# C_2022493EN.01013601.xml

| 27.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 493/136 |
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27.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 493/136

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P9_TA(2022)0235

The EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

European Parliament recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine (2022/2039(INI))

(2022/C 493/15)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to Titles II, III and V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the commitment laid down in the preamble to implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in particular to Articles 10(1) and (2), 13(2), 14(1), 16(1), 24(1), 26, 36, 41, 42(2), (3), (6) and (7), 44, 45 and 46 and Protocol No 10 thereof, |
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having regard to Titles II, III and V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the commitment laid down in the preamble to implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in particular to Articles 10(1) and (2), 13(2), 14(1), 16(1), 24(1), 26, 36, 41, 42(2), (3), (6) and (7), 44, 45 and 46 and Protocol No 10 thereof,

| — | having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ action plan, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022, |
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having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence — For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’ action plan, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the Versailles Declaration of the EU Heads of State or Government of 11 March 2022, |
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having regard to the Versailles Declaration of the EU Heads of State or Government of 11 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward’ (JOIN(2022)0024), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward’ (JOIN(2022)0024),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘The implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021’ (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘The implementation of the common foreign and security policy — annual report 2021’ (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021’ (2), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 February 2022 entitled ‘The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2021’ (2),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Commission contribution to European defence’ (COM(2022)0060), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 15 February 2022 entitled ‘Commission contribution to European defence’ (COM(2022)0060),

| — | having regard to the Council decision of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (3), |
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having regard to the Council decision of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 entitled ‘Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty’ (4), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 March 2017 entitled ‘Constitutional, legal and institutional implications of a common security and defence policy: possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty’ (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (5), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 April 2022 on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022, including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (6), |
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having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (7), |
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having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (7),

| — | having regard to the statements on Ukraine by Parliament’s leaders of 16 and 24 February 2022, |
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having regard to the statements on Ukraine by Parliament’s leaders of 16 and 24 February 2022,

| — | having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of May 2022, |
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having regard to the report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe of May 2022,

| — | having regard to the Brussels Summit communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 14 June 2021, |
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having regard to the Brussels Summit communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 14 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary-General of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’, |
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having regard to the Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary-General of 25 November 2020 entitled ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’,

| — | having regard to the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 March 2022 on the aggression against Ukraine, on 24 March 2022 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine, and on 7 April 2022 on the suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council, |
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having regard to the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on 2 March 2022 on the aggression against Ukraine, on 24 March 2022 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine, and on 7 April 2022 on the suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council,

| — | having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (8), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on 1 September 2017, |
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having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (8), including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on 1 September 2017,

| — | having regard to the decisions adopted by the Council on EU restrictive measures against Russia over its war in Ukraine, |
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having regard to the decisions adopted by the Council on EU restrictive measures against Russia over its war in Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (9) (the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement), |
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having regard to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (9) (the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement),

| — | having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 118 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0164/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0164/2022),

| A. | whereas the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and other aggressive actions worldwide, is a blatant violation of international law, the UN Charter and the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 21 November 1990, and seriously undermines European and global security and stability; |
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A.

whereas the unprovoked and unjustified military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and other aggressive actions worldwide, is a blatant violation of international law, the UN Charter and the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 21 November 1990, and seriously undermines European and global security and stability;

| B. | whereas the Russian Federation did not comply with the order that the International Court of Justice issued on 16 March 2022 unequivocally asking Russia to immediately suspend its military operations and to ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be led or supported by it, as well as any organisations and persons which may be under its control or leadership, take no steps to further the existing military operations; |
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B.

whereas the Russian Federation did not comply with the order that the International Court of Justice issued on 16 March 2022 unequivocally asking Russia to immediately suspend its military operations and to ensure that any military or irregular armed units which may be led or supported by it, as well as any organisations and persons which may be under its control or leadership, take no steps to further the existing military operations;

| C. | whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine constitutes an attack against the European peace order itself and thereby threatens the foundations on which the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy was built; whereas Russia’s persistent attempts to create instability in the Union’s neighbourhood and globally and to undermine and forcefully revise the European security order require the Union to substantially and determinedly enhance the cohesion and effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy; |
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C.

whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine constitutes an attack against the European peace order itself and thereby threatens the foundations on which the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy was built; whereas Russia’s persistent attempts to create instability in the Union’s neighbourhood and globally and to undermine and forcefully revise the European security order require the Union to substantially and determinedly enhance the cohesion and effectiveness of its foreign, security and defence policy;

| D. | whereas thousands of Ukrainians have lost their lives in the war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine since 2014; whereas thousands have been wounded and more than 10 million people have been forced to leave their homes or have fled to neighbouring countries; |
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D.

whereas thousands of Ukrainians have lost their lives in the war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine since 2014; whereas thousands have been wounded and more than 10 million people have been forced to leave their homes or have fled to neighbouring countries;

| E. | whereas the Russian armed forces are deliberately and indiscriminately shelling civilian infrastructure, including homes and shelters, nurseries, schools, hospitals, emergency and care facilities and train and bus stations; |
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E.

whereas the Russian armed forces are deliberately and indiscriminately shelling civilian infrastructure, including homes and shelters, nurseries, schools, hospitals, emergency and care facilities and train and bus stations;

| F. | whereas according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, these attacks are causing immeasurable human suffering and amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas the torture and murder of civilians and the growing number of reports of human trafficking, sexual violence, exploitation, rape and abuse faced by women and children are atrocious war crimes that need to be urgently investigated and documented so the perpetrators can be tried; whereas an international investigation into the crimes committed in Bucha is ongoing; whereas the invasion of Ukraine may constitute a crime of aggression as defined in Article 8a of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the atrocities committed by the Russian army and its proxies meet the definition of genocide contained in the UN Convention of 1948; whereas the decision-makers and perpetrators must be brought to international criminal justice; |
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F.

whereas according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, these attacks are causing immeasurable human suffering and amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas the torture and murder of civilians and the growing number of reports of human trafficking, sexual violence, exploitation, rape and abuse faced by women and children are atrocious war crimes that need to be urgently investigated and documented so the perpetrators can be tried; whereas an international investigation into the crimes committed in Bucha is ongoing; whereas the invasion of Ukraine may constitute a crime of aggression as defined in Article 8a of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the atrocities committed by the Russian army and its proxies meet the definition of genocide contained in the UN Convention of 1948; whereas the decision-makers and perpetrators must be brought to international criminal justice;

| G. | whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought war back to Europe and we Europeans in the European Union now need to use all our determination and resolve to protect and defend this Union and the values and principles it stands for, including the principle of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the rules-based international order; |
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G.

whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought war back to Europe and we Europeans in the European Union now need to use all our determination and resolve to protect and defend this Union and the values and principles it stands for, including the principle of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and the rules-based international order;

| H. | whereas the failure to respond adequately to the Russian aggressions against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014 prompted Russia to continue aggressive military and political campaigns, including the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and by doing so to weaken and undermine the rules-based international order and stability in Europe and elsewhere; |
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H.

whereas the failure to respond adequately to the Russian aggressions against Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine in 2014 prompted Russia to continue aggressive military and political campaigns, including the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and by doing so to weaken and undermine the rules-based international order and stability in Europe and elsewhere;

| I. | whereas the strategic goal of the free world is to help Ukraine to ultimately defeat the Russian aggressor and regain control over its internationally recognised territory; |
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I.

whereas the strategic goal of the free world is to help Ukraine to ultimately defeat the Russian aggressor and regain control over its internationally recognised territory;

| J. | whereas the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its attack against the European peace order are taking place against the backdrop of severe repression against civil society and political opposition in Russia, aimed at ensuring the survival of an increasingly totalitarian regime; |
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J.

whereas the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its attack against the European peace order are taking place against the backdrop of severe repression against civil society and political opposition in Russia, aimed at ensuring the survival of an increasingly totalitarian regime;

| K. | whereas defending Europe is first and foremost an obligation for all European democracies; whereas this obligation must be matched with adequate financial and military capability goals; whereas the Union has resolved to do its part to counter the Russian Federation’s attempts to destroy the foundations of international security and stability, including in close cooperation with NATO, the bedrock of the collective defence of its members; whereas on 18 May 2022, Finland and Sweden officially submitted their applications to join NATO; whereas it is important that all NATO allies swiftly ratify the accession protocols of Finland and Sweden; whereas Turkey is showing a reluctance to welcome Finland and Sweden’s applications to join NATO; whereas Article 42(7) TEU remains an important element of the European security architecture, providing support and protection for all EU Member States; whereas Parliament has expressed its sincere gratitude for the US’s renewed assistance and cooperation when it comes to protecting and providing European territorial defence; |
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K.

whereas defending Europe is first and foremost an obligation for all European democracies; whereas this obligation must be matched with adequate financial and military capability goals; whereas the Union has resolved to do its part to counter the Russian Federation’s attempts to destroy the foundations of international security and stability, including in close cooperation with NATO, the bedrock of the collective defence of its members; whereas on 18 May 2022, Finland and Sweden officially submitted their applications to join NATO; whereas it is important that all NATO allies swiftly ratify the accession protocols of Finland and Sweden; whereas Turkey is showing a reluctance to welcome Finland and Sweden’s applications to join NATO; whereas Article 42(7) TEU remains an important element of the European security architecture, providing support and protection for all EU Member States; whereas Parliament has expressed its sincere gratitude for the US’s renewed assistance and cooperation when it comes to protecting and providing European territorial defence;

| L. | whereas Ukraine has a fundamental right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; whereas Parliament commends the people of Ukraine for their courage in defending their country and our shared values of freedom and democracy and will not abandon them; |
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L.

whereas Ukraine has a fundamental right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter; whereas Parliament commends the people of Ukraine for their courage in defending their country and our shared values of freedom and democracy and will not abandon them;

| M. | whereas Parliament called, in its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine and, in the meantime, to continue to work towards its integration into the EU single market along the lines of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement; |
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M.

whereas Parliament called, in its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, for the EU institutions to work towards granting EU candidate status to Ukraine and, in the meantime, to continue to work towards its integration into the EU single market along the lines of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement;

| N. | whereas, under the renewed mandate of the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine, the mission will ensure close cooperation with the International Criminal Court, the Union agency Eurojust and Member States taking action that directly supports the investigation and prosecution of international crimes in Ukraine; |
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N.

whereas, under the renewed mandate of the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine, the mission will ensure close cooperation with the International Criminal Court, the Union agency Eurojust and Member States taking action that directly supports the investigation and prosecution of international crimes in Ukraine;

| O. | whereas Parliament should initiate a deep analysis of the reasons why the Union, its Member States and its like-minded partners within the international community failed to deter Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine, which violates the UN Charter and thus constitutes an attack on the very core of Europe’s peace and security order, its values and prosperity, and its democratic foundations, and take stock of lessons from previous mistakes in policy vis-à-vis Russia, starting with the failure to ensure the full implementation of the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, as well as investigating cases of breaches of the sanctions imposed since 2014; |
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O.

whereas Parliament should initiate a deep analysis of the reasons why the Union, its Member States and its like-minded partners within the international community failed to deter Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine, which violates the UN Charter and thus constitutes an attack on the very core of Europe’s peace and security order, its values and prosperity, and its democratic foundations, and take stock of lessons from previous mistakes in policy vis-à-vis Russia, starting with the failure to ensure the full implementation of the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, as well as investigating cases of breaches of the sanctions imposed since 2014;

| P. | whereas the Council acknowledged in the Strategic Compass that security and stability throughout the Western Balkans is still not a given and that there is a risk of potential spillover from the current deterioration of the European security situation; |
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P.

whereas the Council acknowledged in the Strategic Compass that security and stability throughout the Western Balkans is still not a given and that there is a risk of potential spillover from the current deterioration of the European security situation;

| Q. | whereas there is an urgent need to increase preparedness in order to be better able to cope with the full spectrum of crises to come, notably humanitarian and security crises; whereas the Union needs to utilise all the instruments at its disposal, with an emphasis on timely engagement, to protect the Union and its residents and its values and interests, and to contribute to international peace and security; whereas there is a need for the Union to work with its allies; |
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Q.

whereas there is an urgent need to increase preparedness in order to be better able to cope with the full spectrum of crises to come, notably humanitarian and security crises; whereas the Union needs to utilise all the instruments at its disposal, with an emphasis on timely engagement, to protect the Union and its residents and its values and interests, and to contribute to international peace and security; whereas there is a need for the Union to work with its allies;

| R. | whereas women, girls and vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by armed conflicts; whereas the constructive participation of women and girls in conflict prevention, resolution and reconstruction makes for a more sustainable peace; whereas the EU institutions committed to mainstreaming gender equality under the Gender Action Plan III, which includes all areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); |
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R.

whereas women, girls and vulnerable groups are disproportionately affected by armed conflicts; whereas the constructive participation of women and girls in conflict prevention, resolution and reconstruction makes for a more sustainable peace; whereas the EU institutions committed to mainstreaming gender equality under the Gender Action Plan III, which includes all areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);

| S. | whereas an active role for Parliament in framing a common Union defence policy and establishing common defence, and its political support therefor and democratic scrutiny thereof, would affirm and enhance the representative and democratic foundations of the Union; |
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S.

whereas an active role for Parliament in framing a common Union defence policy and establishing common defence, and its political support therefor and democratic scrutiny thereof, would affirm and enhance the representative and democratic foundations of the Union;

| T. | whereas the functioning of the Union is founded on representative democracy and whereas EU citizens are directly represented at Union level in Parliament; |
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T.

