NO. 96-057 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

ROBERT PAUL GOULET, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Lawrence A. LaFountain, Attorney at Law, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, 

John Paulson, Ass't Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

Brant S. Light, Cascade County Attorney, 

Julie A. Macek, Deputy Cascade County Attorney, 

Great Falls, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: June 27, 1996 

Decided: August 6, 1996 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Robert Paul Goulet appeals his conviction in the Eighth 

Judicial District Court, Cascade County, of felony escape. We 

affirm. 

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court followed 

statutory requirements in imposing sentence. 

While subject to official detention at the Cascade County 

Detention Center, Goulet climbed a wall in the recreation yard and 

escaped. His escape was observed by a detention officer, who 

warned him to stop and then pursued him on foot. Other officers 

joined in, following Goulet to an apartment building which they 

surrounded and where they found him hiding under a pile of debris 

under a porch. The officers took Goulet back into custody and 

returned him to the Detention Center. 

Goulet pled guilty to felony escape. At the sentencing 

hearing, neither the defense nor the State offered any testimony, 

but counsel for both sides argued for particular sentences. The 

State and the presentence investigation officer both recommended a 

ten-year prison sentence. The defense recommended a two-year 

prison sentence. 

The District Court imposed a sentence of ten years at the 

state prison, stating that the sentence was in accordance with the 

recommendations of the State and the probation officer who prepared 

the presentence investigation report. The court further stated 

that it had taken into account Goulet's prior record, including his 

long history of contact with the legal system as a juvenile. 

2 
Did the District Court follow statutory requirements in 

imposing sentence? 

The first statute upon which Goulet relies is § 46-l& 

102 (3) (b), MCA, which requires that when a sentence is pronounced, 

the court must "clearly state for the record [its] reasons for 

imposing the sentence." Goulet points out that unless the reasons 

for a sentence are set forth, one is left to guess at the reasons 

and cannot know whether the sentence was imposed in violation of 

due process or not. See State v. Stumpf (19801, 187 Mont. 225, 

227, 609 P.2d 298, 299. 

This Court has not insisted upon extensive statements of 

sentencing reasons under § 46-l&102(3) lb), MCA. In State v. 

Krantz (19901, 241 Mont. 501, 788 P.2d 298, cert. denied 498 U.S. 

933, the Court upheld a sentence in which the district court's 

stated reasons were the defendant's criminal record, the serious 

nature of the offense, and the defendant's consistent pattern of 

endangering other people. 

In State v. Petroff (1988), 232 Mont. 20, 757 P.2d 759, the 

reasons stated for the sentence were the recommendations of the 

presentence investigation and the defendant's prior criminal 

record. This Court ruled that the judgment clearly informed the 

defendant of the reasons underlying his sentence and that no more 

was required. Petroff, 757 P.2d at 761. Similarly in State v. 

Johnson (1986), 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248, the Court upheld a 

sentence imposed for the stated reason of the defendant's history 

of alcohol and driving offenses, considered along with the 

presentence report. 

3 
In the present case, the District Court stated both orally and 

in its written sentence that Goulet's sentence was imposed at the 

recommendations of the prosecutor and the probation officer. The 

court also stated that it had taken into consideration Goulet's 

prior record and long history of contact with the legal system as 

a juvenile. We hold that, like the reasons set forth by the 

sentencing courts in Johnson, Petroff, and Krantz, this statement 

of sentencing reasons is sufficient to comply with Stumpf and § 46- 

l&102(3) (b), MCA. 

Goulet contends that the sentence imposed upon him may have 

been improperly influenced by reference at his sentencing hearing 

and in his presentence investigation report to the fact that, at 

the time of his escape, he was awaiting trial on a charge of 

deliberate homicide. In making this argument, Goulet relies upon 

State v. Herrera (1982), 197 Mont. 462, 643 P.Zd 588, and State v. 

Olsen (1980), 189 Mont. 43, 614 P.2d 1061. 

In Herrera, improper matter was brought before the sentencing 

court, including a seemingly constitutionally defective conviction 

in which Herrera was not afforded counsel, and incorrect information as to his history of offenses involving guns. This Court 

remanded for rehearing on sentencing, so that the correct information could be presented to the court. Herrera, 643 P.2d at 592. 

In u, the defendant's "rap" sheet contained inaccurate 

entries, but the record contained substantial evidence that the 

improper information was disclosed to, and discussed with, the 

sentencing judge. There was ample evidence that the trial judge 

relied only upon convictions and facts known to be true accounts of 

4 
Olsen's criminal record. This Court affirmed the sentence. Olsen, 

614 P.2d at 1066. 

In this case, the pending felony charge was an important 

aspect of the crime of escape to which Goulet pled guilty and, as 

such, was properly noted at the sentencing hearing. Section 45-7 

306(3) (b) (i), MCA, provides that a person convicted of the offense 

of escape shall be imprisoned for a term of up to ten years if he 

has been charged with, or convicted of, a felony and escapes from 

the county jail. The felony charge pending against Goulet at the 

time of his escape provided a basis for the District Court to 

impose a term of imprisonment rather than the six-month jail term 

which would apply if the pending charge had been a misdemeanor. It 

was proper for the court to be informed of the pending charge. 

Nothing in the record indicates that the court improperly 

relied upon the pending charge in sentencing Goulet. The court was 

correctly informed at the sentencing hearing and in the presentence 

investigation report that the charge was still pending at the time 

of sentencing. 

Goulet also urges that the court erred in sentencing him to 

prison because he was a nonviolent felony offender and the crime to 

which he pled guilty was not a crime of violence under 5 4618- 

104(3), MCA. Montana law requires the sentencing court to consider 

alternatives to incarceration when sentencing nonviolent offenders. 

Section 46-18-201(11), MCA. We note that Goulet's own counsel 

recommended a term of imprisonment for his client at the sentencing 

hearing. Further, this argument was not raised before the District 

Court. 

5 
This Court recently addressed a similar claim of error raised 

for the first time on appeal, in State v. Nelson (1995), 274 Mont. 

11, 906 P.2d 663. The Court held that Nelson's failure to object 

to the sentence or to move for reconsideration barred him from 

raising on appeal the issue of consideration of alternatives to 

prison. Nelson, 906 P.2d at 668. The Court distinguished Nelson 

from two previous cases--State v. Lenihan (1979), 184 Mont. 338, 

602 P.Zd 997, and State v. Hatfield (1993), 256 Mont. 340, 846 P.2d 

1025--on the basis that Lenihan and Hatfield involved sentences 

that were illegal and in excess of statutory authority. Such was 

not the case in Nelson, and it is not the case here. Goulet's tenyear sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence for his crime 

under § 45-7-306(3) (b), MCA. Absent objection before the trial 

court or an opportunity for that court to consider this issue, we 

decline to further address the issue on appeal. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: 

Ju trees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the 

following named: 

Lawrence A. LaFountain 

Attorney at Law 

Cascade County Courthouse, Rm. 110 

Great Falls, MT 59401 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, A.G. 

John Paulson, Assistant 

Justice Bldg. 

Helena, MT 59620 

Brant S. Light, County Attorney 

Julie A. Macek, Chief Deputy 

121 4th Street North 

Great Falls, MT 59401 

ED SMITH 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA