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| 21.7.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 257/6 |

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Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on preparing for and dealing with crises: strengthening the resilience of the Union, its regions and cities

(2023/C 257/02)

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| | | | | --- | --- | | Rapporteur: | Christophe CLERGEAU (PES/FR), Member of the Pays de la Loire Regional Council | |

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR)

Societal preparedness — a new approach to preparing for risks and crises

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| | 1. | believes that we cannot know which crises will affect Europe, its cities, its counties and regions in future, but that we do know who will be affected. Crises do not stop at administrative borders and therefore require a multilevel approach involving all municipal institutions, local intermediate authorities (provinces, counties, etc.) and the regional level. To avoid this, we need to develop a culture of risks and crises, a new approach based on societal preparedness for the safety, health and well-being of people. This is the main thrust of our opinion; |

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| | 2. | notes that the chief hallmark of crises in recent years has been their brutal and unpredictable nature. Disasters and extreme events relating to climate change could and should be envisaged and anticipated, but their violence and frequency have outweighed all expectations. The COVID-19 crisis, the war in Ukraine and the associated human suffering point to a new pattern of unpredictable, large-scale crises. Overarching preventative approaches (acting to avoid known and probable risks) or the precautionary principle (acting to prevent serious and irreversible new risks to human health or the environment) are no longer sufficient to deal with such phenomena; |

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| | 3. | believes that Europe must invest in a new approach: societal preparedness, defined as the collective capacity to prepare societies, in a spirit of cohesion and solidarity, for the challenges of the future, especially crises and disasters. Societal preparedness places a particular accent on the civic, social and human dimension, and on access to services and the quality of support for people. After all, crises and disasters primarily affect the most vulnerable. This is one of the lessons from COVID-19; |

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| | 4. | considers that the overarching approach to resilience must bring together two elements: developing societies’ capacity to drive the necessary change to deal with the challenges of economic, social and territorial inequalities, climate change and the green transition, and the capacity to tackle societies’ vulnerabilities to risks, crises and disasters, including through the development of societal preparedness activities; |

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| | 5. | proposes making a distinction between vulnerabilities linked to known risks — mainly of an environmental, demographic and industrial nature — and those linked to unknown risks, whether they result from climate change, are health-related or caused by human activities. These vulnerabilities cannot be tackled using management plans, however sophisticated they may be; dealing with such vulnerabilities, especially the second type, means giving priority to developing a crisis and risk culture and a collective capacity to cope with uncertainty and disaster; |

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| | 6. | calls for the analysis of social and territorial vulnerabilities to be made a political priority for the EU, as it will be difficult to prepare societies without this information. Only by highlighting and understanding these vulnerabilities can effective responses be provided at European and national level, but above all in each of our cities, counties and regions. We should be wary of an approach to vulnerabilities that is all-encompassing with an excessive geographical scope, and instead favour a local approach that specifically addresses the circumstances experienced by people on the ground; |

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| | 7. | recognises that civil protection policies are primarily the responsibility of the Member States, but notes that prevention, societal preparedness and relief activities are very often carried out by local actors, cities and counties (provinces, etc.) which usually exercise such powers, with the support of regions. These authorities must therefore be closely involved in designing, implementing and monitoring them and be provided with adequate resources, both financial and legal, in line with the principle of active subsidiarity and a multilevel governance approach that involves and includes all territorial levels; |

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| | 8. | stresses the need to strengthen the capacity of cities and regions to provide the services required by people, including in times of crisis. One key measure is to strengthen common security of supply across Europe. This requires identifying critical dependencies, producing the bulk of essential products and services in Europe, and providing the single market mechanisms needed to bolster security of supply of raw materials, goods and food. Critical infrastructure also needs to be enhanced in order to secure living conditions in times of crisis; |

Putting vulnerability analysis at the heart of future cohesion policy

An index and scoreboard to better understand and take into account risks relating to the vulnerabilities of local areas and their populations

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| | 9. | welcomes the involvement of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) and its risk management unit in developing a vulnerability ‘index’ [(1)](#ntr1-C_2023257EN.01000601-E0001), bringing together environmental, territorial, economic and social dimensions. The Committee would like the JRC to have the full political and financial support to press ahead with this initiative; |

