### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 16, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP1234 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV209 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

N ATHAN B IKOWSKI , P LAINTIFF - A PPELLANT ,
V . P RO S EAMLESS OF W ISCONSIN I NC ., F / K / A P RO S EAMLESS , D EFENDANT - R ESPONDENT .

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Wood County: TODD P. WOLF , Judge. Affirmed

.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Fitzpatrick, and Graham, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS . S TAT . R ULE 809.23(3).No. 2020AP1234

2 ¶ 1 PER CURIAM

. Nathan Bikowski contracted with Pro Seamless of Wisconsin, Inc. to replace the roof and siding on his residence , and he was unsatisfied with Pro Seamless’ s performance . Following completion of t hese projects , Bikowski sued Pro Seamless for breach of contract and trade violation claims and Pro Seamless counterclaimed for unpaid contract amounts

. Bikowski appeals the judgment entered by the circuit c ourt following a bench trial

. According to Bikowski , the court erred when it determined that he failed to m eet his burden of proof on portions of his breac h of contract c laims, and when it denied relief for Pro Seamless’s alleged violations of various trade practices. We reject Bikowski’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND
¶ 2 This is an appeal of a judgment following a three

- day bench trial

. T he parties disputed many facts during the trial , but t he following are undisputed except as noted below

. ¶ 3 Bikowski owns a home in Wisconsin Rapids. In September 2014, following a hailstorm, he entered into two written contracts with Pro Seamless

. Both contracts contained a clause that required the work “to be completed in a workmanlike manner accord ing to standard practices.”
¶ 4 One of the contra cts was for the installation of a new roof over Bikowski’s house and ga rage
. This contract, which we refer to as the “Roofing Agreement,” called for the installation of an ice an d water shield , a drip edge, andNo. 2020AP1234

3 a continuous ridge vent, and also the replacement of the shingles, roof vents, and flashing

. The final pri ce of th e Roofing Agreement was $9,150 .00. 1
¶ 5 The other contract , which we refer to as the “Siding Agreement,” called for t he installation of vinyl siding, aluminum wrap around all windows and doors, and new soffit s and fascia

. 2 The contract price of the Siding Agreement was $11,955.00.
¶ 6 Pro Seamless completed the work on the Roofing Agreement in December 2014 and the work on the Siding Agreement the following s pring. Bikowski’s fiancé e raised issues with Pro Seamless about the quality of its work in March 2015

. Pro Sea mle ss submitted a final invoice for both projects on April 8, 2015 , and Bikowski ’ s fiancé e advised Pro Seamless of additional issues. The parties engaged in the right to cure process found in W IS

. S TAT

. § 895.07 (2019

- 20) , 3 but that process did not result in a resolution of their dispute s
. Bikowski did not pay the final invoice.

1 The Roofing Agreement originally included repair work on the chimney. Pro Seamless contends that, after determining that the chimney required more than just “repair work” and that Pro Seamless would be unable to do the work, it provided Bikowski with a $1,150 credit so he could have some one else replace the chimney. After this adjustment and another smaller credit , the final price for the Roofing Agreement was reduced from $10,500 to $9,150.00. On appeal, Bikowski alleges that the so

- called chimney repair was a “throw in ” designed to induce him to enter into the agreement. We address this a llegation in a footnote below. For now, it suffices to say that it is undisputed that Pro Seamless did not perform any work on Bikow ski’s chimney and did not bill him for any chimney w ork.

2 The S iding Agreement also provided for the installation of river rock or vinyl stone in select areas , 36 feet of gutter, and one 15

- foot downspout. It is undisputed that the rock or stone was not insta lled and that Bikowski was not c harged for that item. Biko wski did not allege that this resulted in a breach of contract. He did challenge the adequacy of the gutter and downspout at trial, but he makes no argument about it on appeal, and we discuss it no further.

3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019

- 20 version unless otherwise noted.No. 2020AP1234

4 ¶ 7 Bikowski filed a complaint alleging that Pro Seamless b reach e d both
contracts and violated various trade p rac tices

. 4 Pro Seamless responded with a counterclaim for $9,274.31, which it claimed r epresented the unpaid balance due under the two contract s
. ¶ 8 Following a bench trial and the submission of post

- trial briefing , the circuit court determined that Pro Seamless breached some but not all of its contractual promises . It awarded damages based on its determination of whether the work in question could be repaired or had to be replaced. Specifically , t he court found that some of the inst allation work contemplated by the Roofing Agreement was not done in a workman like manner , but that there was no “significant violation [] ” of the Roofing Agreement and the minor issues could be easily repaired

. As for the Siding Agreement , the court determined that Pro Seamless did not breach the portions of the Siding Agreement pertaining to the soffits, but that it had breached the portions of the Siding Agreement pertaining to the aluminum wrap and the vinyl siding and that this work had to be repl aced

. ¶ 9 As for a remedy, t he court determined that B ikowski was entitled to damages for breach of the Siding Agreement in the amount of $7,050. 00 , which represented the cost to replace the siding and the aluminum w rap
. T he court subtracted that amount f rom the $9,274.31 that Bikowski still owed on the contracts. It ordered t hat the difference, $ 2,224.31 , would be held in a n attorney
trust a ccount and used to pay for the minor repairs that were required under the

4 The complaint also included claims for slander of title and breach of W IS

. S TAT

. § 895.07. The slander of title claim was dismissed during the trial

. As for the § 895.07 claim, Bikowski does not challenge any aspect of the circuit court’s determinations regarding that claim on appeal.No. 2020AP1234

5 Roofing Agreement , and that any portion of these funds that remained after the repairs were completed would bel ong to Pro Seamless.
¶ 10 As for the alleged trade practices violations, the circuit court determined that Pro Seamless had violated some provision s in the Wisconsin Statutes and the Wisconsin Administrative Code that regulate trade practices, but that Bikowski failed to prove that he was entitled to relief for any violation.
¶ 11 Bikowski appeals. We present additional background and address the parties’ disputes of fact as needed in our discussion below.

DISCUSSION
¶ 12 Our standa rd for reviewing a decision following a bench trial is well established

. We apply a highly deferential standard to the circuit court’s findin gs of fact

. Royster
- Clark, Inc. v. Olsen’ s Mill, Inc. , 2006 WI 46, ¶11 , 290 Wis. 2d 264 , 714 N.W.2d 530

. The circuit court is the ultimate arbiter of witness credibility, and when more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the credible evidence, the reviewing court must accept the inference drawn by the circuit court. Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co. , 87 Wis. 2d 243, 249

- 50, 274 N.W.2d 647 (1979). We will not set aside a fact found by the circuit court unless the record shows it to be clearly erroneous

— meaning that, after accepting all credibility determinations made and reasonab le inferences drawn by the fact finder, the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence supports a contrary finding. Noll v. Dimiceli ’ s , Inc. , 115 Wis. 2d 641, 643

- 44, 340 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1983).
¶ 13 W e review questions of law independently and without deference to the circuit court

. Royster
- Clark, Inc. , 290 Wis. 2d 264, ¶13. Interpretation ofNo. 2020AP1234

6 statutes and administrative r egulation s are question s of law

. Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen, Milk Processors, Cannery, Dairy Emps. & Helpers Loc. No. 695 v. LIRC , 154 Wis. 2d 75, 84, 452 N.W.2d 368 (1990) (statutes); Moonlight v. Boyce , 125 Wis. 2d 298, 303, 372 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Ct. App. 1985) (administrative regulations)

.
I
. Breach of Contract
¶ 14 We begin by addressing Bikowski’s arguments about the contracts. As state d , the circuit court found that Pro Seamless breach ed the Siding Agreement with regard to the aluminum wrap and siding, and Pro Seamless does not challenge this determinat ion on appeal. As for the remainder of Bikowski’s contract claims , the court found that Pro Seamless had committed only minor breaches of the Roofing Agreement and no breach of the portion of the Siding Agreement that called for repl acements of the soffits

. The court granted Pro Seamless’s counterclaim in part on th e same basis.
¶ 15 Bikowski argues that the circuit court er red by awarding only partial relief on his breach of contract claims , and by partially granting Pro Seam less’s counterclaim for the unpaid balance

. He contends t hat the court should have applied th e Uniform Dwelling Code when c onsidering Pro Seamless’s co ntract performance, and that the facts demonstrate that Pro Seamless breached the Roofing Agreement in its entirety and the portion of the Siding Agreement that called for the installation of soffits

. We ad dress these arguments in turn, concluding that any error on the court’s part with regard to the Uniform Dwelling Code is inconsequential, and that the c ourt properly found that Bikowski did not meet his burden of proof regarding the portions of the Roofing Agreement and Siding Agreement for which the c ourt did not find any breach.No. 2020AP1234

7 A. The Uniform Dwelling Code
¶ 16 The Un iform Dwelling Code (UDC) , found in W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE

c hs. SPS 320

- 325 (August 2021) 5 , is a statewide building code for one

- and two

family dwellings . V arious municipalit ies , including Wisconsin Rapids , have adopted the UDC

. ¶ 17 During trial, the parties disputed whether the UDC ’s requirements are applicable to the siding and roofing work that Pro Seamless performed on Bikowski’s residence, which was originally constructed in 1953

. 6 The circuit

cou rt determined that the UDC ’s requirements were in applicable because Bikowski’s residence was constructed prior to the UDC ’s effective date

. T herefore, the court analyzed Bik owski’s breach of contract claims sole ly under the workmanlike manner and standard practices standard , without consider ing whether Pro Seamless’s work w as consistent with the UDC

. ¶ 18 Bikowski contends that the circuit court erred , and that the UDC ’s requirements apply to Pro Seamless’s work . He appears to be arguing that the

5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Administrative Code are to the August 2021 register unless otherwise indicated.

6 The dispute related to the scope provision of the Uniform Dwelling Code (UDC) , which provides th at the UDC applies to a ll one

- and two

- family dwellings built on or after the effective dates under § SPS 320.03. W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § SPS 320.02(1)(a). T he UDC’s effective dates were in 1978 and 1980, long after Bikowski’s residence was constructed. W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § SPS 320.03. However, § SPS 320.02(2)(d) also states that “[a]ny municipality may, by ordinance, adopt the provisions of chs. SPS 320 to 325 to apply to any additio ns or alterations to existing dwellings,” (emphasis added), and Wisconsin Rapids expressly adopted by reference SPS chs 320

- 325 “to all remodeling or alterations in existin g one
- and two

- family dwellings, ” Wisconsin Rapids Building Code Section 14.06(2) (e mphasis added)

. T he parties dispute d whether the siding and roofing work should be considered an “alteration” covered by the UDC and the Wisconsin Rapids Building Code, or a “ repair ” that is not covered by the UDC and the Wisconsin Rapids Building Code

. We do not resolve this dispute because, as discussed below, its resolution is not dispo sitive to any issue on appeal.No. 2020AP1234

8 court ’ s failure to consider the UDC ’s requirements made a difference in the outcome of t his case. However, after carefully reviewing the record and Bikowski’s appellate brief ing , we are not persuaded that the court would have reached any different conclusion s even if it had considered the UDC’s requirements when evaluating Bikowski’s breach of contract claims

. ¶ 19 Bikowski general ly asserts that Pro Seamless ’ s work was not consistent with the UDC . However, he cites just one specific provision in the UDC , W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § SPS 321.28(3)(a) 3., that is even arguably pertinent to the issues he raises on appeal

. This section specifically pertains to the Roofing Agreement, and it provides that “ [ s ] hingles shall be installed in accordance with manufacturer ’ s recommendations. ” W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § SPS 321.28(3)(a) 3

. ¶ 20 The parties vigorously dispute whether Pro Seamless followed the manufacturer’s recommendations when installing the shingles. Bikowski argues that the manuf

acturer’s manual recommends “ hand

- sealing ” shingles if installed in fall or winter, and that Pro Se amless did not follow this recommendation. 7 According to Bikowski, “ the mere fact that [Pro Seamless] did not hand seal the shingles is a b reach. ” Pro Seamless tacitly acknowledge s that it did not hand seal the shingles, but it counters that the manual d oes not actually require shi ngles to be hand sealed at the temperatures at wh ich they were installed.

7 More specifically, the manual provides: “All shingles, which contain a factory

- applied self

- sealing strip, must be subjected to sunlig ht for several days before full sealing will occur. Shingles installed in fall or winter may not seal until the following spring; consequently, the shingles should be hand

- sealed

. ” It further provides: “ Shingles which do not receive direct sunlight or w hich are not exposed to adequate surface temperatures may never seal. ”No. 2020AP1234

9 ¶ 21 W e need not wade into the se evidenti ary disputes t o conclude that the application of W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § SPS 321.28(3)(a) 3

. would not have altered any of the circuit court’s determination s with regard to the Roofing Agreement. This is because proof of damages is one element of a breach of contract claim, 8 and Bikowski did not introduce any evidence that any shingles failed to seal despite the failure to hand seal them. 9 After hearing the ev idence, the circuit court found: “Nobody found any shingles that weren’t properly sealed. They tested a few of them. They appeared all to be sealed properly, so I don’t find that the pla intiffs have made their burden of proof ....” Bikowski does not make any developed argument that thi s finding is clearly erroneous.
¶ 22 For these reasons , we conclude the application of W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § SPS 321.28(3)(a) 3. would not have ch anged the circuit court’s ultimate determination about the Roofing Agreement. And Bikowski does not identify any other UDC provision that t he court s hould have considered that might have made a difference in its determination s about the R oofing Agreement or the portion of the Siding Agreement that called for the installation of soffits. 10 Under these

8 See Brew City Redev. Grp., LLC v. The Ferchill Grp. , 2006 WI App 39, ¶11, 28 9 Wis. 2d 795, 714 N.W.2d 582 (providing that the three elements of a breach of contract claim are (1) a c ontract between the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) a failure of the defendant to do what it unde rtook to do; and (3) damages).

