United States Court of Appeals 

### FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 97-1945SI

_____________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Southern v. * District of Iowa. * William W. Elliott, * [PUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

_____________ Submitted: October 20, 1997

Filed: October 30, 1997

_____________ Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

_____________ PER CURIAM. After a conservation officer encount ered William W. Elliott with two ha ndguns in his van and local law enforcement officers seized a n unregi steredAK-47 fully automatic machinegun at Elliott’s home, a jur y con victedElliott on three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count each of possessing an illegal firearm and failing to register a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(o)(1) (1994); 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994). Elliott appeals his convictions and sentence. We affirm. In challe nging his convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, Elliott

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contends he has no va lid underlying felony conviction for the purposes of § 92 2(g)(1). Elliott argues his counseled guilty plea to an earlie r Arkansas felony charg e is constitutionally infirm because the trial judge failed to comply with Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S . 238, 242-44 (1969). The holdings of the Unite d States Supreme Court, however, foreclose Elliott’s collate ral attack on his earlier plea-based conviction. See Lewis v

. United States , 445 U.S. 55, 60-65 (1980); see also Custis v. United States , 511 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1994).

Because this Court gave Elliott permission to file a pro se brief , we now turn to the ar guments in Elliott’s brief. See Hoggard v. Purkett , 29 F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1994) (pro se briefs not accepted when a party is represented by counsel). Elliott contends hi s § 5861(d) conviction for failure to register the machinegun violates due process. Elliott argues § 5861(d) was implici tly repealed by the later-enacted § 922(o)(1), which prohibits possession of a machinegun. Because Elliott can comply with bot h statutes by simply refusing to possess the machinegun, we agree with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circ uits that the statutes are reconcilable. See Hu nter v. United States , 73 F.3d 260, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996); Uni ted States v. Rivera , 58 F.3d 600, 601-02 (11th Cir. 1995) ; United States v. Ardoin , 19 F.3d 177, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1994); United State s v. Ross , 9 F.3d 1182, 1193-94 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated on other grounds , 511 U.S. 1124 (1994); United States v. Jones , 976 F.2d 176, 182-83 (4t h Cir. 1992 ); but see United States v. Dalton , 960 F.2d 121, 123-24 (10t h Cir

. 1992). In sum, Elliott was fairly convicted under § 5861(d)

. Cla iming he never fired the machinegun and did not know it was a n automa tic, Elliott also contends the Government failed to prove h e knowingly possessed t he weapon. Because Elliott possessed the machinegun and observed its characteristics, Elliott’s contention is foreclosed by ou r holding in United States v. Farrell , 69 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 1995) , cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1283 (1996). We also reject Elliott’s challenge to his sentence. Our review shows the district court’s guideline sentence was correct. Finally , we have considered Elliott’s remaining contentions and find them without merit.

## -3- We affirm Elliott’s convictions and sentence.

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.