vdecMAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2023 ME	43

Docket: Wal-22-298

Argued: May	10,	2023

Decided: August	3,	2023

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS, and	DOUGLAS, JJ.

UPSTREAM	WATCH

v.

CITY	OF	BELFAST et	al.

JABAR,	J.

[¶1]	 Upstream Watch	 (Upstream) appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	

Superior	Court	(Waldo	County,	R.	Murray,	J.) affirming	the	Belfast	Zoning	Board	

of	Appeals’ (ZBA) decision	dismissing	Upstream’s	appeal	on	the	grounds that	

Upstream	 did	 not	 have	 standing	 to	 appeal	 the	 Belfast	 Planning	 Board’s

(Planning	Board)	decision issuing five	permits to	Nordic	Aquafarms	(Nordic).		

We	conclude	 that the	 ZBA	erred	as	a	matter	 of	law	when	it	determined	 that	

Upstream	did	not	have	standing	to	appeal. We	vacate the	judgment	and	remand	

the	case	to	the	Superior	Court	with	instructions	to	remand	the	case	to	the	ZBA.

1

1	 	We	 note	 that	 although	 this	 case	is	 closely	 related	 to	 our	 recent	 decision	in	Mabee	 v.	Nordic	

Aquafarms	Inc., 2023	ME	15,	290	A.3d	79,	the	permits	at	issue	here	are	distinct	from	those	at	issue	in	

Mabee.		While	our	decision	in	Mabee may	have	an	effect	on	the	ultimate	viability	of	the	permits	at	

issue	here,	our	ruling	today	relates	only	to	a	threshold	standing	issue.		We	remand	the	matter	to	the	
2

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		The following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	administrative	record	before	

the	 ZBA,	 the	 municipal	 body	 that	 issued	 the	 decision we	 now	 review.	 	 See	

Friends	of	Lamoine	v.	Town	of Lamoine,	2020	ME	70,	¶	2,	234	A.3d	214.		

[¶3]	 	 Upstream is	 a	 not-for-profit	 corporation registered	 to	 transact	

business	 in	 Maine, with	 its	 principal	 place	 of	 business	 in	 Belfast, that	 is	

dedicated	to	the	restoration	of	Maine	mid-coast	rivers	and	streams,	including	

the	 Little	 River	 in	 Belfast, to	 their	 natural	 habitats.	 	 Nordic	 is	 a	 Delaware	

corporation	 that has	 proposed	 a	 land-based salmon aquaculture	 project	 in	

Belfast at	a	site	where	U.S.	Route	1	crosses	the	Little	River.		On	June 11,	2019,	

in	 furtherance	 of	 the	 project,	 Nordic	 submitted	 applications	 to	 the	 Planning	

Board for	(1)	a	site	plan	permit,	(2) a	zoning	use	permit,	(3)	a	shoreland zoning	

permit,	(4)	a	significant	groundwater	wells	permit,	and	(5) a	significant	water	

intake and	significant	water	discharge/outfall	pipes	permit.		

[¶4]		After Nordic	submitted	its	permit	applications,	the	Planning	Board	

issued	 a	 procedural	 order	 requiring	 any person or	 entity who	wanted	 to	 be	

included	as	a	“Party-in-Interest”	to	file	a	written	statement	with	the	Planning	

ZBA	to	address	the	merits	of	the permits, and we	leave	it	to	the	ZBA	to	address	the	impact of	our	

decision	in	Mabee.
3

Board	on	or	before	July	30,	2019.		The	procedural	order	required	the	written	

statement	 to	 demonstrate,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 the	 person	 or	 entity	 owned	 land	

directly	 or	 indirectly	 affected	 by	 the	 project	 and	 would	 suffer a	“particular	

injury” distinct	from	the	public	because	of	the	project.		Upstream filed	a	written	

statement	which	demonstrated	how	it	was	affected	by	the	project	by	explaining	

its	 purpose,	 listing	 its	 members	 whose	 property	 abutted	 the	 project,	 and	

describing	the	conservation	easement	over	the	intertidal	land	owned	by	other	

Upstream	members	that	would	be	directly	affected	by	the	project.2		Based	on	

this	written	statement,	the	Planning	Board	granted	Upstream	party-in-interest	

status.		

[¶5]		Between	June	2019	and	December	2020,	the	Planning	Board	held	

twenty-two	 public	 hearings	 and	 thirty-nine	 public	 meetings	 on	 the	 project.		

Upstream	 participated	 in	 approximately	 twenty-two	 of	 these	 proceedings,	

expressing	its opposition	to	the	project.		At	the	Planning	Board	proceedings,	a	

representative	 for	 Upstream	 and	 several	 of Upstream’s members	 testified,

expressing	concerns	about the	impact	of	emissions from	the	project,	the	odors	

and	 sounds	 from	 the	 project,	 the	 visual	 impact	 of	 the	 project	 on	 members’	

2		We	adjudicated	 the	issues	surrounding	the	conservation	easement	and	 the	ownership	of	 the	

intertidal	lands	in	Mabee, 2023	ME	15,	290	A.3d	79.
4

enjoyment	of	the	environment,	the	project’s	impact	on	the	environment	itself,	

the	project’s	impact	 on	 traffic,	and	the	project’s	impact	 on	groundwater	and	

freshwater	 supplies.	 	 On	 December	 22,	 2020,	 the	 Planning	 Board	 voted	 to	

approve	Nordic’s	permit applications.		On	January	20,	2021,	Upstream	timely	

appealed	 the	 Planning	 Board’s	 decision	 to	 the	 ZBA.	 	 See	 Belfast, Me., Code	

§ 102-134(a) (Dec. 7,	2004).

[¶6]		As	required	by	the	Belfast	Code	of	Ordinances	Land	Use	Regulations	

Ordinance	 (Ordinance), Upstream	 completed	 the	 two-page	

application-to-appeal	form	to	the	ZBA.		Id.		A	small	space	is	provided	on	the	first	

page	 for	the	applicant	to	describe	the	decision being	appealed,	the	name	and	

mailing	 address	 of	 the	 appealing	 party,	 and	 the	 type	 of	 review	 the	 party	 is	

requesting	 from	 the	 ZBA.	 	 The	 second	 page	 provides	 a	 list	 of	 prompts	 to	

describe	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 appeal	 and	 includes	 a	 few	 lines	 of	 blank	 space	

underneath	each	prompt.		The	first	prompt	reads,	“Describe	why	you	believe	

you	have ‘standing’	to	file	an	appeal.”		Upstream	answered:	

Upstream	 Watch	 was	 qualified	 by	 the	 planning	 board	 as	 an	

“interested	 party” and	 participated	 fully	 in	 the	 planning	 board	

proceedings.	 	 Upstream	 Watch	 was	 formed	 to	 restore	 the	 Little	

River	that	abuts	the	project.		Volunteers	use	the	trails,	the	bay	and	

the	river.
5

[¶7]	 	 At	 the	 ZBA’s	 first	 hearing	 on	 Upstream’s	 appeal,	 a	 ZBA	 board	

member	 questioned	 whether	 Upstream	 had	 standing	 to	 appeal. Upstream’s	

attorney	 explained	 to	 the	 ZBA	 the	 process	 the	 Planning	 Board	 used	 to	

determine	 who	 qualified	 as	 parties-in-interest,	 referencing	 the	 Planning	

Board’s	 procedural	 order.	 	 Upstream’s	 attorney	 further	 explained	 that	 Good	

Karma	Farm,	owned	by	two	Upstream	members,	is	located	about	600	feet	from	

the	 project	 and	 may	 suffer	 potential	 injuries	 associated	 with	 monitoring	 its

private	 wells	 and being	 forced	 to	 respond	 to	 any	 negative	 impacts	 to	

groundwater	 quality	 resulting	 from	 the	 project.	 	 The	 ZBA	 requested	 that	

Upstream	and	Nordic	submit	briefs	on	the	issue.		

[¶8]	 	 Both	 parties	 submitted	 briefs,	 and	 Upstream	 included	 affidavits	

from	 three	 of	 its	 members	 describing	 the	 potential	 injuries	 they	 may	

experience	 due	 to	 the	 project.	 	 Upstream’s	 brief	 and	 affidavits	 were	 dated	

February	25,	2021,	more	than	thirty	days	after	the	appeals	period,	see	Belfast,	

Me.,	Code § 102-134(a),

3 which	had	ended	 January 21,	2021.		The	ZBA	heard	

arguments from	both	parties.		

3		Belfast, Me., Code	§	102-134(a) (Dec.	7,	2004)	provides	that	“[a]n	administrative	appeal	shall	be	

taken	within	30	calendar	days	from	the	vote	taken	by	the	board	from	which	a party	is	aggrieved	or	

the	written	decision	of	the	code	enforcement	officer.”		
6

[¶9]		After	the	arguments,	the	same	member	of	the	ZBA	who	raised	the	

initial	 concern	 about	 Upstream’s	 standing	 to	 appeal	 asked	 whether	 the	 ZBA	

could	 consider	 information submitted after	 the	 thirty-day	 filing	 deadline.		

While	 the	 affidavits	 submitted	 with	 the	 brief	 had	 been	 timely	 filed	 with	 the	

supplemental	brief in	accordance	with	the	ZBA’s	request,	they	did	fall	outside	

the	 original	 thirty-day	window	 to	 file	an	appeal.		Id. The	ZBA	determined	it	

should	 confine	 its	 review,	 and	 did	 confine	 its	 review, to	 Upstream’s	

application-to-appeal form to	determine	whether	Upstream	had	standing.		The	

ZBA	 ultimately	 determined	 that	 Upstream had	 not	 demonstrated	 a	

particularized	injury	sufficient	to	establish	standing	and	dismissed	Upstream’s	

appeal.		

[¶10]	 	 Following	 the	 dismissal	 of	 its	 appeal,	 Upstream	 filed	 with	 the	

Superior	Court	a	complaint	for	judicial	review	pursuant	to	Maine	Rule	of Civil	

Procedure 80B.		The	court	dismissed	Upstream’s	complaint,	holding	 that	the	

ZBA	did	not	err	when	it	determined	that	Upstream	had	failed	to	demonstrate	

administrative	 standing	 and	 therefore,	 Upstream	 failed	 to	 exhaust	 its	

administrative	 remedies	because	it	 did	 not	 file a	 cognizable	 appeal	with	 the	

ZBA.		Upstream	timely	appealed.		M.R.	App.	P.	2B(a),	(c)(1).
7

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶11]		We	are	faced	with	two	issues:	(1)	whether	the	ZBA	erred	when	it	

confined	 its	 review	 of	 whether	 Upstream	 had	 standing	 to	 the	 information	

contained	 on	 the	 application-to-appeal form	 and	 (2)	whether, reviewing	 the	

entire	record	from	 the	Planning	Board, Upstream	had	standing	 to	appeal	 the	

Planning	Board’s	decision.4		

A. Standard	of	Review

[¶12]		“When	the	Superior	Court	acts	as	an	intermediate	court	of	appeals,	

we	 review	 directly	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 tribunal	 of	 original	 jurisdiction.”		

Nergaard	v.	Town	of	Westport	Island,	2009	ME	56,	¶	11,	973	A.2d	735.		Because	

the	question	of	whether	a	party	has	standing	to	bring	an	administrative	appeal	

depends	on	 the	language	of	 the	governing	ordinance,	we must	interpret	and	

apply	the	relevant	sections	of	the	Ordinance.		Id. ¶	12.

[¶13]		We review	the	interpretation	of	an	ordinance	de	novo,	id.,	but	will	

“accord	 substantial	 deference	 to	 the	 [tribunal	 of	 original	 jurisdiction’s]

characterizations	 and	 fact-findings	 as	 to	 what	 meets	 ordinance	 standards,”	

4		Upstream	also	contends	that	it	was	denied	due	process	by	the	ZBA’s	proceedings	and that	the	

ZBA	failed	to	make	specific	findings of	fact and	conclusions of	law.		Because	we	conclude	that	the	ZBA	

erred	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law	 due	 to	 its	 confined	 review, we	 need not	 reach	 Upstream’s	 additional	

arguments.		See State	v.	Boilard,	488	A.2d	1380,	1386	(Me.	1985)(declining	to	reach	additional	claims	

after	reaching	a	dispositive	conclusion	on	different	grounds).
8

Bizier	 v.	 Town	 of	 Turner,	 2011	ME	 116,	 ¶ 8,	 32	A.3d	 1048 (quotation	marks	

omitted). We examine	“the	plain	meaning	of	the	language	of	the	ordinance,	and	

we	construe	its	terms	reasonably	in	light	of	the	purposes	and	objectives	of	the	

ordinance	and	its	general	structure,” Stewart	v.	Town	of	Sedgwick,	2002	ME	81,	

¶	 6,	 797	 A.2d	 27,	 “to	 avoid	 absurd	 or	 illogical	 results,” Olson	 v.	 Town	 of	

Yarmouth,	2018	ME	27,	¶	16,	179	A.3d	920.			

B. ZBA	Appeals	Process

[¶14]		“The	[ZBA]	shall	review	administrative	appeals	from	final	written	

decisions	of	.	.	.	the	Planning	Board.”		Belfast,	Me.,	Code §	102-132(a) (Oct.	21,	

2008).		The	ZBA	accepts appeals	filed	within	thirty	calendar	days	from	the	vote	

“taken	by	the	board	from	which	a	party is	aggrieved.” Id. §	102-134(a).		“Forms	

for	appeal	shall	be	those	approved	by	the	[ZBA],	and	the	aggrieved	person	shall	

set	 forth	on	said	 forms	the	grounds	 for	the	appeal.”		Id.		“All	appeals	shall	be	

considered	filed	at	the	time	of	delivery	to	the	City department	of	planning	and	

community	development .	.	.	.”		Id.		Additionally,	“[i]n	all	administrative	appeals,

.	.	.	the	[ZBA] shall	act	as	an	appellate	board	which	shall	entertain	all	evidence	

of	 record	 submitted	 in	 the	 underlying	 hearing,	 including	 any	 transcripts,	

findings	 of	 facts,	 and	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 board	 of	 original	 fact-finding	

jurisdiction.”		Id.	§ 102-134(f).
9

[¶15]	 	 The	 Ordinance permits	 the	 ZBA	 to	 determine	 standing as	 an	

operative	decisionmaker; however,	the	determination	must	be	made “by	a	vote	

of	a	majority	of	a	quorum	of	the	[ZBA] members	as	a	preliminary	matter	to	the	

extent	that	any	party’s	standing	is	challenged.”		Id. §	102-134(b).		Only	parties	

with	standing	are	permitted	to	participate	in	ZBA	hearings.		Id.

C. Administrative	Standing

[¶16]		Under	the	Ordinance,	an	“aggrieved	party”	who	may	bring	a	case

before	the ZBA	is	“[a]	person	whose	land	is	directly	or	indirectly	affected	by the	

granting	or	denial	of	a	permit	or	variance	.	.	.	or	a	person	whose	land	abuts land	

for	which	a	permit	or	variance	has	been	granted.”	 Belfast, Me., Code § 66-1(c)

(Apr. 6,	2010).		

[¶17]		The	Ordinance	does not	define	“abuts”	or	“abutter.”		See	id.		We	

have	ruled	that	in	the	absence	of	ordinance	language	to	the	contrary,	“abutter”	

means a person	who	possesses	land in	close	proximity	to an	affected	piece	of	

land,	and	thus	is	not	limited	to	a	direct	abutter	or	adjoiner. See	Sahl	v.	Town	of	

York,	2000	ME	180,	¶	9,	760	A.2d	266;	Brooks	v.	Cumberland	Farms,	Inc.,	1997	

ME	203,	¶¶ 2,	9-10,	703 A.2d	844;	see	also Nergaard,	2009	ME	56,	¶	18,	973	

A.2d	735	(“[S]tanding	has	been	liberally	granted	to	people	who	own	property	
10

in	 the	 same	 neighborhood	 as	 the	 property	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 permit	 or	

variance.”).

