[Cite as Scott v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-1052.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

DALE SCOTT, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

STEVEN A. SCOTT,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 21 CO 0014

Civil Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio

Case No. 2020 CV 387

BEFORE:

Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Reversed and Remanded

Atty. Jeffrey Jakmides and Atty. Julie Jakmides Mack, 325 E. Main Street, Alliance, Ohio 

44601, for Plaintiffs-Appellees and

Atty. Mark Mikhaiel, Schneider, Smeltz, Spieth, Bell LLP, 1375 East 9th Street, Suite 

900, Cleveland, Ohio 44114, for Defendant-Appellant.
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

Dated: 

March 25, 2022

Donofrio, J.

{¶1} Appellant Steven Scott (appellant) appeals from a May 4, 2021 Columbiana 

County Common Pleas Court judgment ordering him to pay unpaid rent, repairs, and 

attorney fees to appellees Dale and Diane Scott (appellees), his parents. 

{¶2} On September 16, 2020, appellees filed a complaint for forcible entry and 

detainer against appellant in Columbiana County Municipal Court. They alleged that they 

entered into an oral lease agreement with appellant on or about December 13, 2019 for 

a month-to-month tenancy, with an option to purchase the property if he remained current 

in lease payments. Despite alleging an oral agreement, appellees attached a copy of a 

written lease agreement to their complaint. They averred that for eight months, appellant 

failed to make the $1,070.00 monthly rent payments. They requested appellant’s eviction 

from the property under R.C. 5321.03 due to default in rent payments. They alleged that 

since serving him with the three-day eviction notice, appellant had not brought his balance 

up to date, provided any payment, or left the property. Appellees requested eviction and 

money damages for unpaid rent, late charges, unpaid utility bills, damage to the property, 

and attorney fees.

{¶3} On September 16, 2020, the Columbiana County Municipal Court 

scheduled a forcible entry first cause hearing for September 29, 2020. Appellant’s 

counsel filed a notice of appearance on September 28, 2020. He also filed a motion to 

continue the hearing, explaining that he was retained on September 23, 2020 and 

“needed more time to prepare adequately.” The court denied the motion for continuance. 

{¶4} On the date of the hearing, appellant filed an answer and included a 

counterclaim alleging performance under the statute of frauds, unjust enrichment, and 

damages. He averred that he entered into a written contract with appellees on June 16, 

2020, which was backdated to December 13, 2019. He stated that he signed the contract 

only because appellees threatened to forcibly remove him from the property if he did not. 

Appellant averred that in March 2018, he and appellees had a verbal agreement that he 

would buy the property in the future, so he started making improvements to the property. 

He alleged that he paid appellees $500.00 per month and paid the property taxes until 
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

December 2019. He averred that appellees took possession of the property in December 

2019, he detrimentally relied on their promises, and he partially performed by taking 

possession of, making improvements on, and paying partial consideration for, the 

property. On his unjust enrichment claim, he alleged that he spent over $40,000.00 in 

materials and over $40,000.00 in his own labor costs to improve the property. 

{¶5} Appellant also filed a motion to transfer his case to the Columbiana Court 

of Common Pleas because the recovery of sums in his counterclaim exceeded the 

municipal court’s jurisdictional amount of $15,000.00. 

{¶6} The municipal court held a first cause hearing on September 29, 2020, 

noting that the issue before it was appellees’ right to possess the property. (Sept. 29, 

2020 Tr. at 2). On the record, appellant’s counsel agreed that monthly payments had not 

been made since June, but he asserted that appellant had made other payments, 

although no receipts existed. When the court asked if appellant wished to proceed and 

take evidence, or if he wanted to acknowledge non-payment of rent, appellant agreed 

that he had not paid rent since July. The municipal court concluded that appellees were 

entitled to possession of the property based upon non-payment of rent and the court 

ordered appellant to vacate the property. The court scheduled a second cause hearing 

for damages for November 17, 2020. 

{¶7} On October 28, 2020, the municipal court granted appellant’s motion to 

transfer the case and certified the case to the Columbiana County Court of Common 

Pleas. After the common pleas court held a telephone conference, an order was issued 

scheduling the trial for April 29, 2021, the pretrial on March 29, 2021, and the discovery 

deadline for “30 days prior to trial.” 

{¶8} On February 18, 2021, appellees filed a notice of their first set of 

interrogatories and production of documents propounded on appellant. 

{¶9} On March 22, 2021, appellant filed a motion to continue the April 29, 2021 

“hearing,” stating that his counsel needed more time to prepare. Appellees objected, and 

after a hearing, the court denied appellant’s motion. 

{¶10} Appellees filed their witness and exhibit lists with the court and provided 

them to appellant’s counsel. On April 19, 2021, appellant’s counsel served discovery on 

appellees. The parties filed trial briefs, in which appellees stated that the parties executed 
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

a lease while appellant was living at the residence and he failed to abide by its terms. 

They stated that, “[t]his was not disputed before the Municipal Court.” Appellees noted 

that they bought the house in 2018 and allowed appellant to live there and make 

improvements, but they did not require or request the improvements. They asserted that 

although appellant would probably claim the existence of an oral purchase agreement or 

a written purchase agreement, he never fully disclosed the entirety of either of such an 

agreement to them. They further noted that even if an agreement existed, appellant had 

no present or future interest in the property as he had defaulted on payments and had no 

right to inherit the property. 

{¶11} Appellees requested that the court bar appellant from introducing testimony 

from any witness at trial because he failed to comply with discovery and discovery 

deadlines. They stated that appellant did not disclose his expert witness until April 19, 

2021, ten days before trial, and he provided no expert report. They further noted that 

appellant provided discovery over a month late, he provided no written responses to their 

requests for document production, and more than half of the requested documents were 

not provided. They also complained that many of the produced documents looked like 

scanned receipts, but were unreadable. 

{¶12} On April 29, 2021, appellant filed his trial brief. He noted in that brief that at 

the municipal court hearing, he acknowledged that he had paid rent once since December 

2019. He stated, however, that he had paid double rent when he signed the June 16, 

2020 written agreement, which was the date that the lease actually began. He asserted 

that the three-day eviction notice was placed on his door on July 9, 2020, and he failed 

to pay rent for August and September 2020. He indicated that he did make “house 

payments” that appellees took, but they did not provide him with receipts. He asserted 

that he made many attempts to buy the house, but appellees ignored him or added 

stipulations. Appellant submitted that when appellees first bought the house in 2018, the 

parties understood that appellant would buy it from them at a future date, and appellees 

did not mention rent until late 2019, nearly two years after he relied to his detriment on 

appellees’ statements and made improvements to the property. 

{¶13} Appellant also acknowledged that he provided late discovery. He explained 

that his counsel lost the original discovery documents when counsel changed his 
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

employment and moved into a new location. He also stated that he did not have to provide 

written responses to requests for production of documents because his interrogatories 

and the documents he did produce covered every request. He also acknowledged that 

some materials were difficult to read, but it was the best that he could provide. 

{¶14} On April 29, 2021, the trial began. The court stated that it had spoken to 

counsel before trial and informed them that no change would be made to the rulings made 

by the municipal court. (Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 3). The court further noted that it had not 

received a witness list from appellant, and appellees had raised discovery issues that 

may bar appellant from calling certain witnesses. (Id.). The court also cautioned the 

parties that while underlying family issues existed between them, those issues would not 

be tried in the court. (Id.) The court stated:

This is merely about a property that was purchased, a lease 

agreement that has already been found valid, and the issues of 

the damages as well as the counterclaims that is it. 

(Apr. 29, 2021 at 4). 

{¶15} Appellees’ first witness was an attorney who testified about the 

reasonableness of the attorney fees that they had requested in the case. They then called 

appellee Dale Scott to the stand. He testified about the lease agreement “that was 

approved by Judge McNicol,” which contained the signatures of appellees and appellant. 

(Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 10). He identified the months that appellant failed to pay rent and 

confirmed that the municipal court ordered appellant’s eviction due to nonpayment of rent. 

(Id. at 10-11). He stated that appellant left the residence in an unlivable condition and 

estimated $3,000.00 for materials he bought to repair the house. (Id. at 11-13). He also 

explained that he did not charge for his labor and they could not rent the house out until 

February 1, 2021 because of its condition. (Id.). 

{¶16} On cross-examination, appellant’s counsel asked to admit an item into 

evidence, which he identified as a text message of discussions between appellant and

appellee Dale Scott which showed that a rental agreement was not signed until June 

2020. (Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 16). The court noted that the message was undated and 
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

appellees’ counsel objected to its admission, asserting res judicata as the municipal court 

already determined the validity of the lease. The court agreed. 

{¶17} Appellant’s counsel asked appellee Dale Scott why the option to purchase 

never materialized, and he testified that appellant did not meet the lease term that 

required him to be current in payments. (4/29/21 Tr. at 18). Appellant’s counsel asked the 

court for permission to admit another exhibit into evidence, and appellees again objected, 

stating that the exhibit contained text messages which had nothing to do with the issues 

at hand and which had not been turned over in discovery. (Id. at 16). Appellant’s counsel 

explained that he wanted to use the messages to show that appellant made numerous 

attempts to exercise the option to purchase. (Id.). The court sustained the objection, 

finding that the question was asked and answered since the lease clearly stated that 

appellant could not be in default of rent payments and appellee Dale Scott had testified 

that appellant was delinquent in rent payments, so the option to purchase was not 

considered. (Id.). 

{¶18} The parties then discussed the failure to provide timely discovery. The 

court held that any material not provided to appellees within the discovery deadline was 

inadmissible. (Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 19-20). Appellant’s counsel admitted providing late 

discovery, but stated that it was provided before trial. (Id. at 20). The court told appellant’s 

counsel that he should have filed a motion for extension if he could not make the discovery 

deadline. (Id.). Appellant’s counsel stated that he filed a motion to continue, but the court 

pointed out that the motion to continue was not filed until after the deadline had elapsed. 

(Id.).

{¶19} Appellant’s counsel then tried to admit text messages between appellant 

and appellee Dale Scott allegedly showing that appellee Dale Scott acknowledged 

appellant’s interest, tax, and other payments made on the property. (Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 

21-22). The court excluded these messages and ruled that counsel could not rely on or 

read from the messages. (Id. at 21). The court also found that communications were not 

proof of payments made by appellant. (Id. at 21-22). 

{¶20} Appellant testified on his direct examination, stating that he had a 

purchase agreement with the house’s prior owners, but he could not secure financing 

because of the house’s poor condition. (Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 25). He testified that they 
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

agreed that he could buy the house if he could get it in proper condition so that the bank 

would finance the loan. (Id.). He stated that he could not meet the deadline, and appellees 

bought the house so that he could buy it back from them. (Id. at 26). Appellant further 

testified that after the purchase, he began making improvements and repairs to it. (Apr. 

29, 2021 Tr. at 27). Appellant’s counsel attempted to admit exhibits, but appellees 

objected, stating that the exhibits were not provided to them until the week of trial and 

were otherwise irrelevant since the value of appellant’s services was not recoverable 

under his unjust enrichment claim. (Id. at 28). The court reviewed the exhibits and 

sustained the objection, finding that they were not timely provided, one exhibit was an 

undated snapchat photo, another was a photo that looked like items being removed from 

a property but no foundation was laid for its admission, and other exhibits were receipts 

for materials bought with no indication that they went to the house and one predated the 

purchase of the house. The court ruled that appellant could testify as to the repairs. (Id. 

at 28-29). 

{¶21} Appellees also objected to an attempt by appellant’s counsel to admit 

additional evidence, and the court held that it would not be admitted if it was not offered 

prior to the discovery deadline. (Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 33-36). Appellant’s counsel tried to 

explain why the discovery was late, but the court cut him off, telling him that he had 

already offered his explanation. Appellant’s counsel stated that it was unfair to his client 

to exclude evidence when it was his fault for misplacing the documents. (Id. at 36). The 

court responded that had the evidence been timely produced, an appraisal could have 

been done to determine whether appellant’s $80,000.00 estimate for his repairs, 

materials, and labor, which happened to exactly match the price of the house, was 

reasonable. (Id. at 36-37). 

{¶22} The court repeated that the municipal court had already determined that a 

valid agreement existed between the parties. (Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 39-43). Appellant’s 

counsel stated that appellant paid cash to appellees and was not given receipts, but the 

court reiterated that text messages between the parties did not constitute evidence to 

establish these payments. (Id. at 42-43). The court stated that appellant could show 

withdrawals from his bank account to reflect the payments or he could present W2s 

showing that he had sufficient income to make such payments. (Id.). 
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

{¶23} Appellant’s counsel called appellant back to the stand as a lay witness. 

(Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 43). He testified that he was a self-employed mechanic and made 

$20,000.00 his first year of self-employment and $30,000 the following year as he spent 

most of his time and money improving the house. (Id. at 44-46). He also testified that the 

house was not livable before he moved in and made repairs. (Id). 

{¶24} On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that appellees bought the 

house after he could not obtain financing due to the property’s condition. (Apr. 29, 2021 

Tr. at 47-49). He testified that although he had no signed agreement, he had an oral 

agreement between a father and son to show that the house was going to be his. 

Appellees’ counsel asked for the terms and monthly payment amount of the verbal 

agreement that he alleged, but appellant stated that appellee Dale Scott never gave him 

a straight answer and the payment increased and decreased. (Id. at 48-50). He also 

acknowledged working on the house knowing that he did not own it. (Id. at 51). 

{¶25} Appellant’s counsel called his expert witness to testify, but appellees 

objected, asserting that they did not receive timely notice of the expert or an expert report. 

(Apr. 29, 2021 Tr. at 52). The court sustained the objection. (Id.). Appellant’s counsel also 

called appellant’s fiancée to the stand and appellees’ counsel again objected for the same 

reasons. The court sustained the objection. (Id.). 

{¶26} After closing arguments, the court granted appellees’ claims for money 

damages and attorney fees, and found no merit to appellant’s unjust enrichment 

counterclaim. On May 4, 2021, the court issued its judgment entry and ordered appellant 

to pay $16,410.00 in damages to appellees, with $4,850.00 of that award for attorney fees 

and $3,000.00 for repairs by appellees. The rest was for unpaid rent. 

{¶27} On May 27, 2021, appellant filed his notice of appeal to this Court. 

{¶28} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1: The Trial Court’s Decision to 

Apply Res Judicata as to the Enforceability of the Lease 

Agreement in this case was error.

{¶29} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts:
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Case No. 21 CO 0014

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2: The Trial Court Erred and 

Abused its Discretion when it Granted Judgment in Favor of 

Appellees and Barred Defendant-Appellant from Presenting 

any Evidence Relating to the Defendant-Appellant’s 

Counterclaim or Defenses at the April 29, 2021 Trial.

{¶30} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3: The Trial Court Erred and 

Abused its Discretion when it Failed to Grant DefendantAppellant’s Motion for Continuance. 

{¶31} Although neither party raises the issue, we hold that the municipal court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the forcible entry and detainer action 

portion of this case when the counterclaim exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction. 

{¶32} While municipal and common pleas courts have concurrent original 

jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions, the jurisdiction of the municipal court 

is $15,000.00. R.C. 1901.17. R.C. 1901.22(E) provides: “[i]n any action in a municipal 

court in which the amount claimed by any defendant in any statement of counterclaim 

exceeds the jurisdictional amount, the judge shall certify the proceedings in the case to 

the court of common pleas, except in the Cleveland municipal court.” Civ. R. 13(J) states 

that “[i]n the event that a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim exceeds the 

jurisdiction of the court, the court shall certify the proceedings in the case to the court of 

common pleas.” The Staff Note to Civ. R. 13 explains that the “rule provides for 

certification of the complete proceedings involved to the court of common pleas.” 

[emphasis added].

{¶33} Consistent with these Rules, this Court has held that when a forcible entry 

and detainer action involves issues that exceed a municipal court’s jurisdiction, the 

municipal court errs when it determines only one portion of the action instead of 

transferring the entire action to the common pleas court. O’Hara v. Lloyd, 116 Ohio 

App.3d 439, 440, 688 N.E.2d 544 (7th Dist. 1996), quoting Richwood Homes, Inc. v. 

Brown, 3 Ohio App.3d 204, 444 N.E.2d 463, paragraph two of the syllabus (1981). 
– 10 –

Case No. 21 CO 0014

{¶34} In Rickard v. Solley, 188 Ohio App.3d 205, 2010-Ohio-2786, 935 N.E.2d 64, 

¶ 27, we found that certification to the common pleas court is not automatic when a party 

files a counterclaim requesting damages that exceed the municipal court’s jurisdictional 

amount. We held that the municipal court “should first determine if the counterclaim 

satisfies the formalities of the civil rules and states a claim showing that the party is 

entitled to relief.” Id., quoting Crisalli v. Mearini, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84245, 2004-

Ohio-6018, citing Hersch v. Debreczeni, 33 Ohio App.2d 235, 238–239, 294 N.E.2d 918 

(1973). A municipal court is not required to conduct a trial on the merits of the 

counterclaim. Hersch, at 239. However, that court must determine whether the 

requirements of the Civil Rules are satisfied and “whether the counterclaim contains a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.

{¶35} Most Ohio courts require a municipal court to transfer the entire forcible 

entry and detainer action to the common pleas court when a counterclaim exceeds its 

subject matter jurisdictional amount, with only the Fifth District allowing bifurcation in 

certain cases. See Thompson v. Hansford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29226, 2019-Ohio-2612, 

¶11 (municipal court lacked jurisdiction to determine forcible entry and detainer action 

when counterclaim exceeded $15,000.00 and both were so intertwined that they could 

not be decided separately); accord State ex rel El Turk v. Comstock, 2018-Ohio-2125, 

113 N.E.3d 1122, (8th Dist.) (municipal court required to certify entire forcible entry and 

detainer case to common pleas court after municipal court determined counterclaim was 

authentic and exceeded jurisdiction); State ex rel. Pennington v. Fiehrer, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA93-08-167, 1993 WL 491631, *2 (Nov. 29, 1993) (“[t]he simple language of 

R.C.1901.22(E) * * * suggests that a municipal court has no choice but to certify or transfer 

a case where a counterclaim exceeds the applicable jurisdictional ceiling.”); State, ex rel. 

Penn v. Swain, 21 Ohio App.3d 119, 121 (11th Dist.1984)(“[a] logical interpretation” of 

Rule 13(J) “requires the entire case to be certified to the common pleas court.”); contra

Lyons v. Link, 5th Dist. Knox No. 2003-Ohio-2706, (municipal court could determine 

forcible entry and detainer portion of the case and transfer counterclaim that exceeded 

its jurisdiction to common pleas court as it was capable of separation); but see Isiah’s 

Wings, LLC v. Mount, 5th Dist. Knox No. 2005-CA-39, 2006-Ohio-3573, ¶ 4- ¶ 6 

(distinguishing Lyons by finding that municipal court can sometimes rule on an eviction 
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action without affecting other claims of the parties, but cannot when “the counterclaim * * 

* is so interrelated as to require the issues all be heard together.”). 

{¶36} Consistent with our prior rulings, we hold that the municipal court erred 

when it bifurcated the forcible entry and detainer action and determined that part of the 

action when the amount of the counterclaim exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction. 

Since the municipal court’s judgment as to eviction is void and cannot stand, the common 

pleas court proceedings and judgment concerning damages cannot stand since they are 

based upon a void municipal court judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the Columbiana 

County Court of Common Pleas judgment and remand the instant case to that court to 

determine the entire action. The case shall not return to the Columbiana County Municipal 

Court. 

{¶37} For these reasons, we decline to address appellant’s assignments of error 

and reverse the judgment of the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas and remand 

the case in its entirety to that court for full determination. 

Waite, J., concurs.

D’Apolito, J., concurs.
[Cite as Scott v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-1052.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, we decline to address 

appellant’s assignments of error and vacate the municipal court judgment as void 

because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to bifurcate the instant action. Consequently, 

we reverse the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas judgment since it was based 

upon a void municipal court determination. We remand the case to the Columbiana 

County Court of Common Pleas to determine the case in its entirety. Costs to be taxed 

against Appellee.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.