J-S02044-24

2024 PA Super 44

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

DERRICK FLOYD

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 525 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002630-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 13, 2024

The Commonwealth/Appellant appeals from the order entered January 

11, 2023, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting a 

suppression motion in favor of Defendant/Appellee, Derrick Floyd. After a 

careful review, we reverse.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On September 

9, 2021, Philadelphia Police Officer Gary Outterbridge, who is assigned to the 

Narcotics Strike Force, was working in his official capacity on a surveillance 

operation for the sale of illegal narcotics on the 4500 block of Lancaster Ave. 

in the city of Philadelphia. N.T. at 6. Establishments on the street include liquor 

stores, Chinese restaurants, and bodegas, and the street is located in a 

business district where the sale of narcotics is frequent. N.T. at 17. He was in 

his marked police vehicle in full uniform. N.T. at 7. At approximately 5:42 PM, 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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he observed a black male, later identified as Defendant, Derrick Floyd, engage 

in a brief conversation with an unknown black female. N.T. at 8. The officer 

was using binoculars and was approximately thirty feet away. N.T. at 19. The 

unknown female handed Defendant United States currency. N.T. at 8. 

Defendant walked around to the passenger side of a white Dodge Ram pickup 

truck with a Pennsylvania plate with the last four digits 6336. Defendant 

entered the passenger side of his pickup truck and briefly sat in his vehicle. 

N.T. at 8. When Defendant emerged from his vehicle, he handed the unknown 

female small objects. N.T. at 9. Another team on the strike force was sent to 

apprehend the female, but she was lost in the area. About four minutes later, 

at approximately 5:46 PM, Defendant engaged in a conversation with the 

second black female, later identified as Myra Buchanan. Ms. Buchanan handed 

Defendant an undetermined amount of U.S. currency. In the same manner as 

before, he entered the passenger seat of his white Dodge Ram truck, returned 

into view, and handed Ms. Buchanan small objects. N.T. at 9. Ms. Buchanan 

was stopped by another officer who recovered two green flip top containers 

containing crack cocaine. N.T. at 9-10.

About four minutes later, at 5:50 PM, Defendant entered the driver's 

seat of his truck and an officer stopped his vehicle. On Defendant’s person, 

$36 of United States currency was recovered. N.T. at 10. The officer who 

effectuated the arrest handed the key to Defendant’s Dodge Ram to Officer 

Anthony Woltman, another member of the strike force assigned to the 

operation on 4500 Lancaster Ave. N.T. at 27. Officer Woltman placed the 
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truck on a Philadelphia property receipt, entered the vehicle, and transported 

it to 4298 Macalester Street, a secure police facility, pending the approval of 

a search warrant. N.T. at 24. 

At 9:27 PM, Officer Outterbridge served a warrant on Defendant’s 

vehicle and observed while it was searched by Officer Wright and Officer 

Zukauskas at the secure police facility, 4298 Macalester Street. N.T. at 11. 

Recovered from the vehicle was $725 U.S. currency, a black .45 caliber 

handgun with an obliterated serial number that was loaded with ten live 

rounds, an Arizona tea can with a false bottom containing two and a half grams 

of bulk cocaine and seventy-two green flip top containers containing crack 

cocaine, thirty-three clear flip top containers containing crack cocaine, and 

two clear jars of marijuana. N.T. at 12-14. All of these items were recorded 

on a Philadelphia property receipt. N.T. at 14.

On November 30, 2022, a suppression hearing was held at which Officer 

Outterbridge and Officer Woltman testified to the above facts, and Ms. 

Buchanan testified on behalf of Defendant. She stated that on September 9, 

2021, she interacted with Defendant on Lancaster Ave. and briefly spoke with 

him because he is a family friend. N.T. at 29-30. She admitted that she was 

stopped by police several minutes later and was found to have crack cocaine 

but denied having purchased it from Defendant during their interaction. N.T. 

at 28-29. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court held the 

matter under advisement and directed the parties to file briefs in support of 

their arguments. On January 11, 2023, the trial court granted Defendant’s 
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motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle because of Officer 

Woltman’s warrantless entry of the vehicle. The Commonwealth timely 

appealed. Tr. Ct. Op. at 1. 

