J-A07008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LOUISE A. CARAFA

v.

FRANK N. CARAFA 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1622 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at No(s): 

CV-2009-015174

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 12, 2023

Appellant, Frank N. Carafa (“Husband”), appeals from the August 3, 

2022 order1 entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas that

denied his April 8, 2021 Petition for Special Relief and granted attorney’s fees 

to Appellee, Louise A. Carafa (“Wife”). Upon review, we affirm.2 

Husband and Wife have been involved in highly contentious and litigious

divorce proceedings since 2009 when the parties separated after thirty-five 

years of marriage, and Wife filed a divorce complaint. The trial court entered 

an equitable distribution order on November 16, 2016, and a final divorce 

decree on June 27, 2017. On April 10, 2019, Wife filed a Petition to Distribute 

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1 The order is dated August 2, 2022, but the court did not docket the order 

until August 3, 2022.

2 Wife’s March 8, 2023 Motion for Leave of Court to File Sur Reply Brief is 

granted and we accept the Sur Reply Brief filed on March 8, 2023. 
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the Marital Estate and, on June 26, 2019, the court entered an Agreed Order 

for Distribution. 

On July 9, 2019, Husband filed a Petition for Special Relief to Vacate or 

Set Aside Final Equitable Distribution Order. On February 24, 2021, after a 

hearing on the petition, the trial court denied the petition and found that 

Husband “has failed to present a scintilla of evidence to substantiate his 

continued allegations of fraud in connection with the Equitable Distribution 

Hearing held in September 2016 and the Final Equitable Distribution Order, 

dated November 16, 2016 in this matter, despite this Court having given him 

ample opportunity to do so.” Trial Ct. Op., dated 8/1/22, at 1-2 (citing N.T. 

6/8/20 at 67, 70, 107). 

On April 8, 2021, Husband filed the instant Petition for Special Relief

once again challenging the equitable distribution order and asserting fraud. 

Wife filed an Answer and Counterclaim, requesting attorney’s fees. After a 

hearing, the trial court denied Husband’s petition and ordered Husband to pay 

Wife’s attorney’s fees. 

Husband timely appealed. Both Husband and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3 

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3

In addressing Husband’s issues, the trial court opined:

All claims in this case have been fully and fairly litigated and 

[Husband] is collaterally estopped from raising any alleged claim 

for interest income. The [c]ourt concludes that [Husband] is 

essentially asking this [c]ourt to reconsider [the 2016 equitable 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In his Statement of Questions, Husband raises the following issues for 

our review:

1. May the court deny relief to a party where the court 

based its denial in part on irrelevant, unwarranted, and 

speculative findings without factual basis?

2. May a party be assessed counsel fees, sanctions, and 

costs where there was no proof offered in support of 

excessive, punitive, unwarranted award, and not subject 

to a hearing before this court as required by the 

applicable Rules?

3. May the court base its conclusions on speculative or false 

assumptions and argument not supported by facts or 

testimony before the court in this proceeding.

4. May the court peremptorily find and conclude any further 

attempt by the Defendant to relitigate . . . etc. is without 

merit and . . . serves to harass the Plaintiff[,] denying a 

party Constitutional rights and create[ing] a barrier to 

the party’s access to this court.

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distribution order], which is both improper and impermissible. . . 

The [c]ourt concludes, and the Divorce Code makes clear, that 

beyond thirty (30) days, a decree cannot be vacated absent fraud 

which is collateral to the proceedings. The [c]ourt concludes [that 

the court previously found that Husband] has failed to present a 

scintilla of evidence to substantiate his continued allegations of 

fraud in connection with the Equitable Distribution Hearing held in 

September 2016 . . . despite this [c]ourt having given him ample 

opportunity to do so. [Husband] herein continues to litigate and 

re-litigate, attempting to open up his divorce case years after a 

Final Divorce Decree has been entered, now acknowledging that 

he is appealing solely to the equitable powers of the [c]ourt, while 

[Wife] is being forced to continue to expend attorney’s fees. This 

conduct on the part of [Husband] in continuing to litigate and relitigate this case is without merit and simply serves as an effort to 

harass [Wife]. [Husband]’s conduct is clearly obdurate and 

vexatious and [Wife] is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. 

Trial Ct. Op., filed 8/2/22 at 7, 16. 
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Husband’s Br. at 7 (some capitalization omitted). 

This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny special relief

in divorce actions for an abuse of discretion. Conway v. Conway, 209 A.3d 

367, 371 (Pa. Super. 2019). “An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court 

has rendered a decision or a judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or capricious, has failed to apply the law, or was motivated by 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. (citation omitted).

In his Argument section, Husband essentially abandons the issues as 

stated in his Statement of Questions. Specifically, Husband fails to identify 

which trial court findings and conclusions are speculative, fails to provide any 

argument regarding the award of attorney’s fees, and fails to develop an 

argument regarding a violation of his constitutional rights. 

Instead, Husband avers that the equitable distribution order provided 

for an equal division of assets and argues that he paid state and federal 

income taxes on assets that were subsequently assigned to Wife. Husband’s 

Br. at 15. Husband contends that Wife owes him 50% of the $163,000 that 

he unfairly paid in taxes. Id.

It is axiomatic that issues not presented in an appellant’s Statement of 

Questions Involved or “fairly suggested thereby” will not be considered. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 

2021). Further, an appellant is required to develop an argument regarding 

issues raised with reference to the record, citation and discussion of pertinent 

authorities. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (listing argument requirements for appellate 
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briefs). “The Rules of Appellate Procedure . . . state unequivocally that each 

question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of 

pertinent authority.” Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 811 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (citation omitted). 

Here, assuming that Husband’s argument is fairly suggested by the 

questions presented, he fails to develop it in a meaningful and coherent way. 

Although Husband cites boilerplate law, he fails to apply the law to the facts 

of this case in a meaningful and coherent manner as required by our Rules of 

Appellate Procedure and case law. It is not the role of this Court to develop 

an appellant's argument where the brief provides mere cursory legal 

discussion. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 925 (Pa. 2009). 

This Court will not act as counsel. In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. Super.

2012). 

Appellant’s failure to present a developed argument hampers this 

Court’s ability to provide meaningful review. Accordingly, Husband’s claims 

are waived.4

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4 We remind Wife that our Rules of Appellate Procedure permit a party to file 

an application with this Court for reasonable counsel fees in cases of frivolous 

appeals and obdurate, vexatious conduct. See Pa.R.A.P. 2744; Pa.R.A.P. 

2572; see also Commonwealth v. Wardlaw, 249 A.3d 937, 947 (Pa. 2021) 

("For example, an appellate court, 'may award as further costs damages as 

may be just,' Pa.R.A.P. 2744, provided that, inter alia, the party receiving 

such damages makes 'an application for further costs and damages.’” (citation 

omitted))
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Order affirmed. Wife’s Motion for Leave of Court to File Sur Reply Brief 

is granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/12/2023