THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Gabrielle Washington as Personal Representative of the 

Estate of Walter Washington, Jr., Respondent, 

v. 

St. George Health Care, LLC, d/b/a St. George Health 

Care Center and Walterboro Community Hospital, Inc., 

d/b/a Colleton Medical Center, Defendants, 

Of which St. George Health Care, LLC, d/b/a St. George 

Healthcare Center is the Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2023-001282 

Appeal From Colleton County 

Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge 

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-319 

Submitted September 19, 2024 – Filed September 25, 2024 

AFFIRMED 

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines, James 

D. Gandy, III, Donald Jay Davis, Jr., all of Clement 

Rivers, LLP, of Charleston; and Gaillard Townsend 

Dotterer, III, of Bybee & Tibbals, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, 

all for Appellant. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Shane Morris Burroughs, of Lanier & Burroughs, LLC, 

of Orangeburg; and John Elliott Parker, Jr. and Lee Deer 

Cope, both of Parker Law Group, LLP, of Hampton, all 

for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: St. George Health Care, LLC, d/b/a St. George Healthcare 

Center (the Facility) appeals the circuit court's order denying its motion to compel 

to arbitration the claims of Gabrielle Washington as Personal Representative of the 

Estate of Walter Washington, Jr. (Walter). On appeal, the Facility argues the 

circuit court erred by denying its motion to compel arbitration. It further argues, 

that "[a]t a minimum," the circuit court should have granted the Facility's 

alternative request for permission to conduct limited discovery to address gaps in 

the evidentiary record bearing on the Arbitration Agreement's enforceability under 

an agency theory. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. 

First, we hold the circuit court did not err in denying the Facility's motion to 

compel arbitration because the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration 

Agreement did not merge. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 

596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an 

issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope 

Missionary Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1, 

3 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is 

subject to de novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10, 

571 S.E.2d 711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings 

will not be overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them."); 

Wilson v. Willis, 426 S.C. 326, 335, 827 S.E.2d 167, 172 (2019) ("Whether an 

arbitration agreement may be enforced against a nonsignatory to the agreement is a 

matter subject to de novo review by an appellate court."); Est. of Solesbee by 

Bayne v. Fundamental Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 438 S.C. 638, 648-49, 

885 S.E.2d 144, 149 (Ct. App. 2023), cert. denied (Apr. 16, 2024) (finding the 

admission agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge after considering (1) 

the admission agreement provided it was governed by South Carolina law and the 

arbitration agreement provided it was governed by federal law, (2) the arbitration 

agreement recognized the two documents were separate by stating the arbitration 

agreement "shall survive any termination or breach of this Agreement or the 

Admission Agreement," (3) the documents were separately paginated and had their 

own signature pages, and (4) signing the arbitration agreement was not a 

precondition to admission); Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 407 S.C. 346, 

355, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (concluding that by their own terms, language in 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the admission agreement that "recognize[d] the 'separatedness' of [the arbitration 

agreement] and the admission agreement" and a clause allowing the arbitration 

agreement to "be disclaimed within thirty days of signing while the admission 

agreement could not" indicated the parties' intention "that the common law 

doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of Bamberg, 

LLC, 422 S.C. 544, 562-63, 813 S.E.2d 292, 302 (Ct. App. 2018) (determining an 

admissions agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge because the fact 

"the [a]dmissions [a]greement indicated it was governed by South Carolina law, 

whereas the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated it was governed by federal law[,]" 

"each document was separately paginated and had its own signature page[,]" and 

"the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated signing it was not a precondition to 

admission" evidenced the parties' intention that the documents be construed as 

separate instruments). Here, as in Solesbee and Hodge, (1) the two agreements 

were governed by different bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was 

governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law; 

(2) each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own 

signature page; (3) the Arbitration Agreement recognized the two documents were 

separate, stating the Arbitration Agreement "shall survive any termination or 

breach of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement"; and (4) the Facility 

acknowledged that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to 

admission to the Facility. Thus, the Admission Agreement and Arbitration 

Agreement did not merge. Because we find the documents did not merge, a 

controlling consideration of whether the Arbitration Agreement bound Walter, we 

decline to reach the Facility's remaining arguments. See Futch v. McAllister 

Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 

(ruling an appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of 

a prior issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885 S.E.2d at 149 

(determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did 

not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied); Coleman, 407 

S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here, appellants' 

equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court."); Hodge, 

422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "equitable estoppel would only 

apply if documents were merged"). 

Second, we hold the circuit court did not err by denying the Facility's request to 

conduct limited discovery to address gaps in the evidentiary record bearing on the 

Arbitration Agreement's enforceability under an agency theory. See Est. of 

Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 651, 885 S.E.2d at 150 ("Because we find the trial court 

correctly held there was no merger of the Agreements and Magnolia's equitable 

estoppel argument was properly denied, we also find the court did not err in 
 

denying its request for further discovery when it would not have changed the 

result."). 

AFFIRMED.1 

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur. 

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.