DAN MORALES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

QBffice of toe !Zlttornep Qhneral 

Btate of ?Ilexae 

February 7,1992 

Honorable John W. Segrest 

criminal District Attorney 

McLennan County 

302 Courthouse hex 

Waco, Texas 76701 

Opinion No. DM-89 

Re: Whether a candidate is eligible to 

the office of alderman in a type B general law city if the candidate meets the 

requirements of section 23.824(a) of the 

Local Government Code, but not the 

requirements of section 141.001(a)(4) of 

the Election Code (FIG-119) 

Dear Mr. Segrest: 

You seek a construction of section 141.001 of the Election Code and section 

23.024 of the Local Government Code. Specifically, you ask whether a candidate is 

eligible to the office of alderman in a type B general law city if the candidate meets 

the requirements of section 23.024(a) of the Local Government Code, but not the 

requirement of section 141.001(a)(4) of the Election Code. 

Section 141.001 of the Texas Election Code provides, in part: 

(a) To be eligible to be a candidate for, or elected or 

appointed to, a public elective office in this state, a person must: 

. . . . 

(4) have not been finally convicted of a felony from 

which the person has not been pardoned or otherwise 

released’ from the resulting disabilities; [and] 

IA person may be released from the disabilities resulting from a felony co&&n pursuant to 

the provisioos of article 42.12, section 23, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a release from 

dhbilities is within the discretion of the court. Accordingly, 85 pointed out in the distrid attorney’s 

brief accompanying the request for this opiaion, a candidate subjtd to section 141.001(a)(4) must meet 

P. 449 
Honorable John W. Segrest - Page 2 (DM-89) 

. . . . 

(6) satisfy any other eligibility requirements 

prescribed by law for the office. 

(b) A statute outside this code supersedes Subsection (a) to 

the extent of any conflict. 

(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to an office for which the 

federal or state constitution or a statute outside this code 

prescribes exclusive eligibility requirements. (Footnote added.) 

Section 23.024(a) of the Local Government Code provides: 

To be eligible for the office of mayor, alderman, or marshal1 

of the municipality, a person must be a qualified voter in the 

municipality and must have resided within the municipal limits 

for at least the six months preceding election day. 

On the plain language of section 141.001 of the Election Code, a candidate 

must meet its requirements unless the requirements “conflict” with a statute outside 

the Election Code or unless other constitutional or statutory law is “exclusive” as to 

the requirements for a particular office. We conclude that section 22.024 of the 

Local Government Code does not exclusively govern eligibility to elective office in a 

type B general law city and does not conflict with section 141.001(a)(4) of the 

Election Code.2 

Section 23.024(a) does not expressly or implicitly indicate that it is intended 

to exclusively govern the qualifications of candidates in type B general law cities. 

Section 141.001(a)(6) makes clear that the legislature anticipated that statutes 

outside the Election Code could prescribe additional requirements for candidates. 

(footnote continued) 

that requirement by the fang deadline in order to be a candidate Lemons v. State, 570 S.W.2d 593 

(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ret’d n.r.e.). 

we note that there are other differences between section 23.024(a) and section 141.001(a)(5). 

We do not address those differences in this opinion. 

p. 450 
Honorable John W. Segrest - Page 3 ( DM- 8 9 1 

Accordingly, where two statutes prescribing candidate qualifications may be read as 

cumulative of each other, we think that a legislative intent that one statute apply 

exclusively, within the meaning of section 141.001(c), must be express or clearly 

implied.3 

Section 23.024(a) is a non-substantive recodification of former article 1141, 

V.T.C.S. See Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 149, $I 1. Article 1141, in turn incorporated 

certain requirements from former article 1137, V.T.C.S., which prescribed 

qualifications for municipal voters, in part, by reference to the general laws of the 

state. At the time the source law for section 23.024 was enacted, all felons were 

permanently disfranchised in Texas and would have been, therefore, barred from 

candidacy under the source law.4 We find no implication that section 23.024 

represents a legislative intent to carve out an exception to the general rule excluding 

felons from public office. 

In Brown v. Patterson, 609 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1980, no writ), 

the court considered whether a conflict existed between the Election Code’s general 

six-month residence requirement for candidates and a specific statute governing the 

election of school trustees which, while requiring residence within the district, had 

no durational requirement.5 Citing well-established rules of statutory construction 

that require statutes to be harmonized where there is no positive repugnance 

between the two, or where the statutes deal with the same subject matter, the court 

31n a brief submitted in regard to this question the secretary of state advises that it is the 

position of that office that ‘for a statute to be held as establishing exdusive eligibility requirements, it 

must expressly so state.” We note that section 31.004 of the Election Code provides: 

(a) The secretary of state shall assist and advise all election 

authorities with regard to the application, operation, and interpretation of 

this code and of the election laws outside this code. 

(b) The secretary shall maintain an informational service for 

answring inquiries of election authorities relating to the administration 

of the election law or the performanw of their duties. 

tie provision of the Election Code of 1951 disfranchising felons, article 1.05, was liberalized 

in 1983. Acts 1983,68th Leg., ch. 792. Former artide 1.05 is the source law for current section 141.001 

of the ELxtion Code of 1985. 

SThe general provision considered in Brown was former article 1.05 of the Election Code of 

1951, the predecessor to current section 141.001 of the Election Code of 1985. 

p. 451 
Honorable John W. Segrest - Page 4 (DM-89) 

found that the general and specific requirements were cumulative of each other. 

We think this reasoning is appropriate here as well. The requirements of section 

23.024(a) of the Local Government Code are not in contlict with the requirement of 

section 141.001(a)(4) of the Election Code. Rather, in this respect, section 

141.001(a)(4) merely prescribes an additional requirement. We further note that a 

candidate for office in a type B general law city must state on his application for a 

place on the ballot that he has not been finally convicted of a felony from which he 

has not been pardoned or otherwise released from the resulting disabilities. Elec. 

Code $6 143.004, 141.031(4)(G). A candidate who does not meet the requirement 

of section 141.001(a)(4) is not eligible to an elective office in a type B general law 

city. 

SUMMARY 

Section 23.024 of the Local Government Code does not 

exclusively govern eligibility to elective office in a type B general 

law city and does not conflict with section 141.001(a)(4) of the 

Election Code. A candidate who does not meet the 

requirements of section 141.001(a)(4) is not eligible to an 

elective office in a type B general law city. 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney General of Texas 

P. 452 
Honorable John W. Segrest - Page 5 (DM-89) 

WILL PRYOR 

First Assistant Attorney General 

MARY KELLER 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY (Ret.) 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RBNEAHIcKs 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON 

Chair, Opiniqn Committee 

Prepared by John Steiner 

Assistant Attorney General 

P. 453