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| | 10. | stresses the importance of the social dimension of vulnerability. All too often it is forgotten or overlooked, even though it is a key element of resilience. Any vulnerability analysis should fully integrate the concepts of access to people, social support and access of vulnerable persons to health systems and social services, and the reduction of the digital divide and better digital accessibility. The CoR underlines the vulnerability of minorities, women, the poor, older people and people with disabilities, those with chronic diseases, and the significance of social vulnerabilities in the outermost regions and in isolated and island regions, which are at the forefront of the fight against climate change; |

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| | 11. | backs the JRC’s efforts to improve the quality of data and the vulnerability ‘index’, supports the desire for greater collaboration between the JRC, the other Commission Directorates-General (DGs) and the Member States for this purpose, confirms the usefulness of applying this index at all territorial levels — NUTS 2, NUTS 3 and, above all, local level — and reiterates its call for the vulnerability scoreboard to be published in order to illustrate the actual reality in each area; to this end, recommends that Member States and local and regional authorities invest in risk assessment, especially with regard to vulnerability, and that the results of this work be made public in order to strengthen risk culture in the European Union; |

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| | 12. | draws attention to the need for data in order to effectively map the most vulnerable populations, which means providing non-aggregated data and interlinking data to highlight specific circumstances (e.g. poor women), as well as the need for data to indicate problems of accessing services; |

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| | 13. | believes that rather than trying to create the perfect indicator, the priority should be on testing it as a tool for decision-making; welcomes the fact that several community organisations have signed up to this approach and calls for a pilot programme bringing together cities, counties and regions wishing to experiment with the use of the vulnerability indicator so that it can be compared with local perceptions of reality and to guide their policies and investments; |

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| | 14. | suggests that the JRC could initiate setting-up a European exchange platform with an overarching approach to vulnerabilities, anticipation, preparedness and the management of risks and crises, involving European institutions, Member States, local and regional authorities and stakeholders; this platform could build on the experience of smart specialisation platforms and be funded by the Interreg Europe programme. It would draw in particular on the Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network [(2)](#ntr2-C_2023257EN.01000601-E0002), which should also be supported and developed; |

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| | 15. | proposes getting cities, counties and regions involved in all of these initiatives; |

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| | 16. | calls for a European network of civic movements and non-governmental associations to be set up for the prevention and management of risks and crises and to prepare societies to deal with them; calls on the Commission to support this initiative and help set it up; therefore stands ready to work with the Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network to help create this network, by organising an annual event for all stakeholders, in cooperation with the UNDRR and the European Commission; |

Tackling vulnerabilities, a new priority for cohesion policy

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| | 17. | wishes to highlight how recent crises have shown that vulnerabilities in local areas and among populations can translate into deep new inequalities in health and well-being; stresses, therefore, that dealing with social and territorial vulnerabilities should become a political priority of cohesion policy; this would mean strengthening the social dimension of cohesion policy beyond employment and training by focusing on the issues of inclusion and access to health and social services. It would also bring cohesion policy closer to citizens; |

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| | 18. | believes that developing an ‘index’ and territorial vulnerability scoreboard is crucial in order to start a policy debate on how to use future cohesion policy to respond to such vulnerabilities. The policy should also take into account, across all its components, data at NUTS 3 level in order to ensure a more targeted, accessible and efficient approach; |

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| | 19. | remains cautious about using a vulnerability ‘index’ as a decision-making tool to distribute cohesion policy funds, but stresses the need for cohesion policy to play a bigger role in the most vulnerable regions; |

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| | 20. | suggests making crisis resilience and tackling social and territorial vulnerabilities a programming priority for cohesion policy, together with introducing top-up funding for regions and counties that are particularly vulnerable and opting to make strong use of cohesion policy for this purpose; |

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| | 21. | considers, however, that while cohesion policy can and should be a societal preparedness tool, it cannot cover compensation for damage caused by major disasters; believes that the new Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve is more focused on providing an immediate response to disasters and pandemics than on dealing with their aftermath; calls, therefore, for consideration to be given to setting up a permanent intervention mechanism to compensate for major damage caused by disasters in a given area; |

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| | 22. | proposes encouraging, within the framework of European funding programmes such as Interreg, Horizon Europe or Erasmus+, interregional cooperation projects, which would need to be designed according to the geographical realities of the various areas, which could lead to cooperation with third countries. These projects would focus on crisis resilience and tackling vulnerabilities, particularly on the cross-border approach to risks and crises, which is a powerful lever for bringing together — around specific subjects — the various practices in the Member States. A specific component of Interreg and the EGTC is therefore likely to be crucial; |

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| | 23. | recognises that while instruments at EU level have proved to be very helpful, there is scope for more to be done with regard to the legal and administrative challenges of cross-border cooperation, which would also ensure more European solidarity if obstacles to cross-border cooperation were solved; in this regard, calls on the European Commission to relaunch the adoption of the European cross-border mechanism; |

Moving from risk management to a shared risk culture: preparing Europe and its geographical areas for crises and disasters

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| | 24. | notes that since the COVID crisis, European civil protection and public health policies have proliferated. There have been many new initiatives, including RescEU and European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA). Europe’s reaction to the war in Ukraine has led to a comprehensive response to supporting the people, which has highlighted the human and social dimension of crisis management. Alongside the need for crisis management, which is still very acute, the CoR hopes that priority will now be given to societal preparedness, i.e. risk prevention, crisis preparedness and the spread of a shared risk and crisis culture in Europe; |

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| | 25. | stresses the important role of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre as a focal point for the coordination of European responses to crises, particularly the war in Ukraine and the earthquake in Türkiye. The management of these crises has shone a light on the human and social dimension of crisis management. For this reason, alongside the crucial role of crisis management, which is still extremely relevant, the European Committee of the Regions hopes that priority will now also be given to societal preparedness, i.e. risk prevention, crisis preparedness and the spread of a shared risk and crisis culture in Europe; |

EU disaster resilience goals

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| | 26. | welcomes the Commission’s publication of the recommendation and communication on the EU's disaster resilience goals, and shares their general principles, which include many of the proposals put forward in previous opinions. Also welcomes the fact that local and regional circumstances are better taken into account and underlines the importance of the flagship initiatives; is convinced that this framework, though non-binding, would strengthen the convergence of practices across the various Member States and thus the quality of crisis preparedness; also wishes to be closely involved in the Civil Protection Forum, which will be held in 2024 and provide an opportunity to carry out an initial review of these objectives and to adapt them; |

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| | 27. | encourages regions to seize the new opportunities to take part in initiatives and fund projects, particularly under the second goal ‘Prepare’ and the ‘preparEU’ flagship initiative; intends to help local and regional authorities become better involved in the Union Civil Protection Knowledge Network; |

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| | 28. | finds it regrettable, however, that these publications purely come under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and do not take a more holistic view of the vulnerability and resilience of Europe, its cities and regions to crises; |

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| | 29. | welcomes introducing stress tests on the resilience of emergency operation centres, but calls for this to be extended to include national, regional and local crisis alert and management systems, and proposes that all aspects of vulnerability, including social and territorial factors, be better taken into account in these stress tests; |

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| | 30. | encourages regions/local authorities to engage in stress-testing on scenarios that fit to the local/regional risk landscape. Local/regional risk atlases and public risk awareness and preparedness actions could also be encouraged, also activities in conjunction with the future EU crisis preparedness month proposed in the DRG Communication; |

Building a shared culture for tackling risks and crises within the community of local, national and European decision-makers

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| | 31. | notes that most of the actors with whom meetings have been held are seeking a European strategic risk and crisis framework with a view to developing a systemic and coordinated approach (currently felt to be lacking). Many of them have raised the prospect of setting up a ‘risks and crises’ DG, covering the preparedness of societies, prevention, and the management of risks and crises arising from our vulnerabilities; |

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| | 32. | maintains that the main challenge when it comes to dealing with risks and crises is to change the mindset of decision-makers and political decision-making processes. The vast majority of decision-makers are not trained to anticipate and manage crises or to deal with the challenges of resilience. Mechanisms to manage clearly identified risks have multiplied, with public policies becoming fragmented at the expense of an overarching approach centred on resilience, on the analysis of social and territorial vulnerabilities and on preparedness to deal with unknown risks. A new shared culture for dealing with risks and crises should be promoted around the principle of societal preparedness; |

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| | 33. | proposes, therefore, setting up a European risk and crisis school, which would provide training pathways for policy-makers and those in charge of operations, and develop professional frameworks and an accreditation scheme to create cohesive professional communities and facilitate mobility and mutual recognition. It would also support ongoing training, develop networks and activities to exchange knowledge and experience, and organise workshops on lessons learned and on designing innovative operational strategies and responses; |

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| | 34. | stresses that global crises may begin outside Europe, but can affect any Member State, for example in the form of a refugee crisis or problems accessing critical products. Steps should be taken to enhance the ability to anticipate global crises and prevent them through concerted action, including outside the European Union; |

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| | 35. | believes it is in Europe’s interest to act where new risks emerge in order to limit the EU’s exposure to risks. The relevant authorities within the EU must have the means to network with many bodies that are already CoR partners (including, at international level, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction — UNDRR, its platform for Europe and central Asia, and the Making Cities Resilient 2030 initiative) and to take part in action outside the EU, in collaboration with the countries concerned, as soon as risks are identified, with significant resources to draw on. This cooperation must also cover the preparatory phase and, in particular, prevention measures, reducing vulnerabilities, and preparing societies for crises. To this end, existing mechanisms and stakeholder forums such as the EU Civil Protection Knowledge Network should bolster partnerships with civil society actors and local NGOs; |

Resilient and proactive societies to better tackle risks and crises

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| | 36. | believes that one of the very building blocks of resilience is the ability of citizens to join forces in the initial hours of a crisis while they wait for help to arrive. This means both providing prior training for all citizens, preparing all households and ensuring local practices in the spirit of solidarity. The EU should therefore adopt a ‘72-hour strategy for dealing with crises’, locally adapted and taking into account the specificities of each country and region, specifically drawing on lessons learned from countries such as Japan and the United States; |

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| | 37. | wishes to restate two strong beliefs: the best way to change mindsets is to educate children and young people; strong civic engagement, the voluntary sector and volunteer work are the best drivers of society’s resilience. With this in mind, the CoR proposes building on the EU's disaster resilience goals with three new flagship initiatives: | | | | --- | --- | | — | the roll-out of ‘risk factories’ [(3)](#ntr3-C_2023257EN.01000601-E0003), adapted to local and regional framework conditions and needs, as already trialled in several countries, to educate all young children aged 6-10 on which questions they should ask and the right steps to take to prepare for and deal with risks; | | | | | --- | --- | | — | a European framework for training in first response and first aid, providing training in each country which is transferable and can be built on, and which all young people would be encouraged to complete by the age of 20; | | | | | --- | --- | | — | a European campaign to promote voluntary civic engagement in both volunteer bodies and non-governmental associations; | |

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| | 38. | urges a move away from an approach to risks based on probabilities which systematically underestimates major risks, as has been the case with epidemics; calls for any action not to be limited to plans for managing known and probable environmental and industrial risks, but rather to put in place, in every city, county and region without exception, a resilience strategy and local mobilisation platform to organise local resilience teams and prepare societies for crises, paying particular attention to supporting the most vulnerable. These local resilience platforms should draw on citizen engagement, encourage an interdisciplinary approach, promote data exchange and interoperability, foster cooperation, including cross-border cooperation, facilitate the crisis response chain and build resilience to crises; |

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| | 39. | calls for strong action to reduce digital poverty, which poses an additional risk in a crisis by leaving a significant part of the population without access to essential information and services; underlines the need to build a network of physical access points to information, aid and human support as close as possible to the population in cities and regions, and for them to be operational in the event of a crisis; |

RescEU and emergency response coordination systems

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| | 40. | supports any European financial investment to strengthen rescEU, not only so that the EU can respond more quickly, comprehensively and autonomously, but also to strengthen its role in risk and disaster management; |

