ORIGINAl 

3Jn \lr:be Wniteb ~tates ~ourt of jf eberal ~laims 

No. 14-430 C 

This Opinion Will Not Be Published in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims Reporter Because It 

Does Not Add Significantly to the Body of Law. 

PERCY ALLEN WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

THE UNITED ST A TES, 

Defendant. 

(Filed: August 18, 2014) 

OPINION and ORDER 

FILED 

AUG 19 2014 

~ U.~~.: COURT Oft 

rEDt:RAL CLAIMS 

On May 19, 2014, plaintiff, Percy Allen Williams, filed a complaint for breach of contract 

and for violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 9(a), seeking, inter alia, a 

restraining order and preliminary injunction. Plaintiff, who is presently incarcerated in a 

correctional institution in Polkton, North Carolina, alleges that he entered into a contract with the 

Department of Justice that entitled him to $25 million in damages. On June 5, 2014, plaintiff 

moved to dismiss that complaint under RCFC 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(5), and to have this court deny 

any injunctive relief. On June 23, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed informa 

pauperis, but without responding to defendant's motion. For the reasons that follow, defendant's 

motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED. 

This court is solemnly obliged to address obvious questions concerning its subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). This court recognizes that 

plaintiff is acting pro se before this court, and thus the court will hold the form of plaintiff's 

submissions to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Reed v. United 

States, 23 Cl. Ct. 517, 521 (1991) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). Having 

reviewed plaintiffs complaint, as well as defendant's motion to dismiss, this court is certain that it 

lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims that plaintiff raises. 

When a plaintiff fails to plead facts that are not, as a matter of law, sufficient to show that 

a contract exists with the United States, "the normal disposition would be to dismiss the 
.. 

complaint for failure to state a claim, rather than for want of jurisdiction." Lewis v. United 

States, 70 F.3d 597, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1995). There is, however, an exception to the general rule 

"that permits dismissals on jurisdictional grounds if the claim is 'wholly insubstantial and 

frivolous."' Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). "[T]he Federal Circuit has 

held that insubstantial allegations as to the existence of a money-mandating contract will warrant 

dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Twp. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. 

Cl. 101, 110 (2012) (citing Rick's Mushroom Serv. v. United States, 521F.3d1338, 1343-44 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008)). Such is plainly the case here - would be the case even if plaintiff were viewed as 

meeting the jurisdictional requirements in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). See RCFC 

12(b)(6). 

Nor is there any legal basis for plaintiff's claim that the Department of Justice violated the 

Trading with the Enemy Act. This court lacks jurisdiction to address any claims relating to that 

statute. See Duisberg v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (Ct. Cl. 1950); see also N. V 

Montan Export-Metaal Handel-Maatschappij v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1952); 

see generally, Hoffman v. United States, 17 Fed. Appx. 980 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, the Clerk shall dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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