[Cite as State v. Delehanty, 2023-Ohio-337.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee,

 - vs -

STORMY DELEHANTY,

Appellant.

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CASE NO. CA2021-04-041

O P I N I O N

2/6/2023

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. 20CR37107

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Thomas G. Eagle Co., L.P.A., and Thomas G. Eagle, for appellant.

BYRNE, J.

{¶1} The Warren County Court of Common Pleas convicted Stormy Delehanty1 of 

four charges—including murder—arising out of allegations that she stabbed and killed 

Roman Roshchupkin and attempted to conceal her actions by cleaning the crime scene. 

Stormy appealed. For the reasons described below, we affirm Stormy's convictions, but we 

1. Because appellant Stormy Delehanty and witness Daniel Delehanty share the same last name, we will refer 

to them by their first names.
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vacate her sentence and remand to the trial court for purposes of complying with the 

mandatory advisements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1), and for resentencing.

I. Indictment and Trial Summary

{¶2} A grand jury indicted Stormy on four counts: Count One, murder, a violation 

of R.C. 2903.02(B); Count Two, felonious assault with a deadly weapon, a violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(2); Count Three, felonious assault causing serious bodily harm, a violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); and Count Four, tampering with evidence, a violation of R.C. 

2921.12(A)(1). 

{¶3} R.C. 2903.02(B), the murder statute, states that "No person shall cause the 

death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit 

an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree * * *." Counts Two and 

Three, which were both felonies of the second degree, constituted the predicate offenses 

for Count One.

{¶4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. We summarize the trial testimony below.

A. State's Evidence

1. Daniel Delehanty's Testimony

{¶5} Daniel Delehanty testified that he was Stormy's 17-year-old brother. Stormy 

had adopted him when he was seven or eight years old after their parents died. (The record 

reflects that Stormy was 28 years old at the time of the alleged offenses.) In the summer 

of 2020 Daniel was living with Stormy and Roshchupkin, who Daniel described as Stormy's 

boyfriend, in an apartment at 9852 Dartmouth Way in Warren County ("the apartment"). 

Daniel was not aware whether Stormy and Roshchupkin were married. 

{¶6} On Saturday, July 4, 2020, Daniel left the apartment sometime between 8:00 

a.m. and noon to be with friends. He returned the following morning, Sunday, July 5, at 

around 4:00 a.m. The door was locked when he arrived. Daniel banged on the door until 
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Stormy opened it for him. He observed nothing unusual about Stormy or the apartment. 

He did not see or hear Roshchupkin inside the apartment.

{¶7} Daniel stated that later that morning he had to go to work. Daniel and Stormy 

both worked at the same restaurant. Daniel asked Stormy for a ride to work. Stormy told 

him that he would have to walk and that Roshchupkin could not drive him. He walked to 

work, leaving a little after noon.

{¶8} Daniel testified that Stormy was supposed to work at the restaurant that day 

as well. But she never appeared. He assumed that she and Roshchupkin were hungover. 

He stated that they "like to drink." They were not "wasted every single day," but they were 

"pretty heavy drinkers." 

{¶9} Daniel ended his work shift and called Stormy and Roshchupkin repeatedly, 

trying to get them to pick him up. Neither responded. Finally, Stormy answered. She told 

him that he would need to walk home. He managed to get a ride home and arrived at the 

apartment at about 10:30 or 11:00 p.m.

{¶10} When Daniel arrived at the apartment, he noticed sheets and paintings 

covering the windows. This was unusual. However, he did not ask Stormy about the 

window coverings.

{¶11} Daniel estimated that he went to bed sometime early in the morning of 

Monday, July 6. After he woke up, he spent most of the day in bed. He did not see either

Stormy or Roshchupkin that day. 

{¶12} At some point, intending to do laundry, Daniel began searching the apartment 

for quarters. He looked in several rooms before going to the master bedroom, where 

Stormy and Roshchupkin slept. It was locked. He "shimmied the door open." Daniel was 

on the phone talking with his girlfriend when he saw blankets on the floor and thought 

"someone's passed out." His girlfriend made a comment that "it's a dead body." He decided 
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to take a closer look. He peeled back the blankets and found Roshchupkin's deceased

body.

{¶13} Daniel called 9-1-1. The state played the audio recording at trial. On the 

recording, Daniel stated that he had not seen Stormy or Roshchupkin in "like two days" and 

that Stormy was "being weird." Daniel reported that Roshchupkin had a car, a white Mazda. 

2. Deputy Sara Vaught's Testimony

{¶14} Deputy Sara Vaught testified she was a deputy with the Warren County 

Sheriff's Office assigned to the crime scene unit. On July 6, 2020, she responded to a 

dispatch to investigate a possible dead body at the apartment. 

{¶15} Deputy Vaught took numerous photographs of the scene within the 

apartment, including various photographs of Roshchupkin's body—wrapped in sheets—in 

the master bedroom. These photographs were admitted into evidence and Deputy Vaught 

testified concerning what was depicted in each photograph and what she found as she was 

processing the scene.

{¶16} Deputy Vaught believed that someone moved Roshchupkin's body. In this 

regard, she photographed a belt near the body that someone had cinched tight, "almost to 

a leg diameter." Deputy Vaught photographed the master bedroom and noted that there 

were no "major signs of a struggle" occurring in that location.

{¶17} Deputy Vaught observed that there was a pillowcase tied around 

Roshchupkin's midsection. The knotting was so tight that investigators could not untie it at 

the scene. Deputy Vaught observed indications of massive trauma to Roshchupkin's head 

and neck area, but no obvious signs of trauma to his face.

{¶18} Deputy Vaught took photographs of the apartment's dining room and living 

room areas. These rooms were closer to the entry to the apartment, and the furthest rooms 

away from the master bedroom. One photograph of the dining room depicted a blanket or 
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sheet covering a window. 

{¶19} In the living room area, Deputy Vaught photographed several areas which she 

believed showed visible blood stains. One such area was on the floor. Another area was 

on multiple vertical white blinds covering a sliding glass door. 

{¶20} In the apartment's kitchen, Deputy Vaught photographed a knife block that 

was missing knives. The knife brand was KitchenAid.

{¶21} Deputy Vaught identified the sheets and pillowcase that were wrapped around 

Roshchupkin's body as coming from bunk beds located in the middle bedroom. The 

pillowcase was also the same type that had been hung over a window in the dining room.

{¶22} Deputy Vaught photographed two plastic trash bags and a bucket full of a red 

liquid that was found in the master bedroom's ensuite bathroom.

{¶23} Deputy Vaught applied a forensic investigative product called "Bluestar" to 

areas within the apartment that she believed might reveal latent blood. Under the 

appropriate lighting conditions and in the presence of blood, Bluestar reacts with 

luminescence. Deputy Vaught reviewed a series of photographs indicating where Bluestar 

had revealed latent blood. 

{¶24} Bluestar revealed additional blood on the vertical blinds in the living room. 

There was also a Bluestar pattern on the floor down the hallway from the living room 

towards the master bedroom, in the width of a human body. In the ensuite bathroom, one 

photograph depicted a clean sink. But when Deputy Vaught applied Bluestar to the same 

sink, she observed a reaction around the sink basin, which indicated an attempt to clean up 

blood. There were also footprints observed in a Bluestar reaction on the floor in front of the 

sink. The mop bucket reacted to Bluestar, as did one of the nearby trash bags.

{¶25} Deputy Vaught testified about the contents of the trash bags in the ensuite 

bathroom. The following items, all bloodstained, were recovered when the trash bags were 
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emptied: a bottle of Blue Moon beer, cleaner bottles, bloody towels, numerous paper towels 

covered in blood and feces, a bra, sports shorts, and a white tank top.

3. Dr. Anna Richmond's Testimony

{¶26} Dr. Richmond testified that she was a forensic pathology fellow at the 

Montgomery County Coroner's office. Dr. Richmond performed Roshchupkin's autopsy.

{¶27} Roshchupkin's body had been wrapped in three blankets. He had 33 

superficial, non-fatal wounds in various locations, including on his arms and knees. Dr. 

Richmond noted multiple wounds that displayed a serrated pattern, indicating the use of a 

serrated weapon. 

{¶28} Roshchupkin's body also displayed five stab wounds. These were located on 

his neck, back, chest, and two in his left arm. The chest wound and the stab wounds to the 

arm were non-fatal. 

{¶29} The stab wound on Roshchupkin's back was two inches deep and pierced 

Roshchupkin's lung. Dr. Richmond opined that this wound would have caused blood to 

start pooling in Roshchupkin's chest cavity. This was a significant, possibly fatal injury. 

There were visible indications that a serrated weapon caused this stab wound.

{¶30} The stab wound on Roshchupkin's neck was one-and-one-half inches deep. 

This wound, which also visibly corresponded with a serrated weapon, pierced 

Roshchupkin's jugular vein and would have caused "massive" bleeding. 

{¶31} Dr. Richmond opined that Roshchupkin's cause of death was multiple sharp 

force injuries.

4. Detective Nicholas Behymer's Testimony

{¶32} Detective Nicholas Behymer of the Warren County Sheriff's Office testified 

that he investigated bank activity connected with a Fidelity joint checking account registered 

to Roshchupkin and Stormy. On July 6, 2020, transaction records indicated a $7,000 
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transfer from the couple's joint account to Stormy's individual bank account. Also on July 

6, the account showed a transaction charge at a Radisson Hotel in Covington, Kentucky. 

{¶33} Beginning on July 9, 2020, Detective Behymer began receiving real-time 

updates on the use of the debit card tied to the joint checking account. That day, a 

transaction occurred in Green River, Utah. The next day, July 10, several debit transactions 

occurred at the Stratosphere Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada, including multiple cash 

withdrawals from casino ATMs.

5. Detective Jerry Mauch's Testimony

{¶34} Detective Jerry Mauch testified that he worked for the Las Vegas Metropolitan 

Police Department ("LVMPD"). LVMPD's criminal apprehension team received information 

that Stormy was wanted and was possibly in Las Vegas. On July 11, 2020, a patrol officer 

spotted a white 2010 Mazda parked at Boulder Station Casino. Later, the criminal 

apprehension team arrived at that location and was able to arrest Stormy without incident. 

{¶35} When the apprehension team arrested Stormy, she had lacerations on her left 

arm. She had a gray duffel bag. Inside the bag was a handwritten note that stated, "On 

July 4th, I killed my husband accidentally." 

