1

Filed 6/4/24 In re S.S. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISFTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re S.S., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A167046

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J2100525)

Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 authorizes a juvenile court to 

dismiss a wardship petition and set aside any findings thereon (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 782, subd. (a)(1)(A)).1 Section 782 “requires not just that any 

dismissal be in the interest of justice, but also promote ‘the welfare of the 

person who is the subject of the petition.’ ” (In re J.P. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th

74, 80, quoting § 782, subd. (a)(1), and citing In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th

393, 417.)

The Legislature recently amended section 782 to provide additional 

guidance to a juvenile court in exercising its discretion whether to dismiss a 

1 All undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
2

petition. (Stats. 2022, ch. 970, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.) As amended, the

statute requires a juvenile court to “consider and afford great weight to 

evidence offered . . . to prove mitigating circumstances are present, including 

. . . that the underlying offense is connected to mental illness.” (§ 782, 

subd. (a)(2)(B).) Proof of a mitigating circumstance “weighs greatly in favor”

of dismissal. (Ibid.)

On January 9, 2023, eight days after the amendment took effect, the 

minor in this case—who had admitted two counts of assault by means likely 

to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and spent a year 

on probation—moved to dismiss the petition and findings in his case. The 

juvenile court denied the minor’s motion to dismiss. It found that the minor 

had successfully completed probation, but insufficient evidence connected his 

offenses to his diagnosed mental disorders. It thus terminated jurisdiction 

without dismissing the petition. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. 

Factual Background2

On December 3, 2021, S.S. was at school talking to his ex-girlfriend

when her new boyfriend Logan G. and his friend Tyrell A. walked by. S.S.

was a 17-year-old football player who weighed 160 pounds; Logan and Tyrell 

were 14 years old, and each of them was significantly smaller than S.S. S.S.

and Logan argued. Without physical provocation or warning, S.S. punched 

Logan in the face several times. When Logan fell to the ground, S.S. began 

punching Tyrell. After Tyrell fell, S.S. continued to punch and kick him as he 

lay on the ground. Students tried to stop the beating, but S.S. continued to 

2 Because there was no contested jurisdictional hearing, we derive the 

facts from probation reports, as did the parties’ briefs. 
3

stomp on Tyrell’s face and ribs while shouting, “I’ma kill you!” A student 

videorecorded the beating. Afterward, each boy needed surgery to repair 

fractures to his face and nose. Logan’s nose could not be fully repaired. 

In May 2022, while S.S. was on probation arising from the assault, his 

new high school suspended him for three days because he had sexually 

harassed a female student. S.S. repeatedly bumped into the girl on purpose

when he walked by her. Once, he put his hands on her throat, forcefully 

kissed her while rubbing her throat, then “pulled his penis completely out of 

his pants and showed” it to her. On another occasion, he got angry after the 

girl said she did not want a relationship with him and, when she tried to 

walk away, grabbed her jacket, turned her around, and hugged her. S.S. told 

her he would kill himself if “she did not like him back or want to be with him” 

and showed her what she believed to be “self-harm scars from cutting 

himself.”

II.

Legal Proceedings

The Contra Costa County District Attorney’s Office filed a wardship 

petition (§ 602) in December 2021 alleging that S.S. had committed two 

felony counts of assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury, with an 

enhancement to each count for having caused great bodily injury (Pen. Code,

§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 12022.7, subd. (a)). Later that month, in a negotiated 

disposition, S.S. pled no contest to each count, and the juvenile court 

dismissed the enhancements. The court found the petition’s allegations true 

and found S.S. subject to its jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)).

The juvenile court conducted a contested dispositional hearing in 

January 2022. The prosecutor and the victims’ families expressed their

opposition to the probation department’s recommendation that S.S. be 
4

declared a ward of the court and placed on probation with 120 days of home 

confinement. The court found it a “very difficult case” with “very strong 

competing factors on both sides.” Based on its viewing of the “horrible” video, 

the court described the beatings as “completely unprovoked, unjustified[,] . . . 

ruthless[, and] brutal,” with no dispute as to who had initiated them and 

“dominated throughout.” It added that S.S. had a “history of fighting at 

school,” usually as the aggressor, for which he had been suspended several 

times. The court noted his need for services to address “a severe anger 

management problem.” On the other hand, S.S. had no history of arrests, 

gang involvement, or substance abuse; had strong support from his family 

and community groups; and showed remorse. The court adopted probation’s 

recommendation, including an order requiring S.S. to participate in 

counseling as directed by his probation officer in order to address “untreated 

mental health issues that can be assisted with therapy and other services.”

