# C_2023214EN.01005401.xml

| 16.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 214/54 |
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16.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 214/54

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P9_TA(2023)0010

Implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2022

European Parliament resolution of 18 January 2023 on the implementation of the common security and defence policy — annual report 2022 (2022/2050(INI))

(2023/C 214/05)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), |
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having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

| — | having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP), |
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having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund (1) (EDF), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund (1) (EDF),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (2), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe (2),

| — | having regard to the Commission’s proposal of 19 July 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) (COM(2022)0349), |
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having regard to the Commission’s proposal of 19 July 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) (COM(2022)0349),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (3), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (3),

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council at its meeting on 19 November 2018, |
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having regard to the conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council at its meeting on 19 November 2018,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (4) (EPF), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (4) (EPF),

| — | having regard to Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/748 (5), (CFSP) 2021/749 (6) and (CFSP) 2021/750 (7) of 6 May 2021 on the participation of Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the United States of America in the PESCO project Military Mobility, |
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having regard to Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/748 (5), (CFSP) 2021/749 (6) and (CFSP) 2021/750 (7) of 6 May 2021 on the participation of Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the United States of America in the PESCO project Military Mobility,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) (8), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1143 of 12 July 2021 on a European Union Military Training Mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) (8),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/638 of 13 April 2022 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (9), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/638 of 13 April 2022 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (9),

| — | having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 establishing the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (10), |
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having regard to the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 establishing the Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) (10),

| — | having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) (11), |
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having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) (11),

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 October 2021, and 24-25 March, 30-31 Mayand 23-24 June 2022, |
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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 October 2021, and 24-25 March, 30-31 Mayand 23-24 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 12 December 2022, |
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having regard to the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 12 December 2022,

| — | having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) (12), |
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having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/2444 of 12 December 2022 on a European Union military partnership mission in Niger (EUMPM Niger) (12),

| — | having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 (13) establishing an EU monitoring capacity in Armenia and its decision of 19 December 2022 to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia, |
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having regard to Council decision (CFSP) 2022/1970 of 17 October 2022 (13) establishing an EU monitoring capacity in Armenia and its decision of 19 December 2022 to deploy a transitional planning assistance team in Armenia,

| — | having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022, |
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having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted at the informal meeting of heads of state or government on 11 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, and 24 January 2022 on the European security situation, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, and 24 January 2022 on the European security situation,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 November 2013, 18 November 2014, 18 May 2015, 27 June 2016, 14 November 2016, 18 May 2017, 17 July 2017, 25 June 2018, 17 June 2019, 10 December 2019, 17 June 2020, 12 October 2020, 20 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 10 May 2021 on the CSDP, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 November 2013, 18 November 2014, 18 May 2015, 27 June 2016, 14 November 2016, 18 May 2017, 17 July 2017, 25 June 2018, 17 June 2019, 10 December 2019, 17 June 2020, 12 October 2020, 20 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 10 May 2021 on the CSDP,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 5 June 2020 on Youth in external action, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 5 June 2020 on Youth in external action,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — a new Agenda for the Mediterranean, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on a renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — a new Agenda for the Mediterranean,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 October 2021 on Bosnia and Herzegovina/Operation EUFOR Althea, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 October 2021 on Bosnia and Herzegovina/Operation EUFOR Althea,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on taking the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management to the next level: Priorities 2022-2024, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 24 January 2022 on taking the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management to the next level: Priorities 2022-2024,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 21 February 2022 extending and enhancing the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept in the Gulf of Guinea,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 May 2022 on the development of the European Union’s cyber posture, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 23 May 2022 on the development of the European Union’s cyber posture,

| — | having regard to the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of 16 May 2022 and that of the Foreign Affairs Council with Defence Ministers of 17 May 2022, |
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having regard to the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of 16 May 2022 and that of the Foreign Affairs Council with Defence Ministers of 17 May 2022,

| — | having regard to the global strategy entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016, |
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having regard to the global strategy entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

| — | having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022, |
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having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS) Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 6 November 2020 and to Parliament’s resolution of 7 June 2022 thereon (14), |
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having regard to the European External Action Service (EEAS) Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 6 November 2020 and to Parliament’s resolution of 7 June 2022 thereon (14),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 6 March 2014, entitled ‘For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy’ (JOIN(2014)0009), |
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having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 6 March 2014, entitled ‘For an open and secure global maritime domain: elements for a European Union maritime security strategy’ (JOIN(2014)0009),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 on the Commission contribution to European defence (COM(2022)0060), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 on the Commission contribution to European defence (COM(2022)0060),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence’ (COM(2022)0061), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence’ (COM(2022)0061),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward’ (JOIN(2022)0024), |
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having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward’ (JOIN(2022)0024),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018), |
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having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 22 February 2021 entitled ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (COM(2021)0070), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 22 February 2021 entitled ‘Action Plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries’ (COM(2021)0070),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048), |
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having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

| — | having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘EU Policy on Cyber Defence’ (JOIN(2022)0049), |
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having regard to the Joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘EU Policy on Cyber Defence’ (JOIN(2022)0049),

| — | having regard to the second annual work programme of the European Defence Fund for 2022, adopted by the Commission on 25 May 2022, |
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having regard to the second annual work programme of the European Defence Fund for 2022, adopted by the Commission on 25 May 2022,

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty, |
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having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

| — | having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 29 June 2022, |
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having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the applications by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, jointly submitted on 18 May 2022, and to the signature by NATO Allies of the Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden on 5 July 2022, |
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having regard to the applications by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, jointly submitted on 18 May 2022, and to the signature by NATO Allies of the Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden on 5 July 2022,

| — | having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022, |
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having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

| — | having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023, |
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having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

| — | having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |
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having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the seventh progress report of 20 June 2022 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |
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having regard to the seventh progress report of 20 June 2022 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the relevant reports and recommendations adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), |
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having regard to the relevant reports and recommendations adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA),

| — | having regard to the EU-United States summit statement of 15 June 2021 entitled ‘Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership’, |
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having regard to the EU-United States summit statement of 15 June 2021 entitled ‘Towards a renewed Transatlantic partnership’,

| — | having regard to the Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the VP/HR of 3 December 2021 on the launch of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as well as to the subsequent meetings of this dialogue, |
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having regard to the Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the VP/HR of 3 December 2021 on the launch of the EU-US security and defence dialogue as well as to the subsequent meetings of this dialogue,

| — | having regard to Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova’s region of Transnistria, |
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having regard to Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as the occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Republic of Moldova’s region of Transnistria,

| — | having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), space capabilities and quantum computing, which present new opportunities for humanity, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus among allies, |
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having regard to new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), space capabilities and quantum computing, which present new opportunities for humanity, but also create new challenges in defence and foreign policy that require a clear strategy and consensus among allies,

| — | having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, |
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having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

| — | having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its Article 2.4 prohibiting the use of force and Article 51 on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence, |
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having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its Article 2.4 prohibiting the use of force and Article 51 on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence,

| — | having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), |
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having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

| — | having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1889 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2493 (2019) on Women, Peace and Security and Resolutions 2250 (2015), 2419 (2018) and 2535 (2020) on Youth, Peace and Security, |
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having regard to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1889 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2493 (2019) on Women, Peace and Security and Resolutions 2250 (2015), 2419 (2018) and 2535 (2020) on Youth, Peace and Security,

| — | having regard tο the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Cyprus, |
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having regard tο the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Cyprus,

| — | having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975, |
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having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1975,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (15), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (15),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility (16), |
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having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility (16),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation (17), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2019 on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation (17),

| — | having regard to its position of 26 November 2019 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax and Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise duty as regards defence effort within the Union framework (18), |
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having regard to its position of 26 November 2019 on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax and Directive 2008/118/EC concerning the general arrangements for excise duty as regards defence effort within the Union framework (18),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (19), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 September 2020 on Arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (19),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security (‘Procurement Directive’), and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products (20), |
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having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security (‘Procurement Directive’), and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products (20),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (21), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (21),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (22), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (22),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021 (23), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021 (23),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021 (24), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021 (24),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (25), |
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having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (25),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (26), |
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having regard to its resolution of 9 March 2022 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (26),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (27), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (27),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (28), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the VP/HR on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (28),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2022 on security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (29), |
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having regard to its resolution of 8 June 2022 on security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (29),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2022 to the Commission and the Commission Vice President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new agenda for the Mediterranean, |
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having regard to its recommendation of 14 September 2022 to the Commission and the Commission Vice President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood — A new agenda for the Mediterranean,

| — | having regard to its legislative resolution of 14 December 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (30), |
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having regard to its legislative resolution of 14 December 2022 on the Council position at first reading with a view to the adoption of a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (30),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, |
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having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0296/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0296/2022),

| A. | whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War, accentuated by Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the non-military threats include disinformation, cyberattacks, attacks on critical infrastructure, assassinations, acts of sabotage, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration, and subversive political influence; whereas any deliberate disruption of active European energy infrastructure is unacceptable and should lead to the strongest possible response; whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order; whereas this war of aggression is an attack on the European security architecture that was built after the Second World War and the end of the Cold War to which Russia was a party; whereas in his war against Ukraine and his aggression against Europe and the West, President Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; whereas President Vladimir Putin’s decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation caused migratory pressure from Russians fleeing their country across the borders with Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, but above all, with the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians, he brought unimaginable suffering, resulting in the biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War; whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also common European values of democracy; whereas no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war; |
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A.

whereas Europe is facing the most complex combination of both military and non-military threats since the end of the Cold War, accentuated by Russia’s unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the non-military threats include disinformation, cyberattacks, attacks on critical infrastructure, assassinations, acts of sabotage, economic pressure, food and energy blackmail, instrumentalisation of migration, and subversive political influence; whereas any deliberate disruption of active European energy infrastructure is unacceptable and should lead to the strongest possible response; whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is an attack on the rules-based international order; whereas this war of aggression is an attack on the European security architecture that was built after the Second World War and the end of the Cold War to which Russia was a party; whereas in his war against Ukraine and his aggression against Europe and the West, President Putin deliberately chose escalation based on initiatives such as the staging of sham referendums in occupied Ukrainian territories, annexing the territories of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, the partial mobilisation of Russian forces and repeated and escalating threats, including the threat of the use of nuclear weapons; whereas President Vladimir Putin’s decree of 21 September 2022 announcing a partial mobilisation in the Russian Federation caused migratory pressure from Russians fleeing their country across the borders with Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Baltic countries, but above all, with the brutal aggression against Ukraine and the genocide being committed on Ukrainians, he brought unimaginable suffering, resulting in the biggest wave of refugees since the Second World War; whereas Ukraine is defending not only its sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also common European values of democracy; whereas no robust and effective measures were in place to deter the Russian aggression against Ukraine; whereas Russia has repeatedly threatened Ukraine as well as NATO and EU Member States with nuclear war;

| B. | whereas Ukraine’s victory is also a matter of the credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy; |
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B.

whereas Ukraine’s victory is also a matter of the credibility of the EU and its security and defence policy;

| C. | whereas in response to these threats the EU urgently needs to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy to defend its interests, values and citizens, both within and outside its borders, and first and foremost in its neighbourhood, to deliver peace, human security, sustainable development and democracy and to support its partners; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary strategic guidance, realistic and operational tools to move towards a coherent and credible defence policy, and to make it an effective and capable security provider and an assertive global actor; whereas there is a new urgency to boosting EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine, most notably through the European Peace Facility (EPF), and ensuring complementarity with NATO; whereas Russia’s hybrid aggression makes it necessary to design the defence of a free Europe in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner incorporating all critical areas, from the improvement of traditional military capacities, to the protection of critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, as well as the active fight against disinformation and cybersecurity threats; whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has underlined the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States; whereas NATO has deployed thousands of additional defensive land, air, and maritime forces to its eastern flank; whereas NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance on behalf of Ukraine; whereas the explosion damaging the Nord Stream gas pipelines was a targeted attack against the EU’s critical infrastructure; whereas Belarus has become an accomplice to Russia’s war against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas in response to these threats the EU urgently needs to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy to defend its interests, values and citizens, both within and outside its borders, and first and foremost in its neighbourhood, to deliver peace, human security, sustainable development and democracy and to support its partners; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to equip the EU with the necessary strategic guidance, realistic and operational tools to move towards a coherent and credible defence policy, and to make it an effective and capable security provider and an assertive global actor; whereas there is a new urgency to boosting EU security and defence capabilities, including building on the unprecedented support for Ukraine, most notably through the European Peace Facility (EPF), and ensuring complementarity with NATO; whereas Russia’s hybrid aggression makes it necessary to design the defence of a free Europe in a comprehensive and multifaceted manner incorporating all critical areas, from the improvement of traditional military capacities, to the protection of critical civilian infrastructure, supply chains and energy facilities, as well as the active fight against disinformation and cybersecurity threats; whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has underlined the lack of investment in security and defence in numerous EU and NATO Member States; whereas NATO has deployed thousands of additional defensive land, air, and maritime forces to its eastern flank; whereas NATO is helping to coordinate requests for assistance on behalf of Ukraine; whereas the explosion damaging the Nord Stream gas pipelines was a targeted attack against the EU’s critical infrastructure; whereas Belarus has become an accomplice to Russia’s war against Ukraine;

| D. | whereas on 12 December 2022 the Foreign Affairs Council decided to increase the overall financial ceiling of the EPF by EUR 2 billion in 2023, with the possibility of a further increase at a later stage; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas on 12 December 2022 the Foreign Affairs Council decided to increase the overall financial ceiling of the EPF by EUR 2 billion in 2023, with the possibility of a further increase at a later stage;

| E. | whereas in December 2022 the Parliament and the Council agreed on an EUR 18 billion support package to be transferred to Ukraine for support throughout 2023; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas in December 2022 the Parliament and the Council agreed on an EUR 18 billion support package to be transferred to Ukraine for support throughout 2023;

| F. | whereas, according to the Strategic Compass, ‘a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. These two go hand in hand’; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas, according to the Strategic Compass, ‘a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. These two go hand in hand’;

| G. | whereas the EU’s integrated approach to external conflicts and crises provides for a coherent use of the EU’s different capacities, within which its security and defence policy should complement and be complemented by other civilian tools to contribute to human security and sustainable peace in Europe and the wider world; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the EU’s integrated approach to external conflicts and crises provides for a coherent use of the EU’s different capacities, within which its security and defence policy should complement and be complemented by other civilian tools to contribute to human security and sustainable peace in Europe and the wider world;

| H. | whereas the People’s Republic of China has increased its defence spending over the last decade by about 600 % and is making use of its military power to intimidate and threaten its neighbours, most notably Taiwan, as recently illustrated by the military manoeuvres following the visit by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, to Taiwan in August 2022, whereas China’s dangerous military actions and provocations continue to occur on a daily basis; whereas the People’s Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates core principles of international law; whereas Russian-Chinese military cooperation significantly increased in 2022, as showcased by multiple joint military drills; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the People’s Republic of China has increased its defence spending over the last decade by about 600 % and is making use of its military power to intimidate and threaten its neighbours, most notably Taiwan, as recently illustrated by the military manoeuvres following the visit by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, to Taiwan in August 2022, whereas China’s dangerous military actions and provocations continue to occur on a daily basis; whereas the People’s Republic of China is not taking a clear stance against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates core principles of international law; whereas Russian-Chinese military cooperation significantly increased in 2022, as showcased by multiple joint military drills;

| I. | whereas in late December 2022, Japan and South Korea, two important partners of the EU, underlined the need for cooperation with the EU in their updated security strategies; whereas Japan furthermore has announced a doubling of defence spending to reach 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP); whereas both Japan and South Korea are faced with a triple security challenge stemming from threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea; whereas in 2022 North Korea conducted more than 90 missile tests, by far the highest number ever, and rumours have been circulating about a 7th nuclear test, the first since 2017, which would seriously worsen regional and global security; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas in late December 2022, Japan and South Korea, two important partners of the EU, underlined the need for cooperation with the EU in their updated security strategies; whereas Japan furthermore has announced a doubling of defence spending to reach 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP); whereas both Japan and South Korea are faced with a triple security challenge stemming from threats posed by Russia, China and North Korea; whereas in 2022 North Korea conducted more than 90 missile tests, by far the highest number ever, and rumours have been circulating about a 7th nuclear test, the first since 2017, which would seriously worsen regional and global security;

| J. | whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is negatively affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans are in need of peaceful conflict resolution, improved stability and security, and increased mutual cooperation; whereas security in these regions is negatively affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine;

| K. | whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while at the same time it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration; whereas Russia’s increasing military activity and build-up in the Arctic is alarming; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important for geopolitics, economic development and transport, while at the same time it is facing challenges linked to climate change, militarisation and migration; whereas Russia’s increasing military activity and build-up in the Arctic is alarming;

| L. | whereas Russia’s influence in Africa has developed, in particular due to the expanding footprint of the Wagner Group on the continent; whereas Wagner has been gaining a strong foothold in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR); whereas the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the CAR; in Mali, it is reinforced by the non-cooperative stance of the authorities towards Western partners (including the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali), regional organisations and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas Russia’s influence in Africa has developed, in particular due to the expanding footprint of the Wagner Group on the continent; whereas Wagner has been gaining a strong foothold in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR); whereas the Wagner Group has reportedly committed atrocities in Ukraine, Mali, Libya, Syria and the CAR; in Mali, it is reinforced by the non-cooperative stance of the authorities towards Western partners (including the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali), regional organisations and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA);

| M. | whereas industrial fragmentation along national lines of the development and procurement of European military capability costs between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion each year and it has a considerable impact on the overall competitiveness of the defence sector; whereas the Member States only procured some 11 % of their total equipment collaboratively in 2020, and 8 % in 2021, despite co-financing via EU budget-funded programmes such as the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), and despite their pledge to reach 35 % of common defence procurement; whereas from 1999 to 2021, combined EU defence spending rose by 20 % compared with 66 % in the United States, 292 % in Russia and 592 % in China; whereas Member States have agreed on more and better defence spending that should be primarily channelled into cooperative initiatives and aligned with the defence spending commitments of EU NATO members; whereas the EU needs to further boost research, technological development and innovation in the field of security and defence; whereas the EU’s ambition to become a capable security actor dates back over 20 years, while results with regard to capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective cooperation remain somewhat limited despite the establishment of various structures and processes, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); whereas since 2017 a total of 61 PESCO projects have been launched without any of them having achieved tangible results; whereas the Commission and the EEAS have proposed the establishment of the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA), a short-term EU instrument aimed at incentivising joint procurement to meet our most critical needs; whereas it will be backed by EUR 500 million from the EU budget on top of the Member States’ own investments; whereas in 2023, after the finalisation of EDIRPA, the Commission is expected to put forward a regulation establishing a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) setting conditions for joint procurement by Member States while benefiting from VAT exemption and EU financial support; whereas defence remains one of the key competences of the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas industrial fragmentation along national lines of the development and procurement of European military capability costs between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion each year and it has a considerable impact on the overall competitiveness of the defence sector; whereas the Member States only procured some 11 % of their total equipment collaboratively in 2020, and 8 % in 2021, despite co-financing via EU budget-funded programmes such as the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), and despite their pledge to reach 35 % of common defence procurement; whereas from 1999 to 2021, combined EU defence spending rose by 20 % compared with 66 % in the United States, 292 % in Russia and 592 % in China; whereas Member States have agreed on more and better defence spending that should be primarily channelled into cooperative initiatives and aligned with the defence spending commitments of EU NATO members; whereas the EU needs to further boost research, technological development and innovation in the field of security and defence; whereas the EU’s ambition to become a capable security actor dates back over 20 years, while results with regard to capabilities, interoperability and cost-effective cooperation remain somewhat limited despite the establishment of various structures and processes, such as the European Defence Agency, the Capability Development Plan, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); whereas since 2017 a total of 61 PESCO projects have been launched without any of them having achieved tangible results; whereas the Commission and the EEAS have proposed the establishment of the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA), a short-term EU instrument aimed at incentivising joint procurement to meet our most critical needs; whereas it will be backed by EUR 500 million from the EU budget on top of the Member States’ own investments; whereas in 2023, after the finalisation of EDIRPA, the Commission is expected to put forward a regulation establishing a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) setting conditions for joint procurement by Member States while benefiting from VAT exemption and EU financial support; whereas defence remains one of the key competences of the Member States;

