IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

DON SHOOTER, INDIVIDUALLY,

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

TOBY FARMER, INDIVIDUALLY, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; HELEN PURCELL,

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER; BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS OF MARICOPA COUNTY, A PUBLIC ENTITY; ROBYN 

STALLWORTH POUQUETTE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS YUMA COUNTY 

RECORDER; YUMA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, A PUBLIC ENTITY;

LESLIE M. HOFFMAN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS YAVAPAI COUNTY 

RECORDER; YAVAPAI COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, A PUBLIC ENTITY;

KEN BENNETT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARIZONA SECRETARY OF 

STATE,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-14-0180-AP/EL

Filed July 29, 2014

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable John Christian Rea, Judge

No. CV2014-008772

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL:

Timothy A. La Sota, Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., Phoenix, for Don Shooter

Keith Beauchamp, Roopali H. Desai, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, 

Phoenix, for Toby Farmer

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, M. Colleen Connor, 

Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, for Maricopa County Appellees

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General, Michele L. Forney, Assistant 

Attorney General, Phoenix, for Ken Bennett
SHOOTER V. FARMER

Opinion of the Court

2

The Court, by a panel comprising CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF 

JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICE TIMMER, issued its decision per 

curiam.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 This petition challenge seeks to remove Toby Farmer’s name 

from the primary ballot for the office of State Senator for Legislative District 

13. Don Shooter appeals from the trial court’s order declining to remove 

Farmer’s name based on alleged “petition forgery.” We entered an order 

affirming the trial court’s judgment and denying Farmer’s request for 

attorney’s fees, stating that a written decision would follow. This is that 

decision.

I.

¶2 “[A]ll petitions . . . submitted by a candidate who is found 

guilty of petition forgery shall be disqualified and that candidate shall not 

be eligible to seek election to a public office for a period of not less than five 

years.” A.R.S. § 16-351(F). In Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 101 ¶ 38, 139 

P.3d 612, 619 (2006), we held that the term “petition forgery” in § 16-351(F) 

refers to the class 1 misdemeanor defined in A.R.S. § 16-1020. That statute

prohibits a range of conduct, the most relevant being “[a] person knowingly 

signing any name other than his own to a nomination petition.” § 16-1020. 

Thus, candidates suffer automatic disqualification and a ban of five or more 

years if they sign another person’s name on their nomination petitions, or 

if they knowingly cause another person to do the same. See A.R.S. § 13-303

(criminal liability based upon another’s conduct).

¶3 Shooter demonstrated at trial that seven of the signatures on 

two of Farmer’s petition sheets were signed by persons other than the 

voters whose names had been signed. He did not provide any evidence, 

however, as to who had forged the signatures, and he chose not to call 

Farmer as a witness. Farmer, on the other hand, presented a handwriting 

expert who opined that Farmer had not signed the questioned signatures. 

Shooter showed that Farmer had signed the circulator’s oath on both sheets, 

attesting that he had been present when the signatures were signed. Farmer 

signed the circulator’s oath on a total of thirty-three sheets, bearing 216 

voter signatures. From these facts, Shooter asked the trial court to infer that 

Farmer knew of the forgeries, which the court declined to do. Finding “no 
SHOOTER V. FARMER

Opinion of the Court

3

evidence” that Farmer knew of the forgeries, the court determined that 

petition forgery had not been proved and therefore did not remove 

Farmer’s name from the ballot.

II.

¶4 We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous. State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 556 ¶ 28, 315 P.3d 1200, 1213 

(2014). Shooter argues that whether an inference ought to be drawn is a 

matter of law. However, the inference that Shooter seeks is the presence of 

a fact, namely, Farmer’s alleged knowledge of the forgeries. “The trial 

court, not this court, weighs the evidence and resolves any conflicting facts, 

expert opinions, and inferences therefrom.” In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights 

to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 198 Ariz. 330, 340 ¶ 25, 9 P.3d 1069, 

1079 (2000) (emphasis added).

¶5 Because we cannot say that the trial court’s factual findings 

were clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that petition 

forgery was not proved. Even without the seven signatures that the trial 

court found to be forgeries, Farmer still had hundreds more valid 

signatures than he needed for his name to appear on the ballot.

¶6 Farmer requests attorney’s fees, arguing that Shooter’s 

petition forgery claim was “without substantial justification,” A.R.S. § 12-

349(A)(1), meaning that it “is groundless and is not made in good faith,” 

§ 12-349(F). Because we do not conclude that Shooter acted in bad faith, we 

deny Farmer’s request for fees. We also deny his request for fees under 

§ 12-349(A)(2)–(3).

III.

¶7 We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment and deny

Farmer’s request for attorney’s fees.