United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1289 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

ANGEL RUDIEL CRUZ-VÁZQUEZ, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges. 

Isabelle C. Oria-Calaf on brief for appellant. 

Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Nelson 

Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate 

Division, and Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United 

States Attorney, on brief for appellee. 

November 10, 2016 
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HOWARD, Chief Judge. This case concerns a challenge to 

the sentence imposed on Angel Rudiel Cruz-Vázquez ("Cruz") for 

unlawful possession of a fully-automatic firearm. Cruz challenges 

the reasonableness of his 36-month prison sentence. After careful 

consideration, we affirm. 

 

I. Background 

 Cruz pleaded guilty to possession of a machine gun in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) after law enforcement agents, 

conducting a traffic stop, recovered from his car a Glock pistol 

modified to shoot automatically.1 Although agents also found a 

bag containing drug paraphernalia and marijuana residue in the 

trunk of Cruz's vehicle, this detail was omitted from the plea 

agreement's stipulated version of the facts, and the drug evidence 

also went unmentioned in the PSR. 

 Under the terms of the plea agreement, the parties 

stipulated that Cruz's Base Offense Level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 

was 18 and that, after applying a three-level reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, his Total Offense Level was 15. The 

parties estimated that this Total Offense Level, coupled with a 

 1 Because Cruz pleaded guilty, our discussion of the facts is 

drawn from the plea agreement, the change-of-plea colloquy, the 

Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), and the transcript of 

the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Arroyo-Maldonado, 

791 F.3d 193, 196 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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Criminal History Category of I, would provide for a sentencing 

range of 18 to 24 months. The parties agreed not to seek any 

further guideline adjustments, departures, enhancements, 

reductions, or variances. Finally, the parties stipulated that 

while Cruz could request a sentence at the lower end of the 

applicable guideline range, the government reserved the right to 

argue for a sentence at the higher end. 

 Prior to the sentencing hearing, the government 

submitted a sentencing memorandum to the district court that, among 

other things, discussed the drug paraphernalia retrieved from 

Cruz's car and noted that "[t]he items recovered are consistent 

with what drug traffickers usually keep and use." When the judge 

mentioned the bag of drug paraphernalia at the sentencing hearing,

Cruz objected, as he had not admitted to owning, possessing, or 

previously seeing the bag. Ultimately, the district court stated 

that it would not consider the bag of drug paraphernalia when 

determining Cruz's sentence. 

 The sentencing court went on to make detailed and 

specific findings as to each of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors. While acknowledging potentially mitigating 

factors emphasized by Cruz, the district court also raised concerns 

about Cruz's offense, saying: 

[I]n Puerto Rico . . . [w]e have a record of shootings that 

is greater th[a]n the ones in the City of New York and 

Chicago. . . . [I]t is very clear why these types of guns 
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. . . have been prohibited and it is because of the potential 

to cause real and huge damages to innocent bystanders. I 

think this type of offense is having a dramatic effect on the 

community. You cannot argue that this [gun] can be used for 

personal defense . . . it is not a regular weapon, it is a 

machine gun. 

The judge concluded, "I think that because of this, these factors 

per se will allow for a variance." The district court subsequently 

imposed a 36-month incarcerative sentence. 

This appeal timely followed. 

II. Analysis 

On appeal, Cruz alleges both that the government 

violated the spirit of the plea agreement by bringing the bag of 

drug paraphernalia to the district court's attention and that the 

district court abused its discretion in deviating from the 

guideline range and imposing a 36-month incarcerative sentence. 

We take these claims in turn. 

A. Breach of the Plea Agreement 

Cruz argues, in effect, that the government violated the 

plea agreement by seeking an upward variance from the jointlystipulated Base Offense Level. Specifically, he accuses the 

government of implicitly "arguing for a four level increase as 

prescribed in [U.S.S.G. §] 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)," which applies if a 

defendant used or possessed a firearm in connection with another 
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felony offense, by including the information about drug 

paraphernalia in its sentencing memorandum. 

Whether the government has breached its plea agreement 

with Cruz presents a question of law, and our review is de novo. 

See United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 

2007). "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise 

or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part 

of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 

fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 

Prosecutors engaging in plea bargaining are held to "meticulous 

standards of both promise and performance" because such bargaining 

requires defendants to waive fundamental constitutional rights. 

United States v. Riggs, 287 F.3d 221, 224 (1st Cir. 2002). We 

prohibit not only explicit repudiation of the government's 

assurances but also end-runs around those assurances. RiveraRodriguez, 489 F.3d at 57; United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263, 

269 (1st Cir. 1992). 

Other cases may raise difficult questions about how to 

reconcile the prosecution's obligation to uphold any bargain made 

in a plea agreement with its duty to disclose information material 

to the district court's sentencing determinations. See United 

States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). Admittedly, these 

responsibilities can pull in different directions. Id. This case, 

however, does not implicate that tension. The district court 
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expressly stated that it would disregard the drug paraphernalia in 

calculating Cruz's sentence. In other words, any potential tension 

that the prosecution may have experienced in choosing to disclose 

the drug-paraphernalia information to the district court had no 

bearing on the sentence that Cruz received. 

The plea agreement expressly provided that the 

government could recommend a sentence at the high end of the 

guideline range. And this the government did. In both its 

sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing, the 

government specifically asked the district court to impose "[a] 

sentence of twenty-four (24) months imprisonment," one at "the 

upper end of the applicable guideline in this case." The record 

makes plain that the prosecution never explicitly or implicitly 

sought a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 

Having unequivocally stated that it was recommending a 

sentence at the higher end of the guideline range, the government 

was free to offer reasons supporting its recommendation. See 

Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d at 58 (finding no error where the 

government told the court that there were quantities of cocaine 

beyond the stipulated-to amount in the plea agreement). By 

statute, "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information 

concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person 

convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may 

receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
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sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3661. Thus, the sentencing court has a 

right to expect that the prosecutor will share all relevant facts. 

See Saxena, 229 F.3d at 6 (finding no error where the prosecutor 

shared information about the defendant's post-plea activities with 

the district court).

The government's obligation to provide relevant 

information to a sentencing court does not dissipate merely because 

the government assumes an obligation to adhere to commitments made 

under a plea agreement. Id. at 6. Rather, the obligations coexist 

and must both be discharged conscientiously. Id. Here, because 

the prosecutor adhered to the terms of the agreement with Cruz, we 

see no basis to vacate his sentence based on the alleged breach. 

B. Substantive Reasonableness 

Claims of sentencing error trigger a two-step inquiry: 

"we first determine whether the sentence imposed is procedurally 

reasonable and then determine whether it is substantively 

reasonable." United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 590 (1st 

Cir. 2011). As Cruz objects only to his sentence's substantive 

reasonableness, our review hews to the formula set out for 

substantive challenges. 

"The substantive reasonableness of [a] sentence is 

[typically] reviewed for abuse of discretion, taking into account 

the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Zavala-
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Marti, 715 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2013). Although Cruz did not 

object in the district court, for purposes of this appeal, we will 

assume, favorably to him, that our review is for abuse of 

discretion rather than for plain error.2 Cf. United States v. 

Nunez, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 6092692, at *4 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 

2016) (assuming without deciding that review is for abuse of 

discretion). Nevertheless, his claim fails. 

Cruz denigrates the district court's rationale because 

(in his view) the court inappropriately premised its sentencing 

determination on community-based factors, viz., gun violence in 

Puerto Rico. Although Cruz concedes that this is a permissible 

consideration at sentencing, he submits that the court erred by 

relying on it excessively. Thus, Cruz's argument amounts to a 

disagreement with the district court's weighing of the different 

sentencing factors. 

We discern no abuse of the sentencing court's broad 

discretion. Cf. United States v. Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d 193, 

201 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no error where the defendant sought 

to substitute his judgment for that of the sentencing court). We 

have repeatedly recognized that deterrence is an important factor 

 2 Although we have sometimes stated that a failure to object 

on substantive reasonableness grounds engenders plain error review 

on appeal, several of our recent cases have questioned the 

application of this standard. See, e.g., United States v. DiazArroyo, 797 F.3d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. RuizHuertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir. 2015). 
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in the sentencing calculus. United States v. Diaz-Arroyo, 797 

F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, as was done here, a sentencing 

court may consider the pervasiveness of similar crimes in the 

community when formulating its sentence. See id. Moreover, in 

determining Cruz's sentence, the district court considered all 

sentencing factors, adequately explained its sentence, and imposed 

a reasonable sentence in the totality of the circumstances. See 

Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d at 201; see also Clogston, 662 F.3d at 

592 ("There is no one reasonable sentence in any given case but, 

rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes."). 

Accordingly, the imposition of a 36-month sentence was not 

substantively unreasonable. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the reasons discussed above, the district court's 

sentence is affirmed.