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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Hillsborough-northern judicial district

No. 2018-0202

EVELYN TARNAWA

v.

RICHARD GOODE

Argued: May 8, 2019

Opinion Issued: July 2, 2019

Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon on the 

brief and orally), for the plaintiff.

Nixon, Vogelman, Slawsky & Simoneau, P.A., of Manchester (Leslie C. 

Nixon on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

HICKS, J. The defendant, Richard Goode, appeals an order of the 

Superior Court (Messer, J.) granting a petition to partition real property in 

Manchester brought by the plaintiff, Evelyn Tarnawa. We affirm.

The following facts were found by the trial court or are established by 

documents submitted to the trial court. The parties are siblings. They received 

joint title to the property at issue under the will of their mother (the decedent), 

who died in 2009. The defendant had been living on the property with the 

decedent prior to her death, and, after her death, chose to continue living 

there.
2

In 2010, the plaintiff sent the defendant a proposed agreement 

purporting to set forth the defendant’s rights and responsibilities with respect 

to the property while he continued to reside there. Although some back-andforth discussions took place between the parties, the agreement was never 

executed, and no evidence of any other agreement regarding the property was 

presented to the trial court. The defendant claims to have made improvements 

to the property.

Beginning in 2012, the defendant failed to pay the property taxes in full. 

The plaintiff did not learn of this failure until she was notified by the City of 

Manchester in 2016. By December 7, 2017, the amount owed for outstanding 

taxes, costs and interest was $33,803.13, with interest accruing at $11.17 per 

day.

In 2016, the plaintiff filed a petition for partition, requesting that the 

court order a sale of the property “and a division of the proceeds of the sale on 

an equitable basis, i.e. a deduction of all outstanding deficiencies from the 

Defendant’s share of the proceeds.” The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. He also moved for summary judgment on the basis 

of res judicata and the decedent’s intent to devise the property to the parties as 

joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The trial court denied those motions 

and granted the petition to partition. The court found that “[g]iven the small 

size of the parcel and the residence already constructed thereon,” the property 

“cannot be divided without causing great prejudice or inconvenience to the 

parties.” Thus, the court directed that the property be sold and the proceeds 

divided between the parties as set forth in the order.

The defendant moved for reconsideration and to stay the order, which 

the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

We will uphold a trial court’s equitable order unless it 

constitutes an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In doing so, 

the question is whether the record establishes an objective basis 

sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made. The party 

asserting that a trial court order is unsustainable must 

demonstrate that the ruling was unreasonable or untenable to the 

prejudice of his case. We will not disturb the findings of the trial 

court unless they lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. 

Indeed, our review of the trial court’s decision is limited: we will 

not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless the 

findings and rulings are unsupported by the evidence or are 

erroneous as a matter of law. Nor will we reweigh the equities.

Hayes, Tr. v. Connolly, Tr., 172 N.H. ___, ___ (decided March 29, 2019) (slip. 

op. at 4) (quotations and citations omitted).
3

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to 

dismiss this action because: (1) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) 

the action is barred by res judicata; (3) the claim is really one for breach of 

contract; and (4) the action is barred by laches. The defendant further argues 

that if we reject his subject matter jurisdiction and res judicata arguments, we 

should nevertheless reverse and remand the case for the trial court to “consider 

the individual circumstances of the parties.” (Bolding omitted.)

We first address the defendant’s subject matter jurisdiction argument. 

The trial court, in ruling that it had jurisdiction, relied upon RSA 547:3, II(e), 

which provides that the probate court1 has concurrent jurisdiction with the 

superior court over “[p]etitions for partition pursuant to RSA 547-C.” RSA 

547:3, II(e) (Supp. 2018). The defendant argues that RSA 547:3, II(e) “appears 

to be in direct conflict with RSA 498:1,” which provides, in pertinent part:

The superior court shall have the powers of a court of equity 

in the following cases: . . . the affairs of partners, joint tenants or 

owners and tenants in common; . . . except that the court of 

probate shall have exclusive jurisdiction over equitable matters 

arising under its subject matter jurisdiction authority in RSA 547, 

RSA 547-C and RSA 552:7.

RSA 498:1 (2010) (emphasis added).

The defendant’s argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation 

which presents a question of law subject to our de novo review. See Rogers v. 

Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743 (2019).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the 

intent of the legislature as expressed by the words of the statute 

considered as a whole. We first look to the statutory language, and 

whenever possible construe that language according to its plain 

and ordinary meaning. We interpret legislative intent from the 

statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might 

have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to 

include. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we do 

not look beyond it for further indications of legislative intent.

Id. (citations omitted).

 

1 In 2011, the legislature created the New Hampshire Circuit Court, and conferred upon it the 

jurisdictions of the former probate and district courts and the former judicial branch family 

division. See RSA 490-F:1-:3 (Supp. 2018). Nevertheless, as in Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738 

(2019), “this opinion will refer to the circuit court, probate division as the ‘probate court’ to 

avoid any confusion with our prior decisions concerning probate jurisdiction.” Rogers, 171 

N.H. at 740 n.1.
4

The defendant cites, among other provisions, RSA 547:3, I(a) (2007) and 

RSA 547:3, I(c) (Supp. 2018), which vest the probate court with exclusive 

jurisdiction over the probate of wills and the interpretation and construction of 

wills, and RSA 547:9 (2007), which provides that “[a]ll proceedings in relation 

to the settlement of the estate of a person deceased shall be had in the probate 

court of the county in which his will was proved or administration on his estate 

was granted.” He asserts that “[t]he obvious legislative intent was to vest the 

probate court with full and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all issues relating to 

the distribution of property at death.” See RSA 547:3, I (Supp. 2018) (granting 

the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters). He then 

concludes that the only way to resolve the apparent conflict between RSA 

547:3, II(e) and RSA 498:1 is “to construe RSA 547:3, II(e) as not applying to 

the settlement of [a deceased person’s estate].” (Quotation omitted.) As we 

read the defendant’s argument, he appears to contend that if a property is 

acquired through settlement of a decedent’s estate, jurisdiction over its 

subsequent partition lies exclusively with the probate court.

We rejected a similar invitation to broadly construe the probate court’s 

jurisdiction in Rogers, 171 N.H. at 745. In Rogers, the plaintiff and defendant, 

husband and son of the decedent, respectively, were the devisees of the 

decedent’s estate. Rogers, 171 N.H. at 739-40. The defendant was also 

appointed executor of the estate. Id. at 740. Several years after the estate was 

probated, the plaintiff brought an action in superior court against the 

defendant for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence and unjust 

enrichment, based upon allegations that the defendant had misrepresented the 

value of an estate asset during the estate’s administration. Id. at 740-41. The 

defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that “all of the plaintiff's claims are 

related to the estate, and the administration of the estate, and the values of 

estate assets, and the disbursement of the estate assets and, therefore, the 

probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute pursuant to 

RSA 547:3.” Id. at 741 (quotation and brackets omitted). On reconsideration, 

the trial court dismissed the action, finding that the probate court had 

exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Id. at 741-42.

We reversed, rejecting an interpretation of RSA 547:3 that would vest the 

probate court with exclusive jurisdiction over a common law tort claim “based 

solely upon the fact that some of the alleged conduct occurred during or as a 

part of the administration of an estate.” Id. at 745. Instead we applied the 

analysis of DiGaetano v. DiGaetano, 163 N.H. 588 (2012), to determine 

whether the probate court had jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore, we clarified:

[F]or the purposes of determining the nature of a party’s claim in 

the context of DiGaetano’s jurisdictional analysis, it is the manner 

by which an action relates to an estate that is the critical inquiry, 

not whether a relationship simply exists. Therefore, the 

determination of subject matter jurisdiction in this case depends 
5

upon whether a direct connection exists between the plaintiff’s 

claims and the composition, administration, sale, settlement, and 

final distribution of the estate, and whether the connection relates 

to the estate or will in a manner that mandates the probate court’s 

exclusive jurisdiction.

Id. at 746. We concluded that the manner in which the plaintiff challenged the 

defendant’s conduct did not “require the probate court’s expertise or its 

jurisdiction . . . . Consequently, the manner by which these claims relate to 

the decedent’s estate and will is tangential, not direct, and thus, the plaintiff’s 

claims do not fall within the probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. at 747.

The plaintiff’s claim in the instant case is similarly tangential to the

decedent’s estate. That estate was merely the vehicle through which the 

parties obtained title to the property. We reject the defendant’s contention that 

interpretation of the will is an issue in this case, and that, therefore, the 

“appropriate remedy” for the plaintiff is to seek to reopen the proceeding in 

probate court. The defendant asserts that the decedent’s intent was to leave 

the property to the plaintiff and him as joint tenants with rights of 

survivorship. Because of that alleged intent, the defendant claims that a 

determination whether to sell the property is “premature.”

The trial court concluded, however, and we agree, that it is irrelevant to 

the partition action whether the property was devised to the parties as joint 

tenants with rights of survivorship or as tenants in common. The plaintiff 

would be entitled to partition of the property in either case. See RSA 547-C:1 

(2007) (providing, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person owning a present 

undivided legal or equitable interest or estate in real . . . property . . . shall be 

entitled to have partition or division in the manner hereinafter provided”); 

Pedersen v. Brook, 151 N.H. 65, 66-67 (2004) (noting that “[p]artition is defined 

as a division into severalty of property held jointly or in common or the sale of 

such property by a court and the division of the proceeds” (quotation omitted)). 

Accordingly, the defendant has failed to persuade us that an issue related to 

the estate must now be resolved in order to partition the property and, 

therefore, we conclude that the partition action does not “relate to” an estate in 

the manner Rogers requires for exclusive probate court jurisdiction. Rogers, 

171 N.H. at 747. Because the superior and probate courts have concurrent 

jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case, the superior court properly 

exercised its jurisdiction.

The defendant next argues that this action is barred by res judicata. 

“The applicability of res judicata is a question of law, which we review de novo.” 

Hansa Consult of N. Am. v. Hansaconsult Ingenieurgesellschaft, 163 N.H. 46, 

49 (2011). “The doctrine of res judicata prevents the parties from relitigating 

matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first 

action.” In re Estate of Bergquist, 166 N.H. 531, 534-35 (2014) (quotation 
6

omitted). “The doctrine applies if three elements are met: (1) the parties are the 

same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action was before the 

court in both instances; and (3) the first action ended with a final judgment on 

the merits.” Id. at 535 (quotation omitted).

The element in controversy on appeal is the second. The defendant 

argues that the trial court erred in concluding that “[a]n action to partition 

property is not a theory of recovery that arises out of the settlement of a 

probate estate.” He contends that, to the contrary, “an action to partition and 

sell the property was very much a possibility during the settlement of the 

estate, and was in fact discussed.” “Clearly,” he asserts, “the probate court 

had the authority to order partition if either of the parties had sought it at the 

time the estate was probated and both parties are precluded from seeking it 

now.” (Citation omitted.) We disagree.

In Eastern Marine Construction Corp. v. First Southern Leasing, 129 

N.H. 270 (1987), we adopted “what we consider[ed] to be the modern and better 

view” of what constitutes a “cause of action” for purposes of res judicata. 

Eastern Marine, 129 N.H. at 274. Thus, we chose to “define cause of action 

collectively to refer to all theories on which relief could be claimed on the basis 

of the factual transaction in question.” Id. at 275. We found the definition 

more “in keeping with the principle that pervades our modern procedure . . . 

that the whole controversy between the parties may and often must be brought 

before the same court in the same action.” Id. at 274-75 (quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, there remain some claims that, while they might be 

brought when other claims between the parties are adjudicated, need not be so 

brought or otherwise be barred. See Meier v. Town of Littleton, 154 N.H. 340, 

343 (2006) (acknowledging that Eastern Marine, 129 N.H. at 275, “contain[s] 

language suggesting a somewhat more expansive definition of ‘cause of action,’” 

but distinguishing that case from “a suit making a claim that could only have 

been raised as a [permissive] cross-claim in the previous suit”); see also Super. 

Ct. Civ. R. 10 (addressing compulsory and permissive counterclaims).

The plaintiff’s partition action is just such a claim. The plaintiff was 

entitled to bring her partition action as soon as she became a co-owner of an 

undivided interest in the property, see RSA 547-C:1, and could have petitioned 

for partition in the probate court at the time the decedent’s estate was 

administered. She was not, however, required to do so, and “could, as she did, 

reserve her right to file a complaint for partition at a later date.” Boddiker v. 

McPartlin, 41 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ill. 1942) (concluding that the prior action was 

not res judicata where, “[e]ven if it be conceded that plaintiffs should have filed 

a counterclaim for partition [in that action,] there was no imperative duty on 

their part to do so”).
7

To recognize the foregoing is, of course, to recognize that the plaintiff’s 

partition claim and the administration of the decedent’s estate are not, in fact, 

the same cause of action. The estate’s summary administration, among other 

things, fulfilled the decedent’s intent to pass the property to both the plaintiff 

and the defendant. See RSA 553:33, IV (2007) (upon granting of summary 

administration, the administrator becomes obligated to “complete the 

administration of the estate without further court supervision in accordance 

with the decedent’s will and applicable law”). The partition action calls upon 

the court to exercise its equity powers to physically divide the property between 

the plaintiff and the defendant, with or without monetary adjustments between 

the parties, RSA 547-C:11, :22 (2007), or, if it finds that “the property is so 

situated or is of such a nature that it cannot be divided so as to give each 

owner his or her share or interest without great prejudice or inconvenience,” to

order the property “to be sold and the proceeds from the sale to be divided 

among the owners according to their respective rights, titles, or interests,” RSA 

547-C:25 (2007). The right to seek judicial severance of title at any time is an 

incident of co-ownership. See, e.g., Coolidge v. Coolidge, 287 A.2d 566, 568 

(Vt. 1971) (“The general law is that partition is a right incident to common 

ownership which a co-owner may demand absolutely.”).

The factual transaction at issue in the first action was the testamentary 

disposition of the decedent’s estate; in the second, the factual transaction was 

merely the undivided co-ownership of the property itself, regardless of how it 

was acquired, and the plaintiff’s desire to sever that co-ownership. Thus, the 

two actions are not merely different legal theories for claiming relief on the 

basis of the same factual transaction. See In re Estate of Bergquist, 166 N.H.

at 535; cf. Burns v. Wood, 427 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) 

(concluding that the “present action for partition is clearly distinct and 

separate” from a prior suit seeking to enjoin the appellants from going onto 

land in which, the prior suit determined, they owned an undivided interest,

and holding that the appellee’s failure to request a partition in the previous 

suit did not bar the current partition action on the basis of res judicata).

The defendant nevertheless argues that “courts in other states have 

made it clear that a party can be precluded from seeking partition if he or she 

fails to seek it in an earlier action.” We find the cases cited by the defendant —

Adamson v. Marill, CV166055562S, 2017 WL 715686 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 

13, 2017), and Judy v. Judy, 712 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 2011) — to be 

distinguishable. In Judy, the issue was whether an action for waste was, 

under the doctrine of res judicata, barred by a prior partition action in which a 

claim for waste had been raised, then abandoned with a specific request that 

the probate court not rule on it. Judy, 712 S.E.2d at 410-11, 415. In 

Adamson, the plaintiff brought a prior action regarding disposition of jointlyowned property in which he only sought equitable distribution notwithstanding 

that the applicable statute also afforded the right to seek partition. Adamson, 

2017 WL 715686, at *5. The court held that where the plaintiff had 
8

“voluntarily and intentionally” limited the relief sought in the first action and 

thereby “eschewed the opportunity to full[y] litigate a claim concerning 

partition,” his subsequent attempt to bring a partition action was barred by res 

judicata. Id. at *6. Here, there has been no prior action involving disposition 

of the property while it has been co-owned by the parties. The testamentary 

disposition in the administration of the decedent’s estate, which created the 

parties’ co-ownership, was not such an action. We conclude, for all of the 

foregoing reasons, that the instant partition action is not barred by res 

judicata.

The defendant next contends that the plaintiff’s claim was really for 

breach of contract and that, because “there is an adequate remedy at law in 

the form of monetary damages,” the equitable remedy of partition is 

unavailable. The defendant also relatedly argues that the case should have

been dismissed because the trial court “found that no contract existed 

obligating the defendant to pay property taxes.”

We disagree that the plaintiff’s claim is one for breach of contract. The 

plaintiff’s complaint does recite, in its statement of facts, that she and the 

defendant “agreed that, although [they] would co-own the demised premises, 

[the defendant] would continue to reside [there] and assume all living, 

maintenance, utility and real estate tax expenses, and all other carrying costs 

and expenses, in exchange for the solitary use, enjoyment and benefit of 

residing there.” That statement, however, along with subsequent recitations 

concerning the defendant’s failure to pay the property taxes and other 

expenses, merely provides a factual background to the plaintiff’s claim. The 

only relief the plaintiff requested was that the court “order a sale of the 

demised premises and a division of the proceeds of the sale on an equitable 

basis.” In addition, the only basis for the superior court’s jurisdiction cited in 

the complaint was RSA 498:1, which confers upon the superior court “the 

powers of a court of equity” in specified cases including “the affairs of . . . joint 

tenants or owners and tenants in common.” RSA 498:1. We conclude that the 

complaint unambiguously sought partition, not a remedy for breach of 

contract, and that the plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law.

The defendant next argues that the action should have been dismissed 

on laches grounds. The defendant argues that although the plaintiff knew of 

her right to partition at the time the decedent’s estate was administered, she 

waited more than seven years to bring her action. “In the meantime,” the 

defendant asserts, he “has detrimentally relied on [the plaintiff’s] implied 

agreement to allow him a life tenancy, by maintaining and making 

improvements to the property.”

“Laches is an equitable doctrine that bars litigation when a potential 

plaintiff has slept on his rights.” Flaherty v. Dixey, 158 N.H. 385, 387 (2009)

(quotation omitted). “Laches is not a mere matter of time, but is principally a 
9

question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced — an inequity 

founded on some change in the conditions or relations of the property or the 

parties involved.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In determining whether the doctrine 

should apply to bar a suit, the court should consider the knowledge of the 

plaintiffs, the conduct of the defendants, the interests to be vindicated, and the 

resulting prejudice.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The party asserting laches bears 

the burden of proving both that the delay was unreasonable and that prejudice 

resulted from the delay.” Appeal of Plantier, 126 N.H. 500, 505 (1985)

(quotation omitted). The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether 

the circumstances justify the application of laches, and unless we find that the 

trial court’s decision is unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter 

of law, we will not overturn it. Flaherty, 158 N.H. at 387 (quotation omitted).

We do not find the trial court’s ruling in this case to be “unsupported by 

the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.” Id. With respect to the 

defendant’s claimed improvements, the trial court found that the defendant 

“failed to present evidence proving the existence of the improvements,” other 

than receipts for “minor expenses related to services like pest control, lawn 

care, and stair maintenance.” The trial court also found laches inapplicable 

where the defendant had, in fact, benefited from the delay. The court ruled: 

“The fact that the plaintiff did not object to defendant living on the property 

rent-free and did not move to partition sooner, was beneficial to him and 

certainly does not eviscerate plaintiff’s right to seek partition of the property, a 

right she may exercise at any time.” Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s 

argument that the case should have been dismissed on the basis of laches.

Finally, the defendant urges us to remand the case for the trial court to 

“consider the individual circumstances of the parties.” (Bolding omitted.) The 

defendant asserts that “there were a number of special circumstances” in this 

case, but he has not demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider them. 

In fact, in response to that argument on reconsideration, the trial court noted 

that it “carefully considered all of the information before it in determining that 

the appropriate remedy is partition and sale of the property.” Most of the 

claimed special circumstances were stated in the defendant’s proposed findings 

of fact, and thus, the court ruled, were, “granted, denied, or determined to be 

unnecessary, consistent with” the court’s narrative order. To the extent the 

defendant is asking this court to reweigh the equities, that is not our role on 

appeal. See Hayes, 172 N.H. at ___ (slip op. at 4); Town of Atkinson v. Malborn 

Realty Trust, 164 N.H. 62, 68 (2012) (noting that “[o]ur task on appeal is not to 

reweigh the equities”).

Affirmed.

LYNN, C.J., and BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., 

concurred.