[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12095

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

STEPHANIE NORMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

H. LEE MOFFITT CANCER CENTER AND 

RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., 

d.b.a. Moffitt Cancer Center, 

Defendant-Appellee.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-02430-WFJ-CPT

____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Stephanie Norman, proceeding pro se, appeals the 

grant of summary judgment to the Moffitt Cancer Center, her former employer, on her claims of interference, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act 

(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a); the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12203(a); and the 

Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 760.10(1), 

(7). Norman argues that the district court erred in dismissing her 

suit without considering her evidence on the matter. After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district 

court’s order granting summary judgment to the Moffitt Cancer 

Center.

I.

When appropriate, we review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, “viewing all the evidence, and 

drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving 

party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th 

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21-12095 Opinion of the Court 3 

Cir. 2005). We can affirm the district court's judgment on any basis 

supported by the record, “regardless of whether the district court 

decided the case on that basis.” Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2019).

We construe pro se pleadings liberally, Tannenbaum v. 

United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998); however, pro 

se litigants are required to comply with applicable procedural rules. 

Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation 

omitted). We consider forfeited an issue that was not raised in the 

district court and is raised for the first time on appeal in a civil case, 

and we will not address its merits absent extraordinary circumstances. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 

1331-32 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 

873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), petition for cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 

95 (2022). Further, an appellant abandons an issue if she fails to 

raise it prominently in an opening appellate brief. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680-82 (11th Cir. 2014).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and evidence of record show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 

identifying those portions of [the evidentiary record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553

(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). If the moving party meets its 

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initial burden, the nonmovant must then show that a genuine dispute exists regarding any issue for which she will bear the burden 

of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.

The nonmovant can withstand a summary judgment motion by 

establishing that “based on the evidence in the record, there can be 

more than one reasonable conclusion as to the proper verdict.” 

Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999).

II.

The FMLA creates two types of claims -- interference claims 

and retaliation claims. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)–(2); O'Connor v. PCA 

Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2000). To 

establish a prima facie FMLA interference claim, an employee must 

show, inter alia, that she was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA 

that was denied. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Drago v. Jenne, 453 

F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff is not denied a benefit 

under the FMLA when she receives all the leave she requests, however. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1275 

(11th Cir. 1999). Moreover, where an employer did not deny leave 

time, the plaintiff cannot establish an FMLA interference claim, 

even when the employer terminated her and prevented her from 

the continued use of such leave. Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc., 

981 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020).

To establish an FMLA retaliation claim, an employee must 

show her employer intentionally discriminated against her for exercising a right guaranteed under the FMLA. Strickland v. Water 

Works and Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207 

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(11th Cir. 2001). Unlike an interference claim, an employee bringing a retaliation claim faces the increased burden of showing her 

employer’s actions “were motivated by an impermissible retaliatory or discriminatory animus.” Id. (citation omitted).

The ADA provides that no employer shall discriminate 

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in discharging 

its employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination under the ADA 

includes the failure to make a reasonable accommodation to the 

known physical or mental limitations of the individual. Id. 

§ 12112(b)(5)(A). To support a claim of discrimination under the 

ADA, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that she is a disabled person. Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1255-56 (11th 

Cir. 2007).

An employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual is itself discrimination. Id. at 1262. However, to 

“trigger an employer’s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, the employee must (1) make a specific demand for an accommodation and (2) demonstrate that such accommodation is reasonable.” Owens v. Governor's Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 

1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) (applying ADA principles in Rehabilitation Act case).

The ADA also provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate 

against any individual because such individual has opposed any act 

or practice made unlawful by this chapter . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(a). Because this provision creates a prohibition on retaliation under the ADA that is similar to the prohibition on retaliation 

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found in Title VII, courts should evaluate ADA retaliation claims 

under the same framework used for Title VII retaliation claims. 

See Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 

1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). To support a claim for retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) she suffered an adverse action, and (3) 

there was a causal link between the adverse action and her protected conduct. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1260–

61 (11th Cir. 2001) (summary judgment case). 

The FCRA forbids employers from “discriminat[ing] against 

any individual ... because of such individual's . . . handicap . . . .” 

Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). The FCRA also prohibits employers from

discriminating against any person because that person has opposed 

any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under the 

law. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7).

III.

The record in this case demonstrates that the district court 

did not err in granting the Moffitt Cancer Center’s properly supported motion for summary judgment. After the Moffitt Cancer 

Center moved for summary judgment, Norman had an opportunity to provide evidence supporting her claims or to argue why 

the evidence in the record supported her claims. She failed to do 

so; rather, she filed a short pro se response, accompanied by copies 

of two letters she had written, neither of which provided evidence 

to defeat the motion for summary judgment. One letter requested 

notification of her deposition transcript, and one letter requested 

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information from her former counsel regarding her inquiries with 

social security and the Internal Revenue Service. The district court 

warned her that if she did not properly respond to the motion it 

could deem the motion unopposed. Because Norman failed to respond to the motion, she has failed to preserve for appeal any arguments in opposition to the grant of summary judgment. 

Additionally, we conclude that, even if she had preserved arguments for appeal, she fails to challenge on appeal several of the 

district court’s findings supporting summary judgment. Thus, she 

has abandoned those points. Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Moffitt Cancer Center on Norman’s claims. 

AFFIRMED. 

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