In June 2022, the probation department filed a notice of violation based 

on S.S.’s above-described harassment of a classmate. The notice (as 

amended) alleged he had “failed to obey school authorities and was 

suspended . . . for harassment.” S.S. admitted the allegation. In November 

2022, the juvenile court accepted the department’s recommendation to 

reinstate probation. The court said it had “struggled with” the decision and 

reminded S.S. that placing him on probation had been “a close call.”

In a report for the November 2022 hearing, the probation department 

noted S.S. had been diagnosed with intermittent explosive disorder (IED) and 

depressive disorder; he had been prescribed medication and begun psychiatric 

treatment for the latter condition. In its order reinstating probation, the 

court directed S.S., among other things, to take all prescribed psychotropic 
5

medications and to participate in any recommended “support services, 

evaluation, or medication management.”

On January 9, 2023, the juvenile court held a probation review hearing. 

The probation department recommended the court successfully terminate 

S.S.’s probation and vacate his wardship. At the outset of the hearing, S.S.’s 

counsel acknowledged that S.S.’s offenses were among those listed in 

section 707, subdivision (b), so he was not “eligible for automatic sealing 

under section 786.” Counsel orally moved to reduce the felonies to 

misdemeanors (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)) and to dismiss the petition 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782.

S.S.’s counsel noted that an amendment to section 782, which had 

taken effect eight days earlier, provided that when a juvenile court “is 

terminating its jurisdiction, the court is required to consider and afford great 

weight to mitigating circumstances. And if any one of those mitigating 

circumstances are present, then the court is required to afford [it] great weight 

when considering a dismissal under that section.” (See Stats. 2022, ch. 970, 

§ 1.) Citing section 782, subdivision (a)(2)(A), counsel claimed three 

mitigating circumstances warranted dismissal: S.S. had completed a term of 

probation successfully; his underlying offense was “connected to mental 

illness”; and dismissal would not endanger public safety. The People agreed 

S.S. had “earned . . . a successful termination of his probation” but opposed 

reducing the offenses or dismissing the petition. 

The juvenile court began its ruling by acknowledging S.S. had written 

“heartfelt” letters of apology, completed 80 hours of community service, and 

abided by his mother’s household rules, and was taking his medication and 

participating in services and medication management. But the court noted 

the severity of the assaults, his violation of probation while on home 
6

supervision, and his absences from and troubles at school. It ruled that it 

therefore would not reduce the offenses to misdemeanors or dismiss the 

petition under section 782. The court terminated S.S.’s probation 

successfully and vacated his wardship. 

The court asked if there was “anything further to place on the record.”

S.S.’s counsel noted that “the recent amendments to [s]ection 782 require the 

court to make factual determinations,” but it had not determined, among 

other things, “whether the underlying offense was connected to mental

illness.” The court then stated that, while S.S. had been diagnosed with IED

and depressive disorder, “I do not have sufficient information to connect that 

particular diagnosis with the incident.”

3

DISCUSSION

I.

Statutory Framework

Section 782, subdivision (a)(1) has long given a juvenile court discretion 

to dismiss a wardship petition, or to set aside its findings and dismiss the 

petition, “if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the 

person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if it finds 

that they are not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” (§ 782, subd. (a)(1).) 

Section 782 affords jurisdiction to order such a dismissal even if the subject of 

the petition is no longer a ward of the court. (See In re David T.(2017) 

13 Cal.App. 5th 866, 869 [order granting section 782 dismissal over 20 years 

3 As to the other mitigating circumstances S.S. raised, the court saw 

“enough problems while he was on probation” to bar a finding of “satisfactory 

completion of a term of probation” (§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(A)), and it ruled that 

his probation violation precluded a finding that “dismissal of the petition 

would not endanger public safety” (ibid.). S.S. does not challenge those 

rulings on appeal.
7

after petition sustained], superseded in other part by statute as noted in In re 

Taylor C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 492.)

