SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3572-22 

JAMIE STERLACCI, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

WAWA FOOD MARKET, 

 Defendants-Respondents. 

__________________________

Agued May 29, 2024 – Decided August 27, 2024 

Before Judges Sumners and Rose. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1862-21.

James Bayard Smith argued the cause for appellant 

(John J. Pisano, and Smith and Williams Law Firm, 

LLC, attorneys; John J. Pisano, on the brief). 

Richard S. Ranieri argued the cause for respondent 

(Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby 

LLP, attorneys; Richard S. Ranieri and James E. Hajel, 

on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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In this negligence action arising from plaintiff's slip and fall on black ice 

at defendant's parking lot, plaintiff appeals the summary judgment dismissal of 

her complaint. The court ruled that as a matter of law, plaintiff failed to establish 

defendant had actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition. We 

reverse the order and remand for a trial on all issues. 

We review the motion court's order de novo, Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. 

Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162, 167 (App. Div. 1998), applying the same 

standard as the court, Statewide Ins. Fund v. Star Ins. Co., 253 N.J. 119, 124-25 

(2023). Summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and 

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

4:46-2(c). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also 

R. 4:46-2(c). 

In New Jersey, a business owes a duty of reasonable care to invitees "to 

provide a safe environment for doing that which is within the scope of the 

invitation." Nisivoccia v. Glass Gardens, Inc., 175 N.J. 559, 563 (2003) (citing 

Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 433 (1993)). The duty of due 
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care to invitees "requires a business owner to discover and eliminate dangerous 

conditions, to maintain the premises in safe condition, and to avoid creating 

conditions that would render the premises unsafe." Ibid. "Ordinarily an injured 

plaintiff . . . must prove, as an element of the cause of action, that the defendant 

had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the 

accident." Ibid.; see also Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 257 

(2015). The absence of actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition 

"is fatal to [a] plaintiff's claims of premises liability." Arroyo v. Durling Realty, 

LLC, 433 N.J. Super. 238, 243 (App. Div. 2013). "A defendant has constructive 

notice when the condition existed 'for such a length of time as reasonably to 

have resulted in knowledge and correction had the defendant been reasonably 

diligent.'" Troupe v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 443 N.J. Super. 

596, 602 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Stores, Inc., 48 

N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App. Div. 1957)). 

 Here, plaintiff went to defendant's gas station and convenience store in 

Rahway between midnight and 12:30 a.m. on February 17, 2021. It was not 

snowing or raining at the time, but there had been a snowstorm on February 15, 

continuing into February 16. Main roads were plowed clear by that 

evening/early morning, but some snow and ice remained on side roads. 
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Plaintiff described the weather conditions as freezing cold when she drove 

into defendant's parking lot. After exiting her vehicle, plaintiff walked to the

store's entrance and slipped on black ice on the parking lot surface causing her 

to fall to the ground. She maintains she did not see the ice until after she fell. 

Looking around the lot, she saw additional black and shiny ice on the surface of 

the parking lot and no evidence of salt or sand where she parked to prevent 

someone from slipping and falling. Plowed snow was pushed up along the edge 

of the parking lot in front of the parking spaces. 

One of defendant's employees standing by the gas pumps responded to 

plaintiff's fall and saw the ice where she fell. The employee admitted that the 

area of plaintiff's fall should have been salted or cordoned off. 

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendant, claiming she 

sustained permanent back injuries from the accident. After discovery, defendant 

successfully moved for summary judgment. 

 In its bench decision, the motion court found plaintiff's liability claims 

were "speculative" because she "did not demonstrate [defendant] had any actual 

or constructive notice of the black ice plaintiff slipped on." The court, noting 

plaintiff had no difficulty driving on the roads or to the parking lot, reasoned her 

claim that defendant had constructive notice of the hazardous condition lacks 
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support because she failed to establish through an expert how the ice had formed

by the time she fell. The court maintained plaintiff need to explain how the 

ambient air and ground temperatures following the snowstorm caused black ice. 

Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude 

there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant had 

constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition that caused her accident. 

The area including defendant's business experienced a snowstorm over the 

course of two days prior to plaintiff's accident. Defendant's parking lot was 

cleared of snow and ice to allow customers to safely ingress/egress its store. 

The plowed snow was pushed up in front of the parking spaces. A reasonable 

jury could find defendant had constructive notice of the black ice that caused 

plaintiff's injury. A reasonable jury could infer, without an expert's opinion that 

the snow plowed to the edge of the parking spaces melted during the day and 

the resulting water leaked onto the parking lot and formed into black ice when 

the freezing cold temperature that night based on plaintiff's photographs 

showing melted snow. A reasonable jury could then find defendant was 

negligent in failing to take precautions by applying a substance to prevent the 

hazardous condition where plaintiff fell. Accordingly, based on our de novo 

review of the record, summary judgment should not have been granted. 
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Reversed.