No. 12774 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

MARGARET BROWN, Gallatin County Superintendent of Schools, 

EARL BEST, Gallatin County Surveyor, CARL STUCKY, Gallatin 

County Clerk and Recorder, IRIS WHITTLE, Gallatin County 

Treasurer, WILLIAM JOHNSON, Gallatin County Auditor, PAUL 

REESE, Clerk of the District Court of Gallatin County, and 

L.D.W. ANDERSON, Gallatin County Sheriff, 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA, 

Defendants and Appellants. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

Honorable W. W. Less ley, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellants : 

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, 

Montana 

Thomas Allen Budewitz, Assistant Attorney General, 

argued, Helena, Montana 

For Respondents : 

Thomas A. Olson, County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana 

Ronald K. Olson, Deputy County Attorney, argued, 

Bozeman, Montana 

--1 .J/iC . 12 ;gjq 

Filed: - - 

Submitted: November 19, 1974 

Decided : DfC 12 1974 
Mr. Justice Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a judgment for plaintiffs entered by 

the district court, Gallatin County, Hon. W. W. Lessley presiding. 

Plaintiffs are elected county officers. They brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of their salaries 

under the provisions of section 25-605 and 25-609.1, R..C.M. 1947, 

for the fiscal year July 1, 1973 through June 30, 1974. The 

trial court ' s judgment read : 

"That 'taxable valuation' to be used in computing the 

plaintiffs' salaries is a valuation for the new fiscal 

year 1973-1974, and the defendants have a clear legal 

duty to compute the taxable valuation for the fiscal 

year 1373-1974 and pay salaries to the plaintiffs based 

thereon. The 'taxable valuation' should be computed on 

or before July 1 of each fiscal year using the new 

figures available to the defendants. It 

Defendant raises two issues on appeal: 

(1) Whether there is a clear legal duty to compute taxable 

valuation of a county on or before July 1 of each fiscal year. 

(2) Whether the taxable valuation of a county which is 

completed after July 1 may be used to compute salari~s of county 

officers for the following fiscal year. 

Appellant is the Board of County Commissioners of Gallatin 

County. Its position is that it cannot be compelled to compi~te 

the taxable valuation of a county prior to July 1, because it has 

until the second Monday in July to assess the taxable property 

under section 84-406, R.C.M. 1947, and the second Monday in August 

to affix the mill levy under section 84-3505, R.C.M. 1947. In 

other words, appellant argues that the only valuation existing as 

of July 1 to apply the salary formula to is that of the previous 

year. 

On the other hand, respondent county officers maintain that the 

two sections, 84-406 and 84-3805, are not controlling since the 

only importance of section 84-406 is that it sets the second 

Monday in July as the deadline for reporting to the state department of revenue and section 84-3805 only concerns the time for 

fixing rates. Respondents urge that the 1972 Constitution omitted 
the former prohibition against changing a county official's 

salary during his term of office, and section 25-609.1 imposes a 

clear legal duty to compute the new taxable valuation of a county 

prior to July 1. This, respondents contend, would allow salaries 

to be current with respect to demands of the office and would avoid 

a lack of uniformity and even influence by the commissioners as to 

whether to increase or decrease salaries. We agree with respondents' 

position. 

Traditionally, county officials have been paid according to a 

salary formula based on the taxable valuation and population of 

the county computed just prior to their election. Under the Montana 

Constitution of 1889 a county official could not receive a pay 

increase during the term of his office. The net result was that 

some county officers were paid more, or on a different pay scale 

than others, since they were elected at a different time and there 

were, consequently, different tax valuations. 

The 1972 Montana Constitution removed this restriction and the 

1973 legislature upgraded the county salaries by amending section 

25-609.1, R.C.M. 1947, and setting the salaries at the beginning 

of each fiscal year. This change imposes a clear legal duty to 

compute the taxable valuation prior to July 1, the first day of the 

fiscal year, and the effective date of the legislative amendment. 

The time for assessment and computing taxable valuation set 

out in section 84-406, R.C.M. 1947, is at any time between the 

first Monday in March and the second Monday in July. The second 

Monday in July is only important by virtue of the required reporting 

of this valuation to the State Department of Revenue. In addition, 

the findings of fact of the district court in this matter indicate 

that it would be possibl-e for this valuation to be acted upon by 

defendant Board of County Commissioners on or before July 1, without 

waiting until that last possible moment before the second Monday in 

July. 

Under the 1889 Montana Constitution, the legislature followed 

a clear policy of insulating an officer's compensation from any 
alteration, for political or other reasons, during his term of 

office. Art. V, Sec. 31, 1889 Montana Constitution; Section 25- 

609, R.C.M. 1947; Shubat v. State of Montana, 157 Mont. 143, 484 

P.2d 278. Thus, a public officer was denied a pay raise during 

his term of office. Montana has since abandoned such an arbitrary 

approach. The legislature and the electorate have removed certain 

restrictions to allow salaries of officers to be responsive to 

changes in the amount of work required of their offices. 

The legislature has chosen a salary formula based on population 

and taxable valuation of the county. These yardsticks are fair 

measures of the amount of work required of these officers. But 

to use the taxable valuation of the previous year as appellant 

argues, whether it be larger or smaller, would defeat the whole 

purpose of the constitutional and legislative changes; it would 

be impossible for salaries to achieve a current and responsive 

level. Every public officer would receive his pay raise or decrease 

one year later. By choosing July 1, the legislature has attempted 

to make all such changes consistent with the start of the county 

fiscal year. 

Appellant's argutrent would further allow for the very abuses 

this Court sought to quell in Shubat v, State of Montana, 157 Mont. 

143, 150, 484 P.2d 278. There this Court said, citing from Jackson 

v. Porter, 57 Mont. 343, 188 P. 375: 

'I* ;k * the sole purpose of the constitutional 

limitations is to remove from the sphere of temptation every public officer whose office is created 

by the Constitution and whose official conduct in 

the remotest degree might be influemedby the hope 

of reward or the fear of punishment." 

To allow, as appellant urges, the taxable valuation to be 

determined either before or after the date of fixing these salaries 

would open up the possibility of exerting influence by increase 

or decrease of salary. Certainly the constitutional restriction 

against change has been lifted, but undue influence in branches 

of state and local government is never to be tolerated. 
Appellant in its brief, citing 35 Attorney ~eneral's Opinions, 

No. 33, states that if the taxable valuation is not completed 

until after July 1 of the fiscal year, then the -- statutory schedule -- 

in effect on the first day of the fiscal year must be used. That 

opinion was issued just prior to the filing of the instant suit 

and is deserving of our consideration; however, we feel it is in 

error on two points. 

First, the salary schedule discussed in secti-on 25-605, R.C.M. 

1947, is not the amount of the salary paid, but the formula for 

its determination. This formula or schedule is only open to 

legislathe changes and is n3t affected by when the taxable valuation 

of the county is fixed. The attorney general's opinion infers the 

schedule itself is subject to change, which we feel is clearly 

erroneous. 

Second, that same opinion infers that valuation is not due until 

the second Hmday in August under section 84-3805, R.C.14. 1947. 

However, this section is setting out the time for fixing the rate 

of taxation, not the taxable valuation, which is set out as on or 

before the second Monday in July. Section 84-406, R.C.M. 1947. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

Justice (I 

We Concur: 

Chief Jusice 

Justices.