UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1942

TATIANA ZLOBINA,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: March 8, 2016 Decided: March 16, 2016

Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alexander J. Segal, THE LAW OFFICES OF GRINBERG & SEGAL, 

P.L.L.C., New York, New York, for Petitioner. Benjamin C. 

Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Shelley R. 

Goad, Assistant Director, Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Tatiana Zlobina, a native and citizen of Moldova, petitions 

for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(Board) dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ) 

order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

(CAT), and finding that she filed a frivolous asylum 

application. Zlobina challenges the agency’s adverse 

credibility finding and the finding that she filed a frivolous 

asylum application. She also contends that she sustained her 

burden of proof and is eligible for withholding of removal and 

protection under the CAT. We deny the petition for review. 

Zlobina bears the burden of establishing eligibility for 

relief from removal. Hui Pan v. Holder, 737 F.3d 921, 927 (4th 

Cir. 2013). To be eligible for asylum, Zlobina must show that 

she cannot return to Moldova because she has a well-founded fear 

of persecution on account of a protected ground. Id. Zlobina, 

like all aliens, faces a higher burden of proof to establish her 

entitlement to withholding of removal because she must show “a 

clear probability of persecution on account of a protected 

ground.” Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if Zlobina fails to 

meet her burden of proof, she is also ineligible for withholding 

of removal. Id. 
3

The scope of our review is narrow. Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 

926. We review factual findings for substantial evidence; such 

findings are conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would 

be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 

(4th Cir. 2014). We will affirm so long as the decision “is not 

manifestly contrary to law.” Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 926. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse the Board 

only if “the evidence . . . presented was so compelling that no 

reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of 

persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 

(1992); see also Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 

2002).

The IJ, after “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

circumstances, and all relevant factors,” may make an adverse 

credibility determination based on factors such as the 

plausibility of the applicant’s account, the consistency between 

the applicant’s written and oral statements, the internal 

consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such 

statements with other evidence, or any other relevant factor. 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012); Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 928. A 

credibility determination may rest on any relevant factor, even 

one that does not “go[ ] to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
4

The credibility provision “ensures that an IJ does not 

cherry pick solely facts favoring an adverse credibility 

determination while ignoring facts that undermine that result.” 

Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 928 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“When an adverse credibility determination has been made, this 

court must assess whether the IJ or [the Board] identified nonspeculative, specific, cogent reasons in support of the adverse 

credibility finding.” Id. (internal alteration and quotation 

marks omitted). We review an adverse credibility finding for 

substantial evidence. Id. at 926, 928. 

Here, we conclude that the Board’s finding that the IJ 

considered the totality of the evidence before making the 

adverse credibility finding is not clearly erroneous. We 

further conclude that the adverse credibility finding is 

supported by substantial evidence. An adverse credibility 

finding can rest on the determination that the alien submitted a 

fraudulent document in support of her asylum claim. 

Borovikova v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 436 F.3d 151, 156-58 (2d 

Cir. 2006). Zlobina admitted that she submitted several 

fraudulent documents in order to bolster her claims. 

Moreover, we conclude that substantial evidence supports

the Board’s finding that the IJ did not err in determining that 

Zlobina filed a frivolous asylum application. See Siddique v. 

Mukasey, 547 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that whether 
5

alien filed false or fraudulent material supporting asylum 

application is finding of fact reviewed for substantial 

evidence). Zlobina’s claims that she did not receive adequate 

notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum 

application or of what constituted a frivolous asylum 

application are without merit. Finally, we conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the IJ 

did not err in finding Zlobina ineligible for withholding of 

removal or protection under the CAT. 

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED