COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Haley, Petty and Powell 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER M. WEAVER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1000-08-3 JUDGE CLEO E. POWELL 

 MARCH 17, 2009 

WYTHE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

 SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WYTHE COUNTY 

Josiah T. Showalter, Jr., Judge 

 (R. Christopher Munique; Lacy, Campbell & Munique, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 S. Vernon Priddy III; Marc Alan LeBlanc, Guardian ad litem for 

the minor child (Michael R. Bedsaul; Sands, Anderson, Marks & 

Miller, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

Christopher M. Weaver (“Weaver”) appeals the decision of the trial court terminating his 

parental rights to his daughter, N.W., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). Weaver contends that 

there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Wythe County 

Department of Social Services’ (“DSS”) actions were reasonable and appropriate and that he was 

not making substantial progress in remedying the conditions that required continuation of N.W.’s 

foster care placement. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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BACKGROUND1

“We view the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the prevailing party in the circuit 

court and grant to that party the benefit of ‘all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” 

Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 262, 616 S.E.2d 765, 767 (2005) 

(quoting Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 

463 (1991)). 

Weaver and Brandon Nicole Weaver (“Brandon”) are the biological parents of N.W., 

who was born in September of 2003. On October 7, 2004, Brandon brought N.W. to the hospital 

emergency room because N.W. had stopped breathing. The police and DSS were contacted by 

the hospital. In a subsequent interview, the police and DSS learned that Weaver and Brandon 

only had ten dollars in cash, had no electricity in their home, and they had little food. Weaver 

and Brandon were then arrested and charged with felony child endangerment. At that time, DSS 

assumed custody of N.W. and placed her in a foster home. 

The charges against Weaver and Brandon were later determined to be unfounded and 

dropped; N.W., however, remained in the foster home, as DSS felt that the conditions of the 

home environment were unsafe. 

 On November 14, 2004, DSS prepared the initial Foster Care Service Plan (the “initial 

plan”). The initial plan had the concurrent goals of either returning N.W. to her home or placing 

her with a relative. Under the initial plan, Weaver and Brandon had five responsibilities to 

complete in order to regain custody of N.W.: (1) cooperate with counseling services to address 

relationship issues and enhance marital stability; (2) Brandon will seek substance abuse 

 1

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, and because this 

memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and 

incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of 

this appeal. 
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counseling; (3) cooperate with parenting skills instruction; (4) secure employment; and 

(5) establish and maintain a safe, stable, and suitable home. 

Shortly after being released from incarceration, Weaver and Brandon separated, and 

eventually divorced. Soon after the separation, Weaver began dating, and after his divorce from 

Brandon was finalized, he eventually married Megan Weaver (“Megan”). 

On January 18, 2006, DSS filed a petition to terminate Weaver’s and Brandon’s parental 

rights to N.W. A hearing on the matter was held on October 10, 2006. At the hearing, the court 

terminated Brandon’s parental rights to N.W., due primarily to Brandon’s continued drug use 

and incarceration on other charges; Weaver, on the other hand, was granted a continuance to 

allow the Guardian ad litem time to observe his interactions with N.W. 

 On June 8, 2006, the Wythe County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court 

(“J&DR court”) denied the petition to terminate Weaver’s parental rights to N.W. DSS filed a 

timely notice of appeal. On April 27, 2007, the trial court heard evidence in this matter and 

subsequently denied DSS’s petition to terminate. 

On April 30, 2007, DSS prepared a new Foster Care Service Plan (the “new plan”) with 

concurrent goals of returning N.W. to her home and adoption. Under the new plan, Weaver and 

Megan had five responsibilities to complete in order to regain custody of N.W.: (1) cooperate 

with parenting skills instruction; (2) cooperate with a Child/Parent Attachment Evaluation 

(“attachment evaluation”) and follow through with any recommendations made as a result of the 

evaluation; (3) maintain employment; (4) establish and maintain a safe, stable, and suitable 

home; and (5) visit N.W. on a regular basis. 

In August of 2007, DSS changed its goal concerning N.W. from “return to home” to 

“adoption.” Additionally, DSS filed a petition seeking the termination of Weaver’s parental 

rights to N.W. DSS took these actions based upon Weaver’s failure to comply with all his 
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responsibilities as defined by the plan. According to DSS, Weaver and Megan failed to complete 

the parenting skills instruction and failed to establish and maintain a safe, stable, and suitable 

home. Additionally, DSS stated that, due to the length of time N.W. has been in the foster home 

and the bond that she has developed with her foster family, it would be in N.W.’s best interests 

to remain with her foster family. 

On November 28, 2007, the J&DR court entered an order terminating Weaver’s parental 

rights to N.W. Weaver subsequently appealed. 

Parenting Skills Classes

At the April 7, 2008 termination hearing before the trial court,2 the court heard testimony 

from Weaver that, although DSS had offered him multiple opportunities to receive parenting 

skills instruction, he had repeatedly failed to successfully complete the classes. Initially, Weaver 

was receiving home-based instruction from Heather Kapranos. However, after only twelve or 

thirteen sessions, DSS decided to discontinue the home-based instruction, even though 

Ms. Kapranos admitted that Weaver was showing some signs of improvement. 

DSS then offered parenting classes with Lynn Bowman. According to Ms. Bowman, 

Weaver and Megan missed the first three classes due to a scheduling mix-up. Weaver and 

Megan then attended the next two classes, but never returned for the remaining eight classes.3

 

Weaver and Megan were given another chance to take the parenting skills classes with 

Ms. Bowman in May-June of 2007. This time, Weaver and Megan missed two classes (four 

 2

 The trial court incorporated the evidence from the April 27, 2007 hearing into the 

present hearing. For the purposes of clarity, the evidence presented at both hearings is discussed 

together here. 

3

 The first round of parenting skills classes with Ms. Bowman consisted of thirteen, 

one-hour long classes. 
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hours of class time). Weaver and Megan partially made up for at least half of the missed class 

time by staying late on the subsequent classes.4

Safe, Stable, and Suitable Home

The court also heard testimony from Weaver that he had moved at least twelve times in 

the last three and a half years. In November of 2004, after being released on the felony child 

endangerment charges, Weaver lived with his mother in Speedwell, Virginia. He then lived in 

the basement of Megan’s parents’ home for a few weeks. He and Megan next moved to a studio 

apartment in Wytheville, Virginia. Weaver and Megan then moved to another apartment in 

Wytheville, because the studio apartment didn’t have any room for N.W. After DSS determined 

that the steps of the Wytheville apartment were unsafe, Weaver and Megan then moved to a 

house in Speedwell. After Ms. Kapranos expressed some concern over the presence of a wood 

stove in the Speedwell house, Weaver and Megan moved back into Megan’s parents’ basement. 

From there they moved into a trailer in Wytheville. After being evicted from the trailer for 

failing to pay rent, Weaver and Megan shared a friend’s apartment. They then moved into a 

double-wide trailer in Wythe County. After DSS expressed some concerns over the fact that the 

trailer was currently for sale, Weaver and Megan moved into an apartment in Independence, 

Virginia. A short time later, Weaver discovered black mold in the apartment, so he and Megan 

moved into another apartment in Independence. 

Attachment Evaluation

Additionally, testimony was heard from Dr. Whelan regarding the attachment evaluation. 

The attachment evaluation examined the quality of the relationships between N.W. and Weaver, 

 4

 The second round of parenting skills classes consisted of six, two-hour long classes, 

with the exception of the first class, which was three hours. Weaver and Megan attended classes 

on May 25 and June 8, 15, and 29. They missed class on June 1 and 22, but stayed an extra hour 

on June 8 and 29 to make up for some of the missed time. 
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Megan, and N.W.’s foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. Lewis. Dr. Whelan explained that, based on 

N.W.’s interactions with Weaver and Megan, she had a moderate to high risk for serious 

problems in the future. Dr. Whelan felt that Weaver and Megan did not, at that time, have the 

ability to properly address N.W.’s emotional needs. He also testified that it was unlikely that 

intervention would lead to significant changes in Weaver’s ability to address these needs. He 

further opined that if Weaver and Megan were motivated to participate in psychotherapy and 

responded well to the treatment, it would likely take one to three years before they would 

become sensitive to N.W.’s emotional needs. 