| N. | whereas the CSDP has 12 civilian missions and eight military operations under way with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas only three of these are operations with an executive mandate (Atalanta, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI (EU NAVFOR MED IRINI), EUFOR Althea); whereas CSDP missions and operations suffer from slow decision-making and excessive micro-management from the Council, compounded by insufficient coordination between training activities and the provision of military equipment to partners; whereas the number of total personnel deployed by the Member States has steadily declined in recent years, and missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas such operational failures impede the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood; whereas Civilian CSDP Compact is the key instrument to strengthen the civilian CSDP; whereas EU CSDP missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, putting at risk their effectiveness in stabilising the country in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability whose only beneficiaries are malicious third states; whereas EUFOR Althea aims to guarantee the application of the Dayton agreements negotiated in 1995 and still plays a pivotal role for the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the mandate of EUFOR Althea was extended for another year by the UN Security Council; whereas the continuation of EUFOR Althea is in the best interest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council, and combating illicit weapons and human trafficking; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the CSDP has 12 civilian missions and eight military operations under way with around 5 000 personnel deployed on three continents; whereas only three of these are operations with an executive mandate (Atalanta, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI (EU NAVFOR MED IRINI), EUFOR Althea); whereas CSDP missions and operations suffer from slow decision-making and excessive micro-management from the Council, compounded by insufficient coordination between training activities and the provision of military equipment to partners; whereas the number of total personnel deployed by the Member States has steadily declined in recent years, and missions and operations persistently suffer from Member States not delivering on their pledges to provide sufficient military or civilian personnel; whereas such operational failures impede the overall effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; whereas CSDP missions and operations greatly strengthen the resilience and stability of the European neighbourhood; whereas Civilian CSDP Compact is the key instrument to strengthen the civilian CSDP; whereas EU CSDP missions and operations are often targeted by hybrid threats, including disinformation, putting at risk their effectiveness in stabilising the country in which they are deployed and, instead, reinforcing pre-existing instability whose only beneficiaries are malicious third states; whereas EUFOR Althea aims to guarantee the application of the Dayton agreements negotiated in 1995 and still plays a pivotal role for the security and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the mandate of EUFOR Althea was extended for another year by the UN Security Council; whereas the continuation of EUFOR Althea is in the best interest of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region; whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability by implementing the arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council, and combating illicit weapons and human trafficking;

| O. | whereas conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls and, among other things, intensify gender-based violence as also demonstrated by Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the participation of women in peacekeeping and military operations should be encouraged and strengthened; whereas women constitute 24 % of participants in civilian CSDP missions and only 5 % in military missions and 6 % in military operations (31); whereas, given the importance of gender equality and women’s contribution to peace processes, the inclusion of the gender perspective in the EU’s security and defence policy is essential; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas conflicts disproportionately affect women and girls and, among other things, intensify gender-based violence as also demonstrated by Russia’s unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the participation of women in peacekeeping and military operations should be encouraged and strengthened; whereas women constitute 24 % of participants in civilian CSDP missions and only 5 % in military missions and 6 % in military operations (31); whereas, given the importance of gender equality and women’s contribution to peace processes, the inclusion of the gender perspective in the EU’s security and defence policy is essential;

| P. | whereas security and defence partnerships, as well as sustainable cooperation in the area of security and defence, are essential instruments in supporting the EU’s ambition to be a global actor; whereas EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships such as with the UN, the OSCE, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well as the African Union and certain African countries constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas security and defence partnerships, as well as sustainable cooperation in the area of security and defence, are essential instruments in supporting the EU’s ambition to be a global actor; whereas EU-NATO cooperation and other partnerships such as with the UN, the OSCE, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia as well as the African Union and certain African countries constitute an integral pillar of the CSDP;

| Q. | whereas cultural heritage has a universal dimension as a testimony of history inseparable from peoples’ identity, which the international community has to protect and preserve for future generations; whereas cultural diversity plays an important role in the promotion of conflict prevention, reconciliation and counter-extremism; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas cultural heritage has a universal dimension as a testimony of history inseparable from peoples’ identity, which the international community has to protect and preserve for future generations; whereas cultural diversity plays an important role in the promotion of conflict prevention, reconciliation and counter-extremism;

| R. | whereas data and new technologies such as AI are increasingly critical in maintaining military competitiveness and are used in the development of new or enhanced military capabilities such as AI-powered cyber-weapons, drones and autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons and vehicles, and intelligence and situational awareness tools, all of which have a transformative effect on military operations and strategy; |
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R.

whereas data and new technologies such as AI are increasingly critical in maintaining military competitiveness and are used in the development of new or enhanced military capabilities such as AI-powered cyber-weapons, drones and autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons and vehicles, and intelligence and situational awareness tools, all of which have a transformative effect on military operations and strategy;

| S. | whereas Parliament’s active role in shaping CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations; whereas Parliament can legitimately exercise political control and oversight over the executive at EU level; whereas there is a lack of formal scrutiny powers as regards the EPF and EDF; whereas Parliament’s diplomacy is a proven and complementary means of enhancing strategic communication, and the visibility and effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas Parliament’s active role in shaping CSDP policies bolsters the EU’s democratic foundations; whereas Parliament can legitimately exercise political control and oversight over the executive at EU level; whereas there is a lack of formal scrutiny powers as regards the EPF and EDF; whereas Parliament’s diplomacy is a proven and complementary means of enhancing strategic communication, and the visibility and effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations;

Using momentum to enhance the CSDP

| 1. | Highlights the dramatic deterioration in European security caused by Russia’s unjustified, unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Ukraine; stresses that this situation demands that the EU step up its strategic autonomy and joint efforts to achieve the necessary defence capacities and show greater willingness to continue to act in a united way in order to deliver the security expected by EU citizens; |
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1.

| 2. | Underlines the unprecedented and united EU response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the provision of military equipment through the EPF; remains committed to supporting Ukraine’s defence of its territorial integrity, sovereignty and European values; calls on the EU to increase and speed up its efforts and provide Ukraine with the necessary financial, humanitarian and military aid and equipment, including lethal equipment and especially heavy weaponry, including Leopard tanks and modern air defence systems, needed to win this war; strongly welcomes the Council’s decision to set up, after a previous call by Parliament, a military assistance mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), aimed at enhancing the military capability of Ukraine’s armed forces to effectively conduct military operations, in order to allow Ukraine to defend its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, effectively exercise its sovereignty and protect civilians; calls on the Member States to accelerate their military assistance to Ukraine, in particular the provision of weapons in response to clearly identified needs; calls in this respect on German Chancellor Scholz to initiate a European consortium of relevant European countries in order to deliver Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine without further delay; calls on the EU and its Member States to help Ukraine enhance its ability to regenerate its forces and effectively conduct operations so as to help the country restore its territorial integrity and effectively exercise its sovereignty, protect civilians and deter and respond to military offensives by Russia; calls for the imposition of further sanctions against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for the various crimes committed against Ukraine; |
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2.

| 3. | Underlines the need for solidarity among Member States, especially with those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to various imminent threats and challenges by land, sea and air; fully supports efforts to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU in this respect; |
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3.

| 4. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s illegal annexations of Crimea and the four Ukrainian oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and condemns Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons; stresses that the enforcement of restrictive measures against Russia remains one of the key elements in the EU’s toolbox for countering Russian military aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the Commission’s ninth package of restrictive measures in response to the illegal referendums organised in the Ukrainian regions, the mobilisation of Russian conscripts and Putin’s threat to use nuclear weapons and welcomes preparations for a ninth package; underlines that the impunity which followed the 2008 invasion of Georgia is one of the factors leading to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; |
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4.

| 5. | Urges the EU and the Member States to significantly narrow the gap between the military assistance ‘promised’ and ‘delivered’ to Ukraine; calls on them to overcome the political bottlenecks which are hampering the delivery of long-range missiles, tanks and armoured vehicles to Ukraine in sufficient quantities to support the launch of a scaled-up counter-offensive; calls on the EU and its partners, in cooperation with Ukraine, to start medium- and long-term planning to assess possible developments on the battlefield and predict potential demand for weapons and ammunition, as well as the direction and scope of potential aid; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Strongly welcomes the continuation of important military support to reinforce Ukraine’s air defence and infantry capacities; calls upon EU and NATO members to increase their military assistance, in particular by delivering the necessary heavy weaponry; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Is deeply shocked that several Ukrainian nuclear power plants have been attacked and occupied, and have repeatedly been the scene of hostilities since Russia started its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned about the fact that Russian forces continue to occupy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and its staff, some of whom have been temporarily abducted, has been working constantly under pressure from the occupying forces; is equally concerned about the fact that power supplies to the power plant have repeatedly been cut owing to fighting in and around the plant, severely increasing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe; demands the immediate withdrawal of Russian military personnel from within and around the ZNPP, and the creation of a demilitarised zone around the plant, recognising that fighting around the plant could lead to a major disaster with unimaginable consequences; urges the EU to help the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organisations to implement the necessary nuclear safety measures without delay; calls on the EU and its Member States to promote a full prohibition of military attacks on or from within nuclear installations, without exception, under international law; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls on the EU and the Member States to consider solutions to bolster maintenance, servicing and repair facilities so as to increase the resupply of repaired military equipment from the partner countries; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Welcomes new EU initiatives to enhance European security and defence as well as the capabilities of EU Member States, notably the Versailles Declaration, the Strategic Compass and the joint communication on defence investment gaps; welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a regulation to incentivise joint procurement (EDIRPA) while stressing the need for the allocation of budgetary resources, especially via the Member States and their increased defence budgets; underlines that an enhancement of the EDA’s roles and responsibilities in future joint procurement projects should be explored; calls for increased ambition in defence investment expenditure and joint procurement by the Member States; welcomes the announced presentation by the Commission of the European Defence Investment Programme regulation (EDIP) after the finalisation of EDIRPA in 2023, the budget of which should also be significantly increased; highlights that these constitute a major step towards a European Defence Union; calls for increased funding opportunities for the European defence industry provided that they are invested in collaborative projects and generate added value; welcomes the European Investment Bank’s Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) announced on 10 March 2022 which aims to mobilise EUR 6 billion in investment to support Europe’s dual-use security and defence systems and encourages it to explore all possible funding options for the European defence industry’s collaborative projects including by revising its rules; calls for an adequate budget to be allocated to all European defence instruments, notably the European Defence Fund, Military Mobility, the future EDIRPA and EDIP and, therefore, calls for an adequate budget for all European Defence instruments; underlines NATO’s 2 % goal, reconfirmed at the September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, and welcomes the fact that lately most EU NATO Member States have moved towards this objective, which should be treated as a minimum target, but despite the biggest security threats in decades, until now has been achieved only by a few states in the case of Europe — mostly by those on the Eastern flank; underlines, however, that given the current level of challenges, further investments in the defence sector will be necessary; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Welcomes the new ambition in the Strategic Compass to provide the Union with a vision, a common strategic defence culture and the tools to be an effective security provider as well as to enhance EU security and defence by increasing the EU’s resilience and by making it more capable and responsive, so it can act rapidly to defend our interests, principles and values and protect the EU and its citizens; welcomes the strong commitment in the Strategic Compass to promoting and advancing human security across the CSDP; recalls that the Strategic Compass must be a dynamic process, which must be regularly updated and adapted on the basis of the common threat analysis; considers the Strategic Compass a major impetus that could generate the necessary momentum towards a genuine European Defence Union, build on the EU’s integrated approach, and enable the EU to act as a capable security actor and a reliable partner; calls for the timely and operational implementation of the approximately 80 concrete actions and for them to be updated regularly along with the EU’s Threat Analysis; stresses that this common threat analysis will strengthen the EU’s strategic culture as well as provide guidance on prioritising policy objectives and making necessary adjustments in the field of security and defence; welcomes the particular focus on Eastern European partners in the Strategic Compass and calls on the EU to strengthen security cooperation with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity and countering hybrid threats and disinformation; notes that the response to the new external security issues facing the EU and its Member States lies, above all, in confirming and implementing capabilities on the ground that will make it possible to improve the evaluation of crisis situations, take decisions more rapidly and act more decisively; calls for the sustained political will of all Member States and EU institutions in this process in order to ensure that the Union is prepared to face the broad range of military and non-military threats; reiterates the call for deeper cooperation with international organisations, such as, but not limited to, the UN, the African Union, and its peacekeeping missions in joint theatres, and the OSCE on security; calls on the EEAS to report regularly and comprehensively on the implementation of the Strategic Compass to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence; stresses the importance of the meaningful involvement of civil society in the formulation of the CSDP; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Strongly welcomes the EUR 18 billion support package agreed by the EU in December 2022 and sees it as proof of the unwavering support for Ukraine by the EU and its Member States and as a powerful testament that this support will continue for as long as it is needed; |
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11.

| 12. | Welcomes the significant use of the EPF throughout 2022 to support partners in preventing conflict, preserving peace, and strengthening international security and stability; calls on Member States to increase the EPF’s budget to enable the EU to strengthen the resilience and defence capabilities of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia; recalls the need for military assistance and weapons deliveries by the EPF to meet the growing operational requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces while fully complying with the EU Common Position on arms exports, international human rights law and humanitarian law, as well as providing adequate transparency and accountability; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls on the EU to support the principles of the Kyiv Security Compact as an immediate interim solution for Ukraine’s security; |
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13.

| 14. | Welcomes the Council’s decision of December 2022 to increase the EPF budget and calls for its swift implementation but stresses that this increase will probably not suffice and hence reiterates the need to further raise the ceiling of the EPF and to create a separate EPF envelope for Ukraine that guarantees adequate support for the country; underlines the need to ensure continuity with the support provided to African partners, considering the number of crises the continent is facing and not to neglect other priority regions, including our immediate neighbourhood; calls for a significant increase in all aspects of military support, including training and information sharing with other particularly vulnerable countries such as the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkan countries; calls for all EPF support for the provision of equipment to also contribute to the strengthening of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and, when relevant for European sovereignty, to be carried out in coordination with all the EU’s partners, including NATO, to increase efficiency and avoid unnecessary duplication; reiterates that the EPF also functions as a funding option for the common costs of military operations within the CSDP; concurs with the Strategic Compass that the scope of common costs can be expanded to allow greater EPF utilisation and incentivise force generation for CSDP military missions and operations; calls for effective evaluation of the implementation of EPF assistance measures and their impact on conflict dynamics in the partner countries; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Highlights the importance of PESCO in improving the EU’s defence capabilities; regrets the fact that Member States are still not making full use of the PESCO framework and that progress on implementation still falls far short of expectations; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to conduct a thorough review of the results of PESCO projects and their prospects, which should also include the possibility of merging, regrouping and even closing projects that lack sufficient progress and redirecting efforts towards a small number of priority projects intended to lead to concrete actions as stated in the Strategic Compass; strongly regrets that Parliament is not in a situation to exercise proper scrutiny of PESCO projects; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Welcomes the importance of situational awareness and strategic foresight rooted in intelligence-based capacities within the Strategic Compass; underlines the importance of accurate and timely intelligence for effective EU decision-making and crisis management as well as the need to significantly enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation among the Member States, including at Union level, and with like-minded partners; calls for the creation of intelligence units, where necessary, in CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU Intelligence and Analysis Centre (EU IntCen), EUMS, MPCC and CPCC; calls for all CSDP missions and operations to enhance their cooperation and information sharing with the EU IntCen, EUMS, MPCC and CPCC; underlines the importance of secure communications for reliable intelligence; calls for the continuous flow of intelligence from Member States to the EU on foreign and security issues occurring outside the Union; calls for the strengthening of the EU IntCen and the EEAS Crisis Response Centre by enhancing its resources and capabilities with the aim of Member States sharing intelligence safely, formulating a common strategic culture and providing strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; notes the important work conducted by the European Union Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) and underlines that the EU must have adequate resources in the fields of space imagery and intelligence-gathering, notably in order to provide high-resolution satellite imaging in support of CSDP missions and operations; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Stresses the need to substantially strengthen the society-wide focus on resilience and the response to hybrid threats; calls for existing Union instruments to be made operational so that they can contribute more effectively to preventing and countering hybrid threats; welcomes the joint communication on an EU cyber defence policy and the decision to develop an EU hybrid toolbox for a coordinated response to hybrid campaigns; calls on the EU and its Member States to improve their capabilities to identify hybrid threats; stresses the need to further develop the EU’s cyber-defence policy and capabilities, including the setting up of cyber rapid response teams; emphasises the need to fight adverse disinformation and propaganda; underlines the need to pay special attention to the EEAS’s assets, premises and activities abroad and the safety of EU staff delegated to non-democratic countries with repressive regimes; reiterates the urgent need to develop their strategic communication capabilities including secure communication systems and a rapid reaction capacity; emphasises the need to assist, in close cooperation with NATO, partner countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, to effectively combat cyberattacks and hybrid warfare; stresses that to combat the increasing threats and the rise of anti-European narratives by third countries, the EU has to step up its efforts to provide support, training and capacity-building with like-minded partner countries; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Calls for additional support in training and capacity building in border and crisis management for countries affected by significant migration flows, including those countries faced with inflows of Russian citizens fleeing the Russian Federation since the mobilisation, while fully respecting their fundamental rights, especially for Member States and countries with existing CSDP missions or operations present on their territory; stresses that resilience in the digital age also depends on reducing dependencies for critical materials such as rare earth metals, critical components such as chips, and critical technologies such as drones and autonomous military equipment; highlights that semi-autonomous and autonomous drones are increasingly used in both military operations and in the maintenance and security of critical infrastructure installations; is deeply concerned by their supply and malicious use; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Stresses that dependence on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in critical sectors, including energy, represents a grave security risk for the EU; calls on the EU to prioritise reducing this dependence and to work with our democratic allies to ensure secure and resilient supply chains; notes the need for comprehensive assessment and actions to secure offshore oil and gas pipelines, cables and other strategic infrastructure assets; calls on the EU and its Member States to take decisive action in the EU energy market to ensure a stable energy supply; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Highlights the need to secure and protect critical European infrastructure and supply chains, such as those in the energy, electricity, communication, transport or industrial sectors from sabotage and foreign interference and put in place effective monitoring and surveillance systems; condemns the suspected sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea and calls for a thorough investigation and proportionate response; stresses the importance of including the protection of undersea infrastructure, such as pipelines and fibre-optic cables, as a priority; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Welcomes the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap, which recognises climate change as a ‘threat multiplier that fundamentally affects our long-term security’ and sets out concrete actions to address the increasingly important climate and security nexus; recommends that climate change implications be considered during the planning and implementation of CSDP missions and operations; underlines the need to increase investments in ‘green’ defence, in particular by dedicating a higher share of military and dual-technology innovation to carbon-neutral fuels and propulsion systems for military aircraft, ships and other vehicles; underlines that the EU’s external action and the armed forces of the Member States should work towards reducing their own carbon footprint to mitigate their effect on climate change and the environment; reiterates its call for the EU to adopt an approach incorporating the energy, carbon and environmental footprint by design when implementing relevant EU funds; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Notes the emerging security challenges in the Arctic caused by the changing environment, the increasing militarisation and the growing geopolitical interest in the region; underlines the need to include the EU’s Arctic policy in the CSDP; stresses that the EU must engage in effective cooperation with NATO, including cooperation on situational awareness; stresses that the Arctic must remain an area of peaceful cooperation, while taking into account the new security realities resulting from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, and warns against increased militarisation of the region; encourages EU Member States to use PESCO as a platform to promote enhanced search-and-rescue training and exercises in the Arctic, as well as better crisis management of environmental disasters, such as oil spills; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Underlines the necessity of further strengthening the EU’s role as a global maritime security provider; welcomes the revision of the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy and stresses the need for the revised strategy to be aligned with the Strategic Compass and to reflect new opportunities and challenges; believes that similar reviews should be carried out on other EU policies, and hence welcomes the forthcoming communication on space and the CSDP, expected for early 2023; stresses that, given the growing geopolitical tensions at sea, the EU must safeguard freedom of navigation and ensure that its external maritime borders are monitored effectively to prevent illegal activities; calls on the Member States to consolidate their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the maritime sector; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Recognises the significance of coordinated maritime presences (CMP) as a crucial tool in strengthening EU maritime security engagements around the world; underlines the contribution of the pilot CMP in the Gulf of Guinea to reducing maritime security incidents and welcomes its extension until 2024; welcomes the expansion of the CMP to the North-West of the Indian Ocean; underlines the importance of close cooperation and complementary action with other CSDP operations in the region, including the EU NAVFOR Atalanta operation, among others; supports the valuable work of the CSDP missions EUBAM Libya and EU NAVFOR MED IRINI, which are contributing to sustainable peace, security and stability; continues to support, in particular, IRINI’s core task in enforcing the arms embargo on Libya imposed by the UN; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Stresses the urgent need to significantly increase investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, particularly in multilateral approaches; stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European level on arms exports, especially in anticipation of a period of increased defence spending; points to the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and acknowledge their competences in their defence acquisition policies; calls on the Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (32) as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1560 (33), and to strictly implement criterion 4 on regional stability and halt arms export licensing if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient might use the arms aggressively against another country, in general, and the Member States, in particular; acknowledges the Member States’ competences in their defence procurement policies; underlines the importance of a thorough assessment of applications for authorisation to export technology and military equipment; laments the use of Russian hypersonic missiles in Ukraine and believes that the EU should seek to help prevent an international hypersonic missile arms race; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Recalls the need to define arms export policies as part of security policy and to urgently establish an effective EU-level arms export policy which guarantees that the Member States fully comply with the eight legally binding criteria on arms exports, that their national exports do not fuel regional tensions or undermine the security of other Member States, allies, partners or of the EU as a whole, while fully supporting the legitimate security and defence needs of allies and partner countries, especially those whose territorial integrity is violated and which are exercising their right to self-defence as enshrined in the UN Charter; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Reaffirms its full support for the commitment by the EU and its Member States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing global rules-based non-proliferation efforts; expresses deep concern that no outcome was reached at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NPT due to Russia’s unwillingness to join the consensus; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Notes that the Member States may assess the reform of the decision-making process with a view to realising considerable untapped potential within the Treaties, in particular by activating Article 31 TEU extending qualified majority voting (QMV) to areas relating to the CSDP and pursuing full use of the ‘passerelle clauses’ and the scope of articles that enhance EU solidarity and mutual assistance in the event of crises and secure EU sovereignty; proposes that changes to the Treaties be considered in the case of the CSDP, to be discussed and decided upon within a convention following up on the Conference on the Future of Europe, which should address (1) switching from unanimity to QMV for Council decisions with military implications with the exception of the mutual defence clause in Article 42(7), on defence matters for situations where passerelle clauses do not apply, and only in the case of the dispatch of military equipment or CSDP missions that do not involve an executive mandate, (2) introduction of provisions in Articles 42 and 46 TEU enabling the joint procurement of defence equipment and other security-related spending from the budget of the Union as well as the establishment of joint and permanently stationed multinational military units including command structures, and (3) revision of Article 346 TFEU in order to limit possibilities for EUMS to deviate from the provisions of the Procurement Directive as well as to introduce the requirement of justification for such deviations to be assessed by the Commission and communicated to Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to unleash the full potential of the provisions of the Treaty relating to CSDP and to give serious consideration to implementation arrangements for Article 44 TEU on entrusting the implementation of a CSDP task to a group of Member States to make the CSDP more flexible and efficient in the field, while maintaining a strong collective European dimension; stresses the importance of continuing to carry out exercises; highlights the importance of continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) TEU on mutual assistance in the short run and to clarify the coherence between this and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering that not all EU Member States are NATO members; stresses that the conditions for activating Article 42(7) and the arrangements for providing the assistance required have never been clearly defined; underlines that a Treaty modification could define terrorist attacks, hybrid attacks, disinformation campaigns and economic coercion by third countries as elements that would trigger Article 42(7) TEU; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Strengthening capabilities by increased, joint and smarter spending

| 30. | Welcomes the EU’s ambition to strengthen its military and civilian capabilities; stresses the need to make full and better use of EU initiatives and budgets, notably the envisaged regulations on EDIRPA and EDIP, EDF, PESCO, CARD and Military Mobility as well as the Civilian CSDP Compact, in order to close critical capability gaps and ensure swift deployability of armed forces, replenish depleted stocks, reduce fragmentation in the defence-procurement sector, achieve full interoperability of our forces, reinforce the EDTIB’s supply chains by excluding state-affiliated enterprises from non-partner states that may pose a risk to the EDTIB’s resilience, innovative character and competitiveness via potential export controls or intellectual property theft via espionage; urges maximum consistency between these initiatives to prevent overlaps and guarantee efficient public investments, in particular between PESCO and EDF projects, for which the linkages need to be clarified; welcomes the action plan on synergies between civil, defence and space industries and calls for its implementation to be stepped up; encourages technology transfers from the defence sector to the civilian sector; calls on the Member States to focus, in the process of strengthening the EU’s military abilities, on the needs of military personnel and specialised training to deal with emerging issues (e.g. climate change); underlines that any progress in this key field would also strengthen the European pillar within NATO; is of the view that the valuable contribution of the armed forces during the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the importance of the use of Member States’ military assets and capabilities in support of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Welcomes Member States’ announcements concerning defence investment plans aimed at military procurement and improvement of their defence forces; building on the EDF model and as highlighted in the Joint Communication on defence investment gaps; considers it crucial to fill the identified defence investment gaps such as replenishing stockpiles, in particular replacing Soviet-era systems, reinforcing air and missile defence systems, including a discussion on the feasibility of a European-wide anti-ballistic missile shield and calls for liaison with NATO’s European Sky Shield Initiative, operationalising the ‘Eurodrone’, expanding existing main battle tank and armoured vehicle capabilities, strengthening Europe’s ship-building capacity and naval forces, intensifying maritime cooperation to counter hybrid threats against offshore cables and pipelines that are vital to Europe’s energy and connectivity security, improving satellite-based secure connectivity, investing in industry partnerships that prioritise collaboration with SMEs and stronger investment in research and development (R&D) while contributing to a stronger European cyber-defence ecosystem and expanding the EU’s military mobility programme; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Underlines the need to complement the capability development initiatives with joint procurement mechanisms; stresses that joint procurement of defence products developed and manufactured in Europe is an essential tool for efficient public spending and therefore urges the Member States to utilise the EDIRPA to jointly procure defence products and avoid competition, facilitate cost savings, strengthen the EDTIB and promote interoperability; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Urges the Member States to commit to a significant increase in funding for the envisaged joint EU procurement mechanisms, such as the EDIRPA and the EDIP, by providing adequate funding and to take swift and thorough action in this crucial field while ensuring interoperability with NATO; considers that the rules applicable to the EDIRPA should be similar to those adopted for the European Defence Fund; recalls that the financial support provided for by the EDIRPA and the future EDIP should benefit European industry as a matter of priority; calls on the Member States to adopt it as soon as possible following the completion of negotiations between Parliament, the Council and the Commission; calls on the Council to provide it with the necessary financial support; considers that the rules applicable to the EDIRPA should be similar to those adopted for the European Defence Fund, which have proved their worth, particularly as regards the involvement of third countries; calls on the Member States to work on procuring and developing defence capabilities designed and produced within the EU; considers that the VAT exemption alone will not be sufficient to make the future EDIP decisive in supporting the EDTIB; calls on the Commission to consider various financial incentive mechanisms to support the EDTIB; urges the VP/HR and the Member States to establish another off-budget financial facility which would pool parts of national defence budgets and urgently address the entire life-cycle of military capabilities at EU level to ensure they are effectively and efficiently implemented from collaborative research and development and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Underlines the urgent need to establish a truly European defence equipment market; underlines the need for increased financial support for EU research and development efforts and production in high-tech defence systems that would otherwise be too expensive for individual Member States so as to ensure that the EDTIB remains competitive, is able to meet armed forces’ real needs, demands and increasing ambitions, adapts to emerging threats, and reduces reliance on foreign parties; points out that in addition to capability development, the EDF should also contribute to a consolidation of the EDTIB; calls for the evaluation of the EDF before the mid-term review of the MFF, with a view to strengthening its budget if necessary; encourages the establishment of further initiatives to increase the involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises and innovation in the defence and military industry; calls for the further development of new technologies such as AI and quantum computing through strong links between military and civilian innovation; stresses the importance of reducing dependence on critical technologies and value chains in order for the EU to move towards better operational capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Highlights the positive effects of investments in the defence industry in economic and technological terms; calls for more and smarter defence investments in order to foster industrial cooperation, cost savings and increased interoperability; reaffirms that acting within the EU framework is a way to reduce fragmentation and avoid duplications; calls for synergies with other EU financial instruments to be leveraged and access to private funding for the defence industry to be facilitated; recalls that the EDF and PESCO are crucial to the development of a genuine European Defence Union by enhancing defence cooperation between Member States; calls for other EU policies to be consistent with the EU’s efforts to strengthen the defence industry; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Calls for a swift revision of the MFF in order to provide the necessary funds for EU instruments in the area of defence; calls, in this context, for the strengthening of the EDF; encourages the EU to assess when a revision of the MFF would be appropriate; stresses that any additional resources allocated to meet the NATO target of spending 2 % of GDP on defence should be used in a coordinated and cooperative manner by EU NATO members; calls for the strengthening of the industries’ access to private funding to ensure that the European defence industry has sufficient access to public and private finance and investment on a sustainable basis; calls on the Commission to consider developing parameters for a financial product that aims to support investments in European security including actions by the defence industry; calls for incentivising investments in critical sectors, such as cyber; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Reinforcing CSDP missions and operations

| 37. | Supports the review and reinforcement of all civilian CSDP missions and military operations to align them more closely with the real needs of the countries concerned; supports improving force generation and capacity building for all CSDP missions and operations, particularly those affected by the deteriorating threat landscape, by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, as well as the necessary resources, staffing, funding, training, strategic communication tools and equipment to meet the requirements of more targeted mission objectives; recognises the need for effective training and operational capabilities to keep pace with the evolving threat environment; stresses the need to strengthen their resilience and effectiveness by enabling them to better address hybrid security challenges, such as through better coordination with other EU actors and Justice and Home Affairs Agencies, as well as like-minded partners outside the EU, enhancing strategic communication and further investing in cyber-defence capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Considers it important that CSDP missions and operations are based on a clear understanding of the types of crisis and conflict the EU seeks to respond to with civilian and military instruments, especially where others are not willing or able to intervene or in hostile or non-permissive environments; recalls that all EU engagements must be credible in the eyes of local and regional authorities, especially since other, often more malign, parties are more than willing to step in to fill any gaps; recalls that missions must pay special attention to conflict dynamics, robust risk assessment and mitigation processes, and must include more impact-based monitoring and evaluation of CSDP interventions as well as more consultation and feedback mechanisms; stresses the particular need for military operations to have sunset provisions so as to allow a sustainable exit; notes that out of the eight current military operations, only three have an executive mandate; recalls the EU’s overall engagement in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa through six civilian missions and six military operations; |
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38.

| 39. | Calls for the adoption of a new Civilian CSDP Compact by mid-2023 that will provide objectives on the type, number and size of civilian missions and calls for a civilian capability development process to be set up by 2024, as stipulated by the Strategic Compass; recalls that it is crucial that the Civilian CSDP Compact 2.0 be adopted during the first half of 2023 to ensure continuity in the process of the development of civilian capacities; invites the EEAS to re-visit the participation agreements with third countries with the aim of strengthening their participation in CSDP missions; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Stresses the urgent need to establish the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations, in particular with regard to the use of the future Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC); demands that its Full Operational Capability should be reached immediately, in line with the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018, which envisaged a 2020 deadline; also demands that the MPCC’s staffing level should be increased considerably up to 250 personnel; believes that one of the existing four national Operational Headquarters should be designed as fall-back option; reiterates its call to enable the secure exchange of classified information, including with Member States and CSDP missions or operations; stresses the need for the MPCC to plan and conduct all military missions with a clear chain of command and to be provided with the necessary personnel, funds and infrastructure; points out that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine renders progress in that regard more urgent; |
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40.

| 41. | Is concerned about the increasing manipulation of information, disinformation and hybrid threats and attacks stemming in particular from Russia and China but also from other actors, affecting several theatres and CSDP missions and operations directly; stresses the need for the EU to increase cooperation with like-minded partner countries and to provide support, training and capacity building with them to counter hostile foreign information manipulation and interference; calls on the EEAS to take concrete steps to support CSDP missions and operations fighting and countering disinformation and propaganda as well as to strengthen the capacities of the StratCom division including its task forces; |
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41.

