Present: All the Justices 

ANTONIO MOORING, A MINOR WHO SUES 

BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, 

PATRICIA MOORING, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 981270 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 April 16, 1999 

VIRGINIA WESLEYAN COLLEGE, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge 

 Antonio Mooring, a minor, suffered a traumatic amputation 

of his right thumb when John Braley closed a door while 

Mooring had his hand on the portal of the doorway. The 

incident occurred at the Boys and Girls Club of Hampton Roads 

(the Club). Mooring, through his next friend, sued Braley and 

his employer, Virginia Wesleyan College. The trial court 

dismissed Mooring's motion for judgment finding that Braley 

was a volunteer at the Club and entitled to charitable 

immunity as a result of the Club's status as a charity. 

Because we find that Braley was not engaged in the charity's 

work at the time of the alleged negligence, we conclude that 

the trial court erred in dismissing Mooring's motion for 

judgment. 

 Braley is a professor at Virginia Wesleyan College, 

teaching in a recreation and leisure studies program. The 

Club contacted Braley seeking volunteers to work in its 

programs. In response, Braley established a program with the 
Club in which students in Braley's recreation programming 

class were required to spend six hours observing the children 

and volunteering at the Club. The students were required to 

return to the classroom, design recreation programs for the 

children they observed, and then implement those programs at 

the Club. Braley would go to the Club to observe the students 

conducting the programs and would "help the students out" when 

they needed it. The students were not graded directly on the 

basis of their work at the Club, but on the basis of a report 

they submitted to Braley describing their learning experience. 

On the day Mooring was injured, one of Braley's students 

was conducting a wellness and body-conditioning program for 

thirteen to eighteen-year-olds in the Club's weight room. The 

student was giving a talk to the participants and Braley was 

observing her. At the student's request, Braley went to the 

door to keep younger children not involved in the student's 

program out of the room. While Braley was tending the door, 

Mooring was injured. 

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the 

defendants' joint motion to dismiss. The parties stipulated 

that the Club was a charity entitled to charitable immunity 

and that Mooring was a beneficiary of the charity. The trial 

court held that because Braley received no extra compensation 

from the Club or Virginia Wesleyan College for the services he 

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rendered, and because Braley's role at the Club was both 

supervising his students and "helping the Club perform its 

good work," he was "a volunteer at the Club" and thus entitled 

to charitable immunity under Moore v. Warren, 250 Va. 421, 463 

S.E.2d 459 (1995).*

In Moore, an American Red Cross volunteer was sued for 

negligence allegedly committed while transporting the injured 

party to a routine medical visit in a car owned by the Red 

Cross. Providing transportation for such medical visits was a 

service of the Red Cross. The driver contended that he was 

"'cloaked with the immunity of the charity'" and that 

charitable immunity was not limited to the charity itself. 

Id. at 422, 463 S.E.2d at 459. In resolving this issue of 

first impression, we stated: 

Like any organization, a charity performs its work 

only through the actions of its servants and agents. 

Without a charity's agents and servants, such as the 

volunteer here, no service could be provided to 

beneficiaries. Denying these servants and agents 

the charity's immunity for their acts effectively 

would deny the charity immunity for its acts. 

Id. at 423, 463 S.E.2d at 460. Based on this rationale, we 

included the driver in the immunity of the charity and held 

that he was immune from liability to the charity's 

 *

 In dismissing the motion for judgment against both 

defendants, the trial court did not specifically address 

whether Virginia Wesleyan College was entitled to charitable 

immunity, and this issue is not before us on appeal. 

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beneficiaries for negligence while he was "engaged in the 

charity's work." Id. at 425, 463 S.E.2d at 461. Thus, Moore

requires an individual seeking the cloak of a charity's 

immunity to establish that he was an agent or servant of the 

charity at the time of the alleged negligence and that the 

alleged negligence for which he seeks immunity occurred while 

he was actually doing the charity's work. 

Assuming, without deciding, that the "role" Braley had at 

the Club identified by the trial court satisfied the 

requirement that Braley be an agent or servant of the Club, 

Braley qualifies for protection under the Club's charitable 

immunity only if the alleged negligence occurred while he was 

doing the charity's work. Mooring contends that at the time 

of the injury Braley's "presence did not directly benefit the 

Club," and that Braley presented no evidence that "he was 

doing anything in particular for the Club at the time of the 

incident." We agree. 

While Braley testified that he "helped out" at the Club 

whenever he could, the record shows that at the time of his 

alleged negligence, Braley was at the Club to observe the 

activities of his student. He was not there to directly 

perform any of the Club's work; rather he was carrying out his 

duties as a professor at Virginia Wesleyan College. He was 

observing his student and acting as "doorkeeper" at the 

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student's request to allow his student to properly conduct the 

wellness class. Under these facts, we conclude that Braley 

was not entitled to charitable immunity because he was not 

engaged in the work of the charity at the time of his alleged 

negligence. 

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and remand the case for further proceedings. 

Reversed and remanded.

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