2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-17-2009

USA v. Ely Bell

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-1442

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Ely Bell" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 643.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

 

No. 09-1442

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ELY BELL

also known as 

“HB”

 Ely Bell,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3-07-cr-00170-002)

District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 14, 2009

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed September 17, 2009 )

____

 

OPINION

 

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
2

Appellant Ely Bell pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and the District Court sentenced

him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 100 months imprisonment. On appeal, Bell

challenges only the reasonableness of his sentence. We will affirm. 

I.

In 2007, federal and Pennsylvania law enforcement personnel commenced an

investigation of a suspected drug trafficking ring in Bradford County, Pennsylvania.

During the course of that investigation, Bell directly participated in the sale of crack

cocaine to undercover officers. Following one such transaction, Bell and a co-conspirator

were arrested. Ultimately, a six-count Indictment was returned against Bell and two coconspirators alleging a drug conspiracy to distribute in excess of five grams of cocaine

base and related offenses.

In January 2008, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Bell pled guilty to one

count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The government agreed to drop the remaining charges in

the Indictment, to amend the conspiracy count to reflect a non-specific amount of cocaine

base, and to recommend a three-level downward departure for acceptance of

responsibility. The government also moved for a downward departure of two levels for

substantial assistance.

At Bell’s sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted, without objection from
 Bell was sentenced under the 2007 version of the U.S. 1

Sentencing Guidelines Manual.

3

either party, the findings of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) filed by the

Probation Office. In light of two prior felony drug convictions and a conviction for a 1

crime of violence, Bell was categorized as a career offender under the Sentencing

Guidelines. Including a three-level departure for acceptance of responsibility, Bell

therefore faced an offense level of twenty-nine and a criminal history category of VI,

resulting in an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 188 months imprisonment.

The District Court also granted the government’s motion for a two-level departure for

substantial assistance, which reduced Bell’s Guidelines range to 130 to 162 months

imprisonment.

The District Court then heard argument from both parties regarding an appropriate

sentence in light of the sentencing factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Bell

emphasized his acceptance of responsibility, his very difficult upbringing–his parents

separated when he was twelve, and he lived with his mother and aunt, who were both

addicted to drugs, until he was moved to foster care–and his history of substance abuse

and psychiatric illness, including a diagnosis of schizophrenia before age sixteen. Bell

also noted that, as a consequence of his cooperation with the government in this case, he

was assaulted in prison. In light of these factors, Bell requested a sentence of no more

than eighty-four months imprisonment. The government conceded that Bell’s past was an

important mitigating factor and recommended a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2

§ 3231 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18

U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

4

range in light of Bell’s extensive criminal history, the need for deterrence, and the need

for public safety. 

As noted above, the District Court imposed a sentence of 100 months

imprisonment. The Court expressly found that Bell’s difficult past supported a reduced

sentence, but also concluded that it must balance that past against his extensive criminal

record and the need for deterrence. Accordingly, the Court imposed a substantially

below-Guidelines sentence that was between the sentences requested by Bell and the

government. 

2

II.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). We have

outlined a three-step process for district courts to follow in imposing a sentence. First,

the court must calculate the applicable Guidelines range. Second, it must rule on any

motions for departures pursuant to the Guidelines. Finally, it must consider the § 3553(a)

sentencing factors to determine the appropriate sentence. See id. at 567. 

Here, Bell does not identify any procedural error by the District Court. Indeed, the

District Court adopted the correct calculation of the Guidelines range contained in the

PSR, granted the government’s motion for a downward departure for substantial
5

assistance, and heard argument from the parties regarding the appropriate sentence. The

District Court explained on the record its reasons for the sentence imposed, including

specific reference to the most relevant § 3553(a) factors. 

The crux of Bell’s argument on appeal is that the sentence imposed was

substantively unreasonable because the “District Court failed to give enough weight to

Bell’s mental condition, upbringing, battle with substance abuse, and the reality of his

criminal history.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. However, “if the district court’s sentence is

procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have

imposed the same sentence.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. Here, the District Court acted well

within its discretion. Indeed, it imposed a substantially-below Guidelines sentence in

light of the mitigating factors identified by Bell. The District Court struck a balance

between those mitigating factors, Bell’s extensive criminal history, and the need for

deterrence. We cannot conclude that the Court’s weighing of these countervailing

considerations was an abuse of discretion. 

III.

For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and

sentence.