Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the Pacific Reporter. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.gov. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

CONNIE STOCKTON, 

 Appellant, 

v. 

VERAL STOCKTON, 

 Appellee. 

) 

) Supreme Court No. S-18272 

Superior Court No. 4FA-12-02356 CI 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7666 – July 14, 2023 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, 

Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Paul R. Lyle, Judge. 

Appearances: Lance Christian Wells, Law Offices of Lance 

Christian Wells, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellant. 

Christopher E. Zimmerman, Zimmerman & Wallace, 

Fairbanks, for Appellee. 

Before: Winfree, Chief Justice, Maassen, Carney, 

Borghesan, and Henderson, Justices. 

BORGHESAN, Justice. 

INTRODUCTION 

A woman challenges the superior court’s order denying relief from 

judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). She seeks to overturn a default judgment, 

entered against her in 2013, that divided marital property upon divorce from her 

husband. Asserting that she suffered from severe depression during the divorce 

proceedings and that her husband improperly served the notice of default, she argues 
that the judgment was void for lack of due process and, alternatively, should be vacated 

due to extraordinary circumstances. We affirm the superior court’s factual finding that 

she was not incompetent at the time of divorce and its legal rulings that the judgment 

was not void and extraordinary circumstances warranting relief were not shown. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. Facts 

 Connie and Veral Stockton were married in 1981 in Washington. In 2007 

Connie began suffering from severe depression. She and Veral moved to Alaska in 

2009. Her depression continued. 

 Veral filed for divorce in 2012. Connie was personally served with the 

complaint for divorce at the marital home in Fairbanks, where she was still living at the 

time. Connie then moved back to Washington. In early 2013 Veral applied for entry 

of default after Connie failed to answer the complaint. The party filing an application 

for default must state whether the party against whom default is sought is mentally 

incompetent.1 Veral indicated Connie was not mentally incompetent. Veral served a 

copy of the application by mailing it to Connie at the marital home in Fairbanks despite 

knowing that she had moved to Washington. Connie did not respond, and a default was 

entered against her. 

B. Proceedings 

1. Connie’s Rule 60(b) motion 

 In January 2021 Connie moved for relief from judgment. Connie argued 

that the judgment was void due to her mental illness and the defective service of the 

default application.

2 She also argued that she was entitled to relief because property 

1 Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(c)(2). 

2 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (permitting court to grant relief from judgment 

where judgment is void). 

-2- 7666
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

division in the default divorce decree was “poorly thought out.”3 Veral opposed. 

Connie and Veral testified at an evidentiary hearing. 

a. Connie’s testimony 

Connie testified that from 2007 to around 2019 she was suffering from 

severe mental illness. She testified that she was “basically bedridden,” spending 

approximately 20 to 22 hours in bed every day, from 2007 to 2015. But Connie also 

testified that during that time she was able to engage in activities such as driving long 

distances and caring for her grandchild. Connie testified that in 2012 she gave her son 

a power of attorney to take care of her financial affairs because she was “severely 

depressed and did not feel that [she] could do it [herself].” 

Regarding the divorce proceedings, Connie asserted that when she was 

personally served with the summons and complaint in 2012, she did not understand 

what the documents meant because of the severity of her depression. Connie also 

explained that she had relocated to Washington before Veral sent notice of the 

application for default to the Fairbanks home. She testified that Veral knew she was no 

longer living in Fairbanks because he helped arrange her move. 

Connie testified that she began taking charge of her own personal affairs 

again at some point in 2019. She said it was also in 2019 that she first looked at her 

divorce papers and felt that the property division was not fair or equitable. When asked 

why she did not seek relief at that point, Connie responded, “I did not feel that my 

mental health was back in order to handle all the details and stress to get things legally 

done.” Connie also cited her financial situation as reason for not moving for relief until 

January 2021. She stated she had to wait to come up with money to pay for an attorney 

and to “feel that [she] could deal with the expenses.” 

-3- 7666 

3 Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (permitting court to grant relief from judgment 

for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment”). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Connie urged the superior court to reconsider the marital property 

division. She asserted that Veral withheld certain facts during the default hearing, and 

so was awarded a disproportionate amount of the marital estate including her 

inheritance from her deceased mother. 

b. Veral’s testimony 

Veral acknowledged sending the notice of default to Fairbanks despite 

knowing Connie had already moved back to Washington. He conceded he knew how 

to contact her in Washington and even paid her rent and utility bills while she was there. 

Veral stated he served the notice of default in Fairbanks because he “did not have the 

benefit of legal counsel. [He] was under the impression that [he] was required to serve 

Connie at the address where she was served with the [c]omplaint, so [he] did so.” 

Regarding Connie’s allegation that Veral kept her inheritance and did not disclose it to 

the court at the default hearing, Veral stated he did not keep the money and that all 

remaining funds from Connie’s inheritance were deposited in Connie’s separate 

checking account. 

2. Superior court’s findings 

The superior court denied Connie’s motion for relief. The court found 

that “evidence establishes that Connie was suffering from depression from 2012 

through January 2015,” but also determined that Connie “regained her cognitive 

function and was capable of tending to her legal affairs” sometime between the 

beginning of 2015 and the end of 2018. The court was “concerned” that Connie did not 

submit any medical records dated after 2015. Citing Connie’s own testimony that she 

began taking care of some of her own financial affairs before 2019, the court reasoned 

that “[a] person who can pay [her] own bills, live in [her] own apartment, get up every 

morning to care for young children throughout the day without incident, and prepare 

meals is not likely incompetent to attend to [her] legal affairs.” 

-4- 7666
 
 The court also found that Veral did not misrepresent Connie’s competency 

when he filed the application for default in 2013. The court reasoned that Connie’s 

ability to care for a grandchild gave Veral reason to conclude she was competent. 

 The court found that Connie had not shown that she was too depressed to 

understand the import of the divorce complaint and summons or to file an answer. The 

court pointed to Connie’s 25 years of employment as court clerk in Washington and 

found it “inconceivable that Connie’s depression was so debilitating that she would not 

have understood the import of a summons and complaint.” The court did not credit 

Connie’s claim that she was forced to delay filing her motion to gather funds because 

in mid-2019 her retirement account had at least $32,000 in it. It found that this was the 

same retirement account from which she ultimately withdrew funds to pay for her 

attorney. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 “We review the superior court’s findings of fact for clear error.”4 “A 

finding is clearly erroneous if we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that the 

trial court has made a mistake.’ ”5 We review the denial of a motion for relief from 

judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) de novo.6 Whether the mutual exclusivity rule bars relief 

under Rule 60(b)(6) is also a question of law we review de novo.7 

4 Rohde v. Rohde, 507 P.3d 986, 991-92 (Alaska 2022) (citing Aubert v. 

Wilson, 483 P.3d 179, 186 (Alaska 2021)). 

5 Id. at 992 (quoting Fredrickson v. Button, 426 P.3d 1047, 1052 (Alaska 

2018)). 

6 Blaufuss v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281, 285 (Alaska 2013). 

7 See Chena Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Bridges, 502 P.3d 951, 963­

64 (Alaska 2022), reh’g denied (Feb. 14, 2022) (applying independent judgment to 

question whether mutual exclusivity rule bars relief under Rule 60(b)(6)); Vill. of 

Chefornak v. Hooper Bay Constr. Co., 758 P.2d 1266, 1270-71 (Alaska 1988) (same). 

-5- 7666
 
DISCUSSION 

A.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err By Denying Relief Under Rule 

60(b)(4). 

 Rule 60(b)(4) permits a court to grant relief from a final judgment if the 

judgment is void. A “judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous.”8 A 

judgment is void only “if the issuing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or violated 

due process.”9 A judgment that is merely voidable, rather than void, does not justify 

relief under Rule 60(b)(4).10 Connie argues that the default judgment was void because 

she was suffering from severe depression when it was entered and because the notice 

of default was not properly served on her.

11 

1.	 The superior court’s finding that Connie was not incompetent 

was not clearly erroneous. 

 We have never addressed the question whether a judgment entered against 

an incompetent person is void as a matter of law. Jurisdictions that have addressed this 

question generally hold that a judgment entered against an incompetent party is merely 

voidable, not void.12 But we need not decide this question because the superior court 

did not clearly err in finding Connie was competent. 

8 Blaufuss, 305 P.3d at 286. 

9 Id. at 285. 

10 Heber v. Heber, 330 P.3d 926, 930 (Alaska 2014). 

11 Connie’s allegations and arguments largely sound in fraud, which is more 

properly addressed under subsection (b)(3) as “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other 

misconduct of an adverse party.” But her motion for relief from judgment would not 

have been timely under that subsection, which has a strict one-year deadline, and she 

does not expressly invoke it. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“The motion shall be made 

within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after 

the date of notice of the judgment . . . .”). 

12 Hudnall v. Sellner, 800 F.2d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[J]udgments 

entered against even legally adjudicated mental incompetents not represented by natural 

or appointed guardians are not void on the basis alone of their incompetence and lack 

-6- 7666
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The superior court did not credit Connie’s assertion that she was 

incompetent. The court found it “inconceivable that Connie’s depression was so 

debilitating that she would not have understood the import of a summons and complaint 

or . . . what would happen if she failed to answer or appear.” This finding rested on 

Connie’s 25-year history as a court clerk and the fact that by 2012 she was well enough 

to care for her young grandchild. Given the evidence in the record, we do not have a 

firm conviction that the superior court made a mistake. 

2.	 Failure to serve notice of default on Connie did not violate due 

process, so the judgment is not void. 

Connie argues that the judgment is void because Veral violated her due 

process rights when he knowingly sent the notice of the default application to an address 

at which she no longer resided. Service of process often implicates due process 

concerns.

13 But failure to effectively serve a notice of default does not amount to a due 

process violation, so the error does not make the judgment against Connie void. 

of representation.”); Scott v. United States, 190 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1951) (“Lack of 

proper representation of a mental incompetent does not of itself render a judgment 

against him void. Such a judgment is merely voidable, good until set aside on direct 

attack.”); McCampbell v. Warrich Corp., 109 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1940) (holding 

that after jurisdiction attaches “the decree of the court must be sustained against 

collateral attack regardless of how erroneous it may be in other respects” and applying 

rule to mentally incompetent persons); Mitchell v. Gales, 61 A.3d 678, 685 (D.C. 2013) 

(“[A] judgment entered against an incompetent party is not void, but merely 

voidable.”); Williams v. Pyles, 363 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Mo. 1963) (holding judgment 

entered against mentally incompetent party is voidable); Hodges v. Hodges, 435 P.2d 

784, 788 (Mont. 1967) (holding judgment entered against mentally incompetent party 

is “at most merely voidable,” not void); McCaughey v. Lester, 278 P.2d 826, 828 (Okla. 

1954) (holding judgment against mentally incompetent person is not void); Withrow v. 

Smithson, 17 S.E. 316, 316 (W. Va. 1893) (same). 

13 See Beam v. Adams, 749 P.2d 366, 367 (Alaska 1988) (“Service of process 

is a preliminary requirement to a court obtaining personal jurisdiction over a party. It 

satisfies the notice requirement essential to due process of law.”). 

-7- 7666
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“An ‘elementary and fundamental’ requirement of procedural due process 

is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to inform interested parties 

of action affecting their property rights.’ ”14 “[T]aking a default judgment without 

notice, while a serious error, should not ordinarily be regarded as rendering the 

underlying judgment void.”15 Yet failure to comply with notice requirements “in 

conjunction with other irregularities may render the judgment void.”16 

It is undisputed that Veral failed to serve the default application on Connie 

in accordance with our civil rules. Alaska Civil Rule 55(a)(1) requires that “the party 

seeking default must serve the application on all parties, including the party against 

whom the default is sought, in accordance with Civil Rule 5.” Alaska Civil Rule 5(b) 

provides for effective service at multiple locations, but if service is being delivered by 

mail to an unrepresented party, the rule specifies that service must be made by 

delivering a copy to the party’s “last known address.”17 

The history of Civil Rule 55(a)(1) shows we have never understood 

service of a default application on a nonappearing party to be a requirement of due 

process. The rule has not always required service of a default application on a 

nonappearing party. In 1987 the rule was amended to expressly state that service of the 

14 City of Homer v. Campbell, 719 P.2d 683, 686 (Alaska 1986) (quoting 

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 

15 Kenai Peninsula Borough v. English Bay Vill. Corp., 781 P.2d 6, 10 

(Alaska 1989), disapproved of on other grounds by Hatten v. Hatten, 917 P.2d 667 

(Alaska 1996). 

16 Id. (quoting 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 

60.25[2], at 60-237 to -238 (2d ed. 1985)). 

17 In her brief Connie references Civil Rule 5(f). That subsection addresses 

the requirements for proof of service, so it is not applicable. Civil Rule 5(b) addresses 

the requirements for effective service. 

-8- 7666
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

default application on a nonappearing party was not required.18 We amended the rule 

again in 2012 to require service on the nonappearing party, but did not cite to 

constitutional concerns in making this change.

19 

Our case law also supports the conclusion that the default judgment 

against Connie is not void. In Kenai Peninsula Borough v. English Bay Village Corp. 

we held that failure to serve an application for default on a party was a serious 

procedural error, but it did not void the default judgment if the party being served had 

reason to know the suit against it was ongoing.20 Connie had reason to know the action 

against her was ongoing because she had been properly served with the summons and 

complaint. 

In support of Connie’s argument that her due process rights were violated, 

she relies heavily on two cases, but both are inapposite. Connie first points to our 

decision in Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co.21 In that case an indigent couple living 

in Scammon Bay received a summons to appear in small claims court in Anchorage.

22 

The summons did not mention that the defendants had the option to respond by a written 

pleading.

23 We held this deficiency in the summons violated due process because the 

defendants were not given sufficient information to mount a defense.

24 

18 See Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 787 (Dec. 15, 1986) (“Service of 

the application is not required if the party has failed to appear.”). 

19 Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1771 (Apr. 16, 2012). 

20 781 P.2d at 10-11. 

21 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). 

22 Id. at 1353. 

23 Id. 

24 See id. (stating that because court did not inform “the indigent bush 

defendant of the right to file a written pleading,” summons was not “ ‘reasonably 

calculated . . . to . . . afford him an opportunity’ . . . ‘to be heard at a meanin[g]ful time 

and in a meaningful manner’ ” (first quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr., 339 

U.S. 306, 314 (1950); then quoting Bush v. Reid, 516 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973))). 

-9- 7666
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By contrast, Connie had the necessary information to mount a defense. 

Connie was aware that Veral had filed for divorce because she was personally served 

with the complaint. She does not argue that the complaint lacked sufficient information 

to allow her to respond, as in Aguchak. And although she maintains she was too 

depressed to understand the importance of the complaint, the court found that assertion 

not credible. The Aguchak decision does not support Connie’s claim for relief. 

Connie’s reliance on State, Department of Corrections v. Kila, Inc. is 

misplaced too.

25 Kila concerned defective service under Alaska Civil Rule 4, not Civil 

Rule 5.26 These two rules cover different kinds of service. Civil Rule 4 outlines the 

requirements for service of a summons and complaint. Correct service of the summons 

and complaint is “necessary to effect personal jurisdiction,” without which there is no 

due process.

27 In this case personal jurisdiction attached with valid service of the 

summons and complaint, which gave Connie notice of the action against her. Kila does 

not apply here. 

Because Connie’s judgment is not void, the superior court did not err by 

denying relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). 

B.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err By Denying Relief From Judgment 

Under Rule 60(b)(6). 

Connie next argues that she is entitled to relief from judgment under Civil 

Rule 60(b)(6). A “party can invoke subsection (b)(6) only if none of the other five 

clauses apply and ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exist.”28 The superior court ruled that 

Connie’s claim did not qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because it essentially 

25 884 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1994) (holding default judgment was void for 

improper service of process under Civil Rule 4). 

26 Id. at 661-62. 

27 Id. at 662. 

28 Powell v. Powell, 194 P.3d 364, 371 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Juelfs v. 

Gough, 41 P.3d 593, 597 (Alaska 2002)). 

-10- 7666
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sought relief for excusable neglect, which falls under subsection (b)(1). This ruling was 

correct.29 For example, in Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. a litigant sought 

relief from a default judgment.30 The litigant alleged he had been too ill to respond 

when he was served because he was suffering from depression and other medical 

conditions at the time.31 We addressed his motion under subsection (b)(1), requiring 

him to prove “excusable neglect.”32 Because the grounds for relief asserted by Connie 

fall within subsection (b)(1)’s provision for “excusable neglect,” and because the time 

for seeking relief under that subsection had expired,33 the superior court did not err by 

denying relief. 

29 See, e.g., Cook v. Rowland, 49 P.3d 262, 265 (Alaska 2002) (addressing 

motion for relief under subsection (b)(1) when litigant alleged he failed to respond to 

summons because he was suffering from two gunshot wounds, recovering from surgery, 

and under influence of pain medication); Lovell v. Lovell, 645 P.2d 151, 154 (Alaska 

1982) (addressing motion for relief under subsection (b)(1) when litigant alleged she 

had “long history of medical and psychological problems” and could not afford to travel 

for divorce hearing); Gregor v. Hodges, 612 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Alaska 1980) (addressing 

motion for relief under subsection (b)(1) when litigant alleged she did not understand 

service when bedridden and under influence of pain medication). 

30 790 P.2d 1374 (Alaska 1990). 

31 Id. at 1375. 

32 Id. at 1377 (holding superior court did not clearly err in determining 

litigant’s claims lacked credibility and ruling he was not entitled to relief under Rule 

60(b)(1)). 

33 See Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“The motion shall be made within a 

reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the date 

of notice of the judgment . . . .”). 

Connie also argues AS 09.10.140 tolled the length of time within which 

she could file her Civil Rule 60(b) claim for relief. Alaska Statute 09.10.140(a) 

provides that if a person is “incompetent by reason of mental illness or mental 

disability,” then the time of disability “is not a part of the time limit” for commencement 

of a civil action, but may not extend the time limit for “longer than two years after the 

disability ceases.” We need not decide whether this statute applies to toll the time for 

-11- 7666
 
CONCLUSION 

 We AFFIRM the superior court’s order denying relief from judgment. 

 

 

filing a motion under Civil Rule 60(b). Because the superior court did not clearly err 

by finding that Connie was not mentally incompetent, Connie would not qualify for 

tolling under AS 09.10.140(a) even if the statute otherwise applied. 

-12- 7666