IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

GEORGE MELENDEZ et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

S245607

First Appellate District, Division Three

A149482

San Francisco City and County Superior Court

CGC-13-530672, CGC-15-549146

__________________________________________________________

April 25, 2019

Justice Chin authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief 

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, 

Kruger, and Groban concurred.
1

MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

S245607

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

Under California’s labor laws, “[i]f an employer discharges 

an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of 

discharge are due and payable immediately.” (Lab. Code, § 201, 

subd. (a).) Plaintiffs, security guards at what used to be named

AT&T Park in San Francisco and is now named Oracle Park (the 

park), are suing San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (the 

Giants) for allegedly violating this provision. They claim they 

are discharged after every Giants homestand, at the end of the 

baseball season, and after other events at the park, and they are 

entitled under Labor Code section 201 to receive their unpaid 

wages immediately after each such discharge. The Giants deny 

that the security guards are discharged on those occasions. 

They contend that Labor Code section 204, which generally 

requires semimonthly payment of employees’ wages, applies to 

the guards.

The merits of this action are not now before us. Rather, 

we must consider the Giants’ contention that this lawsuit 

requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement 

(hereafter sometimes CBA) that the guards’ union has entered 

into with the Giants. If so, this lawsuit is preempted under 

federal law and must be submitted to arbitration. (See, e.g., 

Livadas v. Bradshaw (1994) 512 U.S. 107 (Livadas).)

We conclude that, although the agreement between the 

union and the Giants may be relevant to this lawsuit and may 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

2

need to be consulted to resolve it, the parties’ dispute turns on 

an interpretation of state law — namely, the meaning of 

“discharge” under Labor Code section 201 — rather than an 

interpretation of the agreement itself. Because no party has 

identified any provision of the agreement whose meaning is 

uncertain and that must be interpreted to resolve plaintiffs’ 

claim, this lawsuit is not preempted and state courts may decide 

it on the merits. We reverse the judgment of the Court of 

Appeal, which concluded otherwise.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We draw these facts, which are generally undisputed, 

primarily from the Court of Appeal opinion. (Melendez v. San 

Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 339

(Melendez).)

George Melendez, a security guard at the park, is the lead 

plaintiff in this putative class action against the Giants. He 

“contends that he and other security guards were employed 

‘intermittingly’ for specific job assignments (baseball games or 

other events) and were discharged ‘at the end of a homestand, 

at the end of a baseball season, at the end of an inter-season 

event like a fan fest, college football game, a concert, a series of 

shows, or other events,’ and that therefore under Labor Code 

section 201 [they] were entitled to but did not receive immediate 

payment of their final wages upon each such ‘discharge.’ ” 

(Melendez, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 341.) Plaintiffs seek to 

recover penalties under Labor Code section 203 for the Giants’ 

failure to pay them immediately after each such discharge.

The Giants contend that the “security guards are not 

intermittent employees but are ‘year-round employees who 

remain employed with the Giants until they resign or are 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

3

terminated pursuant to the CBA.’ ” (Melendez, supra, 16 

Cal.App.5th at p. 341.) To support this contention, they cite

provisions of the agreement entered into between the Giants 

and the union that represents the security guards, the Service 

Employees International Union, United Services Workers West 

of San Francisco. (Ibid.)

As relevant here, the Giants moved to compel arbitration, 

arguing that the action is preempted by the Labor Management 

Relations Act of 1947. The trial court denied the motion. It 

“held that resolution of the controversy does not require 

interpretation of the CBA, but simply a determination of 

whether the security guards are discharged within the meaning 

of Labor Code section 201 at the conclusion of an event or series 

of baseball games.” (Melendez, supra, 16 Cal.App. 5th at pp. 

345-346.) The Giants appealed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, 

subd. (a) [an aggrieved party may appeal from “[a]n order 

dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration”].)

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Giants and reversed 

the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. It explained 

that, “[a]lthough no provision of the CBA provides an explicit 

answer, the duration of the employment relationship must be 

derived from what is implicit in the agreement.” (Melendez, 

supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.) It cited numerous provisions 

of the agreement that it believed must be interpreted to resolve 

this controversy: “There are numerous provisions from which 

inferences may logically be drawn. The classification of 

employees is based on the number of hours worked in a year, 

itself suggesting that employment is considered to continue 

beyond the conclusion of each event. Continued classification as 

a ‘regular’ employee requires at least 1,700 hours of work in a 

year. ‘All employees shall be probationary employees for their 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

4

first five hundred (500) hours of work with the Giants.’ 

