J-S34031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.R.P., a/k/a 

K.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 669 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered May 17, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans’ Court at CP-02-AP-0000211-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: October 27, 2023

M.P. (Mother) appeals from the order granting the petition of Allegheny 

County Office of Children, Youth & Families (CYF), and terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to her daughter, K.R.P. a/k/a K.P. (Child).

1

 After careful 

consideration, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 CYF petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Child’s father, identified as 

A.W., and “any putative unknown father,” on grounds of abandonment. See 

Petition to Terminate, 10/6/21, at ¶¶ 4-5, 13-21. CYF provided proper notice, 

but neither A.W. nor any unknown father participated in the termination 

proceedings. See N.T., 3/3/23, at 3-7; id. at 24-25 (CYF caseworker 

testifying that A.W. knows Child is in CYF’s care). At the conclusion of the 

termination hearing, the orphans’ court stated its finding that CYF “met their 

burden with regard to [A.W.] and the unknown father ....” Id. at 128. 

However, our review reveals no formal order terminating the parental rights 

of Child’s father. The absence of an order does not impact Mother’s appeal. 

See In re H.S.W.C.-B., 836 A.2d 908, 910 (Pa. 2003). Nonetheless, if no 

order exists, we urge CYF and the orphans’ court to seek and/or enter a formal 

disposition of CYF’s petition to terminate the parental rights of Child’s father.
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CASE HISTORY

Child was born in February 2020. CYF became involved with Mother 

prior to Child’s birth, in October 2014, after receiving reports that Mother was 

neglecting her newborn first child, M.P. Mother’s parental rights to M.P. were

terminated in May 2016.2 

Child tested positive for marijuana at birth. N.T., 3/3/23, at 56. Shortly 

thereafter, CYF obtained emergency custody of Child based on Mother’s

“heavy marijuana use,”3 unstable housing, history of intimate partner violence 

(IPV), and mental health issues. Id. at 9-10.

Child was adjudicated dependent on April 20, 2020. The court found 

aggravated circumstances due to the termination of Mother’s parental rights 

to M.P., but directed CYF to continue reunification efforts with Child. See 

Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 10/6/21, at Exhibit E; 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. The court ordered Mother to comply with permanency 

goals of visiting Child, and participating in services to address substance 

abuse, housing, IPV, and mental health issues. N.T., 3/3/23, at 12. Child 

was placed with L.A. (Foster Mother) in April 2020. Child continues to reside 

with Foster Mother, who is a pre-adoptive resource.

____________________________________________

2 CYF obtained custody of Mother’s third child, J.S., shortly after his birth in 

September 2021. See N.T., 3/3/23, at 8, 11.

3 According to the CYF caseworker, “Mother stated at the time that she 

normally smokes three to four blunts a day.” N.T., 3/3/23, at 10.
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Mother failed to comply with her permanency goals. See id. at 13-24, 

57-58. The review orders from April 2020 to October 2021 indicate Mother 

made “no progress” through July 2021, and “minimal” progress from July 2021 

to October 2021. See CYF Exhibit 5.

On October 6, 2021, CYF petitioned to involuntarily terminate Mother’s 

parental rights. The orphans’ court held a termination hearing on March 3, 

2023. CYF adduced testimony from Nicholas Cortaszo, the CYF caseworker; 

Dr. Eric Bernstein, a licensed psychologist and expert in child psychology; and 

James Middleton, who supervised Mother’s transportation and visitation with

Child. Mother testified in opposition to termination.

The orphans’ court recounted the following evidence:

Mother provided contact information to [CYF caseworker]

Cortaszo during the pendency of this matter, but that contact 

information changed often and resulted in periods of no contact 

between Mother and CYF. Mr. Cortaszo explained that in addition 

to multiple phone numbers, Mother has utilized at least nine 

different email addresses during the case.

Mother has a history of heavy marijuana use, smoking at 

least four blunts per day. She was referred to [the Pennsylvania 

Organization for Women in Recovery (POWER)] on three separate 

occasions and intensive outpatient [treatment] multiple times.

Mother started a drug and alcohol program for the first time on

January 13, 2023. The goal of addressing her drug and alcohol 

treatment needs remained unmet at the time of the hearing

because Mother had no established history of drug and alcohol

treatment. Her significant marijuana use, which affected her daily 

life, was a large factor in her inability to provide essential parental 

care and control for [Child].

Similarly, despite a 2020 recommendation that she pursue 

mental health treatment, Mother’s mental health needs remained 
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unmet throughout the case. Her first engagement with mental

health treatment was also on January 13, 2023.

Mother has historically had unstable housing, and was 

referred to multiple housing assistance programs. She obtained 

housing in November of 2022, through a program that provided 

for a rent holiday, but remains unemployed and therefore does 

not have the means to meet her rent when the assistance expires. 

Complicating Mother’s housing instability, her longest work history 

is only six months. She has worked for various employers for very 

short periods of time. While her current housing is appropriate, it 

is not stable long-term.

As to [Mother’s] goal of attending and completing [IPV]

counseling, the offered testimony was not clear as to whether

Mother had completed counseling.

In-person visitation between Mother and Child began on 

April 26, 2021, and was conducted virtually prior to this date due 

to the COVID-19 pandemic. Visits were set to be twice weekly in

person and once virtually. A total of 114 virtual visits were

offered, and Mother attended 30, or 26.3% of visits.

In-person visits were also inconsistently attended by 

Mother. In 2021, Mother attended 11 out of 25 in-person visits.

In 2022, Mother appeared for 12 of 40 in-person visits. In 2023, 

she missed all seven visits in January and she missed all five in 

February. There were 77 total in-person visits offered and 23 

visits attended, or 29.8%. Dr. Bernstein opined that the level and 

frequency of visitation has a direct effect on [Child’s] “felt 

security” and “emotional security.” So too, Dr. Bernstein 

explained, unpredictably participating in visitation can have a 

negative effect on [a] parent-child bond.

Mother demonstrated a clear understanding of what her 

goals were. Mother maintained that her marijuana use was not 

affecting her ability to parent. Mother further maintained that she 

did not have 100% sobriety as a goal. She deflected questions 

regarding the reasons she had missed a number of visits and she 

did not take any accountability for the circumstances in her life 

that were leading to her instability. Mother insisted that she was 

able to cover the rent for her home even after the rent holiday, 

but did not reference any funding source that would allow her to 

support her needs. Mother demonstrated a stunning lack of 
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insight into her circumstances throughout the [termination]

proceeding and the underlying dependency action. She identified

several individuals who would operate as a support for her, 

including the man who is currently imprisoned for assaulting her, 

but none of those people appeared or testified at the [termination]

hearing. Mother was unable to answer questions about what she 

does with her time on a daily basis. She was similarly unable to 

identify what barriers in her life prevented her from more 

expediently addressing her goals.

By the date of the TPR hearing, Child had been in placement

for approximately 37 months. [F]oster [M]other and [Child] have 

a strong bond, and [F]oster [M]other and [Child] have 

spontaneous affection, good communication, and a loving 

relationship. [Foster Mother] meets all of [Child’s] physical, 

emotional, and psychological needs and is a stable placement.

The caseworker explained that Mother is not currently in a 

position to parent [Child] because she has a long-demonstrated 

lack of stability and a lack of follow-through. During her 

evaluation with Dr. Bernstein, Mother did not identify that she 

needs drug and alcohol or mental health treatment. Mother 

similarly did not believe she could remain abstinent from 

marijuana. Dr. Bernstein testified that marijuana can have 

negative impacts on the ability to parent.

Mother did not accept any responsibility for [Child] being in 

care; Dr. Bernstein explained that [Mother] “instead blamed [CYF]

for unfairly putting their family in her circumstances.” In his 

December 2020 evaluation, Dr. Bernstein recommended mental 

health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and working 

towards [marijuana] abstinence. As of December 2020, [M]other 

was smoking six marijuana blunts per day and was diagnosed with 

cannabis dependence. As far as it related to the relationship 

between Mother and [Child], Dr. Bernstein explained that 

[Mother] has not fulfilled the caretaking capacity for [Child]. That 

role requires consistent investment in parent responsibilities and 

visitation. For [Child], that role has been fulfilled by [F]oster 

[M]other. While Mother and [Child] have a good relationship, the 

bond between them was not necessarily strong. Dr. Bernstein 

recommended that any visitation should be supervised because of 

Mother’s substance abuse, IPV concerns, inconsistency, and lack 

of investment in [C]hild’s life. Dr. Bernstein noted that while he 
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did not believe Mother would put [C]hild in danger, she lacked a 

certain degree of protective capacity over [C]hild.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/11/23, at 4-9 (citations to notes of testimony, 

paragraph headings, and footnote omitted).

“[B]ased upon this record,” id. at 10, the orphans’ court terminated

Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). 

Order, 5/17/23. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

ISSUES

Mother presents two issues for review:

1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 

(5), and (8)?

2. Did the [orphans’] ourt abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

[C]hild pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 8.

DISCUSSION

In considering Mother’s issues, we recognize

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must 

accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the 

orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, 

an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling 

unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
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An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the 

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court 

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial 

courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple 

hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ 

court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make 

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, 

protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has 

significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving 

party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which provides for a bifurcated analysis. First, the orphans’ 

court “must focus on the parent’s conduct” relative to the “eleven enumerated 

grounds” for termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). Id. at 

830. If the court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must 

then assesses the evidence relative to the child’s needs and welfare under 

Section 2511(b), “giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 

267 (Pa. 2013). This Court need only agree with the orphans’ court as to “any 
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one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order 

to affirm the termination of parental rights.” Id. 

Section 2511(a) - Grounds for Termination

Instantly, we address Section 2511(a)(8), which provides:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . .

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court ... 12 months or more have elapsed from the 

date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove: (1) the child 

has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

Section 2511(a)(8) “authorizes the trial court to terminate parental rights if 

the parent has not resolved the conditions which led to placement ....” Int.

of R.R.D., 300 A.3d 1077, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2023). The statute does not 

require that the court evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the 

conditions that led to the child’s removal or placement. See In re M.A.B., 

166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017). Also,
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while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to 

evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to 

resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to 

addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as prescribed 

by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must 

address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

Mindful of the above authority, we turn to Mother’s challenge to 

termination under Section 2511(a)(8). Mother’s Brief at 20-24. Mother

asserts the orphans’ court erred in “conclud[ing] Mother had not remedied the 

conditions that led to the removal of [Child.]” Id. at 24. She also argues

termination is contrary to Child’s needs and welfare. Id. at 22.

CYF counters that it presented “overwhelming evidence” of Mother’s

failure to adequately address or ameliorate her parenting deficiencies to 

support termination under Section 2511(a)(8). See CYF’s Brief at 13.4 We 

agree.

____________________________________________

4 Child’s counsel has not filed an appellate brief. However, during closing 

arguments at the termination hearing, Child’s counsel stated:

Your Honor, it is not something that I normally do, but I’m actually 

going to agree with [CYF] and the points [CYF’s counsel] just 

made. Minimal progress has been made [by Mother] with regard 

to mental health, drug and alcohol [services], housing ... [and 

v]isitation is still sporadic. Parenting classes have not been 

attended, and [Mother] just admitted that she continues to have

an ongoing relationship with [A.W.,] who is a person who abused 

her. I believe that [CYF] has met its burden.

N.T., 3/3/23, at 130.
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(1) Child has been removed from Mother’s care for at least 12 months.

With respect to the first element of Section 2511(a)(8), there is no 

dispute that Child has been removed from Mother’s care for “12 months or 

more.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

(2) The conditions which led to removal or placement still exist.

As to the second element of Section 2511(a)(8), the record supports the 

orphans’ court’s finding that the conditions which led to Child’s removal or 

placement continue to exist. Although Mother argues she has remedied these 

conditions, the evidence indicates otherwise. 

The CYF caseworker, Mr. Cortaszo, testified that Mother did not 

participate in court-ordered services until January 2023, nearly a year and a 

half after CYF petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See N.T., 

3/3/23, at 15-16. For example, Mother did not obtain a psychiatric evaluation, 

such that the specifics of her mental health issues remain unknown.5 Id. at 

111. Likewise, Mother did not engage in services for IPV. Id. at 24, 32, 38. 

Mother also testified that she continues regular marijuana use. Mother stated 

that marijuana “is the most comfortable and unharmful substance for me and 

it helps me.” Id. at 108. She indicated she had no intention of stopping her 

marijuana use. Mother stated, “I do feel that, you know, it’s kind of needed 

____________________________________________

5 Mother testified that she suffers from anxiety and post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD). N.T., 3/3/23, at 118.
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in my life[.]” Id. at 110. Between March 2020 and February 2023, Mother 

appeared for just 1 of 19 scheduled drug screens, and tested positive for THC. 

See CYF Exhibit 4. She did not participate in court-mandated drug counseling 

until January 2023, nearly a year and a half after CYF petitioned to terminate 

her parental rights. Id. at 109. 

In addition, Mother’s housing remains unstable. Mr. Cortaszo testified 

that after Child came into care in 2020, Mother resided with a succession of 

family and friends. Id. at 16. Mr. Cortaszo relayed that in November 2022, 

Mother began living at a property provided through a non-profit organization 

that awarded Mother a “rent holiday.” Id. at 16-17. Since Mother has no 

income, Mr. Cortaszo averred that she will be unable to maintain this residence 

once the rent waiver expires. Id. at 18. Mother expressed a lack of concern, 

stating, “I don’t understand why [Mr. Cortaszo] thinks there would be a 

problem taking care of my child financially or something. That’s nonsense to 

me.” Id. at 114. Mother added, “I can always find different housing.” Id.6

Consistent with the evidence, orphans’ court properly concluded:

Throughout the life of the case, Mother has never [been] more 

than minimally compliant with the permanency plan, nor did she 

ever make more than minimal progress towards alleviating the 

____________________________________________

6

 To the extent Mother claims she temporarily alleviated her lack of housing, 

the change occurred more than a year after she received notice of the 

termination petition. With “any petition filed pursuant to subsection ...

2511(a)(8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy 

the conditions ... which are first initiated subsequent to the ... notice of the 

filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
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conditions that originally led to removal. In multiple reporting 

periods, Mother had no compliance with the permanency plan and 

had made no progress towards alleviating the conditions that 

originally led to removal. She is the same person, with the same 

shortcomings, that she was at removal.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/11/23, at 14-15.

(3) Termination of would best serve Child’s needs and welfare.

The third and final element of Section 2511(a)(8) concerns Child’s needs 

and welfare. The orphans’ court found termination to be in Child’s best 

interest. The record supports this finding.

Dr. Bernstein first interviewed Mother on December 24, 2020. N.T., 

3/3/23, at 55. He issued a written evaluation, which included his conclusion 

that Mother “minimizes her difficulties.” Id. at 58. Dr. Bernstein also 

evaluated Mother in October 2022. Id. at 61. At the termination hearing, Dr. 

Bernstein opined that Mother’s dependence on marijuana posed an ongoing

risk of compromising her level of attention, awareness, supervision, guidance,

and support of Child in a parenting capacity. Id. at 60. He explained that 

Mother was “placing herself in a position of essentially being high throughout 

the day, and her responsibility for a young child of [Child’s] age would 

potentially place that child at risk.” Id. at 65. Dr. Bernstein testified that 

Mother’s constant intoxication and issues with IPV raised significant doubts 

about her ability to provide for Child’s everyday needs and safety. See id. at 

88 (“I have expressed concern about [Mother’s] misuse of marijuana and 

domestic violence to the extent that places her or anyone else in her care at 
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risk.”). In addition, Dr. Bernstein noted that Mother’s lack of consistent 

contact with Child negatively impacted her ability to care for Child. See id.

at 89 (“[T]he more inconsistent or even absent a parent is in a child’s life, the 

more impact it will have upon the security of the relationship ... with the 

child.”).

Mr. Cortaszo echoed Dr. Bernstein’s concerns. Mr. Cortaszo noted Child 

had “been in care her whole life, 36 months, she just had her third birthday

... and she deserves permanency.” Id. at 26. Mr. Cortaszo averred that 

Mother was unable to care for Child due to her “lack of stability” and “lack of 

follow through,” which create a “high risk” environment. Id.

The testimony of Mother as well as Mr. Cortaszo indicates Mother failed 

to attend a majority of visits with Child. During COVID restrictions, Mother 

participated in 30 of 114 virtual visits with Child. Id. at 18-19. From April 

2021 through 2023, Mother attended 23 of 77 visits. Id. at 21-23, 29-31, 

100-01. Mother stated she “felt” like she attended more visits than she 

missed. Id. at 112; cf. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/11/23, at 6 (calculating 

that Mother attended less than 30% of visits).

On this record, the orphans’ court determined:

Mother did not even visit consistently (she missed more than twothirds of both virtual and in-person visits with [Child]), let alone 

provide the essential parental care and control necessary to 

parent independently. Her lack of progress or effort towards her 

goals, combined with her lack of reliability, renders Mother a 

transitory, unreliable visitor in [Child’s] life rather than a 

caregiver[.] 
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Id. at 17.

In sum, the evidence supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that more 

than 12 months passed since Child’s removal or placement; the conditions 

which led to Child’s removal continue to exist; and termination would best 

serve Child’s needs and welfare. Therefore, the orphans’ court did not abuse 

its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(8).

Section 2511(b) - Needs and Welfare

Mother also challenges termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

When the court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must 

separately consider Child’s needs and welfare:

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child. ...

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

“Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, 

placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare 

above concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085,

1105 (Pa. 2023). Courts must also “discern the nature and status of the 

parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation omitted). However,

the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
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Importantly, the question is not merely whether a bond

exists, but whether termination would destroy this

existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.

In re A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 444–45 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted, 

emphasis added).

Our Supreme Court recently affirmed that “the parental bond is but one 

part of the overall subsection (b) analysis.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Courts

must also consider factors such as: (1) the child’s need for permanency and 

length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home 

and bonded with foster parents; and (3) whether the foster home meets the 

child’s needs. Id. It bears repeating that “intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability” are relevant to a child’s needs and welfare. See id. at 

1096, 1098, 1106, 1109, 1111 (citations omitted).

Mother argues:

It was an abuse of discretion and/or error of law that supported 

the [orphans’] court’s finding under [Section] 2511(a). Therefore, 

the [orphans’] court committed an error of law in proceeding to 

the analysis under [Section] 2511(b) and concluding that 

termination best meets the needs and welfare of [C]hild.

Mother’s Brief at 26. For the reasons discussed above, we disagree.

Mother further asserts: 

Mother loves [Child] and has much to offer for her benefit. The 

relationship between Mother and [Child] adds value to their lives. 

Termination would be unnecessary and permanently deprive 

[Child] of her relationship with Mother, and is not best for her 

needs and welfare. [Child] deserves to have her relationship with 

Mother preserved, which can only be assured if Mother retains her 

parental rights.
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Id. at 27.

Mother does not cite any supporting legal authority. See R.A.P. 2119(a)

(providing appellant’s argument shall include “discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Moreover, her argument is belied by 

the record. 

Dr. Bernstein noted that Mother had never parented Child. He stated 

that she “has not fulfilled the caretaking capacity.” N.T., 3/3/23, at 63.7 In 

addition, Dr. Bernstein testified that “while the interaction [between Child and 

Mother] appeared generally positive, I would not view the bond as necessarily

strong.” Id.

In contrast, Foster Mother has cared for Child since April 2020, when 

Child was an infant. According to Dr. Bernstein, Child has a strong parental 

bond with Foster Mother. Id. at 25-26, 37, 89-90. Dr. Bernstein stated that 

Child “has been dependent on” Foster Mother, and views her as her 

“psychological parent.” Id. at 66-67. He also averred that separating Child 

from Foster Mother could be “potentially traumatic.” Id. at 67.

Similarly, Mr. Cortaszo stated that in his observations of Child and Foster 

Mother, “[t]here is spontaneous affection, there is laughter, there is good 

____________________________________________

7 The orphans’ court credited Dr. Bernstein’s expert testimony, finding Dr. 

Bernstein “well-prepared, [and] versed in the facts ....” Orphans’ Court 

Opinion, 7/11/23, at 2. The court “placed great weight on [Dr. Bernstein’s] 

recommendations and report based upon his qualifications, level of expertise, 

and thoughtful and detailed testimony.” Id.
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communication from both, and it’s a very loving environment.” Id. at 26. He 

testified that severing Child’s bond with Foster Mother would be detrimental

to Child, while severing Child’s relationship with Mother would not. Id. at 40. 

Mr. Cortaszo noted Child “has been in care her whole life, 36 months,” and 

opined that Child “deserves permanency.” Id. at 26.

Accordingly, the orphans’ court found CYF

demonstrated that [Child] is thriving with [F]oster [M]other in a 

pre-adoptive home. She has been in care virtually her entire life, 

more than three years. Foster [M]other meets [Child’s] emotional 

and physical needs, and provides a loving, safe, and stable 

environment. This lengthy period of care with a reliable and

effective parental figure stands in stark contrast to Mother’s 

history throughout the case .... The negative effect of severing 

any bond or relationship that Mother and [Child] have is 

significantly outweighed by the positive outcomes of permanency 

for [Child].

... Child needs the permanency, security and safety that adoption 

will provide more than [Child] needs any benefit [she] derives 

from an ongoing relationship with Mother.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/17/23, at 17-18.

The orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in considering Child’s 

needs and welfare under Section 2511(b). As the court did not err, we affirm 

the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Order affirmed.
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Date: 10/27/2023