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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

LONNIE ALLEN BASSETT v. ARIZONA 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 

COURT OF ARIZONA 

No. 23–830. Decided July 2, 2024 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and 

JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 

“[M]andatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles 

violate the Eighth Amendment.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 

U. S. 460, 470 (2012). Sentencing courts therefore must 

have “discretion to impose a lesser punishment” on children 

who commit crimes before they turn 18. Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U. S. 98, 100 (2021). An Arizona court sentenced 

Lonnie Allen Bassett to life without parole for a crime he

committed as a juvenile. At the time Bassett was sentenced, however, Arizona courts had no discretion to impose

parole-eligible sentences because the State had completely

abolished parole for people convicted of felonies. 

The Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that “Bassett 

was actually ineligible for parole.” State ex rel. Mitchell v. 

Cooper, 256 Ariz. 1, ___, 535 P. 3d 3, 8 (2023). Arizona also 

agrees that “parole-eligibility is constitutionally required,” 

and that “Arizona law did not provide a parole eligible option at the time of Bassett’s sentencing.” Brief in Opposition 1, 24. Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Bassett’s petition for postconviction relief. 

This Court’s precedents require a “discretionary sentencing procedure—where the sentencer can consider the defendant’s youth and has discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life without parole.” Jones, 593 U. S., at 112. 

Because Arizona’s sentencing scheme instead mandated 
 

 

2 BASSETT v. ARIZONA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

life without parole for juveniles, I would grant the petition

for certiorari and summarily reverse the judgment below. 

I 

In 2004, Lonnie Bassett shot and killed two people in Arizona when he was 16. He was riding in the back seat of a 

car driven by Frances Tapia when he used a shotgun to

shoot Tapia and her boyfriend, who was sitting in the passenger seat.

Bassett was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. At the time he was sentenced, defendants convicted of 

first-degree murder in Arizona received one of two sentences: either (1) “natural life,” under which the defendant 

was “not eligible for commutation, parole, . . . or release 

from confinement on any basis;” or (2) “life,” which required

a defendant to serve 25 years before “releas[e] on any basis.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., §13–703(A) (2003); see §§13–

703.01(A), 13–1105(C). Arizona abolished parole for people

with felony convictions in 1994, however, and that remained the law until 2014. See §41–1604.09(I) (1994); §13–

716 (2014); §41–1604.09(I)(2) (1994). Therefore, for people

with first-degree murder convictions, “the only ‘release’ 

available under Arizona law [wa]s executive clemency, not 

parole.” Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U. S. 17, 23 (2023). Although

Arizona’s sentencing statute “continued to list two alternatives to death,” id., at 21, the “only alternative sentence to

death was life imprisonment without parole,” Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U. S. 613, 614 (2016) (per curiam); see also Miller, 

567 U. S., at 486 (listing Arizona as one of “29 jurisdictions 

mandating life without parole for children”). 

Bassett was sentenced in 2006. The trial court sentenced 

him to one “natural life” sentence on one count and a consecutive “life” sentence on the other count. Because Bassett 

was sentenced between 1994 and 2014, the trial judge could

sentence him only to life without parole. 
 

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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

II 

Life-without-parole sentences for juveniles are constitutional only for “those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” rather than “transient immaturity.” Montgomery 

v. Louisiana, 577 U. S. 190, 209 (2016). Thus, “an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 

may be sentenced to life without parole, but only if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.” Jones, 593 U. S., at 

100. This “discretionary sentencing procedure” is one

“where the sentencer can consider the defendant’s youth

and has discretion to impose a lesser sentence than life

without parole.” Id., at 112. 

Discretionary sentencing schemes “ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases where that

sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant’s age.” Id., 

at 111–112. This constitutionally required sentencing 

scheme reflects the premise that, in deciding whether to impose life-without-parole for a juvenile, consideration of 

“youth” and “a child’s capacity for change” matter. Miller, 

567 U. S., at 473. This Court has reaffirmed that “Miller 

required a discretionary sentencing procedure.” Jones, 593 

U. S., at 110. Thus, “a State’s discretionary sentencing system” is “constitutionally necessary.” Id., at 105. 

III 

Arizona’s sentencing scheme left no discretion for a parole-eligible sentence in this case. No one disputes that.

See Brief in Opposition 1 (“Arizona law did not provide a 

parole-eligible option at the time of Bassett’s sentencing in

2006”); 256 Ariz., at ___, 535 P. 3d, at 8 (“Bassett was actually ineligible for parole”). That is plainly inconsistent with 

Miller, Montgomery, and Jones. The State does “not argu[e]

that the mere existence of its two sentencing options saves 

it from a Miller violation,” and it agrees “parole-eligibility 

is constitutionally required.” Brief in Opposition 22, 24. 
 

