of action would be to clarify and strengthen the scope of aid and practices that are compatible or do not affect trade, and are thus exempt from competition law. Some elements of evaluation need to be reviewed so that as many entities as possible can invest and coordinate with full legal certainty and without having to engage in the European notification procedure. It thus appears that the de minimis rule should be revised in order to be able to respond more effectively to the characteristics of each sector, such as land transport and trade. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.3.1. | The EESC also welcomes the amendments proposed by the Commission to the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER), as they address many of the needs of businesses, and in particular SMEs, when it comes to accessing the financial support needed to thrive in the sustainable transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.4. | A final area of focus is enforcement and monitoring, whereby DG COMP and particularly the relevant officials should be fully aware of the ‘transition pathways’ established for the 14 strategic European ecosystems selected by the European Commission. It is within this framework that a determination has to be made as to whether a practice or agreement restricts competition with a likelihood of negative effects on the price, production, innovation, quality or variety of goods and services on the relevant market. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.4.1. | The parameters for assessment giving rise to exemption benefits or to merger agreements should also be adapted to those objectives. These conditions focus mainly on the economic advantage and the benefit to the consumer in terms of price, over and above the risk of eliminating competition. The positive effects of restrictions should be more broadly focused on the environmental quality of products and climate-related efficiency gains provided that these elements are uniformly defined at European level. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | The concept of ‘quality’ should thus reflect our sustainability goals and be defined accordingly at EU level. The concept of a ‘sustainable product’ should also be demarcated at European level with a view to the equal treatment of operators and the end of greenwashing. To this end, the EESC supports the Commission’s work on common and transparent scientific methodologies for defining the sustainability of products, services, buildings, etc. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

| 3.4.3. | Feedback from stakeholders differs on how to take the ‘innovation’ criterion into account. According to DG COMP, innovation is a key parameter of the market test. According to economic operators, this parameter is taken into account very little or is mostly rejected in any event. The EESC calls on the Commission to assess how the policies adopted by the EU have been taken into account in its latest decisions. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.3.

| 3.4.4. | Finally, cooperation between businesses on environmental projects which, in many cases, require the involvement of the entire value chain must be facilitated and put on a more secure footing. The EESC therefore calls on the Commission to clarify the new CAP derogation from antitrust rules (Article 210), which allows farmers to enter into agreements on matters of sustainability. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.4.

| 3.4.5. | Furthermore, the rules on both vertical (VBER) and horizontal (HBER) agreements must be adapted to take account of the complexity of the ecosystems to be built around these sustainability objectives. The Commission should indicate, as far as possible, what kind of sustainability-related information can be safely exchanged between competitors. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.5.

4.   Having the right tools to deliver the transitions and compete globally

| 4.1. | As the EESC has already argued (1), increasing open strategic autonomy involves strengthening the resilience of the single market, investing in the EU’s own competences and technological capacity and increasing resources for R & D, greening production and supply chains, securing digital sovereignty, ensuring strategic stockpiling, fostering and attracting investments and sustainable production in Europe by improving the conditions in which businesses operate, exploring alternative solutions and circular economy models, promoting broad industrial cooperation across Member States, and aiming for technological leadership as stated by the Competitiveness Council in November 2020. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC raises the question of the measures proposed to facilitate the investments needed for the climate and digital transitions in a resilient market and in such uncertain times. Achieving these transitions will require considerable investment, both public and private, at a time when the economic and political situation is particularly unstable. We must facilitate the major investments facing our strategic ecosystems and, more generally, the whole business world; this should also be done with a view to creating players that are able to grow on the global market. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | While major investment plans have already been drawn up in certain sectors, the EESC wonders here about the deployment of measures for the service sectors, and generally, for the wider European economy, which is made up predominantly of SMEs. EU State aid rules will play an important role in ensuring that the transitions are successful. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | Businesses also need support for their investments in digitalisation and particularly for upgrading their IT systems, and for automation, robotics and artificial intelligence. SMEs in particular need support to develop their digital presence. Another example is that State aid for broadband roll-out will be a pivotal element of territorial cohesion policy. We call on the Commission to include further amendments to the GBER to support the digitalisation of businesses and transactions. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Similarly, ‘important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEI) as well as industrial alliances, whether for batteries, semiconductors or health, must help develop innovative value chains in Europe. The initial applications of this tool are interesting. The EESC will look closely at whether the IPCEIs are actually open to SMEs, as envisaged in the draft guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | There also needs to be a level playing field with third country players; the control of foreign subsidies is a major challenge in this area.
  Non-European companies receive massive state support. The EESC accordingly considers that the Commission proposal (2) tackling foreign state funding for companies operating in the EU market, a market that such subsidies are likely to distort, is a useful and appropriate instrument. That said, some aspects of the intrinsically complex and far-reaching legislative mechanism need to be further refined. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

Non-European companies receive massive state support. The EESC accordingly considers that the Commission proposal (2) tackling foreign state funding for companies operating in the EU market, a market that such subsidies are likely to distort, is a useful and appropriate instrument. That said, some aspects of the intrinsically complex and far-reaching legislative mechanism need to be further refined.

| 4.7. | The EESC also welcomes the adoption of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) as it aims to ensure contestable and fair digital markets through ex ante regulation. European governance is crucial here to ensure that the DMA regulation is applied in a uniform way across the European Union and that it is effective. Furthermore, while the DMA regulates the issues of data-sharing and access to data for gatekeepers, the situation regarding data in competition assessment remains to be clarified. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | Finally, in its transnational and global alliances, the EU must be able to identify violations of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the health and safety of both people and the environment, throughout value and supply chains. The EESC takes note of the initiatives taken to this end, in particular with regard to mirror clauses. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

Brussels, 19 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Exploratory opinion requested by the French presidency of the Council of the EU: How will the identified industrial ecosystems contribute to the strategic autonomy of the EU and the well-being of Europeans? adopted on 19 January 2022 (OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 34).

1

How will the identified industrial ecosystems contribute to the strategic autonomy of the EU and the well-being of Europeans?

(2)  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (COM(2021) 223 final — 2021/0114 (COD)).

2

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/38

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy

(COM(2021) 778 final)

(2022/C 323/07)

| Rapporteur: | Giuseppe GUERINI |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Giuseppe GUERINI

| Referral | Commission, 21.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 6.4.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 179/1/4 |

Referral

Commission, 21.1.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

6.4.2022

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

179/1/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the social economy action plan (SEAP) which incorporates many key points raised by the Committee over the years, starting with the opinion INT/447 of 2009 (1). The SEAP clearly recognises that the European institutions should promote and recognise the different legal forms that distinguish the social economy ecosystem, not least because of its particular role of supporting the local economy and its proximity to local areas and communities. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The violent invasion of Ukraine and the resulting exodus of refugees is highlighting the great propensity for solidarity of European citizens and civil society organisations involved in receiving refugees and managing humanitarian aid, confirming the social economy’s important role in organising responses that demonstrate solidarity during humanitarian crises. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The potential of the social economy has still not been harnessed in all Member States. The SEAP therefore needs to be complemented by medium- and long-term actions and by targeting and coordinating the necessary measures and strengthening the legal reference framework. In this regard, the EESC fully supports the approach of securing a specific recommendation by the European Council, scheduled for 2023. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC proposes that, in order to make the SEAP more effective, it should be strengthened with targeted proposals in four areas of interest: i) collaboration between public administrations and social economy entities; ii) State aid; iii) investments and financial instruments; and iv) taxation — strengthening the link between the SEAP and the ‘European 2030 Strategy’, with particular reference to the role that the social economy can play in supporting the green, digital and social transitions. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC hopes that the SEAP will promote a more targeted investment of European resources earmarked for the national recovery and resilience plans towards social inclusion, education and employment stimulus targets, with a special focus on young people, families and vulnerable people, recommending that particular attention be paid to digital skills training for disadvantaged people. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | In order to develop best practices for cooperation between public entities and social economy entities, the EESC recommends developing collaborative territorial governance and shared administration instruments as the ideal means of involving as wide a range of stakeholders as possible, strengthening the culture of subsidiarity. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC welcomes the SEAP’s proposal to boost efforts to steer public procurement and concessions towards the pursuit of social and environmental goals and recommends that public-private partnership models be strengthened. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | In line with the SEAP’s proposals on taxation, the EESC encourages the Commission to pay special attention to tax provisions for social economy entities in the legislative initiative Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT), due in the next few months. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   General comments and background

| 2.1. | The social economy action plan looks towards 2030 and is complemented by two working documents. The first of these provides additional information supplementing the communication on Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy, to be taken in parallel with the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The second, on Scenarios towards co-creation of a transition pathway for a more resilient, sustainable and digital Proximity and Social Economy industrial ecosystem, ties in with the new European industrial strategy, in which the social economy can play a role as an innovator, leading to a fair and equitable transition, in strategic sectors such as the digital and green economies. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The EESC welcomes the decision to align the SEAP with both the European Pillar of Social Rights and the new European industrial strategy, which has taken the innovative step of targeting a specific ‘ecosystem’ of the social economy. In this respect, it is important that the medium- and long-term objectives be more clearly defined beyond 2023. The social economy can be of great help in dealing with the big questions currently facing Europe, i.e. the reduction of forms of inequality, demographic pressures, support for the younger generations, managing the reception of refugees and migrants and the sustainability of healthcare systems and the European welfare model. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The EESC believes that the SEAP must also promote measures coordinated with the single market for capital plan, as recommended in opinions ECO/533 (2) and INT/965 (3). These two opinions call for the capital markets union to take account of the specific features required of financial instruments for the social economy sector. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | While the action plan does not provide a legal definition of ‘social economy’, it does identify the distinctive features of its entities: i) primacy of people and social purposes over profit; ii) reinvestment of all or most of the profits in activities that are in the collective interest or which benefit members and users, in the context of the general interest; iii) democratic and participatory governance. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The EESC endorses these principles and encourages the Commission and Member States to undertake more ambitious and better coordinated initiatives with a view to shaping a duly accepted and coordinated legal framework on the social economy built around the above-mentioned three principles, which would make it possible to put an end to ambiguities and uncertainties. A definition incorporating the different organisational models and forms of enterprise that have been taking root would also make it possible to achieve the goal of introducing a European statute for associations, mutual societies and foundations, especially for those engaged in cross-border operations. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposal to guide the Member States in drawing up measures to help the social economy, with a view to supporting a more sustainable, inclusive and innovative model of economic and social development. Specifically, the Commission is proposing to intervene either directly or alongside the Member States in three priority areas: i) creating the right conditions for the social economy; ii) offering opportunities for them to start up and expand their activities; iii) ensuring recognition of the social economy. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | With this in mind, the EESC is pleased that the action plan flags up the need for a mix of policy measures, including taxation, regulation of public procurement, competition and state aid, appropriate regulation of working conditions, education and research. In this regard, the EESC stresses the need to promote the quality of work and the development of the procedures for informing and involving workers when it comes to the strategic decisions taken by social economy entities. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | The sectors in which social economy entities operate encompass social and health services, care, education and training, culture and environmental protection, and in general many of the SGEIs referred to in the European Pillar of Social Rights, sectors that generate increasing economic value and ever higher employment rates. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | Social economy entities are active in all economic sectors in many European countries: from industrial and craft manufacturing to the circular economy, from sustainable tourism to energy production from renewable sources, from transport to communication and information services, with key roles in social innovation and widespread technology transfer supporting disadvantaged populations or areas. The variety of legal and organisational forms means that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is inappropriate, although some form of coordination under the leadership of the Commission would be useful. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | Social economy enterprises are firmly rooted in the local community, contributing to social cohesion in local areas and making them more resilient and inclusive. This propensity for proximity makes social economy entities particularly effective, including at supporting the green and digital transition and making digital technologies more accessible to everyone, including the most vulnerable and at risk of social exclusion, especially enabling technologies that help people with disabilities to work. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | Special attention should also be paid to the involvement and development of young people, who should be supported with training measures that encourage the growth of entrepreneurship among the younger generations. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | To unleash this potential, social economy entities need greater access to investment capital, particularly to make better use of investments in social infrastructure (affordable housing, long-term healthcare and support, education and lifelong learning, poverty reduction, improved accessibility). These types of infrastructure must be strengthened so as to reduce inequality and social exclusion, problems that have been exacerbated in Europe by the pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | The action plan is an opportunity to develop the social economy, by improving industrial policy and by recognising the role played especially by cooperatives (which form major hubs and have considerable capacity for innovation) in European services and industry. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

| 2.14. | The EESC attaches considerable importance to the Commission’s commitment to carrying out studies and research on the social economy with a view to a European Council recommendation in 2023. The EESC is also pleased that the Commission plans to evaluate the implementation of the action plan in 2025. However, to ensure the effectiveness of the studies and assessments the SEAP should set clearer medium and long-term goals to help identify the intended social impact, also in relation to the European 2030 strategy. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

| 2.15. | The EESC welcomes and supports the Commission’s goals for promoting cross-border relations and the internationalisation of the social economy, by supporting and encouraging the participation of social economy undertakings in European partnership platforms, by establishing a single EU Social Economy Gateway (one-stop-shop). |
| --- | --- |

2.15.

| 2.16. | As part of initiatives to promote a culture of entrepreneurship and, in particular, to increase young people’s involvement in starting up new enterprises, it is essential to increase knowledge of the potential of the social economy in secondary school and university curricula. This is why we support the proposal to establish a new Youth Entrepreneurship Academy that includes the social economy. |
| --- | --- |

2.16.

3.   Specific comments

3.1.   Relations between public administrations and social economy entities

| 3.1.1. | Recognising the potential of the social economy for the future of social and industrial policies, the SEAP affirms the importance of the general interest functions to which the social economy contributes, and it is therefore crucial to establish goals for improving collaboration between the public administration, social economy entities and participants in the social dialogue. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | With this in mind, the EESC sees a need to invest in strengthening ‘shared administration’ between public authorities and social enterprises working towards common interest goals within their respective areas of responsibility and remits. Forms of planning using inclusive methods of governance that recognise the role of social economy entities, particularly in local systems of cooperation between the social economy and local authorities, should therefore be encouraged. These innovative ways of working must meet the requirements of transparency, equal treatment, affordability and openness to different stakeholders, applying the principle of subsidiarity. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | These forms of collaboration seem to be particularly effective when establishing services of general interest because they allow better handling of competitiveness, developing and leveraging the collaboration and positive social impact accomplished by taking a ‘common goods’ approach. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

| 3.1.4. | The EESC therefore supports the Commission’s intention to work towards improving access to the public contract market for social economy entities. Much progress has been made in relation to this, owing to the 2014 directive on public contracts (4). However, the EESC hopes that when reviewing the procurement directive — and particularly Article 77 thereof on the lighter regime for social services — the Commission will make a clearer distinction between the pursuit of the general interest and the delivery of the single market, so as to provide a more robust legal basis for collaboration agreements between public and social economy entities. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

3.2.   State aid

| 3.2.1. | It is no secret that some of the sectors in which social economy entities are active, particularly social care, healthcare, education and culture, need sufficient public financial support, which should in any case be introduced without distorting market rules, where services provided by social economy entities are also provided by commercial enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | State aid control seeks to maintain a balance between the provision of support and a level playing field. The action plan highlights how public authorities and beneficiaries frequently fail to make the most of existing possibilities offered by flexibility with regard to state aid. This is certainly true and suggests the need for targeted investments in specialist training for public administrations on European state aid rules, particularly those on services of general economic interest (SGEI). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

| 3.2.3. | Nevertheless, competition rules are not always a good match for issues such as the management of social services, especially healthcare and individual care services, which are based on solidarity rather than being market-oriented. In opinion TEN/605 (5), the EESC pointed out that ‘the lack of certainty or the substantial costs involved in fulfilling the requirements raise barriers that unduly prevent authorities from fully implementing SGEI policy’. The SEAP must be seen as an opportunity to improve the dialogue between the Commission, the Member States, local authorities and representatives of the social partners and of the social economy. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

| 3.2.4. | The EU’s SGEI rules guarantee sufficient flexibility with regard to state aid rules. However, many public authorities pass up the possibility of applying the legal framework on public aid to SGEIs. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.4.

| 3.2.5. | The Commission’s proposal to set up webinars and workshops to help provide sufficient information on ways of accessing state aid is commendable but does not go far enough. More decisive regulatory intervention is needed, including through soft law, to clarify access requirements and the amount of support available under state aid for social economy entities, particularly with regard to the SGEI sector and aid for recruiting disadvantaged people under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.5.

| 3.2.6. | The subsidies granted to social economy entities in their capacity as entities that help to deliver general interest services should be recognised as being compatible with the internal market. To this end, it would be worth reviewing the de minimis thresholds for aid issued to social economy undertakings for social actions and services of general interest. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.6.

3.3.   Investments and financial instruments

| 3.3.1. | According to the estimates given in the action plan, during the 2014-2020 programming period at least EUR 2,5 billion from the EU budget went towards supporting the social economy through a range of European programmes and funds. The EESC is pleased that the Commission intends to further increase the level of support for the 2021-2027 period, reducing the barriers for social economy entities to access European funds. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | An important goal for 2022 would therefore be to launch new financial products under the InvestEU programme, in order to mobilise private funding tailored to the needs of social economy undertakings. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

| 3.3.3. | Besides the promotion of investments and financial instruments, simply accessing bank credit remains difficult for many social economy entities. For this reason, the EESC considers guarantee facilities for access to credit to be necessary. These facilities, which have been extensively tried and tested on SMEs, should also be extended systematically to social economy entities. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.3.

| 3.3.4. | The EESC proposes that every Member State be encouraged to establish, with the help of InvestEU, a dedicated ‘Guarantee fund for social economy entities’ that complies with specific criteria for assessing creditworthiness, supporting the introduction of appropriate indicators for evaluating social economy investments, which would also be useful in promoting innovative financial instruments. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.4.

| 3.3.5. | The EESC endorses the SEAP’s take on workers’ buyouts, pointing to the role of cooperatives formed by employees who take over companies that are in crisis and establish a cooperative. Workers’ buyouts are successful if the workers forming the cooperative can count on suitable funding mechanisms and the establishment of funds for the capitalisation of these enterprises. However, alongside these financial instruments it is essential for workers to be properly supported through training and skill-building activities. The EESC also urges the Commission to continue to work closely with the Member States to identify tools and solutions to remove obstacles and speed up legal procedures for transferring ownership of an enterprise to its employees after it closes, through worker cooperatives or other forms of worker-owned social economy enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.5.

3.4.   A tax policy which recognises functions that are in the general interest

| 3.4.1. | Social economy entities operate within a fragmented fiscal framework that is largely defined by the Member States. The EESC is pleased that the action plan stresses the need for tax provisions specific to the social economy, emphasising that few Member States to date have developed a dedicated and coherent fiscal framework for social undertakings. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | Coordinated fiscal harmonisation, inspired by good practices in Member States, would be useful and desirable, in particular for certain tax exemptions on undistributed profits, reductions on VAT, reductions on or exemptions from social insurance costs and tax reductions for gifts. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

| 3.4.3. | The EESC is pleased that the SEAP proposes the publication of guidance clarifying the existing rules on the tax treatment of cross-border public-benefit donations, and the publication of a specific study on philanthropic donations in the EU; in this respect, the EESC believes that such guidance should include recommendations to Member States on how to recognise when resident public-benefit organisations are comparable to organisations based in another EU country. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.3.

| 3.4.4. | Finally and importantly, the social economy action plan must become a strategic instrument setting out meaningful measures for the benefit of social economy entities and local communities, accompanied by tax policies that are geared towards the stated social goals. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.4.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  OJ C 318, 23.12.2009, p. 22.

1

(2)  OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 20.

2

(3)  OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 39.

3

(4)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65).

4

(5)  OJ C 345, 13.10.2017, p. 45.

5

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/43

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — An EU Strategy on Standardisation — Setting global standards in support of a resilient, green and digital EU single market

(COM(2022) 31 final)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 as regards the decisions of European standardisation organisations concerning European standards and European standardisation deliverables

(COM(2022) 32 final — 2022/0021(COD))

(2022/C 323/08)

| Rapporteur: | Sandra PARTHIE |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Sandra PARTHIE

| Referral | a) | European Commission, 2/5/2022 |
| --- | --- | --- |

Referral

a)

European Commission, 2/5/2022

| b) | European Parliament, 14/2/2022 |
| --- | --- |

b)

European Parliament, 14/2/2022

| c) | Council, 17/2/2022 |
| --- | --- |

c)

Council, 17/2/2022

Legal basis

| a) | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| --- | --- |

a)

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

| b) | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| --- | --- |

b)

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

5/5/2022

Adopted at plenary

18/5/2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

186/1/3

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s Communication on the future of EU standardisation in the global context. The European Commission’s proposal rightly reflects the development of international standards and responds to changes that have taken place. Regarding the proposal in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), the EESC welcomes a review of governance. The governance of European standardisation organisations (ESOs) needs to take into account the transparent, open, inclusive and fair participation of all relevant market players, consumers, social and environmental stakeholders, trade unions, SMEs and large companies. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | To ensure a broad societal consensus, it is essential to guarantee an inclusive, balanced approach that fully enables all interested and affected stakeholders to participate. At EU and Member State level, politics and standardisation organisations support each other by shaping framework conditions. The requirement for the European Standardisation Strategy to be inclusive is unique in the world and well worth reinforcing. At international level, the absence of inclusiveness as a cornerstone of international standardisation is a cause for concern. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC sees the danger that, in other regions in the world, standardisation has become an ‘industrial policy’ tool or geopolitical instrument. The European Union needs to be ready to adapt its approach in order to secure and increase the competitiveness of European companies and the protection of consumers. The EESC therefore welcomes the 22 proposed measures, including setting up a high-level forum to better coordinate stakeholder interests, creating the post of the ‘chief standardisation officer’, calling for governance reform in ESOs, setting standardisation priorities for the twin green and digital transformations, and speeding up standardisation processes. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | It is necessary to bring together the ‘bottom-up approach’ of market-driven standards and the political-strategic ‘top-down approach’ through closer cooperation between governments/politics, industry and other stakeholders in order to develop common European strategies and uphold democratic values. To this end, a continuous exchange between the European Commission, ESOs, national standardisation bodies, industry and civil society stakeholders must be established. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC also supports calling on ESOs to modernise their governance in order to fully represent the European public interest and democratic values, as well as the interests of SMEs, environmental and social stakeholders, trade unions, and civil society and users, and to facilitate access to standards. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The European standardisation strategy mentions several training and educational initiatives aimed at researchers, young professionals and practitioners, which seek to promote the development of skills in the standardisation field. The EESC believes these proposals to be of key importance, especially for SMEs and micro enterprises and in order to set a framework for investing in talent, and strongly supports their broad and swift introduction. It underlines the need for increased funding from European and national authorities to all those involved in standardisation, such as trade unions, civil society organisations and companies, to improve their abilities to participate in standardisation work. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

2.   Context of the Commission proposals

| 2.1. | Standards are at the core of the EU single market. Over the last 30 years, the European standardisation system has delivered more than 3 600 harmonised standards allowing companies to demonstrate compliance with EU law. European standards have delivered great benefits, creating a level playing-field in the single market for businesses and increasing consumer confidence. The contents are defined in the technical committees, where the state has a right to participate, but has no further-reaching rights of intervention. In some EU Member States, there are additional regulations for processing projects of public interest. Because harmonised standards are part of EU law (2), they must be written according to the democratic principles, with involvement of all stakeholders (including civil society, consumer, social, environmental and trade union interests and SMEs) and as such ensuring a balanced decision making process inside the national, European (and international) standardisation organisations. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | European standardisation operates within an increasingly competitive global context. Europe’s competitiveness, technological sovereignty, ability to reduce dependencies and protection of EU values — including our social and environmental ambitions — will depend on how successful European actors are in standardisation at international level. This requires resources/expertise from the European stakeholders, without which it is not possible to uphold European lead in the international standardisation. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The EU’s ambitions towards a climate-neutral, resilient and circular economy cannot be delivered without European standards. In order to remain a global standard setter, the EU must have a strong global footprint in standardisation activities, and lead work in key international forums and institutions. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | In its standardisation strategy (3), the Commission outlines its approach to standards both within the Single Market and globally. The strategy is accompanied by a proposal for an amendment to the Regulation on standardisation (4), a report on its implementation (5), and the 2022 annual Union work programme for European standardisation (6). The strategy aims to strengthen the EU’s global competitiveness to enable a resilient, green and digital economy, and to enshrine democratic values in the application of technology. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | In new and emerging technologies, the European standardisation system often fails to deliver in a timely manner, and thus loses the important ‘first mover’ advantage through standardisation. This strategy proposes a set of actions to put standards back at the core of a resilient, green and digital EU single market, and to strengthen the global role of the European standardisation system. At EU and national Member State level, politics and standardisation organisations support each other by shaping these framework conditions. This cooperation has proven successful and has been the basis for economic success and international market access for European companies. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The Commission is also proposing an amendment (7) to Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 on standardisation to improve governance in the European standardisation system. While the European system will remain open, transparent, inclusive and impartial, the proposal prescribes that standardisation requests of the Commission to the European standardisation organisations must be handled by the national standardisation bodies. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | In line with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, the Commission has published a communication setting out the annual European Union work programme for European standardisation for 2022, which outlines the actions that the Commission intends to initiate over the course of 2022 to enhance the openness, transparency and inclusiveness of the European standardisation system (ESS). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Under Article 24(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, the Commission shall report on its implementation every five years. The Commission presented a second report (8), mainly covering 2016-2020, with some updated facts and figures through to 2021. It shows that the European standardisation system improved in some aspects — e.g. with regard to new IT tools — but that there is still room for improvement in other areas. This applies in particular to inclusiveness, the role of NSBs in the ESS, and the delivery time of HENs to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s Communication on the future of EU standardisation in the global context. The European Commission’s proposal rightly reflects the development of international standards and responds to changes that have taken place. It aims to ensure a strong European voice and secure European interests in standard-setting procedures and structures. If Europe uses the momentum of the twin transition properly, it can become a ‘first mover’ in the areas of green and digital standardisation. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Regarding the proposal in Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012, the EESC welcomes a review of governance. The governance of ESOs needs to take into account the transparent, open, inclusive and fair participation of all relevant European market players, consumers, social and environmental stakeholders, trade unions, SMEs and large companies. It has to reflect the legitimate scope of standardisation, avoiding undermining democratically legitimised legislation processes and excessive demands for standardisation. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Traditionally, standards have been developed by industry. To ensure a broad societal consensus it is essential to guarantee a balanced approach that fully enables all interested and affected stakeholders to participate. At EU and Member State level, politics and standardisation organisations support each other by shaping framework conditions. The requirement for the European Standardisation Strategy to be inclusive is unique in the world and well worth reinforcing. At international level, the absence of inclusiveness as a cornerstone of international standardisation is a cause for concern. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC would like to point out the benefits of the New Legislative Framework (NLF) of the European Commission for using harmonised standards to concretise regulatory requirements. The EESC wishes to highlight that standards are not meant to shift regulatory power to private sectors. Socio-political considerations that fall within the remit of the social partners and/or the regulator should not be dealt with by ESOs and international standardisation bodies. The EESC stresses that the standardisation of services in particular requires careful consideration of democratic legitimisation. The content and complexity of services is extremely diverse, ranging e.g. from postal services to complex intellectual services, and cross-cutting standards cannot adequately take that into account. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC sees the danger that, in other regions in the world, standardisation has become an ‘industrial policy’ tool or geopolitical instrument. The European Union needs to be ready to adapt its approach in order to secure and increase the competitiveness of European companies and the protection of consumers. The EESC therefore welcomes the 22 proposed measures, including setting up a high-level forum to better coordinate stakeholder interests, creating the post of ‘chief standardisation officer’, calling for governance reform in ESOs, defining standardisation priorities for the twin green and digital transformations, and speeding up standardisation processes. The European and international standardisation system should be strengthened by these measures. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | Standards create markets. The EESC believes that the European Single Market and granting third party access to this market is also a strategic asset. In order to secure the interoperability of products and services worldwide and across different economic and societal systems, we need to maintain the fundamental ‘one standard — one test — accepted everywhere’ principle. It must be ensured that standardisation processes that are driven by economic or third party political interests do not override democratically enacted legislation. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC believes that international standards, especially when transposed into European standards, must take into account European social values by ensuring that the international standardisation system is truly inclusive. In this context, the EESC calls for a more robust application of the Vienna (9) and Frankfurt (10) agreements concluded by the standardisation bodies, which aim to avoid European standards competing or even conflicting with international ones. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Implementing existing commitments on standardisation in EU trade agreements, and cooperation on standardisation with like-minded partners in strategic areas and in international standardisation organisations are crucial success factors. The EESC believes that dialogue with the US should be strengthened via TTC — Trade and Technology Council cooperation, and that digital partnerships with Japan, Singapore and South Korea and other like-minded countries can be beneficial. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | It is necessary to bring together the ‘bottom-up approach’ of market-driven standards and the political-strategic ‘top-down approach’ through closer cooperation between governments/politics, industry and other stakeholders in order to develop common European strategies. To this end, a continuous exchange between the European Commission, ESOs, national standardisation bodies and industry must be established. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC also supports calling on ESOs and their member organisations to modernise their governance in order to fully represent the public interest and the interests of SMEs, environmental and social stakeholders, trade unions, and civil society and users, and to facilitate access to standards. However, it must be ensured that this review does not paralyse the ongoing standardisation work or lead to delays of products being placed on the market. The issue of standards made available for free needs to be discussed with all participating market players. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The EESC wishes to point out that standards do not only regulate the technical aspect of a product, but can have an impact on people. Thus the EESC calls on the European Commission to better specify how EU Member States shall be held accountable for ensuring that civil society associations are able to actively participate in standardisation activities. The EESC calls on the European Commission to provide further financial support measures to help SMEs and societal stakeholders (such as consumer organisations) with fewer resources participate in standardisation processes in order to ensure balanced representation. They provide a broad variety of independent expertise and experience relevant for standardisation processes. The EESC also draws attention to the fact that, despite their voluntary nature, the non-application of standards can have severe negative effects, including creating liability and compliance problems. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC believes it important that all stakeholders, ESOs and other partners work together to immediately address the standardisation urgencies that have been identified, such as COVID-19 vaccine and medicine production, critical raw materials recycling, the clean hydrogen value chain, low carbon cement, chips certification and data standards. The EESC therefore calls on the Commission to hold talks with EU Member States and stakeholders before defining standardisation priorities so that important standards are not overlooked. This would ensure that ongoing standardisation work is not interrupted by new goals. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC fully supports accelerating standard-setting procedures, and proposes incorporating a legal check of standards at technical committee level and close cooperation with the harmonised standards (HAS) consultants at this stage of the process. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The EESC warns that the proposed review of existing standards in the light of the objectives of the European Green Deal and the twin transitions must not lead to a massive rework of standards, which would delay the development of much needed new standards. Such a review will take up resources, which should come not only from large industry, but also from national authorities, research institutes, and environmental and social stakeholders, including trade unions. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | In this context, the EESC highlights the possibility of applying ‘equivalent alternative solutions’. This concept is extremely important, especially as regards innovation, and needs to be strengthened, enforced and better communicated in order to avoid hindering innovation because of potential liability claims. The EESC wishes to underline though that these solutions should not be used in the area of health and safety. ‘Equivalent alternative solutions’ should also be considered in public procurement as a tool for the uptake of standards. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | The EESC supports the proposal to set up a high-level forum to assist the Commission in anticipating upcoming standardisation priorities and engage with the European Parliament and Council to ensure political concertation on these priorities. However, it is crucial to provide for industry and relevant stakeholder participation in this high-level forum, and for consistency with the work of the EU Industrial Forum and the Industrial Alliances. However, the EESC calls on the Commission to clarify the relation of the proposed Excellence Hub on Standards with the other forums. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

| 4.12. | The strategy mentions several training and educational initiatives aimed at researchers, young professionals and practitioners, which seek to promote the development of skills in the field of standardisation. These include a ‘standardisation booster’, ‘standardisation university days’, the dissemination of relevant material by the EU Academy, and the funding of standardisation projects abroad. The EESC believes these proposals to be of key importance, especially for SMEs and micro enterprises and in order to set a framework for investing in talent, and strongly supports their broad and swift introduction. |
| --- | --- |

4.12.

| 4.13. | In particular, the EESC encourages international cooperation on EU standards using EU programmes and funds (such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (NDICI-GE) and Horizon Europe), and supporting stakeholder participation in international standardisation abroad (SMEs, civil society, academics), e.g. in Africa as a positive initiative to counter-balance other regions’ engagements on the African continent. Standardisation strengthening should become one key element of the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative. |
| --- | --- |

4.13.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 316, 14.11.2012, p. 12).

1

(2)  Cfr Commission Communication COM(2018) 764.

2

(3)  COM(2022) 31.

3

(4)  COM(2022) 32.

4

(5)  COM(2022) 30.

5

(6)  OJ C 66, 8.2.2022, p. 1.

6

(7)  COM(2022) 32.

7

(8)  COM(2022) 30.

8

(9)  https://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/3146825/4229629/4230450/4230458/01__Agreement_on_Technical_Cooperation_between_ISO_and_CEN_(Vienna_Agreement).pdf?nodeid=4230688&vernum=-2

9

(10)  http://www.iec.ch/about/globalreach/partners/pdf/IEC-CENELEC_Frankfurt_Agreement%7B2016%7D.pdf

10

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/48

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The next generation of own resources for the EU Budget

(COM(2021) 566 final)

Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027

(COM(2021) 569 final — 2021/0429 (APP))

Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union

(COM(2021) 570 final — 2021/0430 (CNS))

(2022/C 323/09)

| Rapporteur: | Philip VON BROCKDORFF |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Antonio GARCÍA DEL RIEGO |

Rapporteur:

Philip VON BROCKDORFF

Co-rapporteur:

Antonio GARCÍA DEL RIEGO

| Referral | European Commission, 1/3/2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted in section | 6/5/2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18/5/2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 144/2/7 |

Referral

European Commission, 1/3/2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted in section

6/5/2022

Adopted at plenary

18/5/2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

144/2/7

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC notes the consensus that is necessary to add new own resources to cover the debt repayment resulting from borrowing under the NextGenerationEU initiative without jeopardising the budgets of other EU programmes and instruments, or substantially increasing the Gross National Income (GNI)-based resource contribution. Although the Commission proposals as set out in the communication are deemed necessary, the EESC believes that the Commission should ensure that the design of the new system is based on achieving equity and fairness, efficiency, transparency, simplicity and stability, with a focus on competitiveness and applying solidarity where necessary. In particular, the EESC considers it paramount to support households and businesses, where necessary, and strongly recommends more targeted impact assessments on a country-by-country level, as well as for specific industries, to determine any negative effects on households and on the overall competitiveness of the EU economy. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | While the own resource based on the Emissions Trading System (ETS) is an essential tool in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the EESC urges the Commission to ensure that it is carried out in a non-disruptive, cost-effective way. Moreover, the EESC notes the extension of the ETS to the maritime sector, the gradual increase of aviation allowances, and the inclusion of road transport and buildings. The EESC believes it plausible that a limited share of ETS revenues could flow into the EU budget. After all, this is a pan-European climate instrument that contributes to climate neutrality goals and strengthens the internal market. In this regard, there should be enough revenue to support sectors that are obliged to implement further measures to address climate change. Moreover, the EESC reiterates that the ‘polluter pays’ principle must apply in all countries. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | Considering that the EU ETS and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) are interlinked, the EESC believes that they should be considered in the same spirit. While the EU ETS can cause carbon leakage, a CBAM would counter such leakage by putting a price on the greenhouse gas emission content of imports. However, the EESC cautions against designing a CBAM system that places European manufacturing and other businesses at a competitive disadvantage. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC is also of the opinion that care must be taken to safeguard the predictability and transparency criteria, given that revenue from the EU ETS and the CBAM could be volatile. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The Commission also proposes a third category of own resources, whereby Member States would provide a national contribution to the EU budget based on the share of residual profits from multinational enterprises re-allocated to each Member State. The EESC considers this an appropriate base for EU own resources, fulfilling the fairness criteria, as firms would pay a proportion of residual profits wherever they operate and generate profits. However, the EESC believes that a level playing field in the international tax system that does not place EU businesses at a competitive disadvantage is necessary. The implementation of the new rules should be made at the same time as the EU’s major trading and competitor nations. Moreover, the new rules should be applied in line with harmonised definitions and standards. The EESC also highlights the volatility associated with corporate tax revenues and the difficulties of estimating future revenues from this own resource, and highlights the fact that the final implementing details of the agreement are still under discussion. In this sense, the EESC believes that it is premature to count these new resources as permanent EU resources, mainly when consideration must be given to the possibility of EU Member States having to pay a proportion of tax revenues to third jurisdictions. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC warns that tax reform and/or compensatory mechanisms at national level might be needed to neutralise any additional tax burdens on households and businesses. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | Finally, the EESC considers that the need for both a strong political will to deepen EU integration and a clear roadmap of the future of Europe is necessary for the proper design and smooth implementation of a new own resources system. This is all the more important in light of the war in Ukraine, and thus the Commission’s proposal may require revisiting at some stage. The EESC is committed to continuously reviewing and monitoring the uncertain evolution of the human and material impacts of this egregious invasion, with a view to assessing the best course of action in due time. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | The European Commission is proposing to establish the next generation of own resources for the EU budget by putting forward three new sources of revenue: the first, based on revenues from the revised ETS; the second, drawing on the resources generated by the proposed EU CBAM; and the third, based on the share of residual profits from multinational enterprises that will be re-allocated to EU Member States under the recent OECD/G20 preliminary agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (‘Pillar One’), that still needs to be finalised. From 2026 to 2030, these new sources of revenue are estimated to generate a total of up to EUR 17 billion annually for the EU budget. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The new own resources will help to repay the funds raised by the EU to finance the grant component of NextGenerationEU. Specifically, the new ETS is intended to contribute towards financing the Social Climate Fund (SCF), as considered under the Fit for 55 package. Financing the Social Climate Fund is an important objective of the proposal. This Fund would contribute to a socially fair transition and support vulnerable households, transport users and micro-enterprises to finance investments in energy efficiency, new heating and cooling systems, and cleaner mobility, as well as temporary direct income support, where appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The Fit for 55 package of July 2021 aims to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. The objective is to reach climate neutrality by 2050. This package includes a revision of the EU ETS, which in future would also apply to the maritime sector, allow for an increase in the auctioning of aviation allowances, and introduce a new system for buildings and road transport. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The new ETS would contribute to ensuring a smooth transition to a decarbonised economy, and one that is mindful of the most vulnerable in society. At present, most revenues from the auctioning of emission allowances are transferred to national budgets. With the proposed new system, 25 % of the revenue from EU emissions trading would flow into the EU budget, and estimated revenues for the EU budget would average around EUR 12,5 billion per year in the years 2026-2030. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The Commission is also proposing a CBAM aimed at reducing the risk of carbon leakage into the EU by putting a carbon price on imports, corresponding to what would have been paid had the goods been produced in the EU. This mechanism will apply to a targeted selection of sectors and has been deemed by the Commission to be fully consistent with the WTO rules. In line with the proposal, the phasing in of the CBAM will take place concurrently with the phasing out of the ETS re-allocation scheme, which was always envisaged to be temporary in any case. Goods imported to the EU would pay a charge which reflects their ‘carbon content’ — that is the CO2 emissions generated by their production (the overall price on these CO2 emissions is the same as the EU carbon price). On the other hand, a rebate (reflecting the difference between the carbon price paid for their production in Europe and the carbon price in the destination market) will not apply on goods exported to other countries. To compensate for this, the Innovation Fund (IF), with revenues derived from the auctioning of 450 million ETS allowances from 2020 to 2030, will help European industry adapt to the decarbonisation process. For 2020-2030, the Fund may amount to around EUR 10 billion, depending on the carbon price. The IF is a key funding instrument for delivering the EU’s economy-wide commitments under the Paris Agreement, and supporting the European Commission’s strategic vision of a climate-neutral Europe by 2050, as recognised also in the European Green Deal Investment Plan. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The Commission is proposing to allocate to the EU budget 75 % of the revenues generated from this CBAM, with revenues estimated at around EUR 1 billion per year on average in the years 2026-2030. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The third source of revenue proposed would be generated from taxing a share of ‘residual profits’ from the world’s largest multinational enterprises, as agreed last year by members of the OECD/G20 inclusive framework on base erosion and profit shifting, the details of which have yet to be finalised. This involves a two-pillar solution to tackle tax transfers from one country to another, make international tax rules more consistent, and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activity and value creation occur. The Commission proposes an own resource equivalent to 15 % of the share of the residual profits of in-scope companies that are reallocated to EU Member States. However, the re-allocation of tax revenues to third countries is not taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | The next step is for the Commission to draft an EU directive once the details of the OECD/G20 inclusive framework agreement on Pillar One are finalised. This process shall complement the Pillar Two Directive for which the Commission recently adopted a separate proposal (1). Pending the finalisation of the agreement, revenues for the EU budget are estimated between EUR 2,5 and 4 billion per year. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | To integrate the proposed new own resources into the EU budget, the EU will need to amend two important pieces of legislation. First, the Commission proposes to amend the Own Resources Decision to add the three proposed new resources to the existing ones. Second, the Commission also proposes a specific amendment to the Regulation on the current long-term EU budget for the period 2021-2027, also known as the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) Regulation. This modification offers the legal possibility to already start repaying loans for NextGenerationEU during the current MFF. At the same time, it proposes to increase the relevant MFF spending caps for the years 2025-2027 in order to align the additional spending with the SCF. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | The Own Resources Decision must be approved unanimously in the Council, after consulting the European Parliament. The decision can enter into force once it has been approved by all EU countries in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The MFF Regulation must be adopted unanimously by the Council, after obtaining the approval of the European Parliament. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | There is no doubt that to repay the funds raised by the EU to finance the grant component of NextGenerationEU and the SCF, a financial model of own resources is needed. However, the implementation of this financial model remains challenging. The EESC also notes that the Commission proposal stabilises a set of rules by which additional national contributions from Member States would be allocated to the EU budget. In the event of a shortfall, the current system of allocation based on GNI would continue to be applied. However, the EESC notes that in 2023 the Commission will propose a new set of own resources. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | In any event, it is the EESC’s view that the proposal under consideration reflects the current revenue collection system, and would continue to rely very heavily on Member State contributions. However, the EESC acknowledges that extending the own resources model would provide the funds to react more effectively to economic shocks and support the financing of sustainable growth initiatives and economic recovery. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | All in all, the own resources model would also boost the fiscal capacity of the Economic and Monetary Union, possibly increasing economic convergence, and helping to mitigate asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. Drawing from own resources would further strengthen policy effectiveness with funding strictly linked to the EU’s targets in climate change and economic sustainability, for example. The link between EU policy objectives and its financing sources in the selection of forms of own resources is an important consideration and one which the EESC supports. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC acknowledges that identifying own resources is a challenging task and that the options under consideration may have their own particular drawbacks (particularly in terms of sufficiency, stability, or efficiency). Hence, it is necessary, as proposed by the Commission, to have a system that combines different own resources in order to minimise, for example, fluctuation in the influx of own resources. A mix of own resources also contributes toward a more fairly distributed financial burden among Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC is also of the view that efficiency in the administration of own resources is critical. However, this must be matched by efficiency and effectiveness on the expenditure side at all stages. This applies in particular to spending on the SCF (2), which is intended to mitigate the negative social effects arising from higher carbon prices in transport and buildings’ heating systems. The EESC has already expressed its concerns in this connection particularly on the costs of an emissions trading system for buildings and transport which could outweigh the desired benefits and could lead to uncontrolled price spikes. The EESC has also referred to the huge challenge of designing an effective and fair compensation mechanism in an EU comprising 27 Member States with often very different socioeconomic and climatic contexts. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC notes that as things stand, Member States have used the ETS auctioning revenues for climate action and to boost investment in emissions trading sectors, thus speeding up emissions reductions. With parts of ETS revenues being used to repay the grant component of NextGenerationEU, the EESC cautions against possible financial constraints that would limit further support to the European economy and population during the transition towards carbon neutrality. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC welcomes the IF and its objective to helping businesses invest in clean energy and clean industry. However, the EESC has expressed doubts as to whether this fund will maintain and strengthen the EU industry’s competitive position. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | Whereas the EESC generally agrees with the three new sources of revenue as proposed by the Commission, the EESC warns of impacts that the additional revenue could have on households and businesses. Hence, it may be necessary to couple any additional tax burden with a tax reform or compensatory mechanisms at national level. In addition, the EESC warns of the impact of higher energy prices for households and businesses caused by the war in Ukraine. These added costs and their social and economic effects could derail the Commission’s proposal. This is all the more important in light of the war in Ukraine, and thus the Commission’s proposal may require revisiting at some stage. Consequently, the EESC is committed to continuously reviewing and monitoring the uncertain evolution of the human and material impacts of this egregious invasion, with a view to assessing the best course of action in due time. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | Whereas the EESC agrees that funding sources are necessary to effectively repay the NextGenerationEU, those funding sources need to be stable, socially fair and business-friendly. Stability is an absolute requirement, as are simplicity and certainty. More specifically, it should be ensured that the systems introduced, particularly the ETS and CBAM, be resilient to economic shocks. Additional burdens on households and businesses also need to be avoided, and the EESC will reserve its judgement on how the funding sources could impact both households and businesses. In this context, the EESC recommends more targeted impact assessments, on a country-by-country level, as well as for specific industries, to determine any negative effects on households and on the overall competitiveness of EU businesses. Assessing funds disbursed under NextGenerationEU would also be relevant. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Whereas the EESC agrees that, following the OECD tax reform, Member States reallocate a proportion of residual tax revenues accruing to them to the Commission as an own resource, such a transfer should not give rise to new burdens for households or businesses. Where necessary, the EESC recommends coupling this transfer with a reform of taxes on other levels with the aim of not levying any additional charges on households and businesses. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EESC is of the view that the OECD international corporate tax pre-agreement is a major breakthrough in efforts to ensure that global corporate companies are taxed where economic activity and value creation occur. The EESC also believes that the new rules can bring stability and coherence to the international tax system. However, we believe that a level playing field in the international tax system should be maintained at all times. The implementation of the new rules should be made at the same time as the EU’s major trading and competitor nations. Moreover, the new rules should be applied in line with harmonised definitions and standards. The EESC also highlights the volatility associated with corporate tax revenues and the difficulties of estimating future revenues from this own resource, and highlights the fact that the final implementing details of the agreement are still under discussion. In this sense, the EESC believes that it is premature to count these new resources as permanent EU resources, mainly when consideration must be given to the possibility of EU Member States having to pay a proportion of tax revenues to third jurisdictions. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC considers the proposal to shift the ETS revenues from being essentially a national resource to an own resource a bold proposal. However, the EESC is concerned that this proposal does not incentivise a drastic reduction of pollution by making sure that polluters pay. Moreover, the EESC is of the opinion that the ‘polluter pays’ principle should be applied in all Member States alike. The challenge here remains that of how such revenues would be re-invested in a way that would be beneficial for communities. Also, the impact of this proposal on sectors such as the property market needs to be assessed on a country-by-country or region-by-region basis, as planning rules often vary and the cost of energy efficiency could lead to higher property prices. The EESC welcomes the temporary solidarity adjustment mechanism, which helps to ensure a fair own resource contribution from all Member States, with an upper and lower boundary applied in relation to the GNI key. This will avoid some Member States contributing disproportionally to the EU budget relative to the size of their economy, as Member States transit towards more sustainable economies. On the other hand, the EESC expresses its concern that, in the event that the ETS scheme is only partially implemented, the SCF would be put in danger, and foresees the risk of giving Member States an excuse to blame Europe for unpopular measures. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC is also of the view that the proposed new own resources need to support EU policy goals, particularly in regard to the single market, competitiveness and sustainable growth, whilst resulting in welfare improvements for EU citizens. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | Another relevant consideration is that the financial burden of the proposals must be fairly distributed among Member States. The EESC highlights the structural differences among Member States, with any one proposal affecting Member States differently. The EESC welcomes how the SCF will be allocated nationally based on the relative wealth on a country-by-country and region-by-region basis. However, fairness in the way the proposals are implemented across the EU is absolutely necessary. Equally important is that the calculation, transfer and control of the new own resources do not lead to an excessive administrative burden for the European Commission, Union institutions or national administrations. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  Proposal for a Council Directive on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups in the Union (COM (2021) 823 final).

1

(2)  OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 158.

2

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/54 |
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26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/54

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050

(COM(2022) 34 final)

(2022/C 323/10)

| Rapporteur: | Krzysztof BALON |
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| Co-rapporteur: | Gonçalo LOBO XAVIER |

Rapporteur:

Krzysztof BALON

Co-rapporteur:

Gonçalo LOBO XAVIER

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2022 |
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| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted in section | 6.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 132/0/1 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted in section

6.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

132/0/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) stresses that social, economic and territorial cohesion is an objective enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and that, in the longer term, meeting this objective will be key to achieving a climate-neutral continent by 2050. At the same time, the most serious challenge in the short and medium term, including for cohesion policy, is Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which is in fact also an act of aggression against the European Union. |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | In this context, given that Ukraine has applied for EU membership and that Ukrainian civil society strongly supports European integration as soon as possible, the EESC calls for Ukraine’s accession to the EU as soon as possible and for cohesion policy and its financial instruments to be adapted accordingly in the coming years in order to meet the challenges of the country’s post-war reconstruction. To this end, the Committee proposes the swift establishment of a separate European Union fund for the reconstruction and development of Ukraine. |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | At the same time, the Committee urges the Member States, the EU’s regions and civil society organisations to make the most effective and rapid use of the possibilities to support Ukrainian refugees created by the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE), proposed by the European Commission on 8 March 2022 (1), in conjunction with the revision of the REACT-EU Regulation proposed by the Commission on 23 March 2022 (2). This support should primarily be distributed by civil society organisations, including specialised NGOs. |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | Another important challenge is overcoming the effects of the current pandemic crisis. In particular, cohesion policy must take into account the fact that the negative impact of the pandemic has generally been greater in less developed regions and among disadvantaged social groups. This situation justifies ‘positive discrimination’ in decisions on investment and distribution of European Union funds. |
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1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC agrees with the conclusions set out in Chapter 5 of the Commission communication, especially on tackling poverty and social exclusion in the context of climate policy, boosting investment in education, as well as in research and innovation, providing an effective response to demographic change, strengthening cross-border cooperation, including in the area of infrastructure, providing universal access to services of general interest also in rural areas, ensuring simple and flexible administration of funds, and consistently complying with the partnership principle, particularly in relations with organised civil society. |
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1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC is in favour of applying the additionality principle cautiously and implementing ex ante conditionalities in such a way that regions without alternative sources of funding are not discriminated against; economic and social convergence should mean convergence with the best. |
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1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC considers a new fiscal policy approach to be necessary, promoted from the European level, which reinforces the established cohesion objectives. To do this, it is necessary to promote a fiscal policy that takes into consideration ending the competition that is currently established between countries within Europe. Otherwise, the existing disparities between the fiscal policies of the Member States may increase the risk of the existence of a ‘two-speed Europe’. Moreover, an in-depth reform of the fiscal rules is necessary, focussing on the sustainability of the public debt of the countries, on mechanisms of European economic governance and on a more equitable and progressive European tax collection. |
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1.7.

| 1.8. | The pandemic crisis has shown that territorial, economic and social cohesion should be accompanied by political cohesion. In crisis situations, it is necessary to strengthen the coordinating role of the EU institutions, including in areas where the Treaties do not provide for EU powers. This is a key issue both for the functioning of the common market and for rebuilding and increasing resilience, and also for fostering European solidarity and identity. |
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1.8.

| 1.9. | Cohesion policy should be conducted in such a way as to ensure that the EU’s development and climate objectives can be met. However, at the same time, it should implement all 20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) fully and consistently. Delivering on climate policy requires not only effective use of the Just Transition Mechanism, but also complementary actions at regional level to safeguard jobs and make sure they are of good quality, through means such as social dialogue. Social protection systems also need to be consolidated as instruments to combat poverty and exclusion, while at the same time improving social cohesion. |
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1.9.

| 1.10. | The success of cohesion policy depends on involving social economy entities as widely as possible in implementing it, particularly those providing services of general interest, including for people with disabilities and other socially disadvantaged groups. These entities should ensure, in cooperation with employees and volunteers, a high degree of social participation and fairness, and support the digital transition and environmental protection. These entities should be given favourable conditions to develop through specific financial support from European funds, favourable treatment in public procurement rules, as well as simplification of rules, a significant reduction in unjustified control activities and getting rid of bureaucratic requirements in individual Member States. |
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1.10.

| 1.11. | Making progress on digitalisation is an important element of cohesion policy. The digital transition should contribute not only to greater economic productivity, but also to better educational attainment and social participation by all people living in the EU, including disadvantaged groups. To this end, it is necessary to ensure universal access to broadband internet as a free public service. |
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1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC points out that other parts of the infrastructure are needed, too, for effective use of technologies throughout society and entrepreneurs. This must be addressed by Member States when making investment decisions. |
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1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC calls on the Member States and the EU’s regions to involve the social partners and other civil society organisations as broadly and genuinely as possible in shaping cohesion policy and monitoring its effects. This inclusion will also help measure the extent to which cohesion policy objectives have been achieved, which should not be based solely on quantitative indicators, but also on quality indicators (measuring development, not just growth). It is extremely important for the European Commission to continuously monitor implementation of the partnership principle in the Member States, as full and transparent application of this principle has a positive impact on ensuring more effective and efficient use of the EU budget. |
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1.13.

| 1.14. | Irrespective of the participation of civil society organisations and the EESC itself in the regularly held Cohesion Forums, the Committee proposes organising an annual event on implementing cohesion policy with representatives of the social partners and other civil society organisations alongside the European Council meeting. |
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1.14.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s Communication on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050. The report is a much needed source of information on the efforts undertaken towards economic, social and territorial cohesion and the problems associated with achieving cohesion. The new document is all the more important in that more than four years have gone by since the previous (7th) report. Given when it was published, the Commission’s communication does not take into account the effects of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is essentially an act of aggression against the European Union and the most serious challenge for cohesion policy in the short and medium term, both in the context of the refugee crisis and the post-war reconstruction and European integration of Ukraine. |
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2.1.

| 2.2. | Given that Ukraine has repeatedly expressed a desire to join the European Union, the staunchly pro-European stance of Ukrainian civil society and the formal membership application to the EU, the Committee is strongly in favour of Ukraine joining the European Union without delay and therefore calls for cohesion policy and its financial instruments to be adapted accordingly in the coming years, including the swift establishment of a separate fund for the reconstruction and development of Ukraine. |
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2.2.

| 2.3. | At the same time, the Committee urges the Member States, the EU’s regions and civil society organisations to make the most effective and rapid use of the possibilities to support Ukrainian refugees created by the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE) (3), proposed by the European Commission on 8 March 2022. Action is also needed so that savings generated in the 2014–2021 financial perspective and the REACT EU instrument can be quickly and flexibly redirected to directly support refugees, particularly in countries bordering Ukraine, and to set up a separate fund for this purpose in case the funds currently available are insufficient. The CARE instrument should assure funds for increasing the operational capacity of social partners and other civil society organisations involved to represent the Ukrainian refugees in their path to labour market insertions. |
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2.3.

| 2.4. | In this context, the Committee strongly welcomes the proposal of the Commission (4) to amend the REACT-EU regulation so that a higher share of the increased pre-financing resources should be allocated to the Member States that are confronted with the largest number of arrivals of persons fleeing Ukraine, either as transit countries or as countries of final destination. |
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2.4.

| 2.5. | Given the massive contribution made so far by civil society organisations from EU Member States bordering Ukraine to provide support for Ukrainian refugees, which goes far beyond the help provided by public authorities, the EESC calls on the Member States to significantly step up their organisational and financial support for these organisations, including from European Union funds. |
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2.5.

| 2.6. | Overcoming the current pandemic crisis also poses a very serious challenge. The report stresses that the pandemic has led to the greatest recession since 1945, particularly in sectors that rely on personal interaction (such as tourism), and has drastically changed the nature of work, education and social life, as well as the situation in border regions. Overall, the pandemic has had a greater negative impact in less developed regions, which slowed down the pace of convergence. |
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2.6.

| 2.7. | The EESC considers that Cohesion Policy should cover all essential policies: among others, fiscal policies. In this context the EESC observes that the existing disparities between the fiscal policies of the Member States are a factor that contributes to the existence of the two speeds of development in Europe. A tax policy focused on cohesion must put an end to the competition between 27 different tax systems of the Member States, which allow multinationals such a profit maximising, which contributes to chronic inequalities. Therefore, an in-depth reform of the fiscal rules is necessary, focussing on the sustainability of the public debt of the countries, on mechanisms of European economic governance and on a more equitable and progressive European tax collection. |
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2.7.

| 2.8. | Moreover, the Committee is concerned that the reintroduction of key provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, planned for 2023, will have a negative impact on cohesion. |
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2.8.

| 2.9. | The EESC believes that the description of the challenges facing cohesion policy set out in the Commission communication is comprehensive and accurate, and agrees with the conclusions set out in Chapter 5 therein. The EESC considers it particularly important to: |
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2.9.

| 2.9.1. | counteract pressure on democracy and its values, in such ways as developing participatory democracy and active involvement of local actors, including those from the social economy sector, social partners and other civil society organisations, in planning economic and social development, and to consistently apply the principles of partnership in cohesion policy; |
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2.9.1.

| 2.9.2. | expand the Just Transition Mechanism, particularly by taking into account the social costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change, in such ways as fighting poverty and social exclusion through close cooperation with social partners and other civil society organisations; |
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2.9.2.

| 2.9.3. | invest more in skills, stimulate people’s creativity and entrepreneurship throughout their lives, particularly through education, upskilling and lifelong learning geared towards the processes of the technological, green and digital transformation, and significantly improve the level of formal education in regions where it is still unsatisfactory, including in rural areas and marginalised regions. In doing so, particular attention should be paid to improving the lifelong learning situation in small and medium-sized enterprises and for irregular workers; |
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2.9.3.

| 2.9.4. | increase investment in R & D, thereby supporting innovation that can help less developed regions to grow, as well as the overall system for supporting them at regional level, as under the smart specialisation strategies (5); |
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2.9.4.

| 2.9.5. | respond effectively to demographic changes, in such ways as supporting the employment of people belonging to groups with lower employment rates, such as young people without sufficient work experience, older people, people with lower professional skills and migrants from outside the EU; |
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2.9.5.

| 2.9.6. | strengthen cross-border and interregional cooperation, particularly in developing climate-friendly railway infrastructure in border areas and consistently maintaining open borders between Member States, even in times of crisis; |
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2.9.6.

| 2.9.7. | strengthen urban-rural links, including in order to ensure all EU citizens access to services of general interest, which are often concentrated around urban areas; |
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2.9.7.

| 2.9.8. | ensure that the use of funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility is fully compatible with the implementation of cohesion policy through the proper use of resources, including by closely coordinating the use of resources from different funds; |
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2.9.8.

| 2.9.9. | streamline cohesion policy for beneficiaries through simplification and flexibility in implementing the funds that should be used to achieve its objectives. It is also necessary to build on the experience of applying simplifications under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and to pay particular attention to make sure that small civil society organisations are able to acquire, implement and account for projects financed by cohesion policy more easily. |
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2.9.9.

| 2.10. | Enlargement of the Schengen area in the countries that are not already in and which are respecting all the legal requirements will have and direct impact on consolidating complementarity, competitivity and cohesion of the EU development, especially in the East of Europe. |
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2.10.

3.   Specific comments

3.1.   Uneven progress in convergence: A ‘two-speed Europe’?

| 3.1.1. | It is absolutely essential that the pandemic crisis does not lead to the creation of a ‘two-speed Europe’ when it comes to convergence. The principle of additionality should therefore be applied with caution. Furthermore, ex ante conditionalities during the 2021–2027 programming period which introduce a number of circumstances that must exist in order for the funds to be mobilised must not lead to the exclusion of regions that do not have the possibility to obtain alternative funding for economic growth, climate policy and social development. |
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3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | There is still a need to transfer resources from richer to poorer regions. The process of economic and social convergence should mean convergence with the best. |
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3.1.2.

3.2.   New risks for cohesion policies

| 3.2.1. | The UN has warned that the movements of refugees due to climate change will become more frequent. It is necessary to have new regulatory frameworks and new policies that allow their settlement in host countries, guaranteeing employment and social protection. The recent proposal for a Regulation on crisis and force majeure (6) does not contemplate these situations of environmental crisis that will cause millions of people to travel to the EU, and even within the EU. |
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3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | High rate of increasing food prices will create a supplementary risk for vulnerable regions and persons of the EU and thus a concern for the Cohesion Policy. |
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3.2.2.

3.3.   The need to strengthen the coordinating role of the European Union institutions

| 3.3.1. | The pandemic crisis has shown that in order to reinforce territorial, economic and social cohesion, it is necessary to strengthen the coordinating role of the EU institutions, including in areas where the Treaties do not provide for EU powers. This applies in particular to crisis situations. While the European Commission has played a very positive role in supplying Member States with COVID-19 vaccines, it was the Member States themselves, generally without bilateral or EU-level consultations, that introduced restrictions on movement within the Schengen area and across the EU. The criteria for these restrictions were also set at national level. The EESC has already criticised such practices (7), stressing that maintaining open borders in the Schengen area is a key issue both for the functioning of the common market and for rebuilding and increasing resilience, as well as for fostering European solidarity and identity. The Committee believes that the pandemic crisis has shown that territorial, economic and social cohesion should be accompanied by political cohesion. |
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3.3.1.

3.4.   Social inclusion as a prerequisite for the success of cohesion policy

| 3.4.1. | The number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion in the EU increased by five million in 2020 as a result of the pandemic crisis. This poses a serious threat to social cohesion and therefore also to achieving the EU’s development and climate objectives. It is clear that cohesion policy should continue to serve these objectives and aim to support economic growth and competitiveness. However, at the same time, it should implement all 20 principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) fully and consistently. The implementation of the EPSR should be combined with social and civil dialogue, as well as the social involvement of employers and workers. Particular attention should be paid to support for children and young people, including in the area of education. |
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3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | The EESC underlines the importance of the impact of social security systems, which, despite the structural differences in the Member States, are an essential factor in achieving social cohesion and social inclusion of citizens. Furthermore, strengthening social security is part of the fight against poverty and exclusion and is based on common EU values. |
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3.4.2.

3.5.   The role of the social economy, volunteers and services of general interest in the implementation of cohesion policy

| 3.5.1. | The Committee has already stressed (8) that social economy actors create and maintain high-quality jobs, promote equal opportunities, including for people with disabilities and other socially disadvantaged groups, ensure a high level of social participation and fairness and support the digital transformation and environmental protection. |
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3.5.1.

| 3.5.2. | The fact that the social economy is a strategic ally in the process of strengthening the social dimension in Europe, and thus in achieving the objectives of social cohesion, has become particularly evident during the pandemic crisis. Therefore, measures relating to the social economy should have specific support from European funds under cohesion policy. |
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3.5.2.

| 3.5.3. | Non-profit social enterprises and similar non-profit organisations should also be reinforced by providing special treatment in public procurement rules compared to public or commercial bidders. This should be the case for public procurement of services of general interest, in particular health, social and education services, especially as one of the core elements of social enterprises and non-profit organisations is often the unpaid involvement of volunteers who, in some Member States, account for over 2 % of GDP. |
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3.5.3.

| 3.5.4. | From the social cohesion perspective, it should also be stressed that ‘volunteering has a value for individuals, communities, the environment, the economy and society at large as one of the most visible expressions of solidarity. It promotes and facilitates social inclusion, builds social capital and has a transformative effect on society’ (9). |
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3.5.4.

3.6.   Cohesion policy, climate transition and employment

| 3.6.1. | After the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, the European Union, and the rest of the world, must face a climate and environmental emergency. If the pandemic crisis had not happened, the fight against the environmental emergency would be the main objective of the European Union, within the framework of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (10). In a recent own-initiative opinion (11), although focused on the field of education, the EESC reminded the European Commission and the Member States that they must better connect environmental policies with employment policies. |
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3.6.1.

| 3.6.2. | However, the transition to a decarbonised economy also requires measures that facilitate a fair transition for the most vulnerable groups and geographical areas, since the climate emergency is a high-risk factor in terms of cohesion, due to the unequal effect it will have on different European geographical areas. The transition towards a more ecological production model that is socially beneficial will only be achieved by promoting the ecological transition of companies, work methodologies and the labour market in general. These efforts will create decent employment opportunities, increase resource efficiency, and build long-term, low-carbon, sustainable societies. |
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3.6.2.

| 3.6.3. | For all these reasons, it is necessary to take into account policies, recommendations and guidelines that can contribute to improving the capacity of Member States, their laws and their policies to face the opportunities and challenges of the ecological transition and decarbonisation through a Just Transition Strategy, which serves as an action guide to optimise benefits and minimise risks regarding employment, working conditions and social protection. |
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3.6.3.

| 3.6.4. | Access to affordable housing, capacity to assure a decent life for youth and their families, assuring a work and personal life ethical balance, stable employment opportunities, adequate working conditions and financial and digital inclusiveness are important for youth and the future of the EU sustainable development. |
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3.6.4.

| 3.6.5. | However, more steps must be taken to complement the Just Transition Fund, particularly at regional level, in order to protect and guarantee high-quality jobs. The role of social dialogue and the full engagement of the social partners is very important in this regard, including through their conclusion of collective agreements. Moreover, the Cohesion Policy should approach instruments such as collective bargaining for reducing inequalities and supporting sustainable development. |
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3.6.5.

3.7.   Digital transformation and education

| 3.7.1. | Cohesion policy will increasingly be linked to the digital transformation. However, as the Commission’s report highlighted, only 2/3 of urban residents and 1/6 of rural residents have access to very high-speed internet connections. The EESC has already stressed (12) that the digital transformation must not only lead to growth in productivity, but also to improvement of education and participation in political, social and cultural life for the whole EU population, including older people, people with disabilities, people at risk of social exclusion and other disadvantaged groups. Therefore, the EESC again calls for access to high-speed broadband internet for all EU residents to be provided for free as a public service, It should be noted that one way to guarantee a successful digital transformation is universal access to the internet and educational opportunities related to it. Free internet access is particularly important in order to ensure the proper functioning of education in rural areas, which in many Member States is not on a par with educational establishments in cities. |
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3.7.1.

3.8.   Cohesion policy and the quality of governance and rule of law

| 3.8.1. | For many years, the Committee has observed that in some Member States there is a need to improve coordination at regional level, or indeed to establish effective regional governance as a bridge between national and local government, able to delineate regional strategies which are important for regional development and convergence. Central government is frequently unable to interpret the needs and priorities of the regions, but in some cases it does not give the requisite powers to regional authorities, which merely provide a sounding board for the national political authority, without any added value for the region (13). In this context, European Union funds should also be used better to build the capacity of local and regional public authorities. |
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3.8.1.

| 3.8.2. | Furthermore, in many cases the participation of social partners and other civil society organisations in decision-making is marginal: the opinions of the entities that best understand the real situation and issues are not taken into account during consultation. |
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3.8.2.

| 3.8.3. | Another concern, which has also been raised by civil society representatives, is the deterioration of the rule of law in some Member States, which indirectly has a negative impact on the quality and effectiveness of cohesion policy measures. |
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3.8.3.

| 3.8.4. | The EESC calls on the Member States and the EU’s regions to involve the social partners and other civil society organisations as broadly and genuinely as possible in shaping cohesion policy and monitoring its effects. This inclusion will also help measure the extent to which cohesion policy objectives have been achieved, which should not be based solely on quantitative indicators, but also on quality indicators that help measure development and not just growth. |
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3.8.4.

3.9.   Management of cohesion policy funds and projects

| 3.9.1. | The above considerations also apply to the planning, implementation and monitoring of programmes linked to implementing cohesion policy and to the process of selecting projects to be implemented. In this context, attention should be paid to the increasing fragmentation of public policies, which runs counter to a comprehensive, bottom-up approach to solving problems through cross-industry projects. Those involved in social and civil dialogue at regional and local level should play an important role in planning and coordination, as they know what the real needs are and how they can be met. Projects should be planned in such a way as to ensure flexibility in achieving their objectives, and the people managing these projects should have access to efficient channels of communication with the holders of European Union funds. Creating a clear synergy between the project contracted and the new economic realities concerning increased energy and raw material prices should be a preoccupation for delivering a proper absorption rate. |
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3.9.1.

| 3.9.2. | Instruments such as Integrated Territorial Investments should be promoted, better financed and extended in the 2021–2027 programming period. |
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3.9.2.

| 3.9.3. | Action should also be taken to limit bureaucracy, in particular by examining the results that were obtained and not the way they were obtained, since the latter entails complex administrative procedures both for beneficiaries and public administrations. In this context, the EESC calls on the European Commission to make sure that its regular assessment of the administrative costs of managing EU funds in specific Member States and the related assessments of unjustified increases of requirements for using the funds (gold plating) at national or regional level lead to consequences for those Member States and regions. |
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3.9.3.

3.10.   Implementing the partnership principle

| 3.10.1. | It is extremely important for the Commission to continuously monitor implementation of the partnership principle in the Member States. The legal basis for this principle is Article 8 of the new framework regulation (14), and its implementation is described in the European Code of Conduct on Partnership, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 (15). It is based on close cooperation between the public administrations of the Member States in planning and implementing programmes co-financed by the European Union with a wide range of partners, particularly the social partners and other organisations representing civil society. The full and transparent application of this principle has a positive effect on increasing public engagement and civil society involvement, as well as on planning more relevant and complementary actions, thus promoting a more effective and efficient use of the EU’s budget. In this context, the EESC welcomes the fact that the European Commission has drawn up a document on implementing the partnership principle in the 2021–2027 programming period in order to review the European Code of Conduct on Partnership. |
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3.10.1.

3.11.   Cohesion Forum

| 3.11.1. | The Committee welcomes the results of the 8th Cohesion Forum, which took place on 17–18 March 2022, with the participation of civil society organisations and the EESC itself. |
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3.11.1.

| 3.11.2. | The EESC has repeatedly proposed (16) that cohesion policy and the European funds supporting it should be examined annually in the context of a dedicated European Summit. In this context, the Committee stands ready to organise an annual event dedicated to implementing cohesion policy, with the participation of representatives of the social partners and other civil society organisations alongside the European Council meeting. |
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3.11.2.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  COM(2022) 109 final.

1

(2)  COM(2022) 145 final.

2

(3)  COM(2022) 109 final.

3

(4)  COM(2022) 145 final.

4

(5)  https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/informat/2014/smart_specialisation_en.pdf

5

(6)  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum (COM(2020) 613 final).

6

(7)  OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 45.

7

(8)  OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 131.

8

(9)  EESC opinion on Volunteers — Citizens building the future of Europe (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 19).

9

Volunteers — Citizens building the future of Europe

(10)  https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/

10

(11)  EESC opinion Towards an EU strategy for enhancing green skills and competences for all (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 56, 16.2.2021, p. 1).

11

Towards an EU strategy for enhancing green skills and competences for all

(12)  OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 45.

12

(13)  OJ C 248, 25.8.2011, p. 68.

13

(14)  Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159).

14

(15)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds (OJ L 74, 14.3.2014, p. 1).

15

(16)  OJ C 248, 25.8.2011, p. 68, OJ C 242, 23.7.2015, p. 43.

16

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/62 |
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26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/62

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a European approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability’

(COM(2021) 770 final)

‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts’

(COM(2021) 773 final)

(2022/C 323/11)

| Rapporteur: | Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ |
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| Co-rapporteur: | Mariya MINCHEVA |

Rapporteur:

Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ

Co-rapporteur:

Mariya MINCHEVA

| Referral | European Commission, 21.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 3.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 204/2/4 |

Referral

European Commission, 21.1.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

3.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

204/2/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC calls again on the European Commission and the Member States to strengthen adult learning (AL) policies to make quality and inclusive AL for life skills a right for all adults in order to meet and exceed the target of 60 % of AL participation per year. The effective implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) also requires addressing skills mismatches and improving governance and financing for AL, including employee training. It is also important that investments, necessary reforms and effective social dialogue aiming to foster skills development, in line with the first principle of the EPSR on the right to training and lifelong learning (LLL), are embedded in the context of the European Semester. |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC recalls the importance of its previous opinions on LLL and AL in relation to the initiatives on individual learning accounts (ILA) and micro-credentials (MCs). In particular, it stresses that ‘upskilling and reskilling are of the utmost importance in supporting the green and digital transitions of industries and they need to be seen as a social and economic responsibility to ensure inclusive training for quality jobs, and a just transition for all. Forward-looking industrial strategies, including effective skills policies, are needed to support upskilling and reskilling of the workforce. These can help ensure a just and socially fair transition to a climate-neutral economy through balancing the labour market that contributes to inclusive digitalisation and high-quality jobs. Companies need effective support to strengthen and finance their strategies for upskilling and reskilling their workforces to encourage innovation. At the same time, the overall economic and social interest should be respected. Collective agreements should determine access to different types of paid education leave for workers’ personal and professional needs’ (1). Where paid leave is not agreed between social partners and follows a government initiative, this should be financed by public resources. |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | The rapid invention and spread of new technologies needs to be accompanied by effective upskilling and reskilling. Investment in AL and skills development can play a crucial role in economic recovery and building social Europe. Individual learning accounts can only be one of the approaches and financial tools considered by EU Member States and social partners. The proposed measures should not replace: the existing forms of training provision put in place by employers and public and private employment services; public support for education and training institutions; or other types of support. In particular, training funds managed by social partners are an effective way to provide training in response to needs identified at national and sectoral level. |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | The supply of a sufficiently skilled workforce and improved employability is a key condition for businesses and society to prosper and grow, to employ people, and to contribute to the policy objectives set by the European Union. Already today, there are skills mismatches and labour shortages across several sectors and regions and these will continue to grow. In this regard, Member States and employers have an important role to play in financing and incentivising participation in training. Skills development must match the needs of the labour markets if Europe is to strengthen its long-term competitiveness and capacity to drive innovation, which is important for businesses and employees alike. |
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1.4.

| 1.5. | Workers face numerous obstacles in accessing training. If individuals are given more control over their own training, it is important to ensure that they receive effective guidance and support to choose and to access training courses that are relevant to their needs. This would also ensure optimal investment in training as the training would closely match the identified needs of each individual. In the case of job-oriented training, a purely individualised approach may weaken the link between the financing and content of training provision thereby potentially resulting in training being less job-oriented and thus insufficiently tailored to employers’ needs. |
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1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC agrees with the tripartite ACVT opinion when it states that there is a need to tailor the conditions for access and entitlement to training to different situations and realities through an appropriate mix of arrangements. The EESC calls on the Commission to respect the division of competences and the principle of subsidiarity, as well as the national specificities and legal frameworks of each Member State. When adopting and implementing the proposals for ILA and MCs, these must be compatible with the existing CVET systems of the Member States, with the role of collective bargaining, the regulation of working conditions and holiday entitlements for employees. |
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1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC calls on the Commission and the Member States to respect existing national and sectoral instruments and funding schemes, and to differentiate between ‘right/entitlement’, terms which are still not defined by law or collective agreements in some countries and sectors, and ‘training account’. The EESC asks that the proposals ensure that all adults, especially the most vulnerable, have the right to access effective, quality and inclusive employee training, paid educational leave, full qualification, validation of informal and non-formal learning, and guidance and counselling. Member States are asked to improve their AL and CVET systems where necessary, following effective social dialogue and consultation with relevant stakeholders. The EESC welcomes the fact that ILA can be used for training, validation and career guidance. |
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1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC underlines the importance of quality standards in the training market, particularly with regard to MCs, and the possible advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to financing AL (e.g. ILA), including the cost-benefit relationship, the administrative burden and costs, achieved status change (higher formal qualification level), quality assurance, the labour market relevant outcome, the added value for career development and the participation rate of the key target group of low-qualified people. The EESC regrets that the Commission did not carry out an impact assessment on MCs as the proposal can have an impact on existing national arrangements, especially on qualifications and on collective agreements. In this regard, it is necessary to ensure effective social dialogue and effective consultation, including with organised civil society, on whether and how the European initiatives on ILAs and MCs can be of added value in improving national and sectoral training systems. |
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1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC stresses that the VET providers’ catalogue of MCs should be established with the involvement of the social partners and education and training providers based on the quality standards of the provision. The catalogue should include the learning outcomes of the MCs and their recognition by other education and training providers and by employers. |
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1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC recalls the importance of paid educational leave (2) also in line with ILO 140 (ratified in 11 Member States (3)), and notes that the proposal on ILA should be compatible with national systems when it asks the Member States to design ILA systems for labour market purposes only, as in several Member States paid education leave can also be used for the purposes of personal development or to complete a study programme (e.g. university degree). |
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1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC reminds the Commission and Member States that the effective involvement of the social partners in the governance of AL, employee training and paid educational leave systems is essential, including promoting joint actions among the social partners. It also stresses the importance of consulting the relevant civil society organisations on AL. |
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1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC calls on the Commission to support the exchange of good practices and mutual learning between Member States, with the involvement of the social partners. The focus should be on how best to ensure effective access to training and how to improve Member States’ AL systems and skills strategies in particular, as well as their financial mechanisms and types of training, including MCs. The EESC also asks for the tripartite ACVT to be involved in the follow-up to the proposals and for it to take an active role in reporting on the implementation of the initiatives and in setting up the monitoring framework in cooperation with the Employment Committee. |
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1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC calls on the Member States to link the initiatives on ILA and MCs to the implementation of the Council Recommendation of 19 December 2016 on Upskilling Pathways: New Opportunities for Adults (4). This would ensure that all low-skilled and low-qualified adults could develop their basic skills and professional skills and that they were guided and motivated to participate in training to improve their life and employability and to ensure that 80 % of adults have basic digital skills. |
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1.13.

| 1.14. | The EESC reiterates that ILA and similar financial systems need to support access to recognised and validated training courses and to allow workers to participate in processes to have their skills and work experience validated. MCs need to be recognised by the relevant authorities with the involvement of the social partners. The EESC calls for the effective implementation of the Council Recommendation on the Validation of non-formal and informal learning (5) and for sufficient public funding to be allocated to validation systems in every EU country. By ensuring that training is recognised, employers and unions can help workers improve their qualifications and can contribute to their career development and a just transition in the labour market. |
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1.14.

| 1.15. | The EESC considers it important that the initiatives address the upskilling and reskilling needs of adults and the workforce as a whole (workers/employees/self-employed persons) as well as other target groups (e.g. the long-term unemployed, inactive individuals, and specifically persons returning to work after parental leave (6), people with disabilities, retired people, women, young people under 30 and NEETs) so that they have effective access to quality and inclusive training. The specific situation of non-standard workers and the self-employed needs to be addressed urgently and appropriately, respecting the key role of social partners in terms of employee training. The role of companies in supporting their workers’ training is essential, as is that of the Member States in providing resources to ensure access to AL. As 90 % of job-related training in the EU is funded by employers (7), their commitment to and positive role in skills development needs to be fully acknowledged and supported by the EU. |
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1.15.

| 1.16. | The EESC calls on Member States to explore possible instruments for portability of ILAs, for instance establishing bilateral agreements. The EESC requests the inclusion of a ‘governance system with the involvement of the social partners’ among the EU’s quality standards for MCs and asks for MCs to be considered alongside full qualifications and employee training. The EESC asks for training providers to publish catalogues of the MCs they offer, including the learning outcomes, and their policy on the recognition of micro-credentials by other providers and companies. Improving access to all forms of quality and inclusive education and training (including MCs) for all learners, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups is important to ensure equal access to full study programmes and qualifications. Efficient support (financial and non-financial) must be provided to people in non-standard forms of work, to enable them to access courses, including MCs, for professional development and mobility, ensuring the accessibility and usability of training materials and tools, whether they are virtual or not according to Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8). |
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1.16.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | On 10 December 2021 the European Commission published the Commission proposal for a Council Recommendation on Individual Learning Accounts (9) and Commission proposal for a Council Recommendation on Micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability (10). These initiatives aim to support the EPSR Action Plan which sets a new target whereby at least 60 % of all adults should participate in training every year by 2030. This is in order to ensure that everyone has ‘the right to quality and inclusive education, training and lifelong learning’ (principle 1), ‘regardless of the type and duration of the employment relationship’ (principle 5), including ‘the right to transfer training entitlements during professional transitions’ (principle 4). It is also important for investments, necessary reforms and effective social dialogue aiming to foster skills development, in line with the 1st principle of the European Pillar of Social Rights on the right to training and lifelong learning, to be embedded in the context of the European Semester. |
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2.1.

| 2.2. | In order to contribute to the proposal on individual learning accounts, on 16 August 2021 the tripartite Advisory Committee on Vocational Training (ACVT) of governments and social partners adopted an opinion on individual learning accounts and strengthening training provision across Europe (11). This tripartite opinion reiterates that ‘The COVID-19 pandemic, digitalisation and decarbonisation are having an enormous impact on the European economy, industries, and the European workforce who are facing a very challenging adaptation to rapidly changing work. The pandemic has accelerated structural changes in many sectors, increasing the pace of the green and digital transformations. This is allied to the ongoing challenges of demographic change, new training needs and skills mismatches’. The tripartite opinion also highlights that ‘taking into account all the realities of the labour market, [...] there is a need to tailor the conditions for access and entitlement to training to different situations and realities through an appropriate mix of arrangements’. |
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2.2.

| 2.3. | The 2021 European social partners project on skills, innovation and training also identifies among its findings that ‘Enterprises and workers play a crucial role in innovation and the development of new skills and competences provided by employee trainings, and which are crucial for adapting to a changing environment. Therefore, the provision of, and access to, employee training that responds to employers’ and workers’ needs for developing innovative technologies and business models and that enables workers to find and maintain jobs in line with their skills, expectations and competences is vital’ (12). To this end, a key challenge is to make the different tools available, including vouchers, paid educational training leave (by law or through collective agreements), personal training accounts or training funds (cross-industry or sectoral), inter-operable and aligned with the country-specific institutional framework (13). |
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2.3.

| 2.4. | National legislation and/or collective agreements ensure an individual’s right to education and training, including AL and training, and paid educational leave for work-relevant training in some Member States. Across Europe, social partners, social dialogue and collective bargaining play a key role in facilitating employees’ effective access to training in different ways in each country. They may consider existing national and/or sectoral level or other alternative approaches to an ILA model to be better suited to fostering training provision within the national context. The effective involvement of national and sectoral social partners in this regard should be respected and ensured. |
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2.4.

| 2.5. | Diverse legal and/or collective bargaining frameworks reflect the choice of each Member State to adopt and implement its own training policies and build on existing financing mechanisms. In this manner, an individual learning account can only be one of the approaches and financial tools considered by EU Member States and social partners. A one-size-fits all approach will not work and Member States’ different training systems and distinctive sectoral traits must be respected. The decision on whether or not to adopt the ILA as one of the mechanisms for providing and financing training must remain fully within the competence of the Member States in the same way the training market is regulated at national level. The EESC underlines that Member States, in consultation with social partners, also have the freedom to decide not to adopt an ILA approach and could instead adapt or further develop their existing approaches to training provision. |
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2.5.

| 2.6. | The EESC recalls that ‘The measures outlined in this Recommendation should not replace training provision by employers, by public and private employment services, public support for education and training institutions or other types of support’ (14). The EESC agrees that the Recommendation ‘should not prevent [the Member States] from maintaining or establishing more advanced provisions on adult learning/training than those recommended’ (15) in the Recommendation and that it ‘should not limit the autonomy of the social partners where they are responsible for setting up and managing training schemes’ (16). |
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2.6.

| 2.7. | The EESC refers back to its recent opinion (17) which points out that ‘the rapid invention and spread of new technologies need to be accompanied by effective upskilling and reskilling. The EESC underlines that the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on Europe’s society and economy further highlighted the importance of effective education and training policies and high-quality jobs in supporting a sustainable and just social and economic recovery and resilience, which is crucial in helping Europe overcome the consequences of the pandemic. Investment in AL and skills development can play a crucial role in economic recovery and a social Europe’. |
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2.7.

| 2.8. | The EESC recalls that the obstacles for adults and workers to access training are numerous, including lack of time, insufficient financing, motivation, quality guidance and counselling, sometimes a lack of available quality training, support from the workplace (replacement) especially in SMEs, and lack of respect of work-life balance. Placing individuals in the driving seat of their own training is important when there is an assurance of effective support for them to access and pursue labour market-relevant training. This includes supporting individuals by providing advice and guidance on suitable types of training. Workers need access to company-based training and low-skilled workers need targeted support especially in relation to online training. ‘Online training offers many opportunities to expand access to AL, but low-skill workers may lack the skills to make the most of this kind of training and may need extra support’ (18). |
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2.8.

| 2.9. | In order to tackle different obstacles to training access and increase the motivation of adults to participate in training, barriers should also be considered from the point of view of the individual’s employment and education status. The instrument should be supported with the provision of effective guidance and counselling. The outreach strategy needs to be improved. In order to reduce the existing skills mismatch, training needs must be identified in advance and training courses must be properly targeted. Comprehensive learning support systems are also necessary to ensure stronger synergies between financial incentives, guidance services, and access to validation and recognition procedures (19). |
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2.9.

| 2.10. | The EESC is concerned that a purely individualised approach may weaken the link between the financing and content of training provision thereby potentially resulting in training being less job-oriented and thus insufficiently tailored to employers’ needs. As 90 % of job-related training in the EU is funded by employers (20), their commitment and positive role for skills development needs to be fully acknowledged and supported by the EU. Social partners have a key role to play, jointly, in fostering training provision and participation. In particular, training funds managed by social partners are an effective way to provide training in response to identified needs at national and sectoral level. The financial and non-financial contributions of individuals should be recognised and supported. |
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2.10.

| 2.11. | The EESC recognises the complementary role that MCs can play in broadening access to upskilling and reskilling while taking into account evolving labour market needs. The EESC also welcomes the fact that Member States are encouraged to link MCs to their employment policies, including active labour market policies, in order to help reduce skills mismatches in sectors and regions while respecting access to full qualifications. Concerning the ‘stackability’ of MCs, the EESC underlines that MCs should not be seen as a substitute for full qualifications. Member States should therefore be encouraged to include MCs in national qualification frameworks. The social partners should be involved in designing this at national level and in thinking about how MCs can be recognised and added to partial qualifications. |
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2.11.

| 2.12. | Micro-credentials can be important in helping adults upskill and reskill or transition to new job opportunities when the quality standards of MCs are well-defined and made clear to the learners. While MCs could be a form of training that is accessed through a potential ILA, they should be viewed as separate to an ILA and as part of the toolbox of additional tools for continuous learning. The EESC also welcomes the fact that among the providers of MCs, the draft recommendation acknowledges the social partners and invites Member States to promote the development of MCs designed and approved by employers’ and workers’ representatives through social dialogue. |
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2.12.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1. | Free movement of workers can help with addressing the challenges of skills mismatches and shortages. Regulations on qualification requirements must remain a national competence with the involvement of the social partners, for example, in the validation of skills, including MCs, and while reducing the number of regulated professions. The better matching of skilled third country nationals with unfilled job vacancies across qualification levels and years of work experience can also play a role. The Commission’s upcoming skills and talent package (21), including the possible scenarios for an EU Talent Pool can play an important role in this regard. |
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3.1.

| 3.2. | Collective agreements are an important means through which the provision of paid educational leave can foster workers’ access to labour market-relevant training. Such agreements play a particularly important role in identifying the ways of accessing paid educational leave for workers in SMEs who typically experience a greater loss of productive capacity while workers are absent due to training. It is important to stress that legislative initiatives at the EU or national level must not undermine the collective bargaining process or the autonomy of the social partners in finding solutions to issues that are important for well-functioning national labour markets, including solutions for skills development and transitions, and quality jobs for workers in the context of the just transition. |
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3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC underlines the importance of quality standards in the training market, particularly with regard to MCs and the possible advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to financing AL, e.g. ILA, including the cost-benefit relationship, administrative burden and costs, achieved status change (higher formal qualification level), quality assurance, labour market relevant outcome, added value for career development and level of participation rate of the key target group of low qualified people. This is necessary in order to ensure effective social dialogue and effective consultation, including with organised civil society, on whether and how the European initiatives on ILAs and MCs can be of added value in improving national and sectoral training systems. The EESC stresses that the VET providers’ catalogue of MCs should be established with the involvement of the social partners and education and training providers based on quality standards of the provision. The catalogue should include the learning outcomes of the MCs and their recognition by other education and training providers and by employers. |
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3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC considers it important that the initiatives address the upskilling and reskilling needs of adults and of the workforce as a whole (workers/employees/self-employed persons) and other target groups (e.g. the long-term unemployed, inactive individuals, people with disabilities, retired people and NEETs) so that they also have access to quality, effective and inclusive training that supports their employability. In this regard, Member State support in ensuring resources for accessing AL is essential. In parallel, the role of companies in supporting their workers’ job-relevant training remains vital. The particular situation of non-standard workers and the self-employed, which cannot be solved by ILA and MCs alone, needs to be addressed urgently and appropriately, while respecting the key role of social partners in terms of employee training. |
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3.4.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  OJ C 374, 16.9.2021, p. 16.

1

(2)  OJ C 374, 16.9.2021, p. 16.

2

(3)  ILO official data available here: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::p11300_instrument_id:312285

3

(4)  OJ C 484, 24.12.2016, p. 1.

4

(5)  OJ C 398, 22.12.2012, p. 1.

5

(6)  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658190/IPOL_STU(2020)658190_EN.pdf

6

(7)  Adult learning statistical synthesis report, EC, 2020/082020.

7

(8)  Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of the websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies (OJ L 327, 2.12.2016, p. 1).

8

(9)  COM(2021) 773 final.

9

(10)  COM(2021) 770 final.

10

(11)  https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1223&furtherNews=yes&newsId=10081

11

(12)  BusinessEurope: ‘Skills, innovation and the provision of, and access to training’.

12

(13)  Cedefop's financing adult learning database.

13

(14)  COM(2021) 773 final.

14

(15)  COM(2021) 773 final.

15

(16)  COM(2021) 773 final.

16

(17)  OJ C 374, 16.9.2021, p. 16.

17

(18)  OECD: ‘Building back better: enhancing equal access to opportunities for all’.

18

(19)  Cedefop (2020), Empowering people to cope with change.

19

(20)  Adult learning statistical synthesis report, EC, 2020/082020.

20

(21)  Foreseen for April 2022.

21

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/69 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/69

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA’

(COM(2021) 782 final — 2021/0411 (COD))

‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on automated data exchange for police cooperation (“Prüm II”), amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council’

(COM(2021) 784 final — 2021/0410 (COD))

‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum’

(COM(2021) 890 final — 2021/0427 (COD))

‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders’

(COM(2021) 891 final — 2021/0428 (COD))

(2022/C 323/12)

| Rapporteur: | Krzysztof BALON |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Krzysztof BALON

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 3.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 210/3/4 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

3.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

210/3/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The Russian military aggression against Ukraine, in the immediate vicinity of the EU's external borders, is an unpredictable game changer. Given the immensity of its encompassing and supposedly long-lasting impacts at all levels, also resulting in an unprecedented number of refugees — the largest since World War II — it constitutes, historically, the greatest threat to the functioning of the Schengen area and the security of the European Union as a whole. |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC highly appreciates the first activation of Council Directive 2001/55/EC (1) (‘Temporary Protection Directive’) in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2). Moreover, the Committee wants to encourage the Commission to consider broadening the usage and the activation of the Directive for third country nationals in future severe and urgent crisis situations. The current activation of the Directive could well be used to develop solidarity mechanisms among the Member States. |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | In this context, the EESC strongly supports an urgent need for effective, genuine, humane — and humanitarian — common European regulations on migration, asylum and security cooperation in an open, but equally secure Schengen area, in full accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Committee highly encourages better conditions for all refugees. |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | The consequences of the war are also a threat for the European model of the social market economy as well as for the freedom and rights of EU citizens and other inhabitants. The EESC encourages preserving and valuing the Schengen area as it is currently constituted, to guarantee not only the free movement of human beings, but also the functioning of the Single Market. |
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1.4.

| 1.5. | During the COVID-19 crisis, many Member States introduced border controls and other restrictions against freedom of movement without any efforts to coordinate and properly justify such restrictions at European level, even though, as already stated in a previous opinion, maintaining open borders is crucial for the full functionality of the Single Market, for recovering and increasing resilience, and for fostering European solidarity and identity. This also demonstrates the need for a ‘real time’ decision-making mechanism at the inter-institutional level in crisis situations. In any case, the EESC fully supports the Commission's position to maintain internal borders open, even during crisis situations. Any travel restrictions between Schengen states imposed as a result of crisis situations should be temporary, and not exceed possible travel restrictions inside Member States. |
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1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC fully agrees with the Commission’s position that the use of police checks and cooperation, including information exchange and communication, have the potential to yield the same results as temporary internal border controls, and are less intrusive to the free movement of persons, goods, and services. In this context, the Committee welcomes the setup of an informal expert group composed of experts from each Member State to advise and support the Commission in the monitoring and application of the Directive on information exchange between the law enforcement authorities of Member States; the EESC proposes to include relevant and representative civil society organisations, as well as the Committee itself, in the work of this informal expert group. |
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1.6.

| 1.7. | Also in this context, the EESC stresses the absolute need for the maintenance of the judiciary's independence, in particular in cases of the physical presence of the judicial bodies at the location of the Single Point of Contact. Moreover, civil society organisations (especially ‘watch dogs’ or those working in the area of the protection of vulnerable groups, including migrants), should enjoy special protection with regard to providing information by Single Points of Contact. |
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1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC acknowledges the ambitious data collection activities to be developed by the Member States in the framework of Prüm II. Prüm II goes a considerable step further than Prüm I, by requiring Member States to build technical installations for facial profiling. In this context, the Committee is concerned about the danger of influencing digital data exchange, especially, given the recent non-transparent war situation in Europe. |
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1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC calls for the introduction of more thorough and frequent control mechanisms to ensure high ethical standards when collecting and storing data by Europol, particularly in relation to third countries, as well as for setting clear time limits on the storage of this data. The EESC recommends the regular monitoring of Europol activities by civil society organisations and other relevant and potentially affected actors. |
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1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC fully acknowledges the fundamental rights of people arriving at European and Schengen borders, and their principle right to ask for entrance permission and the right to apply for asylum. It once again wants to recall respect of the right of non-refoulement. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC calls for Member States to take over shared responsibility, as introduced with the flexible solidarity mechanism in the New Pact for Asylum and Migration. They should be proactive in offering solidarity to other Member States, above all in crisis situations. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC particularly notes the indispensable positive role of respective civil society organisations providing humanitarian help for migrants being instrumentalised by third countries, and, moreover, supporting and providing information about the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers. The organisations' access to migrants and asylum-seekers in the affected border areas should always be guaranteed. Such organisations should be entitled to receive effective and simplified financial support under European funding such as the Emergency Assistance of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC proposes installing large-scale education and awareness raising programmes to enhance the public understanding of migration as a generally positive phenomenon for receiving societies, coordinated centrally, and implemented by each Member State. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | This opinion is being drafted in a time of the historically greatest threat to the functioning of the Schengen area and the security of the European Union, caused by the Russian military aggression against Ukraine in the immediate vicinity of the EU's external borders. This war situation, being also a source of unprecedented numbers of migrants and refugees, the largest since World War II, once again underlines the tremendous importance of external border security and the stability of the Schengen area, as a precondition of internal security, and, moreover, the need for effective, genuine, humane — and humanitarian — common European regulations on migration and asylum. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The Schengen area is home to more than 420 million people across 26 countries. The removal of internal border controls between Schengen member states is an integral part of the European way of life: almost 1,7 million people reside in one Schengen member state and work in another. People have built their lives around the freedoms offered by the Schengen area, with 3,5 million people crossing between Schengen member states every day. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | On 20 October 2021 the Committee adopted its opinion on the Commission's ‘Strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area’ (3). The Committee welcomed this Strategy, believing that the Commission should take a stronger stance in support of borderless travel in Europe. The EESC stressed that Member States' security concerns are better addressed with more and strengthened cooperation and coordination between law enforcement authorities than with the reintroduction of controls at internal borders. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | At the same time, the Committee wants to reiterate its concern about the continued exclusion from full application of the Schengen acquis of the Member States Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. Together with the Commission, it calls for swift and decisive action from the Council in this regard. Moreover, the Committee wants to encourage the Commission to finalise the evaluation of the application of the Schengen acquis with Cyprus as well. The Committee reiterated also, that when implementing EU policy for border management, interoperability, migration and asylum management as well as for police and criminal justice cooperation, the EU and its Member States were at all times bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | In the framework of the implementation of the Strategy, in December 2021, the European Commission proposed updated rules to reinforce the governance of the Schengen area (4). The targeted changes will bring greater EU coordination and better equip Member States to deal with emerging challenges when managing both the EU's common external border and internal borders within the Schengen area. The update seeks to ensure that reintroducing internal border controls remains a measure of last resort. The new rules also introduce common tools to manage the external borders more efficiently in the event of a public health crisis, building on the lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic. The instrumentalisation of migrants is also addressed in the update to the Schengen rules, as well as through a parallel proposal for measures Member States can take in the fields of asylum and return in such a situation (5). |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The updated rules were published in the form of five proposals concerning the Security Union and the Schengen agreement. Given the non-legislative character of one of the proposals, the present opinion focuses on four proposals, namely on a directive on information exchange between the law enforcement authorities of Member States (6), on a regulation on automated data exchange for police cooperation (7), on a regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (8) and on a regulation amending the Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (9). |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | Nevertheless, the EESC strongly believes that the additional, specific and temporary measures and amendments introduced in all parts of the Schengen package and focused on an effective management of borders will respect the right and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the freedom of movement and residence (Art. 45), as well as the right to asylum (Art. 18) and the principle of non-refoulement (Art. 19), as clearly stressed in the proposals. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | As stated elsewhere (10), the narrative of migration and security implicit in the proposed documents needs to be reframed prudently. The configuration of migration as a threat, and the discourse that presents migrants as a danger, dehumanise human beings and only favour those who want to take advantage of them for geostrategic or national political reason. Migration has to be seen as a positive value. Immigrants have become indispensable and increasingly needed contributors to our societies and economies. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

3.   Specific comments regarding the Security Union package

3.1.   Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States (COM(2021) 782 final)

| 3.1.1. | The overall objective of this proposal is to legislate on organisational and procedural aspects of information exchange between law enforcement authorities in the EU with a view to contributing to the effective and efficient exchange of such information, hence protecting a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | The EESC fully agrees with the Commission's position that the use of police checks and cooperation, including information exchange and communication, have the potential to yield the same results as temporary internal border controls, and are less intrusive to the free movement of persons, goods and services. At the same time the EESC supports the Commission's view that such measures must fully comply with fundamental rights, including data protection requirements in line with existing EU legislation. As stated earlier (11), there must be a better balance between the fundamental rights of individuals enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the need for better law enforcement in combating and prosecuting crime, in order to ensure a climate of security and justice across the EU. Any imbalance or violation of fundamental rights should be carefully monitored and reported by EU agencies and external actors. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | Consequently, the Committee welcomes the setup of an informal expert group composed of experts from each Member State to advise and support the Commission in the monitoring and application of the Directive, including in the preparation of Commission guidance papers. In this context the EESC proposes to include relevant and representative civil society organisations as well as the EESC itself in the work of the informal expert group. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

| 3.1.4. | The EESC wants to reiterate considering and including in the monitoring of data exchange, the baseline of the information to be exchanged: the definitions of a (serious) criminal offence (12) as well as ensuring that all sides, those requesting as well as those responding, follow these same definitions and same baselines for it. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

| 3.1.5. | In the context of the capabilities of Single Points of Contact including having at their disposition judicial authorities competent to grant necessary judicial authorisations at all times, the EESC stresses the absolute need and obligation for the maintenance of the judiciary's independence. In practice, this may be particulary important in cases of the physical presence of the judicial bodies or their representatives at the location of the Single Point of Contact. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.5.

| 3.1.6. | Civil society organisations, especially those such as ‘watch dogs’ or working in the area of the protection of vulnerable groups, including migrants, should enjoy special protection with regard to providing information by Single Points of Contact, because of a high probability of undue harm to the vital interests of such legal persons. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.6.

3.2.   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on automated data exchange for police cooperation (‘Prüm II’) (COM(2021) 784 final)

| 3.2.1. | Building on the framework of the existing Prüm (Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA (13) and 2008/616/JHA (14), including the Prüm Convention), the proposal for Prüm II aims at ‘reinforcing and modernising the framework and allowing interoperability with other EU information systems’. Eventually, the initiative should create a new architecture ‘that allows for easier and faster exchange of data between Member States and that ensures high level of data protection of fundamental rights’. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | The EESC acknowledges the ambitious data collection activities to be developed by the Member States. Building on the experiences with the implementation of Prüm I, it shows the time-intensity for Member States to establish the required data collection tools. Prüm II goes a considerable step further with requiring Member States to build technical installations for facial profiling, which is so far only partially present in Member States. Reaching a comparable level of data collection in all Member States may take a lot of time, and create difficulties in ensuring interoperability, a concern which has been stated before (15). The Committee, moreover, is particularly concerned about the danger of influence on digital data exchange given the recent urgent, chaotic and non-transparent war situation in Europe. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

| 3.2.3. | As stated earlier (16), the protection of personal data, under the appropriate legal frameworks, needs to be respected at all times, especially when highly sensitive personal data, such as under the Prüm Decisions, is concerned. The EU and the EESC commented on a general outline for a sufficiently sensitive treatment of data within Europe (17). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

| 3.2.4. | The EECS highlights that particularly the EU-wide mandatory creation of facial profiling data banks and the exchange of such data, even if in the form of record numbers and encrypted formats, needs to be treated with tremendous delicacy. The European Parliament with 2020/2016(INI) (18) has recommended to step back and be cautious with facial profiling tools, not least as recording and sharing facial images of individuals brings those in danger to be recognisable. Thus, the EECS views the proposal for a self-evident establishment of national data banks for facial images as well as their Union-wide exchange between participating Member States with great anxiety. It calls for a high-level scrutinising of proportionality and confidentiality in terms of protecting personal data. Although the EESC fully recognises the general objective of this proposal resulting from the Treaty-based goal of contributing to internal security in the EU, the application of facial profiling could be considered to be non-mandatory. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.4.

| 3.2.5. | Further, the EESC is worried about the proposal to exchange police records between all Member States, even if partially anonymised in terms of record numbers and encrypted in their transfer. Law enforcement agencies in different Member States appear to have different standards for defining and registering suspects and criminals. An exchange upon request for data match thus may depend on the assessment of individual police officers. This may lead to situations where suspects in one Member State, e.g. in relation to activities for refugee rights, enter the criminal record of another Member State. Here, the rights of access and storage need to be clearly confidential and restricted so as not to endanger fundamental rights in a disproportionate way. Moreover, there should be solid and shared criteria established for defining a (serious) crime and criminal suspects. The rules already established have to be respected and enforced in this respect (19). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.5.

| 3.2.6. | The EESC solicits the introduction of more thorough and frequent control mechanisms to ensure an ethical collection, above all in relation to third countries, and storage of Europol data, as well as setting clear time limits on this storage of data. As stated earlier, a central role of Europol in the European architecture of above all cross-border criminal prevention and the fight against crime, including in terms of data exchange, is welcome; however, this role needs to be reviewed independently and evaluated including by civil society, social partners and relevant stakeholders, especially those groups and individuals whose lives could be wrongly or unjustifiably affected by law enforcement activities (20). Europol has been repeatedly accused of lumping together data of suspects and criminals together with those of other private persons (21). Particularly, it needs to be ensured that there is no inadequate overlap with migration and asylum issues. The EESC recommends a regular monitoring of Europol activities by civil society organisations and other relevant and potentially affected actors, moreover, proposing to put transparency mechanisms in place. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.6.

4.   Specific comments regarding the Schengen Package

4.1.   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (COM(2021) 891 final)

| 4.1.1. | The Schengen area comprises an area where European Union citizens and non-EU citizens legally residing in the territory, as well as goods and services, can travel without being subject to internal border controls. Schengen is an essential element of the area of freedom, security and justice and a key element for the functioning of the Single Market. Its creation has brought significant social and economic benefits to European society. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.1.

| 4.1.2. | While large scale public health emergencies, like pandemics, may be considered as a serious threat to public policy, they must not be considered as a reason for reintroducing border controls in the Schengen area. Such action does not appear to be a constructive measure. The same should apply to the exercise of police or other public powers in the internal border areas, being de facto equivalent to those border controls. Any travel restrictions between Schengen states on the basis of large scale public health emergencies should not exceed possible travel restrictions inside Member States. Otherwise the whole concept of an area without controls at internal borders: a ‘part of Europe's DNA’ (22) will be undermined. Moreover, such regulations can weaken efforts in favour of a common European health policy, especially in the area of epidemic control. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.2.

| 4.1.3. | The EESC welcomes the Commission's attempt to introduce new procedural safeguards in the event of unilateral reintroductions of internal border controls. The proposal wishes to clarify and expands the list of elements that must be assessed by a Member State when taking a decision on a temporary reintroduction or the prolongation of border controls. The Commission will be required to issue an opinion on the proportionality and necessity of these decisions and launch a consultation process with the Member States. The EESC urges the further clarifying of the procedural safeguards introduced, above all by defining a clear time limit for potential prolongations. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.3.

| 4.1.4. | In this context the EESC considers the distinction between ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ travel in the Schengen area as also posing a serious threat to the foundations of Schengen. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.4.

| 4.1.5. | The EESC fully supports, and furthermore solicits the Commission's position, that the limitation of the border crossing points or their opening hours should take full account of the rights of third-country nationals seeking international protection. An effective access to border points must be ensured as well as an effective protection of the right to asylum. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.5.

| 4.1.6. | This relates to the EESC's concern that persons apprehended at the internal borders should be treated with dignity and informed about their rights instead of legalising forms of internal pushbacks. Such approach runs a high risk of open floodgates for uncontrollable racial profiling. It should be of utmost priority to ensure the free movement of persons within the Schengen area. Controls should be conducted by adequately trained and authorised personnel only. Their actions should be independently monitored at random. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.6.

| 4.1.7. | The EESC stresses that checks conducted within internal as well as at external border areas using monitoring and surveillance technologies should be reviewed regarding their proportionality. Civil rights organisations could support with reviewing and monitoring activities. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.7.

| 4.1.8. | The Committee understands the Commission's aim with respect to Article 13 of establishing a common procedure for Member States to control and surveil their EU's external and Schengen borders. However, there is no mention of access to a rightful procedure to seek asylum or alternative forms of access for migrants, nor of any legal counselling related. The EESC urges that the fundamental rights of persons reaching the European and Schengen borders and their principle right to ask for entrance permission and the right to apply for asylum always be respected. In particular, vulnerable persons, medical cases and minors must be received and potentially transferred with cautiousness. As stated before the EESC is highly concerned about the violations reported at external borders (23); at the same time, it acknowledges the Commission's strengthened monitoring activities respectively (24). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.8.

| 4.1.9. | The EESC reiteratedly encourages the Commission to actively make use of its enforcement powers under the Treaties in situations where there is a lack of follow-up to deficiencies found during Schengen Evaluations (25). Priority should be given to systemic practices that violate fundamental rights norms. This is of particular importance when it comes to vulnerable migrants. Notably, the Commission should not solely rely on the findings of the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, but also monitor the fundamental rights situation itself actively with reference to international law and with the support of civil rights organisations. Moreover, a dedicated staff of the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), as well as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) should be active at the external borders to supervise the observance of fundamental rights. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.9.

4.2.   Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (COM(2021) 890 final) (26)

| 4.2.1. | Given the crisis at some parts of the external EU border in 2021 and before, this proposal aims at setting up a ‘specific emergency migration management procedure, and, where necessary, providing support and solidarity measures to manage in an orderly, humane and dignified manner the arrival of persons having been instrumentalised by a third country, with full respect for fundamental rights.’ The EESC acknowledges the specific circumstances which required the European Commission to take an effective action; however, it reiterates its concern about introducing and normalising rapid measures in the treatment of vulnerable migrant persons without having enough time and space to ensure their rights (27). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.1.

| 4.2.2. | Moreover, the revised Schengen rules recognise the important role that Member States play at the external borders on behalf of all Member States and the Union as a whole in situations where migrants are instrumentalised for political purposes. The EESC acknowledges this role, but stresses that the protection of the EU or Schengen borders cannot be fulfilled by Member States at the external borders only. It calls for Member States to proactively support the solidarity mechanism proposed herein, but above all take over shared responsibility, as it has been introduced with the flexible solidarity mechanism in the New Pact for Asylum and Migration. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.2.

| 4.2.3. | While the Committee acknowledges the need to provide specific guidance for situations of particular nature, it needs to be stressed that the proposed definition of ‘instrumentalisation’ remains fairly vague. The Committee urges that this approach be scrutinised in order to avoid a potential abuse of the concept in terms of an over-extensive application. Moreover, it recalls that the given treaties for asylum and situations of crisis do provide for fundamental guidelines and measures. The EESC urgently stresses the fundamental rights of persons and above all the principle of non-refoulement need to be respected under all circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.3.

| 4.2.4. | The EESC stresses that a quasi-externalisation of the asylum procedure to the outer EU border in an ad hoc manner may be hard to monitor and implement with sufficient scrutiny and a fundamentally rights-oriented approach, particularly regarding the pre-entry screening capacities of Members States, which have been criticised already elsewhere (28). It needs to be ensured that the affected Member State has the necessary capacity and installations to manage the emergency situation in an adequate way. Support by other Member States through the solidarity mechanism, by central EU Agencies, above all EUAA, as well as NGOs and relevant international organisations such as the UNHCR, should thus be offered and accepted in a proactive way and not upon request of the affected Member State only. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.4.

| 4.2.5. | The EESC particularly notes the indispensable positive role of civil society organisations providing humanitarian help for migrants being instrumentalised by third countries, including food, water, clothing, adequate medical care and temporary shelter, and moreover supporting and providing information about the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers. The organisations' access to migrants and asylum-seekers in the affected border areas should always be guaranteed. Such organisations should be entitled to receive effective and simplified financial support under European funding, like the Emergency Assistance of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.5.

| 4.2.6. | In this context, it is of utmost importance not to soften the principle of non-refoulement, but to ensure people's rights and access to legal support and a rights-based procedure implemented by knowledgeable and capable personnel under the observation of UNHCR and EUAA. As stated elsewhere, the Committee sees the Commission’s focus on irregular migration and so-called voluntary or forced return, with great concern (29). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.6.

| 4.2.7. | Moreover, it should be ensured that alternative reasons for entry, such as family reunification, are to be taken into consideration. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.7.

| 4.2.8. | The EESC worries about the aspect of accommodation of migrants and asylum-seekers during their registration process in particular. It needs to be ensured that Member States are able to accommodate persons in the most proper and dignified way without detaining them as a matter of course. A massive restriction of the freedom of movement of the persons concerned should be avoided. Civil society and humanitarian organisations should be allowed access for monitoring. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.8.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12).

1

(2)  Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection (OJ L 71, 4.3.2022, p. 1).

2

(3)  COM(2021) 277 final.

3

(4)  COM(2021) 891 final.

4

(5)  COM(2021) 890 final.

5

(6)  COM(2021) 782 final.

6

(7)  COM(2021) 784 final.

7

(8)  COM(2021) 890 final.

8

(9)  COM(2021) 891 final.

9

(10)  EESC opinion SOC/707 (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 90).

10

(11)  OJ C 367, 10.10.2018, p. 84.

11

(12)  OJ C 367, 10.10.2018, p. 84, par. 4.3.

12

(13)  Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1).

13

(14)  Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime (OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12).

14

(15)  OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 108.

15

(16)  OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 108.

16

(17)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European strategy for data (COM(2020) 66 final), adopted 18 September 2020; and EESC opinion (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 290).

17

(18)  European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on artificial intelligence in criminal law and its use by the police and judicial authorities in criminal matters (2020/2016(INI)) (OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 17).

18

(19)  Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89) (‘Law Enforcement Directive’); and NIS Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1) (‘NIS Directive’).

19

(20)  OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 66.

20

(21)  A data ‘black hole’: Europol ordered to delete vast store of personal data, Fotiadis, Apostolis et al., The Guardian 10 January 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/10/a-data-black-hole-europol-ordered-to-delete-vast-store-of-personal-data

21

(22)  Communication ‘A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area’ (COM(2021) 277 final).

22

(23)  OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 108.

23

(24)  OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 108.

24

(25)  OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 108.

25

(26)  For further differentiation cf. EESC opinion REX/554 (not yet published in the Official Journal).

26

(27)  OJ C 123, 9.4.2021, p. 15.

27

(28)  OJ C 123, 9.4.2021, p. 15.

28

(29)  OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 86.

29

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/77 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/77

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation

(COM(2021) 759 final — 2021/0394 (COD))

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 2003/8/EC, Council Framework Decisions 2002/465/JHA, 2002/584/JHA, 2003/577/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA, 2009/829/JHA and 2009/948/JHA, and Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards digitalisation of judicial cooperation

(COM(2021) 760 final — 2021/0395 (COD))

(2022/C 323/13)

| Rapporteur: | Maurizio MENSI |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Maurizio MENSI

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 3.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 198/0/1 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

3.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

198/0/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC supports the Commission’s approach and the objectives pursued through this proposal for a regulation. However, believes that adequate safeguards in the following areas need to be provided: a) security and confidentiality, given the sensitive nature of the issues covered in the various hearings; b) open justice, that is to say, the system envisaged must ensure compliance with the open justice principle in terms of participation, observation and accessibility; and c) digital divide, in order to ensure accessibility for all in terms of support measures and technologies. This is to prevent poor digital skills, limited access to technology, and low levels of literacy and legal knowledge increasing the barriers to accessing digital services and thwarting the stated aims. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | It is essential to ensure the security of the technological systems used and the confidentiality of the data involved — especially personal data — given the sensitive nature of certain types of court hearings. It is also fundamental that the online platform to be used be accurately assessed. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | It must also be ensured that no data be processed by the entity in charge of the operational management of the system components, and that an adequate bandwidth be available, since the slightest interruption or inconsistency could hinder the system’s ability to provide an adequate service. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | It is essential that systems, networks and data be adequately protected against possible cyber-attacks, guaranteeing the integrity of the data they carry and store, on the basis of current data protection and cybersecurity rules. The IT systems and digital communication technology in question must also be accessible in accordance with the requirements of the European Accessibility Directive (1) and the Directive on the accessibility of the websites of public administrations (2), and in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 13 December 2006. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The system envisaged must ensure compliance with the open justice principle (in terms of participation, observation and accessibility) in relation to access to the justice system in general, and with specific regard to public hearings. Accessibility for all must therefore be ensured, in terms of support measures and technology. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | It is essential that natural and legal persons retain the option of using paper-based communication channels, and that information is provided in an accessible format in order to ensure access to justice for all, including vulnerable people, minors, and those in need of technical assistance, who live in remote areas, or who otherwise do not have access to digital means or possess the necessary skills. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | Training legal practitioners in Union law is an essential tool for ensuring the correct and effective application of the regulation. This requires organising timely and targeted training activities for all legal practitioners involved in the activities envisaged under the proposed regulation. In particular, specific training focused on the needs of suspects, the accused, witnesses or vulnerable victims is necessary, in order to ensure proper access to justice via digital means. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | In essence, the proposed measures seem likely to improve the efficiency of the judicial system by reducing and simplifying administrative burdens, reducing the time and cost of dealing with cases, and must result in a better and more equal access to justice. In this regard, the EESC believes that, subject to the above, the proposed measures benefit cross-border trade and the competitiveness of the European economic and social system. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   General comments

2.1.   Content of the Regulation

| 2.1.1. | The proposed regulation establishes the legal framework for electronic communication in the context of procedures for cross-border judicial cooperation in civil, commercial and criminal matters, and access to justice in civil and commercial matters with cross-border implications, as provided for under existing law. |
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2.1.1.

| 2.1.2. | It also lays down rules on the use and recognition of electronic trust services, on the legal effects of electronic documents, and on the use of videoconferencing or other accessible distance communication technology for the hearings of persons in civil, commercial and criminal matters. However, the regulation does not cover the procedure for the taking of evidence in civil and commercial matters, and does not introduce new procedures. |
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2.1.2.

| 2.1.3. | In order to be secure and reliable, it is based on a decentralised IT system consisting of interoperable IT systems and access points operating under the responsibility and management of each Member State and of EU agencies and bodies, through which cross-border exchanges between the respective authorities of the Member States take place. |
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2.1.3.

| 2.1.4. | A European electronic access point is envisaged for the European e-justice portal, which is part of this decentralised IT system, and which may be used under the same conditions by all natural and legal persons for electronic communications with courts and competent authorities in civil and commercial matters with cross-border implications. |
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2.1.4.

| 2.1.5. | Member State courts and competent authorities will therefore be obliged to accept electronic communications in judicial proceedings, which are considered equivalent to paper communications. However, natural persons are free to opt for electronic or paper-based means of communication, which cannot be rejected by the competent authorities. |
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2.1.5.

| 2.1.6. | The regulation also lays down conditions for the use of videoconferencing or other distance communication technology in cross-border civil and commercial proceedings. Furthermore, it lays down rules on the hearings of a suspect, accused or convicted person and of minors by videoconference or other distance communication technology. |
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2.1.6.

2.2.   Background

| 2.2.1. | The legislative initiative is based on the premise that natural and legal persons should be able to exercise their rights and comply with their obligations in a swift, cost-efficient and transparent manner, free from discrimination of any kind. Obtaining effective access to justice within a reasonable time is also a crucial aspect of the right to a fair trial, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (3). |
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2.2.1.

| 2.2.2. | A number of instruments already exist at EU level to strengthen judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters. These include instruments relating to communication between authorities, and, in certain cases, communications with EU agencies and bodies dealing with Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). However, most of these instruments do not provide for the use of digital communications and, even where they do, there remains a lack of secure and reliable channels, or the non-recognition of electronic documents, signatures and seals. |
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2.2.2.

| 2.2.3. | The health emergency has also shown that events of force majeure affect and have an impact on the normal functioning of Member States’ judicial systems due to the total lockdown of the population in such cases. Judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border disputes in the EU have also been affected by the health emergency, which has highlighted the need to ensure secure, continuous and resilient communication, also to avoid disrupting the smooth running of economic activities. |
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2.2.3.

| 2.2.4. | In this respect, the rules in the proposal aim to improve both access to justice under the same conditions, and the efficiency and resilience of communication flows related to EU judicial cooperation. The use of digital technologies eases the administrative burden on judicial systems by shortening case-handling times, making communications more secure and reliable, and automating case management. |
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2.2.4.

| 2.2.5. | The Commission’s initiative also stems from the need to avoid the development of IT solutions at national level leading to fragmented solutions that are not compatible with the need to ensure uniform action at EU level. |
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2.2.5.

| 2.2.6. | The proposal for a regulation was preceded by the Communication on the digitisation of justice in the EU of December 2020, which modernises the legal framework on EU cross-border procedures in civil, commercial and criminal law, in line with the ‘digital by default’ principle, recognising the need to avoid all forms of social exclusion. This proposal comes on top of the proposal for a regulation on a computerised communication system for cross-border civil and criminal proceedings (the ‘e-CODEX’ system) (4), and is consistent with the eIDAS regulation (5) as it introduces provisions on the use of trust services. In June 2021, the Commission also adopted a proposal amending the eIDAS Regulation to establish a framework for a European digital identity (6). |
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2.2.6.

2.3.   Specific comments

| 2.3.1. | The EESC supports the Commission’s approach and objectives. However, the EESC deems it essential that the following points be safeguarded. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.1.

2.4.   Data processing and cybersecurity

| 2.4.1. | The implementation of the Regulation entails establishing and maintaining a decentralised IT system consisting of a network of national IT systems and interoperable access points operating under the responsibility and management of each Member State, EU institution or agency, for the secure and reliable exchange of information across borders. It is important to ensure that the data are not stored or processed by the entity in charge of the operational management of the system components, and that the hardware used is able to support the IT system. The EESC welcomes the provision whereby the Commission will provide reference implementation software that Member States may choose to use, where Member States have not already developed appropriate national IT systems. |
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2.4.1.

| 2.4.2. | The availability of adequate bandwidth (an expensive component of video link services) is important. The recommended bandwidth is at least 1,5-2 megabits per second for IP networks (or at least 384 kilobits per second for ISDN networks). Video link systems should be designed with the highest possible bandwidth capacity, and even for systems with the highest capacity, consideration should be given to the reliability and performance of the network connection, as the slightest interruption or inconsistency may hinder the system’s ability to provide a good service. |
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2.4.2.

| 2.4.3. | The EESC therefore points to the need to ensure technical standards for the digital communication used, and to protect systems, networks and data from cyber-attacks, bearing in mind that the two systems have completely different paper-based and digital vulnerabilities, and thus systems and networks must be protected by guaranteeing the integrity of the data they carry and store, on the basis of current data protection rules. The IT systems and digital communication technology in question must also be accessible in accordance with the requirements of the European Accessibility Directive, and the Directive on the accessibility of the websites of public administrations and companies of public interest. |
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2.4.3.

| 2.4.4. | As already pointed out by the EESC in its opinion SOC/573, Interoperability package, of 23 May 2018 (7), given the sensitive nature of the information exchanged, it is essential to ensure both compliance with data protection rules and the security of the data and systems involved. |
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2.4.4.

| 2.4.5. | Video transmissions in both criminal proceedings and in civil and commercial matters should be secured against unlawful interception by third parties, using technical means proportionate to the case. In this regard, compliance should be ensured with both the existing cybersecurity rules and the content of the proposed NIS 2 directive (8). |
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2.4.5.

2.5.   Training

| 2.5.1. | The EESC emphasises that training legal practitioners in Union law is an essential tool for ensuring the correct and effective application of the regulation. In order to prepare legal practitioners for future challenges, the Commission has adopted a European judicial training strategy for 2021-2024 (9) to train them in the use of digital tools in their daily work. To this end, it is essential to organise timely and targeted training activities for all legal practitioners involved in the activities envisaged under the proposed regulation. |
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2.5.1.

| 2.5.2. | In particular, specific training focused on the needs of suspects, the accused, witnesses or vulnerable victims is necessary, in order to ensure that they have proper access to justice via digital means. |
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2.5.2.

2.6.   Digital and paper-based tools

| 2.6.1. | The proposed regulation aims to enable natural and legal persons to communicate with the courts and competent authorities via digital means, free from discrimination of any kind, and take part in hearings via videoconference or other accessible distance communication technology without any specific additional costs beyond those for computer use and access to the internet. |
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2.6.1.

| 2.6.2. | The EESC considers it essential that natural and legal persons retain the option of using paper-based communication channels, and that information is provided in accessible formats in order to ensure access to justice for all, including vulnerable people, minors, and those in need of technical assistance, who live in remote areas, or who otherwise do not have access to digital means or possess the necessary skills. |
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2.6.2.

| 2.6.3. | With specific reference to videoconferencing, which has been systematically introduced in many countries and which is also used for judicial cooperation, it should be noted that according to the European Court of Human Rights, although it is not contrary to the Convention for defendants to participate in proceedings via videoconference, its use must have a legitimate purpose (10). Courts using videoconferencing should therefore continue to improve the quality of videoconferencing and apply video signal encryption to avoid eavesdropping. In its opinion (2011)14 on justice and information technologies (IT), the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) stresses that the introduction of IT in courts in Europe should not compromise the human and symbolic faces of justice. If justice is perceived by users as being purely technical, without performing its real and fundamental function, it risks being dehumanised. |
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2.6.3.

| 2.6.4. | In the United States, video links are mainly used for what are called ‘bail hearings’ to save costs and avoid the risks of transporting defendants from prison to court. Researchers at Northwestern University studied the amount of bail money set before and after the advent of videos, and concluded that videoconferencing increased bail amounts by an average of 51 % (11). Video transmission actually has a dehumanising effect, and puts defendants at a visual and auditory disadvantage. In immigration hearings, if people appear on video, they are more likely to be deported than if they appear in person, and the same is true for asylum seekers. What people in court can see and hear is also important. The audio function of some videoconferencing technologies uses a medium bandwidth filter that cuts off low- and high-voice frequencies, which are typically used to convey emotion, as detailed in a 2015 US Department of Justice-funded report on video hearings. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.4.

| 2.6.5. | Regarding the software used, it should be noted that the availability of open-source software solutions that are comparable in reliability and accuracy to the best industrial products offers the advantage of allowing direct ‘implementation’ on data centres and networks or on infrastructure collectively managed by or with the public administration. This solution would avoid the risks of cross-border flows within or outside the EU linked to cloud solutions of non-European companies (thus avoiding the application of the US Cloud Act). |
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2.6.5.

2.7.   Improving efficiency and competitiveness

| 2.7.1. | The EESC agrees with the Commission that the use of digital communication tools between courts and competent authorities in Member States can undoubtedly contribute to greater efficiency in the judicial system, as it is intended to reduce delays and administrative burdens, simplifying and speeding up the exchange of information between authorities, and reducing the time taken to process cases, as well as related costs. It should be noted that distance communication during the health emergency has made it possible to continue ensuring access to justice, helping to guarantee its quality, efficiency and independence, which are essential elements underpinning the rule of law and the values on which the European Union is founded. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.1.

| 2.7.2. | The EESC also believes that having efficient judicial systems is fundamental for implementing European law, as highlighted in the European Commission’s communication on the EU Justice Scoreboard 2019 of 26 April 2019, which provides an annual overview of indicators relevant to the independence, quality and efficiency of judicial systems, based on data from the Council of Europe’s Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.2.

| 2.7.3. | As such, the possibility for natural and legal persons involved in cross-border operations to benefit from better and more equal access to justice, lower costs, and faster procedures for enforcing their rights will bring benefits for cross-border trade, and generally improve the competitiveness of the economic system. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.3.

| 2.8. | In conclusion, the EESC notes that the proposal should provide adequate safeguards with respect to the following:






  a) | Security of the technology used: security and confidentiality are crucial, given the sensitive nature of some court hearings. It is also essential that IT experts carefully assess the online platforms used. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.8.

a)

Security of the technology used: security and confidentiality are crucial, given the sensitive nature of some court hearings. It is also essential that IT experts carefully assess the online platforms used.

| b) | Open justice: the system envisaged must ensure compliance with the open justice principle (in terms of participation, observation and accessibility). |
| --- | --- |

b)

Open justice: the system envisaged must ensure compliance with the open justice principle (in terms of participation, observation and accessibility).

| c) | Digital divide: poor digital skills, limited access to technology and low levels of literacy and legal knowledge can increase barriers to accessing digital services and thwart the stated aims. Therefore accessibility for all must be ensured, in terms of support measures and technology. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Digital divide: poor digital skills, limited access to technology and low levels of literacy and legal knowledge can increase barriers to accessing digital services and thwart the stated aims. Therefore accessibility for all must be ensured, in terms of support measures and technology.

Brussels, 19 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 70).

1

(2)  Directive (EU) 2016/2102 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 on the accessibility of the websites and mobile applications of public sector bodies (OJ L 327, 2.12.2016, p. 1).

2

(3)  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391).

3

(4)  COM(2020) 712 final.

4

(5)  Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 73).

5

(6)  COM(2021) 281 final.

6

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee SOC/573 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems (borders and visa) and amending Council Decision 2004/512/EC, Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, Council Decision 2008/633/JHA, Regulation (EU) 2016/399 and Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 (COM(2017) 793 final — 2017/0351 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems (police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration) (COM(2017) 794 final — 2017/0352 (COD)) (OJ C 283, 10.8.2018, p. 48).

7

(8)  COM(2020) 823 final.

8

(9)  COM(2020) 713 final.

9

(10)  Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 5 October 2006, Marcello Viola vs. Italy. Right to a fair trial — Importance of the defendant’s presence in the proceedings.

10

Marcello Viola vs. Italy

(11)  Kirchner, L., ‘How fair is Zoom-Justice?’, The Markup, 9 June 2020.

11

The Markup

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/83 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/83

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — A more inclusive and protective Europe: extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime

(COM(2021) 777 final)

(2022/C 323/14)

Rapporteur:
  Cristian PÎRVULESCU

Co-rapporteur:
  Milena ANGELOVA

| Referral | European Commission, 1.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 3.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 211/1/5 |

Referral

European Commission, 1.3.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

3.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

211/1/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC is deeply worried about the development of hate speech and hate crime in Europe over the last decade. Numerous studies and consultations indicate a serious increase in incidents, and an increasing number of individuals and groups exposed to hate-based attacks. The work of organised civil society in Europe also bears witness to these growing tendencies — the organisations are targeted themselves, and they face a growing need to assist and protect the individuals and communities threatened. |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC supports the initiative of the Commission and encourages the Council and the Parliament to fully cooperate in defending the core values of the EU. The EESC considers that hate speech and hate crime are areas of crime that meet the criteria set out in Article 83(1) of the TFEU. A decision by the Council to define it as such will allow the subsequent setting of minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and penalties in this area of crime. |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | More specifically, on the basis of available evidence, the EESC considers that there is a significant and worrying development of hate-based crimes, that there is a clear cross-border dimension at the level of drivers, enablers and impact and that these types of crimes cannot be efficiently prevented and combated in the absence of EU-level legislative and institutional action. |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | Along with the European Court of Human Rights, the EESC considers that when acts that constitute serious offences are directed against a person’s physical or mental integrity, only efficient criminal law mechanisms can ensure adequate protection and serve as a deterrent factor. |
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1.4.

| 1.5. | Hate speech and hate crime must be combated irrespective of where the expression or action takes place, i.e. whether it is in the context of work, public manifestations, hobbies, private or public services, etc. More targeted actions can be considered where hate-based incidents are more likely. A more general objective, pursued through various means and instruments, would be to make public spaces in Europe free of hate speech and hate crime. |
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1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC calls for the Commission to also pay attention to and explore direct and indirect impacts of hate speech and hate crime on the conditions for entrepreneurship and employment, and their implications for economic and social development. |
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1.6.

| 1.7. | Specific attention should also be paid to the awareness and skills of people in professions with an essential role in combating hate speech and hate crime, for example teachers, journalists and law enforcement personnel. For law enforcement personnel, following best practices from EU Member States, the information and training should be compulsory and part of an overall strategy to strengthen the capacities of involved institutions. |
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1.7.

| 1.8. | Victims’ access to information and to the special protection measures given to the most vulnerable victims of crime under the Victims’ Rights Directive should be properly guaranteed. |
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1.8.

| 1.9. | Civil society organisations, including social partners, also play an essential role in combating hate speech and hate crime: on the one hand as societal watchdogs, and on the other hand as promoters of the value-based way of acting in their own activities. They should be protected and supported in their role in making places, communities, groups, organisations and media safe from hate and discrimination, including through promoting voluntary codes of conduct and sharing good practices. More financing is needed to mobilise their capacities and expertise in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The importance of safe online interactions should be stressed. The development of social media platforms and online forums created a space in which some believe they can act with impunity. There is a pressing need to work with national regulators and social media platforms to ensure that online hate is swiftly identified, and eliminated and investigated. |
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1.10.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | The EESC acknowledges the integral part of protecting dignity, fundamental rights and equality in the design of the EU and the democratic regimes of the Member States. Democracy, and the EU in itself, are not possible if people are living in fear and shame, if they are harassed or attacked while living, working, studying or participating in society and politics. With the spread of social media, hate and stigmatisation are gaining traction easier and more quickly and the risk to children and youngsters is constantly growing. There is no choice but to strongly and actively prevent and combat the spread of hate speech and hate crime. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | In the context of the military aggression of the Russian Federation on Ukraine, an act that the EESC fully condemns, there is an increase in disinformation and the spread of hate speech in Europe. This is not new and the EU members became more aware and resilient in the face of it. The Russian Federation makes efforts to create confusion, spread propaganda and delegitimise the support for democracy and human rights. Preventing and combating hate speech and hate crime is thus an existential responsibility for the EU and the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | To efficiently combat hate speech and hate crime, a common basis is indispensable. European societies are intertwined, and freedom of movement creates an increasingly integrated social and public sphere. Member States have the main tools to fight hate speech and hate crime, but their success is unlikely without a clear commitment, cooperation and synergy, with proper EU legislative instruments in place and coordinated definitions, approaches and opportunities for policy learning and transfer. All of the efforts to this end should respect the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The EESC has stated, on many occasions, that the EU and the Member States must act more decisively to protect fundamental rights and combat the whole range of discriminatory and hate-based behaviours. In this respect, it recommends that the Commission align the proposal with other key policy documents like the New Strategy for the Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, A Union of equality: EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025, the Equality Strategies on Gender and LGBTIQ, the Roma Strategic Framework, the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life, the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Strategy on Victims’ Rights. |
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2.4.

| 2.5. | The Commission’s proposal comprehensively identifies the characteristics that individuals and groups exposed to hate speech and hate crime might share: race, ethnicity, language, religion, nationality, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, sex characteristics or any other fundamental characteristic, or a combination of such characteristics. We should also add any ideological and political reasons, and also other conscience related beliefs and values. The EESC considers that risks and threats should also be mapped and addressed in relation to their social and cultural context. Existing and new research could indicate what the most common situations are in which hate speech and hate crime happen. |
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2.5.

| 2.6. | Hate speech and hate crime may target entrepreneurs or the personnel of an enterprise, for example, those serving customers. This has a damaging impact both on the individuals and on the enterprise in question. Hate speech and hate crime may also have an indirect negative impact on the general business and economic environment by increasing uncertainty, instability and conflicts. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The EESC considers that there is a great need for awareness-raising and education on understanding the impacts and seriousness of hate speech and hate crime and on identifying and combating them in everyday life. This applies to people of all ages: children, young people and adults alike. All awareness raising and education (info materials, training, products) should be provided in accessible formats. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Specific attention should also be paid to the awareness and skills of people in professions with an essential role in combating hate speech and hate crime. For example, teachers have an important role to play in the behavioural education of school children. Journalists play a unique role from the point of view of freedom of expression. Law enforcement personnel, police, prosecutors, judges and civil servants play a central role in dealing with cases and developing a preventive legal framework and other measures. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | Politicians have the core responsibility of the overall system of the rule of law and fundamental rights. Their responsibility starts from the moment they ask the support of the citizens, and unfortunately some politicians and parties do it by spreading fear and targeting minorities and social groups. This type of electoral mobilisation is dangerous and must be curbed. With even more serious effects, while holding public office, some politicians could be tempted to use institutional and legal instruments to promote discrimination or avoid fighting it. The EESC urges all political leaders and parties to act responsibly, in the framework and the spirit of inclusive democracy. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | Related to that, leaders of political parties or even heads of governments, who are supposed to guarantee the civility of the public space, have also indulged in insults and verbal attacks against journalists, taking the risk of provoking violence against them. The EESC urges political leaders and parties to respect journalists and media organisations and refers to a solemn acknowledgment of the gravity of that issue made by the four international Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | Civil society organisations, including social partners, also play an essential role in combating hate speech and hate crime: on the one hand as societal watchdogs, and on the other hand as promoters of the value-based way of acting in their own activities. Voluntary codes of conduct and the sharing of good practices should be encouraged and promoted. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | The EESC highlights the important role local and regional authorities have in preventing and combating hate crimes. They are the closest to the communities and can monitor if such risks and incidents might become reality. They also can harness the power of solidarity and empathy, through community and educational programs, with the support of central governments, civil society organisations and social partners. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | It is the responsibility for states to create an enabling environment for the rights to freedom of expression, equality and non-discrimination. States can take positive policy measures to tackle discrimination, to address the root causes driving hate. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1. | The facts and arguments set out in the Commission’s Communication seem to be valid in assessing that hate speech and hate crime fulfil the criteria set for EU crimes, including their seriousness, scale and development, as well as their cross-border dimension. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The Communication rightly describes the serious nature of hate speech and hate crime, based on the fact that they run counter to EU common values and fundamental rights, and due to their harmful impacts on individuals, communities and society at large. EU values work for an open society, which is important for people, businesses and organisations. Equality is deeply rooted in EU values, and the equality of opportunities lays the groundwork for social progress. Diversity and pluralism are an integral part of it. Equality acts as a source of innovation and generates economic added value. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Considering the growing efforts by Member States to address hate speech and hate crime in their criminal law, and the need to avoid fragmentation between Member States and to enhance a level playing field across the EU, a common EU criminal framework seems reasonable in addressing hate speech and hate crime, while respecting the national juridical systems and Article 2 of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | At the same time, the competencies of the EU in the field of criminal law need to be respected, which allow for setting minimum rules by means of directives to be implemented in national legislation. |
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3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC finds it relevant to consider hate speech and hate crime as an area of crime having a common ‘substance’ based on a bias motivation of hatred targeting persons or groups. This leads to the requirement to consider hate speech and hate crime in a holistic way, and to avoid a silo approach to different forms or targets of hatred, especially in regard to differences between the Member States. It also calls for considering hate speech and hate crime in relation to EU values and fundamental rights as a whole. Moreover, it calls for identifying the linkages of hate speech and hate crime with existing EU crimes. In this context, information sharing between law enforcement agencies and governments should be stepped up. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC looks forward to creating a definition of hate speech and hate crime as a next step and is willing to contribute to the inter-institutional consultation. This definition is crucial for the sake of legal certainty, but also for the protection of fundamental rights and ensuring solid general communication. The Council Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law provides a relevant starting point for developing a definition that could be applied in this wider context, while also making use of the definitions used by the Council of Europe. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The definitions of hate speech and hate crime should cover all relevant protected characteristics grounded in EU fundamental rights, including sex/gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation, but also ideological and conscience related beliefs. While the protected characteristics differ from each other, the definition should address the various characteristics according to the same principles. One should also avoid a fragmented approach to various minorities and groups and instead use general expressions applicable to the whole spectrum of the protected characteristic in question. Moreover, the definition should be inclusive enough to respond to new kinds of societal phenomena emerging over time. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The definitions should cover any form of action and expression, whether oral or written, irrespective of where the expression or action takes place, i.e. whether it is in the context of work, public manifestations, or accessing private or public services etc. It should also cover both online and offline expressions. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | While the definitions should be comprehensive, they cannot be unambiguously perfect, and should always require judgement, based on evidence placed in the relevant context when implemented. Common guidance on factors to be considered here would be one means of enhancing the uniform implementation of the definitions and rules. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | It is also important to ensure that the definitions and rules do not work against their purpose. For example, one should not stigmatise words that have been traditionally used in a neutral way. This is also related to the objective of developing common rules for protecting any groups rather than pointing the finger at certain groups. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | In defining hate speech and crime, and the respective sanctions, it is important to clarify their relationship with fundamental rights as a whole. This is particularly relevant with respect to freedom of expression and information, including the conditions that justify limiting the freedom of expression of individuals and the media. Correspondingly, there might be a need for clarification with respect to other fundamental rights as well. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | While hate speech and hate crime can be considered as an area of crime in its own right, they also entail some overlapping with existing EU crimes. Existing EU crimes do not however cover all hate speech and crime, due to the various forms and diverse content of this area of crime. This is also well illustrated by the ‘pyramid of hate’ that starts from bias-motivated speech and moves, via discrimination, to physical violence and even terrorism. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | As stated in the Communication, addressing hate speech and hate crime is not only a matter of substance but also of procedure. Due attention must therefore be paid to issues related to access to information, justice and remedies. Even though hate crime and hate speech is recognised and regulated at national level there are lots of gaps in implementation/reporting/investigation. If not reported and properly investigated as bias crimes, data on the prevalence of those crimes at MS at EU level is unreliable. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | Having hate crime and hate speech listed as an EU crime list is essential in terms of the protection of victims’ rights. If the grounds of hate incidents are not recognised, for example disability, then the rule of the EU Directive on victims’ rights (covering victims of crime) would not necessarily apply. Facing an increasing number of incidents, more attention should be dedicated to the protection of victims. Therefore, victims’ access to information and to the special protection measures given to the most vulnerable victims of crime under the Victims’ Rights Directive should be properly guaranteed. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | As in the case of the Framework Decision, transposed into national law by all Member States in order to criminalise hate speech, we see that not all the countries are advancing at the same pace. The transposition and enforcement have not always been correct or complete, forcing the Commission to launch infringement actions against some Member States. This is a scenario that could be repeated. More work with Member State governments, parliaments and civil society actors is needed to ensure cooperation and commitment. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | The importance of safe online interactions should be stressed. The development of social media platforms and online forums created a space in which some believe they can act with impunity. As shown in various research reports, there is a direct link between hate speech online and the offline proliferation of hate-base behaviour. There is a pressing need to work with national regulators and social media platforms to ensure that online hate is swiftly identified and eliminated and investigated. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/88 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/88

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Drugs Agency’

(COM(2022) 18 final — 2022/0009 (COD))

(2022/C 323/15)

| Rapporteur: | Milena ANGELOVA |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Małgorzata BOGUSZ |

Rapporteur:

Milena ANGELOVA

Co-rapporteur:

Małgorzata BOGUSZ

| Referral | Council, 11.3.2022
  European Parliament, 7.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 3.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 202/1/5 |

Referral

Council, 11.3.2022

European Parliament, 7.3.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

3.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

202/1/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the proposal for creating a European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA), as embedded in the strategic framework, provided by the EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025 (1) and the EU Drugs Action Plan 2021-2025 (2). The Committee supports its reinforced mandate, aimed at providing a swift, coordinated and efficient answer to the growing challenges related to the spread of drugs and illicit substances — the market for which is remarkably resilient. Calls for decisive actions, not only to eradicate the trade in such substances, but also to make every effort to prevent their use, and equally importantly — to help those who are affected or addicted to be cured and re-integrated into society, so that no one is left behind. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC stresses the importance of equal access and active inclusion for all in education, training and quality jobs, acknowledging that NEETs, unemployed and marginalised people are the easiest targets for drug dealers. Underlines the important role that joint actions by the social partners and CSOs have in this process — not only at national, but also at regional and local level, and calls for such actions to be promoted, supported and funded. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC underlines the role of the social partners and organised civil society at every stage of the fight against the spread and use of drugs and illicit substances and especially in the information and awareness-raising campaigns that help people become well informed about the harmful effects of drug usage, the risks of getting involved with such substances, and where and how to get help and support if they are affected or suffering from addiction. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the commitment of the future EUDA to taking on a greater coordination and prevention role and notes that the National Contact Points (NCPs) have an indispensable role to play in this endeavour. Calls on the European Commission and the Member States to make every effort to equip the NCPs with sufficient organisational, technical and financial resources to perform their expanded tasks effectively. To ensure that timely and reliable data can be collected, the EESC suggests that a common methodology and approach be established and adopted. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC highlights the importance of setting up a network of forensic and toxicological laboratories, bringing national laboratories more closely together. The network would foster the exchange of information on new developments and trends and data sharing and would support the training of forensic drug experts. To achieve economies of scale, the EESC welcomes the idea of a network of virtual laboratories, which could also be built by clusters of Member States, on the basis of their geographical proximity, or of similar risk profiles when it comes to the import and spread of drugs. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

2.   Background (3)

| 2.1. | The drugs market, with a minimum estimated retail value of EUR 30 billion per year, is a major source of income for organised crime groups (OCGs) in the EU. In addition to the economic impact, drug-related deaths and other harm to public health, there are broader consequences of the drugs market, such as links with wider criminal activities and terrorism, the negative impact on the legal economy, violence in communities, damage to the environment and the increasingly important issue of how the drugs market can fuel corruption and undermine governance. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Drug use in Europe encompasses a wide range of substances, such as:






  — | cannabis — use remains stable at high levels; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

—

cannabis — use remains stable at high levels;

| — | cocaine — there are worrying signals of increased potential to harm health; |
| --- | --- |

—

cocaine — there are worrying signals of increased potential to harm health;

| — | amphetamine — demand remains stable; |
| --- | --- |

—

amphetamine — demand remains stable;

| — | methamphetamine — production and trafficking highlights potential for increased use in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

—

methamphetamine — production and trafficking highlights potential for increased use in Europe;

| — | MDMA products — high-strength products in particular pose serious risks to health; |
| --- | --- |

—

MDMA products — high-strength products in particular pose serious risks to health;

| — | new psychoactive substances — at the end of 2020, the EMCDDA was monitoring around 830 new psychoactive substances; |
| --- | --- |

—

new psychoactive substances — at the end of 2020, the EMCDDA was monitoring around 830 new psychoactive substances;

| — | LSD, DMT, mushrooms, ketamine and GHB — less commonly used, but also pose increasing challenges for public health; |
| --- | --- |

—

LSD, DMT, mushrooms, ketamine and GHB — less commonly used, but also pose increasing challenges for public health;

| — | heroin and other opioids — potential for increased use is observed. |
| --- | --- |

—

heroin and other opioids — potential for increased use is observed.

| 2.3. | More than 83 million adults in the EU are estimated to have tried illicit drugs during their lifetime. In 2019, at least 5 150 overdose deaths occurred in the EU, with a steady increase every year since 2012, including among teenagers aged 15-19. The extent of stimulant use and the types that are most common vary across countries — and in some Member States some ‘soft’ substances can be bought without restrictions. Evidence is growing of a potential increase in the number of people injecting stimulants. Use of all drugs is generally higher among males, and this difference is often accentuated for more intensive or regular patterns of use. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | Reports indicate that cannabis cultivation and synthetic drug production within the European Union continued at pre-pandemic levels throughout 2020. The drugs market in the EU is fuelled by organised crime groups, is also interlinked globally, and is significantly fuelled strongly by drug production in South America, Africa, Afghanistan, China, Morocco, Turkey, and the Western Balkans region. Africa is important, because of its growing role as a trafficking and transit area, with the potential for this to become a destabilising influence and have a negative impact on security and governance and greater drug problems within the region. Therefore, the EESC underlines the importance of strengthening the international coordination effort in detecting new illicit substances and preventing them from being trafficked and spread. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The data clearly illustrate how much the drug situation has changed over the last 25 years. The events of the past years also highlight a growing need for a rapid response, and this calls for the EU to be given greater capacity to ensure the early identification of threats emerging from an increasingly dynamic and adaptive drug market. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | In line with its previously stated positions on the topic (4), the EESC welcomes and calls for the swift implementation of the EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025, aimed at protecting and improving the well-being of society and of individuals and public health, at offering a high level of security for the general public, and at increasing health literacy. The EESC praises the evidence-based, integrated, balanced and multidisciplinary approach to the drugs phenomenon at the national, EU and international levels that the Strategy takes. The EESC appreciates that it also incorporates a gender equality and health equity perspective, which is important when setting a new course in the fight against drug addiction and the associated problems. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | By 2025, the priorities and actions in the field of illicit drugs, coordinated through the Strategy (5), should produce an overall impact on some key aspects of the EU drug situation. The coherent, effective and efficient implementation of measures should ensure a high level of human health protection, social stability and security, and help raise awareness. Any potential unintended negative consequences associated with the implementation of the actions should be reduced, and human rights and sustainable development should be promoted and respected. Based on these principles, the EESC supports the approach of establishing a separate remit to fight the spread and prevent the voluntary use of illicit drugs and any type of addiction to them. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The drugs phenomenon is an integral element of the health and security challenges that Europe faces today. With the drugs landscape constantly developing and new unclassified substances regularly coming onto the market, the drugs phenomenon is becoming increasingly complex and pervasive. The revenues generated are also a major stimulant for corruption, violence and illegal activities. This situation calls for greater efforts at the EU level. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC shares the conclusion (6) that the drugs market has been remarkably resilient to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Drug traffickers have actively adapted to travel restrictions and border closures. At the wholesale level, this is seen in changes in routes and methods, with more reliance on smuggling via intermodal containers and commercial supply chains and less reliance on the use of human couriers. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | Although street-based retail drug markets were disrupted during the initial lockdowns, and some localised shortages were experienced, drug sellers and buyers appear to have adapted by increasing their use of encrypted messaging services, social media applications, online sources and mail and home delivery services (7). This raises the concern that one potential long-term impact of the pandemic will be to further enable drug markets via digital means. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Drug markets were observed to recover quickly at the onset of the pandemic, and some trafficking dynamics have been accelerated during COVID-19, such as: larger shipment sizes, more frequent use of private aircraft, increased use of waterway routes and contactless methods to deliver drugs to end consumers. These developments pose more challenges for enforcement bodies and demand more coordinated preventive measures. Possible response actions could be designed around (8) fostering international cooperation to combat drug trafficking, the exchange and transfer of law enforcement intelligence and effective banning approaches and best practices; developing international accountability and shipping mechanisms and implementing real-time data and monitoring systems for promptly detecting and addressing drug market changes. The EESC is glad to see all of these elements embedded in the proposal for extending the revised mandate of the future EUDA. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC considers that the mandate of the future EUDA should be more explicitly worded to:






  — | include broad obligations concerning controlled drug precursors (9). This is an opportunity to truly defend the public interest and ensure equity in the fight against drugs at the national, EU and international levels; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.7.

—

include broad obligations concerning controlled drug precursors (9). This is an opportunity to truly defend the public interest and ensure equity in the fight against drugs at the national, EU and international levels;

| — | devote equal attention not only to the eradication of the supply of drugs, but also to the prevention of access to drugs, to assistance with overcoming addiction and to the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of those who are affected. |
| --- | --- |

—

devote equal attention not only to the eradication of the supply of drugs, but also to the prevention of access to drugs, to assistance with overcoming addiction and to the rehabilitation and reintegration into society of those who are affected.

4.   Use of drugs and illegal substances

| 4.1. | The EESC stresses the fact that there are different hypotheses for the use of drugs and illicit substances that may harm human health — especially when taken for no medical reason, without medical supervision and repetitively over a long period of time. As such behaviour can lead to addiction, it becomes very difficult for the affected individuals to resolve the situation on their own and support from specialised bodies and CSOs is therefore indispensable. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Some medicines prescribed by doctors to treat certain health conditions and diseases, such as benzodiazepines or opiates/narcotic drugs, can lead to addiction, if not taken as prescribed. This may lead to the commission of fraud, such as illegal trading in prescriptions or medicines, and is also covered by the mandate of the new EUDA. Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the number and availability of new benzodiazepines on the drug market in Europe and, increasingly, also in Canada and the United States. As of 28 February 2021, the EMCDDA was monitoring 30 new benzodiazepines through the EU Early Warning System. Of these, more than 80 % were detected for the first time between 2014 and 2020 (10). Another group of medicines, prescribed by doctors as painkillers, opiate drugs tend to be mixed with illicit drugs by users, which can not only lead to addiction, but can also pose great danger to health and even cause life-threatening complications. This may also lead to the commission of fraud, such as the trading (both legal and illegal) in prescriptions or medicines. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Considering the current clinical trials in the USA on substances that are currently classified as drugs under EU law (e.g. MDMA, psilocybin, LSD), the EUDA should pay special attention to cooperation with EMA concerning the emergence within 2-3 years of a EU market for drugs (drugs per se, not their derivatives) registered as medicinal products. This may lead to a duality whereby a particular group of patients will use a legally available drug registered as a medicine, and another group will commit a criminal offence by using it illegally. This may lead to a situation whereby healthy people who want to obtain a drug from a legal source produced under GMP regulations will simulate psychiatric diseases for which the medicinal product (drug) is officially registered. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EU faces currently major challenges, stemming from the relative ease of designing and bringing to the market non-classified substances that might cause addiction and harm people’s health, alongside the full spectrum of substances that are illegal to use and sell, for example: marihuana, heroin, cocaine and amphetamines. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Drug dealers are extremely innovative, and thus keep inventing new substances. Identifying, detecting, describing and preventing the emergence, spread and use of these substances is another element of the EUDA’s mandate. Multi-substance use is also now widespread in the EU and is having a detrimental impact on public health. The new EUDA should address all other substance-based addictions when these substances are taken together with illicit drugs. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The use of drugs and illegal substances affects all people, because it carries the risk of addiction, which can not only ruin a person’s health, but can also destroy her/his whole life, by trapping them in a vicious, drug-centred cycle, which leaves no space for social life, family, education, work or anything else. The risk of addiction is higher the younger and less experienced and educated a person is, as well as for those who are inactive and unemployed. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | In order to prevent addicts from learning the symptoms of mental illness, the occurrence of which will be an indication for therapy with medicines (drugs), closer monitoring of the internet should be introduced. Currently, using the information available on the internet, it is possible to obtain prescriptions for drugs used to treat some diseases, such as ADHD and depression. The legitimacy of obtaining them is based only on the patient’s interview and psychological tests, for which anyone can easily prepare using publicly available information. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | Therefore, due to the growing number of people using medicinal products with addictive substances, it seems justified to introduce the EUDA’s competencies in the scope of broader activities related to the public financing of this type of medical product. Public funding of narcotic medicinal products, at a time when anybody can obtain guidance from social media on how to take psychological tests to obtain this kind of medicines, without additional surveillance measures, will lead to the abuse of reimbursed medicinal products (drugs), as this would be more affordable than buying them from a dealer. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

5.   Specific comments

| 5.1. | The EESC agrees with the finding (11), confirmed by regular contacts with the EMCDDA and its stakeholders, that there is an increasing disconnect between the complexity of the drug phenomenon and the provisions of the current EMCDDA mandate. The founding Regulation does not reflect the current reality of the drug phenomenon and is out of step with the tasks required of the EUDA to meet the challenges of the drug phenomenon and the requests from its main stakeholders. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

5.2.   Revising the mandate of the EUDA

| 5.2.1. | In line with its previous opinion, the EESC supports the endeavour to fight against the illegal spread and use of illicit drugs and stands ready to support any preventive campaign and actions to that end. Regrets that its earlier recommendations to closely involve stakeholder civil society organisations in the work of the EUDA are not reflected in the proposal. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.1.

| 5.2.2. | The EESC stresses the need to extend the EUDA’s mandate, by giving it more contemporary, forward-looking approaches and tools, and endorses all seven new areas of additional competences. Regrets that the information provision, awareness-raising campaigns, actions to help resolve addictions and preventive measures were not articulated in a clearer way and that the involvement of CSOs, with their added value and the synergies they create, are not included in the proposal. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.2.

| 5.2.3. | The EUDA’s competences shared with EMA concerning medical prescription should also be extended with regard to the design of training for physicians who prescribe a category of medicinal products that are classified as illicit drugs under EU law. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.3.

| 5.2.4. | The EESC proposes to add some elements to each of the seven specific objectives, as follows:






  — | in order to address better and focus on monitoring multi-drug use, i.e., the addictive use of other substances when linked to drug use, the EUDA should consider multi-substance use to be widespread among drug users and to have a detrimental impact on public health. Tackling this phenomenon effectively requires close cooperation at regional and local level and the direct involvement of CSOs; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.2.4.

—

in order to address better and focus on monitoring multi-drug use, i.e., the addictive use of other substances when linked to drug use, the EUDA should consider multi-substance use to be widespread among drug users and to have a detrimental impact on public health. Tackling this phenomenon effectively requires close cooperation at regional and local level and the direct involvement of CSOs;

| — | national contact points need extra support to develop threat assessments and tools to inform workers in contact with people who use drugs of new developments concerning illicit drugs that could negatively impact public health, safety and security, as they are at the front line in helping to boost the EU’s preparedness to react to new threats; |
| --- | --- |

—

national contact points need extra support to develop threat assessments and tools to inform workers in contact with people who use drugs of new developments concerning illicit drugs that could negatively impact public health, safety and security, as they are at the front line in helping to boost the EU’s preparedness to react to new threats;

| — | set up a network of forensic and toxicological laboratories, bringing together national laboratories. The network would foster the exchange of information on new developments and trends and would support the training of forensic drug experts. To achieve economies of scale, the EESC welcomes the idea of a network of virtual laboratories, which could also be built by clusters of Member States, on the basis of their geographical proximity, or similar drug importing and spreading risk profiles; |
| --- | --- |

—

set up a network of forensic and toxicological laboratories, bringing together national laboratories. The network would foster the exchange of information on new developments and trends and would support the training of forensic drug experts. To achieve economies of scale, the EESC welcomes the idea of a network of virtual laboratories, which could also be built by clusters of Member States, on the basis of their geographical proximity, or similar drug importing and spreading risk profiles;

| — | Reitox’s role should be strengthened to provide a solid database for shaping effective information and prevention strategies, and should be enabled to issue alerts in the event that particularly dangerous substances become available on the market. The EESC sees an opportunity to optimise the process of data collection by the Member States, by introducing a unified scientific methodology, including an automated process of data provision by the Member States, and also by connecting up the relevant registries and databases; |
| --- | --- |

—

Reitox’s role should be strengthened to provide a solid database for shaping effective information and prevention strategies, and should be enabled to issue alerts in the event that particularly dangerous substances become available on the market. The EESC sees an opportunity to optimise the process of data collection by the Member States, by introducing a unified scientific methodology, including an automated process of data provision by the Member States, and also by connecting up the relevant registries and databases;

| — | develop EU-level prevention and awareness-raising campaigns relating to illicit drugs, allowing the EUDA to act on the basis of the analyses it produces. The EUDA should also be able to support Member States in preparing national campaigns and may, in close cooperation with the EMA, design standard visual indications, which should be obligatory on the packaging of medicines containing drug substances; |
| --- | --- |

—

develop EU-level prevention and awareness-raising campaigns relating to illicit drugs, allowing the EUDA to act on the basis of the analyses it produces. The EUDA should also be able to support Member States in preparing national campaigns and may, in close cooperation with the EMA, design standard visual indications, which should be obligatory on the packaging of medicines containing drug substances;

| — | provide research and support, not only on health-related issues, but also on drug markets and drug supply, thus addressing the drugs issue more comprehensively; |
| --- | --- |

—

provide research and support, not only on health-related issues, but also on drug markets and drug supply, thus addressing the drugs issue more comprehensively;

| — | play a stronger international role and support the EU’s leadership role on drug policy at the multilateral level. |
| --- | --- |

—

play a stronger international role and support the EU’s leadership role on drug policy at the multilateral level.

5.3.   Pathways to ensure the smooth operation of the EUDA

| 5.3.1. | The new EUDA must revise the allocation of Member States’ budgetary resources, and these should be assessed on the basis of the availability and capacity of recognised and recommended services in the area of drugs. To be able to deliver on the extended mandate, the national contact points should have the certainty that they will receive sufficient financial resources, in a predictable and stable manner, rather than having to compete for grants. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.1.

| 5.3.2. | Information and prevention as emphasised in Article 168(1), third subparagraph, TFEU, should be extended to specific activities by local communities and should promote the creation of a supportive environment for people who use drugs, so that they can receive help locally to overcome their addiction. It is important that local communities receive work plans and substantive support from the authorities and the EUDA. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.2.

| 5.3.3. | The EESC stresses the fact that drug addictions are strongly related to mental health problems, and to past trauma; therefore, in the fight against these addictions, the root causes should be addressed and the EUDA’s action plan should be constructed on the basis of psychological work in groups at risk of addiction. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.3.

| 5.3.4. | Data show that, in addition to the population requiring psychological support due to previous traumatic experiences, there is also a group of people who, had they not been infected with COVID-19, would probably not have become addicted. Therefore, the EESC recommends that EUDA’s competences be extended to cover this significant increase in people’s susceptibility to addiction due to severe long-term effects of COVID-19. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.4.

| 5.3.5. | At the same time, the effective enforcement of the ban on illicit drugs requires efficient work at the foundations of society, so that people with addictions are not left alone, but are supported in their choice not turn to drugs again. Despite the increasing public funds being spent on fighting drug trafficking, the problem of helping people overcoming addiction is still huge. Therefore, the EUDA, taking into account the best experiences of the EU Member States, could redirect a more significant part of its work towards the psychological causes of drug abuse. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.5.

| 5.3.6. | Taking a global and regional approach to the drugs market in the EU requires tracing and closely monitoring the developments in drug and illicit substances production in regions that traditionally pose risks, such as South America, Afghanistan, Africa, China, Turkey and the Western Balkans. The active and constantly changing role of OCGs in changing the dynamics of drugs supply and in trafficking requires constant and coordinated efforts by all relevant bodies, and especially those engaged in enforcement and border control, at international level. Only intense cooperation can help map drugs corridors in order to effectively cut them off. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.6.

5.4.   National Contact Points

| 5.4.1. | The role and functions of the NCPs should be expanded. Their work in the different EU countries varies considerably. Some NCPs carry out informative, analytical, scientific research, expert consultancy and publishing activities. The main objectives of NCPs activities should include more methodological monitoring, standardised data collection, evaluation and classification, and the processing, storage, analysis and dissemination of information in the field of drug demand and supply in the EU. NCPs should develop drug policy and active responses to the situation in that field. They should work on the provision of information, supporting the activity of national governments and the formulation of national policy on drugs and drug addiction. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.1.

| 5.4.2. | NCPs are key to delivering effectively and promptly on the implementation of the EUDA’s new mandate. Only a stronger and well-coordinated network of NCPs can provide relevant data — not only retrospectively, but most importantly — on the emergence of new harmful substances, their detection and identification, possible distribution channels, etc. As this requires building serious laboratory capacity, regional unions and clusters should be promoted — grouped in high-risk zones, e.g. at the EU’s external borders, close to typical drug-importing routes, etc. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.2.

| 5.4.3. | NCPs should be supported and equipped as effectively as possible with common guidelines and methodologies to be able to gather comparable data and indicators, on which to base the shift towards safety and security issues rather than just fighting the spread of drugs and illicit substances. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.3.

| 5.4.4. | Member States should be encouraged to provide NCPs with more resources — including information, technology, funding, etc. Every effort should be made to help NCPs strengthen their capacity to deliver on the new, expanded mandate and play a greater role. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.4.

| 5.4.5. | It should be remembered that, in addition to creating community mechanisms to fight addiction, the EUDA should, in cooperation with the Member States, build national systems of cooperation to create and support joint support programmes for groups potentially at risk of drug addiction. Only a strong bond developed within local communities can help reduce drug use. As an example of such solutions that have already resulted in positive solutions, the EUDA could use the solutions already implemented by the Portuguese Government. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.5.

| 5.4.6. | The EESC sees an opportunity to improve the reporting system of NCPs, to avoid investing additional time and resources in double reporting — as they are currently required to report to both the future EUDA and the UN. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.6.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  OJ C 102 I, 24.3.2021, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ C 272, 8.7.2021, p. 2.

2

(3)  Based on data from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), European Drug Report 2021, www.emcdda.europa.eu

3

(4)  OJ C 56, 16.2.2021, p. 47, OJ C 34, 2.2.2017, p. 182, OJ C 177, 11.6.2014, p. 52, OJ C 229, 31.7.2012, p. 85, OJ C 69, 21.3.2006, p. 22.

4

(5)  The Strategy is based first and foremost on the fundamental principles of EU law and, in every regard, upholds the founding values the EU: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, solidarity, the rule of law and human rights. The Strategy is also based on international law, the relevant United Nations (UN) Conventions, which provide the international legal framework for addressing the illicit drugs phenomenon, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Strategy takes into account policy developments at the multilateral level, and contributes to the acceleration of their implementation.

5

(6)  One of the main conclusions of The European Drug Report 2021, https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/edr2021_en

6

(7)  European Drug Report 2021.

7

(8)  European Drug Report 2021.

8

(9)  Since 1988, controlled drug precursors have been included in United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The UN has introduced detailed provisions and requirements relating to the control of precursors used to produce drugs of abuse. On 11 February 2004, the EP and the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 on drug precursors (OJ L 47, 18.2.2004, p. 1).

9

(10)  New benzodiazepines in Europe — a review, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2021. ISBN 978-92-9497-641-3.

10

(11)  2018/2019 European Commission evaluation as per EC SWD Impact Assessment.

11

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/95 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/95

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Sustainable Carbon Cycles

(COM(2021) 800 final)

(2022/C 323/16)

Rapporteur:
  Arnold PUECH d’ALISSAC

| Referral | European Commission, 21.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 4.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 221/0/4 |

Referral

European Commission, 21.1.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

4.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

221/0/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC thinks that finding a solution to the carbon neutrality equation in Europe requires mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, increasing carbon sinks and finding alternatives to fossil carbon in our economy. The EESC therefore agrees with the European Commission’s communication that all resources and solutions will have to be combined to achieve this objective. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC supports the Commission’s communication, which proposes two solutions for removing and sequestering carbon: nature-based solutions (known as ‘carbon sequestration’) and industrial technological solutions. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC believes that the land sector (e.g. agriculture, forestry, peatland areas) can be actively involved in combating global warming while contributing to an overall equilibrium in the food supply, providing enough food of sufficient quality and at affordable prices for everyone and ensuring that producers make a profit. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC stresses that the topic of sustainable carbon cycles must be considered in a holistic manner. Increasing carbon sinks and replacing fossil carbon as much as possible will require more biomass to be produced, which will affect the land sector. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | As the agricultural sector is a natural emitter, the EESC believes that implementing practices that produce fewer emissions will be directly correlated with the successful development of a sustainable carbon cycle. Finally, meeting the growing demand for food and deploying the sustainable carbon cycle of the future will require the agricultural sector to adapt to climate change. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC therefore believes that carbon sequestration should not only be seen as a commercial opportunity, but also as a key component of European agriculture and forestry in the future and as a tool for climate action, contributing to more resilient rural areas, in line with the long-term vision for EU rural areas (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | In the EESC’s view, the common agricultural policy (CAP) will not be able to achieve the carbon neutrality objectives on its own: it must provide the policy framework paving the way for the low-carbon transition in agriculture, whereby the sector will emit less and sequester more; the investment support in the CAP can and should reward carbon storage financially as an eco-service and income support for farmers, but carbon storage should not be a general condition of the CAP; even more important, the EESC is of the opinion that the development of the carbon market must be further promoted. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | Carbon credits must remunerate a service rendered, namely that of atmospheric carbon sequestration, but must also support the agricultural sector’s carbon transition. It is therefore necessary to invest in carbon credits through a transparent and trusted system that can meet the sector’s GHG emission sequestration and mitigation needs. Trust in the system will be based on certification that takes national circumstances into account and is tailored to the territorial approach of each country. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The development of carbon sequestration will require a clear legal framework that is shared by the Member States, taking into account the challenges for certified carbon sequestration projects identified in the EC communication. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC warns that there are differences in the level of investment and support that the Member States can provide when it comes to carbon sequestration and that they have different financial and managerial capacities. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | As the carbon border adjustment measures are not adequately protecting the agricultural sector, the EESC recommends to also consider the imported products and to ensure that trade deals, both new and existing, compel exporting countries to engage in sustainable carbon cycles. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC thinks that industrial solutions, such as permanent CO2 storage in geological formations or mineralisation of carbon in innovative aggregates, will have to be sustainable and prevent negative impacts on biodiversity, ecosystems and communities. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The carbon sequestration proposal must be part of a broader transition to a sustainable food system. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The well-being of workers, predictability of careers and working conditions in the agricultural sector, as well as the need for fair remuneration, should be taken into account so that farmers and workers will commit to and make a success of the transition to a low-carbon economy. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

2.   General comments

Carbon neutrality by 2050: the solution for complying with the Paris Agreement

| 2.1. | The exponential increase in the atmospheric concentration of GHG since the Industrial Revolution has led to an overall increase in the global temperature. Scientists agree on the urgent need to reach net zero global emissions by 2050 and that global emissions must peak by 2025 to limit global warming to 1,5 oC (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) believes that a rise of 2 oC could pose a very high risk to the food supply in some parts of the world. The demand for food is expected to increase by 70 % between 2009 and 2050, with 9 billion people to feed, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | As our food production is by nature climate-dependent, the joint climate and food emergency means that we must adapt. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The Paris Agreement aims to limit global warming to 1,5 oC or, at most, 2 oC. The European Union therefore adopted the Green Deal and enshrined the objective of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 in the Climate Law. To this end, it has taken two key initiatives:






  — | reducing GHG emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 through the proposal for the Fit for 55 legislative package; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.4.

—

reducing GHG emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 through the proposal for the Fit for 55 legislative package;

| — | recycling carbon from waste streams, sustainable biomass sources and the atmosphere (circular economy, sustainable bioeconomy, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) technologies). |
| --- | --- |

—

recycling carbon from waste streams, sustainable biomass sources and the atmosphere (circular economy, sustainable bioeconomy, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) technologies).

The need to increase carbon removals

| 2.5. | In light of this situation, the EESC agrees with the European Commission’s communication, which proposes two ways of removing and sequestering carbon: nature-based solutions (called ‘carbon sequestration’) on the one hand, and industrial technology solutions on the other (capturing and storing of carbon from the atmosphere through techniques such as ‘direct air carbon capture and storage’ (DACCS) and ‘bio-energy carbon capture and storage’ (BECCS)). |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | Since agriculture naturally emits 11 % of European emissions, it contributes to emissions, but it also contributes to GHG mitigation by acting as a carbon sink and contributes to the bioeconomy by supplying non fossil carbon. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | It is therefore clear that the objectives of the land sector are to be involved in combating global warming and to contribute to an overall equilibrium in the food supply by providing, at affordable prices, enough food of sufficient quality for everyone, generating stable and high quality jobs, while ensuring that producers make a profit (see in particular the opinions on Food security and sustainable food systems (3) and on Towards a Fair Food Supply Chain (4)). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Tackling climate change will therefore require transition tools that are just and accessible to all Member States and farmers. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

3.   Specific comments

Objectives of the land sector: mitigation, sequestration and food

| 3.1. | Finding a solution to the carbon neutrality equation in Europe requires mitigating GHG emissions and increasing carbon sinks, as well as finding alternatives to fossil carbon in our economy. The EESC therefore agrees with the European Commission’s communication that all resources and solutions will have to be combined to achieve this objective. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | As set out in the proposal to amend the LULUCF Regulation (5) as part of the Fit for 55 package, carbon farming should help to achieve the proposed net removal target for 2030 of 310 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in the land sector. The EESC points out that there are various ways to increase carbon sequestration, including land management, forest regeneration and the restoration of natural ecosystems (see its opinion on this subject (6)). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

Nature-based solutions

| 3.3. | There is more carbon stored in soils than there is carbon stored in plants or in the atmosphere. However, emissions from fossil fuel combustion, industrial processes and land use change are cumulating in the oceans and are dramatically increasing the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, which is a main problem. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Through the fixation of carbon from the air in plant material, the bioaccumulation of organic matter in soil, biomaterials and by using energy from locally grown biomass, agricultural activities recycle part of the carbon emitted. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | Carbon farming focuses on the reduction of CO2 in the atmosphere, but there are other GHG emissions linked to agriculture that must be dealt with (e.g. methane and N2O emissions, which generate relatively (per kg) more heat than CO2). Livestock farming enables organic fertilisers to be provided for crop production, and, so far cattle is fed with locally grown grass, it contributes to the food system in a circular way, as detailed in the opinion on Benefits of extensive livestock farming and organic fertilisers in the context of the European Green Deal (7). |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | In view of these challenges and the diverse solutions provided by the land sector, it seems that the subject of sustainable carbon cycles needs to be considered in a holistic manner, taking into account the diversity of ecosystem services provided by agricultural soils, in addition to carbon sequestration, and varying carbon sequestration capacities depending on pedoclimatic and biological parameters. Increasing the carbon sink and replacing fossil carbon as much as possible requires more biomass to be produced. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | As the agricultural sector is a natural emitter, implementing practices that produce fewer emissions will contribute to mitigation and a sustainable carbon cycle. Also, reducing emissions, enhancing carbon sequestration, and replying to the growing demand for food while adapting to climate change (e.g. negative impact of climate change on harvests) pose several challenges that require innovation and support to the sector. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC therefore believes that the proposal to amend the LULUCF Regulation will be vital for long-term climate balance and that the role of carbon sequestration should not only be seen as a commercial opportunity, but also as a key component of European agriculture in the future. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | While ensuring global food security, attributing a value to carbon entails three different challenges:






  — | sequestration of atmospheric carbon in soil; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.9.

—

sequestration of atmospheric carbon in soil;

| — | mitigation of GHG emissions; |
| --- | --- |

—

mitigation of GHG emissions;

| — | adaptation of the agricultural sector to climate change. |
| --- | --- |

—

adaptation of the agricultural sector to climate change.

| 3.10. | A number of land management practices improve carbon sequestration, including:






  — | afforestation and reforestation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.10.

—

afforestation and reforestation;

| — | agroforestry and other forms of mixed farming combining woody vegetation with crop and/or animal production systems; |
| --- | --- |

—

agroforestry and other forms of mixed farming combining woody vegetation with crop and/or animal production systems;

| — | use of catch crops, cover crops and conservation tillage; |
| --- | --- |

—

use of catch crops, cover crops and conservation tillage;

| — | conversion of cropland to fallow or permanent grassland; |
| --- | --- |

—

conversion of cropland to fallow or permanent grassland;

| — | restoration of peatlands and wetlands. |
| --- | --- |

—

restoration of peatlands and wetlands.

| 3.11. | The potential is important, for example as part of the ‘4 per 1 000’ initiative, the French National Research Institute for Agriculture, Food and Environment (INRAE) found that the maximum potential of the additional agricultural stock in France was 8,43 million tonnes of carbon per year in the first 30 centimetres of soil. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | In conjunction with the objective of net zero land take by 2050 set out in the EU Soil Strategy (8), and to ensure that it can act as a carbon sink and produce biomass, the EESC recommends that arable land be adequately protected, and is pleased to note that some Member States are already working on this (e.g. land legislation is being drafted in Estonia). |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | The Communication identifies some challenges for certified carbon sequestration projects, but does not provide an answer on how to:






  — | address the issue of non-permanence: carbon that is sequestered and stored in soil and biomass can be released into the atmosphere, cancelling out the benefits of climate change mitigation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.13.

—

address the issue of non-permanence: carbon that is sequestered and stored in soil and biomass can be released into the atmosphere, cancelling out the benefits of climate change mitigation;

| — | accurately quantify the actual additional costs since monitoring, reporting on and verifying captured carbon remains a challenge; |
| --- | --- |

—

accurately quantify the actual additional costs since monitoring, reporting on and verifying captured carbon remains a challenge;

| — | take into account the costs of practices to sequester carbon and mitigate agricultural GHG emissions. |
| --- | --- |

—

take into account the costs of practices to sequester carbon and mitigate agricultural GHG emissions.

| 3.14. | Finally, the reduction of emissions from the agricultural sector through adapted practices or new technologies should not be forgotten, with energy sobriety and reducing GHG emissions being the priority. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

Solutions based on industrial carbon capture, utilisation and storage

| 3.15. | The communication proposes the objectives that by 2028 any ton of CO2 captured, transported, used and stored by industries should be reported and accounted by its fossil, biogenic or atmospheric origin, that at least 20 % of the carbon used in the chemical and plastic products should be from sustainable non-fossil sources by 2030, and that 5Mt of CO2 should be annually removed from the atmosphere and permanently stored through frontrunner projects by 2030. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | Fossil carbon will have to be replaced by more sustainable streams of carbon recycled from waste, from sustainable biomass or directly from the atmosphere. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

| 3.17. | According to the sixth IPCC report (9), 100-1 000 Gt of CO2 must be removed by the end of the 21st century. Most current and potential carbon removal measures could significantly affect land, energy, water and nutrients if deployed on a large scale. The EESC believes that effective governance is needed to avoid competition in land use that could significantly affect farming and food systems, biodiversity and other ecosystem functions and services. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

| 3.18. | Various technologies exist for industrial carbon capture, utilisation and storage (the use of biomass in buildings, BECCS, DACCS, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU), etc.), but they each have advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, the EESC notes that no single solution stands out (10). |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

| 3.19. | BECCS technology, for example, removes carbon from the atmosphere while providing heat and energy. However, we need to take into account the sustainability boundaries of the biomass used. Direct air capture projects in Iceland and Scotland are expensive and still very energy-intensive at the moment. |
| --- | --- |

3.19.

| 3.20. | Agriculture and forestry are the main players in the bioeconomy. This ‘photosynthesis economy’ directly reflects the unique ability of plants to produce non fossil carbon from atmospheric dioxide. |
| --- | --- |

3.20.

| 3.21. | These carbon removal technologies will have to reduce in cost and ensure permanent carbon storage and removal. Carbon capture technologies can be highly energy-intensive processes. They will need to use renewable energy, be sustainable and prevent negative impacts on biodiversity, ecosystems and land availability. |
| --- | --- |

3.21.

4.   Tools for developing carbon sequestration in Europe

European Union: determining a baseline for low-carbon farming

| 4.1. | The Commission communication states that using national CAP instruments (national strategic plans) and meeting the objectives set out in the LULUCF Regulation can only be beneficial. The challenge and objectives of this Regulation are such that all solutions need to be deployed. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | As such, the CAP can make it possible to determine at the appropriate territorial level the baseline for mitigating emissions, sequestering carbon and adapting the sector, for example by protecting permanent grassland and agro-ecological infrastructure. The 2023 CAP reform will also enable climate action to be stepped up via eco-schemes, as it has protected social conditionality. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | However, given these multiple objectives, the EESC believes that the CAP will not be able to achieve the carbon neutrality objectives just on its own. It should provide the policy framework paving the way for the low-carbon transition in agriculture, whereby the sector will emit less and sequester more. The EESC thinks that the investment support in the CAP can and should reward carbon storage financially as an eco-service and income support for farmers, but carbon storage should not be a general condition of the CAP; even more important, the EESC is of the opinion that the development of the carbon market must further be promoted. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

Carbon credits: a necessary investment in order exploit the potential of agricultural soils

| 4.4. | There are solutions to the issue of adaptation and mitigation in the agriculture sector, but they have a price, risks and sometimes an impact on long-term profitability. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC believes that farmers and agricultural workers need fair remuneration and long-term access to land ownership or leases so that they will commit to and make a success of the low carbon transition. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | In the EESC’s view, quantifying the positive externalities brought about by climate-friendly farming practices can make it possible to attribute value through private contracts on a voluntary market and by issuing carbon credits that have value on the market. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | Issuing carbon credits will require greater cooperation with farmers and will have to take into account the international context. Other countries have already created their carbon credit systems: the price of recently issued Chinese carbon allowances was set at EUR 5,20/tonne in 2021 and could reach EUR 20,5/tonne in 2030 (compared to plans for an average of EUR 30/tonne or even EUR 40/tonne from carbon sequestration in Europe) (11). |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | It will therefore be necessary to make these European carbon credits attractive in a competitive market, while guaranteeing environmental integrity. Without an economic and political tool, the EU will have difficulties in financing and selling more expensive local sequestered and avoided carbon. It will be necessary to attribute an economic value to positive externalities, such as those of France’s low-carbon label (12). |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | France’s low-carbon label remunerates both sequestered carbon and avoided carbon emissions (CO2, CH4 and N2O agricultural emissions given in carbon equivalent), enabling all farmers to work towards a low-carbon and agro-ecological transition. Under France’s low-carbon label, switching to practices that significantly reduce the use of mineral nitrogen fertilisers is thus rewarded by a certified carbon credit. This is effective because it means that the credit can be used to remunerate activities mitigating N2O emissions too. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC believes that carbon credits must remunerate a service rendered, namely that of atmospheric carbon sequestration, but they must also support the agricultural sector’s low-carbon transition and guarantee the well-being of workers, predictability of careers, and working conditions in this sector. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | The EESC therefore recommends investing in carbon credits through a transparent and trusted system that can meet the sector’s GHG emission sequestration and mitigation needs. Consolidation of the role of civil society and the social partners, particularly in assessing the social impact of carbon credits, must be taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

| 4.12. | As the carbon border adjustment measures are not adequately protecting the agricultural sector, the EESC recommends to also consider the imported products and to ensure that trade deals, both new and existing, compel exporting countries to engage in sustainable carbon cycles. |
| --- | --- |

4.12.

A socially just low-carbon transition

| 4.13. | The EESC warns that there are differences in the level of investment and support that the Member States and farmers can provide when it comes to carbon sequestration. In addition, some Member States are severely affected by the war in Ukraine, which will affect their ability to support future investments in carbon sequestration. |
| --- | --- |

4.13.

| 4.14. | The EESC calls for companies to be given support and guidance in training their staff so that they can make the transition towards the new, low-carbon models of the future. It would therefore be a good idea to include social conditions in State aid for carbon investments so as to avoid poorly paid, unprotected and precarious working conditions in line with ILO conventions. Access to innovation and transfer of best practices must be taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

4.14.

| 4.15. | The EESC emphasises the importance of training and supporting farmers and agricultural workers. |
| --- | --- |

4.15.

Brussels, 19 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  See in particular the action ‘Climate action in peatland through carbon farming’ under the flagship ‘Resilient rural areas’ (https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-european-democracy/long-term-vision-rural-areas_en).

1

(2)  Second part of the Sixth Assessment Report on Climate Change by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published 28 February 2022: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-cycle/

2

(3)  OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 72.

3

(4)  OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 38.

4

(5)  COM(2021) 554 final.

5

(6)  EESC opinion on The inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from LULUCF (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 192).

6

The inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from LULUCF

(7)  EESC information report on the Benefits of extensive livestock farming and organic fertilisers in the context of the European Green Deal.

7

Benefits of extensive livestock farming and organic fertilisers in the context of the European Green Deal

(8)  EESC opinion on the New EU Soil Strategy (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 131).

8

New EU Soil Strategy

(9)  https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/

9

(10)  For more information on this topic, see own-initiative opinion CCMI/190 on the Role of carbon removal technologies in decarbonising the European industry (not yet published in the Official Journal).

10

(11)  https://www.citepa.org/fr/2021_07_b05/

11

(12)  https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/label-bas-carbone

12

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/101 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/101

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942

(COM(2021) 805 final/2 — 2021/0423 (COD))

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen

(COM(2021) 804 final — 2021/0424 (COD))

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen

(COM(2021) 803 final — 2021/0425 (COD))

(2022/C 323/17)

| Rapporteur: | Udo HEMMERLING |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Udo HEMMERLING

| Referrals | European Parliament, 17.2.2022 and 7.3.2022
  Council of the European Union, 23.2.2022 and 3.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 114(1), 194(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 2.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 184/2/2 |

Referrals

European Parliament, 17.2.2022 and 7.3.2022

Council of the European Union, 23.2.2022 and 3.3.2022

Legal basis

Articles 114(1), 194(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

2.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

184/2/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | After the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions against Russia and Belarus, the EU is on a fast track to adapt its energy policy, especially where natural gas is concerned. The European Commission presented the communication ‘REPowerEU’ on becoming independent from Russian fossil fuels by 2030, with the first big steps already planned for 2022. The EESC generally supports this challenging approach and recommends that the Commission draft an updated proposal for this gas market package in order to reflect the new situation. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s intention to accelerate the transition to renewable gases, which is urgently needed because of continued climate change. Their use should be focused on sectors that are hard to decarbonise or when no alternative technology solutions are already available, such as the direct electrification of end uses. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The proposal defines the gas and the hydrogen system as two separate systems. The rules set out in the gas package would mean that the requirements are very different. The EESC believes that different and restrictive requirements to the two systems are unproportional. The potential synergies in the joint development, operation and maintenance of the two systems through common regulation should be realised. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC believes that renewable gases should be fully tradeable in the Common Market. Therefore, a uniform EU-wide system for gas quality and sustainability standards should be introduced from the outset. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC underlines the special role of biomethane in developing a larger supply of renewable gas, for the circular economy and for regional value added. This would also benefit sustainable agriculture, by reducing GHG emissions. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | Fossil methane emissions are under-reported. The EESC is well aware that most methane leakage occurs outside the EU and for this reason, implementing an EU methane performance import standard is necessary in the regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

2.   Overview of the European Commission’s proposals

| 2.1. | The European Commission’s three proposals from December 2021 are part of the ‘Fit for 55’ approach to accelerate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and progress along the pathway towards climate neutrality by 2050. The aim is to adapt the EU gas market rules for the transition to renewable and low-carbon gases and to expand these rules to cover an EU hydrogen market. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The last time the regulatory framework for a common gas market was substantially adapted was 2009. So far, the main focus has been on regulatory issues relating to efficiency, trade, networks, competition and consumer information. This is now being radically expanded to include rules governing the transition to renewable energies. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | Preference is given to renewable, negative-, zero- and/or low-carbon gases on the market. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | An internal market and network for hydrogen will be set up and developed in line with the rules for the EU gas market. However, the Commission proposes that the existing gas network and the future hydrogen network must not be run by a single operator. This proposal will apply even if an existing gas network operator also develops a hydrogen network (so-called horizontal unbundling). |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Moreover, a regulation on methane emissions reduction in the gas sector is being put forward for the first time. This will turn the EU methane strategy’s aim of monitoring and reducing the energy sector’s methane emissions into specific rules. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

3.   Need for an update after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine

| 3.1. | The Russian invasion of Ukraine is causing immense sorrow to the people of Ukraine. Their civilian and military resistance must be supported. As a consequence of the sanctions against the Russian Federation and Belarus, the energy policy of the European Union should be revised, especially with regard to natural gas imports from Russia. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | In March 2022, the European Commission outlined a new plan to become independent of Russian fossil fuels by 2030, called ‘REPowerEU’. It will be extremely challenging for the European economy and society to reduce the demand for Russian gas by two thirds by the end of this year. The communication addresses many new priorities on energy security, gas storage, energy prices and biomethane that are related to the gas market package of December 2021. A mandatory instrument for increasing the use of renewable gas including biomethane should be discussed. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | For a coherent gas market policy, the EESC recommends that the Commission draft an updated proposal for this gas market package. This should include a proposal to accelerate authorisation procedures for gas and hydrogen infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

4.   General comments

| 4.1. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s intention to accelerate the transition to renewable gases, which is urgently needed because of continued climate change. The gas sector must make a major contribution to decarbonisation and sector coupling under the Green Deal. Low-carbon gases are also necessary for this transition, with high sustainability requirements needing to be met here. Their use should be focused on sectors that are hard to decarbonise or when no alternative technology solutions are already available, such as the direct electrification of end uses. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC is aware of the climate neutrality commitment that the EU has enshrined in the Climate Law. Based on this commitment, EU policies should consider the special advantages of electricity systems and gas systems. Electricity grids can transport renewable solar and wind power with low transformation losses. Gas grids can use big storage facilities and provide long-distance transport. Within gas, preference is to be given to renewable and, to a lesser extent, low-carbon gases on the market. In particular, hydrogen should be the focus in sectors that are hard to decarbonise, such as steel, cement, ceramics or long-haul transport. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Given that CO2 remains in the atmosphere for a long time, the binding target for climate neutrality by 2050 enshrined in the EU Climate Law must be ensured. Additional measures will have to be taken if this target is missed in the coming years, especially if it turns out that methane emissions from the energy sector have a higher impact on climate than currently estimated. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | Efficient gas networks and storage — and, in the future, hydrogen networks and storage — are needed, as they are an important element of a secure and affordable energy supply. They should be developed in a way that complements the electricity system. This way the gas and hydrogen sector can help to reduce dependency on Russian fossil fuels. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Accelerating the transition to renewable gases can help to diversify gas supply in the European Union. Carbon prices for fossil fuels will enforce the change to renewable gases. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The European Commission’s proposals are designed to facilitate and expand market access for renewable and low-carbon gases, including hydrogen, in the common market. The EESC considers this approach to be useful. But is it enough to help renewable gases break through? The EESC therefore proposes also considering giving explicit legal priority to the injection of renewable gases into grids. Similar feed-in priority rules exist in some Member States for the electricity sector and could serve as a model for the transition. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC believes that existing gas infrastructure must be used and further developed as needed to achieve the objective of climate neutrality. The Committee supports the special focus on setting up a hydrogen market and network. In this regard, the EESC questions the need for a strict separation of natural gas and hydrogen networks in line with competition law. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The proposal defines two separate systems: A gas system, which should switch from fossil to renewable gas, and a hydrogen system. The rules set out in the gas package would mean that the requirements applicable to both systems are very different. This would cause a blocking of technical and economic synergies between the two systems. The EESC questions whether the different and restrictive requirements to the two systems are needed and proportional. The potential synergies in the joint development, operation and maintenance of the two systems through common regulation should be realised. Opportunities to connect separated local grid sections should be made possible and executable. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The European Commission’s proposals aim to enable rapid market development for so-called low-carbon hydrogen as well as for genuine renewable hydrogen. This broad approach is intended to achieve a rapid and competitive expansion of hydrogen on the market. In the EESC’s view, it must be ensured that genuine renewable hydrogen continues to be prioritised over hydrogen produced using fossil fuels. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | Electrolysis and steam reforming are the most well-known and established chemical processes for producing hydrogen. Pyrolysis and biological processes (fermentation) — as well as biogenic CO2 from biogas processing may also be used. Depending on the process, different energy sources or feedstocks can be used to produce renewable hydrogen, such as renewable electricity, renewable gas or even sustainable biomass. The creation of a hydrogen economy is therefore expected to result in a mixture of technologies and installation sizes. Mining hydrogen from space is another option that should be acknowledged. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | In principle, the EESC recommends an open market design for the development of a hydrogen economy, with specific consideration of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This will mean that renewable gas or hydrogen can be produced locally from off-grid renewable electricity, biogenic residues and waste or recycled materials. This requires equal access to networks and markets. Furthermore, special attention should be paid to smaller operators and new entrants to the market (including energy communities) that produce renewable gases, for example, biomethane. Small and new entrants to the gas market need special support because they have to make high investments with relatively low profitability. At least those operators should have guaranteed access to distribution networks. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

| 4.12. | The EESC underlines the special role of biomethane in developing a larger supply of renewable gas. In March 2022, the European Commission set a new goal of 35 billion cubic metres of biomethane by 2030. There are still many unused sources of biomass that are not in competition with sustainable food production and nature protection goals. The use of by-products and residues from agriculture for biomethane will support the sector in reducing climate emissions. This will also provide additional fertilisers for farmers as a further step towards the circular economy and regional value added. |
| --- | --- |

4.12.

| 4.13. | High safety standards for gas and hydrogen have already been established to protect employees and the environment. With greater use of hydrogen in future, the role of preventive measures will become even more important. |
| --- | --- |

4.13.

5.   Specific comments

Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen

| 5.1. | Article 2 of the Directive provides a new definition for ‘low-carbon hydrogen’. The definitions for ‘low-carbon gas’ and ‘low-carbon fuels’ are based on those in the Renewable Energy Directive. A greenhouse gas emission reduction threshold of 70 % must be met. The definition of ‘low-carbon hydrogen’ should be re-examined to see whether this is blocking the change to renewable gases. On the one hand, so-called blue hydrogen (i.e. hydrogen produced from natural gas with carbon capture) seems to be needed in order to rapidly achieve significant hydrogen production. On the other hand, the need to develop ‘genuine’ renewable hydrogen production must not be hampered or delayed by favouring low-carbon hydrogen. Both should be ensured in the Directive. Consequently, priority should be given to renewable gases. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | Article 8 of the Directive provides for certification of renewable and low-carbon gases. In line with the Renewable Energy Directive, this will be done using the mass balance system already established for renewable fuels in the transport sector. The gas industry believes that different national verification systems create barriers to cross-border trade in renewable gases. The EESC believes that end-to-end certification of renewable gases is necessary and therefore suggests that a uniform EU-wide system for gas quality and sustainability standards should be introduced from the outset. It should include updated Guarantees of Origin that also include greenhouse gas information and sustainability criteria. This will enhance the liquidity of the gas market as it undergoes decarbonisation. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | Articles 13 and 14 of the Directive lay down rules for ‘active customers’ (prosumers) and energy communities for the first time. The EESC welcomes the fact that its position has been taken up by the Commission (1).This provides customers with a diversified gas supply portfolio and more competition in the gas market. Furthermore, prosumers and energy communities stimulate regional or rural development and drive the digitalisation of the energy sector. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | Article 27 of the Directive stipulates that contracts for the supply of fossil gas must be terminated by 2049 or must not run beyond then. The EESC has doubts whether laying down an end date in law is a good idea for certain private-sector supply contracts as this may run counter to the market economy principle of supply and demand. On the other hand, to be coherent with the climate neutrality binding target enshrined in the EU Climate Law and given the long persistence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 2049 date comes in too late. If the Commission decides to go ahead with termination of contracts date, the end date should be about one decade earlier in order to be able to meet our environmental commitments and especially in light of the REPowerEU initiative, prioritising the necessary transition to renewable energy. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | The Directive (Article 62 et seq.) also provides for unbundling of producers, traders, network operators and storage operators of hydrogen networks, in line with gas network regulations. The EESC supports this competitive approach but points out that this could hinder time-critical initiatives to build hydrogen networks. The Directive provides exceptional rules to apply until the end of 2030; a further extension should therefore be assessed. Requiring legal unbundling between gas network operators and hydrogen network operators would make it more difficult to convert and build the infrastructure necessary to achieve the climate objectives. A way to decarbonise the gas sector is to adapt and convert the existing gas infrastructure to pure hydrogen transportation. The EESC therefore thinks that exceptions to unbundling rules the hydrogen network would be worth discussing. As with gas network regulations, hydrogen network regulations should also make a distinction between the transmission and distribution network levels and should lay down specific unbundling requirements. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (recast)

| 5.6. | Article 4 of the revised Gas Regulation contains a rule stating that a Member State may allow financial transfers between regulated services for gas and hydrogen. The EESC can support this approach. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

| 5.7. | The Regulation (Article 6 et seq.) provides for non-discriminatory market access to hydrogen networks and storage facilities in line with gas network regulations. The EESC supports this approach. |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

| 5.8. | Article 16 of the Regulation provides for network tariff discounts for renewable and low-carbon gases. The EESC supports this. |
| --- | --- |

5.8.

| 5.9. | Article 20 of the Regulation stipulates that a hydrogen content of up to 5 % must be accepted in gas transmission between Member States. The EESC believes that it should be re-examined whether it is possible for blended content to exceed 5 % while ensuring that the network runs smoothly from a technical point of view. This would facilitate the market growth of renewable gases through blending. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

| 5.10. | The Regulation (Article 39 et seq.) provides for the gradual establishment of a European Network of Network Operators for Hydrogen (ENNOH). Due to potential synergies between gas and hydrogen, it should be organised in close collaboration with existing ENTSOG. The EESC underlines the important role of this network to create an EU internal market for hydrogen. In this respect, it has to be ensured that the network is open to new players. The special competitive interests of SMEs have to be respected. |
| --- | --- |

5.10.

Proposal for a Regulation of European Parliament and of the Council on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector

| 5.11. | Globally, the EU is responsible for only 5 % of methane emissions (2). Most of the methane emissions from natural gas imports originate outside the EU. An international approach that includes energy imports remains essential to combat methane emissions in the energy sector. |
| --- | --- |

5.11.

| 5.12. | The EESC believes that an EU framework for limiting or reducing methane emissions in the energy sector is a good idea. Care should be taken to ensure that the monitoring requirements for the gas sector are feasible, for example when measuring, reporting and verifying emission data. This should include setting appropriate inspection deadlines for facilities by distinguishing between their technical condition and age. Existing industry initiatives to reduce emissions should be taken into account (Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (OGMP)), as well as the need to boost international cooperation under initiatives such as the Methane Pledge and Climate and Clean Air Coalition. |
| --- | --- |

5.12.

| 5.13. | A large part of fossil methane emissions data is currently under-reported. The EESC welcomes the proposals on Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV), in particular when applied to preventing leakages along gas pipelines. Initiatives such as the International Methane Emissions Observatory (IMEO), as well as the use of satellite technologies to detect such leakages, should be streamlined and prioritised. Practices of unjustified venting and flaring should be banned in the EU. Exemptions to this rule should be limited to emergency and safety-related situations. As for biomethane, several EU Member States have already implemented technical and regulatory monitoring and avoidance measures. This might help with the assessment of methane emissions during fossil exploitation. |
| --- | --- |

5.13.

| 5.14. | The EESC is well aware that most methane leakage happens outside the EU and for this reason, implementing and enforcing an EU methane performance import standard for gas imports is necessary. Such an import standard should set a benchmark for acceptable upstream emissions. This standard should already be developed under this regulation. Furthermore, the inclusion of upstream methane emissions in the CO2-Pricing system should be considered. |
| --- | --- |

5.14.

| 5.15. | The proposal on reducing methane emissions focuses on the energy sector. The EESC reiterates the relevance of methane emissions from agriculture. As stated in the Commission’s methane strategy, farmers should be supported in reducing methane emissions. This could consist of including a mandate in the Common Agricultural Policy to offer measures to reward methane emissions reductions by farmers. |
| --- | --- |

5.15.

Brussels, 19 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  Opinion TEN/761 — Energy prices (OJ C 275, 18.7.2022, p. 80).

1

(2)  See Opinion TEN/725 — Methane Strategy (OJ C 220, 9.6.2021, p. 47).

2

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/107 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/107

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the New EU Urban Mobility Framework

(COM(2021) 811 final)

(2022/C 323/18)

Rapporteur:
  Mateusz SZYMAŃSKI

| Referral | European Commission, 21.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 7.4.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 203/1/8 |

Referral

European Commission, 21.1.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

7.4.2022

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

203/1/8

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission communication on an EU urban mobility framework. The document has been published at the right time, given the challenges relating to the need for environmental care and those that have emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic, which is changing the way we think about mobility and, more broadly, about urban life and work. It is necessary to strike the right balance between environmental protection and inclusiveness of urban mobility. The need to reduce emissions should not lead to reduced mobility and transport exclusion. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The Committee points out that the right to mobility should be recognised as a fundamental human right which is also included in the European Pillar of Social Rights. It therefore calls for ambitious EU action to make urban transport more inclusive. Mobility should be seen as a factor that can promote equality, especially equal opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC calls on representatives of public authorities at different levels, with the involvement of civil society representatives and citizens, to work together to improve mobility, not only in cities, but in urban functional areas more broadly (including peri-urban and rural areas). Above all, it calls for the creation of sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs) and sustainable urban logistics plans (SULPs) as well as spatial planning that extends beyond urban boundaries. This should be reflected in the work on the revision of TEN-T insofar as urban nodes are concerned. In the EESC’s view, these hubs should be one-stop shops. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Furthermore, the EESC calls for a participatory approach to the planning process. In the Committee’s view, only the involvement of all transport stakeholders in urban areas can lead to a change in the desired direction. It therefore welcomes the proposal to change the composition of the Expert Group on Urban Mobility and open it up to people outside the public administration. The EESC proposes broadening its membership to include representatives of different social groups and backgrounds, especially young people. It also expresses its desire to participate in the work of this body. At the same time, it believes that such an approach could favour the promotion of SUMPs and SULPs. The EESC would also like to underline the importance of raising passenger and business awareness of urban mobility and logistics options, particularly the optimisation of car usage. The role of education and broad cooperation between different institutions and organisations are extremely important. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | It is of the utmost importance to ensure adequate long-term funding for mobility activities. EU Member States and local authorities are encouraged to commit their own resources, which, alongside the creation of SUMPs and SULPs, can demonstrate the political will to make change in this area. Consideration should be given to allocating specific resources to the development of transport infrastructure within the framework of EU funds. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC stresses that steps should be taken to make employment in the area of urban mobility more attractive, especially in relation to public transport, where there is a lack of staff and an ageing workforce. Solutions need to be developed to improve employment conditions through social dialogue. This also applies to people working via digital platforms that offer mobility-related services. The EESC points out the Commission’s proposal to improve the conditions of work performed through online platforms. Effective implementation of the directive should be ensured. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC recognises the particular role of public transport in improving urban and peri-urban mobility. This mode of transport should provide high-quality services and be accessible. Safety is not negligible in the current health situation. This is why the EESC is calling for ambitious action to boost public transport, especially as it has a particular impact on improving equal opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The development of digitalisation creates new opportunities and risks. The EESC recognises the potential of digital solutions and supports their development. However, it must be ensured that the emergence of new mobility tools does not restrict access to mobility for those who, for various reasons, cannot or are unable to use them. Improving digital skills and security in the digital environment are therefore of particular importance. In addition, we call for the principles of transparency and democratic governance to be respected with regard to data obtained through digital applications. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC supports efforts to develop reliable and comparable mobility indicators. It is recommended that the indicators under UN SDG 11 be used first and foremost. It is important to be aware that collecting and compiling data entails a significant effort on the part of administrations. The Committee therefore encourages efforts to support administrations at different levels in this process. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | Statistics on urban mobility illustrate the scale of the challenge of changing mobility behaviour and choices (1). Residents of cities are attached to their cars. This comes with social, economic and environmental consequences. The scale of the challenge of moving towards sustainable mobility has also been highlighted by the European Court of Auditors, which, in its report, pointed out that ‘there is no clear trend towards more sustainable modes of transport’ (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | In the communication, the EC puts forward proposals for more decisive actions to change the approach to organising urban mobility. As the Commission points out, the aim is to move from an approach based on ensuring seamless flow of traffic towards moving people and goods more sustainably. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | According to the Commission, this would mean strengthening the structure of collective transport, including public transport, better opportunities for active mobility and efficient, zero-emission urban logistics and last-mile delivery. Multimodality implemented through digital solutions should be key. It should enable better connection of urban and peri-urban areas and improve efficiency. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The communication should be seen against the backdrop of the twin energy and digital transitions. In the context of transport, a strengthened approach to TEN-T urban nodes, including the promotion of multimodality in both passenger and freight transport, should contribute to their implementation. This also means making full use of the opportunities afforded by digitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC shares the Commission’s observations and recommendations. Cities and urban mobility need to evolve and adapt to new realities. Urban mobility is rightly seen as a broad concept that encompasses city life as a whole, which should enable economic, social and environmental objectives to be achieved. This is important given the difficulties the transport sector is facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the EESC sees public transport as part of policies to reduce inequality, especially inequality of opportunity. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC recognises mobility as a fundamental right. This follows from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that everyone has the right to freedom of movement. It is also important to remember the European Pillar of Social Rights, according to which ‘everyone has the right to access essential services of good quality, including [...] transport [...].’ Nevertheless, the EESC notes that the current urban mobility infrastructure is not equally accessible to all. Transport should be as inclusive as possible. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC appreciates the role of the EC in improving urban mobility. However, it is aware that the main decision-making burden lies with local authorities and with the Member States. It therefore calls for active steps to develop mobility, including work to develop sustainable urban mobility plans (SUMPs) and sustainable urban logistics plans (SULPs). A lack of political will is one of the things preventing them from being established. The EESC stresses the need for administrations at different decision-making levels to work together, also by involving CSOs and citizens. At the same time, Member States are called upon to assign their own resources for the development and maintenance of urban mobility infrastructure. Consideration should be given to allocating specific resources to the development of transport infrastructure within the framework of EU funds. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC shares the Commission’s view on SUMPs and SULPs. Unfortunately, many cities in the EU still do not have such plans, which may indicate that the process of establishing them entails significant financial and organisational resources. The Commission’s proposals are a step in the right direction. The EESC will also take measures to promote these instruments. Furthermore, the EESC encourages the promotion of these plans in relation to businesses. It is important for these plans to respond to current trends. If there is no significant improvement in the situation in the long term, consideration should be given to making creation of SUMPs and SULPs mandatory, while taking account of the subsidiarity principle. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The communication pays great attention to the problem of environmental protection in developing urban transport. It is necessary to strike the right balance here. The need to reduce emissions should not lead to reduced mobility and transport exclusion. The EESC proposes that priority be given to solutions that encourage the use of low-emission vehicles and support for businesses, civil society organisations and consumers in purchasing such vehicles. At the same time, the full spectrum of possibilities for transportation that will fully or partially reduce the need for private cars should be presented. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Appropriate spatial planning is extremely important. Mobility trends should be monitored and adequate reserves of space created for goals relating to the development of new forms of mobility as well as to development of public transport networks. To ensure a good quality of life in areas remote from city centres, there needs to be adequate infrastructure for the people living in these areas. It is important that business models for new types of mobility are adapted to urban infrastructure. If there is insufficient potential in cities, partnerships should be supported to monitor urban mobility trends and their implementation in the EU and at global level. The EESC will support such activities. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | It is recommended that cities, peri-urban and rural areas work together to create SUMPs and SULPs for broad functional areas. The aim should be to push back against suburbanisation and spatial chaos. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC agrees with the importance the communication places on strengthening TEN-T urban nodes for passengers and freight, and shares the view that these aspects should form part of the revision of the TEN-T Regulation (3). In this context, the EESC would like to stress that cities cannot develop in isolation from their surrounding areas. It is therefore of the utmost importance that transport links exist between urban and peri-urban areas, including those in rural areas, that allow for convenient mobility and use of the full potential of different areas and their inhabitants. In the EESC’s view, these hubs should be one-stop shops. They should serve not only to change the way people get around in the strict sense of the term, but to provide a comprehensive transport service, with information for passengers and services and products related to transport, including freight transport. In the EESC’s view, railway stops may have a special role in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC agrees with the need to decarbonise freight transport logistics, for example through the development of SULPs, with a focus on developing sustainable solutions and improving multimodality with an eye to zero-emission solutions, technologies and vehicles. The EESC stresses the importance of involving public and private stakeholders in this process and of adequately addressing transitional problems. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The challenge for the sector will be attracting staff. One of the problems identified is the advanced age of workers. At the same time, there is little interest in working in urban public transport. In relation to this, we can see staff shortages that have an impact on the quality of the services provided. On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic has clearly shown that workers in this sector play an important role and ensure that whole communities can continue to function. Therefore, work in this sector should be made more attractive by guaranteeing decent and fair working conditions. Moreover, it is very important for education on sustainable mobility to be included in school curricula and in youth work and to make educational programmes more attractive and interactive for young people, including through the Erasmus+ programme. Solutions should be developed through social dialogue mechanisms. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | Under the system of urban transport public contracts, consideration should be given to a number of social and environmental criteria when selecting the best tender, taking into account the requirements laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4). |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | Public transport is crucial for the development of mobility. Its development should therefore be supported in such ways as setting targets for public transport for the coming years. We should also not forget about such elements as accessibility, affordability, safety, reliability and punctuality. At the same time, confidence in urban transport, as something that is safe in terms of health, needs to be strengthened, especially during health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also important that using this mode of transport is not associated with poverty. The role of public transport in equal opportunities, including gender equality, should also not be overlooked. The EESC calls for a long-term financial support framework for financing public transport infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | The communication highlights issues related to the use of mobility as a service (MaaS). This is a desirable area for development as it offers huge potential to produce a large amount of data. However, there are concerns as to whether the data processed by applications will be used in an unauthorised manner. An appropriate regulatory framework should be put in place to ensure that democratic principles of transparency are respected in the management of urban transport. Public scrutiny is necessary here. In addition, local and regional authorities need support for the development of artificial intelligence technologies. The EESC stresses that the development of modern digital mobility tools must not lead to the exclusion of those who cannot or are unable to use such solutions. There is a need to develop society’s digital skills. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | The EESC stresses the importance of awareness-raising and education on modern mobility. Residents should be shown the benefits of leaving private vehicles behind in favour of other methods of travel. Optimisation in terms of car use is particularly important. In addition to EU bodies and initiatives, civil society organisations and networks (5) play an important role in this regard. A successful example is CIVITAS. The EESC also proposes promoting urban tourism that takes account of the use of sustainable modes of mobility. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | The EESC would like to express its interest in participating in the work of the Expert Group on Urban Mobility. We agree that the composition and working methods of this group need to be revised. Opening it up to areas beyond administration is a step in the right direction. The Committee encourages diversifying the composition of this group so that different social groups and different backgrounds are represented. The above considerations can also be applied to other mobility bodies at different levels. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | Furthermore, the EESC supports the Commission’s proposals to improve harmonised urban mobility indicators. It is worth noting here that the communication refers to SDG 11, which aims to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable by 2030. It is important to stress that specific objectives can provide guidelines for EU policy in this area and for the design of indicators, which should be guaranteed to be comparable and up-do-date. The EESC therefore calls for support for services responsible for collecting data and producing statistics at various levels. The Committee encourages the use of SUMI (6) as a basis for further work, and calls for the experience accompanying the work on this tool to be taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC also points out that passenger information that is accessible to all passengers should be an integral part of the public transport service. Numerous fares, zones and the variety of tickets assigned to them make it difficult to travel smoothly. This is particularly true for those who come to cities for short stays. The EESC encourages the creation of simple and clear fare systems. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | For many young people, a comprehensive change of perspective that focuses on healthy, climate-friendly and sustainable mobility is a priority (7). The EESC therefore encourages efforts to develop more structured youth engagement on climate and sustainability in the EU policy-making and decision-making processes (8), and to continue initiatives such as DiscoverEU. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | In the communication, the Commission justifiably refers to work through digital platforms, including in the field of mobility. In recent years, a number of problems and challenges have been identified in relation to this, including employment conditions. The EESC points out the Commission’s proposal to improve the conditions of work performed through online platforms. Effective implementation of the directive should be ensured. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC draws attention to the retail trade sector, which can make a significant contribution to achieving urban mobility objectives, provided that the assumptions of the proximity model in retail trade are taken into account, especially for essential products. Local trade should promote greater use of sustainable solutions. New trends should also be followed, such as aerial mobility, which may represent a new quality of mobility services. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The communication mentions the role of inland waterway transport as something that can also play a part in greening both urban transport and last mile freight transport. Here, the EESC would like to refer to its opinion on NAIADES III (9), which presented recommendations for solutions in this area. It mentions, among other things, that certain conditions should be put in place for the development of inland waterway transport in cities. These include the creation of appropriate infrastructure and the provision of the same preferential treatment for public water transport as for public land transport. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  https://www.eiturbanmobility.eu/

1

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Passenger_mobility_statistics#Distance_covered

(2)  Court of Auditors, Special report No 06/2020; Sustainable Urban Mobility in the EU: No substantial improvement is possible without Member States’ commitment.

2

(3)  Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU (OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 1).

3

(4)  Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1).

4

(5)  For example, EIT Urban Mobility or city associations.

5

(6)  https://civitas.eu/tool-inventory/sumi-sustainable-urban-mobility-indicators

6

(7)  Youth Position Paper, Vienna 2021 https://www.klimaaktiv.at/service/publikationen/mobilitaet/the-pep.html

7

(8)  OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 44.

8

(9)  OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 102.

9

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/112 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/112

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — State of the Energy Union 2021 — Contributing to the European Green Deal and the Union’s recovery (pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action)

(COM(2021) 950 final)

(2022/C 323/19)

| Rapporteur: | Alena MASTANTUONO |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Alena MASTANTUONO

| Referral | European Commission, 20.12.2021 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted at plenary | 19.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 184/4/2 |

Referral

European Commission, 20.12.2021

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted at plenary

19.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

184/4/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The serious situation currently unfolding as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine expressly shows that the risks to EU energy security and safety and the issues linked to it have been hugely underestimated not only in the text of the 6th annual report on the State of the Energy Union, but especially in reality. The current tragic picture shows that the bet on an intensive economic cooperation of the EU with Russia in the energy field was a fatal mistake that was strongly supported by many former high-ranking politicians from some EU Member States. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The extent of the potential risks linked to the dependence of the EU energy system on imports of raw materials needed for the energy sector from Russia, which accelerated after the annexation of Crimea, has now been revealed, and requires the EU to act as a matter of urgency. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC is committed to the objectives of the Green Deal and recommends stepping up efforts to achieve the set targets and reduce the EU’s dependence on fossil fuels as quickly as possible. However, the overall scenario for the implementation of the Green Deal needs to be adapted to make sure it is feasible and realistic under the current circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Regarding the Energy Union, the EESC strongly believes that the focus must now be on paying particular attention to its first pillar on security, solidarity and trust. At the same time, synergies between its pillars must be strengthened further, along with all relevant supporting instruments (financing, taxation, taxonomy, emission allowances and regulatory rules). |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC stresses that the 6th annual report on the State of the Energy Union is not perfectly balanced. Influenced by the effect of the supply shocks on the energy market, it focuses a great deal on energy prices and the instruments for eliminating carbon emissions, but only covers issues such as security of supplies or innovation and research superficially. The EESC would like to see a broader and well-structured overview of financial sources to strengthen the Energy Union, as well as improvements in the ways the Energy Union’s progress contributes to innovative actions and competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | In particular, the EESC is more than irritated by the fact that, as in previous reports, key objectives of the European Energy Union are once again either not addressed or only marginally addressed in this report. It should be remembered, among other things, that our wish was to reduce import dependency, put citizens at the heart of the Energy Union, and make the EU the world’s number one in renewable energy. One should expect that the annual State of the Energy Union reports will also analyse these key issues centrally and clearly identify possible flaws so that new initiatives can be developed where necessary. This report falls far short of this. For example, the issue of the development of civic energy, which is important for the EESC, is woefully neglected. The EESC expects the Commission to make clear statements on this in separate chapters in the 2022 report. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC very much appreciates the fact that renewables have become the main EU power source; this is key in helping reduce the high dependence on EU energy imports and in supporting the Union’s energy security. However, the Committee is of the opinion that more tangible actions are needed to enable consumers to be actively engaged in the market and to benefit from more decentralised and more sustainable supply structures. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC agrees with the report’s statement on the potential of internal energy market development, which is not yet complete in terms of market environment, institutions, regulatory rules and connectivity between the Member States. The transition will be a test for energy infrastructure and all means must be mobilised in order to ready the infrastructure for change and make it resilient to future shocks. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The experience of the rise in energy prices in autumn 2021 combined with the current situation stresses the need to closely monitor the development of energy prices and to develop a more integrated approach on how to rationally deal with the impact of high energy prices on poverty. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The development of the EU Energy Union has entered a period when visible efforts need to be made with regard to improving security. There also needs to be a stronger emphasis on solidarity and trust. It is highly probable that next winter crisis management test will be inevitable, requiring preparedness to minimise the negative impacts on energy distribution and consequently on economic performance and living standards. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EU should also be aware that the current system of energy deliveries from Russia to the EU keeps financial flows in the hands of the Russian state regime with these financial resources being used to fund its military efforts. Alternative ways of securing energy supplies through diversification of suppliers from different countries and use of different energy sources while enhancing solidarity inside the EU, must be found as soon as possible. This also applies to raw materials imported to the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC would very much welcome a stronger policy stance and an impact assessment of the relationship between energy and the digital sector, and between the Energy Union and the new industrial strategy for Europe, as well as some forecasts on the impact of the current risky situation facing the EU energy sector, business and society. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The State of the Energy Union report also deserves a specific section on efforts to achieve a just transition, including best-case examples implemented in the Member States and at the European level, how EU financing is used in order to give a financial boost to the reskilling and upskilling needed for the green transition. The EESC emphasises that the just transition is not just a question of financing the transition. It also includes the goal of working with the social partners to create decent work and quality jobs as well as social security, and requires specific action at the regional level. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The EU is lacking in public investment in clean energy R&I and is therefore lagging behind its global partners, and thus risks falling behind in the area of important future technologies and markets. The EESC strongly encourages the European Commission to come up with a strategic plan for the clean energy sectors in order to give a boost to the development of clean energy industries in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | The 6th annual report of the European Commission takes stock of progress in the implementation of the European Union energy and climate policies, including the Energy Union across its five pillars. It also highlights how the EU’s new climate targets, enshrined by the European Climate Law, were translated by the Fit for 55 package into meaningful legislative proposals. The green transition is regarded as part of the solution on the path to climate neutrality and a response to the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The report confirms a positive trend in the reduction of EU greenhouse gas emissions. In 2020, GHG emissions were down 31 % compared to 1990 due to the impact of the pandemic on energy consumption but also due to continued decarbonisation trends. Projections submitted by Member States in 2021 point to a 34 % reduction in GHG net emissions by 2030 with existing measures and to a 41 % reduction with additional measures for the EU, compared to the GHG emissions reduction of at least 55 % laid down in the European Climate Law. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | For the first time, renewables overtook fossil fuels as the EU’s main power source in 2020 (38 % of EU electricity, fossil fuels 37 % and nuclear 25 %). The share of renewable energy sources in the overall EU energy mix is expected to have reached at least 22 % although some Member States are at risk of failing to meet their national binding target. The uptake of renewables was supported by the investment of EUR 48,8 billion in 2020 compared to EUR 32,9 billion in 2019. However, the picture varied across the different technologies. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | This report is published against the backdrop of a sharp spike in gas and electricity prices. Wholesale electricity prices have increased by 230 % on a yearly basis with a more moderate impact on retail prices until September 2021 (+11 % EU average). The price shock was largely felt due to negative electricity prices experienced in 2020, pushed down by the economic slowdown. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | This was largely driven by rising gas prices which had an effect on the electricity price nine times bigger than the effect of the observed carbon price increase over the same period. Gas storage levels are low and the EU is experiencing the highest level of overall net energy import dependency in the past 30 years (60,6 % in 2019 compared to 58,2 % in 2018 and 56 % in 2000). This is despite the fact that reducing this dependency has been and remains an explicit goal of the Energy Union. A ‘State of the Energy Union’ report should not only mention such negative figures, but also explain why the objective of reducing import dependency has not been even partially achieved. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The increase in energy prices prompted the European Commission to issue the toolbox for action and support in order to quickly help vulnerable groups. In 2019, energy poverty affected up to 31 million people in the EU. This underlines the importance of shielding vulnerable groups from the price spike and ensuring a just transition towards climate neutrality. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | In the report, the Commission tasked the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) with assessing the benefits and drawbacks of the current wholesale electricity market set-up, including its capacity to address situations of extreme price volatility in gas markets. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Renewable energy subsidies reached EUR 78 billion. On the contrary, fossil fuel subsidies dropped slightly in 2020, down to EUR 52 billion. However, they might increase with the current economic growth. According to the 6th report, nine Member States have phased out coal, 13 have made national commitments to do so by a certain date, four are considering possible dates and only one has not yet started national discussions on a phase-out. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | The pace of decline in 2019 towards the 2030 targets was satisfactory for primary energy consumption only. EU primary energy consumption declined by 1,9 % and final energy consumption by 0,6 % in 2019 compared to 2018. Much greater efforts are needed to reduce the existing final energy consumption target and achieve the higher ambition set out in the proposed revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | The report helps identify future areas for action and increased efforts. Beside the need for investment, the report also stresses the need for the removal of administrative barriers to RES deployment and acceleration of permitting procedures. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | The EU is looking into how to increase the safety and security of energy supplies as well as to ensure better interconnectivity across the EU. The crisis pointed out the need to ensure security of supply and avoid supplies coming from unsecure sources. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | EU public clean energy R&I spending in Member States continues to be lower than in 2010, but national and EU recovery funding that targets clean energy R&I can partially compensate this. The 2021-27 EU budget will provide significant support to implement the European Green Deal and the energy transition across the Union. In particular, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund will allocate at least 30 % and 37 % respectively of the available funding to this objective. Besides that, the green transition will be funded by the Just Transition Mechanism or InvestEU. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | By 5 October 2021, the planned combined climate-related investment in 22 national recovery and resilience plans (RRF) was around EUR 177 billion, representing 40 % out of a total of EUR 445 billion of RRF funds allocated to these Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

| 2.14. | The Communication is accompanied by the following five reports on:






  — | Energy subsidies in the EU |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.14.

—

Energy subsidies in the EU

| — | Climate Action Progress Report 2021 |
| --- | --- |

—

Climate Action Progress Report 2021

| — | Progress on the competitiveness of clean energy technologies |
| --- | --- |

—

Progress on the competitiveness of clean energy technologies

| — | The fuel quality report, and |
| --- | --- |

—

The fuel quality report, and

| — | The report on the functioning of the carbon market (emissions trading system). |
| --- | --- |

—

The report on the functioning of the carbon market (emissions trading system).

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC perceives the Russian military invasion of Ukraine as a gigantic shock to the security, functioning and performance of the Energy Union, besides it being a horrific situation for Ukraine and its people. This is the biggest security threat in the history of European integration. It requires re-defining and adjusting the EU’s strategic and security priorities and preparing appropriate instruments for the implementation of these priorities as soon as possible. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC urges the EU institutions to be more far-sighted about future security threats and to pay more attention to the security and diversification of supplies as well as ensuring better solidarity among EU Member States. The security threat has also revealed the need to speed up the rollout of renewables in order to decrease the EU’s dependence on fossil fuels and to ensure that the goals of the Green Deal are achieved. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC takes note of the European Commission’s detailed report taking stock of the change and of progress in the implementation of the European Union energy and climate policies. It positively assesses the progress of the EU in fulfilling its climate targets and welcome the identification of areas where more progress needs to be made. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had a somewhat positive impact on the reduction of CO2 emissions as it pushed down energy consumption, and thus production. However, the economic growth in 2021 pushed demand upwards which influenced together with other elements the surge in energy prices. The EESC, welcomes that the Commission’s Communication on energy prices (1) allowed help and support to quickly be given to the vulnerable, to address the negative impacts of the price shock and draws attention to its opinion TEN 761 (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC encourages the European Commission to follow the development of energy prices very closely and suggests including the statistics on the development of energy prices in the next report on the State of the Energy Union. In this regard, it points out the need for more consistent data that can provide an accurate picture of the market. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | As in its previous reports, the EESC highlights that the green transition must happen in a just manner, leaving no one behind. The transition is not only technical but economic and social too. Regular dialogue with citizens and civil society, including social partners, especially in regions in transformation, will ensure that the climate and energy policy objectives will be perceived as socially attractive and met with the minimum socioeconomic costs. At least as important as deepening dialogue is delivering on the promise to actively integrate citizens into the market, make them ‘prosumers’, and involve them in new value creation opportunities. Quality of operationalisation and funding of individual instruments and their specific implementation at national level will be crucial in this regard. Including the views of social partners must therefore be a key objective of future dialogues and is a central prerequisite for achieving a successful and just transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The State of the Energy Union report should also include a section on efforts to achieve a just transition, incorporating examples of measures successfully implemented in Member States and at European level. The EESC emphasises that the just transition is not just about financing the transition. It also includes the goal of creating decent work and quality jobs, as well as social security, and requires specific actions at the regional level. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC would like to see a more balanced approach of the 6th annual report to the particular areas of the Energy Union. It focuses comprehensively on the areas of energy efficiency and decarbonisation, which currently represent the key policy priorities. However, the attention paid to the topics of security, solidarity, and confidence, or research, innovation and competitiveness, and challenges and achievements surrounding these areas seems to be insufficient. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | In particular, the EESC is more than irritated by the fact that, as in previous reports, key objectives of the European Energy Union are once again either not addressed or only marginally addressed in this report. It should be remembered, among other things, that our wish was to reduce import dependency, put citizens at the heart of the Energy Union, and make the EU the world’s number one in renewable energy. One should expect that the annual State of the Energy Union reports will also analyse these key issues centrally and clearly identify possible flaws so that new initiatives can be developed where necessary. This report falls far short of this. For example, the issue of the development of civic energy, which is important for the EESC, is woefully neglected. The EESC expects the Commission to make clear statements on this in separate chapters in the 2022 report. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | It is pleased to see that Member States increased their ambition in achieving existing 2020 targets for renewable energy, henceforth the main power source for electricity. It encourages those Member States which are failing to achieve this target to focus on better deployment of RES support and/or engage in agreements for statistical transfers. In doing so, the EESC would like to point out, as shown by a study by the Commission (3), that phasing out fossil energy is accompanied by a substantial reduction in external costs (such as health and environmental costs), which must be borne by society. To illustrate: for electricity generation, fossil fuel technologies have the highest external costs of EUR 68-EUR 177/MWh for the EU-27 average. Nuclear and renewable energy technologies have external costs, of EUR 3-17/MWh with wind and hydropower, reaching levels below EUR 5/MWh. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | Compared to previous reports, the Committee welcomes the focus on the role of prosumers. We recall our plea that the most important objective is that citizens should be at the core of the Energy Union (4). Consumers should have the possibility to choose and to be actively engaged in the market. Still, concrete measures in EU legislation need to be adopted in order to put this concept swiftly into practice. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The internal energy market is still not complete. It does not offer sufficient benefits to small renewable energy producers. Moreover, the energy price surge showed the weaknesses of the energy market. It revealed that some energy suppliers are not competent to exercise this activity, nor have a sufficient capital base. The cultivation of the market, its relevant regulation, the creation of the necessary requirements for individual actors and reasonable consumer protection should be reinforced. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | The Committee regrets that not only has its call for a reduction in strategic dependency on third parties not been heard but this dependency has actually increased. In 2021, the EU reached its highest dependency on energy imports in the last three decades. This failure played a role in the energy price surge. In this regard, we recall our statement that the European Commission and Member States should avoid any further increase in imports and take this topic seriously when pointing to hydrogen or other energy sources as a driving force for the decarbonisation as it can further increase imports. Given the current situation, it is not only important to implement a strategy to reduce the EU’s increasing energy dependence, but also to provide a feasible territorial diversification of energy deliveries and distributions without geopolitical risks. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | The Member States proved that they are willing to support the green transition, and the share of spending on climate-related investment from 22 RRF equal to 40 % of total budgets confirms how costly the green transition is and will be. However, the EU’s rate of public investment in clean energy technologies needed for decarbonisation is the lowest of the major economies and hampers our competitive edge over global partners. We also need to put citizens at the centre of energy policy. If they are able to invest and benefit from their investments, a considerable amount of private money can flow into that sector. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | Fast approval of the delegated act of the rules defining environmentally sustainable economic activities seems to be a crucial signal for opening up the public clean energy R&I spending in Member States. The EESC expects that it will also contribute to the reduction of investment in fossil fuel capacity and associated subsidies. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | The Carbon Market Report 2021 offers proof of a significant contribution of the EU ETS to decarbonisation. In the period 2013-2020 it generated auction revenues exceeding EUR 68 billion. The EESC takes note that 75 % of the EU ETS revenues was used for climate action and energy-related purposes, which is well above the 50 % limit for Member States. In this regard, the EESC encourages Member States to further increase this share in order to combat climate change. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | The European Union is not an island, its cooperation on the international scene is of utmost importance as well as the coordination with global partners regarding climate policy. The EU should work towards the objective of climate neutrality, while ensuring competitiveness and security of energy supply at affordable prices for businesses and citizens. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

| 3.17. | It appreciates that the report includes the data for employment in the clean energy sector, growing 2 % per year. The EU suffers from vacant green jobs which will become more striking with an accelerated green transition headed by investments in renovations. We need to ensure that people with the right skills can swiftly enter the labour market and that the new jobs created by the green transition are jobs with good working conditions and decent wages. It is important to invest as much effort as possible in developing training and qualifications in the field of energy renovation. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

| 3.18. | The current situation in the energy market reflects some underestimation of several aspects of energy security, especially in terms of deliveries of gas to the EU, or insufficient efforts to eliminate the high, and even deepening dependence of the EU on energy imports. It also reflects a limited solidarity among the EU Member States to efficiently solve the problem, including a potential lack of trust to reach a consensus. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

| 3.19. | The EESC highly appreciates a huge volume of financial sources coming from the 2021-2027 EU MFF and NextGenerationEU to be specifically targeted at tackling the challenges connected with the Energy Union’s targets. |
| --- | --- |

3.19.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | Despite the EU’s commitments to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, they are not declining sufficiently. The annex to the report shows the slight decline in fossil fuel subsidies but with economic growth we can expect their increase. Between 2015 and 2019, fossil fuel subsidies rose in the EU by 4 % and decreased measurably in 2020. They fell by 10 % in the energy sector and by 4 % in industry, while in transport they rose by 25 % and by 13 % for households who benefit from subsidies on heating oil and natural gas consumption. Subsidies play an important role in the social area, as they ensure that the transition towards a climate-neutral economy happens in a just manner. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC regrets that the report does not analyse the relationship between the energy and digital transition. Digitalisation opens up opportunities for savings in energy, reduction in energy intensity as well as better management of energy infrastructure. The report could develop in depth the solutions for the increasing demand in electrification and the need for stable and sustainable energy solutions. The transition will be a test for energy infrastructure and all means must be mobilised in order to ready the infrastructure for change and make it resilient to future shocks. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Reskilling and upskilling will play an important role in the green transformation. In order to build up concrete strategies for monitoring and anticipating the needs for skilling, up- and reskilling of workers in the electricity sector, the EESC points to the outcomes of the social partner project ‘The Skills2Power’. The report on the State of the Energy Union could also take stock of how EU financing such as the RRF, Erasmus+ or cohesion funds are used in order to give a financial boost to the reskilling and upskilling needed for the green transition. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC recommends very close monitoring of the potential bottlenecks in the raw materials supply chains for energy technologies that are critical for energy security and the clean energy transition. It suggests diversifying as much as possible the supply of critical raw materials by entering into international talks with global partners and preparing a scenario for alternative solutions. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EU needs more investment in clean energy R&I. The EU’s rate of public investment in clean energy technologies was 0,027 % of GDP in 2019. How can we be serious about the clean energy rollout when we have the lowest rate among the major economies? Although the EU retains a strong position in the wind industry, it is lagging behind global partners in multiple other industries including solar PV, renewable hydrogen, heat pumps or renewable fuels (5). The EESC encourages the European Commission to come up with a strategic plan for each of the sectors in order to give a boost to the development of clean energy industries in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | In order to monitor which Member States are the most agile in the areas of research, development and innovation, the EESC suggests publishing a scoreboard on a regular basis. This could concern EU managed programmes, but also cohesion policy and the RRF as we already have an RRF scoreboard and the long-running cohesion policy scoreboard (6). |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC strongly recommends making the EU ETS system more transparent and applying a system of reasonable interventions making it possible to adjust the allowance price to the desired target and eliminate the sudden price volatility observed over the last year (first an enormous increase to over EUR 100 and now a steep drop to about EUR 55 within a few days). |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC recommends that Energy Union governance and management reflect more intensively on the synergies with the new EU industrial strategy (as defined in the Commission’s communication of March 2020). |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | Regarding the targets connected with decarbonisation, the EESC stresses that all types of instruments, namely the regulatory rules, the EU ETS system, the environmental taxes, and taxonomy, have to be coordinated and harmonised in a well-tuned and functioning system. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

Brussels, 19 May 2022

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  COM(2021) 660 final.

1

(2)  OJ C 275, 18.7.2022, p. 80.

2

(3)  Study on behalf of the European Commission: Energy costs, taxes and the impact of government interventions on investments, EnergyVille.

3

(4)  OJ C 220, 9.6.2021, p. 38.

4

(5)  COM(2021) 952 final.

5

(6)  https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/; https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-resilience-scoreboard/index.html#

6

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/119 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/119

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/25/EC as regards the inclusion of improved stability requirements and its alignment with stability requirements defined by the International Maritime Organisation

(COM(2022) 53 final — 2022/0036 (COD))

(2022/C 323/20)

| Rapporteur: | Mateusz SZYMAŃSKI |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Mateusz SZYMAŃSKI

| Referral | European Parliament, 7.3.2022
  Council of the European Union, 1.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 100(2) and Article 304 of the TFEU |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 2.5.2022 |
| Date adopted in plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 182/1/1 |

Referral

European Parliament, 7.3.2022

Council of the European Union, 1.3.2022

Legal basis

Article 100(2) and Article 304 of the TFEU

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

2.5.2022

Date adopted in plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

182/1/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the proposal to amend the current rules on the safety of ro-ro passenger ships in damaged condition. It strongly advocates maintaining the highest possible safety standards in maritime transport. This is particularly important for the type of craft in question, which, due to their specific characteristics, are more vulnerable than other types of vessels. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | Moreover, the EESC welcomes the efforts made to harmonise international rules, in this case bringing them into line with the international rules established by the IMO. It also appreciates the efforts made to simplify legislation that facilitates the use and application of these rules. We welcome the method of working on the project, in particular the in-depth consultation of experts in the field. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | However, the EESC would like to stress that the examination of this proposal is extremely difficult due to the complicated and unclear drafting of the text. The provisions and clarifications thus designed actually run counter to the objective of the proposal, which is to facilitate the use and application of the aforementioned legal provisions. It is recommended that its transparency be increased, including through a graphical presentation of the targeted solutions with appropriate explanations. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC is concerned about the temporary alternative solutions adopted in the proposal for newly built ships certified to carry 1 350 persons or fewer, and about the suggestion that these two options be evaluated 10 years after the implementation of the amendment, as well as the announced revision of the Directive after the evaluation. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC notes that the introduction of two alternatives for newly built ships would mean that the objective of the proposal to ‘reduce complexity and the technical and administrative burdens primarily stemming from the existence of two different regimes for evaluating the survivability of ro-ro passenger ships in damaged condition’ is not fully achieved. Two alternative schemes are being proposed for a temporary period of 10 years. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | In the EESC’s view, the introduction of such temporary solutions will create a situation of uncertainty and further problems in the future. It should be stressed that fleet investments in this transport sector are of a long-term nature. The outlook set out in the proposal should therefore take into account the realities of the sector. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC believes that the provision indicating the temporary application of alternative stability requirements should be replaced by a single solution for stability requirements in relation to newly built vessels carrying 1 350 and fewer people, so as not to create further problems with the consistency and clarity of the rules and to avoid the temporary nature of their application. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC suggests the introduction of a periodic evaluation at set intervals, e.g. every 10 years. However, legislative action should not be prejudged on the basis of the conclusions of the evaluation. It is suggested that the bodies regulating these matters be continuously consulted with a view to improving safety. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | In addition, in order to improve the readability of the proposal and to facilitate the application of the new rules, it is proposed that the content of the proposal be amended in such a way that previously built non-certified ships can comply with the existing standards applicable to previously built certified (or new) ships. Other ships should be subject to the new solutions. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

2.   Summary of the Commission proposal and background to the opinion

| 2.1. | The Commission proposal concerns a modification of Directive 2003/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) on specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

This is linked to the launch of a legal review in 2017 under the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT). At that time, Directives (EU) 2017/2108, (EU) 2017/2109 and (EU) 2017/2110 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) were amended.

| 2.2. | The fitness check also covered Directive 2003/25/EC governing specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships. In view of the parallel discussions at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) on stability standards for ships in damaged condition, it was decided to postpone the modification of the Directive. The IMO ultimately adopted revised specific provisions on stability standards for passenger ships in damaged condition by Resolution MSC.421(98) which also apply to ro-ro passenger ships. It is necessary to take into account those developments at international level and to align the Union rules and requirements with those established in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (‘the SOLAS Convention’) for ro-ro passenger ships engaged in international voyages. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | According to the Commission, the overarching objective of the revision is to provide for a clear, simple and up-to-date legal framework that is easier to implement, monitor and enforce, thus increasing the overall safety level. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | In addition, the revision of EU passenger ship safety rules aims to simplify and streamline the existing regulatory framework. The objective of this action is to maintain EU rules to the extent necessary and proportionate. The Commission also seeks to ensure their correct implementation and to eliminate potential overlaps and inconsistencies between related pieces of legislation. It should also be noted that the revision aims to reduce complexity and the technical and administrative burdens primarily stemming from the existence of two different regimes for assessing the survivability of ro-ro passenger ships with regard to the requirements for stability in damaged condition, and to rationalise the burden on enterprises and shipyard operators involved in such calculations. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | For ships engaged in international voyages which involve routes between two Member States, international conventions (under the purview of the IMO, in particular the SOLAS Convention) and certain EU rules apply. In addition to the international requirements, passenger ships, ro-ro passenger ships and high-speed craft are subject to specific EU rules. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | Directive 2003/25/EC lays down stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships in damaged condition for all ro-ro passenger ships operating to or from a port of a Member State on a regular service, regardless of their flag, when engaged in international voyages. It aims to ensure their stability following damage, improving the survivability of this type of vessel in the event of collision damage. The Directive is the result of the Stockholm Agreement of 1996. The specific EU stability requirements complement the SOLAS requirements on stability in damaged condition. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The proposed revision is the result of an assessment of the possibility of aligning the EU regulatory approach on specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships with international legislation, providing that the current safety level determined by Directive 2003/25/EC be at least maintained. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Work on the proposal took the form of a targeted consultation. National experts were consulted in the framework of the Passenger Ship Safety Expert Group. The consultation resulted in the drawing up of a structure for damage stability requirements, which were defined taking into account vessel capacity. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | Temporary alternative solutions are introduced in the proposal for newly built ships certified to carry 1 350 persons or fewer. These solutions are based on the following criteria: the date on which the keel was laid or the ship was at an equivalent stage of construction and the capacity of the ship to carry passengers on board. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | The proposal envisages the introduction of monitoring and reporting mechanisms. The key data on newly built ships and damage stability calculations would be collected and evaluated with the assistance of EMSA. After 10 years of implementation of the revised requirements, an evaluation would be carried out and the Directive would be revised. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | The proposal also lays down rules for the certification of ro-ro ships with regard to the amended requirements. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

3.   Comments

| 3.1. | Transport safety is one of the major challenges of today, and safety expectations are rising. The existence of different regulations makes it very difficult to implement and enforce agreed rules. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Ro-ro ships are considered more vulnerable than other vessels. This is linked to the specific nature of their construction, which is adapted to the transport of vehicles and passengers. Relatively small draughts and a high centre of gravity can cause stability problems. Other risks include high freeboard, use of loading doors as ramps, lack of bulkheads, high location points of lifeboats and life rafts, possible stowage errors and uneven loading. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC welcomes the efforts made to harmonise international rules, in this case bringing them into line with the international rules established by the IMO. It also appreciates the efforts made to simplify legislation that facilitates the use and application of these rules. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | However, the Committee takes a negative view of the readability and transparency of the document. Examination of the proposal proves to be extremely difficult even for experts, due to the structure of the text and the way in which the chosen solutions are presented. The provisions and clarifications thus designed actually run counter to the objective of the proposal, which is to facilitate the use and application of the aforementioned legal provisions. It is recommended that a graphical presentation be attached to the submitted proposal, e.g. in the form of the table in the appendix, and that appropriate guidelines and explanations be drawn up. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC would like to express its satisfaction with the method of working on the proposal. Taking into account the voice of industry experts and stakeholders in the design of the draft legislation is the correct practice and facilitates the achievement of the objectives of any legislative initiative. At the same time, it can be expected that the envisaged harmonisation of technical definitions and the introduction of legal wording will be properly effected and implemented. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC is concerned about the temporary alternative solutions adopted in the proposal for newly built ships certified to carry 1 350 persons or fewer, and about the suggestion that these two options be evaluated 10 years after the implementation of the amendment, as well as the announced revision of the Directive after the evaluation. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC notes that the introduction of two alternatives for newly built ships means that the objective of the proposal will not be achieved, i.e. reducing complexity and the technical and administrative burden. The proposal, as the Commission points out, responds to the new solutions introduced in the SOLAS Convention and seeks to align two parallel sets of rules. Despite these objectives, a temporary solution is proposed, with two alternative systems for a period of 10 years, to be revised after that period. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | In the EESC’s view, the introduction of such temporary solutions will create a situation of uncertainty and further problems in the future. It should be stressed that fleet investments in this transport sector are of a long-term nature. The Committee points out that the average age of ro-pax ships is 26 years, while the average age of ro-ro cargo ships is over 15 years (3). The outlook set out in the proposal should therefore take into account the realities of the sector. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC believes that the provision indicating the temporary application of alternative stability requirements should be replaced by a single solution for stability requirements in relation to newly built vessels carrying 1 350 and fewer people, so as not to create further problems with the consistency and clarity of the rules and to avoid the temporary nature of their application. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The EESC supports mechanisms for monitoring and periodic evaluation, but in the light of the foregoing recommends changing the wording and logic of such a solution. The introduction of a periodic evaluation at set intervals is suggested, e.g. every 10 years. However, legislative action should not be prejudged on the basis of the conclusions of the evaluation. It is important that the evaluation be carried out with the involvement of those who are most involved in applying the rules in practice. It is therefore also suggested that the bodies regulating these matters be continuously consulted with a view to improving safety. This is important in view of climate change, which generates stronger weather fluctuations and, as a result, frequent exposure of shipping to extreme conditions. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | In addition, to improve the readability of the proposal and to facilitate the application of the new rules, it is suggested that the content of the proposal be amended so that ships previously built can meet the existing standards, irrespective of certification. Other ships should be subject to the new solutions. However, following the transitional period, the rules should be fully harmonised. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Directive 2003/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 April 2003 on specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships (OJ L 123, 17.5.2003, p. 22).

1

(2)  Directive (EU) 2017/2108 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 amending Directive 2009/45/EC on safety rules and standards for passenger ships (OJ L 315, 30.11.2017, p. 40); Directive (EU) 2017/2109 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 amending Council Directive 98/41/EC on the registration of persons sailing on board passenger ships operating to or from ports of the Member States of the Community and Directive 2010/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on reporting formalities for ships arriving in and/or departing from ports of the Member States (OJ L 315, 30.11.2017, p. 52); Directive (EU) 2017/2110 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 on a system of inspections for the safe operation of ro-ro passenger ships and high-speed passenger craft in regular service and amending Directive 2009/16/EC and repealing Council Directive 1999/35/EC (OJ L 315, 30.11.2017, p. 61).

2

(3)  EMSA, European Maritime Transport, Environmental Report 2021, Luxembourg, 2021.

3

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| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/123 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/123

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy

(COM(2022) 108 final)

(2022/C 323/21)

| Rapporteurs: | Thomas KATTNIG


  Alena MASTANTUONO


  Simo TIAINEN |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteurs:

Thomas KATTNIG

Alena MASTANTUONO

Simo TIAINEN

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Adopted in section | 2.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 159/3/4 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Adopted in section

2.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

159/3/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The current geopolitical situation caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine highlights the importance of the security of energy supplies and calls for increasing the EU’s energy independence and autonomy. The EESC fully supports the objective of breaking away from Russian energy, to be implemented as soon as possible. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EU has also faced an unprecedented surge in energy prices in the past year. This phenomenon was further reinforced by the consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and has placed an unbearable burden on European households and business. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | Therefore, immediate actions are warranted to ensure the security of energy supplies and to mitigate the impact of high prices for households, farmers, businesses and industry. The communication REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy sets out new actions to ramp up the production of green energy, diversify supplies and reduce demand on Russian gas which has led to significant increases in electricity market prices due to market manipulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the communication REPowerEU, as it presents solutions in line with the objectives of the Green Deal and the European Energy Union. The EESC warns that Europe must be particularly cautious in case of resources replacing Russian gas in terms of their impact on environment as well as in terms of new dependence on third countries which do not share European values. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC notes with regret that its call (1) for a reduction in strategic dependency on unreliable third parties has not been translated into action by political leaders, but on the contrary this dependency has increased. The current energy price crisis would not be hitting European citizens and companies anywhere near as hard if Europe were not so highly dependent on imports of fossil fuels from Russia. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EU needs to consistently adhere to all the basic objectives of its energy policy: security of supply, reasonable costs and prices, and carbon-neutrality. It is thus vital to focus on measures that bring about the greatest benefit in terms of the entirety of the objectives both in the acute current situation and in the long run. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | While the EESC agrees with the European Commission on the objective of achieving independence from Russian gas, it points out that it will be extremely challenging for the European economy and society to reduce the demand for Russian gas by two thirds by the end of this year. This means diversification, on the one hand and primarily in the short term via LNG and biomethane, and on the other hand via energy efficiency and the expansion of renewables. Changing reliance on one supplier and on an energy source which has a large share in the EU’s energy mix is a complex issue and cannot happen overnight. In the short term this means that all energy sources available should be used without prejudice, giving preference to available renewable sources, in order to avoid blackouts and social unrest. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | In order to ensure socially acceptable energy prices while keeping the EU on track to remain the leader in deploying renewable energy, the EESC calls for:






  — | Streamlining and accelerating permit-granting procedures for renewables, as these procedures are seen as the key barrier preventing the more rapid deployment of renewable energy. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.8.

—

Streamlining and accelerating permit-granting procedures for renewables, as these procedures are seen as the key barrier preventing the more rapid deployment of renewable energy.

| — | Incentivising Member States to define suitable ‘go-to areas’ to increase uptake of renewables. |
| --- | --- |

—

Incentivising Member States to define suitable ‘go-to areas’ to increase uptake of renewables.

| — | Evaluating existing bureaucratic provisions for the installation and marketing/self-usage of renewables and removing all unnecessary barriers in order to unleash the full potential of citizen and community energy, focusing on smaller installations and flexibility options. |
| --- | --- |

—

Evaluating existing bureaucratic provisions for the installation and marketing/self-usage of renewables and removing all unnecessary barriers in order to unleash the full potential of citizen and community energy, focusing on smaller installations and flexibility options.

| — | Exploring ways to encourage the faster deployment of heat pumps. While the acceleration of the installation target for heat pumps as suggested in the REPowerEU is welcome, electrical peak management problems throughout Europe need to be avoided. Hybrid heat pumps should also be considered. |
| --- | --- |

—

Exploring ways to encourage the faster deployment of heat pumps. While the acceleration of the installation target for heat pumps as suggested in the REPowerEU is welcome, electrical peak management problems throughout Europe need to be avoided. Hybrid heat pumps should also be considered.

| — | Exploring and incentivising concrete measures to boost biomethane production, as suggested by REPowerEU. |
| --- | --- |

—

Exploring and incentivising concrete measures to boost biomethane production, as suggested by REPowerEU.

| — | Increasing investment in geothermal energy and district heating. |
| --- | --- |

—

Increasing investment in geothermal energy and district heating.

| 1.9. | The EESC acknowledges that Member State interventions, whether fiscal or regulatory, will be necessary in order to secure affordable prices for end consumers and to prevent energy poverty. In addition, the EESC urges the Commission and the Council to take further action in order to stabilise the prices in the EU's energy system in such a way that unexpected sudden price increases can be avoided. Nevertheless, policymakers should ensure that these do not hamper the functioning of the internal energy market, do not jeopardise decarbonisation and energy efficiency efforts and do not cause investment uncertainties in the energy industry. Any measures, whether at Member State or European level, should be closely consulted with the relevant stakeholders, e.g. the social partners. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The internal energy market is not complete and in a time of crisis, the aspect of solidarity is highly important. Infrastructure must be enhanced in order to accommodate the switch to the green transition and also to diversified gas sources, while at the same time ensuring the flow of energy among Member States via transmission interconnections. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC welcomes the announcements of the Commission on the processing times for files with regard to State aid (by the summer). |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC strongly supports the Commission’s proposal on gas storage and urges the Institutions to:






  — | supplement it with a short-term investment instrument to support development of hydrogen-ready infrastructure, such as interconnectors and storage facilities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.12.

—

supplement it with a short-term investment instrument to support development of hydrogen-ready infrastructure, such as interconnectors and storage facilities;

| — | consider using gas storage facilities in bordering third countries, including in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

—

consider using gas storage facilities in bordering third countries, including in Ukraine;

| — | create plans for individual Member States to avoid unbalanced burden sharing on a regional dimension. |
| --- | --- |

—

create plans for individual Member States to avoid unbalanced burden sharing on a regional dimension.

| 1.13. | A versatile energy production palette is part of the security of energy supply. In addition to wind and solar power, it is thus important to make use of the wide variety of low-carbon energy sources, that fit economically and ecologically within an energy system. Until the EU energy diversification has been completed, the EESC would welcome the practical utilisation of stable and affordable energy sources fulfilling the low-carbon requirements. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The EESC regrets the fact that the Communication does not mention the role of stable low-carbon sources in the stability of energy supply. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

2.   Background and context

| 2.1. | As a direct consequence of and reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission announced and proposed in March 2022 an outline of the Plan with the purpose of making the EU independent of Russian fossil fuels well before 2030, starting immediately with gas. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The focus can be extended to phasing out dependence on Russian oil and coal, for which the EU has a broader diversity of potential alternative suppliers. The EU imports 90 % of the gas it consumes, with Russia providing more than 40 % of the EU’s total gas consumption. Russia also accounts for 27 % of oil imports and 46 % of coal imports. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The Plan also describes a set of measures with the purpose of reacting to increasing energy prices and replenishing gas stocks for next winter. Next to the Energy Prices Toolbox, the Plan provides the Member States with additional guidance, confirming the possibility of regulating prices in exceptional circumstances, and setting out how Member States can redistribute revenue from high energy sector profits and emissions trading to consumers. EU State aid rules also offer Member States options for providing short-term support to companies affected by high energy prices, and help reduce their exposure to energy price volatility in the medium to long term. In this regard, the Commission will look into all possible options for emergency measures to limit the contagion effect of gas prices on electricity prices. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The Plan — REPowerEU — has the ambition of diversifying deliveries and the supply of gas, accelerating gas generation from renewable sources and also providing for the replacement of gas for the purpose of heating and the production of electricity. These measures together are intended to reduce the EU demand for Russian gas by two thirds by the end of 2022. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The diversification of the overall EU energy supply is to be made through:






  a) | a diversification of gas deliveries via higher imports of LNG and gas coming via the pipelines of non-Russian suppliers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.5.

a)

a diversification of gas deliveries via higher imports of LNG and gas coming via the pipelines of non-Russian suppliers;

| b) | higher volumes of production and imports of bio-methane and hydrogen from renewable sources; a faster reduction of the usage of fossil fuels in households, buildings, industry, and the energy system; higher energy efficiency; an increase in the use of renewable sources of energy; electrification; and removing obstacles in infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

b)

higher volumes of production and imports of bio-methane and hydrogen from renewable sources; a faster reduction of the usage of fossil fuels in households, buildings, industry, and the energy system; higher energy efficiency; an increase in the use of renewable sources of energy; electrification; and removing obstacles in infrastructure.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC understands that REPowerEU is an extraordinary and urgent step caused by an escalation of Russian aggression and its impact on the functioning of the EU energy market and its security in the future. It also agrees that such a step has to be robust and implemented in practice as soon as possible. The current situation is not only a question of the import prices of strategic commodities, but also the accommodation of the supply needed for the functioning of the EU economy and society. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC welcomes the communication REPowerEU, as it presents solutions in line with the objectives of the Green Deal and the European Energy Union. However, the Committee warns that Europe must be particularly cautious in case of resources replacing Russian gas in terms of their impact on environment as well as in terms of new dependence on third countries which do not share European values. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The new reality requires a drastic acceleration of the transition to clean energy and the increasing of the EU’s energy independence and autonomy. Infrastructure needs to be enhanced in order to accommodate the switch to the green transition towards Green Deal goals and also to diversified gas sources, while at the same time ensuring the flow of energy among Member States via transmission interconnections. In its paper, the Commission calls for hydrogen compatibility, and the EESC supports this. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | REPowerEU is also linked with the comprehensive sanctions measures adopted by the EU and other parts of the Western world with regard to Russia, and can be coordinated and adjusted accordingly, as it can be expected that the range and intensity of sanctions could change over time. However, the final sense of REPowerEU — to be independent from Russia in terms of deliveries of strategic commodities and its interference on the European energy market — should stand firm and unchanged. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | At the same time, the EESC regrets that its numerous calls for a reduction of the strategic dependency on unreliable third parties has not been translated into action by political leaders, while on the contrary this dependency increased. The current energy price crisis would not be hitting European citizens and companies anywhere near as hard if Europe were not so highly dependent on imports of fossil fuels from Russia which is the result of short-sighted energy decisions by some Member States in the past decade. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | In times of crisis, it is necessary to keep overall objectives in mind instead of only trying to solve the most urgent problems. The EESC is therefore pleased that the Commission is doing so in its Communication. The EU thus needs to consistently adhere to the basic objectives of its energy policy and energy systems: security of supply, reasonable costs and prices, and carbon-neutrality. Considering that all these basic objectives are currently at stake, the EU should focus on measures that bring about the greatest benefit in terms of the entirety of the objectives and contribute in the most efficient way to the acute current challenges and the longer-term goals. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | A versatile energy production palette is part of the security of energy supply. In addition to wind and solar power, it is thus important to make use of the wide variety of low-carbon energy sources that fit economically and ecologically within an energy system. There is also a need for parallel use of district heating and heat pumps. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC regrets the fact that the Communication does not mention the role of stable low-carbon sources in the stability of energy supply. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | While the EESC agrees with the European Commission on the objective of achieving independence from Russian gas, it points out that it will be extremely challenging for the European economy and society to reduce the demand for Russian gas by two thirds by the end of this year. This means diversification, on the one hand and primarily in the short term via LNG and biomethane, and on the other hand via energy efficiency and the expansion of renewables. Changing reliance on one supplier and on an energy source which has a large share in the EU’s energy mix is a complex issue and cannot happen overnight. All energy sources need to be activated in order to avoid blackouts and social unrest. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The EESC acknowledges that Member State interventions, whether fiscal or regulatory, will be necessary in order to secure affordable prices for end consumers and to prevent energy poverty. In addition, the EESC urges the Commission and the Council to take further action in order to stabilize the prices in EU's energy system in such a way that unexpected sudden price increases can be avoided. Nevertheless, policymakers should ensure that these do not hamper the functioning of the internal energy market, do not jeopardise decarbonisation and energy efficiency efforts and do not cause investment uncertainties in the energy industry. Any measures, whether at Member State or European level, should be taken in close consultation with the relevant stakeholders, e.g. social partners. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | High energy prices lead to high profits for many oil companies, as well as some energy suppliers and traders. The International Energy Agency estimates these so-called ‘windfall profits’ in the EU at around EUR 200 billion in 2022 and proposes that these profits be skimmed off with the help of taxes and redistributed as financial compensation to energy consumers, such as vulnerable households, energy-intensive companies, agriculture and forestry, and used for the expansion of renewable energy production and the necessary grid infrastructure. The EESC highlights that with any ‘windfall taxes’, care must be taken not to discourage investments by energy companies in low-carbon solutions precisely at a time when Europe is being asked to speed them up in order to reach Green Deal goals. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | Any support measures aimed at mitigating the crisis should be temporary and well-targeted at those suffering most, whether this concerns citizens, SMEs or energy intensive industries. Instead of new EU instruments, use should be made of existing funds such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Just Transition Fund and the increased revenues from the emissions trading system. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | In the event of a complete interruption of Russian supplies, Europe would not be able to cover its gas demand during the winter in the second half of the year. It is therefore necessary to consider ways to organise demand and increase supply. First, demand must be organised, and the IEA has made proposals in this sense which would reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas (energy sobriety, organised load-shedding plan, etc.). Second, all the options should be activated for diversifying gas supply by importing LNG (fill storage facilities as much as possible by importing LNG while also increasing LNG import capacities). |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | Not all Member States have access to LNG terminals, and the situation calls for an extraordinary effort of solidarity among Member States and the acceleration of transmission interconnections. All these changes will mean gigantic additional costs due to the investments required. A time schedule should be drawn up of the practical feasibility of such measures and investments. It will simply take some time, probably a few years, to complete investments in the needed infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | Enhancement of infrastructure will also be needed due to the increase in renewable energy use, and investments in this area should be more incentivised than hindered. Distribution grids are key to integrating large amounts of green electricity and need to be expanded and digitised accordingly. To avoid stranded costs, these investment decisions need to be well considered and planned in future-proof way. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | The current market conditions do not provide any incentive to store gas in the summer. The EESC is pleased that the Commission designates gas storage as ‘critical infrastructure’. The EESC strongly supports the Commission’s proposal on gas storage. The Committee urges the Institutions to:






  — | supplement it with a short-term investment instrument to support investment in hydrogen-ready infrastructure such as interconnectors and storage facilities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.16.

—

supplement it with a short-term investment instrument to support investment in hydrogen-ready infrastructure such as interconnectors and storage facilities;

| — | consider using gas storage facilities in bordering third countries, including in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

—

consider using gas storage facilities in bordering third countries, including in Ukraine;

| — | create plans for individual Member States, taking under consideration the storage’s size, the country’s consumption, and the capacities of the storage to serve other countries in the region, to avoid unbalanced burden sharing on a regional dimension; |
| --- | --- |

—

create plans for individual Member States, taking under consideration the storage’s size, the country’s consumption, and the capacities of the storage to serve other countries in the region, to avoid unbalanced burden sharing on a regional dimension;

| — | introduce an early implementation mechanism, which will allow national regulatory authorities to start preparatory work on the mandatory certification process as soon as possible. |
| --- | --- |

—

introduce an early implementation mechanism, which will allow national regulatory authorities to start preparatory work on the mandatory certification process as soon as possible.

Due to different systems in various Member States, it must also be possible to meet gas storage obligations with alternative fuels.

| 3.17. | The EESC welcomes the acceleration announced for hydrogen and the new objectives (+ 15 million tonnes by 2030), but a realistic approach is needed. There is a need for flexibility in deployment (e.g. additionality), pragmatism in support (and decisions on IPCEI/State aid as quickly as possible), and the removal of unnecessary constraints that can hinder investment. In this regard, the EESC welcomes the announcements of the Commission on the processing times for files with regard to State aid (by the summer). |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

| 3.18. | The EESC recalls its plea that the most important objective is that citizens should be at the core of the Energy Union (2). Still, concrete measures in EU legislation need to be adopted in order to put this concept swiftly into practice and relieve the EU from its dependence on Russia. Complicated access for consumers to their own production and sharing of renewable energy hinders the protection of these customers from rising energy prices. The EESC calls for an evaluation of existing bureaucratic provisions for the installation and marketing/self-usage of renewables and removal of all unnecessary barriers in order to unleash the full potential of citizen and community energy, focusing on smaller installations and flexibility options. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC calls on the European Commission to create a taskforce responsible for permanent surveillance over the implementation of the plan in practice, evaluation of its feasibility and the potential risks. The circumstances can change dramatically, and the objectives of REPowerEU have to be fulfilled and successfully implemented for important strategic reasons. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Despite the need for urgent action, it is also vital to continue investment in research and innovation, with due account of the increased need to find solutions for managing energy-related geo-economic, societal and environmental risks and challenges. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | REPowerEU suggests that biomethane production be boosted to 35 bcm by 2030. While this goal is welcome, it is very ambitious, and the EESC calls for concrete measures and incentives to achieve this goal. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The target for heat pump installation should be doubled to two million heat pumps installed each year. This can lead to a significant decrease in gas consumption for heating of approximately 35 bcm by 2030. Ways should be explored to encourage more rapid deployment of heat pumps. However, care should be taken not to create electrical peak management problems throughout Europe, and hybrid heat pumps should also be considered. Current infrastructure will need to be upgraded with smart grids in order to respond to higher demand for electrification. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Acceleration of investments requires a favourable and secure investment environment. The proposal to speed up permit-granting procedures is welcome, while it is important not to undermine the proper consultation of stakeholders. At the same time, a rapid increase in investment brings many challenges which also need to be managed, including the availability of skilled labour and the necessary materials and equipment. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | Member States should be incentivised to define suitable ‘go-to areas’ to increase uptake of renewables. There is untapped synergy potential in terms of deploying renewables together with achieving other socially and economically beneficial activities such as brownfield transitions or fully exploiting the renewables uptake potential in the residential and commercial sectors. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  EESC opinion on Energy prices (OJ C 275, 18.7.2022, p. 80).

1

(2)  OJ C 220, 9.6.2021, p. 38.

2

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/129 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/129

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks

(COM(2022) 135 final — 2022/0090 (COD))

(2022/C 323/22)

| Rapporteur-general: | Marcin NOWACKI |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur-general:

Marcin NOWACKI

| Referral | European Parliament, 4.4.2022
  Council of the European Union, 4.4.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 194(2) and 304 of the TFEU |
| Section responsible | Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society |
| Date adopted in plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 160/1/3 |

Referral

European Parliament, 4.4.2022

Council of the European Union, 4.4.2022

Legal basis

Articles 194(2) and 304 of the TFEU

Section responsible

Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society

Date adopted in plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

160/1/3

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC condemns the unjustified and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Government and expresses its solidarity with the Ukrainian people, calling for firm actions at both EU and national levels, in a spirit of unity at this dramatic time. The Russian aggression has sparked a global geopolitical crisis, which is having an exponentially growing impact on the EU. The dependence on primary energy from third countries has become a direct threat to the security and stability of the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC strongly supports the proposal for the Regulation, welcomes the decision to apply an expedited procedure, and applauds the swift reaction of the European institutions (1) (2). Having well-filled gas storage facilities plays a key role in ensuring a safe winter (2022/2023), protecting against price shocks, shielding Europeans from energy poverty, and securing the competitiveness of European businesses. The Committee notes that the cost of inaction in current circumstances would significantly exceed the cost of short-term measures envisaged by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The Committee urges the Institutions to introduce a short-term investment instrument, which will improve the EU’s energy independence, and stresses that merely accelerating existing plans is not enough to guarantee Europe’s energy security. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Cooperation with third countries is a complimentary measure to investments in new infrastructure, which will increase Europe’s energy security. The EESC urges the Council and the Parliament to consider using gas storage facilities in bordering third countries, which will bring a value-added to providing security of supply, especially in Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The Committee supports the plan to fill gas storages in consideration of the storage’s size, the country’s consumption, and the capacities of storage facilities to serve other countries in the region, with the aim of avoiding unbalanced burden sharing on a regional dimension. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The Committee notes that a final decision on the mandatory certification of gas storage operators will take several years due to the possibility of appeals before national courts. Hence, the Committee recommends introducing an early implementation mechanism, which will allow national regulatory authorities to start preparatory work before the Regulation becomes fully effective. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | In recent months, ‘the unbalanced gas market has led to a sharp increase in gas prices’ (3). During the heating season which is currently coming to an end, the EU’s level of filling storage was largely below the level of preceding years, with over 20 percentage points difference compared to 2020, and almost 30 percentage points compared to 2019.

  Table


  Comparison of filling levels in Europe | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| February | 51,98  % | 71,19  % | 50,85  % |
| July | 73,31  % | 80,71  % | 47,84  % |
| October | 96,92  % | 94,62  % | 74,93  % |
| December | 94,23  % | 87,68  % | 67,21  % |

2.1.

Table

Comparison of filling levels in Europe

2019

2020

2021

February

51,98  %

71,19  %

50,85  %

July

73,31  %

80,71  %

47,84  %

October

96,92  %

94,62  %

74,93  %

December

94,23  %

87,68  %

67,21  %

Source: Reuters (4)

| 2.2. | The total EU underground storage capacity is 101,1 bcm, distributed across 160 facilities in 18 Member States (5). Gazprom owns about 10 % of total European underground gas storage capacity (6), and has influence over almost one-third of all gas storage in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands (7). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The Commission noted that the filling rate of Gazprom-owned storages has been significantly lower than average (8). In October 2021, in countries where Gazprom does not own storage facilities, such as France and Italy, the level of gas in storage has reached near-normal levels for that time of year. Nevertheless, the Gazprom-owned Rehden natural gas storage facility in Germany, which accounts for almost a fifth of the country’s storage capacity, has been less than 10 % full, since being full in October 2019, according to Gas Infrastructure Europe data. The Haidach facility in Austria, also operated by Gazprom and one of the largest underground storage facilities in central Europe, has been merely 20 % full (9). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | In light of Gazprom’s conduct, it has become apparent that the European energy market may be under the undue influence of third countries, and that it is necessary to take decisive steps against it. Therefore, the Committee supports the plan to fill gas storage’s without Russian gas. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Notwithstanding the measures proposed in the Regulation, the EU’s energy security can be improved by removing restrictions in gas transmission and trading between Member States, as well as the temporary resumption of extraction in unused (damped) resources in the EU. The EU’s energy security and energy price stability can be further improved by joint gas purchases. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

3.   Specific comments

3.1.   Mandatory filling targets and trajectory

| 3.1.1. | The EESC supports the Commission’s proposal on the mandatory filling targets. The targets set by the Regulation cannot be seen as excessive. Nevertheless, to avoid further increases in energy prices, the Committee strongly recommends not to increase the prescribed targets further. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | Without prejudice to the quality of the Regulation, in practice a common and effective gas storage policy cannot happen without robust gas transmission systems. To increase Europe’s resilience in the long-run, it is crucial to invest in the infrastructure, including hydrogen-ready infrastructure, especially interconnectors and storage facilities. The Committee urges the Institutions to introduce a short-term investment instrument, which will improve the EU’s energy independence, and stresses that merely accelerating existing plans is not enough to guarantee Europe’s security. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | Where a Member State cannot meet the filling target due to specific technical characteristics, the Member State shall inform the Commission before 1 November, providing reasons for the delay. In the EESC’s view, the November deadline for notification of delay is too late. November is already well into the heating season, and delays in any Member State can jeopardise the European effort and cause price shocks. Therefore, the EESC recommends the deadline for notification of delay is moved to October at the latest. At the same time, Member States should be encouraged to comply with mandatory targets as soon as technically possible, rather than by December. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

| 3.1.4. | At the same time, the EESC stresses the importance of cooperation with the Energy Community and urges the Commission, the Council and the Parliament to consider using gas storage facilities in bordering third countries, which will bring a value-added to providing security of supply, especially in Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

| 3.1.5. | Cooperation with third countries is a complementary measure to investments in new infrastructure to ensure adequate levels of gas storage quickly, and hence should be given high priority. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.5.

3.2.   Implementation, monitoring and enforcement

| 3.2.1. | The EESC applauds the fact that the introduction of mandatory targets is accompanied by the introduction of effective implementation, monitoring and enforcement measures on the part of Member States as well as the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | At the same time, the EESC notes that there is a no clarity as to the responsibility for non-compliance with the obligations prescribed. Since gas storage operators are not free from the influence of third countries, the Committee believes that the legal burden should fall on the Member States. Moreover, the EESC calls for the Regulation to be complemented by a set of effective sanctions that can be imposed by the Commission on Member States, which do not comply with obligations. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

| 3.2.3. | Article 6a(8) shall be amended by adding the underlined: ‘In case of substantial and sustained deviation from the filling trajectories or the filling target, the following measures shall be taken’. The purpose of filling should be reconsidered in the process of filling a storage facility due to objective circumstances. Article 6c on fair burden sharing should be amended according to the above. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

| 3.2.4. | The EESC notes that there is a significant extension of the Commission’s competences and positively assess the fact that it is limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.4.

3.3.   Financial incentives for market participants

The EESC supports the exemptions from transmission tariffs at storage entry or exit points. On the other hand, the Committee stresses the rising inflation and potential effects of providing additional financial incentives and state aid for market participants. The EESC recommends reassessing the use of existing EU funds, especially the National Reconstruction and Resilience Plans, to adjust them to the current situation, so that part of the funds can be allocated for these purposes.

3.4.   Burden sharing mechanism

| 3.4.1. | The EESC notes that an unbalanced division of responsibilities in relation to storage fillings is highly problematic. The Committee calls on the Commission to supplement the Regulation by plans for individual Member States, which would take into consideration the storage’s size, the country’s consumption, and the capacities of the storage facility to serve other countries in the region, with the aim of avoiding unbalanced burden sharing, risks and costs. The EESC is concerned that the lack of good coordination can lead to an immense impact on the regional gas market. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | For instance, a regional approach to the implementation of the Regulation can be taken. For instance, the Inčukalns facility could be considered as a natural gas storage facility in the Baltic region and Finland with the location in Latvia. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

3.5.   Mandatory certification of storage system operators

| 3.5.1. | The EESC supports the mandatory certification of storage system operators. Nevertheless, the EESC notes that given the possibility to appeal a negative certification decision, the final decision depriving storage facilities’ operators from their licenses would take several years, depending on the expediency of national judicial proceedings. Therefore, mandatory certification of storage system operators is an instrument, which will improve the EU’s energy security in the long-term, rather than short-term. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.1.

| 3.5.2. | Therefore, the Committee recommends introducing an early implementation mechanism, which will allow national regulatory authorities to start preparatory work before the Regulation becomes fully effective. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.2.

| 3.5.3. | In light of the above, the Committee urges the Commission to present guidelines for the certification procedures as soon as possible, in order to allow for the timely assessment by national regulatory authorities. At the same time, the EESC stresses the importance of the Commission’s guidelines for the consistent application of the Regulation across the Member States, and, ultimately, for the success of gas storage policy. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.3.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220405IPR26703/meps-back-urgency-procedure-to-refill-gas-reserves-before-next-winter

1

(2)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_22_1937

2

(3)  Explanatory memorandum to the proposal for the Regulation.

3

(4)  https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/europe-would-struggle-refill-gas-storage-without-russian-supplies-2022-03-30/

4

(5)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_22_1937

5

(6)  https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/how-gazprom-manipulated-the-eu-gas-market/

6

(7)  https://www.ft.com/content/576a96f7-e41d-4068-a61b-f74f2b2d3b81

7

(8)  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2021-004781-ASW_EN.html

8

(9)  https://www.ft.com/content/576a96f7-e41d-4068-a61b-f74f2b2d3b81

9

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/133 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/133

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1628 as regards the extension of the empowerment of the Commission to adopt delegated acts

(COM(2022) 113 final — 2022/0080 (COD))

(2022/C 323/23)

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 24.3.2022
  European Parliament, 23.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 199/2/1 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 24.3.2022

European Parliament, 23.3.2022

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

199/2/1

Since the Committee unreservedly endorses the contents of the proposal and has already set out its views on the subject in its earlier opinion INT/763 (1), adopted on 18 February 2015, it decided, at its 569th plenary session of 18 and 19 May 2022 (meeting of 18 May), by 199 votes to two, with one abstention, to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text and to refer to the position it had taken in the above-mentioned document.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  OJ C 251, 31.7.2015, p. 31.

1

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/134 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/134

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources

(COM(2022) 145 final — 2022/0096 (COD))

Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources

(COM(2022) 162 final — 2022/0096 (COD))

(2022/C 323/24)

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 25.3.2022 and 4.4.2022
  European Parliament, 4.4.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 175(3), 177 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 179/0/4 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 25.3.2022 and 4.4.2022

European Parliament, 4.4.2022

Legal basis

Articles 175(3), 177 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

179/0/4

Since the Committee endorses the content of both proposals for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 223/2014 as regards increased pre-financing from REACT-EU resources and feels that it requires no comment on its part, it decided, at its 569th plenary session of 18 and 19 May 2022, (meeting of 18 May), by 179 votes with 4 abstentions, to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

| 26.8.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/135 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.8.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/135

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending and correcting Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to alleviate the consequences of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine on fishing activities and to mitigate the effects of the market disruption caused by that military aggression on the supply chain of fishery and aquaculture products

(COM(2022) 179 — 2022/0118 COD)

(2022/C 323/25)

| Referral | Council, 25.4.2022
  European Parliament, 2.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 43(2), 175 and article 304 of the TFEU |
| Section responsible | Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted at plenary | 18.5.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 569 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 188/2/2 |

Referral

Council, 25.4.2022

European Parliament, 2.5.2022

Legal basis

Articles 43(2), 175 and article 304 of the TFEU

Section responsible

Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted at plenary

18.5.2022

Plenary session No

569

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

188/2/2

In view of the short deadlines and the necessary character of the EC initiative, the Committee decided, at its 569th plenary session of 18 and 19 May 2022 (meeting of 18 May), by 188 votes in favour, 2 votes against and 2 abstentions, not to draw up a substantial opinion but to formally endorse the proposal.

Brussels, 18 May 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---