UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4719

HAROLD MEADOWS, a/k/a Butch,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley.

Charles H. Haden II, District Judge.

(CR-02-4)

Submitted: March 18, 2003

Decided: July 22, 2003

Before WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Christopher F. Cowan, COWAN & OWEN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, John L.

File, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Harold Lloyd Meadows pled guilty to one count of transfer of firearms across state lines by an unlicenced person in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(5) & 924(a)(1)(D) (2000). On appeal, Meadows

claims: (1) the district court abused its discretion by denying his

motion to withdraw the guilty plea; (2) the base offense level under

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(5) (2001) was clearly

erroneous; (3) it was plain error not to award a reduction to the

offense level for acceptance of responsibility; and (4) counsel was

ineffective. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

We review the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215

F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant does not have an absolute

right to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245,

248 (4th Cir. 1991). Rather, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a "fair and just reason" supports his request to withdraw

his plea. Id. Moore’s claim fails because he withdrew the motion and

he did not offer any evidence in support of his claim that the guilty

plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

A district court’s factual findings used to determine the sentence

are accorded substantial deference. The factual findings need only be

supported by a preponderance of the evidence and will only be disturbed if clearly erroneous. United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138,

1148 (4th Cir. 1992). We find the court’s decision with regard to the

base offense level not clearly erroneous. See USSG § 2K2.1(a)(5); 18

U.S.C. § 921(a)(30) (2000).

Because Meadows did not object to the district court’s decision not

to award a three-level reduction to the offense level for acceptance of

responsibility, review is for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507

2 UNITED STATES v. MEADOWS
U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). Under this standard, we exercise our discretion only to correct errors that are plain, material, or affecting substantial rights, and that seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. We find no plain error because

Meadows did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that he

was entitled to the reduction. United States v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902,

905, 907 (4th Cir. 1989). 

We find Meadows’ claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not

cognizable on direct appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295

(4th Cir. 1997). 

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. MEADOWS 3