J-S07039-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.C.J.P., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother : No. 1475 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 104 AD 2015/CP-22-DP-314-2008 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.P., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother : No. 1476 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 105 AD 2015/CP-22-DP-67-2013 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.P., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother : No. 1477 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 106 AD 2015, CP-22-DP-68-2013 
J-S07039-17

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IN THE INTEREST OF: A.W.P., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: Q.P., Mother : No. 1478 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered August 16, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 107 AD 2015/CP-22-DP-90-2015 

BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2017

In these consolidated appeals, Q.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the 

Orders terminating her parental rights to A.C.J.P. (born in 2008), A.J.P. 

(born in 2010), A.M.P. (born in 2012), and A.W.P. (born in 2014) 

(collectively “the Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b),1and changing their permanency goals 

to adoption. We affirm.

The three older Children, A.C.J.P., A.J.P., and A.M.P., came into the 

care of Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (“DCSSCY” or 

the “Agency”) in September 2013. The youngest child, A.W.P., was placed 

in Agency care and custody in April 2015. On December 21, 2015, DCSSCY 

filed Petitions (collectively, “the ITPR Petitions”) to involuntarily terminate 

 

1

In separate Decrees entered on August 16, 2016, the trial court also 

terminated the parental rights of the unknown father of A.C.J.P.; the 

biological father of A.J.P., N.M.; and the biological father of A.M.P. and 

A.W.P., M.T. None of these fathers filed an appeal, nor are they parties to 

the instant appeal. 
J-S07039-17

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Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The trial court held an evidentiary 

hearing (hereinafter “the termination hearing”) on the ITPR Petitions on 

August 16, 2016. 

The trial court set forth in its Opinion the relevant evidence adduced at 

the termination hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 1-5. We 

adopt the trial court’s recitation as though fully set forth herein. See id. 

On August 16, 2016, the trial court entered the Orders involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother filed separate, timely Notices of 

Appeal from the Orders, along with Concise Statements of errors complained 

of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Thereafter, this 

Court, sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

determined to change the [Children’s] goal from reunification 

to adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 15 (capitalization omitted; issues renumbered for ease of 

disposition).

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 
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appellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. ... [O]ur standard of review 

requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). 

If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to 

determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its 

discretion. Id.; [In re] R.I.S., 36 A.3d [567, 572 (Pa. 2011) 

(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also 

Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [] 34 A.3d 1, 

51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, [] 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 

2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As [the Supreme Court] discussed in R.J.T., there are 

clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of 

review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, 

appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific 

determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are 

observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and 

parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the 

facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its 

own credibility determinations and judgment; instead[,] we must 

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not 

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re 

Adoption of Atencio, [] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[T]he 

standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so
J-S07039-17

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clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

This Court may affirm a trial court’s decision regarding the termination 

of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), 

along with a consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, we will focus on 

section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the 

date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist 

and termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.-- The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 
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described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

The party seeking termination under section 2511(a)(8) must prove 

the following by clear and convincing evidence: “(1) the child has been 

removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of 

removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). “Termination under section 2511(a)(8) 

does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or 

ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the 

availability or efficacy of Agency services.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, Mother argues that the Agency failed to meet the requirements 

of subsection 2511(a)(8) by clear and convincing evidence because “[t]he 

conditions that led to the [C]hildren being [placed] in care ha[ve] been 

remedied.” Mother’s Brief at 30. Specifically, Mother contends that 

[s]ince November [] 2015, eleven [] months prior to the 

[termination] hearing ..., Mother was actively pursuing her 

sobriety through a series of residential drug and alcohol 

treatment facilities. The Agency never had an issue with 

Mother’s parenting skills. The only issue that existed at the time 

[that] the [C]hildren were dependent was Mother’s sobriety. It 

is clear from the testimony presented, that Mother had remained 

clean and sober since she entered into the residential treatment 

facility in November 2015. 
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Id. at 27 (citations to record omitted). Mother contends that “[t]he 

termination of [her] parental right[s] would not serve the needs and welfare 

of the [C]hildren, because Mother was sober and could have cared for [the 

C]hildren months prior to the [termination] hearing.” Id. According to 

Mother, “the reason why the[] [C]hildren were dependent for thirty-five [] 

months was because Mother was making significant progress toward her 

objectives.” Id. at 25.

The trial court set forth in its Opinion its reasons for determining that 

the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was proper under section 2511(a)(8). See Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 9-10; see also id. at 6 (stating that “the 

[three] oldest [C]hildren have endured a lack of permanency for nearly three 

years and [A.W.P.], for most of his life. Continued placement would render 

the [C]hildren’s chance for safety, permanency and well-being secondary to 

Mother’s challenge in remaining drug free.”); see also id. at 1-5 (setting 

forth the evidence adduced at the termination hearing). The record supports 

the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s conclusions are not the 

result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. See In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s recitation as 

though fully stated herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 6, 9-10.

Next, we must determine whether the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights was in the Children’s best interests under section 2511(b). See In re 
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B.L.W., supra. We have explained that the focus in terminating parental 

rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant 

to section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the 

child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 

A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 

485 (Pa. 1993)], th[e] [Pennsylvania Supreme] Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires 

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and 

child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the 

effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121; see also In re 

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that although it is 

often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it part of the certified 

record, “[t]here are some instances ... where direct observation of the 

interaction between the parent and the child is not necessary and may even 

be detrimental to the child.”). There is no bond worth preserving between a 

child and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care for most of 

the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated. 
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In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764. Finally, it is appropriate to consider a child’s 

bond with his or her foster parent(s). See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

“[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of ... 

her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill ... her parental duties, to the 

child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential 

in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 

856 (Pa. Super. 2004). “[W]e will not toll the well-being and permanency of 

[a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life 

“simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)).

Here, Mother contends that “[t]he termination of [her] parental 

right[s] would not best serve the needs and welfare of the [C]hildren, 

because Mother was sober and could have cared for [the] [C]hildren months 

prior to the [termination] hearing.” Mother’s Brief at 27.2

In its Opinion, the trial court stated its reasons for determining that 

the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests under section 

2511(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 11-12. We agree with the 

 

2 Aside from this sole reference to the Children’s best interests, and to 

boilerplate case law concerning section 2511(b), see Mother’s Brief at 30-

31, Mother does not otherwise develop any argument as to section 2511(b). 

At the termination hearing, Mother testified that her visits with the Children 

went well, and that the Children became upset when the visits ended. N.T., 

8/16/16, at 76.
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trial court’s analysis and determination, which is supported by the record, 

and thus incorporate it as though fully set forth herein. See id. 

We additionally note the following. The Children’s respective foster 

parents are adoptive resources. The Agency caseworker, Valerie Broody 

(“Broody”), testified concerning these placements at the termination hearing 

as follows:

Starting with [A.C.J.P.], she has done very well with her 

current foster parent, Miss K[.] [A.C.J.P.] is receiving treatment. 

[The Agency is] starting to get [A.C.J.P.] more treatment for the 

issues she’s presented. She definitely has a bond with Miss K[.] 

[A.C.J.P.] is able to talk about her feelings, and she’s rather 

articulate for eight [years-old].

[A.J.P. and A.M.P.] are with Miss E[.]R[.] They have 

essentially been with her since September of 2013. They do 

appear to be bonded [to Miss E.R.] They look to her when they 

... need anything. ... I’ve observed them in [Miss E.R.’s] home. 

They definitely feel at home with Miss E[.]R[.]

A.W.P. is with Miss H[.]G[.], and she has done wonders 

with him. He has many medical issues. He’s been diagnosed 

with rickets. He has a feeding tube through his nose. Until 

recently[,] he had very poor muscle tone, and it’s only been 

with[in] maybe the last three or four months that he’s been 

really sitting up and making efforts to work on his gross motor 

skills. He’s finally started speaking. He was very delayed for a 

long time.

N.T., 8/16/16, at 56-57; see also id. at 57 (wherein Broody stated that all 

of the above-mentioned pre-adoptive foster parents meet the Children’s 

emotional, physical and mental needs).

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests 
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under section 2511(b). See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/16, at 11-12; see 

also In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763-64 (affirming the involuntary 

termination of the mother’s parental rights, despite the existence of some 

bond, where placement with the mother would have been contrary to the 

child’s best interests, and any bond with the mother would have been fairly 

attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost constantly, for 

four years). As we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and 

(b), her first issue lacks merit.

In her second issue, Mother asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it changed the Children’s permanency goal to adoption. See

Mother’s Brief at 21-26. Mother argues that (1) the Agency did not put in 

place reasonable measures to reunify her with the Children; (2) Mother was 

not required to take parenting classes; (3) Mother’s visits with the Children 

“were going extremely well”; and (4) the trial court improperly focused on 

Mother’s prior failures in achieving sobriety, yet did not consider her current 

sobriety. Id. at 24-25.

When we review a trial court’s order to change the 

placement goal for a dependent child to adoption, our standard 

is abuse of discretion. In order to conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion, we must determine that the court’s 

judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not 

apply the law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are bound 

by the trial court’s findings of fact that have support in the 

record. ... When the trial court’s findings are supported by 
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competent evidence of record, we will affirm even if the record 

could also support the opposite result.

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-23 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent 

children are controlled by the Juvenile Act 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§§ 6301-65, which was amended in 1998 to conform to the 

federal Adoption and Safe Families Act []. The policy underlying 

these statutes is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely 

in foster care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, 

and long-term parental commitment. 

In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and brackets 

omitted). As to change of goal proceedings, “the best interests of the child 

and not the interests of the parent must guide the trial court, and the 

burden is on the child welfare agency involved to prove that a change in goal 

would be in the child’s best interest.” In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d at 573 (citations 

omitted). The safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take 

precedence over all other considerations. In the Matter of S.B., 943 A.2d 

973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Upon review of the record and the transcript of the termination 

hearing, we conclude that there is ample support in the record for the trial 

court’s decision to change the Children’s permanency goals to adoption. 

Having already determined that it is in the Children’s best interests to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights, we also agree that it is in the Children’s 

best interests to change their permanency goals to adoption, where the 

Children are bonded with their pre-adoptive foster parents.
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Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err in granting the 

ITPR Petitions and changing Children’s permanency goal to adoption.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/13/2017
1 The Court also terminated the parental rights of the unknown father of A.C.J.P., ofN ... M•, father of A.J.P., 

and ofM .. T.-, father of A.M.P. and A.W.P .. The fathers received proper notice and failed to appear for the 

hearing.(N.T. pp. 5-21 ). No appeals have been taken from those decrees. 

served as caseworker since September 2013 when the 3 oldest children, A.C.J.P, A.M.P. and 

Dauphin County Children and Youth service ("Agency") caseworker Valerie Broody has 

FACTS 

pp. 82-88)(hereinafter "N.T."). We supplement those statements with this Trial Court Opinion. 

and holdings. See, Transcript of Proceedings, Termination of Parental Rights, August 16, 2016, 

Petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, we set forth on the record our findings, conclusions 

Parental Rights on December 21, 2015. On August 16, 2016, we conducted a hearing upon the 

The Agency filed the Petition for Goal Change to Adoption and Involuntary Termination of 

minor children AlllltC_J_P_ ("A.C.J.P."), born January .2008, A..,J_ 

P- ("A.J.P."), born December.2010, A_ M_P __ ("A.M.P."), born February8 

2012, and A ... w_. P .. ("A.W.P.") born December.2014.1 

adoption and involuntary termination of parental rights of o•••p .. ("Mother") to the 

