# L_2023242EN.01003701.xml

| 29.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 242/37 |
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29.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 242/37

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RESOLUTION (EU) 2023/1816 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

of 10 May 2023

with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2021, Section II – European Council and Council

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,

| — | having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2021, Section II – European Council and Council, |
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having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2021, Section II – European Council and Council,

| — | having regard to Rule 100 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure, |
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—

having regard to Rule 100 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, |
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having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0085/2023), |
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—

having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A9-0085/2023),

| A. | whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget; |
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A.

whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget;

| B. | whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions; |
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B.

whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

| C. | whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them; |
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C.

whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

| D. | whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council, and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget; |
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D.

whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council, and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

| E. | whereas, over the course of almost 20 years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued; |
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E.

whereas, over the course of almost 20 years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

| F. | whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them; |
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F.

whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

| G. | whereas, since 2009, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council; |
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G.

whereas, since 2009, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

| H. | whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources; |
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H.

whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

| I. | whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds; |
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I.

whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

| J. | whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue; |
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J.

whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue;

| K. | whereas the recommendation of the European Ombudsman (the ‘Ombudsman’) in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE on the transparency of the Council legislative process indicated that the Council’s practice with regard to transparency in the legislative process constituted maladministration and should be addressed in order to enable citizens to follow the Union legislative process; |
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K.

whereas the recommendation of the European Ombudsman (the ‘Ombudsman’) in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE on the transparency of the Council legislative process indicated that the Council’s practice with regard to transparency in the legislative process constituted maladministration and should be addressed in order to enable citizens to follow the Union legislative process;

| 1. | Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 10,7 billion in 2021; notes that the Council’s budget represents around 5,6 % of the total administrative budget under MFF heading 7; |
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1.

| 2. | Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2021, increased its sample of transactions under Administration from 48 in 2020 to 60 in 2021; |
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2.

| 3. | Notes that the Court mentions that its work carried out over many years indicates that MFF heading 7 concerns overall low-risk spending; |
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3.

| 4. | Notes with satisfaction that, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2021, the Court notes that it did not identify any specific issues concerning the Council; |
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4.

State of play of the discharge procedure

| 5. | Deeply regrets that, for the financial year 2020, the Parliament once again had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council refuses to cooperate with Parliament on ensuring a thorough, orderly and well informed discharge procedure; |
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5.

| 6. | Emphasises Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU, as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely, the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability with respect to Union taxpayers; |
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6.

| 7. | Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it to be appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget; |
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7.

| 8. | Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of almost 20 years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament; |
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8.

| 9. | Stresses that the current situation, where Parliament is only able to check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman and the information on the Council’s website, but does not receive written or oral answers from the Council during the annual discharge procedure, i.e. the Council refuses to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure, makes it impossible for Parliament to carry out its duties properly and for it to make an informed decision on granting discharge; |
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9.

| 10. | Deplores that the Council, for more than a decade, has shown that it does not have any political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions by jeopardising the image of the Union as a whole, discrediting the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and reducing the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity; deeply regrets the Council’s continual refusal to engage in loyal cooperation in the framework of the discharge procedure; |
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10.

| 11. | Stresses that, while the current situation has to be improved through better interinstitutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could render the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; |
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11.

| 12. | Recalls that the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenues; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure; |
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12.

| 13. | Calls on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament as soon as possible in order to find a solution in the current framework of the discharge procedure, if Council is interested in showing Union citizens that it takes proper budget control and transparency seriously while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure; |
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13.

| 14. | Notes that despite the Council being unwilling to cooperate in the discharge procedure, the Parliament nevertheless stresses some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report; |
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14.

| 15. | Notes that while completing this report, Parliament has had to work with information provided by the Council via its website since the Council has chosen, as in previous years, not to respond to the questionnaire that was sent to the General Secretariat of the Council and has chosen not to accept an invitation to come and answer questions from democratically elected representatives of Union citizens, like all other institutions are doing as part of the discharge procedure; |
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15.

