United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 7, 2020

Decided January 7, 2020

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2448

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES SHARPE, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:18-CR-40040-SMY-1

Staci M. Yandle,

Judge.

O R D E R

Charles Sharpe, Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of production of child 

pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e), and was sentenced to 282 months’ 

imprisonment to be followed by five years’ supervision. Sharpe seeks to appeal his 

judgment and sentence, but his lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and asks

permission to withdraw from representation. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967). Sharpe has not responded to this motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief 

explains the nature of the case and addresses potential issues that this kind of appeal 

might involve. The analysis in counsel’s brief appears thorough, so we limit our review 

to the subjects she discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-2448 Page 2

Sharpe has told counsel that he does not want to contest his guilty plea, but 

counsel nonetheless considers whether Sharpe could challenge the adequacy of the plea 

colloquy or the voluntariness of his guilty plea. We have been clear, however, that 

counsel should not even explore challenges under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

11 unless the defendant “really wants to withdraw the guilty plea.” United States v. 

Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 

2002). 

Next, counsel asks whether Sharpe might challenge his sentence on procedural 

grounds. A district court would commit procedural error by incorrectly calculating the 

Guidelines range or by treating the Guidelines as mandatory. See Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But here we could not conclude that the court miscalculated the 

Guidelines range. Sharpe had a criminal history category of I and a total offense level 

of 39, yielding a Guidelines range of 262–327 months’ imprisonment, and he declined to 

object to these calculations.

Counsel then explores challenging the substantive reasonableness of Sharpe’s

sentence, and properly concludes that this challenge would be frivolous. A withinGuidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Cunningham, 883 

F.3d 690, 701 (7th Cir. 2018). Counsel identifies no basis to disturb that presumption 

here, nor do we see one. The court also justified the sentence based on factors in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offense (the 

judge said this was “the most egregious case of child sexual exploitation that I have 

dealt with to date”) and the need to protect the public and deter future bad conduct 

(this was Sharpe’s second sex-related offense, separated by over thirty years).

Finally, counsel properly determines that she could not raise any claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel on Sharpe’s behalf, because she was his attorney in the 

district court. She also correctly points out that such a claim is best saved for collateral 

review because the record here is too undeveloped to support such a claim. See Massaro 

v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 341 (7th Cir. 

2014).

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.