NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAURA B. WRIGHT, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-16221 

D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01235-VCF 

MEMORANDUM* 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Cam Ferenbach, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2023

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Dissent by Judge BRESS.

Laura Wright appeals the district court’s decision affirming an Administrative 

Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Wright’s application for Social Security disability 

benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district 

court’s decision de novo and “will disturb the denial of benefits only if the [ALJ’s] 

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 25 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

decision contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” 

Kilpatrick v. Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Lambert v. Saul, 

980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020)). We vacate and remand.

At step four of the five-step Social Security evaluation process, the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant, with her residual functional capacity, can still 

perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If she can, the 

claimant will be found not disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ considers whether the 

claimant can perform her past work “either as the claimant actually performed it or 

as generally performed in the national economy.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(2). “Although 

the burden of proof lies with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to 

make the requisite factual findings to support h[er] conclusion.” Pinto v. Massanari, 

249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001).

The ALJ found that Wright—who, due to her limitations, needs a “sit/stand 

option” permitting her to alternate between sitting and standing every 30 minutes—

could perform her past relevant work as a casino card dealer, as that position is 

generally performed in the national economy. This finding was not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

The ALJ relied on the relevant Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 

entry, as well as the testimony of a vocational expert (VE). But the DOT does not 

indicate whether the card dealer position is compatible with a sit/stand option or 
3 

whether casinos generally allow card dealers to alternate between sitting and 

standing. And while the VE testified that “at times . . . there’s a chair or stool 

available,” and that she “ha[d] seen both” dealers who sit and dealers who stand, the 

VE’s limited and unelaborated testimony does not support a conclusion about how 

the job of a card dealer is “generally performed.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). Aside 

from these brief recollections, the VE offered no indication of the prevalence of 

sit/stand options for casino card dealers or whether it is feasible for someone to work 

as a card dealer with this limitation.

The thin evidentiary record on which the ALJ relied does not sufficiently 

demonstrate that Wright could perform her past work “as generally performed in the 

national economy.” Id.1

 We vacate the judgment of the district court with 

instructions to remand to the Commissioner for proceedings consistent with this 

decision. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

1 Because the ALJ’s findings at step four are focused on Wright’s past work as a 

dealer, we need not address the parties’ arguments premised on Wright’s ability to 

perform work as a supervisor or composite dealer/supervisor. See Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We review only the reasons provided 

by the ALJ in the disability determination . . . .”). 
1

Wright v. Kijakazi, No. 22-16221

Bress, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I would affirm the denial of Social Security disability benefits. 

The ALJ relied on the applicable section of the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles and testimony from a vocational expert (VE) to conclude that Wright could 

perform her past work as a card dealer, as that work is “generally performed in the 

national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). Taken together, this was

substantial evidence that someone with Wright’s limitations and need for a sit/stand 

option could perform the job functions of a card dealer, as that role is generally 

performed in the national economy. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 

(2019) (“[A] vocational expert’s testimony may count as substantial evidence even 

when unaccompanied by supporting data.”); Thomas v. CalPortland Co., 993 F.3d 

1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that substantial evidence “is an extremely 

deferential standard”). 

“At step four, a claimant has the burden to prove that [s]he cannot perform 

h[er] past relevant work ‘either as actually performed or as generally performed in 

the national economy.’” Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002)). Wright did not crossexamine the VE on this point or offer evidence undermining the VE’s testimony. 

On this record, I believe substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision.

FILED

MAY 25 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS