T he H o no rable Lawrence P
. Za t ko f f , U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he E ast ern D i st ri ct of M i chi gan, s i t t i ng * b y de si gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0324n.06 No. 09-3030
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT BARD HUNTSMAN, P laintif f-App ellant; LA RR Y SH EN ISE, Attor ney-Appellant,
v. P ER RYLOC AL S CH OOLS BOA RD OF EDUCATION, et al., De fend ant s- App e lle e s. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O
OP IN ION

BEFORE: CLAY and GILMAN, C ircuit Judges; and ZATKOF F , District Judge. * CLAY, Circuit Jud ge. Plaintiff, B ard Huntsman (“H untsman”), appea ls f rom the district
c ourt or de r d ism iss inghis 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 c omp la int on Au g us t 19 , 2 00 8. Attor

ne y -A pp e lla nt, L arr y D. Shenise (“ At torney

Shenise”), se parately

appea ls from the district court’ s imposit ion of
sanc tio ns e nte re d in

a De c e mbe r 5 , 2 00 8 o rd e r. Hunts ma n fi le d su it a lle g ingpr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss vio la tio ns , o the r c on sti tut ion a l c la ims , a nd a state law s po liatio n of e vid e nc e c la im a g a ins tNo. 09-3030

2 Def endants, Perr

y L ocal Scho o l s Bo ar d

o f E d u ca t i o n(“ Bo ar d

o f E d u ca t i o n ”) an d

Ke n n et h Hardwick, arising out of the termination of H untsman’s employ ment as a te ache r. The district c ourt dismissed the suit on three se parate g rounds: 1) untimeliness under the a pplicable statute of

limit ations, 2) re s judicata, a

nd 3) fa il u re to state a claim. The district court imposed sanc tions pursuant to Fede ral Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 11 (“ Rul e 11 ” ) o n A tto rn e y She nis e , r e qu ir ing him

to p ay De fe nd ants ’
a tto rn e y fe e s in the a mou nt of $3 ,1 35 .0 0. De fe nd ants a lso mov e d th is C ourt fo r s anc tio ns and

c os ts
on a pp e a l pu rs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure 38 . F or the re a so ns se t f

or th i n th is opinion, we DI SM ISS Huntsman’s appe al for la ck of jurisdiction, AF F IRM th e d i s trict court’ s
awa rd of Rule 11 sanc tions, and IM P OSE partial a ppellate sa

nctions on Attorney

Shenise. BACK GR OUND The instant ca se beg an with eve nts that took place in 1997. Huntsman wa s employ ed by the Perry L ocal Schools B oard of Education a s a tea cher beg inning in 1983. In 1997, information was broug ht to the attention of Defenda nts relating to Huntsman’s allege d acc essing of sexually oriented, ina pp ro pr ia te we bs ite s o n s c hool c omp ute rs , a llo wi ngstu de nts a c c e ss t o s a me , a nd vie wi ngthe se websites with students. Huntsman was placed on paid l eave of absence from April 15, 1997 t o May 21, 1997 and re ceive d notice that the B oard of Education would consider his termination at a Ma y 22, 1997 meeting
. At that meeting , the Boa rd of Educ ation passed a

resolution initiating termination proce eding s and suspending Huntsman without pay or bene fits. Furthe r alleg ations of sexual misconduct involving Huntsman c ame to l i gh t over the summer of 1997, a nd in Aug ust 1997 the Boa rd of Educ ation pas s ed a resolution to continue Huntsman’s suspension and ter mination proce eding s.No. 09-3030

3 Hunts man w a s c ri min a lly c ha rg e d in re la tio n to the se a lle g a tio ns of mis c on du c t, a

nd his counsel re quested on Oc t o b er 13, 1997, that the termination proc eeding s ag ainst Huntsman be postponed pending the re solution of his criminal charg es. Ultimately , Huntsman was c onvicted of one count of

g ross sexual impos ition and five counts of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles and wa s incarc erated for one y ear . His convictions wer e r ev er sed on appe al, and he then pled no
c on te st a nd wa s c on vic te d o f tw o c ounts of c on tr ibutin g to the un ru lin e ss or de lin qu e nc y of a c hil d in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.24. On J an u a r y

1 3 , 1 9 9 8 , t h e B o ar d

o f E d u ca t i o nv o t edt o t er m i n at e H u n t s m an . T h ro u gh Huntsman’s authorized re prese ntative, his contributions to the St ate Te ache rs R etireme nt Sy stem
wer e withdra

wn on J anuar

y 26, 1998, which re quired co mpleting a n application ce rtifying that Huntsman was no long er te achingor under any contra ct or a g ree ment to teach in the future, a nd was not under a

lea v e o f ab s ence from any teac hing position. On September 30, 1999, Huntsman’s
c ouns e l r e qu e ste d a

status c on fe re nc e to r e a c tiv a te the po stp on e d te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g s, appar ently

despite Hunstman’s pr ior termination. Huntsman then attended three Boa rd of Educ ation meeting s, on September 26, 2000, October 25, 2000, and De cembe r 19, 2000, in which he reque sted the B oard g o into ex ecutive se ssion to dis cuss his employ ment status, which was de nied. Huntsman subsequently

eng ag ed in litigatio n an d discussion with the St ate B oard of Education, not a party

to the instant ca s e, re garding his per manent ele mentary

and eig ht-y ear t eaching cer

tificates. As of

the State B oard of

Education’s J uly

8-10, 2002 mee ting, Huntsman’ s te a c hin g c e rt if

ic a te s w e re re vo ke d. Oh io l aw doe s n ot p e rm it H un tsm an’ s te a c hin g c re de nti a ls t o be re ins ta te d d

ue to t he natur e of

his c on vic tio ns to w hic h h e ple d n o c on te st.No. 09-3030

4 Huntsman, proce eding throug h Attorney Shenise, filed a c omplaint on J une 3, 2002 in the Stark County

Court of Common P leas (the “state tria l court” ). T h at co mplaint requested a decla ratory judgme nt reg ardingHuntsman’s emp lo y me nt s ta tu s a n d s o u gh t r e in s ta

te me nt a s a tea cher in the Perry

L ocal Schools, alongwith ba ck pay and benef its, a s well as attorney fee s. The pa rties filed seve ral stipulated fa cts befor e this complaint was voluntarily dismiss ed without prejudice by Huntsman on Fe bruar

y 5, 2003. Huntsman re- filed his complaint, in a n amende d version, on F ebrua ry 4, 2004, adding new
cause s of ac tion for wrong ful dischar g e and br eac h of contra ct. The state trial court conside red the
a me nd e d c omp la int , a lon g wi th t he sti pu la te d f

a c ts f ro m th e or ig ina l su it, in g ra nti ngDe fe nd ants ’ motion for summary

judgme nt on October

18, 2004. Huntsman appea led to the Fif th District Court of Appea ls ( the “state court of appea ls”), which aff irmed the state trial cour

t in a unanimous opinion
o nJ u n e 2 7 , 2 0 0 5
. On a m o t i o nt o re co n s i d er , t h e s t a t e co u rt o f ap p ea l s af fi rm edi t s p ri o r r

u l i n g. Huntsman filed notice of

appea l with the Ohio Supreme C ourt on Aug ust 11, 2005, which dec lined jurisdiction on init ial application and on r econside ration. Huntsman filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Nor thern District of Ohio on November

23, 2007 alleg ing f

ive claims ag ainst Defe ndants – three claims arising out of an alleg ed proc edura l due proc ess violation, one claim of de liberate indiffer ence , and one state la w
c la im f or sp oli a tio n o f e vid e nc e . Pr ior to the fi lin g of the c omp la int , H un tsm an, thr ou g h c ouns e l,
se nt a le tte r t o D e fe nd ants re g ard ingthe pla nn e d f ili ngin f e de ra l c ourt . Cou ns el for De fe nd ants responde d that such a c omplaint would be barr ed on multipl e grounds and that if such a c ase w ere f i l e d , D e f e n d an t s w o u l d

s e e k s an c t i o n s . O nA p r i l 9 , 2 0 0 8 , D e f e n d an t s f i l e d a m o t i o nt o dis mis s,No. 09-3030

5 purs ua nt to Rul e 12 (b )( 6) of the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure , a rguin g that H un tsm an’ s c la ims
we re ba rr e d b y the a pp lic a ble stat ut e of li mitat ion s a nd by re s ju dic ata , a

nd fa ile d to state a

c la im upon which re lief ca

n be g rante d. Def

endants also filed a motion for sanctions and fe es on May 19, 2008. The district c ourt g rante d the motion to dismiss on Aug ust 19, 2008, dismi ssing Huntsman’ s complaint with prejudice . On Dec ember 5, 2008, the district court g rante d Def endants’ motion for sanctions i n part, im posing sanctions on Attorney Shenise in the amount of $3,135.00 for attorney fee s, but denying the motion with respect to Huntsman. Huntsman and Attorne y

Shenise filed Notice of Appe al o n J anuar y 5, 2009. Attorney Shenise filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on April 6, 2009, which was g rante d by this Court on May 11, 2009. Def

endants filed a mot ion for sanctions and costs with this Court on September 16, 2009 seekingdouble costs ag ainst both Huntsman and Attorney Shenise. JURISDICTION OVER HUNTSMAN’S AP P EAL Under Fe dera l Rule of Appellate Proc edure 4 (“Rule 4” ), notice of appea l must be filed within thirty

(30) da y s after the judg ment or other a

ppeala ble orde r is enter ed. Fe d
. R. App. P. 4. A par ty may move f o r a fi ling e x tension within thi rty day s of the expiration of that initial period. Fe d. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (A), ( 5)(A) (i). Rule 4' s timeline is mandatory and jurisdictional. Ul tim ate Appliance CC

v. The Kirby Co. , 60 1 F .3 d 41 4, 41 5- 16 (6 th Cir
. 20 10 ) (c oll e c tin g c a se s in w hic h th is Court and the Supreme Court held Rule 4 to be mandatory and jurisdictional). T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt g r an te d D e f e n d an ts ’ mo ti o nto d is mi s s o nA u g u s t 1 9 , 2 0 0 8
. H u n ts ma n filed notice of appea l on J anuar y 5, 2009. Huntsman did not move the district cou rt fo r a filing extension, nor does he off er a ny argument that the dismissal of his complaint with prejud i ce w asNo. 09-3030

6 somehow not a fina l appea lable orde r. The or der g ranting the motion to dismiss clearly states that the claims ar e dismissed with prejudice. T he district cour t’s later or der g ranting t h e m o t i o n for sanctions m ak es n o m en t ion of the motion to dism iss. Huntsman’s time to file notice of a ppeal beg an to run whe n the orde r g ranting t h e m o tion to dis miss was entere d on Aug ust 19, 2008. There fore , Huntsman either ne eded to f ile notice of a

ppeal by Sep t em b er 1 8, 2008 or move the district court for

a fi l i n g extension on or before October 20, 2008. See Fe d. R. App. P. 26 (a)(1) (setting out method fo r ca lculating time periods). This Court may not ext end the time for

filing notice of a

ppeal nor cre ate e quitable exceptions to the jurisdi ct i o n al require ments. Ul tim ate Appliance , 601 F.3d at 416 (“A lthough we are sy mpathetic to the plaintiff’ s plight, we are not free t o i gn o re R

u l e 4 's re s t ri ct i o n s . ”) (c i t i n g Bo wle s v . R us se ll , 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007)). Th is C ourt

is w ith ou t ju

ri sd ic tio n to he ar H un tsm an’s app eal of the mot ion

to d ism iss beca use he f iled his notice of appeal o u t s i d e of Rule 4' s mandatory and jurisdictional timetable. There fore , we DI SM ISS thi s p or tio n o f t he a pp e a l. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s imp os iti on of san cti on s on

