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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37146

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KIMBERLY D. JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2011 Opinion No. 63

Filed: October 31, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. G. Richard Bevan, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction entered upon conditional guilty plea to two counts of 

possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Kimberly D. Jones appeals from her judgment of conviction entered upon a conditional 

guilty plea to two counts of possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, under her 

reserved rights in the conditional plea, Jones challenges the district court’s denial of her motion 

to suppress evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The central issue in this case arises from the fact that Jones was initially stopped and 

arrested for reckless driving. Following her arrest, Jones admitted to being in possession of a 

pipe used for smoking methamphetamine and a small quantity of marijuana. These items were 

found during the ensuing search incident to her arrest. Jones was charged with one count of 

felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), 

and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), Idaho Code § 
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37-2732(c)(3). Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence, asserting the search violated her rights 

under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the 

Idaho Constitution because her arrest for reckless driving, used to justify the search, was invalid. 

She argued the arrest exceeded the officer’s authority granted in sections 49-1409, 49-1407, and 

49-1405(1)(f), (2) of the Idaho Code. After briefing and a hearing on the matter, the district 

court found the arrest was lawful and denied the motion to suppress. Jones entered a conditional 

guilty plea pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11(a)(2), reserving her right to appeal the district 

court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Jones timely appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 

motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). Because 

this case presents no factual disputes, the review is limited to issues of the proper application of 

law to those facts. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Authority to Arrest for Reckless Driving Under Idaho Law

Jones challenges the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress her statements and 

evidence seized in the search incident to her warrantless arrest. Jones contends the officer had 

no legal authority under Idaho law to arrest her for reckless driving, making the ensuing search a 

violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 

I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution1

, thereby requiring exclusion of the evidence. 

 

1 Jones argues that this Court’s decision in State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 963 P.2d 1215 

(Ct. App. 1998) provides a basis to hold that Idaho’s Constitution affords greater protection 

against unreasonable searches and seizures than federal constitutional standards and has 

continuing viability despite the holding in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (a warrantless 

arrest based on probable cause, even where the arrest violates state law, does not offend Fourth 

Amendment principles). Because we conclude that the arrest was authorized under Idaho law, 

we need not reach Jones’s constitutional question of whether Foldesi enlarges the scope of 

protection under the Idaho Constitution beyond that of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Doe, 

140 Idaho 271, 273, 92 P.3d 521, 523 (“[W]hen a case can be decided upon a ground other than 
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Search of a person without a warrant is presumptively violative of the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution 

unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 

302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007); State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. 

App. 2010). One well-established exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. United States 

v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802 (1974); State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 728, 905 P.2d 1032, 1037 

(Ct. App. 1995). Under Idaho Code section 49-1409, in regards to misdemeanor traffic 

violations, an officer generally is not authorized to make an arrest; rather, the officer is 

compelled to issue a citation unless an arrest is required or permitted by another statute 

elsewhere in Title 49. See State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 781-82, 963 P.2d 1215, 1218-19 (Ct. 

App. 1998). Reckless driving is a traffic misdemeanor, Idaho Code § 49-1401, and thus, a 

warrantless arrest would not be permitted absent some other authority. 

Among Title 49 statutes that do grant officers the authority to arrest for traffic 

misdemeanors are sections 49-1405 and 49-1407.2 The applicable portion of subsection (1) of 

section 49-1405 states, “The authority to make an arrest is the same as upon an arrest for a felony 

when any person is charged with any of the following offenses: . . . (f) Reckless driving.” The

next subsection of section 49-1405 further states that “[w]henever any person is arrested as 

authorized in this section, he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper 

magistrate,” except that in a case of a failure to stop at the scene of an accident, reckless driving, 

or eluding a police officer, the “officer shall have the same discretion as is provided by law.” 

I.C. § 19-1405(2). 

Section 49-1407 also gives an officer the authority to make a warrantless arrest for a 

traffic misdemeanor under limited circumstances. It provides:

Whenever any person is halted by a peace officer for any misdemeanor 

violation of the provisions of this title and is not required to be taken before a

 

a constitutional ground, the Court will not address the constitutional issue unless it is necessary 

for a determination of the case.”).

2 See also section 49-1408, which authorizes the arrest of a non-resident involved in an 

accident when the officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a traffic 

offense and has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will disregard a written 

promise to appear in court. 
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magistrate, the person shall, in the discretion of the officer, either be given a 

traffic citation or be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper magistrate

. . . in the following cases:

(1) When the person does not furnish satisfactory evidence of identity or 

when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the person will 

disregard a written promise to appear in court. 

(2) When the person is charged with a violation relating to the refusal of a 

driver of a vehicle to submit a vehicle to an inspection and test.

(3) When the person is charged with a violation relating to the failure or 

refusal of a driver of a vehicle to submit the vehicle and load to a weighing or to 

remove excess weight therefrom. 

The outcome of this case turns on whether the officer’s “discretion as is provided by law” in 

subsection (2) of section 49-1405 must be read with, and is limited by, the circumstances which 

restrict an officer’s discretion in section 49-1407, or whether the two statutes give separate 

authority to arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation. 

Jones argues the language in subsection (2) of section 49-1405 incorporates section

49-1407, and consequently, the officer had no authority to arrest her for reckless driving since 

none of the circumstances in the latter statute were met. The State asserts the discretion referred 

to in subsection (2) of section 49-1405 is that which an officer retains to issue a citation, even 

though the officer can arrest for the offense as if it were a felony.

This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State 

v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of a 

statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without 

engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 

(1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 

Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of the statute is to be given its 

plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the 

language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative 

history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this 

Court must interpret ambiguous language, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and 

give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of 

the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of 

those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative history. Id. Moreover, 

statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together to further the 
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legislature’s intent. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382, 987 P.2d 290, 294 (1999). It is 

incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State 

v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001). Constructions of a statute that 

would lead to an absurd result are disfavored. State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 

525 (2004); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 

In looking to the statutes, we conclude the legislature did not intend for the arresting 

authority granted in section 49-1405 to be restricted by section 49-1407. This interpretation is 

dictated by the language of the statutes themselves, read in context. While section 49-1409 

restricts general arresting authority for misdemeanor traffic violations, subsection (1) of section 

49-1405 and section 49-1407 simultaneously grant arresting authority in certain situations. 

Specifically, arresting authority is granted in section 49-1405 in relation to seven listed offenses3

the State legislature finds sufficiently serious to justify an arrest; hence, the statute is titled

“Arrests for serious offenses.” In contrast, section 49-1407 grants officers discretion to arrest 

when an officer has reasonable grounds to believe a person will disregard the promise to appear 

in court, where a person is charged with a violation relating to the refusal of a driver to submit a 

vehicle to an inspection or test, or where a person is charged with the failure or refusal of the 

 

3 The seven offenses listed in full are: 

(a) Negligent homicide.

(b) Driving, or being in actual physical control, of a vehicle or operating a 

vessel while under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating beverage.

(c) Driving a vehicle or operating a vessel while under the influence of 

any narcotic drug, or driving a vehicle or operating a vessel while under 

the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the person 

incapable of safely driving a vehicle.

(d) Failure to stop, or failure to give information, or failure to render 

reasonable assistance, in the event of an accident resulting in death or 

personal injuries.

(e) Failure to stop, or failure to give information, in the event of an 

accident resulting in damage to a vehicle or vessel or to fixtures or other 

property legally upon or adjacent to a highway or waterway.

(f) Reckless driving. 

(g) Fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. 

I.C. § 49-1405(1). 
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driver to submit the vehicle and load to a weigh in or to remove excess weight. Considering the 

nature of the offenses addressed by each statute, it is evident the aims of the statutes are quite 

distinct: section 49-1405 focuses on what the legislature considers serious offenses and elevates 

certain traffic misdemeanors to treatment like felonies for arrest purposes; section 49-1407 

permits arrests for less egregious traffic misdemeanor offenses involving inspections, testing,

and weighing of vehicles and in the situation where it appears likely a person will fail to appear 

in court. This interpretation of the authority granted in sections 49-1405 and 49-1407 is 

consistent with our previous intimation that these provisions are to be read as separate grants of 

arresting authority for particular types of misdemeanor traffic offenses. Foldesi, 131 Idaho at 

782 n.4, 963 P.2d at 1219 n.4.

Also, in considering the entirety of Title 49, it is apparent that where the legislature 

intended for one part of Title 49 to be construed according to other provisions within that title, it

did not hesitate to add in such references. For example, section 49-1407 itself refers to section

49-1411, which outlines the proper procedure for an appearance before a magistrate. Another 

example is in section 49-1401, which defines reckless driving. That section refers specifically to 

section 49-326 to determine the suspension of the driver’s license or privileges. It is quite 

obvious that had the legislature intended section 49-1405 to be restricted by section 49-1407, it 

would have explicitly done so. 

It is apparent that the language in subsection (2) of section 49-1405, stating “a peace 

officer shall have the same discretion as is provided by law,” refers to the discretion an officer 

retains to issue a citation, even though the officer can arrest for reckless driving as if it were a 

felony, and any other discretion that may be conferred by law in connection with an arrest.

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Accordingly, we find that sections 49-1405 and 49-1407 provide officers separate authority to 

arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation, including reckless driving. Because the requirements 

of section 49-1407 do not apply to arrests which are permissible under section 49-1405, Jones’s

arrest was valid. 

 

4 See Idaho Code § 49-1409 (“Whenever a person is halted by a peace officer for a 

misdemeanor traffic violation . . . the officer shall issue a citation . . . .) and Idaho Code § 19-603 

(“A peace officer . . . may, without a warrant, arrest a person: 1. For a public offense committed 

or attempted in his presence. 2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in 

his presence. . . .” (emphasis added)).
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B. The Rule of Lenity

Jones argues that if section 49-1405 is ambiguous when read as a whole, this Court must 

resolve it in favor of her and find her arrest was not authorized. The rule of lenity requires that 

ambiguous criminal statutes should be read narrowly and be construed in favor of the defendant. 

State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008). However, this rule does not 

require a court to disregard the purpose of a statute when it is clear from the context. See State v. 

Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 766, 779 P.2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1989). Though the language in 

subsection (2) of section 49-1405 may be ambiguous when read alone, when examined within 

context, the purpose of the statute is clear. Therefore, this Court is not compelled to construe the 

statute in Jones’s favor where that result would be contrary to the clear intent of the relevant 

statute. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

We conclude Jones’s arrest was authorized under Idaho statutes and valid. Therefore, the 

district court properly denied her motion to suppress evidence, and we affirm Jones’s judgment 

of conviction. 

Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.