J-S46010-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY WRIGHT

Appellant No. 1918 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 30, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000815-2013

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2015

Appellant, Anthony Wright, appeals from the June 30, 2014 judgment 

of sentence of two and one-half to five years’ imprisonment, followed by a 

maximum of five years’ probation, imposed after a jury found him guilty of 

one count of robbery as a second-degree felony.1 Contemporaneously with 

this appeal, Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw and an 

Anders brief, stating that the appeal is wholly frivolous.2 After careful 

review, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to 

withdraw.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts as follows.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv).

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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On September 21, 2012 at about 1:30am, Tina 

Freeman brought her car to a stop underneath a 

streetlight on Germantown Avenue to remove a 

parking ticket from her windshield. She was 

approached by a man who asked, “Can I help you 

with that?” This man was later identified by Ms. 

Freeman as [Appellant]. Feeling nervous, Ms. 

Freeman responded that she did not need help and 

quickly attempted to return to the driver’s seat of 

her vehicle. At that time, [Appellant] wedged 

himself between Ms. Freeman’s car door and her leg 

and began pulling at her clothes and hitting her. 

[Appellant] hit Ms. Freeman on the left side of her 

chest area toward her shoulder and grabbed at her 

arms, thereby causing bruises. He also struck the 

back of her head and pulled her shirt down. Ms. 

Freeman testified that she was afraid [Appellant] 

would rape her. Eventually, [Appellant] reached 

behind Ms. Freeman to the passenger seat of her car 

and grabbed her tote bag, which contained her 

phone, makeup, cash, credit cards, driver’s license, 

CDs, and an iPod touch engraved with the words 

“Happy Birthday Tia.” At trial, Ms. Freeman testified 

that [Appellant]’s face was about eight inches from 

her during the incident and that she was able to get 

a good look at him. She stated that he was wearing 

a blue long-sleeved shirt and jeans and that he had 

tiny braids.

After their altercation, Ms. Freeman testified 

that [Appellant] ran down the street laughing. Ms. 

Freeman also testified that nearby there was another 

man whom she approached and asked why he had 

not helped her. Ms. Freeman described this man as 

follows: “darker black skin, longer braids that shot 

out, and an apple face, very round cheeks, heavierset.” This man was later identified as Bryant Davis. 

Shortly after the incident, Ms. Freeman flagged down 

a police vehicle. She briefly followed the officers in 

an unsuccessful attempt to locate the man who had 

robbed her. No report was filed at that time.
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Bryant Davis also testified at trial. Mr. Davis 

testified that he went to a bar in the Germantown 

area with [Appellant] at about 11:00pm on 

September 20, 2012. Mr. Davis stated that he left 

the bar between 1:00am and 1:30am, a minute or 

so after [Appellant]. Mr. Davis stated that when he 

emerged from the bar, he witnessed [Appellant] 

running down the street holding an object that 

looked like a pocketbook. At this point, Mr. Davis 

stated that a woman came up to him on the street in 

a panic asking why he did not help her. Mr. Davis 

stated he went back in the bar for another thirty 

minutes or so before he left. After his departure at 

about 2:00am, he spotted [Appellant] standing 

outside a Checkers down the street and gave him a 

ride. Mr. Davis asked [Appellant] what had 

happened, and [Appellant] stated that he had robbed 

a lady.

At about 5:40pm later that day[,] Mr. Davis 

was pulled over by [p]olice [o]fficer Colin Goshert for 

a traffic violation. As he approached the vehicle on 

foot, Officer Goshert noticed Mr. Davis dip below his 

seat, so he removed him from the vehicle. Mr. Davis 

was frisked, and the front area of his car was 

searched. A BB gun was recovered underneath his 

seat, and a phone and an iPod touch with the 

engraving “Happy Birthday Tia” were recovered from 

his center console. Mr. Davis was arrested as a 

suspect in the robbery of Ms. Freeman and was 

questioned with regard to his possession of the 

stolen property. He said that he did not know to 

whom the items belonged and told officers the story 

of what had occurred earlier that morning. He also 

made an identification of [Appellant]. Mr. Davis was 

eventually charged with receiving stolen property[3]; 

he was found guilty and was placed on probation for 

a period of one year.

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).
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Officer Goshert testified that he called “home” 

from the recovered cell phone and was able to reach 

Ms. Freeman. Officer Goshert requested that Ms. 

Freeman come to the station to be interviewed 

regarding the robbery earlier that morning. When 

Ms. Freeman arrived at the police station, she gave a 

statement and was shown a photo array which 

included a photo of Mr. Davis. Ms. Freeman did not 

make an identification, but testified that in the array 

she saw a photo of someone who looked like the 

individual who was on the street at the time of the 

incident, but not the person who attacked her. 

There is no record in any of the police paperwork 

that she told this piece of information to the 

detective who interviewed her.

On September 24, 2012, Ms. Freeman was 

called back to the police station to view another 

photo array. This photo array included a photo of 

both [Appellant] and Bryant Davis. Ms. Freeman 

identified [Appellant] as the individual who robbed 

her. Detective Daphne Smith, the officer who 

showed Ms. Freeman the second photo array, also 

indicated that Ms. Freeman pointed out Mr. Davis as 

the man whom she approached on the street that 

evening, but this again was not recorded. Ms. 

Freeman also attended a preliminary hearing on 

October 31, 2012. At the hearing she was not 

permitted to see [Appellant] and was required to 

participate in a prison lineup, where Ms. Freeman 

identified [Appellant] as her assailant. Ms. Freeman 

also made an in-court identification of [Appellant] at 

the rescheduled preliminary hearing on January 17, 

2013 and identified [Appellant] at trial as the man 

who robbed her. Ms. Freeman indicated that she 

was 99% sure of her identification in the photo array 

and that she was 100% sure of her in-person 

identification of [Appellant].

The Commonwealth also presented testimony 

from Officer Joseph Cahill, who arrested [Appellant] 

on October 11, 2012. Officer Cahill described 

[Appellant] as five foot seven, about 140 pounds, 

and having small cornrows that were close to the 
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back of his head and neck. The Commonwealth also 

presented testimony from Detective Bill Urban, who 

conducted the lineup and testified to Ms. Freeman’s 

identification of [Appellant]. Detective Urban 

testified that Ms. Freeman identified [Appellant] from 

the lineup without hesitation.

[Appellant] called Ikea Nalley, [Appellant]’s 

girlfriend, as an alibi witness. Ms. Nalley testified 

that she was watching movies with [Appellant] from 

8:00pm or 9:00pm until midnight on the evening of 

September 20, 2012. She said that she remembered 

that day in particular because it was their 

“anniversary day,” and they celebrated this day each 

month by spending time together. Ms. Nalley stated 

that she and [Appellant] went to sleep around 

midnight that evening and that when she awoke at

around 3:00am [Appellant] was still asleep. Ms. 

Nalley testified that she would have been aware if 

[Appellant] left at any point because, “I sleep on 

him.”

Ms. Nalley’s credibility was called into question 

by the Commonwealth on various occasions. First, 

the Commonwealth put a witness on the stand for 

rebuttal, Officer Joseph Czepiel, to testify that the 

address at which Ms. Nalley stated she and 

[Appellant] were located on the evening of the 

incident did not exist. Ms. Nalley later made a 

correction to the address on surrebuttal by stating 

that she had made a mistake and that she only 

resided at that home for “maybe a month.” There 

was also question as to when and to whom Ms. 

Nalley first alerted any defense attorney or law 

enforcement officer that she was with [Appellant] on 

the night in question. Ms. Nalley claimed that she 

told an investigator who was hired by [Appellant]’s 

former attorney about the alibi, but she was not 

interviewed by a detective until approximately one 

week before trial. Assistant District Attorney Omar 

Graham testified that he handled the preliminary 

hearing on January 17, 2013. He remembered that 

Ms. Nalley was not sequestered at that hearing and 

that Ms. Freeman reported to him that Ms. Nalley 
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and people with her were making faces at Ms. 

Freeman and were acting in a manner which 

intimidated Ms. Freeman. As a result, the [trial] 

[j]udge issued an order requiring Ms. Nalley to stay 

away from the complaining witness.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/18/14, at 1-6 (quotations in original, citations 

omitted).