Attor ne y She nis e purs ua

nt t o Ru le 11 is revie wed for abuse of

discretion. Dixon v. Clem , 492 F.3d 665, 671 ( 6th Cir. 2007). An abuse of dis c re tio n o c c ur s w he re “ the low e r c ourt re lie s o n c le arl y erro ne ou s f ind ing s o f f

a c t, o r w he n it improperly

applies the lawor uses a

n err oneous l eg al standar d.” Un ite d S tat es v . H e av rin , 330 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. True, 250 F.3d 410, 422 n.9 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). DI SCU SSIO N I. Rul e 11 Sanc ti ons Im pos e d on A tt or ne y She niseNo. 09-3030

7 Rule 11(c) (1) a llows sanctions to b e i m p o s ed on any attorney , law firm, or

party by the distri ct cou rt wh e n th e c ourt de te rm ine s th a t Ru le 11 (b ) h a s b e e n v iol a te d. Rul e 11 (b ) s ta te s in rele vant par

t that the act of

filing a pleadingor other doc ument with a cour t
cer tifies that to the best of the per son’s knowledg e, information, and belief, f ormed a ft e r a n in qu ir y re a so na ble un de r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s: (1 ) i t is no t be ingpr e se nte d f or any imp ro pe r p ur

po se , such as to hara ss, c a us e un ne c e ssa

ry de lay , o r n e e dle ssl y

inc re a se the c os t of

lit ig a tio n; (2) the claims, defe nses, and other leg al contentions ar e wa

rra nted by exis ting law

or by a nonfr ivolous a

rg ument for extending, modifying, or reve rsing exis ting law or for establishing ne w law. Fe d. R. Civ. P
. 1 1(b). The test for whe ther Rule 11 sanc tions im posed on an attorney wer e ap p ropriate is whether the attorney ’s conduc t was re asonable under the circ umstances. M ich. Div.-M onument Builders of N. Am. v. Mic higan , 524 F.3d 726, 739 ( 6th Cir. 2008). The district cour

t dismi ssed Huntsman’s c laims b as ed o n three theories: 1) the action wa s time-barr ed under

the applica

ble statute of limitations, 2) the action was barr ed under the doctrine of re s judicata, a

nd 3) the c laims were without merit, i.e., based on Huntsman’ s failure to state a claim. We conclude that on the first two theories, the dismiss al was pr oper. H oweve r, there may have be e n a

pla us ibl e c la im f

or no min a l da

ma g e s a ri sin g ou t of

the pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss c la im. The a pplicable statute of

limit ations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising in Ohio require s that claims be filed w ithin two y ear s of their a ccr ual. LRL Props. v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth. , 55 F.3d 1 0 9 7 , 1 1 0 5 (6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) (c i t i n g Browning v. Pendleton , 869 F.2d 989, 992 ( 6th Cir. 1989) (en ba nc )) . I n Hun tsm an’ s com pla int , the la te st da te fo r a fa c tua l alle g a tio n upo n whi c h he re sts his § 1983 theory

of relief i s J anuar

y 18, 1998, which is the date when the B oard of Education passed aNo. 09-3030

8 resolution to terminate Huntsman. The instant case w as filed in the district court in Nove mber 2007,
ne arl y te n y e ars a ft e r t

he a c c ru a l of

his c la ims
. Huntsman argued in the portion of this a ppeal that was untimely that he was entitled to the application of e quitable tolling under the doctrine of conc ealment a nd that the statute of limitations
ru ns on ly a ft e r h e e xha

