United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-20084

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Kasavion Dickson, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:21-CR-11-1

______________________________

Before Barksdale, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Kasavion Dickson was sentenced, inter alia, to 157-months’ 

imprisonment and five years of supervised release, based on his pleading

guilty to: aiding and abetting interference with commerce by robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and, brandishing and discharging a firearm 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 19, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 23-20084

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during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 

Dickson contends the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) by 

imposing supervised-release conditions mandating Dickson: provide the 

probation officer with requested financial information, and not incur new 

credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the probation 

officer’s approval. Dickson maintains the conditions: are inconsistent with 

the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements; lack any reasonable 

relationship to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors; and deprive him 

of more liberty than necessary to serve those factors. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(d)(1)–(3) (outlining requirements for conditions); Guideline 

§ 5D1.3(d) (outlining “special” conditions that “are recommended in the 

circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise be appropriate in 

particular cases” (emphasis added)).

“Abuse-of-discretion review typically applies to conditions of 

supervised release, but plain-error review applies if the defendant fails to 

object in the district court.” United States v. Scott, 821 F.3d 562, 570 (5th 

Cir. 2016). The parties contest whether Dickson preserved his two 

contentions adequately. 

At sentencing, Dickson asked the court to consider removing the newcredit condition because no restitution had been ordered. That brief 

“objection” was “insufficient to notify the . . . court of a § 3583(d) challenge

[to the new-credit condition] so that the . . . court [could] correct itself and 

. . . obviate the need for our review”. United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 

269, 273 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (second and third alterations in original) (citation 

omitted). Dickson’s request also did not alert the court to any error involving 

the separate financial-information condition. See United States v. HernandezMontes, 831 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he basis for objection 

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presented below [must give] the district court the opportunity to address the 

gravamen of the argument presented on appeal”. (second alteration in 

original) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, review of the challenged 

conditions is only for plain error. See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 272–73.

Under that standard, Dickson must show a forfeited plain error (clearor-obvious error, rather than one subject to reasonable dispute) that affected 

his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If 

he makes that showing, we have the discretion to correct the reversible plain 

error, but generally should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id. (citation omitted). 

Although “the district court’s stated reasoning [for imposing the 

conditions] was scant, we independently review the record for sufficient 

evidence to support” the conditions. United States v. Bree, 927 F.3d 856, 860 

(5th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 

2017) (“We can nonetheless uphold them if the justification can be inferred 

from the record.”). 

Both conditions are reasonably related to several of the listed 18 

U.S.C. § 3553 factors, particularly the nature of Dickson’s offense (robbery)

and his history, including burglary and using counterfeit bills. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1); United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 152–54 (5th Cir. 

2009) (rejecting defendant’s special-conditions contention under plain-error 

review). The conditions are also reasonably related to protecting the public 

and deterring criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C); United 

States v. Vega, No. 13-40681, 2014 WL 10937081, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 

2014) (permitting financial-information condition in drug-dealing context 

because it allows the probation officer “to detect if [defendant] begins to 

obtain funds illegally, thereby deterring further criminal conduct and 

protecting the public”). 

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Further, the conditions are not more restrictive than necessary 

because the financial-access condition applies only to requested financial 

information, and the new-credit condition allows Dickson to incur new credit 

charges or open additional lines of credit with the approval of the probation 

officer. See Vega, 2014 WL 10937081, at *2; cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 558 

F.3d 408, 416 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding the “restriction is not absolute” 

where the probation officer could consent to the activity). 

Finally, the conditions are not inconsistent with the Guidelines’ 

policy statement. See Guideline § 5D1.3(d) (outlining “special” conditions 

that “may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases” (emphasis added)). 

In sum, Dickson has not shown the requisite clear-or-obvious error. 

See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 272–73.

AFFIRMED.

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