9 Bikowski presented the written report and testimony of an expert who inspected the roof the summer after the shingles were i nstalled. In his written report, Bikowski’s expert acknowledged that “ the vast majority of the shingles were sealed down.” The written report did not id entify any shingle that was not sealed at the time the inspection occurred , and the expert did not tes tify that he found any shingles that were unsealed. Additionally, during his trial testimony, Bikowski’s expert acknowledged that there was no evidence of water infiltratio n through the roof.

10 Bikowski’s expert also identified provisions of the UDC that pertain to the proper installation of a waterproof barrier under the siding. However, the circuit court found that Pro Seamless breached this portion of the Siding Agreement even without reference to the se UDC provisions . Accordingly, consideration of t he UDC would not have changed the court’s conclusions about the Siding Agreement.No. 2020AP1234

10 circumstances, we need not decide whether the circuit court erred when it concluded that the UDC was inappli c able. Any potential error did not alter the
outc ome of the trial

. See Milton v. Washburn Cnty

. , 2011 WI App 48, ¶8 n.5, 332 Wis. 2d 319, 797 N.W.2d 924 ( “ [I]f a circuit court reaches the right result for the wrong reason, we will nevertheless affirm. ” ).

B. The Roofing Agreement
¶ 23 Bik owski argues that the circuit court erroneously determined that he had not met his burden to prove that P ro Seamless breached the Roofing Agreement in its entirety

. We have already addressed Bikowski’s arguments about the shingles , and we now address the remai ning issues about the Roofing Agreement.
¶ 24 T he circuit court ma d e the following findings of fact. It found that the drip edge was separating from the roof in two distinct areas , and that the ridge vent was buckling and warped and ne eded to be re attached to the roof. The court determined that the drip edge and ridge vent had not been installed in a workmanlike manner, but that the problems could be repaired

. It noted that both parties had taken an “all or nothing approach” to damage s, and t hat neither party provided estimates of the cost for repairs

. As the court explained, given the parties’ submissions, “the best way [ it could ] handle” damages under the Roofing Agreement was to order that the minor repairs would be paid from the $ 2,224.31 that was otherwise owed to Pro Sea mless

. ¶ 25 As we understand his appellate briefing , Bikowski does not appear to challenge the circuit court’s determination about the ridge vent. Apart from the shingles, which we have addressed, Bikowski’ s argument about the Roofing Agreement is focused on the drip edge and the adequacy of the remedy imposedNo. 2020AP1234

11 by the court

. Bikowski appears to be arguing that the evidence showed that improper installation of the drip edge c reate d the potential for water infiltration, that it could not be repaired , and that the entire roof must instead be replaced . He contends that Pro Seamless ’s breach of the Roofing Agreement excus es Bikowski’s obligation to pay for any of the roofing work

. ¶ 26 Bik owski’ s argument is not consistent with our standard of review. Whether Pro Seamless materially breached the Roofing Agreement in its entirety is a question of fact. See Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. DOT , 2010 WI 15, ¶50

n n
. 28

- 29 , 323 Wis. 2d 294, 779 N.W.2d 423 ( explaining that t he determination whether a material breach has occurred is generally a question of fact for the circuit court); see also Shy v. Indus trial Salvage Material Co. , 264 Wis. 118, 125, 58 N.W.2d 452 (1953) (explaining that the issue of whe ther a party’s breach excuses future performance by the non

- breaching party presents a question of fact). As state d above, we defer to a circuit court’s decision on questions of fact unless clearly erroneous, and the circuit court is the ultimate arbiter of witness credibility. Cogswell , 87 Wis. 2d at 249

- 50.
¶ 27 Bikowski presents the opinion offered by his expert witness regarding the drip edge as if it were established fact, and he fails to address the expert testimony about proper insta llation techniques that was provided by a Pro Seamless employee

. During the trial, that employee testified that, when installing a square drip edge on the roof of an existing building that has shifted and moved, it sometimes needs to be fastened with a nail to keep it straight, which is what occurred in th is case. The employee acknowledges that the drip edge has lifted in a couple places, and he testified that to fix this problem, these places “ should be resealed

... and tacked down.” The circuit court implicitly credited this opinion and discredit ed the opinion of Bikowski’s expert, who testified that the entire dripNo. 2020AP1234

12 edge would need to be replaced. It is for the fact find er to sort between competing expert opinions , and that is precisely what the cour t did here

. Adams Outdoor Advert., Ltd. v. City of Madison , 2006 WI 104, ¶27, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803 (The “weight and credibility to be given to the opinions of expert witnesses is ‘uniquely within the province of the fact finder.’” ( q uoted sourc e omitted)). We discern no err oneous exercise of discretion.
¶ 28 Bikowski also argues that the remedy imposed by the circuit court for the roof repairs is inadequate. He contends that the court erred when it “limited ” the damages to the r emaining balance due on the contract. We disagree. At trial, Bikowski took an all

