NO T F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0447n.06 Nos. 08-6420; 09- 5049 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA,

P laintif f-App ellee, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT CO UR T F OR

THE M ID DL E CH RI STOP HER

SUT TON (0 8- 64 20 ); DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE RENNIE TURNER, (09-5049) ;

De fend ant s- App e lla nt s. ____________________________________/ BEF OR E: BOG G S, SU HR HEI NRIC H, a nd R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. De fe nd ant C hr ist op he r L . Sutto n ( “ Sutton ” ) a pp e a ls his c on vic tio n fo r c on sp ir a c y to str uc tur e c ur re nc y tr ans a c tio ns to a vo id re po rt ingre qu ir e me nts , in vio la tio n o f 3 1 U .S. C. § 53 24 (a )( 3) , a nd Sutton and his c o- de fe nd ant R e nn ie Turn e r a pp e a l th e ir sentenc es. Rennie Tur

ner ple d g uilty

prior to trial and a

ppeals the rea sonablene ss of his sentence

. Sutton was tried and convic ted bef ore a jury with two othe r co-de fenda nts. On appe al, he a

rg ues that 1) the Gove rnment pre sented insuffic ient evidenc e on sever al key elements of the structuringstatute, 2) his ri g ht t o c on fr on t hi s a c c us e rs wa s v iol a te d, and 3) the dis tr ic t c ourt vio late d his e x pos t f a c to

c la us e ri g hts by

us ing th e wro ng Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s e dit ion a t tr ia l. F or

the re a so ns se t f

or th below, we AF F IRM Sutton’s conviction and the sentenc es of both De fenda nts. I. Bac kgr ound A. The Conspi racy2

The c onvictions in th i s case arise f rom an e x pansive sche me to illega lly traff ic in tobacc o from 1998 to 2003. During this time period, the United States De partment of A g riculture ( “USDA” ) operated a tobac co mar

keting quota prog ram to regulate the supply of tobacc o. Part of this prog ram

w a s t h e b u r l e y t o b a c c o a l l o t m e n tp r o g r a m t h a tr e g u l a t e d t h e s a l e o f

b u r l e y t o b a c c o i nK e n tu c ky, No rt h Ca ro lin a , a nd Te nn e sse e . T he USDA i ss ued a USD A B ur le y Mark e tin g Card

(“ Card ” ) t o tobacc o far

mers in these state s. Eac h Card could only be used to sell tobac co produc ed on the f arm listed on the Card. The Ca rd also limited the amount and ty pe of toba cco that could be sold from

eac h far m. The c onspirators soug ht to profit from sales of “ex ce s s t o b acco”—whic h included selling tobacc o g rown on another far m with a C ard as if it wer e grow n on the designate d far m, selling a

bove a quota amount, or falsely desig nating tobacc o. To this end, conspirators ma de ca sh purcha ses of tobacc o in Pennsy lvania, a non-quota state, of Pennsy lvania ty pe tobacc o, mainly from Amish and Mennonite farmers. This tobac co wa s shipped to Tennesse e and K entucky and passe d off a s burley tob a c c o g ro wn

in c omp lia

nc e wi th the burl e y

tob a c c o a llo tme nt p ro g ra

m—i n s ome y e ars , n on -q

uo ta tob a c c o f ro m P enn sy lv ani a/M ary lan d wa s i den ti cal or al mo st id ent ica l t o Ke nt uck y /T enn esse e qu ota tobacc o. To provide the f

unds nece ssary

for this operation, the co-c onspirators structur ed fina ncial tr ans a c tio ns . Sutto n a

nd Rob e rt D. Ol dh a m ( “ Ol dh a m” ) w e re the co-l e a de rs . Sutto n g e ne ra lly provided the f

unds to be structure d. He was a tobac co executive a nd licensed U SDA tobacc o deale r who owned two toba cco c ompanies in Nor t h C ar olina: Coastal L eaf , L td. and CL P, I nc. He alleg edly g ener ated the c ash to purcha se excess tobac co and br i b e t o bacc o executives. Oldham g ener ally direc ted the oper ations of the con s p i rac y , including the g ener ation of ca sh, but Sut tonThis char g e re lated to fa lse repr esentations made when se lling tobac co with a USDA 1 Card. This char g e re lated to a tra nsaction betwe en Oldham a nd a g overnme nt ag ent. The 2 Gover nment alleg ed that Oldham tra ded two che cks for cash that was re prese nted as proc eeds from nar cotics traf

ficking

. 3 sometimes direc tly arr ang ed for cash to be structur ed. The other de fenda nts rece ived money

from Sutton or Oldham through w ire tra nsfer s or che cks—g ener ally i n amounts of more tha n $10,000. They then g ener ated c ash in incre ments below $10,000, and either g ave the ca sh to Sut ton or Oldham

or we re dire cted by

one of the m as to how to use the ca sh. Rennie Turne r’s role in the conspirac y was to structure transac tions a n d d el iver the c ash as dire cted, includingtransporting cash f rom Pennsy lvania to Tenne ssee. B. Ind ictm ent and Trial I n J une 2006, a g rand jury returne d an indictment ag ainst Sutt on, Rennie Turne r, and nine other individuals: Oldham, J oey Bow en, R o n ald D. Bowen ( “Ron Bow en”) , Bobby C. Cates (“ Ca te s” ), Ga

rt h E. Mid da

ug h (“ Mid da

ug h” ), Cla

re nc e Shi rk (“ Shi rk ” ), Willi am A . S hotw e ll (“Shotwell”) , Kenne th A. Sway ne (“ Sway

ne”) , and S am A. Turner (“ Sam Turner ”). The Gover nment broug ht a three -c o u n t indictment: conspiracy to structure ( ever

y defe ndant except Shotwell a

nd Sam T urner ), conspirac y to f alsify a materia l f

act (Oldham, Shot we l l , an d Sam Turner ), and money

launder ing ( Oldham only ). The indictment also conta ined a f orfe iture 1 2 alleg ation of $4,500,000. Most of the defe ndants, including Rennie Turne r, pled guilty prior to trial. Sutton was tried along with two co-de fenda nts: Ron B owen a

nd J oey Bow en. B eca

use Sutton, J oey

Bow en, and Ron Bow en we re only

indicted for co n s p i ra cy t o structure , the trial wa s limi ted to this count of the4

ind ic tme nt. Th e Oc tob e r 2 00 7 tr ia l la ste d se ve n da y s. Witn e sse s a t tr ia l in c lud e d g ov e rnme nt a g e nts who had assisted in the investigation, bank officia ls, and coope ratingdefe ndants—Shirk, Sway ne, Middaug h, and Oldham a ll testified for the Gover nment. The cooperating defenda nts testified about the ir ro le s in the c on sp ir acy

and the ro le s o f t

he oth e r c o- de fe nd ants . So me of the c o- de fe nd ants , including Ron Bowen, wore a wire for t he Government during the investigation. As a re sult, severa l wireta pped conve rsations wer e admitted into evidenc e. Sutton di d not testify in his defe nse, but he did prese nt severa l witnesses who testified a bout the leg itimate business dealing s they had with him. J oey

Bow en testified in his own def ense. Ron B ow e n d id n ot t e sti fy

and c a lle d n o w itn e sse s. The jury found Sutton and Ron Bowe n g uilty . I t found J oey Bow en not g uilty . The district

c o u rt s e n te n c e d Sutt o n to s ixt y mo n th s in p r is o n , th e s tatuto r y maxim u m, to b e f

o llowe d by

two y ear s of supervise d re l ea s e. T h e cour t also awa

rded the Gover

nment a for feiture amount of $4,500,000, to be paid by Sutton. The court sentenc ed R ennie Turner to fifty -one months i n prison. II. Su tton’s Appeal A. Insuf fi ciency of the Evidence Sutton arg ues that the evidenc e adduce d at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction. This court re v i ew s de novo a district c ourt’s denia l of a motion for judg ment of acquittal that cha lleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence

. United St ates v. Kee ton , 101 F.3d 48, 52 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Gibson , 8 96 F .2 d 20 6, 20 9 (6th Cir . 1 99 0) ). To a sc e rt a in whether Sutton has a v ali d sufficie ncy of evide nce c laim, this court must decide “w hether , afte r viewing the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the prosec ution, any ra tio na l trie r of

fa c t c ou ld have f ound the essential e lements of the c rime b ey o n d a re asonable doubt.” Id. at 52 (quoting5

J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) ( internal quotation marks omitted). The jury ’s verdic t w ill stand unless it “ is not supported by substantial a nd competent evidenc e upon the re cord

as a whole.” Un ite d S

tates v . Ca mp be ll , 5 4 9 F. 3 d 3 6 4 , 3 7 4 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Grubbs , 506 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2007) ). When making this inqui ry , all rea sonable infe renc es and cre dibilit y choice s are made in support of the verdic t. Id. (c i t i n g United States v. Newsom , 452 F.3d 593, 608 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). Th e e le me nts of

str uc tur ingare a s f

oll ow s: (1) the de fenda

nt must, i n fac t, have eng ag ed in a cts of structuring ; (2) he must have done so wit

h k n o w le d g e tha

t the financ ial instit utions invol ved we re le g ally obligated to re po rt c ur

re nc y tr ans a c tio ns in exc e ss of $1 0, 00 0; an d (3) he mus t ha ve a c te d w ith the intent to evade this reporting require ment. United States v. Mac

Pherson , 424 F.3d 183, 1 8 9 (2 d C i r. 2005); see also United States v . One Million Seve n Hundred Thousand Dollars ( $1,700,000.00) in U.S. Currency , 545 F. Supp. 2d 645, 65 1- 52 (E .D . M ic h. 20 08 ). Sutton a pp e a ls the su ff

ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e wi th r e sp e c t to thr e e e le me nts neede d for c o n v i ct i o n : knowledg e of the repor ting r equire ment, intent to evade the repor ting require ment, and the involvement of a domestic fina

ncial instituti on. 1. Knowledge Sut ton c on te nd s th a t th e Go ve rnme nt did no t e sta bli sh his “ kn ow le dg e ” of a c on sp ir a c y to structure curr ency

transac tions to evade re porting require ments. Sutton’s arg ument fails, howeve r, beca use the Gove rnment pre sented ample circ umstantial evidence at trial to support its theory that Sutton had knowledg e of the conspirac y . See U nited States v. Johnson , 26 F. Ap p’ x 44 1, 44 6 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (re ferri n g t o ci rcumstantial evide nce to hold that the pr osecution pre sented suff icient evidenc e to support the knowledge element of the money

launder ing statute). F or example, Shirk6

testified that Sutton had instructed him to keep c ash transa ctions below $10,000. I RS S pecia l Ag ent Geor g e Muenc h testified that when he aske d Sutton, during anothe r investig ation in the 1990s that p re ceded this case, w hy

he used c hecks in the a

mount of about $9,800, Sutton answere d “it was easie r.” Charles Rice, Sutton’s ac countant during an unrelated I RS audit, testified that he believed Sutton had a “g ood understanding ” of the financ ial repor ting r equire ments based on his intera ctions with him during the a

udit. Finally , comments in the admitted wireta pped conve rsations sug g ested that Sutton knew about the financ ial repor ting r equire ments

. F o r

instance, in one conver sation, taped by Ron Bowe n, the following exchang e occ urre d: Rennie Turne r: L ong as y o u didn’t write any under te n thousand dollars, ain’t no, a in’ t a g a ins t th e law i s it ? Sut ton : T he y

a lw ay s c ome up wi th so me thi n’ c a lle d str uc tur ing , b ut t

he y , th e re ’s a c ourt ru lin g in a

h Ch arl ott e , a

nd , a nd the jud g e fl a t r

ule d - he sa id, “ I f y ’a ll w ant i t for less than ten thousand dollars, chang e the Goddamn law.” . . . B ut, y ou know .

. . . T h i s e v i d e n c e i s s u f

f i c i e n tt o s a t i s f

y Jack son . 2. Int e nt Sutton arg ues th a t c r e d ib le e v id e n c e w a s n o t p r e s e n te d a t t r ia l t o e s ta

b li s h th a t h e h a d

the

nece ssary “intent” to eva de the fi n an ci al re porting require ments. This argument fails bec ause the Gover nment prese nted suffic ient evidenc e at tria l of Sutton’s int ent to evade the structuringlaw. Shirk testified that he re ceive d chec ks or wire transfe rs i n amounts above $10,000 a nd was dire cted by Sutton t o “cr eate cash” in increme nts below $10,000. Oldham testified that Sutton’s role in the conspirac y

was to provide the money . Oldham t es t i fi ed t h at on one occasion Sutton told hi m he neede d $640,000 to bribe ex ecutives at R.J

. Rey nolds to buy some tobacc o. Sutton provided a chec k7

in that amount and Oldham ar rang ed to have the money g ener ated in amounts below $10,000. Oldham then ar

rang ed to have the ca sh delivere d to Sutt on. Jack son is theref

ore satisfied. 3. Dom estic F inan cial Institution Sut ton c on te nd s th a t th e Go ve rnme nt f a ile d to e sta

bli shtha t he str uc tur e d tr ans a c tio ns “ wi th

one or more domestic financ ial instit utions” pursuant to § 5324(a) (3). Sutton argu es t h at , of the twenty -six differ ent definitions f or a domestic financ ial instit ution f ound in 31 U .S.C. § 5312, t he only definitions that could be applicable in this case a re a n FDI C insured bank, a

trust company , or

a commer cial bank. He concede s that the trial included te stimony from diffe rent ba

nk officia ls, but notes that none of the evidenc e at tria l establ i s h ed t h at the fina ncial instituti ons involved were fede r a ll y in s u r e d o r tr u s t c o mp an ie s . H e th e r e f o r e ar g u e s th a t t

h e o n ly w ay th e G o v e r

n me n t c an

m ee ti t s b u rd en o f p ro o f i s t o es t ab l i s h t h at t h e t ra n s ac t i o n s i n v o l v ed a co m m er ci al b an k

. T ak i n g a definition from the Code of Fe dera l Reg ulations, he argues that to meet this definition, the Gov e r n me n t mu s t e s ta

b li s h th a t a b an k w a s “ o r g an iz e d u n d e r th e la w s o f an y St a te o r the United States.” 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(c )(1) . He then c oncludes that the Gover nment did not meet its burden beca use none of the evidence related to the banks’ corpora te cha rters, dome stication, or the laws of the state unde r which the y wer e org anized. The F ifth Circuit has employ ed a pe rsuasive f rame work for

dealingwith this i ssue: Finally , Thomas cha lleng es the suff iciency of the evidenc e on the structuring conviction reg arding the definition of a financ ial instit ution. Thomas asser ts that the Go ve rnme nt f

a ile d to pr ov e fe de ra l jur isd ic tio n be c a us e it did no t showthat H ibe rn ia and Ha ncock B anks we re insure d by the FD I C and there fore did not show that they are domestic financ ial instit utions. The de finition of a financ ial instit ution is found i n 31 U.S.C. § 5312, which provides 26 diffe rent de finitions, in cludi ng a F DI C insured bank. § 5312(a )(2) (A). F ina nc i a l i n s t i t ut i o n s a lso are c omm e rc ia l ba nk s, c re dit

un ion s, ins ur anc e c omp anie s,8

trave l ag encie s, and other institutions not required to be insure d by the FDI C. The Gover nment was not re quired to prove that Hibernia and Ha ncock B anks ar e insured by the FD I C. The Gove rnment pre sented e vidence that a bank qua lifies as a f inancial ins tit uti on . Th e te sti mony of Ag e nt Ad a ms e xpla ine d that ba nk s a re inc lud e d w ith in the de fi nit ion

of fi na nc ia l insti tut ion s and

are su bje c t to the re po rt ingre qu ir e me nts of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a). H is testimony provides suff

icient evidenc e for a rational trier of fa c t to c on c lud e that H ibe rn ia and Ha nc oc k B ank s are fi na

nc ia l in sti tut ion s w ith in the meaningof 31 U.S.C. § 5324. United States v. Thomas , 176 F. App' x 625, 628 (5th Cir. 2006). Simi larly , t h e G o v ernment prese nted evidenc e in this case that the ban k s i n v o l ved we re subjec t to the fede ral re porting require ments: Ag ent L y

nn Ba rker , a criminal investigator for the I RS, testified at trial about financ ial ins tit uti on s’ ob lig atio n to fi le a c ur re nc y tr ans a c tio ns re po rt

fo r t ra ns a c tio ns ov e r $ 10 ,0 00 . T his te sti mony satis fi e s Jack

son . B. Violation of

Conf rontation Rights Sut ton arg ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d e vid e nce t hat vio late d h is confr ontation rig hts: three audio tape s made by Ron Bow en and g overnme nt ag ents’ testimony and roug h notes from a

n interview w ith J oey

Bow en. This cour

t review s evidentiary

ruling s under a

n abuse of discretio n s t an d ard, but reviews Confrontation Cl ause c laims de novo. United States v. Pugh , 2 7 3 F. Ap p ’x 4 4 9 , 4 5 3 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Vasilakos , 508 F.3d 401, 406 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ). B e c a

us e Sutto n’s a

rgume nts are ba se d o n d if fe re nt C on fr on tatio n Cl a us e prec edents, they

will be considere d separ ately

.

1. The Tap e Re cordings Sutton m ainta in s th at the district cour t ran a foul of the Confr ontation Clause when it admitted statements obtained dur ing w iretappe d conver sations. Aft er me eting with fede ral off icials, Ron9

Bow en ag ree d to cooper ate in the investigation of the c onspiracy and wor e a w ire in conve rsations with his co-conspirators. Sutton’s C onfrontation Clause a rgum ent involves tapes made by Ron Bow en, which inc lude: 1) an Aug ust 26, 2003 conversation b et wee n Ron Bowe n, Rennie Turne r,

an d R i chie Tur

ner, 2) an August 26, 2003 conversation between Ron B owen, Rennie Turner , and Daniel Va ndiford, and 3) an Oc tober 8, 2003 conversation betwee n Ron Bow en, R ennie Tur ner, a nd Sutton. M any

statements on these tape s, including state ments made by Sutton, i ncriminate Sutton. The Confrontation Cl ause g ives an a ccuse d the rig ht “to be conf ronted with t he witnesses ag ainst him.” U.S. Const . amend. VI

. Howeve r, “bec ause the Confrontation Clause is conce rned with testimoni al statements only , once it is dete rmined that a state ment is nontestimoni al, only the rules of e vidence may

bar its admissi o n . ” Pugh , 2 73 F . App ’x at 45 4. State me nts ma de in fu rt he ra nc e of a c on sp ir a c y

are inh e re ntl y

no n- te sti mon ia l. Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). Sut ton argue s th a t th e state me nts we re te sti mon ia l be c a us e Ron B ow e n w a s c oo pe ratin g wi th the Gover nment when the ta

pes we re ma de. This cour t has consistently reje cted the c ontention that the p r e s e n c e o r

p art i c i p a t i o no f

a g o v e r n m e n ti n f o r m an to r a g e n tm a k e s a l l r e c o r d e d c o m m e n ts testimonial. I n United States v. Moone yham , 473 F.3d 280 ( 6th Cir. 2007), this court rea soned: The thre shold question, then, is whether Mc Mahan’ s statement was “ te sti mon ia l.” I n thi s r e g ard , th e pr op e r i nq uir y is “ wh e the r a

re a so na ble pe rs on

in the dec lara

nt’s p o s it io n

would anticipate his stateme nt being used ag ainst the ac cused in investigating a

nd prosec uting the crime.” United States v. Cromer , 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir.2004). McMaha n’s statements we re a dmitted into evidence unde r the theory that they wer e stateme nts mad e by a co- conspirator

in further ance of the conspirac y . By

definition, such statements are not by their nature testimonial; t he one making them has no “a

war eness or

expectation that his or her statements may

later b e u s e d a t a tr ial.” Id. at 674 (interna l quotation omit ted). Indeed, the Cra wfo rd court spec ifically

identified statements in furtheranc e of a conspiracy as examples of s tatements that ar e inher ently non-testimonial. See 5 4 1 U

. S

. a t 5 1 , 5 6 , 12 4 S. Ct.10

1354 (“A n acc user who m ak es a for mal statement to g overnme nt office rs bea rs testimony in a sense that a per son who makes a casua l re m ar k t o an ac quaintance do e s n ot. ” ). B e c a

us e Mc Maha

n wa s not aw are that Williams wa s a po lic e of fi c e r, his rema rks wer e not the produc t of interrog ation and we re not testi m o n i al i n nature

. Henc e, ther e wa s no Cra wfo rd e rr or in t he int ro du c tio n o f t

ho se re mark s. Id. at 286-87. See also United States v . Johnson , 581 F.3d 320, 325 ( 6 t h Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur prec edent make s clea

r that the intent of

. . . the dec lara nt [ ] determines whethe r the stateme nts on the ta pe -r e c or din g are test im on ial .” ). Ac c or din g ly , th e state me nts by any of the c o- c on sp ir a tor s, other than B owen, a

re non- testimonial because the co- conspirator s did not know t h ey wer e being taped, a nd no Crawf

ord e rr or aro se fr om t

he ir a dmi ssi on . F ur

the rm or e , d e sp ite Sutton ’s argume nts otherwise, be cause no n -t es timonial out-of-court state ments do not impl icate the Confrontation Clause, this court does not need to determine whe ther the state ments of the co- conspirator s (other than B owen’ s) comport with Oh io v . R ob e rts , 448 U.S. 56 (1980), or Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S . 123 (1968). Se e Un ite d S tates v . A rn old, 4 8 6 F

. 3 d 1 7 7 , 1 9 2

- 9 3 ( 6 th Ci r . 2007) (e n banc) (no ti ng that Ro be rts does not apply to non-testimonial out-of-cour t statements) and Johnson , 5 81 F. 3 d at 326 (“ Be cause it is premised on the Confrontation Clause, the Bruton r u le , li ke the Confrontation Clause itself, does not apply to nontestimoni al statements.”)

. There fore , the only

plausible Confrontation Clause ar g ument that Sutton makes is that the district court improper ly

admitted the statements made by Ron Bowe n on the tapes

. At t ri al, t he Gover nment conce ded that Ron B owen’ s statements wer e testimonial, whic h was c orre ct since Ron Bow en would have rea sonably believed that his statements would be used ag ainst Sutton and other co-de fenda

nts (including B owen himself)