4 BASSETT v. ARIZONA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Arizona advances three arguments for why Bassett did, 

in fact, receive all the discretionary process required by Miller. These arguments formed the basis for the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision below.1 Each runs contrary to Miller’s clear command. 

First, the State contends that the sentencing court “was

so mistaken about its own sentencing statutes that it fortuitously complied with Miller” because of a “widespread mistaken belief among Arizona judges and attorneys that the

release-eligible option included parole eligibility.” Brief in 

Opposition 3, 27. To start, Arizona eliminated parole more 

than a decade before Bassett was sentenced, and this argument is “inconsistent with the presumption that state 

courts know and follow the law.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 

U. S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). Indeed, Arizona courts recognized that state law “eliminat[ed] the possibility of parole

for crimes committed after [1993],” State v. Rosario, 195 

Ariz. 264, 268, 987 P. 2d 226, 230 (App. 1999); and the State 

itself represented, in this Court and other courts, that state 

law made life without parole the minimum sentence. See 

Brief for State of Michigan et al. as Amici Curiae in Miller 

v. Alabama, O. T. 2011, No. 10–9646, etc., pp. i, 1; see also, 

e.g., State Motion To Dismiss in Chaparro v. Ryan, No. 

2:19–cv–00650 (D Ariz., Mar. 27, 2019), p. 3 (arguing that

“Arizona statutory law at all relevant times unambiguously 

—————— 1The State does not argue, nor did the Arizona Supreme Court clearly 

hold, that executive clemency qualifies as the equivalent of a parole-eligible sentence under Miller. See Brief in Opposition 22–23 (conceding

that “clemency-eligibility alone would have been insufficient”). That is 

for good reason. Executive clemency provides no “meaningful” or “realistic opportunity to obtain release.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U. S. 48, 79, 

82 (2010). Indeed, “amici who track clemency proceedings in Arizona are 

not aware of a single instance in which an individual convicted of firstdegree murder since Arizona eliminated parole in 1994 has received a 

grant of executive clemency (i.e., commutation of sentence or pardon).”

Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 

Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 8. 
 

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SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

forbade parole to anyone convicted of first-degree murder

after 1993”); Reply Brief 5–6 (collecting examples). This argument requires speculating, based on no evidence, about

the possibility of a judge’s two-decade-old mistaken belief 

about state law. Miller permits no such thing. Instead, as 

this Court has recently confirmed, “Miller required a discretionary sentencing procedure.” Jones, 593 U. S., at 110. 

Here, it is undisputed that Arizona’s sentencing regime required a sentence of life without parole at the time Bassett

was sentenced. 

Second, the State contends that Bassett did, in fact, receive “an individualized sentencing hearing at which his 

youth and attendant characteristics were considered” as

mitigation evidence. Brief in Opposition 14; see also 245 

Ariz., at ___–___, 535 P. 3d, at 11–13 (noting that “Bassett’s 

chronological age and attendant characteristics were considered”). That too misunderstands this Court’s precedents. Sentencing courts must have the authority to actually “impose a lesser sentence than life without parole,” not 

just the discretion to consider youth as a mitigating factor. 

Jones, 593 U. S., at 112. In other words, juvenile defendants can be sentenced to life without parole “only so long as

the sentence is not mandatory—that is, only so long as the 

sentencer has discretion to ‘consider the mitigating qualities of youth’ and impose a lesser punishment.” Id., at 106 

(quoting Miller, 567 U. S., at 476). 

When a State offers no possible penalty other than life

without parole, the sentence is unconstitutionally mandatory because consideration of age “could not change the sentence; whatever [is] said in mitigation, the mandatory lifewithout-parole prison term would kick in.” Id., at 488. 

Here, for example, although the judge mentioned Bassett’s

age as a mitigating factor, it is clear that the judge could

not have considered how “the distinctive attributes of youth

diminish the penological justifications for imposing the 
 

 

6 BASSETT v. ARIZONA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

harshest sentenc[e]” of life without parole. Id., at 472. Because Bassett was sentenced well before Miller, the sentencing court could not have adequately considered Bassett’s youth, his capacity for rehabilitation, or the necessity

of a parole-eligible sentence. 

“Miller’s discretionary sentencing procedure has resulted 

in numerous sentences less than life without parole for defendants who otherwise would have received mandatory 

life-without parole sentences.” Jones, 593 U. S., at 119. 

