IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-51151

In the Matter of: LISA ANN GALAZ 

 

 Debtor 

RAUL GALAZ, 

 Appellant 

v. 

LISA ANN GALAZ, 

 Appellee 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 5:15-CV-349 

Before WIENER, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Raul and Lisa Ann Galaz divorced in 2002. The divorce decree required 

Lisa to maintain health insurance for her and Raul’s children, pay the 

premiums required to maintain that insurance, and pay certain medical 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fif h Circuit

FILED

December 12, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

2 

expenses not covered by insurance. Initially, Lisa complied with the divorce 

decree. In December 2007, however, she filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. And

in January 2008, she ceased making payments for the children’s health 

insurance and other medical expenses. 

In 2009, Raul brought an action against Lisa in state court seeking 

unpaid child support expenses. The parties submitted to binding arbitration. 

Raul was ultimately awarded $6,727.00 “for child support arrearage” plus 

$3,000.00 for attorney’s fees, amounting to a total award of $9,727.00. The 

state court entered this order (the “2009 Order”) on November 17, 2009. Raul 

then moved for the bankruptcy court to direct payment to him from the 

bankruptcy estate under the 2009 Order. Lisa responded that this amount 

should be offset against any judgment that she might obtain in her pending 

adversarial proceeding against Raul. See Galaz v. Galaz (In re Galaz I), 480 F. 

App’x 790, 792 (5th Cir. 2012). The adversarial proceeding concerned Raul’s 

fraudulent transfer of assets from a company—that Lisa partially owned—to 

Segundo Suenos, LLC, a company controlled by Raul and his father (the 

“Segundo proceeding”). See Galaz v. Galaz (In re Galaz II), 765 F.3d 426, 428-

29 (5th Cir. 2014). The district court took the matter under advisement, and

Raul later renewed his motion to direct payment. Id. The bankruptcy court 

denied the renewed motion, explaining that if Lisa was successful in her 

adversary claim, Raul’s claim could be offset against the damages that she 

might recover. Raul appealed that decision to the district court and this court, 

both of which affirmed. See In re Galaz I, 480 F. App’x at 791. 

On November 17, 2011, the state court entered a second order (the “2011 

Order”) requiring, among other things, that Lisa pay half of her daughter’s 

future medical premiums and unreimbursed medical costs until she reached 

the age of majority. 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

3 

Ultimately, Lisa was successful in the Segundo proceeding. The 

bankruptcy court awarded her $241,309.10 in actual damages and $250,000.00 

in exemplary damages. See In re Galaz II, 765 F.3d at 429. Raul appealed. 

While the Segundo proceeding was being appealed, Lisa completed the terms 

of her Chapter 13 plan and was granted a discharge in January 2012. The 

district court affirmed Lisa’s judgment in the Segundo proceeding. But this 

court vacated the bankruptcy court’s judgment because the bankruptcy court 

did not have authority to enter a final judgment on a “non-core” bankruptcy 

proceeding. In re Galaz II, 765 F.3d at 432-34. Thus, this court remanded the 

Segundo proceeding so that the district court could refer the case to the 

bankruptcy court for proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 

434. On January 23, 2015, the bankruptcy court issued its proposed findings 

of fact and conclusions of law in the Segundo proceeding, recommending that 

judgment be entered in favor of Lisa for $491,309.10. The district court adopted 

the bankruptcy court’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 

entered judgment in Lisa’s favor. Raul again appealed to this court. Galaz v. 

Galaz (In re Galaz III), No. 15-51194.1 

On February 24, 2015, Raul moved in state court to enforce the 2009 and 

2011 Orders, seeking $9,727.00 and $1,429.00, respectively. Raul alleged, 

among other things, that Lisa failed to make the regular medical premium 

payments and expense reimbursements required by the 2011 Order, which as 

of filing amounted to $1,429.00. In response, Lisa filed a Motion to Enforce 

Stay or Prior Order in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court entered an 

order preliminarily enjoining Raul from collecting the child support obligations 

in the state court proceeding, finding that Lisa had a right to offset the amount 

owed under the 2009 and 2011 Orders against any potential judgment in Lisa’s 

 

1 As of 7/20/16, briefing is still ongoing in this appeal. 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

4 

favor in the Segundo proceeding. The preliminary injunction would 

automatically dissolve if the Segundo proceeding did not result in an award to 

Lisa exceeding $11,156.00, so that Raul could pursue enforcement and 

collection in state court. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 

order, noting that the district court had entered judgment in favor of Lisa for 

$491,309.10, and therefore “Raul’s judgment against Lisa in the amount of

$11,156.00 may now operate as a setoff against the damages awarded to Lisa 

in that judgment.” Raul filed this appeal, arguing that the bankruptcy court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin him from enforcing his orders and, 

alternatively, that the child support obligations arising from the 2009 and 2011 

Orders are ineligible for setoff against the Segundo judgment. 

I. 

 “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law which we review de 

novo.” In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2008). “In reviewing the 

rulings of the bankruptcy court, this court applies the same standards of 

review as applied by the district court.” In re ASARCO, LLC., 702 F.3d 250, 

257 (5th Cir. 2012). “In conducting this review, we analyze the legal 

conclusions that guided the awarding court’s determinations de novo and that 

court’s findings of fact for clear error.” Id. (emphasis added). 

II. 

Raul argues that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

to enjoin him from taking action in state court on the 2009 and 2011 Orders

because Lisa’s bankruptcy estate had been closed for nearly three years when 

he filed his state court action in 2015. Alternatively, Raul argues that if the 

bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, offsetting the child support award is 

improper because Texas law does not allow offset against child support 

obligations and because the obligations lack mutuality. Lisa counters that the 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

5 

district court had either arising under, arising in, or related to jurisdiction, and 

that Raul waived his offset arguments. 

“Bankruptcy courts find their source of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 

and 1334.” In re Baker, 593 F. App’x 416, 417 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished). 

Section 1334(a)-(b) confers to district courts “original and exclusive 

jurisdiction” over “all cases under title 11” and “original but not exclusive 

jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or 

related to cases under title 11.” Section 157 provides for the referral of certain 

cases from district courts to bankruptcy courts. In re Baker, 593 F. App’x at 

417 n.2. 

Proceedings “‘arising under title 11’ . . . describe those proceedings that 

involve a cause of action created or determined by a statutory provision of title 

11.” In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1987). “‘[A]rising in’ proceedings . . . 

[refer] to those ‘administrative’ matters that arise only in bankruptcy cases. In 

other words, ‘arising in’ proceedings are those that are not based on any right 

expressly created by title 11, but nevertheless, would have no existence outside 

of the bankruptcy.” Id. at 97. A matter is related to a bankruptcy proceeding if

“the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate 

being administered in bankruptcy.” Id. at 93 (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 

743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).

To decide whether the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin Raul from 

enforcing his 2009 and 2011 Orders, we must decide if this dispute arises 

under, arises in, or relates to Lisa’s bankruptcy proceeding. We address the 

2009 and 2011 Orders in turn. 

A. 2009 Order 

Raul’s arguments that the bankruptcy court had no subject matter 

jurisdiction to enjoin him from seeking to enforce his 2009 Order in state court 

are meritless. He contends that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

6 

because Lisa’s plan had been confirmed, fully implemented, and executed by 

2012. Raul maintains that “[a]fter a debtor’s reorganization plan has been 

confirmed, the debtor’s estate, and thus bankruptcy jurisdiction, ceases to 

exist, other than for matters pertaining to the implementation or execution of 

the plan.” In re Baker, 593 F. App’x at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Craig’s Stores of Tex., Inc. v. Bank of La., 266 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 2001)). 

According to Raul, because the estate was fully administered when he filed his 

state court action in 2015, this matter does not pertain to the implementation 

or execution of Lisa’s plan, and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

issue the injunction. 

But Raul’s argument ignores the fact that “a bankruptcy court plainly 

ha[s] jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its own prior orders.” Id. (alteration 

in original) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 151 (2009)).

Here, Raul previously moved for the bankruptcy court to direct payment to him 

for the amount owed under the 2009 Order. The bankruptcy court denied this 

motion, acknowledging that Raul could offset this amount against any 

judgment that Lisa obtained in the Segundo proceeding. The district court and 

this court affirmed. See In re Galaz I, 480 F. App’x at 791. To allow Raul to 

enforce his 2009 Order in state court now, outside of the proceeding where he 

was ordered to pursue such enforcement (i.e., the Segundo proceeding), would 

create an end run around the bankruptcy court’s previous ruling.2 The 

bankruptcy court’s injunction was necessary to enforce its previous order. See 

In re Nat’l Ass’n of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), 333 F. App’x 822, 

827 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (“A final decree closing the case after the 

 

2 Raul’s contention that the original bankruptcy court order did not prevent him from 

enforcing the child-support obligations against non-bankruptcy assets or collecting the child 

support outside of the bankruptcy process is misguided. Raul is merely attempting to 

collaterally attack the bankruptcy court’s previous order. 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

7 

estate is fully administered does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to enforce 

or interpret its own orders.” (quoting In re 350 Encinitas Invs., LLC, 313 F. 

