In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-2469 

RAHUL MALHOTRA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 2:21-cv-02220 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 25, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2023 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, ST. EVE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. 

PRYOR, Circuit Judge. After finding that Rahul Malhotra 

had hosted a party during the COVID-19 pandemic, the 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign suspended him 

for two semesters. Malhotra sued the University and several

of its officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Due Process 
2 No. 22-2469 

violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 The district 

court dismissed the suit, concluding that Malhotra had failed 

to adequately plead the requisite property or liberty interest 

to state a due process claim. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In reviewing the dismissal of Malhotra’s complaint, we 

take his allegations as true and view them in the light most 

favorable to him. Muskegan Hotels, LLC v. Patel, 986 F.3d 692, 

695 (7th Cir. 2021). Malhotra subleased a room in a fraternity 

house while attending the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign in January 2021. The University prohibited 

students from permitting underage drinking in their 

residences. At the time, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, 

the University also restricted the number of people who could 

attend social gatherings.

According to Malhotra, a few days after he moved in, 

other residents of the fraternity house decided to throw a 

party. Malhotra was not involved in planning or hosting the 

party, and he had been assured by its organizers that the party 

would comply with the University’s COVID restrictions. The 

night of the event, Malhotra was wearing noise-canceling 

headphones and studying in his first-floor room when his

roommate alerted him to loud noises coming from upstairs. 

Malhotra investigated and discovered a large group of people

partying, including a young woman who was visibly 

intoxicated. The party ended after police officers and campus 

patrol arrived at the house. 

1 Malhotra also brought Fifth Amendment claims, but he does not 

pursue these claims on appeal, meaning any arguments relating to them 

are waived. O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 588 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2009).
No. 22-2469 3 

The next week, the University charged Malhotra and other 

residents of the fraternity house with violating the 

University’s code of conduct by disregarding COVID 

restrictions and allowing underage drinking. Malhotra met 

with Rony Die, the University’s Assistant Dean of Students, 

and explained that he had been studying in his room and had 

nothing to do with the party. After the meeting, Malhotra was 

notified that he would have a hearing before the 

“Subcommittee on Undergraduate Student Conduct” to 

determine whether he was responsible for the violations. 

Malhotra appeared at the hearing, testified in his defense, and 

answered questions from the subcommittee.

Several weeks later, the subcommittee found Malhotra

guilty of all charges and suspended him for two semesters. 

Dean Die explained to Malhotra that he had been held 

responsible because he was a signatory on the fraternity 

house’s lease. 

Malhotra, however, had not signed the lease; he had 

merely subleased a room. He appealed the subcommittee’s 

decision, attaching a copy of the lease as evidence. The 

suspension was upheld. 

Malhotra then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the 

second amended complaint, Malhotra named as defendants

the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, as well as 

several University staff in their personal and official capacities 

including Dean Die. He argued that the University’s decision 

to suspend him for two semesters violated his Fourteenth 

Amendment rights because the University failed to give him 

a proper hearing as outlined in its student code. As a remedy, 

Malhotra sought money damages from the individual 

defendants. He also sought an injunction, against both the 
4 No. 22-2469 

individual defendants and the University, that would require 

them to expunge the disciplinary charges from his record. 

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b)(6). The court ruled that Malhotra’s claim against the

University—an alter ego of the state—was not cognizable, 

and that his claims against Dean Die and other officials failed 

because he did not allege a constitutionally protected 

property or liberty interest as required under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Malhotra appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

This court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to 

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 986 F.3d 746, 751

(7th Cir. 2021). 

A.

Malhotra sought different types of relief against three 

categories of defendants: (1) injunctive relief against the 

University, (2) injunctive relief against Dean Die and staff 

members in their official capacities, and (3) monetary relief 

against Dean Die and staff members in their personal 

capacities. 2 Before considering the specifics of his allegations, 

we must first sort out who was a proper party to the lawsuit. 

2 These are the forms of relief that Malhotra requested in his “prayer 

for relief” in the second amended complaint. Because another section of 

the second amended complaint could be read to suggest that Malhotra 

also sought monetary relief against the individual defendants in their 

official capacities, it is important to note that these damages are 

unavailable. Section 1983 does not allow awards of damages against 
No. 22-2469 5 

Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue a “person” who, 

acting under color of state law, has violated the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. Jones v. Cummings, 998 F.3d 782, 786 (7th 

Cir. 2021). If successful, the plaintiff may recover damages or 

obtain injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Malhotra’s claim for injunctive relief against the 

University fails at the outset because the University is not a 

“person” within the meaning of § 1983. The district court 

concluded that the University is an alter ego of the state, 

rather than a person, and Malhotra does not contest this 

conclusion. See Haynes v. Indiana Univ., 902 F.3d 724, 731 (7th 

Cir. 2018) (“The University and its Board of Trustees are state 

agencies for sovereign-immunity purposes.”); Kaimowitz v. 

Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 951 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 

1991) (concluding that “a state university is an alter ego of the 

state”). This is significant given § 1983 authorizes suits only 

against “person[s].” Because the University is an alter ego of 

the state, Malhotra could not sue it under this statute. Barnes 

v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 946 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 

2020); Holton v. Indiana Horse Racing Comm’n, 398 F.3d 928, 929 

(7th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, to the extent Malhotra pursues 

claims against the University under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we 

affirm their dismissal.

We turn next to Malhotra’s claims of injunctive relief 

against the individual defendants in their official capacities. 

Even though we treat an official capacity claim against a state 

actor as a suit against the governmental unit for which the 

states, and official-capacity suits against state actors are treated as suits 

against the states themselves. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 

58, 64, 70–71 (1989); Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 22 F.4th 

701, 703 (7th Cir. 2022).
6 No. 22-2469 

actor works (here, the State of Illinois), Bridges v. Dart, 950 

F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2020), the exception established in Ex 

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows these claims to go 

forward. Ex parte Young holds that a plaintiff may sue a state 

official for prospective relief if the plaintiff seeks to enjoin 

ongoing violations of federal law. Id. at 159–60. The theory is 

that an official actively flouting the law is representing only 

himself, not the state. See Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 47 F.4th 

587, 604 (7th Cir. 2022) (describing the doctrine). Malhotra’s 

official capacity claims fall within the situation contemplated 

by Ex parte Young: he seeks to compel state officials to expunge 

his suspension from his record on grounds that their failure 

to do so continues to violate his due process rights. See Doe 

v. Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(concluding that a student’s “marred [disciplinary] record” is 

a continuing harm). 3

Malhotra could also proceed against Dean Die and the 

other staff in their personal capacities for money damages. 

Each was a “person” who Malhotra alleged violated his 

constitutional rights.

In sum, the University was not a proper defendant to the 

suit, but the other defendants were. Thus, moving forward, 

3 Ex parte Young applies only to state officials and therefore cannot 

save Malhotra’s claim against the University. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer 

Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (explaining that the 

doctrine “has no application in suits against the States and their 

agencies”); Peirick v. Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep’t, 

510 F.3d 681, 696 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a plaintiff could not 

proceed against the Board of Trustees of Indiana University “even on her 

claims for prospective injunctive relief”).
No. 22-2469 7 

we will evaluate only Malhotra’s personal and official 

capacity claims against the individual defendants.

B.

We turn now to Malhotra’s argument that the individual 

defendants violated his procedural due process rights. The 

Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from depriving a 

person of “property” or “liberty” without due process of law. 

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A procedural due process 

analysis therefore consists of two steps. First, we must 

identify the protected property or liberty interest at stake.

Second, if the plaintiff was deprived of one of those interests, 

we must determine what process was due under the 

circumstances. Charleston v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois at 

Chicago, 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court 

concluded that Malhotra’s claim failed at the first step, and 

we agree. Malhotra did not plausibly allege that the 

defendants deprived him of a property or liberty interest.

1. 

We first address whether Malhotra adequately alleged 

that the individual defendants deprived him of a 

constitutionally protected property interest. In his complaint, 

Malhotra asserted that he had a property interest in his 

continued education because he “paid tuition.” On appeal, he 

elaborates that he and the University entered into “an express 

contract,” in which he paid tuition in exchange for a “promise 

not to be expelled or suspended unless [he] violated the 

institutional rules.”

The problem with Malhotra’s argument is that attending a 

university does not automatically create a constitutional 

property right. Our cases establish that students do not have 
8 No. 22-2469 

a stand-alone property interest in their continued education 

at state universities. Charleston, 741 F.3d at 772. This is 

because, unlike with grade schools, the law does not entitle 

each person to an education at a public university. Purdue, 928 

F.3d at 660. Rather, to have a legally protected entitlement to 

continued education at a state university, a plaintiff must

point to something more. He must not only allege the 

existence of an express or implied contract, but he must also 

establish that the contract “entitled him to the specific right 

that the university allegedly took, ‘such as ... the right not to 

be suspended without good cause.’” Purdue, 928 F.3d at 660

(quoting Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 581 F.3d 599, 

601 (7th Cir. 2009)). Put simply, “the student’s complaint must 

be specific about the source of this [express or] implied 

contract, the exact promises the university made to the 

student, and the promises the student made in return.” 

Charleston, 741 F.3d at 773. 

Because Malhotra failed to sufficiently plead that the 

University officials violated a specific contractual right 

between the parties, he did not allege a constitutionally 

protected property interest in remaining enrolled at the 

University. Despite having had multiple opportunities to 

amend, Malhotra never provided the source of any express 

contract, nor did he identify any specific promise by the 

University or any promises he made to the University.

