[Cite as State v. McWilliams, 2024-Ohio-97.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellant

v. 

DEREK ULLMAN McWILLIAMS

 Appellee

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

C.A. No. 2023-CA-16

Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 014

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas 

Court)

. . . . . . . . . . .

O P I N I O N

Rendered on January 12, 2024

. . . . . . . . . . . 

KEVIN S. TALEBI & JANE A. NAPIER, Attorneys for Appellant

 

ADDIE J. KING, Attorney for Appellee

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant the State of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Champaign 

County Common Pleas Court that acquitted Appellee Derek Ullman McWilliams of 

aggravated possession of drugs pursuant to a Crim.R. 29 motion. This Court granted 

leave to appeal based on the State’s argument that it is not appealing the judgment of 

acquittal but is instead seeking review of a discreet legal issue regarding venue that is 
-2-

capable of repetition, yet evading review. Because we find that the trial court erred in 

refusing to consider whether venue could be appropriate pursuant to R.C. 2901.12(H)(3), 

the State’s assignment of error is sustained; however, we do not disturb the judgment of 

acquittal.

I. Procedural History and Facts

{¶ 2} On January 3, 2023, McWilliams was indicted by the Champaign County 

grand jury on one count of aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A),(C)(1)(a), a felony of the fifth degree; one count of operating a vehicle while 

under the influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled 

substance (“OVI”) (500 ng/ml or more of methamphetamine in urine), in violation of R.C. 

4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ix),(G)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and one count of OVI

(500ng/ml or more amphetamine in urine), in violation of R.C. 

4511.19(A)(1)(j)(i),(G)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree. Each of the offenses 

listed in the indictment was alleged to have occurred in Champaign County, Ohio. 

{¶ 3} McWilliams entered a not guilty plea at his arraignment, waived his right to a 

jury trial, and proceeded to a bench trial on April 11, 2023. At trial, the State presented 

the testimony of two witnesses: Deputy Daniel Fisher and Parole Officer Victor Bullock.

{¶ 4} Deputy Daniel Fisher, a four-year veteran of the Champaign County Sheriff’s 

Office, testified that on September 17, 2022, he was running routine checks on vehicle 

registrations while traveling southbound on State Route 4. While running a check of 

McWilliams’ vehicle registration, Deputy Fisher discovered that McWilliams’ driver’s 

license was suspended. Fisher made a traffic stop and approached the vehicle from the 
-3-

passenger side. McWilliams was in the driver’s seat while Shelby Riley was in the 

passenger seat. Fisher requested McWilliams’ license and, while he was searching for 

it, McWilliams explained why his license was suspended. McWilliams was speaking very 

fast, and his motions appeared erratic, jerking from side to side. 

{¶ 5} Deputy Fisher asked if there was anything illegal in the car, and McWilliams 

pulled a bag containing a green leafy substance from the center console; he claimed it 

was CBD weed that he could purchase at any gas station. Riley claimed to have a 

medical marijuana card, pulled out a dispensary container from the glove box, and 

showed Fisher that it had some “roaches” in it. McWilliams provided his identification 

card showing that his address was in Union County, Ohio. Riley’s address was identified 

as being in Logan County, Ohio. 

{¶ 6} Deputy Fisher asked the occupants to get out of the vehicle in order to 

conduct a search of the car. During the search, methamphetamine was discovered in a 

bag which had originally been under the front passenger’s seat of the vehicle but was 

surreptitiously moved by Riley in an attempt to conceal it. McWilliams told Fisher that he 

had picked up Riley to take her to her mother’s house in Clark County but denied knowing 

anything about drugs in his car. Riley was later charged and convicted related to the

methamphetamine that was recovered from the vehicle.