whereas the functioning of the Union is founded on representative democracy and whereas EU citizens are directly represented at Union level in Parliament;

| U. | whereas each EU institution should make full use of the powers conferred on it by the Treaties and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them; whereas the institutions should practice mutual sincere cooperation; |
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U.

whereas each EU institution should make full use of the powers conferred on it by the Treaties and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them; whereas the institutions should practice mutual sincere cooperation;

| V. | whereas the Union’s competence in CFSP matters covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to common defence when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides, in accordance with Articles 24 and 42(2) TEU; |
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V.

whereas the Union’s competence in CFSP matters covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to common defence when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides, in accordance with Articles 24 and 42(2) TEU;

| W. | whereas the specific role of Parliament in the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy is defined in the Treaties; |
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W.

whereas the specific role of Parliament in the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy is defined in the Treaties;

| X. | whereas Parliament should, together with the Council, exercise its budgetary function in this area, as provided for in Article 41 TEU, and should exercise its political consultation function as provided for in Article 36 TEU; |
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X.

whereas Parliament should, together with the Council, exercise its budgetary function in this area, as provided for in Article 41 TEU, and should exercise its political consultation function as provided for in Article 36 TEU;

| Y. | whereas when European Council and Council decisions on foreign, security and defence policy are made, the executive of the European Union is composed of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Political and Security Committee, and the subordinate agencies; whereas Article 24 TEU notes that the ‘Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’, and that they ‘shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’; |
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Y.

whereas when European Council and Council decisions on foreign, security and defence policy are made, the executive of the European Union is composed of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Political and Security Committee, and the subordinate agencies; whereas Article 24 TEU notes that the ‘Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’, and that they ‘shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’;

| Z. | whereas Parliament is the only institution that can legitimately exercise the function of political control and oversight over the executive at Union level; |
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Z.

whereas Parliament is the only institution that can legitimately exercise the function of political control and oversight over the executive at Union level;

| AA. | whereas deepening defence cooperation among Member States at Union level should go hand in hand with the strengthening of parliamentary oversight and control by both the European Parliament and national parliaments; |
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AA.

whereas deepening defence cooperation among Member States at Union level should go hand in hand with the strengthening of parliamentary oversight and control by both the European Parliament and national parliaments;

| AB. | whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), together with the Commission if appropriate, will provide Parliament with its detailed views regarding the recommendations below, in particular where those are linked to Parliament’s budgetary and political control function over the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy; |
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AB.

whereas the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), together with the Commission if appropriate, will provide Parliament with its detailed views regarding the recommendations below, in particular where those are linked to Parliament’s budgetary and political control function over the Union’s foreign, security and defence policy;

| AC. | whereas cooperation between Member States and partners under Articles 42(2), 45 and 46 TEU should benefit from the legal identity, privileges and immunities that the Treaties provide; |
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AC.

whereas cooperation between Member States and partners under Articles 42(2), 45 and 46 TEU should benefit from the legal identity, privileges and immunities that the Treaties provide;

| AD. | whereas the Union aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; |
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AD.

whereas the Union aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels;

| AE. | whereas together with its allies, the Union must aim to uphold its peace and security order to provide the continent and its residents with the peace and security they deserve; whereas the war in Ukraine has exposed the flaws of the current global security architecture; |
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AE.

whereas together with its allies, the Union must aim to uphold its peace and security order to provide the continent and its residents with the peace and security they deserve; whereas the war in Ukraine has exposed the flaws of the current global security architecture;

| AF. | whereas, owing to the multifaceted nature of Russia’s hostile actions, it is important to think and design the defence of a free Europe in a holistic manner incorporating all critical areas, ranging from defence, international cooperation, media and critical civilian infrastructure, technology, supply chains and energy; |
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AF.

whereas, owing to the multifaceted nature of Russia’s hostile actions, it is important to think and design the defence of a free Europe in a holistic manner incorporating all critical areas, ranging from defence, international cooperation, media and critical civilian infrastructure, technology, supply chains and energy;

| AG. | whereas the Union is witnessing the most direct threat to its territorial security since the end of the Second World War; whereas the current crisis has shown the need for a discussion on the EU budget, notably given the ongoing discussion on what kind of military equipment or support can be provided by the Union; |
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AG.

whereas the Union is witnessing the most direct threat to its territorial security since the end of the Second World War; whereas the current crisis has shown the need for a discussion on the EU budget, notably given the ongoing discussion on what kind of military equipment or support can be provided by the Union;

| AH. | whereas disinformation and propaganda must be urgently countered, legally and technically, especially in EU candidate and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries; |
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AH.

whereas disinformation and propaganda must be urgently countered, legally and technically, especially in EU candidate and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries;

| AI. | whereas the Strategic Compass was adopted by the Council in March 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to give the Union the tools to be an effective security provider in a hostile environment and a more assertive global actor for peace and human security; |
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AI.

whereas the Strategic Compass was adopted by the Council in March 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass aims to give the Union the tools to be an effective security provider in a hostile environment and a more assertive global actor for peace and human security;

| AJ. | whereas all EU initiatives aiming at reinforcing European defence should be regularly updated in line with the findings of the Strategic Compass and future revisions of the threat analysis; |
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AJ.

whereas all EU initiatives aiming at reinforcing European defence should be regularly updated in line with the findings of the Strategic Compass and future revisions of the threat analysis;

| AK. | whereas any additional resources allocated to meet the target of spending 2 % of GDP on defence should be used in a coordinated and cooperative manner, making full use of EU defence instruments to overcome capability shortfalls and strengthen European defence; |
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AK.

whereas any additional resources allocated to meet the target of spending 2 % of GDP on defence should be used in a coordinated and cooperative manner, making full use of EU defence instruments to overcome capability shortfalls and strengthen European defence;

| AL. | whereas making full use of the efforts to develop joint EU defence capabilities, notably the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), will help to increase the security of NATO allies and Member States alike; |
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AL.

whereas making full use of the efforts to develop joint EU defence capabilities, notably the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), will help to increase the security of NATO allies and Member States alike;

| AM. | whereas the Member States should avoid uncoordinated actions that could further exacerbate fragmentation and duplication in the Union’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base, thereby making better use of taxpayers’ money; |
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AM.

whereas the Member States should avoid uncoordinated actions that could further exacerbate fragmentation and duplication in the Union’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base, thereby making better use of taxpayers’ money;

| AN. | whereas the enforcement of sanctions remains one of the key elements in the Union’s toolbox for countering Russia’s war against Ukraine, and whereas all means must therefore be made available at EU and Member-State level to ensure that sanctions are fully enforced; whereas the Council has acted swiftly and in a united manner and has so far adopted five packages of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine, including individual sanctions such as asset freezes and travel restrictions, economic sanctions targeting the financial, trade, energy, transport, technology and defence sectors, media restrictions, diplomatic measures, restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol and the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, and measures concerning economic cooperation; |
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AN.

whereas the enforcement of sanctions remains one of the key elements in the Union’s toolbox for countering Russia’s war against Ukraine, and whereas all means must therefore be made available at EU and Member-State level to ensure that sanctions are fully enforced; whereas the Council has acted swiftly and in a united manner and has so far adopted five packages of sanctions against Russia over its war in Ukraine, including individual sanctions such as asset freezes and travel restrictions, economic sanctions targeting the financial, trade, energy, transport, technology and defence sectors, media restrictions, diplomatic measures, restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol and the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, and measures concerning economic cooperation;

| AO. | whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is having secondary consequences impacting the macro level of international relations, global alliances, industrial production and supply chains, thereby impacting food security and people’s livelihoods; |
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AO.

whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is having secondary consequences impacting the macro level of international relations, global alliances, industrial production and supply chains, thereby impacting food security and people’s livelihoods;

| AP. | whereas the People’s Republic of China, through its statements and acts, is showing support and sympathy for Russia’s position, promoting Russia’s narrative and obvious lies and demonstrating reluctance to fully endorse Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; |
| --- | --- |

AP.

whereas the People’s Republic of China, through its statements and acts, is showing support and sympathy for Russia’s position, promoting Russia’s narrative and obvious lies and demonstrating reluctance to fully endorse Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

| AQ. | whereas the CFSP is drafted and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide for exceptions, as does Article 24 TEU; |
| --- | --- |

AQ.

whereas the CFSP is drafted and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide for exceptions, as does Article 24 TEU;

| AR. | whereas Parliament, as a direct representation of EU citizens at the Union level, has a unique role in the EU institutions and plays a central role in ensuring that EU decision-making, including in the area of foreign policy, is aligned with citizens’ wishes, as stated in the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe; |
| --- | --- |

AR.

whereas Parliament, as a direct representation of EU citizens at the Union level, has a unique role in the EU institutions and plays a central role in ensuring that EU decision-making, including in the area of foreign policy, is aligned with citizens’ wishes, as stated in the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe;

| 1. | Recommends that the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy:






  (a) | reiterate strong support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders; provide all necessary material, military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and prepare to contribute as much as possible to rebuilding the country post-war, as democracy and freedom are dependent on prosperity and economic stability; establish a legal instrument allowing frozen Russian assets and funds to be confiscated and used for reparations and the reconstruction of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

reiterate strong support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders; provide all necessary material, military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and prepare to contribute as much as possible to rebuilding the country post-war, as democracy and freedom are dependent on prosperity and economic stability; establish a legal instrument allowing frozen Russian assets and funds to be confiscated and used for reparations and the reconstruction of Ukraine;

| (b) | build upon the resolve and unity demonstrated at the beginning of the war against Ukraine and urgently deliver on their joint level of ambition; make genuine progress in foreign policy and defence cooperation at Union level, as expressed in the Versailles Declaration and the Council’s conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2022; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

build upon the resolve and unity demonstrated at the beginning of the war against Ukraine and urgently deliver on their joint level of ambition; make genuine progress in foreign policy and defence cooperation at Union level, as expressed in the Versailles Declaration and the Council’s conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2022;

| (c) | agree that the VP/HR should be present ex officio in negotiating formats initiated or led by EU Member States; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

agree that the VP/HR should be present ex officio in negotiating formats initiated or led by EU Member States;

| (d) | introduce qualified majority voting for certain foreign policy areas, as already provided for in the Treaties, for example the adoption of EU personal sanctions regimes, and strive to extend qualified majority voting to foreign policy in the Council, in order to increase the effectiveness of EU foreign policy; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

introduce qualified majority voting for certain foreign policy areas, as already provided for in the Treaties, for example the adoption of EU personal sanctions regimes, and strive to extend qualified majority voting to foreign policy in the Council, in order to increase the effectiveness of EU foreign policy;

| (e) | ensure that Member States adhere to the principles of the Treaties, especially Article 24 TEU, which notes that the ‘Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

ensure that Member States adhere to the principles of the Treaties, especially Article 24 TEU, which notes that the ‘Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’;

| (f) | make swift progress in establishing a defence union with more ambitious short-, medium- and long-term objectives by implementing the concrete actions laid down in the Strategic Compass, which would serve as a starting point for implementing common EU defence, in line with the provision laid down in Article 42(2) TEU; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

make swift progress in establishing a defence union with more ambitious short-, medium- and long-term objectives by implementing the concrete actions laid down in the Strategic Compass, which would serve as a starting point for implementing common EU defence, in line with the provision laid down in Article 42(2) TEU;

| (g) | intensify cooperation with like-minded partners around the globe, especially with transatlantic NATO allies, in order to maintain the strongest possible unity in defence of the rules-based international order, thus promoting and defending peace, democratic principles and respect for human rights, and ensuring that economic dependencies do not prevail over the defence of human rights and the values the Union stands for; emphasise, in particular, such cooperation with countries in the Global South and utilise development cooperation and the global gateway strategy to that end; emphasise the need for international cooperation on food security concerns; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

intensify cooperation with like-minded partners around the globe, especially with transatlantic NATO allies, in order to maintain the strongest possible unity in defence of the rules-based international order, thus promoting and defending peace, democratic principles and respect for human rights, and ensuring that economic dependencies do not prevail over the defence of human rights and the values the Union stands for; emphasise, in particular, such cooperation with countries in the Global South and utilise development cooperation and the global gateway strategy to that end; emphasise the need for international cooperation on food security concerns;

| (h) | establish a regular EU defence minister council; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

establish a regular EU defence minister council;

| (i) | make the Union’s strategic autonomy an overarching aim in all areas and a fundamental and holistic approach to its foreign, security and defence policy and external action, to give it the ability to act alone when needed and with partners when possible and therefore enable it to play an important role on the international stage; create tools to counteract economic coercion and to achieve, as soon as possible, food sovereignty and full security of energy supplies to reduce energy dependencies; further ensure that supply chains are diversified to counter strategic dependencies on raw materials; ensure, in this context, that there is also reciprocity in investment and trade policy; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

make the Union’s strategic autonomy an overarching aim in all areas and a fundamental and holistic approach to its foreign, security and defence policy and external action, to give it the ability to act alone when needed and with partners when possible and therefore enable it to play an important role on the international stage; create tools to counteract economic coercion and to achieve, as soon as possible, food sovereignty and full security of energy supplies to reduce energy dependencies; further ensure that supply chains are diversified to counter strategic dependencies on raw materials; ensure, in this context, that there is also reciprocity in investment and trade policy;

| (j) | work with allies and partners to address the secondary consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including food security in non-EU countries, in particular in the Union’s neighbourhood; |
| --- | --- |

(j)

work with allies and partners to address the secondary consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, including food security in non-EU countries, in particular in the Union’s neighbourhood;

| (k) | fight and counter propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the Union and its neighbourhood and boost cooperation with partners in EU candidate and potential candidate countries and around the world, including by urgently setting up the necessary legal and technical abilities to do so, in order to counter malign foreign interference, such as that by Russia prior to and during its war of aggression against Ukraine; strengthen the capacities of the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force; have a proactive, multilingual and strategic communication policy; |
| --- | --- |

(k)

fight and counter propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the Union and its neighbourhood and boost cooperation with partners in EU candidate and potential candidate countries and around the world, including by urgently setting up the necessary legal and technical abilities to do so, in order to counter malign foreign interference, such as that by Russia prior to and during its war of aggression against Ukraine; strengthen the capacities of the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force; have a proactive, multilingual and strategic communication policy;

On the follow-up to the adoption of the Strategic Compass

| (l) | draw lessons from the use of the European Peace Facility in order to support Ukraine, improve its ability to act and build on the clearing house mechanism, which was implemented for the first time during the Ukraine crisis; consider improving the European Peace Facility for the remainder of the 2021-2027 financial period; consider ways to strengthen the security and resilience of the EU’s associated partners through utilising the possibilities opened by the Strategic Compass and increasing assistance to Georgia and Moldova within the framework of the European Peace Facility; |
| --- | --- |

(l)

draw lessons from the use of the European Peace Facility in order to support Ukraine, improve its ability to act and build on the clearing house mechanism, which was implemented for the first time during the Ukraine crisis; consider improving the European Peace Facility for the remainder of the 2021-2027 financial period; consider ways to strengthen the security and resilience of the EU’s associated partners through utilising the possibilities opened by the Strategic Compass and increasing assistance to Georgia and Moldova within the framework of the European Peace Facility;

| (m) | urgently launch a discussion with a view to establishing another off-budget financial facility which would address the entire life-cycle of military capabilities at EU level from collaborative R&D and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply; |
| --- | --- |

(m)

urgently launch a discussion with a view to establishing another off-budget financial facility which would address the entire life-cycle of military capabilities at EU level from collaborative R&D and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply;

| (n) | significantly enhance and upgrade intelligence sharing and cooperation among the Member States, including at Union level, and with like-minded partners; improve the financial and technical resources and capabilities of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the European Union Military Staff Intelligence Directorate; engage in systematic, regular and frequent updates of the threat analysis as committed to in the Strategic Compass; stresses that the threat analysis should strengthen the Union’s strategic culture and provide guidance on prioritising policy objectives in the field of security and defence; |
| --- | --- |

(n)

significantly enhance and upgrade intelligence sharing and cooperation among the Member States, including at Union level, and with like-minded partners; improve the financial and technical resources and capabilities of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and the European Union Military Staff Intelligence Directorate; engage in systematic, regular and frequent updates of the threat analysis as committed to in the Strategic Compass; stresses that the threat analysis should strengthen the Union’s strategic culture and provide guidance on prioritising policy objectives in the field of security and defence;

| (o) | award permanent Union funding to the EU Satellite Centre to enable it to maintain its contributions to the Union’s actions in the fields of space imagery and intelligence gathering, including in support of CSDP missions and operations; |
| --- | --- |

(o)

award permanent Union funding to the EU Satellite Centre to enable it to maintain its contributions to the Union’s actions in the fields of space imagery and intelligence gathering, including in support of CSDP missions and operations;

| (p) | work swiftly on the implementation of the most urgent aspects of the Strategic Compass, including the further operationalisation of Article 42(7) TEU, taking into account the specific constitutional framework and security arrangements of all the Member States, and taking concrete steps to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure in the Union, improve security of supply, obtain precise and firm commitments from the Member States as regards better defence spending and joint efforts to address capability shortfalls, notably in the area of strategic enablers, joint training and military education, enhanced efforts to boost strategic communication, and a strengthened toolbox to tackle hybrid and cyberthreats and to fight disinformation; further develop the Union’s cyber defence policy; work on establishing collective attribution for malicious cyberattacks; make full use of the EU cyber sanction regimes against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for or involved in the various cyberattacks targeting Ukraine; enhance the protection and security of institutions in the Union against cyberattacks, at EU and Member-State level; urgently reinforce the cyber defence capacities of bodies that play a strategic role in immediate conflict response; |
| --- | --- |

(p)

work swiftly on the implementation of the most urgent aspects of the Strategic Compass, including the further operationalisation of Article 42(7) TEU, taking into account the specific constitutional framework and security arrangements of all the Member States, and taking concrete steps to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure in the Union, improve security of supply, obtain precise and firm commitments from the Member States as regards better defence spending and joint efforts to address capability shortfalls, notably in the area of strategic enablers, joint training and military education, enhanced efforts to boost strategic communication, and a strengthened toolbox to tackle hybrid and cyberthreats and to fight disinformation; further develop the Union’s cyber defence policy; work on establishing collective attribution for malicious cyberattacks; make full use of the EU cyber sanction regimes against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for or involved in the various cyberattacks targeting Ukraine; enhance the protection and security of institutions in the Union against cyberattacks, at EU and Member-State level; urgently reinforce the cyber defence capacities of bodies that play a strategic role in immediate conflict response;

| (q) | advance the work to draft and operationalise the proposal for a rapid deployment capacity instrument, and given its significant importance for the Union’s security and defence architecture, reach operational capability significantly sooner than 2025; |
| --- | --- |

(q)

advance the work to draft and operationalise the proposal for a rapid deployment capacity instrument, and given its significant importance for the Union’s security and defence architecture, reach operational capability significantly sooner than 2025;

| (r) | urgently revise the rapid deployment capacity concept, which is not ambitious enough, and rework its complex structure, which does not respond adequately to the urgent need of the Union to have a very reliable permanent multinational military unit that should include a multinational land brigade of around 5 000 troops and air, maritime and special forces components, and whose leading elements should be ready to move within two to three days; |
| --- | --- |

(r)

urgently revise the rapid deployment capacity concept, which is not ambitious enough, and rework its complex structure, which does not respond adequately to the urgent need of the Union to have a very reliable permanent multinational military unit that should include a multinational land brigade of around 5 000 troops and air, maritime and special forces components, and whose leading elements should be ready to move within two to three days;

| (s) | clarify, as a matter of urgency, how Article 44 TEU will be implemented in practice to increase the flexibility of the CSDP by allowing a group of willing and able Member States to plan and conduct missions and operations under the EU framework on behalf of the entire Union; |
| --- | --- |

(s)

clarify, as a matter of urgency, how Article 44 TEU will be implemented in practice to increase the flexibility of the CSDP by allowing a group of willing and able Member States to plan and conduct missions and operations under the EU framework on behalf of the entire Union;

| (t) | seek to bring the UK into a framework for common cooperation on defence and foreign policy matters through the addition of relevant provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in order to maximise the possibilities for EU-UK cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

(t)

seek to bring the UK into a framework for common cooperation on defence and foreign policy matters through the addition of relevant provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in order to maximise the possibilities for EU-UK cooperation;

| (u) | rapidly work towards setting up a fully functional EU military headquarters by merging the Military Planning and Conduct Capability structure and the Civil Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate to create a fully fledged civil-military operational headquarters, taking into account the new security environment; |
| --- | --- |

(u)

rapidly work towards setting up a fully functional EU military headquarters by merging the Military Planning and Conduct Capability structure and the Civil Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate to create a fully fledged civil-military operational headquarters, taking into account the new security environment;

| (v) | set up a joint situational awareness centre, which would be a crucial tool for improving strategic foresight and the Union’s strategic autonomy; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

set up a joint situational awareness centre, which would be a crucial tool for improving strategic foresight and the Union’s strategic autonomy;

| (w) | make full use of EU capability development initiatives, notably the EDF and PESCO, to refill Member States’ military stockpiles and enhance the Union’s defence capacities, including air and missile defence, while increasing the efficiency of PESCO; recognise the added value of further cooperation with like-minded countries on certain concrete projects in this context; |
| --- | --- |

(w)

make full use of EU capability development initiatives, notably the EDF and PESCO, to refill Member States’ military stockpiles and enhance the Union’s defence capacities, including air and missile defence, while increasing the efficiency of PESCO; recognise the added value of further cooperation with like-minded countries on certain concrete projects in this context;

| (x) | significantly strengthen the civilian CSDP in terms of available personnel, pre-deployment training, gender mainstreaming and its budget and make sure that its missions primarily focus on the security, justice and rule-of-law needs of the local population, and that strong parliamentary oversight over the civilian security sector and transparency are incorporated to make modernisation and reform more sustainable; |
| --- | --- |

(x)

significantly strengthen the civilian CSDP in terms of available personnel, pre-deployment training, gender mainstreaming and its budget and make sure that its missions primarily focus on the security, justice and rule-of-law needs of the local population, and that strong parliamentary oversight over the civilian security sector and transparency are incorporated to make modernisation and reform more sustainable;

| (y) | significantly increase investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, in particular multilateral approaches which reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; |
| --- | --- |

(y)

significantly increase investment in regional and global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, in particular multilateral approaches which reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

| (z) | support the crucial work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to secure the safety of Ukrainian nuclear facilities; strengthen the global weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control architecture; further strengthen its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear preparedness; |
| --- | --- |

(z)

support the crucial work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to secure the safety of Ukrainian nuclear facilities; strengthen the global weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control architecture; further strengthen its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear preparedness;

| (aa) | urge the Commission to present, without delay, a security of supply regime for defence as demanded by the European Council in 2013, and which has become a matter of utmost urgency given the current security situation; |
| --- | --- |

(aa)

urge the Commission to present, without delay, a security of supply regime for defence as demanded by the European Council in 2013, and which has become a matter of utmost urgency given the current security situation;

| (ab) | improve the inclusion of women and marginalised groups in conflict prevention, resolution, mediation and peace negotiations across all tracks, and pay specific attention to gender equality and the rights of women, girls and marginalised groups in the CFSP and the CSDP, in particular in conflict situations; |
| --- | --- |

(ab)

improve the inclusion of women and marginalised groups in conflict prevention, resolution, mediation and peace negotiations across all tracks, and pay specific attention to gender equality and the rights of women, girls and marginalised groups in the CFSP and the CSDP, in particular in conflict situations;

On the impact on CSDP missions and operations

| (ac) | review and strengthen, if needed and without delay, the mandate of EUAM Ukraine and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine, in line with the needs expressed by the Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities, in order to adapt to the new geopolitical reality and promptly and efficiently support the Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities; |
| --- | --- |

(ac)

review and strengthen, if needed and without delay, the mandate of EUAM Ukraine and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine, in line with the needs expressed by the Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities, in order to adapt to the new geopolitical reality and promptly and efficiently support the Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities;

| (ad) | work on ensuring the renewal of the UN Security Council resolutions enabling CSDP operations to perform critical tasks for global security; |
| --- | --- |

(ad)

work on ensuring the renewal of the UN Security Council resolutions enabling CSDP operations to perform critical tasks for global security;

| (ae) | improve force generation and strengthen staffing, response capacity, resources and strategic communication for all CSDP missions and operations, particularly those affected by the deteriorated threat landscape, notably the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the latter case by ensuring the availability and adequate readiness of sufficient reserves in the event that the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorates; |
| --- | --- |

(ae)

improve force generation and strengthen staffing, response capacity, resources and strategic communication for all CSDP missions and operations, particularly those affected by the deteriorated threat landscape, notably the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the latter case by ensuring the availability and adequate readiness of sufficient reserves in the event that the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorates;

| (af) | improve intelligence capacity for CSDP operations on the ground and reinforce situational awareness; |
| --- | --- |

(af)

improve intelligence capacity for CSDP operations on the ground and reinforce situational awareness;

| (ag) | strengthen the resilience of CSDP missions and operations on the ground against cyber and hybrid attacks, such as disinformation campaigns designed to damage their credibility in the eyes of the local populations; |
| --- | --- |

(ag)

strengthen the resilience of CSDP missions and operations on the ground against cyber and hybrid attacks, such as disinformation campaigns designed to damage their credibility in the eyes of the local populations;

| (ah) | demand that countries in which EU CSDP missions and operations are deployed support capacity-building for those missions and operations so their contracts with private military security companies allegedly involved in human rights violations can be terminated; |
| --- | --- |

(ah)

demand that countries in which EU CSDP missions and operations are deployed support capacity-building for those missions and operations so their contracts with private military security companies allegedly involved in human rights violations can be terminated;

On EU-NATO cooperation

| (ai) | swiftly finalise the work on a substantial third EU-NATO Joint Declaration and ensure that the objectives and priorities of the Strategic Compass are duly taken into account when the NATO Strategic Concept is drafted and subsequently adopted at the Madrid Summit; ensure that the Strategic Compass and the NATO strategic concept are aligned and lead to increasing strategic complementarity; |
| --- | --- |

(ai)

swiftly finalise the work on a substantial third EU-NATO Joint Declaration and ensure that the objectives and priorities of the Strategic Compass are duly taken into account when the NATO Strategic Concept is drafted and subsequently adopted at the Madrid Summit; ensure that the Strategic Compass and the NATO strategic concept are aligned and lead to increasing strategic complementarity;

| (aj) | significantly increase funding for and speed up the implementation of projects related to the crucial military mobility project in close coordination with NATO; underline the crucial importance of improving Europe’s transport infrastructure and streamlining customs procedures to enable troops to be deployed throughout Europe in a timely manner; |
| --- | --- |

(aj)

significantly increase funding for and speed up the implementation of projects related to the crucial military mobility project in close coordination with NATO; underline the crucial importance of improving Europe’s transport infrastructure and streamlining customs procedures to enable troops to be deployed throughout Europe in a timely manner;

| (ak) | engage within the Union and with NATO, relevant non-EU countries and Ukraine itself to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

(ak)

engage within the Union and with NATO, relevant non-EU countries and Ukraine itself to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine;

| (al) | encourage the EU Member States to increase their defence budgets and investments and to acknowledge the NATO target to spend 2 % of GDP on defence, in order to close existing capability gaps and ensure proper protection for EU residents given the increased military threat in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood posed by Russia; |
| --- | --- |

(al)

encourage the EU Member States to increase their defence budgets and investments and to acknowledge the NATO target to spend 2 % of GDP on defence, in order to close existing capability gaps and ensure proper protection for EU residents given the increased military threat in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood posed by Russia;

| (am) | encourage the further strengthening of NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the EU Member States geographically closest to the Russian aggressor and to the conflict; |
| --- | --- |

(am)

encourage the further strengthening of NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the EU Member States geographically closest to the Russian aggressor and to the conflict;

On enlargement and relations with countries in the European neighbourhood

| (an) | recognise that the European integration of the Western Balkans is essential for the long-term stability and security of the European Union, which is why Parliament wants to give those countries a credible prospect of joining the EU; call for greater political and economic assistance to and closer trade and security cooperation with the Union’s partners in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries, including in the fields of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warfare, cybersecurity and the resilience of critical entities, as a part of the European neighbourhood policy; |
| --- | --- |

(an)

recognise that the European integration of the Western Balkans is essential for the long-term stability and security of the European Union, which is why Parliament wants to give those countries a credible prospect of joining the EU; call for greater political and economic assistance to and closer trade and security cooperation with the Union’s partners in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries, including in the fields of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warfare, cybersecurity and the resilience of critical entities, as a part of the European neighbourhood policy;

| (ao) | review the European neighbourhood policy with the aim of thoroughly assessing the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on cooperation within the Eastern Partnership; develop, in addition, proposals on how to continue to strengthen ties with the Eastern Partnership countries in a context marked by outright military aggression and other tangible security threats, targeted disinformation campaigns, and the economic and social consequences of the confrontation with Russia, including for the European aspirations of Moldova and Georgia and the continued progress of related reforms; |
| --- | --- |

(ao)

review the European neighbourhood policy with the aim of thoroughly assessing the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on cooperation within the Eastern Partnership; develop, in addition, proposals on how to continue to strengthen ties with the Eastern Partnership countries in a context marked by outright military aggression and other tangible security threats, targeted disinformation campaigns, and the economic and social consequences of the confrontation with Russia, including for the European aspirations of Moldova and Georgia and the continued progress of related reforms;

| (ap) | reinforce the Union’s diplomatic presence and engagement in countries that show an interest in enhanced cooperation with the Union, in particular the Eastern Partnership countries and those in the Western Balkans, and in countries where Russian interference threatens their stability, security or democratic path; |
| --- | --- |

(ap)

reinforce the Union’s diplomatic presence and engagement in countries that show an interest in enhanced cooperation with the Union, in particular the Eastern Partnership countries and those in the Western Balkans, and in countries where Russian interference threatens their stability, security or democratic path;

| (aq) | urgently strengthen the Union’s enlargement strategy while ensuring that enlargement policy, accession prospects and the accession process contribute to strengthening security and stability, democracy and the rule of law, and economic and social prosperity, and maintain the credibility, coherence and effectiveness of EU action and internal EU cohesion; |
| --- | --- |

(aq)

urgently strengthen the Union’s enlargement strategy while ensuring that enlargement policy, accession prospects and the accession process contribute to strengthening security and stability, democracy and the rule of law, and economic and social prosperity, and maintain the credibility, coherence and effectiveness of EU action and internal EU cohesion;

On parliamentary scrutiny

| (ar) | involve Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the European Peace Facility, which is an off-budget instrument; ensure Parliament is meaningfully involved in the scrutiny, implementation and regular review of the Strategic Compass; foster exchanges with national ministers in the European Parliament on topics that are current EU priorities; recall the important role of national parliaments in Member States, underline the key role the NATO Parliamentary Assembly can play and call for a further strengthening of Parliament’s relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; |
| --- | --- |

(ar)

involve Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the European Peace Facility, which is an off-budget instrument; ensure Parliament is meaningfully involved in the scrutiny, implementation and regular review of the Strategic Compass; foster exchanges with national ministers in the European Parliament on topics that are current EU priorities; recall the important role of national parliaments in Member States, underline the key role the NATO Parliamentary Assembly can play and call for a further strengthening of Parliament’s relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

| (as) | replace the unilateral declaration on political accountability with a bilateral agreement with the VP/HR, setting out all aspects of the relationship; |
| --- | --- |

(as)

replace the unilateral declaration on political accountability with a bilateral agreement with the VP/HR, setting out all aspects of the relationship;

On budgetary matters

| (at) | aim for Parliament to have a comprehensive budgetary function in foreign security and defence policy, which Articles 14(1), 16(1) and 41 TEU provide for, in particular for decisions taken pursuant to Articles 42(2), 45 and 46 TEU; |
| --- | --- |

(at)

aim for Parliament to have a comprehensive budgetary function in foreign security and defence policy, which Articles 14(1), 16(1) and 41 TEU provide for, in particular for decisions taken pursuant to Articles 42(2), 45 and 46 TEU;

| (au) | encourage the EU and its Member States to live up to the political will expressed through the Versailles Declaration, and to strongly support and enhance the level of ambition of the joint communication of 18 May 2022 on defence investment gaps and the way forward, in order to swiftly close the gaps identified in this communication and by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence while ensuring true European added value; thus make appropriate assessments of the common financial means of the Union and the instruments needed for a more effective and credible EU security and defence policy, while also supporting the possibilities for synergies with other EU funds, such as complementing the EDF with a joint procurement task force and a joint procurement mechanism, thereby strengthening the security of the EU Member States, and provide adequate security to everyone in the Union; |
| --- | --- |

(au)

encourage the EU and its Member States to live up to the political will expressed through the Versailles Declaration, and to strongly support and enhance the level of ambition of the joint communication of 18 May 2022 on defence investment gaps and the way forward, in order to swiftly close the gaps identified in this communication and by the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence while ensuring true European added value; thus make appropriate assessments of the common financial means of the Union and the instruments needed for a more effective and credible EU security and defence policy, while also supporting the possibilities for synergies with other EU funds, such as complementing the EDF with a joint procurement task force and a joint procurement mechanism, thereby strengthening the security of the EU Member States, and provide adequate security to everyone in the Union;

| (av) | make full use of the possibilities for funding from the Union’s budget provided for in the Treaties, as proposed in the joint communication on defence investment gaps and the way forward, in order to facilitate and perform a revision of the possibilities for funding in the context of the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework with a view to providing the necessary increased funds for EU instruments and relevant EU initiatives in the area of defence; strengthen the EDF and increase the number and relevance of collaborative defence industry projects; reduce the bureaucratic burden on companies applying for calls for tender, especially small and medium-sized enterprises; expand the European Peace Facility and the Military Mobility project; facilitate the financing of force generation for CSDP operations, military deployments and live exercises; and swiftly implement the measures proposed as the Commission’s contribution to European defence; |
| --- | --- |

(av)

make full use of the possibilities for funding from the Union’s budget provided for in the Treaties, as proposed in the joint communication on defence investment gaps and the way forward, in order to facilitate and perform a revision of the possibilities for funding in the context of the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework with a view to providing the necessary increased funds for EU instruments and relevant EU initiatives in the area of defence; strengthen the EDF and increase the number and relevance of collaborative defence industry projects; reduce the bureaucratic burden on companies applying for calls for tender, especially small and medium-sized enterprises; expand the European Peace Facility and the Military Mobility project; facilitate the financing of force generation for CSDP operations, military deployments and live exercises; and swiftly implement the measures proposed as the Commission’s contribution to European defence;

| (aw) | ensure that the budget proposal for 2023 includes appropriate funding for the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre, PESCO, the envisaged EU Rapid Deployment under the CFSP budget and, under that same title and under other titles as appropriate, funding for the incentives referred to above in accordance with the Treaties; |
| --- | --- |

(aw)

ensure that the budget proposal for 2023 includes appropriate funding for the European Defence Agency, the EU Satellite Centre, PESCO, the envisaged EU Rapid Deployment under the CFSP budget and, under that same title and under other titles as appropriate, funding for the incentives referred to above in accordance with the Treaties;

| (ax) | streamline and coordinate the Member States’ announced efforts to increase defence spending, and swiftly develop the joint Commission and European External Action Service plan for joint EU procurement of military systems, in order to reach the best level of consistency and impact for Europe’s collective security and territorial defence, with a view to avoiding duplication and fragmentation; |
| --- | --- |

(ax)

streamline and coordinate the Member States’ announced efforts to increase defence spending, and swiftly develop the joint Commission and European External Action Service plan for joint EU procurement of military systems, in order to reach the best level of consistency and impact for Europe’s collective security and territorial defence, with a view to avoiding duplication and fragmentation;

| (ay) | improve funding possibilities for the European defence industry by removing military equipment from the list of excluded activities of the European Investment Bank; |
| --- | --- |

(ay)

improve funding possibilities for the European defence industry by removing military equipment from the list of excluded activities of the European Investment Bank;

On Ukraine

| (az) | provide, without delay, weapons in line with the needs expressed by the Ukrainian authorities, notably by using the European Peace Facility and the clearing house mechanism, and under the bilateral agreements of Member States with Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

(az)

provide, without delay, weapons in line with the needs expressed by the Ukrainian authorities, notably by using the European Peace Facility and the clearing house mechanism, and under the bilateral agreements of Member States with Ukraine;

| (ba) | recognise that the Versailles Declaration acknowledges Ukraine’s European aspirations and its application for EU membership and grant it EU candidate status as a clear political sign of solidarity with the people of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

(ba)

recognise that the Versailles Declaration acknowledges Ukraine’s European aspirations and its application for EU membership and grant it EU candidate status as a clear political sign of solidarity with the people of Ukraine;

| (bb) | reinforce that Ukraine, like any other country, has the sovereign right to make decisions about its political alliances and economic integration on its own, without interference from other countries; |
| --- | --- |

(bb)

reinforce that Ukraine, like any other country, has the sovereign right to make decisions about its political alliances and economic integration on its own, without interference from other countries;

| (bc) | support the investigation of war crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine, including by calling for a special UN tribunal; ensure that the perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations are held accountable and call for the Union and its Member States to assist Ukraine in its international war crime investigations; |
| --- | --- |

(bc)

support the investigation of war crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine, including by calling for a special UN tribunal; ensure that the perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations are held accountable and call for the Union and its Member States to assist Ukraine in its international war crime investigations;

On sanctions

| (bd) | ensure comprehensive monitoring of EU sanctions and their implementation and issue guidance to Member States on how to properly implement and enforce those sanctions; enact secondary sanctions on entities and non-EU countries that actively facilitate evasion of the Union’s sanctions against Russia; work with international partners to study in detail the impact of sanctions on Russia so far; reach out to non-EU countries and especially EU candidate countries and encourage more alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures; |
| --- | --- |

(bd)

ensure comprehensive monitoring of EU sanctions and their implementation and issue guidance to Member States on how to properly implement and enforce those sanctions; enact secondary sanctions on entities and non-EU countries that actively facilitate evasion of the Union’s sanctions against Russia; work with international partners to study in detail the impact of sanctions on Russia so far; reach out to non-EU countries and especially EU candidate countries and encourage more alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures;

| (be) | strengthen the Commission’s capacity to implement restrictive measures and publish weekly key statistics; |
| --- | --- |

(be)

strengthen the Commission’s capacity to implement restrictive measures and publish weekly key statistics;

| (bf) | address the different levels of implementation of targeted sanctions against Kremlin-linked individuals across the Member States and influence those Member States that have not already done so to render all the necessary military, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and to impose a full embargo on Russian gas, oil and coal imports into the EU; |
| --- | --- |

(bf)

address the different levels of implementation of targeted sanctions against Kremlin-linked individuals across the Member States and influence those Member States that have not already done so to render all the necessary military, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and to impose a full embargo on Russian gas, oil and coal imports into the EU;

| (bg) | deploy a diplomatic offensive in all states that abstained or voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions to explain the seriousness of the Russian aggression and the need for a unanimous response from the international community; |
| --- | --- |

(bg)

deploy a diplomatic offensive in all states that abstained or voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions to explain the seriousness of the Russian aggression and the need for a unanimous response from the international community;

| (bh) | pursue a holistic approach towards the Russian Federation and abandon any selective engagement with Moscow in the face of the atrocities and war crimes orchestrated by Russian political elites and committed by Russian troops, their proxies and mercenaries in Ukraine and elsewhere; hold to account the decision makers responsible for these acts and bring them to international justice; |
| --- | --- |

(bh)

pursue a holistic approach towards the Russian Federation and abandon any selective engagement with Moscow in the face of the atrocities and war crimes orchestrated by Russian political elites and committed by Russian troops, their proxies and mercenaries in Ukraine and elsewhere; hold to account the decision makers responsible for these acts and bring them to international justice;

| 2. | Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. |
| --- | --- |

2.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0039.

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0040.

(3)  OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14.

(4)  OJ C 263, 25.7.2018, p. 125.

(5)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0121.

(6)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0099.

(7)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0052.

(8)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(9)  OJ L 149, 30.4.2021, p. 10.

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