J-A25023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM MICHAEL-DALTON HOGE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1500 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-30-CR-0000211-2020

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: February 14, 2023

Appellant William Michael-Dalton Hoge appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following a joint bench trial in which he was convicted for 

burglary, criminal trespass, and theft by unlawful taking.1 Appellant argues 

that the trial court erred in admitting video confessions from his co-defendant

and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

Briefly, Appellant and Taylor Pierson (co-defendant Pierson) were 

arrested in 2020 after a witness saw the two individuals enter a residential 

building, gather personal property, and place the items in bags outside the 

building for later transport. Following their arrest, both Appellant and codefendant Pierson gave recorded statements to police.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(3), 3503(a)(1)(ii), and 3921(a), respectively.
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The Commonwealth subsequently filed a motion to join both cases for 

trial, which the trial court granted. Although Appellant and co-defendant 

Pierson agreed to the consolidated trial, they requested that the trial court

preclude the Commonwealth from introducing the other co-defendant’s 

statement at trial. Ultimately, the trial court denied the joint defense request,

but indicated that it would not consider either statement against the other codefendant. See N.T. Trial, 8/24/21, at 32-33.

On August 26, 2021, the trial court found Appellant guilty of burglary, 

criminal trespass, and theft by unlawful taking, but not guilty of conspiracy. 

The trial court found co-defendant Pierson not guilty on all counts. Appellant 

filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing 

Appellant’s claims.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following claims, which we have 

reordered as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred, in this joined, non-jury trial with 

co-defendant, Taylor Pierson, in admitting the video 

statements of both co-defendants when there was a high 

likelihood of confusion concerning which statements were 

admissible against which co-defendant and for what respective 

purpose such that a reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 

on the merits of each case was not possible.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding [] Appellant guilty on 

the charges of burglary 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(2), criminal 

trespass 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(a)(1)(ii) and theft by unlawful 

taking 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a) when said guilty verdicts were not 

supported by a sufficiency of the evidence on each respective 

count.
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Appellant’s Brief at 8 (some formatting altered).

Admission of Video Confessions

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce a video of co-defendant 

Pierson’s statement to police. Id. at 21. In support, Appellant asserts that 

because co-defendant Pierson did not testify at trial, her recorded statement 

was “hearsay and violated [] Appellant’s right to confrontation under the 

federal and state constitutions.” Id. Appellant contends that not only was 

the statement inadmissible, but also “had the unavoidable effect of causing 

confusion in arriving at the trial court’s verdict against [Appellant].” Id. at 

20. Finally, Appellant claims that because “the trial court was exposed to the 

inadmissible video-taped hearsay statement of [co-defendant Pierson]. . . the 

court abused its discretion in its evidentiary ruling, and in allowing the 

proceeding to go forward in this manner and that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Id. at 21. Therefore, Appellant 

requests that we remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial. Id.

“The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the 

trial court and our review is for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. 

Kane, 188 A.3d 1217, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). 

As our Supreme Court has explained

[a]n appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion “based on 

a mere error of judgment, but rather . . . where the [trial] court 

has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, 

or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or 

the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Importantly, an 
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appellate court should not find that a trial court abused its 

discretion merely because the appellate court disagrees with the 

trial court’s conclusion. Indeed, “when reviewing the trial court’s 

exercise of discretion, it is improper for an appellate court to 

‘step[] into the shoes’ of the trial judge and review the evidence 

de novo.” 

Commonwealth v. Gill, 206 A.3d 459, 466-67 (Pa. 2019) (citations 

omitted).

“Under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, a criminal 

defendant has a right to confront witnesses against him.” Commonwealth 

v. Rivera, 773 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). In Bruton, the 

United States Supreme Court held that the introduction of statements by a

non-testifying co-defendant violated the defendant’s confrontation rights, 

despite the trial court’s instruction that the statement should only be 

considered against the co-defendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 

123, 135-36 (1968). In reaching that conclusion, the Bruton Court explained 

that although the trial court issued a limiting instruction, the statements were 

of such a powerfully incriminating nature that it was unlikely that the jury 

would have followed the trial court’s instruction. Id.

“Following Bruton, the [United States Supreme Court] has approved 

redaction and a limiting instruction as a means of eliminating the possible 

spillover prejudice arising from the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession against that co-defendant at a joint trial.” 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 104 A.3d 267, 294 (Pa. 2014) (citation 

omitted).
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However, this Court has explained:

[T]he fundamental reason on which the decision in Bruton was 

predicated was a balancing of risks, i.e., the risk that a jury could 

or would not disregard prejudicial out-of-court inculpatory 

statements of a co[-]defendant, who did not testify, although 

instructed by the court to do so, against the risk of the jury system 

not accomplishing the justice it is established to render. Such a 

risk is not present in this case where the fact finder it the judge 

who, in a jury trial, would be the one to give the instruction to the 

jury to disregard such prejudicial evidence. Certainly it is not too 

unreasonable to presume that he would himself obey the mandate 

he would have given to a jury.

Commonwealth v. Mangan, 281 A.2d 666, 668 (Pa. Super. 1971). 

Moreover, this Court has held that the risks addressed in Bruton are not 

present where the defendant is tried in a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial. 

See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 660 A.2d 609, 614 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1995).

Indeed, it is well settled that “[a] judge, as factfinder, is presumed to 

disregard inadmissible evidence and consider only competent evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d 179, 183 n.6 (Pa. 1980) (citations 

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 463 (Pa. 

2004) (explaining that a “trial judge is assumed to be able to separate the 

evidence that was admitted against the co-defendant alone and that which 

was admitted against [the] appellant”); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 156 

A.3d 299, 309 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reiterating that a trial court acting as the 

fact-finder “is presumed to know the law, ignore prejudicial statements, and 

disregard inadmissible evidence” (citation omitted)).

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:
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The instant court presided over a bench trial with joined codefendants. Each co-defendant gave a post-arrest statement to 

the police. The court considered only the statement made by the 

individual defendant, and we did not consider any statement 

offered by either of the defendants against the other.

Essentially, the testimony provided clear evidence that each 

defendant was present at a property that did not belong to either 

defendant, that the defendants were in a relationship, and that on 

a particular day, while riding a 4-wheeler, it was alleged that the 

defendants entered into a remote dwelling and removed personal 

property, thus establishing the crimes of theft and burglary. 

After the non-jury trial, [co-defendant Pierson] was acquitted. 

She did not testify in the non-jury trial, and the evidence against 

[her] did not rise to the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In the statement offered by [co-defendant Pierson] to the 

Pennsylvania State Police, [co-defendant Pierson] did not present 

any incriminating evidence against herself, nor did she admit to 

entering the property or participating in the theft and burglary. 

Again, [co-defendant Pierson] did not testify at trial.

Richard Lemley, a neighbor and caretaker of the property, testified 

that he observed the co-defendants on a four-wheeler at the 

remote dwelling. He established that they were present almost 

immediately after personal property had been removed from the 

dwelling. The facts established that the personal property was 

gathered, bagged, and moved from the dwelling. The personal 

property was placed outside the dwelling in anticipation of later 

transporting the stolen items.

During the trial, [Appellant] did offer testimony. In his trial 

testimony, he indicated that neither he nor [co-defendant Pierson]

entered the property. [Appellant] said that he lied to the police 

officer in his post-arrest statement when he stated that he and 

[co-defendant Pierson] committed the crime together.

[Appellant] claimed that he confessed to the police officer as he 

was not going “to jail for something [he] didn’t do by [him]self.”

The court, in the bench trial, was sitting as a finder of fact. We 

observed [Appellant] and simply made a determination that his 

testimony at trial was not credible and that his statement made 

to the police was credible.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 2-4.

Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce co-defendant 

Pierson’s recorded statement at trial. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1229. As noted 

previously, the “judge, as factfinder, is presumed to disregard inadmissible 

evidence and consider only competent evidence.” Davis, 421 A.2d at 183 n.6

(citations omitted); see also McFadden, 156 A.3d at 309. In the instant 

case, the trial court explicitly stated that it would not consider co-defendant 

Pierson’s statement as evidence against Appellant. See N.T. Trial at 32-33. 

Indeed, the trial court found Appellant guilty based on witness testimony and 

Appellant’s own statement to police. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4. Therefore, we 

conclude that there was no error in the trial court’s decision to admit codefendant Pierson’s statement at trial. See Gribble, 863 A.2d at 463; 

Mangan, 281 A.2d at 668. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on 

this claim.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions for burglary, criminal trespass, and theft by unlawful taking. 

Appellant’s Brief at 12. Before addressing these issues, we must determine 

whether Appellant preserved a sufficiency claim before the trial court. 

It is settled that to “preserve a sufficiency claim, the Rule 1925(b) 

statement must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was 

insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 1156 (Pa. Super. 
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2020) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 249 A.3d 505 (Pa. 2021). If the 

appellant does not specify such elements, the sufficiency claim is deemed 

waived. Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Here, Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement in which he raised a 

boilerplate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for burglary, criminal 

trespass, and theft by unlawful taking. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/17/22, 

at 1 (unnumbered). Appellant did not specify the element or elements for 

which the evidence was insufficient. See Widger, 237 A.3d at 1156. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude that Appellant has waived his sufficiency

claim for review. See Roche, 153 A.3d at 1072. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2023