COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Haley, Petty and Powell Argued at Salem, Virginia

CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1000-08-3 JUDGE CLEO E. POWELL MARCH 17, 2009 WYTHE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WYTHE COUNTY Josiah T. Showalter, Jr., Judge (R. Christopher Munique; L acy, Campbell & Munique, P.C., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. S. Vernon Priddy III; Marc Alan LeBlanc, Guardian ad litem for the minor child (Michael R. Bedsaul; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

Christopher M. Weaver (“Weaver ”) appeals the decision of th e trial court terminating his parental rights to his daughter, N.W., pursuan t to Code § 16.1-283(C). Weaver contends that

there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s fi nding that the Wythe County Department of Social Services’ (“DSS”) actions were reasonable and appropriate and that he was not making substantial progress in remedying the c onditions that required continuation of N.W.’s foster care placement. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - BACKGROUND 1 “We view the evidence in the ‘light most fa vorable’ to the prevailing party in the circuit court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all re asonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). Weaver and Brandon Nicole Weaver (“Bra ndon”) are the biological parents of N.W., who was born in September of 2003. On Octobe r 7, 2004, Brandon brought N.W. to the hospital emergency room because N.W. had stopped breat hing. The police and DSS were contacted by the hospital. In a subsequent interview, the police and DSS learned that Weaver and Brandon only had ten dollars in cash, had no electricity in their home, and they had little food. Weaver

and Brandon were then arrested a nd charged with felony child endangerment. At that time, DSS assumed custody of N.W. and placed her in a foster home. The charges against Weaver and Brandon were later determined to be unfounded and dropped; N.W., however, remained in the foster home, as DSS felt that the conditions of the

home environment were unsafe. On November 14, 2004, DSS prepared the initial Foster Care Servi ce Plan (the “initial plan”). The initial plan had the concurrent goals of e ither returning N.W. to her home or placing

her with a relative. Under the initial plan, Weaver and Brand on had five responsibilities to complete in order to regain custody of N.W.: (1 ) cooperate with counseling services to address relationship issues and enhance marital stab ility; (2) Brandon will seek substance abuse

1 As the parties are fully conversant with th e record in this case, and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understandin g of the disposition of this appeal.- 3 - counseling; (3) cooperate with parenting skil ls instruction; (4) secure employment; and (5) establish and maintain a safe, stable, and suitable home. Shortly after being released from incarceration, Weaver and Brandon separated, and eventually divorced. Soon after the separation, Weaver began da ting, and after his divorce from Brandon was finalized, he eventually married Megan Weaver (“Megan”). On January 18, 2006, DSS filed a petition to te rminate Weaver’s and Brandon’s parental rights to N.W. A hearing on the matter was he ld on October 10, 2006. At the hearing, the court terminated Brandon’s parental rights to N.W., due primarily to Brandon’s continued drug use

and incarceration on other char ges; Weaver, on the other hand, was granted a continuance to

