UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4296

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERTO CARLOS ALVAREZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:07-cr-00289-HEH-1)

Submitted: February 1, 2011 Decided: February 25, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John G. LaFratta, MAIN STREET LAW OFFICE, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Angela 

Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Roberto Carlos Alvarez was convicted, following a jury 

trial, of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and 

possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base. The 

district court imposed a 360-month sentence on the drug charge 

and a 120-month concurrent sentence on the firearm charge. 

Alvarez appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence 

and the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward 

departure or variance from the 360-month to life advisory 

guideline range. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

During the hearing on Alvarez’s motion to suppress 

evidence, Officer Woodson testified that, while working a 

traffic checkpoint, he observed a vehicle approach the 

checkpoint and then turn into a private driveway just prior to 

the checkpoint. The vehicle pulled halfway down the long 

driveway and stopped with the vehicle partially concealed behind 

a bush. Woodson observed the vehicle for about sixty to ninety 

seconds and no one got out of the car. Based on his training 

and experience, Woodson testified that he believed that the 

driver was operating an unregistered vehicle or driving without 

a valid license and was attempting to avoid the checkpoint. He 

then drove his marked police vehicle to investigate.

Woodson parked his police vehicle at the entrance to 

the driveway, blocking the other vehicle from exiting. As he 
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did so, Woodson noted a “no trespassing” sign at the entrance to 

the property. He also observed that there was no one in the 

driver’s seat of the vehicle and a juvenile female was moving 

from the passenger seat to the driver’s seat, while a man who 

was sitting in the back seat started to exit the rear passenger 

side door. 

Woodson directed the man to sit back in the vehicle, 

determined that neither occupant had a license or any 

identification, that the vehicle’s occupants did not live at the 

residence, and the man did not answer Woodson’s requests for his 

name. Woodson patted the man down and discovered a significant 

amount of cash, but no weapon. Woodson walked around the 

vehicle and discovered a black “backpack-type” bag about twenty 

feet from the vehicle. The bag was dry, although it had been 

raining that morning, and inside the bag, Woodson found a 

quantity of cocaine, digital scales, baggies, and a loaded 

firearm. Woodson thereafter arrested the man and charged him

with possession of the firearm and possession with intent to 

distribute cocaine base. The man was later identified as 

Alvarez.

Also at the suppression hearing, the juvenile 

testified that Alvarez became nervous when he saw the 

checkpoint, he then turned into the driveway, and directed that 

she change seats with him. He also threw the black bag out of 
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the window. She testified that Alvarez had made a prior stop at 

a hotel and picked up the black bag.

The district court denied Alvarez’s motion to suppress 

the evidence, finding that Officer Woodson had reasonable 

suspicion to investigate Alvarez’s purpose for pulling into the 

driveway and that the black bag had been abandoned, and 

therefore Alvarez lacked standing to challenge the search of the 

bag. 

This court reviews the district court’s factual 

findings relevant to a motion to suppress for clear error, and 

its legal determinations de novo. United States v. Cain, 524 

F.3d 477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008). The facts are reviewed in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party below. United 

States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 628 (4th Cir. 2007). A vehicle 

stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment and is permissible if the officer has probable cause 

to believe a traffic violation has occurred, Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996), or has a reasonable 

suspicion of unlawful conduct, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 

(1968), regardless of the officer’s subjective motivations. 

Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 813-19.

Alvarez contends that the officer lacked probable 

cause to arrest him based only on the fact that he drove into a 

driveway near the checkpoint. “[W]hen law enforcement officers 
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observe conduct suggesting that a driver is attempting to evade 

a police roadblock — such as unsafe or erratic driving or 

behavior indicating the driver is trying to hide from officers —

police may take that behavior into account in determining 

whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and 

investigate the situation further.” United States v. Smith, 396 

F.3d 579, 585 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, based 

on Alvarez’s conduct of abruptly turning into the driveway prior 

to the checkpoint and pulling halfway down the driveway and 

parking behind a bush, we hold that the district court correctly 

determined that Officer Woodson had reasonable suspicion to stop 

the vehicle and investigate further. 

His observations of the “no trespassing” sign and the 

vehicle’s occupants changing places in the vehicle provided 

additional support for Officer Woodson’s investigation of 

Alvarez and the juvenile. Under the totality of the 

circumstances, the officer’s conduct of blocking the driveway 

was not an unlawful seizure. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 

U.S. 266, 273-75 (2002) (applying “totality of the 

circumstances” test).

The district court also properly denied the motion to 

suppress the drugs and the gun that were found in the black bag. 

As the district court noted, Alvarez did not claim ownership of 

the bag, which was found twenty feet from the vehicle. The 
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juvenile who was a passenger in the vehicle testified that 

Alvarez threw the bag out of the passenger window. This bag 

constituted abandoned property, and therefore Alvarez had no 

expectation of privacy in the contents. See Rawlings v. 

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); United States v. Leshuk, 65 

F.3d 1105, 1110-11 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of Alvarez’s motion to suppress 

evidence.

Alvarez also challenges the district court’s denial of 

his motion for a downward departure or a variance from the 

career offender guideline range of 360 months to life 

imprisonment. While he does not dispute that he had two prior 

convictions for drug trafficking offenses, he asserts that his 

classification as an adult — rather than a juvenile — for the 

first of his drug trafficking offenses could substantially 

overstate the seriousness of his criminal history relative to 

other individuals with similar criminal records.

The district court determined, however, that Alvarez’s 

criminal history was not overstated. Rather, at the time of the 

first drug trafficking offense, Alvarez was 17 years old, had 

three prior felony convictions as a juvenile, and had been 

committed to the department of juvenile services. The district 

court noted that most state court judges would certify such a 

case for adult prosecution, rather than retaining it as a 
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juvenile case. The district court also denied the variance 

request based on the facts that Alvarez had three drug 

trafficking convictions, he was on supervised release at the 

time of this offense, he was in possession of a loaded firearm 

and a large sum of cash in addition to the drugs, and he refused 

to give the officer his name. We conclude that the district 

court’s denial of the downward departure was not an abuse of 

discretion. Additionally, we have determined that Alvarez’s 

sentence was properly calculated and is reasonable. See Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Llamas, 

599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court followed 

the necessary procedural steps in sentencing Alvarez, 

appropriately treated the sentencing guidelines as advisory, 

properly calculated and considered the applicable guidelines 

range, and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) 

factors. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing the chosen sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 41; United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) 

(applying appellate presumption of reasonableness to within 

guidelines sentence).

Alvarez has filed a motion for leave to file a pro se 

supplemental brief. While we grant that motion, we find no 

merit to the claims therein. Accordingly, we affirm Alvarez’s 

conviction and his 360-month sentence. We dispense with oral 
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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED