[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11093

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

YVETTE GOMEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF DORAL, 

MAYOR JUAN CARLOS BERMUDEZ, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-20389-JLK

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11093

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Yvette Gomez is a former police officerfor the City of Doral. 

In this action against the City and its mayor, Juan Carlos Bermudez, 

Gomez alleges that she experienced discrimination on the basis of 

sex and was also retaliated against for supporting Councilwoman 

Sandra Ruiz, one of Mayor Bermudez’s political adversaries. 

Gomez raises a number of claims: (1) sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), (2) creation of a hostile work environment by Mayor Bermudez, (3) infringement on Gomez’s First Amendment right to freedom of association, (4) infringement on her First Amendment right to free 

speech, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed Gomez’s complaint in its entirety for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After careful 

consideration, we vacate the district court’s judgment in part, affirm it in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

I 

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim de novo, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. 

Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 

1305 (11th Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 

must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see 

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Although the complaint 

need not make “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). Instead, the plaintiff’s complaint 

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id.

II 

We turn first to Gomez’s Title VII and FCRA claims, for 

which our analysis is the same. See Harper v. Blockbuster Ent.

Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998). Title VII and the FCRA

make it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or 

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 

[her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1); see also Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a).

Gomez claims that the City violated these laws by subjecting 

her, in a “male-dominated work environment,” to the following 

forms of disparate treatment: (1) failing to give her promotions 

and commendations and treating her “disrespectfully and 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11093

differently” from her male coworkers, (2) refusing to accommodate her scheduling requests after the birth of her child while granting similar requests to men, (3) reprimanding her for wearing jeans 

on the weekend while allowing men to do the same, (4) using surveillance cameras to spy on her without doing the same to any 

male officers, (5) reassigning her to the midnight shift while permitting a man to work her previous day shift, (6) placing a tracker 

on her police car, (7) increasing the length of her shifts from ten to 

twelve hours to interfere with her childcare schedule, (8) refusing 

to pay her overtime, and (9) advising her that she should resign 

“before she was discriminatorily terminated.” Gomez further alleges that termination would have “permanently jeopardize[d] her 

ability to ever work in another law enforcement agency” due to the 

policies of many Florida police departments. So, faced with the 

prospect of termination and a “working environment [that] grew 

incredibly hostile, discriminatorily abusive, and intolerable,”

Gomez claims that she “was constructively terminated and forced 

to resign.”

The district court held that Gomez’s complaint was deficient 

because she “failed to explain how” any other male officers referenced in her complaint were “similarly situated to her ‘in all material respects.’” Doc. 17 at 3–4 (quoting Lewis v. City of Union City, 

918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)). But, as Gomez argued both here and below, that wasn’t a valid reason to dismiss her

complaint. To be sure, one way for a plaintiff “to survive summary 

judgment” is to satisfy “the burden-shifting framework set out in 

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McDonnell Douglas,” whereby the plaintiff shows “that her employer treated ‘similarly situated’ employees outside her class more 

favorably.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220–21 (emphasis added); see 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). “The 

prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz v. 

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

569–70. After all, “the McDonnell Douglas framework does not 

apply in every employment discrimination case.” Swierkiewicz, 

534 U.S. at 511; see Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220 n.6. And it is “incongruous” to demand that a plaintiff “plead more facts than [she] may 

ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits.” Swierkiewicz, 

534 U.S. at 511–12. Thus, following Supreme Court precedent, we 

have held that a plaintiff’s “complaint ‘need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case’”

to survive a motion to dismiss. Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 

789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Davis v. 

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Yet that’s precisely what the district court required Gomez

to allege. In doing so, it “did not use the Iqbal/Twombly plausibility standard” that our precedents—and those of the Supreme 

Court—demand. Id.; see Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511 (holding 

that, in Title VII cases, “the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply”). Those decisions make clear that

Gomez “need not prove [her] case on the pleadings.” Speaker v. 

United States HHS CDC & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1386 (11th 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11093

Cir. 2010). Hence, by faulting Gomez for failing to “ma[ke] out a 

prima facie case of [sex] discrimination under McDonnell Douglas,” the district court erred as a matter of law. Surtain, 789 F.3d at 

1246; see Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508.

The pertinent question, as always, is whether Gomez’s complaint “provide[s] ‘enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’

intentional [sex] discrimination.” Davis, 516 F.3d at 974 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, her complaint “must 

merely provide enough factual material to raise a reasonable inference, and thus a plausible claim,” that her employer violated Title 

VII and the FCRA. Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1386. If so, she may proceed to discovery on her claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

Having set forth the appropriate standard, we decline to

consider how it applies at this juncture. Because the district court 

failed to conduct the proper inquiry—and because the defendants

followed suit in their appellate briefing—we think it more prudent 

for the parties to present their arguments to the district court in the 

first instance. We therefore vacate the dismissal of Gomez’s Title 

VII and FCRA claims and remand for reconsideration under the 

correct standard. See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246.1

1 In remanding, we express no view on whether Gomez has alleged sufficient 

facts to support a constructive discharge theory of sex discrimination as well. 

Though unclear from its order, the district court’s rejection of this separate, 

“aggravated” theory of sexual harassment, Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 

129, 146 (2004), seems to have been premised on Gomez’s failure to identify 

male comparators that were similarly situated to her in all material respects. 

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III 

Moving along to Gomez’s hostile work environment 

claim—which was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—she asserts 

that Mayor Bermudez discriminated against her on the basis of sex. 

This, she claims, violated her rights under the Equal Protection 

Clause.2

“To establish a hostile work environment claim under the 

Equal Protection Clause,” a public employee “must show harassing 

behavior ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 

[her] employment.’” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004)). 

That is, the district court viewed such comparators as mandatory to support 

any theory of liability under Title VII, even at the pleading stage. As explained 

above, that premise was faulty. The parties may argue—and the district court 

may reevaluate—Gomez’s constructive discharge theory on remand, using 

the correct plausibility standard.

2 To the extent Gomez seeks to hold Mayor Bermudez liable in his individual 

capacity under Title VII, this argument fails. Our court has held “that ‘relief 

under Title VII is available against only the employer and not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.’” Martin 

v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., 959 F.3d 1048, 1051 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). In any 

event, “the analysis of disparate treatment claims under § 1983 is identical to 

the analysis under Title VII where the facts on which the claims rely are the 

same.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). So, whichever 

statutory vehicle Gomez is attempting to use with respect to Mayor Bermudez, we would reject Gomez’s theory of hostile work environment for the 

reasons described in text.

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-11093

This unwelcome harassment, moreover, must be “based on a protected characteristic of the employee,” such as the employee’s sex. 

Id. (quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 

1275 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Like the district court, we conclude that the instant complaint doesn’t allege any facts from which we might plausibly infer

that the Mayor—him being the sole defendant on this count—harassed Gomez based on her sex. Simply put, Gomez’s conclusory 

assertion that the Mayor harassed her on this basis is insufficient to 

withstand a motion to dismiss. See Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 

1357 (11th Cir. 2021) (“A district court may properly dismiss a complaint if it rests only on conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual 

deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts.” (quotation 

marks omitted)). In fact, Gomez’s speculative theory is contradicted by the factual allegations in her complaint, which suggest 

that the Mayor targeted Gomez for a different reason—her support 

for the Mayor’s political rival, Councilwoman Ruiz. See Edwards 

v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010). Absent “more 

by way of factual content” suggesting that the Mayor personally 

harassed Gomez because of her sex, we conclude that Gomez 

hasn’t nudged this claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 (quotation marks omitted).

In so holding, we do not decide whether Gomez has alleged 

a hostile work environment more generally, or whether the City 

can be held responsible under Title VII for the allegedly discriminatory conduct of its employees. But in § 1983 suits, “a plaintiff 

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must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Again, Gomez brought her equal protection 

claim only against Mayor Bermudez. Her claim thus fails for the 

simple reason that no factual allegations reasonably imply that the 

Mayor harbored any sex-based animus in taking the actions that he 

did.

IV 

Next, we turn to Gomez’s freedom of association claim. 

“The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression.” Rodriguez v. City of Doral, 863 F.3d 1343, 1349 

(11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). As such, the government may 

not take adverse action against a public employee “solely because 

of [her] political association or beliefs.” Id. at 1350.

