FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JASON ALEXANDER YEGGE, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D12-4193 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed April 15, 2015. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Richard A. Luce, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Alisa Smith, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Dawn A. Tiffin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM. Jason Alexander Yegge appeals the sentence he received on reman d after his partially successful appeal from the denial of his Fl orida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. He a rgues that his ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for the offense of armed burglary is illegal because- 2 - youthful offenders are not subject to mandatory minimum sentenc ing, even after committing a substantive violation of probation. Because Yegge 's ten-year mandatory minimum sentence is not illegal, despite his youthful offender status, we disagree and affirm Yegge's mandatory minimum sentence. In 2003, Yegge pleaded guilty to armed burglary, manufacture of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. T he trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Yegge as a youthful offender to drug offender probation for the burglary and manufacture charges. The court adjudicated Ye gge guilty and sentenced him to time served for the paraphernalia charge. In 2005, after having twice been restored to probation following violations for possessing drugs, Yegge admitted to violating his probation by commi tting the criminal offenses of possession of a controlled substance and introduction of contraband into a county detentio n facility. The court revoked Yegge's probation and youthful offender designation, ad judicated him guilty, and sentenced him to a ten-year mandatory minimum term pursuant to section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2002), for armed burglary and to five years' prison for manufacture of marijuana. Yegge subsequently challenged the trial court's revocation of h is youthful offender status in a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal se ntence. This court reversed the postconviction court's order denying relief and remanded fo r the circuit court to amend Yegge's sentence to reflect his youthful offender classif ication. We expressly affirmed Yegge's ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. See Yegg e v. State, 88 So. 3d 1058, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ("The maximum sentence for Yeg ge's original offense, armed burglary, is life in prison. Therefore, Yegge's ten-year mandatory- 3 - minimum was not illegal." (citation omitted)). On remand, the circuit court resentenced Yegge as a youthful offender but did not alter his ten-year man datory minimum sentence. On appeal, Yegge argues that his ten-year mandatory minimum sentence is illegal because sentencing enhancements do not apply to youthfu l offender sentences. We disagree. Once Yegge violated probation or community control, he was rese ntenced in accordance with section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2002) (emp hasis supplied), which provides: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06. However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time served while incarcerated, o r for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. In our view, this unqualified statement of the sanctions to whi ch a youthful offender who commits a substantive violation is exposed reflects the legisla ture's intent that such offenders lose the benefit of the original sentencing limitatio ns of the Youthful Offender Act. To understand the full import of the first sentence of th is statute, some statutory history is helpful. When section 958.14 was enacted in 1978, i t provided simply that "[a] violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a c ommunity control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948 .06(1). . . ." Ch. 78-84, § 14, at 123, Laws of Fla. In 1985, the legislature modified t his sentence as follows:- 4 - Provided that, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. Ch. 85-288, § 24, at 1821, Laws of Fla. And again in 1990, the legislature further amended the second sentence to appl y the six-year cap only to t echnical, not substantive, violations of probation. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990), amended by ch. 90–208, § 19, at 1161, Laws of Fla.; see also Shultz v. Sta te, 136 So. 3d 1232, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). The statute has remained substantively unc hanged since then, including the statute relevant here. It is widely accepted that youthful offenders maintain their "y outhful offender status" after violating probation or community control . See Lee v. State, 67 So. 3d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); accord Smith v. State, 143 So . 3d 1023, 1024-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Jacques v. State, 95 So. 3d 419, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Christian v. State, 84 So. 3d 437, 441-42 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Hudson v. State, 989 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). As we explained in Yegge, "[a ] youthful offender designation carries benefits—including the availability of prog rams and facilities, and, though Yegge may not qualify, eligibility for early release—wit hin the criminal justice system." 88 So. 3d at 1060; see also Christian, 84 So. 3d at 4 43. However, although the trial court must continue a youthful offender's status afte r a substantive violation of probation or community control, the trial court is not preclude d from imposing an

enhanced sentence under the Youthful Offender Act. "The intent of the legislature should be derived from the plain language of the statute in question." State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994, 997 (Fla. 1990). A plain- 5 - reading of section 958.14 leads to the conclusion that the sent encing limitations contained in section 958.04, which preclude sentencing enhancem ents, do not apply to a sentence imposed after a substantive violation of probation o r community control. Section 958.14 states that a violation of probation shall subje ct the youthful offender to sentencing under the general violation statute, section 948.06, which states that on revocation of probation or comm unity control the court "shall . . . impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the proba tioner on probation or the offender into community control." § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). This language is mandatory. Although youthful offenders who commit technical violations of probation or community control retain the benefit of the six-year sentenc ing cap, youthful offenders who commit a substantive violation may be sentenced t o "the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty." § 958.14. A defendant's maximum exposure in a criminal case is controlled by the chargi ng document. Yegge was charged with armed burglary and the information alleged tha t he was armed or became armed with a firearm. After Yegge pleaded guilty to arm ed burglary, his maximum sentence was controlled by sections 810.02(2)(b) and 77 5.087(2)(a)(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2002), and the guidelines in effect at the ti me of his offense. Once a youthful offender violates probation, he is sentenced according to section 958.14, which states that a youthful offender who commits a substantive viola tion is exposed to the maximum sentence for his original offense. A defendant's maxim um sentence for his original offense necessarily i ncludes any enhancements for whic h he qualifies. See Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 750 (Fla. 2010) ("We thus c onclude that under- 6 - section 775.087(2)(a)(3), the trial court has discretion to imp ose a mandatory minimum within the range of twenty-five years to life. Consequently, w e conclude that Mendenhall was properly sentenced to thirty-five years with a t hirty-five-year mandatory minimum, notwithstanding the statutory maximum of thirty years contained in section 775.082 for Mendenhall's offense."); Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2 d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991) (explaining that the defendant's "maximum guideline sentence" i ncluded the section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1985), enhancement). Nothing in section 958.14 suggests that a sentence imposed after a s ubstantive violation is limite d by the other qualifiers of section 958.04. Imposing a mandatory minimum on a youthful off ender sentence does not equate with removing a defendant's youthful offender status

. Yegge, however, relies on State v. Arnette, 604 So. 2d 482 (Fla . 1992), for the proposition that "[u]nless the legislature clearly states o therwise, youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a cond ition of community control." Id. at 484. In Arnette, the Florida Supreme Court c onsidered the application of the six-year cap to a youthful offender who committed a substan tive violation of community control in 1984. In holding that the cap does apply to youthful offenders sentenced after a violation of probation or community control u nder the pre-1985 version of the statute, the court concluded that the 1985 amend ment was evidence of the legislature's prior intent "to limit penalties against yout hful offenders to six years." Id. The Arnette decision does not address the application of m andatory minimums to youthful offender sentences and is thus limited to the applicat ion of the sentencing cap; as noted above, in 1990 the legislature amended that cap to app ly to technical- 7 - violations only. Arnette simpl y does not support application o f the sentencing limitations of section 958.04 to a youthful offender following a substantiv e violation of probation. We recognize that the Fourth District has expressed a view cont rary to ours and held that drug trafficking mandatory minimum sentences cannot be imposed on a youthful offender who substantively violates probation. S ee Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785, 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ("Because [the defendant] m aintains his youthful offender status, the minimum mandatory penalties do not apply." ). To support its holding, the Fourth District cited Mendez v. State, 835 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), and Jones v. State, 588 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). However , both Mendez and Jones address initial youthful offender sentencing under sectio n 958.04, not postviolation sentencing under section 958.14. Moreover, in Go ldwire v. State, 73 So. 3d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), the Fourth District held that the t rial court has discretion to impose a non-youthful offender sentence after a substantive vio lation of probation and specifically noted that "the trial court is not required to imp ose the minimum mandatory sentence, but instead, is able to do so when exercising its dis cretion, dependent upon

the circumstances of the case." Id. at 846. Similarly, the special concurrence relies on State v. Wooten, 7 82 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), to support its conclusion that Yegge's youthful offender designation "trumped the otherwise mandatory 10/20/Life statute and removed the possibility of enhancing his sentence with a ten-year minimum m andatory." However,

because the issue in Wooten was whether the 10/20/Life Statute could be applied to a youthful offender's initial sentence, its reasoning is not rele vant to Yegge's appeal from a postviolation sentence. Section 958.14 does not extend the s entencing limitations of- 8 - section 958.04 to youthful offenders who substantively violate supervision. This follows from our understanding that youthful offenders do not receive t he benefit of the sentencing cap based on being repeat offenders. In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to impose the mandatory minimum sentence for Yegge's armed burglary offense a fter he committed a substantive violation of probation. We agree with the analysis in Goldwire. To the extent that our decision conflicts with Blacker, we certify con flict.

Affirmed.