allow the Guardian ad litem time to observe his interactions with N.W. On June 8, 2006, the Wythe County Juvenile and Domestic Relati ons District Court (“J&DR court”) denied the petition to terminate Weaver’s parental rights to N.W. DSS filed a timely notice of appeal. On April 27, 2007, the tr ial court heard evidence in this matter and subsequently denied DSS’s petition to terminate. On April 30, 2007, DSS prepared a new Foster Ca re Service Plan (the “new plan”) with concurrent goals of returning N.W. to her hom e and adoption. Under th e new plan, Weaver and Megan had five responsibilities to complete in order to regain custody of N.W.: (1) cooperate with parenting skills instructi on; (2) cooperate with a Child/ Parent Attachment Evaluation (“attachment evaluation”) and follow through with any recommendations made as a result of the evaluation; (3) maintain employment; (4) estab lish and maintain a safe, stable, and suitable home; and (5) visit N.W. on a regular basis. In August of 2007, DSS changed its goal conc erning N.W. from “return to home” to “adoption.” Additionally, DSS filed a petition seeking the te rmination of Weaver’s parental rights to N.W. DSS took these actions based up on Weaver’s failure to comply with all his- 4 - responsibilities as defined by the plan. According to DSS, Weaver and Megan failed to complete the parenting skills instruction and failed to esta blish and maintain a safe, stable, and suitable home. Additionally, DSS stated that, due to the length of time N.W. has been in the foster home and the bond that she has develope d with her foster family, it woul d be in N.W.’s best interests to remain with her foster family. On November 28, 2007, the J&DR court entered an order terminating Weaver’s parental rights to N.W. Weaver subsequently appealed. Parenting Skills Classes At the April 7, 2008 termination h earing before the trial court, 2 the court heard testimony from Weaver that, although DSS had offered hi m multiple opportunities to receive parenting skills instruction, he had repeatedly failed to successfully complete the classes. Initially, Weaver was receiving home-based instruction from Heat her Kapranos. However, after only twelve or thirteen sessions, DSS decided to disconti nue the home-based in struction, even though Ms. Kapranos admitted that Weaver was showing some signs of improvement. DSS then offered parenting classes with Lynn Bowman. According to Ms. Bowman, Weaver and Megan missed the first three cla sses due to a scheduling mix-up. Weaver and Megan then attended the next tw o classes, but never returned for the remaining eight classes. 3 Weaver and Megan were given another chance to take the parenting skills classes with Ms. Bowman in May-June of 2007. This time, Weaver and Megan missed two classes (four

2 The trial court incorporated the evidence from the Ap ril 27, 2007 hearing into the present hearing. For the purposes of clarity, the evidence presented at both hearings is discussed together here.

3 The first round of parenting skills classe s with Ms. Bowman consisted of thirteen, one-hour long classes.- 5 - hours of class time). Weaver and Megan partially made up for at least half of the missed class time by staying late on the subsequent classes. 4 Safe, Stable, and Suitable Home The court also heard testimony fr om Weaver that he had move d at least twelve times in the last three and a half years. In November of 2004, after be ing released on the felony child endangerment charges, Weaver lived with his mother in Speedwell, Virginia. He then lived in the basement of Megan’s parents’ home for a few weeks. He and Megan next moved to a studio apartment in Wytheville, Virginia. Weaver a nd Megan then moved to another apartment in Wytheville, because the studio apartment didn’t have any room for N.W. After DSS determined that the steps of the Wytheville apartment we re unsafe, Weaver and Megan then moved to a house in Speedwell. After Ms. Kapranos expre ssed some concern over the presence of a wood stove in the Speedwell house, Weaver and Megan moved back into Megan’s parents’ basement. From there they moved into a trailer in Wythev ille. After being evicted from the trailer for failing to pay rent, Weaver and Megan shared a friend’s apartment. They then moved into a double-wide trailer in Wythe County. After DSS expressed some c oncerns over the fact that the trailer was currently for sale, Weaver and Mega n moved into an apartment in Independence, Virginia. A short time later, Weaver discovered black mold in the apartment, so he and Megan moved into another apartment in Independence.

Attachment Evaluation Additionally, testimony was hear d from Dr. Whelan regarding the attachment evaluation. The attachment evaluation examined the quality of the relationships between N.W. and Weaver,

4 The second round of parenting skills classe s consisted of six, tw o-hour long classes, with the exception of the first class, which was three hours. Weaver and Megan attended classes on May 25 and June 8, 15, and 29. They missed class on June 1 and 22, but stayed an extra hour on June 8 and 29 to make up for some of the missed time.- 6 - Megan, and N.W.’s foster parent s, Mr. and Mrs. Lewis. Dr. Whelan explained that, based on N.W.’s interactions with Weaver and Megan, she had a moderate to high risk for serious problems in the future. Dr. Whelan felt that We aver and Megan did not, at that time, have the ability to properly address N.W.’s emotional needs. He also testified that it was unlikely that intervention would lead to significant changes in Weaver’s ability to address these needs. He further opined that if Weaver and Megan were motivated to pa rticipate in psychotherapy and responded well to the treatment, it would likely take one to three years before they would

become sensitive to N.W.’s emotional needs. In contrast, N.W.’s interactions with her fost er parents were a mix of avoidant and secure patterns, which is within the av erage range of interaction for a child N.W.’s age. Further,

Dr. Whelan felt that Mr. and Mrs. Lewis were a source of significant emotional healing for N.W., although there was some room for improvement.

Court’s Decision to Terminate After hearing all of the evid ence, the trial court found that, although Weaver had changed jobs a number of times since N.W. was removed from the home, Weaver had maintained stable employment. Additionally, the court commended Weaver on his efforts to remain employed. However, the trial court also found that Weaver had not demonstrated that he could provide the kind of stability that N.W. needed in her life. The trial court ultimately decided that this lack of stability combined with Weaver’s continued failure to successfully complete the pare nting skills classes dem onstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Weaver had failed to ma ke substantial progress towards elimination of the conditions which required N.W.’s foster care placement. The trial court found that

termination was in N.W.’s best interest and, as such, terminated Weaver’s parental rights to

N.W.- 7 - ANALYSIS [B]efore residual parental rights can be terminated under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), a court must find: (1) by clear and convincing evidence; (2) that termin ation is in the child’s best interests; and, (3) that the parent or parent s, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, me dical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. C. S. v. Va. Beach Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 41 Va. App. 557, 565, 586 S.E.2d 884, 888 (2003). In the present case, Weaver contends that the trial court erre d in finding sufficient evidence (1) that DSS made reasonable and appropria te efforts to reunite Weaver with N.W. and (2) that Weaver had not made substantial pr ogress in remedying the conditions which required N.W.’s continued placement in foster care.

Preservation As an initial matter, DSS argues that Weaver failed to preserve his sufficiency argument and, as such, this Court is precluded from c onsidering the matter as a basis for reversal. See Rule 5A:18. Specifically, DSS argues that, alth ough Weaver made an initial motion to strike after DSS had finished presenting its evidence, he failed to renew that motion after presenting his

evidence. “If a closing argument adequately advises the tr ial court of the defenda nt’s position and if

it is clear that the trial court considered the issue and had an opportunity to take corrective action, the contemporaneous objecti on rule is satisfied.” Fortune v. Commonwealth , 14 Va. App. 225, 228, 416 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1992) (citing Campbell v. Commonwealth , 12 Va. App. 476, 478, 405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991) ( en banc )). Here, Weaver argued in his motion to strike that the evidence was insufficient to show (1) that DSS’s actions were “reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite his family” and (2) that he was not making substantia l progress in remedying the situation. In his- 8 - closing argument, Weaver argued that the evid ence showed (1) that DSS’s actions were not reasonable and appropriate effort s to reunite Weaver with N.W. and (2) that he was making substantial progress in remedying the situation. Although the motion to strike was worded in the negative and the closing argument was worded in the positive, both amount to the sa me argument: the evidence was insufficient to show (1) that DSS’s actions were reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite his family and (2) that he was not making substantial progress in remedying the situation. As such, we find that Weaver’s argument was prope rly preserved for appeal. Reasonable and Appropriate Efforts Upon review of a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the ev idence, considered the statutory requirements,

and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990). “The trial court’ s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard

ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless pl ainly wrong or without evidence to support

it.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted). Weaver’s primary argument is that the evid ence shows that DSS acted in an extremely adverse manner and, therefore, the evidence is insufficient to prove that DSS acted with reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite N.W. with her father. Weaver argues that this adversity can be shown based on (1) DSS’s deci sion to stop providing home-based instruction with Ms. Kapranos in January of 2006, even though Weaver was maki ng progress; (2) DSS’s decision to reduce the length of his visitations with N.W. and require that the visitations occur at the DSS office; and (3) DSS’s deci sion to petition the court for term ination of Weaver’s parental rights before the attachment evaluation had been completed.- 9 - After DSS terminated the home-based sessions with Ms. Kapranos, Weaver was offered two chances to complete the parenting skills inst ruction with Ms. Bowman, but he failed to do so. The failure to successfully complete the pa renting skills classes w ith Ms. Bowman must fall squarely upon Weaver’s shoulders. DSS made reasonable and appropr iate efforts to ensure that the classes were available to Weaver; therefore, DSS cannot be faulted for Weaver’s failure to take advantage of the opportunities presented to him. Similarly, the record demonstrates that the d ecision to reduce the length of his visitations with N.W. was due to comments made by Weave r’s mother to N.W., and not because of any adversity on the part of DSS. Fran Anders, N.W.’s case worker, testified that the length and location of the visits were necessarily limited, due to the requirement that the visitation must be supervised anytime Weaver’s moth er would be present. Ms. Ande rs also testified that she had

informed Weaver that if he in formed her ahead of time that his mother was not going to be present during the visit, arrangements could be made so that the visits would not have to be monitored. According to Ms. Anders, these unmon itored visits could be longer, as no overtime would be required from DSS employees. Howe ver, because Weaver was unwilling to preclude his mother from attending the visitations, D SS was forced to shorten the duration of the

visitations and monitor them. Finally, Ms. Anders also testified rega rding the reason that DSS filed the new permanency plan at the time it did. Accordi ng to Ms. Anders’s uncontradicted testimony, the decision to file the new permanency plan was prim arily due to the fact that DSS would lose the federal funding it was receiving for N.W.’s placement if the new plan had not been filed at that time. Thus, as with the s hortened visitation, the decision was based on independent policy requirements.- 10 - Based on these facts, the record clearly show s that DSS offered two additional parenting

skills classes to Weaver after can celing the home-based program. Furthermore, the decisions to

reduce his visitation sessions and to file for term ination of his parental rights were based on policy, not on any animosity toward Weaver. As such, the record demonstrates that there is sufficient evidence showing that DSS acted with reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite

N.W. with her father. Substantial Progress in Remedying the Situation Weaver had five requirements he had to m eet before he could regain custody of his daughter. Of those five requirements, the record demonstrates that Weaver failed to complete

two of them and had little lik elihood of meeting a third. Under the new plan, Weaver was required to establish and maintain a safe, stable, and suitable home. The trial court specifically admonished Weaver regarding this fact, stating at the April 27, 2007 hearing: “There has to be stabil ity for the child. You cannot move every other month.” The evidence shows that, beginning in November of 2004 until April of 2008, a period of forty-two (42) months, Weaver moved at least tw elve (12) times. This averages to one move every three and a half months. Additionally, of these twelve locat ions, the evidence shows that DSS found only one of those locatio ns acceptable by their standards. Additionally, Weaver was require d to successfully complete the parenting skills classes. The initial, home-based sessions were terminated by DSS, and as such, it cannot be said that Weaver failed to complete this program. Ho wever, as we noted above, he must bear sole responsibility for his failure to complete either of the two parenting skills programs with

Ms. Bowman. Finally, Weaver was required to submit to an attachment evaluation and follow through with any recommendations made as a result. Although Weaver did subm it to the attachment- 11 - evaluation, the results indicated th at Weaver lacked the skills/ability to meet N.W.’s attachment patterns and emotional needs. According to the re sults of the attachment evaluation, if the court returned N.W. to Weaver and Megan, signifi cant intervention would be needed, requiring Weaver to undergo at le ast one to three years of intense psychotherapy. Based on Weaver’s prior history of failing to complete the parenting skills classes, it is reasonable to question his ability to meet this goal. Moreover, th e one to three year time frame moves N.W. away from the finality and permanency cited by the trial judge in his ruling. Even if Weaver was willing, the attach ment evaluation calls into questi on whether he would be able to develop the skills n ecessary to deal with the child’s attachment patter ns and emotional needs.

CONCLUSION Given the evidence in this case, the trial court had sufficien t factual grounds to support its decision that Weaver had not, within a reasonab le period of time, substantially remedied the conditions that required N.W.’s continued placement in foster care and that termination was in

her best interests. See Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to terminate Weaver’s residual pare ntal rights under Code § 16.1-283(C).

Affirmed.