Political priorities

| 16. | Recalls that pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court after consultation with Parliament; regrets that the Council has failed repeatedly to take into consideration the recommendations of Parliament in Parliament’s consultative role regarding the appointment of members of the Court but, rather, continues to appoint members of the Court that have been rejected by Parliament; |
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16.

| 17. | Regrets generally that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies without taking into account the views of interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF); insists on the need for a review of the Council’s prerogative with a view to guaranteeing and strengthening the participation of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies concerned and increasing the legitimacy of those appointed; |
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17.

| 18. | Points out the serious gender imbalance in the Court, where at the end of 2021 there were only 8 female members compared to 18 male members; notes that the difficulties in achieving gender balance in the Court are due to the current nomination procedure; reiterates its call on the Council to reconsider the nomination procedure with the aim of tackling this problem with concrete actions, such as making it compulsory for Member States to present at least two candidates of different genders; |
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18.

| 19. | Regrets that the Council has so far ignored Parliament’s resolution of 17 December 2020 on the need for a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality (1) and insists that a dedicated institutional forum would ensure stronger integration of gender equality in Union policies and strategies, as well as essential coordination and progress in the main files related to gender equality; |
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19.

| 20. | Recalls and supports the recommendations of the Ombudsman regarding the transparency of the Council legislative process in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE; regrets that the decision-making process in the Council is still far from fully transparent, which affects the trust of the citizens in the Union as a transparent entity and thereby jeopardises the reputation of the Union as a whole; urges the Council to take all the measures necessary to implement the recommendations of the Ombudsman and the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union without undue delay; underlines in that regard the importance of the recent judgement of the General Court in Case T-163/21 De Capitani v Council (2) on transparency within the Union legislative process, in which it is stated that the documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests; highlights that the Court clarifies that when refusing access to such documents, the Council should provide concrete and precise explanations, and completely rejects Council references to vague risks as a sufficient reason; strongly supports the Court’s view that access to legislative documents would not undermine in any way the decision-making process, despite such claims by the Council, and would simply correspond to the obligation of public accountability of the co-legislators and the Member States, which is enshrined in any system founded on democratic legitimacy; |
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20.

| 21. | Believes that the use of unanimous voting in the Council in certain policy areas is paralysing the Union’s decision-making process, making it prone to blackmailing by governments of Member States for domestic political purposes, especially those who fail to respect the rule of law; calls on the Council to apply the qualified majority voting procedures whenever provided by the Treaties and to consider the review of the Treaties with respect to voting procedures; believes that the generalised shift to a qualified majority voting procedure in the Council is a crucial step towards more efficient policy-making; |
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21.

| 22. | Expresses its deep concern regarding the increasing role of the European Council in legislative files, despite the fact that it has neither a legislative nor an executive function and that it does not apply the same transparency standards as the Council, meaning that it is not being held accountable; |
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22.

| 23. | Regrets the fact that the participation of the Member States’ Permanent Representatives in the Transparency Register is completely voluntary and insists that all Permanent Representations should take an active part in the Transparency Register before, during and after their Member State’s Council presidency; believes that the existing ethics rules on conflicts of interest, revolving doors and transparency on lobbying should be strengthened and harmonised; encourages the Council to fully utilise the Transparency Register beyond its current limitations and calls on the Council to refuse to meet with unregistered lobbyists; |
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23.

| 24. | Regrets the Council position on the Transparency Register, refusing to consider any strengthening of the measures and rejecting any recommendation for improvement; |
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24.

| 25. | Reiterates its deep concern with respect to the confirmed conflicts of interest of Member State representatives involved in policy and budget decision-making processes; believes that Member State representatives who benefit directly from Union subsidies through the businesses they own should not be allowed to participate in policy or budgetary discussions and votes related to those subsidies; |
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25.

| 26. | Reiterates its call on the rotating Council presidencies to decline any corporate sponsorship to contribute to covering their expenses; understands that financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States and that each Member State, irrespective of its size and available budget, should have an equal opportunity to organise a successful Council presidency, but believes that the acceptance of corporate sponsorship causes reputational damage because it risks creating conflicts of interest; reiterates its call on the Council to budget the Council presidencies to ensure adequate and uniform standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the work in Council in general; is disappointed with the non-binding guidance issued on corporate sponsorships by the Council and is of the opinion that it should be revised; |
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26.

Budgetary and financial management

| 27. | Notes that the budget for the Council was EUR 594 386 954 for 2021, representing a marginal increase of 0,6 % compared to 2020, which is lower than the increase from 2019 to 2020 (1,5 %); |
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27.

| 28. | Reiterates its regret that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council where it is currently impossible to get reliable information about the its costs; |
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28.

| 29. | Notes that the General Secretariat of the Council publishes a series of annual activity reports covering different parts of the General Secretariat but that it is difficult to get a comprehensive overview of the activities of the General Secretariat of the Council since there is not a single report summarising and presenting a coherent overview of Council activities; |
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29.

| 30. | Notes with satisfaction that the annual activity reports contain declarations of assurance from the Council’s authorising officers by delegation (AODs), stating that resources have been used for their intended purpose and in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and that control procedures put in place give the necessary guarantees concerning the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions; |
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30.

| 31. | Notes that the Council carried out 43 budget transfers in 2021, all on the basis of Article 29 of the Financial Regulation and of which two involved informing the budgetary authority; |
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31.

Internal management, performance and internal control

| 32. | Welcomes that the General Secretariat of the Council was able to ensure that decision-making could continue in the European Council and the Council despite the continuing exceptional situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic; |
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32.

| 33. | Notes that, in 2021, the Council organised a total of 4 581 meetings, representing a significant increase of 30 % compared to 2020 where 3 520 meetings were organised; notes that the major part of the increase comes from a significantly higher number of working group meetings, which increased by 48 % from 2 790 to 4 135; |
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33.

| 34. | Notes with satisfaction that the Council provides the discharge authority with a summary of the number and types of internal audits carried out in the General Secretariat of the Council, a synthesis of the recommendations made and the action taken on those recommendations; notes that eight internal audits were carried out in 2021; |
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34.

| 35. | Notes that the internal audits cover the annual planning and reporting of the AODs; notes that the main recommendations from the internal audits include a recommendation that the Council’s finance directorate should provide guidance to the AODs on how to document the assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of their internal control system to ensure full compliance with Article 74(9) of the Financial Regulation; welcomes the fact that the audit of the Council’s finance helpdesk did not compel the Council’s internal auditor to issue any recommendation with high priority; |
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35.

| 36. | Notes that the internal audit on data protection shows that, overall, the internal control system in place provides reasonable assurances about the processes designed to allow the services of the General Secretariat of the Council to process data with the required high level of protection; notes, however, that the Council’s internal auditor issued recommendations focussing on clarifying roles and responsibilities, enhancing the role of data protection contact persons and adopting further implementing decisions for the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council (3) (the ‘EUDPR’) in the General Secretariat of the Council; resolving the backlog of notifications made under the former regulation, which need to be transformed into records under the EUDPR, communicating clearly the kind of activities that require a data protection record and establishing a plan to absorb the existing backlog of legacy notifications; and reviewing the cloud policy; |
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36.

| 37. | Notes that the audit of recruitment led the Council’s internal auditor to issue recommendations to the General Secretariat of the Council regarding the establishment of indicator(s) to monitor the achievement of the key objective of the recruitment policy which is to ‘provide the Council General Secretariat with the best staff to fulfil its needs’; welcomes that the audit of the ordinary legislative procedure did not compel the internal auditor to issue any recommendation with high priority; |
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37.

| 38. | Notes that the audit of the operational security led the Council’s internal auditor to conclude that, overall, the internal control system in place provides reasonable assurances regarding the achievement of the objectives set up for operational security; notes, however, that the internal auditor issued recommendations concerning documentation of follow-up of quality controls and penetration tests, enhancement of physical security, updating instructions to security staff and performing a new risk assessment of the IT security network; |
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38.

| 39. | Notes that the audit of the office automation network of the General Secretariat of the Council led the Council’s internal auditor to issue recommendations relating to the clarification of mandates, the allocation of vulnerability assessment activities of network devices and the migration of sensitive systems to more protected network locations; |
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39.

| 40. | Notes that the audit on the network that supports the building management systems of the General Secretariat of the Council led the Council’s internal auditor to issue recommendations with a view to defining a strategy on the future of the building management systems and the level of involvement of digital services in related operational activities; agreeing a minimum set of information security requirements to be included in contracts with third parties to manage the risk resulting from external providers’ access to the systems of the General Secretariat of the Council; and assessing the migration of building management IT systems to the digital service data centres in order to mitigate physical and environmental threats to current information processing facilities; |
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40.

| 41. | Notes with satisfaction that, as part of the digitalisation of the General Secretariat of the Council the relative share of e-invoices has been increasing continuously from 1 % in 2014 to 74 % in 2020 and 89 % in 2021; |
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41.

Human resources, equality and staff well-being

| 42. | Notes that the number of posts in the establishment plan of the Council in 2021 was fixed at 3 029; deplores, however, that the Council publishes very limited data about the composition of its staff; notes that, according to the information provided on its website, on 16 January 2022, the General Secretariat of the Council employed 3 119 members of staff out of which 1 791 (57 %) were women and 1 328 (43 %) were men; notes that 50 members of staff were categorised as senior management out of which 19 (38 %) were women, while 31 (62 %) were men; notes that 82 members of staff were categorised as middle management out of which 36 (44 %) were women, while 46 (56 %) were men; notes that 1 459 members of staff were categorised as administrators out of which 806 (55 %) were women, while 653 (45 %) were men; finally notes that 1 412 members of staff were categorised as assistants and secretaries out of which 889 (63 %) were women and 523 (37 %) were men; |
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42.

| 43. | Regrets the gender imbalance in senior management positions within the General Secretariat of the Council; calls on the Council to take immediate and concrete measures to achieve gender balance at all levels of hierarchy; |
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43.

| 44. | Regrets the lack of information on the implementation of the Council’s gender action plan and on the measures taken to ensure equal opportunities for persons with disabilities employed by the Council; calls on the Council to provide information to the budgetary authority on the gender balance, geographical distribution and disabilities of its members of staff and on the related internal policies; notes that all 27 Member States are represented on the staff but that the geographical balance remains suboptimal (with some Member States being over-represented); |
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44.

Ethical framework and transparency

| 45. | Regrets that, despite several requests by Parliament, the code of conduct for the President of the European Council has not been brought into line with those of Parliament and the Commission, in particular in terms of activities to be approved after the President leaves the post; |
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45.

| 46. | Regrets not having received information about the code of conduct applicable to all members of staff of the Council; reiterates that ethical conduct contributes to sound financial management and increases public trust and that, as stressed by the Court in its Special Report No 13/2019, there is scope for improvement in the ethical frameworks of the Union institutions, something that is crucial as any unethical behaviour by staff and members attracts high levels of public interest and reduces trust in the Union; |
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46.

| 47. | Recalls the recommendation issued by the Court in the above-mentioned Special Report No 13/2019 with regard to improving the Council ethical framework; expresses concern about the lack of a common Union ethical framework governing the work of the representatives of Member States in the Council as identified by the Court; |
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47.

| 48. | Notes that the General Secretariat of the Council publishes an annual report with information regarding the occupational activities of former senior officials of the General Secretariat of the Council after leaving the service (Article 16, third and fourth paragraphs, of the Staff Regulations); notes that, according to the report from 2022, two senior officials declared their intention to engage in occupational activities with a total of seven requests; notes that none of the requests were found to fall within the scope of Article 16; |
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48.

Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

| 49. | Notes that the Council budget for computer systems and telecommunications in 2021 was EUR 47 116 000, which represents an increase of 5,9 % compared to 2020; |
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49.

| 50. | Welcomes that the number of videoconference meetings and hybrid meetings increased by 107 % from 1 380 in 2020 to 2 859 in 2021; |
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50.

| 51. | Calls on the Council to explore ways to use open-source technologies as widely as possible and report on the progress in using such systems; |
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51.

Buildings

| 52. | Notes that the Council budget for buildings in 2021 was EUR 57 151 000, which represents an increase of 0,9 % compared to 2020; |
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52.

| 53. | Notes that the Council declares that their building policy is stable and that the aim since 2004, to accommodate all its activities and those of the European Council in Brussels in buildings it owns, was completed with the addition of the Europa Building in 2016; |
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53.

Environment and sustainability

| 54. | Notes that it is difficult to obtain updated information about any initiatives from the Council concerning the environment and sustainability; encourages the Council to report systematically on environmental and sustainability elements of its work as part of its annual reporting; |
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54.

| 55. | Calls on the Council to establish systems, if they have not already been established, to encourage staff to use public transportation or other low emission transportation like bikes to reduce the carbon footprint of the Council; |
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55.

| 56. | Notes that the financial statement of the Council mentions that, at the end of 2021, the Council was in possession of 2 589,2 Green Energy Certificates, based on the energy produced by solar panels located on the roof of Council buildings; asks the Council to report back on the sale of those certificates on the open market and the intended use of the revenue generated; |
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56.

Interinstitutional cooperation

| 57. | Calls on the Council to follow up on the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 2022 on the call for a Convention for the revision of the Treaties (4); |
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57.

| 58. | Calls on the Council to comply fully with the obligations set out in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (5); |
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58.

Communication

| 59. | Notes that 2021 was a record year with more than 20 million visits on the Council’s website, representing an increase of 23 % compared to 2020, and that the number of followers on Facebook increased by 3 %, whereas the number of followers on Twitter and Instagram increased by 11 % and 29 % respectively; |
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59.

| 60. | Encourages the Council to engage with the European Data Protection Supervisor with a view to utilising the two open-source social media platforms, EU-Voice and EU-Video, that were launched as a public pilot project to promote the use of free and open -source social networks; encourages the Council to use decentralised social network alternatives to very large online platforms, such as Mastodon. |
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60.

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(1)  
  OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 150.

1

(2)  Judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2023, De Capitani v Council, T-163/21, ECLI:EU:T:2023:15.

2

De Capitani

Council

(3)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

3

(4)  
  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 130.

4

(5)  
  OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.

5

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