WALLACE and CRENSH AW, JJ., Concur. DAVIS, CHARLES A., SENIOR JUDGE, Concurs specially with opinion

.- 9 - DAVIS, Senior Judge, Specially concurring. Because in Yegge v. State, 88 So. 3d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla. 2d D CA 2012), this court held that Yegge's ten-year sentence—including the 10 /20/Life minimum mandatory enhancement—is legal, I must concur with the majority opinion. However, it is my opinion that because Yegge maintained his youthful offend er status when he was resentenced on remand, the 10/20 /Life sentencing enhancement st atute, section 775.087(2), does not apply to this new sentence. 1 Accordingly, it is my belief that this court should recede from Yegge, 88 So. 3d 1058, reverse Yegge's sentence, and

remand this case with instruc tions that Yegge be resentenced as a youthful offender to a term within the statutory maximum that does not include the 1 0/20/Life enhancement.

When this court reversed the de nial of Yegge's rule 3.800(a) motion, we concluded "that the sentencing court must maintain the defendan t's youthful offender status upon resentencing for a violation of probation even when the violation [i]s substantive." Yegge, 88 So. 3d at 1059-60. However, this cour t denied Yegge's additionally requested relief regarding the minimum mandatory e nhancement to Yegge's sentence, observing that "[a] youthful offender who commits a s ubstantive violation of probation can be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowable fo r the original offense" and that "the six-year limitation applicable to youthf ul offender sentences no longer applies." Id. at 1059 (emphasis omitted) (citing § 958. 14, Fla. Stat. (2007), which provides that "no youthful offender shall be committed to the c ustody of the department

1 See generally Young v. State, 86 So. 3d 541, 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 2 012) (recognizing section 775.087(2) to be an enhancement statute by noting that "in order for a court to enhance a defendant's sentence based on section 775.087(2), the grounds for the enhancement must be clearly charged in the info rmation").- 10 - for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximu m sentence for the

offense for which he or she was found guilty"). Accordingly, t his court concluded that

because the maximum sentence for armed burglary under section 8 10.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), is life and the six-year cap for the originall y imposed youthful offender sentence under section 958.04 no longer applied, Yegge's ten-ye ar sentence, including the minimum mandatory designation, was within the allowable sen tencing range and was legal. 88 So. 3d at 1059. This court did not, however, sp ecifically consider that imposing the minimum mandatory against Yegge required the addit ional application of the 10/20/Life sentencing enhancement to a youthful offender se ntence. Instead, we reversed the postconviction court's order and remanded solely " for amendment of Yegge's sentence to reflect his youthful offender classificatio n." Id. at 1060. On remand, the trial court resentenced Yegge by reinstating h is youthful offender status and leaving his ten-year sentence, including th e 10/20/Life minimum mandatory enhancement, intact. Although this is in keeping wit h the holding of Yegge, I

conclude that such constitutes an illegal sentence because 10/2 0/Life sentencing enhancements do not apply to youthful offender sentences. Initially, I note that this c ourt has held that sentencing en hancements pursuant to section 775.087(2) do not apply to youthful offende r sentences at the time of original sentencing. In Wooten, 782 So. 2d 408, the State c hallenged Wooten's sentence on direct appeal, arguing that the trial court erred i n not applying the 10/20/Life enhancement to the youthful offender sentence impose d. This court affirmed, concluding that "the 10/20/Life statute contains no l anguage to supersede the youthful offender sentence and . . . that minimum mandatory sen tencing is not- 11 - applicable when one is sentenced as a youthful offender." Id. at 410. Admittedly, Wooten is factually distinguis hable from the instant case in th at there the State was challenging Wooten's original youthful offender sentence rather than a sentence imposed after a substantive violation of probation. However, t he clear holding of the Wooten opinion is that the 10/20/Life enhancement statute does not apply to the original sentence imposed under the Youthf ul Offender Act. The question before this court in the instant appeal is whether an individual's retention of yout hful offender status after a substantive violation of supervision likewise prohibits imposit ion of the 10/20/Life minimum mandatory. And I conclude that it should. In doing so, I disagree with th e majority's reasoning in thre e ways. First, the majority dismisses the reasoning in Arnette, 604 So. 2d 482 , as limited only to the application of the six-year sent encing cap to resentencing of y outhful offenders following a substantive violation of supervision. The majority concludes that Arnette has no application here because the legislature amended the cap in 199 0, limiting it to technical violations only. I do recognize that Arnette arose in a differ ent posture than the instant case, but I nevertheless find its reasoning instructive. In that case, at Arnette's original sentencing in 1981 on a c harge of burglary, the trial court designated him to be a youthful offen der and imposed a split sentence of four years' prison and two years' community control . He then violated the conditions of his community control in 1984, and the sentencing court resentenced him to life in prison. The Fifth District vacated the life sentenc e, concluding that it was illegal. Arnette v. State, 566 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). On review, the Florida Supreme Court noted that at the time of Arnette's resen tencing,- 12 - section 958.14, Florida Statues (1983), read: "A violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthf ul offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1)." Subsection 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provided that, if com munity control is revoked because of a violation, the court may "impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer or offender on probation or into community control." Thus, we must deter mine what sentence the trial judge could have imposed on Arnette originally. 604 So. 2d at 483. In answering that question, the supreme cou rt specifically addressed a 1985 amendment to section 958.14 by which the legis lature added the provision that "no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for such violation for a period longer than [six] years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less." See 604 So. 2d at 484. The court interpreted this language to be "a declaration of [the legislature's] prior intent" and observed as follows: It has always been clear that the legislature intended to treat youthful offenders differently than adults. Unless th e legislature clearly states otherwise, youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of community control. Section 958.14 did not specifically authorize applying adult sanctions to a youthful offender, and now we perceive the legislature's intent to have been to limit penalties against youthful offenders to six years. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Fifth District to vacate Mr. Arnette's life sentence and "authorize[d] a total of six years' imprisonment."

Id. As the majority points out, in 1990, the legislature again am ended section 958.14, changing the second sentence of the statute to read as follows:- 13 - However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty . . . or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than [six] years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less . . . . I agree that this amendment establishes the legislature's int ent to remove the six-year cap for youthful offender sentences following subs tantive violations of probation. But the balance of the section was left unchanged. Therefore, both the pre1990 version of section 958.14—which was at issue in Arnette—an d the post-1990

version of section 958.14—at issue here—state in the first sent ence that "[a] violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community cont rol program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1)." In Arnette, the supreme court concluded that this language in section 958.14 should not be considered as the legislature's statement that every conceivable

adult sanction should be availabl e upon resentencing youthful o ffenders for violations of probation without limitation. 604 So. 2d at 484 ("Section 958. 14 did not specifically authorize applying adult sanctions to a youthful offender."). And although subsequent amendments have expanded the range of postviolation youthful of fender sentencing options beyond those available u nder the version of section 958 .14 applicable in Arnette, I see nothing in the post-Arnette amendments to sectio n 958.14 that changes

this conclusion or aut horizes the limitless application of sect ion 948.06(1) to youthful offender sentences following a substantive violation. The post -Arnette amendment merely altered the scope of the youthful offender limitations a ccording to the- 14 - seriousness of the violation of supervision. Accordingly, I co nclude that Arnette applies and supports a reversal in this case. I also disagree with the majority's assessment that the first line of section 958.14 is an "unqualified" directive that upon a substantive vi olation of supervision youthful offenders are to be resentenced only pursuant to secti on 948.06(1). In my opinion, this language most certainly has been qualified—both b y case law requiring that a youthful offender designation be retained upon resentenc ing after a violation of probation, see, e.g., Vantine v. State, 66 So. 3d 350, 352 (Fla . 2d DCA 2011), and more pointedly by the second sentence of section 958.14, which requi res that "no youthful

offender shall be" resentenced "for a substantive violation for a period longer than the

maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty." (Emphasis added.) The first sentence of section 958.14 serves to sever t he restraints of the original youthful offender sentencing caps of section 958.04(2) , but the second sentence dictates the boundaries for resentencing after substan tive violation. It is the interpretation of the phrase "maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty" in the second sentence that b rings me to my final disagreement with the majority's opinion. The majority correct ly states that the youthful

offender who is found to have committed a substantive violation of supervision is subject to this section 958.14 language. But the majority then concludes that "a defendant's maximum exposure in a criminal case is controlled b y the charging document." (Emphasis added.) It is with this language that I disagree because "the maximum sentence for the offense" is not necessarily synonymous with "a defendant's- 15 - maximum exposure in a criminal case." 2 The maximum sentence for an offense is determined by the legislature via statute. But a defendant's m aximum exposure is determined by the statutory maximum sentence combined with othe r specific factors as related to the particular defendant or the specific circumstanc es of the commission of the offense. See, e.g., §§ 775.082(9)(a), .084, .087. In the instant case, Yegge was adjudicated guilty of an armed burglary, which carries a maximum sentence of life. Because Yegge's offe nse involved the use of a firearm, which is not an element of the offense, see § 810 .02(2)(b), absent any youthful offender considerations, his maximum exposure would ha ve included the mandatory 10/20/Life enhancement in addition to the statutory m aximum life sentence.

Under the circumstances of the in stant case, it is clear that t he statutory maximum and Yegge's maximum exposure were not the same. An examination of Yegge's original sentence illustrates why t his distinction is important. At the time of his original conviction and sente nce, the trial court's decision to sentence him as a youthful offender was discretionary. Once the trial court elected to

exercise its discretion and sent ence Yegge as a youthful offend er, that designation trumped the otherwise mandatory 10/20/Life statute and removed the possibility of enhancing his sentence with a ten-year minimum mandatory. See Bennett v. State, 24 So. 3d 693, 694 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); see also State v. Drury, 8 29 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). This is true, and in keeping with the holding of Wo oten, 782 So. 2d 408, because "[t]he youthful offender sentencing statute itself expr essly provides that the

2 I would also note that a defendant's maximum exposure is determ ined by the offenses adjudicated at the time of judgment rather than th ose charged in the information.- 16 - sentencing alternatives prescribed therein are [i]n lieu of oth er criminal penalties authorized by law." See Holmes v. State, 638 So. 2d 986, 987 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (second alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks o mitted). When Yegge then committed a substantive violation of his prob ation, pursuant to the second sentence of section 958.14, Yegge's new sentence could be no "longer than the maximum sentence for" armed burglary. Accordi ng to section 810.02(2), the trial court could have sentenced Yegge to life b ecause "[b]urglary is a felony of the first-degree, punishable by imprisonment for a te rm of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." (Emphasis added.) Although, section 810.02(2) makes reference to section 775.084, which sets forth sentencing enhancements for violent career criminals, hab itual felony offenders, and habitual violent felony offenders, the burglary statute con tains no additional reference to the availability of a minimum mandatory sentencing enhancement pursuant

to section 775.087. 3 As such, upon resentencing of Yegge, the trial court exceeded the scope of section 958.14 by imposing the 10/20/Life minimum mand atory enhancement to his ten-year sentence. Furthermore, in my opinion, the holdings in Mendenhall, 48 So . 3d at 750, and Lareau, 573 So. 2d at 815, which are cited by the majority to support its conclusion that the maximum sentence for the original offense includes 10/ 20/Life enhancements, are inapplicable to the instant c ase because they are distingui shable. First, neither Mendenhall nor Lareau was sentenced as a youthful offender, and the sentences at

3 Cf. Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107, 1115 (Fla. 2007) ("[W]e h ave applied the principle that the [l]egislature knows how to accomplish wh at it has omitted in a provision, in construing related statutes." (internal quotation marks omitted)).- 17 - issue in those cases were origi nal sentences, not ones imposed upon revocation of probation. Furthermore, the specific issue in Mendenhall was whether the mandated "minimum term of imprisonment of not less than [twenty-five] years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison" under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) gives the trial court the discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within the range of twenty-five years to life, even if that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of thirty years provided for under section 775.082(2)(c). 48 So. 3d at 745. That case in no way addressed whether sectio n 775.087(2) enhancements are part of the statutory maximum sentences a yout hful offender might face upon resentencing after a substantive violation of supervi sion. Lareau is also factually distinguishable because the three-yea r minimum mandatory applied in that case was part of a plea bargain to wh ich Lareau agreed. Additionally, Lareau addressed the application of section 775.0 87(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which is a reclassification statute. The "consequentia l enhancement of penalties" referred to in Lareau are increased penalties based on the reclassification of the degree of the offense. 573 So. 2d at 815. Such reclassifi cation is not an enhancement to the sentence like a 10/20/Life minimum mandatory , but rather it is an increase in the severity of the offense itself. Furthermore, r eclassification is not an issue in the instant appeal. Finally, the version of section 7 75.087 at issue in Lareau did

not include the 10/20/Life enhancements at issue here because t his provision was not enacted until 1999. See ch. 99-12, § 1, at 538-42, Laws of Fla

. Because this court is not receding from Yegge, 88 So. 3d 1058, I must concur in the result of the majority. However, for the reasons I have discussed, I would recede from this court's opinion in Yegge to the extent that it affirms the application of- 18 - the 10/20/Life sentencing enhancement to a youthful offender se ntence and would remand for resentencing of Yegge as a youthful offender to a te rm within the statutory

maximum but not to include the 10/20/Life enhancements. I would also note that the Fourth District has recently taken the contradictory position that upon resentencing for a substantive violation of supervision by a youthful offender, the trial court has the discretion to i mpose a non-youthful offender sentence, for which an of fense using a firearm would n ecessarily include the application of the 10/20/Life minimum mandatory enhancement. S ee Goldwire v. State, 73 So. 3d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). As such, in reversing to re cede from Yegge, I also would certify conflict with Goldwire, 73 So. 3d 844, on this is sue.