United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-2310

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeffery Wayne Taylor

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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Submitted: January 26, 2022

Filed: February 9, 2022

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Jeffery Taylor appeals after the district court1 convicted him of drug offenses

following a bench trial. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed

1The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.
a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the conviction

and the sentence. Taylor has filed a pro se brief raising additional issues.

As to counsel’s arguments, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Taylor’s motion to disclose the identity of a confidential

informant, as the trial evidence showed that the informant’s identity was not material,

see Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (there can be no fixed rule for

disclosure of informant’s identity, courts must consider the particular circumstances

of each case, including the crime charged, the possible defenses, and the possible

significance of the informant’s testimony); United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977,

1005 (8th Cir. 2004) (district court’s refusal to require disclosure is reviewed for

abuse of discretion; defendant has burden of showing that the need for disclosure

outweighs the government’s privilege to withhold the identity of its informant); or in

admitting audio recordings of controlled buys conducted with the informant, see

United States v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2016) (evidentiary rulings are

reviewed for abuse of discretion).

We also conclude that the district court did not impose a substantively

unreasonable sentence, as the court properly considered the factors listed in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) and did not err in weighing the relevant factors. See United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (sentences are reviewed for

substantive reasonableness under deferential abuse of discretion standard; abuse of

discretion occurs when court fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight

to improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment in weighing

appropriate factors). Further, the court imposed a sentence below the Guidelines

range. See United States v. McCauley, 715 F.3d 1119, 1127 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting

that when district court has varied below Guidelines range, it is “nearly

inconceivable” that court abused its discretion in not varying downward further).

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As to Taylor’s pro se arguments, we conclude that his Confrontation Clause

rights were not violated, as the informant’s statements on the audio recordings were

not testimonial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (Confrontation

Clause applies only to testimonial statements); United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637,

649 (8th Cir. 2004) (unobjected-to Confrontation Clause violation is reviewed for

plain error). To the extent Taylor attempts to assert ineffective assistance of counsel,

we decline to address the claim in this direct appeal. See United States v. Hernandez,

281 F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 2002) (generally, ineffective-assistance claim is not

cognizable on direct appeal).

We have also independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75 (1988), and we find no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we

affirm, and we grant counsel leave to withdraw.

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