[Cite as State v. Forbus, 2011-Ohio-4287.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO : 

: Appellate Case No. 24061 

Plaintiff-Appellee : 

: Trial Court Case No. 2009-CR-3152 

v. : 

: 

RICHARD FORBUS, JR. : (Criminal Appeal from 

: (Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

: 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 26th day of August, 2011. 

. . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by KIRSTEN A. BRANDT, Atty. Reg. #0070162, Montgomery 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. 

Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 

JAY A. ADAMS, Atty. Reg. #0072135, 424 Patterson Road, Dayton, Ohio 45419 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, J. 

{¶ 1} Richard Forbus appeals from his conviction and sentence on charges of felonious 

assault, improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, and a related firearm 

specification. 

{¶ 2} Forbus advances three assignments of error on appeal. First, he contends the trial 
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court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s use of his pre-arrest silence as 

substantive evidence of guilt. Second, he alleges that he received constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. Third, he challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support 

his convictions. 

{¶ 3} The present appeal stems from an incident that occurred outside the home of 

Randy Hamblin on the evening of September 23, 2009. While Hamblin was standing in his 

own front yard, two males and a female pushing a stroller walked by on the sidewalk. As they 

did, Hamblin’s dog began barking at them. Although the dog was fenced in the front yard, the 

barking frightened the female, who began arguing with Hamblin. A neighbor, Jeremiah Lyons, 

overheard the argument and began yelling at the female from his yard across the street. The 

female approached Lyons and confronted him on his property. When she threatened violence, 

the two males, one of whom later was identified as Forbus, pushed the stroller across the 

street and persuaded her to leave. As she was leaving, the female threatened that someone 

would return to “shoot up” the neighborhood. 

{¶ 4} After the female departed, Hamblin retrieved a handgun from his house and 

placed it in a hip holster. Hamblin’s son Aaron arrived approximately thirty minutes later and 

heard about the incident. The two Hamblins stood outside along with Lyons, who had arrived 

from across the street, and another neighbor, John Vanderpool. While the men were talking, 

Forbus reappeared and approached them on the sidewalk. Lyons testified at trial that he saw 

Forbus pull a handgun from his waistband. Upon seeing the gun, Lyons exclaimed, “He’s got 

a gun, he’s got a gun.” Prosecution witnesses testified that Forbus held the gun sideways and 

fired it multiple times at the men. Aaron Hamblin grabbed Randy Hamblin’s handgun and 
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returned fire, striking Forbus in the neck. 

{¶ 5} Police responding to the scene located Forbus two or three blocks away, 

bleeding from the neck. Forbus refused to cooperate and would not tell the officers what had 

happened or who had shot him. He refused to answer questions, providing only his name, date 

of birth, and Social Security number. Forbus continued to be uncooperative as he was placed 

in an ambulance. At the hospital, he again refused to tell police anything. In the mean time, 

other officers spoke to witnesses who stated that Forbus had fired first and that Aaron 

Hamblin had returned fire. Police recovered the gun Aaron Hamblin had fired and four .40 

caliber spent shell casings from it. They were unable to find Forbus’s gun or any other shell 

casings in the area. Police did find a nine-millimeter bullet, however, lodged in the siding of a 

front porch three houses from Randy Hamblin’s residence. Randy Hamblin subsequently 

identified Forbus as the shooter in a photo lineup. After a jury found Forbus guilty on several 

charges, the trial court merged them into the offenses set forth above and imposed an 

aggregate ten-year prison term. This appeal followed. 

{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Forbus contends the trial court erred in 

overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s use of his pre-arrest silence as substantive 

evidence of guilt. This argument concerns testimony presented during the State’s case-in-chief 

from the police officers who spoke to Forbus immediately after the shooting. 

{¶ 7} The first officer, Brian Spencer, testified that he responded to a dispatch about 

the incident. When he reached the area, he saw Forbus standing near an intersection and 

bleeding from the neck. At that time, Spencer had no “solid information” about what had 

happened. The officer considered Forbus a potential victim and asked what had happened, 
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where it had happened, and who had shot him. (Trial transcript at 352-353, 356). Forbus 

responded by turning away and not answering any of the questions. (Id. at 354, 357). 

{¶ 8} Officer Spencer’s partner, Michael Dorsten, also testified for the State. Officer 

Dorsten testified that he too considered Forbus a victim. He described Forbus as being 

uncooperative. Dorsten stated that Forbus would not answer any questions and only gave his 

name, date of birth, and Social Security number. (Id. at 366-367). A third officer, Christopher 

Cornwell, provided similar testimony. When Cornwell approached Forbus in the back of an 

ambulance, Forbus gave his name and then “refused to talk.” (Id. at 376). Finally, a fourth 

officer, Willie Hooper, testified about his interaction with Forbus at the hospital. Several 

times, Forbus refused to say anything when Hooper asked who had shot him and what had 

happened. (Id. at 345). 

