Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1604-CR-841 | November 29, 2016 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald E. C. Leicht

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jennifer M. Wright,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A02-1604-CR-841

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable George A. 

Hopkins, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D04-1502-F3-17

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1604-CR-841 | November 29, 2016 Page 2 of 10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jennifer Wright (Wright), appeals the trial court’s

judgment, finding her guilty but mentally ill for aggravated battery, a Level 3 

felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.5, after a bench trial.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Wright raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State 

established sufficient evidence to support her conviction of guilty but mentally 

ill beyond a reasonable doubt. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On December 18, 2014, Wright was spending time with Natasha Adams 

(Adams) and Adams’ fiancé, Charles Sanders (Sanders). Wright and Sanders 

had previously dated, and Sanders was Wright’s current landlord. On that day, 

Adams and Sanders had taken Wright and her husband out to lunch, after 

which they all returned to Adams’ home in Kokomo, Indiana, to listen to music 

and spend the rest of the day together. At some point, Sanders and Wright’s 

husband went outside, while Adams and Wright remained inside the residence.

[5] Adams went to the kitchen to start preparations for dinner. When she turned 

around, she saw Wright “standing with a hammer, getting ready to hit.” 

(Transcript p. 14). Adams attempted “to grab the hammer before [Wright] hit 

[her] in the head and she ended up hitting [Adams] in [her] knee instead.” (Tr. 
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p. 14). Wright “all of a sudden [] just went crazy.” (Tr. p. 19). Adams noticed 

that Wright “knew what she was doing” because she called Adams by her name

and cursed at her, “saying she was going to kill [her].” (Tr. pp. 19, 14). Wright 

hit Adams’ left knee with the claw side of the hammer. As a result of the 

injury, Adams required reconstructive knee surgery and was unable to walk for 

four to five months after the surgery. 

[6] Upon her arrest, Wright was voluntarily admitted to St. Joseph Hospital Trinity 

House, where she admitted to using methamphetamine two to three weeks 

earlier. On December 20, 2014, Wright reported that “she had done 

methamphetamine just the night before and her friend had slid it under the 

door.” (Def. Exh. B, p. 11). When she was told that she would have to submit 

to a drug screen, “she changed her story and said ‘I didn’t do it.’” (Def. Exh. 

B., p. 11). On December 21, 2014, the treating physician reported that Wright 

felt “disoriented” and still did “not recall [the] event [with the] hammer.” (Def. 

Exh. B, p. 76). Wright was also diagnosed with “Depression NOS” and the 

physician noted “malingering[1

] likely.” (Def. Exh. B., p. 76). On December 

22, 2014, Wright was again diagnosed with “Depression NOS” and 

“Unspecified Amphetamine Use DO.” (Def. Exh. B., p. 66). The following 

day, Wright’s diagnosis evolved to “Unspecified Psychotic DO” and she was

 

1 Dr. George Parker testified to the medical meaning of the verb ‘to malinger,’ as “consciously faking 

symptoms to achieve a measurable gain[.]” (Tr. p. 43). 
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prescribed Haldol. (Def. Exh. B., p. 114). Wright was discharged on 

December 26, 2014, with a primary discharge diagnosis of depression. 

[7] On February 10, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Wright with 

Count I, aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, I. C. § 35-42-2-1.5; Count II, 

battery, a Level 5 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1; Count III, battery, a Level 6 felony, 

I.C. § 35-42-2-1; and Count IV, battery, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-

1. On April 21, 2015, Wright filed a motion for psychological examination “to 

determine her mental health status at the time” of the incident, which was 

granted by the trial court. (Appellant’s App. p. 66). In its order, the trial court 

appointed Dr. George Parker (Dr. Parker) and Dr. Paul Roberts (Dr. Roberts) 

“to conduct a psychological evaluation of [Wright] to determine mental disease 

or defect at the time of the offense[.]” (Appellant’s App. p. 68). 

[8] On February 9, 2016, the trial court conducted a bifurcated bench trial and 

competency hearing. Dr. Parker testified that at the time of the incident it 

appeared that Wright suffered from “some sort of psychotic episode,” which 

was a “relatively short experience of psychosis lasting about a week or so and it 

appeared to start to resolve on its own[.]” (Tr. pp. 47, 48). Dr. Parker 

concluded that Wright “suffered from a mental illness” which “rendered her 

unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct at the time of the” offense. 

(Tr. p. 51). On the other hand, Dr. Roberts opined that Wright suffered from a 

mental disease—a long-standing depression disorder, with “border on 

personality features”—and could “appreciate the difference between right and 

wrong.” (Tr. p. 77-78). At the close of the evidence, the trial court took the 
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matter under advisement. On February 10, 2016, the trial court found Wright 

guilty of Count I, aggravated battery, a Level 3 felony, but mentally ill at the 

time of the offense. On March 18, 2016, Wright was sentenced to 1,096 days 

executed at the Indiana Department of Correction.

[9] Wright now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[10] Wright contends that the State failed to establish sufficient evidence to sustain 

her conviction of guilty but mentally ill beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, 

she asserts that the evidence supports a judgment of not guilty by reason of 

insanity.2

 

[11] To sustain a conviction, the State must prove each element of the charged 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See I.C. § 35-41-4-1(a). Even where the 

State meets this burden, a defendant in Indiana can avoid criminal 

responsibility by successfully raising and establishing the “insanity defense.”3

 

See I.C. § 35-41-3-6(a). A successful insanity defense results in the defendant 

being found not responsible by reason of insanity. See I.C. § 35-36-2-3.

 

2 We agree with the State’s observation that Wright did not affirmatively plead an insanity defense but 

merely filed a motion for a psychological evaluation, which was granted by the trial court. However, during 

a pretrial hearing on November 13, 2015, Wright informed the trial court that the legal posture of the case 

revolved around the “mental disease or defect statute.” (Tr. p. 3).

3 The rationale underlying the insanity defense is that a legally insane person is unable to form the requisite 

criminal intent. See Truman v. State, 481 N.E.2d 1089, 1089-90 (Ind. 1985) (“[T]he inability to form intent by 

reason of insanity” is a defense to crime in Indiana.).
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[12] The defendant bears the burden of establishing the insanity defense by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ind. 

2010). To meet this burden, the defendant must establish both (1) that he or she 

suffers from a mental illness and (2) that the mental illness rendered him or her 

unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the 

offense. See I.C. § 35-41-3-6(a). Thus, mental illness alone is not sufficient to 

relieve criminal responsibility. See Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Ind. 1998). 

Rather, a defendant who is mentally ill but fails to establish that he or she was 

unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct may be found guilty 

but mentally ill. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1109, 1112 (Ind. 1982).

[13] Whether a defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the 

time of the offense is a question for the trier of fact. Thompson v. State, 804 

N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). Indiana Code section 35-36-2-2 provides for the 

use of expert testimony to assist the trier of fact in determining the defendant’s 

insanity. Such expert testimony, however, is merely advisory, and even 

unanimous expert testimony is not conclusive on the issue of sanity. Cate v. 

State, 644 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. 1994). The trier of fact is free to disregard the 

unanimous testimony of experts and rely on conflicting testimony by lay 

witnesses. Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ind. 1995). And even if there is 

no conflicting lay testimony, the trier of fact is free to disregard or discredit the 

expert testimony. Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149.

[14] Because it is the trier of fact’s province to weigh the evidence and assess witness 

credibility, a finding that a defendant was not insane at the time of the offense 
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warrants substantial deference from reviewing courts. See Barany, 658 N.E.2d 

at 63. A defendant claiming the insanity defense should have prevailed at trial 

faces a heavy burden because he or she “is in the position of one appealing from 

a negative judgment.” Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149. A court on review will 

not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or disturb reasonable 

inferences made by the trier of fact, even though a “more reasonable” inference 

could have been made. Id. at 1149-50.

[15] However, Wright now argues that this is “an almost impossible burden,” 

rendering the right of appeal “dim or illusory.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 7). 

“Although this standard of review is deferential, it is not impossible, nor can it 

be.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709. The Indiana Constitution guarantees “in all 

cases an absolute right to one appeal.” IND. CONST. art. VII, § 6. “An 

impossible standard of review under which appellate courts merely ‘rubber 

stamp’ the fact finder’s determinations, no matter how unreasonable, would 

raise serious constitutional concerns because it would make the right to an 

appeal illusory.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709 (quoting Serino v. State, 798 

N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. 2003)). As such, our supreme court has long held that 

where the defendant claims the insanity defense should have prevailed, the 

conviction will be set aside “when the evidence is without conflict and leads 

only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was 

committed.” Galloway, 798 N.E.2d at 709. 

[16] As a matter of law, a person is either sane or insane at the time of the crime; 

there is no intermediate ground. Id. at 711. The trier of fact therefore has one 
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of only two options with regard to insanity. Id. Its decision must be based on 

probative evidence, which means evidence that tends to prove or disprove a 

point in issue. Id. An expert witness who is called to testify as to his or her 

opinion, in an effort to aid the trier of fact, and who testifies that he or she has 

no opinion does not provide probative evidence. Id. 

[17] Here, the State called two expert witnesses and one lay witness. Dr. Parker,

who evaluated Wright approximately six months after the incident, diagnosed 

her with an unspecified psychosis, which rendered her unable to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of her conduct at the time of the offense. On the other hand, Dr. 

Roberts testified that while Wright suffered from a mental disease, she was 

nevertheless able to appreciate the difference between right and wrong. Adams, 

the lay witness, noticed that Wright “knew what she was doing” because she 

called Adams by her name and cursed at her, “saying she was going to kill 

[her].” (Tr. pp. 19, 14). Faced with this conflicting testimony, the trial court 

concluded that Wright was guilty but mentally ill, thereby rejecting Wright’s 

allegation of insanity. 

[18] The trial court’s conclusion is supported by substantive evidence. As noted by 

the State, Wright did not attack a random person but instead targeted her exboyfriend’s fiancée. She intentionally took steps to arm herself with a hammer, 

rather than entering into a fist fight, and waited until she was alone with 

Adams. When Wright approached Adams from behind, she got Adams’ 

attention by calling her by her name, and stated that she was “going to kill 

[her].” (Tr. p. 19). Wright then swung the hammer towards Adams while 
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uttering Sanders’ name. Based on Wright’s demeanor, Adams concluded that 

Wright knew what she was doing when swinging the hammer. 

[19] The record reflects that Wright has no history of mental illness or psychosis and 

that she had previously only been diagnosed with a recurring and long-standing 

depression. However, Wright did admit to having a long history of drug abuse, 

which Dr. Parker opined could have contributed to her psychosis. Dr. Roberts 

clarified that in some situations, drugs have long-lasting effects even after usage 

has stopped. He believed that Wright suffered from a major depression 

disorder, but added that those suffering from depression can generally 

appreciate the difference between right and wrong. Accordingly, based on the 

evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the evidence is without conflict 

and leads only to the conclusion that Wright was insane when the crime was 

committed.4

 See Galloway, 798 N.E.2d at 709. 

CONCLUSION

[20] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt to support Wright’s conviction of guilty but 

mentally ill. 

 

4 We deny Wright’s request to remand this cause to the trial court for “findings that reviewing courts can use 

to evaluate an appeal.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). “In a criminal case, the judge need not make findings of fact 

or conclusions of law to explain the mental processes he engaged in as the trier of fact.” Nation v. State, 445 

N.E.2d 565, 570 (Ind. 1983). 
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[21] Affirmed.

[22] Crone, J. and Altice, J. concur