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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 23, 2016 

v No. 323795 

Wayne Circuit Court 

CYNTHIA ILENE FLEMING, LC No. 13-001653-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and JANSEN and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right her bench trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL 

750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 

750.227b(1). Defendant was sentenced to 13 1⁄2 to 24 years’ imprisonment for the second-degree 

murder conviction, to be served consecutively to the mandatory two-year term of imprisonment 

for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence, but remand 

for the limited purpose of correcting the presentence investigative report (PSIR) to reflect that 

defendant was convicted following a bench trial and that she did not have any outstanding 

warrants at the time of sentencing. 

I. OFFENSE VARIABLE 5 

 In the brief submitted by appellant counsel, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

scoring 15 points under offense variable (OV) 5.1

 We disagree. 

 

1

 We review for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact, and such findings require support by 

a preponderance of the record evidence. People v Steanhouse, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2015); slip op at 19. The application of the facts to the law, namely whether the 

facts are sufficient to meet the scoring conditions set forth in the pertinent statute, presents a 

question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Id. This Court will also review de novo the trial 

court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. Id. A trial court’s findings of fact are clearly 

erroneous where, after a review of the record as a whole, “this Court is left with a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 119; 575 

NW2d 84 (1997) (citation omitted). 
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 OV 5 addresses psychological injury to a member of a victim’s family. MCL 777.35. A 

trial court must assess 15 points if a “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional 

treatment occurred” to a member of the victim’s family. MCL 777.35(1)(a). The court must 

“[s]core 15 points if the serious psychological injury to the victim’s family may require 

professional treatment.” MCL 777.35(2). “In making this determination, the fact that treatment 

has not been sought is not conclusive.” MCL 777.35(2). 

 Here, the victim’s daughter gave a statement at sentencing. She explained that after her 

mother’s death, the victim reached out to her and provided emotional support. She stated that 

although she was in counseling before the victim’s death, she had to increase her counseling to 

three days a week because she could not get out of her head what she thought the victim’s 

thoughts must have been when he died. In People v Steanhouse, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ 

NW2d ___ (2015); slip op at 19-20, we affirmed a trial court’s assessment of 15 points for OV 5 

where the victim’s parents were present in the home when their son’s throat was slashed, and 

they discovered the crime was committed by someone they believed was a close friend of their 

son. The Steanhouse Court noted “the trial court’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of [the 

victim’s] parents during their testimony” supported the trial court’s finding regarding their 

psychological injuries. Id. at ___; slip op at 20. Here, the trial court was in the unique position 

to hear the daughter’s testimony both at trial and at the sentencing hearing, and so the court was 

able to observe her demeanor and make a credibility determination. Id. Given the record, the 

trial court’s finding that the victim’s daughter suffered serious psychological harm requiring a 

score of 15 points under OV 5 was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.2

II. STANDARD 4 BRIEF 

 Defendant next raises several issues in a brief submitted pursuant to Administrative Order 

No. 2004-6, Standard 4. After review, we conclude that the issues raised in defendant’s Standard 

4 brief do not warrant reversal. 

A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 First, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for a number of reasons. 

Because no Ginther3

 hearing was conducted, “our review of the defendant’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record.” People v Mack, 265 

Mich App 122, 125; 695 NW2d 342 (2005). 

 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that 

trial defense counsel’s conduct did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness, and that, 

but for defense counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would 

have been different. People v Lopez, 305 Mich App 686, 694; 854 NW2d 205 (2014), quoting 

 

2

 Defendant has not raised a challenge to the scoring of OV 5 based on the court’s potential use 

of judicial factfinding and we decline to raise it sua sponte. 

3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
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Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). There is a 

strong presumption that defense counsel’s actions are pursuant to sound trial strategy. People v 

Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242-243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). We will not interfere with defense 

counsel’s judgment regarding matters of trial strategy or second-guess defense counsel’s 

decisions with the benefit of hindsight. Id. at 242-243. Moreover, a criminal defendant must 

establish the factual predicate for his or her claim. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 

(1999). 

 Defendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not retaining and 

presenting an expert witness on battered woman syndrome. 

 In People v Christel, 449 Mich 578, 591; 537 NW2d 194 (1995), the Michigan Supreme 

Court held that expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome is admissible when 

relevant to an issue before the factfinder. The Court limited such testimony to a description of 

“the generalities or characteristics of the syndrome” and its possible relationship to “a specific 

behavior brought out at trial.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Court also barred expert opinion 

testimony on whether a person was, in fact, a battered woman. Id. 

 Defense counsel did present evidence that defendant had endured prior physical abuse 

from the victim. The victim’s daughter and one of the victim’s neighbors testified about 

defendant and the victim’s volatile relationship. Defense counsel also extensively questioned a 

police detective about prior domestic dispute calls originating from defendant and the victim’s 

apartment. While it is conceivable that expert testimony may have bolstered the defense, 

defendant has failed to provide us with a basis upon which we could reach this conclusion, let 

alone to determine whether it affected the outcome of the case. Defendant has not presented an 

affidavit or any other material to indicate that such an expert exists and what the substance of his 

or her testimony would have been. Defendant filed a pro per motion to remand for a Ginther

hearing, which also contained no such material. On August 14, 2015, we denied her motion 

without prejudice stating that we “will consider another motion to remand if it is filed by 

defendant-appellant’s counsel and is supported by affidavits to show the testimony that could 

have been presented at trial and is available to place on the record on remand.”4

 Such material 

has not been submitted. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that defense counsel’s failure to call 

an expert as to battered woman syndrome was ineffective or that it was reasonably likely to be 

outcome determinative. Lopez, 305 Mich App at 694. 

 Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not 

communicate with her and because she was unaware of the trial strategy, the anticipated 

defenses, or the evidence that would be admitted at trial. In support of her claim, defendant 

provided letters that she sent to the trial court and to defense counsel. There is nothing on the 

record to suggest that defendant sent the letters to the trial court before trial. Although one of the 

letters attached to defendant’s Standard 4 brief is dated before the trial, her second appended 

letter is dated after proofs were closed, and it expressly states that the other letter was not 

 

4 People v Fleming, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 14, 2015 (Docket 

No. 323795). 
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previously sent to the trial court. The letter to defense counsel, which is dated June 20, 2014 

(before trial), does indicate that defendant had some confusion about what defense was going to 

be presented at trial. Copies of the letters are not included in the lower court file, nor is there 

anything on the letters, such as a court stamp, to indicate that they were actually received by the 

trial court. Moreover, given that defense counsel appears to have presented the defense that 

defendant wanted him to present at trial, we are not persuaded that the outcome of the trial would 

have been different had defense counsel communicated with defendant more before trial. 

Accordingly, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance is without merit. Id. 

 Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective because he did not object to 

hearsay statements related by a police officer and a firefighter. The police officer testified that 

while defendant was in his squad car she stated that she hoped the victim died. This statement is 

not hearsay because it is a party-opponent admission under MRE 801(d)(2) and is, by definition, 

not hearsay. The firefighter testified that he asked the victim if defendant shot him and the 

victim responded by nodding. This nonverbal response is an out of court statement introduced 

for the truth of the matter asserted, so it is hearsay. MRE 801(c). However, it was admissible as 

a statement made under belief of impending death. MRE 804(b)(2). Because both statements 

were admissible, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. People v Collins, 298 

Mich App 458, 470; 828 NW2d 392 (2012) (stating that defense counsel is not ineffective for 

failing to raise a meritless objection). 

 Admission of those statements did not deprive defendant of her right to confront the 

witnesses against her. Defendant’s own statements to the police do not implicate the 

Confrontation Clause. See People v Fackelman, 489 Mich 515, 524-525; 802 NW2d 552 (2011) 

(recognizing that the United States and Michigan constitutions provide a criminal defendant with 

the right to confront the witnesses against him or her). And the victim’s nonverbal statement to 

the firefighter identifying defendant as his assailant is nontestimonial. See People v Taylor, 275 

Mich App 177, 182; 737 NW2d 790 (2007) (holding that the victim’s statements identifying his 

assailant as he was dying of his gunshot wounds were nontestimonial under Crawford v 

Washington, 541 US 36, 68; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004) and were admissible 

pursuant to MRE 804(b)(2)). Accordingly, because the Confrontation Clause was not violated, 

defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the testimony on grounds that it 

violated the Confrontation Clause. Collins, 298 Mich App at 470. 

 Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to have an expert 

witness testify at her sentencing hearing about mitigating factors that bore on the trial court’s 

sentencing decision. Defendant acknowledges that while preparing for sentencing, defense 

counsel did consult with a psychologist to determine whether there was a reason for a downward 

departure. Defense counsel, however, ultimately decided not to present an expert in support of 

his request for a downward departure. Instead, he prepared a memorandum presenting his 

argument and then orally argued in favor of a downward departure. On appeal, defendant argues 

that if a psychologist were contacted mitigating factors may have been expounded upon by the 

expert. Defendant suggests that the mitigating factors might have included the fact she allegedly 

had post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, besides defendant’s unsupported assertion, 

there is nothing in the record indicating what a psychologist would have actually stated. 

Accordingly, defendant has not established the factual predicate for her claim, Hoag, 460 Mich 

at 6, and has not overcome the presumption that defense counsel was acting pursuant to a valid 
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strategy when he decided not to present a psychologist at sentencing. Unger, 278 Mich App at 

242. 

 Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress her 

statements to the police officer in the squad car and her statements during the booking process on 

the grounds that the statements were made when she had not been advised of her Miranda5

rights. However, Miranda warnings are not required unless the accused is subject to a custodial 

interrogation. See People v Hill, 429 Mich 382, 397-399; 415 NW2d 193 (1987). Here, the 

police officer testified that defendant was talking to herself in the back of the squad car when she 

made the statement that she hoped the victim died and that he should not have lost all their 

money at the casino. The officer testified that defendant was not being questioned when she 

made the statement. Further, during the booking procedure, a booking officer asked defendant 

general identification questions, but did not question defendant about the shooting. The officer 

testified that defendant made several unsolicited statements during the booking procedure that 

pertained to the shooting, including statements that the victim grabbed the gun and attempted to 

shoot himself and statements that the victim had asked defendant to shoot him. Because none of 

the challenged statements was solicited during a custodial interrogation, we conclude that 

defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to suppress the statements. 

 Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call her mother, 

two neighbors, and the victim’s cousin. Defendant asserts that her mother would have 

corroborated her testimony that the victim was angry about various issues. Defendant asserts 

that one neighbor would have testified that on the day of the shooting, (1) the victim was angry 

about various issues, (2) defendant seemed shaky and “out of it” when approached by the victim, 

and (3) that defendant did not make sense when she was talking to the neighbor. Defendant 

asserts that another neighbor would have testified that she had witnessed the victim abusing 

defendant on multiple occasions and that she did not visit defendant and the victim because she 

was sick of seeing the victim beat defendant.6

 Finally, defendant asserts that the victim’s cousin 

could have testified that the victim never told him that defendant shot at him on a previous 

occasion. Defendant argues that the testimony from these witnesses would have impacted her 

credibility at trial. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the potential witnesses 

would have testified in the manner that defendant asserts they would have testified, and 

defendant has not attached any affidavits from the potential witnesses. Thus, defendant has 

failed to supply the factual predicate for her claim. Hoag, 460 Mich at 6. Moreover, assuming 

arguendo that the witnesses would have testified as indicated by defendant and that defense 

counsel was ineffective for failing to present their testimony, defendant has nevertheless failed to 

establish that, but for the alleged error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 

Lopez, 305 Mich App at 694. Defense counsel presented testimony supporting defendant’s 

testimony that the victim was angry with her and that he had previously abused her, including 

presenting a personal protection order that defendant had obtained against the victim following 

one incident of abuse. The trial court never expressed any doubt with regard to that testimony; 

 

5 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 

6

 Defendant concedes that defense counsel unsuccessfully attempted to locate this neighbor. 
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however, the court found that defendant’s testimony lacked credibility, in main part because she 

testified that the victim was shot twice in the living room, but there was no blood actually found 

in the living room. The court also noted that defendant’s stories about what occurred during the 

shooting were inconsistent. On these facts, defense counsel was not ineffective. Id. 

 Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 

continuance during the trial when he was feeling ill. Defendant asserts, without support, that five 

days after the trial, defense counsel told her he did not object to “certain witnesses” on July 17, 

2014, the last day of trial, because he was not feeling well. It is not clear which witnesses 

defense counsel apparently failed to object to because of illness. The record shows that 

defendant was the only witness that testified on July 17, 2014. Moreover, there is nothing on the 

record to indicate that defense counsel was, in fact, ill, or that, if he was ill, it affected his ability 

to effectively represent defendant. Given that defendant has not identified the witnesses that 

apparently should have been objected to or what portions of their testimony was objectionable, 

defendant has not established the factual predicate for her claim, Hoag, 460 Mich at 6, and so 

relief is not warranted on this claim. 

 Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of defense counsel’s errors mandates 

reversal. However, given that we have not found any errors, we decline to reverse on that basis. 

B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for 

second-degree murder.7

 She asserts that there was insufficient evidence to show malice, that the 

prosecution failed to negate her claim of self-defense, and that the record evidence only 

supported a manslaughter conviction. We disagree. 

 “The elements of second-degree murder consist of (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the 

defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.” People v Henderson, 306 

Mich App 1, 9; 854 NW2d 234 (2014) (quotation omitted). “The term ‘malice’ has been defined 

as the intent to kill, the intent to do cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton 

and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause 

death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 9-10 (quotation omitted). 

 There was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant acted with malice when she shot 

the victim. Although defendant presents her trial testimony as support for a finding that she did 

not act with malice, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 

 

7

 Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo. People v Ericksen, 288 

Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). Due process requires, that when the evidence is 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of fact could find each 

element of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Lundy, 467 Mich 254, 

257; 650 NW2d 332 (2002). It is the trier of fact’s role to judge credibility and weigh the 

evidence. People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 587; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). 
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People v Lundy, 467 Mich 254, 257; 650 NW2d 332 (2002). Here, defendant called 911 after 

the shooting and stated that she had shot the victim. Then, when she was placed in a police car, 

she stated that she hoped defendant died and that he should not have lost all of their money at the 

casino. Further, during the booking procedure at the police station, defendant also made 

unsolicited statements about how the victim told her to shoot him. The record also established 

that defendant was shot twice, once in the back and once in his left leg. Viewed in the light most 

favorable the prosecution, the evidence supports a finding that when defendant shot the victim 

she intended to kill him and, in fact, wanted him to die.8

 Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to disprove that she acted in selfdefense. Whether a defendant acted in self-defense is an issue reserved to the trier of fact. 

People v Prather, 121 Mich App 324, 330; 328 NW2d 556 (1982). In People v Roper, 286 Mich 

App 77, 86; 777 NW2d 483 (2009), this Court set forth the relevant law on the defense of selfdefense: 

“In Michigan, the killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide 

if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent 

danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm.” People v Heflin, 434 Mich 

482, 502; 456 NW2d 10 (1990); see also MCL 780.972(1)(a) (providing that a 

person may use deadly force against another if the person “honestly and 

reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the 

imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself or herself or to 

another individual”). “Once evidence of self-defense is introduced, the prosecutor 

bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Fortson, 

202 Mich App 13, 20; 507 NW2d 763 (1993). 

 At trial, defendant testified that she came out of the bedroom and saw her gun on a TV 

table. She stated that she had left her gun in her jacket and that it had not been in the “firing” 

position. She testified that when she saw the gun she became concerned and started to ask the 

victim about it but that before finishing her question, she and the victim moved towards the gun. 

She testified the victim reached the gun first and that she grabbed his hand and a mutual struggle 

ensued during which the victim pulled her hair and swore at her. Defendant stated that the gun 

went off twice during the struggle at which point the victim accused her of shooting him in the 

leg and she responded he had shot himself in the leg. Whether or not to accept this version of 

events was for the factfinder, People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 587; 808 NW2d 541 (2011), 

and in rendering its verdict, the trial court stated that it found defendant’s testimony not credible. 

Moreover, the forensic evidence strongly indicated that the shots were fired from a distance of 

feet, not inches and were unlikely to have been fired during a close struggle. We conclude that 

the trial court did not err in finding that the prosecutor had proven beyond a reasonable doubt 

that defendant was not acting in self-defense. 

 

8

 Defendant also argues that, at best, she should have only been convicted of manslaughter. 

However, given our conclusion that sufficient evidence existed to support her conviction for 

second-degree murder, we decline to address this argument further. 
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C. DENIAL OF REQUEST TO REOPEN THE PROOFS 

 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to reopen the proofs several 

days after closing arguments were finished. Defense counsel explained that he wanted to reopen 

the proofs to provide a brief demonstration to the trial court to show that defendant’s version of 

events could have led to the injuries sustained by the victim. Defendant asserts that the trial 

court’s refusal deprived her of her constitutional right to a fair trial and to present a defense.9

 “Relevant in ruling on a motion to reopen proofs is whether any undue advantage would 

be taken by the moving party and whether there is any showing of surprise or prejudice to the 

nonmoving party.” People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 420; 633 NW2d 376 (2001) 

(quotation omitted). When we review a trial court’s decision on a motion to reopen the proofs, 

we consider several factors, including: “whether conditions have changed or undue advantage 

would result, whether newly discovered and material evidence is sought to be admitted, whether 

surprise would result, and the timing of the motion during the trial.” People v Moore, 164 Mich 

App 378, 383; 417 NW2d 508 (1987), mod on other grounds 433 Mich 851 (1989).

 Here, the motion to reopen the proofs was heard over a week after the trial court heard 

closing arguments. The proposed evidence was not newly discovered and was, in fact, 

cumulative to defendant’s trial testimony. Accordingly, on these facts, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to reopen the proofs. Id. at 384 (concluding 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not reopening the proofs to allow the defendant to 

testify where the motion to reopen the proofs was filed after closing arguments and there was no 

newly discovered evidence or change in circumstances). Moreover, the trial court’s denial did 

not deprive defendant of her right to present a defense because she was, in fact, allowed to 

present her defense through her testimony, which was then argued by defense counsel during 

closing argument. 

D. ACCURACY OF SENTENCING INFORMATION 

 Defendant also argues that she was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information. To 

the extent that defendant is referring to the court’s scoring decision on OV 5, there was sufficient 

evidence to support the court’s scoring decision. Thus, defendant was not sentenced on 

inaccurate information with regard to OV 5. 

E. DOWNWARD DEPARTURE 

 

9

 This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s determination concerning the 

reopening of the proofs. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 419; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). 

“An abuse of discretion occurs when a court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of 

reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v White, 307 Mich App 425, 429; 862 NW2d 1 

(2014). Unpreserved claims of constitutional error are reviewed for plain error affecting 

defendant’s substantial rights. People v Costner, 309 Mich App 220, 232; 870 NW2d 582 

(2015). 
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 Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to depart 

downward from the sentencing guidelines range. Defendant asserts that a downward sentence 

was required because (1) she appeared intoxicated during the booking procedure, (2) she was 58 

years old, (3) she had hypertension and clinical depression, (4) she had previously been abused 

by the victim, and (5) she did not have a prior criminal record. Regardless of whether those 

circumstances would have supported a downward departure, defendant cannot establish that the 

trial court’s decision to sentence within the guidelines range was an abuse of discretion. The 

trial court stated that, after considering the trial testimony and the arguments presented in favor 

of a downward departure, it did not think a downward departure was warranted and it did not 

think that a sentence at the top of the guidelines was warranted. The guidelines range was 162 to 

270 months. The court sentenced defendant to a minimum of 162 months, a sentence at the 

bottom of the guidelines range. Given the facts of this case, the court’s decision was not an 

abuse of discretion. 

F. ACCURACY OF THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 

 Finally, defendant argues that the PSIR was incorrect. She asserts that it incorrectly 

stated that she had an outstanding warrant at the time she was sentenced and that her convictions 

were the result of a guilty plea. 

 It is apparent that defendant was convicted by the court, not on the basis of a plea. 

Moreover, at sentencing, the court, defense counsel, and the prosecution all stated that defendant 

did not have a prior criminal history, which suggests that at the time of sentencing there was not 

an outstanding warrant against defendant. Accordingly, there are factual errors in the PSIR. 

Defense counsel did not challenge the accuracy of the statements. However, where the trial 

court “did not rely on the challenged information in the PSIR in sentencing defendant, 

resentencing is not required; rather the remedy is to remand for the limited purpose of correcting 

the PSIR.” People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 650; 658 NW2d 504 (2003) (citation omitted). 

In this case, the trial court affirmatively stated that defendant had no prior criminal history. The 

court also referenced the testimony at the bench trial over which it presided. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court did not rely on the incorrect information in the PSIR. Therefore, we 

remand for the ministerial task of correcting the PSIR. Id.

10

 

 

10 Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the accuracy of 

the PSIR. However, given that the trial court did not rely on the inaccurate statements, we 

conclude that defendant cannot show that she was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure. 
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III. CONCLUSION 

 We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence, but remand for the limited purpose of 

correcting the PSIR to reflect that defendant was convicted following a bench trial and that she 

did not have any outstanding warrants at the time of sentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro