NO. 4-00-0991

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

           Plaintiff-Appellee,

           v.

CHARLES E. BRAMLETT,

           Defendant-Appellant.	)

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)	  Appeal from

  Circuit Court of 

  Sangamon County

  No. 99CF1053

  Honorable

  Leo J. Zappa, Jr.,

  Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________

			JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

		In October 1999, the State charged defendant, Charles

E. Bramlett, with the offense of aggravated criminal sexual

abuse, a Class 2 felony, in violation of section 12-16(c)(1)(i)

of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i)

(West 1998)).  In July 2000, the State filed an amended petition

to proceed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725

ILCS 205/0.01 through 12 (West 1998)).  In August 2000, defendant stipulated to two psychiatric evaluation reports and admitted the

State had sufficient evidence to prove he was a sexually danger

ous person.  The trial court found defendant to be sexually

dangerous and ordered him committed to the Illinois Department of

Corrections for care and treatment.

		On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in

allowing him to stipulate to evidence establishing him as a

sexually dangerous person without first admonishing him pursuant

to Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) to determine the

voluntariness of his stipulation.  We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

		In October 1999, the State charged defendant with one

count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in violation of section

12-16(c)(1)(i) of the Code, alleging defendant, 17 years of age

or older, committed an act of sexual conduct with A.T.A., under

the age of 13 when the act was committed, in that he knowingly

fondled the genitals of A.T.A. for the purpose of the sexual

arousal or gratification of defendant.

		In January 2000, the State filed a petition to proceed

under the Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 through 12 (West 1998)).  At a hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss the petition, the trial

court granted the State leave to file the petition.  The court

also ordered defendant to be examined by two psychiatrists, Dr.

Bohlen and Dr. Killian.

		In June 2000, the State indicated to the trial court

the two psychiatrists had found defendant not to be a sexually

dangerous person.  The State also indicated defendant was ar

rested on new matters, and the State sought a court-ordered re-

examination of defendant by the two psychiatrists.  The trial

court granted the State’s motion for reexamination, noting the

new charges against defendant were similar to his pending

criminal case.  

		In July 2000, the State filed an amended petition to

proceed under the Act.  The State alleged defendant was charged

with one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse based on an

April 1999 incident.  The petition alleged defendant resigned his position as custodian at an elementary school after being accused

of lifting the dress and touching the legs of a 10-year-old girl

in 1989.  Further, in May 2000, defendant allegedly had incidents

of sexual contact with a seven-year-old girl even after he was

ordered by the court to have no contact with minor children.  The

State also alleged defendant was suffering from a mental disorder

which had existed for more than one year prior to the filing of

this petition, coupled with criminal propensities to the commis

sion of sexual offenses, and has demonstrated propensities to

acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children, making

him a sexually dangerous person.

		In August 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing on

the State’s petition to proceed under the Act, which included the

following exchange:

			“THE COURT: It’s my understanding, Miss

Essenburg, the State at this time is willing

to stipulate to the findings of Doctors

Killian and Bohlen, who are qualified psychi

atrists under the Sexually Dangerous Persons

Act, and stipulate to the findings that at

this time Mr. Bramlett is a sexually danger

ous person as defined by Illinois law; is

that correct?

			MS. ESSENBURG: The State is prepared to

stipulate to that, Your Honor, yes.

			THE COURT: Miss Behnke, it’s my under standing that Mr. Bramlett will *** stipulate

to the reports and the findings of the two

doctors; is that correct?

			MS. BEHNKE: That is correct, Your Honor.

			THE COURT: And, Mr. Bramlett, is that

your understanding; is that correct?

			DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

			THE COURT: All right, we’ll show then by

stipulation of the parties then that the

[c]ourt makes a finding that based upon the

testimony of Doctors Bohlen and Killian,

through their reports, that Mr. Bramlett

suffers from a mental disorder which has

existed for more than a year prior to the

filing of the [p]etition, which is coupled

with criminal propensities for the commission

of sex offenses and that he has demonstrated

propensities toward acts of sexual assault or

sexual molestation of children.

			It is therefore my finding by this

[c]ourt that he is therefore a sexually dan

gerous person.” 

Thereafter, the trial court entered an order finding defendant

had stipulated to the psychiatric reports and admitted the State

had sufficient evidence to prove he was a sexually dangerous

person.  The court dismissed without prejudice defendant’s charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse.  The court also ordered

defendant committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections for care and treatment.  This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

		Defendant first argues the trial court erred in allow

ing defendant to stipulate to evidence establishing him as a

sexually dangerous person without first admonishing him pursuant

to Supreme Court Rule 402 to determine the voluntariness of his

stipulation.  We disagree.  The question presented in this case,

whether the trial court was required to ascertain the voluntari

ness of defendant’s stipulation establishing him as a sexually

dangerous person, is a question of law, and such questions are

reviewed de novo (Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516, 693 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1998)).

		The Illinois legislature has defined a sexually

dangerous person under the Act as one who suffers from a mental

disorder coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of

sex offenses and has demonstrated propensities toward acts of

sexual assault or sexual molestation of children.  725 ILCS

205/1.01 (West 1998).  The Act serves the purpose of (1) protect

ing the public by sequestering sexually dangerous persons until

such persons have recovered and are released and (2) subjectingtreating

sexually dangerous persons to treatment such that they may

recover from the propensity to commit sexual offenses and be

rehabilitated.  People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 323-24, 752 N.E.2d 1055, 1058-59 (2001).

		The General Assembly, in passing the Act, sought the

commitment of sexually dangerous persons for treatment instead of

being

ccriminally punisheding them for their criminal sexual offenses. 

People v. Cooper, 132 Ill. 2d 347, 355, 547 N.E.2d 449, 454 (1989).  Our supreme court has stated “the Act does not promote

traditional aims of punishment, such as retribution or deter

rence.  Rather, under the Act, the State has a statutory

obligation to provide care and treatment for persons adjudged

sexually dangerous.”  Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 325, 752 N.E.2d at 1059.

		A proceeding under the Act is civil in nature.  725

ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998).  However, because of the loss of

liberty a commitment can cause, the Act provides certain

protections afforded to criminal defendants.  People v. Kastman, 309 Ill. App. 3d 516, 518, 722 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (2000).  For

example, the State must prove the defendant is subject to con

finement as a sexually dangerous person beyond a reasonable

doubt.  725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998); People v. Akers, 301 Ill. App. 3d 745, 749, 704 N.E.2d 452, 454 (1998).  Further, respon

dents have the right to demand a jury trial and to be represented

by counsel in the proceedings.  725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998). 

Likewise, a respondent under the Act is entitled to the effective

assistance of counsel under the standard used in criminal cases. 

People v. Dinwiddie, 306 Ill. App. 3d 294, 300, 715 N.E.2d 647, 652 (1999).

		In the case sub judice, defendant argues Rule 402 admonishments should have been given here because the proceedings

were the equivalent of a guilty plea in a criminal case.  We

disagree.  Rule 402 requires admonishments by the court in

“hearings on pleas of guilty, or in any case in which the defense

offers to stipulate that the evidence is sufficient to convict.” 

177 Ill. 2d R. 402.  The Supreme Court of Illinois has stated proceedings under the Act are not criminal proceedings.  People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 103, 481 N.E.2d 690, 696 (1985), aff'd,  Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).  The United States Supreme Court, in reviewing Allen, noted the Act “does not appear to promote either of 'the traditional aims of

punishment--retribution and deterrence.'”  Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 370, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 305, 106 S. Ct. at 2992, quoting

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 661, 83 S. Ct. 554, 567 (1963).  As the Act itself describes the

proceedings as civil in nature, and as commitment under the Act

does not constitute a criminal conviction, Rule 402 does not

apply.

		Defendant also argues due process and fundamental

fairness require the trial court to give admonishments before

accepting defendant’s stipulation.  We disagree.

		This court has acknowledged “the importance of

scrupulously ensuring the fairness of judicial proceedings that

may result in indefinite commitment of a person determined to be

sexually dangerous.”  People v. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d 920, 923, 676 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (1997).  In People v. Pembrock, 23 Ill. App. 3d 991, 995, 320 N.E.2d 470, 473 (1974), aff'd, 62 Ill. 2d 317, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976), the First District, in deciding the

reasonable doubt standard applied to proceedings under the Act,

also addressed the Act as to the requirements of Rule 402 and due

process.  The court stated, in part:

			“Although we have held that a standard

of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt must be

used in sexually dangerous persons proceed

ings, we do not believe that other elements

of the criminal process, such as admonitions

regarding a right to a jury trial, a right to

appeal and the consequences of a guilty plea,

are also constitutionally required as has

been contended by defendant.  We have noted

above that the requirements of due process

are not static but may vary depending upon

the nature of the interests involved.  While

both the civil proceedings in question and

criminal prosecutions may result in a loss of

liberty, substantial differences exist be

tween them.  Foremost among these are that in

a commitment under the Act there is no infer

ence of moral blameworthiness since a finding

of sexual dangerousness indicates that a

defendant’s inability to conform to the dic

tates of the law is the product of a mental

illness and, secondly, commitment under the Act, unlike criminal incarceration, is not

intended as punishment.  Thus our supreme

court has specifically rejected defendant’s

arguments regarding jury trial admonitions

[citation] and right to appeal [citation]. 

Moreover, since commitment under the Act does

not constitute a criminal conviction, Supreme

Court Rule 402 [citation] does not apply.” 

Pembrock, 23 Ill. App. 3d at 995, 320 N.E.2d at 473-74.

As we find the court’s elaboration on the Act persuasive, we

adopt its reasoning and find the requirements of due process do

not require admonishments here as they are required in a plea of

guilty in a criminal case.  Our holding is also supported by our

supreme court’s conclusion that “due process of law does not

require that the safeguards and procedural requirements

surrounding the waiver of a defendant’s right to jury trial in a

criminal case be followed in a proceeding under the Sexually

Dangerous Persons Act.”  People v. Studdard, 51 Ill. 2d 190, 197, 281 N.E.2d 678, 681 (1972).

		We also note the Act provides an additional safeguard

to guarantee the fairness and reliability of the proceedings. 

Section 4 requires the court to appoint two qualified psychia

trists to personally examine the defendant to determine if that

person is sexually dangerous.  725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998).  The

examining psychiatrists must then file a report with the court containing the results of their examination.  725 ILCS 205/4

(West 1998).  Thus, the Act provides a defendant with adequate

and necessary protections before he may be committed to the

Department of Corrections.

		Defendant argues admonitions must still be given to

determine the voluntariness of his stipulation.  However, this

court has held there is no constitutional requirement that a

defendant in a proceeding under the Act must be fit to stand

trial.  Akers, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 751, 704 N.E.2d at 455.  Similarly, there is no constitutional requirement that the trial

court give admonishments to defendant to determine the voluntari

ness of a stipulation. 

		In this case, defendant was represented by counsel who

agreed, along with defendant, to stipulate to the findings of the

two psychiatrists that defendant was a sexually dangerous person. 

The trial court received the stipulation and was privy to the

reports and opinions from the two examining psychiatrists.  No

court has held due process also required the trial court to give

the admonishments required for defendants in a criminal case, and

we decline to hold the admonishments were constitutionally

necessary.

III. CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment of the . 

		Affirmed.

		McCULLOUGH, P.J., and stSTEIGMANN, J., TURNER, J., withconcur.