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| | 41. | welcomes the ERCC 2.0 initiative, which aims to enhance the capacity to anticipate, forecast and prepare for EU-wide cross-sectoral events and to further improve and invest in early warning systems to ensure that the provision of early information and awareness-raising become a reality. The European Committee of the Regions recognises the work carried out by the European Commission in this area in line with its mandate in the field of early warning systems, and as part of the legislation on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. This is aimed at developing cross-border detection, information and alert systems such as EFAS (European Flood Awareness System), EFFIS (European Forest Fire Information System) and EDO (European Drought Observatory); |

HERA and the European Health Union

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| | 42. | supports HERA and the action taken over the past year, in particular to identify health risks, identify management scenarios and medical response measures, and strengthen value chains and the ability to produce the goods and services we need in Europe; points out that HERA needs renewed and ongoing political and financial support for several years in order to carry out its tasks effectively; |

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| | 43. | recognises that it is difficult to evaluate HERA after just one year, but reiterates its call for the European Parliament, cities and regions and societal stakeholders to play a more effective role in HERA bodies, especially the HERA Forum; |

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| | 44. | welcomes the deployment of the new One Health approach to break down silos between human, animal and environmental health, and to integrate health policies into a coherent approach to sustainable development; |

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| | 45. | reiterates its strong warning to the Commission and the Council about the insufficient efforts to enhance Europe's production of the products and medicines we need to deal with health crises, and about the practices of public buyers. In many countries, these practices favour low prices over production in Europe, thereby forgetting the lessons of the COVID-19 crisis; |

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| | 46. | proposes that the resilience of health systems, including community healthcare and hospitals, should be a explored in the context of a ‘Europe of health’, involving the Member States and the relevant local and regional authorities. This includes ensuring that continuity of care can be guaranteed in times of crisis through sufficient pre-existing or temporary reception capacities. The CoR therefore calls for studies to assess the impact of care being postponed or halted because of COVID-19, particularly for cancers, chronic diseases and mental health; |

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| | 47. | calls for a more in-depth debate on how health data can be used to identify those most vulnerable to crises, thereby making is easier to provide them with social support and to continue their medical care. While assessing ethical and operational challenges, the CoR encourages the creation of a ‘European health data space’ to gather data, improve its quality and make it available to local public services; warns of the risk of entire sections of the population being overlooked by health data due to them being excluded or the digital divide; |

For a cross-cutting approach to vulnerability, crisis preparedness and crisis management

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| | 48. | proposes that the index and the vulnerability scoreboard be taken into account to guide developments in the various EU policies beyond cohesion policy (such as in the common agricultural policy, research and innovation policy, or the European Health Union). An inter-DG task force within the Commission might be particularly useful for carrying out this task; |

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| | 49. | supports ‘a resilience by design’ approach that allows impacts relating to resilience and vulnerability to be integrated from the early elaboration stages of public policies, regulations, action plans, major investment programmes and large-scale infrastructure, etc.; |

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| | 50. | believes that public procurement has a major role to play in bringing about innovation, experimenting with new approaches based on local solidarity and building the resilience of local infrastructure and equipment; |

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| | 51. | encourages setting up a Horizon Europe ‘mission’ on risk and crisis resilience (management, preparedness, shared culture, vulnerabilities), building on the ‘Civil security for society’ focused on developing methods and technologies, in order to make it a living laboratory for innovation and engagement rooted in the realities of cities and regions. |

Brussels, 24 May 2023.

The President of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO

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[(1)](#ntc1-C_2023257EN.01000601-E0001)  https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/risk-data-hub/#/vulnerability-in-europe

The vulnerability index makes it possible to go beyond the work carried out by the JRC as part of the ‘resilience dashboard’, which reflects a broader approach to the ability of societies to adapt and anticipate (https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-planning/strategic-foresight/2020-strategic-foresight-report/resilience-dashboards\_en).

[(2)](#ntc2-C_2023257EN.01000601-E0002)  https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/about-knowledge-network

[(3)](#ntc3-C_2023257EN.01000601-E0003)  E.g. in Scotland: http://www.safercommunitiesscotland.org/wp-content/uploads/the-risk-factory.pdf; in the Netherlands: https://www.riskfactorymwb.nl/over-ons/

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