{¶ 7} Deputy Fisher testified that, during the traffic stop, McWilliams had very 

erratic movements and refused to look at Fisher, or if he did, then he would look away 

very fast. When McWilliams was looking for his identification card, his movements were 

jerky and twitchy. Fisher attributed McWilliams’ mannerisms to methamphetamine use 
-4-

and therefore asked McWilliams to consent to a urine sample. McWilliams stated that 

“he would be hot because he parties,” meaning that he would test positive for drugs. 

Fisher asked what McWilliams would be “hot” for, and McWilliams responded, “marijuana 

and some lines.” When Fisher asked for clarification as to the “lines” substance, 

McWilliams stated “cocaine, methamphetamine, and probably some meds.” Tr. 22. 

McWilliams claimed to have “partied” on Monday, which was five days prior to the traffic 

stop. He did not identify where he partied. 

{¶ 8} Deputy Fisher collected a sample of McWilliams’ urine, which was sent to the 

Ohio State Patrol Crime Laboratory. The results of the testing, which were stipulated to 

by the parties, indicated that the urine screen was positive for methamphetamine with 

results greater than 1,000 ng/mL and was positive for amphetamine with results greater 

than 1,000 ng/mL. Fisher testified that methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled 

substance. 

{¶ 9} State of Ohio Parole Officer Victor Bullock testified that he had been a parole 

officer for 20 years and he was supervising McWilliams on post-release control out of 

Union County. Officer Bullock discussed the September 17, 2022 traffic stop with 

McWilliams, who denied knowing anything about the drugs that were in the car that day, 

but admitted to having used a lot of cocaine as well as methamphetamines and marijuana. 

As a result, Bullock ordered McWilliams to get himself into treatment. When questioned

if he asked McWilliams whether McWilliams had used drugs on the date of the traffic stop, 

Bullock responded, “Well, the conversation was – well, he did admit that he did use. 

[McWilliams] had confirmed possession, that he was partying, using lots of cocaine, but 
-5-

he did not give me a time frame.” Tr. 31. 

{¶ 10} Following the admission of the State’s exhibit, which was a copy of the 

stipulations, the State rested. Relevant to this appeal, McWilliams made a Crim.R. 29 

motion for acquittal challenging venue for the aggravated drug possession charge. The 

State conceded that had McWilliams only been charged with the drug possession offense, 

and the only evidence submitted of possession was the urinalysis results showing that he 

had methamphetamine in his system, then the State would have been unable to proceed. 

However, the State argued that because McWilliams had been charged with multiple 

offenses related to the same underlying methamphetamine use, the State sufficiently 

proved venue because the events occurred in a continuing course of conduct and at least 

one element of one of the offenses occurred in Champaign County. The State relied on 

R.C. 2901.12(G) and 2901.12(H)(3) to support its position, arguing that the basis for 

McWilliams’ possession charge was the same methamphetamine that was the basis of 

the OVI charge, meaning that McWilliams used methamphetamine and continued his 

course of conduct by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of that same 

methamphetamine in Champaign County. 

{¶ 11} In relying on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Foreman, 166 

Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70, the trial court found that the State had

not offered sufficient evidence that McWilliams committed the drug possession offense in 

Champaign County. Specifically, the trial court stated that “the State has not offered 

evidence that the Defendant had been in Champaign County before the stop, what he 

was doing in Champaign County before the stop, [or] that the metabolites that were found 
-6-

in State’s Exhibit 1 would have been in his system at the same time that the Defendant 

was in Champaign County.” Tr. 39. When the trial court asked the State if there was 

any additional evidence as to when McWilliams had ingested the methamphetamine, the 

State argued that because McWilliams had twice the minimum level in his urine for the 

per se OVI violation, an inference could be made as to when he ingested the drugs. The

trial court responded that it could not make such an inference without an expert 

toxicologist to testify about the metabolism of the drug. Consequently, the trial court 

sustained McWilliams’ Crim.R. 29 motion, finding that the State had not presented 

sufficient evidence to prove venue, and it acquitted him of aggravated possession of 

drugs. 

