J-A22006-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF J.C.A. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.A.

No. 525 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order January 16, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Civil Division at No(s): 2017-05546

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 3, 2018

B.A. (Father) appeals from the January 16, 2018 order that granted the 

petition filed by V.N. (Mother) for change of name of the parties’ son, J.C.A., 

(Child) (born in May of 2015) from Father’s surname to Mother’s surname. 

We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual circumstances of this 

matter, stating:

Appellant [Father] is the acknowledged father of [C]hild who 

is now almost three (3) years old but [Father] separated himself 

from [Mother] and [C]hild within eight (8) days of birth, and has 

never resided with [Mother] and [C]hild as a nuclear family since 

that time. [C]hild’s surname was noted on the birth certificate as 

that of [Father]. At the time of [C]hild’s birth, [Mother] believed 

that the parties would get married and live as a nuclear family. 

After [Father’s] departure at various times, [Mother,] accepting 

as a fact that [Father], [Mother] and [C]hild would not be living 

as a nuclear family, requested [Father’s] permission to change 

[C]hild’s surname to [Mother’s] last name in that [C]hild lived 

primarily with [Mother]. Upon [Father’s] refusal, [Mother] 

requested that they agree upon [C]hild having a hyphenated last 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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name of both [Father] and [Mother]. Again, [Father] refused 

stating that he wanted [C]hild to bear the same name as 

[Father’s] other son. 

Upon our inquiry to [Father] as to whether it would be in the 

best interest of [C]hild to bear a common name with his other son, 

with whom he did not live, rather than a common name with 

[C]hild’s [M]other with whom [C]hild was in fact living on a 

primary basis, [Father] remained insistent. [Father] does not 

dispute that at the time [Mother] filed the [p]etition for the change 

of name[,] [Father] did not have custody of his other son. We 

concluded that the best interest of [C]hild would be served by 

[C]hild sharing a common surname with his [M]other. 

Trial Court Opinion, 4/6/18, at 2-3 (citation to notes of testimony omitted).1 

After the grant of Mother’s petition to change Child’s name, Father 

appealed to this Court, raising the following issues for our review. 

1. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of law 

when it granted the [p]etition of Mother ... to change the name 

of the minor child over the objection of Father ... when evidence 

was insufficient to support the decision? 

2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of law 

when it failed to hear and to consider evidence regarding the 

best interest of the child in regard to the name change?

Father’s brief at 4. 

In addressing Father’s issues, we are guided by the following:

The appellate standard of review involving a petition for change 

of name, regardless of the age of the petitioner, is whether or not 

there was an abuse of discretion. In re Change of Name of 

Zachary Thomas Andrew Grimes to Zachary Thomas 

Andrew Grimes-Palaia, 530 Pa. 388, 390, n.1, 609 A.2d 158, 

159, n.1 (1992). When considering a petition to change the name 

of a minor child, the best interest of the child should be the 

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1 Both parties attended the hearing before the trial court without counsel, but 

both are represented in this appeal. 
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standard by which a trial court exercises its discretion. Id. This 

Court has further held: 

the party petitioning for the minor child’s change of 

name has the burden of coming forward with evidence 

that the name change requested would be in the 

child’s best interest, and that where a petition to 

change a child’s name is contested, the court must 

carefully evaluate all of the relevant factual 

circumstances to determine if the petitioning parent 

has established that the change is in the child’s best 

interest.

In re C.R.C., 819 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

In re E.M.L., 19 A.3d 1068, 1069 (Pa. Super. 2011). Moreover, when the 

Supreme Court adopted the “best interests” standard of review in appeals 

from a petition granting a name change of a minor, it stated:

Specific guidelines [for a child’s best interests] are difficult to 

establish, for the circumstances in each case will be unique, as 

each child has individual physical, intellectual, moral, social and 

spiritual needs. However, general considerations should include 

the natural bonds between parent and child, the social stigma or 

respect afforded a particular name within the community, and, 

where the child is of sufficient age, whether the child intellectually 

and rationally understands the significance of changing his or her 

name. 

Id. at 1071 (quoting In re Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 161 (Pa. 1992)). 

Father’s argument centers on his contention that Mother’s evidence was 

insufficient to support the trial court’s determination.2 Specifically, Father 

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2 We note that although Father lists two issues in his brief, his argument 

section contains only one part. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall 

be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall 

have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively 
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asserts that the court’s decision was mainly based on Mother’s testimony that 

the parties had never married, that since birth Child had primarily lived with 

Mother, that Child had not yet begun attending school, and that Child could 

not read or write. Father also contends that the trial court gave little weight 

to his testimony and “mistakenly found [Mother’s] testimony to be credible 

and accepted her testimony that [C]hild does not know enough at this point 

in his development to recognize either [name] as being meaningful as a last 

name.” Father’s brief at 12. Father also points out that he has partial custody 

of Child and “has been paying support for the minor child since [Mother] filed 

in July of 2015.” Id. at 13. Father also claims that Mother failed to explain 

how the name change would strengthen the bond between Mother and Child 

and how it would be in Child’s best interest. Rather, Father asserts that 

Mother’s motive stems from her hostility toward Father and her desire to keep 

Father out of Child’s life. Id. at 14. Moreover, Father takes issue with the 

trial court’s conclusion that it would be in Child’s best interest to have “the 

name of the person he is living primarily with.” Id. at 15. Essentially, Father 

contends that the trial court “impos[ed] its own views upon the litigants as 

opposed to consider[ing] ‘good sense, common decency and fairness to all 

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displayed—the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion 

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Because we are able 

to address Father’s issues, we overlook his noncompliance with the rule. 
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concerned and the public.’” Id. at 16 (citing Petition of Falcucci, 50 A.2d 

200, 202 (Pa. 1947)). 

In response, Mother counters by asserting the reasons that she believes 

Child should have her last name, which coincides with the reasons given by 

the court for the basis for its decision. Namely, Mother contends that Child 

lives with her and her extended family, and that because he has not yet 

started school “[t]his is the time for his name to be established, before he 

enters society and interacts with his peers.” Mother’s brief at 5. Mother 

further points out that having a name different than the family with whom he 

lives could “create confusion, emotional instability and possibly anxiety as 

[Child] struggles to explain to teachers and fellow students why his name [is] 

different from those with whom he lives.” Id. at 6. Mother also questions 

why Child’s best interests would be served to have the same name as a halfbrother with whom he does not live rather than with the parent where he lives 

primarily. Additionally, Mother notes Father’s argument that the trial court 

mistakenly found Mother’s testimony to be credible. Obviously, Father 

misconstrues this Court’s scope of review, which we have stated as follows:

On appeal, our scope of review is broad in that we are not bound 

by deductions and inferences drawn by the trial court from the 

facts found, nor are we required to accept findings which are 

wholly without support in the record. On the other hand, our 

broad scope of review does not authorize us to nullify the factfinding function of the trial court in order to substitute our 

judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, we are bound by

findings supported in the record, and may reject conclusions

drawn by the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are

unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
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Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting Sawko v.

Sawko, 625 A.2d 692, 693 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations omitted)). 

Father has failed to provide a basis upon which we could overturn the

trial court’s order granting Mother’s petition. Therefore, following our review

of the record, we conclude that under the circumstances here, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in granting Mother’s petition to change Child’s

name. The court’s findings are supported by the evidence; no error of law

was committed; and the court’s conclusions are not unreasonable. Thus, we

affirm the order granting Child’s name change. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/3/18