Gomez argues that she was treated improperly due to her 

political affiliation with Councilwoman Ruiz, and she seeks to hold 

the City liable for the treatment she faced. However, as the district 

court rightly observed, “a local government may not be sued under 

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, 

“recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly 

speaking, acts ‘of the municipality’—that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of 

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). To impose § 1983 liability on 

the City, then, Gomez must show that her constitutional rights 

were violated by the City itself through some unconstitutional 

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policy or custom that is attributable to the City. See id.; McDowell 

v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).3

Gomez “has two methods by which to establish [the City’s]

policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated [City] policy or 

(2) an unofficial custom or practice of the [City] shown through the 

repeated acts of a final policymaker for the [City].” Grech v. Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Lacking 

anything official, Gomez turns to option two, arguing that the City

had a practice or custom of punishing anyone that supported

Councilmember Ruiz. 

We disagree. “In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a policy 

or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and widespread practice.” McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1290 (quotation marks 

omitted). “Moreover, actual or constructive knowledge of such 

customs must be attributed to the governing body of the municipality.” Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 

1986); see Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1131 

3 In her complaint, Gomez brought the same freedom of association claim 

against Mayor Bermudez. But the district court construed this claim as one 

brought against the Mayor in his official capacity. Gomez doesn’t dispute the 

district court’s characterization on appeal. As a result, we too will analyze the 

claim as one against the Mayor in his official capacity. Our analysis for that 

claim is accordingly the same as that for Gomez’s § 1983 claim against the City. 

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Because the real party in interest in 

an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, 

the entity’s policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of federal 

law.” (quotation marks omitted)).

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(11th Cir. 2021). Here, Gomez has failed to plausibly allege that 

Mayor Bermudez’s meddling in employment-related affairs gives

rise to municipal liability. For one thing, she didn’t allege that Bermudez had final policymaking authority to hire, fire, or supervise

the City’s police officers. Indeed, by the City’s charter, that authority is explicitly vested elsewhere—in the City Manager. See Doral 

Municipal Charter, art. III, § 3.04 (“The [City] Manager 

shall . . . [b]e responsible for the hiring, supervision and removal of 

all City employees . . . .”). In addition, rather than suggest that 

Mayor Bermudez possessed the “[a]uthority to make municipal 

policy” in this area, Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, Gomez’s complaint 

alleges the opposite—that Mayor Bermudez “violated” the City 

Charter and overstepped his authority.

It doesn’t matter that the Mayor may have had significant 

power to act for the City in other respects. To impose municipal 

liability, the challenged action must have been taken pursuant to a 

policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under local law 

for making policy “in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” 

McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997); see Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481 (“Municipal liability attaches only where the 

decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.”); Manor Healthcare Corp. 

v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 638 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[N]o matter how 

much power an official has, no municipal liability exists if that official does not set the policy at issue.” (quotation omitted)). Only 

then can it be said that the rogue official is “acting on behalf of the 

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-11093

municipality,” such that the city can be held responsible. Sewell v. 

Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997). That’s 

not the case here. To hold otherwise would in essence subject the 

City to vicarious liability. And that we cannot do. See Monell, 436 

U.S. at 691.

Likewise, Gomez has failed to allege that the maltreatment 

of officers who supported Councilwoman Ruiz amounted to a 

“custom” of the City—a practice “so widespread as to have the 

force of law.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 

404 (1997). In such a scenario, the “longstanding and widespread 

practice is deemed authorized by the policymaking officials because they must have known about it but failed to stop it.” Brown 

v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991); see 

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (plurality 

op.). Yet we don’t find that theory plausible either. Gomez says

that several officers received adverse treatment on the job—purportedly because of their affiliation with Councilmember Ruiz. 

But, with the exception of Detective Rodriguez, Gomez provides 

no facts to support her bald and conclusory allegations. See Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. Left with a single instance of an alleged constitutional violation, Gomez hasn’t stated a plausible claim against the 

City. Even construed in the light most favorable to Gomez, her 

complaint doesn’t exhibit “a series of constitutional violations from 

which deliberate indifference can be inferred” on the part of the 

City’s policymakers. Craig v. Floyd County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1311 

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(11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted); see Weiland v. Palm Beach 

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2015).

Accordingly, Gomez hasn’t plausibly stated a claim that the 

City violated her First Amendment right to freedom of association.

V 

We now move to Gomez’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim. Gomez believes that City officials retaliated against her for 

providing a sworn statement to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) during itsinvestigation into the criminal activity

of the local police chief and his command staff.

The Supreme Court “has made clear that public employees 

do not surrender” their free speech rights entirely “by reason of 

their employment.” Garcetti v. Cabellos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). 

In particular, the First Amendment still provides some protection 

for a public employee who speaks (1) “as a citizen” (2) “addressing 

matters of public concern.” Id.; see Alves v. Bd. of Regents of the 

Univ. Sys. of Ga., 804 F.3d 1149, 1160 (11th Cir. 2015). If both these 

requirements are met, then a court is to “balance” the interests of 

the employee, “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 

concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 

the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).

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A 

We first address whether Gomez was speaking as a citizen. 

As the Court in Garcetti explained, an employee does not speak “as 

a citizen” if her speech “owes its existence to [the] public employee’s professional responsibilities.” 547 U.S. at 421–22. In making this determination, though, the “critical question” is “whether 

the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.” 

Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014). Speech that “simply relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the 

course of public employment” remains eligible for First Amendment protection. Id. at 239.

So it is here. Gomez’s speech may have concerned information that she learned on the job. But construing the complaint 

in the light most favorable to Gomez, she wasn’t “simply performing . . . her job duties” when she rendered a sworn statement to the 

FDLE. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. After all, Gomez worked for a 

municipality, the City of Doral. And the FDLE is a distinct lawenforcement agency of the State of Florida, not her employer. See 

Fla Stat. §§ 20.04, 20.201. Gomez’s speech also occurred at an 

FDLE office, rather than at work. And nothing from the face of the 

complaint suggests that Gomez’s “ordinary job responsibilities” as 

a detective were implicated by this outside investigation into a public corruption scandal. Carollo v. Boria, 833 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th 

Cir. 2016). Like any other private citizen who possessed information relevant to an investigation, it is at least plausible that 

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Gomez’s sworn statement to the FDLE was provided as an ordinary witness—as a citizen—and not as a detective. See Cooper v. 

Smith, 89 F.3d 761, 765 (11th Cir. 1996); Lane, 573 U.S. at 238 

(“Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the 

scope of [her] ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First 

Amendment purposes.”).

B 

On to the public-concern inquiry. “To fall within the realm 

of ‘public concern,’ an employee’s speech must relate to ‘any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” Alves, 

804 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). “Whether an 

employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be 

determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, 

as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. But 

the “most important factor” is the content of the speech. Mitchell 

v. Hillsborough County, 468 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006).

Applying this test, we conclude that some—but not all—of 

Gomez’s speech touched on a matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. In the context of an investigation into the

“impropriety and criminal activity” of a local police chief, Gomez 

(1) discussed problems she had with the chief that were “administrative in nature,” and (2) provided information to facilitate the 

criminal investigation. Only the latter speech is protected. The 

former is “speech that concerns internal administration” of the police department “and personal grievances,” which renders it ineligible for constitutional protection. Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 

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1546, 1552 (11th Cir. 1988); see Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755 

(11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). But, to the extent Gomez recounted

her “personal knowledge of information relevant to the investigation” or directed the FDLE to others who she believed had “information about alleged criminal activity involving the Chief of Police 

and certain members of his command staff,” such speech regarded

a matter of public concern. “Exposing governmental . . . misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 

425; see Lane, 573 U.S. at 241. And “[t]here can be no doubt that 

corruption in a police department is an issue of public concern.” 

Cooper, 89 F.3d at 765. Moreover, the “point of the speech in question” was to help “bring [this] wrongdoing to light.” Alves, 804 

F.3d at 1167 (quoting Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th 

Cir. 1985)); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. Finally, the form and context of the speech—a sworn statement to the FDLE that could help 

produce criminal charges—fortify our conclusion that Gomez has 

plausibly alleged that she was speaking on a matter of public concern. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 241. As such, Gomez has successfully 

alleged that her speech was eligible for constitutional protection. 

See, e.g., Cooper, 89 F.3d at 765 (holding that a county deputy’s 

cooperation with a GBI investigation into corruption in the Sheriff’s Department constituted speech on a matter of public concern); 

Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2000) 

(similar); Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 

1996) (similar).

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C 

Having concluded that Gomez’s speech facilitating the criminal investigation implicates the First Amendment, two questions 

remain. First, has Gomez plausibly shown that her “free speech 

interests outweighed the employer’s interest in effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities”? Cook v. Gwinnett Cnty. 

Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005). Second, if the balance does favor Gomez, has she plausibly alleged that the protected 

speech “played a substantial part in [an] adverse employment action”? Id. The district court did not address either question. Nor 

have the parties briefed these issues on appeal. Thus, we think it 

inappropriate to reach out and decide them ourselves. We will instead vacate the district court’s opinion with respect to Gomez’s 

First Amendment retaliation claim and allow the parties to raise 

these arguments—if they so choose—on remand.

VI 

Finally, we turn to Gomez’s IIED claim against Mayor Bermudez. To state such a claim under Florida law, a plaintiff must 

allege (1) intentional or reckless conduct (2) that is outrageous and 

(3) causes the victim emotional distress (4) that is severe. Kim v. 

Jung Hyun Chang, 249 So. 3d 1300, 1305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 

The district court held that, as a matter of law, the allegations 

against Mayor Bermudez were “not sufficiently ‘outrageous’ to 

support a claim for IIED.” Doc. 17 at 7.

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We agree. To show outrageousness, the plaintiff must allege conduct that is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 

regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278–79 

(Fla. 1985) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). It is 

not enough “that the defendant has acted with an intent which is 

tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 

‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.” Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (quotation omitted). Nor will liability “extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, 

or false accusations.” Williams v. Worldwide Flight Servs. Inc., 877 

So. 2d 869, 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam); see also 

Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Florida courts have been reluctant to find claims for [IIED] based solely 

on allegations of verbal abuse.” (quotation omitted)).

The conduct alleged by Gomez doesn’t rise to the level of 

outrageousness required by Florida law. Bermudez’s actions of 

publicly disparaging Gomez, wrongly accusing her of reporting 

misconduct, and lodging a complaint that caused her to have a 

tracker placed on her police car may have been inappropriate. But 

those actions were not “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” 

McCarson, 467 So. 2d. at 279. Indeed, Florida courts have repeatedly held that conduct far worse than that alleged here is 

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insufficient to maintain a claim for IIED. See, e.g., Worldwide 

Flight, 877 So. 2d at 870 (pattern of harassment at work, including 

(1) supervisor making racial epithets in front of plaintiff and to others over the work radio, (2) creating “false disciplinary related incidents” to justify termination, (3) falsely accusing plaintiff of theft, 

(4) refusing to allow plaintiff to work with other African Americans, (5) repeatedly threatening to terminate plaintiff, and (6) forcing plaintiff to work in “dangerous” conditions); Diamond v. 

Rosenfeld, 511 So. 2d 1031, 1033–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (pattern of harassment to make plaintiffs’ lives “as miserable as possible,” including (1) threatening to shoot their dog, (2) directing antiSemitic remarks toward plaintiffs, (3) falsely accusing one plaintiff 

of attempted rape, (4) making repeated “threatening and/or harassing telephone calls” to plaintiffs, (5) cursing plaintiffs and their 

children, and (6) directing “prayers for the dead” against plaintiffs

and their children); see also Mundy v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 676 

F.2d 503, 505–06 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (collecting employment-related cases denying IIED claims).

Thus, we hold that the district court correctly dismissed 

Gomez’s IIED claim.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s 

judgment with respect to Gomez’s Title VII, FCRA, and First 

Amendment retaliation claims (Counts I, II, and VI), AFFIRM the 

dismissal of all other claims, and REMAND this case to the district 

court for further proceedings.

USCA11 Case: 21-11093 Date Filed: 01/03/2022 Page: 19 of 19