UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 99-4427

LINWOOD EARL BYRD,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge.

(CR-98-188)

Submitted: June 9, 2000

Decided: June 28, 2000

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Reversed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

David W. Bouchard, BOUCHARD & SMITH, Chesapeake, Virginia,

for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Darryl J.

Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for

Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Linwood Earl Byrd challenges the district court's denial

of his motion to suppress. The Government concedes that the police

lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Byrd. We agree, and we therefore

reverse Byrd's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon.

On November 14, 1998, the Portsmouth Police Department

received an anonymous call describing a man brandishing a gun on

the porch at 1119 Lansing Avenue. The police, aware of criminal

activity at that address and in the surrounding area, went to 1119 Lansing Avenue and saw that Byrd matched the description given by the

tipster. An officer patted Byrd down and found a handgun in his

pocket.

When Byrd was then indicted for being a felon in possession of a

firearm, he moved to suppress the weapon. The district court denied

this motion, and Byrd entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the

right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.

In denying the motion to suppress, the district court relied on two

circumstances: that the tip was adequately substantiated by the correlation between its description of the man with the gun and the officers' observations and that the allegations related to an address known

for criminal activity. This decision issued before the Supreme Court

decided Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000). In J.L., the Court held

that the police lacked reasonable suspicion under circumstances

nearly identical to those presented in this case. See 120 S. Ct. at 1379.

Although the frisk in this case occurred in a high-crime area, that circumstance cannot serve as an "independent corroborating factor."

United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1995). We

requested supplemental briefing from the parties to address J.L.; in its

supplemental brief, the government concedes that J.L. compels the

conclusion that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and

frisk him. We agree.

For these reasons, we hold that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Byrd and the district court therefore improperly

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denied Byrd's motion to suppress. Because the firearm was inadmissible, we reverse Byrd's 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West 2000) conviction.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

REVERSED

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