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******************************************************CARRIE YERINIDES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 35733)
DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Bear, Js. Argued October 29, 2014—officially released March 17, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Newson, J.)
William A. Snider, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Jonathan M. Sousa, special deputy assistant state’s attorney, withwhom, onthebrief, wereDavidI. Cohen, state’s attorney, and Yamini Menon, special deputy assistantstate’s attorney, forthe appellee (respondent).Opinion BEAR, J. The petitioner, Carrie Yerinides, appeals fromthe denial ofherpetitionforcertificationto appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying her amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying her petition for certification and improperly determined that her criminal defense counsel had provided effective assistance. We conclude thatthe habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The following facts and procedural history are relevantto ourresolution ofthepetitioner’s appeal. In2009, the petitioner was the defendant in numerous matters pending in the judicial districts of Bridgeport and Norwalk. She had a total of seven cases pending against her, four criminal and two motor vehicle cases in Norwalk, and a criminal violation of probation case in Bridgeport. Whilethosecaseswerepending, onSeptember 30, 2009, the petitioner was arrested, charged with the sale ofnarcotics byapersonwho is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) and possession ofnarcotics in violation ofGeneral Statutes § 21a-279 (a), and presented before the Norwalk Superior Court under docket number S20N-CR-09-0124007 (docket #007). Priorto the petitioner’s arrest on docket #007, the state had presented the petitioner with an offer that would have resolved her Norwalk cases and required herto serve approximatelythree years imprisonment. That offer, however, was withdrawn when the petitioner was arrested on the charges in docket #007.1 The statepresentedanew offer, and onJanuary4, 2010, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to one count of sale ofnarcoticsbyapersonwho is not drug-dependent inviolation of§ 21a-278 (b)2 in docket#007 in exchange forthe agreeduponsentence ofeightyears ofincarceration, followed by five years of special parole, to be served concurrently to other sentences she was then serving or going to serve.3
On June 24, 2010, the petitioner, through her habeas counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was later amended on July 17, 2012. The petitioner claimed that her defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate her history ofdrug use and dependence as apossible defense to § 21a-278 (b) in orderto negotiate amore favorable plea agreement. The habeas trial was held on December 10, 2012, and in a memorandum of decision filed on March 18, 2013, the habeas court denied the petition. The habeas court found: ‘‘[T]here is no reasonable probability to believe that had defense counsel sought and obtained a substance abuse exam for his client pursuant to CADAC[see General Statutes § 17a-693 et seq.], or had he obtained the substance abuse records that were available at the time, the petitioner would have received a more favorable pretrial offer, and the petitioner has presented nothing more than speculation and conjecture to supporther claimthat eitherthe state’s attorney
or sentencing court would have been swayed by such information to do so.

. . . [S]ince there was already
anofferoutstandingatthetime ofthepetitioner’s arrest
on docket #007 that would have required her to accept
a prison sentence, there is no reasonable construction ofthe evidence presented that would support the petitioner’s claimthat, had counsel obtained andpresented such substance abuse information, either the court or the state’s attorneywouldhave beenwillingto consider
a long-term drug treatment program as an alternative disposition

. . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.)
The courtfurtherfound: ‘‘[T]hepetitioner’s claimthat she would have elected to go to trial had she known that she was being sentenced as a [person who is not drug-dependent] under General Statutes § 21a-278 (a) simplylackedcredibility. First, thepetitionerhasaprior conviction for sale ofnarcotics under the same statute, which, although some time ago, undermines her credibility that she did not understand that the present conviction under the same statute was as a [person who is not drug-dependent]. Additionally, the petitionerwas wellversedinthe criminaljustice system, andthis court doesnotbelievethatshe was unaware ofthe significant exposure she faced on all files had she made the foolhardy decision to reject a plea deal on this one file when her only other option was to proceed to separate trials on eight [files]. Even had a fact finder believed she was drug-dependent and convicted her of selling narcotics under General Statutes § 21a-277, her overall exposure on all charges and files then pending still would have been multiple times the plea agreement negotiated by her attorney. By proceeding to trial, she may have won that battle, but she surely would have lost the war. In fact, when given this option by the trial court a few days prior to entering her pleas, the petitioner quickly declined.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) The court concluded that ‘‘the petitionerhas failed to establishshe wasprejudiced, because she has failedto establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s advice, she was willing to proceed to trial.’’
On March 28, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the judgment denying her amended petition, which the habeas court denied on April 4, 2013. This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review and legal principles that inform our analysis. ‘‘Faced with the habeas court’s denial of certification to appeal, a petitioner’s first burden is to demonstrate that the habeas court’s ruling constituted an abuse ofdiscretion.

. . . If the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment ofthe habeas court should be reversed on its merits.

. . . To prove an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolution ofthe underlying claim involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.

. . . In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must considerthemerits ofthepetitioner’sunderlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.

‘‘ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Michael G

. v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 153 Conn. App. 556, 559, 102 A.3d 132 (2014), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 916, A.3d (2015). ‘‘A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance ofcounsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings.

. . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution.

. . . It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

. . . The United States Supreme Court, long before its recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012), recognized that the two part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), applies to ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims arising out of the plea negotiation stage.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn. App. 781, 792, 93A.3d 165 (2014). ‘‘In its analysis, a reviewing court may look to the performance prong or to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to prove either is fatal to a habeas petition.

. . . The prejudice inquiry in claims arising from counsel’s advice during the plea process differs from the analysis of claims following conviction after trial.

. . . In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), the Supreme Court of the United States articulated amodifiedprejudice standard for cases in which the conviction has resulted from a guilty plea.

. . . In order to establish prejudice in such cases, the petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
ongoingtotrial.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Delvecchio v. Commissioner of Correction, 149 Conn. App. 494, 500, 88 A.3d610, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 904, 91A.3d906 (2014);
see also Washington v. Commissioner of Correction,287 Conn. 792, 833, 835, 950A.2d 1220 (2008); Crawford

v. CommissionerofCorrection, 285 Conn. 585, 598, 940 A.2d 789 (2008); Johnson v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 285 Conn. 556, 576, 941 A.2d 248 (2008); Axel D

. v. Commissioner of Correction, 135 Conn. App. 428, 432–33, 41 A.3d 1196 (2012). Inanearlieropinion, Copas

v. CommissionerofCorrection, 234 Conn. 139, 151, 662 A.2d 718 (1995), however, our Supreme Court interpreted Hill as requiring the petitioner to show ‘‘that he would not have pleaded guilty, that he would have insisted on going to trial, and that the evidence that hadbeenundiscoveredorthe defenseshe claimsshould have been introduced were likelyto have been successful at trial.’’ In Carraway v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 144 Conn. App. 461, 471 n.9, 474–76, 72 A.3d 426 (2013), cert. granted, 312 Conn. 925, 95 A.3d 521 (2014), this court declined to follow the prejudice standard as articulated in Copas because it determined that the Hill standard was controlling as a matter of federal constitutional law as also recognized by our Supreme Court in Washington, Crawford, and Johnson

. We conclude, after a thorough review of the record, thatthepetitionerhasnotdemonstratedthattheresolution of any underlying claim involves issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner, or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court found the following: that the petitioner had extensive experience with the criminaljustice system; that she had aprior conviction under § 21a-278 (b); that her responses during the plea
canvassbythe courtconfirmedthatherdefensecounsel explained the elements ofthe offense ofsale ofnarcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent and the five year mandatory minimum sentence; that the court explained to her that her rejection of the offer would resultinconsecutivetrialsonallofherpendingcharges, including other charges that had mandatory minimum sentences; that there was the possibility of an ultimate sentence ‘‘substantially in the double figures’’; that the court determined that the petitioner understood the substantial benefit that she would receive by pleading guilty to the offense of sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent inviolation of § 21a-278 (b), instead of electing to be tried on all ofthe outstanding charges; and thatbecause ofthe foregoing findings, she failed to establish that she suffered any prejudice, i.e., the petitioner did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. 59; Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 287 Conn. 833; Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 285 Conn. 585; Johnson v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 285 Conn. 576; Delvecchio

v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 149 Conn. App.500; Carraway v. Commissioner ofCorrection, supra, 144 Conn. App. 474–76; Axel D

. v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 135 Conn. App. 428. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 We also note that at the time of her arrest on the charges in docket #007, the petitioner had thirty-one prior convictions, nine of which were drug related.

2 General Statutes § 21a-278 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who manufactures, distributes, sells, prescribes, dispenses, compounds, transports with the intent to sell or dispense, possesses with the intent to sell or dispense, offers, gives or administers to another person any narcotic substance, hallucinogenic substance other than marijuana, amphetaminetype substance, or one kilogram or more of a cannabis-type substance

. . . and who is not, at the time of such action, a drug-dependent person, for a first offense shallbe imprisonednot less thanfive years ormore thantwenty years

. . . .’’

3 We note that as part of the plea agreement, the state agreed not to prosecutetheremainderofthe casesthatwerependingagainstthepetitioner in Norwalk. The petitioner, however, was serving a six month sentence for contempt of court, which she received in Norwalk on November 20, 2009, and a concurrent four year sentence for the criminal violation ofprobation she received in Bridgeport on December 23, 2009.