6. Detective Brandon Abshear's Testimony

{¶36} Detective Brandon Abshear, with the Warren County Sheriff's Office, testified 

that after the LVMPD detained Stormy, he and another detective flew out to Las Vegas. In 

the meantime, the LVMPD had secured Roshchupkin's Mazda. Once in Las Vegas, 

Detective Abshear photographed and inventoried the contents of the vehicle and the gray 

duffel bag. 

{¶37} In addition to the letter about accidentally killing Roshchupkin, the bag 

contained several other handwritten letters. One letter, dated July 6, 2020, stated 

Roshchupkin's name, stated that he was from "Veronish," Russia, and asked the reader to 
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"notify the Russian Embassy in Washington D.C. so his parents can be notified."

{¶38} Detective Abshear collected a white towel from the vehicle that appeared to 

be stained with blood. Detective Abshear testified that when he interviewed Stormy, she 

acknowledged this towel and indicated that she used it to wipe away blood from wounds 

she had self-inflicted while at the Radisson Hotel.

{¶39} Officers recovered a pillowcase in the vehicle. Inside the pillowcase were two 

KitchenAid kitchen knives. One was a chef's knife. The other was a bread knife with a 

serrated edge.

{¶40} Detective Abshear testified about a series of exhibits, consisting of still 

photographs and video recordings. When considered together, these exhibits presented a 

visual timeline of Stormy's activities leading up to and following Roshchupkin's death. The 

video recordings were obtained from a neighbor's doorbell video camera that happened to 

be pointing at the front of the apartment. Still photographs were also produced from security 

cameras inside various stores Stormy visited on July 5, 2020. The video recordings and 

photographs showed the following activities on the dates indicated.

July 4, 2020

• 4:34 p.m.: Roshchupkin's white Mazda pulls into a parking spot 

outside the apartment. Roshchupkin and Stormy emerge from 

the vehicle and enter the apartment together. Minutes later, 

Roshchupkin exits the apartment alone, enters the Mazda, and 

drives away. 

• 4:53 p.m.: Roshchupkin returns to the apartment in the Mazda. 

This is the last time he is seen alive. 

July 5, 2020

• 4:08 a.m.: A car drops off Daniel outside the apartment. Stormy 

opens the door and lets him inside.

• 12:13 p.m.: Daniel leaves the apartment on foot.
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• 12:55 p.m.: Stormy leaves the apartment, gets into the Mazda, 

and drives away. 

• Between 1:34 p.m. and 5:27 p.m.: Stormy is observed on 

security camera at various stores making purchases. She 

purchases floor cleaner at Ace Hardware. She purchases a 

bath scrub brush, Pepto Bismol, spot stain remover, cleaner, 

trash bags, and a mop at Kroger. She purchases a pruning saw 

and hedge shears at Home Depot. She purchases cigarettes, 

snacks, and drinks at Speedway. She purchases a duffel bag 

at Target. She purchases Bactine at CVS.

• 5:37 p.m.: Stormy arrives back to the apartment in the Mazda. 

• 10:50 p.m.: A vehicle drops off Daniel outside the apartment.

July 6, 2020

• 2:54 p.m.: Stormy exits the apartment with a black trash bag in 

hand. She walks to the Mazda and drives away. 

• 4:35 p.m.: Stormy checks into the Radisson Hotel in Covington, 

Kentucky.

• 8:23 p.m.: Daniel is seen on the doorbell camera footage 

walking in and out of the apartment while he contacts 9-1-1.

• 8:26 p.m.: The first deputy from the Warren County Sheriff's 

Office arrives on scene.

{¶41} Detective Abshear further testified that after her arrest, Stormy contacted him 

from the Warren County Jail, stating that she wished to speak with him. On August 8, 2020, 

Detective Abshear met with Stormy and interviewed her. The interview was recorded.

7. Stormy Delehanty's Recorded Interview

{¶42} The recording of Detective Abshear's approximate two-hour interview with 

Stormy was played at trial. At the outset of the interview, Stormy admitted to Detective 

Abshear that "I'm the one who did it" and "It's just me." That said, she also claimed that she 

could not remember anything about what happened because "I was extraordinarily 

intoxicated."
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{¶43} Stormy explained that on July 4, she and Roshchupkin started drinking. She 

consumed four 8%-alcohol beers in about one and one-half hours. Then she started 

drinking Hennessey cognac. 

{¶44} Stormy recalled that at some point she was in the master bedroom with 

Roshchupkin, listening to music. He threw her off the bed and onto the floor and "had my 

wrists back." Then, the next thing she could recall was "him on the ground in a puddle of 

blood * * * by the front door." Stormy stated she did not know why Roshchupkin threw her 

off the bed, just that they were on the bed listening to music and "the next thing I know is 

we're on the floor and he's on top of me."

{¶45} Stormy claimed to have no memory of stabbing Roshchupkin and stated, "It 

wasn't me. I wasn't consciously in control. * * * It was like being a marionette. I remember 

starting to clean up the blood * * * I remember wiping it all up." Stormy said she was on 

"auto-pilot" as she cleaned up the scene. Stormy also recalled dragging Roshchupkin down 

the hallway on a blanket. She wrapped the blanket around him and pulled. When she 

answered the door for Daniel, everything was clean. 

{¶46} Stormy thought about hiding Roshchupkin's body, but realized she was not 

going to be able to go through with it. That was when she decided to leave. When she was 

at the Radisson Hotel in Kentucky, she wrote the handwritten notes that the police later 

found in the duffel bag. She stated to Detective Abshear that she intended to kill herself at 

the Radisson, but she could not go through with it.

B. Defense Case – Stormy's Testimony

{¶47} Stormy testified in her defense at trial. She explained that she first met 

Roshchupkin in August 2018. They began dating in January 2019. She moved into the 

apartment in February 2019 and Roshchupkin moved in with her in August 2019. 

{¶48} In March 2019, Roshchupkin asked Stormy to marry him. In the moment, she 
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said "yes." She knew that Roshchupkin was an illegal immigrant. While she was suspicious 

of his intentions, he denied that his marriage proposal was "all about the green card." They 

married in August 2019.

{¶49} Stormy testified at length concerning her personal history, which included 

family trauma, rape, and a prior abusive romantic relationship. Stormy stated that these 

previous experiences, coupled with her own personal struggle with alcoholism, and other 

"things that were going on in my household" between she and Roshchupkin, "led" to what 

occurred on July 4, 2020.

{¶50} Stormy also testified about the events of July 4. She and Roshchupkin were 

drinking that day. Roshchupkin was agitated about financial and immigration issues. He 

threw a box of checkbooks and credit cards at her. She was not sure why he threw this box 

at her.

{¶51} Later, she was in the bedroom with Roshchupkin. She was "fumbling through 

[Roshchupkin's] phone to play music." She started clicking on his text messages and found 

a photograph of a "girl" in a towel with her hair in a towel. She asked Roshchupkin about 

the girl. Roshchupkin looked at her "like I was silly" and then he "ends up pushing me off 

the bed." Then, Roshchupkin was on top of her and was screaming, "is this what you want?" 

{¶52} Roshchupkin then got up and went back to the bed. Stormy followed him 

back to the bed. She started questioning him again about the girl and he threw her off the 

bed a second time. This time she hit her head on a guitar amplifier positioned near the side 

of the bed. She testified that, "next thing I know * * * I'm cleaning up blood." 

{¶53} Stormy claimed that when she came out of her blacked-out state she found 

Roshchupkin stabbed, lying in the small entryway behind the entry door, which leads into 

the dining room/living room area.

{¶54} Stormy claimed that July 4 was not the first time Roshchupkin had attacked 
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her. She explained that she did not report him to police when he allegedly previously 

attacked her due to his immigration status. Stormy testified that one of Roshchupkin's 

"favorite things" was to tell her to kill herself and that no one cared about her. Stormy also 

said that on "numerous" occasions, Roshchupkin had attempted to kill her "with his car." 

She said that he was very dominant and controlling.

{¶55} Stormy acknowledged that the story she told at trial did not match the story 

she told Detective Abshear during her interview. She explained the stories did not match 

because she had not contacted Detective Abshear to discuss the case, but rather to find 

out what happened to Roshchupkin's body. Stormy stated that she said nothing to 

Detective Abshear or other investigators about domestic violence, prior sexual abuse, or 

her history of abuse because no one asked her questions about those issues. 

{¶56} On cross-examination, the state asked Stormy to provide details concerning 

the multiple times that she claimed Roshchupkin tried to kill her with his car. Stormy stated 

that Roshchupkin had attempted to kill her three times. First, Roshchupkin tried to run her 

over with a car in July 2019, about one month prior to their marriage. Second, Roshchupkin 

tried to drive his car into a telephone pole while she was inside. She could not recall the 

third time Roshchupkin had allegedly tried to kill her.

{¶57} Also on cross-examination, Stormy subtly backed off from her admission that 

she killed Roshchupkin and for the first time raised the possibility that someone else had 

killed him. Specifically, she stated that she could not "confirm or deny" whether there was 

someone else in the apartment at the time of Roshchupkin's murder that might have been 

responsible for his death. She then stated that "theoretically it is plausible that I was 

involved in this incident." 

C. Verdict and Sentence

{¶58} After deliberation, the jury convicted Stormy on all four counts. The court 
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sentenced her to a combined sentence of 18 years to life in prison. The court, in its 

sentencing entry, stated that Stormy was required to register with the Violent Offender 

Database. It also stated that Stormy would be subject to the supervision of the Adult Parole 

Authority upon her release from prison "for the remainder of her life pursuant to R.C. 

2967.13."

{¶59} Stormy appealed, raising four assignments of error. We will address her 

assignments of error out of order.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Gruesome Photographs

{¶60} Stormy's Assignment of Error No. 1 states:

{¶61} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF MEDICAL PHOTOS.

{¶62} Stormy argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted 

certain crime scene and autopsy photographs. Specifically, Stormy argues the trial court 

erred in admitting State's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 20, 21, 81-84, 86-93, 95-1, and 95-2. 

Stormy argues that the photographs were gruesome, served little or no purpose, and that 

their probative value did not outweigh the danger of prejudice. 

1. Applicable Law

{¶63} Evid.R. 403(A) provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not admissible 

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of 

confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury." Under Evid.R. 403(A), only evidence 

that is unfairly prejudicial is excludable. State v. Wright, 48 Ohio St.3d 5, 8 (1990). 

Logically, all evidence presented by the state is prejudicial, but not all evidence unfairly 

prejudices a defendant. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, ¶ 107. 

Evid.R. 403(B) provides that a trial court "may" exclude evidence "if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of 
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cumulative evidence."

{¶64} The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court. State v. Meredith, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2004-06-062, 2005-

Ohio-062, ¶ 7. Absent an abuse of discretion, this court will not reverse the trial court's 

decision to admit or exclude relevant evidence. Id. An abuse of discretion implies that the 

trial court's decision was "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." State v. Motz, 12th 

Dist. Warren No. CA2009-10-137, 2010-Ohio-2170, ¶ 12.

{¶65} "The mere fact that a photograph may be gruesome or horrendous is not 

sufficient to render it per se inadmissible." State v. Benge, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA93-06-

116, 1994 WL 673126, *14 (Dec. 5, 1994), citing State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, 265 

(1984). This is true even if the defendant stipulated to the cause of death. Id. A trial court 

may admit gruesome photographs if they provide the jury with an appreciation of the nature 

and circumstances of the crimes. State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St. 3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 

¶ 26. In other words, consistent with Evid.R. 403, "[g]ruesome photographs are admissible 

at trial as long as their probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger that 

the accused will be unfairly prejudiced."2 State v. Houston, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C190598, 2020-Ohio-5421, ¶ 43.

2. Analysis of Challenged Photographs

{¶66} Stormy argues that the court erred in admitting State's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 

20, 21, 81 through 84, 86 through 93, 95-1 and 95-2. Prior to the publication of any of the 

2. In her initial brief, Stormy argued that we should use a different standard than the one outlined above when 

reviewing the trial court's decision regarding the admission of gruesome photographs. Specifically, Stormy 

asserted that a "gruesome photograph is admissible only if its 'probative value * * * outweigh[s] the danger of 

prejudice to the defendant.'" But the cases that Stormy cited in support of her assertion were all capital cases. 

State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, ¶ 237; Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d at 264-65; State v. 

Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 9 (1987). Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained that the standard 

Stormy urges we apply is to be applied in capital cases, but not in non-capital cases. State v. Mammone, 139 

Ohio St. 3d 467, 2014-Ohio-1942, ¶ 95-96. Stormy conceded as much in her reply brief.
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photographs to the jury, Stormy's counsel objected to these photographs (and others not 

challenged on appeal) on the basis that they were prejudicial. The trial court reviewed each 

photograph individually and considered the state's explanation for the relevance of each 

photograph. After this review, the court excluded only one photograph – State's Exhibit 20 

– and admitted the remainder. Given that the court excluded State's Exhibit 20, we need 

not consider Stormy's challenge to the "admission" of that exhibit. State v. Hamrick, 12th 

Dist. Clermont No. CA2021-06-028, 2023-Ohio-117, ¶ 55 ("Since no photograph depicting 

[the victim's] reflected scalp was introduced at trial, [the defendant's] objection to reflected 

scalp photographs is not a proper basis for appeal. Accordingly, [the defendant's] argument 

related to any alleged gruesome photograph depicting [the victim's] reflected scalp lacks 

merit").

{¶67} Moving now to the photographs that Stormy challenges on appeal that were

admitted at trial, we note that on appeal, Stormy fails to state any individual concerns with 

the submitted photographs. Stormy merely refers to them, generically, as repetitive, 

gruesome, and unfairly prejudicial. 

{¶68} State's Exhibit 7 consists of a photograph of the entryway to the master 

bedroom. Roshchupkin's body is not depicted in the photograph, nor is there anything else 

that could be described as gruesome. There is no other photograph depicting this angle of 

the apartment. It is not repetitive. 

{¶69} State's Exhibits 8, 9, 14, and 15 consist of different viewing angles of 

Roshchupkin's body, wrapped in blankets, in the master bedroom. While the photographs 

depict some blood smearing and a stab wound to Roshchupkin's back, the photographs are 

not overly gruesome. They are not repetitive as they show different angles of the crime 

scene. 

{¶70} Exhibit 21 is the only crime scene photograph that depicted Roshchupkin's 
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face as it appeared at the scene. The photograph, while unpleasant, is not gruesome. The 

photograph reveals that there were no obvious injuries or wounds to Roshchupkin's face. 

It is not repetitive.

{¶71} Exhibits 81 through 84, 86 through 93, 95-1 and 95-2 are all photographs 

taken during Roshchupkin's autopsy. The photographs depict the numerous wounds 

documented by Dr. Richmond. As described in the above summary of Dr. Richmond's

testimony, some of the photographs depict features suggesting the attacker use a serrated 

weapon. Photographs 95-1 and 95-2 are zoomed-in photographs of the injuries to 

Roshchupkin's jugular vein. In conjunction with Dr. Richmond's testimony concerning the 

effects of such an attack, these photographs were relevant to demonstrate how the stab 

wound to the neck was a fatal wound. The autopsy photographs are "gruesome" in the 

sense that autopsy photographs generally depict graphic injuries or surgical techniques 

necessary to conduct a postmortem examination. However, these photographs present an 

accurate and objective depiction of the numerous wounds present on Roshchupkin's body.

{¶72} Each challenged photograph served a distinct purpose, including showing 

where and how Roshchupkin's body was found and where the various wounds were located 

on Roshchupkin's body. Due to the large number of wounds present on Roshchupkin's 

body, complete documentation necessarily required multiple photographs. The 

photographs were relevant to the various issues potentially at issue at the criminal trial, 

such as the identity of the perpetrator (someone using a serrated weapon taken from the 

apartment), and the direction from which Roshchupkin was attacked (potentially negating a 

claim of self-defense). The challenged photographs provided the jury with "an appreciation 

of the nature and circumstances of the crimes." Hamrick, 2023-Ohio-117 at ¶ 47, citing

State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St. 3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, ¶ 26. Accord State v. Barnette, 

12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-05-099, 2013-Ohio-990, ¶ 32-33 (gruesome photographs 
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relevant to manner and circumstances surrounding the victim's death); State v. Jackson, 

107 Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, ¶ 85-86 (gruesome photographs helped explain 

shooter's intent, manner and circumstances of death, and the testimony of the officers who 

discovered and processed the scene). The relevance of the photographs to the state's case 

was great and the danger of unfair prejudice to Stormy was minimal. The challenged 

photographs' probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger that Stormy 

would be unfairly prejudiced. Houston, 2020-Ohio-5421 at ¶ 43. For all these reasons, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged photographs. 

{¶73} Even if there had been error in the admission of any of the exhibits that Stormy 

challenges on appeal, we find that such error would have been harmless. "An accused has 

'a constitutional guarantee to a trial free from prejudicial error, not necessarily one free of 

all error.'" State v. Tucker, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-10-263, 2012-Ohio-139, ¶ 17, 

quoting State v. Swartsell, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-06-151, 2003-Ohio-4450, ¶ 31. 

Crim.R. 52(A) provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not 

affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." As we explained in Tucker, "[a] finding of 

harmless error is appropriate where there is 'overwhelming evidence of guilt' or 'some other 

indicia that the error did not contribute to the conviction.'" 2012-Ohio-139 at ¶ 17, quoting

State v. Sims, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-11-300, 2009-Ohio-550, ¶ 34. As described in 

detail in Section I of this Opinion, the state presented overwhelming evidence of guilt 

establishing that Stormy murdered Roshchupkin. 

{¶74} We overrule Stormy's first assignment of error.

B. Self-Defense Instruction

{¶75} Stormy's Assignment of Error No. 2 states: 

{¶76} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING A JURY INSTRUCTION ON 

SELF-DEFENSE.
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{¶77} Stormy argues that the trial court erred when it denied her request for a jury 

instruction on self-defense.3 She argues that there was evidence submitted at trial that 

Roshchupkin had abused her in the past and that he assaulted her prior to the stabbing.

1. Applicable Law

{¶78} "Requested jury instructions should ordinarily be given if they are correct 

statements of law, if they are applicable to the facts in the case, and if reasonable minds 

might reach the conclusion sought by the requested instruction." State v. Adams, 144 Ohio 

St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240. A court of appeals reviews a trial court's refusal to give 

a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. Id., citing State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio 

St.3d 64, 68 (1989).4 

{¶79} The elements of self-defense are (1) that the defendant was not at fault in 

creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that 

she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that her only means of 

escape from such danger was in the use of such force, and (3) the defendant did not violate 

any duty to retreat or avoid danger. State v. Sturgill, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-03-

018, 2020-Ohio-6665, ¶ 20, citing State v. Ray, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-10-213, 2013-

Ohio-3671, ¶ 26, and State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24 (2002).

3. The trial court granted Stormy's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter but denied her request 

for a self-defense instruction, finding that the two jury instructions were inconsistent. The state argues on 

appeal that the two instructions would have been inconsistent. We need not address this issue because, as 

we will explain below, the testimony and evidence in this case did not warrant a self-defense instruction.

4. The state argues that we should review this issue for plain error, arguing that Stormy's trial counsel 

equivocated on requesting a self-defense instruction and did not object to the omission of the instruction in 

the court's final jury charge. Upon our review of the proceedings, we find that defense counsel requested the 

instruction. During the trial, defense counsel indicated he would be requesting a self-defense instruction 

based on the evidence presented. The trial court noted defense counsel's request prior to discussing and 

deciding the issue by stating, "we have been discussing the issue with regard to the requested instructions by 

the defense of self-defense and [voluntary] manslaughter." We do not think it was necessary for counsel to 

have requested the self-defense instruction again, immediately prior to the final jury charge, in order to 

preserve this issue for appellate review. Crim.R. 51 ("An exception, at any stage or step of the case or matter, 

is unnecessary to lay a foundation for review, whenever a matter has been called to the attention of the court 

by objection, motion, or otherwise, and the court has ruled thereon.").
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2. Propriety of Self-Defense Instruction

{¶80} The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Stormy's request for 

a self-defense instruction because there was no evidence presented supporting a charge 

of self-defense. Stormy did not testify that she had a bona fide belief that she was in

imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from any action by Roshchupkin and there 

were no facts presented at trial that support such a finding. Stormy denied having any 

memory of what occurred immediately prior to the stabbing and denied knowing how or why 

she inflicted 38 knife wounds on Roshchupkin. At most, at some indeterminant time before 

the stabbing, Roshchupkin pushed Stormy off a bed twice, yelled at her, and briefly held 

her down. Stormy hit her head on a guitar amplifier near the bed and remembers nothing 

else until she was "cleaning up blood." 

