NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________ No. 22

- 3195

___________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. LE ’ VAR BROWN ,

Appellant

____________ On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Pennsylvania ( D.C. No. 2

- 21

- cr - 00457

- 001 ) District Judge: Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand

____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 26, 2023 Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN , and MONTGOMERY

- REEVES , Circuit Judges

. (Filed: October 30 , 2023 )

____________ OPINION *

____________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I .O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge

. Le’ V ar Brown appeals his judgment of sentence , claiming the District Court committed procedural error at his sentencing hearing

. We will affirm.
I Brown pleaded guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Probation Office’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated Brown’s Sentencing Guidelines range as 57 to 71 months ’ imprisonment

. Brown did not object to the PSR’s calculations , which the District Court adopted

. Brown requested a downward variance of 22 months . The Government countered by requesting a sentence within the Guidelines range

. In doing so , the Government noted that because Brown ’s sentence could be reduced by good

- time credits , a sentence within the Guidelines range would be reasonable “in light of what [Brown] did [and] in light of his criminal record as well.” App. 140. Counsel f or the Government also argued:
I think it is important to point out, it may not be the most important thing, but if Mr. Brown receives, let’s say, a 57

- month sentence in this case, the amount of time he actually would serve on that sentence in light of all of the different reductions in [ the ] Bureau of Prison’s credits and after the First Step Act, I don’ t know how much time he would actually serve, but there’s a very good chance it is not actually going to be 57 months and that’s the case for most cases now. I think that does provide some context for guideline sentencing anymore is that a guideline range sentence after the First Step Act is likely not to be as long of a sentence as it used to be and I think that should be accounted for.3

App. 140

– 41. After hearing from both sides, the District Court sentenced Brown to 57 months’ imprisonment

— the bottom of the Guidelines range. Brown failed to raise any procedural objection to the sentence after it was pronounced

. Brown filed this timely appeal.
II

“ [ W ] hen a party wishes to take an appeal based on a procedural error at sentencing [,] .

. . that party must object to the procedural error complained of after sentence is imposed in order to avoid plain error review on appeal. ” United States v. Flores

- Mejia , 7 59 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)

. Because Brown did not comply with our instruction in Flores

- Mejia , we review his appeal only for plain error. 1 Brown’s appellate brief neither cites Flores

- Mejia nor adverts to the plain error standard of review . Instead, Brown argues that it is improper for a district court to increase a sentence in view of the possibility that the defendant may earn good

- time credits. Brown maintains that this thwarts Congress’s objective of providing a reward

— in the form of a shortened sentence

— for good behavior. This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. F or starters, as Brown concedes, the record does not show that the District Court relied on the Government’s argument about good

- time credits. Second, even had the Court relied on that argument , it’s far from clear that it would have been error. See, e.g. , Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 3 2 (1981) ( “ [A] prisoner ’ s eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor

1 The District Court had j urisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)

.4

entering into

. . . the judge ’ s calculation of the sentence to be imposed

. ” ) ; see also Sash v. Zenk , 439 F.3d 61, 67

– 68 (2d Cir. 2006) (sentencing court’s consideration of good

- time credit is “routine [] ”); United States v. Fowler , 948 F.3d 663 , 669 (4th Cir. 2020) (court’s consideration of good

- time credits was a valid application of its discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Finally, we have found no precedent to support the proposition that any error would have been plain

— much less that it would have affected Brown’s substantial rights or impug ned “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. ” Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) ( quoting United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) ).

* * * For the reasons we have identified, Brown’s appeal fails. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.