This appeal follows the Order filed August 18, 2016 which granted the goal change to 

TRJAL COURT OPINION 

: NOS. ~-AD-2015/ CP-22-DP-314-2008 

: NOS.QQ.v-AD-2015/ CP-22-DP-67-2013 

: NOS. 106-AD-2015/ CP-22-DP-68-2013 

: NOS. 107-AD-2015/CP-90-2015 

A~P., 

(A.J.P;., 

A.lv(P., 

A.C.J.P. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

IN THE INTEREST OF 

Circulated 02/28/2017 11:23 AM
A.J.P. first came into care. At that time, the Agency received a referral that Mother appeared to 

be driving while under the influence of drugs with the children in the car. (N.T. p. 35). The 

referral also indicated that Mother, A.C.J.P, A.M.P. and A.J.P. were homeless. (Id.). 2 

A Court ordered Family Service Plan set forth the following objectives for Mother: 

1. Cooperate and comply with the Agency; 

2. Attend al Court hearings, Agency meetings and treatment plan meetings; 

3. Sign all releases of information as requested; 

4. Notify the Agency within 24 hours of new residence or contact information; 

5. Address any drug and alcohol issues; 

6. Obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation; 

7. Submit to random urine screens as required by the Agency; 

8. Follow all recommendations of the drug and alcohol evaluation; 

9. Order and maintain appropriate housing; 

l 0. Obtain a stable and legal source of income and provide documentation to the Agency; 

11. Successfully complete reunification services and maintain contact with the children; 

12. Attend and actively participate in all scheduled visits with the children. 

(Petition for Goal Change to Adoption and Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 

December 21, 2015, para. pp.- xii; Hearing Exhibit 8). 

In November 2013, Mother participated in a treatment program with T.W. Pontessa & 

Associates Counseling Service. (N.T. p. 39). A.C.J.P, A.M.P. and A.J.P. were returned to 

Mother's care for a period oftime. 

In September 2014, while pregnant with A.W.P., Mother began residing in Lourdes House, a 

home for expectant mothers and children up to the age of 6 months. (N.T. pp. 39-40). During her 

2 As set forth herein, Mother's fourth child, A.W.P. came into care in April, 2015. (N.T. pp. 23-24). 

2 
3 

residence, Mother provided frequent urine screens as required. (N.T. p. 42). Mother did well 

while in the residential program. (N.T. p. 50). In February 2015, upon discharge from Lourdes 

House, the Agency assisted Mother with a move to a house. The Agency paid the security 

deposit and the first 2 months ofrent on Mother's behalf. (N.T. p. 52). The Agency explained to 

Mother that it would not provide further financial assistance with rent. (N.T. p. 62). 

From September 2013 through September 2014, Mother failed to consistently provide urine 

screens as required or maintain appropriate housing. (N.T. pp. 40-41). 

From the time of her discharge from Lourdes House through April 2015, Mother was not 

enrolled in any drug and alcohol treatment program. She provided negative drug screens for a 

short period following discharge from Lourdes House. (N.T. p. 42). 

However, on April 17, 2015, the Agency received a referral that Mother was unresponsive 

behind the wheel and appeared to be under the influence of drugs, with the children in the 

vehicle. (N.T. pp. 35-36; N.T. p. 43). Mother's fourth child, A.W.P., came into care following 

the April 2015 incident. (N.T. pp. 23-24). 

In June 2015, Mother returned to T.W. Pontessa for drug treatment but was discharged for 

non-attendance. (N .T. p. 45). Mother received criminal charges related to the April 17, 2015 

incident. Mother was incarcerated from July 14, 2015 to August 21, 2015. (N.T. pp. 53-54). 

Mother was evicted from her housing in July 2015. (N.T. p. 43; p. 53). 