{¶81} There was no evidence presented of any defensive injuries suffered by 

Stormy. There was evidence of lacerations on Stormy's body, but she admitted that she 

self-inflicted those lacerations while contemplating suicide at the Radisson Hotel. 

{¶82} Stormy did not testify that Roshchupkin used or threatened to use any deadly 

force or weapons during their disagreement about the woman whose photo Stormy found 

on Roshchupkin's phone. Stormy did not testify that Roshchupkin did anything physically 

to Stormy on the day she killed him that would have reasonably made her believe he 

intended to use deadly force or to inflict great bodily harm. And Stormy's admission that 

she tried to conceal Roshchupkin's death belies the claim that she attacked Roshchupkin 

out of bona fide fear for her life.

{¶83} There was also no evidence presented that would establish that Stormy 

believed that she had to use deadly force in self-defense. Stormy, in fact, waivered on 

whether she used any force. While she conceded that "theoretically it is plausible I was 

involved in this incident" she also stated that it was possible that someone else was present 
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in the apartment when Roshchupkin was stabbed to death. Self-defense is a justification 

for "admitted conduct." State v. Edgerson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101283, 2015-Ohio593, ¶ 17, citing State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91, 94 (1986).

{¶84} In Edgerson, the state charged and convicted the defendant with aggravated 

assault for stabbing the victim three times with a knife. Id. at ¶ 3, 5. On appeal, Edgerson 

argued that the jury should have been instructed on self-defense. Id. at ¶ 14. The appeals 

court disagreed. Id. at ¶ 17. The court noted that the defense theory of the case was that 

the victim's wounds could have been self-inflicted and that Edgerson never had a knife and 

did not know how the victim's injuries occurred. Id. at ¶ 17-18. The court observed that it 

was logically and legally inconsistent for the defendant to deny the assault charges but also 

to assert that the defendant acted in self-defense. Id. at ¶ 18. Here too, an instruction on 

self-defense would be logically and legally inconsistent with Stormy's claim that she was 

potentially not involved in Roshchupkin's stabbing.

{¶85} In her appellate brief, Stormy argues that the fact that she testified about a 

history of abuse, and specifically the mental and physical abuse she alleged she was 

subjected to by Roshchupkin, warranted giving the jury the chance to determine whether 

she acted in self-defense. In essence, Stormy suggests that she suffered battered woman 

syndrome—without using that phrase, and without having called an expert witness—and 

that the syndrome may have contributed to a mistaken, but bona fide belief of imminent 

danger. 

{¶86} In State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675-676 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court 

held that evidence of battered woman syndrome is admissible when the defendant 

mistakenly believed the circumstance warranted the use of deadly force in self-defense, but 

that such mistake was demonstrated reasonable in light of suffering from the syndrome. Id.

at 676. In Sallie, the court held that evidence related to the syndrome was immaterial 
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because the defendant did not claim self-defense at all, and instead stated that the shooting 

was an accident. Id. 

{¶87} Here too, Stormy's battered-woman-syndrome-type argument would be 

immaterial because Stormy never claimed that she mistakenly used deadly force against 

Roshchupkin based on her prior history. There was no evidence presented connecting 

Stormy's alleged prior abuse, battered woman syndrome, or any other mental condition or 

defect with a claim of self-defense. In essence, Stormy is inviting total speculation that 

alleged past abuse justified a self-defense killing she committed while allegedly intoxicated 

beyond the ability to remember any of her actions. "If the evidence brought forward 

generated only mere speculation of a self-defense claim, such evidence is insufficient to 

raise the affirmative defense, and submission of the issue to the jury is unwarranted." State 

v. Towson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-08-069, 2022-Ohio-2096, ¶ 23. 

{¶88} For all these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Stormy's request for an instruction on self-defense. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954 at ¶ 240. We 

overrule Stormy's second assignment of error.

C. Violent Offender Registry

{¶89} Stormy's Assignment of Error No. 4 states:

{¶90} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING APPELLANT TO ENROLL IN 

THE VIOLENT OFFENDER REGISTRY.

{¶91} In its sentencing entry, the trial court stated that, "Defendant will be required 

to register with the Violent Offender Database pursuant to R.C. 2903.41 et seq." Stormy 

argues that R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) required the trial court to inform her, as a violent offender, 

of certain rights and procedures, and that the trial court erred when it failed to provide those 

notifications at her sentencing hearing. She urges us to vacate her registration requirement.

{¶92} The statute that Stormy cites required that the trial court inform Stormy, as a 
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person classified as a violent offender under R.C. 2903.41, of the rebuttable presumption 

that a violent offender shall be required to enroll in the violent offender database and comply 

with its duties for ten years after enrollment. R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). The statute also 

required the trial court to notify her "of the offender's right to file a motion to rebut the 

presumption, of the procedure and criteria for rebutting the presumption, and of the effect 

of a rebuttal and the post-rebuttal hearing procedures and possible outcome* * *." R.C. 

2903.42(A)(1). The statute further required that the trial court provide Stormy with these 

notifications "before sentencing." R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). The record reflects that the trial 

court did not provide Stormy with the required notifications.5

{¶93} The state concedes that the trial court erred when it failed to provide Stormy 

with the notifications required by R.C. 2903.42(A)(1)(a). However, the state argues that this 

failure only requires the case to be remanded so that the trial court can provide the required 

notifications and does not require us to vacate the registration requirement. 

{¶94} In State v. Baker, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2021-03-006, 2021-Ohio-4544, 

we addressed the same issue. We concluded that "the trial court lacked the authority to 

proceed with sentencing appellant until the notifications were given," and that the sentence 

was thus contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Id. at ¶ 21-22. We vacated the 

defendant's sentence and remanded the matter for the purposes of complying with the 

mandatory advisements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) and for resentencing. Id. We do the same 

here. Accord State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109142, 2021-Ohio-580, ¶ 61; State 

v. Beard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109630, 2021-Ohio-2512, ¶ 62. 

{¶95} We sustain Stormy's fourth assignment of error and remand to the trial court 

for purposes of complying with the mandatory advisements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) and for 

5. We note that R.C. 2903.42(A)(3) imposes further notification requirements regarding Sierah's Law.
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resentencing.

D. Lifetime Post-Release Control

{¶96} Stormy's Assignment of Error No. 3 states:

{¶97} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO LIFETIME 

POST-RELEASE CONTROL.

{¶98} This assignment of error concerns the following language in the trial court's 

sentencing entry: "Defendant shall be subject to the supervision of the Adult Parole 

Authority upon her release from prison for the remainder of her life pursuant to R.C. 

2967.13." Stormy argues that, by using this language, the trial court imposed "lifetime postrelease control" on her, and did so in error. She contends that murder, as a special felony, 

is not subject to post-release control. 

{¶99} In fact, the relevant language in the sentencing entry does not refer to "postrelease control" at all. Not only did the trial court not use that phrase, but the trial court 

referred to "supervision" by the Adult Parole Authority "pursuant to R.C. 2967.13."6 

(Emphasis added.) The statute the court referenced, R.C. 2967.13, does not concern postrelease control, but rather parole eligibility. We find that, contrary to Stormy's argument, 

the trial court did not impose lifetime post-release control.

{¶100} That being said, to the extent Stormy's argument is that the trial court's 

statement that she "shall" be subject to "supervision" by the APA "upon her release from 

prison for the remainder of her life" was not authorized by statute, that argument has merit. 

R.C. 2967.13 provides rules regarding parole eligibility, not parole supervision after release. 

6. The trial court used the phrase "post-release control" in the very next paragraph of the sentencing entry, 

when it stated that Stormy was subject to an optional period of up to three years of post-release control. This 

demonstrates that the court distinguished the lifetime "supervision" period addressed in the paragraph that 

Stormy cites in this assignment of error from the "post-release control" discussed in the next paragraph of the 

sentencing entry. 
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In State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-09-101, 2021-Ohio-2982, we analyzed 

language much like that at issue here. In that case, the defendant was also convicted of 

murder and given a life sentence. In its sentencing entry, the trial court stated that the 

defendant's sentence "includes Mandatory Lifetime Parole supervision by the Adult Parole 

Authority pursuant to [R.C.] 2967.13." Id. at ¶ 42. We stated:

However, [R.C. 2967.13] applies to parole eligibility, not to 

parole supervision after release from prison. Furthermore, no 

statute provides for a lifetime parole supervision in Ohio. 

Rather, the Adult Parole Authority may grant a paroled prisoner 

final release, but if the paroled prisoner has been sentenced to 

life in prison, "the authority shall not grant a final release earlier 

than five years after the paroled prisoner is released form the 

institution on parole." R.C. 2967.16(A).

Id. We found that the trial court's language regarding lifetime supervision by the APA 

pursuant to R.C. 2967.13 was a "clerical error[]" that "'may be corrected by the court at any 

time.'" Id. at ¶ 43, quoting Crim.R. 36. We remanded the case and instructed the trial court 

to "correct the improper imposition of lifetime parole supervision by the Adult Parole 

Authority." Id.

{¶101}In the sentencing entry in this case, the trial court informed Stormy that she 

"shall be subject to the supervision of the Adult Parole Authority upon her release from 

prison for the remainder of her life." As set forth above, this is not accurate. Stormy could

be subject to APA supervision for the remainder of her life, but the APA does have the 

authority to grant her a final release after a minimum of five years of supervision following 

prison release. R.C. 2967.16(A); State v. Rosales, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27117, 2018-

Ohio-197, ¶ 26 (acknowledging that R.C. 2967.16(A) means that a defendant sentenced to 

life in prison may be paroled and subject to lifetime APA supervision, but may also be 

granted final release from parole supervision, provided that final release may be granted no 

earlier than five years after being released from prison). Accordingly, the court was 
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incorrect in advising Stormy that she "shall" be subject to APA supervision for the rest of 

her life. 

{¶102} However, we need not address in this appeal whether such an error requires 

a remand for resentencing. For the reasons discussed in response to Assignment of Error 

No. 4, we have already decided to vacate Stormy's sentence and remand for the purposes 

explained with regard to that assignment of error. This renders Assignment of Error No. 3 

moot and it need not be considered. Yet we note that on remand the court may 

appropriately advise Stormy concerning APA supervision upon release. 

III. Conclusion

{¶103} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Stormy's convictions. However, we 

vacate her sentence and remand to the trial court for purposes of complying with the 

mandatory advisements of R.C. 2903.42(A)(1) and for resentencing. 

{¶104} Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

M. POWELL, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.