F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

P E D R O M AD R

I G A L -B AR C E N A S , AKA J uan Rey nosa-Varsenas, P etitioner ,

v

.
L O R E T T A E. LY

N C H , Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 10-72049

B .I .A. No. A088-914-486

OPI NI ON

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court

F iled August 10, 2015

B efore: J ohn T. Noonan, A. W allace Tashima, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit J udg es. Opinion by

J udg e GraberM AD R I G A L -B AR C E N A S V

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SUMMARY *

Im m igration

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the p a nel g ranted Pedro Madrig al-B arcenas’ petition for review of the B oard of I mmig ration Appeal s ’ decision finding him inadmissible o n the g r ound that his Nevada state law conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia constituted a c o n v iction f

or violation of a law r elating to a contro l l e d substance.

I n Madrigal-Barc en a s v. Lynch , 135 S.Ct. 2828 (2015), the Supreme Co u r t v acated this court’s decision for f urther consideration in lig ht of Mellouli v. Lynch , 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) (holding that a drug paraphernalia possession conviction did not render an alien categ orically removable) , the panel held that petitioner’s conviction is not a categ orical controlled substance offense. The panel held that the Nevada stat ute is o verbroad because it penaliz es possession o f paraphernalia in connection with substances not controlled under federal law. The panel held that petitioner was thus not inadmissible, and remanded for the ag ency to consider in the first in s t ance the potential application of the modified categ orical approac h a n d the merits of petitioner’s cancellation of removal application.

The panel also held in lig ht of Mellouli tha t L u u-Le v

. INS , 224 F .3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000) a n d i t s prog e ny (holding that it w as irrelevant whether a specific drug paraphe r nalia

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b eenp rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M AD R I G A L -B AR C E N A S V

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conviction involv e d a federally controlled substance) a re no l o n g er g ood law, and rejected as effectively overruled t h e holding s in United States v. Oseguera-Madrigal , 7 0 0 F .3d 1196, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2012); B ermudez v

. Holder , 586 F .3d 1167, 1168–69 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Estrada v

. Holder, 560 F .3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); Luu-Le , 224 F .3d at 916.

COUNSEL

J o n Dean, Pantea Ahmadi, J essica Mariani, and Sauri s h B hattacharjee, McDermott W ill & Emery L L P, L os Ang eles, California, for Petitioner.

W

. Manning Evans, Senior L itig ation Counsel, B enjamin C. Miz er, Principal Deputy Assistant Attor n ey General, a nd Donald E. K eener, Deputy D irector, Civil Division, United States Department of J ustice, W a shing ton, D.C., for Respondent.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:
Petitioner Pedro Madrig al-B arcenas, a native and citiz en of Mex ico, applied for c ancellation of remova l p u r suant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). He petitions for review of the B oard o f I mmig r ation Appeals’ (“B I A”) denial of that application.

Petitione r w a s c onvicted o f possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of section 453.566 of t h e Nevada Revised Statutes. The question on re v i e w i s whether thatM AD R I G A L -B AR C E N A S V

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misdemeanor conviction renders Petitioner inelig ible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I I ) (“Section 1 182”) , which p rovides that an applicant is inadmissible if the applicant stands convicted under “any law
or regulation

. . . relating to a controlled substance ( as defined in section 802 of [ the F ederal Controlled Substances Act] ).” I n ruling that P e t i tioner was inadmissible, the B IA relied on In re Martinez-Espinoza , 25 I . & N. Dec. 118 (B .I .A. 2009), to h old that the conviction was for violation o f a law relating to a c ontrolled substance. Apply ing our ex tant precedent to the same effect, United S ta t e s v. O

seguera-Madrigal , 700 F .3d 1196, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2 012); Bermudez v

. Holder , 586 F

. 3 d 1167, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Estrada v. Holder , 560 F .3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); LuuLe v. I NS , 224 F .3d 9 11, 916 (9th Cir. 2000), we denie d the petition. Madrigal-Barcenas v

. H older , 507 F

. App’x 715 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Subsequently , the Supreme Court issue d Mellouli v

. Lynch , 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). The Court then g ranted a writ of certiorari to Petitioner, vacated our decision, and remanded this case for further consideration in li gh t of Mellouli

. Madriga l

- Ba rcenas v. Lynch , 135 S. Ct. 2828 ( 2015). W e ordered supplemental b r iefing from the parties on the effect of M e llouli

. Reviewing de n ovo, Cazarez-Gutierrez v

. Ashcroft , 382 F .3d 905, 909 ( 9 th Cir. 2004), we now g r a nt the petition, hold that Petitioner’s conviction is not categ orically for a controlled substance off e n se, and remand for f

urther proceeding s.

I n Mellouli , the Court addressed whether a misdemeanor conviction under Kansas’ drug paraphernalia statute renders
an alien ca t e g o r i c a l l y re m o v a b l e u n d e r 8 U .S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B )(i) (“Section 1227”). 135 S. Ct. at 1983–84.M AD R I G A L -B AR C E N A S V

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Section 1 227 a

nd Section 1182 contain identical tex t; eac h attaches immig ration c o n s e q uences to a conviction under a law “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 [ o f the Controlled S u b s t a nces A ct] ).” The Court h eld that the Kansas conviction did not trig g er removal under Section 1227. Id. at 1984. I n so holding , the Court reasoned that the tex t of Section 1 227 “limi t s t h e meaning o f ‘controlled substance’

. . . to the substances controlled under § 802.” Id. at 1990–91.

B ef o r e M ellouli , the B I A had held that a conviction for possession or distribu t i on of a controlled substance met the requirements of Section 1227 only if “the state statute under which the alien was convicted covered federa l ly controlled substances and n o t o thers.” Id. at 1987. B ut for paraphernalia convictions, B I A precedent required o n l y that the crime be “associated with the drug trade in g eneral.” Id. at 1 9 88–89 (internal quotation marks o mitted). As n oted, we had drawn the same distinction in Luu-L e , 2 2 4 F .3d at 916, and in several other cases. Mellouli rejected that approach, holding that there is “no home in the tex t” of Section 1227 for different treatment of convi c t i o ns f or p ossession a

nd distribution of a controlle d substance, on the one hand, a nd possession of drug p araphernalia, on the other. 1 35 S. Ct. at 1989. The Court conclud e d that “the tex t [ of Section 1227]

. . . limits the meaning of ‘controlled substance,’ for removal purpose s , to the substances c o ntrolled under § 802.” Id. at 1990–91.

The Court ex p r e s sly abrog ated Martinez-Espinoza , on which the B I A relie d h e r e. I d. at 1989. The g overnment concedes, and we ag ree, that L u u
- L e and its prog eny no long er are g ood law a fter Mellouli , ei t h e r , and we ex pressly reject as effectively overru l e d t he relevant h olding s inM AD R I G A L -B AR C E N A S V

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N C H 6 Oseguera-Madrigal , 700 F .3d at 1199–1200; Be r mudez , 586 F .3d at 1168–69; Estrada , 560 F .3d at 1042; and Luu-Le , 224 F .3d at 9 16. See M

iller v. Gammie , 335 F

. 3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“ [ W ] h e r e the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit a

uthority is clearly irreconcilable w ith the reasoning or theory of i n t e rvening hig her authority , a threejudg e panel should conside r i t s e l f bound by the later a nd controlling authority , and should reject the prior c i r cuit opinion as having been effectively overruled”).

F or present purposes, we see no material difference between the Kansas statute at issue in Mellouli and the Nevada statute at i s s u e i n this case. Kansas law lists some substances that are not on the federal list, Mellouli , 135 S. Ct. at 1984 , a n d i t is undisputed that Nevada law lists at least
some substances that a

r e not on the f

e d e r a l list, compare 21 U.S.C. § 802 with N ev. Admin. Code § § 453.510–453.550 (listing D atura, hy drog en iodide g as, human g rowth hormone, and Carisoprodol, as controlled substances). Analy tically , it is unimportant whether Nevada reg u lates six teen substances that are n ot controlled substances under fede r a l l aw, a s Petitioner claims, or only four, as the g overnment concedes; it is the fact, not the deg ree, of overinclusiveness that matters. See Mellouli , 135 S

. Ct. at 1989 (rejecting a test that would deem “a s t a t e p a r a p h e r n al i a possession conviction categ oricall y r elate[ d] to a f ederal controlled substance so long a s there is ‘nearly a c omplete overlap’ between the drug s co n t r o l l ed under state and federal law” (quoting Mellouli v

. Holder , 719 F .3d 995, 1000 (8 t h C i r. 2013))). B ecause the Nevada statute penaliz e s p ossession of par a phernalia in connection with sub s t a nces that are not controlled under federal law, we hold that it is overbroad, so that Petitioner’s conviction is not categ o rically for violation of a law relating to a controlled substance.M AD R I G A L -B AR C E N A S V

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N C H 7

W e ag ree with Respondent, thoug h, that a r emand is required. W e hold only that Petitioner is not categ orically barred from seeking cancellation of removal because of his misdemeanor conviction under Nevada’s drug paraphernalia sta t u t e

. The ag ency must consider, in the first instance, the potential application of the modified categ orical approach, a s well as the merits of Petitioner’s request for cancellation. See Mellouli , 135 S. Ct. at 1986 n

. 4 (ex pressly declining to decide whether the modified c ateg orical approach could apply ); INS
v

. Orlando V

entura , 537 U.S. 12, 16 ( 2002) (per curi a m ) (“[ T] he proper c ourse, ex cept in rare c ircumsta n c e s , is to remand to the a g ency f or additional in v e s tig ation o r ex p lanation.” (quotin g F la. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion , 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985))).

P etition G RANTED; REMANDED.