- or
- not hing approach, maintaining that the entire roof need ed to be replaced. As a result of this appro ach , he did no t provide an estimate of th e cost to repair . Under the circumstances, in which t he court did not find that the roof needed to be replaced in its entirety and there was no evidence about the cost to repair the minor issues identified by the court , it might have been within the court’s discretion to entirely deny recovery for Bikowski

. See Thorp Sales Corp. v. Gyuro Grading Co. , Inc

. , 107 Wis. 2d 141, 153, 319 N.W. 2d 141 (Ct. App. 1982) (stating that a plaintiff in a breach of contract bears th e burden of
p roving reasonably certain damages ). Here , the court instead endea vored to craft a remedy that aimed to addr ess the minor issues that the court found needed to be addressed. Bikowski does not provide any basis for us to disturb the court’s reasonable exer cise of discretion. 11 See Cords v. Anderson , 80 Wis. 2d 525, 552

- 53, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977) (“In reviewing damage awards granted in either a

11 Pro Seamless does not appeal the circuit court’s decision to set aside $2,224.31 in trust to be used for the repairs that the court found were needed on the roof.No. 2020AP1234

13 bench or jury trial this court does not substitute its judgment f or that of the fact finder, but rather determines whether the award is within reasonable limits.”)

C. The Siding Agreement
¶ 29 We now address Bikowski’s argument about the Siding Agreement. As stated above, the circuit court found that Pro Seamless breached the Siding Agreement with rega rd to the aluminum wrap and siding, but n ot with regard to the soffits.
¶ 30 By way of background, the original soffits were wooden, and the Siding Agreement called for the installation of aluminum soffits. T he Siding Agreement did not stat e that the original wooden soffits would be removed , but Bikowski ’s fiancé e testified that she asked Pro Seamless to remove them and Pro Seamless agreed

. Bikowski asserts that Pro Seamless’s failure to remove the original soffits resulted in airflow being reduc ed by “fifty percent,” consistent with his trial testimony that he observed ice damming for the first time since the soffits were installed. However, these assertion s were not supported by expert testimony

. The only evidence of testing was done by Pro Seamless’s e xpert , who testified that he used a wire to verify that the vent in the old soffit had been widened and ultimately determined that the venting met industry standards and was more than adequate

. For his part, Bikowski’s expert acknowledged that he had not done any testing to substantiate Bi kowski’s assertions about airflow an d further testified: “I still to this day do not know whether t here is enough sufficient f low at the eaves.”
¶ 31 It is apparent that t he circuit court did not credit Bikowski’s fiancé e ’s testimony about an oral agreement, and it found “no indication in the [Siding A greement ] that the old soffits would be

... totally removed. ” As forNo. 2020AP1234

14 damages, the court further found that Bikowski’s assertion that the sof fits provided poor ventilation was “pure speculation” that was no t “supported by the evidence.”
¶ 32 Apart from asserting that the circuit court should have credited his evidence, Bikowski does not develop any argument explaining how the court erred. The Siding Agreement does not address the removal of the original soffits , and it was within the court ’s discretion to credit or discredit testimony about an oral agreement. As for damages, the court could reasonably disregard Bikow ski’ s unsubstantiated assertions as speculation. The c ourt’s determination that Bikowski failed to meet his burd en of proof regarding the soffits is not clearly

erroneous
. ¶ 33 For all these reasons, we reject Bikowski’s arguments that the circuit court should have found that Pro Seamless materially breached the Roofing Agreement in its entirety and the portion of the Siding Agreement pertaining to the soffits. 12

I I
. Trade Practices
¶ 34 We now turn to Bikowski’s argument abou t Pro Seamless’s trade practices. Bikowski contends that Pro Seamless violated a number of Wisconsin

12 We likewise reject Bikowski’s argument, which he barely dev elops , that the circuit court erred by granting Pro Seamless’s counter claim to recover the balance due for services it performed under the contracts. If Bikowski is now arguing on appeal that he shou ld have been excused from paying the amount due to Pro Seamless because the court found that portions of the two contracts had been breached, we reject the argument because it was not adequately raised in the circuit court. See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist. , 2010 WI 86, ¶45 & n.21, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (explaining that issues not raised in the circuit court may be forfeited and supporting proposition that appellate courts generally do not address forfeited issues). Indeed, in his post

- t rial submissions to the circuit court, Bikowski expressly advocated for a component

- by

- component approach to damages for breach of contract

.No. 2020AP1234

15 statutes and code provisions that regulate the home improvement industry, including W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.148 (2) , W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65(3), and various provisions in W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE c h. ATCP 110. We address Bikowski’s arguments about these statutes and regulations in turn, ult imately concluding that the court did not err when it declined to grant relief

.
A. W IS . S TAT . § 101.148 (2)
¶ 35 U nder W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.148(2), a contractor is required to deliver a notice and a brochure concerning construction defects to a consumer before entering into a written contract for remodeling work on a dwelling

. During the trial, the parties disputed wheth er Pro Seamless had timely delivered the notice and brochure to Bikowski . T he circuit court found that Pro Seamless violated W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.148(2), but it did n ot order any damages or any other type of remedy

. ¶ 36 Bikowski does not appear to assert that he su ffered any harm as a result of Pro Seamless’s failure to deliver the notice and brochure

. Although his appellate briefing is not entirely clear on this point, h e may be arguing that he i s entitled to a “remedial penalty” as a re sult of the violation. W e disagree for two

reasons
. ¶ 37 First, Bikowski does not develop any argument t hat the circuit court has authority to impose a remedial penalty for a violation of W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.148(2). The t ext of § 101.148 does not specifically provide any penalty for a person’s failure to deliver the notice and brochure. T he enforcement mechani sm for that statute is found in W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.02(13)(a), which provides: “If any ... person violates this subchapter , or fails

... to perform any duty specified under this subchapter ... for which no penalty has been specifically provided , ” that personNo. 2020AP1234

16 “shall forfeit and p ay into the state treasury a sum not less than $10 nor more than $100 for each such offense.” 13 W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.02 (13)(a). Thus, the statute is explicit

— any forfeiture should be paid to the s tate , no t to a consumer in a private cause of action

. ¶ 38 Second, we agree with Pro Seamless that Bikowski forfeited any entitlement to a remedial penalty for a v iolation of W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.148(2). During the circuit court’s ora l ruling, the court specifically determined that Pro Seamless violated § 101.148(2) , but it did not address whether Bikowski was entitled to a remedy for t his violation . After the court w as done issuing rulings , it specifically asked: “[I]s there anything that I am missing that I need to deal with ...?” Bikowski’s attorney responded in the negative, stating: “I think you’ve covered all of the claims.” He did not raise the issue of any ent itlement to a remedial penalty for the violation of § 101.148(2). We normally do not consider issues that were not raised in the circuit court, and we do not see any reason to do

so here. See Schill v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist ., 2010 WI 86, ¶45 & n. 21, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177 (explaining the forfeiture rule ).

B. W IS . S TAT . § 100.65 (3)
¶ 39 Under W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65(3)(a) , residential contractor s must furnish certain customer s with statement s relating to the customers ’ potential expectation s that proceeds from insurance claim s will be used to pay for contract

13 The subchapter referred to in W IS

. S TAT

. § 101.02(13)(a) is titled “REGULATION OF INDUSTRY: GENERAL PROVISIONS” and consists of W IS

. S TAT

. § § 101.01

- 101.599.No. 2020AP1234

17 work

. 14 Additionally, § 100.65(3)(b) requires a residential contractor to provide a form “NOTICE OF CANCELLATION” that the customer can use to cance l the contract i f the insurance carrier denies the claim

. It appears to be undisputed that Pro Seamless did not provide Bikowski with the statement and form required by W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65 (3) for either contract

. The circuit court found that Pro Seamless knew that Bikow ski intended to use insurance proceeds to pay for at least a portion of the work, and that Bikowski’s insurance company did in fact d o

so.
¶ 40 In its oral ruling, the circuit court indicated that it was not “concerned with any violations of [ W IS

. S TAT

. ] § 100.65 ” because both parties were already aware of and dealing with Bikowski’s insurance company . In

ess ence, the court took no action regarding Pro Seamless ’s failure to comply with § 100.65(3) because Bikowski suffered no h arm

— his insur er was already involved , and it was evident to the parties t hat it would not be denying the claim.
¶ 41 Bikows ki argues that the circuit court misinterpreted the language of W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65(3) , which, Bikowski appears to suggest, mandate s that the statement and form be provided regardless of whether the parties are already on noti ce that an insurer ha s approved payment of a claim. H e points to § 100.65(9) , which provides: “A ny person who violates this section shall forfeit not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 for each violation. ” Bikowski contends that the circuit court erred when it failed to award him at least $2 , 000 in forfeitures

— $5 00 for the

14 Specifically, t h e statement required by W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65(3)(a) asks the customer to indicate whether “the work contemplated by this contract is related to a claim under a property insurance policy,” and informs the customer, “[y] ou may cancel this contract at any time before midnight on the third business day after you have received written notice from your insurer that the claim has been denied in whole or in part under the property insurance policy .”No. 2020AP1234

18 violation of § 100.65(3) (a) and $5 00 for the violation of § 100.65(3) (b) for each of
two contracts

— b ased on “the plain mandate ” of § 100.65(9)

. Pro Seamless
counters that it is not clear “ who this forfeiture should be paid to , ” and further, that B ikowski forfeited any entitlement to a forfeiture when his attorney failed to specifically raise the issue at the close of the circuit court’s oral ruling.
¶ 42 To the extent that th e circuit court determined that Pro Seamless did not violate W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65 because Bikowski’s insurer was already involved,

we would not ag ree with t h at analysis. Yet , when a circuit court “ reaches the right result for the wrong reason, we will nevertheless affirm. ” Milton , 332 Wis. 2d 319 , ¶8 n.5 . Here, we conclude that the circuit court nevertheless reached the right result for two reasons.
¶ 43 First, Bikowski does not develop an argument that he would be entitled to collect the f

orfeiture provided for in W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65(9) . That
statute do es not explicitly provide that the consumer may bring a private cause of action to c ollect such forfeitures . And , as we have seen, “forfeitures” for

nonco mpliance with industry regulations are often paid to the state , not to consumers in a private cause of action

. See supra ¶3 7

. ¶ 44 Second, we agree with Pro Seamless tha t Bikowski forfeited any

e ntitlement to these forfeitures by fai ling to raise the issue after the circuit court made its oral ruling. A s discussed above, the court ruled that there would be no recovery under W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.65(3) because B ikowski did not suffer any harm. The court did not address Bikowski’s claim that he was entitled to forfeitures under § 100.65(9). Yet, when the court then asked whether it was missing anything t hat it needed to deal with, Bikowski’s attorney responded i n the negative. Bikowski’s attorney did not take the opportunity to allow the court toNo. 2020AP1234

19 correct any error it made based on what Bikowski characterizes as the “plain mandate” of § 100.65(9). We conclude that Bikowski forfeited this issue by failing to brin g the issue to the attention of the circuit court. See Sch ill , 327 Wis. 2d 572 , ¶45 n.21 (one of the policies underlying the forfeiture rule is to give the circuit court notice of any error and a fair opportunity to address it )

.

C. W IS . A DMIN . C ODE § ATC P 110
¶ 45 Thr oughout the trial, Bikowski argued that Pro Seamless violated a number of regulations adopted by t he Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection in W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE c h. ATCP 110. These regulations were adopted by the agency pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.20(2 )

. See c h. ATCP 110 (Note)

. ¶ 46 Bikowski argues that he is entitled to double damages and attorney fees pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.20(5) and Stuart v. Weisflog ’ s Showroom Gallery, Inc. , 2008 WI 22, ¶24, 308 Wis. 2d 103, 746 N.W.2d 762. S ubs ection 100.20(5) provides: “Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation by any other person of

... any order issued under this section may sue for damages therefor

... and shall recover twice the amount of such pecuniary loss, together with costs, including a reasonable attorney fee.” In Stuart , our supreme court explained that recovery is appropriate under this section when there is a “ cl ear causal connection ” between the pecuniary loss and the trade violation. Stuart , 308 Wis. 2d 103, ¶24

. ¶ 47 Here , the circuit court appeared to conclude that Bikowski had to prove some kind of deception or misrepresentation to prevail und er W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.25(5) . In so doing, the court may have misi nterpreted the language of the pertinent statutes and administrative regulations, which do not necessarily requireNo. 2020AP1234

20 deception or misrepresentation. 15 Under the circumstances, Bikowski argues , the court erred by failing to engage in an analysis of whether there was a causal connection between the alleged violations of W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE ch. ATCP 110 that he pursued in the post

- trial brief and any pecuniary damages he purportedly suffered . We dis agree. In this case, d espite its possible misinterpretation of the statutory and regulatory requirements , we conclude that the court did not commit reversible error

. Bikowski failed to present any evidence or argument that wou ld have show n a causal conne ction between a violation of c h. AT CP 110 and any pecuniary loss he purportedly suffered

. ¶ 48 During the circuit court proceedings and again in his post

- trial brief , Bikowski pointed to sparse and disputed evidence purporting to show that P ro Seamless violated variou s trade regulations found in W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE c h. ATCP 110. 16 However, with one exception discussed below, Bikowski did not attempt to

15 The circuit court referenced W IS JI C IVIL 2720 , which specifically addresses th e provisions of W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § ATCP 110.05, most of wh ich involve some kind of deception or misrepresentation. However, Bikowski pursued violations of different sections o f ATCP
c h. 110, see infra n ote 1 6 , and these sections do not appear to address dece ption and misrepresentations. Separately, Bikowski asserts that he did in fact prove that Pro Seamless made misleading representations about performing work on his chimney

. First, Bikowski did not develop this argument in the circuit court . Second, he does not cite a ny specific section of W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE c h. ATCP 110 on appeal that would entitle him to relief . Third , his argument also fails because, again, Bikowski does n ot show any causal connection between the alleged misrepresentation and any pecuniary loss

. See State v. Pettit , 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646

- 47 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (w e need not consider arguments that are unsupported by adequate factual and legal citations or are ot herwise undeveloped).

16 Specifically, in his post

- trial brief to the circuit court, Bikowski argued that he had proven that Pro Seamless violat ed the following provisions in W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE c h. ATCP 110: (1) § ATCP 110.04 by failing to timely provide copies of written warranties; (2) § ATCP 110.05(2)(a) by failing to identify the agent who solicited the contract; (3) § ATCP 110.05(2)(b) by failing to adequately describe the roofing and siding works contemplated by the agreements; (4) § ATCP 110.05(2 )(d) by failing to provide a start date and end date in the Siding Agreement; (5) § ATCP 110.05(2)(f) by failing to furnish statements of guarantees or warranties; (continued)No. 2020AP1234

21 conne ct any alleged violation to any pecuniary loss

. He merely asserted in conclusory fashion that he was entitled to double the contract amounts, which were “the amount[s] necessary to remedy the issues caused by [Pro Seamless’s] failure to comply with the [UDC], the manufacturer’s installation instructions, and their own practice and poli cy.” As such , the argument Bikowski advanced in the circuit court in favor of double damages appeared to be based on his allegations that Pro Seamless breached the Roofing Agreement and the Siding Agreement

— not on his allegation that Pro Seamless violat ed any provision in c h. ATCP 110.
¶ 49 Bikowski makes ju st one attempt to show a causal connection between a violation of W ISCONSIN A DMIN

. C ODE ch. ATC P 110 and a pecuniary loss. Th at sole attempt pertains to the shingles and fails for reason s we now explain

. ¶ 50 W ISCONSIN A DMIN

. C ODE § ATCP 110.027 (1) provides that “[a] seller must give the buyer timely notice of any impending delay in the home improvement contract performance if performance will be delayed beyond a deadline specified i n the home improvement contract,” and further , that “ no change in performance deadline s is effective unless the buyer agrees in writing to the change. ” Here, the Roofing Agreement specified that the work would be completed in the “fall.” Bikowski contends that Pro Sea mless delayed the shingle

(6) § ATCP 110.05(4) by failing to furnish insurance protections within the agreement; (7) § ATCP 110.05(5) by failing to identify a person performing some of the contract work as an independent contractor; and (8) § ATCP 110.027 by failing to provide written notice regarding a delay in performance on the Roofing Agreement.
We note that the f acts pertaining to these violations were vigorously disputed at trial, as were the interpretation and application of the pertinent regulations. The court did not make any specific findings of fact about whether Pro Seamless actually violated any of these regulations.No. 2020AP1234

22 installation until mid

- December without writte n notice or his agreement , and that “[t] his led to various issues with the roof, i.e. , the arcing shingles, all the shingles not sealing , [and] the separation of the ice and water protection. ” The parties dispute whether there was actually any delay in th e contract performance, and whether December is or is not considered part of “fall.”
¶ 51 W e need not resolve these disputes because, even if we were to agree that performance was delayed contrary to W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § ATCP 110.027(1) , Bikow ski’s a ssertion that the delay caused him to suffer a pecuniary loss is not supported by evidence in the record. A s we have already explained, the circuit cour t reasonably found that the evidence presented at trial did not establish that the shingles were not sealed. Nor does Bikowski identify any portion of the record showing that any shingles were arcing or suggesting that a ny delay in shingl e installation ca used the ice and water protection to separate from the roof in two places . Indeed, Bikowski’ s own expert specifically testified that the separation was caused by the method by which the drip edge was installed. Bikowski does not connect the issues with t he drip edge to any violation of

c h. ATCP 110.
¶ 52 In sum , we reject Bikowski’s argument that he is entitled to double damages under W IS

. S TAT

. § 100.20(5)

. 17

17 In his appellate brief, Bikowski also ar gues that the circuit court erred with respect to his post

- appeal petition for waiver of fees and costs associated with the appeal . Although Bikowski’s petition is in the appellate record, there is n o circuit court order in the record that addresses Bikowski’s petition. Bikowski did not separately appeal any such order . We question whether we have jurisdiction over any order that was entered following the judgment , and we will not address a ruling t hat is not reflected within the record

. We instead assume that material missing from the record supports the circuit court’s decision. Fiumefreddo v. McLean , 174 Wis. 2d 10, 27, 496 N.W.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1993).No. 2020AP1234

23 CONCLUSION
¶ 53 For the reasons stated above, we reject Bikowski’s arguments and affirm.
By the Court.

— Judgment a ffirmed

.

This opinion will not be published. See W IS

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. R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5

.