Instead, Malhotra alleged only that he paid tuition. Then he

assumes on appeal that his act of paying tuition created a 

return promise from the University to either suspend him 

only for good cause or to follow its own procedures when 

deciding whether to suspend him. Unfortunately for 

Malhotra, our case law does not allow us to make this 

assumption; he needed to allege facts that plausibly 
No. 22-2469 9 

suggested the existence of an express or implied contract. 

Because Malhotra failed to meet the threshold requirement of 

alleging that the individual defendants deprived him of a 

constitutionally protected interest, our analysis ends there, 

and we cannot review whether the defendants followed the 

University’s internal process in deciding to suspend him. See 

Charleston, 741 F.3d at 773 (holding that a plaintiff does not 

have a constitutional right to state-mandated process).

In sum, because Malhotra has not alleged that he had a 

constitutionally protected property interest, we cannot 

evaluate whether the actions of the University officials

unfairly stripped him of any such interest.

2. 

We turn now to whether Malhotra adequately alleged that 

the individual defendants deprived him of a constitutionally 

protected liberty interest. Malhotra alleged that he had a 

liberty interest in pursuing his chosen career of a healthcare

consultant, and that the defendants will “invariably” disclose 

his disciplinary record to any graduate school or employer to 

which he applies. On appeal, he maintains that the 

suspension adversely affected his pursuit of this career

because he “may suffer harm to his future career prospects.” 4

To succeed on a claim that the defendants deprived him of 

a liberty interest, Malhotra had to satisfy the “stigma plus” 

test, which required him to allege both that he suffered a 

4 At oral argument, counsel did not mention the healthcareconsultant-career plans alleged in Malhotra’s second amended complaint, 

and instead stated that Malhotra wishes to pursue a law degree. Our 

conclusion—that he failed to allege a loss of liberty—applies regardless of 

his chosen vocation.
10 No. 22-2469 

reputational injury (“stigma”) and an alteration in legal status 

that deprived him of a right he previously held (“plus”). 

Mann v. Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2013). Liberty in the 

Fourteenth Amendment includes the pursuit of “a trade, 

profession, or other calling.” Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe 

County, 725 F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1984). In turn, a state 

actor can violate the Constitution by depriving a plaintiff of 

his “occupational liberty”—his right to pursue a career of his 

choice. Purdue, 928 F.3d at 661. That said, “the loss of 

reputation is not itself a loss of liberty,” even when the 

reputational loss causes a “serious impairment of one’s future 

employment.” Purdue, 928 F.3d at 662 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). A state actor infringes on a liberty interest 

only by “cast[ing] doubt on an individual’s ... reputation” to 

such a degree that “it becomes virtually impossible for the 

[individual] to find new employment in his chosen field.” 

Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 617 (7th Cir. 

2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Malhotra’s allegations are too speculative to plausibly 

suggest that it will be virtually impossible for him to pursue 

a career as a healthcare consultant. Even if University officials 

will “invariably” disclose his suspension to graduate schools

and employers, this at most suggests—as Malhotra’s brief 

acknowledges—that his career prospects “may” be affected. 

After his suspension, Malhotra can return to the University, 

graduate, and then apply to a variety of graduate schools or

jobs in the field of his choice. He has not alleged that he 

applied to these schools or jobs yet none would take him. 

While we acknowledge that future schools and employers 

might not look favorably on a suspension for violating the 

University’s rules, it is far from clear that they would 

reflexively turn Malhotra away for this reason. The 
No. 22-2469 11 

allegations therefore do not suggest that the suspension will 

make it impossible for him to become a healthcare consultant.

When we have ruled that a defendant deprived a plaintiff 

of occupational liberty, the deprivation has been much more 

certain. In Purdue, for example, the defendant’s decision to 

brand the plaintiff as a sex offender resulted in his expulsion 

from the Naval ROTC program and foreclosed his reenrollment in the program. Naturally, the plaintiff’s chances 

of pursuing naval service were thwarted. Purdue, 928 F.3d at 

662–63; see also Mann, 707 F.3d at 878 (plaintiff was deprived 

of occupational liberty because she was prohibited from 

operating her daycare center); Doyle, 305 F.3d at 617 (plaintiffs 

were deprived of occupational liberty because a central 

database, commonly relied on by employers, listed them as 

child abusers). Here, by contrast, the facts in the complaint do 

not plausibly suggest that the suspension will functionally 

bar Malhotra from an entire field of work.

In sum, the allegations merely speculated about the 

suspension’s stigmatizing effect. The complaint therefore 

failed to plausibly allege that the defendants deprived 

Malhotra of the liberty guaranteed to him by the Constitution.

III. CONCLUSION

Because Malhotra did not meet the threshold requirement 

of pleading a property or liberty interest, we AFFIRM the 

district court’s judgment dismissing his complaint.