App’x 70, 72 (9th Cir. 2009))). Even though the estate had been fully

administered, the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction regarding 

the child support claims from the 2009 Order because it needed to enforce its 

previous order.3

Raul’s arguments that Texas law does not allow offset against child 

support obligations and that the obligations here lack mutuality also fail. Raul 

did not timely raise these arguments before the bankruptcy court. See Galaz I, 

480 F. App’x 790 at 792-94 (holding that Raul had waived his mutuality 

argument by failing to raise it in the bankruptcy court); see also In re OCA, 

Inc., 552 F.3d 413, 424 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Since this issue was not properly 

presented to the bankruptcy court, it cannot be raised now for the first time on 

appeal.”). Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in enjoining Raul from 

enforcing his 2009 Order in state court.4 

B. 2011 Order 

Conversely, Raul’s arguments that the bankruptcy court had no subject 

matter jurisdiction to enjoin him from seeking to enforce his 2011 Order in 

state court have merit. Raul again points out that Lisa’s bankruptcy case 

closed when she was granted a discharge in January 2012. But here, he argues 

 

3 Cabining this exercise of jurisdiction under § 1334(b)’s arising under, arising in, or 

related to framework is not without its challenges. Nevertheless, this exercise of jurisdiction 

falls within the “arising in” framework because this issue would not have arisen absent Lisa’s 

bankruptcy case. See Lothian Cassidy, LLC v. Lothian Expl. & Dev. II, L.P., 487 B.R. 158, 

162 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“‘Arising in’ claims may include [m]atters involving the enforcement or 

construction of a bankruptcy court order . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4 Raul contends that both the bankruptcy court and the district court failed to apply 

the $9,727.00 offset to the judgment obtained by Lisa against him in the Segundo proceeding. 

He contends that this obligation still exists. Lisa counters that Raul chose not to assert his 

claim to offset. Because this panel will not decide the merits of In re Galaz III, No. 15-51194, 

we defer to that panel to decide the issue. 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

8 

that because the bankruptcy court never previously considered the 2011 Order, 

it had no jurisdiction to enjoin him from enforcing this order in state court. 

Again, we must determine whether the bankruptcy court’s action falls 

within arising under, arising in, or related to jurisdiction. Because this action 

by the bankruptcy court was not “created or determined by a statutory 

provision of title 11,” it does not fall within arising under jurisdiction. In re 

Wood, 825 F.2d at 96. Likewise, arising in jurisdiction is inapplicable here 

because, unlike the 2009 Order, the bankruptcy court has no prior order to 

enforce with respect to the 2011 Order. Thus, the bankruptcy court cannot rely 

on its authority to enforce its prior order to exercise jurisdiction. Similarly, 

related to jurisdiction is inapplicable. 

As explained above, a matter is related to a bankruptcy proceeding when

“the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate 

being administered in bankruptcy.” Id. (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 

F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). After confirmation of the bankruptcy plan,

however, this circuit has adopted a “more exacting theory of post-confirmation 

bankruptcy jurisdiction.” In re Craig’s Stores of Tex., Inc., 266 F.3d 388, 391 

(5th Cir. 2001). “After a debtor’s reorganization plan has been confirmed, the 

debtor’s estate, and thus bankruptcy jurisdiction, cease to exist, other than for 

matters pertaining to the implementation or execution of the plan.” Id. at 390.

Here, the child support obligations under the 2011 Order began to accrue in 

December 2011 and each month thereafter. Lisa’s bankruptcy plan was 

confirmed in 2008, and the bankruptcy case was closed in 2012. Clearly, the 

obligations under the 2011 Order, nearly all of which arose after her 

bankruptcy case was closed, did not pertain to the implementation or execution 

of her bankruptcy plan. Even if we applied the less exacting pre-conformation 

approach to related to jurisdiction, whether Raul is successful in proving that 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/12/2016
No. 15-51151

9 

Lisa owes him money under the 2011 Order would have no conceivable effect 

on Lisa’s bankruptcy estate. 

Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Raul from seeking 

to enforce Lisa’s obligations under the 2011 Order.

III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and 

REMAND to the district court. 

 Case: 15-51151 Document: 00513792256 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/12/2016