{¶ 9} During closing arguments, the State used Forbus’s silence against him as 

evidence of guilt. The prosecutor stated: 

{¶ 10} “* * * Ladies and gentlemen, [this] is an absolutely perfect example of an 

individual acting with a guilty conscience. Because an innocent person who’s been shot 

wrongfully says to the police as soon as they show up, oh, my God, I’ve been shot, I’ll tell you 

exactly who did this. I’ll tell you exactly where they are. I’ll look at photographs. I’ll look at 

mug shots. I’ll look at houses. I’ll tell you exactly what happened. An innocent person doesn’t 

say my name is Richard Forbus, Jr., here’s my date of birth, here’s my social security number, 

I don’t want anything to do with you. 

{¶ 11} “* * * 

{¶ 12} “* * * If you’re an innocent victim who’s just been shot in the neck, you don’t 
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have anything to hide. And yet when the very people who are sworn to protect us arrive, tell 

us what happened, how can we help? Like a prisoner of war, he says his name, rank, and serial 

number. * * *.” (Id. at 487, 509). 

{¶ 13} On appeal, Forbus contends the State’s use of his pre-arrest silence against him 

violated the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that “no 

person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” It is well 

settled that the Fifth Amendment’s protections apply to questioning outside of the courtroom 

when the information sought reasonably could lead to a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., 

Cincinnati v. Bawtenheimer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 260, 264-266. It is equally true that the 

Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from having his pre-arrest silence used against him as 

substantive evidence of guilt. In State v. Leach, 102 Ohio St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, the 

Ohio Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s use of pre-arrest silence as evidence of a 

defendant’s guilt “substantially subverts the policies behind the Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination and is not a legitimate governmental practice.” Id. at ¶37. 

{¶ 14} In reaching its conclusion, the Leach court recognized that “[u]se of pre-arrest 

silence in the state's case-in-chief would force defendants either to permit the jury to infer 

guilt from their silence or surrender their right not to testify and take the stand to explain their 

prior silence.” Id. at ¶31. Moreover, “in the face of police questioning, the suspect might 

remain silent for innocent reasons: fear of police, threats from another person not to speak 

with police, embarrassment about a relationship or course of conduct that is not necessarily 

criminal, or the belief that explaining his or her conduct is futile.” Id. at ¶34. The Leach 

court saw “no reason to permit individuals to remain silent only when they have been 
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specifically told by police of their right to do so.” Id. at ¶35. 

{¶ 15} While not disputing the rule articulated in Leach, the State insists that Forbus’s 

case is distinguishable. It notes that the defendant in Leach was a suspect when police 

questioned him. Conversely, the record contains testimony that Forbus was not a suspect at 

the time he refused to answer questions. The State insists that this distinction is critical and 

that many of the concerns identified in Leach are not implicated when the subject of police 

questioning is not a suspect. 

{¶ 16} The application of Leach to the unique facts of this case is not certain. Indeed, 

even the Leach court pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has not specifically 

addressed whether pre-arrest silence can be used as substantive evidence of guilt. Moreover, 

the United States Circuit Courts are split on the issue. The Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 

witness against himself.” Arguably, there is no compulsion and there is no “criminal case” 

when the person being questioned by police is questioned as, and considered to be a victim. 

The evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Forbus was a victim rather than a 

suspect at the time he was questioned by the various officers. There is also the question of 

whether Forbus’s supply of only his name, date of birth and Social Security number was a 

clear exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. In Leach, the ultimate defendant 

was not only definitely a suspect, but Leach’s failure to appear at the police station for an 

interview was coupled with the message that he wanted to speak to an attorney before 

speaking to the police. “‘A suspect’s right to an attorney during questioning * * * is 

derivative of his right to remain silent * * *.’ Wainwright v. Greenfield (1986), 474 U.S. 284, 
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298–299, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).” Leach, at ¶13. On the 

other hand, denying Fifth Amendment protection because police themselves did not know 

Forbus would be prosecuted when they questioned him could miss the point. Forbus obviously 

knew he might be prosecuted for firing a weapon at several people so in his mind he is still 

faced with the choice “either to permit the jury to infer guilt from [his] silence or surrender 

[his] right not to testify and take the stand to explain [his] prior silence.” Id. at ¶31. 

{¶ 17} In our view, the critical issue is not whether Forbus was a suspect when he 

apparently chose not to explain his injury. Rather, for Fifth Amendment purposes, the issue is 

whether he remained silent in the face of police questioning during an active criminal 

investigation. We also cautiously note that this Court has recognized “all of the cases that 

prohibit the use of one’s silence as evidence of guilt–even the Leach holding that the use of 

one’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence violates the court’s sense of fair play–do so only when 

silence is invoked in the presence of law enforcement officers. None * * * extend the 

constitutional protection to a defendant’s behavior during the course of a crime or before law 

enforcement officers have become involved in the situation.” State v. Buelow, Clark App. No. 

