### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 13, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1144 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 98-00915 CV -T -S W IL LI E M CNA IR, Petitioner-Appellee, ve rs us DO NA L C AMP BE LL , C omm issio ner, A la bam a D ep ar

tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns, T RO Y K IN G , T he A tto rn ey G en er al of the State of A labam a, L E SL IE T H O MP SO N , W ar de n, Re spon de nts -Appe llants .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 04- 1270 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 98-00915 CV -T -S W IL LI E M CNA IR, Pe tit ion er -Appe llant, ve rs us DO NA L C AMP BE LL , C omm issio ner, A la bam a D ep ar

tm en t of Co rr ec tio ns, T RO Y K IN G , T he A tto rn ey G en er al of the State of A labam a,2

L E SL IE T H O MP SO N , W ar de n, Re spon de nts -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court f o r th e M i d d l e D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (July 13, 200 5) Be fo re T JO FL A T , A

N D E RS O N , and H U L L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judge:

D ef en dant W ill ie Mc N ai r w as c onvi ct ed in A la bam a state c ourt and se nte nc ed to de ath f

or the r obbe ry

and m ur de r of E lla F oy Ri le y . H e re ce ive d a new sentencing hearing on direct appeal and wa s again sentenced to death. A fter his secondsentence w as aff irm ed, Mc Na ir sough t and was denied state habeas corpus relief. H e then filed a f ederal habea s corpus petitio n pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 225 4. T he district court granted the petition on the basis o f ineff ective assistance of c ouns el a t the pe na lty

pha se and d en ie d it

on a ll oth er

gr ound s. T he S ta te appeals the district court’ s grant of the petition . McN air cr oss-appeals the dis trict co urt’ s de nia l of

the pe tit ionw ithr es pe ct

to his c la im s th at

( 1) j ur or s im

pr ope rl y co nsi de re d e xtr an eo us e vid en ce dur ing the pe na lty pha se and ( 2) the pr ose cu tor en g ag edi n ra ci al d i s cr i m i n at i o n du ri n g ju ry s el ec t i o n i n v i o l at i o n o f M cN ai r’s Fo urte en th A m en dm en t r igh ts unde r Batso n v. K en tuc ky , 476 U . S. 79, 106 S . Ct .3

1712 ( 1986 ). F or

the r ea sons dis cu sse d be low , w e re ve rs e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of Mc N ai r’ s pe tit ionon the ba sis of ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el and a ff

irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of

the pe tit ionon a ll oth er

gr ound s. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGRO UND O n th e nig ht o f May

21, 199 0, W ill ie Mc N ai r an d anothe r m anw en t t o th e hom e of E lla Foy

Riley , an elderly

widow who lived alone and occasionallyhired Mc N ai r to d o y ar d w ork. Whe n R ile y c am e to the doo r, Mc N ai r as ke d he r if he co ul d b orro w twen ty dol la rs . Ril ey to ldhi m sh e h adno m on ey

to len d h im . Mc N ai r the n a ske d if

he c oul d have agla ss o f w at er . R ile y inv ite d hi m

in, and w he n sh e tur

ne d aro und Mc N ai r gr ab be d he r by the ne ck and s ta bbe d he r in the thr oa t. Whe n th e bla de of the kni fe br oke of

f in R ile y ’ s ne ck , Mc N ai r’ s c om panio n retrieved anoth er knife f

rom the kitchen and McNair

stabbed Riley

in the neck again. T he wounds severed Riley ’ s carotid arter y and j ugul ar vein. E vidence indicated that McNair

also strangled Riley , who strug gled for several m inutes as she bled to death. Af

ter killing Riley , Mc Na ir took her purse from the kitchen co un te r an d fl edth e sc en e wit h h is co m pa ni on . The p ai r dr ov e se ve ral m il es do wn a rura l road, r

umm aged through Riley ’ s purse, then dum ped it. When an officer cam e to his hou se the next m orning, McN air adm itted killi ng Riley and was4

arre sted. H e subsequent ly directed off

icers to the place where he had dum ped Ri le y ’s pu rs e an d g av e d et ai le d d es cri pt io ns of t he m ur de r to in ve st ig at or s. Mc N ai r w as c onvi ct ed

of c ap ita l m ur de r in the c our se of

ar obbe ry

on Apr il 18, 1991. He wa s sentenced to death following a 10-2 jury vote in favor of that pe na lty . T he A la

bam a Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s c onf

irm ed the c onvi ct ion , but

it rem anded the case for a newsentencing hearing because the sentencing j udge had im properly considered as an aggravating factor a prior conviction that resulted f r o m an o l o c o n t e n d e r e p l e a . M c N a i r v . S t a t e , 6 5 3 S o . 2 d3 2 0 , 3 2 7 ( A l a . C r i m. Ap p . 1 9 9 2 ) . Th e s e c o n dju ry re c o mm e n d e das e n t e n c e o f l i f e wi t h o u tp a r o l e b y a vot e of 8- 4. T he c ourt r ej ec te d th is r ec om m en da tio n and a ga in s en te nc ed Mc N ai r to death. McN air’ s case w as twice rem anded for corr ection of the sentencing o rder be fo re f ina lly be ing a ff irm ed on d ir ec t a

ppe al . Mc N ai r v. S ta te , 653 S o. 2d 3 51 (A l a. Cr i m . Ap p . 1 9 9 4 ). Th e U n i t edSt at es Sup re m e C o u rt d en i edMc Na i r’s petition for ce rtiorari. McN air v. Ala bam a, 513 U.S . 1159, 115 S. Ct. 1121 (1995). A ft er his uns uc ce ssf

ul d ir ec t a

ppe al , Mc N ai r pe tit ion ed f or pos t- co nvi ct ion relief pursuant to Ala

bam a Rule of C rim inal Procedure 32 (“ Rule 32"). The H enry CountyCircuit Court (the “ Rule 32 court”) issued an order dism issin g as pr oc ed ur al ly barr ed a ll of Mc N ai r’ s c la im s e xc ep t ( 1) ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of counsel in v iolation of the Sixth Am endm ent, ( 2) state fa ilure to turn over5

ex cu lpator

y e vid en ce to the de fe nse , and ( 3) the unc onst itu tio na lity of the de ath pe na lty due to a pa tte rnof

r ac ia l bi as in its im

ple m en ta tio n. A n e vid en tiary he ar ing for these cla im s was originally scheduled for Septem

ber 22, 1995, but it was m oved to Novem ber 8, 1995 on McNa ir’ s m otion . The R ule 32 court entered an order deny ing McNair’ s petition on all ground s on Novem ber 13, 1995. Its order

wa s affir m ed by Court of Crim inal Appeals, and the Alabam a Suprem e Court denied certiorar i. Mc Na ir v. S tate, 706 So. 2d 828 (A la. Crim . App. 1997). McN air filed a

feder al habeas corpus petition in the United States D istrict Court for the Middle District of Alabam a on August 18, 1998 . He alleged num er ous gr ound s f

or r el ie f, inc lud ing ( 1) ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el a t the gui lt an d pe na lty

pha se s of

his tr ia l, ( 2) im

pr ope r co nsi de ratio n of

e xtr an eo us ev ide nc e by

j ur or s duri ng the gui lt pha se , and ( 3) Batso n vi olatio ns b y the S ta te during jury

selection. T he district court determ ined that several claim s wer e entitled to review under 28 U. S. C. § 225 4, and, over the State’ s objection, gr anted an evidentiary

hearing on McNa ir’ s ineffec tive assistance claim s. T he hearing wa s he ld o n Ju ly

27- 28, 200 0. O n M ar ch12, 200 4, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d M cN ai r’ s ha be as pe tit ionw ith respect to the death sentence, holdi ng that McNair rece ived ineffective assistance of c ouns el a t the pe na lty

pha se of his tr ia l. T he c ourt de nie d M cN ai r’ s pe tit ionon6

al l othe r gr ound s. T he S ta te appe al ed the c ourt’ s de ci sio n onthe ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e iss ue , and M cN ai r fi le d ac ro ss- ap pe al w ithr es pe ct to his e xtr an eo us ev ide nc e an d B at son cl ai m s. T hose appe al s are nowbe fo re thi s c ourt.

II. ST AN DA RD OF RE VIEW W e re vie wde nov o adis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t or de nia l of aha be as c or pus petition . Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 701 (11t h Cir. 1999 ). T he district court’ s factual f

indin gs are r eviewe d for clear er ror, while m ixed questi ons of law an d f ac t are r ev ie w ed

de nov o. I d. A n in ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of

c ouns el c la im

is a m ixe d qu es tio n of

lawand f

ac t su bj ec t t o de nov o r ev ie w . I d. Be ca use Mc N ai r fi le d hi s f

ed er al ha be as pe tit iona ft er

Apr il 24, 199 6, thi s ca se is gove rn ed

by the A nti te rr or ism

and E ff ec tiv e D eath P en al ty

A ct of 199 6 (“ A E D PA ”) , w hic h “ es ta bli she s ahig hly

de fe re nti al standard

f or r ev ie w ing state court j udgm ents.” P arker v. Se c’ y for D ept. of C orr. , 331 F. 3d 76 4, 768 (11th Cir. 2003 ). U nde r A E D PA , ape rs on i n c ust ody pur suant t o th e j udgm en t of astate co urt sh al l no t be gr an te d ha be as r el ie f unl es s th e state c ourt’ s de ci sio n w as ( 1)

“ contrary to, or involved an un reasonable application of, clearly established Fed eral law as de te rm in edby the Supr em e Co ur t o f th e Uni te d S ta te s; or ( 2) . . . wa s based on an un reasonable determ ination of the fac ts in lig ht of the evidence7

pr es en te d inthe S ta te c our t pr oc ee din g. ” 28 U . S. C. § 22 54( d) . Mo re ove r, astate co urt’ s f ac tua l de te rm inatio ns are pr es um ed c or re ct unl es s r eb utt ed

by c le ar and co nv in ci ng ev id en ce. 2 8 U.S.C. § 22 54 (e)( 1) . Finally , A ED PAm andates that a petitioner who failed to develop the factual ba sis f or ac la im in state c ourt sh al l no t be gr an te d af ed er al e vid en tiary

he ar ing absent certain extraor dinary circum stances. 28 U .S .C. § 2254 (e)( 2). A district co urt’ s de ci sio n to gr an t or de ny an e vid en tiary

he ar ing is re vie w ed

f or an a buse of discretion. K elley

v. S ec’ y for D ept. of C orr. , 377 F. 3d 13 17, 1333 (11t h Cir. 2004 ). Adis tr ic t c ourt a

buse s it s di sc re tio n by

m isa ppl y ing the lawor

m ak ing fi ndi ngs of

f ac t tha t are c le ar ly

e rr one ous. I d.

III. DIS CU SSION A. Ineff ective A ssistance of C ounsel Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt , a ft erh o l d i n g an ev i d en t i ary h ea ri n g , g ra n t edMc Na i r’s habeas petition on the groun d that he received ineff ective assistance of counsel du ri n g th e p en al t y p h as e o f h i s tri al . S p ec i fi ca l l y, th e c o u rt h el dth at Mc Na i r’s co unse l w as c onst itu tio na lly ine ff ec tiv e fo r pr es en tin g lay

te sti m ony

about Mc N ai r’ s dr

ug u se w ith out

of fe ri ng a ddi tio na l e vid en ce about the e ff ec ts o f dr ug addiction and its pot ential m itigatin g effe cts. T he State argues that the district§ 2254(e) (2) doe s have two e x ceptions, but neither a pplies in this case. F or 1 e xamp le , f

or the ne wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e e xce pti on to a pp ly , “ the fa c ts und e rl yingthe c la im [on which the petitioner see ks an evide ntiary hear ing] must be sufficie nt to establish by clea r and convincingevidenc e that but for the constitutional error, no r easona ble fa ctfinder

would have found the a

pplicant guilty

of the unde rlying of

fense .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2)( B) . Be cause there is no doubt that McNair is guilty of the unde rlying of

fense , the exceptions in § 2254(e)( 2) ar e inapplicable in this ca se. 8 co urt e rr ed

by ( 1) gr an tin g M cN ai r ane vid en tiary he ar ing w he n M cN ai r w as not d i l i g en ti n d ev el o p i n g h i s cl ai m i n s t at e c o u rt ; (2 ) n o td ef erri n g t o th e s t at e c o u rt ’s de te rm inatio n onthe m er its a s r equir ed by 28 U . S. C. § 22 54( d) ; and ( 3) f ind ing that M cN ai r’ s c ouns el w as c onst itu tio na lly ine ff ec tiv e unde r the te st l ai d ou t i n Stri ck land v . W as hin gto n, 466 U . S. 668 , 104 S . Ct . 205 2 ( 1984 ). F or the r ea sons d i s cu s s edb el o w, w e a g re e t h at th e d i s t ri ct co u rterre di n g ra n t i n g Mc Na i r’s pe tit ion . W e tur n f ir st t o th e St at e’ s arg um en t tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in gr an tin g McN air an e videnti ary

hearing. Under A ED PA , when a feder al habeas petitioner

“ ha s f ai le d to de ve lop the f

ac tua l ba sis of

ac la im in St at e co urt pr oc ee din gs, the co ur t s ha ll no t h ol d a n e vi de nt ia ry he ari ng on th e cl ai m .” 28 U.S.C. § 2 25 4( e)(2 ). 1 T he S upr em e Co urt ha s he ld tha t “ a fa ilure to de ve lop the f ac tua l ba sis of

ac la im is not e sta bli she d un le ss the re is la ck of dil ige nc e, or

som e gr eate r fa

ult , a ttr ibu ta

ble to the pr iso ne r or

the pr iso ne r’ s c ouns el . ” W ill iam s v. T ay lor , 529 U . S. 420 , 432 , 120 S. Ct . 147 9, 148 8 ( 2002 ). “ D ili ge nc e, ” as use d inse ct ion225 4( e) (2 ), “ de pe nds9

uponw he the r the pr iso ne r m ad e a re as ona ble a tte m pt, in lig ht o f the inf

orm at ion av ai la ble a t the ti m e, to inv es tig at e an d purs ue c la im s instate c ourt. ” W ill iam s, 529 U . S. a t 43 5, 120 S . Ct . a t 14 90. A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d no t have gr an te d M cN ai r ane vid en tiary he ar ing unl es s he m ad e a re as ona ble a tte m pt t o inv es tig at e an d purs ue his ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el c la im

in state c ourt. Init s op ini on g ranti ng the e vid en tiary he ar ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt “ co uld not co nc lud e that [ Mc N ai r] ha d f ai le d to de ve lop the f

ac tua l ba sis of

thi s c la im

in the state pr oc ee din gs, be ca

use the state c ourt ha d f

or ec los ed [ his ] a tte m

pts to de ve lop the r equis ite e xpe rt

te sti m ony . ” Mc N ai r v. H al ey , 97 F . S upp. 2d 1 270, 127 9 (M .D. Al a. 2 0 0 0 ). Sp ec i fi ca l l y, th e d i s t ri ct co u rt p o i n t edt o th e Ru l e 3 2 co u rt ’s o rd er s (1 ) d en yin g Mc Na i r f u n d s t o h i re ex p er twi t n es s es , ( 2 ) d en yin g Mc Na i r’s re que st f or on o rd er a llo w ing “ any

e xpe rt s” to vis it him

in pr iso n, and ( 3) ove rr uli ng M cN ai r’ s ob

j ec tio ns t o th e de nia l of

the f ir st tw o m oti ons. I d. O n th e basis of these three orders, the district court held that McNair wa s entitled to an evidentiary

hearing under section 225 4(e)( 2). T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e va luatio n of Mc N ai r’ s di lig en ce in state c ourt f ai le d to dis cu ss thr ee c ru ci al f

ac tor s. T he f

ir st i s th e ch ro nol ogy

of e ve nts be fo re the Ru le 32 c ourt. Mc N ai r fi le d hi s R ule 32 p et iti on o n Ju ly

5, 199 5. O n Augus t 30 , 199 5, the Rule 32 court dism issed nu m erous claim s as procedurally barre d and schedul ed10

a h eari ng on th e in effe ct iv e as si st an ce o f co un se l cl ai m forSep te m

be r 22 , 19 95 . McN air did not file a m otion for discovery until Septem

ber 8, 1995 , and that m oti on i nc lud ed

ne ith er am oti on f

or f unds f or ind ep en de nt m en ta l he al th e xpe rt s nor a m otion for ac cess. On S eptem ber 19, Mc Na ir filed a m otion requesting that the scheduled hearing be changed to a pre- hearing conference . The district court gr an te d th is m oti on, c ont inu ing the S ep te m be r 22 h eari ng and s ch ed uli ng a status co nf er en ce f or that date ins te ad . T he Ru le 32 h eari ng w as r es ch ed ule d f or N ove m be r 8, 199 5. Mc N ai r the n w ai te d un til O ct obe r 24, tw o w ee ks b ef or e the al re ady c ont inu ed

he ar ing , to fi le his m oti on f or e xpe rt f unds . H is m oti on f

or expert acc ess was not filed until October 30, one wee k before the continued hearing and alm ost four m onth s after the Rule 32 petition . Given their tem poral pr oxi m ity to the r es ch ed

ule d he ar ing , gr an tin g e ith er of the se m oti ons al m ost ce rt ai nly w oul d have m an da te d anothe r co nti nuanc e, a s M cN ai r ac know le dge d in his sim ult an eo us f

ili ng o f a m oti on f

or c ont inu an ce on O ct obe r 25. H ow ev er , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s op ini on m ad e no m en tio n of the be la te dne ss o f the se m oti ons. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso ign or ed Mc N ai r’ s f

ai lur e to a dduc e any

e vid en ce in supp ort of

his ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el c la im

w he n it w as be fo re the Ru le 32 c ourt. Whil e the Ru le 32 c ourt’ s r uli ng o n hi s m oti ons fo r expe rt f unds and ac ce ss m igh t have im

pe de d M cN ai r’ s pr es en ta tio n of e xpe rt te sti m ony

about theIn f a c t, M c Na ir

did of fe r s uc h te sti mony

wh e n atte mpt ingto e sta

bli shhis 2 i n ef fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o un s el cl ai mi nh i s fe d er al ev i d en t i ary h eari n g. The brie f fa iled to mention that the motions wer e made shortly befor e the a lrea dy 3 co n t i nu edh eari n g. 11 effe cts of drug addiction , he face d no im pedim ent to establish ing th e fa ctual pr ed ic at e unde rl y ing his c la im in oth er w ay s. A sid e fr om

e xpe rt te sti m ony , Mc N ai r co uld have e sta bli she d th at

pr ed ic at e by

te sti fy ing him se lf

, or havin g hi s f

am ily m em be rs te sti fy , about

his dr ug a buse and the c hange s inhis pe rs ona lity and be havio r that i t c au se d. Mo re ove r, Mc N ai r co uld have a dduc ed

e vid en ce of

the 2 effe cts of drug addiction by offer ing treatises or other literature. A lthou gh ign ored by the dis tr ic t c our

t, Mc N ai r’ s f

ai lur e to p ur sue the se oth er m eans o f es ta

bli shi ng the f ac tua l pr ed ic at e fo r his c la im in the Ru le 32 c ourt i s in dic at ive of ala ck of dilig ence. A f i n al an dv ery s i g n i fi ca n tfa ct o r i g n o re db y t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt i s Mc Na i r’s fa ilure to fa ir ly

pr es en t the iss ue of

the Ru le 32 c ourt’ s de nia l of his m oti ons in h is ap pe al to the A la

bam a Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s. A lth oughthe state m en t of the ca se m entio ne d th at

the Ru le 32 c ourt ha d de nie d se ve ra l m oti ons, inc lud ing tho se fo r expe rt f unds and a cc es s, the r el ev an t se ct ionof Mc N ai r’ s br ie f dis cu ssi ng the 3 cl ai m that hi s c ouns el w as ine ff ec tiv e fo r fa ili ng t o in tr oduc e dr ug a ddi ct ion evidence m ade no m ention o f the m otion s or their denial. The brie f also neverIndeed, it wa s not until his application for r ehea ringthat McNa ir argued to the 4 Court of Criminal Appeals that his Rule 32 evidentiar y hear ing w as unfa ir, listing, amongother rea sons, that the Rule 32 court had de nied his motions for expert funds and ac cess. We ca nnot conclude that such belated pre sentation of the issue to the a ppellate c ourt – at a time whe n the State could no long er r espond, af ter the issues f

or appe llate re view had be en joined, and a fter the decision of the a

ppellate c ourt – constituted a dilige nt pursuit of the issue on appe al or a re a so na ble atte mpt

to p ur su e the c la im i n s tate c ourt . At oral a rgument, McNa ir argued that the state court’s de nial of seve ral discove ry 5 motions m ade it futile for him to pursue his desired discove ry in the Rule 32 court. McN air ha s waived that argument on appea l by raisingit for the first time at ora l argument. Ev e n if Mc Na ir ha d n ot w a ive d th e argume nt, our r e vie w o f t he pr oc e e din g s le a din gup to the evidentiar

y hear ing in the Rule 32 c ourt persua de us that any such futility

claim would fa il. Mc Na ir fi le d h is f

ir st d isc ov e ry

mot ion on Se pte mbe r 8 , 1 99 5, se e kin gdis c ov e ry of matte rs in the pr os e c uti on

fi le s and c e rt a in o the r l aw e nf

or c e me nt, c or

re c tio na l, m e dic a l, a

nd me nta l he a lth rec ords. With particular re levanc e to this case, the discovery reque st for mental he alth rec ords at the var ious state fac iliti es wa s g rante d on September 22, 1995. O n that same date, the discove ry reque st was also g rante d with respec t to medical re cords, law enfor ceme nt rec ords, and 12 ur ge d th e Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s to r em an d th e ca se to pe rm it the pr es en ta tio n of that e vid en ce . I n li ght

of Mc N ai r’ s f

ai lur es in thi s r eg ar d, w e cannot c onc lud e 4 that he dil ige ntl y

pur sue d an a tte m

pt t o e sta bli sh the f

ac tua l ba sis of

his ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el c la im

in the A la

bam a Co urt of

Cr im ina l A

ppe al s. Taken cum

ulatively , the f

acts outlined abo ve dem onstrate that McNa ir w as not di ligent in establishin g the factual basis of his ineffective a ssistance of counsel cl ai m in state c ourt. B ec au se the dis tr ic t c ourt i gnor ed the se c ru ci al f

ac ts, and because of our fir

m conviction in this regard, w e have no difficulty concludin g that its findin gs with respect to diligence wer e clearly err oneous . The district court th eref or e err edin gra nt in g M cNai r a fed eral ev id en ti ary he ari ng un de r 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)( 2). 5corr ectional r ecor ds. In addition, open file discove ry was grante d to McNair w ith respec t to the pr os e c uti on

fi le s. We c ann ot c on c lud e that c oll ate ra l c ouns e l c ou ld r e a so na bly have de e me d it futile to promptly

move for f

unds for e x pert a ssistance or f or ac cess, just as we cannot c onclude that c ouns e l w a s d ili g e nt i n w a iti nguntil jus t on e and tw o w e e ks be fo re the sc he du le d h e ari ngto file such motions. As noted in the text, gra nting of such belated motions would necessa rily have mandated a

nother c ontinuance, a

fac t virtually

acknow ledg ed in McNa ir’s simultaneously filed motion to continue the November 8, 1995, hear ing. F ina lly , e ve n if

our a sse ssm e nt o f t

he pr oc e e din g s in

the Rul e 32 c ourt

we re e rr on e ou s, there still would be no excuse for collater al counse l’s failure to diligently pursue the matter in the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls. Th e re le va

nt p ro vis ion

re a ds , in fu ll, a s f oll ow s: 6 (d) An a pplication for a

writ of habe as cor

pus on behalf of

a per son in custody

pursuant to the judgme nt of a State c ourt shall not be g rante d with respec t to any claim that was a djudicated on the me ri ts i n St ate c ourt

pr oc e e din g s unle ss t

he a dju dic atio n o f t

he c la im – (1) r esulted in a de cision that was contr ary to, or involved an unre asonable application of, c le arl y e sta bli sh e d F e de ra l la

w, a s d e te rm ine d b y

the Sup re me Court

of the Un ite d St ate s; or (2 ) r e su lte d in

a de c isi on that w a s b a se d o n a

n unr e a so na

ble de te rm inatio n o f t

he fa c ts i n l i gh to f t h e e v i d en ce p re s en t edi nth e S t at e c o urtp ro ce ed i n g. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 13 W e nowtur

n to the S ta te ’ s arg um ent tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by not de fe rr ing to the state c ourt’ s de te rm inatio n of Mc N ai r’ s in ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of counsel claim . When a claim is adjudicated on the m erits in state court, A ED PA bars af ed er al c ourt f

ro m gr an tin g ha

be as c or pus re lie f on tha t c la im

unl es s th e state court determ ination “ wa s contrary to, or involved an un reasonable application of, clear ly established Federal law ” or “ resulted in a decision th at w as based on an unr ea sona

ble de te rm inatio n of

the f ac ts i n li ght

of the e vid en ce pr es en te d inthe St at e co urt pr oc ee din g. ” 28 U . S. C. § 22 54( d) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt de cl ine d to appl y 6 thi s bar, r ea soni ng tha t no state c ourt ha d a dj udi cate d M cN ai r’ s in ef fe ct ive14

as sis tanc e of

c ouns el c la im

on the m er its w hil e co nsi de ri ng the e vid en ce be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt a ft er

it s e vid en tiary

he ar ing . Mc N ai r v. Cam pbe ll, 307 F . S upp. 2d 1277 , 131 1 ( M. D . A la . 200 4) . H ow ev er , be ca use the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr one ousl y gr an te d th e ev ide nti ar

y he ar ing , e vid en ce a dduc ed the re in c annot

se rv e as aba sis fo r habe as r el ie f. W e co nc lud e that se ct ion225 4( d) appl ie s w ithf ull f or ce , and the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in dis re gard ing it . Apply ing section 2254 (d), it is clear that McNa ir is not entitledto habeas re lie f on h is i ne ff

ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el c la im . T ha t the Ru le 32 c ourt and the Co urt of Cr im ina l Appe al s a dj udi cate d th is c la im on the m er its is undi sput ed . I t i s al so c le ar that the de ci sio ns o f tho se c ourts w er e not c ontrary to, and d id n ot invo lve an unreasonable application of, clear ly established federal law , and that th ey di d n ot un reas on ab ly det erm in e th e fac ts in li gh t o f th e ev id en ce b efo re t he m . Cl earl y e sta bli she d f ed er al lawm an da te s th at , in or de r to s uc ce ed on h is i ne ff

ec tiv e as s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el cl ai m , M cN ai r w o u l dh av e t o s h o w t h at (1 ) h i s co u n s el ’s pe rf orm an ce f

ai le d to m ee t the standard of ar ea sona

bly c om pe te nt atto rn ey ; and (2 ) that this de fi ci en t pe rf orm an ce pr ej udi ce d hi s de fe nse . S tr ic kland v . Was h i n g t o n , 4 6 6 U.S . a t6 8 7 , 1 0 4 S. Ct . a t2 0 6 4 . S cru t i n y o f c o u n s el ’s pe rf orm an ce is hig hly

de fe re nti al , and the bur de n is on the c onvi ct ed de fe ndant t o show that counsel’s per form ance w as unreasonable. I d. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. atBe cause we ha ve held that the district c ourt err ed in g rantingMcNa ir an 7 evidentiar y hear ing a nd in not defer

ringto the state cour

t adjudication pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we need not r eac h the State’s ar gument that the district court e rre d in finding Mc Nair’ s co un s el i n ef

fe ct i v e i nl i gh to f t h e e v i d en ce ad d u ce d atth e f ed er al ev i d en t i ary

h eari n g. 15 2 0 6 4 -6 5 . De s p i t e b ea ri n g th e b u rd en o f d emo n s t ra t i n g h i s co u n s el ’s ine ff ec tiv en es s, Mc N ai r ad duc ed no e vid en ce to supp ort this c la im dur ing his Ru le 32 p ro ce ed ing s. B ec au se Mc N ai r of fe re d no e vid en ce to supp ort hi s c la im , the Co urt of Cr im ina l Appe al s w as not unr ea sona

ble in de ny ing r el ie f, and i ts adj udication is entitled to d efer ence under section 2254 (d). T he district court the re fo re e rr ed

in gr an tin g M cN ai r’ s ha

be as pe tit ionon h is i ne ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of c o u n s e l c l a i m. 7 B. Ex tr an eo us Ev id en ce in t he Ju ryR oom Mc N ai r’ s ne xt c la im ed

ba sis f or ha be as r el ie f is tha t j ur or s im pr ope rl y co nsi de re d e xtr an eo us e vid en ce dur ing the ir de lib er at ion s inthe gui lt pha se of his tr ia l. E vid en ce sho w s th at L es D av is, aCh ri sti anm ini ste r w ho s er ve d a s th e fo re m anof

Mc N ai r’ s j ur

y , br ough t a

Bi ble int o th e j ur

y r oom dur ing de lib er at ion s, re ad a lou d f ro m it , and l ed

the oth er j ur or s inpr ay er . Mc N ai r nowc la im s th at the Bi ble , w hic h ha d no t be ena dm itt ed int o th e re co rd , c onst itu te d e xtr an eo us ev ide nc e an d th at

the j ur or s’ c onsi de ratio n of it vio la te d hi s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t to a f ai r tr ia l. T he A la

bam a Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s, appl y ing state law , he ld that McNa ir w as not entitled to relief . McN air, 706 So. 2d at 835-38. The district16

co ur t al so de ni edrel ie f on th is cla im . McNai r, 30 7 F . Sup p. 2 d a t 1 30 1- 05 . Mc N ai r ch al le nge s th is h old ing in his c ro ss- ap pe al . 1. Pr ocedural Bar The district court began its discussi on of McNa ir’ s extraneous evidence claim by addressing th e claim ’ s procedural posture; we shall do the sam e. A s noted ab ove , Mc N ai r’ s c la im

in his f ed er al ha be as pe tit ionis that the j ur or s’ consideration o f extraneous evidence deprived him of his right to a fair trial a s guaranteed by

the Sixth Am endm ent to the United States Constituti on. H owever , Mc N ai r ar gue d to the state c ourt tha t “ the j ur y im pr ope rl y c onsi de re d and r el ie d on extraneous evidence in vio lation of Alabam a law .” McN air, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 ( int er

na l qu otatio n om itt ed ) (e m pha sis in or igi na l) . I t i s a lso c le ar that the Co urt of Cr im ina l Appe al s a ddr es se d M cN ai r’ s e xtr an eo us e vid en ce c la im sol el y under state law principles. McN air, 706 So. 2d at 837-38 (rely ing on standards set out in E x part e T ro ha , 462 S o. 2d 9 53 ( A la . 198 4) , E x part e L as le y , 505 S o. 2d 1263 ( A la . 198 7) , and R oan v. S ta te , 143 S o. 454 ( A la . 193 2) ). B ec au se Mc N ai r did not r ai se the f

ed er al c onst itu tio na l i ssu e in s ta te c ourt, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld th atth e is su e was pro cedur al ly defau lt ed . McNai r, 30 7 F . Sup p. at 13 01 . How ever, because the State failed to ar gue the procedural bar, the district court he ld tha t the bar w as w ai ve d and p ro ce ed ed to co nsi de r the m er its . I d. a t 13 02. F or17

the reasons discuss ed below, the district court properly held that McNa ir had pr oc ed ur al ly de fa ult ed his S ixth A m en dm en t c la im , but e rr ed in hol din g th at

the state w ai ve d th e de fa

ult . H ab ea s pe tit ion er s ge ne ra lly c annot r ai se c la im s inf

ed er al c ourt i f tho se cl ai m s w er e not

f ir st e xhaust ed

in state c ourt. 28 U . S. C. § 22 54( b) (1 ); K el le y v. Sec’ y for D ept. of C orr. , 377 F. 3d at 134 3. I n order to be exhausted, a f ederal cl ai m m ust be f ai rl y pr es en te d to the state c ourts. P ic ar d v. Co nnor , 404 U . S. 270 , 275, 92 S. C t. 509, 512 (1971). “ It is not sufficient m erely that the federa l habeas pe tit ion er ha s be enthr oughthe state c ourts . . . nor is it suf fi ci en t tha t a ll the f

ac ts necessary to supp ort the claim

we re bef ore the state courts or that a som ew hat sim ilar state -l awc la im

w as m ad e. ” K el le y , 377 F . 3d at 13 43- 44 ( ci tin g P ic ar d, 404 U . S. a t 27 5- 76, 92 S . Ct . a t 51 2 and A nde rs on v . H ar le ss, 459 U . S. 4, 6, 103 S . Ct . 276, 277 ( 1982 )) . R athe r, in or de r to e nsur e that st at e co urts h av e the f ir st oppo rt uni ty to he ar a ll cl ai m s, f

ed er al c ourts “ have r equir ed astate pr iso ne r to present the state courts with the sam e claim he urges upon th e fe deral courts. ” Pi card , 404 U . S. a t 27 5, 92 S . Ct . a t 51 2 ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ). Whil e w e do n ot require a verbatim

restatem ent of the claim s brough t in state court, w e do require that a pe tit ion er

pr es en te d hi s c la im s to the state c ourt “ suc h th at ar ea sona

ble reader would understand each claim ’ s particular legal basis and specific fa ctual18

fo undatio n. ” K el le y , 377 F . 3d at 13 44- 45 ( ci tin g P ic ar d, 404 U . S. a t 27 7, 92 S . Ct . at 513). Whil e the se br oa d pr inc ipl es are r el at ive ly c le ar , the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly not ed that m any

c ourts h av e str

uggl ed to pinpoi nt the m ini m

um r equir em en ts tha t a habe as pe tit ion er

m ust m ee t i n or de r to e xhaust

his r em ed ie s. F or

ins tanc e, the Su pr em e Co urt r ec en tly

w ro te that a

pe tit ion er

w ish ing to ra ise af

ed er al iss ue in state c ourt c ando s o “by

c iti ng i n c onj unc tio n w iththe c la im the f ed er al sourc e of lawon whic h he r el ie s or ac as e de ci din g su chac la im on f ed er al gr ound s, or

by sim ply la be lin g th e cl ai m

‘ fe de ra l. ’ ” Ba ldw in v . Re es e, 541 U . S. 27, 32, 124 S . Ct . 1347 , 135 1 ( 2004 ). I f re ad in a va cuum , thi s di ct a m igh t be tho ught to cr eate alow floor indeed for petitioners seeking to establish exhaus tion. How ever, we agree w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t this langua ge m ust be “ ap pli ed

w ithc om

m on s en se and in l igh t of the pur pose und er ly ing the e xhaust ionr equir em en t[ :] ‘ to a ff or d th e state co urts a m eanin gf

ul o ppor tun ity to co nsi de r al le ga tio ns o f le ga l e rr or w ith out int er fe re nc e fr om

the f ed er al j udi ci ar

y . ’ ” Mc N ai r, 315 F . S upp. 2d at 11 84 ( quot ing V as que z v. H ill ar

y , 474 U . S. 254 , 257 , 106 S . Ct . 617 , 620 ( 1986 )) . T his is consist ent with settled law established b y the Suprem e Court. See Picar d, 404 U. S. at 275 , 92 S . Ct . a t 51 2 ( “ W e em pha siz e that the f

ed er al c la im

m ust be f ai rl y pr es en te d to the state c ourts. ”) . W e the re fo re hol d th at “ ‘ [t ] he e xhaust iondoc tr ine19

re qui re s aha

be as appl ic an t t o do m or e than sc atte r som e m ak es hif t ne ed le s inthe hay sta ck of the state c ourt r ec or d. ’ ” K el le y , 377 F . 3d at 13 45 ( quot ing Mart en s v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 715 , 717 (1st Cir. 1988 )). W ith these principl es in m ind, we now consider the extraneous evidence ar gum en ts tha t M cN ai r pr es en te d instate c ourt. I n hi s in iti al br ie f to the Co urt of Cr im ina l Appe al s, Mc N ai r re lie d a lm ost e xc lus ive ly

on s ta te law . T he se ct ionof his brief addressing his extraneous evidence claim wa s captioned: “ MR. MCNAIR ’S JURY IMPR OPERLY CONSIDERED AND RELIED ON EXTRANEOUS E VIDENCE DURING ITS GUILT PHASE DELIBERATIONS INV IO L A T IO N O F A L A BA MAL A W . ” A ll of the sub stanti ve arg um en t co nta ine d inthat se ct ionof Mc N ai r’ s br ie f ad dr es se d A la bam a law , w iththe bul k of it c onsi sti ng o f Mc N ai r’ s a tte m pt t o ana log iz e his c as e to E x part e T ro ha , 462 So . 2d at 95 3. T he r el ev an t part of the br ie f co nta ine d on ly

tw o r ef er en ce s to fed eral law. Th e fi rs t was a ci ta ti on to Jo ne s v . Kem p, 7 06 F. Sup p. 1 53 4 (N.D. G a. 198 9) , w hic h w as one of se ve n c as es inc lud ed

in a str ing c itatio n su

ppor tin g Mc N ai r’ s c la im

that “ j ur or s m ay

not c onsi de r ex tr an eo us e vid en ce dur ing the ir de lib er at ion s and c ourts h av e co nsi ste ntl y and r ep eate dly

r ev er se d c onvi ct ion s w h e r e s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a s o c c u rr e d . ” T h e o t h e r r e f e r e n c e t o f

e d e r a l l a wc a me in the c los ing para gr ap h of Mc N ai r’ s arg um en t, w he n he w ro te that the j ur or s’J ones v. Ke mp, 706 F. Supp. at 1558-60, the one fede ral c ase bur ied in McNa ir’s 8 string c ite, also did not mention the presumption of prejudice . 20 co nsi de ratio n of

the Bi ble vio la te d hi s r igh ts “pr ote ct ed by the F if th, S ixth, E igh th[ , ] and F ourte en th A m en dm en ts t o th e U nit ed S ta te s C onst itu tio n, the Alabam a Constituti on[,] and Alabam a law .” Im portantly , Mc Na ir never m en tio ne d, m

uc h le ss arg ue d, the f

ed er al standard

that e xtr an eo us e vid en ce is pr es um pti ve ly pr ej udi ci al . S ee T ur

ne r v. L oui siana , 379 U . S. 466 , 473 , 85 S . Ct . 8 546, 550 ( 1965 ); Re m

m er v. U nit ed S ta te s, 437 U . S. 227 , 229 , 74 S . Ct . 450 , 451 (1 954) ; U nit ed

S tate s v. Mart ine z, 14 F . 3d 5 43, 550 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ( “ Pr ej udi ce is presum ed the m om ent the defendant establishes th at extrinsic contact with the j ury in fact occurr ed.” (internal quotation om itted)). M c N a i r ’s r e l i a n c e o n s t a t e l a wc o n t i n u e dw h e n h e w e n tb e f o r e th e A l ab a ma Suprem e Court. H is nine page petitio n for cer tiorari on the extraneous evidence iss ue did not c ite asin gle f

ed er al c as e; it s on ly

m en tio n of

f ed er al laww as a re pe tit ionof

the c onc lud ing para gr ap h of his arg um en t be fo re the Co urt of Cr im ina l Appe al s. H is b ri ef in supp ort of

the pe tit ioninc lud ed

ave rb at im re state m en t of

the Jon es v. K em

p c itatio n and c los ing para gr ap h f ro m his br ie f to the Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s and n oth ing m or e. A ga in, the pr es um pti on o f pr ej udi ce that ari se s un de r fe de ra l l aww as ne ve r m en tio ne d.A h a be a s p e tit ion e r c an o nly

e va de the e xha

us tio n r e qu ir e me nt b y

sh ow ingc a

us e 9 fo r a n d ac tu al p re

j u d i ce re s u l t i n g fr o mth e d ef au l to r b y es t ab l i s h i n g a f

un d am en t al m i s carr i age of justice. Ke lley , 377 F.3d at 1345 (citations omitted). McNair clea rly cannot satisfy

either of the se e xce pti on s, a s th e re is n o c on c e iva ble e xcu sa

ble c a us e fo r h is f

a ilure to r a ise his Sixth Am e ndme nt c la im i n s tate c ourt and no fu nd ame nta l mi sc arr ia g e of jus tic e wi ll r e su lt f

ro m it s de fa ult . 21 McN air’ s refe rences to fe deral lawin his state habeas proceedings are exactly the ty pe of needles in the hay stack that we have previouslyheld are ins uf fi ci en t t o satis fy

the e xhaust ionr equir em en t. S ee K el le y , 377 F . 3d at 13 44- 50. McN air never cited any United State s Suprem e Court or fe deral appellate c ourt ca se de al ing w ithe xtr an eo us e vid en ce , nor did he m en tio n th e pr es um

pti on o f pr ejud ic e th atari se s u nd er fe de ral law wh en juro rs co ns id er s uc h e vi de nc e. Instead, he r elied on state law opinions to argue a state law c laim under a state law standard , c iti ng a

lon e fe de ra l di str ic t c ourt op ini on ( whic h it se lf did not m en tio n the f ed er al pr es um

pti on o f pr ej udi ce ) onl y

a s part of astr ing c itatio n il lus tr at ing va rio us co ur ts ’ ho ld in gs wit h re sp ectto ex tra ne ou s ev id en ce i n t he jury ro om . A care fu l r ev ie wof

the r ec or d m ak es it

c le ar that M cN ai r did

not f ai rl y pr es en t hi s fe de ra l c onst itu tio na l c la im to the state c ourt. H e the re fo re f ai le d to e xhaust

his state court rem edies and is procedurally barre d from

raising his no n-exhausted fe de ra l c la im

in his f ed er al ha be as pe tit ion . 9 Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly he ld tha t M cN ai r’ s S ixth A m en dm en t c la im is p ro ce dur al ly

barr ed due to la ck

of e xhaust ion , it

w en t onto co nsi de r the m er itsAt oral a rgument, McNa ir’s counse l sugg ested that the State e x pressly waived the 10 e xha us tio n r e qu ir e me nt i n it s b ri e f t o th is c ourt . T hat is no t th e c a se . T he State c la ime d in its br ie f t hat McNa ir ’s Sixth Ame ndme nt e xtra ne ou s e vid e nc e c la im s ho uld have be e n p ro c e dura lly barr ed, and the n simply

repe ated the district c ourt’s holdingthat the State had wa ived the pr oc e dura l ba

r b y fa ili ngto a sse rt

it. 22 of the claim

after finding th at the State wa ived the procedural bar. McN air, 307 F. Su p p . 2 dat1 3 0 1 -0 2 . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt b as edi t s wa i v erfi n d i n g o n th e S t at e’s failure to identify

the Sixth Am endm ent issue as procedurally defaulted in its briefs to the dis tr ic t c ourt. I d. H ow ev er , the S ta te ’ s f ai lur e to r ai se e xhaust iondoe s no t co nst itu te aw ai ve r unde r A E D PA , w hic h m an da te s th at “ [a ] S ta te sha ll not

be deem ed to have waived the exhaustion requirem ent or be estopped from reliance uponthe r equir em en t un le ss the S ta te , thr oughc ouns el , e xpr es sly w ai ve s th e req ui rem en t.” 2 8 U.S.C. § 22 54 (b )(3 ); s ee Di ll v. Ho lt , 37 1 F .3d13 01 , 13 02 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that AE DP A r equires a court to address exhaustion when it is n ot e xpr es sly

w ai ve d by

the S ta te ). W e have c ondu ct ed ac ar ef ul r ev ie wof

the St at e’ s br ie fs to thi s c ourt a s w el l a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt and h av e fo und no e xpr es s w ai ve r of the e xhaust ionr equir em en t. 10 T hus, the pos tur e of

thi s c as e is a s f

oll ow s: M cN ai r ha s f

ai le d to pr ope rl y exhaust his extraneous evidence claim ; the State has not expressly wa ived that failure; and the claim

could no longer be brough t in state court if w e dism issedThere is no question that Alabama law would bar Mc Nair f

rom prese ntly

raising 11 his Si x th Amendment extraneous evide nce c laim in state court. See, e .g ., Whit t v. State, 827 So. 2d 869, 876 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) ( holding that ne w claims ra ised in subsequent habe as petitions are ba

rre d as succ essive unless the pe titioner can show c ause a nd a miscar

riag e of jus tic e ). We c an th e re fo re sa fe ly a dd re ss M c Na ir ’s oth e r c la ims rathe r t ha n r e mand ingthe c a se to the district court with instructions to dism iss the petition. Kelley , 377 F.3d at 1351.

