IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30992

ERYON LUKE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CPLACE FOREST PARK SNF, L.L.C., doing business as Nottingham 

Regional Rehab Center, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:13-CV-402

Before DAVIS, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The district court granted summary judgment dismissing Eryon Luke’s 

pregnancy discrimination claim. Because Luke has not presented evidence 

that would allow a jury to discredit the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason 

for firing her, we AFFIRM. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 14, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-30992

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I.

Luke was a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) at a skilled nursing 

rehabilitation center owned by CPlace Forest Park. When she learned that she 

was pregnant with twins, she told CPlace the good news through a doctor’s 

note. The note informed CPlace that she could continue working only if she 

did not engage in heavy lifting for two weeks. Luke was given work that did 

not involve heavy lifting by the weekend shift supervisor for two days, but 

when the human resource manager returned, the manager sent her home. 

About ten days after the first note, Luke presented a second note from 

her doctor that cleared her for work with no restrictions. She was back on the 

job for about a month and a half before she presented a second doctor’s note 

that said she should not lift more than thirty pounds for the duration of her 

pregnancy. CPlace said that it could not abide this, that all the CNAs

regularly had to lift more than thirty pounds, and that there was no light duty 

work available for Luke. As a result, Luke took the pregnancy leave (up to four 

months) she is entitled to under Louisiana law. LA. STAT. § 23:342(2)(b).

About a month into her leave, Luke wrote a letter to CPlace telling them 

that she would like to return to work and that she “was able to perform all of 

my duties except lifting patients.” She wrote, “I ask that you work with me 

and allow my supervisors to make reasonable adjustments to the type of work 

I am able to perform while under doctor’s care.”

When four months were up, CPlace told Luke that she was still “unable 

to return to work” and fired her. She gave birth to her twins one month later.

Luke sued CPlace, but the district court entered summary judgment 

against her. While her appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Young 

v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). In light of Young, we

vacated and remanded for reconsideration by the district court. Luke v. CPlace 

Forest Park SNF, L.L.C., 608 F. App’x 246 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). The 

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district court entered summary judgment again, finding that Luke did not 

make out a prima facie case of discrimination. This appeal followed.

II.

Luke relies only on indirect evidence to support her claim. Young 

authorized use of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework to 

determine when such circumstantial evidence is enough to defeat summary 

judgment in a case alleging that denial of an accommodation violated the 

Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–54. The plaintiff 

bears the initial burden of making out a prima facie case “by showing that she 

belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the 

employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate 

others ‘similar in their ability or inability to work.’” Id. at 1354 (citing 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). If she does, the “employer may then seek to justify its 

refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on ‘legitimate 

nondiscriminatory’ reasons for denying her accommodation.” Id. (quoting 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). If the employer 

offers that justification, the onus returns to the employee to show that the 

reasons given by the employer were not its true reasons but a pretext for 

discrimination. Id.; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 

U.S. 133, 143 (2000).

The parties focus on the first step of this inquiry, as the district court 

held that Luke could not make out a prima face case. Our review of a summary 

judgment, however, is not limited to the rationale of the district court and we 

may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Holtzclaw v. DSC 

Commc’ns Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir.2001). In addition to defending 

the district court’s rationale, CPlace argues that we can affirm on the 

alternative ground that it offers a nondiscriminatory reason—Luke’s inability 

to perform an essential aspect of her job—that the evidence does not 

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undermine. Because we agree that Luke does not point to any evidence that 

casts doubt on CPlace's justification, we affirm on that ultimate question

without deciding whether she established a prima facie case. See, e.g., Diggs 

v. Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 742 F. App’x 1, 4 (5th Cir. 2018);

Lay v. Singing River Health Sys., 694 F. App’x 248, 254 (5th Cir. 2017); 

Easterling v. Tensas Parish Sch. Bd., 682 F. App’x 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2017) (all 

assuming arguendo that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie McDonnell 

Douglas case in affirming grants of summary judgment because plaintiff did 

not offer evidence of pretext); see also Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 

F.3d 490, 493–94 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.) (recommending that courts

focus on the pretext stage if the employer has identified a nondiscriminatory 

reason for the employment action). 

CPlace asserts that it fired Luke because being able to lift more than 

thirty-five pounds was essential to the job so certified nurses could lift 

residents when needed. It further contends that it did not offer light duty 

positions to its nurses. 

Luke does not point to evidence that casts doubt on this explanation. See 

Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2014). She tries to show that 

other workers were given accommodations that involved less lifting. But this 

involved receiving help from coworkers when lifting, and there is no indication

that the employer directed these ad hoc accommodations. Whether the 

employer engaged in disparate treatment is the question when evaluating 

whether its nondiscriminatory explanation should be discredited because it 

has not been consistently applied. Cf. Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 381 (5th 

Cir. 2001) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) 

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining why statements from 

nondecisionmakers do not help a plaintiff unless she can show the employer 

was acting as a cat’s paw for that coworker)). More fundamentally, none of the 

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workers who allegedly received these accommodations were, like Luke, under 

a doctor’s orders not to engage in heavy lifting. Notably, when Luke’s doctor 

cleared her for work after lifting the initial restriction, Luke was allowed to 

return. It was only after the doctor again restricted her that Luke was not 

allowed to work. Because Luke has not pointed to any other CNAs who were 

accommodated when they had a similar medical restriction on heavy lifting, 

there is not evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that CPlace is 

insincere when it says that such lifting is an essential part of the job. Contrast 

Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355 (“[W]hy, when the employer accommodated so many, 

could it not accommodate pregnant women as well?”).

* * *

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. We also DENY Luke’s 

motion to file a supplemental brief after oral argument as both parties were 

afforded the full process of briefing and argument. 

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