UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PAULETTE A. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster General, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17-1285 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on an assortment of motions from Plaintiff and several 

Defendants, including two motions to dismiss, see Dkt. 21; Dkt. 29. For the reasons that follow, 

the Court will dismiss all claims against all Defendants—with the exception of Plaintiff’s 

Rehabilitation Act claims against Megan Brennan in her official capacity as the Postmaster 

General.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Paulette Williams, proceeding pro se, filed this action in June 2017. Dkt. 1. The 

Court dismissed her initial complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with the minimal 

pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 4. 

Williams moved for reconsideration; requested that the Court reopen the case; and filed an 

amended complaint. Dkt. 6; Dkt. 7 (Am. Compl.). The Court granted that motion and reopened 

the case. Dkt. 9. The amended complaint names sixteen Defendants. The United States 

Attorney’s Office has appeared on behalf of eleven of the Defendants, including Postmaster 
2

General Megan Brennan and various Postal Service employees (“Federal Defendants”).

1

 Private 

counsel has appeared on behalf of four additional Defendants, all of whom apparently work for 

the American Postal Workers Union (“APWU”).2 As far as the Court can discern, counsel has 

yet to appear on behalf of the final Defendant, who is identified in the amended complaint as an 

“EEO Counselor.”3

Most of the named Defendants are not discussed in any of the substantive allegations in 

the amended complaint. Although not a picture of clarity, the amended complaint appears to 

challenge the manner in which the Postal Service responded to Williams’s “physical disability” 

and “mental health issues.” Dkt. 7 at 2–3 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5). Williams first alleges that Tony 

Johnson, the Postmaster of Fort Belvoir, Virginia, (1) violated the Americans with Disabilities 

Act of 1990 by failing to accommodate her “physical disability;” (2) violated her “rights to 

return to work” under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and (3) “creat[ed] a hostile work 

environment” by making “crude remarks” about her “disability” and homelessness, presumably 

in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 2 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–3). Next, she alleges that 

Preston Phillips, the manager of a Postal Service facility in Gaithersburg, Maryland, retaliated 

against her due to a “pending grievance” and that he failed to accommodate her “mental health 

issues.” Id. at 3 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4–5). Third, she alleges that Patrice Shaw, the Officer in 

 1

 In addition to the Postmaster General, these Defendants are Linda Ackerman, Henry Bear, 

Monique Gillis, Tony Johnson, the Managing Counsel of the U.S. Postal Service, Kym 

Matthews, Robbyn Mayfield, Lisa Murray, Alicia Taylor, and Mary Walls. See Dkt. 25. 

Because the amended complaint appears to provide their work addresses, the Court will construe 

the pleading to name these individuals as well as Megan Brennan as Defendants in their official 

capacities.

2

 These Defendants are Annette August-Taylor, Romanah Nestor, Pamela Richardson, and 

Vance Zimmerman. See Dkt. 31 at 1–2.

3

 There is no evidence that this Defendant, Dana Claybrooks, has been served.
3

Charge at the Gaithersburg facility, threatened to “expos[e] her personal business” unless she 

met with Shaw “without a steward present,” which was her “right [under the] collective 

bargaining agreement.” Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6). Shaw purportedly “victimized” Williams again 

by asking floor supervisor Loretta McCabe to notify Williams that her “job would . . . be 

abolished” on July 8, 2017, which contradicted a “certified letter stating [that] the abolishment 

would . . . take place” on July 22, 2017. Id. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8). Finally, Williams alleges that the 

Postal Service denied her “transfers, craft changes, other positions, advancements[,] and 

promotions . . . due to [her] intent” to file suit against the agency and that she was “laid off again 

. . . due to [her] disability.” Id. at 3–4 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 9). Williams seeks “injunctive relief,” 

id. at 4 (Am. Compl. Prayer), and $4,440,000 in damages for lost wages, mental anguish, and 

pain and suffering, id. at 10 (Am. Compl.).

Two of the APWU Defendants, Romanah Nestor and Pamela Richardson, have moved to 

dismiss Williams’s claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 21. Because the 

amended complaint “makes no factual allegations against” them, they argue, it does not provide

adequate notice of Williams’s claims and fails to state any claims against them. Id. at 2–3 (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6)). After Nestor and Richardson filed their motion, the Court 

advised Williams of the consequences of failing to respond and, in addition, ordered that 

Williams show cause why the Court should not dismiss “the claims against all Defendants not 

mentioned in the substantive averments” of the amended complaint. Dkt. 22 at 1–2. In response 

to the motion to dismiss and the Court’s Order, Williams argues that her allegations against 

Nestor, Richardson, and “the other individuals named as defendants” were presented in her 

“initial complaint,” and she makes several new factual assertions: (1) that APWU filed a 

grievance on Williams’s behalf; (2) that APWU settled without her permission; (3) that after she 
4

learned of the “unfortunate pre-arbitration settlement,” she informed Nestor and Richardson that 

she “had been sneakily bamboozled by APWU and [the Postal Service]” and would “not 

willingly . . . accept [such a] small payout;” and (4) that Nestor and Richardson failed to 

invalidate the settlement, barring Williams from pursuing arbitration. Dkt. 28 at 2–5. The other 

two APWU Defendants, Annette August-Taylor and Vance Zimmerman, filed a similar motion 

to dismiss. Dkt. 29. Williams’s opposition, filed hours later, recounts how Williams allegedly 

contacted August-Taylor and Zimmerman to “figure out who [she] needed to meet with” to 

return the settlement check so that she could pursue arbitration. Dkt. 30 at 2.

Nestor, Richardson, August-Taylor, and Zimmerman (“APWU Defendants”) filed a joint 

reply. Dkt. 31. They argue that Williams cannot amend her complaint through her opposition 

brief and that the Court should dismiss her claims with prejudice because “individual union 

officials and employees cannot be held liable” for breaching a union’s duty of fair representation. 

Dkt. 31 at 2–4. In addition, they assert—preemptively—that the Court should deny leave to 

amend to sue the APWU itself because such an amendment would be futile. Dkt. 31 at 4–8.

Because Williams responded to August-Taylor and Zimmerman’s motion to dismiss 

before the Court could notify her of the consequences of failing to respond or to address 

particular arguments, the Court permitted her to file a supplemental opposition. Dkt. 32. Her 

supplemental opposition clarifies that her claims against August-Taylor and Zimmerman are 

based on their “refus[al] to allow [her] the opportunity to g[o] before an administrative law 

judge.” Dkt. 33 at 2. The next day, Williams moved for leave to file a second amended 

complaint but did not attach a proposed pleading. Dkt. 34. In addition, Williams has filed a 

second motion for a preliminary injunction barring the Postmaster General “from constantly 

doing things in a mischievous manner to [Williams’s] wages” and requiring that the Postal 
5

Service “put [Williams] back to work straightaway.” Dkt. 18. Finally, Williams has renewed 

her request that the Court appoint counsel to represent her, Dkt. 13; Dkt. 23, and has filed an 

“emergency motion to appoint counsel,” Dkt. 35.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Williams’s Claims

Complaints by pro se litigants are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, accordingly, may 

“consider supplemental materials filed by [Williams,] a pro se litigant[,] in order to clarify the 

precise claims” raised in the amended complaint. Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 572 

(D.C. Cir. 2007). Even a pro se litigant, however, must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). This requirement 

“ensures that the opposing party will receive ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.’” Jones v. Changsila, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2017 WL 4179881, at *7 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 20, 2017) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). “Where a complaint is 

insufficiently focused, it places an undue burden on the defendant to answer or move[,] and it 

invites unnecessary delay and confusion in the proceedings.” Achagzai v. Broad. Bd. of 

Governors, 109 F. Supp. 3d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2015). Moreover, “a pro se complaint, like any 

other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted,” as required by Rule 12(b)(6). 

Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted)).
6

1. APWU Defendants

Williams’s amended complaint does not contain any factual allegations with respect to 

the individual APWU Defendants, but, rather, merely alleges that she was “tricked” by the 

APWU. Dkt. 7 at 3 (Am. Compl. ¶ 7). As her oppositions clarify, Williams contends that the 

union procured an unauthorized and inadequate settlement and that the individual APWU 

Defendants failed to take corrective action. See Dkt. 28; Dkt. 30. The Postal Reorganization Act 

provides, “Any money judgment against a labor organization . . . shall be enforce[a]ble only 

against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforce[a]ble against 

any individual member or his assets.” 39 U.S.C. § 1208(c). Accordingly, to the extent Williams 

intends to allege that the individual APWU Defendants breached the duty of fair representation, 

her claims must be dismissed. See Price v. Union Local 25, 787 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.D.C. 

2011) (“[I]ndividual union officer[s] may not be held liable for money damages based on . . . 

actions undertaken as an officer of the union.”).4

 To the extent Williams intends to assert other 

claims against the APWU Defendants, such claims cannot be discerned from the amended 

complaint and, therefore, must also be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6). 

In their joint reply, the APWU Defendants argue that the Court should preemptively deny 

Williams leave to amend her complaint to assert claims against APWU. Because Williams has 

not submitted a proposed second amended complaint, denying her leave to amend would be 

premature.

 4

 Price addressed a duty of fair representation claim brought pursuant to § 301 of the Labor 

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Price, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 66. The 

Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. § 1208, however, is the “analogue” of § 301 of the 

LMRA, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Service, 590 F.2d 1171, 1174 

(D.C. Cir. 1978), and the same conclusion the Court reached in Price applies under the Postal 

Reorganization Act.
7

Accordingly, the Court will grant the APWU Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Dkt. 21; 

Dkt. 29, for failure to state a claim and will dismiss Williams’s claims against Defendants 

Nestor, Richardson, August-Taylor, and Zimmerman.

2. Dana Claybrooks

The amended complaint also names Dana Claybrooks as a Defendant; identifies her as an 

“EEO Counselor;” and lists the U.S. Postal Service Headquarters as her address. Dkt. 7 at 6. 

Williams has not alleged any facts respecting Claybrooks. Because the Court cannot discern 

the substance of Williams’s claim against Claybrooks, the Court will, sua sponte, dismiss the 

amended complaint as to this Defendant. See Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 42 F. 

Supp. 3d 102, 109 n.3 (D.D.C. 2014).

3. Federal Defendants

The amended complaint alleges that Tony Johnson, the Postmaster of the Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia facility, discriminated against Williams in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 701 et seq.

5

 She also alleges that other Defendants failed reasonably to accommodate her 

disabilities; that she was subject to harassment and retaliation; and that she was improperly 

suspended or “laid off” due to her disability. Dkt. 7 at 2–3 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4–5, 7). Mindful 

that pro se pleadings should not be held to the strict standards applicable to pleadings filed by 

 5

 The amended complaint also alleges that Williams’s due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were violated because she was “deprived” of something

“without fair procedures.” Dkt. 7 at 10. The Court will construe the pleading to allege a 

violation of Williams’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 

which applies to the federal government. Williams, however, has not identified the Defendant 

responsible for the alleged deprivation nor clarified the nature of that deprivation. Accordingly, 

the Court will dismiss any due process claim that the amended complaint may be construed to 

have asserted.
8

counsel, the Court will construe Williams’s amended complaint to allege claims under both the 

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act against each of the Federal Defendants.

Even liberally construed, Williams’s ADA claims fail as a matter of law. The ADA does 

not apply to federal employees because “the federal government is not considered an ‘employer’ 

under the ADA.” Ahmed v. Napolitano, 825 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2011); see also 42 

U.S.C. § 12111 (“The term ‘employer’ does not include . . . the United States . . . .”). Williams’s 

claims under the ADA will, therefore, be dismissed as to all Federal Defendants.

The Rehabilitation Act, in contrast, does provide a remedy to federal employees, and, 

indeed, constitutes “the exclusive remedy for federal employees alleging disability 

discrimination.” Welsh v. Hagler, 83 F. Supp. 3d 212, 222 (D.D.C. 2015) (collecting cases). 

Under the Rehabilitation Act, however, “only the heads of federal agencies in their official 

capacity may be sued, not their individual employees.” Richardson v. Yellen, 167 F. Supp. 3d 

105, 118 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2009); 

Marshall v. Potter, 634 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68 n.1 (D.D.C. 2009); Paegle v. Dep’t of Interior, 813 F. 

Supp. 61, 64 n.2 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Since the Rehabilitation Act draws from the procedures of 

Title VII, the only proper defendant is the head of the department, agency or unit.” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). Williams apparently seeks to assert claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act against Postmaster General Megan Brennan as well as ten other Postal 

Service employees. See Dkt. 30. As the head of the Postal Service, the Postmaster General is 

the only proper defendant with respect to Williams’s disability discrimination claims. In 

addition, the amended complaint does not allege any facts concerning nine of the ten other Postal 

Service employees.
9

Accordingly, the Court will sua sponte dismiss Williams’s claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act as to all Federal Defendants except the Postmaster General: Defendants 

Ackerman, Bear, Gillis, Johnson, Managing Counsel of the U.S. Postal Service, Matthews, 

Mayfield, Murray, Taylor, and Walls. As a result, the only remaining Defendant in this action is 

Postmaster General Megan Brennan; the only remaining claims stem from Williams’s allegations 

that the Postal Service violated her rights under the Rehabilitation Act.

B. Williams’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

Shortly after her case was reopened, Williams filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. 

Dkt. 14. The Court denied that motion, holding that the only two Defendants who had been 

served at that time were “apparently not subject to [that] motion” and that the motion was, 

accordingly, premature. Dkt. 17. Two days later, Williams filed a second motion for a 

preliminary injunction. Dkt. 18. The Federal Defendants have now responded to that motion, 

Dkt. 25, and Williams has filed a reply brief, Dkt. 26. The Court concludes that no hearing is 

required to resolve Williams’s second motion for a preliminary injunction.

As an initial matter, it is not clear what preliminary relief Williams seeks. See Dkt. 18. 

At one point, Williams asserts that she is asking that the Court order the Postal Service to put her 

“back to work straightaway,” Dkt. 18 at 3, while, at another point, she asserts that she “is back to 

work after being forced off for two whole months,” id. at 1; see also Dkt. 26 at 2 (referring to

Williams’s prior layoff, at least two weeks of which were with pay). Elsewhere, she appears to 

seek an injunction that would prevent the Postal Service from laying her off in the future. Dkt. 

18 at 1. She also asserts, without elaboration, that she is seeking an order “enjoining” the Postal 

Service “from constantly doing things in a mischievous manner to [her] wages.” Id. at 2. Her 
10

motion, moreover, contains little argument explaining why she is entitled to a preliminary 

injunction.

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). Williams must demonstrate that (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits; 

(2) that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the 

balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. 

If Williams cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, “there is no need to consider the 

remaining factors.” Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & 

Urban Dev., 639 F.3d 1078, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Even liberally construing Williams’s amended complaint and motion for a preliminary 

injunction, she has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that she is entitled to preliminary 

relief. As explained above, the sole claim that remains at this time is her claim against the 

Postmaster General for violating the Rehabilitation Act. Her motion for a preliminary 

injunction, however, does not establish that she is likely to prevail on that claim. Indeed, the 

Court has before it little more than conclusory assertions—unsupported by any evidence—that 

the Postal Service failed to accommodate Williams’s disability and has, in the past, taken 

retaliatory and harassing actions against her. It is unclear whether Williams has exhausted her 

Rehabilitation Act claim, see Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2006); it is unclear 

whether her claim was addressed in whole or in part through the APWU grievance proceeding 

she references, see Dkt. 28 at 2–3, and it is unclear what the Postal Service has allegedly done—

and, more importantly—what it is likely to do in the near future that would violate Act.

The Court must, accordingly, deny Williams’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Dkt. 
11

18.

C. Other Motions

Shortly after filing her amended complaint, Williams moved for appointment of counsel. 

Dkt. 8. The Court, however, determined that “appointment of counsel [was] not warranted” at 

that time in part because Plaintiff had not demonstrated “that her claims [were] particularly 

complex or that ‘any greater interest of justice [would] be served by appointing counsel in this 

case than in any other pro se case.’” Dkt. 11 at 3 (quoting Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 

228 F. Supp. 3d 28, 47 (D.D.C. 2017)); see also Local Civil Rule 83.11(b)(3). The Court also 

noted that it was not clear whether her claims would survive threshold motions. Dkt. 11 at 3. 

Since the Court’s Order, Plaintiff has filed three more motions to appoint counsel. See Dkt. 13; 

Dkt. 23; Dkt. 35. The Court will deny these motions for the reasons discussed in its earlier 

Order.

Finally, Williams has moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. Dkt. 34. 

Because she has already amended her complaint once, she is not entitled to amend as of right 

under Rule 15(a)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). To the extent she seeks leave to amend under 

Rule 15(a)(2), Williams must attach the proposed pleading to her motion to allow the Court to 

assess whether the amendment would be appropriate. See Local Civil Rule 48(g) (“A motion for 

leave to file an amended pleading shall be accompanied by an original of the proposed pleading 

as amended.”). The Court will, therefore, deny her motion for leave to amend, Dkt. 34, without 

prejudice.
12

CONCLUSION

It is hereby ORDERED that Nestor and Richardson’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 21, and 

August-Taylor and Zimmerman’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 29, are GRANTED pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6); and it is further

ORDERED that Williams’s claim against Dana Claybrooks is DISMISSED sua sponte

for failure to comply with Rule 8(a); and it is further

ORDERED that Williams’s ADA and due process claims are DISMISSED sua sponte

as to all Federal Defendants; and it is further

ORDERED that Williams’s Rehabilitation Act claims are DISMISSED sua sponte as to 

all Federal Defendants with the exception of Megan Brennan in her official capacity; and it is 

further

ORDERED that Williams’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Dkt. 18, is DENIED; 

and it is further

ORDERED that Williams’s motions for appointment of counsel, Dkt. 13; Dkt. 23; Dkt. 

35, are DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Williams’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, Dkt. 

34, is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Brennan shall answer or otherwise respond to the amended 

complaint within the time provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(2).

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Randolph D. Moss 

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge 

Date: October 24, 2017