T h i s p r e s e n t s ani s s u e o f

f i r s ti mp r e s s i o ni nth i s c i r c u i t . In P e r r u qu e tv . B r i l e y, 12 390 F.3d 505, 516 ( 7 Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit listed our opinion in Nelson v. Schofeld, th 37 1 F .3 d 7 68 (2 00 4) , a s h old ingthat § 2 25 4( b) (3 ) a pp lie s to a

pr oc e dura l ba

r t hat ari se s f

ro m a fa ilure to e xha

us t. H ow e ve r, we do ub t th at ou r o pin ion a c tua lly so he ld. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt in Nelson had dismissed a ha beas pe tition as procedur ally barr ed, and this cour

t did affirm. Ne lson, 371 F.3d at 769, 771. In the proc ess of a ffirming , Nelson did rely upon the express waive r require ment of sec tion 2254(b)(3) in r ejec ting the pe titioner’s argument that the State had wa ived exhaustion. I d. at 770 n.4. Howe ver, the Certificate of Appe alability in Nelson included only

the iss ue of wh e the r N e lso n w a s r e qu ir e d to pe tit ion the Sup re me Court

of Ge or g ia fo r c e rt ior ari in order to exhaust hi s state re medies. I d. at 769. Neither the Certificate of Appe alability nor the dis c us sio n in

the op ini on

a dd re sse d whe the r § 22 54 (b )( 3) a pp lie s n ot o nly

to e xha us tio n, but a lso to a pr oc e dura l ba

r t hat ari se s o ut o f a

fa ilure to e xha

us t. T hu s, we do ub t th at N e lso n d e fi nit ive ly resolves this issue. Howe ver, w e do note that the r esult in Nelson is entirely consistent with our h o l d i n gt o d ay. 23 Mc N ai r’ s pe tit ionf

or la ck of e xhaust ion . T he c la im is the re fo re pr oc ed

ur al ly 11 ba rred . Kell ey , 37 7 F .3dat 1 35 1. This raises an interesting q uestion . Section 2253 (b)(3), by its own language, ap pli es onl y

to the e xhaust ionr equir em en t. I t do es not m en tio n pr oc ed

ur al de fa ult , which, while r elated to exhaustio n, is distinct. H owever , w e ar e persuaded that se ct ion225 4( b) (3 ) ap pli es w ithf ull f or ce in ca se s su cha s th is, w he re the pr oc ed ur al bar ar ise s on ly

a s adir ec t r es ult

of the pe tit ion er ’ s f

ai lur e to e xhaust

his state lawr em ed ie s. 12 It is w el l e sta

bli she d th at

w he n ape tit ion er

ha s f ai le d to e xhaust

his c la im by24

failing to fairly

present it to the state courts and the state court rem edy is no lon ger av ai la ble , the f ai lur e al so c onst itu te s apr oc ed ur al bar. S ee , e . g. , Co le m anv. T hom pson , 501 U . S. 722 , 735 n. 1, 111 S . Ct . 254 6, 255 7 n. 1 ( 1991 ) (c itatio ns om itted) (“ [I] f the petitioner failed to exhaust state rem edies and the court to which the pe tit ion er

w oul d be r equir ed

to pr es en t hi s c la im s inor de r to m ee t the ex haust ionr equir em en t w oul d no wf ind the c la im s pr oc ed

ur al ly barr ed . . . the re is a pr oc ed ur al de fa ult f or pur pose s of f ed er al ha be as . ”) . I n su chasit

ua tio n, the Su pr em e Co urt ha s he ld tha t the pe tit ion er ha s f ai le d to pr ope rl y

e xhaust his state co urt r em ed ie s and the re fo re ha s pr oc ed ur al ly de fa ult ed his c la im s. O ’ Su lli van v. Bo er ck el , 526 U . S. 838 , 848 , 119 S . Ct . 172 8, 173 4 ( 1999 ) (e m pha siz ing that the re le vant i nqui ry

is “ not onl y w he the r a pr iso ne r ha s e xhaust ed his state r em ed ie s, but also whether he has properly exhausted tho se rem edies, i. e. , whether he has fairly presented his claim s to the state courts” (em phasis in original)). Be ca u s e s ec t i o n 2 2 5 4 (b )( 3 ) p ro v i d es th at th e S t at e c an wa i v e M cN ai r’s fai lu re t o p ro pe rly exh au sthi s cl ai m on ly by ex pr es sl y

do in g s o, i t l og ic al ly foll ows that the r es ult ing pr oc ed

ur al bar, w hic h ari se s f

ro m and i s de pe nde nt u

pon the fa ilure to pr ope rl y

e xhaust , c anonl y

be w ai ve d e xpr es sly . S ee F rankl in v . Joh nson , 290 F. 3d 1 223, 123 8 ( 9thCi r. 200 2) ( O ’ Sc annla in, J. , c onc ur ri ng) ( “ T he re c oul d be no pro cedur al ba r in th is cas e wit ho ut [pe ti ti on er’s] fail ur e . . . to e xh au sthi s cl ai m .25

T hus, be ca

use the S ta te ’ s arg um en t i s ba se d up on [ pe tit ion er ’ s] f ai lur e to e xhaust hi s cl ai m , whi ch , as abypro du ct , ren de rs itpro cedur al ly barre d fo r ou r pu rp os es , I wou ldho ldth atth e St at e d idno t wai ve th is arg um en t b y fai li ng to rai se itbe lo w.” (e m p h as i s i n o ri g i n al )) . Th u s , b ec au s e t h e S t at e d i dn o tex p re s s l y wa i v e M cN ai r’s procedural default in this case, we hold th at section 225 4(b)(3) applies and that M c N a i r i s p r o c e du r a l l y b a rr e df

r o m r a i s i n g h i s e x t r a n e o u s e v i d e n c e c l a i m. In so hold ing, we j oin th e T enth Circuit, which has repeatedly applied se ct ion225 4( b) (3 ) an d it s e xpr es s w ai ve r re qui re m en t t o pr oc ed ur al bars ari sin g fr om ape tit ion er ’ s f

ai lur e to p ro pe rl y

e xhaust his state c ourt r em ed ie s. S ee E lli s v. H ar ge tt, 302 F . 3d 1 182, 118 9 ( 10th C ir . 200 2) ; G onz al ez v. Mc K une , 279 F . 3d 922, 924 -2 5 ( 10th C ir . 200 2) ( enbanc ) (r el y ing on s ec tin225 4( b) (3 ) an d it s express wa iver requirem ent in hol ding that a petitioner’ s unexhau sted claim wa s procedurally

barre d even thou gh the State asserted the bar for the f irst tim e at en banc oral ar gum ent); Ha le v. G ibson , 277 F. 3d 12 98, 1327-28 and n.12 (10th Cir. 2000 ). W e al so n ote that a num be r of oth er c ir cu its have dis cu sse d th e iss ue w ith out r es olv ing it . S ee K er

ns v . Ault , 408 F . 3d 4 47, 449 n. 3 ( 8thCi r. 200 5) (i m ply ing that se ct ion225 4( b) (3 ) w oul d a ppl y to a pr oc ed

ur al de fa ult ari sin g ou t of a petitioner’ s failure to properly exhaust state court rem edies, but finding an explicit waiver by

the State) ; Perr

uquet v. Briley , 390 F. 3d 50 5, 515-16 (7th Cir.We a g re e wi th t he ratio na le of

Judg e O’ Sc ann la in’ s c on c ur ri ngop ini on

in 13 F ra nk lin , a nd we re sp e c tf

ull y dis a g re e wi th t

he ma jor ity op ini on wh ic h Jud g e O’ Sc ann la in criticized. We believe that the Fr anklin majority misplaced its relianc e on the Supre me Court’s decision in O’Sullivan. As indicated in the te x t above, the Court in O’ Sulli van re cognized the interplay of the c oncepts of e x haustion and proc edura l bar a nd held that the re levant cla im was proce durally

barr ed bec ause of

the habe as petitioner’ s failure to properly exhaust the claim in the state cour ts. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848, 119 S. C t. at 1734. Indeed, the Fr anklin majority ’s approa ch – rig idly

limit ing the exhaustion concept to situations in which the state re medies we re ava ila ble at th e tim e of

the fe de ra l pe tit ion

– s e e ms t o b e dr awn

mor e fr om Jus tic e Ste ve ns ’ d i s s en ti nO’ S u l l i v an . 5 2 6 U. S . at8 5 1 -5 6 , 1 1 9 S . C t . at1 7 3 5 -3 8 (S t ev en s , J . , d i s s en t i n g) (asse rtingthat the conc ept of e x haustion assumed the c ontinued availability of state r emedies a

nd criticizing the ma

jority for f ocusingon exhaustion i n a conte x t in which state re medies we re no longe r ava ilable). L ike J ustice Stevens’ dissent, the F ranklin majority relies upon a

quotation from Eng le v. I saac , 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28, 102 S. C t. 1558, 1570 n.28 (1982), sug g estingthat the exhaustion concept a

pplies only

when r emedies a

re still available at the time of the fe dera l petition. However , the quotation from Eng le is not only dicta, but it also fails to acc ount for O’Sullivan’s later holdingdiscussing the interplay of the two doc trines when the state re medies are no lon g e r a

va ila ble and re c ognizi ngthe de pe nd e nc y of the ba r u po n th e fa ilure to e xha

us t. 26 2004 ) (c ollecting relevant cases but not resolving th e issue because the State had not a ct ua lly w ai ve d th e pr oc ed

ur al bar ar isi ng o ut o f the pe tit ion er ’ s f ai lur e to exhaust). O nly

the Ninth Circuit, in its op inion in Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231, has ad op te d t he co nt rary vie w. 13 In holdin g that section 22 54(b)(3) applies to this particular proce dural bar, we em phasize that this h oldin g applies on ly to a procedural bar that arises out of a fa ilure to ex haust

state r em ed ie s. S uc h apr oc ed ur al bar is t o be dis tin gui she d f ro m one that ari se s, not

be ca use of af ai lur e to e xhaust , but

r athe r be ca

use the state court will not hear the cla im due to a state procedural bar. For e xam ple, m ost states re qui re c ont em

por an eo us o bj ec tio ns and o ft ende cl ine to en te rt ai n ac la im be ca use of af ai lur e to o bj ec t. S uc h ac la im m ay w el l be f ull y e xhaust ed , but

ne ve rthe le ssIndeed, our own ca se of Romine v. He ad, 253 F .3d 1349 (11 Cir. 2001), is such a th 14 c a se . T he re , th e re le va

nt c la im w a s c le arl y

e xha us te d, havin gbe e n r a ise d o n d ir e c t a pp e a l and in the state ha

beas c ourt. The latter

court de clined to addr ess the cla im because it had alre ady been addre ssed and de cided by the Geor g ia Supreme Court. I d. at 1363. The f eder al district court noted that Romine had fa iled to preser ve the issue by

failingto object at trial, but that there was no proce dural ba

r bec ause the Geor g ia Supreme Court ha d decide d the issue on the mer its. Howeve r, this court noted that e ven “if there wer e any

proce dural ba

r ... , the State ha s waived it. The State did not asser

t a proc edura l bar to this specific c laim in the district court, and ha s not argued one a s to it i n this [ c]ourt.” I d. at 1364. Romine is dist inguishe d from the instant ca se, and provide s no guidance for it, bec ause the only possible proce dural ba

r there did not arise out of a f ailure to e x haust state re medies. Rather , the possible bar r esulted fr om a fa ilure to object at tr ia l. I nd e e d, the c la im w a s f

ull y e xha us te d. We n ote a lso tha

t th e Rom ine pa

ne l pr op e rl y

did not mention § 2254(b)(3). Simi larl y , Jac ks on

v. John so n, 19 4 F .3 d 6 41 , 6 52 n. 35 (5 Cir . 1 99 9) , d e c lin e d to a pp ly th § 2254(b)( 3) to a proc edura l bar that did not arise from a f ailure to e x haust state re medies. Rather, the de fault in that ca se ar ose fr om a fa ilure to comply with Texas’ contempora

neous objection rule. I d. at 651-52. See also Fr anklin v. J ohnson, 290 F.3d at 1238-39 (O’ Scannlain, J ., concur ring ) (similarly

distinguishing Jackson v. Johnson).

27 pr oc ed ur al ly barr ed in fe de ra l c ourt be ca

use of the S ta te ’ s in voc at ionof it s bar fo r fa ilure to obj ec t. I n su chac as e, the pr oc ed ur al bar in f

ed er al c ourt ha s no thi ng t o d o wi t h e x h au s t i o n , an dth e r e f o r e s e c t i o n 2 2 5 4 ( b ) ( 3 ) wo u l dn o tap p l y. 14 Insho rt , the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly c onc lud ed

that M cN ai r’ s e xtr an eo us ev ide nc e cl ai m

is pr oc ed ur al ly barr ed due to la ck

of e xhaust ion , but

it e rr ed in concludin g that the State has w aived the procedural bar. A ccordingly , the district co urt sh oul d have dis m iss ed thi s c la im

a s pr oc ed

ur al ly barr ed . 2. T he Me ri ts Even if McN air’ s scattered r efer ences to feder al lawin his state court proceedings did satisfy

the exhaustio n requirem ent, or e ven if the State had w aived the pr oc ed

ur al bar, and w e re ite rate that ne ith er is tr ue in thi s c as e, Mc N ai r sti llI f M c Na ir ’s sc atte re d r e fe re nc e s to fe de ra l la w i n s tate c ourt

we re e no ugh to 15 satisfy the exhaustion requireme nt, then it is clear the de novo revie w would be a ppropriate . See Romine v. Head, 253 F .3d1349, 1365 (11th Cir. 2001) (holdingthat this court applies de novo revie w when a

state cour

t fails to apply

fede ral lawor an ide ntical state lawrule to a f eder al claim). On the other ha

nd, if the fe dera l claim was not fa irly prese nted to the state c ourts, but the proce dural de fault wa s waived, the appropr iate re view is less clea r. 28 w oul d no t be e nti tle d to r el ie f on this c la im . I n th e pe cu liar ci rc um stanc es of thi s al te rn at ive hol din g, w e w ill a ssum e ar gue ndo, but e xpr es sly

not de ci de , that the cl ai m is be st r ev ie w ed

de nov o. H ow ev er , r el ev an t f ind ing s of

f ac t by the state 15 co urt are sti ll pr es um ed

c or re ct abse nt c le ar

and c onvi nc ing e vid en ce to the contrary . 28 U. S. C. § 225 4(e)( 1). U nde r fe de ra l l aw , any

e vid en ce that do es not

“ co m e fr om

the w itn es s st an d in a pub lic c ourtr oom

w he re the re is fu ll j udi ci al pr ote ct ionof the de fe ndant’ s r igh t of c onf ro ntatio n, of

c ro ss- ex am inatio n, and o f co unse l” is pr es um pti ve ly prej udicial. T urner, 379 U.S . at 473, 85 S. C t. at 550; see also Rem m er, 347 U.S . at 229, 74 S . Ct . a t 45 1; M ar tin ez , 14 F . 3d at 55 0. I n or de r to g ive r ise to thi s pr es um pti on, ade fe ndant n ee d on ly de m onstrate that j ur or s ha d c ont ac t w ith ex tr ins ic e vid en ce . Mart ine z, 14 F . 3d at 55 0. O nc e the de fe ndant m ak es thi s showing, the State bears the burden of rebutting th e presum ption by showing that th e juro rs ’ co ns id erat io n o f th e ex tri ns ic ev id en ce was ha rm le ss to th e d efen da nt . Rem m er, 347 U.S . at 229, 74 S. C t. at 451; Martinez, 14 F.3d at 550. When ev al ua tin g w he the r the S tate ha s m et it s burd en , c ourts are to co nsi de r the tot al ity29

of the c ir cum stanc es sur

ro undi ng the intro duc tio n of the e xtr an eo us e vid en ce to the jury. See Re m

m er v . Uni te d S ta te s, 3 50 U.S. 37 7, 3 79 , 76 S. Ct. 4 25 , 42 6 (1 95 6) . Our c ase lawindicates that the factors to be considered include the heavy burden on the S ta te , the na tur e of the e xtr ins ic e vid en ce , howthe e vid en ce r ea ch ed the j ur y , and the str en gthof

the S ta te ’ s c as e. Mart ine z, 14 F . 3d at 55 0. Beca use it is un dispu ted that juror s in the gui lt phase of McN air’ s trial co nsi de re d e xtr ins ic e vid en ce dur ing the ir de lib er at ion s, our

ana ly sis f

oc use s on w he the r the S ta te c anr eb ut the r es ult ing pr es um pti on o f pr ej udi ce . W e be lie ve that thr ee f

ac tor s are c ru ci al to the ana ly sis in thi s c as e: ( 1) the f ac tua l f ind ing s of the state c ourt, ( 2) the m anne r in whic h th e ev ide nc e re ac he d th e j ur y , and ( 3) the str en gthof

the S ta te ’ s c as e ag ai nst

Mc N ai r. E ac h w ill be dis cu sse d intur n. Mc N ai r ra ise d hi s c ha lle nge to the j ur y ’ s c onsi de ratio n of

e xtr an eo us m aterial during the state collatera l proceedings. Both the trial court and the Court of Cr im ina l Appe al s c ar ef

ull y c onsi de re d th e cl ai m

on the m er its pur suant t o st at e law , and b othc ourts m ad e cr uc ia l f ind ing s of

f ac t whic h are r el ev an t t o our analy sis of the issu e under feder al law . Although McN air ar gued that th e fore m an urged the juror s to find McNair guilt y based on passages from

the Bible, the tr ial court rej ected that ar gum ent, f indin g as a fa ct that two passages w ere read and that

“ [n ] ei the r of

the se sc ri pture s c ont ai n m at er ia l whic h w oul d e nc our ag e j ur or s to f indThe two B ible verse s rea d included the f amiliar Psalm 121, and Luke 6:37. The 16 latte r v e rs e re a ds a s f

oll ow s: “ Judg e no t, a

nd y e sh a ll n ot b e jud g e d; c on de mn n ot a nd y e sh a ll not be conde mned; forg ive, and ye shall be f org iven ....” 30 a de fe ndant g uil ty

or to re co m m en d th e de ath pe na lty . ” Mc N ai r v. S ta te , 706 16 So .2dat 8 37 (qu ot in g t he Ru le 32 co ur t’s o rd er). The Co ur t o f Cri m in al App eal s al so m ad e se ve ral cru ci al fin di ng s o f fac t. Co nf irm ing the Ru le 32 c ourt’ s f ind ing , it f ound that M cN ai r’ s “ as se rt ion s inhis br ie fs . . . that [ D av is, the m ini ste r w ho s er ve d a s f or em an ] ur ge d th e j ur or s to f ind him gui lty ba se d onpa ssa ge s f

ro m the Bi ble and tha t the j ur y r el ie d onthe Bi ble in fin di ng hi m

gu il ty are no t s up po rte d b y th e rec or d.” McNai r, 70 6 S o.2 d a t 8 38 . T he Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s a lso m ad e cr uc ia l f ind ing s w ithr es pe ct

to the na tur e an d c hara ct er

of the r ea din gs, the ir

int en t, and the ir

e ff ec t onthe j ur

y . T he se fi ndi ngs inc lud e the f

oll ow ing : [T ] he e xtr an eo us m at er ia l, i. e. , r ea din g f ro m the Bi ble and p ray ing in the j ur y r oom dur ing de lib er at ion s, w as not of suc h ac hara ct er

or na tur e as to ind ic at e bia s or c or ru pti on o r m isc ondu ct

that m igh t have af fe ct ed the ve rd ic t.

... Fr om the te sti m ony

a t the he ar ing , w e co nc lud e that the pr ay er s and sc ri pture r ea din gs i n th e j ur y r oom w er e int en de d to e nc our ag e, and ha d th e ef

fe ct of e nc our ag ing , the j ur or s to take the ir obl igatio n se ri ousl y and t o de ci de the que sti on o f gui lt or inn oc en ce ba se d on ly on th e ev id en ce p res en te d fr om th e wit ne ss st an d i n o pe n c ou rt.

...Ind e e d, e ve n if the state c ourt

fi nd ing s o f f

a c t w e re e nti tle d to no de fe re nc e at a ll, 17 our own e x amination of the e vidence indicates that nothingjudgme ntal or pre judicial was re ad. 31 Af ai r re ad ing of

[ D av is’ s] te sti m ony , in its e nti re ty , le ad s in es ca pably to the c onc lus ionthat hi s r ea din gs f ro m the Bi ble and p ray er s inthe j ury room .. . did not encourage its m em bers to consid er anything other than the evidence presented in the court in arriving at a verdict. Ther e is n oth ing he re to sugg es t tha t the j ur y did anythi ng o the r than ba se it s verdict on the evidence presented in open cou rt in the trial of the ca se. Id . a t 83 8. T he se f

ind ing s of

f ac t are of c our se e nti tle d to apr es um pti on o f correc tness, unless McNair dem onstrates by

clear and convin cing evidence that th ey are erro ne ou s. 2 8 U.S.C. § 22 54 (e)( 1) . McNai r ha s m ad e n o s uc h s ho win g. W e thu s r ea dil y

c onc lud e that the f

or eg oin g st at e co urt f

ind ing s of

f ac t e sta bli sh the relevant fa cts in this case. Moreover, our own reviewof the rec ord persuades us tha t the state c ourt f

ind ing s are a m

ply sup porte d. 17 Be ca use w e knowthe inn oc uous na tur e of the pa ssa ge s th at

D av is r ea d, and be ca use w e knowthat the pa ssa ge s and p ray er s m er el y ha d th e “ ef

fe ct of en co ur ag ing the j ur or s to take the ir obl igatio ns s er iou sly

and t o de ci de the que sti on of gui lt or inn oc en ce ba se d on ly

on the e vid en ce , ” w e re ad ily c onc lud e that the St at e h as eas il y

carr ie d i ts bu rd en of r eb ut ti ng th e p res um pt io n o f pr ejud ic e. In addition to the inno cuous natu re of the e xtrinsic evidence and the fact that itdi d n ot di st ract th e jury from ba si ng it s v erd ic t o n t he ev id en ce p res en te d, t wo other factors indicated in the case law a lso stron gly favor the State. As the districtThe instant ca se is unlike J ones v. Ke mp, 706 F. Supp. at 1560, wher e the juror s 18 consulted a B ible with the express permission of the trial judg e. The instant case is a lso very differ ent from Romine, 253 F .3d at 1358-71, whic h addre ssed a r elated due proce ss issue. The challeng e ther e wa s to a closingargument in which the prose cutor urg ed the juror s in the sentenc ing pha se to follow the law of God, which the pr osecutor a rgued mandates death for one who kills his parents. I d. at 1368-69. Additionally , the ca se itself wa s saturate d with evidence relating to re ligion; the jury was seque stered dur ing de liberations in a B aptist church; a nd there was e vidence that at least one or two jurors we re influe nced by the prosec utor’s improper argument. Be cause a sepa rate jury considere d the death penalty , the extraneous evide nce 19 issue relates only

to the guilt phase. 32 co urt no te d, the e xtr an eo us e vid en ce in thi s c as e w as br ough t i n by aj ur or , and d id no t ca rry th e im pr im aturof t he co ur t. McNai r, 30 2 F . Sup p. 2 d a t 1 30 4. 18 A ddi tio na lly , the state of fe re d ov er

w he lm ing and l ar ge ly

unc ont es te d e vid en ce of Mc N ai r’ s gu ilt . B othof the se f ac tor s f av or the state , and, w he n c om bin ed w ith 19 the state ’ s f

ind ing s of

f ac t, r ea dil y

e sta bli sh tha t the j ur

y ’ s c onsi de ratio n of ex tra ne ou s ev id en ce was ha rm le ss in th is cas e. Beca use the state could su ccessfully rebut the presum

ption of prej udice ar isi ng f ro m the j ur y ’ s c onsi de ratio n of

e xtr an eo us e vid en ce , Mc N ai r w oul d no t have be ene nti tle d to r el ie f on this c la im e ve n if he ha d pr ope rl y

r ai se d it in state co ur t. The di st ric t co ur t p ro pe rly rejecte d t hi s cl ai m . C . R ac ialD isc ri m in at ion in Ju ryS el ec ti on Mc N ai r’ s f

ina l c la im is that the S ta te ’ s us e of

pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s to str ike a num be r of A fr ic an -A m er ic anpot en tia l j ur or s vi olate d hi s F ourte en th A m en dm en t33

ri ght s un de r Batso n v. K en tuc ky , 476 U . S. 79, 106 S . Ct . 171 2 ( 1986 ). Mc N ai r ra ise d th is c la im

be fo re the Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s and the S upr em e Co urt of A la bam a on d ir ec t a

ppe al , and b othc ourts d en ie d r el ie f. E x part e Mc N ai r, 653 S o. 2d 35 3, 354-58 (Ala. 1994 ); McN air, 653 So. 2d at 323. T he district court, af ter re vie w ing the state c ourt op ini ons an d c ondu ct ing an in de pe nde nt r ev ie wof the re co rd , l i k ew i s e d en i edre l i ef o n th i s cl ai m . M cN ai r, 3 0 7 F. Sup p . 2 dat1 2 9 3 . We ag re e that M cN ai r ha s no t m ad e out ac la im f or r el ie f unde r Batso n. InBatso n, the U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt e sta bli she d athr ee -s te p te st f or ev al ua tin g c la im s of

r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n inj ur y se le ct ion . T he de fe ndant m ust fi rs t e sta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se by

pr oduc ing e vid en ce suf

fi ci en t t o su

ppor t the in fere nc e th atth e p ro se cu to r ex erci se d p erem pt ory ch al le ng es on th e b as is of r ace. John son v. California, ___ U.S . ___, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S . at 9 6 , 1 0 6 S. Ct . a t1 7 2 3 . Th e b u rd en th en s h i ft s t o th e S t at e t o re b u tth e d ef en d an t ’s pr im a fa ci e ca se by

of fe ri ng r ac e- ne utr al e xpl an at ion s f or it s c ha lle nge s. B at son, 476 U . S. a t 97 , 106 S . Ct . a t 17 23. T he S ta te ’ s pr of fe re d e xpl an at iona t this sta ge ne ed not be “pe rs ua siv e or

e ve n pl au sib le . . . the iss ue is the f ac ia l va lid ity

of the pr ose cu tor ’ s e xpl an at ion . ” P urke tt v. E le m , 514 S . Ct . 765 , 768 , 115 S . Ct . 176 9, 17 71 (19 95 ) (i nt ern al qu ot at io n o m it te d) . If both sides carry

their burdens, it is left to the court to determ ine whether34

th e d efen da nt ha s p ro ve n p ur po se fu l d is cri m in at io n. Id . at 9 8, 1 06 S. Ct. at 17 24 . At this point , “ the decisive questio n will be w hether counsel’ s race -neutral explana tio n . . . sho uld

be be lie ve d. ” H er

nande z v. N ewY ork, 500 U . S. 352 , 365 , 111 S. Ct . 185 9, 186 9 ( 1991 ) (p lur al ity opi nio n) . T his is “ a pur e iss ue of f ac t, subject to re view under a defere ntial standard . . . [and] peculiarly within a trial jud ge ’s pro vi nc e.” Id . at 3 64 -6 5; 11 1 S . Ct. at18 69 (in te rn al qu ot at io n o m it te d) . A lso , be ca

use thi s c la im

w as de ci de d onthe m er its by the A la bam a co urts, Mc N ai r i s n o ten t i t l edt o h ab ea s re l i ef u n l es s h e c an “ d emo n s t ra t e t h at [t h e] s t at e c o u rt ’s fi ndi ng o f the abse nc e of

pur pose fu l di sc ri m inatio n w as inc or re ct by c le ar and convin cing evidence . . . and that the correspondin g factual deter m ination wa s

‘ objec tively

unreasonable’ in ligh t of the rec ord.” Miller-E l v. Cockre ll, 537 U. S. 322, 348 , 123 S . Ct . 102 9, 104 5 ( 2003 ); se e 28 U . S. C. § 22 54( d) -( e) ; M ill er -E l v. D re tke , 545 U . S. ___ , 125 S . Ct . 231 7, 232 5 ( 2005 ). T his standard is de m an din g, but not ins urm ount ab le . Mi lle r- E l, 545 U . S. a t __ _, 125 S . Ct . a t 23 25. McN air’ s trial j ury

wa s selected fr om

a sixty -four m em

ber venire that inc lud ed e igh te enA fr ic an -A m er ic an s. E x part e Mc N ai r, 653 S o. 2d at 35 5. T he pr ose cu tor

use d e le ve n of

his tw en ty -s ix p er em

pto ry c ha lle nge s to str ike A fr ic an Am ericans; the rem aining seven Af rican-A m erican m em

bers of the venire ser

vedThe Supreme Court of Alabama noted that the c ounty from which the jury

pool 20 was dra wn was a pproxi mately

forty perc ent black, the venire twenty -eight perc ent black, a nd the ultimate jury

fifty -eight perc ent black. McNair, 653 So. 2d at 356. It held that these statistics ne g ate d a fi nd ingof

dis pa rate imp a c t and , a s a

pa rt of its tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s a

na ly sis , that they wer e a r eleva

nt fac tor weighing a g ainst a findingof discriminatory intent. I d. After vie wi ngthe tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s, we c ann ot c on c lud e that th is w a s a n unr e a so na

ble de te rm inatio n o f t

he fa c ts. 35 on McNair ’ s jur

y . Id. McN air ar gues bot h that the totalit y of the circ um stances 20 of the j ury

selection process indicates a Batson viol ation and th at three par ticular str ike s c onst itu te d vi olatio ns. W e ad dr es s e ac h of the se c la im s intur

n. 1. T he Jur y S el ec tio n P ro ce ss a s aWhol e Mc N ai r pr es en ts thr ee arg um en ts i nte nde d to c as t do ubt on the j ur

y se le ct ion pr oc es s: ( 1) that the dis tr ic t atto rn ey ’ s of fi ce that handl ed

Mc N ai r’ s pr ose cu tio n ha s ahis tor

y of r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n; ( 2) that the pr ose cu tor did not que sti on t enof the e le ve n stri ck enA fr ic an -A m er ic anve nir e m em be rs about

the spe ci fi c ar ea

of co nc er n th at pr om pte d th e use of

the pe re m

pto ry c ha lle nge ; and ( 3) that the prosecutor relied on “ vague and uns ubstant iated notes” from an assistant dis trict attor ne y a s th e ba sis f

or c ha lle ngi ng f

ive of the ve nir e m em

be rs . W e re ad ily dis co unt the latte r tw o a sse rt ion s. T he pr ose cu tor ’ s f ai lur e to que sti on m ost

of the stricken Af

rican-A m erican venire m em bers about the specific concern that prom pted the use of the challenge is not very persuasive in this case. For e xam ple, it is n ot l ike ly

to have be enpr oduc tiv e to que sti on a j ur or about a ge or apr ior36

m isd em eanor

or aba d r ep utatio n. Mo re ove r, the pr ose cu tor a lso str uc k w hit e j urors without such sp ecific questio ning . W ith respect to McN air’ s assertion that the pr ose cu tor

r el ie d onva gue and unsub stanti at ed not es f ro m his a ssi stant, Mc N ai r fa ils to expla in why

apr ose cu tor ’ s r el ianc e on n ote s and i nf orm at ionf

ur nis he d by ana ssi stant i s any

ind ic at iona t a ll of

r ac ia l bi as . F urthe rm or e, our r ev ie wof

the no te s d oe s n ot pe rs ua de us th atth ey were u nd ul y

va gu e o r un su bs ta nt ia te d. A lth oughMc N ai r’ s a sse rt ionthat the dis tr ic t atto rn ey ’ s of fi ce ha d ahis tor

y of ra ci al dis cr im inatio n is am atte r of som e co nc er

n, w e w ill c onsi de r that a s part of our tot al ity of the c ir cum stanc es ana ly sis a ft er dis cu ssi ng M cN ai r’ s c ha lle nge s w ith res pe ctto in di vi du al juro rs . 2. T he Individu al Challenges Ade fe ndant c ane sta

bli sh a Batso n vi olatio n by

de m onstratin g th at

any sin gle str ike w as the r es ult of pur pose fu l di sc ri m inatio n. C oc hr anv. H er ri ng, 43 F. 3d 1 404, 141 2 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . I n an a tte m pt t o do thi s, Mc N ai r ar gue s th at his pr ose cu tor s pe re m

pto ri ly c ha lle nge d th re e spe ci fi c ve nir e m em be rs in vio la tio n of Batson. Be fore discussing the m erits of ea ch claim , w e note that in no in stances does McNair

argue that the prosecutor’ s proffer ed rea sons for the strikes w ere fa ci al ly dis cr im inator

y . W e al so n ote that the state tr ia l c ourt m ad e a fi ndi ng o f f a c tth a tth e s t r i k e s w e r e n o tr a c i a l l y mo t i v a t e d , an dth atth e A l ab a maS up r e me37

Court concluded th at the trial court’ s ruling was not clearly err oneous . McN air, 653 So . 2d at 35 5- 56. T hus, the onl y que sti on f

ac ing thi s c ourt i s w he the r Mc N ai r can show by

clear and convin cing evidence that the state court finding wa s er ro ne ous. M cN ai r’s fi rs tcl ai m

fo cu s es o n J ames Mc Al l i s t er . Th e p ro s ec u t o r’s proffer ed rea son for striking McA llister wa s that the latter w as not from He nry County . In response to a questio n during voir dire, McA llister gave his address as Route 3, Box 605, w hich is in Henry County , and stated that he worked in Eufala , A la bam a, w hic h is not

in H enry Co unty . H e re m ai ne d si le nt whe n th e tr ia l j udge as ke d th e en tir e ve nir e if

any of the m r es ide d ou tsi de of

H enry Co unty . F ina lly , the not es sup pli ed

by the pr ose cu tor ’ s a ssi stant s ugge ste d th at Mc A lli ste r did

not li ve in H enry Co unty . P re se nte d w iththi s in fo rm at ion , the pr ose cu tor r ea sona bly c oul d have be lie ve d th at

Mc A lli ste r did

not li ve in H enry

Co unty . Mc A lli ste r cl earl y worked in another county , his address m ay have im plied residence in another co unty , and h is s ile nc e in the f ac e of age ne ra l qu es tio n f

ro m the tr ia l j udge , w hil e inf orm at ive , is not

dis posi tiv e. A lth oughthe pr ose cu tor ’ s r ea son fo r str iki ng Mc A lli ste r w as ba se d onabe lie f that ul tim at el y pr ove d in co rr ec t, thi s do es not establish b y

clear and convin cing evidence that the state court’ s finding of fac t wa s erro ne ou s, an d M cNai r pr es en ts no ad di ti on al ev id en ce t o s up po rt h is co nt en ti on .38

McN air’ s next claim

focuses on Allen Boatw right. T he prosecutor struck Boatwr ight b ecause the latter had a prior m isdem eanor conviction. McN air ar gues that this r ea son w as pr et ex tua l be ca use the pr ose cu tor

ha d e ar lie r, w he n a ski ng i f any venire m em

bers or their r elatives or close frie nds had b een prosecuted by that part ic ular dis tr ic t atto rn ey ’ s of fi ce , state d th at

he w as not

int er es te d in m isd em eanor s. T his arg um en t i s no t pe rs ua siv e. A ft er narr ow ing the f

ie ld som ew hat with his initi al inquiry , the prosecutor r easonably could have decided that, of the r em aining v enire m em bers, he would prefer

those without p rior cr im inal violatio ns. W e also note that the prosecutor struck white venire m em bers who had pr ior m isd em eanor

c onvi ct ion s. T he pr ose cu tor ’ s pr of fe re d r ea son w as pla

usi ble an d r ac e- ne utr al , and M cN ai r of fe rs no e vid en ce to supp ort hi s c la im of pr et ex t. The subj ect of Mc Na ir’ s third claim is David Mar sh. T he prosecutor struck Mars h onthe ba sis of

ar ec om m en da tio n f

ro m an a ssi stant d istri ct

a tto rn ey w ho kne wMars h and h is a

ppare ntl y poo r re put at ionin the c om m uni ty . T his r ea son is fa ci al ly ne utr al , and M cN ai r of

fe re d no e vid en ce that i t w as pr et ex tua l. I n th e absence of any

evidence that the state’ s proffer ed fac ially neutral rea son was p re t ex tu al , M cN ai r c an n o to v er co m e t h e p re s u m p t i o n fa v o ri n g th e s t at e c o u rt ’s de te rm inatio n. 3. T he Totality

of the Circ um stances39

A ft er ac ar ef ul r ev ie wof

the r ec or d, w e cannot

c onc lud e that the tot al ity of t h e c i rc u m s t an ce s p ro v i d es cl ea r a n dco n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce th at th e s t at e c o u rt ’s fin di ng of t he ab se nc e o f pu rp os efu l d is cri m in at io n was in co rrec t, n orcan we co nc lud e that the c ourt’ s c or re spon din g f

ac tua l de te rm inatio n w as obj ec tiv el y unr ea sona

ble in lig ht o f the r ec or d be fo re the c ourt. A s no te d inthe pr ec ed ing d i s cu s s i o n , M cN ai r o ff

er s v i rt u al l y n o ev i d en ce t o i n d i ca t e t h at th e p ro s ec u t o r’s ar t i cu l at edl eg i t i m at e r ea s o n s fo r t h e i n d i v i du al s t ri k es we re p re t ex tu al . M cN ai r’s ch al le ng es in th atreg ardare m ere s pe cu la ti on lac ki ng an y pe rs ua si ve for ce. The only argum ent with any

force at all is McN air’ s list of cases in which co nvi ct ion s ob ta ine d by

thi s di str ic t atto rn ey ’ s of fi ce have be enr ev er se d or criticized on the basis of Batson. W e cannot conclude that thi s argum ent can car ry Mc N ai r’ s he av y

bur de n. W e not e ini tia lly that M cN ai r him se lf

a dm its that a pr ose cu tor ’ s hi sto ry

of dis cr im inatio n, w hil e a re le vant c onsi de ratio n, is not dispo sitive. In addition, McN air has whollyfailed to connect any conduct cr iti ci ze d inthe c ite d c as es to Mc N ai r’ s own pr ose cu tor , m uc h le ss h is c ondu ct

in thi s c as e. S uc h di sc onne ct ed his tor y c annot c ar ry Mc N ai r’ s burd en , e spe ci al ly w he n th e pr ose cu tor ’ s art ic ulate d, le git im at e re as ons fo r ea chstr ike r em ai nIn sug g estingthat this court’s opinion in Cochran, 43 F .3d at 1410, implies that 21 evidenc e such a s that prese nted by McNa ir ca

n be dete rminative of a

Batson claim, the district court e ither exag g erates the evide nce in the instant c ase, misre ads Cochra n, or both. In Cochran, there was strongevidenc e that the pr osecutor’ s office had a policy of strikingblack ve nire members on the ba sis of their ra ce in e ffe ct at the time of de fenda nt’s trial. Severa l former prosec utors who serve d at the re levant time so testified, and Cochr an’s own pr osecutor te stified that bl a c k ju

ro rs we re le ss r e lia

ble , mo re dis tr

us tf ul o f t he po lic e , le ss l ike ly

to r e tur n a de ath pe na lty , a nd mor e lik e ly

to i de nti fy

wi th a bla c k d e fe nd ant. I d. Coc hr an’ s p ro se c uto r a lso provided no spec ific non-r acia l rea sons for his strikes in that case . On the basis of that evidence , it was clea

r that ra ce w as a de terminingfac tor in the exercise of pere mptory

challeng es re moving se ve n o f n ine ava ila

ble bla c k ju

ro rs , le avin gon ly

on e to s e rv e , p lus on e a lte rn ate . A s in dic ate d in the text, t he cir cumstance s here are very differ ent. The State of

fer ed leg itimate, non-rac ial rea sons for ea ch strike, a

nd McNa ir proff

ere d virtually

no evidenc e indicatingthat the re asons we re pr e te xtua l. And

in t his c a se , th e state c ourt s f ound a s a fa c t th at th e str ike s w e re no t r a c ia lly mot ivate d. Mc Na ir

ha s f a ile d to sh owby

c le ar a nd c onvin c inge vid e nc e tha

t th e fi nd ingis err oneous. 40 virtua lly uni m pe ac he d. 21 H av ing c onsi de re d th e tot al ity of the c ir cum stanc es , and i n li ght of the pr es um pt io n e njo y edby the st at e co ur t fi nd in gs of f act , 28 U.S.C. §2 25 4( e)(1 ), we cannot conclud e that McN air has re butted th e presum ption of corr ectness by

clear and convin cing evidence. A ccordingly , w e cannot conclude that the state court de ci sio n w as ba se d onan un re as ona ble de te rm inatio n of

f ac ts i n li ght

of the evidence presented to the state court, 24 U .S .C. 2254 (d)(2); and thu s, the district co ur t co rrec tl y

de ni edhabe as co rp us rel ie f wit h re sp ectto th is Bat so n c la im .

IV. CO NC LUS ION W e hold that th e district court err ed in granting McN air an e videnti ary41

he ar ing and i n ho ldi ng tha t he w as e nti tle d to ha be as r el ie f on h is i ne ff

ec tiv e assistance of counsel claim . The district court’ s order granting habeas relief on that cl ai m is the re fo re RE V E RS E D . W e al so h old that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in fa ili ng to ap pl y th e p ro cedur al ba r wit h re sp ectto McNai r’s ex tra ne ou s ev id en ce cl ai m . H ow ev er , w e ne ed

not dis tur b th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r on tha t i ssu e, a s it c or re ct ly he ld tha t M cN ai r w as not e nti tle d to r el ie f on the m er its . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso co rr ec tly he ld tha t M cN ai r w as not e nti tle d to r el ie f on h is B at son cl ai m s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s or de r de ny ing Mc N ai r’ s pe tit ionw ithr es pe ct to his e xtr an eo us ev id en ce cl ai m

an d B at so n c la im s i s t he refo re AFFI RMED.

AF FIRMED IN P AR T A ND RE VER SED I N P AR T.