. See Crome r , 389 F.3d at 675. Neve rtheless, the district

c ourt a dmi tte d mo st o f t

he state me nts be c a

us e the y we re be ingoff

ered to pr ov ide c on te xt, no t to establish the t ruth of t he matter asser ted. The district c ourt did make one edit to the tapes, re moving11

a stateme n t t h at the cour

t found to be pre

judicial and unnec essar

y to provide conte x t. The district court a lso ga

ve a se parate limiti ng instruction at the time eac h tape wa s admitted into evidence and a sing le jury

char g e that discussed the Ron Bowe n rec ording s. T h i s c o u rth a s h e l d

t h a t n o C o n f

r o n t a t i o nC l a

u s e v i o l a t i o no c c u r s w h e ns t a t e m e n t s b y a g overnme nt informant ar e admitted to provide c ontext , not to establish the tr u t h o f t h e matter

asser ted. United States v. J

ones , 205 F. App’x 327, 342-43 (6th Cir. 2006). See ge nerally United States v. He ndricks , 395 F.3d 173, 184 ( 3d Cir. 2005) (“We thus hold that if a Def endant or his or her c oconspirator

makes stateme nts as part of a rec iproca l and i n t egr at ed conversation with a g overnme nt informant who later become s unavailable for tria l, the Confrontation Clause does not ba r t h e i n t r o d

u c t i o n o f t h e i n f

o r m an t ’ s p o rt i o n s o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n a s ar e r e a s o n a b l y re qu ir e d to pla c e the de fe nd ant o r c oc on sp ir a tor ’s no nte sti mon ia l st a te me nts in to con text.” ). I n ma kin g thi s

argume nt, Sutton

do e s n ot s pe c if

ic a lly po int to a ny state me nts that he be lie ve s w e re imp ro per ly admitted. Exa min a tio n o f t

he re c or d s ho ws that Ron B ow e n’ s st a te me nts we re re a so na bly re qu ir e d to pr ov ide con text. T he c on ve rs a tio ns wo uld no t ha ve ma de se ns e wi tho ut t he inc lus ion

of his questions and statements. F or instance , in one conve rsation Ron Bowe n asked Rennie Turner : “And,

an d , an d t h e f o lk s - l o o k , t h e f

o l k s - w h o m a d e t h e m o n e y i nt h e d e a l ? W h o m a d e t h e m o n e y ?” Turn e r r e sp on de d, “ Chr is. ” I f t he jud g e ha d e xclu de d a ll o f B ow e n’ s q ue sti on , o nly

the re sp on se

“ Chr is” wo uld

have be e n a dmi tte d, re nd e ri ngthe e vid e nc e wor th less . T he re fo re , b e c a us e the se statements wer e nee ded to provide contex t, no Confrontation Clause violation occur red. Mor eover , even if some o f

th e s e c o mm e n ts w e r e f

o u n d to h a v e v io late d

th e Co n f r o n tati o nCl a

u s e , th e e r

r or12

would be har

mless in light of the incr iminating testimony at t ri al from co- conspirator s and the extensive amount of other wire tap evidenc e. 2 . Th e I nt e r v ie ws Sutton arg ues that the district cour t violated Bruton when it a dmitted testimony by fede ral ag ent David Ma

rtin perta ining to incriminating state ments made by J oey Bow en about Sutton and Martin ’s ro ug h n ote s f

ro m th a t c on ve rs a tio n. Sutton a c kn ow le dg e s th a t Bruton is s u es ar e not implicated in this case be cause J oey Bow en testified on his own be h al f d u ri n g Sutton’s trial. See United States v. Morrow , 9 77 F .2 d 2 22 , 2 25 (6 th C ir . 1 99 2) (e n banc) (ho ldi ngthat th e c ro ssexamination of a co-de fenda nt defe ats a Bruton c la im) ; se e als o Ne lso n v . O ’N e il , 402 U.S. 622, 627 (1971) ( “The Constit ution as construed in Bruton

. . . is violated only wher e the out-of

-cour t hear say statem en t i s t h at of a decla rant who is unava ilable at the tria l for ‘f ull and eff

ective’

cross-e x amination.”). N ever theless, S utton arg ues that his confr ontation rig hts were violated beca use the district cour

t failed to provide his c ounsel with the opportunity to cross-e x amine Joey Bow en. Specif

ically , Sutton m aintains, without any supporting c ase law, that the district court ha d an oblig ation to ask him whether he wished to cross- examine J oey Bow en. I t is bey ond dispute that a defe ndant has the rig ht to cross-e x amine a co- defe ndant when the co-de fenda

nt’s testimony

incriminates him, as it did here. See, e .g., S t a n l ey v. United States , 245 F.2d 427, 433 ( 6th Cir. 1957). Howeve r, simply beca use the trial judge did not ask Sutt on on the

re c or d wh e the r he wi sh e d to c ro ss- e xami ne Joey B ow e n do e s no t me an that his ri g ht to cros sexamination was infring ed. See U nited States v. Grossley , 224 F.3d 847, 864 (6th Cir. 2000) . At trial, Sutton neither mentioned a de sire to cr oss-examine J oey Bow en nor obje cted whe n the district court dismissed the witness and continued to pr ocee d to the proof of Ron B owen. I t f ollows that no13

err or occ urre d, plain o r o therwise. Se e Un ite d S tates v . D e itz , 577 F.3d 672, 683 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (c i t i n g Un ite d S

tates v . P owe rs , 500 F.3d 500, 505 ( 6th Cir. 2007)). C. Se nt e nc ing

Sutton arg ues that the district cour t erre d when it used a

2007 edition of the Sentenc ing Guidelines to ca lculate his sentenc e. He maintains that the district court should have used either the 1998, 1999, or 2000 Guidelines e ditions and that use of one of those editions would have r esulted in a low e r Guid e lin e s rang e be c a us e of the low e r f

ra ud and de c e it e nh anc e me nts in t ho se e dit ion s. Sutton di d not object at trial; there fore , the district court’s use of the 2007 Guidelines is revie wed for plain e rror . Un ite d S

tates v . D av is , 397 F.3d 340, 346 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Sutton has failed to establish that an er ror oc curr ed, let alone a p l ain one. Although “the Gu ide lin e s c le arl y

ins tr uc t the c ourt

to a pp ly the ve rs ion

in p la c e a t th e tim e the de fe nd ant’ s o ff e ns e

was c ommitt ed if a

pply ing the curr ent Guidelines would amount to a violation of the e xpo st f ac to

c lau se ,” id. , the cour

t’s use of the 2007 Guidelines did not implicate the ex post fac to clause. Eve n though “ the punishment for fr aud committed on or afte r Nove mber 1, 2001, wa s increa sed whe n Part F -O ff e ns e s Inv olv ingF ra

ud and De c e it w a s e lim inated a nd c on so lid a te d w ithPart

B -B a sic Economic Of

fense s[,] ” United States v. Gre en , 242 F. App' x 343, 347 (6th Cir. 2007), Sutton was convicted of conspiring to struc ture transac tions fr om D ece mber 1998 to F ebrua ry 2003. Thus, the conspirac y

in this case continued be y ond the time that use of a n older v er s i o n o f t h e Guidelines would have c hang ed the se ntence beca use the Gu i d el ines in eff

ect in 2003 would have led to the same sente ncing rang e as the 2007 Gu i d el i n es . This court has he ld that applying the curr ent14

Guidelines to a c onti n u i n g offe nse does not violate the e x post facto c lause, e ven if the se ntence potentially

encompa sses ac ts that occurr ed prior to the Guidelines cha ng e: When an offense beg ins befor e but continues after the eff ective date of a Guideline or ame ndments thereto, the most re cent Guide line applies. W e h ave he ld that se nte nc ingun de r t

he mos t r e c e nt Guid e lin e fo r a c on tin uin g of fe ns e do e s n ot v iol a te the ex post facto Clause. We conclude that the fra udulent activity

at i ssue her e constitutes a contin u ing of fense . Def

endant pled guilty

to a sing le violation of 18 U. S.C. § 1 34 4, wh ic h a

pp lie s to wh oe ve r “ e xec ute s, or a tte mpt s to e xec ute , a

sc he me . . . to defra

ud a finan ci al institut ion.” Althoug h there wer e multiple victims, t hey we re d ef ra u d ed t h ro u gh a s i n gl e s ch em e. T h e ch ar ac t er o f t h ei r l o s s es d i d

n o tch an ge when the Guideline was amende d. The Guidelines in e ffe ct at the date of sentenc ing t h e r e f o r e a p p l y t o th e e n t i r e s c h e m e o f

b an k f r a u d t o w h i c h d e f

e n d an tp l e d

g u i l t y, whether or not t h e individual fraudulent loans w ere initiated before or af ter November

1, 1989. United States v. Buck

ner , 9 F.3d 452, 454 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). L ike in Buck ner , the district court wa s corr ect to use the curr ent edition of th e Gu i d el i n es si nce Sutton’s conduc t continued until 2003. S ee G reen , 2 4 2 F. Ap p ’x at 3 4 8 ( h o l d i n g Bu c k ne r to be controlling in a conspirac y

case simil ar to this one). Sutton also appears e ither to argue that the district cour t would have be en more likely to give a lower sentenc e whe n applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sente ncing fac tors if the cor rec t Guidelines

wer e used or

to raise a separ ate issue with r eg ard to the rea sonablene ss of his sentence without any supporting a

rg ument. The fir st argument is moot since the cour t used the cor

rec t Guidelines edition. Th e se c on d a

rgume nt f a ils wi tho ut m or e su

pp or t b e c a u s e S utton

ha s me nti on e d n oth ingthat su g g e sts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

imp ro pe rl y

a pp lie d § 35 53 (a ) i n th e se nte nc ingde te rm inat ion . Sutto n a lso

argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d be c a

us e the re we re no ide nti fi e d v ic tim s in his pr e -s e nte nc e re po rt , bu t he fa ils to speci fy why th is m a ke s h is s e nte nc e unre a so na ble . T he re are no c a se s o r p la us ibl e arguments that sugg est that a sente nce is unrea sonable sim ply beca use the de fenda

nt was convic ted15

of a c ri me wi tho ut s pe c if

ic vic tim s. F ina lly , Sutto n ar g ue s tha t Oldh a m, wh o Sutto n cla ims wa s a simil arly situated co-de fenda

nt, only rec eived f

ive y ear s of probation. Ho wever, it is the

rea sonablene ss of Sutton’s sentenc e that is at issue, not Oldham’s. United States v. Burley , 2 41 F. App’x 290, 299 (6th Ci r. 2007). Moreover , Oldham, unlike Sutton, pled guilty and assisted the Go ve rnme nt. III. Rennie Tu rner’ s Appeal Rennie Turne r appe als the re asonable ness of his sentenc e of fifty -one months in prison. He d o e s n o t a p p e a l h i s T o t a l O f

f e n s e Le v e l o f

t w e n t y - f o u r o r h i s C r i m i n a l H i s t o r

y C a t e g o r y o f I. I nstead, he argues that the c ourt failed to a dequate ly consider his c o mpelling mitigating circ umstances a

nd considere d an impermissible fac tor. This court re views the re asonable ness of a sentenc e under

an abuse -of- discretion standa rd. United States v. Thompson , 515 F.3d 556, 560 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States , 5 52 U. S. 38, 41 (2007))

. When this court reviews a sentenc e, it ensure s that the district court c ommitt ed no signific ant proc edura l error s and then c onsiders the substantive re asonable ness of the se n tence imposed. United States v. Grossman , 5 1 3 F. 3 d 5 9 2 , 5 9 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51 )) . “ A s e nte nc e is pr oc e dura lly un re a so na ble if the dis tr ic t jud g e fa ils to c on sid e r t he a pp lic a ble Guidelines ra

ng e or ne g lects t o consider the other factors lis ted i n 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) , and instead simply selec ts what the judg e dee ms an appropr iate sente nce w ithout such require d consideration.” United States v. Simmons , 5 0 1 F. 3 d 6 2 0 , 6 2 4 -2 5 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. W ebb , 403 F .3 d 3 73 , 3 83 (6 th C ir

. 20 05 )) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . “ A s e nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly

u n re as o nable whe n the district court ‘se lect[s] the sentenc e ar bitrarily , bas[es] t he sente nce on imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, fa il[s] t o c on sid e r per ti ne nt § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s o r g iv[e s] an unr e a so na ble16

amount of we ight to any

pertinent fa ctor.’” I

d

. a t6 2 5 (q u o t i n g W

ebb , 4 03 F .3 d at 38 5) . B e c a us e Re nn ie Turn e r r e c e ive d a wi thi n- Gu ide lin e s se nte nc e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n e njo y s a rebuttable presumption of re asonable ness. United States v. V o n ner , 516 F.3d 382, 389 ( 6th Cir. 20 08 ) ( e n b anc ). B e c a

us e bo th of Turn e r’ s argume nts re late to t he su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss o f h is

se nte nc e , w e do no t ne e d to re vie w h is s e nte nc e fo r p ro c e dura l r e a so na ble ne ss. A. Mitigating Evidence Rennie Turne r ar g ues that the district c ourt failed to c onsider rele vant mitigatingevidenc e when f ashioning his sentence . He pr esente d multipl e re asons for a lenient s en t ence to the district court at his sente ncing hear ing: (1) he was orphane d at a y oung ag e; (2) he is e lderly ; ( 3) he ha s had substantial medical proble ms including a ) pins in his knee from a football injury in high sc hool, b) pins in his s houlder, two a rtificial hips, and a fused back as a result of a workplac e inj ury that left him on e hund re d pe rc e nt dis a

ble d, c ) dia

be te s, d) hig h blo od

pr e ssu re , e ) a mis sin g fi ng e r, f) tr ipl e by pa ss s ur g e ry

a fe w y e ars a g o, g ) s po t on his lun g that c ou ld l a te r pro ve proble matic ; ( 4) he is a

no n- vio le nt fi rs t- tim e of

fe nd e r; (5 ) he did no t ac c umu late any a sse ts f ro m th e c on sp ir a c y

and on ly enter ed the c onspiracy

to pay rent a fter g oing on disa

bility ; (6) he w as a low- level play er in the conspirac y ; and (7) he pled g uilty ear ly on in the investigation. A district court must adequa tel y ex plain its reasons for imposing a se ntence to enable the

a pp e llate c ourt to r e vie w the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on fo r r e a so na

ble ne ss. United States v. W illiams , 432 F.3d 621, 622 (6th Cir. 2005) . Wit h reg ard to mitigating e vidence , “[w]hi le the district cour t need not e x plicitly

ref ere nce e ach of the sentenc ing f actor s of § 3553(a ), there must be sufficient evidenc e in the re cord to a ffirmative l y demonstrate the court’s c onsideration of [these fa ctors].”Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fe lt Re nn ie Turn e r h a d atte mpt e d to pr ote c t Su tto n. Af te r h is p are nts 3 died, Rennie Tur

ner w as ra ised by

his sist er B etty . She marrie d Charles Sutton, and had a son Chris. There fore , Sutton i s Rennie Turne r’s ne phew, a nd they wer e ra ised as brothe rs. 17 Thompson , 5 1 5 F. 3 d

at 5 6 0 (q u o t i n g United States v. J ones , 445 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir. 2 0 0 6)) (interna l quotation marks omitted). The dist ri ct cour

t met these re quirements. The district court consider ed the mitigating circ umstances mentioned by Re n n i e T u rn er but still sentence d him to fifty -one months in prison be c a us e it f e lt that he ha d n ot f

ull y a c c e pte d r e sp on sib ili ty

fo r h is a c tio ns : Ithi nk tha t Mr. Turn e r’ s h e a lthc on c e rn s are ve ry su bs tanti a l, a

nd that w e ig hs he a vil y on the Court in this calculation of the 3553 factors. The other fac tors, of cour se, have merit as we ll, and lean towa rds a non- g uideline sentenc e. Howeve r, what the Court finds is that Mr. Turner really hasn’t ac cepte d full responsibility for his cr ime and the scope of his crime. He ’s denied what’s on the a udiotapes over

and over ag ain. I t’s ther e t o b e heard, it’s cohe rent, a nd what appe ars to be f

or re asons of prote cting family members won' t admit the full scope of his cr ime. And that outweig hs all these mitigating c ircumstance s. And t h at’s the differe nce betwe e nM r . T u r

n e r an d th e p e o p le th a t h a v e g o tt e np r o b a ti o nin th is c a s e . They stood here a

nd said Idid it, I have r emorse, I ’m sorry

. No w, Mr . T ur

ne r ha s a ri g ht, of c ours e , no t to sp e a k, and I ’m no t ho ldi ngthat a g a ins t him. But his continual denial of what he said on the a udio rec ording s ref

lects a la ck of ac cepta

nce of responsibility

for the sc ope of the crime. And as a r esult Ithink a g u i d el i n e s entenc e is what’s a ppropriate . This case would otherwise c all for leniency , but Mr. Turner

has stubbornly

denied the obvious. And I ’m g oing to se ntence y ou, Mr. Turner , to the bottom of the g uideline sentenc e, a se nte nc e of

51 mon ths

. 3 Moreove r, we find unp ersuasive Turne r’s a rg ument that there was insuffic ient rec ord

e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the di st ri ct court ’s c on c lus ion that he ha d n ot a c c e pte d r e sp on sib ili ty fo r h is cri mi n a l c o n d

u c t b e c a u s e o f “ h is c o n ti nu a l d e n ia l o f w h a t h e s a id o n th e a u d io r e cording s.” At sentenc ing, Turner argued that he play ed a minor role in the conspirac y . I n doing so, he contested the ver acity

of ce rtain statements that he made wh i l e unknowingly being taped by

Ron Bowe n.T h e F i f t h C i r c u i tr e f

e r r e d t o t h i s k i n d

o f c l a i m a s p r o c e d

u r a l , b u ti ti s ar g u a

b l y a 4 su bs tanti ve re a so na

ble ne ss c la im und e r S ixth Ci rc uit pr e c e de nt b e c a

us e a se nte nc e is substantively

unrea sonable whe n a district cour t “bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factor s.”

18 These statements sug g ested that Tur ner ha d an extensive knowledg e of the s ize and scope of the

c on sp ir a c y

and that he kn ow ing ly de liv e re d larg e a mou nts of c a sh to tob a c c o e xec uti ve s a s b ri be s. Turn e r a rgue s th at it

wa s h is tri a l c ouns e l th a t c on te ste d the ve ra c ity of the state me nts on the ta pe s,

n o t T u rn er h imself. Gene rally , howeve r, “c lients must be held acc ountable for the ac ts and omissions of their attorney s.” Pi on e e r I nv . S e rv s. Co. v . B ru ns wic k

As so c s. Ltd

. P ’s hip , 5 07 U. S. 38 0, 39 6 ( 19 93 ). As e xpla ine d b y the Sup re me Court : Petitioner voluntarily

chose this attorne y

as hi s repr esentative in the action, and he cannot now a

v o i d t h e consequence s of the ac ts or omissions of this free ly selec ted ag ent. An y

other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our sy stem of re pr e se ntativ e lit ig a tio n, in w hic h e a c h p art y is de e me d b ound by the a c ts o f h is lawy er- ag ent and is consider ed to have n o t i ce o f all fac ts, notice of which c an be c h ar g e d u p o nt h e a t t o r

n e y. Id. at 3 9 7 (q u o t i n g Link v

. W abash R.R. Co. , 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)) (interna l quotation marks omitted). I n light of this g ener al rule, Turner ’s failure to provide ca se law that leads to a c ontrary

c on c lus ion , a

nd the fa c t th a t T ur

ne r h a s n ot atte mpt e d to re tr a c t any of the se state me nts ma de by his attorney , we c annot s ay that the district court a bused its discretion when it used state ments by Turner ’s counse l to fashion the sentenc e.

B. Consid erat ion of

an Imper m issib le F actor Rennie Turne r ar g ues that it was unre asonable for the district c ourt to c redit him with a twole ve l r e du c tio n f

or a c c e pta nc e of re sp on sib ili ty , but the n to re fe r to his fa ilure to a c c e pt r e sp on sib ili ty for his cr ime, specific ally his lack of r emorse, a s a re ason for his Guidelines -r an ge sente nce. He 4 of fe rs no c a se law i n s up po rt of thi s a sse rt ion . A s a

n in iti a l matte r, we no te that r e pe a te d d e nia ls19

ab o u t th e c o n te n ts o r th e ta p e s w o u ld n o t n e c e s s ar il y le a d to a c o n c lu s io n th a t T u r n e r lac ked

remorse , but it wa s n ot an abuse of discre tion for the district cour t to interpret Turne r’s de nial as

e vid e nc e of a la c k of re mor se . Th e jud g e c ou ld have re a so na bly c on c lud e d th a t T ur

ne r’ s d ish on e sty

re g ard ing imp or

tant pie c e s of e vid e nc e ind ic a te d that he ha d no t fu lly a c c e pte d re sp on sib ili ty fo r h is p art i c i p a t i o ni nt h e c o n s p i r a c y. F ur the rm or e , w e are no t c on vin c e d b y Turner ’s argume nt t

hat a dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se s it s dis c re tio n w he n it

c re dit s a de fe nd ant w itha

tw o- po int

de du c tio n for accep tanc e of re sp on sib ili ty

an d l at er re fe rs t o h i s fa i l u re t o ac ce p t re s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r h i s cr i m e as a r ea s o nfo r h i s gu i d el i n es ra n ge

se nte nc e . T he F if

th C ir c uit re c e ntl y c on sid e re d th is i ssu e , a

nd its ana ly sis is i ns tr

uc tiv e : The dist rict court deter

mined that [t he defenda

nt] was not remorseful ba sed on his comments reg retting leavingMexi co, and [the def endant] does not dispute the court’s c hara cter ization of those co m m ents. Under the advisory

Sentencing Guidelines, the district co u rt must consider var ious factor s in craf ting a n individua l i z ed sentenc e and is fr ee to g ive more or less weig ht to factors a lrea dy acc ounted for in that a dvisory rang e. See United States v. W illiams , 517 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Ci r . 2 0 0 8 )

. O th e r th an§ 3 E 1

. 1 , [th e d e f

e n d an t] p o in ts to n o th in g in the Guidelines that m ight require the district court to adjust i ts calculation of the advisory rang e for lack of re morse. The ref ore, the court did not commit procedur al er ror by g rantinghim an offe nse leve l reduc tion for the ac c e p ta n c e o f r e s ponsibili ty

evidenc ed by his guilty

plea while c alculatingth e Guidelines and the n sentenc ing him to an a bo ve -r ang e no n- Gu ide lin e se nte nc e ba se d o n it s a sse ssm e nt o f t h e § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, including its finding that the def endant lac ked re morse for his crime. United States v. Douglas , 569 F .3 d 5 23 , 5 27 -2 8 ( 5th Cir . 2 00 9) ; see also United States v . Jones , 509 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2007) (“ We have he ld that a district court may impose an upwa

rd var iance based on f

acts a lrea dy

included in the advisory

sentenc ing guidelines wher e the a dvisory g uidelines do no t fu lly a c c ount f

or tho se fa c ts. ” ). Th e a

bo ve ana ly sis is e ve n mo re pe rs ua siv e in t he ins tant c a se be c a us e Re nn ie Turn e r i s a

pp e a lin g a

g uid e lin e s rang e se nte nc e . A c c or din g ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did not abuse its discretion whe n it considered T urner ’s per ceive d lack of remorse .20 IV. Conclusion For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM

.