In contrast, N.W.’s interactions with her foster parents were a mix of avoidant and secure 

patterns, which is within the average range of interaction for a child N.W.’s age. Further, 

Dr. Whelan felt that Mr. and Mrs. Lewis were a source of significant emotional healing for 

N.W., although there was some room for improvement. 

Court’s Decision to Terminate

After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court found that, although Weaver had changed 

jobs a number of times since N.W. was removed from the home, Weaver had maintained stable 

employment. Additionally, the court commended Weaver on his efforts to remain employed. 

However, the trial court also found that Weaver had not demonstrated that he could provide the 

kind of stability that N.W. needed in her life. 

The trial court ultimately decided that this lack of stability combined with Weaver’s 

continued failure to successfully complete the parenting skills classes demonstrated by clear and 

convincing evidence that Weaver had failed to make substantial progress towards elimination of 

the conditions which required N.W.’s foster care placement. The trial court found that 

termination was in N.W.’s best interest and, as such, terminated Weaver’s parental rights to 

N.W. 
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ANALYSIS 

[B]efore residual parental rights can be terminated under Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2), a court must find: (1) by clear and convincing 

evidence; (2) that termination is in the child’s best interests; and, 

(3) that the parent or parents, without good cause, have been 

unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to 

exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster 

care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to the child’s 

foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agencies to such end. 

C. S. v. Va. Beach Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 41 Va. App. 557, 565, 586 S.E.2d 884, 888 (2003). 

 In the present case, Weaver contends that the trial court erred in finding sufficient 

evidence (1) that DSS made reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite Weaver with N.W. and 

(2) that Weaver had not made substantial progress in remedying the conditions which required 

N.W.’s continued placement in foster care. 

Preservation

 As an initial matter, DSS argues that Weaver failed to preserve his sufficiency argument 

and, as such, this Court is precluded from considering the matter as a basis for reversal. See

Rule 5A:18. Specifically, DSS argues that, although Weaver made an initial motion to strike 

after DSS had finished presenting its evidence, he failed to renew that motion after presenting his 

evidence. 

“If a closing argument adequately advises the trial court of the defendant’s position and if 

it is clear that the trial court considered the issue and had an opportunity to take corrective action, 

the contemporaneous objection rule is satisfied.” Fortune v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 225, 

228, 416 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1992) (citing Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 478, 405 

S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991) (en banc)). Here, Weaver argued in his motion to strike that the evidence was 

insufficient to show (1) that DSS’s actions were “reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite his 

family” and (2) that he was not making substantial progress in remedying the situation. In his 
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closing argument, Weaver argued that the evidence showed (1) that DSS’s actions were not 

reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite Weaver with N.W. and (2) that he was making 

substantial progress in remedying the situation. 

Although the motion to strike was worded in the negative and the closing argument was 

worded in the positive, both amount to the same argument: the evidence was insufficient to 

show (1) that DSS’s actions were reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite his family and (2) 

that he was not making substantial progress in remedying the situation. As such, we find that 

Weaver’s argument was properly preserved for appeal. 

Reasonable and Appropriate Efforts

Upon review of a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights, “[a] trial court is 

presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, 

and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 

329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard 

ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it.’” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted). 

 Weaver’s primary argument is that the evidence shows that DSS acted in an extremely 

adverse manner and, therefore, the evidence is insufficient to prove that DSS acted with 

reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite N.W. with her father. Weaver argues that this 

adversity can be shown based on (1) DSS’s decision to stop providing home-based instruction 

with Ms. Kapranos in January of 2006, even though Weaver was making progress; (2) DSS’s 

decision to reduce the length of his visitations with N.W. and require that the visitations occur at 

the DSS office; and (3) DSS’s decision to petition the court for termination of Weaver’s parental 

rights before the attachment evaluation had been completed. 
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After DSS terminated the home-based sessions with Ms. Kapranos, Weaver was offered 

two chances to complete the parenting skills instruction with Ms. Bowman, but he failed to do 

so. The failure to successfully complete the parenting skills classes with Ms. Bowman must fall 

squarely upon Weaver’s shoulders. DSS made reasonable and appropriate efforts to ensure that 

the classes were available to Weaver; therefore, DSS cannot be faulted for Weaver’s failure to 

take advantage of the opportunities presented to him. 

Similarly, the record demonstrates that the decision to reduce the length of his visitations 

with N.W. was due to comments made by Weaver’s mother to N.W., and not because of any 

adversity on the part of DSS. Fran Anders, N.W.’s case worker, testified that the length and 

location of the visits were necessarily limited, due to the requirement that the visitation must be 

supervised anytime Weaver’s mother would be present. Ms. Anders also testified that she had 

informed Weaver that if he informed her ahead of time that his mother was not going to be 

present during the visit, arrangements could be made so that the visits would not have to be 

monitored. According to Ms. Anders, these unmonitored visits could be longer, as no overtime 

would be required from DSS employees. However, because Weaver was unwilling to preclude 

his mother from attending the visitations, DSS was forced to shorten the duration of the 

visitations and monitor them. 

Finally, Ms. Anders also testified regarding the reason that DSS filed the new 

permanency plan at the time it did. According to Ms. Anders’s uncontradicted testimony, the 

decision to file the new permanency plan was primarily due to the fact that DSS would lose the 

federal funding it was receiving for N.W.’s placement if the new plan had not been filed at that 

time. Thus, as with the shortened visitation, the decision was based on independent policy 

requirements. 
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Based on these facts, the record clearly shows that DSS offered two additional parenting 

skills classes to Weaver after canceling the home-based program. Furthermore, the decisions to 

reduce his visitation sessions and to file for termination of his parental rights were based on 

policy, not on any animosity toward Weaver. As such, the record demonstrates that there is 

sufficient evidence showing that DSS acted with reasonable and appropriate efforts to reunite 

N.W. with her father. 

Substantial Progress in Remedying the Situation

Weaver had five requirements he had to meet before he could regain custody of his 

daughter. Of those five requirements, the record demonstrates that Weaver failed to complete 

two of them and had little likelihood of meeting a third. 

Under the new plan, Weaver was required to establish and maintain a safe, stable, and 

suitable home. The trial court specifically admonished Weaver regarding this fact, stating at the 

April 27, 2007 hearing: “There has to be stability for the child. You cannot move every other 

month.” The evidence shows that, beginning in November of 2004 until April of 2008, a period 

of forty-two (42) months, Weaver moved at least twelve (12) times. This averages to one move 

every three and a half months. Additionally, of these twelve locations, the evidence shows that 

DSS found only one of those locations acceptable by their standards. 

 Additionally, Weaver was required to successfully complete the parenting skills classes. 

The initial, home-based sessions were terminated by DSS, and as such, it cannot be said that 

Weaver failed to complete this program. However, as we noted above, he must bear sole 

responsibility for his failure to complete either of the two parenting skills programs with 

Ms. Bowman. 

 Finally, Weaver was required to submit to an attachment evaluation and follow through 

with any recommendations made as a result. Although Weaver did submit to the attachment 
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evaluation, the results indicated that Weaver lacked the skills/ability to meet N.W.’s attachment 

patterns and emotional needs. According to the results of the attachment evaluation, if the court 

returned N.W. to Weaver and Megan, significant intervention would be needed, requiring 

Weaver to undergo at least one to three years of intense psychotherapy. 

Based on Weaver’s prior history of failing to complete the parenting skills classes, it is 

reasonable to question his ability to meet this goal. Moreover, the one to three year time frame 

moves N.W. away from the finality and permanency cited by the trial judge in his ruling. Even 

if Weaver was willing, the attachment evaluation calls into question whether he would be able to 

develop the skills necessary to deal with the child’s attachment patterns and emotional needs. 

CONCLUSION 

Given the evidence in this case, the trial court had sufficient factual grounds to support its 

decision that Weaver had not, within a reasonable period of time, substantially remedied the 

conditions that required N.W.’s continued placement in foster care and that termination was in 

her best interests. See Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to 

terminate Weaver’s residual parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C). 

Affirmed.