That is because, “in concluding that a discretionary sentencing procedure would help make life-without-parole sentences relatively rare, the Court relied on data, not speculation.” Id., at 112. Arizona asks this Court to speculate

that some consideration of age as a mitigating factor is sufficient to satisfy Miller, Montgomery, and Jones. Perhaps

Bassett would have received the same parole-ineligible sentences for the same reasons the sentencing judge already

discussed; or perhaps Bassett’s horrific childhood, including

the fact that he was abandoned by his mother, kidnapped

and abused by his father, and kept in a closet with just one 

meal a day, would have led to a parole-eligible sentence. 

This Court should not speculate on this cold record, though,

because “[d]etermining the proper sentence in such a case

raises profound questions of morality and social policy” that

are best left to “state sentencing judges and juries.” Jones, 

593 U. S., at 119–120. Instead, this Court’s role is to ensure 

that the trial judge had “discretion to impose a lesser punishment in light of [Bassett’s] youth.” Id., at 120. 

Third, the State contends that “the juveniles who received parole-eligible sentences will all receive parole eligibility within 25 years by virtue of the 2014 legislative fix,” 

so the “functional outcome is no different than if parole-eligibility had been on the books all along.” Brief in Opposition 21; see also 256 Ariz., at ___–___, 535 P. 3d, at 12–13. 

That is wrong. To start, the 2014 reinstatement of parole 

only applies to juveniles serving “life” sentences, not those 
 

Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

serving “natural life” sentences.2 So in this case, for example, it applies to only one of Bassett’s two sentences. See 

Brief for 15 Constitutional and Criminal Law Professors as 

Amici Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 10 (Law Professors Brief ) 

(“[T]he legislature did nothing to make individuals like Petitioner Bassett, who were sentenced to natural life with no 

possibility of release, parole-eligible”).3 

Moreover, the relevant question is the constitutionality

of the sentencing scheme at the time of sentencing; and 

here the court lacked discretion to impose a sentence less

than life without parole when it sentenced Bassett. Courts 

generally have “no authority to leave in place a conviction

or sentence that violates a substantive rule,” and there is 

“no grandfather clause that permits States to enforce punishments the Constitution forbids.” Montgomery, 577 U. S., 

at 203–204. Therefore, “any post hoc revision to the sentencing scheme does nothing to alter the lack of discretion

that judges faced when Petitioner Bassett and similarly situated defendants were sentenced. Their sentences remain 

unconstitutional.” Law Professors Brief 10. That is why

this Court has already rejected the idea that “the potential

for future ‘legislative reform’” can rescue an unconstitutional sentencing scheme. Lynch, 578 U. S., at 616. 

* * * 

In Jones, this Court assumed that “most offenders who 

could seek collateral review as a result of Montgomery have 

done so and, if eligible, have received new discretionary sentences under Miller.” Jones, 593 U. S., at 111, n. 4. That is 

simply not true in Arizona. “Dozens of juvenile offenders in 

—————— 2 “[A] person who is sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility

of release after serving a minimum number of calendar years for an offense that was committed before the person attained eighteen years of 

age is eligible for parole on completion of service of the minimum sentence.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–716 (2014). 3Arizona does “not argu[e] that the mere existence of its two sentencing options saves it from a Miller violation.” Brief in Opposition 22. 
 

8 BASSETT v. ARIZONA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Arizona . . . were sentenced to life imprisonment without

the opportunity for any type of release for crimes they committed as teenagers.” Brief for National Association of 

Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae on Pet. for 

Cert. 3. Miller identified 28 States that had mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles, including Arizona. 

Arizona “remains the only one of those states that has neither made individuals like Petitioner Bassett eligible for 

parole nor allowed them to be resentenced under a constitutional scheme.” Law Professors Brief 18–19.4 “Arizona 

thus remains the only state where juvenile homicide defendants are still serving unconstitutional sentences of 

mandatory life without parole with no meaningful mechanism to challenge their sentences.” Id., at 21. 

Arizona now concedes that “[b]ut for the sentencer’s actual consideration of parole-eligibility and the subsequent 

statute effectuating this sentence, there would be a Miller 

violation.” Brief in Opposition 23. For the reasons discussed above, those two features do not save Arizona’s 

scheme. Because the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision departed from this Court’s established precedents, I would 

grant the petition for certiorari and summarily reverse the

judgment below. 

I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 4 “Following Miller, all other twenty-seven states called out in the decision have taken meaningful action to comply with federal constitutional law. Sixteen of those states have banned juvenile life without parole entirely. Six others have passed legislative reforms that remedy 

unconstitutional pre-Miller juvenile sentences. The remaining five 

states have addressed unconstitutional pre-Miller sentences via their 

state courts.” Law Professors Brief 19–21 (footnotes omitted) (collecting 

cases).