2004 CA 18, 2004-Ohio-6052, ¶28. 

{¶ 18} For purposes of our analysis we will assume that Forbus invoked his silence in 

the presence of law enforcement officers and in response to their questioning during an active 

criminal investigation. Therefore, we will view the State’s use of his silence in its 

case-in-chief as substantive evidence of guilt as a violation of his Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination. 

{¶ 19} The remaining issue is whether the Fifth Amendment violation requires 
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reversal of Forbus’s convictions. We conclude that it does not. As a preliminary matter, it is 

questionable whether defense counsel sufficiently objected to the police officers’ testimony 

about his silence. The prosecutor initially raised the issue in his opening statement, telling 

jurors that Forbus gave his name, birth date, and Social Security number but refused to say 

anything else. (Trial transcript at 100). Defense counsel did not object to the opening 

statement. Instead, defense counsel first objected on the morning of the second day of trial. In 

apparent anticipation of the police officers’ testimony later that day, defense counsel raised the 

Fifth Amendment issue out of the jury’s presence. (Id. at 225-227). The trial court took the 

matter under advisement until after the lunch recess. At that time, the trial court treated 

defense counsel’s oral objection as a motion in limine and overruled it. (Id. at 335). Following 

additional remarks by the prosecutor, the trial court reiterated its ruling by telling defense 

counsel: “I’ll overrule your objection, then, and note your exception.” (Id. at 336). The 

prosecutor proceeded to call each of the four police officers to testify. In the course of their 

testimony, the officers stated that Forbus had refused to answer their questions. Defense 

counsel did not object during this testimony. 

{¶ 20} Even if we assume, arguendo, that defense counsel’s objection on the morning 

of the second day of trial, alone, was enough to preserve the issue for appeal, we conclude that 

the Fifth Amendment violation constituted harmless error. 1

 See, e.g., State v. Thompson 

(1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 4 (recognizing that a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right 

against self-incrimination is subject to harmless-error review). Notably, nine eye-witnesses 

 1

If the lack of a contemporaneous objection when the police officers testified resulted in a waiver of Forbus’ objection, then 

plain-error analysis would apply. Based on our determination above that the Fifth Amendment violation here constituted harmless error, the 

result would be the same under plain-error review, which is less favorable to a defendant. 
9

testified about the shooting and what they saw. All but one of them testified that Forbus fired 

first. (Trial transcript at 123, 155, 189, 208, 234, 263, 282, 295, 309). The other witness heard 

shots and looked up but was not asked who fired first. Although they lived on the same street, 

not all of the eye-witnesses were friends. Some of them did not even know the Hamblins. (Id. 

at 241, 251, 292-293). 

{¶ 21} The fact that police found Forbus a few blocks away and bleeding from a 

gunshot wound to the neck establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was the person 

eye-witnesses saw firing at Aaron Hamblin. The uncontroverted testimony of the eight 

eye-witnesses (some of whom were disinterested) who saw Forbus fire first establishes, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that Forbus was guilty of the offenses charged. This conclusion is 

strengthened by the unrefuted testimony of Jeffrey Fugate, who recounted hearing a “thug” 

and finding a nine-millimeter bullet lodged in the exterior of his house at the time of the 

shooting. (Id. at 324-325). 2

 In light of the foregoing evidence, we conclude, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the jury would have convicted Forbus even absent the improper 

testimony about his silence. Introduction of that testimony constituted harmless error, and 

Forbus’s convictions need not be reversed. Thompson, at 4. Accordingly, the first assignment 

of error is overruled. 

{¶ 22} In his second assignment of error, Forbus alleges that he received 

constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He advances two arguments in support. 

First, he contends counsel provided ineffective assistance by not seeking suppression of Aaron 

 2

Although defense counsel stressed that a home-invasion shooting had occurred at Fugate’s residence a week or so earlier, the 

record reflects that the home-invasion shooting occurred inside the home. (Trial transcript at 330). 
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Hamblin’s photo line-up identification of him. Second, he claims counsel provided ineffective 

assistance by making an untimely objection to the State’s use of his pre-arrest silence as 

evidence of guilt. 

{¶ 23} To prevail on his claim, Forbus must show deficient performance and resulting 

prejudice. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. To 

establish deficiency, he must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. Id. To show prejudice, he must demonstrate that counsel’s 

deficiency impacted the judgment against him. State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136. 

Reversal is warranted if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 

performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. 

{¶ 24} Upon review, we conclude that Forbus cannot prevail on his 

ineffective-assistance claim. “When a witness has been confronted with a suspect before trial, 

due process requires a court to suppress the witness’s identification of the suspect if the 

confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of the suspect’s guilt and the identification was 

unreliable under the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Armstrong, Montgomery App. No. 

20964, 2006-Ohio-1805, ¶16. “The defendant must first show that the identification procedure 

was unduly suggestive. If the defendant meets that burden, the court must then consider 

whether the identification, viewed under the totality of the circumstances, is reliable despite 

the suggestive procedure.” Id. “If the pretrial confrontation procedure was not unduly 

suggestive, any remaining questions as to reliability go to the weight of the identification, not 

its admissibility, and no further inquiry into the reliability of the identification is required.” Id. 

{¶ 25} In the present case, Forbus asserts, without elaboration, that a photo spread 
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shown to Aaron Hamblin was “unduly suggestive.” Having reviewed the pictures, we see 

nothing unduly suggestive about them. In light of that determination, and absent any specific 

argument from Forbus, we find no basis for suppressing Aaron Hamblin’s identification. As a 

result, defense counsel did not provide deficient representation by failing to seek suppression. 

{¶ 26} With regard to the State’s use of his silence against him, Forbus claims his 

attorney should have raised the issue in a pre-trial motion in limine or filed a motion to 

suppress. We see no deficient performance on these grounds. Failure to file a pre-trial motion 

in limine, which results in only a tentative ruling by a trial court, does not constitute 

ineffective assistance of counsel provided counsel objects at trial sometime before the 

evidence is introduced. State v. Lenoir, Montgomery App. No. 19241, 2003-Ohio-2820, ¶25. 

This is precisely what occurred here. Despite not filing a true liminal motion, defense counsel 

objected to the prosecutor’s use of Forbus’s silence against him before any of the officers 

testified. (Trial transcript at 225, 335). Finally, we see no basis for having Forbus’s 

invocation of his silence “suppressed.” There was nothing illegal about the police officers’ 

interaction with Forbus. He was not under arrest when they questioned him, and he remained 

free to answer or refuse to respond. The only issue was whether the State could use his 

decision to remain silent against him. The use of his silence as substantive evidence of guilt 

raised a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issue, not a Fourth Amendment suppression 

issue. Thus, defense counsel did not provide deficient representation by failing to seek 

suppression of Forbus’s silence. The second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 27} In his third assignment of error, Forbus challenges the legal sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his convictions. In support, he notes that police never found the gun he 
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allegedly fired, never found any shell casings from the gun he allegedly fired, and never found 

any property damage in the immediate area of the shooting. Although police did find a single 

nine-millimeter bullet in the siding of a porch three houses down the street, Forbus claims this 

location was “out of the immediate range of fire” and was a location where another shooting 

had occurred a month earlier. Forbus reasons that “[i]t is difficult to comprehend how a man 

could fire at least four shots at a range of 6-10 feet and hit absolutely nothing and leave no 

shell casings for the evidence team to find.” As a result, he argues that his convictions are 

based on legally insufficient evidence. 

{¶ 28} When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he is arguing that 

the state presented inadequate evidence on each element of the offense to sustain the verdict 

as a matter of law. State v. Hawn (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471. “An appellate court’s 

function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to 

examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would 

convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant 

inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 29} With the foregoing standards in mind, we conclude that Forbus’s convictions 

are based on legally sufficient evidence. Numerous eye-witnesses testified that they either saw 

a gun in Forbus’s hand and saw him shoot it or saw what they described as fire, flames, 

sparks, or flashes coming from his hand. The State’s evidence established that Aaron Hamblin 

fired a .40 caliber Glock handgun. Aaron Hamblin described the weapon Forbus fired as a 
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semi-automatic handgun. Jeffrey Fugate, a resident of the house where police found a 

nine-millimeter bullet lodged in the siding, testified that he heard a “thug” hitting his house 

around the time of the shooting. Although police never recovered a nine-millimeter handgun 

or found any nine-millimeter shell casings at the scene, the State presented legally sufficient 

evidence to support a finding that Forbus had fired a handgun at his intended victims and had 

struck a neighbor’s house. Therefore, the State presented legally sufficient evidence to support 

Forbus’s conviction for felonious assault (deadly weapon), improperly discharging a firearm 

at or into a habitation, and a related firearm specification.3

 The officers’ failure to recover the 

weapon Forbus fired or any of his shell casings does not negate the legal sufficiency of the 

State’s evidence. Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 30} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FROELICH and CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur. 

(Hon. Frank D. Celebrezze, Jr., Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of 

the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.) 

Copies mailed to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Kirsten A. Brandt 

Jay A. Adams 

Hon. Timothy N. O’Connell 

 3

Although Forbus also challenges a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, we note that the trial court merged that offense 

into the felonious assault (deadly weapon) for purposes of sentencing. See Termination Entry, Doc. #50.