[¶18]		The	Ordinance defines a	“person,”	and	thus	someone	who	may	be	

an	 aggrieved	 party,	 see	 §	 102-134(a), as	 including	 “an	 association” or

“organization”	as	well	as “an	individual,” §	66-1(b)(5).		We	have	concluded,	in	

the	absence	of	contradictory	language	in	an	ordinance,	that	a	group	may	show	

standing	if	at	least	one	member	has	standing.		Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes v.	Town	

of	Lincoln,	2010 ME	78,	¶	15,	2	A.3d	284.		Therefore,	to	establish	standing	under	

the	Ordinance,	Upstream had	the	burden	of	demonstrating	that at	least	one	of	

its	members	is	an	aggrieved person in	the	member’s	own	right.5

1. The	ZBA’s	Confined	Review

[¶19]		We	consider	de	novo	the	ZBA’s	decision	to	confine	its	review	of	the	

facts	 contained	 in	 the	 application-to-appeal	 form	 because	 it	 involves	 a	 legal	

interpretation	of	the	Ordinance.		See	Nergaard,	2009	ME	56,	¶	12,	973	A.2d	735.	

The	ZBA	erred	when	it	confined	its	review	of	Upstream’s	standing	argument	to	

5		Generally,	associational	standing	includes	three	elements.	“An	association	has	standing	to	bring	

suit	on	behalf	of	its	members	when	[1]	its	members	would	otherwise	have	standing	to	sue	in	their	

own	right,	[2]	the	interests	at	stake	are	germane	to	the	organization’s	purpose,	and	[3]	neither	the	

claim	 asserted nor	 the	 relief	 requested	 requires	 the	 participation	 of	 individual	 members	 in	 the	

lawsuit.”	 	 Black	 v.	 Bureau	 of	 Parks	 &	 Lands,	 2022	 ME	 58,	 ¶	 29,	 288	 A.3d	 346 (quotation	 marks	

omitted).		Because	we	determine	that	Upstream	meets	all	three	prongs,	we	need	not decide	whether	

only	 the	 first	 prong	 applies, or	 all three	 prongs	 apply, when	 determining	 whether	 an	 entity	 has	

associational	standing	in	the	administrative	law context.
11

Upstream’s written	response	on	the	application-to-appeal	form	because	(1)	the	

Ordinance	does	not	contain	such	a	restriction	and	(2)	the	Ordinance mandates	

that,	 when	 acting	 in	 an	 appellate	 capacity,	 the	 ZBA	 consider	 all	 evidence	 of	

record	submitted	in	the	underlying	hearing.		See	§ 102-134(f).

[¶20]		While	 the	Ordinance does include	 two	provisions	governing	the	

scope	of	the	ZBA’s	review,	neither	provision	expressly	restricts the	ZBA	from	

considering	 the	 administrative record,	 including	 the	 Planning	 Board	 record.		

See	§	102-134(f),	(g).		To	the	contrary,	the	Ordinance	mandates	that	when	the	

ZBA	 acts	 in	 its	 appellate	 capacity,	 it	 “shall	 entertain	 all	 evidence	 of	 record	

submitted	in	the	underlying	hearing,	including	any	transcripts,	findings	of	fact,	

and	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 board	 of	 original	 fact-finding	 jurisdiction.”		

§ 102-134(f); cf.	M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)-(f)	(limiting	the	contents of, and	the court’s	

review	of, the	record).		Although	the	ZBA	was	making	a	standing	determination	

in	the	first	instance,	it	was	considering	this	appeal	from	the	Planning	Board	in	

its	appellate	capacity,	and	the	ZBA	should	have	used	the	administrative	record,	

including	 the	 Planning	 Board	 record, to	 determine whether	 Upstream	 had	

standing.		See §	102-134(f);	Norris	Fam. Assocs.,	LLC	v.	Town	of	Phippsburg,	2005	

ME	 102,	 ¶	 20,	 879	 A.2d	 1007 (determining	 party’s	 standing	 from	 Planning	

Board	record);	Witham	Fam. Ltd.	P’ship	v.	Town	of	Bar	Harbor,	2011	ME	104,	
12

¶¶ 12-13,	30	A.3d	811 (same).		Therefore,	 the	ZBA	should	not	have	confined

itself	to	a	review	of	the	application-to-appeal form	because	the	Ordinance	does	

not	 contain	 such	 a	 restriction	 and	 mandates	 the	 ZBA	 to	 consider	 the	 entire	

record	when	acting	in an	appellate	capacity.

2. Upstream’s	Standing

[¶21]		We	normally	 review	with deference a municipal	board’s	 factual	

determinations,	 see	 Bizier,	 2011	 ME	 116,	 ¶	 8,	 32	 A.3d	 1048,	 but the	 facts	

contained	in	the	administrative	record	here	clearly	establish	Upstream’s	status	

as	an	aggrieved	person as	a	matter	of	law.		See	Black v.	Bureau	of	Parks	&	Lands,	

2022	ME	58,	¶ 26,	288	A.3d	346	(“We	review	standing	de	novo	as	a	question	of	

law	and	may	raise	the	issue	sua	sponte;	therefore, we	are	not	bound	by	the	trial	

court’s	conclusion.”).

[¶22]		The parties	and	the	ZBA	agree	that	to	have	standing,	Upstream	had	

to	 demonstrate	 that	 it	 was	 an	 aggrieved	 person under	 the	 Ordinance.	 	 See	

§§ 66-1(c),	102-134(a).	 In	determining	that	Upstream	did	not	have	standing,	

the	ZBA	applied	both	the	aggrieved	person standard contained	in	the	Ordinance

and	a particularized	injury	standard.		

[¶23]		We	look	first	to	the	plain	language	of	the	Ordinance.	 While	it	does	

mention	standing	generally,	it	does	not	explicitly	require	that	a	party	show	a	
13

particularized	injury	to	qualify	as	an aggrieved	party.		See	§§ 66-1(c),	102-134;	

Stewart,	2002	ME	81,	¶	6,	797	A.2d	27;	Nelson	v.	Bayroot,	LLC,	2008	ME	91,	¶	9,	

953	A.2d	378 (“Whether	a	party	has	standing	depends	on	the	wording	of	the	

specific	statute	involved.”).		In	Nergaard,	the	town’s	ordinance	did	not	contain	

the	same	language	present	in	the	Ordinance.		2009	ME	56,	¶ 13,	973	A.2d	735.		

In	 Nergaard,	 we analyzed	 a	 particularized	 injury	 requirement	 when	

determining	whether	the	plaintiffs	had	standing	because the	ordinance at	issue

defined	“aggrieved	party” as	

an	owner	of	land	whose	property	is	directly	or	indirectly	affected	

by	 the	 granting	 or	 denial	 of	 a	 permit	 or	 variance	 under	 [the	

applicable] Ordinance;	a	person	whose	land	abuts	land	for	which	a	

permit	or	variance	has	been	granted;	or	any	other	person	or	group	

of	 persons	who	 have	 suffered	particularized	injury as	 a	 result	 of	

granting	or	denial	of	such a	permit	or	variance.

Id. (emphasis	 added) (quotation	marks	 omitted).	 	The	 plaintiffs	in	Nergaard	

could	not	argue	that	they	were	abutters	nor	that	they	had	land	affected,	which	

meant	 they	 could	 demonstrate	 that	 they	were	aggrieved	 parties	only	if	 they	

suffered a	 particularized	 injury.	 	 Id. ¶	 16.	 	 The Ordinance	 does not	 define

“aggrieved	party” as	any	person	who	has	a	particularized	injury.		See	§ 66-1(c).

Unlike	the	ordinance	at	issue	in	Nergaard, the	term “particularized	injury” does	

not	appear	anywhere	in	the Ordinance. See	§§ 66-1(c),	102-134	(containing no	

particularized	injury	requirement);	Nergaard,	2009	ME	56,	¶¶	13,	17-22,	973	
14

A.2d	735 (analyzing	the	particularized	injury	requirement	in	the	ordinance at	

issue).

[¶24]	 	 We	 require	 particularized	 injury for	 judicial standing,	 but	 a	

municipality	can	set	its	own	more	liberal	rules	for	administrative	standing.		Cf.	

Rockland	Plaza	Realty	Corp.	v.	City	of	Rockland,	2001	ME	81, ¶	6, 772	A.2d	256

(discussing	 an	 ordinance	 provision	 that	 allowed	 for	 administrative	 review	

prior	to	an	agency	taking	a	final action).		Any	confusion	in	the	case	law	arises	

from	 the	 fact	 that	 most	 ordinances	 incorporate	 a	 particularized	 injury

requirement.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 Nergaard,	 the	 relevant	 ordinance	 expressly	

incorporated	 a	 particularized	 injury	 requirement	 into	 its	 definition	 of an	

“aggrieved	party” where	a	party,	like	the	plaintiffs	in	Nergaard, did	not	possess	

land	that	was	affected	by	or	abutted	a	permit	or	variance.		2009	ME	56,	¶ 13,	

973	A.2d	735.		This	conclusion	is	reinforced	by	language	in	Friends	of	Lincoln	

Lakes,	 which	 states	 that	 in	 Nergaard,	 “a	 recent	 decision	 interpreting	 an	

ordinance	containing	identical	language,	we	held	that	to	establish	standing	the	

plaintiff	 ‘must	 demonstrate	 not	 only	 that	 he	 or	 she	 had	 party	 status	 at	 the	

administrative	 proceedings,	 but,	 in	 addition, that	 he	 or	 she	 has	 suffered	 a	

particularized	injury	or	harm.’” Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes,	2010	ME	78,	¶	11,	2	

A.3d	284 (quoting	Nergaard,	2009	ME	56,	¶	16,	973	A.2d	735).		We	viewed	the
15

particularized	injury requirement	as incorporated	in	 the	specific	language	of	

that ordinance.		It	would	make	no	sense	for	us	to	impose	a	particularized	injury

requirement	 for	 administrative	 standing	 when	 an	 ordinance	 itself	 does	 not	

include	such	a	requirement,	because	nothing	in	any	statute	requires	it.		

[¶25]		Another	source	of	confusion	may	be	the	fact	that	we	can, and	do,

impose	a	particularized	injury standard	for	a	plaintiff	to	seek	redress	in	court.		

See	Dubois	v.	Town	of	Arundel,	2019	ME	21,	¶	6,	202	A.3d	524 (“In	order	to	have

standing to	 file	a Rule 80B complaint,	 the	complainant	must	show	(1)	 that	it	

was	 a	 party	 at	 the	 administrative	 proceeding,	 and	 (2)	 that	 it	 suffered	 a	

particularized	 injury	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 agency’s	 decision.”	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted)). This judicial	 restriction	 effectively	 limits	 judicial	 review	 under	

Maine	Rule of	Civil	Procedure 80B	to	those	aggrieved	persons,	however	defined	

by	 an	 ordinance,	 who	 have	 a	 particularized	 injury.	 	 But	 here,	 that	 judicial	

standing	 restriction	 is	 immaterial	 because	 no	 one	 is	 arguing	 that	 Upstream

does not have	a	particularized	injury “as	a	result	of	 the	agency’s	decision” to	

appeal	in	court.		Dubois,	2019	ME	21,	¶	6,	202	A.3d	524.

[¶26]	 	 Here,	 upon	 examining	 the	 entire	 administrative	 record,	 we	

conclude, as	a	matter	of	law, that	Upstream	satisfies the	definition	of	“aggrieved	

party” under	the	Ordinance.		See § 66-1(c); Black,	2022	ME	58,	¶¶ 28-30,	288	
16

A.3d	 346.	 	 The	 proceedings from	 the	 Planning	 Board, contained	 in	 the	

administrative	 record	 available	 to	 the	 ZBA, demonstrate	 that	 at	least	 one	 of	

Upstream’s	 members	 was	 an	 aggrieved	 person,	 either	 as	 an	 abutter	 or	 as	 a	

possessor	 of land	 directly	 affected	 by	 the	 project.	 	A number	 of	 Upstream’s	

members	owned	property	next	to	or	near	enough	to	the	project	to	qualify	as	

abutters,	making	them	aggrieved	parties	under	the	Ordinance.		§ 66-1(c);	see	

Nergaard,	2009	ME	56,	¶	18,	973	A.2d	735.		Additionally, the	administrative	

record	 reflects	 that Upstream	 presented	 a	 number	 of	 concerns at	 Planning	

Board	hearings sufficient	to	demonstrate	that	at	least	one	of	its	members was	

an	aggrieved	person due	to	owning	land	that	would	be	directly	affected	by	the	

project,	such	as	the	potential	impact that	the	project’s drawing large	amounts	

of	water	 from	a	local	aquifer	could	have	on members’ wells	that	draw	water	

from	that	aquifer,	see	Norris	Fam. Assocs.,	LLC,	2005	ME	102,	¶¶	19-20,	879	A.2d	

1007	 (determining	 that	 abutters	 had	 standing	 to	 challenge	 potential	

construction	that	might displace	water	and	redirect	it	onto	other	properties),	

the	potential	impact	of	the	project	on	members’	actual	enjoyment	of	the	local	

environment,	see	Fitzgerald	v.	Baxter	State	Park	Auth.,	385	A.2d	189,	196-97	

(Me.	 1978) (holding	 that	 users	 of	 public	 land	 had	 standing	 to	 challenge	 an	

agency’s	action), and	the	potential	impact of	the	project on	local	traffic,	see	Sahl,	
17

2000	ME	180,	¶	10,	760 A.2d	266 (conferring	standing	to	appellants	claiming	

that	a motel	expansion	would	obstruct	their	view	and	create	additional	traffic).		

See	§ 66-1(c).		

[¶27]	 	 Our	 review	 establishes	 that	 the	 administrative	 record	 clearly	

demonstrates	as	a	matter	of	law	that	at	least	one	of	Upstream’s	members was	

an	aggrieved	person. Accordingly,	Upstream	had	standing	to	appeal	to	the	ZBA

and	the	ZBA	erred	in	dismissing	Upstream’s	appeal	for	lack	for	standing.				

III.	 CONCLUSION

[¶28]	 	We	 conclude	that	 the	 ZBA	 erred	 when	it	 dismissed	 Upstream’s	

appeal	 for	lack	of	standing	because	it	should	not	have	confined	its	review	 to	

Upstream’s	application-to-appeal form.		We	further	conclude	that,	as	a	matter	

of	law,	the	administrative record	sufficiently	demonstrates	that	Upstream	had	

standing	to	appeal	to	the	ZBA.		We	vacate	the	decision	of	ZBA	and	remand	to	

the	Superior	Court	with	instructions	to	remand	to	the	ZBA	for	consideration on	

the	merits of	Upstream’s	appeal	from the	Planning	Board decision.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	 vacated.	 	 Remanded	 to	 the	 Superior	

Court	with	instructions	to	remand	to	the	ZBA	for	

proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.
18

David	B.	 Losee,	Esq.,	David	B.	 Losee	 LLC,	Camden; and	David	 J.	Perkins,	Esq.

(orally),	and	Robert	J.	Papazian,	Esq.,	Curtis	Thaxter	LLC,	Portland,	for	appellant	

Upstream	Watch

Kristin	M.	Collins,	Esq. (orally),	Preti	Flaherty	Beliveau	&	Pachios	LLP,	Augusta,	

for	appellee	City	of	Belfast

David	M.	Kallin,	Esq. (orally),	and	Grady	R.	Burns,	Esq.,	Drummond	Woodsum,	

Portland,	for	appellee	Nordic	Aquafarms	Inc.	

Waldo	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2021-03

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY