IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-20662

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TERRON JERESE WILLIAMS, also known as Blak,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:09-CR-294-5

Before JONES, DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Terron Jerese Williams appeals the 188-month term of imprisonment

imposed on his guilty plea conviction for conspiring to possess with intent to

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine

base. In his plea agreement, Williams waived “the right to appeal the sentence

imposed or the manner in which it was determined on any grounds set forth

in . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3742,” but he reserved “the right to appeal an illegal sentence

or an upward departure from the guidelines not requested by the United States.” 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 3, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 11-20662 Document: 00512100471 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/03/2013
No. 11-20662

The agreement did not define an illegal sentence. Because all of Williams’s

claims fail even absent a contractual bar, however, we pretermit consideration

of the effect of the appeal waiver. 

Williams contends correctly that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA),

PUB. L. NO. 111-220, § 2(a)(2), applies to his sentence. See Dorsey v. United

States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329-36 (2012). He also asserts correctly that he would

have been exposed to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence under the FSA

instead of the ten-year mandatory minimum that applied previously. However,

the district court sentenced Williams to a term significantly above the 10-year

mandatory minimum under the pre-FSA version of the statute. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2009). Nothing indicates that the district court would have

imposed a different sentence had it believed that the statutory changes effected

by the FSA applied to Williams’s offense. Thus, any error in not recognizing the

FSA’s retroactive applicability was harmless. See United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d

578, 587 (5th Cir. 2012).

We have no jurisdiction to entertain Williams’s claim that the district

court erred by denying a downward departure, but we may review the sentence

for reasonableness. See United States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir.

2007), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United States v.

Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 2009). We employ the plain error

standard because Williams did not properly object to the sentence in the district

court. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Because Williams has not shown any error, much less error that is clear or

obvious, we do not disturb his sentence. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.

129, 135 (2009). The reasons recited by the district court for its sentence

comport with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and Williams offers no

persuasive basis for questioning the district court’s evaluation of them. See Rita

v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 11-20662 Document: 00512100471 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/03/2013