United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-20439

Summary Calendar

Antwan Henry, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Ditech Financial, L.L.C., formerly known as Green Treen 

Servicing, L.L.C.; Carrington Mortgage Services, L.L.C.; 

The Bank of New York Mellon, as Trustee for the Certificate 

Holders of the CWABS, Inc. Asset-Backed Certificates, 

Series 2006-5, formerly known as The Bank of New York, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CV-4414

Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Smith and Elrod, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 5, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Antwan Henry filed suit raising claims of quiet title, cancellation of 

instrument, request for accounting, unconscionable inducement, dual 

tracking, violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and 

violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Henry 

now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint and granting of the 

defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motions. He argues that 

he presented a valid claim of quiet title, that the assignment of the deed of 

trust was defective, that the district court erred in dismissing several claims 

with prejudice and without allowing him an opportunity to amend, that the 

motions to dismiss were untimely filed, that defendants were liable under the 

FDCPA, and that the court erred in considering unauthenticated documents. 

We review the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(c) motion for 

judgment on the pleadings under the same de novo standard as is used for a 

ruling on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See 

Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010). A complaint is 

properly dismissed if it does not state sufficient facts to set forth a plausible 

claim or if the claims it raises are merely speculative. Bass v. Stryker Corp.,

669 F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2012).

Under Texas law, “[a] suit to quiet title is an equitable action used to 

establish that an adverse party’s claim to property is invalid, and to remove 

the cloud caused by the invalid claim from the owner’s title.” Montenegro v. 

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 419 S.W.3d 561, 572 (Tex. Ct. App.—Amarillo 

2013, no pet.). A plaintiff “must prove and recover on the strength of his 

own title, not the weakness of his adversary’s title.” Fricks v. Hancock, 45 

S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. Ct. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.).

Henry makes no real argument regarding the strength of his own title, 

instead arguing in conclusory fashion that the deed of trust is invalid because 

it does not contain his signature. As for Henry’s argument challenging the 

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assignment of the deed of trust, it is without merit. See Reinagel v. Deutsche 

Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 735 F.3d 220, 226-27 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Martins v. 

BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 722 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2013).

Regarding his claims arising under the FDCPA and the RESPA, his 

claims of cancellation of instrument and unconscionable inducement, and his 

request for accounting, Henry generally asserts that the district court should 

not have dismissed these claims with prejudice because granting a Rule 12(c) 

motion is akin to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and therefore should be without 

prejudice. He also asserts that the district court should have allowed him the 

opportunity to amend the complaint to remedy the defects, specifically, the 

lack of sufficient facts to support his allegations. 

In his brief, Henry points to no legal authority in support of his 

argument that the dismissal should have been without prejudice and does not 

identify what facts he could or would have alleged if given the opportunity to 

amend. Thus, his argument that the court erred in dismissing these claims 

with prejudice and without giving him the opportunity to amend is without 

merit.

His argument that the defendants’ motions for judgment on the 

pleadings filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) was untimely because it was filed after 

they filed an answer in the state court proceeding fails. A Rule 12(c) motion 

can be filed after an answer. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 

1999). 

Finally, Henry’s arguments regarding violations of the FDCPA are 

vague and do not address the district court’s conclusion that he failed to 

allege facts showing that the defendants engaged in misconduct. General 

arguments giving only broad standards of review and not citing to any error 

are insufficient to preserve issues for appeal. Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. 

Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Because Henry has 

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failed to brief any issue adequately relating to the district court’s ruling on 

the aforementioned claim, the issue is abandoned. See Brinkmann, 813 F.2d 

at 748. His argument regarding the consideration of unauthenticated 

documents is likewise conclusional and inadequately briefed. See id.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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