UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5268

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERIC THOMPSON, a/k/a Derick Cannon,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (3:10-cr-00128-LO-1)

Submitted: July 28, 2011 Decided: August 17, 2011

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David R. Lett, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael R. Gill, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Eric Thompson on four counts of 

robbery affecting commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 

(2006), four counts of using, carrying, and possessing a firearm 

in relation to the robberies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1) (2006), and one count of unlawful possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). Thompson was sentenced to a 

total of 1,097 months of imprisonment.

On appeal, Thompson first challenges his convictions 

for a March 24, 2010, robbery of a Family Dollar store (Count 

Five) and the related firearms offense (Count Six). Thompson 

contends that the Government did not sufficiently prove that he 

was the person who committed the March 24 crimes because of the 

lack of a definitive eyewitness identification. 

When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence, the “jury verdict must be sustained if there is 

substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the 

Government, to support it.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 

849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (emphasis and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence 

that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 
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(4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 271 (2010). 

In determining whether substantial evidence supports 

the verdict, “this Court must consider circumstantial as well as 

direct evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to 

be established.” United States v. Cameron, 573 F.3d 179, 183 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “[A]ppellate reversal on grounds of insufficient 

evidence . . . will be confined to cases where the prosecution’s 

failure is clear.” Green, 599 F.3d at 367 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Thompson’s counsel objected to the 

sufficiency of the evidence at trial, but the district court 

found sufficient evidence to submit the matter to the jury. 

Thus, we review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Green, 

599 F.3d at 367. After reviewing the record, we easily conclude 

that substantial evidence supports the jury’s convictions of 

Thompson on Counts Five and Six. 

Thompson next asserts that the district court erred 

when it overruled his objection to the Government’s exercise of

a peremptory challenge to strike a black male juror. When 

defense counsel raised a challenge pursuant to Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) to the use of a peremptory strike 

to remove the juror, the Government denied discriminatory intent 
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and explained that it struck the juror because he seemed 

distant, inattentive, and disengaged. The district court 

overruled the objection. 

The use of a peremptory challenge for a racially 

discriminatory purpose offends the Equal Protection Clause. 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-90. The trial court’s resolution of a 

Batson challenge is largely a credibility determination, and 

thus this court gives “great deference” to the trial court’s 

findings as to whether a Batson violation occurred, and reviews 

its findings for clear error. Green, 599 F.3d at 377; United 

States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 221 (4th Cir. 2008). 

A three-step process is used to analyze a Batson

claim. First, the party opposing the strike must make a prima 

facie showing that the opposing party exercised the strike on 

the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. The burden then 

shifts to the party exercising the strike to offer a racially 

neutral explanation for removing the juror in question. Id. at 

97-98. When conducting this analysis, “the decisive question 

[is] whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation . . . should be 

believed.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).

Once the neutral explanation is presented, the 

complaining party must prove purposeful discrimination. Batson, 

476 U.S. at 98. A movant may show purposeful discrimination by 

demonstrating that the opposing party’s explanation is a mere 
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pretext for racial discrimination. Farrior, 535 F.3d at 221. 

The party must “show both that [counsel’s stated] reasons were

merely pretextual and that race was the real reason for the 

strike.” United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 953 (4th Cir. 

1994) (emphasis in original). In making this showing, the party 

“‘may rely on all relevant circumstances to raise an inference 

of purposeful discrimination.’” Golphin v. Branker, 519 F.3d 

168, 179 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 

231, 240 (2005)). 

Thompson failed to establish a prima facie case that 

the Government exercised the peremptory challenge on the basis 

of race. A prima facie case does not arise merely because a 

racial minority has been struck from the venire. Farrior, 535 

F.3d at 221. Moreover, the Government offered the prospective 

juror’s disinterest and lack of attentiveness as a race-neutral 

reason for its challenge. “A prosecutor is justified in 

striking jurors that he or she perceives to be inattentive or 

uninterested.” United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 

(4th Cir. 1988). Thompson failed to show that the proffered 

reason was pretextual. Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not clearly err in overruling the Batson objection. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED