The Honor able Ave rn Cohn, United States District J udg e for the Easte rn Di s t ri ct of 1 Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0536n.06 F iled: August 29, 2008 No. 05-5563 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. GARY MU S IC K, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On App eal from the United St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e Eastern Distr ict of Tenn essee

Before: BOGG S, Chief Judge; MCK

EAGU E, Circuit Judge; and COH N, Distric t Judge. 1 BOGG S, Chief

Judge. Ga

ry Mu sic k w a s c on vic te d o f c on sp ir ingto dis tr ibute and to possess, with the intent to dist ribute, a quantity of coca ine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1); conspirac y

to commit money

launder ing, in violation of 1 8 U. S
. C
. § 1956(h); and two c ounts of money launder ing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)( 1)(B )(ii). Musick wa s acquitted of c onspiring to distribute 100 kilogr ams or m ore of marijuana , in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)( 1)(B ). Musick forf

eited his interest in one mi llion dollars in curr ency and re al prope rty

and wa s sentence d to 2 3 5 c o n c u r

r e n t mo n th s o f im

p r is o n me n t o n e a c h c o u n t. M u s ic k a p p e a ls h is c o nviction andNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 2 - sentenc e. He alleg es four teen e rror s in his trial and seeks to have his convictions reve rsed a nd the char g es dismissed or the a gra n t o f a new trial. He also seeks a new se ntencinghear ing. H aving deter mined that eac h of Musick’s a rg uments are without merit, we af firm.

I On Octobe r 28, 2003, Musick was char g ed in a nine-c ount supe rseding indictment. Count One c harg ed appe llant and his mother, L ita Musick, along wi th Gorg e Dua rte, Jose Duarte, Guada lupe Duar

te, Delman Davis, Trevis L ove, C raigStewart, a nd Gar rick B utler with conspiring to distri b u t e fi v e kilogr ams or more of coc aine. Count Two cha rg ed appe llant and five c oconspirator s with conspiring to distribute 100 kilog rams or more of marijuana . Count Three c harg ed appellant, L ita Musick, and other s known and u n k n o wn wit h conspiring to commit money launde r in g o f

f e n s e s . Co u n ts F o u r

an d Se v e nc h ar g e d

a p p e ll an t a n d L it a M u s ic k w it h s u b s ta n tive money -l au n d ering off

enses. Counts One, Tw o, Three , and F our also dema nded for feiture s upon conviction. Se ve ra l cod efen dan ts p le a de d guil ty . D a vis and L ov e we re c on vic te d in

a se pa ra te tr ia l. Appellant and L ita Musick went to trial tog ether on September 1, 2004. At trial , co -c o nspirator Gor g e Dua rte testified that he dea lt cocaine and mar ijuana in the Morristown and Ne wport areas of Tenne ssee from 1997 or 1998 to Marc h 2003. I n 1997 or 1998, Du art e be g a n d e liv e ri ngdr ug s to a pp e lla nt o n b e ha lf of

Du art e ’s bo ss, Juan

Ga rc ia . A ft e r s ix months, Duarte we nt out on his own, selling coca ine and marijuana to Ga rcia ’s customers. D uring this period, Duar

te sold thirty

to fifty pounds of m arijuana and one-half to one kil og ram of c ocaineNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 3 - to ap pe lla nt thr e e or fo ur tim e s ea c h mont h. Du art e wa s ar

re ste d in 1998 and ja ile d f or fi ve or six da y s. Whe n r e le a se d, Du art e imm e diate ly re su me d s e lli ngdr

ug s to app e lla

nt a nd c on tin ue d unti l appellant wa s arr ested later in 1998. Dua rte a nd appellant r esumed their tr ansac tions when appe llant
wa s r e le a se d f

ro m ja il o ne y e ar l a te r. Ap pe lla nt b e g an p urchas in g l arge r a mou nts , w hic h D ua

rt e
e sti ma te d at 10 0 p ound s o f m ari jua na and kil og ra m qu anti tie s o f c oc a ine pe r w e e k. I n 2 00 0, Du a rt e beg an delivering the drug s to a ppellant’s house in Mor

ristown, Tenne ssee. Duar te was a rr es t ed aga i ni n 2 0 0 1 , re m ai n i n g i n cu s t o dy u n t i l De ce mb er 2 0 0 2
. W h en re l ea s ed , h e b ega ns el l i n g dru gs with the assistance of his cousin, Eric Ser na, and his brothe r, Jos e Dua rte. Du art e wa s ar

re ste d ag a in in 200 3 an d ha s re ma ine d in cus tod y sin c e . B e fo re thi s la st a

rr e st, Duar te was se lling an e stimated five kilog rams of c ocaine and 300 to 500 pounds of marijuana per transac tion to appellant. Duar te charg ed appellant approximately $22,000 per kilog ram of c ocaine
. Duar te estimated that he sold appellant for ty to f orty -five kilogr ams of coca ine betwee n 2002 and 2003. Some of this coca ine was delivere d to a frie nd’s house, some to other locations in Morristown and Ne wport, including appellant’ s various re sidence s and L ita Musick’s house. Duar te kept tra ck of his drug transac tions in not ebooks, which he g ave to Ser na whe n he wa s jailed in 2003. The notebooks wer e seized from Serna ’s safe when Ser na wa s arr ested. Ref

err ing to the notebooks, Du ar t e testified a s to how he re corde d the quantities and pric es of the dr ug s he boug ht from his suppliers. Duar t e al s o rec orded tra nsactions with his customers, noting the customer’ s name a

nd the amount t h e customer owe d. The notebooks c orrobor ated Dua rte’s te sti mony tha t a pp e lla nt w a s o ne of

his c u s t o me rs . D ua

rt e a c kn ow le dg e d ma

kin g $2 50 ,0 00 in p ro fi ts by se lli ngc oc a ine to a

pp e lla nt. Th e on ly

tim e a ft e r 19 97 whe n Dua rt e did no t se ll c oc a ine toNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

I n 2003, appellant h ad $15,000 of ma rble installed in the bathr oom. The work inc luded floor 2 tiles eng rave d with dollar signs, a twelve- inch by

six ty -inch slab of

marble e tche d wi t h t h e word “Escoba r,” a nd a two-f oot by three -foot mar

ble floor til e etched with t he imag e of f ormer Colombian car tel leade r Pablo Escoba

r’s fa ce. A

ppellant m ade two cash pay ments of $7,500 ea ch to pay for the work. - 4 - a pp e lla nt w a s w he n e ith e r o f t

he m w a s in

ja il. Co- c on s p i r a t o r

E r i c S e r n a , D u art e ’ s c o u s i n , t e s t i f i e d t h a th e w e n tt o w o r

k f o r D u a rt e distributing drug s and collecting money in 2002. Serna confirme d that appellant wa s one of Dua rte’s customers an d identified appe llant’s residenc e as a location wher e drug s were distributed. Serna testified to specific coca ine transa ctions with ap p el l an t , including the sale of f ifteen kilog rams of
c oc a ine , s ta tin g that he he lpe d c ount a pp ro xima te ly

$3 00 ,0 00 re c e ive d f

ro m a pp e lla nt. Se rn a a lso
re c a lle d co cai ne del ive ri e s to a pp e lla nt’ s f ri e nd ’s ho us e . Se rn a

too k o ve r D ua

rt e ’s dr ugbu sin e ss when Dua

rte we nt to jail in 2003 and kept the drug notebooks in a safe at his house. The note books
wer e seized whe n Serna w as ar rested in 2003. Ser

na re viewed the notebooks and t es tified that appellant wa s one of the c ustomers listed in the notebook. Evidence was also introduced that appellant sold 4.8 g rams of coca ine to an under cover ag ent on J anuar y 3, 2000, and 13.9 g rams of coca ine t o an undercove r age nt on April 7, 2000. Appellant’s admission that he sold drug s on these occ asions was a lso admitted. Evidence of appe llant’s use of the pr ocee ds from his drug dealingwas a lso presente d. Appellant’s r esidenc e at 7379 Spring Creek D rive wa s purchas ed for $139,000 in L ita Musick’s name on Oc tober 12, 2001. At closing , she provided a cashie rs che ck for

$29,419.01 for the dow n pay ment and closing costs. On Marc h 25, 2003, L ita Musick purcha sed a 2003 L incoln Navig ator 2No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

On November 20, 2002, a 2002 Cadillac Escala de was purcha sed in th e n am e o f Lee 3 Al m any , a fr iend of a

ppellant whose house Duar te and Ser

na identified a s a deliver

y location for their drug s. Almany

made thre e cash pay

ments, eac h less than $10,000, in three wee ks for the dow n pay ment. Appellant spent $8,800 in ca sh on ri m s an d t i re s fo r the Esc alade and had the interior reupholster ed for

$2,190 in cash. In 20 0 3, appellant pur chase d a Volvo for his girlf riend He ather Mann fo r $ 21 ,0 00 , p ayingthe $7 ,0 00 do wn pa y me nt in ca sh
. He la te r s pe nt n e arl y $1 ,4 00 in c a sh for c ustom wheels for the car . - 5 - for a pproxi mately

$75,000 in her name. Acc ording to the salesman, a p p el l an t and L ita Musick wanted to make a $15 , 0 0 0 ca s h d own pay ment, and L ita Musick asked howmuch she c ould put down without having the transac tion r eporte d. When told $10,000 wa s the maxi mum amount that would not be re ported, L ita Musick paid $9,500 that day and $5,500 a few day s later using cashie r’s chec ks. She completed the pur chase by trading -in appe llant’s Honda a nd financ ing the rema ining $39,000. Evidence of other c ar pur chase s using c ash wa s also prese nted. 3 Western Union records showed that L ita Musick wired $5,000 to Nathan Wade on Apr il 13, 2003, and $8,000 to Penny Gates on Aug ust 10, 2003. W ade a nd Ga t es we re l at er identified as appellant’ s associate s. L ita Musick’s bank rec ords s how deposit s totaling ove r $128,000 we re ma de be tw e e n D e c e mbe r 1 99 9 a nd No ve mbe r 2 00 3. Of

tha t amou nt, ove r $ 10 0, 00 0 w a s d e po sit e d in
c a sh
. Ap pe lla

nt’ s ba nk a c c ou nt wa s ra re ly us e d. F ro m Janu ary

20 00 thr ou g h a

pp e lla nt’ s a rr e st i n November

2003, a total of $6,995 wa s deposited, $6,920 of whic h was c ash. Only one che ck wa s
e ve r w ri tte n o n th e a c c ount. Ham b li nCo u n ty

Sh e r if f ’ s D e te c ti v e M ik e H ay e s te s ti f ie d to thr e e in c id e n ts inv olving appellant. On January

31, 1998, Hay es responde d to a repor t of an attempted suicide at a ppellant’s g randpa rents’ tra iler. Afte r re ceivingconsent to sea rch, H ay es found a

16-g aug e sh o t gu n an d anNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 6 - SKS assault rifle in appellant’ s bedroom closet, a red cooler containing $3,500 in cash, ba g g ies, two small bag s of drugs, and a speeding ticket i ssued t o appellant. Hay es also found a digital sc ale a

nd tr ipl e -b e a m sc a le s in

the ro om. Ap pe lla

nt w a s a juv e nil e a t th e tim e , a

nd he wa s c ha

rg e d in state court with poss ession of drug paraphe rnalia and possession of cocaine for sale. I n Dec ember 1999, Hay es executed a

sear ch warra

nt for L ita Musick’s M aple Valley residenc e. Offic ers f ound $42,800 in cash, a rec eipt for a

digital sc ale, gambling ticke ts, a Ruge r .357 mag num pistol , four boxes of sandwich ba g g ies, and a g old-colore d neckla ce. Appellant was ultimately sent to a boy s’ home for fo ur te e n mo nth s. Severa l y ear s later, on Septembe r 30, 2002, Hay es responde d to a n ear ly morning call fr om
a pp e lla nt’ s Sp ri ngCr e e k Dr ive re sid e nc e . L ita Mu sic k r e po rt e d th a t se ve ra l me n h a d f or c e d th e ir way into the residenc e, bound her, and forc ed her and a small c hild into a c loset. The intruder s then
r an s a c k e d t h e h o u s e . L i t a

M u s i c k t o l d an o t h e r o f f i c e r t h a tt h e m e n w e r e l o o k i n g f o r dr u g s o r m o n e y. On Oc tob e r 1 , 2 00 3, se arc h w arr ants we re e xec ute d at th re e loc a tio ns a sso c ia te d w ith appellant. Chris Wilhoi t, a Tenne ssee B urea u of Investig ation (TB I ) ag ent, executed the w arr ant for the Spring Creek D rive residenc e. Ag ents found re ceipts showing $6,468 of ca sh purcha ses from
se ve ra l L a s V e g a s sto re s and a re c e ipt fo r t he purc ha se of

a 20 02 Ho nd a

ind ic a tin g an $ 8, 00 0 c a sh pay ment had bee n made. The sear ch of L ita Musick’s Ray Street re sidence resulted in sei z u re of
rec eipts, tax documents, and a gold necklace
. A s ear ch of another of appellant’ s apar

tments, this one at Har rison Fe rry

Road in Ba

neber ry , Tenne ssee, led to se izure of $2,700 in cash, baggi es , four digital sc ales, a