us te d s ta t e r e m e d ie s. Th e do c tr ine of fr a ud ule nt c on c e a lme nt a llo ws e qu ita ble tolling of the statute of

limit ations where 1) the defe ndant conce aled the underly ing c onduct, 2) the plaintiff was pr evente d from discoveringthe ca use of a ction by

that conce alment, and 3) the plaintiff exercised due diligenc e to disc over the cause of ac tion. Pi nn e yDo c k & Tra ns p. Co. v . P e nn Ce nt. Corp. , 8 3 8 F. 2 d 1 4 4 5 , 1 4 6 5 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 8 ). Ho we v er , i nt h e d i s t ri ct co u rt , Hu n t s m an d i d n o tal l ege in h is c omp la int

that he wa s e nti tle d to e qu ita ble tol lin g un de r t

he do c tr ine of

c on c e a lme nt. Even i f Huntsman had pled the elements of c oncea lment, he would not have be en entitled to e qu ita ble tol lin g be c a

us e it is c le ar fr om the re c or d that he ha d a c tua l or c on str uc tiv e no tic e of

his termination when his leg al re prese ntative withdrewhis funds from the S t at e Tea cher s Retirement Sy stem on J anuar

y 26, 1998 and ce rtified that he was no longe r employ ed as a teac her. There fore , he wo uld no t ha ve be e n a ble to s uc c e e d o n h is c la im that th e B oa rd of Ed ucati on con ceal e d it s conduct, the f

irst element of the doctrine of conce alment. L ikewise, ther e is no requir ement of exhaustion i n state cour

t for § 1983 actions, nor does l itigating first in state court toll t he statute of lim itatio ns fo r § 19 83 c la ims . T he re fo re , th e tw o- y e ar s ta tut e of lim itatio ns ha d r

un pr ior to Hunts man f

ili nghis c omp la int
. The district cour

t also corr ectly found t hat Hunts man’s claims were ba rre d by the doctrine of res judicata. “Unde r the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgme nt on the merits is a n absolute barNo. 09-3030

9 to a subs equent a ction betwee n the same pa rties or their pr ivies based upon the sa me claims or
cause s of ac tion. The doctrine of res judicata also prohibits relitigation of all claims or issues which
wer e ac tually

litigated or

which could have been litigate d in a prior a ction.” Reid v. City of Flint , 221 F.3d 1335 (table) , 2000 WL 876547, *1 (6th Cir. 2000) (c iting J .Z. G. Re s. , I nc . v . S he lby In s. Co , 8 4 F .3 d 2 11 , 2 14 (6 th C ir . 1 99 6) ; Fe de ra te d D e p't S tor es, In c . v . M

oit ie , 452 U. S
. 3 94, 398 (1 98 1) ; Bittinger v . Tecumse h Prods. Co. , 123 F .3 d 8 77 , 8 80 (6 th C ir .1 99 7) ; Kane v. Magna M ixer Co. , 71 F.3d 555, 560 ( 6th Cir. 1995)). There is no question that the u n d er l y i ngfac ts of this li tiga tion are ide ntical to those of the state-c ourt ac tion, nor that the parties a re ide ntical par

ties. Simi larly , there is no indication that any party in the instant case challeng es t he fina lity of the state- court disposition nor the competenc y of the state c ourts to rende r disposition. The issue is sim ply whether the claims and cause s of ac tion
are materia lly

the same or if the c laims broug ht in the instant case c ould have be en broug ht in the state-c ourt ac tion. Count I Iof

Hunts man’ s se c on d s ta te -c ourt c omp la int

re a ds a s f

oll ow s: 8. Parag raphs 1- 7 are incorporated her ein as if or igina lly plead. 9. On or a

bout November

2002, Plaintiff du ri ng the cour se of litigation conce rning his teachingce rt i fi cate lear ned throug h a deposition of Def endant’ s ag ent that his employ ment had act u al ly

been te rminated by De fe nd ant. 10
. Whil e Pla int if

f has no wri tte n s ub sta

nti a tio n o f t

he a lle g e d d isc ha

rg e , if in fac t Plainti ff ha s been discharg ed then suc h action would be in violation of Section 3319.16 of the Ohio Revise d C o d e, as Pl aintiff has ne ver be en aff orded the proper

due proc ess as re quired by law. (Dist. Ct. Doc
. No. 14, Ex
. D, Pl.’s Sec ond State Court Complaint). The state law w rong ful dis c ha rg e c la im i s ne arl y

ide nti c a l to the fe de ra l pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss c la ims Hunts man s ou g ht t oNo. 09-3030

10 bring in the instant case. A dmittedly , Huntsman ref ere nced only state law in his state c omplaint, but the fe dera l claim is essentially the s ame and could have been broug ht using the same languag e. The fe de ra l pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss claim in clu des a tw o- pr on g ana ly sis : 1) wh e the r H un tsm an h a s a protec ted intere st in his employ ment as a te ache r and 2) whether he wa s aff

orded the proce ss he was due, which ty

pically would require notice and a pre -termination hea ring
. Leary v. D aeschne r , 228 F.3d 729, 741- 44 (6th Cir
. 2 0 0 0 ). Huntsman’s plea ding in state court would likely have be en sufficie nt for his fede ral c l ai m s i m ply by incorpora

ting a ref ere nce to f

eder al law. The ref

ore, the dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y a pp lie d th e do c tr ine of

re s ju dic a ta

in d ism iss ing

the c omp la int
. Finally , the district court noted that the claims broug ht by Huntsman wer e without merit. As that court found, “ [Huntsm an’s] conduc t resulted in a c riminal conviction such that he w as unemploy able by

the Boa rd, which would have a cted in contr avention of state law had it attempted to re-hir e him. To hold a hea ring reg arding [Huntsm an’s] termination would have been a vain and fruitless ac t.” (Dist. Ct. D oc. No. 18, Mem. Orde r and O p., 8). We are not fully convince d that the district court wa s cor re ct o n the merits of Huntsman’ s claim. Whil e he pr obably could not have
rec eived most of the r elief he reque sted due to his ineligibility for employ ment, he wa s not give n the hear ing that he was e ntitled to prior to his t ermination. The fundamental aspe cts of proc edura l due proce ss are notice and a

n opportunity

to be hea rd. S e e G o ld b e r g v . Ke lly , 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970). I t is unclear w hethe r, i n an i n s tance wher e the only relief available would amount to a fruitless hea

ring and potentially

nominal damag es, this Circuit would sim ply apply harmless e rror analy sis to procedura l due proc ess claims. See Fligiel v. Samson , 440 F.3d 747, 747 (6th Cir. 2006)No. 09-3030

11 (dec lining to re ach the merits of t he appeal, but noting that “the [ district] court held that the denial of pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss w a s h arm le ss e rr or ” ); but see Neilson v. Colgate-PalmoliveCo. , 199 F.3d 642, 658-62 (2d Cir. 1999) ( Sotomay or, J. di ssenting) (denia l of a he aringcannot be harmless e rror ); Kim v. Hurston , 18 2 F .3 d 1 13 , 1 19 (2 d Ci r. 19 99 ) ( same ); W J R, TheGo od

will Sta tio n v . FCC , 174 F .2 d 2 26 , 2 41 (D .C. Cir . 1 94 8) (“Den ial of a pr oc e dura l r ig ht gua

ra nte e d b y the Con sti tut ion

– in this inst ance denial of a hear ing g uara nteed by the due pr ocess c lause – is neve r ‘ha rmless err or.’” ), rev'd on other grounds , 3 3 7 U. S
. 2 6 5 , 6 9 S
. C t
. 1 0 9 7 , 9 3 L
. E d
. 1 3 5 3 (1 9 4 9 ). T h e r e f o r e , a l t h o u gh Huntsman would not have be en able to rec eive most of the r elief he desired, the complaint may have stated a pla

usible claim for nominal damages. Eve n if there may have be en a c olorable c laim for
no min a l damages re la te d to the la c k o f a he ari ngin H un tsm an’ s f e de ra l pr oc e dura l- du e -p ro c e ss lawsuit, that claim should have be en par t of the state- court litigation. I n any event, the suit i s clea

rly barr ed by

res judicata and the statute of limitations, s o the dis mis sa l w a s n ot i n e rr or . A dd iti on a lly , c ouns e l f or De fe nd ants no tif

ie d A tto rn e y

She nis e pr ior

to the fi lin g of the c omp la int in the dis tr ic t c ourt that th e c la ims we re ba

rr e d a nd that D e fe nd ants wo uld seek sa nctions if the ca se we re filed. There fore , we c onclude that it was not re asonable for Attorne y S h e n i s e t o f

i l e t h e c o mp l a i n tan d

t o ar g u e t h a t t h e c l a i m s w e r e “ w ar r an t e d b y e x i s t i n g l aw o r

b y a nonfrivolous argument for ex tending , modify ing, or reve rsing exis ting law or for establishing ne w law.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). I t was not an a

buse of discr etion for the d i s t ri ct cour t to impos e sanc tions on Attorney Shenise for f

iling this complaint which wa s so clear ly barr ed by the statute of limit ations and by res judicata. The ref

ore, the Rule 11 sanctions as to Attorney Shenise are AF F IR M ED
.No. 09-3030

12 II. M ot ion for App e lla te Sanc ti ons on H unt sm an a nd A tt or ne y She nise F e d e ral Rule of A

ppellate Proc edure 38 (“Rule 38” ) allows for this Court t o impose sanctions upon motion of the appellee for frivolous appea ls. Simi larly , 28 U.S.C. §§ 1912 and 1927 allow f or sanctions to be imposed in fede ral c ourts aga i n s t the attorne y under both statutes, a

nd ag ainst the litigant under

§ 1912. This Court has held that “sanc tions unde r [Rule 38 are ] appropriate w hen an
a pp e a l is ‘w ho lly wi tho ut m e ri t’ and wh e n th e a

pp e lla nt’ s ‘ argume nts e sse nti a lly ha d n o r e a so na

ble expectation of altering the district c ourt’s judgme nt ba sed on law or f act.’ ” B & H Me d., L.L.C . v. ABP A d mi n . , Inc
. , 5 2 6 F. 3 d

2 5 7 , 2 7 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g W ilton Corp. v. Ashland Castings Corp. , 188 F.3d 670, 677 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). “We will usually impose Rule 38 and § 1927 s anctions only wher e ther e wa s some improper pur pose, such a s hara ssment or delay , behind the appe al.” Barney v . Holzer Clinic, Lt d. , 110 F.3d 1207, 1212 ( 6th Cir. 1997). Appellee s filed a motion for a ppellate sa

nctions in the amount of double attorne y fee s to be paid by Huntsman and/or Attorne y Shenise. I n the alter

native, the a

ppellees se ek sing le costs on
a pp e a l in a dd iti on to t he sanc tio ns a lr e a dy

awa rd e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt
. The only timely appea l at issue i n t h i s ca s e i s the appe al of the sa nctions ag ainst Attorney She n i s e. T h e ap p eal is not frivolous on its face , since it simply seeks r elief ba sed on a c olorable, though unc onvincing , argument that Attorney S h en i s e’s c onduct was r easona ble under

the circ umstances. Ap p el late sanc tions are ty pically not appropriate for the appea l of the Rule 11 sanctions imposed by

the district court, a

nd this appeal is no exception. Ho we ve r, Attor

ne y She nis e fi le d noti c e of a pp e a l f or bo th o rd e rs e nte re d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt , and bo th a pp e lla nts fi le d b ri e fs on

a pp e a l se pa

rate ly , r e qu ir ingDe fen da nts to l iti g a te bo thNo. 09-3030

13 Huntsman’s untimeliness and to defe nd the i mpositi on of sanctions at t he dis trict court be low. The appea l of the motion to dismiss wa s frivolous both beca use it was untimely , as discussed a bove, and be c a us e it c on tin

ue d li tig a tio n th a t w a s b a se d o n a rgume nts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y sanctioned. H oweve r, once Attorney Shenise moved to withdraw a s counsel in the app ea l o f the mot ion to d ism iss , h e c e a se d to be pa rt of the fr ivo lou s a

pp e a l pu rs ue d b y Hunts man a

nd so sh ou ld
on ly be sanc tio ne d f

or the tim e duri ngwh ic h h e wa s in vo lve d in the a pp e a l. De fe nd ants a lso se e k to s anc tio n H un tsm an f or purs uin g his a

pp e a l of the mot ion

to d ism iss
. Al tho ug h i ti s c l e ar

t h a tH u n t s m anw a s o nn o t i c e o f t h e f r i v o l o u s n a tu r e o f

h i s c l a i m s i nt h i s c a se based on the district c ourt’s dismiss al and its g rant of Rule 11 sanctions, the equities of the situation
we ig h in fa vo r o f n ot s anc tio nin g Hunts man. De sp ite Hunts man ev ide ntl y re fu sin g to d ism iss thi s appea l at the conc lusion of mediation effor ts, and there after Att orney Shenise withdrawingas counsel, thi s Court is inclined t o deny the m otion for appellate sanctions beca use of the r elative lac k of sophistication of a pr o s e litigant like Huntsman. Also, we note that most of the case s in which appellate sanctions ar e aw arde d ag ainst a litiga nt appea r to be in situations where the appe llant was
a cor poration, and more likely

to be able to a ffor d such fe es. See, e .g., B & H Me d. , 526 F.3d at 271- 72 ; W ilton Corp. , 188 F.3d at 677-78. Sanctioning A ttorney

Shenise for f

iling a n o t i ce of

appea l of the orde r dismissing Huntsman ’s c omp la int

in a n unti me ly

mann e r f

or a c la im that he c le arl y

kn e w w a s f

ri vo lou s is
a pp ro pr ia te . A lth ou g h th is C ourt may have su pp or t in the c a sel aw to sanc tio n H un tsm an a s w e ll, the equities of the situation we igh in fa vor of sa nctioning only

the attorne y . Simi larly , the appe al of the a wa

r d o f s an c t i o n s b y

t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd o e s n o tr i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f s an c t i o n a

b l e c o n du c t.No. 09-3030

14 There fore , only

single costs related to the appeal of the m otion to dismiss acc rued from the t ime of filing the notice of appea l, J anuar y 5, 2009, to the t ime Attorney Shenise filed a moti on to withdraw
a s c o u n s e l f

o r H u n t s m an ’ s a

p p e a l o f t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , A p r i l 6 , 2 0 0 9 , a r e i mp o s e d, a ndon ly Attor ne y She nis e is r e qu ir e d to pa y tho se c os ts. CO NC LU SION Be cause this Court does not have jurisdiction over the a ppeal of the dismissal of Huntsman’s
c la im, Huntm an’ s a

pp e a l is DI SM ISSED . We further conclude that the impositi on of Rule 11 sanctions should be AF F IR M ED , and that appe llate sanc tions should be IM P OSED for the f iling of the a pp e a l of the dis mis sa l or de r u

p to the po int

wh e re Attor

ne y She nis e mov e d this cou rt to withdraw a s counsel o n t h at ap p ea l. An aff idavit of costs detailing attorney fee s from January

5, 2009 to April 6, 2009 from De fenda nts should be filed with this C ourt within 30 day s so that such costs may be imposed, with any

response from Attorne y

Shenise due 15 da

y s therea fter.