| 42. | Is concerned by the persistent structural problem of ensuring that CSDP missions and operations are fully staffed; urges the Member States to follow through on their decisions to launch missions and operations by providing the necessary personnel; recalls that the Strategic Compass underlines that CSDP missions and operations require better trained personnel; strongly urges all Member States to fulfil their pledges so as to match their actual engagement to their ambitions; urges the EU to provide personnel engaged in missions and operations with adequate equipment and training; strongly urges the Member States to take into account the social and working rights of military personnel when they are trained and deployed together in an EU framework; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Calls, given its importance for the EU’s security and defence architecture, for the operationalisation of the VP/HR’s proposal for the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) enshrined in the Strategic Compass to be implemented as soon as possible and by 2025 at the latest, so as to ensure the ability to respond rapidly and decisively during crises, and to serve and protect the EU’s citizens, interests and values across the world; calls on the Member States to commit to substantially narrowing critical gaps in strategic enablers by 2025, in particular those linked to the RDC; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Underlines the need for gender equality and women’s rights to be a core component of security and defence measures; strongly condemns war crimes committed against civilian populations, including the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to expedite the implementation of the gender-related commitments of the Strategic Compass to ensure effective gender mainstreaming; emphasises the importance of cybersecurity measures to monitor and prevent trafficking of women affected by conflict; encourages the Member States to reduce career barriers for women within their defence forces; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Highlights that women’s participation in CSDP missions and operations contributes to their effectiveness and is a driver of the EU’s credibility as a proponent of equal rights for men and women worldwide, while recalling the EU’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) III (2020-2024), which requires systematic integration of a gender perspective in all EU policies and external actions including the CSDP; urges the EEAS to promote an increase in the number of women in CSDP military operations in particular and a better gender balance in the personnel and leadership of CSDP missions and operations; considers a zero-tolerance approach to sexual and gender-based harassment and sexual exploitation within all CSDP missions and operations to be paramount; emphasises the important work of gender advisers in CSDP missions and operations and the need to finance them; calls for collaboration between CSDP missions and operations and the European Institute for Gender Equality; calls on the EEAS to report on its progress in gender-related actions to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE); |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Recognises the important role of young people and youth organisations in maintaining and promoting peace and security; calls on the EEAS to commit to more systematically integrating young people into its youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda, and pursuing and adopting a comprehensive strategic framework for the implementation of the YPS agenda; calls on the EEAS to involve young people as partners in the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Welcomes the launch of the non-executive CSDP military assistance mission for Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine); expects it to allow for the training of the Ukrainian armed forces in a flexible way through strategic advice, non-executive support, capacity building, and overall military support to combat Russian aggression and assist in the liberation of the occupied regions of Ukraine; considers that EUMAM will be effective provided that the MPCC is reinforced, and will be able to exercise strategic command and control over the mission; calls on the EEAS to open this mission to the participation of third states; calls on the Member States to provide the necessary support for its implementation; stresses the importance of communicating to the Ukrainian people that the EU will remain by their side throughout the period of Russian aggression; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Commends and underlines the importance of the work of the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine); notes its new tasks, which include providing support to law enforcement agencies to facilitate the flow of refugees from Ukraine to neighbouring Member States, the entry of humanitarian aid into Ukraine and advice, training and support to rule of law institutions to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of international crimes; calls for the review and strengthening of the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in order to adapt to the new geopolitical reality; calls for the strengthening of the staffing, response capability, resources and strategic communication of CSDP missions and operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine and Georgia and the reinforcement of the EU’s diplomatic presence in the Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Welcomes the cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans, including through the EUFOR Althea and the Kosovo Force operations; recalls that the lessons learned from both operations add substantial value to all current and future military and civilian CSDP missions and operations; calls for the strengthening of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina in close cooperation with NATO and other allies, in order to guarantee the necessary stability for the country and the whole region; welcomes the EU’s unequivocal support for the extension of EUFOR Althea’s mandate; underlines the need to bilaterally enhance military-security cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina in parallel with the EUFOR framework; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Stresses the need for continued close cooperation with African and international partners in a bid to ensure a collective effort to achieve stabilisation and development, involving in particular the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the UN and international financial institutions, as well as other key bilateral and regional players; underlines the EU’s global commitment in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa through eight civilian (EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Somalia) as well as military (EUTM Mali, EUTM Somalia, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, EU NAVFOR MED IRINI, EUMPM Niger) missions; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Expresses deep concern about developments in the Sahel region and the recent coups d’état in the region; highlights the strategic importance of that region to the EU; condemns the increasing presence of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group in the Sahel and other parts of the African continent; firmly believes that the latter’s involvement in West Africa runs counter to the objective of bringing peace, security and stability to the region; acknowledges that the various international missions in the Sahel have not yet achieved their primary goal of lasting peace in the Sahel region and that a reflection process on the mandates and roles of international missions and policies is therefore needed; expresses similar concern over the increased presence and activity of Islamist terrorist groups, in particular Al-Qaeda, Daesh and Al-Shabaab in the Middle East and Africa; calls for more joint action and policy coherence between different EU and partner interventions in the Sahel; deplores the deteriorating security environment in Mali and welcomes the decision to suspend all operational training and delivery of military equipment to the country; calls on the EU and its Member States to provide effective assistance tailored to the needs of the countries concerned; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Believes that any international security support in the region must prioritise improving the protection of civilians, alleviating conflict dynamics, and promoting good governance of the security sector; emphasises the need for more political engagement with the relevant governments to ensure greater transparency, to combat corruption, cultivate inclusivity and engage with citizens in an effort to curb the explosion of armed and ethnic conflicts; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Welcomes the renewal of the CSDP EUCAP Sahel for two years and insists on the importance of coordinating with EUBAM Libya for the EU-led development of the border capacities of the Sahel states; calls for joint efforts between the EU and the UN to address the destabilisation and violence in Mali and to work with local forces to promote stability and security; takes note of the extension and refocusing of the EUAM and EUTM in the CAR and remains very concerned about the continuing deterioration of the political and security situation there; welcomes the progress already made by the EUTM Mozambique and calls on the EEAS to consider delivering lethal weapons under the EPF to Mozambican forces and to speed up the delivery of equipment; calls for a broad public debate about the EU’s involvement in Mozambique and for public discussion of what a meaningful integrated approach that addresses the root causes of unrest in Cabo Delgado could look like; recalls reports about systematic and violent attacks by security forces against large swathes of the local population, forceful displacements by security forces, high levels of inequality, regional neglect by the central government, conflicts over natural resources, high levels of corruption and the violations of various rights; supports the reform of the Mozambican armed forces and insists on the need to pursue an integrated approach to the crisis in Cabo Delgado; welcomes EPF assistance for the Nigerien armed forces and underlines the need to provide CSDP military support to Niger; calls on the Council to step up coordinated maritime operations in the Gulf of Guinea; calls for the extension of EU NAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate, which is set to expire at the end of 2022, in order to further combat piracy; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Regrets the increasing inadequacy of the EUTM missions that were intended to meet the security challenges of the Sahel and Central African countries (Mali and the CAR); calls for a thorough review of the objectives and guiding principles of EUTMs; considers that EUTM mandates should be extended to accompanying measures in particular, in order to enable EU advisers on the ground to verify as accurately as possible the extent to which training programmes have been properly implemented and are in line with the operational needs of the local armed forces; underlines the added value of advisory missions to the mission’s command structures and accordingly encourages the participation of Member States in EUTMs, particularly in an advisory capacity where incoming officers would make it possible to provide significant support to the conduct of operations, as well as multilateral military assistance; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Welcomes the Council decision establishing the military partnership mission to support Niger (EUMPM Niger), aimed at enhancing the ability of the Niger Armed Forces to contain the threats to the country, protect the population in the country and ensure a safe and secure environment, in compliance with human rights law and international humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Stresses, with regard to the maritime component of IRINI, the international obligations regarding search and rescue of people in distress at sea; calls on Member States to ensure that IRINI acts in full compliance with maritime law, in particular obligations related to search and rescue; reiterates its grave concern at the fate of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Libya, whose already dramatic situation continues to deteriorate; calls on the Libyan authorities and militias to close detention facilities for migrants; deplores the fact that the withdrawal of ships from any given area with a significant presence of migrants is envisaged; demands clarification of the envisaged decision-making process and modalities on any future decision related to the so-called ‘pull factor effect’, for which there is currently no scientific evidence; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Reiterates its call on the EU to take full advantage of its position and reputation in the Indo-Pacific as a credible and autonomous global actor for peace amid the growing geopolitical competition between global and regional powers in the region; recalls that the added value of EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific lies in its comprehensive range of civilian and military assistance measures, including well-developed non-military contributions; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Expresses grave concern over China’s rapid military build-up in the South China Sea as well as its continued military pressure, assault exercises, airspace violations and other grey-zone military actions including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan; urges China to halt all these actions, which pose a threat to the stability of the entire region and have, overall, a direct impact on European security and prosperity; reiterates its support for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Strongly welcomes the robust references to EU cooperation in both Japan’s recent update of its National Security Strategy and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy; reiterates the strong partnership with both Japan and South Korea and calls on the EU to further deepen its military and defence cooperation with both key partners; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Vehemently condemns the numerous missile tests conducted by North Korea in 2022 and underlines the need for the international community to increase efforts to contain North Korea and prevent it from conducting a further nuclear test in 2023, which would be a serious escalation and a threat to regional and global security; underlines the particular responsibility of China and Russia when it comes to North Korea and calls on them to use their influence to prevent any further escalation; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Expresses its serious concern about the delivery of weapons by North Korea to the Wagner Group and underlines that this further highlights the need for the EU and its Member States to not only increase their focus on the Korean peninsula but on the Indo-Pacific region as a whole; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Strongly condemns Iran for supplying Russia with drones and missiles to use in its illegal war against Ukraine, and recalls that in doing so it is violating UN Security Council Resolution 2231(2015); welcomes Council’s decision of 12 December 2022 to adopt further sanctions against Iran both for the ongoing violations of the human rights of its own people as well as for Iran’s active support to Russia, which is being used against the Ukrainian people; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Calls on the Council and the EEAS to include a cultural heritage protection component to its CSDP missions and operations in order to provide assistance and education to local partners in addressing security challenges related to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage; calls on the EU to address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage and clamp down on the smuggling of cultural artefacts, especially in conflict zones; notes that depriving societies of their cultural heritage and historical roots makes them more vulnerable to radicalisation; calls on the EU to develop a broad strategy to counteract such threats; recalls that EUAM Iraq is the only CSDP mission that has a cultural heritage protection component; expects EUAM Iraq to completely fulfil all dimensions of its mandate, including the protection of cultural heritage and the fight against artefact trafficking; calls for such provisions to be generalised to all CSDP mission or operation mandates; |
| --- | --- |

64.

Systematisation of security and defence partnerships

| 65. | Calls for the strengthening, when strategically relevant, of security and defence partnerships with like-minded partners worldwide to meet the EU’s level of ambition as a security provider; considers it essential to include security and defence issues more systematically in the EU’s political dialogues with like-minded partners; welcomes plans to convene the first ever EU Security and Defence Partnership Forum; calls for a more assertive, unified, and consistent position vis-à-vis non-democratic states that threaten European security and the international order; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Underlines the fundamental shared democratic values at the heart of the EU and NATO; calls for the deepening of EU-NATO relations on the basis of the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity, mutual openness and transparency, in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members; welcomes the third EU-NATO Joint Declaration and underlines the importance of further steps aimed at deepening this partnership, building on the contents of the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept and on concrete steps to further enhance cooperation, especially in the fields of military mobility, dual-use infrastructure and resilience as well as increased joint exercises; underlines the need to strongly upgrade the strategic partnership with NATO to base it on the strengthening of political unity and solidarity and enhanced political dialogue on all aspects of common challenges and strategically relevant issues, including challenges related to climate change and rapid digitalisation; encourages coordinated operational responses in conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms to counter common emerging threats in geographical zones and areas of common interest; points out that EU capability development also strengthens the European pillar within NATO and contributes accordingly to transatlantic security; notes with concern the deep and persistent periods of tension between EU Member States and Türkiye, a NATO ally, which are hampering cooperation between the EU and NATO; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | While recognising the importance and potential of a strategic partnership with Türkiye, regrets Türkiye’s overall destabilising role in many areas of concern for the EU and in its neighbourhoods, which threatens regional peace, security and stability; is extremely concerned by, and strongly condemns, Türkiye’s illegal activities and threats of military action against EU Member States, in particular Greece and Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean; deplores the fact that despite de-escalation efforts, Türkiye continues its unilateral provocative actions and non-compliance with the UN Security Council resolution on the arms embargo on Libya with regard to operation IRINI, violating international law including UNCLOS and the sovereign rights of EU Member States in the area; reiterates the EU’s condemnation of the signature of the two memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on comprehensive security and military cooperation and on the delimitation of maritime zones, which are against international law; reiterates the EU’s readiness to use all instruments and options at its disposal, including those under Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States, as well as to uphold regional stability; notes that Türkiye is increasingly present in areas where the EU has key security interests and CSDP missions, and calls upon Türkiye to refrain from undermining EU interests and missions in these areas; reiterates its call on Türkiye to align with the EU sanctions against Russia; calls on Member States to fully comply with Common Position 2008/944/CFSP in relation to Türkiye, including the strict application of criterion 4 on regional stability; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Strongly supports NATO’s Open Door Policy; stresses the importance of the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO as it would advance the security both of the EU and of NATO Allies; welcomes the swift ratification by most NATO Allies of the Finnish and Swedish NATO accession protocols and deplores the fact that Türkiye has still not ratified the applications of Sweden and Finland to join NATO; emphasises the need to address the security and defence concerns of Member States which are not part of NATO; invites the EU and NATO to reinforce cooperation on supporting the capacity-building of our partners; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Considers synergies and coherence with the implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass essential, particularly in the areas of countering aggression against Ukraine that is being waged by Russia and countering Russia’s accomplice the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, addressing the challenges posed by China’s coercive policies, the spread of malign disinformation, as well as cyber-defence, hybrid threats and support for partners; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Emphasises the importance of developing coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities to boost the security of the Euro-Atlantic area in line with the principle of the single set of forces; calls on the EU and NATO to maintain global technological leadership in military capabilities; stresses the need to ensure coherence of output between respective EU and NATO capability development planning processes; underlines the need for the EU to develop its own defence capabilities and strategic autonomy in order to also enhance its capacity to be a stronger partner to its allies; calls on the EU NATO Member States to increase their military budgets to at least 2 % of GDP in line with NATO guidelines; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Welcomes the participation of the US, Canada and Norway in the PESCO project on Military Mobility, which is essential for the defence of Europe and important to increase coherence between the respective efforts of the EU and NATO to facilitate the movement of military forces; recalls nevertheless that third country participation in individual PESCO projects must be decided on a case-by-case basis, when such participation is in the EU’s strategic interest; welcomes the United Kingdom’s recent application to join the PESCO project on Military Mobility; reminds participating Member States to PESCO of the need for swift implementation of their operational and collaborative commitments; welcomes the EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility; welcomes the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 as presented by the Commission and the VP/HR on 10 November 2022 and calls for its swift implementation in synergy with the PESCO project on Military Mobility; calls for the strengthening of the Connecting Europe Facility regarding military mobility projects; calls on Member States to act to simplify and harmonise procedures for military mobility and shorten the timelines for granting permission to enable the EU Member States to act faster and increase the efficiency of response; stresses that the new Military Mobility Action Plan must ensure that requirements in the areas of infrastructure, resilience and logistics are assessed from a military strategy perspective; underlines the need for additional funding for this flagship EU-NATO cooperation initiative; calls on the EU to consider inviting Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova to participate in PESCO projects such as military mobility; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Highlights the importance of the EU’s close relationship with the United States, which is based on the shared values of democracy, freedom and the rule of law; values the United States’ and its current administration’s commitment and engagement to the territorial defence of Europe, especially in the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine that threatens the whole continent; takes note of the fact that the United States is also being challenged in the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s increasing military posturing stresses that EU Member States need to step up their efforts to improve European defence capabilities in order to pave the way for burden shifting in the long run, with the EU taking more responsibility for its defence; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Welcomes the EU-US security and defence dialogue as an important milestone in closer transatlantic cooperation; encourages the VP/HR to devote particular attention to security in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods in this dialogue, to include in the discussion areas such as mutual security and defence initiatives, CSDP missions and operations, disarmament and non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, improving information exchange among intelligence services, the impact of disruptive technologies, climate change, hybrid threats, cyber-defence, military mobility, crisis management and the relationship with strategic competitors; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Reiterates its call for institutionalised security and defence cooperation with the United Kingdom; encourages the United Kingdom to seriously engage with the EU on pressing strategic challenges by ensuring complementarity and synergies of actions; encourages the VP/HR to invite the United Kingdom, on an ad hoc basis, to informal Council meetings of foreign affairs (and defence) ministers to exchange views on issues of common concern while fully protecting the EU’s decision-making autonomy; points out that the parallel projects for developing future combat air systems are an inefficient use of resources and therefore recommends that both projects should be merged; welcomes the UK’s support for Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Expresses strong concern about the increased instability of our neighbourhood, which often is the result of deliberate actions by malign actors who, through various actions, are weakening democratic reforms in order to ultimately weaken the EU; underlines that the EU’s security is closely interlinked with the security of our immediate neighbours in the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood as well as in the Western Balkans; calls for deeper military-security cooperation with like-minded Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, including by strengthening the security dimension of the EaP and for enhanced security and defence policy dialogues, particularly with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; calls for increased cooperation in the security and defence field with partners in the Southern Neighbourhood; calls on the EU to play a significant role in the Mediterranean, having become an actor with the ability to guarantee the stability of the region, including in relation to energy security; calls for enhanced cooperation with partner countries in the Mediterranean to combat extremism, terrorism, human trafficking and the illicit trade in weapons; |
| --- | --- |

75.

| 76. | Calls for the strengthening of EU-NATO cooperation on the Alliance’s eastern flank and for an increase in European military personnel in the Black Sea; believes it essential to recognise and capitalise on the strategic position of the Black Sea in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine and to increase investment in European military projects in the region, including when it comes to modernising and strengthening its military industry and infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Expresses deep concern about the increasing tensions and recurrent outbreaks of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, where Armenia has been attacked within its internationally recognised borders and where Russia has not played a stabilising role; urges the VP/HR to fully engage in efforts to uphold the ceasefire; welcomes the launch of the civilian EU monitoring capacity in Armenia and the deployment of a transitional planning assistance team to enhance the EU’s awareness of the security situation, and to contribute to the planning and preparation of a possible civilian CSDP mission in the country; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Stresses that Russia is still not fully complying with the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia of 12 August 2008; strongly condemns Russia’s illegal military presence in, and occupation of, the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia; calls on the EEAS to prepare a thorough report of violations of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire agreement, an agreement for which the EU bears special responsibility as the mediator, identify and communicate clearly the provisions which have still not been fulfilled by the Russian Federation and submit recommendations, which could induce the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations, notably to withdraw its military forces from Georgia’s occupied territories and allow the establishment of an international security mechanism in these territories, and to allow the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia, pursuant to its mandate; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Underlines the importance of close alignment with CFSP positions by EU candidate and potential candidate countries; with regard to the Western Balkans, brings attention to Serbia’s relationship with Russia and its lack of condemnation of Russia’s unjustified and illegitimate actions against Ukraine and the consequences of this relationship in the Western Balkans; calls for stronger military security, including civilian/military as well as police/military security, cooperation with like-minded Western Balkan countries, in particular in areas such as resilience, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, border management, counter-terrorism and countering disinformation; calls, in this regard, on the EEAS to strengthen the role of the EU delegations and CSDP missions in third countries in order to reinforce their ability to detect and debunk disinformation campaigns orchestrated by foreign state actors; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Calls for closer relations and cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to achieve common goals and interests in the fields of security and defence; |
| --- | --- |

80.

Enhancing Parliament’s scrutiny of the CSDP

| 81. | Stresses the need to involve Parliament more actively in CSDP and defence industrial policy decision-making, in particular with regard to the implementation of the Strategic Compass, the EDF, EDIRPA, EDIP, the EPF and the various policies and initiatives which affect, or are of particular importance for, European defence and security; encourages proposals for further action by Parliament, and in particular its Subcommittee on Security and Defence, to improve its impact on the CSDP, and to ensure the effectiveness, consistency, democratic accountability and adequate parliamentary scrutiny of EU security and defence policy and initiatives by:






  — | including the Subcommittee on Security and Defence as co-deciding committee in accordance with rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament in all legislative files with substantial and relevant implications for security and defence, |
| --- | --- | --- |

81.

—

including the Subcommittee on Security and Defence as co-deciding committee in accordance with rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament in all legislative files with substantial and relevant implications for security and defence,

| — | using the mid-term review of the EDF and the upcoming negotiations on EDIRPA to implement adequate and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny rights via delegated acts for work programmes for the main defence industrial programmes, |
| --- | --- |

—

using the mid-term review of the EDF and the upcoming negotiations on EDIRPA to implement adequate and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny rights via delegated acts for work programmes for the main defence industrial programmes,

| — | creating a fully-fledged Defence Council, |
| --- | --- |

—

creating a fully-fledged Defence Council,

| — | setting up a full Committee on Security and Defence, |
| --- | --- |

—

setting up a full Committee on Security and Defence,

| — | strengthening cooperation across Parliamentary committees where security and defence matters are discussed, |
| --- | --- |

—

strengthening cooperation across Parliamentary committees where security and defence matters are discussed,

| — | clarifying Parliament’s right to and access to information under Article 36 TEU, |
| --- | --- |

—

clarifying Parliament’s right to and access to information under Article 36 TEU,

| — | reinforcing inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation with national parliaments on European security and defence, including through the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, with the aim of reinforcing accountability and scrutiny of security and defence policy; |
| --- | --- |

—

reinforcing inter-parliamentary dialogue and cooperation with national parliaments on European security and defence, including through the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP, with the aim of reinforcing accountability and scrutiny of security and defence policy;

| 82. | Calls for further strengthening of Parliament’s relations with the NATO PA, in the framework of which Parliament should support the establishment of the NATO Centre for Democratic Resilience aimed at monitoring and identifying challenges to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and facilitating democracy and governance assistance to member and partner states; |
| --- | --- |

82.

o

o o

| 83. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary-General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU agencies in security and defence, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

83.

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(1)  OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 149.

(2)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, p. 57.

(4)  OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14.

(5)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 106.

(6)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 109.

(7)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 112.

(8)  OJ L 247, 13.7.2021, p. 93.

(9)  OJ L 117, 19.4.2022, p. 38.

(10)  OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 85.

(11)  OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 93.

(12)  OJ L 319, 13.12.2022, p. 86.

(13)  OJ L 270, 18.10.2022, p. 93.

(14)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 19.

(15)  OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 86.

(16)  OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 22.

(17)  OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 16.

(18)  OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 71.

(19)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 47.

(20)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 54.

(21)  OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 105.

(22)  OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 102.

(23)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 148.

(24)  OJ C 342, 6.9.2022, p. 167.

(25)  OJ C 125, 18.3.2022, p. 2.

(26)  OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 61.

(27)  OJ C 434, 15.11.2022, p. 59.

(28)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 136.

(29)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 70.

(30)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0439.

(31)  Report on the Follow-up Baseline Study on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality into the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

(32)  OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, p. 99.

(33)  OJ L 239, 17.9.2019, p. 16.

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