Scotch Guar d can w ith a hidden compartment, rec eipts, and sample tiles cr eate d for appellant’ s renovated bathroom. Travis Owensby and Jeremy

J ones, appe llant’s roommates, we reNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 7 - prese nt during the sea

rch. Richa

rd Whitt , a loca l policeman assig ned to the DEAtask forc e that executed the wa

rra nts, ex plained that the ba g g ies wer e used for packa g ing drug s. Whit t also testified t h a t w h e n ar

r e s t e d o n N o v e mb e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 3 , a p p e l l an t h a d b o a s t e d t o an o f f i c e r a t t h e s c e n e , “ H e y, Mike, tell them about me, that I don’t coope rate . All the big dr ug deale rs g o to trial. Wait t ill they try to ge t me to testify .” I n addition to the testimony summarized a

bove, the Gover

nment introduced a

cer tification from the I RS showing t hat appellant failed to repor t any income for the y ear s cover ed by the drug conspirac y . The Gove rnment then re sted. Appellant moved f or a j u d gm en t of ac quittal on the conspirac y

counts, and the judg e re serve d decision on that motion. I n his defense , ap pellant introduce d jail rec ords for G org e Dua rte showinghis periods of inc arc e ratio n. I nmate Ric ky Ramse y te sti fi e d tha t Du art e or g anize d a sc he me to smu g g le dr ug s in to the c ounty

ja il d ur inghis inc arc e ratio n in

20 01 . N a ta lia

Ste wa rt , th e c ou sin

of c o- c on sp ir a tor

Cr a ig Ste wa rt , w ho se c a se wa s st ill pe nd inga t th e tim e , te sti fi e d that Dua rte ’s wi fe tol d h e r t hat D ua rt e was be ing pressure d to testify ag ainst appellant. Simi lar testimony was provide d by

Gorg e Dua

rte’s brother- in-law. Travis Ow ensby

testified that he a

nd J ere my

J ones re nted an a

partment fr om appellant at Har rison Fe rry

Road. He a lso testified that ever y thing seized from the apar tment dur ing the October 20 03 se arc h b e lon g e d to him , n ot a pp e lla nt. Shann o n M antooth, one of a ppellant’s g irlfriends, testified that appellant made his money fr om g a mbl ingand

no t dr ug de a lin g and that she wa s unawa re that g a mbl ingwa s il le g a l. S he a lso testified that the Spring Creek house was re ally L ita Musick’s house a

nd that appellant did not ownNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 8 - the Esca lade he drove. Paul Coll ins testified that he taug ht appellant how to be a bookie a nd descr ibed appe llant as
a “ hu stl e r. ” Co ll ins te sti fi e d th a t so me of the $4 2, 00 0 s e ize d in

19 99 fr om a

pp e lla nt w a s h is, alleg ing that the money

was g ambling pr ocee ds. He de nied t hat appe llant was a dr ug deale r. On
cross-e x amination, Colli ns admitted that he had two pr ior convictions for distributing coca ine. Nathan Wade , a self- descr ibed profe ssional poker play er, c l ai m ed t h at he and appellant would play

in L as Veg as whe re w ins or losses could exceed $50,000 in a single g ame. He testified that they play ed poker two to three times eac h wee k. When asked if he repor ted his ear nings, Wade te sti fi e d th a t he ma de jus t eno ugh to “ma ke e nd s me e t,” bu t r a te d h is p ok e r s kil ls a s su pe ri or to
a pp e lla nt’ s. Wad e a lso c la ime d th a t th e mon e y L ita Mu sic k h a d w ir ed h im d id n ot b e lon g to
a pp e lla nt. L ee A lmany

testified that he had filed a claim see king r eturn of the Escala de. The vehicle, wi th an ou t s t an d i n g l i e no f $ 3 4 , 0 0 0 , w a s r e tu r

n e d t o h i m . D a v i d

H o l l e y , a

f r i e n d o f a p p e l l a nt, te s ti f ie d th a t a p p e ll an t m a d e mo n e y

g a mb li n g an d

th a t H o ll e y

n e v e r kn e w a p p e ll an t t o b e a

dr ug deale r. After

appellant r ested his case, L ita Musick testified in her ow n behalf . She told the jury

she lived on Ray

Street wit h her second son, who was twelve y ear s old, and the son’s father, a nd that she had wor ked at Har dee’ s for twenty -one y ear s making biscuits. She testified that appellant wa s often left with his gr andpar ents while she wor ked. L ita M u s i ck d i s p uted Dete ctive Ha y es’s testimony about the 1998 sea

rch of the trailer , stating that appellant did not have a bedroom ther e and that the dr ug s and g un s h a d b e e n s e ize d f

ro m he r m oth e r’ s b e dr oo m.No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 9 - L ita Musick testified that appe llant purcha sed t he $75,000 L incoln Navig ator for her. She believed the cash c ame f

rom g ambling pr ocee ds. She testified that the $28,000 down pay ment for the Spring Creek residenc e came from money her f ather g ave he r bef

ore he died and that a

ppellant
wa s g oin g to h e lp h e r w iththe mor tg a g e pa y me nts
. Th e n i gh t o f the home invasion, she wa s at the Spring Creek r esidenc e house- sitti ng appellant’ s dog s. Appellant ca me home at 11:00 p.m. with $30,000, which he hid in cere al boxes befor e leaving. A n hour later , two men knocked at the door, rushed in, bound her, and put her a nd h er o t h er s o n i n a cl o s et
. T h e ca s h wa s n o t d i s co v er ed
. L i t a M u s i cks t at edt h at s h e w as “gu es s i n g” that th e int

ru de rs we re loo kin g fo r dr ug s or mon e y wh e n she g a ve that opin ion to D e te c tiv e Ha y e s. L ita Musick further

testified that the Western Union tra nsfer s di d n o t i nvolve appe llant’s money . She maintained that the cash in he r chec king a ccount wa s from individuals, including he r pare nts, friends, and a

ppellant, for w hom she paid bills. Further , she testified that the c ash g ifts from h er s o nwe re fr o m gam b l i n g. O n c r o s s - e xa mi n a ti o n , L it a M u s ic k a c kn o w le d g e d th a t s h e w a s aw ar e a p p e ll an t h a d been eng ag ed in drugactivity

beca use he ha d been c o n v i cted of drug offe nses. When asked a bout the $3,600 seized from her

pare nts’ trailer in 1998, she stated she did not know the money ’s orig ins. She testified that she thoug ht appellant had been sent to a boy s’ hom e for fourtee n months following the 1998 sear ch bec ause he had bee n unruly and not going to school, not for dea ling dr ug s. She further stated that t he $42,800 in cash the police seized from he r Maple V alley residenc e in 1999 belong ed to a pp e lla nt and a dmi tte d that sh e ha d lie d to De te c tiv e Ha y e s wh e n s he sa id t

he mon e y wa s h e rs . She admitted that the intruders to the SpringCreek house wer e looking f or drug s or money

and thatNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 10 - she had not told police a

bout the $30,000. She maintained that the Escalade was not appellant’s c ar. L ita Mu sic k a dmi tte d th a t be tw e e n 1 99 8 a nd 20 02 , a pp e lla nt d id n ot h a ve any

le g iti ma te employ ment to her knowle dg e. Dur in g t h at t i m e, he of ten broug ht plastic shopping ba g s full of
mon e y to h e r h ou se , w he re he wo uld hid e the m. S he e sti ma ted t hat ov e r t he pa st f our- and -a -h a lf y e ars , s he ha d d e po sit e d $ 11 1, 00 0 in c a sh int o he r ch e c kin g a c c ount, of wh ic h up to $7 5, 00 0 c a me fr om a pp e lla nt. On September

17, 2004, the jury

convic ted appe llant of the money launder ing c onspiracy char g e in Count Three , the substantive money launder ing of

fense s in Counts Four

and Seven, a

nd on a lesser

included offense in Count One of conspirac y to distribute a quantity

of coc aine. He was acquitted of

the marijuana

conspiracy ch ar ged in Count Two. L ita Musick was c onvicted on the sub s ta n ti v e mo n e y la

u n d e r in g o f

f e n s e s in Co u n ts F o u r an d Se v e n an d w a s a c qu itte d o f the three conspirac y

char g es. On Septembe r 21, 2004, the j ury order ed forfeiture of appe llant’s interest in one
m i l l i o n d o l l ar s in curre ncy and his and L ita Musick’s intere st in real prope rty . On Fe bruar y 28, 2 0 0 5 , appellant wa s sentence d to 235 months of imprisonm ent for e ach c onviction, to run
concurre n t l y . On Marc h 29, 2005, Musick filed a timely notice of a

ppeal. L ita Musick did not
a pp e a l.

II Appellant has raised fourtee n claims of error in his appe al. The c laims are a naly zed in turn be low , a lth ou g h w e have g ro up e d to g e the r s imi lar c la ims wh e re log ic a l.No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 11 -

A. Re quir e m e nt s o f a P r ope r Cha r ge of M one y La unde r ing We review de novo whether an indictment ade quately char g es an of

fense
. United States v. Cor-Bon Custom Bullet Co. , 287 F.3d 576, 578- 79 (6th Cir. 2002). Appellant argues that Count Thr ee should have bee n dismiss ed for failing to state an ove rt act, whic h is a requir ed ele ment of a c onspiracy
. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . R os s , 1 90 F .3 d 4 46 , 4 50 (6 th Cir. 1999). Appellant filed a motion to dismiss Count Thr ee, and the district court de nied the motion afte r a he aring
. An ind ic tme nt a de qu a te ly

c ha rg e s a n o ff e ns e if it “ (1 ) inc lud e s the e le me nts of the of fe ns e intended to be c harg ed, (2) notifies the appe llant of ‘what he must be prepa red to mee t,’ and (3) allows the appe llant to invoke a forme r convic tion or acquittal in the eve n t o f a subsequent prosec ution.” Ibid. (c i t i n g Russell v. United States , 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962) a nd United States

v. Ma r tinez , 9 8 1 F
. 2 d 8 6 7 , 8 7 2 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 9 2 ) )
. Se c ti o n 1 9 5 6 s tate s th a t w h o e v e r , kn o w in g the pr op e rt y us ed in a fi na nc ia l tr ans a c tio n is pr oc e e ds fr om i lle g a l c on du c t, “ c on du c ts o r a tte mpt s to conduct suc h a fina

ncial tra nsaction which in fa ct involves the proce eds of spe cific unla wful activity ” is g uilty

of a c rime. I n 2005, afte r appellant’s conviction, t he S upreme Court unanimously held that there is no require ment to prove a

n overt a ct under

§ 1956(h). W

h it fi e ld v . U n it e d States , 5 4 3 U. S. 209, 219 (2 0 0 5 ). Fo l l o wi n g W

hit fie ld , we state d tha t “a ll the g ov e rnme nt h a d to pr ov e ” in a § 1 95 6 c a se , is t h a tt h e a p p e l l an t“ a g r e e d

w i t h an o t h e r

p e r s o nt o v i o l a t e t h e s u

b s t an t i v e p r o v i s i o n s o f

t h e m o n e ylaunder ing statute during the per iod al l eged in the indictment.” United States v. Hy nes , 467 F.3d 9 5 1 , 9 6 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g W hit fie ld , 543 U.S. at 211).No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 12 - I n this case, Count Thre e cha rg ed appe llant with ag ree ing to c onduct unspecifie d financ ial transac tions over a five-y ear period with the intent of c oncea ling illeg al proc eeds. The indictment do e s no t c ha

rg e an o ve rt

a c t. T he Sup re me Court ’s W hit fie ld opinion clear ly

states that an ove rt ac t is not a nece ssary

element of

a § 1956(h ) p ro s ec u t i o n . Henc e, it need not be char g ed in the indictment, and the indictment in this case adequately char g ed the offense . Appellant’s a rg ument fa ils
. Appellant also a

rg ues that the indictment is “duplicitous” bec ause it cha rg ed the a ppellant wi th b oth a tte mpt ingand

a c tu ally c on du c tin g mon e y -l a

un de ri ngtr ans a c tio ns . T his argume nt i s meritless. See U

nited States v. Colon , 238 F.3d 367, 369 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (def endants indi ct ed for both distributi on of coc aine a nd attempt to distribute cocaine ).

B. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence We review de novo wh et her the evidenc e wa s sufficient to sustain a c onviction, asking if “ anyrational trier of fa ct could hav e fo u n d t h e essential elements of the cr ime bey ond a
rea sonable doubt.” United St ates v. Abboud , 438 F.3d 554, 589 ( 6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 1 27 S. Ct
. 446 (2006). This c ourt “views the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the pr osecution and g ives the prosec ution the benef it of all rea sonable infe renc es fr om the testimony .” Ib id
. Count O ne of

the ind ic tme nt c ha

rg e d a pp e lla nt w ithc on sp ir ingt o d i s t

r i b ut e a n d p o s s e s s, wi th intent to distribute, five kil og rams or more of c ocaine . Appellant ar g ues that since the jury convicted appellant of

the lesser , included off

ense of conspiring t o d i s t ri b u t e a qua ntity of coc aine, the jur

y reje cted the e vidence prese nted of a ppellant’s involvement with D uarte and Serna . Appellant’s B r.No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 13 - a t 18 -1 9. Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t the re ma ini ng e vid e nc e , i.e ., a pp e lla nt’ s un ilate ra l c on sp ir a c y wi th underc over la

w enf orce ment office rs, was not suff icient to find appellant guilty under Count One. Appellant’s B r. at 19-20. We rec ently

reje cted a n argument like appellant’ s in United States v. J ackson , 473 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2007). I n that ca s e, t h e p an el h eld t hat a jury ’s ac quittal of appellant on a char g e of distribut io nan d

p o s s e s s io nw it

h in te n t t o d is tr ib u te mo r e th an5 0 g r a ms o f c r a c k c o c a in e w a s not
nece ssarily

inconsistent with a jury ’s c o nviction of appe llant on a cha rg e of distribution and possession with intent to di stribute more than f ive g rams of c rac k coca ine. See id. at 669-70. The jury could have conclude d that the witnesses we re not wholly cre dible as to the drugamount, but
wer e somewhat cre dible, and part i ally cre dited their testimony

acc ording ly
. Id. a t6 7 0
. N o t a b l y, even if the j ury has rendere d “truly inconsistent verdicts,” a

n appellant may

not upset such a ve rdict beca use such inconsistenc y

does not show that “they wer e not convince d of the a ppellant’s g uilt” of the char g es for

which he w as convic ted. Un ite d S tat es v . P owe ll , 469 U.S. 57, 64-55 (1984) ( quoted in Jack son , 473 F.3d at 670). I n this case, the jur

y ’s convictio n of appe llant for a le sser include d offe nse wa s not inconsistent with the char g ed o ff en s e. As in Jack

son , the jury

could have partially

cre dited the testimony of Duarte and Serna, without reje cting it entirely
. The jury could have been c onvinced of appellant’ s g uilt. Given the testimony from Duar te and Serna and other

evidenc e, it is simpl y

not po ssi ble to s ay

that no ratio na l tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld h a ve fou nd app ell ant g uil ty of c on sp ir ingto dis tr ibute a

qu anti ty of c oc a ine . App e lla

nt’ s a rgume nt f a ils
. Appellant also ra ises a cla im of insufficient evide nce r eg ardingCount Three. The indictmentNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 14 - char g ed appe llant with conspiring w ith L ita Musick and “othe r per sons known and unknown” to the g r an d ju r y to la u n d e r mo n e y . A p p e ll an t a

r g u e s th a t s in c e L it a

M u s ic k , th e o n ly

n a me dcoconspirator , was a cquitt ed of the conspirac y count, insufficie nt evidence exis ted to find appe llant g uilty of the c o nspiracy . Appellant’s B r. at 23. Appe llant relies on the pa nel dec ision in Getsy v

. Mi c ha e ls fo r t

he pr op os iti on

that w he re a

jur y c on vic ts o nly on e of mul tip le de fe nd ants c ha rg e d w ith committing an of

fense requiring multipl e par ticipants, that conviction ca nnot be sustained. See 456 F.3d 575, 591 (6th Cir. 2006), vacate d and reheard e n banc , Ge tsy v . M itc he ll , 4 95 F .3 d 2 95 (6 th Cir. 2007) (en ba

nc); Appe llant’s Br
. at 23-24. Appellant also argues t hat the Gove rnment provided insufficient proof

that the alleg edly illega l proce eds we re de rived fr om coca ine dea ling a nd that the jury ’s ver dict materia lly varie d from the c harg ed off ense, me aning that he wa s convicted of conduct for whic h he wa s not properly indicted. Appellant’ s Br . at 24-25. Def endant’ s argument based on Ge tsy fails bec ause the panel opinion upon which he relies
was va cate d when the pe tition for rehe aring on banc w as g rante d on November 22, 2006. Ge tsy , 495 F.3d at 300. The en ba

nc cour t rejec ted the p an el ’s co n clus ion on which Musick re lies. Id. at 307–08. Fur

thermore , contra

ry to de f e n d a nt’ s arguments, we have held pr eviously that “the a cquittal of all but one co-c onspirator during the same trial does not ne cessa rily indicate that the jur

y found no ag ree ment to act.” United States v. Crayton , 357 F.3d 560, 565 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Th e jury ’s decision to acquit one co-c onspirator may have been based upon lenity and is not an indication that the evidenc e ag ainst the rema ining c o-conspirator is insufficient. Se e ibi d . Appellant’s c ontention that the evidenc e that the pr ocee ds came from coc aine wa s insufficient is w ithout merit since there
was ove rwhe lming evide nce of appellant’ s money -launderi n g activities. His contention that theNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 15 - ve rd ic t mate ri a lly

va ri e d f ro m th e c ha

rg e d o ff e ns e a lso fa ils
.

C. F ederal Rule of Crim inal Proc edure 16 and Alleged P rosec utorial Misconduct We reviewa district court’s decision t o admit or ex clude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See U nited States v. Ganier , 468 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 2006). Finding s of fa ct ar e re viewed f or clea r er ror; leg al conc lusions are re viewed de novo
. Se e ibi d
. Mu sic k f ile d a se ri e s o f m oti on s und e r F e de ra l Ru le of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 16 (d )( 2) to exclude late discove ry

provided be tween June 8 and J une 26 for admission to his June 29 trial. The paper s in question included rea l estate recor ds for the Spring Cre ek Dr ive re sidence , which wa s the basis for the substantive money -launde ring offe nse cha rg ed in Count Four. The paper s in question also included Western U nion rec ords for mone y transfe rs by

L ita Musick, which s u p p o rt ed the money -launde ring conspirac y count. At a he aring o n J u n e 2 4, the district court a sked Assistant United States Attorney

Smit h if it should gra

nt t h e d ef

endant a continuance to deal with the do c ume nts or

if the Go ve rnme nt c ou ld pr oc e e d a s sc he du le d wi th the e vid e nc e e xclu de d. Smith to ld the c ourt that th e Go ve rnme nt w a s r e a dy to p ro c e e d to tr ia l on

June 29 wi tho ut t

he e vi den ce if

it
wer e excluded. On June 28, the district co u rt o rder ed that all “late produc ed discove ry by the Go ve rnme nt
. . . e xce pt fo r B ra dy or Jenc ks ma te ri a l c on ta ine d in that dis c los ur e and e xce pt fo r i te ms that wer e previously

rec eived in the g overnme nts bates stamped disclosure s prior to J une 8, 2004, is e x cluded.” On the morning of trial on J une 29, AUSA Smit h g ave notice of appea l fr o m t he dist ri ct court’s or der. The district court aske d Smit h why he should not be held in conte mpt for attempting to de lay

the trial. Ultimately , no sanction wa s issued beca use the judg e dete rmined thatNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 16 - AUSA Smith was merely “over whelmed” with his duties and not acting in bad faith. The a ppeal of the dis tr ic t court ’s or de r div e ste d th e dis tr ic t c ourt of jur isd ic tio n p e nd ingre so lut ion of the a pp e a l. On J uly 6, AUSA Smith di smissed the appea l and moved the district court to reconside r excluding the e vidence beca use the c ase ha d been a lrea dy continu ed p en d i n g that appea l. An opposition t o rec onsideration wa s filed, and the matter wa s argued. On July 21, a diffe rent AU SA, Guy B la c kw e ll, a

pp e are d to ha

nd le the c a se , p ro mis e d a

pr omp t su

pe rs e din g ind ic tme nt a

nd tim e ly compliance with disc overy . The district c ourt reve rsed its June 28 order excluding the e vidence and allowed the e x cluded e vidence to be used. No sa nctions ag ainst AUSA Smit h or the Gove rnment
wer e ordered. Appellant was permitted t o file a rene wed moti on to suppress, which was then de nied on Aug ust 19, 2004. Ultim ately , trial beg an on September 1, 2004, and the e vidence was a dmitted. Ap pe lla nt co nte nd s in his app e a l tha t AUSA Smit h “u se d th e pr e tr ia l no tic e of a pp e a l a s a prete x t to fo rc e t h e d i s trict court to continue Musick’ s trial. [T] he pre text was de signe d for the g overnme nt to g ain a tactica l advanta g e over Musick by avoiding the exclusion of evidence cause d by AUSA Smith’s viol ations of Rule 16(a) .” Appellant’s Br . at 28. Appellant c ontends that the d i s t r i c tc o u rti n c o r

r e c t l y a p p l i e d R u l e 1 6 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( B ) an d

( C ) b e c a u s e t h e G o v e r

n m e n tw o u l d

a l w a ys have the op tio n o f a

pp e a lin g an or de r e xclu din g e vid e nc e un de r R ule 16 , w hic h w ou ld a

uto ma tic a lly
c re a te tim e fo r de fe ns e to re c e ive and stu dy the e vid e nc e , th e re by

moo tin g the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ba sis for e x cluding the evidenc e. Appellant’s Br
. at 29. “Allowing evidenc e afte r a c ontinuance f orce d by a pretext ual pretrial appea l results in 16(d)( 2)(C) having no application to the Government.” Ib id
. I n deter mining whe ther suppre ssion is the appropriate remedy for a discovery

violation, the district court consider s: (1) the re ason for the del ay in producing the mater ials, (2) the de g ree ofNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 17 - prejudice to the defe ndant, and ( 3) whe ther the pr ejudice c an be cu re d wi t h a less seve re c ause of action, such a s g rantinga continuanc e. See G anier , 468 F.3d at 927. Appellant does not de monstrate any err or in admitting the ev i d en ce other than a ppellant’s policy arguments reg ardingRule 16. Since t he dis trict court ex plained that its “full intent” had be en to gr ant the appellant’ s counsel a continuance to de al with the belatedly -produc ed documents, and then admit the documents into evidenc e, the Gover nment g ained nothing from having to appea l and there by forc ing a continuance that the district court wa s alrea dy willing to gra n t
. T h e ap p eal wa s made to cor

rec t AUSA Smit h’s err or in stating he did not intend to use the docume nts at trial. I t was not pretextual. Appellant demonstrate s no prejudice from the c ontinuance of the trial fr om J une 25 to S e pte mbe r 1 , w hic h g a ve him a de qu a te tim e to s tud

y the dis c ov e ry

ma te ri a l. Finally , there is no evidence of p ro secutoria l misconduct. The district cour t offer ed sua sponte to c on ti nu e th e tr ia l so tha t a pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l c ou ld s tud

y the re c or ds and

c ur e the la te discovery if Smit h wanted to use the evidenc e at tria l. AUSA Smit h said he c ould proce ed without the re cords. However , Smit h later ex plained that he had been confused a bout the rec ords in question. The district cour

t f ound that a continuance to September 1 c ould cure the discover y err or and that there had bee n no bad fa ith. The district cour t corre ctly

conclude d that there had bee n no Rule 16 viola ti o n an d n o b a d f

a it h b e c a u s e th e G o v e r

n me n t h a d tu

r n e d o v e r th e r e c o r d s to th e d e fense as soon as they

had bee n rec eived. D. Spe e dy Tr ialAc t a nd Six th Am e ndm e nt Spe e dy Tr ialRi ght I n th e pa st, we have “ a

pp lie d tw o c on fl ic tin g sta nd ard s of re vie w t o Sp e e dy Tr ia l A c t c la imsNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 18 - – de novo and abuse of discre tion.” United States v. Cope , 31 2 F .3 d 75 7, 77 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 2) . M os t
rec ently , we a

pplied a de novo sta

ndard of revie w. See Greenup v. United States , 401 F.3d 758, 763 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Un ite d S

tat es v . G ar c ia-Ec ha v e rri a , 374 F.3d 440, 445 ( 6th Cir. 2004). I n this case, appellant loses unde r either standard. The Spee dy

