United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued April 5, 2006

Decided April 26, 2006

Before

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 05-3861

JASON SEDDON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MAYTAG CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 04 C 4058

J. Phil Gilbert, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Jason Seddon filed this action in Illinois state court alleging his former

employer, Maytag Corporation, violated Illinois law by constructively discharging

him for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Maytag removed the action to the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, and that court

properly exercised its diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332: Seddon is an

Illinois citizen seeking more than $75,000 in damages, and Maytag is a Delaware

corporation with its principal place of business in Iowa. The district court granted

Maytag’s motion for summary judgment and Seddon appealed. We affirm the

district court’s judgment because the Illinois appellate courts have never recognized

a retaliation action based on constructive discharge.

Seddon hurt his back while working on Maytag’s assembly line in November

2002. On December 2, 2002, Seddon filed a workers’ compensation claim with the

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-3861 Page 2

Illinois Industrial Commission naming Maytag as the respondent. He returned to

work following his injury, but his back pain persisted so he visited his chiropractor

in late December. His chiropractor found him “totally incapacitated” and said he

should refrain from all work. In February 2003 Maytag required Seddon to submit

to an examination by a physician of its choosing; Maytag’s doctor concluded he could

return to work immediately without any “light duty” restrictions. Seddon followed

his chiropractor’s advice and remained on unpaid medical leave until late June

2003, when his personal physician drafted a note indicating he could return to

work. During his six-month absence, Seddon received disability insurance

payments and kept Maytag advised of his medical status by providing the company

with doctor’s notes every thirty days as required by his union’s contract with

Maytag.

Seddon reported back for work on June 28 but soon encountered further back

pain causing him to miss work July 16-18. His personal physician wrote a note

dated July 21 asking Maytag to “[p]lease allow Jason to do no bending or heavy

lifting due to low back sprain.” Maytag refused to assign Seddon to “light duty”

work because in February its doctor cleared him to return to work without

restrictions. Due to Maytag’s refusal to place him “light duty” status, Seddon

returned to unpaid medical leave on July 22. At his deposition Seddon disputed

whether he was on leave during July and August 2003, but he was surely aware

Maytag considered him on leave when the company sent him a letter dated

August 26. The letter advised Seddon that he had not updated the company on his

medical status within the past thirty days, and that if he did not do so by

September 9, the company would “assume that you no longer wish to remain on

leave of absence and have terminated your employment with Maytag [].” Seddon

received the August 26 letter but never responded or provided Maytag with updated

medical information as required by his union’s contract. Consequently, Maytag

sent Seddon a letter dated September 11 advising him that his employment was

terminated due to his failure to update his medical information by the September 9

deadline.

Seddon’s counsel made it clear both in his appellate briefs and at oral

argument that he bases his retaliation claim solely on the constructive discharge he

allegedly suffered when Maytag refused to give him “light duty” work in July 2003. 

He does not contend that his actual termination in September 2003 was the product

of unlawful retaliation. The district court concluded Seddon could not prevail

because Illinois law does not recognize a retaliatory discharge action for anything

short of actual termination and there was no evidence connecting his actual

discharge to any unlawful motive.

The Illinois Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of action for

retaliatory constructive discharge, and it has repeatedly emphasized its

disinclination to expand the present scope of retaliation claims. E.g., Metzger v.
No. 05-3861 Page 3

DaRosa, 805 N.E. 2d 1165, 1173 (Ill. 2004) (“[T]his court has consistently sought to

restrict the common law tort of retaliatory discharge. . . . We have . . . never

recognized a common law tort for any injury short of actual discharge.”); Fisher v.

Lexington Health Care, Inc., 722 N.E. 2d 1115, 1121 (Ill. 1999) (“this court has thus

far declined to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory constructive discharge or

retaliatory demotion”); Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 645 N.E. 2d 877,

882 (Ill. 1994) (“We note that Illinois courts have refused to accept a ‘constructive

discharge’ concept.”); Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 601 N.E. 2d 720, 730 (Ill. 1992) (“We

further decline to expand the tort of retaliatory discharge, on these facts, to

encompass the concept of ‘constructive discharge.’”); Hinthorn v. Roland’s of

Bloomington, Inc., 519 N.E. 2d 909, 912 (Ill. 1988) (“We agree that plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged that she was discharged, but wish to make abundantly clear

that we are not now endorsing the constructive discharge concept.”).

In light of these precedents from the Illinois Supreme Court, we have

previously noted that Illinois courts do not recognize retaliation claims based on

constructive discharge. Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir.

2004) (“only an actual termination can support an employee’s retaliatory discharge

claim under Illinois law”). Our decision in Thomas also discussed the long and

uninterrupted line of Illinois cases frowning upon any expansion of retaliatory

discharge beyond actual terminations. Id. at 708. Seddon cites two unreported

district court decisions that suggest the Illinois Supreme Court has not categorically

foreclosed the possibility of recognizing a retaliatory constructive discharge claim in

the future. See Contreras v. Suncast Corp., No. 96 C 3439, 1997 WL 598120, at *5

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 1997); Handel v. Belvedere USA Corp., No. 00 C 50420, 2001 WL

1286842, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2001). But as things stand now, retaliatory

constructive discharge claims are not recognized in Illinois, and the Illinois

Supreme Court’s language strongly discourages us from turning Seddon’s claim into

a novel cause of action under Illinois law.

Seddon urges us to ask the Illinois Supreme Court whether it would

recognize his claim, but there is no need to certify a question because that court has

had “‘an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the issue.’” Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.

Co. v. Statewide Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting State Farm

Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2001)). All of the Illinois

Supreme Court’s decisions point in the same direction: against the recognition of a

claim for retaliatory constructive discharge.

AFFIRMED.