4

In 2022, the Legislature amended section 782 to give juvenile courts 

guidance in exercising their discretion whether to dismiss a petition, and to 

require them to give “great weight” to certain mitigating circumstances. 

(Stats. 2022, ch. 970, § 1, adding subd. (a)(2)(B); see Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 

Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2629 (2021–2022 

Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 16, 2022, Background, ¶¶ 1–2.) The amended

statute states that, “When exercising its discretion . . . at the time the court 

terminates jurisdiction or at any time thereafter, the court shall consider and 

afford great weight to evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating 

circumstances are present, including, but not limited to, . . . that the 

underlying offense is connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or 

childhood trauma. Proof of the presence of one or more mitigating 

circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the petition.” (§ 782, 

subd. (a)(2)(A).) “The reasons for a decision under this section shall be stated 

orally on the record.” (Id., subd. (b).) The legislative history of Assembly Bill

No. 2629 (Assembly Bill 2629) shows that its purposes included furthering

the juvenile justice system’s goal of rehabilitation by enabling those involved 

in the system to secure dismissals to clear their records of adjudications that 

can impair their future ability to enlist in the military, secure employment, 

or qualify for occupational licenses. (See Sen. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis 

of Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 23, 2022, 

Comments, ¶¶ 1–4.)

4 The termination of S.S.’s wardship thus will not prevent him from 

filing a future motion pursuant to section 782 to seek dismissal of the petition 

and findings. (§ 782, subd. (a)(1).) We express no opinion as to what effect, if 

any, the denial of the present motion might have on such a motion.
8

Section 782 specifies that “mental illness” and other terms related to 

mitigating circumstances “have the same meanings as defined in Penal Code 

section 1385.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 782, subd. (a)(2)(F).) Subdivision (c) of 

that Penal Code provision states that, when a trial court considers whether to 

strike a sentencing enhancement, it must give “great weight” to specified 

mitigating circumstances, including a connection between the offense and a 

mental illness. (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c).) The statute defines a “mental 

illness” for that purpose as “a mental disorder as identified in the most recent 

edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM)

(with certain irrelevant exclusions). (Id., subd. (c)(5).)

II.

Standard of Review

We review the juvenile court’s decision under section 782 for abuse of 

discretion, while using the substantial evidence standard to review any 

factual findings underlying its decision. (In re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at 

p. 417; In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154.) The abuse of

discretion standard “ ‘asks in substance whether the ruling in question “falls 

outside the bounds of reason” under the applicable law and the relevant 

facts.’ ” (In re Tony R. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 395, 414.) In applying that 

standard, we “ ‘ “ ‘indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of 

the juvenile court.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 414.)

S.S. contends on appeal that “Substantial evidence does not support the 

juvenile court’s finding that [his] mental illness diagnosis did not qualify as a

mitigating circumstance under section 782.” Where, as here, an appellant 

challenges a trial court’s failure to make a factual finding in his favor on an 
9

issue as to which he bore the burden of proof,

5 the question on appeal 

becomes “whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as 

a matter of law.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved 

on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, 

fn. 7.) “Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence 

was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and 

weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was 

insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528, quoting Roesch v. 

De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 571.) That standard is extremely daunting. 

(See, e.g., Atkins v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 734 [“ ‘it is 

almost impossible for [the party who had the burden of proof below] to prevail 

on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor’ ”].) That

5 The parties have not briefed the issue of who bears the burden of 

proof as to the existence of a mitigating circumstance under section 782, 

subdivision (a)(2)(A). Absent such argument, we assume without deciding 

that the juvenile, as the party seeking relief, bears the burden. (See Simpson 

Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 24 [“the ‘general principle’ of 

Evid. Code, § 500 is ‘that a party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears 

the burden of persuasion thereon’ ”].) By requiring a court to consider 

“evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present” 

(§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(A)), the statute strongly implies that the person offering 

such evidence bears the burden of proof. In construing the similar language 

of Penal Code section 1385, which requires a court to give “great weight” to 

mitigating circumstances in deciding whether to strike an enhancement, the 

Sixth District held that a defendant bears the burden of proving the existence 

of such a circumstance. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1095, 

fn. 5, review granted, Apr. 12, 2023, S278894.) Accordingly, if a defendant 

appeals from a trial court’s failure to find that an offense was “connected to 

mental illness” (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)), the question becomes 

“whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of [the defendant] as a 

matter of law.” (Ortiz, at p. 1095, fn. 5.) Here, absent a contrary argument, 

we assume the same principle applies to section 782. (See In re J.P., supra,

94 Cal.App.5th at p. 78 [courts construing section 782 often look for guidance 

to the “closely analogous” Pen. Code, § 1385].)
10

principle applies with even greater force here, for the disputed factual issue is 

subsidiary to an ultimate determination that we review under the deferential

abuse of discretion standard. (See In re Tony R., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 414 [noting deferential review of section 782 ruling].)

III.

The Mere Submission of Evidence of a Mitigating Circumstance Under 

Section 782 Does Not Trigger a Rebuttable Presumption

S.S. contends that by directing a juvenile court to “consider and afford 

great weight to evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating 

circumstances are present,” subdivision (a)(2)(A) of section 782 “creat[es] a 

presumption-like burden that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is 

evidence of such a circumstance.” His argument disregards the legislative 

history of Assembly Bill 2629, which was amended to eliminate language 

creating a presumption, and relies on inapposite authority. We conclude the 

statute means what it says: a juvenile court must “afford great weight” to 

certain evidence, not treat it as creating a presumption in favor of a finding.

The legislative history of Assembly Bill 2629 shows that, in the first 

version relevant here,6 the bill would have amended section 782 to provide 

that, “When exercising its discretion under paragraph (1), at the time the 

court terminates jurisdiction, or at any time thereafter, there shall be a 

presumption that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is 

the subject of the petition favor that dismissal. This presumption shall not be 

overcome unless there is clear and convincing evidence that dismissal of the 

6 As introduced, the bill merely changed the phrase “he or she” in 

section 782 to “they.” (Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as 

introduced, Feb. 18, 2022.) It was then amended to add the new 

subdivision (a)(2), regarding a decision to dismiss a petition, quoted in text. 

(Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended, Mar. 24, 2022.)
11

petition would endanger public safety.” (Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. 

Sess.) as amended, Mar. 24, 2022.) Two months later, the bill’s author 

amended the paragraph to read as it did when enacted: “When exercising its 

discretion under paragraph (1) at the time the court terminates jurisdiction 

or at any time thereafter, the court shall consider and afford great weight to 

evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present, 

including, but not limited to, . . . that dismissal of the petition would not 

endanger public safety, or that the underlying offense is connected to mental 

illness, prior victimization, or childhood trauma. Proof of the presence of one 

or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the 

petition.” (Assem. Bill 2629 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 23, 

2022.)

The amendment of Assembly Bill 2629 undermines S.S.’s claim that the 

Legislature intended to create a presumption in favor of finding a mitigating 

circumstance so long as a juvenile offers any evidence thereof. S.S. does not 

cite anything in the bill’s history to suggest that, despite eliminating the 

explicit “presumption” language in a prior version of the bill, the Legislature 

intended the “great weight” phrase to create a presumption by implication.

S.S. also relies on two inapposite decisions concerning a trial court’s 

duty to defer to expert determinations about sentencing made by nonjudicial 

bodies. Neither involved a statute using the phrase “great weight,” and 

neither is relevant here. The first concerned a statute that barred a court 

from sentencing a minor to state prison “unless . . . the court finds after 

having read and considered the report submitted by the Youth Authority that 

the minor is not a suitable subject for commitment to the Youth Authority.” 

(Former § 707.2, quoted in People v. Javier A. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 811, 815, 

superseded by statute as noted in People v. Martinez (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 
12

1372, 1386–1387.) The court applied a judicially created standard construing 

the provision to mean that “great weight [is] to be given to the Youth 

Authority’s recommendation,” which “should ‘be followed in the absence of 

substantial countervailing considerations’ [citation], . . . of sufficient weight 

to overcome the recommendation.” (Javier A., at p. 819.) Similarly, in People 

v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437 (Martin), the court applied a judicially created 

standard requiring a trial court to give “great weight” to a determination by 

the Board of Prison Terms that a sentence was “ ‘disparate in comparison 

with the sentences imposed in similar cases.’ ” (Martin, at pp. 441, 446 & 

fn. 2.)

Those decisions involved statutes requiring trial courts to defer to the 

judgments of bodies in another branch of government—the Youth Authority 

and the Board of Prison Terms—about matters within those bodies’ expertise. 

In People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 399, review granted, Mar. 22, 

2023, S278309, the Second District explained that Martin’s discussion of the 

judicially created “great weight” standard is thus inapplicable to analysis of 

Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c), which is the statute requiring a trial 

court to give “great weight” to mitigating circumstances in deciding whether 

to strike an enhancement, and the statute from which section 782 

incorporates its definition of “mental illness.” (Ibid.) Here, as in Walker, the

“great weight” standard is set forth in a statute, section 782, that does not 

involve deference to a nonjudicial body. Rather, the disputed provision of 

section 782 concerns a juvenile court’s independent performance of a core 

judicial function—assessing whether evidence supports a requested factual 

finding.

S.S.’s arguments thus fail to show that section 782’s direction to a 

juvenile court to “consider and afford great weight to evidence offered . . . to 
13

prove mitigating circumstances are present” (§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(A)) requires 

the court to apply a presumption that such circumstances are present 

whenever the record contains any evidence of such a circumstance.

IV.

The Evidence Did Not Compel a Finding in S.S.’s Favor

The evidence that S.S.’s offenses were connected to mental illness 

consists of statements by S.S. and his mother recounted in probation reports, 

and a letter from a medical social worker. As set forth below, the minor’s 

evidence was not “ ‘ “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and . . . ‘of such a 

character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it 

was insufficient to support a finding” ’ ” that S.S.’s offenses were connected to 

mental illness. (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1164; In re

I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) 

According to the report for the January 2022 disposition hearing, S.S.

told a probation officer, “I lost my temper, blacked out.” Asked if anger had 

ever previously made him black out, he replied, “This has happened many 

times, especially during football. I have an anger problem.” S.S. had told his 

mother that he wanted to kill himself after witnessing a shooting at school. 

He struggled to deal with bullying on social media and teasing by peers on 

the football team. S.S.’s mother said he started therapy in May 2019 because 

she saw signs of depression and anxiety. At the time of the offenses, he had 

an appointment scheduled to be assessed for medication for depression and 

impulse control. The probation report stated S.S. was “clearly in need of 

significant anger management treatment,” could benefit from therapy, and 

should have a medication assessment as soon as possible.

The probation department also submitted a report in November 2022 

for the disposition hearing on S.S.’s probation violation. It stated that, after 
14

his probation began in January 2022, S.S. was diagnosed with IED and 

depressive disorder. An attached September 2022 letter from medical social 

worker Mara Binkov stated: “[S.S.] was recently involved in a fight at his 

school, which was a result of being targeted and literally cornered by his 

classmates. [S.S.’s] mental health diagnosis can also result in blacking out 

when triggered. [S.S.] was punished through school suspension and legal 

action with no proof as to who instigated the fight and only video footage 

showing [S.S.] defending himself.” The probation report also stated S.S. had 

completed a medication assessment, begun psychiatric treatment for 

depressive disorder, and been prescribed medication for depression. His 

mother stated he took the medication regularly and found it somewhat 

helpful.

On appeal, S.S. contends the juvenile court erred in ruling that it 

lacked sufficient information to connect the offenses to his diagnosed IED and 

depressive disorder. While he claims that “extensive evidence” showed he 

displayed symptoms of the disorders near the time of the beatings, he fails to 

cite persuasive evidence to that effect offered below.

The first pieces of asserted evidence S.S. cites are lists from the DSM of 

diagnostic criteria for IED and features of depressive disorder. But as the 

Attorney General notes, S.S. did not cite or submit any part of the DSM to 

the juvenile court, so we may not consider the material on appeal. (In re 

Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“ ‘an appeal reviews the correctness of a

judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were 

before the trial court for its consideration’ ”].)

In reply, S.S. asserts that Penal Code section 1385, as incorporated by 

section 782, “directs the court, not the defendant, to refer[ to] the most recent 

edition of the DSM to identify [qualifying] mental disorders.” He is incorrect. 
15

While the statute defines a mental illness for its purposes as “a mental 

disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the [DSM]” (Pen. Code, 

§ 1385, subd. (c)(5)), it does not require a juvenile court to sua sponte consult 

the DSM to identify the symptoms of a disorder and try to correlate them to a 

juvenile’s offenses. Instead, Penal Code section 1385 states that a court “may 

conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense . . . 

after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence.” (Ibid., italics added.) 

The statute presumes, in other words, that a court will take the usual 

approach of American law: reviewing evidence submitted by the parties, not 

conducting factual research to gather evidence on its own.

More importantly, the pertinent question is not whether IED and 

depressive disorder are identified in the DSM, but whether S.S. offered 

evidence compelling the juvenile court to find his offenses were connected to 

one of those disorders. The main evidence to that effect was the letter by 

social worker Mara Binkov. As noted, Binkov described S.S. as having been 

“involved in a fight” as “a result of being targeted and literally cornered by 

classmates,” and stated there was “no proof as to who instigated the fight and 

only video footage showing [S.S.] defending himself.” Her account is 

irreconcilable with the juvenile court’s findings that S.S. had engaged in an 

unprovoked, unjustified, and brutal beating of two smaller boys, which he 

initiated and “dominated throughout.” Because Binkov’s account was 

inconsistent with the juvenile court’s prior findings, it could have declined to 

credit her implication that S.S.’s actions were connected to his disorders. 

On appeal, recognizing that Binkov’s account of the “fight” cannot be 

reconciled with the juvenile court’s explicit findings of a brutal, unprovoked 

beating, S.S. contends that the only relevant statement in her letter was that 

his “diagnosis” can cause him to “black[] out when triggered.” But Binkov did 
16

not state that S.S.’s offenses were in fact connected to IED or in fact resulted 

from his blacking out during the incident; she merely noted that his “mental 

health diagnosis can also result in blacking out when triggered.” That

general statement of possibility did not compel the court to find that that is 

what happened in this case.

S.S. also cites his own statement, recounted in the January 2022 

probation report, that he “lost [his] temper, blacked out”; that such blackouts 

had “happened many times”; and that he has “an anger problem.” He adds 

that the facts of the encounter themselves show that he responded to an 

argument with disproportionate violence. But while his self-serving 

statement and the facts of the beating may constitute some evidence that the 

offenses were connected to mental illness, we cannot say that the evidence 

was “ ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 

determination that it was insufficient’ ” to prove a mitigating circumstance. 

(In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) The evidence could have 

supported such a finding, but it did not compel one.

S.S. also contends that the probation department’s and juvenile court’s 

observations that he could benefit from anger management, medication 

assessment, and counseling, and the court’s imposition of related probation 

terms, constitute evidence that his offenses were connected to his IED and/or 

depressive disorder. They do not. They represent forward-looking 

assessments of how to maximize S.S.’s chances of rehabilitation, not evidence 

about why he committed the past offenses that brought him within the 

court’s jurisdiction. To the extent the cited statements and orders rested on 

evidence, it was the same evidence that, as discussed above, is insufficient to 

compel a finding that the offenses were connected to mental illness.
17

S.S. contends it is “not clear” the juvenile court understood the scope of 

its discretion under section 782, as amended, when it assessed whether his 

offenses were connected to mental illness. But “[a]bsent evidence to the 

contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing 

law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) We also presume, 

absent “an affirmative record to the contrary,” that it “considered all of the 

relevant factors.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) That 

settled rule is “an aspect of the presumption that judicial duty is properly 

performed.” (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644, overruled on 

other ground by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.) 

The record here reflects no comment by the juvenile court misstating the law. 

To the contrary, it shows that S.S.’s counsel accurately summarized and 

quoted the amended provisions of section 782 at the hearing, ensuring the 

court was not only presumptively but actually aware of the applicable law.

Finally, in a related argument, S.S. briefly asserts that the juvenile 

court may not have “considered the correct standard” in determining whether 

his offenses were connected to mental illness. As he recognizes, section 782 

does not define the phrase “connected to” as used to identify the mitigating

circumstance that an offense was “connected to mental illness.” (§ 782, 

subd. (a)(2)(A), italics added.) But Penal Code section 1385, whose definition 

of “mental illness” section 782 incorporates by reference, states that a court 

“may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense 

if . . . the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the 

defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.” (Pen. Code, 

§ 1385, subd. (c)(5), italics added.) S.S. contends the use of the phrase 

“substantially contributed” in Penal Code section 1385, as incorporated by 

reference in section 782, adopts the “substantial factor” test of causation used 
18

in tort law and in some criminal contexts. (See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, 

Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 969 [discussing “substantial factor” test of but-for 

causation in tort, which excludes “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’ 

or ‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury”]; People v. Caldwell (1984) 

36 Cal.3d 210, 220 [similarly defining “substantial factor” test for whether 

criminal act caused death].) But as set forth below, S.S. offers no support for 

his theory, and persuasive authority rejects it.

S.S. cites nothing in the legislative history of Assembly Bill 2629, or of 

the 2021 bill amending Penal Code section 1385 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1, 

eff. Jan. 1, 2022), to suggest the Legislature intended the phrase 

“substantially contributed” to integrate the distinct legal term of art 

“substantial factor.” Nor does he cite any authority construing Penal Code 

section 1385, or section 782, in that way. Most importantly, he does not 

explain why, if the Legislature meant to impose a “substantial factor” test, it 

did not simply use that phrase. It could have enacted a provision stating,

“the defendant’s mental illness was a substantial factor in the defendant’s 

involvement in the commission of the offense,” but it did not. “ ‘ “[W]hen the 

Legislature uses a term of art, a court construing that use must assume that 

the Legislature was aware of the ramifications of its choice of language.” ’ ” 

(People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 871.) By the same token, we may 

assume that, if the Legislature intends a statute to have the meaning and 

effect of a legal term of art, it will use that term of art in the text of the 

statute.

S.S.’s argument also overlooks the broader history of the phrase 

“substantially contributed” as used in Penal Code section 1385. As a leading 

treatise explains, the Legislature likely intended the term to impose a fairly

demanding standard. (Couzens, et al., Sentencing California Crimes 
19

(The Rutter Group 2023) § 12:11.) “The use of the phrase ‘substantially 

contributed’ is unclear. Likely it is the intent of the Legislature that the 

factor plays some significant role in the commission of the crime or the 

defendant’s involvement. In other circumstances, the Legislature used the 

phrase ‘a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.’ (See, e.g., 

[Pen. Code,] § 1170, subd. (b)(6) [Factor affecting imposition of the low term 

of imprisonment].) While ‘contributing factor’ suggests the court must find 

the factor to have some connection, however slight, [to] the commission or 

circumstances of the crime, the phrase ‘substantially contributed’ clearly 

implies a factor more significant in weight from that of ‘contributing factor.’ ” 

(Ibid.) As Couzens notes, the same Legislature enacted both the amendment 

adding the “substantially contributed” test to Penal Code section 1385 and 

the amendment adding the “contributing factor” test to Penal Code section 

1170. (Ibid.) That circumstance strengthens the inference that it intended 

“substantially contributed” to mean something more than “contributing 

factor.” (Ibid.) We thus reject S.S.’s unsupported speculation that the 

Legislature intended the phrase to impose a “substantial factor” test.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the minor’s section 782 motion is affirmed.
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_________________________

Mayfield, J.*

We concur:

_________________________

Stewart, P.J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

In re S.S. (A167046)

* Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.