# FILED
October 20, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk IN THE COURT OF C RIMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT KNOXVILLE AUGUST 1999 SESSIO N

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, * C.C.A. # 03C01-9902-CR-00052

Appellee, * HAMILTON CO UNTY VS. * Honorable Step hen M. Bevil, Judge PARIS A. WEA

VER, * (Aggravated Assault) Appellant. *

FOR THE APPELLANT : FOR THE APPELLEE : ARDENA J. G ARTH PAUL G. SUMMERS District Public Defender Attorney General & Repor ter DONNA ROBINSON MILLER MARVIN S. BLAIR, JR. and Assistant Attorney Gener al CHRISTIAN CODER 425 Fifth Avenue North Assistant District P ublic Defender Nashville, TN 37243 701 Cherry Street, Suit e 300 Chattanooga, TN 37402 WILLIAM H. COX, III District Attorney General H. C. BRIGHT, III Assistant District A

ttorney 600 Market Street, Suite 310 Chattanooga, TN 37402

OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED

JOHN EVERETT WILLIA MS, Judge-2- 

### OPINI ON

INTRODUCTION The defendant, Paris A. Weaver, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s ord er revoking his pr obation. The defendant contends that the trial court had insufficient e vidence to support rev

ocation. We AFFIRM the trial court’s order revok

ing probation.

BACKGROUND On June 3, 1998, the defendant pled guil ty to one count of aggrav ated assault with an agreed sentence of eight years at Range II to be served in split confinement. Defendant was requi red to serve 100% of an elev en month and twenty-nine day ac

tive confinement sentence and w as ordered to be released on November 30, 1998, with the balance to be served in supervised probation. The defendant was further ordered by the court as a special condi tion of probation to have no contact of any kind with Angela Burrell, the victim of defendant’s aggravated assault.
On July 2, 1998, a Petition to Revoke was filed by the state in response to a letter written to th e victim by the defendant w hile he was incarcer

ated. On September 16, 1998, the Hamilton Count y Court held a hearing

in consideration of the state’s petition, at w hich the defendant admitted to wri ting and mailing the letter. The victim testi

fied that she felt threatened by the letter especially the words, “I will

see you soon.” Howe

ver, the defendant testified that the letter was written with no inten t to threaten o r harass but rath er to express regret, apology and Christian sentiment. The tr ial court upon hearing thi s testimony granted the Petition to Revoke and ordered that the defenda nt serve his full sentence in incarceration. From that decision, the defendant now appeals.-3- ANAL YSIS The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to suppor t the Hamilton County Court’ s decision to revoke hi s probation. We disagree.

A trial cou rt may revok e a sente nce of pr obation upon a fi nding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the conditions of his probation. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-35-311. T he judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Williamson , 619 S.W.2d 145, 14 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). In order for this Court to be warranted i n finding an abuse of discretion in a probation revocatio n case, it must be established that the record contains no subs tantial evidence to support the conclusion of the tr ial judge that a viol ation of the conditions of probation has occurred. See State v. Grear , 568 S.W.2d 285, 28 6 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp , 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. C rim. App . 1980). The proo f of a probation violation need not be established beyond a reasona ble doubt, but it is sufficient if it allows the trial judge to make a cons cientious and intellig ent judgment. See State v. Milton , 673 S.W.2d 555, 55 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).

Our review of the rec

ord demonstrates that the state es tablished sufficient facts during the hearing t o permit the trial judge to make an intelligent judg ement. At the hearing, it was

established that: (1) As a special conditi on of defendant’s probation, the defendant was ordered by the cou rt to have “no contact of any kind with the victim;” (2) The defendant, w

hile incar cerated, w rote a lette r to the vi ctim stating among other things, “I know that I shoul d not do this but I am writing to y

ou...” and “I will s

ee you soon;” and (3) The victim fou nd this letter th reatening.

The trial court had sufficient basi s to find a probation violation. The probation order made no except ion for written communicati on, and thus the trial court reasonably concl uded that the letter constituted contact in violation of the-4- probation condition. The victim further testified, quite un derstandably, that this letter, especially the words, “I wil l see you soon,” fright ened her. The defendant would argue that we

take these words innocently in a restricti ve context confined to the plain language of the l etter; but this we w ill not do. Defendant’s w ords exist in a complicated context of violence, a context where a history of abuse culminated in a blow w ith a deadly object to the s ide of the victim’s head, and a context where simple words trigger fear. The court sought to end this fear and protect the victim by

conditioning the defendant’s r elease. The defendant accepted the court’s conditi on and now must accept the conseq uence of its violation. With one letter, the defendant v iolated the right of his v ictim to be free from fu rther har assment and chall enged the integrity o f the cou rt. Accord ingly, we echo the sentiments of the tr ial court and affirm its decis ion: [Y]ou’re the one the Court told to stay away from her and not to have any contact wi

th her. You told me you w ould and you get out there -- I can not have peo ple, Mr. Weaver, intimidating peopl e that are victims of their cr

iminal activity, I can’t have that. I specifically ordered

you not to have any c

ontact with her whatsoever, and you did it anyway. You’ve intimidated her when you told her you’ll see her soon. I can understand why she would have been threatened by that an d why she would hav e fear after everything that’s gone on. I can’t tolerate that, Mr. Weaver, I can’t have people deliberately violating the order

when its protection of somebody else, I just can’ t have that done.

Further, we note that the t rial court’s decisi on coincides with the i mportant legislative poli cy against domestic abus e. See , e.g. , Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3- 618. We recognize, like the legislature, the seriousness of domestic abuse as a crime and the pressing need to afford its victims assur ance and protection. In this case, the court’s duty is to stand behind its order and provide this vi ctim of abuse some level of safety and peac e.

CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the trial court’s order revoking the defendant’s pr obation.-5- __________________________________ JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge

CONCUR:

____________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPT ON, Judge

____________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, Ju dge