UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________ ) A.N.S.W.E.R. COALITION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 05-0071 (PLF) ) SALLY JEWELL, ) Secretary of the Interior, et al., 1 ) ) Defendants. ) __________________________________________)

OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on plainti ff’s objections to Magi strate Judge Alan Kay’s decisions regarding the nondisclosure by th e United States Secret Service of certain documents during discovery. Plaintiff contends that the Court should set aside certain portions of Judge Kay’s February 3, 2012 Memorandum Order and his September 27, 2012 Memorandum Order as clearly erroneous a nd contrary to law. See F ED

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. P. 72(a). After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, Judge Kay’s decisions, this Court’s own in camera review of the disputed documents, and the releva nt legal authorities, th e Court concludes that Judge Kay’s privilege and releva nce rulings are correct, although the Court disagrees with one aspect of Judge Kay’s reasoning. The Court theref ore will overrule in part and sustain in part plaintiff’s objections. 2

1 Sally Jewell, the current Secretary of th e Interior, has been substituted for former secretary Ken Salazar, and Julia A. Pierson, the current Director of the Secret Service, has been substituted for former director Mark Sullivan. See F ED

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. P. 25(d).

2 The papers reviewed in connecti on with the pending motions include the following: Judge Kay’s Memorandum Order, Dkt No. 131 (Feb. 3, 2012) (“Feb. 3 Mem.2 I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff A.N.S.W.E.R. (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) Coalition (“ANSWER”) filed this lawsuit in January 2005 to challenge certain governmental policies that have restricted ANSWER’s ability to engage in expressive activity during the Presidential Inaugural Parades in Washington, D.C. One of th ese policies – and the only policy relevant to

the matter now before the Court – is the Secret Service’s prohibition on sign supports along the Inaugural Parade Route. This Court granted ANSWER’s request for Rule 56(f) discovery (now Rule 56(d)) for the production of all documents rela ting to the prohibition of sign supports by the Secret Service. See Order, Dkt. No. 56 (N ov. 13, 2007); Memorandum Opinion and Order, Dkt. No. 75 (Nov. 14, 2008). During the discovery that followed, ANSWER challenged the government’s withholding of certain documents as privileged, and the Court agreed to review the disputed documents in camera . See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Dkt. No. 104 at 3 (Apr. 23, 2010). On August 3, 2010, the Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay to

conduct the in camera review. See Referral Order, Dk t. No. 117 (Aug. 3, 2010). Judge Kay issued his privilege rulings for most of the documents on the Secret Service’s 27-page privilege log on February 3, 2012, and directed counsel for the Secret Servic e to provide him with certain

Order”); plaintiff’s objections to the February 3 Memorandum Order, Dkt. No. 141 (March 12, 2012) (“Pl.’s 1st Obj.”); defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s first objections, Dkt. No. 151 (Apr. 11, 2012) (“Def.’s 1st Opp’n”); plaintiff’s reply in support of its first objections, Dkt. No. 156 (Apr. 30, 2012) (“Pl.’s 1st Reply”); Judge Kay’ s Memorandum Order, Dkt. No. 160 (Sept. 27, 2012) (“Sept. 27 Mem. Order”); plaintiff’s objections to the September 27 Memorandum Order, Dkt. No. 161 (Oct. 15, 2012) (“Pl.’s 2nd Obj.”) ; defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s second objections, Dkt. No. 163 (Nov. 6, 2012) (“Def.’s 2nd O pp’n”); and plaintiff’ s reply in support of its second objections, Dkt. No. 164 (Nov. 16, 2012) (“Pl.’s 2nd Reply”).3 other missing documents. See Feb. 3 Mem. Or der. Judge Kay addressed the remaining documents in a decision dated September 27, 2012. See Sept. 27 Mem. Order. ANSWER timely filed objections “in gene ral and categorically” to Judge Kay’s orders on the ground that Judge Kay failed to state his reasoning with respect to each document. See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 2; Pl.’s 2nd Obj. at 1. ANSWER does not ask this Court, however, to

review de novo every document withheld by the S ecret Service. Rather, ANSWER has identified certain privilege and relevance determ inations within each of Judge Kay’s orders to which it specifically objects. First, ANSWER asserts that Judge Kay erred in approving th e withholding of the following documents, in whole or in part, on the ba sis of attorney-client privilege: Bates Nos. 000185, 000186, 000191, 000316, 000537, 000562, 000563, 000566, and 000588. See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 2 n.2, 17-19. Second, ANSWER maintain s that Judge Kay erred in deeming the following documents protected, in whole or in part, as attorney work product: Bates Nos. 000174, 000175-80, 000183, and 000326. Id. at 2 n.2, 21-26. Third, ANSWER challenges Judge Kay’s ruling that the law enforcement priv ilege protects the following documents from compelled disclosure: 000668, 000682, 000726, 000734-35, 000740, 000750, 000795-97. Pl.’s 2nd Obj. at 1-2. Fourth, ANSWE R asserts that Judge Kay erre d in ruling that the document marked “Withheld 74-84” was properl y withheld as nonresponsive. Id. ANSWER requests that

the Court conduct an in camera review of these four categories of withheld documents and order their production. In addition, ANSWER asks the Court to order that all re maining withheld documents be reviewed and produced in accordan ce with the principles articulated in any opinion issued in response to these objections. Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 2.4 II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review When a party objects to a magistrate j udge’s determination with respect to a nondispositive matter, such as the privilege and re levance determinations made in this case, the Court must modify or set aside all or part of the magistrate judge’s order if it is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” F ED

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. P. 72(a); see also L OC

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. R. 72.2(c). This standard is met when, “although there is evidence to support [a determination], the reviewing

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm c onviction that a mistake has been committed.” Federal Savs. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 130 F.R.D. 507, 508 (D.D.C. 1990) (internal quotation omitted); s ee also Beale v. Dist. of Columbia, 545 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2008).

B. Documents Withheld Pursuant to the Attorney-Client Privilege “The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications made between clients and their attorneys when the communications are for the purpose of securing legal advice or services.” Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 241 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting In re Lindsey , 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 2-3. The D.C. Circuit construes the privilege narrowly to apply when a communi cation “relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed . . . by his client . . . for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii ) assistance in some legal proceeding.’” In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (alt eration in original) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The pr ivilege also protects a communication made by an attorney to a client if the communication is “based, in part at least , upon a confidential5 communication to the lawyer from the client.” United States v. Naegele, 468 F. Supp. 2d 165, 169 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d at 99) (emphasis in original) (internal brackets omitted). Although all of the documents withheld by the Secret Service pursuant to this privilege involve a communication to or from an attorney, ANSWER contends that the government has failed to show that the communicatio ns reflect an attorney-client relationship, or that they relate to the provision of legal services or advice. See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 8, 10-19; Pl.’s 1st Reply at 3-5. Specifically, ANSWER asserts that the releva nt attorneys – Anne Rowland, legal counsel to the Secret Se rvice, and Assistant United Stat es Attorney Marina Braswell, responsible for litigating this case on behalf of all the defendants – were acting in regulatory or policy-making roles, rather than as attorneys pr oviding legal advice to an agency client. See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 8, 10-12; Pl.’s 1st Reply at 3-5. As this Court previously has noted, “communications made by and to [an] inhouse lawyer with respect to business matters, ma nagement decisions or business advice are not protected by the [attorney-client] privilege .” Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 228 F.R.D. 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Boca Investering P’ ship v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11-12 (D.D.C. 1998)); see also Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 4-5. Similarly, when a government attorney “act[s] more in the nature of a business advisor, le gislator, adjudicator, or regulator, the attorneyclient privilege generally doe s not apply.” General Elec. Co. v. Johnson, Civ. Action No. 00-2855, 2006 WL 2616187, at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2006) (collecting cases); see also Nat’lCouncil of La Raza v. Dep’t of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 360-61 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming attorneyclient privilege inapplicable to legal memora ndum adopted as or incorporated into agency policy). A communication by an attorney work ing for a government agency is protected,6 however, when the communication “relate[s] to some legal strategy, or to the meaning, requirements, allowances, or prohibitions of the law.” General Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 2006 WL 2616187, at *15. The Court has carefully reviewed the documents wit hheld on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and concludes that Ms. Rowland and Ms. Braswe ll were not acting as regulators; nor were they simply providing “neutr al, objective analyses of agency regulations.” Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Rather, it is apparent from the documents and their contents that the attorneys were acting “within the bounds of the privileged attorney-client relationship” in “weigh[ing] the legal risks associated with certain undertakings” and working to “tailor those undertak ings to the requirements of the law.” General Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 2006 WL 2616187, at *16. 3 The Court therefore concludes that Bates Nos. 000185, 000186, 000191, 000537, 000562, 000563, 000566, and 000588 are properly redacted or withheld under the attorney-client privilege. With respect to Bates No. 000316, ANSWE R characterizes this document as an attorney-to-attorney communicatio n (Ms. Rowland to Ms. Braswell) “which was forwarded to an agency official” and “[a]s such, even facially . . . does not fa ll within the attorney-client privilege.” See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 19. ANSWER neglects to note that the agency official, Tim Foley, is an attorney himself. See Supp. Di scovery Doc. Priv. Log, Dkt. No. 152 Ex. 2 at CPLrev-02 (describing Foley as a Secret Service “Agent Attorney”). More over, it appears that

3 ANSWER also suggests that the Secret Service did not specify the individual recipients of Bates Nos. 000006-65, 000273-74, 000275-81, and 000282-87, thereby failing to meet the Secret Service’s burden “to demonstr ate that confidentiality was expected in the handling of these communications” in order to inv oke the attorney-client privilege. See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 16 (quoting Coastal States Gas Cor p. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d at 863). These documents, however, were not withheld as privile ged attorney-client communications, but rather were withheld under the law enforcemen t privilege or as non-responsive.7 this document from Ms. Rowland was forwarded to Mr. Foley – who, in the circumstances, was the representative of the client – in order “to apprise [him] of th e legal advice sought and received.” See Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 5 (quotin g In re Vioxx Products Liability Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 810 (E.D. La. 2007)). It therefore is prot ected by the attorney-client privilege. Having identified no error in Judge Kay’ s reasoning or conclusions, the Court will overrule ANSWER’s objections to Judge Kay’s determinations relating to the attorney-client privilege.

C. Documents Withheld as Attorney Work Product The attorney work product rule “protects from disclosu re any material prepared by or for a party or its attorney or by or for a part y’s representative in anti cipation of litigation.” Hertzberg v. Veneman, 273 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75 (D.D .C. 2003); see also Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 5-7; F ED

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. P. 26(b)(3). “While litigation need not be imminent or certain in order to satisfy the anticipation-of- litigation prong of the test, this circu it has held that ‘at the very least some articulable claim, likely to lead to litigatio n, must have arisen,’ such that litigation was ‘fairly foreseeable at the time’ the materials were prepared.” Hertzberg v. Veneman, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (quoting Coastal States Gas Co rp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d at 865).

ANSWER asserts that certain emails w ithheld or redacted as attorney work product – Bates Nos. 000174, 000175-80, and 000183 – c ould not possibly have been prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, as these communications were sent in December 2004,

before this action had been filed. See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 20. The Secret Service responds that the documents themselves show that “the governme nt attorneys working on this issue obviously8 knew that there would be a challe nge to any action involving rest rictions on facilitative conduct

connected to First Amendment activit y.” Def.’s 1st Opp’n at 17-18. The Court rejects ANSWER’s contention that the documents cannot be protected as attorney work product simply because the pres ent litigation had not yet commenced. Not only was such litigation “fairly foreseeable,” but the possi bility of litigation is explicitly discussed in

these documents. 4 As for ANSWER’s objection to Judge Kay’s ruling with respect to Bates No. 000326, ANSWER does not contest the claim that th e withheld material constitutes attorney work product. This document consists of an email exchange between Anne Rowland and intelligence research specialist Zachary Ains worth, dated January 15 and January 16, 2005. In the unredacted portion of this document, Mr. Ains worth states: “Sticks can be used to pry up cobbles, planters, etc.,” referring to an image attached to the orig inal email. The redacted portion

contains two emails: Ms. Rowland’ s request for more information about the attached image, and

Mr. Ainsworth’s communication of this inform ation. ANSWER itself notes that these emails, sent in the days immediately following the filing of this lawsuit, “appear to be prepared in anticipation of – and, indeed in sp ecific response to – litigation . . . over the sign support issue.” Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 26. Upon reviewing the red acted material, the Cour t agrees that this communication constitutes attorney work product, as it involves an attorney working with an employee of her agency client on a theory of defense in the present litigation. ANSWER contends, however, that th e work product rule embodies only a qualified privilege, and that ANSWER has a “subst antial need for the information” redacted

4 In addition, Judge Kay concluded th at Bates No. 000174 was subject to the attorney-client pr ivilege. See Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 14. ANSWER has not contested this determination.9 from Bates No. 000326 because the reda cted material may relate to “ post-hoc rationalizations being presented in Court by the G overnment as purported security justifications for the ban.” Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 20, 26. But this assertion is not enough to satisfy the burden of “the one who would invade [the] privacy” of the work product privilege to pres ent sufficient reasons to compel production. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947)); see F ED

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. P. 26(b)(3). Upon review of the document, the Court finds that the redacted mate rial provides no substa ntive information about the Secret Service’s “purported security justifications” for the sign prohibition, nor does it

contain evidence of a post-hoc rationalization. Rather, the red acted material merely contains a statement of fact about the image attached to an unredacted email. As such, ANSWER has not shown, and the Court does not perceive, adequate reasons to compel pr oduction through court

order. Finding no error, the Court will overr ule ANSWER’s objections to Judge Kay’s determinations relating to attorney work product.

D. Documents Withheld Pursuant to the Federal Law Enforcement Privilege The federal law enforcement privilege is a qualified privilege that allows for the

nondisclosure “of information that would be contra ry to the public inte rest in the effective functioning of law enforcement.” Tuite v. Henr y, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176 (D.D.C. 1998). It serves to protect “the integrity of law enforcemen t techniques and confid ential sources, protects witnesses and law enforcement personnel, sa feguards the privacy of individuals under investigation, and prevents interference with inves tigations.” Id. at 176-77. In the D.C. Circuit, the government may invoke the law enforcement privilege by presenting a formal claim of10 privilege by the head of the relevant law enfor cement agency, after actual personal consideration by that individual, with a detail ed explanation of the information withheld and the privilege’s applicability to that information. Landr y v. F.D.I.C., 204 F.3d 1125, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).

The Secret Service withheld or redacted several documents on the basis of this privilege, including portions of its Presidential Advan ce Manual, see Bates Nos. 000668, 000682, 000726, 000734-35, 000740, and 000750, and portions of a powerpoint presentation

entitled “JFT-AFIC J-G Verizon/Parade Route Coordination Meeting,” Bates Nos. 000795-97.

The Secret Service maintains that the Presid ential Advance Manual co ntains information on “protective equipment and me thodology,” “protective communication means,” “information regarding motorcade alignment and duties of ag ent personnel in motorcade,” and “protective communication signal.” Supp. Discovery Doc. Pri v. Log, Dkt. No. 152 Ex. 2 at CPLrev-15. The

Secret Service asserts that th e redacted portions of the power point “pertain to security preparations and information regarding potential vulnerabilities regarding [the] parade route” and “the location of a law enforcement command post ,” and “do not pertain to the admission or prohibition of items into the Inaugural parade route.” S ee id. at CPLrev-17. Although the Secret Service has proper ly presented a formal claim of law enforcement privilege, ANSWER correctly notes th at because the privileg e is a qualified one, the “public interest in nondisclosure must be balanced agai nst the need of a pa rticular litigant for access to the privileged information.” Tuite v. Henry, 98 F.3d 1411, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 272). As noted by Judge Kay, the D.C. Circuit has identified the following ten factors “as illustrative of the factors the district court must consider” in balancing these interests:11 (1) the extent to which disclo sure will thwart governmental processes by discouraging citi zens from giving the government information; (2) the impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking discov ery is an actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceedi ng either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether the police investigation has been co mpleted; (7) whether any interdepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the investigation; (8) whet her the plaintiff’s suit is nonfrivolous and brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available through othe r discovery or from other sources[; and] (10) the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff’s case. In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 272 (quoting Fr ankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973)); see also Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 7-8. After reviewing the withheld documen ts, Judge Kay found that the relevant Frankenhauser factors weigh in favor of nondisclo sure. In his analysis, however, Judge Kay drew an analogy between this di spute and the facts in McNamara v. City of New York (In re City of New York), 607 F.3d 923 (2d Cir. 2010), in which the Second Circui t concluded that the law enforcement privilege protected intelligence reports prepared by undercover police officers who had investigated potential secu rity threats prior to a political convention. Id. at 943-47; see

also Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 8. ANSWER assert s that in following McNamara, Judge Kay erroneously applied the Second Ci rcuit’s “strong presumption” ag ainst disclosure, a presumption that has never been adopted by our circuit. See Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 27-29; Pl.’s 2nd Obj. at 1-2.

ANSWER is correct that the Second Ci rcuit’s standard is distinct from the

standard articulated in this ci rcuit. In the Second Circuit, once a party has invoked the law enforcement privilege, the party opposing the pr ivilege must overcome the “strong presumption12 against disclosure” by demonstrat ing that its suit is in good fa ith, the information sought is otherwise unavailable, and the party has a “comp elling need” for the information. McNamara v. City of New York, 607 F.3d at 945; see also Dorsett v. County of Nassau, 762 F. Supp. 2d 500, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying presumption). On ly after the party overcomes this “strong presumption” does the Second Circuit apply the te n-factor balancing test discussed above. McNamara v. City of New York, 607 F.3d at 945. By contrast, the D.C. Circuit has not recognized any strong presumption against disclosure, and the district courts in this ci rcuit generally have conducted the balancing test, weighing the relevant Frankenhauser factors, “wit h an eye toward disclosure.” Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 177 (D.D.C. 1998) (Lamberth, J.); see also Singh v. South Asian Soc’y of the George Washington Univ., Civ. Action N o. 06-0574, 2007 WL 1556669, at *5 (D.D.C. May 24, 2007) (Collyer, J.) (applying no presumption of nondisclosure). The portion of Judge Kay’s analysis that applies a “strong presumption against disclosure” th erefore is erroneous. ANSWER has requested that the Court re view certain of the documents withheld under the law enforcement privileg e, see Bates Nos. 000668, 000682, 000726, 000734-35, 000740, 000750, 000795-97, and order that the remaining documents be reviewed and produced consistent with the principles arti culated in any rulings made after such review. Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 2. Because Judge Kay may have adopted a presump tion against disclosure, the Court agrees that an additional review of the remaining documents is appropriate. Rather than initiating a second round of review and production by the Secret Se rvice and then by Judge Kay, however, the Court has independently reviewed in camera the full set of documents that Judge Kay deemed protected by the law enforcement privilege.13 On a de novo review of all documents wit hheld under the law enforcement privilege, including those documents specified in the preceding pa ragraph and in footnote three, and upon consideration of the rele vant legal factors, without reliance on the Second Circuit’s “strong presumption,” this Court concludes that Judge Kay reached the right result: the law enforcement privilege in fact does protect each of these documents. The withheld information does not relate to materials banned along the para de route, but rather pertains to staffing protocols, the use of certain technological equipment, the ge ographic locations of security facilities, and the email addresse s and telephone numbers of securi ty personnel. Therefore, at least three factors weigh heavily against disclosure. First, the withheld documents are at most marginally relevant to ANSWER’s claim. Second, as the Secret Service co rrectly maintains, the production of the withheld material “would disclose law enforcement techniques,” and “[d]isclosure of the . . . information could fore warn potential attackers by providing them with

sensitive information that could be utilized to ci rcumvent law enforcement efforts.” See Def.’s 2nd Opp. at 6-7 (quoting Declaration of Nicolas Trotta, Dkt. No. 163 Ex. 3 at 2, 4). Third, compelling production of security documents such as these likely would chill governmental selfevaluation and consequent program improvement in this area.

As to other of the Frankenhauser factor s, clearly this lawsu it is non-frivolous and has been brought in good faith. Furthermore, th e withheld information does not pertain to the investigation or arrest of any particular individu als; so there is little ri sk that disclosure will discourage citizens from c ooperating in an investigation or violat e the privacy rights of particular persons, other than security personnel. But ba lanced against the minimal relevance of these documents to ANSWER’s claims, the security ri sk presented by disclosure, and the possible chilling effect, these pro-disclosure factors do not carry the day.14 The Court will sustain in part and ov errule in part ANSWER’s objections to Judge Kay’s privilege determinations relating to th e law enforcement privilege. It will affirm Judge Kay’s designation of these documents as pr otected by the law enforcement privilege, but will do so on different grounds from those arti culated in Judge Kay’s decisions. See Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 10-25; Sept. 27 Mem. Order at 1-2. The Court will set aside the reasoning therein pertaining to the strong presumption against disc losure. See Feb. 3 Mem. Order at 8-9; Sept. 27 Mem. Order at 1-2 (applying legal standa rds set forth in Feb. 3 Mem. Order).

E. Document Withheld as Not Relevant ANSWER objects to the withholdi ng of the document entitled “Standard Operating Procedures for Screening Persons and Property, Parade Security,” numbered as “Withheld 74-84.” Pl.’s 2nd Obj. at 1, 3-5; see Sept. 27 Mem. Order at 1-2. ANSWER asserts that the document is relevant because it discusses “what items were to be included or permitted,

excluded or screened out or searched for at th e checkpoint.” Pl.’s 2nd Ob j. at 4. This draft document, however, was prepared by the Transportation Security Administration – not by the

Secret Service – and the Secret Se rvice represents that it was not used by the Secret Service with respect to its ban on sign supports. See Def.’s 2nd Opp. at 9-10. After examining the document, the Court agrees that it is not relevant to ANSWER’s claims. Th e Court therefore will overrule ANSWER’s objection to Judge Kay’ s relevance determination.15 F. Request for Additional Review ANSWER has requested that “the remainder of all documents under review by the Magistrate Judge be reviewed a nd produced consistent with the principles articulated in any opinion to issue in response to th ese objections.” Pl.’s 1st Obj. at 2. The Court finds no error in either Judge Kay’s analysis or his conclusions relating to the a ttorney-client priv ilege, attorney work product, or relevance. It therefore declines to order, or undertake itself , an additional review of the remaining documents withheld on these grounds. As discussed above, because the Court did detect error in one por tion of Judge Kay’s analysis of the law enforcement privilege, the Court has conducted an independent review of all documents that he deemed protected by this privilege. An additional review of these documents by th e Secret Service or Judge Kay therefore is unnecessary. For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s objections are overruled in part and sustained in part; it

is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Court affi rms in part and sets aside in part Magistrate Judge Kay’s February 3, 2012 decision [131]; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Court affi rms in part and sets aside in part Magistrate Judge Kay’s Septem ber 27, 2012 decision [160]; it is FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s reque st that defendant Secret Service be compelled to produce certain documents (Bates Nos. 000174, 000175-80, 000183, 000185, 000186, 000191, 000316, 000326, 000537, 000562-63, 000566, 000588, 000668, 000682; 000726, 000734, 000735, 000740, 000750, and 000795-000797; and Withheld 74-84) is DENIED; and it is16 FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s re quest that the remainder of documents that Judge Kay deemed properly withheld be su bjected to an additional review is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/______________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN DATE: May 16, 2013 United States District Judge