{¶ 12} No additional evidence was introduced and, after the defense rested, the 

trial court found McWilliams guilty of the two misdemeanor OVI counts. Following 

McWilliams’ sentencing on the misdemeanor charges, the State filed a motion for leave 

to appeal the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding venue for the felony drug charge. 

This Court granted the State leave to appeal.

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 13} The State raises a single assignment of error on appeal, which states:

The trial court’s legal and evidentiary findings regarding venue were 

in error as the State presented sufficient evidence that venue was proper in 

Champaign County pursuant to R.C. 2901.12. 

{¶ 14} The State argues first that the trial court misconstrued the import of 

Foreman, 166 Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70, and contends that case 
-7-

is distinguishable. Secondly, the State argues that the trial court failed to address the 

applicability of R.C. 2901.12(G) and (H), which the State argues permitted McWilliams to 

be charged with and convicted of all counts in Champaign County, as the offenses 

constituted a continuing course of criminal conduct. 

a. Standard of Review

{¶ 15} “A directed verdict of acquittal by the trial judge in a criminal case is a ‘final 

verdict’ within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A) which is not appealable by the state as a 

matter of right or by leave to appeal pursuant to that statute.” State v. Keeton, 18 Ohio 

St.3d 379, 481 N.E.2d 629 (1985), paragraph two of the syllabus. “In cases resulting in 

a judgment of acquittal, however, the prosecution may nevertheless appeal, by leave of 

court, evidentiary rulings and rulings on issues of law, because those rulings fall within 

the language of ‘any other decision, except the final verdict,’ in R.C. 2945.67(A).” 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Pawelski, 178 Ohio App.3d 426, 2008-Ohio-5180, 898 N.E.2d 

85, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). Accordingly, under R.C. 2945.67(A), a court of appeals has discretion 

to review the rulings of substantive law that result in a judgment of acquittal as long as 

the judgment itself is not appealed. State v. Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 159-160, 555 

N.E.2d 644 (1990). In this case, we granted the State’s request for leave to appeal the 

trial court’s ruling on an issue of law. We review questions of law under a de novo 

standard of review. State v. Clay, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2015-CA-17, 2016-Ohio-424, ¶ 5.

b. Venue

{¶ 16} “Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution fixes venue, or the proper 

place to try a criminal matter, as follows: ‘ * * * In any trial, in any court, the party accused 
-8-

shall be allowed * * * a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the 

offense is alleged to have been committed * * *.’ Thus, the rule is that the place of trial 

is to be where the offense occurred.” State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477, 453 

N.E.2d 716 (1983). “Venue is not a material element of any offense charged. The 

elements of the offense charged and the venue of the matter are separate and distinct.” 

State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981). Nevertheless, “[u]nder 

Article I, Section 10 and R.C. 2901.12, evidence of proper venue must be presented in 

order to sustain a conviction for an offense.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Hampton, 134 

Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 20. “In the prosecution of a criminal 

case, it is not essential that the venue of the crime be proven in express terms, provided 

it be established by all the facts and circumstances in the case, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the crime was committed in the county and state as alleged in the indictment.” 

State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907), syllabus. “[I]n all criminal 

prosecutions, venue is a fact that must be proved at trial unless waived.” Draggo at 90, 

citing State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 N.E.2d 258 (1947).

{¶ 17} “Under Ohio's venue statute, R.C. 2901.12, venue generally lies in the 

territory in which the offense is committed. R.C. 2901.12(A). However, venue is also 

proper in other territories, under special circumstances.” State v. Moore, 6th Dist. Erie 

No. E-18-064, 2020-Ohio-6781, ¶ 42. R.C. 2901.12 states, in relevant part:

(A) The trial of a criminal case in this state shall be held in a court having 

jurisdiction of the subject matter, and * * * in the territory of which the offense 

or any element of the offense was committed. 
-9-

* * *

(G) When it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense or any 

element of an offense was committed in any of two or more jurisdictions, 

but it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdiction the offense or 

element was committed, the offender may be tried in any of those 

jurisdictions.

* * *

(H) When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits 

offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those 

offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element 

of one of those offenses occurred. Without limitation on the evidence that 

may be used to establish the course of criminal conduct, any of the following 

is prima-facie evidence of a course of criminal conduct:

* * *

(3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or chain 

of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective.

{¶ 18} “R.C. 2901.12(G) and (H) are statutory reflections of the modern mobility of 

criminals to perform unlawful deeds over vast geographical boundaries. The abovenoted statutory provisions effectuate a sensible, efficient approach to justice by permitting 

one court to hear a matter which has roots in several court jurisdictions.” Draggo, 65 

Ohio St.2d at 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343. “R.C. 2901.12(H) exists to promote judicial economy 

and allow the state to prosecute multiple offenses during one trial in one county.” State 
-10-

v. Moore, 169 Ohio St.3d 18, 2022-Ohio-1460, 201 N.E.3d 834, ¶ 20. 

c. Analysis

{¶ 19} McWilliams was charged with aggravated possession of drugs in violation 

of R.C. 2925.11(A),(C)(1)(a). The statute provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly 

obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance[.]” R.C. 2925.11(A). In this case, the 

controlled substance at issue was methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, 

which falls under section 2925.11(C)(1)(a). " ‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having 

control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the 

thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing 

or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). “[W]hen a controlled substance is assimilated 

into a person’s body, the person loses the ability to control or possess the substance.” 

Foreman, 166 Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70, at ¶ 17, 19. Accordingly, 

an individual cannot be in “possession” of a controlled substance, as is required under 

R.C. 2925.11(A), if the possession is based on the mere presence of the substance that 

was assimilated into the person’s body. 

{¶ 20} As the State conceded, McWilliams was not in possession of drugs at the 

time of the traffic stop in Champaign County as it is defined in R.C. 2925.11(A). The 

State informed the trial court that “we’re not going to be able to establish that the 

Defendant used drugs in Champaign County” or that any element of that offense was 

committed in Champaign County. Tr. 13, 44. However, the State argued that they did 

not have to identify where or when McWilliams used any drugs, because since 

McWilliams’ urine screen showed that he had consumed methamphetamine, he was 
-11-

unlawfully in possession of the methamphetamine at some point in time. Then, at some 

point after taking the drugs, he proceeded to drive his vehicle into Champaign County 

while under the influence of that same methamphetamine, thereby constituting a 

continuous course of criminal conduct. The State relied primarily on R.C. 2901.12(H), 

which provides that, “[w]hen an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits 

offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any 

jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses 

occurred.” Offenses “committed as part of the same transaction or chain of events, or in 

furtherance of the same purpose or objective,” constitute prima-facie evidence to 

establish a course of criminal conduct. R.C. 2901.12(H)(3). The State further argued 

that R.C. 2901.12(G) allowed the State to pursue the charge in Champaign County, 

although it is unclear how that statute purportedly helps the State since the State did not 

provide any evidence that the offense was committed in two or more jurisdictions, one of 

which was Champaign County. 

{¶ 21} The trial court rejected the State’s argument and found that the State had 

failed to present sufficient evidence of venue with respect to the charge of aggravated 

possession of drugs. In deciding whether the State sufficiently established venue, the 

trial court questioned, “where is the evidence that [the aggravated possession of drugs] 

occurred in Champaign County?” Tr. 38. The trial court stated that “the State has not 

offered evidence that the Defendant had been in Champaign County before the stop, 

what he was doing in Champaign County before the stop, [or] that the metabolites that 

were found in State’s Exhibit 1 would have been in his system at the same time that the 
-12-

Defendant was in Champaign County.” Tr. 39. The trial court relied heavily on Foreman

to support its decision sustaining McWilliams’ Crim.R. 29 motion. 

{¶ 22} In Foreman, the defendant gave birth to a baby boy at Tiffin Mercy Hospital, 

located in Seneca County, Ohio. Following the baby’s birth, it was discovered that the 

umbilical-cord tissue and the child’s urine and meconium tested positive for the presence 

of cocaine metabolites. Foreman, 166 Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70, 

at ¶ 2. Foreman was confronted about the positive test results and admitted that she 

had consumed cocaine several times during the course of her pregnancy, including as 

recently as a week or two prior to giving birth. However, Foreman denied using any 

drugs at her home, which was located in Seneca County. Relying on the positive drug 

tests collected from the hospital, Foreman was indicted on a single count of possession 

of cocaine in Seneca County. Following a bench trial, Foreman was convicted as 

charged. Id. at ¶ 6.

{¶ 23} The Ohio Supreme Court reversed Foreman’s conviction, finding that the 

State failed to prove that Foreman knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County. Id. 

at ¶ 31. The Court reasoned that the statutory definition of the word “possession” 

requires an individual to have control over a substance or thing. But when a person 

ingests a controlled substance, it assimilates into the body and the individual no longer 

has control over it. Thus, when the presence of cocaine metabolites was discovered at 

the time Foreman gave birth to her son, she could not have been in possession of cocaine 

because she could not have controlled it. Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶ 24} Although the Court found that Foreman had not been in possession of 
-13-

cocaine at the hospital, it considered whether the State had presented circumstantial 

evidence that Foreman possessed cocaine somewhere else in Seneca County. The 

Court noted that “[b]ased on a positive drug-test result, a fact-finder may deduce that the 

defendant ingested the drug and likely possessed it but is left to speculate as to where

that prior possession occurred. Thus, for purposes of proving venue under R.C. 

2901.12(A), sufficient corroborating evidence is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant possessed the drug within the charging county.” (Emphasis 

sic.) Id. at ¶ 26. The Court determined that the State failed to present any such 

corroborating evidence to prove that Foreman possessed the cocaine at a prior time in 

Seneca County. Rather, the evidence merely established that Foreman “possessed 

cocaine somewhere at some time, not that Foreman possessed cocaine in Seneca 

County.” Id. at ¶ 28. The Court specifically noted that the State did not present 

evidence concerning the amount of time that cocaine metabolites remain in a person’s 

system after ingesting it, or that Foreman had been present in Seneca County during the 

time frame in which she admitted she had consumed cocaine. Id. at ¶ 29. 

{¶ 25} Foreman is certainly pertinent to the case at hand in validating that 

McWilliams was not in possession of methamphetamine as defined in R.C. 2925.11(A) at 

the time he was stopped in Champaign County. But unlike Foreman, McWilliams was 

charged with more than one offense. In that regard, R.C. 2901.12(H)(3) may have been

applicable, so long as the State could prove that the offenses occurred as a course of 

criminal conduct in that the offenses were committed in different jurisdictions and “as part 

of the same transaction or chain of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or 
-14-

objective.”

{¶ 26} A defendant may be indicted in one county for an offense that occurred in 

another county when the offenses are related by a course of criminal conduct that

included crimes in the charging county. State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-

Ohio-3707, 23 N.E.3d 1023, ¶ 131. R.C. 2901.12 “provides the criteria for which territory 

an offender may be tried for multiple offenses which involve different jurisdictions or 

venues.” State v. DeBoe, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-02-057, 2004-Ohio-403, ¶ 38. R.C. 

2901.12(H)(3) specifically provides that the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction in 

which at least one of the offenses, or any element of one of those offenses, occurred 

when all of the offenses were committed as part of a course of criminal conduct. 

Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, the purpose of R.C. 2901.12(H) is to 

promote judicial economy and allow the State to prosecute multiple offenses during one 

trial in one county. Moore, 169 Ohio St.3d 18, 2022-Ohio-1460, 201 N.E.3d 834, at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 27} When deciding whether the State proved venue, the trial court relied on the 

jury instruction that requires the trier of fact to consider each count separately. Then, 

relying on Foreman, the trial court determined that the State was required to establish 

that McWilliams committed aggravated possession of drugs, or at least an element of that 

offense, within Champaign County as alleged in the indictment. Because the State could 

not demonstrate either of those requirements, the trial court acquitted McWilliams. To 

the extent the trial court failed to consider whether the State proved the offenses were 

committed in different jurisdictions as part of a continuing course of conduct under R.C. 

2901.12(H)(3), we sustain the State’s assignment of error. In deciding whether the State 
-15-

established venue, the trial court considered the aggravated possession of drugs offense 

in a vacuum rather than as part of a potential course of criminal conduct which, if 

established, would have allowed the prosecution of the aggravated possession of drugs 

offense to be tried in Champaign County even if none of the elements of that offense were

committed in Champaign County. 

{¶ 28} R.C. 2901.12(H)(3) does not require that at least one of the elements of 

each offense be committed in the charging county, only that one of the elements of one

of the offenses charged be committed in the charging county. Although the indictment 

listed Champaign County as the venue for the aggravated possession of drugs offense, 

that was not necessarily fatal to the State’s case. When alleging that offenses occurred 

pursuant to a course of criminal conduct under R.C. 2901.12(H)(3), the State may identify 

the charging county in which the offenses are indicted where at least one of the elements 

of one of the offenses occurred there. State v. Armengau, 2017-Ohio-4452, 93 N.E.3d 

284, ¶ 116 (10th Dist.). It is, however, preferable for the State to identify which offenses 

occurred out-of-county or for the indictment to include “course of conduct” language when 

the State intends to proceed under R.C. 2901.12(H).

{¶ 29} Whether or not the State submitted sufficient evidence that the offenses 

occurred in different jurisdictions as part of a course of criminal conduct to satisfy the 

venue statute in this case, however, is a factual determination that we will not consider. 

While this Court may accept a State’s appeal from an acquittal to evaluate issues of law, 

we are not to consider the sufficiency of the evidence, because that is tied to the specific 

facts of the case and would in essence be asking this Court to review the acquittal itself, 
-16-

which is prohibited by R.C. 2945.67(A). State ex rel. Ramirez-Ortiz v. Twelfth Dist. Ct. 

of Appeals, 151 Ohio St.3d 46, 2017-Ohio-7816, 85 N.E.3d 725, ¶ 9-13.

{¶ 30} We do note that the State’s reliance on R.C. 2901.12(G), however, is 

misplaced. R.C. 2901.12(G) provides that, “[w]hen it appears beyond a reasonable 

doubt that an offense or any element of an offense was committed in any of two or more 

jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdiction the offense or 

element was committed, the offender may be tried in any of those jurisdictions.” “[V]enue 

questions arising under R.C. 2901.12(G) must * * * be resolved by determining whether 

‘any element’ of the offense was committed within the jurisdiction where the trial is to take 

place.’ ” Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at 478, 453 N.E.2d 716, citing Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d at

91, 418 N.E.2d 1343. The plain language of this statute does not apply to a course of 

conduct for multiple offenses as is provided in R.C. 2901.12(H). Moreover, there is no 

dispute that the State could not prove that any of the elements of aggravated possession 

of drugs occurred in Champaign County in order to satisfy the requirement that the 

offense be tried in one of the “two or more jurisdictions” where any element of the offense 

occurred. Thus, R.C. 2901.12(G) did not apply to this case, and the trial court did not err 

in failing to consider the applicability of this statute. 

{¶ 31} Accordingly, we sustain the State’s assignment of error to the extent that 

the trial court failed to consider whether the State proved the offenses were committed in 

different jurisdictions as part of a continuing course of conduct under R.C. 2901.12(H)(3). 

However, we overrule the State’s assignment of error to the extent that the State 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented. 
-17-

III. Conclusion

{¶ 32} The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider whether R.C. 

2901.12(H)(3) applied. We note, however, that this legal conclusion has no effect on 

McWilliams’ acquittal in this case.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.