The Commonwealth raises one question for our review: “Did the lower 

court err by suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a valid search warrant 

from a car on the ground that, following defendant’s lawful arrest, an officer 

drove the car from a public street to a police lot pending approval of the 

warrant?” Appellant’s Br. at 3. 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the suppression 

court's order granting a suppression motion is well settled:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we 

follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the 

evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the 

evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the 

entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's 

findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those 

findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are 

not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether 

the record supports the suppression court's factual findings; 

however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court's 

legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 159 A.3d 933 (2016). Here, Defendant was arrested without a 

warrant. 

This Court has previously noted:

It is axiomatic that the validity of a warrantless arrest is 

determined by considering “whether, at the moment the arrest 
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was made, the officer had probable cause to make it,” Beck v. 

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, (1964), 

and the person arrested is believed to be the guilty party.

Commonwealth v. Mallory, 614 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal 

denied, 621 A.2d 578 (Pa. 1993). Probable cause to effectuate a warrantless 

arrest exists when:

“the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting 

officer are reasonably trustworthy and sufficient to justify a person 

of reasonable caution in believing that the arrestee has committed 

an offense.” Commonwealth v. Romero, 449 Pa. Super. 194, 

673 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. Super. 1996). In making this 

determination, this Court has held that “[p]robable cause for a 

warrantless arrest requires only the probability, and not a prima 

facie showing, of criminal activity.” Id. at 377 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Quiles, 422 Pa. Super. 153, 619 A.2d 291, 

298 (Pa. Super. 1993) (en banc)).

Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 835-36 (Pa. Super. 1997) 

(some formatting added).

Here, Defendant was arrested without a warrant after the officers 

obtained probable cause through their observations to believe he was engaged 

in narcotic transactions, or a violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113. Instantly, 

Defendant argues that his arrest was not supported by probable cause 

because the officers failed to establish a nexus between their extensive 

experience and their observations. Appellee’s Br. at 12-13. Defendant cites 

Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671 (Pa. 2007) and Commonwealth 

v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928 (Pa. 2009) for the proposition that the 

Commonwealth must establish a nexus between an officer’s experience and 
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the specific circumstances of the incident. Appellee’s Br. at 13. However, this 

Court has noted:

First, Thompson involved a single hand-to-hand transaction. It 

was under those limited circumstances (as was also the case in 

Dunlap) that the value of police experience became critical to the 

probable cause determination. Because the officer's observation 

of the lone transaction, by itself, did not create probable cause, 

the police officer's experience was necessary to determine 

whether probable cause existed. Per Thompson, that experience 

has value only if the officer can demonstrate a nexus between the 

experience and the observed behavior. However, the necessity of 

establishing that nexus diminishes if probable cause exists based 

solely upon the behavior that the officer observed.

Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1085-86 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, probable cause existed for the 

officers to stop and arrest Defendant, and a nexus was established between 

their experience and their observation. Thompson and Dunlap pertain to 

single hand-to-hand transactions. Here, the officers observed Defendant 

receive money from another individual, enter his vehicle, return to the 

individual, and hand over small objects. N.T. at 8-9. This sequence of events 

occurred twice in under ten minutes in the same exact manner. The second 

individual with whom Defendant engaged was stopped minutes later by police 

and two green flip-top containers of crack cocaine were found. N.T. at 9-10. 

When Defendant’s vehicle was later searched pursuant to a valid search 

warrant, seventy-two green flip-top containers of crack cocaine were found, 

inter alia. N.T. at 13. Lancaster Avenue was a place where narcotics are 

regularly sold. N.T. at 14. Officer Outterbridge has been a police officer for 
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sixteen years with thirteen years in narcotics. N.T. at 15. He had training in 

terms of packaging, distribution, and surveillance techniques, and had 

conducted at least three or four surveillances of 4500 Lancaster Ave., the 

specific location where Defendant was observed. N.T. at 15-16. Those 

surveillances led to arrests. N.T. at 16. Officer Outterbridge testified that the 

drug trade in the city of Philadelphia is central to establishments that sell 

alcohol, Chinese stores, stop-and-go delis, and bodegas. N.T. at 17. 

Relating that experience to the specific facts of the instant case, Officer 

Outterbridge testified that these types of establishments were present at 

location. Id. His testimony formed a nexus between his experience and the 

facts of the arrest. Dunlap, 941 a.2d at 676. Given the nature and location of 

the transactions, and the frequency and repetitiveness of the transaction, we 

are unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that the lower court’s finding that 

probable cause existed to arrest him was based entirely on Officer 

Outterbridge’s years of experience as a police officer.

We are also not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that because the 

lower court did not state its credibility determination on the record, that we 

cannot consider the testimony of Officer Outterbridge which Defendant claims 

contradicts Ms. Buchanan’s testimony. Appellee’s Br. at 11 (“The trial court 

made no credibility findings between Ms. Buchanan and Officer Outterbridge. 

The law is clear however, this Court is not at liberty to consider Officer 

Outterbridge’s testimony where it is contradicted by that of Appellee’s witness, 

Ms. Buchanan.”). Defendant admits that the “trial court determined that 
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probable cause to arrest Appellee existed based on Officer Outterbridge’s 

testimony describing his observations.” Appellee’s Br. at 9. Additionally, the 

trial court referred to Ms. Buchanan as Defendant’s “second buyer.” N.T. at 

39. Thus, it is facially apparent that the trial court found Officer Outterbridge’s 

testimony credible and found that Ms. Buchanan’s testimony that she did not 

make a drug purchase not credible. 

Nonetheless, the contradictions between the testimonies are not 

abundantly clear—while Ms. Buchanan denied purchasing narcotics from 

Defendant, the Officer’s testimony is not that he definitively saw Defendant 

sell narcotics to Ms. Buchanan. He stated that he observed two transactions 

with Defendant and another of unidentified small objects in exchange for U.S. 

currency, and Ms. Buchanan never testified that she did not hand Defendant 

money or take any object. Thus, the officer’s testimony of the interaction 

between Defendant and Ms. Buchanan stands uncontradicted, and in 

combination with the additional facts above, provides ample evidence for a 

finding of probable cause for arrest. 

Next, we must address the issue at hand: if the evidence recovered from 

Defendant’s vehicle after a valid search warrant was executed must 

nonetheless be suppressed because of the Officer’s driving of Defendant’s 

vehicle to the impound lot. The Commonwealth argues that it is reasonable 

for constitutional purposes for police to seize and hold a car until a search 

warrant can be obtained in circumstances such as this. Appellee’s Br. at 10. 

Even if the police officer moving the vehicle was improper, the vehicle was not 
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searched during the relocation of the car and thus the evidence recovered 

could not be the fruit of any putative police conduct requiring suppression. Id.

at 13. The Commonwealth cites Commonwealth v. Holzer, 389 A.2d 101 

(Pa. Super. 1978), for the proposition that:

It is reasonable, therefore, for constitutional purposes, for police 

to seize and hold a car until a search warrant can be obtained, 

where the seizure occurs after the user or owner has been placed 

into custody, where the vehicle is located on public property, and 

where there exists probable cause to believe that evidence of the 

commission of a crime will be obtained from the vehicle.

Id. at 106. The Commonwealth argues that here, Defendant was placed into 

custody, after the arrest his vehicle was still on a public street, and there was 

probable cause to believe evidence of the drug sales was in the vehicle, and 

thus the car was properly moved to a secure location until a search warrant 

was obtained. Appellant’s Br. at 11-12; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6.

The trial court stated on the record at the conclusion of the suppression 

hearing, “There was a valid warrant which was executed. That valid warrant 

was executed after an illegal seizure. The question is whether the illegal 

seizure of the vehicle is grounds for suppression of the evidence.” N.T. at 40. 

However, as it is our appellate duty in a suppression case, we must determine 

if the court below correctly applied the law to the facts. Korn, supra. 

There is statutory authority for the seizure of vehicles at the direction 

of police:

(c) Removal to garage or place of safety. — Any police officer may 

remove or cause to be removed to the place of business of the 

operator of a wrecker or to a nearby garage or other place of 
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safety any vehicle found upon a highway under any of the 

following circumstances:

(1) Report has been made that the vehicle has been stolen or 

taken without the consent of its owner.

(2) The person or persons in charge of the vehicle are physically 

unable to provide for the custody or removal of the vehicle.

(3) The person driving or in control of the vehicle is arrested for 

an alleged offense for which the officer is required by law to take 

the person arrested before an issuing authority without 

unnecessary delay.

(4) The vehicle is in violation of section 3353 (relating to 

prohibitions in specified places) except for overtime parking.

(5) The vehicle has been abandoned as defined in this title. . . .

75 Pa.C.S. § 3352.

This statutory power is above the traditional caretaking function which 

allowed police to remove cars which presented some hazard to the public or 

impaired the movement of traffic. Commonwealth v. Bailey, 986 A.2d 860, 

863 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Interestingly, despite the fact that this statute has been on the 

books since 1976, we have found only one that case has 

commented on section (c)(3), Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 

2000 PA Super 145, 753 A2d. 245 (Pa. Super. 2000). In that case, 

the police impounding the car was improper because the suspect 

was not operating or in control of his car at the time of arrest. 

Rather, the car was simply legally parked on the side of the road. 

In dicta, Hennigan comments that the ability to impound a car is 

derived from the traditional care-taking function of the police 

which has allowed police to tow cars, prior to statute, in situations 

where the cars presented some manner of hazard to the public or 

where the car might impact on the movement of traffic.

We note, however, that the statute separately accounts for 

the traditional care-taking functions where the police have always 

been allowed to tow a vehicle. For example, section (c)(5) 

addresses abandoned vehicles. Section (c)(2) addresses 

situations where the person or persons in charge of the vehicle 

are incapable of providing custody or removal of the vehicle. 

Section (c)(4) directs attention to the traditional parking 
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situations where the vehicle might pose a hazard or impede the 

orderly flow of traffic.

Therefore, it appears that the legislature intended these 

situations to be viewed distinctly and separately.

Bailey, 986 A.2d at 863.

In Commonwealth v. Germann, 621 A.2d 589 (Pa. Super. 1993), 

police officers stopped a driver with a fraudulent inspection sticker on a vehicle 

in very poor condition. Id. at 592. Believing evidence of more fraudulent 

stickers would be found in the car, the officer searched the car and found two 

more fraudulent stickers, drugs paraphernalia, and cocaine. Id. at 591. The 

trial court held that there was independent probable cause for a search of the 

vehicle, and that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered through 

a search when the police moved the car pursuant to section 3352. On appeal, 

this Court found that the vehicle could not have been subject to removal by 

police pursuant to any enumerated subsection of section 3352 because the 

defendant would only have been issued a summary citation based on the 

exterior fraudulent stickers, so he still had the right to custody of his vehicle. 

Id. at 594. 

Thus, in order to determine if the seizure of Defendant’s vehicle was in 

fact illegal or if it was legally moved, we must determine if the facts of this 

case fall into any enumerated subsection of section 3352. Subsection (c)(3) 

states that a police officer may remove a vehicle to a place of safety if the 

person “in control of the vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for which 

the officer is required by law to take the person arrested before an issuing 

authority without unnecessary delay.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3352(c)(3). Here, the 
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record shows that Defendant was in control of the Dodge Ram from which he 

conducted transactions and later drove. N.T. at 9. Defendant was stopped 

and arrested without a warrant after a perceived violation of 35 P.S. § 780-

113. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 519, “when a defendant has been arrested 

without a warrant in a court case, a complaint shall be filed against the 

defendant and the defendant shall be afforded a preliminary arraignment by 

the proper issuing authority without unnecessary delay.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

519(A)(1). Thus, unlike the initial summary violation in Germann, 

Defendant’s alleged offense is one “for which the officer is required by law to 

take the person arrested before an issuing authority without unnecessary 

delay.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3352(c)(3). Therefore, the requirements of section 3352 

have been satisfied and the police had statutory authority to remove 

Defendant’s vehicle to the impound lot. 

The question remains if the fact that Officer Woltman personally entered 

Defendant’s car to remove it to a secure facility while awaiting a search 

warrant instead of calling a towing service, was a violation of Defendant’s 

constitutional rights. Section 3352 states that a police officer may “remove or 

cause to be removed” a vehicle. While the word “remove” is not defined, the 

plain language of the statue does not indicate the vehicle always needs to be 

towed even if that is the usual method of removal. 

In Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 A.3d 611 (Pa. Super. 2010), a case 

discussed in each party’s brief, after a defendant was placed under arrest on 

probable cause of narcotics dealing while exiting his vehicle outside his home, 
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a police officer drove the defendant’s car from his private driveway to the 

police station. Id. at 615. The vehicle was not searched during the drive, but 

canines alerted the police of the presence of drugs upon the car’s arrival at 

the police station. The car was fully searched after a valid warrant was 

executed. Id. at 617. Evidence of drugs, inter alia, was discovered. Id. at 

615. There, citing Commonwealth v. Holzer, 389 A.2d 101 (Pa. Super. 

1978), we said,

Our Supreme Court concluded that the towing of the car was not 

improper, holding: “It is reasonable . . . for constitutional 

purposes for police to seize and hold a car until a search warrant 

can be obtained, where the seizure occurs after the user or owner 

has been placed into custody, where the vehicle is located on 

public property, and where there exists probable cause to believe 

that evidence of the commission of crime will be obtained from 

the vehicle.” The Court also observed that if the “vehicle is located 

on the defendant’s private property (garage or driveway), it 

becomes more difficult, although not impossible, to find the police 

conduct reasonable, since there has been a greater infringement 

upon defendant's expectations of privacy.”

Williams, 2 A.3d at 618 (citations omitted). The issue then became if the 

removal of the vehicle from defendant’s private property, as opposed to from 

a public location, was still reasonable. Thus, the issue was not the manner of 

removal—towing or driving. 

To remedy the fact that the car was seized from private property, we 

engaged in an analysis of the independent source doctrine, as articulated in 

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, (1984), to determine if the evidence 

that was discovered “lawfully, and not as a direct or indirect result of illegal 

activity,” was admissible. Id. at 618. We stated,
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The information supporting the canine sniff and the warrant was 

not derived to any extent from the singular act of taking 

[defendant’s vehicle] from the driveway to the police station to 

secure it. Rather, those two searches were based upon facts 

learned prior to the act of transporting the vehicle. Thus, the 

independent source doctrine, as articulated in Segura, is directly 

applicable.

Williams, 2 A.3d at 620-21. Thus, it seems plain that we only engaged in the 

independent source analysis in Williams because the defendant’s vehicle was 

seized from his private property without a warrant, not because it was 

removed by an officer driving it. This would defeat Defendant’s argument that 

“the Commonwealth failed to present evidence . . . [to] establish an 

independent source.” Appellee’s Br. at 23-24. Nonetheless, here we will 

analyze if the evidence discovered in Defendant’s vehicle pursuant to the valid 

search warrant had an independent source. 

The “exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, 

tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful 

invasion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). The 

Wong Sun Court stated that the exclusionary rule does not prevent the 

introduction of evidence that is “gained from an independent source,” but 

rather applies only to “knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong.” 

Id. The Supreme Court further expounded on the concept of the independent 

source doctrine in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). In 

Segura,

drug enforcement officers made an invalid warrantless entry into 

the defendant's apartment because there were no exigent 
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circumstances permitting such an entry. However, the drug 

agents did not conduct a search of the premises with the exception 

that they visually inspected each room solely to ensure that no 

one was present who posed a threat or would destroy evidence. 

The drug officers then secured the apartment in order to preserve 

the status quo while a search warrant was procured. Significantly, 

the drug enforcement officers did not seize any evidence, even 

that in plain view, until the warrant arrived. Additionally, the 

government did not use any information that was found due to 

the initial entry into the apartment to support issuance of the 

warrant.

The Supreme Court held that, even though the initial 

warrantless entry into the apartment was illegal, it did not taint 

the discovery of the evidence found and seized pursuant to the 

warrant. It reasoned that “the evidence discovered during the 

subsequent search of the apartment the following day pursuant to 

the valid search warrant issued wholly on information known to 

the officers before the entry into the apartment need not have 

been suppressed as “fruit” of the illegal entry.” Id. at 799. The 

Supreme Court concluded that suppression was unnecessary 

“because the warrant and the information on which it was based 

were unrelated to the entry and therefore constituted an 

independent source for the evidence under Silverthorne Lumber 

Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 

T.D. 2984, 17 Ohio L. Rep. 514 (1920).” Id. The Supreme Court 

noted that the evidence obtained as a result of the valid warrant 

did not result to any extent from the original, invalid entry. 

Williams, 2 A.3d at 620.

Here, the trial court states multiple policy reasons for justifying 

suppression concerning Defendant’s rights:

Despite appellee's arrest, he maintained a reasonable expectation 

of privacy along with an ownership interest in his vehicle. By 

entering and driving the appellee's vehicle, and using the gasoline 

which appellee purchased to fuel his vehicle all without a warrant, 

the police infringed upon appellee's property interests and his 

privacy rights.

Moreover, allowing the police to transport vehicles by 

driving them to various locations throughout the Commonwealth—

as opposed to having the vehicle's towed—police could be 

operating unsafe vehicles on public roads and unwittingly 
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endangering motorists and pedestrians. Arresting officers should 

not be responsible for assessing the safety and roadworthiness of 

these vehicles. Certainly, motorists and pedestrians should not 

bear the risk of potentially dangerous vehicles being transported 

by the police from crime scenes to impound lots.

Tr. Ct. Op. at. 6. 

Here, the facts supporting the valid search warrant were not derived to 

any extent from the act of Officer Woltman entering Defendant’s vehicle to 

drive it to the secure lot or any impressions Officer Woltman made from within 

the vehicle. N.T. at 40. Instead, the facts supporting the search warrant 

included Officer Outterbridge’s observations of Defendant’s activities on 

Lancaster Ave. Id. Those facts were known to Officer Outterbridge before 

Officer Woltman’s entry into Defendant’s vehicle and thus need not have been 

suppressed as fruit of an illegal seizure. Segura, 468 U.S. at 799. 

The trial court erred in failing to address that section 3352 gives 

statutory authority to police officers to remove a vehicle “to the place of 

business of the operator of a wrecker or to a nearby garage or other place of 

safety.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3352(a). Officers are not authorized to drive the vehicles 

of another to any “various locations throughout the Commonwealth” as the 

trial court suggests. Thus, since there was probable cause to arrest Defendant 

and for the officers to obtain a warrant to search his vehicle, the police had 

authority to remove the vehicle, and because the evidence recovered from the 

vehicle had an independent source, we reverse. 

Order reversed. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Date: 3/13/2024