Trial Act mandates “that a defenda nt be brought to t rial within seventy day s from the date of

arr e st, the fi lin g of the ind ic tme nt or inf or ma tio n, or the fi rs t a

pp e ara nc e be fo re the c ourt , whicheve r is later.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)
. An indictment must be dismis sed if a c riminal defe ndant is not tried within the tim e allowe d by the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (2). The Act, howe ver, c ontains numerous provisions permitting the tolling of the 70-day period, including “de lay resulting from any pr oc e e din g , in c lud ingany e xami natio ns , to de te rm ine the me nta l c omp e te nc y . . . o f t he de fe nd a nt; . . . delay resulting from any

pretria l motion, from the filing of the motion through the c o n clus ion of the he ari ngon , o r o the r p ro mpt dis po sit ion

of , s uc h mo tio n; [a

nd ] . . . de lay

re a so nab ly att ributable to any

period, not to exceed thirty day s, during which any

proce eding conce rning the d e f e n d an ti s a c tu a l l y

u n d e r a d v i s e m e n tb y

t h e c o u rt
. ” 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 3 1 6 1 ( h ) ( 1 )
. U n d e r a c a t c h- a ll pr ov isi on of the same statut e , d e lay s d ue to c on tin

ua nc e s g ra nte d by the c ourt are a lso e xclu de d “ if the ends of justice serve d by t ak i n g such ac tion outweigh the best interest of the public and the defe ndant in a spee dy

trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)( A). The trial court must state on the r ecor d, orally or in writing , its reasons for g ranting such continuanc es. Ib id
. Appellant and e ight c odefe ndants wer e indicted on October 28, 2003. The last code fenda nt
was a rre sted in Texas and made his initial appea ranc e on Fe bruar

y 9, 2004. The district cour t foundNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 19 - that the 70-da

y period to sta

rt appellant’ s trial beg an on Fe bruar y 9, 2004. On Fe bruar

y 19, 2004, appellant f

iled twenty -three motions i n the district court. These motions were r esolved on May 3, 2004. The c ourt found the period of t ime from Februa ry 19 throug h May

3 excludable. On May

18, Musick filed more motions, including objections to the May 3 ruling s. Musick continued filing motions t hroug h J une 2004, and the court he ld a serie s of hea ring s on these moti o n s over se vera l da y s at the e nd of June
. Th e c ourt e xclu de d the tim e fr om May 18 thr ou g h J un e 28 , 200 4, be c a us e “at a ll t i m es d u ri n g t h at per iod the defe ndant Gar y Musick filed a stre am of motions” up to and including the day of trial. The district c ourt also excluded the per iod throug h J uly 8, 2004, during which its order

excluding ce rtain evidence was on interlocutory appea l. The cour t also excluded the time from J uly

8 throug h September 1, 2004, “ due to the pending motions in reg ard to relevanc e and admissibili ty

filed by the def endant.” The c ourt noted t h at Musick would be tried le ss than ten
mon ths fr om t

he date of his ini tia l app e ara nc e and that the “ va st ma

jor ity of the de lay

in t ry ingthi s
case has bee n cause d by

the constant stre am of re petitive motions filed by this defenda

nt.” Appellant ar g ues t hat t he dis trict court e rre d in not making f indings that the pe riod of dela y from Musick’s appear ance to the appeara nce of the final codefe ndant (be tween N ovember 19, 2003 and F ebrua

ry 9, 2004) wa s rea sonable. Appe llant’s Br . at 3 1
. Appellant also a rg ues the that Gover nmen t s h o u l d not benef

it from delay

cause d by

the alleg ed misconduct of A USA Smit h on J une 29. Id. at 32. Appellant’s a

rg uments are without merit. The Speedy Trial Ac t excludes a rea sonable pe riod of dela y when a defe ndant is joined for trial with a c odefe ndant as to whom the time for trial ha s notNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

I n a supp le me nta l lett e r to this c ourt , ap pe lla nt c ite s Zedner v. U

nited States , 126 S. Ct . 1976 4 (2006). How ever , the Zedner Court merely

held t hat a district court judge may exclude time from t h e S p ee dy

T ri al Ac t t i m e cal cu l at i o n , as p er m i t t ed u n d er 1 8 U. S
. C
. § 3 1 6 1 (h )( 8 ), o n l y i f t h e j u d ge makes finding s on the rec ord that the c ontinuance se rves the “ ends of justice.” Such finding s are not require d for e x clusions of time made unde r 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)
. - 20 - run and no motion for se vera nce ha s been g rante d. See 18 U. S.C. § 3 16 1( h) (7 ); Cope , 312 F.3d at 77 6- 77 . T hu s, the c loc k in thi s c a se be g an to ru

n o n F e br ua ry 9, 20 04 . T he e xclusi on of tim e require d to addre ss appellant’s twe nty -three p r e tria l motions filed in Fe bruar y 2004 and other

pretria l motions i s expressly

permitted under

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). The exclusion of interlocutory appea l time is ex pressly

permitted under

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)( 1)(E)
. No continuances were g rante d be c a us e of imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, su c h a s c on g e sti on of th e court

c a le nd ar o r f

a ilure to o bta in witnesses by

the Gover

nment attorney
. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)(8)( C). I n sum, the total non- 4 excludable time that elapse d befor e appellant’ s trial beg an is 25 da y s, well within the limi ts of the Spe e dy Tr ia l A c t. Appellant also a sserts violation of his Six th Amendment rig ht to a speedy tr i al
. A district court’s a djudication of a c onstitut ional speedy -trial cla im is reviewed de novo
. United States v. Gardner , 488 F.3d 700, 719 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I n addition to a criminal def endant' s rig hts under the Speedy Trial Act, the Six th Amendment g ua ra nte e s “th e ri g ht to a spe e dy and pu bli c tr ia l.” U. S. C O N ST . ame nd . V I ; se e als o Kl op fe r v . No rth Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). Whether there has bee n a violation of the c onstitut ional rig ht to a spee dy

trial is a fac t-intensive inquiry requiring the balanc ing of “whe ther de lay

befor e trial wa s
u n c o m m o n l y l o n g , w h e t h e r t h e g o v e r n m e n to r t h e c r i m i n a l d e f

e n d an ti s m o r e t o b l a m e f

o r t h a td e l a y,No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 21 - whether , in due cour se, the de fenda nt asserte d h i s ri ght to a speedy trial, and whe ther he suffe red prejudice as the de lay ' s result.” Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S
. 647, 651 (1992). “ Until there is some delay

which is presumptively

prejudicia l , t h er e i s no nece ssity for inquiry

into the other fac tors that g o into the balance .” B a rker v . W ingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). A one -y ear delay betwee n acc usation and the be g inning of trial is ge nera lly

considere d “pre sumptively prejudicia l.” Do gg e tt , 505 U.S. at 6 5 2 n . 1
. W e have previously held that a ne arly

nine-month delay

was not pr e su mpt ive ly pr e

jud ic ia l in a c a se inv olv ingtw o d e fe nd ants and e le ve n c ounts re la tin g to m ult ipl e al l ega t i o n s of attempted murde r. See Cope , 3 12 F .3 d at 77 8; se e als o Gardner , 4 8 8 F
. 3 d at 719 (finding nine-month delay not presumptively

prejudicia l). I n th is c a se , M us ic k’ s tr ia l be g an te n mo nth s a ft e r h is i nd ict men t. Gi ve n th a t th e c a se involved eig ht c odefe ndants, with a ppellant ultimately being tried jointly with one code fenda nt, and
se ve ra l con sp ir a c y and su bs tanti ve c ounts , we ho ld that the de lay in thi s ca se is n ot p re su mpt ive ly prejudicia l. Delay s sever al months short of one y ear are not “uncommonly long,” espec ially

in case s inv o lv in g mu lt ip le d e f

e n d an ts an d n u me r o u s p r e tr ia l mo ti o n s. See Ga r d ner , 488 F.3d at 719. Moreove r, eve n if there wer e pre judicial d el ay s u ff

i cient to trig g er a

full inquiry , the fa ct that the de fe nd ant’ s v ig or ou s mo tio n p ra c tic e wa s the main c a us e of de lay we ig hs a g a ins t f

ind inga Sixth Amendment violation. The other fac tors outlined in Do gg e tt also weig h ag ainst finding a violation here
.

E. Administrat ive SeizuresNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 22 - We review a dis trict court’s decision to admit or ex clude evidence for a n abuse of discretion. See G a nier , 468 F.3d at 925. Finding s of fa ct ar e re viewed f or cle ar e rror ; leg al conc lusions are revie wed de novo
. Se e ibi d
. Musick challeng es the administrative seizure of an Esca lade a

nd a Volvo while the c ars we re parke d at an a

uto shop and the seizure of a Navig ator from a publi c st ree t. He a lso challeng es the resulting sear ches, w hich wer e wa rra ntless a nd not ma de incident to a n arr est. Evidence g ather ed during the seizures was used t o obtain sear ch warra nts for two of Mus ick’s residence s, to identify
and ob ta in b ank

re c or ds , an d to ge ne rate oth e r ev ide nc e . Mu sic k ar g ue s tha t ag e nts la c ke d p ro ba ble
cause to searc h and seize the vehicles. Appellant’s B r. at 38. He also argues that the ve hicles we re not c ontraba

nd and, ther efor e, not subject to seizure. Id . at 39. Mo re ov e r, a pp e lla nt ar g ue s th a t c ivi l forf eiture a pplies to vehicles only

and not any

paper s fo u n d i n s uch vehic les and that the D EA’s inventory of items in the vehicle was prete x tual and unnece ssary since other persons wer e pre sent to take possession of pe rsonal prope rty found in the vehic le. Id . at 41. Al l “ c onvey ances , incl ud ing
. . . v e hic le s . . . wh ic h a re us e d, or

are int e nd e d f

or us e , to tr ans po rt , o r i n a

ny mann e r t o f

a c ili ta te the tr ans po rt a tio n, sa le , re c e ipt , po sse ssi on , or c on c e a lme nt” of controlled substanc es ar e subjec t to forfe iture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)( 4). The se i zure of such proper ty must be eff

ecte d in the manner set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 981(b). See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b). Se c tio n 981 (b ) re qu ir e s tha t se izur e s sh a ll b e ma de purs ua nt t o a wa rr ant u nle ss “ the re is p ro ba

ble
cause to believe that the property is subject t o forf eiture and the seizure is made pur suant to a lawf ul
ar r e s to r s e a r c h o r an o t h e r e x c e p t i o n t o t h e F o u rt h A m e n d m e n t w ar r an t r e qu i r e m e n tw o u l d

a p p l y .No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 23 - . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2) (B ). I nventory sear ches undertake n pursuant to standard police procedure s are rea sonable. So uth Dakota v. O

pperman , 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976). The Court ha s limit ed such inve ntories, howeve r, holding that it was unr easona ble for a state police trooper to open a locked suit case found i n a trunk wher e ther e wa s no policy with respec t to opening c losed containe rs found duringinventory
sear ches. Fl or ida v . W

e lls , 495 U.S. 1, 5 (1990). Howe ver, w here a vehic le is subject to forf eiture,
an inve nto ry

and se arc h may be re a so na

ble e ve n w he re no wa

rr ant h a s b e e n is su e d a

nd no pr ob a ble
cause to se arc h for c ontraba nd in the vehicle ha s been e stablished. Se e Coo pe r v . Ca lif

or nia , 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (discusse d in Opperman , 428 U.S. at 373). We have applied Cooper and joi ne d th os e ci rc u i t s that have f

ound that pre- forf

eiture inve ntories do not require war rants. U n it e d S tate s v. Dec ker , 1 9 F. 3 d 2 8 7 , 2 9 0 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Pac e , 898 F.2d 1218, 1244- 45 (7th Cir. 1990) (“onc e a vehic le is validly seized for for feiture , it can be se arc hed at w ill , w ith ou t a
war rant” )). I n this case, DE A Special Ag ent Templ et o n p u rs ued the f orfe iture of the ve hicles af ter a
consensua l searc h of S er n a’ s h ome led Te mpleton to discover Dua rte a nd Serna’ s drug ledg er. appellant’ s name wa s in the ledg er. Templeton conc luded that he ha d probable cause to believe that appellant’ s car s were likely purcha sed with drugp ro ce ed s . Based upon a tip, the Esc alade was dis c ov e re d at Way

ne ’s Up ho lst e ry ; it and a

pp e lla nt’ s Vo lvo we re se ize d wh e n a pp e lla nt a rr ive d to pick up the Esca lade. Templeton conducted an inventory of t he vehicles’ contents and seiz ed seve ral
rec eipts for wor

k done on the Escala de and f or re nt paid for a

n apar tment in Bane berr

y , Tenne ssee.No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 24 - After lear ning tha t d efe ndant claimed ow nership of the Navig ator a nd that L ita Musick held that
car ’s title and had attempted to pay for the vehicle in cash, Te mpleton directe d two police off icer s to conduct a stop of the Navig ator on a publi c st ree t. Fr om the Navigator, Templeton seized a r ece ipt for $15,000 f

or tile work be ing done in appellant’s home. Se e su pra note 2. The distric t c o u

r t found that the administrative seizures of the vehicle s were authorized under the s tatute. “ B a s e d

u p o nth e e xp e n s iv e n a tu

r e o f th e s e v e h ic le s , M u s ic k ’ s to ta l l a c k o f r e p o rte d inc ome , a nd the le dg e r imp lic a tin g Mu sic k in larg e sc a le dr ug de a ls, ” the c ourt

fo un d th a t pr ob a

ble
c a us e e xiste d to be lie ve the ve hic le s we re su bje c t to fo rf

e iture . Th e c ourt a lso no te d that th e F ourt h Am e ndme nt doe s not re qu ir e po lic e to obt a in a warr ant be fo re se izin g an a uto mob ile fr om a

pu bli c place when they

had proba

ble ca use to believe that it was forf eitable c o n traba

nd. See Florida v. W hit e , 526 U.S. 559, 566 (1999). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s ar e no t in c le ar er ro r; no r is the le g a l ana ly sis inc or re c t. Probable c ause to seize the vehicles exis ted, and the re sulting inventories w ere lawful. Police may
sear ch a ve hicle without a warra nt if they have pr obable c ause to be lieve it contains contra band. See W hit e , 526 U.S. at 564. Moreove r, even if the police lack probable cause to be lieve a car contains contra band, they

may seize the car if they

have pr obable c ause to be lieve the c ar itself is contr aband. Se e ibi d . The seiz u re o f a v eh i cle on a public street or

“other open plac es” doe s not involve any invasion of privac y . See id. at 566. Musick provides no support fo r h i s argument that Ag ent Templeton wa s prec luded from c onducting a n in v e ntory sear ch of the vehicles a fter the y wer e seized. Ap pe lla nt d oe s n ot a

rgue that th e re c e ipt s were in c los e d c on ta ine rs or oth e rw ise ou tsi de of

pla inNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 25 - view. Appe llant’s arguments about the proba ble ca use re quirement for

making a traff

ic stop and the plain-view r

ule ar e irre levant to the for feiture s at issue here . App el l an t has not demonstrate d any b ad faith or that Te mpleton was ac ting “ for the sole purpose of investigation.” S

e e Co lorado v. Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1987). Finally , it should be noted that none of the doc uments found in the vehicles w ere introduced at trial. Appellee ’s B r. at 43.

F . Sup pression of

Evid ence W h en re v i ew i n g a d i s t ri ct co u rt 's d en i al o f a m o t i o nt o s u p p re s s , we re v i ew fa ct u al fi n d i n gs fo r c le ar e rr or

and le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo
. Abboud , 438 F.3d at 568. Be fore trial, Musick filed multiple motions for a Rule 12(b)(4) (B ) n o t i ce from the Gover nment of t h e ev i d ence and exhibits it intended to present a s part of its ca se-in-c hief. The district court found that, a s of Marc h 18, 2004, appellant h ad been pr ovided with notice that the Gover nment planned to introduce two tapes of w ir e taps ag ainst him. The district court extended the dea dline for a

ppellant to file suppre ssio n m o t i ons throug h Marc h 22, 2004. Appellant filed
no thi nga t th a t ti me , n ot e ve n a re qu e st f or an a dd iti on a l e xten sio n. Ap pe lla nt i ns te a d c on tin

ue d to
asser t that he would not file suppre ssion moti ons until he had rec eived further disclosure from the Gover nment. A mag istrate judg e had de nied appe lla n t’s reque sts for more spe cific disclosure s from the Gover nment reg ardingthe evidenc e it intended to pre sent in its ca se-in-c hief. On June 8, the district court ove rruled the mag istrate judg e and require d the g overnme nt to provide appellant with “noticeNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 26 - o f those items that it contemplates using in its ca se in chief ” by J une 10. The court then g ave
a pp e lla nt u nti l June 17 , 2 00 4, to f

ile a dd iti on a l mo tio ns ne c e ss it ate d b y the Go ve rnme nt’ s Ru le 12(b)( 4)(B ) desig nation of exhibit s. The g overnme nt provided the requisite disclosures on J une 10, and appellant’s counsel then filed numerous motions to suppress, culminating in a series of motions filed on J une 17 and 18. On J une 29, the district cour t held that Musick had wa ived his motions t o suppress evide n ce found during sear ches of

his residenc es and c erta in wiretaps. The court noted that it had ext ended time f or appellant to re spond to ne w Rule 12(b)( 4)(B ) disclosures, but that it had not e x tended time for filing mot ion s to su

pp re ss e vid e nc e . T he c ourt fo un d th a t Mu sic k’ s mot ion s to su pp re ss w e re fi le d s ome eig ht months after the se arc hes we re e x ecute d and that his motions stated that he c ould not contend that the sear ches wer e illega l in any way beca use “counse l ha s been unable within the mo t i ons deadline to pa

rticularize a motion for suppr essi o n fo r evidence” be cause the Gover nment had not made suff icient Rule 12(b)( 4)(B ) disclosure. T he cour t found t hat M usick had “e very thing that he neede d to challeng e the se arc hes in question by Mar ch 8 , 2 0 0 4
. . . . The de fenda nt sought a

nd ob ta ined an e xten sio n o f t ime up to M arc h 2 2, 20 04 , to ide nti fy wh ic h o f t

he se ta pe s h e wo uld challeng e. Howe ver, he filed nothing .” The court re jected a s “ridiculous” Musick’ s contention that he could not file a

motion to s uppress until he had r ece ived notice o f wh i ch ev i d ence the Gover nment intended to use at trial. Finding the m otions to suppress untimely , the cour t found that appellant ha d not shown g ood cause for missing court-imposed deadlines and deeme d the objections
wa i v ed , ci t i n g Un ite d S

tat es v . Ki nc aid

e, 145 F.3d 771, 778 (6th Cir. 1998). Ne verthe less, the cour tNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 27 - a dd re sse d th e lawf

uln e ss o f t

he se arc he s a

nd c on c lud e d th e y

we re lawf

ul. Rule 12(b)(4) (B ) stat es t hat at the a rra ignme nt or as soon af terwa rd as pr actica

ble, the de fe nd ant m ay , in

or de r to fil e su

pp re ssi on mot ion s, “ re qu e st not ic e of the g ov e rnme nt’ s in te nt t o
us e (i n it s e vid e nc e -i n- c hie f a t tr ia l) any e vid e nc e that th e de fe nd ant m ay be e nti tle d to un de r R

ule 16.” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 12(b)(4)( B) . T h e d ef en d an t is require d to make any suppression motions befor e trial. See F ED . R. C R IM . P. 12(b)(3)( C). A party is deeme d to have waived any such pre trial motion if he fails t o ra i s e i t “b y the dea dline the cour

t sets,” provided that “[f] or g ood cause , the court may g rant relief from the waiver.” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 12(e). We ar e g ener ally prec luded from
rea ching the merits of cha lleng es to a district cour t’s ruling s on timeliness of pre-tr ial motions. See Kincaide , 145 F.3d at 778 (ana ly zing Rule 12(f) , the pre vious codification of Rule 12( e))
. I n this case, ther e is no rea son to u p s et t h e district cour t’s finding that appellant missed deadlines a

nd had not shown g ood cause for doing so. The district cour t is corre ct that additional disclosures we re not ne cessa ry for a ppellant to challeng e the leg ality of the sear ches of his residenc es
o n ce all of the supporting aff idavits and sear ch wa

rra nts were provided to him. Moreove r, the district court ac tually

addre ssed app el l an t ’s s uppression ar g uments. Of cour se, the fa ct that the district court “sa

w fit to r ule on the merits of [defendant’ s] motion, de spite its unti meliness, does not save defenda

nt from waive r of the g rounds stated in the motion.” Un ite d S tat es v . O biu k

wu , 17 F.3d 816, 819 (6th Cir. 1994). The dist rict court itemiz ed over 200 ruling s on appellant’s va rious pending motions and/or objections. Given this e x haustive treatment of appellant’ s motions t o suppress, ther e is no point se rved in r emanding the question of whether evidenc e should have been suppr essed a sNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 28 - a pp e lla nt r e qu e sts
.

G. Bill of Part iculars We reviewa deni al o f a reque st for a bill of par ticulars for

an abuse of discre tion. United States v. Pe rkins , 994 F.2d 1184, 1190 (6th Cir. 1993). To make a succ essful cha lleng e to a district court' s denial of a motion for a bill of pa rticulars, “ the def

endant must show not only that the cour

t abused its discre tion, but that defe ndant actua lly suffe red sur prise or othe r pre

judice at tria l.” United Sta te s v . S ali sb ur y , 983 F.3d 1369, 1375 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Pursuant to Rule 7(f), Musick moved f or a bill of par

ticulars for

Counts One, Two, and T h r e e , c h ar g i n g c o n s p i r a c y t o d i s t r i b u t e c o c a i n e , d i s t r i b u t e m ar i j u a n a , an d

l a u n d e r m o n e y, respe ctively
. M u s i ck re quested that the bill disclose, amongother items, any unchar g ed ac ts the Gover nment would offe r at trial; names of known but unnamed c o-conspirators; places othe r than the Ea s t er n Di strict of Tenne ssee whe re a cts the Gove rnment intended to off er a s proof we re
c omm itt e d; t

he date , p la c e , a

nd natur e of

e a c h a c t of

any c o- c on sp ir a tor

and a pp e lla nt d on e in further ance of the c onspiracy ; and the basis for any sentenc ing enhanc ements the Gover nment might seek. The mag istrate judg e and the district judge denied the motion. Rule 7(f) states that “the defenda nt may move for a

bill of particular s.” F ED . R. C R IM . P. 7(f). Th e purp os e of a bil l of pa rt ic ula rs is t o in fo rm

the de fe nd ant o f t

he c ha rg e s a g a ins t hi m “ if

thi s is
nece ssary to the prepa

ration of the de fense , and to avoid pre judicial surprise at the trial.” 1 C HARL ES A L AN W R I GHT , F ED ER A L P RACTI CE & P ROCE DURE § 1 29 (3 d e d. 19 99 ); see United States v. Birmley ,No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 29 - 52 9 F .2 d 1 03 , 1 08 (6t h Ci r. 19 76 ). Thus , th e te st i n r uli ngon a mot ion fo r a bil l of pa rt ic ula rs is
w h e th e r p r o v id in g s u c h d e ta il s is n e c e s s ar y to th e p r e p ar a ti o n o f th e d e f e n s e an d avoidanc e of prejudicia l surprise. See F ED ER A L P RA CT I CE & P ROCE DURE § 129. The bill of par ticulars is not intended as “a means of lear ning the g overnme nt’s evidenc e and theories.” Ibid. A def endant is not entitled to a bill of particula rs if the purpose of the bill is to obta in a l i s t o f t h e G o v er nment’s witnesses or to discove r all of the ove rt ac t s t h at m i g ht be prove n at trial. See U nited States v. Largent , 5 45 F .2 d 1 03 9, 10 43 (6 th C ir . 1 97 6) ; Un ite d S tat es v . S ali sb ur y , 98 3 F .2 d 13 69 , 1 37 5 ( 6th Cir. 1976). Nor is the Government r equire d to furnish the name s of all other c o-conspirators. See United States v. Crayton , 357 F.3d 560, 568 ( 6th Cir. 2004). I n this case, the district c ourt found that the indictment provided s ufficie nt information reg ardingwho purc hased, de livered, store d, and distributed the coc aine a nd marijuana an d the persons involved in the a lleg ed money -launde ringconspirac y and the sourc e of the funds to be launder ed. Two spe cific a cts wer e deta iled in Counts Four and Seve n. I n addition, the Gover nment had provided Musick with signific ant di scover y , including 11 audio t apes, 14 vide o tapes, a nd 649 do c ume nts
. Th e c ourt a lso fo un d that th e se arc h w arr ant a ff ida vit s p ro vid e d M us ic k “ wi th a we a lth of deta ils of the char g es ag ainst him.” The cour t concluded that “the mater ial avail ab l e t o the defe ndant, when vie wed in totality , adequa tely provides the de fenda

nt with information about the details of the char g es aga inst him nece ssary to the preparation of hi s defe nse, pre vents prejudicia l surprise at trial and pre cludes a second pr osecution for

the same c rimes” a

nd denied the motion. The court a lso noted that appellant’s motion consisted of six page s of interrog ato ri es, which the courtNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 30 - deter mined wer e desig ned to ef fec t additional discovery

of the Gove rnment’s e vidence and ca se. Appellant’s a

rg ument is meritless. First, he does not alleg e any prejudice resulting from the denial of his motion. Second, the indictment set out the names of all indicted c o-conspirators, the rele vant dates of the conspirac ies, the means and methods of the conspira cies, a nd, wher e re quired, t h e o v er t ac t s i n further ance of the c onspiracie s. As such, it was suff icient. Third, as the district
c ourt fo un d, Mu sic k r e c e ive d acces s to a ll o f t he pe rt ine nt i nf

or ma tio n n e c e ssa

ry to p re pa re his de fe ns e and

a vo id u nf a ir surp ri se . A c c or din g ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se it s di sc re tio n in de nyingthe mot ion

fo r t he bil l.

H. Adm ission of T estim ony Abou t P re- Arr est Sear ches We review a district c ourt’s decision to admit or exclude evidenc e for an abuse of discre tion. See G anier , 46 8 F.3d at 925. Finding s of fa ct ar e re viewed f or cle ar e rror ; leg al conc lusions are revie wed de novo
. Se e ibi d
. Musick contends that the district c ourt err ed in the admission of Hamblin C ounty Detec tive Hay es’s testimony . Appellant’s B r. at 52- 53. Hay es testified a bout a sea

rch of Musick’s g randpa rents’ tra iler on January

31, 1998, when Musick wa s seventee n. H a y es testified that he found
a 16 -g a ug e sh otgun and an a ssa

ult ri fl e in wh a t he be lie ve d to b e a pp e lla nt’ s b e dr oo m c los e t, a s w e ll as a small re d cooler

containing $3,500 in cash, ba g g ies, two small bag s of drugs, a speedingticket issued to appellant, and various scales. Hay es also testified t hat he sear ched L ita Musick’s re sidence on Dec ember

23, 1999, and found c lothing, $42,800, a sma ll amount of ma ri j u an a, a receipt forNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 31 - digital sc ales, g ambling ticke ts, and a Ruger .357 mag num. Finally , Hay es testified that the of fice rs soug ht to searc h the re siden ce o f M u s i ck’s g irlfriend, H eathe r Mann. He explained that Mann consente d to the sear ch, and that th e s ea rc h d iscovere d a g ree n laptop computer, f ive g ambling tickets, and a

small amount of cash. Appellant objec ted during trial to the introduction of Ha y es’s testimony

on the g rounds that it w a s h e ars ay , ir

re le va nt, a nd un du ly pr e jud ic ia l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt ov e rr ule d th e ob

je c tio ns . Musick then re newe d his objection in the form of a motion for mistrial. The district c ourt ruled f rom the benc h that the g uns wer e rele vant evidenc e of drug traff icking and could be rec eived a s evidenc e in a drug distribut ion case . See United States v. Gahagan , 865 F.2d 1490, 1499 ( 6th Cir. 1989). The district court also found that the testimony was not unduly

prejudicial s i n ce the g uns themselves
wer e not offe red into testimony and conside ri ng Hay es’s testimony in the context of all of the evidenc e pre sented at trial. I n response to a motion for a ne w trial, the district cour t rende red a
w r i t t e no p i n i o no nD e c e mb e r 2 , 2 0 0 4 , a g a i nd e n yi n g a p p e l l an t ’ s o b

j e c t i o n s t o H aye s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. The c o u rt d id

g r an t a p p e ll an t’ s mo ti o nto p r e v e n t H ay e s f r o m t e s ti f

y in g a b o u t s tolen
merc handise found on the proper ty . During testimony , Hay es stated that office rs had f ound sever al items of new mer chandise in appellant’s be droom during the 1998 sear ch of the trailer. A ppellant’s counsel objec ted; the cour t sustained the objection and instructed the Gover nment to move on. The stolen mercha

ndise ag ain came up during cross-e x amination. Durin g t h e jury char g e, the c ourt instructed the jury

to disreg ard a

ny testimony

as to stolen merc handise. Musick now ar g ues that the a dmission of Hay es’s testimony was error. Musick a

rg ues thatNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 32 - the Gover

nment had re prese nted t h at i t would not offer any Rule 404(b) e vidence , that the Gover nment had fa iled to provide Rul e 12(b) (4)( B) notice of the items Hay es would desc ribe, that the testimony

about g uns and stolen merc handise wa s irrele vant, and that Hay es’s testimony about relationships of persons at Musick’s g ran dp arents’ trailer was he arsa

y and violated Musick’ s constitutional right to conf ront witnesses ag ainst him. Appellant’s Br . at 56-61. “Evidenc e o f o th e r c r im e s , w r o n g s , o r a c ts is n o t a d mi s s ib le to p r o v e th e c h ar a c te r of a person in orde r to show ac tion in conformity there with. I t may , howeve r, b e ad m issible for other purposes, such a s proof of motive, oppor tunity , in tent, prepa

ration, plan, knowle dg e, identity , or absenc e of mistake or

acc ident . . . .” F ED . R. E V ID . 4 04 (b)
. Ev ide nc e of g un s b e ingloc a te d at a de fe nd ants ’ r e sid e nc e dir e c tly su pp ort s the c ha

rg e of c on sp ir ingto d ist

ri bu te and

to p os se ss w ith intent to dist ribute drug s. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . W ar e , 161 F.3d 414, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1998). “ Such evidenc e is not evidenc e of other crime or wrong , but of involvement in the coc aine c onspiracy at issue.” Id . at 418. I n the instant c ase, Rule 404 was simil arly not violate d by the testimony about the guns. The g uns wer e rele vant, and the district c ourt’s ruling that the testimony was not overly prejudicia l was not a n abuse of discretion. Simi larly , the judge ’s curative instruction r eg arding Ha y es ’s b ri ef
me nti on of the sto le n me rc ha

nd ise wa s su ff

ic ie nt. Mu sic k’ s Cra wfo rd objection is also meritless. See Crawford v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Musick a

rg ues that his rig ht to confront witnesses w as violated by Hay es’s testim ony that (1) Mu s i ck is the g randson of L ouise and L eroy

Wil son, (2) duringthe 1998 sea rch of the trailer ,No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 33 - L ouise Wil son said she did not use the bedr oom where the evidenc e wa s found, (3) H eathe r Mann
wa s d e fe nd a nt’ s g ir lf

ri e nd , a nd (4 ) H ay e s w a s se arc hin g fo r s tol en mer c ha nd ise and dr ug s. Th is argument is meritless. Hay es’s testimony that Musick was the Wilsons’ gr andson w as based on persona l kno wl edg e, and he was available f or cr oss-examination. The district court sustained the objection to Hay es’s testimony that L ouise Wil son told him the bed ro o m wa s n o t hers. Ha y es’s testimony that Mann wa s Musick’s g irlfriend w as also base d on persona l knowledg e; moreove r, the court found this statement was offe red not for the tr uth of the matter a sserted, but mer ely explained why Hay es obtained a war

rant to sear ch Mann’s apar tment. Hay es’s statement that he wa s sear ching for dr ug s an d s t o l en m erchandise wa s admitted only afte r def endant ha d asked him if he w as conductinga g ambling r aid when he sear ched L ita Musick’s house in 1999. These ruling s were not
an a bu se of dis c re tio n a

nd did no t c on sti tut e vio la tio ns of a pp e lla nt’ s Co nf ro ntatio n Cl a

us e ri g hts
.

I. Rul e 16 Di sc ov e r y a nd In Ca mera Review of S um m aries of Witness Statem ents Be fore trial, appe llant made seve ral re quests for disclosure under Rule 1 6 o f t h e Feder al Rul e s o f Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure . T he ma g istra te jud g e or de re d th e Go ve rnme nt t o d isc los e impeachme nt material to appe llant in tim e for trial. Appellant argued that stateme nts of witnesses to Governme nt investigators are documents that ar e discove rable under Rul e 16(a)(1) (E). The
ma g istrate jud g e dis a g re e d, no tin g that su c h s ta te me nts are no t d is c ov e ra ble purs ua

nt t o Ru le 16(a) (2). Af

ter a ppellant objecte d to this ruling, the district cour t adopted and a ff

i rmed the
ma g istrate jud g e ’s or de r. I n h is b ri e fs to t his c ourt , a

pp e lla nt a sk s u s to ho ld that item s li ste d in Rul eNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 34 - 16(a) (1)( E) that ar e not otherw ise excluded from dis co v er y in Rule 16(a)( 2) ar e discove rable
. Ap pe lla nt’ s B r. a t 63 . We de c lin e to d o s o f or se ve ra l r e a so ns . First, we may

well be without jurisdiction to entertain this argument. Appellant identifies no document produced at trial that, if rec eived pr e-tria l, might have been use d in the prepa ration of his defense . Thus, he has not shown a ny injury from the a lleg ed er

ror. Second, eve n assuming a ppell an t h as stated a live c ontroversy upon which this court may rule, his claim is without merit. I n United States v. Pre sser , this court held that neither Brady , Gi gli o , nor Rule 16 g ives a de fenda nt the rig ht to broad pre-tria l discovery of impeac hment evidenc e, the disclosure of

which is instead contr olled by the J encks A ct, 18 U.S .C. § 3500. See 844 F.2d 1275, 1282-85 (6th Cir. 1988). Ac cordingto Presser , “so lo n g as t h e defe ndant is g iven imp e a c hme nt m a ter ial , eve n e xcu lpator y imp e a c hme nt m a te ri a l, i n ti me fo r u se a t tr ia l, w e fa il t o see howthe Constitut ion is viol ated.” Id
. at 1 2 8 3
. The Jencks Act states, “ I n any criminal prosec ution broug ht by

the United States, no stat em en t o r report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government wit ness or prospec tive Gover nment witness (other tha

n the defe ndant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery , or inspection until said witness has testified on direc t examination i n the trial of the c ase.” 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). I n this case, the Jencks Ac t limi ts discovery of witness statements made to investigating ag ents. The district court rule d corr ectly that disclosure of suc h statements could not be c ompelled. Th e Go ve rnme nt w a s o rd e re d to pr od uc e e xcu lpator

y ma te ri a l in

tim e fo r d e fe nd ant’ s u se a t tr ia l. This order w as cor

rec t. Moreove r, beca

use appellant ha s not pointed to any injury from this rulingNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 35 - nor to any

specific evidenc e ac t u al l y ad mitted at trial, his objection seems to call for an advisory opinion about the meaningof Rule 16. To the e x tent this is t rue, a ppellant’s ar gu ment is not cog nizable. Mu sic k a lso a

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on no t to re vie w ce rt a in sum mari e s of w itn e ss state me nts in c am e ra . T he fi rs t da y of tr ia l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d a pp e lla nt’ s r e qu e st und e r R

ule 26.2 for pr oduction of DEA inve stigative repor ts of interviews with D uarte and Serna. The district
c ourt a lso de nie d a

pp e lla nt’ s r e qu e st t

hat th e cou

rt re vie w the re po rt s in c am e ra to determine whether they contained Bradyma te ri a l. Since Rule 26.2 was intended to pr ovide a counter part to the J encks Act, any cases interpre ting a

provision of the J encks Act should be applicable to a similar provision of Rule 26.2. See F ED . R. C R IM . P. 26.2(a) advisory committee’s note. Unde r the Jencks Act, the G overnme nt’s
no te s f ro m an inte rv ie w mus t be pr od uc e d only if the y we re re a d ba c k to and ve ri fi e d b y the wi tne ss and if the re port summarized the notes without material va riation. See United States v. W illiams , 921 F.2d 1218, 1224 (6th Cir. 1992)
. An ag ent’s repor t does not count as a “ statement” f or the purpose s of the rule wher e the witness doe s not adopt it. See United States v. Nathan , 816 F.2d 230, 236- 38 (6th Cir. 1987). Review in c am e ra is not re q u i red if the Gover nment advises in g ood faith that repor ts do not contain Brady material. See U nited States v. He rnandez , 3 1 F .3 d 3 54 , 3 60 -6 1 ( 6th Cir.), cert de nied , 513 U.S. 912 (1994). F inally , the Supreme Co u rt has held that Jencks Act violations may be subject to the harmless e rror rule. See R osenberg v . United States , 360 U.S. 367 (1959). We have applied harmless err or analy sis to Rule 26.2 er rors, stating that the “c ritical issueNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

Appellant’s or igina l briefing acc identally omitted the he ading and introductory para g raphs 5 of this argument. On the day the ca se wa s set for or al ar g ument, appellant f iled a motion to “corr ect scribner ’s [sic] err or” by

filing a supplemental brief

containing the complete a rg ument. Be cause the omission was not material and did n ot preve nt us from understa nding or fully consideringappellant’ s argument, the motion is denied. - 36 - is whether the failure t o furnish t he st atement its elf caused any actua l prejudice to the defense in the context of all the circumstanc es of the tr ial.” U n it e d S ta te s v. W ebster , No. 8 9

- 6 4 7 6 , 1 9 9 0 WL 1 3 6 1 1 7 , at * 3 (6 t h C i r. S ep t
. 2 0 , 1 9 9 0 ) ( ci t i n g Goldberg v. U nited States , 425 U.S. 94 (1976)). I n th is c a se , the di st ri ct court c or re c tly a pp lie d th e law. Ac c or din g to t he dis tr ic t c ourt , appellant c oncede d that there was “ nothing to sug g est that the re ports wer e eve r re viewed a nd/or adopted by

any witness.” There fore , the re ports did not fall under Rule 26.2. The court a lso noted that th e Go vernme nt h a d b e e n ma de awa re of its Bradyobligation and had re prese nted that the repor ts did not contain a

ny such materia l. Moreove r, even assuming that the district c ourt err ed, the
e rr or he re is h arm le ss. Ap pe lla nt c ann ot demo ns tr a te any a c tua l pr e

jud ic e . D ur ingthe tr ia l, appellant c ross-examined Duar te and Ser na. Appe llant asked both about their i nterview s with DEA Spe c ia l A g e n t T e mp le to nan d u n c o v e r e d

n o in f o r mati o nth a t T e mp le to n ’ s n o te s c o n ta ined imp e a c hme nt i nf

or ma tio n. Ab se nt a c tua l pr e jud ic e , a ny e rr or wa s h arm le ss.

J. Rule 611 Appellant ar g ues that the district cour t abused its discretion in ove rruling objections to the scope of the Gover

nment’s cr oss-examination of L ita Musick. Appellant’s B r. at 65-66. A ppellant 5

argue s th e c ourt

imp ro pe rl y

a pp lie d a re le va nc e sta nd ard rathe r tha

n lim iti ng c ro ss- e xami natio n toNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 37 - the subject matter

of direc t examination. See F ED . R. E V ID . 611(b). We reviewthe district court’s de cisions a s to cross-e x amination for a buse of discr etion. See F ED . R. E V ID . 6 11 (b ); United States v. Askarov , 299 F.3d 896, 898 (2002). “Unde r Rule 611, a tria l judge has consider able discr etion and a judg e’s r uling will not be the basis for r ever sal of a c riminal conviction unl ess a defenda nt’s substantial rig hts are a ffe cted.” Un ite d S tat es v . M oo re , 917 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. de nied , 499 U.S. 963 (1991). Rule 611(b) states: “ Cross examination should be li mited to the subject matter of the dire ct examination and matters af fec ting the cre dibilit y of the witness. The court may , in the exercise of discretion, per

mit inquiry into additional matters as if on dir ect e x amination.” The “subjec t matter of the dire ct examination” has be en l ibera lly construed to include all infere nces a nd implications arising from such te stimony
. Se e Mo or e , 917 F.3d at 222. Appellant re peate dly

objected to the G overnme nt’s cross-e x aminat i o n o f L ita Musick as being out s i de the sc ope of dire ct examination. On eac h occa sion, the district court ruled that the questions were permissible, finding that they wer e either within the scope of dir ect or wer e mater ial to t he wi tne ss’ s c re dib ili ty . L ita Mu sic k ha d b e e n a sk e d o n d ir e c t e xami natio n a bo ut t he 19 98 a rr e st and juvenile de tention of appe llant. It w as not a n abuse of

discretion for

the district court to allow
cross-e x amination about t he details of t hat arrest, i ncluding questions about the evidenc e discove red d u r i n g t h e 1 9 9 8 s e ar c h o f

t h e t r a i l e r

t h a tl e d t o a p p e l l an t ’ s d e t e n t i o n . A p p e l l an td i d n o tt e s t i f y, relying instea d on L ita Musick’s testimony that he wa s a har d-workingy oung man whom she did not know to be involved with dr u gs . T h e Government’s que stioning wa s desig ned to probe herNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 38 - knowledg e of he r son’s drugactivities and to impeac h her c redibi l i t y . The district cour t did not abuse its discre tion in thi s case .

K . J ur y I nst r uc ti ons “This cour

t review s jury

i n s t ru ct i o ns as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately

inform the jury

of re levant conside rations and explain the applicable law to a ssist t he jury in rea ching its decision. Trial cour ts have broa d discretion in dra fting jury i n s t ru ct i o ns, and we
re ve rs e on ly

fo r a bu se of dis c re tio n. We wi ll no t re ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt un le ss t he jur y c ha rg e fa ils
a c c ur a te ly to re fl e c t the law. We may re ve rs e a jud g me nt ba se d on an imp ro pe r jur y ins tr uc tio n o nly if the i nstructions, viewed as a whole, w ere confusing , misleading , or pre judicial.” United States v. Prince , 214 F.3d 740, 761- 61 (6th Cir. 2000) (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). Appellant re qu est ed an instruc tion to the jury that it could not consider the e vidence prese nted re g ardingthe 1998 sea rch of appellant’ s g randpa rents’ trailer unless the jury found beyond
a re asonable doubt that acts on January 31, 1998, wer e (1) committed by Musick, (2) c onstitut ed a
c ri me invo lv in g co cai ne, and (3 ) w e re do ne by

Mu sic k a s an a c t du

ri ngthe c ours e , a

nd in further ance , of the c onspiracy char g ed in C ount One. Appellant also reque sted an instruction that the jur y c ou ld on ly c on sid e r e vid e nc e that he ha d be e n arr e ste d tw ic e in 2 00 0 f or se lli ngc oc a ine if i ts i m i l ar l y

f o u n d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b tt h a ts u c h a c t s w e r e p art o f t h e c h ar g e d c o n s p i r a c y . In addition, appellant re quested a “buy er- seller instruction” r eg ardingthe 2000 incident s and now argues that the district cour t should have give n differ ent instructions on single/multiple conspirac iesNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 39 - and should have re q u i re d a special verdic t. Appellant ra ises the district court’s f ailure to include such instructions as er

ror. Appe llant’s Br . at 69-72. “[A] di stri ct co u rt ’s re fusal to g ive a spe cific instruc tion warra nts rever sal only

if that ins tr uc tio n is (1 ) a c or

re c t st a te me nt o f t

he law, (2 ) n ot s ub sta

nti a lly c ov e re d b y

the c ha rg e a c tua lly de liv e re d to the jur

y , a nd (3 ) c on c e rn s a

po int so im po rt ant in th e tr ia l th a t th e fa ilure to g ive it substantially

impairs the def

endant’ s defe nse.” United States v. Jam ieson , 427 F .3 d 3 94 , 4 14 (6 th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). I n this case, the district c ourt’s fa ilure to include a ppellant’s pr op os e d in str

uc tio ns wa s n ot e rr or

fo r s e ve ra l r e a so ns . First, the district cour

t corre ctly

instructed the jury

that the testimony

about t he 1998 and 2000 incidents “wa s offe red a s proof that those acts wer e in f urthera nce of the conspirac y

char g ed in this indictment. You m ay not consider the se thing s for a ny other purpose ag ainst Gary Musick.” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

the n e xpla ine d thos e e le me nts the jur y wa s re qu ir e d to fin d b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt in order to convict appellant. Appellant’s proposed i nstruction is incorre ct bec ause the jury is not required to find be y ond a re asonable doubt that the evidenc e from the t railer constituted the crime of possession of coc aine be fore it could consider that ev i d en ce as showing appellant’ s p art i c i p a t i o ni nt h e c h ar g e d c o n s p i r a c y. Second, appe llant’s reque st for a “ buy er- seller” instruction was prope rly denied. The district court found that such an instruction wa s not warr anted whe re the jury could re asonably

find appe llant
was buy ing larg e quantities of coca ine from Duar te on a continuing basis as part of t h e c h ar g ed conspirac y . The Gove rnment’s c ase did not re ly on a series of intermittent transac tions invol vingNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 40 - sma ll amou

nts of dr ug s, the sit

uatio n in wh ic h a so -c a lle d “ buy er-s e lle r” ins tr uc tio n is mos t a

pt. Moreove r, a conviction will not be reverse d for f ailure to g ive a buy er- seller instruction whe re the district court g ave c omplete instructions on the eleme nts of conspiracy , as was done in this case. See Riggs v. United States , 209 F.3d 828, 833 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Th ir d, the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ins tr uc tio ns a de qu a te ly e xpla ine d to the jur y that th e 20 00 inc ide nts should be consider ed only as ac ts of the conspira cy and car ef

u l l y ex p l ained the e lements of the
c o n s p i r a c y. Four th, no instruction naming spe cific c o-conspirators was re quired. Appe llant argues that the jur y c ou ld n ot c on vic t ba se d o n c on sp ir a c y wi th a n und e rc ov e r a g e nt. Whil e tr ue , th is c a se did not involve a conspira cy

betwee n appellant a

nd mere ly

one other

person, who w as a g overnme nt ag ent. Rather, the conspirac y involved multipl e other persons with w hom it was leg ally possible for appellant to conspire
. There fore , no instruction was re quired. See U nited States v. Hay den , 6 8 F. Ap p ’x 5 3 0 , 5 3 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( d i s cu s s i n g Un ited St at es v. Pe nn e ll , 737 F.2d 521, 536 ( 6th Cir. 1984)). The district court used this circ uit’s p at t ern jury instruction reg ardingconspirac ies and inc lud e d th e name s o f t

he c ha rg e d c oc on sp ir a tor s st a te d in the ind ic tme nt. Fifth, the district court used this circuit’s pattern jury instruction reg ardingsingle versus multipl e co n s p i ra ci es. In his briefing befor e this court, appe llant objects to the district court’s char acte rization of his arg ument in the instructions give n to the jury . Appellant’s B r. at 72-73. Those instructions stated: The de fenda

nt Gary Musick argues t h at t here wer e re ally multipl e conspira cies involved in this case. To c onvict either one of the de fe n d an ts of the conspira cyNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 41 - char g ed, the g overnme nt must con v i n ce you bey ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant was a

member of

the conspira cies c harged i n t h e indi ctment. I f the g overnme nt fa ils to prove this, then y ou must find that defenda nt not guilty

of the conspirac y

char g es, eve n i f y ou find that he or she was a member of

some other c o n s p i r a c y. H o w e v e r , a

p p e l l an th a d s t a t e d a s m u c h d u r i n g c l o s i n g ar g u m e n t s w h e n h i s c o u n s e l t o l d t h e j u r y , “ It is our position, and we ar gue to y ou, that beca use there are multipl e conspira cies, the g overnme nt ha s tr ie d to pu t tog e the r a se ri e s of un su pp or te d c on sp ir a c ie s that re a c h b a c k to that 19 98 juv e nil e whateve r happe ned . . . .” Finally , the denial of the reque st f or specia l ve rdicts was not a n abuse of

discretion. Specia l verdic ts a re disfa vored in c riminal trials, beca use they invade the spe cial provinc e of the jury
. See Un ite d S tat es v . B lac k

we ll , 459 F.3d 739, 766- 67 (6t h C i r. 2006), cert. de nied , 127 S. Ct . 1336 (2007). There is no a

uthority for the pr oposition t hat fa ilure to ask the jury to return a

specia l verdict constitutes reve rsible er

ror. Se e ibi d
. As in Blac k we ll , appellant’ s conce rns about the single ve rsus multipl e conspira cies issue wa s adequately addre ssed vi a other instructions. Appellant’s ar g ument that a spec ial verdic t would have assisted in his prepa ration of an appe al is irrele vant. Appellant’ s Br . at 73. Appellant’s r emaining argument is that the instruction r eg arding Count Thr ee was in error beca use it enable d the jury

to find him guilty

of t h e conspirac y

to launder mone y

based on a

ny unlawful c onduct. Thi s argument too is meritless. The district court’s instructions cle arly stated that the j ury could convict as t o Count Three only if the Gove rnment prove d bey ond a re asonable doubt that “ the c on sp ir a c y

de sc ri be d in

the ind ic tme nt wa s will fu lly fo rm e d. ” Th e ins tr uc tio n e xplic itl yNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 42 - l i m i t e d t h e j u r y t o c o n s i d e r i n g a

p p e l l an t ’ s dr

u g d e a l i n g a s t h e s o u r c e o f t h e l a u n d e r e d m o n e y.

L. Reasonableness of

Appellan t’s Sentence Appellant wa s sentence d on J anuar y 21, 2005, nine day s after the Supreme Court de cided United States v. Book

er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report (PS R ) wa s p repa red on N ovember

15, 2004. Using the 20 03 ve rs ion

of the Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e s, the PSR c a lc ulate d a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of

24 fo r h is convictio n on Counts Three, F our, and Seve n reg ardingmoney launder ing. Atwo-leve l enhanc ement applied be cause appellan t was convicted under 28 U.S.C. § 1956. See USS G §2 S1. 1( b) (2 )( B ). Counts Th re e , Fo ur , an d Sev e n we re g ro up e d tog e the r as pr ov ide d und e r U SSG §3D1.2(c ). The PSR calc ulated a base offe nse level of 24 for a ppellant’s convic tion of conspirac y to distribute and possession with intent to di stribute a quantity of coc aine. B eca

use appe llant quali fi ed as a ca

re e r o ff e nd e r u nd e r U SSG §4 B 1. 1, a

pp e lla nt’ s c on du c t r e su lte d in

a tot a l of fe ns e level of 34. I n c a lc ulatin g a

pp e lla nt’ s c ri min a l his tor

y po int s, the PSR a dd e d tw o c ri min a l hi sto ry po int s for a juvenile conviction to seve n points for adult convictions for a to t al of nine c riminal history points. Three more points were a dded for committing the instant offe nse while on probat i o n and within two y ear s of hi s rele ase from custody , y ielding a t otal of twelve criminal history points and placingdefe ndant in Categ ory V. Howe ver, a s a ca

ree r off ender , the cr iminal history cate g ory was raised to Cate g ory

VI
. Ba sed on a tot al offense level of 34 and a criminal history cate g ory of VI , theNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 43 - PSR c a lc ulate d a

g uid e lin e s r ang e of

26 2 to 32 7 mo nth s o f i mpr iso nme nt. I n r e sp on se to o bje c tio ns to t he PSR, and be c a

us e thi s c a se wa s th e c ourt ’s fi rs t po st- Booke r sentenc ing, the district court issued a w ritte n s entenc ing opinion on January 21, 2005, explaining how sentenc ing w ould proce ed. In its written sentencing memorandum, the district court e x plained its understandingof Booke r as making the Sentencing Guidelines “ef fec tively advisory .” The court stated that it “must decide, on a case b y ca s e b as i s , what sente nce is re asonable in the case based upon a conside ration of the othe rwise a pplicable guidelines rang e as w ell as t h e o ther statutory fa c tor s w hic h a

re s et forth[in 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a )]. ” Th e c ourt c on c lud e d th a t “ in e xer c isi ngits discretion in imposing re asonable sentenc es, the Court will afford sig nificant we ight to the r ang e of imprisonment recommende d by the g uid el i n es b ut will deviate from those guidelines wher e ther e
e xist c le arl y

ide nti fi a ble and pe rs ua siv e re a so ns c onsi st ent wi th t he statut e fo r d oin g so . In th os e
case s where the cour

t deviates fr om the applicable g uidel i n e ra n g e, the Court will explain on the
rec ord its rea sons for doing so.” I n its written opinion, the dist rict cour t sustained M usick’s obj ection to being classified a s
a ca ree r cr iminal and found that his t o t al criminal hist ory points should be four instead of twe lve. The c ourt noted that, under USSG §4A1.2, criminal history points are a ssessed for

“prior se ntence s,”
me anin g “ any

se nte nc e pr e vio us ly

imp os e d .
. . fo r c on du c t no t pa rt of the ins tant o ff

e ns e .” USS G §4A1.2(a )(1) . The c ourt rea soned that the PSR, therefor e, had imprope rly cou n t ed eig ht criminal history points based on convictions and conduct that had been i ntroduce d as acts in further ance of the co n s p i racy

char g ed in this instant case. The court did count four points for convictions forNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 44 - conduct not introduce d as par t of t h e charg ed conspira cy , and appe llant was plac ed in cr iminal h i s t o r y C a t e g o r y III
. I n addition, while the PSRhad ca lculated a n offe nse level of 34, the district court a rrived at dif fe re nt o ff e ns e le ve ls. F or the mon e y -l a un de ri ngc on vic tio ns , th e c ourt sta rt e d w itha

ba se of fe ns e level of 8, to which it added 16 levels based on the value of t he funds involved, 6 levels beca use the funds wer e proc eeds f

rom distribution of a controlled substanc e, and 2 levels for violation of § 1956, y ielding a total offense level of 32. Apply ing a n offe nse leve l of 32 and the c riminal history cate g ory of I I I , th e c ourt

c a lc ulate d a g uid e lin e s ra ng e of 15 1 to 18 8 mo nth s. Th e c ourt did no t r e c a lc ulate t h e c o c a i n e c o n s p i r a c y o f f e n s e l e v e l a t t h i s t i m e , b e c a u s e t h e c o u rt b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e m o n e yla un de ri ngof

fe ns e le ve l w a s th e hig he r l e ve l. At the sentenc ing hear ing held on Fe bruar y 28, 2005, the court found by a pre pondera

nce of the e vid e nc e tha

t th e le a st a

mou nt o f c oc a ine fo r w hic h appel lan t is re sp on sib le is 1 5 k ilo g ra ms. Th is am ount of c oc a ine y ie lds a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of 3 4. Th e c ourt e rr on e ou sly

c omm e nte d th a t it
was ad d i n g the two-leve l enhanc ement for being convicted unde r § 1956, eve n though that enhanc ement perta ins to money launder ing convictions and not dr ug convictions, to a

rrive at t he le ve l of 34
. Al tho ug h the c ourt ’s c a lc ulatio n se e ms in e rr or (a pr op e r 2 -l e ve l e nh anc e me nt w ou ld have r esulted in a leve l of 36), the actua l r esult was c orre ct: an off ense le vel of 34 wa s used, and that is the appropr iate off

ense level solely for conspiring to distribute betwee n 15 and 50 kilog rams of
coca ine. Of c ourse, the c ourt was contradicting its ear lier assertion in its written m emora ndum that the money -launde ring offe nse leve ls would control since they wer e hig her. N ow that the cour t hadNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

On the day

of ora l argument in this ca se, appellant filed two motions reg ardinghis sentence
. 6 First, appe llant moved for “ leave to consolidate appe llant’s sentenc ing iss u e p er t aining [si c] acquitted conduct wit h en banc proce eding s in Un ite d S tat es v . W hite .” Th is mot ion is p ro c e dura lly ir re g ula r s inc e it wa s ma de be fo re thi s p ane l ha d e ve n is su e d th is d e c isi on ; th e re fo re , th e mot ion is de nie d. Of

c ours e , a

pp e lla nt m ay no w p e tit ion

thi s c ourt

fo r r e he ari ngof

his a pp e a l en banc
. Second, appe llant m o v ed for rese ntencingbeca

use he ha s rec ently

lear ned that the Gove rnment provides individuals who plead guilty with “undisclosed sente ncing benef its not authoriz ed by

the U.S.S.G. 5k1.1.” Appellant’s motion consists me rely of vag ue alleg ations of impropriety reg arding Duar te and Ser na’s se ntencing . The motion is denied. - 45 - calc ulated a dr

ug conspirac y

level of 34, that offense level contr olled beca use it was higher than the of fe ns e le ve l of

32 fo r m on e y

la un de ri ngtha

t the c ourt

ha d c a lc ulate d in

its wr itt e n me mor and

um. At the he ari ng , th e fi na l c a lc ulatio n s ta te d b y the c ourt y ie lde d a

g uid e lin e ra

ng e of 18 8 to 235 months, which is the corre ct ra ng e g iven an of

fense level o f 3 4 an d a Categ ory I I Icriminal history . After

consideringthe fa ctors in § 3553(a ), the district court imposed a f inal sentenc e of 235 months of imprisonment for Count One and 235 months of i mprisonment for Counts Three , Four , an d S e v e n , t h e s e n t e n c e s t o r u nc o n c u r r e n t l y. Appellant ch al l en ges h i s s en t en ce o nn u m er o u s gro u n d s . Fi rs t , h e a rgu es t h at t h e j u d ge er red 6 in a c c or din g “ sig nif

ic ant w e ig ht” to t

he Gu ide lin e s and

re qu ir ingMu sic k to “ e sta bli shc le a rl y identifiable a

nd persua sive rea s o n s ” for any depar ture. Sec ond, he ar g ues that the district cour t improperly

considere d acquitted conduct in finding that Musick had conspire d to distribute 15 to 45 kilogr ams of coc aine. Third, he argues the district cour t violated Blak

e ly and Apprendiby

finding fac ts not established by

the jury ’s ver dict. Finally , Musick argues that the district court’s sente nce
was unre asonable beca

use it was fa

r hig her than the 15 to 21 month rang e appe llant believes wa s
mor e a pp ro pr ia te . App e lla

nt’ s B r. a t 75 -8 1. Ap pe lla nt’ s c la ims are wi tho ut m e ri t.No. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 46 - The district cour

t’ s s ta te ment of the impac t of Booke r a c c or ds wi th t

his c ir c uit ’s su

bs e qu e ntl y de ve lop e d c a se law. Th e di st ri ct court pr op e rl y re c og nize d th a t th e Gu ide lin e s w e re “ e ff e c tiv e ly advisory ” and the n considere d the § 3553(a ) fa ctors. The district court’s stateme nt that it accor ded substantial weig ht to the Guidelines rang e wa s not error . I t is true that district courts may not treat the Gu ide lin e s r ang e a s b e ing“ pe r s e re a so na ble ” or a c c or d th e Gu ide lin e s r ang e an ir re bu tta ble presumption of rea sonablene ss. See United States v. Buchanan , 449 F.3d 731, 734 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Ho we ve r, that is no t w hat the dis tr ic t c ourt did in t his c a se . T he c ourt

a c c or de d “ sig nif

ic ant w e ig ht” to the Guidelines sentenc e and the n stated it would do ex ac tly what it should: deviate fr om the g uidelines when pr esente d with persua sive rea sons for doing so. See Kimbrough v. U nited States , 12 8 S. Ct. 55 8, 57 4 ( 20 07 ) ( e xpla ini ngbo th t he “ ke y ro le ” of the Se nte nc ingCom mis sio n in for m u l at ing the Guidelines, which a re the “initial benchmar

k” of a sentenc e, and the sentenc ing judge ’s ability

to vary from the Guide lines when pre sented with re asons to do so under § 3553)
. Her e, the district cour

t’s sentenc e wa s proce d

u r a ll y a n d substantively

rea sonable. A se ntence is procedur ally

unrea sonable if the district court fails t o consider the applicable Guidelines ra ng e or neg lects t o consider the other fa ctors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Borho , 485 F.3d 904, 908 ( 6th Cir. 2007). A s entenc e is substantively unrea sonable “ when the district c ourt selec ts the sentence arbitra rily , bases the se ntence on impermissible factor s, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a ) fa ctors or g ives an unre asonable amount of we ight to any pertinent fa ctor.” Ib id
. I n th is c a se , M us ic k’ s se nte nc e of 23 5 mo nth s o f i mpr iso nme nt i s w ith in t he pr op e rl y calc ulated g uidelines rang e; there fore , we may , and do, cr edit the sentenc e with a pr esumption ofNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 47 - rea sonablene ss. See U

nited States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 389 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc). The district court sustained some of appellant’ s objections to the P S R an d d i s agre ed with the PSR’s calc ulation of the sentenc ing r ange of 262 to 327 months of imprisonm ent. The c ourt’s own calc ulation y ielded a r ang e of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. The district cour t considere d the Guidelines r an g e it calc ulated and the § 3553(a) fac tors. The district cour t did not accor d an
unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any fac tor, as it car efully

addre ssed ea ch fa ctor a

nd descr ibed the weig ht it accor ded to ea ch. To the extent Musick challeng es the c ourt’s fa ilure to depa rt from the G uideline sentenc e, his arg ument is not reviewa ble, since the district c ourt clea rly understood that the Guidelines we re
mere ly advisory and wa s awa

re of i t s d i s cr etion to depar t. Se e Un ite d S

tat es v . P uc k

e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. de nied , 126 S. Ct . 1935 (2006). F ina lly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing of fa c ts by a pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e is p e rf e c tly law fu l
. First, Musick wa s not acquitted of the c ocaine conspirac y char g e; he wa s found g uilty of conspiring to distribute a lesser a mount of coca ine than wa s char g ed. Second, district c ourts may proper ly find fac ts at s entenc ing by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. See United States v. Brika , 487 F.3 d 4 50, 458-60 (6th Cir. 2007) (e x plaining that conduct on which jur y rende red a

judgme nt of acquittal or f

ailed to re ach a

verdic t may

be conside red by

a s en t en cing judge ). In this case, the court’s f inding by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the dr ug co n s p i ra cy involved 15 to 45 kilogr ams of coc aine wa s not a finding based on acquitted conduct; there fore , the i ssue of whether sentenc ing judg es may

find fac ts based on so-ca lled “ac quitted conduct” is not presented. Cf
. UnitedNo. 05-5563

United States v. Musick

- 48 - Sta te s v . W hit e , 503 F.3d 487 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (addr essing “ac quitted conduct” issue) , reh’g en banc gran te d, op . wi thd

ra wn , 2 00 7 WL 28 90 97 4 (6t h Cir. No v. 30 , 2 00 7) ; United States v. Me ndez , 498 F.3d 423, 426 ( 6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7) (holding that a jury ’s ver dict of ac quittal “does not preve nt the sentenc ing c ourt from c onsidering conduct unde rlying the acquitted c harg e”)
. The only aspec t of the di strict court’s se ntence that appea rs problematic is the court’s statement about the addition of t he two-level enha nceme nt for beingconvicted unde r § 1956 to the drug conviction offe nse leve l. That enha nceme nt applies onl y to money -launde ring convictions, not dr u g c o n v i c t i o n s . H o w e v e r , t h e c o u rta p p e ar s m e r e l y

t o h a v e m i s - s p o k e n , b e c a u s e i tu l t ima te ly
arr ived at the proper offense level based on its finding s of fa ct re g ardingthe amount of c ocaine at issue, without consideration of § 1956. IV Havingaddre ssed all of appellant’ s arguments and finding none of the m persuasive for the
rea sons articulate d above, w e AF FI RM appellant’s convic tion and sentenc e.