By criminal information filed on January 24, 2013, the Commonwealth 

charged Appellant with one count each of robbery as a first-degree felony, 

theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, simple assault, and 

recklessly endangering another person.4 On June 30, 2014, after a jury 

trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of robbery as a second-degree felony, a 

lesser-included offense. The jury found Appellant not guilty of robbery as a 

first-degree felony. The Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining 

charges. That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two and onehalf to five years’ imprisonment, followed by a maximum of five years’ 

probation. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. On July 7, 2014, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.5

In his Anders Brief, counsel has raised the following issue for our 

review.

____________________________________________

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3921(a), 3925(a), 2701, and 2705, 

respectively.

5 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Was the evidence sufficient to support [A]ppellant’s 

conviction for robbery?

Anders Brief at 3.

“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the 

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to 

withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (citation omitted). Additionally, an Anders brief shall comply with the 

requirements set forth by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).

[W]e hold that in the Anders brief that 

accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to 

withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of 

the procedural history and facts, with citations to the 

record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) 

set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for 

concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel 

should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous.

Santiago, supra at 361. 

Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. 

2005), and its progeny, counsel seeking to withdraw on direct appeal must 

meet the following obligations to his or her client.

Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders

brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a 

letter that advises the client of his right to: (1) 

retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) 

proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points 
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that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s 

attention in addition to the points raised by counsel 

in the Anders brief. 

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Once counsel has satisfied 

the above requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own 

review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment 

as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. 

Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc), quoting

Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further, 

“this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to discern if 

there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” 

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(footnote and citation omitted).6

____________________________________________

6 Speaking for myself only, I disagree with Flowers’ interpretation of case 

law to impose a duty on this Court, when reviewing an Anders brief, to 

comb the record for issues of arguable merit that counsel did not raise. See 

Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 633 n.1 (Pa. 2012) (Saylor, J., 

concurring) (discussing the precedent for a special concurrence by the 

author of the majority opinion); Flowers, supra. 

In introducing this Court’s duty of independent review, the majority in 

Flowers acknowledged, “[n]either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor an 

en banc panel of this Court has explicitly discussed this issue.” I agree with 

Judge Strassburger’s dissent in Flowers, explaining that our Supreme 

Court’s decisions do not require this approach. Flowers, supra at 1251-

1252 (Strassburger, J., dissenting). Further, this approach causes disparate 

treatment of criminal defendants, with this Court acting as appellate counsel 

when counsel seeks to withdraw, but not when counsel does not seek to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In this appeal, we conclude that counsel’s Anders brief complies with 

the requirements of Santiago. First, counsel has provided a procedural and 

factual summary of the case with references to the record. Second, counsel 

advances relevant portions of the record that arguably support Appellant’s 

claims on appeal. Third, counsel concluded, “this appeal would be wholly 

frivolous.” Anders Brief at 16. Lastly, counsel has complied with the 

requirements set forth in Millisock. As a result, we proceed to conduct an 

independent review to ascertain if the appeal is indeed wholly frivolous.

The sole issue counsel raises on Appellant’s behalf is the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the robbery conviction.7 Anders Brief at 13. We 

begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. “In reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the evidence presented at 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

withdraw. Id. at 1252 (Strassburger, J., dissenting); see also 

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 914 A.2d 427, 438 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(explaining “it is not this Court’s duty to become an advocate for an 

appellant and comb through the record to assure the absence of trial court 

error[]”), appeal denied, 961 A.2d 858 (Pa. 2008). Moreover, a review by 

this Court for all potential issues renders the requirement of counsel to 

identify issues arguably supporting an appeal and the opportunity afforded 

to the appellant to raise issues pro se mere superfluities. See 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 511 A.2d 200, 204 (Pa. Super. 1986). For 

these reasons, I disagree with Flowers. However, we are constrained to 

apply it. See Commonwealth v. Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 

2006) (noting that a panel of this Court cannot overrule a prior decision of 

this Court), appeal denied, 946 A.2d 686 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 

881 (2008).

7 Appellant did not respond to counsel’s petition to withdraw or raise any 

additional issues for our review.
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trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support the jury’s 

verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 

A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. 

Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its 

burden by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be 

drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 

A.3d 108, 113 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate 

court, we must review “the entire record ... and all evidence actually 

received[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of 

the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014). “Because evidentiary 

sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 

126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania, 

135 S. Ct. 145 (2014).
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Here, Appellant was convicted of robbery as a second-degree felony. 

“A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he ... 

inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally 

puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv). 

Appellant presents two challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Specifically, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence establishing that he committed the robbery or that he caused, or 

threatened, bodily injury to Freeman. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, we conclude there 

was ample evidence to support Appellant’s conviction for robbery. 

First, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to identify Appellant 

as the perpetrator of the robbery. This Court has previously held that a 

positive identification by one eyewitness is satisfactory to overcome a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s proof of identity. See 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 502 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(concluding the evidence was sufficient where “the complainant testified 

positively and without qualification that [the defendant] perpetrated the 

offenses[]”), appeal denied, 960 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2008), citing 

Commonwealth v. Wilder, 393 A.2d 927, 928 (Pa. Super. 1978). Here, 

Freeman, the complainant, testified that on September 21, 2012, between 

1:00 and 1:30 a.m., after she pulled her vehicle over to remove a parking 

ticket from her windshield, Appellant approached her and asked if she 
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needed help. N.T., 4/28/14, at 9-12. Appellant then assaulted Freeman, 

took her tote bag from the passenger’s side of her vehicle, and fled down 

the street on foot. Id. at 12-21. Freeman testified that she had a clear 

view of Appellant’s face during the attack, and she later identified him as the 

assailant in a photo array, a prison lineup, at the preliminary hearing, and at 

trial. Id. at 20, 34, 36-37. At trial, Freeman stated that she was “100 

percent sure” that Appellant was “absolutely the person that attacked me in 

my car.” Id. at 38. Freeman’s unequivocal identification of Appellant as the 

assailant is sufficient evidence to enable the jury to conclude beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the robbery. See Patterson, 

supra.

The defense presented one alibi witness, Ikea Nalley, Appellant’s 

girlfriend. She testified that she and Appellant fell asleep around midnight 

while watching movies on the night in question, which she remembered 

because the 20th of each month was their anniversary night. N.T., 4/28/14, 

at 134-135. She further stated that she woke up around 3:00 a.m., saw 

Appellant still asleep, and went back to bed. Id. at 135. In light of the 

testimony of Freeman and Davis, to whom Appellant admitted he committed 

the robbery, the jury was free to reject Nalley’s proffered alibi and conclude 

Appellant was guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Orie, 

supra. We will not reweigh the evidence. Id.
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Next, we conclude there was sufficient evidence that Appellant 

threatened to, and actually did, inflict bodily injury on Freeman. The “bodily 

injury” required to prove second-degree robbery is defined as “[i]mpairment 

of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301; see also

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 546 A.2d 116, 118 (Pa. Super. 1988), appeal 

denied, 554 A.2d 509 (Pa. 1989). Here, Freeman testified that Appellant 

attacked her when she tried to retreat into her car as he approached her. 

He pushed her into the vehicle, pulling at her clothes and hitting her in the 

chest and head. N.T., 4/28/14, at 12-17. Appellant struck Freeman at least 

three times in the chest and multiple times in the back of the head with a 

closed fist. Id. at 14, 17. Freeman sustained defensive bruises to her arms. 

Id. at 15. During the attack, Appellant pinned Freeman down so that she 

could not move her legs. Id. at 16. Freeman explained that she thought 

Appellant was attempting to rape her because he was trying to remove her 

clothes and position her on her back in the car. Id. at 18. The struggle 

lasted for one to two minutes before Appellant grabbed Freeman’s tote bag 

from the car and fled on foot. Id. at 19-20. This evidence is sufficient to 

enable the jury to conclude that Appellant inflicted bodily injury on Freeman 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Watley, supra.

Based on the foregoing, we agree with counsel that this appeal is 

without merit, and the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence for the 

jury to find Appellant guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, 
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after conducting an independent review of the record, we conclude there are 

no additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel. Flowers, supra

at 1250. As a result, we agree with counsel’s assessment that this appeal is 

wholly frivolous. Therefore, we affirm the June 30, 2014 judgment of 

sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/12/2015