### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RAYMOND NICHOL US WALLACE

Circuit Court for Tipton County

No. 4074

No. W2001-02598-CCA-R3-CD

ORDER - Filed March 14, 2003

On August 27, 2001, pursuant to a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Tipton County found the defenda nt, Raymond N. Wallace, g uilty of driving under

the influence , s econd of fense. F or this offense, he rece

ived an effectiv e sentence of el even mo nths , twenty-nine (29) days, suspended on the service

of forty -five (4 5) day s. The court fined the defe ndant $60 0.00 and s uspende d his licen se to drive for two years. The defendant contends that the evidence prese nted at his trial was insufficient to support the conviction for driving under the influence of int oxi catin g bevera ges. Af ter a t horou gh review of the record before this Court, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. As above noted, the defendant contends that the evide nce is ins ufficie nt to suppor

t his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages. When a defenda nt challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence, the Court i s oblige d to revie w that cha

llenge accord ing to ce rtain well-settledprinciples. A verdict of guilty , rendered by a trier of fact, accredits the testimony of the State’s witnesse s and res olves all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State. State v. Cazes , 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 ( Tenn. 199 4); State v. H arris , 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Th us, although the accused is originally cloa

ked with a presumption of innocence, the verdict of g uilty removesthis p resumption a nd replaces it with one of guilt. State v. Re id , 91 S.W.3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002). Hence, on appeal the b urden of proof rests with the defendant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Id . The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the acc used guilty of e

very element of the offense bey ond a reasona ble doubt. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13(e ); Harris , 839 S.W.2d at 75. In making this decision, we are to accord the State the stronge st legitimate view of the evidenc e as well as all reasonable and legitima te inferences that may be dra wn therefrom. See Statev. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). As such, t

his Court is preclu ded from re-wei ghing

or reco nsiderin g the ev idence in evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan , 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); Statev. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Cr im. App. 19 90). More over, we may not substitu

te our own “inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” Matthews , 805 S.W.2d at 779.-2-

After considering the proof in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the evidence was sufficient

to support the conviction for driving under the influence. On Ma y 14, 2000, at 3:30 a.m., while the defendant was traveling north on Hig hway 51, Off

icer Mike Durham of the Atoka Police Departmen t observed the defendant’s erratic driving. While attempting to pass a car, the defendant’s truck

went over the white fog line on the opposite side of the roa d, entering the median. When the defendant’s truck returned to its proper lane , Officer Durham ob served t he vehic le weaving back an d forth wi thin the la

ne. At tha

t p o int, Officer Durham activated his emerg ency lights. After pu

lli ng ov er, defendant got out of his truck and stag gered to the patrol car. Off icer Durham then proce eded to a

dminister field sobriety

tests. Although the

defenda nt produc ed his driver’s license

without vis ible troub le, he sme lled of int oxicating bevera ges and fail e d all three sobriety tests. The

defenda nt, at tria l, attempt ed to expla

in these failures because of an

ex is ti ng eye condition irritated by

the patrol car’s flashing lights, which had r emainedactivated during the stop. However, th e t ri al co ur t w as un pe rs ua de d. Th is eye condition, about which the defendant submitted medical proof, would not have caused him to slur his speech. Furthermore, when the officer asked whether the defendant had any

physical impairment such as a n injur y or

ill ness that might impact his perfor mance, t he defe ndant nev er mentio ned this c ondition. Co upling th ese facts withthe smell of alcohol e

manating from the d

efenda nt and his refusal to submit to a clarifying blood a lcohol content test, we find the trial court’s rejection of this explanation reasonable. In sum, the defendant’s claim lacks merit. According ly, we aff irm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tennessee Court of

Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Costs of the appeal will be taxed to the appella nt.

____________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

____________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE