vdec MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 3 ME 43 Docket: Wal

- 22

- 298 Argued : May	10,	2023 Decided: August	3,	2023 Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS , and DOUGLAS , JJ.

UPSTREAM	WATCH

v. CITY OF	BELFAST et	al.

JABAR ,	J. [¶1] Upstream Watch	 (Upstream) appeals	 from a	 judgment	 of	 the Superior	Court	(Waldo	County, R.	Murray,	J. ) affirming the	Belfast	Zoning	Board of	Appeals ’ (ZBA) decision dismissing	Upstream’s	appeal	on	the	grounds that Upstream	 did	 not	 have	 standing	 to	 appeal	 the Belfast Planning	 Boar d ’s (Planning	Board) decision issuing five	permit s to	Nordic	Aquafarms	(Nordic)

. We	conclude	 that the	 ZBA	erred	as	a	matter	 of	law	when	it	determined	 that Upstream	did	not	have	standi ng	to	appeal

. We	vacate the	judgment and remand the	case	to	the	Superior	Court with	instructions to	remand	the	case	to	the	ZB A

. 1

1 We	 note	 that	 although	 this	 case	is	 closely	 related	 to	 our	 recent	 decision	in Mabee	 v.	Nordic Aquafarms	Inc. , 2023	ME	15,	290	A.3d	79 ,	the	permits	at	issue	here	are	distinct	from	those	at	issue	in Mabee

. While	our	decision	in Mabee may	have	an	effect	on	the	ultimate	viability	of	the	permits	at issue	here,	our	ruling	today	relates only to	a	threshold	standing	issue

. W e	remand	the	matter	to	the2 I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The following	facts	are	drawn	from	the	administrative	record	before the	 ZBA,	 the	 municipal	 body	 that	 issued	 the	 decision we	 now	 review

. See Friends	of	Lamoine	v.	Tow n of Lamoine ,	2020	ME	70,	¶	2,	234	A.3d	214

. [¶ 3 ] Upstream is	 a	 not

- for

- profit	 corporation registered	 to	 transact business	 in	 Maine , with	 its	 principal	 place	 of	 business	 in	 Belfast , that	 is dedicated	to	the	restoration	of	Maine	mid

- coast	rivers	and	streams ,	including the	 Little	 River	 in	 Belfast, to	 their	 natural	 habitats.	 	 Nordic	 is	 a	 Delaware corporation that has	 proposed	 a	 land

- based salmon aquaculture	 project	 in Belfast at	a	site	where	U.S.	Route	1	crosses	the	Little	River .		On	June 11,	2019, in	 furtherance	 of	 the p roject,	 Nordic	 submitted	 applications	 to	 the	 Planning Board for (1) a s ite p la n p ermit, (2) a z oning u se p ermit, (3) a s horeland z oning
p ermit, (4) a s ignificant g roundwater w ells p ermit,	and (5) a s ignificant w ater
i ntake and s ignificant w ater d ischarge/ o utfall p ipes p ermit

. [¶ 4 ] After Nordic	submitted	its	permit applications ,	the	Planning	Board issued	 a	 procedural	 order	 requiring	 a ny pe rson or	 entit y who	wanted	 to	 be included	as	a	“Party

- i n - Interest”	to	file	a	written	statement	with	the	Planning

ZBA	to	address	the	merits	of	the permits , and we	leave it to	the	ZBA to	address	the	impact of	our decision i n Mabee

.3 Board	on	or	before	July	30,	2019.		The	p rocedural	order	required	the	written statement	 to	 demonstrate,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 the	 person	 or	 entity	 owned	 land directly	 or	 indirectly	 affected	 by	 the p roject	 and	 would suffer a “ particular injury ” distinct	from	the	public	because	of	the p roject.		Upstream filed	a	written statement	which	demonstrated	how	it	was	affected	by	the p roject	by	explaining its	 purpose,	 listing	 its	 members	 whose	 property	 abutted	 the p roject,	 and describing	the	conservation	easement	over	the	intertidal	land	owned	by other Upstream	me mbers	that	would	be	directly	affected	by	the p roject. 2 Based	on this	written	statement,	the	Planning	Board	granted	Upstream	party

- in

- interest
status. [¶ 5 ] Between	June	2019	and	December	2020,	the	Planning	Board	held twenty
- two	 public	 hearings	 and	 thir ty
- nine	 public	 meetings	 on	 the p roject. Upstream	 participated	 in	 approximately	 twenty

- two	 of	 these	 proceedings, expressing its opposition	to	the p roject. At	the	Planning	Board	proceedings, a representative for Upstream	 and	 several	 of Upstream’s members	 testified , expressing	concerns about t he impact	of	emissions from	the p roject ,	the	odors and	 sounds	 from	 the p roject,	 the	 visual	 impact	 of	 the p roject	 on	 members’

2 We	adjudicated	 the	issues	surrounding the conservation	easement	and	 the	ownership	of	 the intertidal	lands	in Mabee , 2023	ME	15,	290	A.3d	79.4 enjoyment	of	the	environment,	the p roject’s impact	on	the	environment	its elf, the p roject’s impact	 on	 traffic,	and the p roject’s impact	 on	groundwater	and freshwater	 suppl ies

. On	 December	 22,	 2020,	 the	 Planning	 Board	 voted	 to approve	Nordic’s	permit applications .		On	January	20,	2021,	Upstream	timely appealed	 the	 Planning	 Boar d’s	 decision	 to	 the	 ZBA. See Belfast, Me., Code § 102

- 13 4 ( a ) (Dec. 7,	2004)

. [¶ 6 ] As	required	by	the Belfast Code	of Ordinance s Land	Use	Regulations Ordinance (Ordinance) , Upstream	 completed	 the	 two

- page application

- to
- appeal	form to	the	ZBA. Id

. A	small	space	is	provided	on	the	first page	 for	the	applicant	to	describe	the decision being	appealed,	the	name	and mailing	 address	 of	 the	 appealing	 party,	 and	 the	 type	 of	 review	 the	 party	 is requesting	 from	 the	 ZBA.	 	 The	 second	 page	 prov ides	 a	 list	 of	 prompts	 to describe	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 appeal	 and	 includes	 a	 few	 lines	 of	 blank	 space underneath	each	prompt.		The	first	prompt	reads,	“Describe	why	you	believe you	ha ve ‘standing’	to	file	an	appeal.”		Upstream	answered: Upstream	 Watch	 was	 q ualified	 by	 the	 planning	 board	 as	 an

“ interested	 party ” and	 participated	 fully	 in	 the	 planning	 board proceedings.	 	 Upstream	 Watch	 was	 formed	 to	 restore	 the	 Little River	that	abuts	the	project.		Volunteers	use	the	trails,	the	bay	and the	river.5 [¶ 7 ] At	 th e	 ZBA’s	 first	 hearing	 on	 Upstream’s	 appeal,	 a	 ZBA	 board member question ed	 whether	 Upstream	 had	 standing	 to	 appeal

. Upstream’s attorney	 explained	 to	 the	 ZBA	 the	 process	 the	 Planning	 Board	 used	 to determine	 who	 qualified	 as	 parties

- in

- interest,	 referencing the	 Planning Board’s	 procedural	 order.	 	 Upstream’s	 attorney	 further	 explained	 that	 Good Karma	Farm,	owned	by two Upstream	members,	is	located	about	600	feet	from the p roject	 and	 may	 suffer	 potential	 injuries	 associated	 with	 monitoring its private	 wells	 and being	 forced	 to	 respond	 to	 any	 negative	 impacts	 to groundwater	 quality	 resulting	 from	 the p roject.	 	 The	 ZBA	 requested	 that Upstream	and	Nordic	submit	briefs	on	the	issue. [¶ 8 ] Both	 parties	 submitted	 briefs,	 and	 Upstream	 included	 affidavits from	 three	 o f	 its	 members	 describing	 the	 potential	 injuries	 they	 may experience	 due	 to	 the p roject.	 	 Upstream’s brief	 and affidavits	 were	 dated February	25,	2021,	more	than	thirty	days	after	the	appeals	period, s ee Belfast, Me.,	Code § 102

- 134(a) , 3 which	had ended	 January 21,	2021.		The	ZBA	heard argument s from	both	parties.

3 Belfast, Me., Code	§	102

- 13 4 (a) (Dec.	7,	2004)	provides	that	“[a] n	administrative appeal	shall	be taken	within	30	calendar	days	from	the	vote	taken	by	the	board	from	which	a party	is	aggrieved	or the	written	decision	of	the	code	enforcement	officer .”6 [¶ 9 ] After	the	arguments,	the	same	member	of	the	ZBA	who	raised	the initial	 concern	 about	 Upstream’s	 standing	 to	 appeal	 asked	 whether	 the	 ZBA could	 consider	 information submitted after the	 thirty

- day filing deadline

. While	 the	 affidavits	 submitted	 with	 the	 brief	 had	 been	 timely	 filed	 with	 the supplemental	brief in	accordance	with	the	ZBA’s	request ,	they	did	fall	outside the	 original	 thirty

- day window	 to	 file	an	appeal

. Id

. T he	ZBA det ermined	it should	 confine	 its	 review,	 and	 did confine	 its	 review , to	 Upstream’s application

- to
- appeal form to	determine	whether	Upstream	had	standing. The
ZBA ultimately determined	 that	 Upstream had	 not	 demonstrated	 a particularized	injury	sufficient	to	establish	standing	and	dismissed	Upstream’s appeal. [¶1 0 ] Following	 the	 dismissal	 of	 its	 appeal,	 Upstream	 filed with	 the Superior	Court	a	complaint	for	judicial	review	pursuant	to M aine	Rule	of Civil Procedure 80B. The	court	dismissed	Upstream’s complaint ,	holding	 that the ZBA	did	not	err	when	it	determined	that	Upstream	had	failed	to	demonstrate administrative standing	 and	 therefore, Upstream	 failed	 to	 exhaust	 its administrative	 remedies becau se	it	 did	 not	 file a	 cognizable	 appeal	with	 the ZBA.		Upstream	timely	appealed. M.R.	App.	P.	2B(a),	(c)(1)

.7 II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 1 ] We	are	faced	with	two	issues:	(1)	whether	the	ZBA	erred	when	it confined	 its	 review	 of	 whether	 Upstream	 had	 standing	 to	 the information contained	 on	 the	 application

- to
- appeal form and	 (2)	whether , reviewing	 the entire	record from	 the	Planning	Board , Upstream	had	standing	 to	appeal	 the Planning	Board’s	decision. 4
A. Standard	of R eview [¶1 2 ] “ When	the	Superior	Court	acts	as	an	intermediate	court	of	appeals, we	 review	 directly	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 tribunal	 of	 original	 jurisdiction.” Nergaard	v.	Town	of	Westport	Island ,	2009	ME	56,	¶	11,	973	A.2d	735 .		Because the	question	of	whether	a	party	has standing	to	bring	an	administrative	appeal depends	on	 the	language	of	 the	governing	ordinance, we must	interpret	and apply	the	relevant	sections	of	the Ordinance

. Id. ¶	12. [¶1 3 ] We review	the	interpretation	of	an	ordinance	de	novo, id. ,	but will

“ accord	 substantial	 deference	 to	 the [tribunal	 of	 original	 jurisdiction’s] characterizations	 and	 fact

- findings	 as	 to	 what	 meets	 ordinance	 standards , ”

4 Upstream	also	contends	that	it	was	denied	due	process	by	the	ZBA’s	proceedings	and that	the ZBA	failed	to	make	specific	findings of	fact and	conclusions of	law .		Because	we	conclude	that	the	ZBA erred	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law	 due	 to	 its	 confined	 review , we need not	 reach	 Upstream’s	 additional arguments. See State	v.	Boilard ,	4 8 8	A.2d	1380,	1386	(Me.	1985) (declining	to	reach	additional	claims after	reaching	a	dispositive	conclusion	on	different	grounds)

.8 Bizier	 v.	 Town	 of	 Turner ,	 2011	ME	 116,	 ¶ 8,	 32	A.3d	 1048 (quotation	marks omitted). We examine “ the	plain	meaning	of	the	language	of	the	ordinance,	and

we construe	its	terms	reasonably	in	light	of	the	purposes	and	objectives	of	the ordinance	and	its	general	structure , ” Stewart	v.	Town	of Sedgwick ,	2002	ME	81, ¶	 6,	 797	 A.2d	 27 ,	 “ to	 avoid	 absurd	 or	 illogical	 results , ” Olson	 v.	 Town	 of Yarmouth ,	2018	ME	27,	¶	16,	179	A.3d	920

. B. ZBA	Appeals	Process [¶1 4 ] “T he [ZBA] shall	review	administrative	appeals	from	final	written decisions	of	.	.	.	the	Planning	Board.”		Belfast, Me., Code §	102

- 132(a) (Oct.	21, 2008)

. The	ZBA accepts appeals	filed	within	thirty	calendar	days	from	the	vote “taken	by	the	board	from	which	a	party is	aggrieved.” Id. §	102

- 134(a)

. “Forms for	appeal	shall	be	those	approved	by	the [ ZBA ] ,	and	the	aggrieved	person	shall set	 forth	on	said	 forms	the	grounds	 for	the	appeal

. ” Id. “ A ll	appeals	shall	be considered	filed	at	the	time	of	delivery	to	the	City department	of	planning	and community	development

.	.	.	. ” Id. Additionally,	“ [i] n	all	administrative	appeals , .	.	.	the [ZBA] shall	act	as	an	appellate	board	which	shall	entertain	all	evidence of	 record	 submitted	 in	 the	 underlying	 hearing,	 including	 any	 transcripts, findings	 of	 facts,	 and	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 board	 of	 original	 fact

- finding jurisdiction.” Id. § 102

- 134(f)

.9 [¶1 5 ] The Ordinance permits	 the	 ZBA	 to	 determine	 standing as	 an operative	decisionmaker ; however,	the	determination	must	be	made “by	a	vote of	a	majority	of	a	quorum	of	the [ZBA] members	as	a	preliminary	matter	to	the extent	that	any	party ’ s	standing	is	chall enged.” Id. §	102

- 134(b)

. Only	parties with	standing	are	permitted	to	participate	in	ZBA	hearings. Id

. C. Administrative Standing [¶1 6 ] Under	the Ordinance ,	a n	“aggrieved	p arty ” who	may bring	a	case before	the ZBA	is	“[a]	person	whose	land	is directly	or	indirectly	affected	by the granting	or	denial	of	a	permit	or	variance	.	.	.	or	a	person	whose	land	abuts land for	which	a	permit	or	variance	has	been	granted.” Belfast, Me., Code § 66

- 1(c) (Apr

. 6,	2010). [¶1 7 ] The	Ordinance	do es not	define	“abuts”	or	“abutter.” See	id

. We have	ruled	that	in	the	absence	of	ordinance	language to	the	contrary , “abutter”

means a person who possesses	land in	close	proximity to an	affected	piece	of land,	and	thus	is	not	limited	to	a	direct	abutter	or	adjoiner. See Sahl	v.	Town	of York ,	2000	ME	180,	¶	9,	760	A.2d	266 ; Brooks	v.	Cumberland	Farms,	Inc. ,	1997 ME	203,	¶ ¶ 2,	9

- 10 ,	70 3 A.2d	844 ; see	also Nergaard ,	2009	ME	56,	¶	18,	97 3 A.2d	735	( “[S]tanding has	been	liberally	granted	to	people	who	own	property10 in	 the	 same	 neighborhood	 as	 the	 property	 that	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 permit	 or variance.” ). [¶1 8 ] The	Ordinance define s a	“person,”	and	thus	someone	who	may	be an	 aggrieved	 party , see §	 102

- 134(a), as	 including	 “an	 association” or “organization” as	well	as “an	individual , ” §	66

- 1(b)(5). We	have	concluded,	in the	absence	of	contradictory	language	in	an	ordinance,	that	a	gr oup	may	show standing if	at	least	one	member	has	standing. Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes v.	Town of	Lincoln ,	2010 ME	78,	¶ 15 ,	2	A.3d	284

. Therefore, to	establish	standing	under the	Ordinance , Upstream had	the	burden	of	demonstrating	that at	least	one	of its	members	is	an	aggrieved person in	the	member’s	own	right. 5
1. The	ZBA’s C onfined R eview [¶1 9 ] We	consider de	novo the	ZBA’s	decision	to	confine	its	review	of	the facts	 contained	 in	 the application

- to
- appeal	 form	 because	 it	 involves	 a	 legal interpretation	of	the Ordinance

. See Nergaard ,	2009	ME	56,	¶	12,	973	A.2d	735. The	ZBA	erred	when	it	confined	its	review	of	Upstream’s	standing	argument	to

5 Generally,	associational	standing	includes	three	eleme nts

. “ An	association	has	standing	to	bring suit	on	behalf	of	its	members	when [1] its	members	would	otherwise	have	standing	to	sue	in	their own	right, [2] the	interests	at	stake	are	germane	to	the	organization’s	purpose,	and [3] neither	the claim	 asserted nor	 the	 relief	 requested	 requires	 the	 participation	 of	 individual	 members	 in	 the lawsuit.” Black	 v.	 Bureau	 of	 Parks	 &	 Lands ,	 2022	 ME	 58,	 ¶	 29,	 288	 A.3d	 346 (quotation	 marks omitted). Because	we	determine	that	Upstream	meets	all	three	prongs ,	we	need	not decide	whether only	 the	 first	 prong applies, or all three	 prongs	 apply , when	 determining	 whether	 an	 entity	 has associational	standing	in	the	administrative law context

.11 Upstream’s written	response	on	the	application

- to
- appeal	form	because	(1) the Ordinance does	not	contain	such	a	restriction	and	(2) the	Ordinance mandates that,	 when	 acting	 in	 an appellate	 capacity,	 the	 ZBA	 consider	 all	 evidence	 of record	submitted	in	the	underlying	hearing. See § 102

- 134(f)

. [¶ 20 ] While	 the Ordinance do es include	 two	provisions	governing the scope	of	the	ZBA’s	review,	neither provision expressly	restrict s the	ZBA	from considering	 the administrative record ,	 including	 the	 Planning	 Board	 record

. See §	102

- 134(f),	(g). To	the	contrary,	the	Ordinance	mandates	that	when	the ZBA	 acts	 in	 its	 appellate	 capacity,	 it	 “ shall entertain	 all	 evidence	 of	 record submitte d	in	the	underlying	hearing,	including	any	transcripts,	findings	of	fact, and	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	 board	 of	 original	 fact

- finding	 jurisdiction. ” § 102

- 13 4(f); cf. M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)

- (f) (limiting	the	contents of, and	the court’s review	of , the	record). Although	the	ZBA	was	making	a	standing	determination in	the	first	instance,	it	was	considering	this	appeal	from	the	Planning	Board	in its	appellate	capacity,	and	the	ZBA	should	have	used	the administrative	record, includin g	 the Planning	 Board	 record , to determine whether	 Upstream	 had standing. S ee §	102

- 134(f); Norris	Fam

. Assocs.,	LLC	v.	Town	of	Phippsburg ,	2005 ME	 102,	 ¶	 20,	 879	 A.2d	 1007 ( determin ing	 party’s	 standing	 from	 Planning Board	record); Witham	Fam

. Ltd.	P ’ ship v.	Town	of	Bar	Harbor ,	2011	ME	104,12 ¶ ¶ 12

- 13,	30	A.3d	811 (same).		Therefore,	 the	ZBA	should	not	have	con fined itself	to	a	review	of	the application

- to
- appeal form	because	the	Ordinance	does not	 contain	 such	 a	 restriction	 and	 mandates	 the	 ZBA	 to	 consider	 the	 entire record	when	acting in an	appellate	c apacity

. 2. Upstream’s	Standing [¶ 2 1] We normally	 review with deference a municipal	board’s	 factual determinations , see Bizier ,	 2011	 ME	 116,	 ¶	 8,	 32	 A.3d	 1048 , but the	 facts contained	in	the	administrative	record here clearly	establish	Upstream’s	status as	an	aggrieved	p erson as	a	matter	of	law

. See	Black v.	Bureau	of	Parks	&	Lands , 2022	ME	58, ¶ 26,	288	A.3d	346 (“ We	review	standing	de	novo	as	a	question	of law	and	may	raise	the	issue	sua	sponte; therefore, we	are	not	bound	by	the	trial

court ’ s	conclusion.”). [¶ 22 ] The parties	and	the	ZBA	agree	that	to	have	standing,	Upstream	had to	 demonstrate	 that	 it	 was	 an	 aggrieved	 p erson under	 the	 Ordinance. S ee § § 66

- 1(c) , 102

- 13 4 (a)

. In	determining	that	Upstream	did	not	have	standing , the	ZBA	applied	both	the	aggrieved	p erson standard contained	in	the	Ordinance and a particularized	injury	standard. [¶ 23 ] We	l ook	first	to	the	plain	language	of	the	Ordinance

. W hile	it	does mention	standing	generally,	it	does	not explicitly require	that	a	party	show a13 particularized	inju ry to	qualify	as	an aggrieved	party

. See § § 66

- 1(c) , 102

- 13 4;
Stewart ,	2002	ME	8 1 ,	¶	6,	797	A.2d	27 ; Nelson	v.	Bayroot,	LLC ,	2008	ME	91,	¶	9, 953	A.2d	378 (“Whether	a	party	has	standing	depends	on	the	wording	of	the specific	statute	involved.”) .		I n Nergaard , the	town’s	ordinance	did	not	contain the	same	language	present	in	the	Ordinance

. 2009	ME	56,	¶ 13,	973	A.2d	735.
In Nergaard , w e analyzed	 a	 particularized	 injury	 requirement	 when determining	whether	the	plaintiffs	had	standing	because the ordinance at	issue defined “ aggrieved	party ” as an	owner	of	land	whose	property	is	directly	or	indirectly	affected by	 the	 granting	 or	 denial	 of a	 permit	 or	 variance	 under [the applicable] Ordinance;	a	person	whose	land	abuts	land	for	which	a permit	or	variance	has	been	granted;	or	any	other	person	or	group of	 persons	who	 have	 suffered particularized injury as	 a	 result	 of granting	or	denial	of	such a	permit	or	variance. Id

. (emphasis	 added) (quotation	marks	 omitted). The	 plaintiffs	in Nergaard could	not	argue	that	they	were	abutters	nor	that	they	had	land	affected,	which meant	 they	 could	 demonstrate	 that	 they	were	aggrieved	 parties only if	 they suffered a	 particularized	 injury. Id. ¶	 16. The Ordinance	 does not define

“ aggrieved	party ” as	any	p erson	who	has	a particularized	injury

. See § 66

- 1(c)

. Unlike	the	ordinance	at	issue	in Nergaard , t he	term “ particularize d	injury ” does not	appear anywhere in the Ordinance. See § § 66

- 1(c) , 102

- 13 4	( containing no particularized	injury	requirement) ; Nergaard ,	2009	ME	56,	¶¶	1 3,	17

- 22,	97314 A.2d	735 (analyzing	the particularized	injury	requirement in	the ordinance at issue)

. [¶ 24 ] We	 require	 particularized	 in jury for judicial standing,	 but	 a municipality	can	set	its	own	more	liberal	rules	for administrative standing. Cf. Rockland	Plaza	Realty	Corp.	v.	City	of	Rockland ,	2001	ME	81 , ¶	6 , 772	A.2d	256 (discussing	 an	 ordinance	 provision	 that	 allowed	 for	 administrative	 review prio r	to an	agency	taking a final action)

. Any	confusion	in	the	case	law	arises from	 the	 fact	 that	 most	 ordinances	 incorporate	 a	 particularized	 in jury requirement.	 	 For	 example,	 in Nergaard ,	 the	 relevant	 ordinance expressly incorporated	 a particularized	 injury	 requirement	 into	 its	 definition	 of an

“ aggrieved	party ” where	a	party ,	like	the	plaintiffs	in Nergaard , did not	possess land	that	was	affected	by	or	abutted	a	permit	or	variance. 2009	ME	56,	¶ 13, 973	A.2d	735. This	conclusion	is	re inforced	by	language	in Friends	of	Lincoln Lakes ,	 which	 states	 that	 in Nergaard , “a	 recent	 decision	 interpreting	 an ordinance	containing	identical	language,	we	held	that	to	establish	standing	the plaintiff	 ‘must	 demonstrate	 not	 only	 that	 he	 or	 she	 had	 part y	 status	 at	 the administrative	 proceedings,	 but, in	 addition, that	 he	 or	 she	 has	 suffered	 a particularized	injury	or	harm. ’ ” Friends	of	Lincoln	Lakes ,	2010	ME	78,	¶	11,	2 A.3d	284 (quoting Nergaard ,	2009	ME	56,	¶	16,	973	A.2d	735)

. We	viewed	the15 particularized	in jury requirement as incorporated	in	 the	specific	language	of th at ordinance.		It	would	make	no	sense	for	us	to	impose	a	particularized	in jury requirement	 for	 administrative	 standing	 when	 an	 ordinance itself	 does	 not include	such	a	requirem ent ,	because	nothing	in	any	statute	requires	it. [¶ 25 ] Another	source	of	confusion	may	be	the	fact	that	we	can , and	do , impose	a	particularized	in jury standard	for	a	plaintiff	to	seek	redress	in	court.
See Dubois	v.	Town	of	Arundel ,	2019	ME	21,	¶	6, 202	A.3d	524 (“ In	order	to	have standing to	 file	a Rule 80B complaint,	 the	complainant	must	show	(1)	 that	it was	 a	 party	 at	 the	 administrative	 proceeding,	 and	 (2)	 that	 it	 suffered	 a particularized	 injury	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 agency ’ s	 decision. ”	 (quotation	 ma rks omitted) )

. This judicial	 restriction	 effectively	 limits judicial	 review	 under
Maine Rule of	Civil	Procedure 80B	to	those	aggrieved persons,	however	defined by	 an	 ordinance,	 who	 have	 a	 particularized	 in jury

. But	 here,	 that	 judicial standing	 restriction	 is	 immaterial	 because	 no	 one	 is	 arguing	 that Upstream does not have	a	particularized	i njury “as	a	result	of	 the	agency’s	decision” to appeal	in	court. Dubois ,	2019	ME	21,	¶	6,	202	A.3d	524

. [¶ 26 ] Here , upon	 examin ing the entire administrative	 record , w e conclude , as	a	matter	of	law , that	Upstrea m	satisfies the	definition	of “ aggrieved party ” under	the	Ordinance

. See § 66

- 1(c) ; Black ,	2022 ME 58,	¶¶ 28

- 30,	28816 A.3d	 346. T he	 proceedings from	 the	 Planning	 Board , contained in	 the administrative	 record available	 to	 the	 ZBA , demonstrate	 that	 at	least	 one	 of Upstream’s	 members	 was	 an	 aggrieved	 p erson ,	 either	 as	 an	 abutter	 or as	 a possessor	 of land	 directly	 affected	 by	 the p roject. A number	 o f	 Upstream’s members	owned	property	next	to	or	near	enough	to	the p roject	to	qualify	as abutters,	making	them	aggrieved	parties	under	the	Ordinance.		§ 66

- 1(c) ; see Nergaard ,	2009	ME	56,	¶	18,	973	A.2d	735

. Additionally , the	administrative record reflects	 that Upstream	 presented	 a	 number	 of	 concerns at	 Planning Board	hearings sufficient	to	demonstrate	that at	least	one	of	its	members was an	aggrieved person due	to	owning	land	that	would	be	directly	affected	by	the
p roject ,	such	as	the potential	imp act that the p roject ’s drawing large	amounts of	water	 from	a	local	aquifer	could have	on members’ wells that draw	water from	that	aquifer, see	Norris	Fam

. Assocs.,	LLC ,	2005	ME	102,	¶¶	19

- 20,	879	A.2d 1007	 (determining that	 abutters	 had	 standing	 to	 challen ge	 potential construction	that might displace	water	and	redirect	it	onto	other	properties), the	potential	impact of	the	project on	members’	actual	enjoyment	of	the	local environment, see Fitzgerald	v.	Baxter	State	Park	Auth. ,	385	A.2d	189,	196

- 97 (Me. 1978) ( holding	 that users	 of	 public	 land	 had	 standing	 to	 challenge	 an agency’s	action ) , and the	potential	impact of	the	project on	local	traffic , see Sahl ,17 200 0	ME	180 ,	¶	1 0 , 760 A.2d 266 (conferring	standing to	appellants	claiming that	a motel	expansion	would obstruct	their	view	and	create	additional	traffic )

. See § 66

- 1(c)

. [¶ 27 ] O ur	 review	 establishes	 that	 the	 administrative	 record clearly demonstrates as	a	matter	of	law that at	least	one	of Upstream ’s	members was an	aggrieved	p erson . Accordingly,	Upstream had	standing to	appeal	to	the	ZBA and	the	ZBA	erred	in	dismissing	Upstream’s	appeal	for	lack	for	standing

. III. CONCLUSION [¶ 28 ] We	 conclude that	 the	 ZBA	 erred	 when	it	 dismissed	 Upstream’s appeal	 for	lack	of	standing	because	it	should	not	have	confined	its	review	 to Upstream’s application

- to
- appeal form. We	further	conclude	that,	as	a	matter of	law,	the administrative record	sufficiently	demon strates	that	Upstream	had standing	to	appeal	to	the	ZBA. W e	vacate	the	decision	of	ZBA	and	remand	to the	Superior	Court	with	instructions	to	remand	to	the	ZBA for	consideration on the	merits of	Upstream’s	appeal	from the Planning	Board decision

. The	entr y	is: Judgment vacated.	 	 Remanded	 to	 the	 Superior Court	with	instructions	to	remand	to	the	ZBA	for proceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.18 David	B.	 Losee,	Esq.,	David	B.	 Losee	 LLC,	Camden ; and	David	 J.	Perkins,	Esq. (orally) ,	and	Robert	J.	Papazian,	Esq.,	Curtis	Thaxter	LLC,	Portland,	for	appellant Upstream	Watch Kristin	M.	Collins,	Esq. (orally) ,	Preti	Flaherty	Beliveau	&	Pachios	LLP,	Augusta, for	appellee	City	of	Belfast David	M.	Kallin,	Esq. (orally) ,	and	Grady	R.	Burns,	Esq.,	Drummond	Woodsum, Portland,	for	appellee	Nordic	Aquafarms	Inc.

Waldo	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP

- 2021

- 03 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY