# Official Journal C 224/2013

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.224.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 224 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 563 August 2013 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.C_2013.224.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 224

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 563 August 2013

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 224/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6934 — Norges Bank/Generali/Group of buildings in Paris) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2013/C 224/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case COMP/M.6934 — Norges Bank/Generali/Group of buildings in Paris) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Council |
| 2013/C 224/02 | Council conclusions on maximising the potential of youth policy in addressing the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy | 2 |
| | European Commission |
| 2013/C 224/03 | Euro exchange rates | 7 |
| 2013/C 224/04 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 27 November 2012 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.6497 — Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria — Rapporteur: Portugal | 8 |
| 2013/C 224/05 | Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Hutchinson 3G Austria/Orange Austria (COMP/M.6497) | 10 |
| 2013/C 224/06 | Summary of Commission Decision of 12 December 2012 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.6497 — Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria) (notified under document C(2012) 9198 final)
   (
  1
  ) | 12 |
| | NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES |
| 2013/C 224/07 | Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons | 18 |
| 2013/C 224/08 | Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons | 22 |
| 2013/C 224/09 | Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons | 26 |
| 2013/C 224/10 | Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons | 30 |
| 2013/C 224/11 | Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons | 34 |
| 2013/C 224/12 | Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons | 38 |
| 2013/C 224/13 | Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons | 42 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

2013/C 224/02

Council conclusions on maximising the potential of youth policy in addressing the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy

2

European Commission

2013/C 224/03

Euro exchange rates

7

2013/C 224/04

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 27 November 2012 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.6497 — Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria — Rapporteur: Portugal

8

2013/C 224/05

Final Report of the Hearing Officer — Hutchinson 3G Austria/Orange Austria (COMP/M.6497)

10

2013/C 224/06

Summary of Commission Decision of 12 December 2012 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.6497 — Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria) (notified under document C(2012) 9198 final)
   (
  1
  )

(notified under document C(2012) 9198 final)

1

12

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

2013/C 224/07

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

18

2013/C 224/08

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

22

2013/C 224/09

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

26

2013/C 224/10

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

30

2013/C 224/11

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

34

2013/C 224/12

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

38

2013/C 224/13

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

42

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| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
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EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.6934 — Norges Bank/Generali/Group of buildings in Paris)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 224/01

On 29 July 2013, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6934. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) under document number 32013M6934. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Council

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/2

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Council conclusions on maximising the potential of youth policy in addressing the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy

2013/C 224/02

THE COUNCIL AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES, MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL:

RECALLING THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THIS ISSUE AS SET OUT IN THE ANNEX AND IN PARTICULAR:

1.   CONSIDER THAT:

| 1. | The Europe 2020 Strategy and its flagship initiatives emphasise the importance of the design and delivery of policies that equip all young people with the skills and competences they need to play their part in the knowledge-based economy and society and recognises the role of youth policy in this regard. The overall goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy and Member States’ respective targets to increase youth employment, reduce early school leaving and increase participation in tertiary education have a particular relevance to youth and to those young people most at risk of marginalisation. Youth policy involves measures to aid young people’s inclusion in educational, developmental, cultural and associational activities, possibilities to gain experience and practical learning opportunities which enhance the life, learning and employment skills of young people. |
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1.

The Europe 2020 Strategy and its flagship initiatives emphasise the importance of the design and delivery of policies that equip all young people with the skills and competences they need to play their part in the knowledge-based economy and society and recognises the role of youth policy in this regard. The overall goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy and Member States’ respective targets to increase youth employment, reduce early school leaving and increase participation in tertiary education have a particular relevance to youth and to those young people most at risk of marginalisation. Youth policy involves measures to aid young people’s inclusion in educational, developmental, cultural and associational activities, possibilities to gain experience and practical learning opportunities which enhance the life, learning and employment skills of young people.

| 2. | The renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth Field (2010-2018) (1), stresses the importance of a dual approach that involves both (a) specific youth policy initiatives and (b) mainstreaming initiatives to integrate a youth perspective into relevant policy fields. It offers a set of instruments to pursue activities in eight fields of action and emphasises a cross-sectoral policy approach in response to young people's needs and aspirations. |
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2.

The renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth Field (2010-2018) (1), stresses the importance of a dual approach that involves both (a) specific youth policy initiatives and (b) mainstreaming initiatives to integrate a youth perspective into relevant policy fields. It offers a set of instruments to pursue activities in eight fields of action and emphasises a cross-sectoral policy approach in response to young people's needs and aspirations.

| 3. | The 2012 Joint EU Youth Report (2) calls for stronger links and more cohesion between the renewed framework and the Europe 2020 Strategy. |
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3.

The 2012 Joint EU Youth Report (2) calls for stronger links and more cohesion between the renewed framework and the Europe 2020 Strategy.

| 4. | The impact of the economic downturn on young people presents challenges for youth policy, for a range of related policy areas which are designed to meet the needs of all young people and in particular, for wider public policy objectives — most notably those to do with the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The challenges (3) include unemployment, an increasing risk of exclusion and the potential for the well-being of young people to be adversely affected. |
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4.

The impact of the economic downturn on young people presents challenges for youth policy, for a range of related policy areas which are designed to meet the needs of all young people and in particular, for wider public policy objectives — most notably those to do with the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The challenges (3) include unemployment, an increasing risk of exclusion and the potential for the well-being of young people to be adversely affected.

| 5. | Many young people are actively engaging, developing and progressing in groups, communities and wider society; and are both offering and deriving great benefit in terms of their personal and social development, skills, experiences and expertise. However, young people are experiencing elongated ‘transitions’ between dependence and independence, and less certain trajectories in terms of their occupational engagement and progression. |
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5.

Many young people are actively engaging, developing and progressing in groups, communities and wider society; and are both offering and deriving great benefit in terms of their personal and social development, skills, experiences and expertise. However, young people are experiencing elongated ‘transitions’ between dependence and independence, and less certain trajectories in terms of their occupational engagement and progression.

| 6. | The capacity and ability of young people for creativity, innovation, entrepreneurship and adaptability — which are recognised as invaluable in stimulating a renewed and sustainable return to economic and social wellbeing in Member States and to bring about a more inclusive society — needs to be recognised and resourced. |
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6.

The capacity and ability of young people for creativity, innovation, entrepreneurship and adaptability — which are recognised as invaluable in stimulating a renewed and sustainable return to economic and social wellbeing in Member States and to bring about a more inclusive society — needs to be recognised and resourced.

| 7. | Knowledge of youth and how it impacts on youth policy and youth-related policies is important and should be based on sufficient research. |
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7.

Knowledge of youth and how it impacts on youth policy and youth-related policies is important and should be based on sufficient research.

| 8. | A refined emphasis on the positive and distinct contribution and added value that youth policy can make to the Europe 2020 Strategy, most notably in relation to goals in the areas of education and training, employment and social inclusion, is necessary. |
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8.

A refined emphasis on the positive and distinct contribution and added value that youth policy can make to the Europe 2020 Strategy, most notably in relation to goals in the areas of education and training, employment and social inclusion, is necessary.

2.   TAKE NOTE THAT:

| 9. | Several policy initiatives (as outlined in the Annex of this document) have been introduced to advance the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy and to address the challenges arising from the impact of the crisis for people throughout the EU. Many of these have particular relevance to young people. Policy initiatives in employment, education and training that target young people promote the adoption of a ‘joined up’ approach in which youth policy should have a key part to play. The role of Ministers responsible for youth and the integration of the youth perspective in a broad range of policy fields should be supported, specifically within the European Semester. |
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9.

Several policy initiatives (as outlined in the Annex of this document) have been introduced to advance the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy and to address the challenges arising from the impact of the crisis for people throughout the EU. Many of these have particular relevance to young people. Policy initiatives in employment, education and training that target young people promote the adoption of a ‘joined up’ approach in which youth policy should have a key part to play. The role of Ministers responsible for youth and the integration of the youth perspective in a broad range of policy fields should be supported, specifically within the European Semester.

3.   ARE OF THE VIEW THAT:

| 10. | Cross-sectoral and inter-institutional coordination at national and EU level is central to the implementation of an effective youth policy and in addressing the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy for young people. |
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10.

Cross-sectoral and inter-institutional coordination at national and EU level is central to the implementation of an effective youth policy and in addressing the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy for young people.

| 11. | Youth Policy provides a youth-centred and holistic policy response for young people which offer both vertical and horizontal reach. Youth policy holds both a distinctive and complementary role, in coordination with other policy fields, in stimulating a range of positive responses for young people. The role and remit of youth policy would, however, benefit from greater definition in how it informs and interacts with related policy domains. This would strengthen the impact of youth policy, both on its own terms and as a contributor to the Europe 2020 Strategy, particularly in relation to employment and social inclusion, and would therefore enhance the visibility of youth policy in this context. |
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11.

Youth Policy provides a youth-centred and holistic policy response for young people which offer both vertical and horizontal reach. Youth policy holds both a distinctive and complementary role, in coordination with other policy fields, in stimulating a range of positive responses for young people. The role and remit of youth policy would, however, benefit from greater definition in how it informs and interacts with related policy domains. This would strengthen the impact of youth policy, both on its own terms and as a contributor to the Europe 2020 Strategy, particularly in relation to employment and social inclusion, and would therefore enhance the visibility of youth policy in this context.

| 12. | In particular, youth policy measures, as expressed, for example through youth work and non-formal and informal learning, have a distinct relevance in terms of young people’s preparedness, participation and progression in education and training, and employment as well as in the areas of health and social inclusion. Such measures can actively assist the EU Youth Employment Package, in particular the effective implementation of the Youth Guarantee and would benefit from the support of the Youth Employment Initiative and other relevant European funds. |
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12.

In particular, youth policy measures, as expressed, for example through youth work and non-formal and informal learning, have a distinct relevance in terms of young people’s preparedness, participation and progression in education and training, and employment as well as in the areas of health and social inclusion. Such measures can actively assist the EU Youth Employment Package, in particular the effective implementation of the Youth Guarantee and would benefit from the support of the Youth Employment Initiative and other relevant European funds.

| 13. | The youth sector has particular expertise in engaging and empowering young people, and in particular those young people with fewer opportunities that may not be reached by education and training and employment policies. |
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13.

The youth sector has particular expertise in engaging and empowering young people, and in particular those young people with fewer opportunities that may not be reached by education and training and employment policies.

4.   UNDERLINE THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES TO MAXIMISE THE POTENTIAL OF YOUTH POLICY IN ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY:

| 14. | Measures to enhance cross-sectoral and inter-institutional cooperation to improve coordination of youth and youth related policy areas, most particularly in education and training and employment, are a priority to provide a comprehensive and integrated policy response to the social and economic challenges young people currently face, and to reach out to young people with fewer opportunities, notably young people who are marginalised and not in employment, education or training (NEET), so as to promote a more inclusive society and contribute to the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy. |
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14.

Measures to enhance cross-sectoral and inter-institutional cooperation to improve coordination of youth and youth related policy areas, most particularly in education and training and employment, are a priority to provide a comprehensive and integrated policy response to the social and economic challenges young people currently face, and to reach out to young people with fewer opportunities, notably young people who are marginalised and not in employment, education or training (NEET), so as to promote a more inclusive society and contribute to the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

| 15. | The role of young people themselves in shaping the design of policies that affect them should be enhanced, especially in regard to their options, access and progression in education and training, and employment, in order to achieve greater social inclusion. Young people’s participation in policy formulation is central to the ways in which youth policy is implemented in line with the Renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth field (2010-2018). Youth policy stakeholders have specific expertise in facilitating the active participation of young people in policy development. |
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15.

The role of young people themselves in shaping the design of policies that affect them should be enhanced, especially in regard to their options, access and progression in education and training, and employment, in order to achieve greater social inclusion. Young people’s participation in policy formulation is central to the ways in which youth policy is implemented in line with the Renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth field (2010-2018). Youth policy stakeholders have specific expertise in facilitating the active participation of young people in policy development.

| 16. | The role of the proposed new EU programme on education and training, youth and sport and in particular its youth chapter, as well as other EU Programmes and Funds, will be important in providing Europe’s young people with opportunities for learning and mobility, acquiring new skills and experiences, and for engaging in volunteering and cultural exchanges. The independent and intrinsic value of youth policy as well as the added-value of youth policy should be recognised for the way it supports outcomes for young people in education and training, employment and social inclusion. The next generation of European Structural and investment Funds will be instrumental in investing in young people and their skills, and improving their employability and access to the labour market. |
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16.

The role of the proposed new EU programme on education and training, youth and sport and in particular its youth chapter, as well as other EU Programmes and Funds, will be important in providing Europe’s young people with opportunities for learning and mobility, acquiring new skills and experiences, and for engaging in volunteering and cultural exchanges. The independent and intrinsic value of youth policy as well as the added-value of youth policy should be recognised for the way it supports outcomes for young people in education and training, employment and social inclusion. The next generation of European Structural and investment Funds will be instrumental in investing in young people and their skills, and improving their employability and access to the labour market.

5.   INVITE MEMBER STATES, WITH DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY, TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

| 17. | Ensure, where appropriate, that priority tasks undertaken under the Renewed Framework for European cooperation in the Youth Field (2010-2018) support and complement the Goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy. |
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17.

Ensure, where appropriate, that priority tasks undertaken under the Renewed Framework for European cooperation in the Youth Field (2010-2018) support and complement the Goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

| 18. | Promote the active involvement of youth ministries in national policy-making relating to the Europe 2020 Strategy, in particular in the formulation and, where appropriate, coordination of annual National Reform Programmes (NRPs). |
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18.

Promote the active involvement of youth ministries in national policy-making relating to the Europe 2020 Strategy, in particular in the formulation and, where appropriate, coordination of annual National Reform Programmes (NRPs).

| 19. | Promote, in this context and based on national provisions for dialogue with young people, the better use of existing mechanisms or the development of new ones to capture young people’s views to inform and shape youth policy and youth-related policies. |
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19.

Promote, in this context and based on national provisions for dialogue with young people, the better use of existing mechanisms or the development of new ones to capture young people’s views to inform and shape youth policy and youth-related policies.

| 20. | Consider how youth policy can contribute to the formulation of measures under the Youth Employment Package including, as appropriate, the implementation of the Council Recommendations on the Validation of Non-Formal and Informal Learning and on Establishing a Youth Guarantee. |
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20.

Consider how youth policy can contribute to the formulation of measures under the Youth Employment Package including, as appropriate, the implementation of the Council Recommendations on the Validation of Non-Formal and Informal Learning and on Establishing a Youth Guarantee.

6.   INVITE THE MEMBER STATES AND THE COMMISSION WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES OF COMPETENCE AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND WHILE RESPECTING MEMBER STATES RESPONSIBILITY FOR YOUTH POLICY, TO:

| 21. | Promote the contribution of youth policy measures, as part of wider education and training, employment and social inclusion policy strategies, to the achievement of the Goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy. |
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21.

Promote the contribution of youth policy measures, as part of wider education and training, employment and social inclusion policy strategies, to the achievement of the Goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

| 22. | Ensure greater coordination and synergy between work undertaken under the Renewed Framework and work being done in the education and training and employment fields, to strengthen young people’s participation in education and training, their progression into employment and their inclusion in society. In particular, emphasise the inclusion of young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEET). |
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22.

Ensure greater coordination and synergy between work undertaken under the Renewed Framework and work being done in the education and training and employment fields, to strengthen young people’s participation in education and training, their progression into employment and their inclusion in society. In particular, emphasise the inclusion of young people who are not in employment, education or training (NEET).

| 23. | Develop, within the framework of the Renewed Framework for European cooperation in the Youth field 2010-2018, a medium-term work plan to guide the youth policy and youth related policy work in response to current youth and youth related themes and trends and which will highlight relevant areas for coordination and collaboration with education and training and employment policies with a view to ensuring youth policy input into the European Semester. |
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23.

Develop, within the framework of the Renewed Framework for European cooperation in the Youth field 2010-2018, a medium-term work plan to guide the youth policy and youth related policy work in response to current youth and youth related themes and trends and which will highlight relevant areas for coordination and collaboration with education and training and employment policies with a view to ensuring youth policy input into the European Semester.

| 24. | Institute the practice whereby Member States representatives responsible for youth policy meeting within the Council and/or its preparatory bodies may discuss and exchange views on the important policy-focused steps within the European Semester, the Annual Growth Survey and the Country Specific Recommendations on Member States' policies, with a view to providing relevant and timely input to the Employment Committee in its multilateral surveillance work on Country Specific Recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

24.

Institute the practice whereby Member States representatives responsible for youth policy meeting within the Council and/or its preparatory bodies may discuss and exchange views on the important policy-focused steps within the European Semester, the Annual Growth Survey and the Country Specific Recommendations on Member States' policies, with a view to providing relevant and timely input to the Employment Committee in its multilateral surveillance work on Country Specific Recommendations.

| 25. | Ensure that the instruments outlined in the EU Youth Strategy and the Joint EU Youth Report (2012), such as the Structured Dialogue process, evidence-based policies and cross-sectoral cooperation are developed to maximum effect with a view to channelling to the Europe 2020 Strategy policy debate all available evidence regarding how the crisis is impacting on young people; and ensuring that the voice of young people can be heard within this debate. |
| --- | --- |

25.

Ensure that the instruments outlined in the EU Youth Strategy and the Joint EU Youth Report (2012), such as the Structured Dialogue process, evidence-based policies and cross-sectoral cooperation are developed to maximum effect with a view to channelling to the Europe 2020 Strategy policy debate all available evidence regarding how the crisis is impacting on young people; and ensuring that the voice of young people can be heard within this debate.

| 26. | Highlight how youth policy measures, as expressed, for example through youth work and non-formal and informal learning, are a means for young people, in particular for those with fewer opportunities, to empower themselves in order to become active citizens and fully participate in civil society and to develop their learning and employment skills. |
| --- | --- |

26.

Highlight how youth policy measures, as expressed, for example through youth work and non-formal and informal learning, are a means for young people, in particular for those with fewer opportunities, to empower themselves in order to become active citizens and fully participate in civil society and to develop their learning and employment skills.

| 27. | Specifically highlight how such measures assist young people to develop their competences and transversal skills which assist them in accessing education and training and occupational opportunities which can enhance their autonomy and progression, as well as assist in developing their personal and social skills and acquiring employment and entrepreneurial skills. |
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27.

Specifically highlight how such measures assist young people to develop their competences and transversal skills which assist them in accessing education and training and occupational opportunities which can enhance their autonomy and progression, as well as assist in developing their personal and social skills and acquiring employment and entrepreneurial skills.

| 28. | Promote accessibility among all relevant stakeholders and encourage take up of European programmes such as:






  — | the European programme for education, training, youth and sport, which supports mobility, exchange and skills enhancement and opportunities for engaging in volunteering and cultural exchanges, and |
| --- | --- | --- |

28.

Promote accessibility among all relevant stakeholders and encourage take up of European programmes such as:

—

the European programme for education, training, youth and sport, which supports mobility, exchange and skills enhancement and opportunities for engaging in volunteering and cultural exchanges, and

| — | other European programmes and funds which inter alia aim to reach out to all young people, including those with fewer opportunities and, notably, those who are not in education, employment or training, |
| --- | --- |

—

other European programmes and funds which inter alia aim to reach out to all young people, including those with fewer opportunities and, notably, those who are not in education, employment or training,

and thereby contribute to the skills development and employability of young people.

| 29. | Promote full and optimal use, where applicable, of the Youth Employment Initiative to implement the Council Recommendation establishing the Youth Guarantee. |
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29.

Promote full and optimal use, where applicable, of the Youth Employment Initiative to implement the Council Recommendation establishing the Youth Guarantee.

7.   INVITE THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

| 30. | Consider actions to ensure that a youth policy perspective is central to education and training, employment and social inclusion policies, to incorporate a distinct ‘youth policy’ dimension to policies to implement the Europe 2020 Strategy, in particular with regard to youth work and the recognition and validation of non-formal and informal learning. |
| --- | --- |

30.

Consider actions to ensure that a youth policy perspective is central to education and training, employment and social inclusion policies, to incorporate a distinct ‘youth policy’ dimension to policies to implement the Europe 2020 Strategy, in particular with regard to youth work and the recognition and validation of non-formal and informal learning.

| 31. | Promote awareness of all EU funding programmes and associated best practice examples which develop young people’s XXI Century skills by placing clearer emphasis on how such programmes stimulate skills-based, experiential and entrepreneurial learning which enhance and empower young people’s participation in society, in education and training, in employment, and in particular, for young people with fewer opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

31.

Promote awareness of all EU funding programmes and associated best practice examples which develop young people’s XXI Century skills by placing clearer emphasis on how such programmes stimulate skills-based, experiential and entrepreneurial learning which enhance and empower young people’s participation in society, in education and training, in employment, and in particular, for young people with fewer opportunities.

| 32. | In the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth Field (2012-2018), continue its intentions to assess the Structured Dialogue process to ensure that the scope, scale and content of the process are reflective of and responsive to the current needs of young people and which, in turn, usefully informs the development of youth policy. |
| --- | --- |

32.

In the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Renewed Framework for European Cooperation in the Youth Field (2012-2018), continue its intentions to assess the Structured Dialogue process to ensure that the scope, scale and content of the process are reflective of and responsive to the current needs of young people and which, in turn, usefully informs the development of youth policy.

| 33. | Consider drafting a concept paper based on findings from the EU Youth Report and on-going work in the areas of peer-learning and on that basis, hold a peer-learning seminar involving the key policy areas of Youth, Education and Training and Employment, and relevant stakeholders, to examine the optimum manner in which a collaborative policy response to the current challenges facing young people could be progressed. Such an initiative could outline recommendations which could be considered by the respective policy areas and relevant councils for further action. |
| --- | --- |

33.

Consider drafting a concept paper based on findings from the EU Youth Report and on-going work in the areas of peer-learning and on that basis, hold a peer-learning seminar involving the key policy areas of Youth, Education and Training and Employment, and relevant stakeholders, to examine the optimum manner in which a collaborative policy response to the current challenges facing young people could be progressed. Such an initiative could outline recommendations which could be considered by the respective policy areas and relevant councils for further action.

---

(1)  OJ C 311, 19.12.2009, p. 1.

(2)  OJ C 394, 20.12.2012, p. 5.

(3)  The unemployment rate of young people aged 15 to 24 rose sharply from 15 % in February 2008 to 23,6 % in January 2013 The NEET cohort (young people not in education, employment or training) comprised 7,5 m young people between ages 15 and 25 years) in January 2012.

---

ANNEX

Political background

| 1. | The Conclusions of the European Council of 13/14 December 2012 (1) and of 7/8 February 2013 (2), which stressed that highest priority should be given to promoting youth employment and launched a new Youth Employment Initiative. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Conclusions of the European Council of 13/14 December 2012 (1) and of 7/8 February 2013 (2), which stressed that highest priority should be given to promoting youth employment and launched a new Youth Employment Initiative.

| 2. | The Statement of the members of the European Council of 30 January 2012‘Towards growth-friendly consolidation and job-friendly growth’, which invited Member States to stimulate employment, especially for young people, by developing and implementing comprehensive initiatives on employment, education and training and skills. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Statement of the members of the European Council of 30 January 2012‘Towards growth-friendly consolidation and job-friendly growth’, which invited Member States to stimulate employment, especially for young people, by developing and implementing comprehensive initiatives on employment, education and training and skills.

| 3. | The Council Recommendation on establishing a Youth Guarantee, under the ‘Youth Employment Package’ (3), which is part of a coordinated policy approach to address unemployment, early school leaving and poverty and social exclusion among young people. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The Council Recommendation on establishing a Youth Guarantee, under the ‘Youth Employment Package’ (3), which is part of a coordinated policy approach to address unemployment, early school leaving and poverty and social exclusion among young people.

| 4. | The Council Recommendation on the validation of non-formal and informal learning (4), stresses opportunities and mechanisms that enable knowledge, skills and competences acquired through non-formal and informal learning to play an important role in enhancing employability and mobility, as well as increasing motivation for lifelong learning, particularly in the case of the socio-economically disadvantaged or the low-qualified. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Council Recommendation on the validation of non-formal and informal learning (4), stresses opportunities and mechanisms that enable knowledge, skills and competences acquired through non-formal and informal learning to play an important role in enhancing employability and mobility, as well as increasing motivation for lifelong learning, particularly in the case of the socio-economically disadvantaged or the low-qualified.

| 5. | The Joint Report of the Council and the Commission on the implementation of the ‘Education and Training 2020’ strategic framework (5), which sets out steps to mobilise the ‘ET2020’ process in support of the Europe 2020 Strategy objectives on growth and jobs, and identifies a number of priority areas for European cooperation in education and training for the period 2012-2014. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Joint Report of the Council and the Commission on the implementation of the ‘Education and Training 2020’ strategic framework (5), which sets out steps to mobilise the ‘ET2020’ process in support of the Europe 2020 Strategy objectives on growth and jobs, and identifies a number of priority areas for European cooperation in education and training for the period 2012-2014.

| 6. | The Council Conclusions on ‘Investing in education and training — a response to Rethinking Education: Investing in skills for better socio-economic outcomes and the 2013 Annual Growth Survey on Rethinking Education’ (6). |
| --- | --- |

6.

The Council Conclusions on ‘Investing in education and training — a response to Rethinking Education: Investing in skills for better socio-economic outcomes and the 2013 Annual Growth Survey on Rethinking Education’ (6).

| 7. | The Council Recommendation on Policies to reduce early school leaving (7) which emphasises the need for comprehensive cross sectoral policies to strengthen links between education and training systems and employment. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Council Recommendation on Policies to reduce early school leaving (7) which emphasises the need for comprehensive cross sectoral policies to strengthen links between education and training systems and employment.

| 8. | The Commission's Communication on a ‘Youth Opportunities Initiative’ of 20 December 2011 (8), calling upon Member States to take more action to tackle the high youth unemployment rates, including better use of European Social Funds and more possibilities for mobility. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The Commission's Communication on a ‘Youth Opportunities Initiative’ of 20 December 2011 (8), calling upon Member States to take more action to tackle the high youth unemployment rates, including better use of European Social Funds and more possibilities for mobility.

---

(1)  EUCO 205/12.

(2)  EUCO 3/13.

(3)  17944/12.

(4)  OJ C 398, 22.12.2012, p. 1.

(5)  OJ C 70, 8.3.2012, p. 9.

(6)  OJ C 64, 5.3.2013, p. 5.

(7)  OJ C 191, 1.7.2011, p. 1.

(8)  5166/12.

---

European Commission

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/7

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Euro exchange rates (1)

2 August 2013

2013/C 224/03

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,3203 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 131,78 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4547 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,87135 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 8,7714 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,2383 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 7,8655 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 25,959 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 300,25 |
| LTL | Lithuanian litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian lats | 0,7028 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2550 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4385 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 2,5711 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,4837 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,3734 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 10,2412 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,6765 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,6848 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 484,93 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 13,2330 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 8,0926 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,5210 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 13 581,57 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,3075 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 57,603 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 43,7059 |
| THB | Thai baht | 41,444 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,0512 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 16,9560 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 80,6770 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,3203

JPY

Japanese yen

131,78

DKK

Danish krone

7,4547

GBP

Pound sterling

0,87135

SEK

Swedish krona

8,7714

CHF

Swiss franc

1,2383

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

7,8655

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

25,959

HUF

Hungarian forint

300,25

LTL

Lithuanian litas

3,4528

LVL

Latvian lats

0,7028

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2550

RON

Romanian leu

4,4385

TRY

Turkish lira

2,5711

AUD

Australian dollar

1,4837

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,3734

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

10,2412

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,6765

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,6848

KRW

South Korean won

1 484,93

ZAR

South African rand

13,2330

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

8,0926

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,5210

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

13 581,57

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,3075

PHP

Philippine peso

57,603

RUB

Russian rouble

43,7059

THB

Thai baht

41,444

BRL

Brazilian real

3,0512

MXN

Mexican peso

16,9560

INR

Indian rupee

80,6770

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

---

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/8

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on mergers given at its meeting of 27 November 2012 regarding a draft decision relating to Case COMP/M.6497 — Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria

Rapporteur: Portugal

2013/C 224/04

| 1. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.

| 2. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction has a Union dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation.

Market definition

| 3. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant product and geographic markets in the draft Decision. A minority disagrees and a minority abstain. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s definitions of the relevant product and geographic markets in the draft Decision. A minority disagrees and a minority abstain.

| 4. | In particular, the majority of the Advisory Committee agrees that the following markets should be distinguished:






  — | Austrian market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers (retail mobile telecommunications services market), |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

In particular, the majority of the Advisory Committee agrees that the following markets should be distinguished:

—

Austrian market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers (retail mobile telecommunications services market),

| — | Austrian market for wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks, |
| --- | --- |

—

Austrian market for wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks,

| — | Austrian wholesale market for international roaming, |
| --- | --- |

—

Austrian wholesale market for international roaming,

| — | Austrian wholesale market for mobile call termination. |
| --- | --- |

—

Austrian wholesale market for mobile call termination.

A minority disagrees and a minority abstain.

Horizontal Effects

| 5. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's assessment that the proposed operation is likely to give rise to non-coordinated horizontal effects that would significantly impede effective competition on the Austrian market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers (retail mobile telecommunications services market). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's assessment that the proposed operation is likely to give rise to non-coordinated horizontal effects that would significantly impede effective competition on the Austrian market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers (retail mobile telecommunications services market).

Vertical Effects

| 6. | The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's assessment that the proposed operation is not likely to give rise to vertical effects that would significantly impede effective competition on the:






  — | Austrian wholesale market for international roaming, |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's assessment that the proposed operation is not likely to give rise to vertical effects that would significantly impede effective competition on the:

—

Austrian wholesale market for international roaming,

| — | Austrian wholesale market for mobile call termination. |
| --- | --- |

—

Austrian wholesale market for mobile call termination.

Remedy

| 7. | The majority of the members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the final commitments offered by the Notifying Party on 12 November 2012 address the competition concerns identified by the Commission on the Austrian-wide market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers. A minority disagrees and a minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The majority of the members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the final commitments offered by the Notifying Party on 12 November 2012 address the competition concerns identified by the Commission on the Austrian-wide market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers. A minority disagrees and a minority abstains.

| 8. | The majority of the members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's conclusion that, subject to the full compliance with the final commitments, the notified transaction is not likely to significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it. A minority disagrees and a minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The majority of the members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission's conclusion that, subject to the full compliance with the final commitments, the notified transaction is not likely to significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it. A minority disagrees and a minority abstains.

| 9. | The majority of the members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction must therefore be declared compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement in accordance with Articles 2(2) and 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. A minority disagrees and a minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The majority of the members of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the notified transaction must therefore be declared compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement in accordance with Articles 2(2) and 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. A minority disagrees and a minority abstains.

| 10. | The members of the Advisory Committee ask the Commission to take into account all the other points raised during the discussion. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The members of the Advisory Committee ask the Commission to take into account all the other points raised during the discussion.

---

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/10

---

Final Report of the Hearing Officer (1)

Hutchinson 3G Austria/Orange Austria

(COMP/M.6497)

2013/C 224/05

| (1) | On 7 May 2012, the Commission received the notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation (2) by which the undertaking Hutchison 3G Austria Holdings (‘Notifying Party’) would acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, control of the whole of the undertaking Orange Austria Telecommunication GmbH (‘Orange’), by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 7 May 2012, the Commission received the notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation (2) by which the undertaking Hutchison 3G Austria Holdings (‘Notifying Party’) would acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, control of the whole of the undertaking Orange Austria Telecommunication GmbH (‘Orange’), by way of purchase of shares.

| (2) | On 28 June 2012, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. The commitments to address the competition concerns identified in the Article 6(1)(c)-decision submitted by the Notifying Party in August were rejected by the Commission as not suitable after having conducted a market test. Subsequently the Notifying Party submitted its written comments on the decision in September 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 28 June 2012, the Commission initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. The commitments to address the competition concerns identified in the Article 6(1)(c)-decision submitted by the Notifying Party in August were rejected by the Commission as not suitable after having conducted a market test. Subsequently the Notifying Party submitted its written comments on the decision in September 2012.

I.   Statement of Objections and oral hearing

| (3) | A Statement of Objections (‘SO’) was sent to the Notifying Party on 20 September 2012. In the SO, the Commission indicated that the notified concentration would significantly impede effective competition in the market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers in Austria. Access to the file was granted on the day of the notification of the SO and additionally on 14 and 23 November 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

A Statement of Objections (‘SO’) was sent to the Notifying Party on 20 September 2012. In the SO, the Commission indicated that the notified concentration would significantly impede effective competition in the market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers in Austria. Access to the file was granted on the day of the notification of the SO and additionally on 14 and 23 November 2012.

| (4) | The Notifying Party and Orange submitted their reply to the SO on 4 October 2012 and requested an oral hearing. The day before the oral hearing on 10 October 2012 the Notifying Party offered a revised set of remedies. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Notifying Party and Orange submitted their reply to the SO on 4 October 2012 and requested an oral hearing. The day before the oral hearing on 10 October 2012 the Notifying Party offered a revised set of remedies.

II.   Third persons

| (5) | Three companies applied and were granted the status of third persons after having shown sufficient interest within the meaning of Article 18(4) of the Merger Regulation, i.e. Liberty Global BV, T-Mobile Austria GmbH and Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH. Upon their request, all three third persons were given the opportunity to express their views at the oral hearing. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Three companies applied and were granted the status of third persons after having shown sufficient interest within the meaning of Article 18(4) of the Merger Regulation, i.e. Liberty Global BV, T-Mobile Austria GmbH and Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH. Upon their request, all three third persons were given the opportunity to express their views at the oral hearing.

III.   Remedies

| (6) | After the hearing, the Notifying Party continued to discuss remedies with the Commission with a view to improving them. The final remedy package includes commitments by the Notifying Party: to enter into an upfront agreement with a mobile virtual network operator (‘MVNO’) to be approved by the Commission; to grant MVNOs access to its network; and, to make available spectrum to a new entrant. Such remedy proposal is also linked to the acquisition by the new entrant of additional spectrum which will be auctioned in Austria. After the market test, the Commission concluded that the final remedy package addressed the competition concerns identified in the SO. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

After the hearing, the Notifying Party continued to discuss remedies with the Commission with a view to improving them. The final remedy package includes commitments by the Notifying Party: to enter into an upfront agreement with a mobile virtual network operator (‘MVNO’) to be approved by the Commission; to grant MVNOs access to its network; and, to make available spectrum to a new entrant. Such remedy proposal is also linked to the acquisition by the new entrant of additional spectrum which will be auctioned in Austria. After the market test, the Commission concluded that the final remedy package addressed the competition concerns identified in the SO.

IV.   Draft Decision

| (7) | In my opinion the draft Decision relates only to objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity to make known their views. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In my opinion the draft Decision relates only to objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity to make known their views.

V.   Concluding remark

| (8) | Overall, I conclude that all participants in the proceedings have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Overall, I conclude that all participants in the proceedings have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case.

Brussels, 29 November 2012.

Michael ALBERS

---

(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1).

2

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| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/12

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Summary of Commission Decision

of 12 December 2012

declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/M.6497 — Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria)

(notified under document C(2012) 9198 final)

(Only the English text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

2013/C 224/06

On 12 December 2012 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
   (1), and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

I.   THE OPERATION AND THE PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 7 May 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the ‘Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking Hutchison 3G Austria Holdings GmbH (‘H3G Austria Holdings’, Austria) (the ‘Notifying Party’), the parent company of Hutchison 3G Austria GmbH (‘H3G’, Austria) and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Limited (‘HWL’, Hong Kong), would acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of Styrol Holding 1 GmbH (‘Styrol’, Austria) and its indirect wholly owned subsidiary Orange Austria Telecommunications GmbH (‘Orange’, Austria), excluding Yesss! Telekommunikation GmbH (‘Yesss!’), by way of purchase of shares (together ‘the Parties’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 7 May 2012, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the ‘Merger Regulation’) by which the undertaking Hutchison 3G Austria Holdings GmbH (‘H3G Austria Holdings’, Austria) (the ‘Notifying Party’), the parent company of Hutchison 3G Austria GmbH (‘H3G’, Austria) and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Limited (‘HWL’, Hong Kong), would acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of Styrol Holding 1 GmbH (‘Styrol’, Austria) and its indirect wholly owned subsidiary Orange Austria Telecommunications GmbH (‘Orange’, Austria), excluding Yesss! Telekommunikation GmbH (‘Yesss!’), by way of purchase of shares (together ‘the Parties’).

| (2) | This transaction was conditional upon the onward sale of Orange's ‘no frills’ mobile brand Yesss! to Telekom Austria (‘TA’). The latter transaction was to be dealt with by the Austrian National Competition Authority (‘Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde’ or ‘BWB’). So the concentration subject to Union jurisdiction was the acquisition of Orange Austria (minus the ‘Yesss!’ business) by H3G. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

This transaction was conditional upon the onward sale of Orange's ‘no frills’ mobile brand Yesss! to Telekom Austria (‘TA’). The latter transaction was to be dealt with by the Austrian National Competition Authority (‘Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde’ or ‘BWB’). So the concentration subject to Union jurisdiction was the acquisition of Orange Austria (minus the ‘Yesss!’ business) by H3G.

| (3) | Moreover, TA was also to acquire from H3G certain sites, spectrum frequencies and intellectual property rights currently owned by Orange. This transfer of frequencies requires approval by the Austrian Telecommunications Regulator, the Rundfunk & Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH, (‘RTR’) and the Telekom-Control Kommission (‘TKK’). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Moreover, TA was also to acquire from H3G certain sites, spectrum frequencies and intellectual property rights currently owned by Orange. This transfer of frequencies requires approval by the Austrian Telecommunications Regulator, the Rundfunk & Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH, (‘RTR’) and the Telekom-Control Kommission (‘TKK’).

| (4) | On 29 May 2012, the BWB requested, on the basis of Article 9(2)(a) of the Merger Regulation, a referral of the Proposed Transaction from the Commission to Austria (the ‘Referral Request’). Based on a market investigation, the Commission raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the proposed transaction with the internal market. Subsequently the BWB did not send any reminder pursuant to Article 9(5) of the Merger Regulation after the Commission adopted the Article 6(1)(c) decision on 28 July 2012. The Commission therefore decided to deal with the aspects raised by the BWB itself pursuant to Article 9(3)(a) of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 29 May 2012, the BWB requested, on the basis of Article 9(2)(a) of the Merger Regulation, a referral of the Proposed Transaction from the Commission to Austria (the ‘Referral Request’). Based on a market investigation, the Commission raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the proposed transaction with the internal market. Subsequently the BWB did not send any reminder pursuant to Article 9(5) of the Merger Regulation after the Commission adopted the Article 6(1)(c) decision on 28 July 2012. The Commission therefore decided to deal with the aspects raised by the BWB itself pursuant to Article 9(3)(a) of the Merger Regulation.

| (5) | On 21 August 2012, the Notifying Party submitted commitments pursuant to Articles 8(2) and 10(2) of the Merger Regulation in order to remove the Commission’s concerns as regards the compatibility of the proposed concentration with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 21 August 2012, the Notifying Party submitted commitments pursuant to Articles 8(2) and 10(2) of the Merger Regulation in order to remove the Commission’s concerns as regards the compatibility of the proposed concentration with the internal market.

| (6) | On 20 September 2012 the Commission sent a Statement of Objections (the ‘SO’) to the Notifying Party under Article 18 of the Merger Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 20 September 2012 the Commission sent a Statement of Objections (the ‘SO’) to the Notifying Party under Article 18 of the Merger Regulation.

| (7) | On 10 October 2012, the Commission's Hearing Officer afforded the Notifying Party the opportunity to make itself heard in an oral hearing. Following their requests, T-Mobile Austria (‘T-Mobile’), Tele2 and UPC (Liberty Global) were admitted as interested third parties to the Oral Hearing. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 10 October 2012, the Commission's Hearing Officer afforded the Notifying Party the opportunity to make itself heard in an oral hearing. Following their requests, T-Mobile Austria (‘T-Mobile’), Tele2 and UPC (Liberty Global) were admitted as interested third parties to the Oral Hearing.

II.   THE PARTIES

| (8) | HWL is a multi-national conglomerate headquartered in Hong Kong. The operations of HWL and of its associated companies consist of six core businesses: ports and related services, property and hotels, retail, energy, infrastructure and telecommunications. In the European Union subsidiaries of HWL include mobile network operators in Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

HWL is a multi-national conglomerate headquartered in Hong Kong. The operations of HWL and of its associated companies consist of six core businesses: ports and related services, property and hotels, retail, energy, infrastructure and telecommunications. In the European Union subsidiaries of HWL include mobile network operators in Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

| (9) | H3G is a mobile network operator (‘MNO’) active in Austria under the brand name ‘3’ and wholly owned by HWL. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

H3G is a mobile network operator (‘MNO’) active in Austria under the brand name ‘3’ and wholly owned by HWL.

| (10) | Orange is an Austrian MNO. Orange and its parent company Styrol were at the moment of notification owned by Stubai S.C.A., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the private equity investment fund Mid Europa Partners (‘MEP’), and by Orange Belgium SA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of France Télécom SA Yesss! was a fully-owned subsidiary of Orange. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Orange is an Austrian MNO. Orange and its parent company Styrol were at the moment of notification owned by Stubai S.C.A., a wholly-owned subsidiary of the private equity investment fund Mid Europa Partners (‘MEP’), and by Orange Belgium SA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of France Télécom SA Yesss! was a fully-owned subsidiary of Orange.

III.   SUMMARY

| (11) | On the basis of the turnover data of the parties the proposed transaction had a Union dimension. It would lead to a reduction of network operators from four to three (with the remaining MNOs, Telekom Austria and T-Mobile having respectively [40-50 %] and [30-40 %] market shares by total number of subscribers) and creates the third largest Austrian MNO with an overall market share of [20-30 %]. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

On the basis of the turnover data of the parties the proposed transaction had a Union dimension. It would lead to a reduction of network operators from four to three (with the remaining MNOs, Telekom Austria and T-Mobile having respectively [40-50 %] and [30-40 %] market shares by total number of subscribers) and creates the third largest Austrian MNO with an overall market share of [20-30 %].

| (12) | The Commission's market investigation identified competition concerns due to the removal of Orange from a market which was already highly concentrated and where there was no prospect of entry. The concern was therefore that the transaction as notified would lead to competition concerns in the retail market for the provision of mobile communication services to end customers in Austria as a result of unilateral effects. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Commission's market investigation identified competition concerns due to the removal of Orange from a market which was already highly concentrated and where there was no prospect of entry. The concern was therefore that the transaction as notified would lead to competition concerns in the retail market for the provision of mobile communication services to end customers in Austria as a result of unilateral effects.

| (13) | To remove the Commission's concerns, H3G submitted a package of commitments consisting, in their final version, of three elements.






  (a) | First, H3G committed to divest radio spectrum and additional rights to an interested new entrant in the Austrian mobile telephony market. The potential new MNO would have the right to acquire spectrum not only from H3G but also additional spectrum at an auction planned in 2013 by the Austrian telecom regulator. The latter would reserve spectrum for a new entrant, in order to enable such an operator to build up a physical network for mobile telecommunication services in Austria. The new entrant would also benefit from privileged conditions for the purchase and lease of sites for building up its own network in Austria. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

To remove the Commission's concerns, H3G submitted a package of commitments consisting, in their final version, of three elements.

(a)

First, H3G committed to divest radio spectrum and additional rights to an interested new entrant in the Austrian mobile telephony market. The potential new MNO would have the right to acquire spectrum not only from H3G but also additional spectrum at an auction planned in 2013 by the Austrian telecom regulator. The latter would reserve spectrum for a new entrant, in order to enable such an operator to build up a physical network for mobile telecommunication services in Austria. The new entrant would also benefit from privileged conditions for the purchase and lease of sites for building up its own network in Austria.

| (b) | Second, H3G committed to provide, on agreed terms, wholesale access to its network for up to 30 % of its capacity to up to 16 mobile virtual network operators (‘MVNOs’) in the coming 10 years. This would enable interested MVNOs to offer mobile telecommunications services to end customers in Austria at competitive terms and conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Second, H3G committed to provide, on agreed terms, wholesale access to its network for up to 30 % of its capacity to up to 16 mobile virtual network operators (‘MVNOs’) in the coming 10 years. This would enable interested MVNOs to offer mobile telecommunications services to end customers in Austria at competitive terms and conditions.

| (c) | Third, an up-front commitment ensured that H3G would not complete the acquisition of Orange before it had entered into a wholesale access agreement with at least one MVNO. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Third, an up-front commitment ensured that H3G would not complete the acquisition of Orange before it had entered into a wholesale access agreement with at least one MVNO.

| (14) | In light of these commitments, the Commission concluded that the transaction would no longer raise competition concerns, as the decision is conditional upon full compliance with the commitments. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In light of these commitments, the Commission concluded that the transaction would no longer raise competition concerns, as the decision is conditional upon full compliance with the commitments.

IV.   EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

A.   The relevant product markets

| (15) | In previous Commission decisions the mobile telecommunications services product markets have been defined as follows:






  (a) | mobile telecommunications services to end customers (retail mobile telecommunications services market); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(15)

In previous Commission decisions the mobile telecommunications services product markets have been defined as follows:

(a)

mobile telecommunications services to end customers (retail mobile telecommunications services market);

| (b) | wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks;

| (c) | wholesale market for international roaming; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

wholesale market for international roaming; and

| (d) | wholesale market for mobile call termination |
| --- | --- |

(d)

wholesale market for mobile call termination

| (16) | The activities of H3G and Orange would, on this basis, overlap in the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers. The Parties were also potential competitors on the market for wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks. There was also a link between the activities of H3G and Orange on the wholesale market for international roaming and the wholesale market for mobile call termination. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The activities of H3G and Orange would, on this basis, overlap in the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers. The Parties were also potential competitors on the market for wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks. There was also a link between the activities of H3G and Orange on the wholesale market for international roaming and the wholesale market for mobile call termination.

Mobile telecommunications services to end customers

| (17) | The Commission considered whether for the purposes of this case it was necessary to further subdivide the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers by type of customer (business or private, post-paid subscribers or pre-paid customers) or by type of network technology (2G/GSM or 3G/UMTS). |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The Commission considered whether for the purposes of this case it was necessary to further subdivide the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers by type of customer (business or private, post-paid subscribers or pre-paid customers) or by type of network technology (2G/GSM or 3G/UMTS).

| (18) | On the basis of the market test and supply side considerations the Commission considered an overall product market for private and business customers as regards mobile telecommunications services to end customers. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

On the basis of the market test and supply side considerations the Commission considered an overall product market for private and business customers as regards mobile telecommunications services to end customers.

| (19) | As regards a possible distinction between pre-paid and post-paid services the Commission considered that there were some arguments in support of this position in this case. Even though the Commission's conclusion was that pre-paid and post-paid are part of the same market, at least in view of supply-side substitution, the specificities and the interaction between these segments was further considered in the competitive assessment. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

As regards a possible distinction between pre-paid and post-paid services the Commission considered that there were some arguments in support of this position in this case. Even though the Commission's conclusion was that pre-paid and post-paid are part of the same market, at least in view of supply-side substitution, the specificities and the interaction between these segments was further considered in the competitive assessment.

| (20) | Notwithstanding clear performance differences for data traffic over 2G, 3G and LTE networks, in the light of the results of the market test, the Commission considered that the subdivision of the mobile end-customer market by type of network technology (2G, 3G and Future 4G Technologies) was not appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Notwithstanding clear performance differences for data traffic over 2G, 3G and LTE networks, in the light of the results of the market test, the Commission considered that the subdivision of the mobile end-customer market by type of network technology (2G, 3G and Future 4G Technologies) was not appropriate.

| (21) | From a demand perspective, services designed for use on a voice-enabled device are distinguished from services designed for use on a data-only device. However, the Commission concluded that it was not appropriate to depart from its previous practice of defining a single market including all services provided whether for data-only devices or for voice-enabled devices. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

From a demand perspective, services designed for use on a voice-enabled device are distinguished from services designed for use on a data-only device. However, the Commission concluded that it was not appropriate to depart from its previous practice of defining a single market including all services provided whether for data-only devices or for voice-enabled devices.

| (22) | The Austrian RTR/TKK in its Telecommunications Markets Ordinance has found that mobile broadband access by residential customers is a substitute for fixed line internet services. The Commission did not dispute this finding in relation to Austria. However, for the assessment in this case, the question was the reverse, namely whether fixed broadband services are a substitute for mobile data services in general or for mobile broadband specifically. The Commission concluded that fixed broadband services were not a substitute for mobile data services and therefore did not form part of the same product market. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Austrian RTR/TKK in its Telecommunications Markets Ordinance has found that mobile broadband access by residential customers is a substitute for fixed line internet services. The Commission did not dispute this finding in relation to Austria. However, for the assessment in this case, the question was the reverse, namely whether fixed broadband services are a substitute for mobile data services in general or for mobile broadband specifically. The Commission concluded that fixed broadband services were not a substitute for mobile data services and therefore did not form part of the same product market.

| (23) | The relevant product market for the purpose of the decision was defined as a single market in Austria for the provision of mobile telecommunications services to end customers. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The relevant product market for the purpose of the decision was defined as a single market in Austria for the provision of mobile telecommunications services to end customers.

Wholesale market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks

| (24) | Wholesale network access is provided by MNOs to MVNOs. In previous decisions, the Commission considered wholesale network access and call origination to be part of the same product market. In the market investigation, market participants unanimously confirmed that this approach is also appropriate in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Wholesale network access is provided by MNOs to MVNOs. In previous decisions, the Commission considered wholesale network access and call origination to be part of the same product market. In the market investigation, market participants unanimously confirmed that this approach is also appropriate in this case.

Wholesale market for international roaming

| (25) | Demand for wholesale international roaming services comes from foreign mobile operators who wish to provide their own customers with mobile services outside their own network and, downstream, from subscribers wishing to use their mobile telephones outside their own countries. The Commission concluded that there was a separate wholesale market for international roaming. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Demand for wholesale international roaming services comes from foreign mobile operators who wish to provide their own customers with mobile services outside their own network and, downstream, from subscribers wishing to use their mobile telephones outside their own countries. The Commission concluded that there was a separate wholesale market for international roaming.

Wholesale market for mobile call termination

| (26) | As established in previous Commission Decisions, there is no substitute for call termination on each individual network since the operator transmitting the outgoing call can reach the intended recipient only through the operator of the network to which the recipient is connected. Therefore the Commission concluded that there was a separate wholesale market for mobile call termination. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

As established in previous Commission Decisions, there is no substitute for call termination on each individual network since the operator transmitting the outgoing call can reach the intended recipient only through the operator of the network to which the recipient is connected. Therefore the Commission concluded that there was a separate wholesale market for mobile call termination.

B.   The relevant geographic markets

| (27) | In the market investigation the vast majority of respondents considered the relevant geographic markets to be national, that is to say, limited to the territory of Austria but no smaller. There appeared to be no relevant commercial practice or ability to discriminate between users on the basis of their location within the Austrian territory as far as mobile telecommunications services to end customers are concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

In the market investigation the vast majority of respondents considered the relevant geographic markets to be national, that is to say, limited to the territory of Austria but no smaller. There appeared to be no relevant commercial practice or ability to discriminate between users on the basis of their location within the Austrian territory as far as mobile telecommunications services to end customers are concerned.

| (28) | In line with the Commission's previous decisions and based on the results of the market investigation also the markets for wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks, the wholesale market for international roaming and the wholesale market for mobile call termination were defined as national in scope (that is to say, Austria). |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In line with the Commission's previous decisions and based on the results of the market investigation also the markets for wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks, the wholesale market for international roaming and the wholesale market for mobile call termination were defined as national in scope (that is to say, Austria).

C.   Competitive assessment

| (29) | The competitive assessment focused on the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

The competitive assessment focused on the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers.

1.   
  Unilateral effects

Market shares and market structure post-merger

| (30) | The Austrian Market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers was already highly concentrated prior to the transaction, as a result of which a fully-fledged competitor would be eliminated from the market and the number of market players would be reduced from four to three. The competition concerns identified by the Commission in this case were a consequence of a number of factors: the market structure, the high diversion ratios between the Parties, the significant margins which they realised, and the pre-merger importance of the Parties with regard to the acquisition of new business. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The Austrian Market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers was already highly concentrated prior to the transaction, as a result of which a fully-fledged competitor would be eliminated from the market and the number of market players would be reduced from four to three. The competition concerns identified by the Commission in this case were a consequence of a number of factors: the market structure, the high diversion ratios between the Parties, the significant margins which they realised, and the pre-merger importance of the Parties with regard to the acquisition of new business.

| (31) | Competition concerns would have arisen as a result of the proposed transaction in particular owing to high barriers to entry, the absence of significant buyer power and the existence on the part of competitors of an incentive to follow price increases by the merged entity. Furthermore, the argument of the Notifying Party according to which the competitive constraint posed by Orange in the market was likely to deteriorate in the near to medium term could not be accepted on the basis of the evidence. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Competition concerns would have arisen as a result of the proposed transaction in particular owing to high barriers to entry, the absence of significant buyer power and the existence on the part of competitors of an incentive to follow price increases by the merged entity. Furthermore, the argument of the Notifying Party according to which the competitive constraint posed by Orange in the market was likely to deteriorate in the near to medium term could not be accepted on the basis of the evidence.

| (32) | The Proposed Transaction would bring together two of the four MNOs in Austria. H3G and Orange were, respectively, the fourth and third MNOs ranked by market share size in the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers. Despite their lower market shares compared to the other two MNOs, TA and T-Mobile, the Commission considered that the transaction would lead to a significant impediment of effective competition. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Proposed Transaction would bring together two of the four MNOs in Austria. H3G and Orange were, respectively, the fourth and third MNOs ranked by market share size in the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers. Despite their lower market shares compared to the other two MNOs, TA and T-Mobile, the Commission considered that the transaction would lead to a significant impediment of effective competition.

| (33) | In addition to the MNOs there were only two independent MVNOs active on the Austrian market which did not own their network and were hosted by one of the MNOs. And even though there was a significant number of independent resellers active in Austria, in practice they accounted for a negligible portion of the total subscribers. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

In addition to the MNOs there were only two independent MVNOs active on the Austrian market which did not own their network and were hosted by one of the MNOs. And even though there was a significant number of independent resellers active in Austria, in practice they accounted for a negligible portion of the total subscribers.

| (34) | The Commission analysed the market shares of the Parties in a number of different ways to ensure its assessment was complete and reflected the particular characteristics of the market in question. The Commission examined HHI values and deltas, the relevance of which is referred to in the Horizontal Guidelines. The Commission then looked closely at the Parties' position in certain segments which were particularly relevant for growth and innovation (such as post-paid voice and data and data only) and which were likely to influence the overall market for telecommunications services going forward. Finally, the Commission considered the dynamic power of the Parties in the market arising from their current ability to attract new customers. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

The Commission analysed the market shares of the Parties in a number of different ways to ensure its assessment was complete and reflected the particular characteristics of the market in question. The Commission examined HHI values and deltas, the relevance of which is referred to in the Horizontal Guidelines. The Commission then looked closely at the Parties' position in certain segments which were particularly relevant for growth and innovation (such as post-paid voice and data and data only) and which were likely to influence the overall market for telecommunications services going forward. Finally, the Commission considered the dynamic power of the Parties in the market arising from their current ability to attract new customers.

| (35) | Although the combined market shares of the Parties would be below [20-30 %], the HHI and delta values were above those defined as initial indicators of the absence of competition concerns in the Horizontal Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Although the combined market shares of the Parties would be below [20-30 %], the HHI and delta values were above those defined as initial indicators of the absence of competition concerns in the Horizontal Guidelines.

| (36) | The post-paid private voice and data (that is to say, bundled offerings for use on voice-enabled devices) and the data-only segment were closely examined, given that these segments were particularly important for the market as a whole and its near-term development. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The post-paid private voice and data (that is to say, bundled offerings for use on voice-enabled devices) and the data-only segment were closely examined, given that these segments were particularly important for the market as a whole and its near-term development.

| (37) | Data use was already the biggest driver of growth in the market, and this trend was expected to continue and intensify in the next few years. Indeed, LTE is a network protocol designed for data, in which voice is expected to occupy only a very minor share of total traffic. The Commission found that the post-paid private voice and data and the data-only segments accounted for the largest market shares of the total revenues of both Orange and H3G. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Data use was already the biggest driver of growth in the market, and this trend was expected to continue and intensify in the next few years. Indeed, LTE is a network protocol designed for data, in which voice is expected to occupy only a very minor share of total traffic. The Commission found that the post-paid private voice and data and the data-only segments accounted for the largest market shares of the total revenues of both Orange and H3G.

Switching and closeness of competition

| (38) | Furthermore, analysing switching and closeness of competition to assess the competitive constraints imposed by the Parties on each other, the Commission revealed a significant competitive constraint imposed by H3G on Orange and similarly by Orange on H3G. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Furthermore, analysing switching and closeness of competition to assess the competitive constraints imposed by the Parties on each other, the Commission revealed a significant competitive constraint imposed by H3G on Orange and similarly by Orange on H3G.

| (39) | The Commission concluded that the available qualitative evidence was consistent with the direct evidence furnished by the observed diversion ratios and supported the conclusion that the degree of such closeness, together with the other evidence presented in the Decision, was such as to predict a significant impediment to effective competition as a result of the merger. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Commission concluded that the available qualitative evidence was consistent with the direct evidence furnished by the observed diversion ratios and supported the conclusion that the degree of such closeness, together with the other evidence presented in the Decision, was such as to predict a significant impediment to effective competition as a result of the merger.

| (40) | Assessing the competitive force of H3G pre- and post-merger, the Commission considered that H3G was an important, if not the most important, competitive force in the market and its incentive to remain a driving force, in the absence of substantiated efficiencies, would be reduced after the transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Assessing the competitive force of H3G pre- and post-merger, the Commission considered that H3G was an important, if not the most important, competitive force in the market and its incentive to remain a driving force, in the absence of substantiated efficiencies, would be reduced after the transaction.

| (41) | Moreover, there was a strong expectation that H3G would have had less incentive to compete aggressively than the Parties would have in the absence of the merger. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Moreover, there was a strong expectation that H3G would have had less incentive to compete aggressively than the Parties would have in the absence of the merger.

Absence of countervailing factors

| (42) | The Commission analysed potential countervailing factors such as buyer power, barriers to entry and the likelihood of new entries and concluded that it was unlikely that MNO or MVNO market entry would occur in Austria following the transaction as notified. Even if an MNO were to enter, it would have needed to await suitable spectrum allocation, build a radio network and then roll out its services to customers, all of which would have taken a considerable time. It could therefore be excluded that, in the absence of appropriate remedies, any market entry would be sufficiently timely to exercise a disciplining effect on the price levels resulting from the merger. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Commission analysed potential countervailing factors such as buyer power, barriers to entry and the likelihood of new entries and concluded that it was unlikely that MNO or MVNO market entry would occur in Austria following the transaction as notified. Even if an MNO were to enter, it would have needed to await suitable spectrum allocation, build a radio network and then roll out its services to customers, all of which would have taken a considerable time. It could therefore be excluded that, in the absence of appropriate remedies, any market entry would be sufficiently timely to exercise a disciplining effect on the price levels resulting from the merger.

| (43) | On the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers there was no appreciable countervailing buyer power to exercise competitive pressure on the MNOs to off-set the expected adverse effects of the merger. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

On the market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers there was no appreciable countervailing buyer power to exercise competitive pressure on the MNOs to off-set the expected adverse effects of the merger.

Anticipated effect of the proposed transaction on prices in the post-paid phone segment (voice and data) and the reaction by other competitors post-merger

| (44) | The Commission analysed upward pricing pressure (UPP) in the post-paid segment. UPP makes it possible to estimate to what extent the merged firm would have an incentive to raise prices post-merger, given in particular prices, margins and diversion ratios observed in the market and making some assumptions on demand. The proposed transaction would result in a significant UPP to the detriment of consumers. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Commission analysed upward pricing pressure (UPP) in the post-paid segment. UPP makes it possible to estimate to what extent the merged firm would have an incentive to raise prices post-merger, given in particular prices, margins and diversion ratios observed in the market and making some assumptions on demand. The proposed transaction would result in a significant UPP to the detriment of consumers.

| (45) | The estimated gross upward pricing pressure index (‘GUPPI’) was computed on a per-user basis using the Parties' figures for the average revenue per user and the diversion ratios implied by the MNP (Mobile Number Portability) for the most recent 12 month period. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The estimated gross upward pricing pressure index (‘GUPPI’) was computed on a per-user basis using the Parties' figures for the average revenue per user and the diversion ratios implied by the MNP (Mobile Number Portability) for the most recent 12 month period.

| (46) | The Commission's analysis using the GUPPI approach predicted substantial increases in quality-adjusted prices as a result of the Proposed Transaction in the post-paid private segment. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission's analysis using the GUPPI approach predicted substantial increases in quality-adjusted prices as a result of the Proposed Transaction in the post-paid private segment.

| (47) | The GUPPI approach looks only at the incentives faced by the Parties. Competitors would have been expected to respond to price increases by the merged entity with price increases of their own. This would have further relaxed pricing constraints on the merged entity, resulting in feedback effects which would have been expected to further inflate the price increases. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The GUPPI approach looks only at the incentives faced by the Parties. Competitors would have been expected to respond to price increases by the merged entity with price increases of their own. This would have further relaxed pricing constraints on the merged entity, resulting in feedback effects which would have been expected to further inflate the price increases.

| (48) | Even though H3G was a particularly important competitor in the Austrian market pre-merger, as a result of which prices in that market were low compared to other Member States, as a result of the proposed transaction H3G's incentives would have changed. This change in incentives was only partially reflected in the UPP calculations and constituted an additional reason to expect quality-adjusted prices to rise compared to what would have happened in the absence of the merger. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Even though H3G was a particularly important competitor in the Austrian market pre-merger, as a result of which prices in that market were low compared to other Member States, as a result of the proposed transaction H3G's incentives would have changed. This change in incentives was only partially reflected in the UPP calculations and constituted an additional reason to expect quality-adjusted prices to rise compared to what would have happened in the absence of the merger.

| (49) | It follows that the data supported a robust prediction of significant quality-adjusted price increases by the merged entity in the post-paid segment. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

It follows that the data supported a robust prediction of significant quality-adjusted price increases by the merged entity in the post-paid segment.

| (50) | The Commission further analysed how competitors in the retail telecommunications market could be expected to react. It found that competitors were unlikely to increase supply or reduce prices in response to a price increase by the merged entity. Neither could the reduction in competition be fully and effectively offset by MVNOs or other service providers active on the Austrian market. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Commission further analysed how competitors in the retail telecommunications market could be expected to react. It found that competitors were unlikely to increase supply or reduce prices in response to a price increase by the merged entity. Neither could the reduction in competition be fully and effectively offset by MVNOs or other service providers active on the Austrian market.

Framework of analysis as regards the competitive constraint due to Orange in the absence of the merger

| (51) | The Commission analysed Orange's competitive position, its market shares and plans absent the merger. The Commission found that, absent the merger, Orange would have remained a relevant competitor on the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The Commission analysed Orange's competitive position, its market shares and plans absent the merger. The Commission found that, absent the merger, Orange would have remained a relevant competitor on the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers.

Conclusions on non-coordinated effects

| (52) | The results of the market investigation and its own analysis therefore led the Commission to conclude that the elimination of Orange as an independent network operator and provider of mobile telecommunications services to end users, and the reduction of operators from four to three would have significantly impeded effective competition in the internal market by means of non-coordinated effects in the Austrian market for the provision of mobile telecommunications services to end customers. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The results of the market investigation and its own analysis therefore led the Commission to conclude that the elimination of Orange as an independent network operator and provider of mobile telecommunications services to end users, and the reduction of operators from four to three would have significantly impeded effective competition in the internal market by means of non-coordinated effects in the Austrian market for the provision of mobile telecommunications services to end customers.

Other markets

| (53) | The Proposed Transaction did not give rise to competition concerns on the other relevant markets, namely the wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks, the wholesale market for international roaming and the wholesale market for mobile call termination. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Proposed Transaction did not give rise to competition concerns on the other relevant markets, namely the wholesale access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks, the wholesale market for international roaming and the wholesale market for mobile call termination.

| (54) | Even though the Commission found some indications that the merger might possibly have affected access opportunities for MVNOs, there was no need to come to a final decision in that respect, as the commitments proposed by the Notifying Party aimed to facilitate market entry and thus equally addressed and ruled out the possibility that the transaction would lead to negative effects on the Austrian wholesale market for network access and call origination. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Even though the Commission found some indications that the merger might possibly have affected access opportunities for MVNOs, there was no need to come to a final decision in that respect, as the commitments proposed by the Notifying Party aimed to facilitate market entry and thus equally addressed and ruled out the possibility that the transaction would lead to negative effects on the Austrian wholesale market for network access and call origination.

Efficiencies

| (55) | In its response to the Statement of Objections, the Notifying Party claimed an efficiency defence. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

In its response to the Statement of Objections, the Notifying Party claimed an efficiency defence.

| (56) | In order for the Commission to take into account pro-competitive effects under the Merger Regulation, efficiencies must be verifiable, likely to be passed on to consumers and merger specific to the extent that no other practicable less anticompetitive alternatives exist to achieve the same benefits. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In order for the Commission to take into account pro-competitive effects under the Merger Regulation, efficiencies must be verifiable, likely to be passed on to consumers and merger specific to the extent that no other practicable less anticompetitive alternatives exist to achieve the same benefits.

| (57) | The analysis of the Commission revealed that the claimed efficiencies had not been shown to be verifiable, merger specific and to the benefit of consumers. Therefore, they could not be taken into account in order to offset the competitive harm resulting from the Proposed Transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The analysis of the Commission revealed that the claimed efficiencies had not been shown to be verifiable, merger specific and to the benefit of consumers. Therefore, they could not be taken into account in order to offset the competitive harm resulting from the Proposed Transaction.

2.   
  Coordinated effects

| (58) | The Commission found that some characteristics of the Austrian mobile telecommunications market might be conducive to coordination and some past parallel behaviour of the Austrian MNOs could point to co-ordination. However, the indications did not meet the requisite standard of proof the Commission has to meet according to the case law, namely a significant impediment to effective competition leading to coordinated effects. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Commission found that some characteristics of the Austrian mobile telecommunications market might be conducive to coordination and some past parallel behaviour of the Austrian MNOs could point to co-ordination. However, the indications did not meet the requisite standard of proof the Commission has to meet according to the case law, namely a significant impediment to effective competition leading to coordinated effects.

| (59) | In any event, even if coordinated effects in the market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers were assumed, the fact would remain that the commitments proposed by the Notifying Party aimed to facilitate market entry and thus also addressed possible coordinated effects. Hence, it could be ruled out that the transaction as modified by the commitments would lead to a significant impediment to effective competition in the form of coordinated effects on the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

In any event, even if coordinated effects in the market for mobile telecommunication services to end customers were assumed, the fact would remain that the commitments proposed by the Notifying Party aimed to facilitate market entry and thus also addressed possible coordinated effects. Hence, it could be ruled out that the transaction as modified by the commitments would lead to a significant impediment to effective competition in the form of coordinated effects on the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications services to end customers.

D.   Commitments submitted by the notifying party

| (60) | In order to address competition concerns identified by the Commission, the Notifying Party submitted a first commitments package pursuant to Article 6(2) of the Merger Regulation on 20 August 2012. Those commitments were subsequently market tested. On 9, 19, 24 and 29 October 2012 and further on 11 and 12 November 2012, in the light of the results of the market tests and the competition concerns communicated by the Commission, a revised commitments package was submitted pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation. The ultimate consolidated document is attached in Annex III to the Commission's Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In order to address competition concerns identified by the Commission, the Notifying Party submitted a first commitments package pursuant to Article 6(2) of the Merger Regulation on 20 August 2012. Those commitments were subsequently market tested. On 9, 19, 24 and 29 October 2012 and further on 11 and 12 November 2012, in the light of the results of the market tests and the competition concerns communicated by the Commission, a revised commitments package was submitted pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation. The ultimate consolidated document is attached in Annex III to the Commission's Decision.

| (61) | With the aim of addressing the raised competition concerns and obtaining conditional clearance of the proposed transaction, H3G committed to make available wholesale access to the H3G Network to up to 30 % of H3G's network for up to 16 MVNOs in the coming 10 years, enabling them to offer mobile communication services to end customers in Austria. In addition, H3G made an upfront commitment to enter into an MVNO agreement with an MVNO to be approved by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

With the aim of addressing the raised competition concerns and obtaining conditional clearance of the proposed transaction, H3G committed to make available wholesale access to the H3G Network to up to 30 % of H3G's network for up to 16 MVNOs in the coming 10 years, enabling them to offer mobile communication services to end customers in Austria. In addition, H3G made an upfront commitment to enter into an MVNO agreement with an MVNO to be approved by the Commission.

| (62) | The details of the terms upon which access would be made available would be published on the H3G website in the form of a Reference offer. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The details of the terms upon which access would be made available would be published on the H3G website in the form of a Reference offer.

| (63) | The Reference Offer would be available to MVNOs who wished to provide mobile services to end customers under their own brand name provided that they were not controlled by an MNO active in Austria. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Reference Offer would be available to MVNOs who wished to provide mobile services to end customers under their own brand name provided that they were not controlled by an MNO active in Austria.

| (64) | Under the commitments, H3G is not obliged to carry out the technical implementation with more than two MVNOs at any one time. However, technical implementations which continue for more than 12 consecutive months are not counted in this limit. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Under the commitments, H3G is not obliged to carry out the technical implementation with more than two MVNOs at any one time. However, technical implementations which continue for more than 12 consecutive months are not counted in this limit.

| (65) | The wholesale prices are set out in Appendix A to the Reference Offer. The prices are not subject to any minimum volume or minimum revenue commitments. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The wholesale prices are set out in Appendix A to the Reference Offer. The prices are not subject to any minimum volume or minimum revenue commitments.

| (66) | For voice and SMS transactions, per unit prices apply (for both the origination and termination legs). For data transactions, the MVNO has a choice of unit pricing — either a single unit price or a tiered unit price. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

For voice and SMS transactions, per unit prices apply (for both the origination and termination legs). For data transactions, the MVNO has a choice of unit pricing — either a single unit price or a tiered unit price.

| (67) | In addition, the MVNO may elect a retail tariff which is offered by H3G to which retail minus pricing will be applied. Retail minus pricing shall only be available for data access SIM-only services (and shall not be available for other products or market developments such as NFC (Near Field Communication) offerings, handset subsidies or content offerings). |
| --- | --- |

(67)

In addition, the MVNO may elect a retail tariff which is offered by H3G to which retail minus pricing will be applied. Retail minus pricing shall only be available for data access SIM-only services (and shall not be available for other products or market developments such as NFC (Near Field Communication) offerings, handset subsidies or content offerings).

| (68) | The Reference Offer foresees a Base Rate per unit (voice, SMS, data) and a Discount Rate per unit. The Discount Rates are applicable to all units purchased after a specific annual Discount Threshold has been reached. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Reference Offer foresees a Base Rate per unit (voice, SMS, data) and a Discount Rate per unit. The Discount Rates are applicable to all units purchased after a specific annual Discount Threshold has been reached.

| (69) | The Reference Offer contains an offer from H3G to make available wholesale access to its network and this includes access to LTE technology. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Reference Offer contains an offer from H3G to make available wholesale access to its network and this includes access to LTE technology.

| (70) | H3G will consider reasonable requests for additional services (beyond wholesale access) if required by the MVNO, subject to separate agreement of the terms. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

H3G will consider reasonable requests for additional services (beyond wholesale access) if required by the MVNO, subject to separate agreement of the terms.

| (71) | A fast-track dispute resolution procedure has been put in place for disputes which arise between an MVNO and H3G during negotiations. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

A fast-track dispute resolution procedure has been put in place for disputes which arise between an MVNO and H3G during negotiations.

| (72) | H3G undertook not to complete the acquisition of Orange Austria before it had entered into an MVNO agreement based on the Reference Offer with one MVNO which would need to be approved by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

H3G undertook not to complete the acquisition of Orange Austria before it had entered into an MVNO agreement based on the Reference Offer with one MVNO which would need to be approved by the Commission.

| (73) | An independent Monitoring Trustee would be appointed to monitor H3G’s compliance with the commitments. The Monitoring Trustee would report to the Commission periodically throughout the term of the commitments in relation to the negotiation of MVNO Agreements so that the Commission could assess whether H3G was complying with its obligations under the Commitments. The Monitoring Trustee would also monitor the fast-track dispute resolution procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

An independent Monitoring Trustee would be appointed to monitor H3G’s compliance with the commitments. The Monitoring Trustee would report to the Commission periodically throughout the term of the commitments in relation to the negotiation of MVNO Agreements so that the Commission could assess whether H3G was complying with its obligations under the Commitments. The Monitoring Trustee would also monitor the fast-track dispute resolution procedure.

| (74) | The Commission market tested these commitments and, in the light of all the preceding considerations concluded that, subject to full compliance with the commitments given by H3G, the Proposed Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the Internal Market or a substantial part thereof. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Commission market tested these commitments and, in the light of all the preceding considerations concluded that, subject to full compliance with the commitments given by H3G, the Proposed Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in the Internal Market or a substantial part thereof.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (75) | For the reasons mentioned above, the decision concluded that the proposed concentration would not significantly impede effective competition in the Internal Market or in a substantial part of it. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

For the reasons mentioned above, the decision concluded that the proposed concentration would not significantly impede effective competition in the Internal Market or in a substantial part of it.

| (76) | Consequently the concentration was declared compatible with the Internal Market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently the concentration was declared compatible with the Internal Market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

NOTICES FROM MEMBER STATES

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/18

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Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

2013/C 224/07

PUBLIC INVITATION TO TENDER FOR A CONCESSION

FOR THE PROSPECTION, EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF HYDROCARBON UNDER CONCESSION IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF BATTONYA-PUSZTAFÖLDVÁR

On behalf of the Hungarian State, the Minister for National Development (‘the contracting authority’ or ‘the Minister’) as the minister responsible for mining and for overseeing State-owned assets hereby issues a public invitation to tender for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon under a concession contract on the basis of Act CXCVI of 2011 on national assets (‘the National Assets Act’), Act XVI of 1991 on concessions (‘the Concessions Act’) and Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Act’), subject to the following conditions.

1.   The Minister will publish the invitation to tender, adjudge the bids and conclude the concession contract in cooperation with the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Magyar Bányászati és Földtani Hivatal) in accordance with the Concessions Act and the Mining Act. Bids that meet the tender specifications will be evaluated by an evaluation committee set up by the Minister.

On the recommendation of the evaluation committee the Minister will issue the decision awarding the concession, on the basis of which the Minister may then conclude the concession contract with the successful bidder in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Concessions Act (1).

The language of the tendering procedure is Hungarian.

2.   Participation in the tendering procedure is open to any domestic or foreign natural person and to any transparent organisation within the meaning of the National Assets Act provided they meet the tender specifications; joint bids are also permitted. In the case of joint bids for this concession activity or area, the bidders must designate one of their number as representative, but assume joint and several liability for performance of the concession contract. Under the tendering procedure, domestic and foreign bidders will be treated on an equal footing.

For the purpose of carrying out the activity subject to concession, using its own resources the bidder signing the concession contract (‘the concession-holder’) must, within 90 days of signing, set up a company with legal personality and with its registered office in Hungary (‘the concession company’); the concession-holder must hold the majority of the shares, business interests and voting rights in the company at the time it is set up and for as long as it continues to exist, and must, as owner, undertake to enforce the requirements specified in the concession contract within the concession company. The concession company will enjoy the rights and be subject to the obligations under the concession contract as a mining operator.

3.   Duration of the concession: 20 years from the entry into force of the concession contract; the original duration may be extended once without a further call for tenders for a maximum of half of its original duration if the concession-holder and concession company have complied with all their obligations in accordance with the contract and on time.

4.   Data on area designated for concession

Area designated for concession: the area is situated between the municipalities given in the table below in the counties of Csongrád and Békés.

| Municipality | County | Municipality | County |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ambrózfalva | Csongrád | Magyardombegyház | Békés |
| Battonya | Békés | Makó | Csongrád |
| Békéssámson | Békés | Mezőhegyes | Békés |
| Csanádalberti | Csongrád | Mezőkovácsháza | Békés |
| Dombegyház | Békés | Nagybánhegyes | Békés |
| Dombiratos | Békés | Nagyér | Csongrád |
| Kaszaper | Békés | Nagykamarás | Békés |
| Kevermes | Békés | Pitvaros | Csongrád |
| Kisdombegyház | Békés | Tótkomlós | Békés |
| Kunágota | Békés | Végegyháza | Békés |
| Magyarbánhegyes | Békés | |

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Ambrózfalva

Csongrád

Magyardombegyház

Békés

Battonya

Békés

Makó

Csongrád

Békéssámson

Békés

Mezőhegyes

Békés

Csanádalberti

Csongrád

Mezőkovácsháza

Békés

Dombegyház

Békés

Nagybánhegyes

Békés

Dombiratos

Békés

Nagyér

Csongrád

Kaszaper

Békés

Nagykamarás

Békés

Kevermes

Békés

Pitvaros

Csongrád

Kisdombegyház

Békés

Tótkomlós

Békés

Kunágota

Békés

Végegyháza

Békés

Magyarbánhegyes

Békés

Size of area: 471,1 km2.

Overburden of area designated for concession: surface and bedrock: 5 000 metres below Baltic Sea level.

The border point coordinates delimiting the area designated for concession can be viewed in the Uniform National Projection System by clicking on the ‘Koncesszió’ tab on the website of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (http://www.mbfh.hu) and on the website of the Ministry of National Development (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-miniszterium).

5.   Minimum net concession fee: HUF 293 000 000 (two hundred and ninety-three million forint), but a bid for a larger fixed amount may be entered in the tendering procedure. Once the result is published, the successful bidder must pay the concession fee for the amount, in the manner and by the date specified in the concession contract.

6.   Participation in the concession tendering procedure is subject to payment of a participation fee of 3 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender document, i.e. HUF 8 790 000 net (eight million seven hundred and ninety thousand forint) plus VAT; this amount is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

7.   In addition to paying the participation fee, for their bid to be valid bidders must lodge a tendering security of 7 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender notice, i.e. HUF 20 510 000 (twenty million five hundred and ten thousand forint gross), by the deadline for submitting bids as a guarantee that the bid is binding. The tendering security paid will be forfeited to the contracting authority if the bidder withdraws or if the bidder is successful but then fails to conclude the contract or fails to pay the concession fee offered, for the amount, in the manner and by the deadline stipulated in the contract. The tendering security is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

8.   The mining royalty to be paid on the basis of the concession contract will be a percentage of the current mining royalty laid down in the Mining Act in accordance with the Minister's decision, plus 6,80 %.

9.   The legal, financial, technical and other conditions and information relating to the tendering procedure can be found in the tender document.

10.   The tender document may be collected at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary; tel. +36 13012900) on working days between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. up until the day before the submission deadline on presentation of adequate documentary proof that the purchase price for the tender document has been paid (preferably a bank statement showing that the bank account has been debited for the amount). The Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology will issue the purchaser with a certificate in their name confirming that they have received the tender document.

When purchasing the tender document, for the purposes of being contacted and receiving communications the purchaser must also submit a concession bidder identification sheet, on which they must state their name and address, an e-mail address (to which communications from the contracting authority regarding the tender document may be sent) and their tax identifier and declare that they are duly authorised to purchase the tender document.

11.   The purchase price for the tender document is HUF 25 000 (twenty-five thousand forint) plus VAT, which must be paid by transfer into Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology account No 100032000-01417179-00000000. The message accompanying the transfer must state ‘Szénhidrogén kutatása, feltárása, kitermelése Battonya-Pusztaföldvár dél elnevezésű területen tárgyú Koncessziós pályázati eljárás, Koncessziós pályázati kiírás vételára’ (‘Tendering procedure for a concession for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the southern area of Battonya-Pusztaföldvár, Purchase price for concession tender document’) and the name and address of the bidder. The purchase price for the tender document may not be paid in cash and is non-refundable in part or in full.

12.   Bids may be submitted only by persons certified as having purchased the tender document and having paid both the participation fee and the tendering security.

13.   Bids must be submitted in person on 15 November 2013 between 10 and 12 o'clock at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (address: Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary) in Hungarian, as specified in the tender document.

14.   From the time it is submitted, the bid becomes binding on the bidder and remains binding until the tendering procedure is ended. Bidders may not exclude liability for failure to abide by their bid.

15.   The Minister reserves the right to declare the concession tender procedure unsuccessful. No claims arising from the tender procedure being declared unsuccessful may be lodged against the Minister, the Hungarian State represented by the Minister, or the Ministry of Development as the Minister's place of work.

16.   The successful bidder will acquire the exclusive right for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the area designated for concession for the duration of the concession through the concession company mandatorily set up for that purpose. Once the decision establishing the mining site becomes final and enforceable, the concession right for the prospection area will be restricted to the area of the mining site.

17.   Each bidder may submit only a single valid bid.

18.   Scheduled time limit for the adjudication of concession bids: within 90 days following the deadline for bids to be submitted.

19.   The contracting authority will ensure a level playing field and will not apply any preferential criteria.

20.   Tender adjudication criteria

| I. | Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:






  — | programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted, |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:

—

programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted,

| — | how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are, |
| --- | --- |

—

how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are,

| — | the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession,

| — | the deadline for the research activity subject to concession. |
| --- | --- |

—

the deadline for the research activity subject to concession.

| II. | Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:






  — | the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:

—

the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources,

| — | the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender. |
| --- | --- |

—

the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender.

| III. | The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister. |
| --- | --- |

III.

The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister.

The detailed adjudication criteria and the legislation governing the procedure for authorising the concession work and how it is to be performed and completed are specified in the tender document.

21.   The concession contract

The concession contract is to be concluded within 60 days following the announcement of the result. This time limit may be extended by the Minister once only by a maximum of 60 days.

The successful bidder is entitled to carry out the exclusive State-controlled economic activity (prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in a delimited area) permitted under the concession for the duration of the concession in accordance with the relevant legislation and the concession contract.

When submitting the bid, bidders must take account of Section 22/A(13) of the Mining Act, which states that in the case of hydrocarbons a mining operator's prospection right or prospection permit may cover a total of no more than 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for conventional extraction of hydrocarbon, and a total of 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for non-conventional and special extraction of hydrocarbon. When establishing the prospection territory, account must also be taken of the prospection territory of the mining operator that controls — within the meaning of the Civil Code — the mining operator wishing to obtain the prospection right or prospection permit.

The draft concession contract is annexed to the tender document.

22.   Information regarding the tendering procedure may be requested exclusively in Hungarian, in writing after the tender document has been purchased, in the manner stipulated in the tender document; replies will be made available to all parties by the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology using the e-mail address indicated on the bidder identification sheet submitted when the tender document was purchased.

Budapest, April 2013.

Lászlóné NÉMETH

Minister

---

(1)  At the date on which this invitation to tender is being published, the member of the Government responsible for overseeing State-owned assets and for mining is the Minister for National Development in accordance with Section 84(d) and (g) of Government Decree 212/2010 of 1 July 2010 governing the duties and powers of certain ministers and of the State secretary for the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

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| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/22

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Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

2013/C 224/08

PUBLIC INVITATION TO TENDER FOR A CONCESSION

FOR THE PROSPECTION, EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF HYDROCARBON UNDER CONCESSION IN THE NORTHERN AREA OF BATTONYA-PUSZTAFÖLDVÁR

On behalf of the Hungarian State, the Minister for National Development (‘the contracting authority’ or ‘the Minister’) as the minister responsible for mining and for overseeing State-owned assets hereby issues a public invitation to tender for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon under a concession contract on the basis of Act CXCVI of 2011 on national assets (‘the National Assets Act’), Act XVI of 1991 on concessions (‘the Concessions Act’) and Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Act’), subject to the following conditions.

1.   The Minister will publish the invitation to tender, adjudge the bids and conclude the concession contract in cooperation with the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Magyar Bányászati és Földtani Hivatal) in accordance with the Concessions Act and the Mining Act. Bids that meet the tender specifications will be evaluated by an evaluation committee set up by the Minister.

On the recommendation of the evaluation committee the Minister will issue the decision awarding the concession, on the basis of which the Minister may then conclude the concession contract with the successful bidder in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Concessions Act (1).

The language of the tendering procedure is Hungarian.

2.   Participation in the tendering procedure is open to any domestic or foreign natural person and to any transparent organisation within the meaning of the National Assets Act provided they meet the tender specifications; joint bids are also permitted. In the case of joint bids for this concession activity or area, the bidders must designate one of their number as representative, but assume joint and several liability for performance of the concession contract. Under the tendering procedure, domestic and foreign bidders will be treated on an equal footing.

For the purpose of carrying out the activity subject to concession, using its own resources the bidder signing the concession contract (‘the concession-holder’) must, within 90 days of signing, set up a company with legal personality and with its registered office in Hungary (‘the concession company’); the concession-holder must hold the majority of the shares, business interests and voting rights in the company at the time it is set up and for as long as it continues to exist, and must, as owner, undertake to enforce the requirements specified in the concession contract within the concession company. The concession company will enjoy the rights and be subject to the obligations under the concession contract as a mining operator.

3.   Duration of the concession: 20 years from the entry into force of the concession contract; the original duration may be extended once without a further call for tenders for a maximum of half of its original duration if the concession-holder and concession company have complied with all their obligations in accordance with the contract and on time.

4.   Data on area designated for concession

Area designated for concession: the area is situated between the municipalities given in the table below in the county of Békés.

| Municipality | County | Municipality | County |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Almáskamarás | Békés | Medgyesbodzás | Békés |
| Békéssámson | Békés | Medgyesegyháza | Békés |
| Csabaszabadi | Békés | Mezőkovácsháza | Békés |
| Csanádapáca | Békés | Nagybánhegyes | Békés |
| Dombiratos | Békés | Nagykamarás | Békés |
| Gerendás | Békés | Orosháza | Békés |
| Kardoskút | Békés | Pusztaföldvár | Békés |
| Kaszaper | Békés | Pusztaottlaka | Békés |
| Kevermes | Békés | Tótkomlós | Békés |
| Kunágota | Békés | Újkígyós | Békés |
| Magyarbánhegyes | Békés | |

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Almáskamarás

Békés

Medgyesbodzás

Békés

Békéssámson

Békés

Medgyesegyháza

Békés

Csabaszabadi

Békés

Mezőkovácsháza

Békés

Csanádapáca

Békés

Nagybánhegyes

Békés

Dombiratos

Békés

Nagykamarás

Békés

Gerendás

Békés

Orosháza

Békés

Kardoskút

Békés

Pusztaföldvár

Békés

Kaszaper

Békés

Pusztaottlaka

Békés

Kevermes

Békés

Tótkomlós

Békés

Kunágota

Békés

Újkígyós

Békés

Magyarbánhegyes

Békés

Size of area: 390,9 km2.

Overburden of area designated for concession: surface and bedrock: 5 000 metres below Baltic Sea level.

The border point coordinates delimiting the area designated for concession can be viewed in the Uniform National Projection System by clicking on the ‘Koncesszió’ tab on the website of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (http://www.mbfh.hu) and on the website of the Ministry of National Development (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-miniszterium).

5.   Minimum net concession fee: HUF 297 000 000 (two hundred and ninety-seven million forint), but a bid for a larger fixed amount may be entered in the tendering procedure. Once the result is published, the successful bidder must pay the concession fee for the amount, in the manner and by the date specified in the concession contract.

6.   Participation in the concession tendering procedure is subject to payment of a participation fee of 3 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender document, i.e. HUF 8 910 000 net (eight million nine hundred and ten thousand forint) plus VAT; this amount is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

7.   In addition to paying the participation fee, for their bid to be valid bidders must lodge a tendering security of 7 % of the concession fee set in the tender notice, i.e. HUF 20 790 000 (twenty million seven hundred and ninety thousand forint gross), by the deadline for submitting bids as a guarantee that the bid is binding. The tendering security paid will be forfeited to the contracting authority if the bidder withdraws or if the bidder is successful but then fails to conclude the contract or fails to pay the concession fee offered, for the amount, in the manner and by the deadline stipulated in the contract. The tendering security is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

8.   The mining royalty to be paid on the basis of the concession contract will be a percentage of the current mining royalty laid down in the Mining Act in accordance with the Minister's decision, plus 6,90 %.

9.   The legal, financial, technical and other conditions and information relating to the tendering procedure can be found in the tender document.

10.   The tender document may be collected at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary; tel. +36 13012900) on working days between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. up until the day before the submission deadline on presentation of adequate documentary proof that the purchase price for the tender document has been paid (preferably a bank statement showing that the bank account has been debited for the amount). The Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology will issue the purchaser with a certificate in their name confirming that they have received the tender document.

When purchasing the tender document, for the purposes of being contacted and receiving communications the purchaser must also submit a concession bidder identification sheet, on which they must state their name and address, an e-mail address (to which communications from the contracting authority regarding the tender document may be sent) and their tax identifier and declare that they are duly authorised to purchase the tender document.

11.   The purchase price for the tender document is HUF 25 000 (twenty-five thousand forint) plus VAT, which must be paid by transfer into Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology account No 100032000-01417179-00000000. The message accompanying the transfer must state ‘Szénhidrogén kutatása, feltárása, kitermelése Battonya-Pusztaföldvár észak elnevezésű területen tárgyú Koncessziós pályázati eljárás, Koncessziós pályázati kiírás vételára’ (‘Tendering procedure for a concession for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the northern area of Battonya-Pusztaföldvár, Purchase price for concession tender document’) and the name and address of the bidder. The purchase price for the tender document may not be paid in cash and is non-refundable in part or in full.

12.   Bids may be submitted only by persons certified as having purchased the tender document and having paid both the participation fee and the tendering security.

13.   Bids must be submitted in person on 15 November 2013 between 10 and 12 o'clock at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (address: Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary) in Hungarian, as specified in the tender document.

14.   From the time it is submitted the bid becomes binding on the bidder and remains binding until the tendering procedure is ended. Bidders may not exclude liability for failure to abide by their bid.

15.   The Minister reserves the right to declare the concession tender procedure unsuccessful. No claims arising from the tender procedure being declared unsuccessful may be lodged against the Minister, the Hungarian State represented by the Minister, or the Ministry of Development as the Minister's place of work.

16.   The successful bidder will acquire the exclusive right for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the area designated for concession for the duration of the concession through the concession company mandatorily set up for that purpose. Once the decision establishing the mining site becomes final and enforceable, the concession right for the prospection area will be restricted to the area of the mining site.

17.   Each bidder may submit only a single valid bid.

18.   Scheduled time limit for the adjudication of concession bids: within 90 days following the deadline for bids to be submitted.

19.   The contracting authority will ensure a level playing field and will not apply any preferential criteria.

20.   Tender adjudication criteria

| I. | Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:






  — | programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted, |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:

—

programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted,

| — | how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are, |
| --- | --- |

—

how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are,

| — | the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession,

| — | the deadline for the research activity subject to concession. |
| --- | --- |

—

the deadline for the research activity subject to concession.

| II. | Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:






  — | the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:

—

the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources,

| — | the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender. |
| --- | --- |

—

the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender.

| III. | The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister. |
| --- | --- |

III.

The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister.

The detailed adjudication criteria and the legislation governing the procedure for authorising the concession work and how it is to be performed and completed are specified in the tender document.

21.   The concession contract

The concession contract is to be concluded within 60 days following the announcement of the result. This time limit may be extended by the Minister once only by a maximum of 60 days.

The successful bidder is entitled to carry out the exclusive State-controlled economic activity (prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in a delimited area) permitted under the concession for the duration of the concession in accordance with the relevant legislation and the concession contract.

When submitting the bid, bidders must take account of Section 22/A(13) of the Mining Act, which states that in the case of hydrocarbons a mining operator's prospection right or prospection permit may cover a total of no more than 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for conventional extraction of hydrocarbon, and a total of 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for non-conventional and special extraction of hydrocarbon. When establishing the prospection territory, account must also be taken of the prospection territory of the mining operator that controls — within the meaning of the Civil Code — the mining operator wishing to obtain the prospection right or prospection permit.

The draft concession contract is annexed to the tender document.

22.   Information regarding the tendering procedure may be requested exclusively in Hungarian, in writing after the tender document has been purchased, in the manner stipulated in the tender document; replies will be made available to all parties by the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology using the e-mail address indicated on the bidder identification sheet submitted when the tender document was purchased.

Budapest, April 2013.

Lászlóné NÉMETH

Minister

---

(1)  At the date on which this invitation to tender is being published, the member of the Government responsible for overseeing State-owned assets and for mining is the Minister for National Development in accordance with Section 84(d) and (g) of Government Decree 212/2010 of 1 July 2010 governing the duties and powers of certain ministers and of the State secretary for the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

---

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/26

---

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

2013/C 224/09

PUBLIC INVITATION TO TENDER FOR A CONCESSION

FOR THE PROSPECTION, EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF HYDROCARBON UNDER CONCESSION IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN AREA OF THE SZEGED BASIN

On behalf of the Hungarian State, the Minister for National Development (‘the contracting authority’ or ‘the Minister’) as the minister responsible for mining and for overseeing State-owned assets hereby issues a public invitation to tender for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon under a concession contract on the basis of Act CXCVI of 2011 on national assets (‘the National Assets Act’), Act XVI of 1991 on concessions (‘the Concessions Act’) and Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Act’), subject to the following conditions.

1.   The Minister will publish the invitation to tender, adjudge the bids and conclude the concession contract in cooperation with the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Magyar Bányászati és Földtani Hivatal) in accordance with the Concessions Act and the Mining Act. Bids that meet the tender specifications will be evaluated by an evaluation committee set up by the Minister.

On the recommendation of the evaluation committee the Minister will issue the decision awarding the concession, on the basis of which the Minister may then conclude the concession contract with the successful bidder in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Concessions Act (1).

The language of the tendering procedure is Hungarian.

2.   Participation in the tendering procedure is open to any domestic or foreign natural person and to any transparent organisation within the meaning of the National Assets Act provided they meet the tender specifications; joint bids are also permitted. In the case of joint bids for this concession activity or area, the bidders must designate one of their number as representative, but assume joint and several liability for performance of the concession contract. Under the tendering procedure, domestic and foreign bidders will be treated on an equal footing.

For the purpose of carrying out the activity subject to concession, using its own resources the bidder signing the concession contract (‘the concession-holder’) must, within 90 days of signing, set up a company with legal personality and with its registered office in Hungary (‘the concession company’); the concession-holder must hold the majority of the shares, business interests and voting rights in the company at the time it is set up and for as long as it continues to exist, and must, as owner, undertake to enforce the requirements specified in the concession contract within the concession company. The concession company will enjoy the rights and be subject to the obligations under the concession contract as a mining operator.

3.   Duration of the concession: 20 years from the entry into force of the concession contract; the original duration may be extended once without a further call for tenders for a maximum of half of its original duration if the concession-holder and concession company have complied with all their obligations in accordance with the contract and on time.

4.   Data on area designated for concession

Area designated for concession: the area is situated between the municipalities given in the table below in the county of Csongrád.

| Municipality | County | Municipality | County |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Algyő | Csongrád | Kübekháza | Csongrád |
| Deszk | Csongrád | Makó | Csongrád |
| Domaszék | Csongrád | Maroslele | Csongrád |
| Ferencszállás | Csongrád | Röszke | Csongrád |
| Hódmezővásárhely | Csongrád | Szeged | Csongrád |
| Kiszombor | Csongrád | Tiszasziget | Csongrád |
| Klárafalva | Csongrád | Újszentiván | Csongrád |

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Algyő

Csongrád

Kübekháza

Csongrád

Deszk

Csongrád

Makó

Csongrád

Domaszék

Csongrád

Maroslele

Csongrád

Ferencszállás

Csongrád

Röszke

Csongrád

Hódmezővásárhely

Csongrád

Szeged

Csongrád

Kiszombor

Csongrád

Tiszasziget

Csongrád

Klárafalva

Csongrád

Újszentiván

Csongrád

Size of area: 278,1 km2.

The border point coordinates of the area designated for concession as recorded in the Uniform National Projection System are contained in Annex 1.

Overburden of area designated for concession: surface and bedrock: 6 500 metres below Baltic Sea level,

The border point coordinates delimiting the area designated for concession can be viewed in the Uniform National Projection System by clicking on the ‘Koncesszió’ tab on the website of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (http://www.mbfh.hu) and on the website of the Ministry of National Development (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-miniszterium).

5.   Minimum net concession fee: HUF 413 000 000 (four hundred and thirteen million forint), but a bid for a larger fixed amount may be entered in the tendering procedure. Once the result is published, the successful bidder must pay the concession fee for the amount, in the manner and by the date specified in the concession contract.

6.   Participation in the concession tendering procedure is subject to payment of a participation fee of 3 % of the concession fee set in the tender document, i.e. HUF 12 390 000 net (twelve million three hundred and ninety thousand forint) plus VAT; this amount is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

7.   In addition to paying the participation fee, for their bid to be valid bidders must lodge a tendering security of 7 % of the concession fee set in the tender notice, i.e. HUF 28 910 000 (twenty-eight million nine hundred and ten thousand forint), by the deadline for submitting bids as a guarantee that the bid is binding. The tendering security paid will be forfeited to the contracting authority if the bidder withdraws or if the bidder is successful but then fails to conclude the contract or fails to pay the concession fee offered, for the amount, in the manner and by the deadline stipulated in the contract. The tendering security is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

8.   The mining royalty to be paid on the basis of the concession contract will be a percentage of the current mining royalty laid down in the Mining Act in accordance with the Minister's decision, plus 10 %.

9.   The legal, financial, technical and other conditions and information relating to the tendering procedure can be found in the tender document.

10.   The tender document may be collected at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary; tel. +36 13012900) on working days between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. up until the day before the submission deadline on presentation of adequate documentary proof that the purchase price for the tender document has been paid (preferably a bank statement showing that the bank account has been debited for the amount). The Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology will issue the purchaser with a certificate in their name confirming that they have received the tender document.

When purchasing the tender document, for the purposes of being contacted and receiving communications the purchaser must also submit a concession bidder identification sheet, on which they must state their name and address, an e-mail address (to which communications from the contracting authority regarding the tender document may be sent) and their tax identifier and declare that they are duly authorised to purchase the tender document.

11.   The purchase price for the tender document is HUF 25 000 (twenty-five thousand forint) plus VAT, which must be paid by transfer into Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology account No 100032000-01417179-00000000. The message accompanying the transfer must state ‘Szénhidrogén kutatása, feltárása, kitermelése Szegedi-medence délkelet elnevezésű területen tárgyú Koncessziós pályázati eljárás, Koncessziós pályázati kiírás vételára’ (‘Tendering procedure for a concession for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the south-eastern area of the Szeged Basin, Purchase price for concession tender document’) and the name and address of the bidder. The purchase price for the tender document may not be paid in cash and is non-refundable in part or in full.

12.   Bids may be submitted only by persons certified as having purchased the Tender Document and having paid both the participation fee and the tendering security.

13.   Bids must be submitted in person on 15 November 2013 between 10 and 12 o'clock at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (address: Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary) in Hungarian, as specified in the tender document.

14.   From the time it is submitted, the bid becomes binding on the bidder and remains binding until the tendering procedure is ended. Bidders may not exclude liability for failure to abide by their bid.

15.   The Minister reserves the right to declare the concession tender procedure unsuccessful. No claims arising from the tender procedure being declared unsuccessful may be lodged against the Minister, the Hungarian State represented by the Minister, or the Ministry of Development as the Minister's place of work.

16.   The successful bidder will acquire the exclusive right for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the area designated for concession for the duration of the concession through the concession company mandatorily set up for that purpose. Once the decision establishing the mining site becomes final and enforceable, the concession right for the prospection area will be restricted to the area of the mining site.

17.   Each bidder may submit only a single valid bid.

18.   Scheduled time limit for the adjudication of concession bids: within 90 days following the deadline for bids to be submitted.

19.   The contracting authority will ensure a level playing field and will not apply any preferential criteria.

20.   Tender adjudication criteria

| I. | Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:






  — | programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted, |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:

—

programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted,

| — | how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are, |
| --- | --- |

—

how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are,

| — | the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession,

| — | the deadline for the research activity subject to concession. |
| --- | --- |

—

the deadline for the research activity subject to concession.

| II. | Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:






  — | the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:

—

the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources,

| — | the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender. |
| --- | --- |

—

the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender.

| III. | The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister. |
| --- | --- |

III.

The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister.

The detailed adjudication criteria and the legislation governing the procedure for authorising the concession work and how it is to be performed and completed are specified in the tender document.

21.   The concession contract

The concession contract is to be concluded within 60 days following the announcement of the result. This time limit may be extended by the Minister once only by a maximum of 60 days.

The successful bidder is entitled to carry out the exclusive State-controlled economic activity (prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in a delimited area) permitted under the concession for the duration of the concession in accordance with the relevant legislation and the concession contract.

When submitting the bid, bidders must take account of Section 22/A(13) of the Mining Act, which states that in the case of hydrocarbons a mining operator's prospection right or prospection permit may cover a total of no more than 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for conventional extraction of hydrocarbon, and a total of 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for non-conventional and special extraction of hydrocarbon. When establishing the prospection territory, account must also be taken of the prospection territory of the mining operator that controls — within the meaning of the Civil Code — the mining operator wishing to obtain the prospection right or prospection permit.

The draft concession contract is annexed to the tender document.

22.   Information regarding the tendering procedure may be requested exclusively in Hungarian, in writing after the tender document has been purchased, in the manner stipulated in the tender document; replies will be made available to all parties by the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology using the e-mail address indicated on the bidder identification sheet submitted when the tender document was purchased.

Budapest, April 2013.

Lászlóné NÉMETH

Minister

---

(1)  At the date on which this invitation to tender is being published, the member of the Government responsible for overseeing State-owned assets and for mining is the Minister for National Development in accordance with Section 84(d) and (g) of Government Decree 212/2010 of 1 July 2010 governing the duties and powers of certain ministers and of the State secretary for the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

---

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/30

---

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

2013/C 224/10

PUBLIC INVITATION TO TENDER FOR A CONCESSION

FOR THE PROSPECTION, EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF HYDROCARBON UNDER CONCESSION IN THE WESTERN AREA OF THE SZEGED BASIN

On behalf of the Hungarian State, the Minister for National Development (‘the contracting authority’ or ‘the Minister’) as the minister responsible for mining and for overseeing State-owned assets hereby issues a public invitation to tender for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon under a concession contract on the basis of Act CXCVI of 2011 on national assets (‘the National Assets Act’), Act XVI of 1991 on concessions (‘the Concessions Act’) and Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Act’), subject to the following conditions.

1.   The Minister will publish the invitation to tender, adjudge the bids and conclude the concession contract in cooperation with the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Magyar Bányászati és Földtani Hivatal) in accordance with the Concessions Act and the Mining Act. Bids that meet the tender specifications will be evaluated by an evaluation committee set up by the Minister.

On the recommendation of the evaluation committee the Minister will issue the decision awarding the concession, on the basis of which the Minister may then conclude the concession contract with the successful bidder in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Concessions Act (1).

The language of the tendering procedure is Hungarian.

2.   Participation in the tendering procedure is open to any domestic or foreign natural person and to any transparent organisation within the meaning of the National Assets Act provided they meet the tender specifications; joint bids are also permitted. In the case of joint bids for this concession activity or area, the bidders must designate one of their number as representative, but assume joint and several liability for performance of the concession contract. Under the tendering procedure, domestic and foreign bidders will be treated on an equal footing.

For the purpose of carrying out the activity subject to concession, using its own resources the bidder signing the concession contract (‘the concession-holder’) must, within 90 days of signing, set up a company with legal personality and with its registered office in Hungary (‘the concession company’); the concession-holder must hold the majority of the shares, business interests and voting rights in the company at the time it is set up and for as long as it continues to exist, and must, as owner, undertake to enforce the requirements specified in the concession contract within the concession company. The concession company will enjoy the rights and be subject to the obligations under the concession contract as a mining operator.

3.   Duration of the concession: 20 years from the entry into force of the concession contract; the original duration may be extended once without a further call for tenders for a maximum of half of its original duration if the concession-holder and concession company have complied with all their obligations in accordance with the contract and on time.

4.   Data on area designated for concession

Area designated for concession: the area is situated between the municipalities given in the table below in the counties of Csongrád and Bács-Kiskun:

| Municipality | County | Municipality | County |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ásotthalom | Csongrád | Mórahalom | Csongrád |
| Balástya | Csongrád | Röszke | Csongrád |
| Bordány | Csongrád | Szatymaz | Csongrád |
| Csólyospálos | Bács-Kiskun | Szeged | Csongrád |
| Domaszék | Csongrád | Üllés | Csongrád |
| Forráskút | Csongrád | Zákányszék | Csongrád |
| Kömpöc | Bács-Kiskun | Zsombó | Csongrád |

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Ásotthalom

Csongrád

Mórahalom

Csongrád

Balástya

Csongrád

Röszke

Csongrád

Bordány

Csongrád

Szatymaz

Csongrád

Csólyospálos

Bács-Kiskun

Szeged

Csongrád

Domaszék

Csongrád

Üllés

Csongrád

Forráskút

Csongrád

Zákányszék

Csongrád

Kömpöc

Bács-Kiskun

Zsombó

Csongrád

Size of area: 348,8 km2.

The border point coordinates of the area designated for concession as recorded in the Uniform National Projection System are contained in Annex 1.

Overburden of area designated for concession: surface and bedrock: 6 500 metres below Baltic Sea level.

The border point coordinates delimiting the area designated for concession can be viewed in the Uniform National Projection System by clicking on the ‘Koncesszió’ tab on the website of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (http://www.mbfh.hu) and on the website of the Ministry of National Development (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-miniszterium).

5.   Minimum net concession fee: HUF 300 000 000 (three hundred million forint), but a bid for a larger fixed amount may be entered in the tendering procedure. Once the result is published, the successful bidder must pay the concession fee for the amount, in the manner and by the date specified in the concession contract.

6.   Participation in the concession tendering procedure is subject to payment of a participation fee of 3 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender document, i.e. HUF 9 000 000 net (nine million forint) plus VAT; this amount is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

7.   In addition to paying the participation fee, for their bid to be valid bidders must lodge a tendering security of 7 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender notice, i.e. HUF 21 000 000 (twenty-one million forint), by the deadline for submitting bids as a guarantee that the bid is binding. The tendering security paid will be forfeited to the contracting authority if the bidder withdraws or if the bidder is successful but then fails to conclude the contract or fails to pay the concession fee offered, for the amount, in the manner and by the deadline stipulated in the contract. The tendering security is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

8.   The mining royalty to be paid on the basis of the concession contract will be a percentage of the current mining royalty laid down in the Mining Act in accordance with the Minister's decision, plus 7 %.

9.   The legal, financial, technical and other conditions and information relating to the tendering procedure can be found in the tender document.

10.   The tender document may be collected at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary; tel. +36 13012900) on working days between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. up until the day before the submission deadline on presentation of adequate documentary proof that the purchase price for the tender document has been paid (preferably a bank statement showing that the bank account has been debited for the amount). The Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology will issue the purchaser with a certificate in their name confirming that they have received the tender document.

When purchasing the tender document, for the purposes of being contacted and receiving communications the purchaser must also submit a concession bidder identification sheet, on which they must state their name and address, an e-mail address (to which communications from the contracting authority regarding the tender document may be sent) and their tax identifier and declare that they are duly authorised to purchase the tender document.

11.   The purchase price for the tender document is HUF 25 000 (twenty-five thousand forint) plus VAT, which must be paid by transfer into Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology account No 100032000-01417179-00000000. The message accompanying the transfer must state ‘Szénhidrogén kutatása, feltárása, kitermelése Szegedi-medence nyugat elnevezésű területen tárgyú Koncessziós pályázati eljárás, Koncessziós pályázati kiírás vételára’ (‘Tendering procedure for a concession for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the western area of the Szeged Basin, Purchase price for concession tender document’) and the name and address of the bidder. The purchase price for the tender document may not be paid in cash and is non-refundable in part or in full.

12.   Bids may be submitted only by persons certified as having purchased the tender document and having paid both the participation fee and the tendering security.

13.   Bids must be submitted in person on 15 November 2013 between 10 and 12 o'clock at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (address: Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary) in Hungarian, as specified in the tender document.

14.   From the time it is submitted, the bid becomes binding on the bidder and remains binding until the tendering procedure is ended. Bidders may not exclude liability for failure to abide by their bid.

15.   The Minister reserves the right to declare the concession tender procedure unsuccessful. No claims arising from the tender procedure being declared unsuccessful may be lodged against the Minister, the Hungarian State represented by the Minister, or the Ministry of Development as the Minister's place of work.

16.   The successful bidder will acquire the exclusive right for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in the area designated for concession for the duration of the concession through the concession company mandatorily set up for that purpose. Once the decision establishing the mining site becomes final and enforceable, the concession right for the prospection area will be restricted to the area of the mining site.

17.   Each bidder may submit only a single valid bid.

18.   Scheduled time limit for the adjudication of concession bids: within 90 days following the deadline for bids to be submitted.

19.   The contracting authority will ensure a level playing field and will not apply any preferential criteria.

20.   Tender adjudication criteria

| I. | Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:






  — | programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted, |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:

—

programme design aiming for maximum prospection and production of hydrocarbon and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of hydrocarbon that can be extracted,

| — | how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are, |
| --- | --- |

—

how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are,

| — | the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession,

| — | the deadline for the research activity subject to concession. |
| --- | --- |

—

the deadline for the research activity subject to concession.

| II. | Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:






  — | the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:

—

the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources,

| — | the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender. |
| --- | --- |

—

the total value of work performed in connection with hydrocarbon mining in the three years preceding the invitation to tender.

| III. | The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister. |
| --- | --- |

III.

The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister.

The detailed adjudication criteria and the legislation governing the procedure for authorising the concession work and how it is to be performed and completed are specified in the tender document.

21.   The concession contract

The concession contract is to be concluded within 60 days following the announcement of the result. This time limit may be extended by the Minister once only by a maximum of 60 days.

The successful bidder is entitled to carry out the exclusive State-controlled economic activity (prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon in a delimited area) permitted under the concession for the duration of the concession in accordance with the relevant legislation and the concession contract.

When submitting the bid, bidders must take account of Section 22/A(13) of the Mining Act, which states that in the case of hydrocarbons a mining operator's prospection right or prospection permit may cover a total of no more than 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for conventional extraction of hydrocarbon, and a total of 12 000 km2 of prospection territory for non-conventional and special extraction of hydrocarbon. When establishing the prospection territory, account must also be taken of the prospection territory of the mining operator that controls — within the meaning of the Civil Code — the mining operator wishing to obtain the prospection right or prospection permit.

The draft concession contract is annexed to the tender document.

22.   Information regarding the tendering procedure may be requested exclusively in Hungarian, in writing after the tender document has been purchased, in the manner stipulated in the tender document; replies will be made available to all parties by the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology using the e-mail address indicated on the bidder identification sheet submitted when the tender document was purchased.

Budapest, April 2013.

Lászlóné NÉMETH

Minister

---

(1)  At the date on which this invitation to tender is being published, the member of the Government responsible for overseeing State-owned assets and for mining is the Minister for National Development in accordance with Section 84(d) and (g) of Government Decree 212/2010 of 1 July 2010 governing the duties and powers of certain ministers and of the State secretary for the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

---

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/34

---

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

2013/C 224/11

PUBLIC INVITATION TO TENDER FOR A CONCESSION

FOR THE PROSPECTION, EXTRACTION AND EXPLOITATION OF GEOTHERMAL ENERGY UNDER CONCESSION IN THE JÁSZBERÉNY AREA

On behalf of the Hungarian State, the Minister for National Development (‘the contracting authority’ or ‘the Minister’) as the minister responsible for mining and for overseeing State-owned assets hereby issues a public invitation to tender for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy under a concession contract on the basis of Act CXCVI of 2011 on national assets (‘the National Assets Act’), Act XVI of 1991 on concessions (‘the Concessions Act’) and Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Act’), subject to the following conditions.

1.   The Minister will publish the invitation to tender, adjudge the bids and conclude the concession contract in cooperation with the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Magyar Bányászati és Földtani Hivatal) in accordance with the Concessions Act and the Mining Act. Bids that meet the tender specifications will be evaluated by an evaluation committee set up by the Minister.

On the recommendation of the evaluation committee the Minister will issue the decision awarding the concession, on the basis of which the Minister may then conclude the concession contract with the successful bidder in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Concessions Act (1).

The language of the tendering procedure is Hungarian.

2.   Participation in the tendering procedure is open to any domestic or foreign natural person and to any transparent organisation within the meaning of the National Assets Act provided they meet the tender specifications; joint bids are also permitted. In the case of joint bids for this concession activity or area, the bidders must designate one of their number as representative, but assume joint and several liability for performance of the concession contract. Under the tendering procedure, domestic and foreign bidders will be treated on an equal footing.

For the purpose of carrying out the activity subject to concession, using its own resources the bidder signing the concession contract (‘the concession-holder’) must, within 90 days of signing, set up a company with legal personality and with its registered office in Hungary (‘the concession company’); the concession-holder must hold the majority of the shares, business interests and voting rights in the company at the time it is set up and for as long as it continues to exist, and must, as owner, undertake to enforce the requirements specified in the concession contract within the concession company. The concession company will enjoy the rights and be subject to the obligations under the concession contract as a mining operator.

3.   Duration of the concession: 35 years from the entry into force of the concession contract; the original duration may be extended once without a further call for tenders for a maximum of half of its original duration if the concession-holder and concession company have complied with all their obligations in accordance with the contract and on time.

4.   Data on area designated for concession

Area designated for concession: the area is situated between the municipalities given in the table below in the counties of Pest, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Heves.

| Municipality | County | Municipality | County |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bénye | Pest | Péteri | Pest |
| Csévharaszt | Pest | Sülysáp | Pest |
| Gomba | Pest | Szentmártonkáta | Pest |
| Jászberény | Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok | Tápióbicske | Pest |
| Jászdózsa | Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok | Tápióság | Pest |
| Jászfelsőszentgyörgy | Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok | Tápiószecső | Pest |
| Jászjákóhalma | Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok | Tarnaörs | Heves |
| Mende | Pest | Tóalmás | Pest |
| Monor | Pest | Úri | Pest |
| Nagykáta | Pest | Üllő | Pest |
| Pánd (2) | Pest | Vasad | Pest |

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Bénye

Pest

Péteri

Pest

Csévharaszt

Pest

Sülysáp

Pest

Gomba

Pest

Szentmártonkáta

Pest

Jászberény

Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok

Tápióbicske

Pest

Jászdózsa

Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok

Tápióság

Pest

Jászfelsőszentgyörgy

Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok

Tápiószecső

Pest

Jászjákóhalma

Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok

Tarnaörs

Heves

Mende

Pest

Tóalmás

Pest

Monor

Pest

Úri

Pest

Nagykáta

Pest

Üllő

Pest

Pánd (2)

Pest

Vasad

Pest

Size of area: 395,6 km2.

Overburden of area designated for concession: – 2 500 m measured from the surface and the bedrock: – 6 000 m measured from the surface.

The border point coordinates delimiting the area designated for concession can be viewed in the Uniform National Projection System by clicking on the ‘Koncesszió’ tab on the website of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (http://www.mbfh.hu) and on the website of the Ministry of National Development (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-miniszterium).

5.   Minimum net concession fee: HUF 38 500 000 (thirty-eight million five hundred thousand forint), but a bid for a larger fixed amount may be entered in the tendering procedure. Once the result is published, the successful bidder must pay the concession fee for the amount, in the manner and by the date specified in the concession contract.

6.   Participation in the concession tendering procedure is subject to payment of a participation fee of 3 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender document, i.e. HUF 1 155 000 net (one million one hundred and fifty-five thousand forint) plus VAT; this amount is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

7.   In addition to paying the participation fee, for their bid to be valid bidders must lodge a tendering security of 7 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender notice, i.e. HUF 2 695 000 (two million six hundred and ninety-five thousand forint), by the deadline for submitting bids as a guarantee that the bid is binding. The tendering security paid will be forfeited to the contracting authority if the bidder withdraws or if the bidder is successful but then fails to conclude the contract or fails to pay the concession fee offered, for the amount, in the manner and by the deadline stipulated in the contract. The tendering security is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

8.   The mining royalty to be paid on the basis of the concession contract will be a percentage of the current mining royalty laid down in the Mining Act in accordance with the Minister's decision, plus 3 %.

9.   The legal, financial, technical and other conditions and information relating to the tendering procedure can be found in the tender document.

10.   The tender document may be collected at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest; Hungary, tel. +36 13012900) on working days between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. up until the day before the submission deadline on presentation of adequate documentary proof that the purchase price for the tender document has been paid (preferably a bank statement showing that the bank account has been debited for the amount). The Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology will issue the purchaser with a certificate in their name confirming that they have received the tender document.

When purchasing the tender document, for the purposes of being contacted and receiving communications the purchaser must also submit a concession bidder identification sheet, on which they must state their name and address, an e-mail address (to which communications from the contracting authority regarding the tender document may be sent) and their tax identifier and declare that they are duly authorised to purchase the tender document.

11.   The purchase price for the tender document is HUF 25 000 (twenty-five thousand forint) plus VAT, which must be paid by transfer into Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology account No 100032000-01417179-00000000. The message accompanying the transfer must state ‘Geotermikus energia kutatása, kinyerése, hasznosítása Jászberény elnevezésű területen tárgyú Koncessziós pályázati eljárás, Koncessziós pályázati kiírás vételára’ (‘Invitation to tender for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy under concession in the Jászberény area, Purchase price for concession tender document’)’ and the name and address of the bidder. The purchase price for the tender document may not be paid in cash and is non-refundable in part or in full.

12.   Bids may be submitted only by persons certified as having purchased the tender document and having paid both the participation fee and the tendering security.

13.   Bids must be submitted in person on 15 November 2013 between 10 and 12 o'clock at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (address: Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary) in Hungarian, as specified in the tender document.

14.   From the time it is submitted, the bid becomes binding on the bidder and remains binding until the tendering procedure is ended. Bidders may not exclude liability for failure to abide by their bid.

15.   The Minister reserves the right to declare the concession tender procedure unsuccessful. No claims arising from the tender procedure being declared unsuccessful may be lodged against the Minister, the Hungarian State represented by the Minister, or the Ministry of Development as the Minister's place of work.

16.   The successful bidder will acquire the exclusive right for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy in the area designated for concession for the duration of the concession through the concession company mandatorily set up for that purpose. Once the decision establishing the geothermal protection boundary becomes final and enforceable, the concession right for the prospection area will be restricted to the area of the geothermal protection boundary.

17.   Each bidder may submit only a single valid bid.

18.   Scheduled time limit for the adjudication of concession bids: within 90 days following the deadline for bids to be submitted.

19.   The contracting authority will ensure a level playing field and will not apply any preferential criteria.

20.   Tender adjudication criteria:

| I. | Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:






  — | programme design aiming for maximum prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of exploitable geothermal energy (in PJ), |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:

—

programme design aiming for maximum prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of exploitable geothermal energy (in PJ),

| — | how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are, |
| --- | --- |

—

how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are,

| — | the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession,

| — | the deadline for the research activity subject to concession. |
| --- | --- |

—

the deadline for the research activity subject to concession.

| II. | Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:






  — | the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:

—

the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources,

| — | the total value of work performed in connection with prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy. |
| --- | --- |

—

the total value of work performed in connection with prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy.

| III. | The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister. |
| --- | --- |

III.

The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister.

The detailed adjudication criteria and the legislation governing the procedure for authorising the concession work and how it is to be performed and completed are specified in the tender document.

21.   The concession contract

The concession contract is to be concluded within 60 days following the announcement of the result. This time limit may be extended by the Minister once only by a maximum of 60 days.

The successful bidder is entitled to carry out the exclusive State-controlled economic activity (prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy in a delimited area) permitted under the concession for the duration of the concession in accordance with the relevant legislation and the concession contract.

The draft concession contract is annexed to the tender document.

22.   Information regarding the tendering procedure may be requested exclusively in Hungarian, in writing after the tender document has been purchased, in the manner stipulated in the tender document; replies will be made available to all parties by the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology using the e-mail address indicated on the bidder identification sheet submitted when the tender document was purchased.

Budapest, May 2013.

Lászlóné NÉMETH

Minister

---

(1)  At the date on which this invitation to tender is being published, the member of the Government responsible for overseeing State-owned assets and for mining is the Minister for National Development in accordance with Section 84(d) and (g) of Government Decree 212/2010 of 1 July 2010 governing the duties and powers of certain ministers and of the State secretary for the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

(2)  In Pánd the area designated for concession covers only a few m2.

2

2

---

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/38

---

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

2013/C 224/12

PUBLIC INVITATION TO TENDER FOR A CONCESSION

FOR THE PROSPECTION, EXTRACTION AND EXPLOITATION OF GEOTHERMAL ENERGY UNDER CONCESSION IN THE FERENCSZÁLLÁS AREA

On behalf of the Hungarian State, the Minister for National Development (‘the contracting authority’ or ‘the Minister’) as the minister responsible for mining and for overseeing State-owned assets hereby issues a public invitation to tender for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy under a concession contract on the basis of Act CXCVI of 2011 on national assets (‘the National Assets Act’), Act XVI of 1991 on concessions (‘the concessions Act’) and Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Act’), subject to the following conditions.

1.   The Minister will publish the invitation to tender, adjudge the bids and conclude the concession contract in cooperation with the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Magyar Bányászati és Földtani Hivatal) in accordance with the Concessions Act and the Mining Act. Bids that meet the tender specifications will be evaluated by an evaluation committee set up by the Minister.

On the recommendation of the evaluation committee the Minister will issue the decision awarding the concession, on the basis of which the Minister may then conclude the concession contract with the successful bidder in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Concessions Act (1).

The language of the tendering procedure is Hungarian.

2.   Participation in the tendering procedure is open to any domestic or foreign natural person and to any transparent organisation within the meaning of the National Assets Act provided they meet the tender specifications; joint bids are also permitted. In the case of joint bids for this concession activity or area, the bidders must designate one of their number as representative, but assume joint and several liability for performance of the concession contract. Under the tendering procedure, domestic and foreign bidders will be treated on an equal footing.

For the purpose of carrying out the activity subject to concession, using its own resources the bidder signing the concession contract (‘the concession-holder’) must, within 90 days of signing, set up a company with legal personality and with its registered office in Hungary (‘the concession company’); the concession-holder must hold the majority of the shares, business interests and voting rights in the company at the time it is set up and for as long as it continues to exist, and must, as owner, undertake to enforce the requirements specified in the concession contract within the concession company. The concession company will enjoy the rights and be subject to the obligations under the concession contract as a mining operator.

3.   Duration of the concession: 35 years from the entry into force of the concession contract; the original duration may be extended once without a further call for tenders for a maximum of half of its original duration if the concession-holder and concession company have complied with all their obligations in accordance with the contract and on time.

4.   Data on area designated for concession

Area designated for concession: the area is situated between the municipalities given in the table below in the county of Csongrád.

| Municipality | County | Municipality | County | Municipality | County |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Deszk | Csongrád | Klárafalva | Csongrád | Makó | Csongrád |
| Ferencszállás | Csongrád | Kübekháza | Csongrád | Szeged | Csongrád |
| Kiszombor | Csongrád | |

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Deszk

Csongrád

Klárafalva

Csongrád

Makó

Csongrád

Ferencszállás

Csongrád

Kübekháza

Csongrád

Szeged

Csongrád

Kiszombor

Csongrád

Size of area: 100,09 km2.

Overburden of area designated for concession: – 2 500 m measured from the surface and the bedrock: – 6 000 m measured from the surface.

The border point coordinates delimiting the area designated for concession can be viewed in the Uniform National Projection System by clicking on the ‘Koncesszió’ tab on the website of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (http://www.mbfh.hu) and on the website of the Ministry of National Development (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-miniszterium).

5.   Minimum net concession fee: HUF 49 000 000 (forty-nine million forint), but a bid for a larger fixed amount may be entered in the tendering procedure. Once the result is published, the successful bidder must pay the concession fee for the amount, in the manner and by the date specified in the concession contract.

6.   Participation in the concession tendering procedure is subject to payment of a participation fee of 3 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender document, i.e. HUF 1 470 000 net (one million four hundred and seventy thousand forint) plus VAT; this amount is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

7.   In addition to paying the participation fee, for their bid to be valid bidders must lodge a tendering security of 7 % of the minimum concession fee set in the tender notice, i.e. HUF 3 430 000 (three million four hundred and thirty thousand forint), by the deadline for submitting bids as a guarantee that the bid is binding. The tendering security paid will be forfeited to the contracting authority if the bidder withdraws or if the bidder is successful but then fails to conclude the contract or fails to pay the concession fee offered, for the amount, in the manner and by the deadline stipulated in the contract. The tendering security is to be paid in the manner specified in the tender document.

8.   The mining royalty to be paid on the basis of the concession contract will be a percentage of the current mining royalty laid down in the Mining Act in accordance with the Minister's decision, plus 5,30 %.

9.   The legal, financial, technical and other conditions and information relating to the tendering procedure can be found in the tender document.

10.   The tender document may be collected at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary; tel. +36 13012900) on working days between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. up until the day before the submission deadline on presentation of adequate documentary proof that the purchase price for the tender document has been paid (preferably a bank statement showing that the bank account has been debited for the amount). The Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology will issue the purchaser with a certificate in their name confirming that they have received the tender document.

When purchasing the tender document, for the purposes of being contacted and receiving communications the purchaser must also submit a concession bidder identification sheet, on which they must state their name and address, an e-mail address (to which communications from the contracting authority regarding the tender document may be sent) and their tax identifier and declare that they are duly authorised to purchase the tender document.

11.   The purchase price for the tender document is HUF 25 000 (twenty-five thousand forint) plus VAT, which must be paid by transfer into Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology account No 100032000-01417179-00000000. The message accompanying the transfer must state ‘Geotermikus energia kutatása, kinyerése, hasznosítása Ferencszállás elnevezésű területen tárgyú Koncessziós pályázati eljárás, Koncessziós pályázati kiírás vételára’ (‘Invitation to tender for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy under concession in the Ferencszállás area, Purchase price for concession tender document’) and the name and address of the bidder. The purchase price for the tender document may not be paid in cash and is non-refundable in part or in full.

12.   Bids may be submitted only by persons certified as having purchased the tender document and having paid both the participation fee and the tendering security.

13.   Bids must be submitted in person on 15 November 2013 between 10 and 12 o'clock at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (address: Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary) in Hungarian, as specified in the tender document.

14.   From the time it is submitted, the bid becomes binding on the bidder and remains binding until the tendering procedure is ended. Bidders may not exclude liability for failure to abide by their bid.

15.   The Minister reserves the right to declare the concession tender procedure unsuccessful. No claims arising from the tender procedure being declared unsuccessful may be lodged against the Minister, the Hungarian State represented by the Minister, or the Ministry of Development as the Minister's place of work.

16.   The successful bidder will acquire the exclusive right for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy in the area designated for concession for the duration of the concession through the concession company mandatorily set up for that purpose. Once the decision establishing the geothermal protection boundary becomes final and enforceable, the concession right for the prospection area will be restricted to the area of the geothermal protection boundary.

17.   Each bidder may submit only a single valid bid.

18.   Scheduled time limit for the adjudication of concession bids: within 90 days following the deadline for bids to be submitted.

19.   The contracting authority will ensure a level playing field and will not apply any preferential criteria.

20.   Tender adjudication criteria

| I. | Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:






  — | programme design aiming for maximum prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of exploitable geothermal energy (in PJ), |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

Assessment criteria relating to the content of the programme of work subject to concession:

—

programme design aiming for maximum prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of exploitable geothermal energy (in PJ),

| — | how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are, |
| --- | --- |

—

how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are,

| — | the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession,

| — | the deadline for the research activity subject to concession. |
| --- | --- |

—

the deadline for the research activity subject to concession.

| II. | Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:






  — | the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract:

—

the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources,

| — | the total value of work performed in connection with prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy. |
| --- | --- |

—

the total value of work performed in connection with prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy.

| III. | The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister. |
| --- | --- |

III.

The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister.

The detailed adjudication criteria and the legislation governing the procedure for authorising the concession work and how it is to be performed and completed are specified in the tender document.

21.   The concession contract

The concession contract is to be concluded within 60 days following the announcement of the result. This time limit may be extended by the Minister once only by a maximum of 60 days.

The successful bidder is entitled to carry out the exclusive State-controlled economic activity (prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy in a delimited area) permitted under the concession for the duration of the concession in accordance with the relevant legislation and the concession contract.

The draft concession contract is annexed to the tender document.

22.   Information regarding the tendering procedure may be requested exclusively in Hungarian, in writing after the tender document has been purchased, in the manner stipulated in the tender document; replies will be made available to all parties by the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology using the e-mail address indicated on the bidder identification sheet submitted when the tender document was purchased.

Budapest, May 2013.

Lászlóné NÉMETH

Minister

---

(1)  At the date on which this invitation to tender is being published, the member of the Government responsible for overseeing State-owned assets and for mining is the Minister for National Development in accordance with Section 84(d) and (g) of Government Decree 212/2010 of 1 July 2010 governing the duties and powers of certain ministers and of the State secretary for the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

---

| 3.8.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 224/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 224/42

---

Communication from the Minister for National Development of Hungary pursuant to Article 3(2) of Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons

2013/C 224/13

PUBLIC INVITATION TO TENDER FOR A CONCESSION

FOR THE PROSPECTION, EXTRACTION AND EXPLOITATION OF GEOTHERMAL ENERGY UNDER CONCESSION IN THE KECSKEMÉT AREA

On behalf of the Hungarian State, the Minister for National Development (‘the Contracting Authority’ or ‘the Minister’) as the minister responsible for mining and for overseeing State-owned assets hereby issues a public invitation to tender for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy under a concession contract on the basis of Act CXCVI of 2011 on national assets (‘the National Assets Act’), Act XVI of 1991 on Concessions (‘the Concessions Act’) and Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Act’), subject to the following conditions.

1.   The Minister will publish the invitation to tender, adjudge the bids and conclude the concession contract in cooperation with the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Magyar Bányászati és Földtani Hivatal) in accordance with the Concessions Act and the Mining Act. Bids that meet the tender specifications will be evaluated by an Evaluation Committee set up by the Minister.

On the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee the Minister will issue the decision awarding the concession, on the basis of which the Minister may then conclude the concession contract with the successful bidder in accordance with Section 5(1) of the Concessions Act (1).

The language of the tendering procedure is Hungarian.

2.   Participation in the tendering procedure is open to any domestic or foreign natural person and to any transparent organisation within the meaning of the National Assets Act provided they meet the tender specifications; joint bids are also permitted. In the case of joint bids for this concession activity or area, the bidders must designate one of their number as representative, but assume joint and several liability for performance of the concession contract. Under the tendering procedure domestic and foreign bidders will be treated on an equal footing.

For the purpose of carrying out the activity subject to concession, using its own resources the bidder signing the concession contract (‘the Concession-Holder’) must, within 90 days of signing, set up a company with legal personality and with its registered office in Hungary (‘the Concession Company’); the Concession-Holder must hold the majority of the shares, business interests and voting rights in the company at the time it is set up and for as long as it continues to exist, and must, as owner, undertake to enforce the requirements specified in the concession contract within the Concession Company. The Concession Company will enjoy the rights and be subject to the obligations under the concession contract as a mining operator.

3.   Duration of the concession: 35 years from the entry into force of the concession contract; the original duration may be extended once without a further call for tenders for a maximum of half of its original duration if the Concession-Holder and Concession Company have complied with all their obligations in accordance with the contract and on time.

4.   Data on area designated for concession

Area designated for concession: The area is situated between the municipalities given in the table below in the county of Bács–Kiskun.

| Municipality | County | Municipality | County | Municipality | County |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ágasegyháza | Bács-Kiskun | Kecskemét | Bács-Kiskun | Nyárlőrinc | Bács-Kiskun |
| Ballószög | Bács-Kiskun | Kerekegyháza | Bács-Kiskun | Orgovány | Bács-Kiskun |
| Fülöpháza | Bács-Kiskun | Lajosmizse | Bács-Kiskun | Szentkirály | Bács-Kiskun |
| Helvécia | Bács-Kiskun | Nagykőrös: | Bács-Kiskun | Városföld | Bács-Kiskun |

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Municipality

County

Ágasegyháza

Bács-Kiskun

Kecskemét

Bács-Kiskun

Nyárlőrinc

Bács-Kiskun

Ballószög

Bács-Kiskun

Kerekegyháza

Bács-Kiskun

Orgovány

Bács-Kiskun

Fülöpháza

Bács-Kiskun

Lajosmizse

Bács-Kiskun

Szentkirály

Bács-Kiskun

Helvécia

Bács-Kiskun

Nagykőrös:

Bács-Kiskun

Városföld

Bács-Kiskun

Size of area: 525,3 km2.

Overburden of area designated for concession: – 2 500 m measured from the surface and the bedrock: – 6 000 m measured from the surface.

The border point coordinates delimiting the area designated for concession can be viewed in the Uniform National Projection System by clicking on the ‘Koncesszió’ tab on the website of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (http://www.mbfh.hu) and on the website of the Ministry of National Development (http://www.kormany.hu/hu/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-miniszterium).

5.   Minimum net concession fee: HUF 50 000 000 (fifty million forint), but a bid for a larger fixed amount may be entered in the tendering procedure. Once the result is published, the successful bidder must pay the concession fee for the amount, in the manner and by the date specified in the concession contract.

6.   Participation in the concession tendering procedure is subject to payment of a participation fee of 3 % of the minimum concession fee set in the Tender Document, i.e. HUF 1 500 000 (one million five hundred thousand forint) plus VAT; this amount is to be paid in the manner specified in the Tender Document.

7.   In addition to paying the participation fee, for their bid to be valid bidders must lodge a tendering security of 7 % of the minimum concession fee set in the Tender Notice, i.e. HUF 3 500 000 (three million five hundred thousand forint), by the deadline for submitting bids as a guarantee that the bid is binding. The tendering security paid will be forfeited to the Contracting Authority if the bidder withdraws or if the bidder is successful but then fails to conclude the contract or fails to pay the concession fee offered, for the amount, in the manner and by the deadline stipulated in the contract. The tendering security is to be paid in the manner specified in the Tender Document.

8.   The mining royalty to be paid on the basis of the concession contract will be a percentage of the current mining royalty laid down in the Mining Act in accordance with the Minister's decision, plus 5,50 %.

9.   The legal, financial, technical and other conditions and information relating to the tendering procedure can be found in the Tender Document.

10.   The Tender Document may be collected at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary; telephone: +36 13012900) on working days between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m. up until the day before the submission deadline on presentation of adequate documentary proof that the purchase price for the Tender Document has been paid (preferably a bank statement showing that the bank account has been debited for the amount). The Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology will issue the purchaser with a certificate in their name confirming that they have received the Tender Document.

When purchasing the Tender Document, for the purposes of being contacted and receiving communications the purchaser must also submit a Concession Bidder Identification Sheet, on which they must state their name and address, an e-mail address (to which communications from the Contracting Authority regarding the Tender Document may be sent) and their tax identifier and declare that they are duly authorised to purchase the Tender Document.

11.   The purchase price for the Tender Document is HUF 25 000 (twenty-five thousand forint) plus VAT, which must be paid by transfer into Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology account No 100032000-01417179-00000000. The message accompanying the transfer must state ‘Geotermikus energia kutatása, kinyerése, hasznosítása Kecskemét elnevezésű területen tárgyú Koncessziós pályázati eljárás, Koncessziós pályázati kiírás vételára (Invitation to tender for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy under concession in the Kecskemét area, Purchase price for concession tender document)’ and the name and address of the bidder. The purchase price for the Tender Document may not be paid in cash and is non-refundable in part or in full.

12.   Bids may be submitted only by persons certified as having purchased the Tender Document and having paid both the participation fee and the tendering security.

13.   Bids must be submitted in person on 15 November 2013 between 10 and 12 o'clock at the Customer Service Office of the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology (address: Columbus utca 17-23, 1145 Budapest, Hungary) in Hungarian, as specified in the Tender Document.

14.   From the time it is submitted the bid becomes binding on the bidder and remains binding until the tendering procedure is ended. Bidders may not exclude liability for failure to abide by their bid.

15.   The Minister reserves the right to declare the concession tender procedure unsuccessful. No claims arising from the tender procedure being declared unsuccessful may be lodged against the Minister, the Hungarian State represented by the Minister, or the Ministry of Development as the Minister's place of work.

16.   The successful bidder will acquire the exclusive right for the prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy in the area designated for concession for the duration of the concession through the Concession Company mandatorily set up for that purpose. Once the decision establishing the geothermal protection boundary becomes final and enforceable, the concession right for the prospection area will be restricted to the area of the geothermal protection boundary.

17.   Each bidder may submit only a single valid bid.

18.   Scheduled time limit for the adjudication of concession bids: within 90 days following the deadline for bids to be submitted.

19.   The Contracting Authority will ensure a level playing field and will not apply any preferential criteria.

20.   Tender adjudication criteria:

| I. | Assessment criteria relating to the content of the Programme of Work subject to concession:






  — | Programme design aiming for maximum prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of exploitable geothermal energy (in PJ), |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

Assessment criteria relating to the content of the Programme of Work subject to concession:

—

Programme design aiming for maximum prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy and seeking to conduct prospection as comprehensively as possible and across as broad an area as possible on the concession site; the projected quantity of exploitable geothermal energy (in PJ),

| — | how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are, |
| --- | --- |

—

how up-to-date the envisaged technical solutions are,

| — | the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession, |
| --- | --- |

—

the measures envisaged for protecting the environment and preventing and reducing damage in the course of the work subject to concession,

| — | the deadline for the research activity subject to concession. |
| --- | --- |

—

the deadline for the research activity subject to concession.

| II. | (Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract






  — | the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

(Assessment criteria relating to the bidder's ability to perform the concession contract

—

the bidder's financial standing, the availability of the resources needed to finance the work to be performed under the concession, and the proportion of this accounted for by own resources,

| — | the total value of work performed in connection with prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy. |
| --- | --- |

—

the total value of work performed in connection with prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy.

| III. | The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister. |
| --- | --- |

III.

The size of the concession fee offered above the minimum concession fee set by the Minister.

The detailed adjudication criteria and the legislation governing the procedure for authorising the concession work and how it is to be performed and completed are specified in the Tender Document.

21.   The concession contract

The concession contract is to be concluded within 60 days following the announcement of the result. This time limit may be extended by the Minister once only by a maximum of 60 days.

The successful bidder is entitled to carry out the exclusive State-controlled economic activity (prospection, extraction and exploitation of geothermal energy in a delimited area) permitted under the concession for the duration of the concession in accordance with the relevant legislation and the concession contract.

The draft concession contract is annexed to the Tender Document.

22.   Information regarding the tendering procedure may be requested exclusively in Hungarian, in writing after the Tender Document has been purchased, in the manner stipulated in the Tender Document; replies will be made available to all parties by the Hungarian Office for Mining and Geology using the e-mail address indicated on the Bidder Identification Sheet submitted when the Tender Document was purchased.

Budapest, May 2013.

Lászlóné NÉMETH

Minister

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(1)  At the date on which this invitation to tender is being published, the member of the Government responsible for overseeing State-owned assets and for mining is the minister for national development in accordance with Section 84(d) and (g) of Government Decree 212/2010 of 1 July 2010 governing the duties and powers of certain ministers and of the State secretary for the Prime Minister’s Office.

1

(d)

(g)

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