FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

PATRICIA CARESS McMATH GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MICHAEL WOODSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A05-1106-CR-306

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable James B. Osborn, Judge

The Honorable Patrick Murphy, Commissioner

Cause No. 49F15-1102-FD-009919

 

January 6, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

Michael Woodson (“Woodson”) was convicted of two counts of Fraud, each as a

Class D felony.1 He now appeals.

We reverse.

Issue

Woodson raises two issues for our review. We find one dispositive: whether the trial 

court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence DVDs seized from Woodson 

because the seizure was unlawful under the United States and Indiana constitutions.

Facts and Procedural History

On February 13, 2011, Officer Christopher Cooper (“Officer Cooper”) was on patrol 

in Indianapolis, and had parked his car in a parking lot across the street from a gas station 

and fast-food restaurant on 38th Street in an area of Indianapolis known as a “hot zone” for 

drug activity.2 (Tr. 9.) Officer Cooper’s attention was drawn to a maroon car in the parking 

lot of the gas station. The car was occupied by two individuals, and a bicycle was parked 

immediately next to the vehicle.

One of the individuals, later identified as Woodson, got out of the car, put on a 

backpack, and began to ride the bicycle in the gas station’s parking lot. (Tr. 12.) The car 

drove away and was followed by another police officer. Officer Cooper drove his car into 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-5-4(10).

2 Officer Cooper’s testimony indicates that he worked the “one-thirty to ten” shift and that the events in 

question occurred around “7:30 or 8:00” (Tr. 7), but it is unclear from the testimony whether either Officer 

Cooper’s shift or the incident occurred in the morning or evening.
3

the gas station parking lot and pulled up next to Woodson, who had gotten off the bicycle just 

as Officer Cooper began to approach him.

Officer Cooper asked Woodson what he was doing, to which Woodson responded that 

he was going home. Woodson was “loud” and “belligerent” (Tr. 11), so Officer Cooper 

handcuffed him for officer safety reasons. After confirming Woodson’s identity, Officer 

Cooper asked Woodson whether he could search the backpack. Woodson consented to the 

search and Officer Cooper found thirty-four DVDs, each in a white sleeve, with various 

movie titles handwritten on them. Among the titles were “Green Hornet” and “Sanctum.” 

Knowing that these movies were still in movie theaters and were not available in DVD 

release, Officer Cooper arrested Woodson. Later examination of the DVDs confirmed that 

they contained the titled movies and were not manufactured by the originating movie studios.

On February 15, 2011, Woodson was charged with two counts of Fraud. On March 

30, 2011, Woodson filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending that the DVDs Officer 

Cooper obtained were products of an illegal search and seizure.

On April 21, 2011, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress and a 

bench trial. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and after a bench trial found 

Woodson guilty on both counts. On May 31, 2011, the trial court sentenced Woodson to two 

years imprisonment, with 514 days suspended and 216 executed.

This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

Woodson argues that the trial court erred when it did not suppress and subsequently 
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admitted into evidence the DVDs Officer Cooper obtained because they were the fruit of an 

improper search and seizure.

“Our standard of review of rulings on the admissibility of evidence is essentially the 

same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to suppress or by trial objection.” 

Boston v. State, 947 N.E.2d 436, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We determine whether there is 

substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s ruling. Litchfield v. State, 

824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). We do not reweigh evidence and construe conflicting 

evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Widduck v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We must also consider uncontested evidence favorable to the 

defendant. Id. The trial court’s ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or 

seizure is, however, reviewed de novo. Harper v. State, 922 N.E.2d 75, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)) (applying this 

standard to a Terry stop), trans. denied.

Woodson contends that Officer Cooper’s actions constitute a Terry stop, that is, a brief

detention for investigative purposes, and that under the totality of the circumstances Officer 

Cooper lacked the reasonable suspicion required under the United States and Indiana 

Constitutions to conduct the stop. The State responds that the initial interaction between 

Woodson and Officer Cooper was a consensual encounter that did not implicate Woodson’s 

Fourth Amendment interests, but that Officer Cooper nonetheless had the reasonable 

suspicion required for a Terry stop.

The United States Constitution affords individuals protection from “unreasonable 
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searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Indiana Constitution extends similar 

protections. Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 11. The Fourth Amendment’s protections “extend to brief 

investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States 

v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and United 

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Because the balance between public interest and 

an individual’s right to personal security tilts in favor of a lower standard than probable 

cause, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot” is sufficient to justify such 

investigatory stops. Id. 

Reasonable suspicion requires that there be “some objective manifestation that the 

person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. 

While there is no set of hard-and-fast rules to determine what constitutes reasonable 

suspicion, Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, a mere “hunch” is insufficient. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 

When reviewing investigatory stops for reasonable suspicion, we “look at the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and 

objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (citing Cortez, 

449 U.S. at 417-418). 

A consensual encounter that does not implicate the Fourth Amendment occurs when 

an officer approaches an individual to make a casual and brief inquiry and the individual 

remains free to leave. State v. Calmes, 894 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The test 

for whether a reasonable impression existed that the individual was free to leave is “what a 

reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the citizen’s 
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shoes.” Crabtree, 762 N.E.2d at 245. Several factors may be considered in determining 

whether a reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave, including the presence 

of multiple officers, the display of a weapon, any physical touching of the person, or the use 

of a tone of voice by the officer indicating that compliance might be compelled. Calmes, 894 

N.E.2d at 202.

Here, we cannot conclude that Officer Cooper’s interaction with Woodson began as a 

consensual encounter. Woodson had been riding his bicycle in the parking lot of the gas 

station and was able to see the maroon car that he had just exited being pulled over by 

Officer Cooper’s colleague. Officer Cooper approached as Woodson got off the bicycle, 

pulled his car up immediately next to Woodson, and asked Woodson what he was doing. 

Officer Cooper testified that he would have pursued Woodson if Woodson fled instead of 

complying with the request for information. Officer Cooper handcuffed Woodson for officer 

safety purposes when Woodson became “loud” and “belligerent” in the absence of any 

apparent threat to Officer Cooper and before obtaining information about Woodson from his 

police computer. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that this was a consensual 

encounter.

We thus consider whether Officer Cooper’s stop of Woodson was a proper Terry stop. 

Woodson argues that Officer Cooper lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a 

Terry stop. We agree.

Woodson was one of two individuals in a car parked at a gas station in a “hot zone” of 

drug activity, with a bicycle parked immediately next to the car. Officer Cooper testified that 
7

he could not see what interaction, if any, was occurring within the car. Woodson got out of 

the car carrying a backpack, got on his bicycle, and began to ride it. The State characterizes 

this as Woodson riding “around in circles” (Appellee’s Br. 9), but on cross examination 

Officer Cooper agreed that Woodson was “kind of idly riding his bike” along 38th Street in 

front of a fast food restaurant attached to the gas station. (Tr. 12-13). At some point before 

Officer Cooper approached him, Woodson got off the bicycle, even as he was able to see 

another police officer pull over the maroon car he had just been sitting in.

Officer Cooper testified here that he could not see any transaction between Woodson 

and the driver of the maroon car and there had been no report of criminal activity to which 

Officer Cooper was responding. Woodson did not attempt to flee the scene and hide or dump 

contraband upon completing a transaction and seeing a police officer approach in a highcrime area. See Ross v. State, 844 N.E.2d 537, 541-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Nor did Officer 

Cooper testify that in his training and experience Woodson’s behavior was of a type 

frequently displayed by individuals dealing in pirated DVDs, drugs, or any other contraband. 

See Wilson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 27, 28-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding there was 

reasonable suspicion to detain defendant where the arresting officer was in a high-crime and -

drug area, was trained in the factors pointing to drug transactions, and observed conduct 

conforming to this pattern).

 Only the fact that the area of Indianapolis in which Woodson was arrested was 

considered to be a “hot zone” gave Officer Cooper any kind of suspicion that drug-related or 

other illegal activity might be afoot. Cf. Crabtree, 762 N.E.2d at 246-47 (concluding there 
8

was reasonable suspicion where the defendant was in a high-crime area, it was 4:30 a.m., a 

noise complaint had been conveyed to police, and the defendant was found hiding behind a 

car when police arrived on scene). This is not enough to amount to reasonable suspicion, and 

we therefore cannot conclude under the totality of the circumstances that Officer Cooper’s 

Terry stop was appropriate under the Fourth Amendment.

Because Officer Cooper’s stop of Woodson was neither a consensual encounter nor 

supported by reasonable suspicion, the evidence obtained as a result of that stop—the DVDs 

in Woodson’s backpack—should have been excluded from evidence. The admission into 

evidence of those DVDs was clearly prejudicial because the discs formed the basis for 

subsequent testimony at trial as to the number and nature of the materials, without which the 

State would have lacked sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. We therefore reverse 

Woodson’s conviction.

Reversed.

BAKER, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.