Employees rise to ‘senior’ and ‘super senior’ status by working a 

minimum of 300 hours each year for the last five or 10 years, 

hardly possible if each event is deemed a separate 

employment. . . . [T]he CBA provides that ‘All new applicants for

employment as security personnel shall be subject to prehire 

drug screening and background investigation’; the language 

seems to imply that such screening and investigation will occur 

only once prior to the start of a single employment, and practice 

under the agreement confirms this interpretation. The 

specification of holidays in the CBA certainly implies yearlong 

employment. And under the CBA, the Giants have the right to 

discharge an employee only for cause. Other provisions may 

also support inferences as to the intended term of employment.” 

(Id. at pp. 346-347.)

We granted plaintiffs’ petition for review limited to the 

question of whether this action is preempted because it requires 

interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 

1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)) (hereafter section 301(a)) provides: 

“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization representing employees in an industry affecting 

commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor 

organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 

States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 

amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the 

parties.” (See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988) 

486 U.S. 399, 403 (Lingle).) “Courts typically refer to the 

statutory provisions at issue as ‘section 301(a)’ rather than by 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

5

citation to the United States Code.” (Knutsson v. KTLA, LLC

(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126.)

“In a series of opinions, the Supreme Court concluded that 

§ 301’s jurisdictional grant required the ‘complete preemption’ 

of state law claims brought to enforce collective bargaining 

agreements.” (Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.

(9th Cir. 2000) 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Balcorta).) The main 

policies behind this preemption rule are to “ensure nationwide 

uniformity with respect to the interpretation of collective 

bargaining agreements and preserve arbitration as the primary 

means of resolving disputes over the meaning of collective 

bargaining agreements.” (Sciborski v. Pacific Bell Directory

(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1163 (Sciborski), citing Lingle, 

supra, 486 U.S. at p. 404, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 

471 U.S. 202, 211, 219 (Allis-Chalmers).)

After reviewing the high court opinions that developed the 

preemption rule, the Balcorta court explained that “[a]lthough 

the language of § 301 is limited to ‘[s]uits for violation of 

contracts,’ courts have concluded that, in order to give the 

proper range to § 301’s policies of promoting arbitration and the 

uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreement 

provisions, § 301 ‘complete preemption’ must be construed to 

cover ‘most state-law actions that require interpretation of labor 

agreements.’ [Citations.] One reason for expanding complete 

preemption beyond the textual confines of § 301 is that any 

claim the resolution of which requires the interpretation of a 

collective bargaining agreement presents some risk to the policy 

of uniformity if state law principles are employed in that 

interpretation, even if the claim is not one for breach of contract. 

[Citing Lingle, supra, 486 U.S. at pp. 405-406, Livadas, supra, 

512 U.S. at pp. 121-123.] Moreover, extending complete 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

6

preemption to cover claims involving interpretation of collective 

bargaining agreements promotes the federal policy favoring 

arbitration of labor disputes . . . .” (Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at 

p. 1108, fn. omitted.)

Critically, Balcorta also explained that “[t]here is another 

strand to this aspect of federal labor law, however. Despite the 

breadth of § 301 complete preemption, ‘not every claim which 

requires a court to refer to the language of a labor-management 

agreement is necessarily preempted.’ [Citation.] In order to 

help preserve state authority in areas involving minimum labor 

standards, the Supreme Court has distinguished between 

claims that require interpretation or construction of a labor 

agreement and those that require a court simply to ‘look at’ the 

agreement. See Livadas, supra, 512 U.S. at 123-126, 124, 114 

S.Ct. 2068 (“[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not subject 

to dispute, the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement 

will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does 

not require the claim to be extinguished.”). We have stressed 

that, in the context of § 301 complete preemption, the term 

‘interpret’ is defined narrowly — it means something more than 

‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’ ” (Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at p. 

1108.) Moreover, “ ‘look[ing] to’ the CBA merely to discern that 

none of its terms is reasonably in dispute does not require 

preemption.” (Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. (9th 

Cir. 2001) 255 F.3d 683, 692 (en banc) (Cramer), citing Livadas, 

supra, 512 U.S. at p. 125.)

“Preemption does not arise when interpretation is 

required only by a defense. [Citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams

(1987) 482 U.S. 386, 398-399, Cramer, supra, 255 F.3d at p. 690.] 

Preemption occurs when a claim cannot be resolved on the 

merits without choosing among competing interpretations of a 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

7

collective bargaining agreement and its application to the claim. 

The determination of whether a claim is preempted depends on 

the particular facts of each case.” (Sciborski, supra, 205 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164-1165.) “The primary point of reference 

in the preemption analysis is . . . not state law writ large . . . but 

the plaintiff’s pleading.” (Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th 

Cir. 2018) 898 F.3d 904, 923 (en banc) (Alaska Airlines).) The 

inquiry is not “into the merits of a claim; it is an inquiry into the 

claim’s ‘legal character’ — whatever its merits — so as to ensure 

it is decided in the proper forum. . . . Our only job is to decide 

whether, as pleaded, the claim ‘in this case is “independent” of 

the [CBA] in the sense of “independent” that matters for . . . preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not 

require construing the collective-bargaining agreement.’ ” (Id. 

at p. 924.)

The high court has also said that preemption applies 

“when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent 

upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the 

parties in a labor contract.” (Allis-Chalmers, supra, 471 U.S. at 

p. 220.)

These concepts are not bright lines. “ ‘[T]he line between 

reference to and interpretation of an agreement may be 

somewhat hazy’ ” (Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at p. 1108), and 

“ ‘[s]ubstantial dependence’ on a CBA is an inexact concept, 

turning on the specific facts of each case . . . .” (Cramer, supra, 

255 F.3d at p. 691.) But “the totality of the policies underlying 

§ 301 — promoting the arbitration of labor contract disputes, 

securing the uniform interpretation of labor contracts, and 

protecting the states’ authority to enact minimum labor 

standards — guides our understanding of what constitutes 

‘interpretation.’ ” (Balcorta, at pp. 1108-1109.)
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

8

 As an overarching principle, the high court has also

“emphasized that ‘pre-emption should not be lightly inferred in 

this area, since the establishment of labor standards falls within 

the traditional police power of the State.’ ” (Lingle, supra, 486 

U.S. at p. 412.) Although a policy exists in ensuring uniformity 

of interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, no such 

policy exists in favor of uniformity of state labor standards. 

Federal law “does not provide for, nor does it manifest any 

interest in, national or systemwide uniformity in substantive 

labor rights.” (Alaska Airlines, supra, 898 F.3d at p. 919.)

Sciborski summarized the analytical process a court 

should use to apply these principles. “Under section 301 

preemption analysis, it is helpful to apply a two-part test to 

determine whether a claim is preempted. First, the court should 

evaluate whether the claim arises from independent state law 

or from the collective bargaining agreement. If the claim arises 

from the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is 

preempted as a matter of law. [Citation.] However, if the claim 

arises from independent state law, the court must then proceed 

to the second step. In this step, the court determines whether 

the claim requires ‘interpretation or construction of a labor 

agreement,’ or whether a collective bargaining agreement will 

merely be ‘reference[d]’ in the litigation. [Citations.] A state 

law claim is preempted if a court must interpret a disputed 

provision of the collective bargaining agreement to determine 

whether the plaintiff’s state law claim has merit.” (Sciborski, 

supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164; see Kobald v. Good 

Samaritan Regional Medical Center (9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3d 

1024, 1032-1033 [similar].) “At this second step of the analysis, 

‘claims are only preempted to the extent there is an active 

dispute over “the meaning of contract terms.” ’ ” (Curtis v. Irwin 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

9

Industries, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 913 F.3d 1146, 1153, quoting 

Alaska Airlines, supra, 898 F.3d at p. 921; see McCray v. 

Marriott Hotel Services, Inc. (9th Cir. 2018) 902 F.3d 1005, 1013 

[a “speculative possibility” that a collective bargaining 

agreement dispute may arise later in the course of litigation will 

not preempt a state law claim when none of the collective 

bargaining agreement’s terms are presently in dispute].)

The first step in this analytical process is easy in this case. 

Plaintiffs’ claim arises solely from independent state law —

Labor Code section 201 — and is not based on the collective 

bargaining agreement.

Because the difference between interpreting and merely 

referencing a collective bargaining agreement is inherently 

“ ‘hazy’ ” (Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at p. 1108), the second step 

is more difficult. But, bearing in mind that preemption should 

not be lightly inferred because establishing minimum labor 

standards comes within a state’s traditional police power, we 

conclude this lawsuit is not preempted. The parties’ dispute

turns on an interpretation of California’s independent labor 

laws, not on an interpretation of the collective bargaining 

agreement.

As noted, Labor Code section 201, subdivision (a),

provides, “If an employer discharges an employee, the wages 

earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable 

immediately.” In Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77

(Smith), we construed the word “discharge” in this statute. 

There, L’Oreal USA, Inc. hired the plaintiff to be a “hair model” 

working for a single day. At the end of that day, the employment 

relationship ended. But L’Oreal failed to pay her for more than 

two months. She sued, claiming a violation of Labor Code 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

10

section 201. Because the employment relationship was 

voluntarily terminated, L’Oreal argued she was not discharged 

under the statute. We stated the issue as “whether the 

discharge element of [Labor Code sections 201 and 203] requires 

an involuntary termination from an ongoing employment 

relationship, such as when an employer fires an employee, or 

whether this element also may be met when an employer 

releases an employee after completion of a specific job 

assignment or time duration for which the employee was hired.” 

(Smith, at p. 81.) We concluded that “the statutory element 

contemplates both types of employment terminations.” (Ibid.)

In reaching this conclusion, we noted that a “commonly 

understood meaning of ‘discharge’ includes the action of an 

employer who, having hired an employee to work on a particular 

job or for a specific term of service, formally releases the 

employee and ends the employment relationship at the point the 

job or service term is deemed complete.” (Smith, supra, 39 

Cal.4th at p. 84.) We held that “discharge” in this context 

includes this commonly understood meaning. (Id. at p. 90.)

The parties debate at length how Smith, supra, 39 Cal.4th 

77, applies here. The Giants argue that “[a]n employee cannot 

be simultaneously discharged under statute while continuing to 

remain continuously and gainfully employed by contractual 

agreement.” They contend that “[t]his is a case about which

Labor Code protections apply.” In their view, Labor Code 

section 204 — which applies to wages not governed by other 

provisions such as Labor Code section 201, and which requires 

semimonthly wage payments and places strict limits on the time 

that may elapse between performance of labor and payment for 

that labor — governs security guards. They also rely on a 

declaration by the Giants’ senior director of security explaining 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

11

the employment process that, they contend, shows plaintiffs are 

not continually discharged. Plaintiffs argue that they are 

“temporarily laid off” every time a specific job assignment ends, 

and such layoffs are discharges within the meaning of Labor 

Code section 201. They are willing to concede that, by the terms 

of the collective bargaining agreement, their employment 

relationship with the Giants is a continuing one. But they 

contend that “[e]ven if the CBA contained an undisputed term 

providing that security guards are employed for life, the layoffs 

they endure would still trigger the employer obligations 

contained in Labor Code section 201.” The parties also discuss 

the legislative history behind the statute and the meaning and 

significance of interpretations of it by the Division of Labor 

Standards Enforcement.

These are credible arguments, and they will have to be 

considered when the trial court resolves the merits of this 

lawsuit on remand. But they are arguments concerning the 

meaning of “discharge” under Labor Code section 201, not 

concerning the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. 

The parties have pointed us to no disagreement concerning the 

meaning of any provision of the agreement. 

Closely on point is Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d 1102. In that 

case, the plaintiff, an electrical rigger in the film industry, 

“worked several short-term ‘calls’ ” for Twentieth Century Fox 

Film Corporation. (Id. at p. 1104.) He sued the corporation,

claiming a violation of Labor Code former section 201.5, which, 

he alleged, required him to be paid within 24 hours of each call. 

As here, the reviewing court had to decide whether the lawsuit 

was preempted under section 301(a). The court held it was not.
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

12

Balcorta concluded that the collective bargaining 

agreement in that case had to be consulted but not interpreted. 

“Although the provisions do detail fairly complicated procedures 

and contain a hefty dose of industry jargon, their meaning is 

neither uncertain nor ambiguous. A court may be required to 

read and apply these provisions in order to determine whether 

an employee was discharged from his ‘call’ at the end of his shift, 

but no interpretation of the provisions would be necessary.” 

(Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at pp. 1109-1110.) “[D]etermining 

whether Balcorta was discharged does not require a court to 

interpret the collective bargaining agreement . . . , and thus does 

not render Balcorta’s claims subject to complete preemption.” 

(Id. at p. 1110.)

Balcorta also explained that labor law rights such as that 

under Labor Code former section 201.5, are not negotiable and 

that section “301 does not permit parties to waive, in a collective 

bargaining agreement, nonnegotiable state rights . . . .” 

(Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at p. 1111; see Lab. Code, § 219 [“no 

provision of this article can in any way be contravened or set 

aside by a private agreement, whether written, oral, or 

implied”].) Accordingly, the collective bargaining agreement did

not have to be interpreted to determine whether it waived the 

right to timely payment of wages under state law. (Balcorta, at 

pp. 1111-1112.)

Although this case involves Labor Code section 201, not 

Labor Code former section 201.5, we believe the same result 

applies. The collective bargaining agreement must be consulted

or referenced, but not interpreted. Nor is resolution of the state

law claim “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms 

of” the collective bargaining agreement. (Allis-Chalmers, supra, 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

13

471 U.S. at p. 220.) Instead, Labor Code section 201 must be 

interpreted.

The Court of Appeal in this case concluded that plaintiffs’ 

claim was preempted based on “inferences . . . drawn” from 

several provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 

(Melendez, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.) It cited provisions 

that define seniority and wage levels, pre-hire drug screening 

and background investigation, and annual holidays. Those 

provisions may be relevant, but none directly address whether 

the Giants, at the end of each event or series of home games, 

“discharge” plaintiffs pursuant to Labor Code section 201. As 

the Court of Appeal recognized, no provision of the agreement 

“provides an explicit answer.” (Melendez, at p. 346.) Nor do 

those provisions require interpretation in the narrow sense in 

which that word is used for preemption purposes. The parties 

have not identified any provision of the collective bargaining 

agreement whose meaning is “ambiguous” (Balcorta, supra, 208 

F.3d at p. 1109) or subject to “active dispute.” (Alaska Airlines, 

supra, 898 F.3d at p. 921.) Indeed, nothing in the agreement 

addresses the timing of wage payments, which shows that 

plaintiffs’ complaint is aimed at an issue separate from the 

benefits bargained for in the agreement.

Our finding that the action is not preempted is consistent 

with the policies underlying section 301(a). Allowing a state 

court to interpret Labor Code section 201 does not threaten the 

policies of “promoting the arbitration of labor contract disputes” 

or “securing the uniform interpretation of labor contracts.”

(Balcorta, supra, 208 F.3d at pp. 1108-1109.) But, importantly, 

it does “protect[] the states’ authority to enact minimum labor 

standards.” (Id. at p. 1109.) It is up to state courts, not an 
MELENDEZ v. SAN FRANCISCO BASEBALL ASSOCIATES LLC

Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.

14

arbitrator, to interpret state labor law standards applicable to 

all workers.

We express no view on the parties’ interpretations of 

Labor Code section 201 or the ultimate merits of this lawsuit, 

which are not before us in this appeal from the denial of the 

motion to compel arbitration, and on which no court has yet 

ruled. We hold only that section 301(a) does not preempt this 

lawsuit. The merits will have to be resolved when the matter is 

remanded to the trial court.

III. CONCLUSION

The trial court correctly denied the motion to compel 

arbitration. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court 

of Appeal and remand the matter to that court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIN, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 16 Cal.App.5th 339

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S245607

Date Filed: April 25, 2019

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Francisco

Judge: Curtis E. A. Karnow

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Nancy Pritikin, Babak Yousefzadeh, Karin Dougan Vogel and 

Brian S. Fong for Defendant and Appellant.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Richard J. Simmons, Jason W. Kearnaghan, Daniel J. McQueen 

and Ryan J. Krueger for Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, Athletics Investment Group LLC, Padres L.P., and 

San Jose Arena Management, LLC, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Sahag Majarian II; Moss Bollinger and Dennis F. Moss for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Karin Dougan Vogel

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton

Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111-4109

(415) 434-9100

Dennis F. Moss

Moss Bollinger

15300 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 207

Sherman Oaks, CA 91403

(310) 773-0323