In September 2015, the Agency referred Mother to Gaudenzia Addiction Treatment and 

Recovery Services. The Agency attempted to pick up Mother to take her to an intake 

appointment there, but Mother was not present at the address she provided. (N.T. p. 46). Mother 

initiated treatment with Gaudenzia on her own in October 2015, first as an outpatient then as an 

inpatient. (N.T. pp. 45-46). 
4 

During the period of April 2015 through November 2015, Mother provided 5 urine screens, 2 

of which tested positive for PCP, the substance abuse which initiated the Agency's involvement. 

(N.T. 44). In November 2015 and December 2015, Mother resided in Vantage House, a 

residential treatment facility. (N.T. p. 47; p. 63). Vantage House would have allowed only 2 of 

the children to reside there with Mother. (N.T. p. 67). 

Since November 2015, Mother has failed to provide regular urine screens as required. (N.T. p. 

44). 

During the second period during which A.C.J.P, A.M.P. and A.J.P. came into the care of the 

Agency, Mother failed to maintain regular contact with them. (N.T. p. 48). Based upon Mother's 

failure to maintain substantial and continuing contact, on October 6, 2015, the Court made the 

finding of aggravated circumstances as to A.C.J.P, A.M.P. and A.J.P. (N.T. p. 49; Exhibit 13, 

Exhibit Packet p. 389). 

Mother has not maintained consistent employment and would be unable to financially support 

the children. (N.T. p. 66). 

Adoptive resources exist for all of the children. (N.T. p. 55). A.C.J.P., now age 8, receives 

treatment for anxiety related to the lack of permanency. (N.T. pp. 65-66). A.C.J.P. has bonded 

with her foster parent and is progressing well in her foster home. (N.T. p. 56). 

A.J.P. and A.M.P. reside together with a different foster parent, with whom they have bonded 

well. (N.T. p. 56). A.J.P. receives services to address behavioral problems in school. (N.T. pp. 

65-66). Agency caseworker Ms. Broody has observed A.J.P. and A.M.P. in the foster home and 

finds that they appear comfortable. The children look to their foster parent to meet their needs. 

(N.T. p. 56). 
5 

Superior Court stated, 

1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 601 A.2d 702 (Pa. 2009). In In re N. C., the 

prove the goal change would be in the child's best interest." In the Interest of D.P., 972 A.2d 

must guide the trial court, and the parent's rights are secondary. The burden is on the Agency to 

In a goal change proceeding, "the best interest of the child, and not the interest of the parent, 

A. The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion in determining that a change of the 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption serves the best interest of the children. 

DISCUSSION 

A.W.P. for 17 months. (N.T. p. 47). 

As of the time of the hearing, A.C.J.P, A.M.P. and A.J.P. were in care nearly 3 years and 

hearing, Mother has resided with various friends. (N.T. p. 54). 

From the time of her release from incarceration in August 2015 through the date of the 

All of the foster homes meet the emotional, physical and mental needs of the children. (Id.) 

I 

Mother testified that since April 2015, she has gained an understanding =r»: and 

has progressed with recovery. (N.T. p. 73). Mother testified that she was sched1ied for a job 

interview following the hearing date and an opportunity for housing. (N.T. pp. 73-74). 

regular medical care he requires. (Id.). 

has begun to show marked progress. (N.T. p. 57). His foster parent ensures that he receives the 

rickets. (N.T. p. 56). His gross motor skills and language are significantly delayed although he 

challenges which require that he receive feeding through a tube. He has been diagnosed with 

A.W.P., approximately 18 months old at the time of the August 2016 hearing, faces medical 
6 

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental 

rights, [the Superior Court] is limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. See 

In re K. C. W., 456 Pa. Super. I, 689 A.2d 294, 298 (1997). Absent 

an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary 

support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Id. 

Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate 

parental rights, [the Superior Court] must accord the hearing 

judge's decision the same weight we would give to a jury verdict. 

See In re Child M., 452 Pa. Super. 230, 681 A.2d 793, 800 (1996). 

We must employ a broad comprehensive review of the record in 

order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported 

by competent evidence. See In re Matsock, 416 Pa.Super. 520, 611 

A.2d 737, 742 (1992). In re C. S. 761 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. 

Super. 2000). 

settled. Namely, 

The standard of review governing the trial court's termination of parental rights is well 

B. The Trial Court properly found that the Agency met its burden of proving that statutory 

grounds existed for and the children's best interests required termination of Mother's 

parental rights . 

Accordingly, we properly granted the goal change to adoption. 

safety, permanency and well-being secondary to Mother's challenge in remaining drug free. 

youngest child, for most of his life. Continued placement would render the children's chance for 

Here, the oldest children have endured a lack of permanency for nearly three years and the 

909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2006)( citations and footnotes omitted)( emphasis added). 

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent children are controlled by the 

Juvenile Act, [42 Pa.C.S.A. §§6301-6365] which was amended in 1998 to conform to the 

federal Adoption and Safe Families Act ("AFSA")[42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq.] The policy 

underlying these statutes is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster 

care, with inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental commitment. 

Consistent with this underlying policy, the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as 

required by AFSA, place the focus of dependency proceedings, including goal change 

proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take 

precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of the parents. 
7 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the 

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a 

period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent 

*** 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of 

the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent. 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim 

to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

which provide: 

Mother's parental rights based upon the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §251 l(a)( 1 ), (2), (5) and (8), 

opportunities to do so were made readily available to her. The Agency sought termination of 

Mother failed to remedy the conditions which led to placement although services and 

The record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that for an unreasonable time, 

proof and that termination of Mother's parental rights was proper. 

Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203-1204 (Pa. 1989). We found that the Agency met its burden of 

a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Matter of 

"testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). The standard of clear and convincing evidence means 

convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights. In re JD. W. M., 810 

The Agency, as the party seeking termination, bears the burden of establishing by clear and 
8 

with the trial court's decision as to any one subsection in order to affirm the termination of 

452 A.2d 1021, 1023-24 (1982) (citations omitted). Further, the Appellate Court need only agree 

expected of any individual under similar circumstances. Matter of ML. W, 307 Pa. 29, 33-34, 

obligations; the court must further measure the parent's performance in light of what would be 

court must consider all the circumstances in determining whether a parent has fulfilled his 

the duties and obligations inherent in parenthood." Id. In a termination proceeding, the trial 

cooperate with CYS to obtain the rehabilitative services necessary to enable the parent to meet 

1986). At a minimum, that "affirmative duty requires that the parent show a willingness to 

his or her children. In re Adoption of JJ., 511 Pa. 590, 602, 515 A.2d 883, 889 (Pa. Super. 

Appellate Court keeps in mind that a parent has an affirmative duty to work towards the return of 

In considering whether the party seeking termination has satisfied these provisions, the 

23 Pa.C.S. § 251 l(a)(l), (2), (5) and (8). 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more 

have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist 

and termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

*** 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available 

to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental rights would 

serve the needs and welfare of the child. 
9 

[a]s [the Superior Court] Court has repeatedly indicated, termination under subsection 

2511 (a)(8) does not require an evaluation of the parents' willingness or ability to remedy 

some progress in accomplishing the goals of the Family Service Plan, 

completed some aspects of the Family Service Plan. While the record reflects that she made 

Mother asserts that the Trial Court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights where she 

inpatient setting has rendered her unable to maintain a stable home and employment. 

children in April 2015 still exist. Mother's ongoing struggle to remain sober outside of an 

§(a)(8). The record includes ample evidence that the conditions which led to the removal of the 

Clear and convincing evidence established grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental 

relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles 

placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable time to perform one's parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and 

emotional needs. 

*** 

The statute permitting the termination of parental rights 

outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care 

that parents must provide for their children, and a parent who 

cannot or will not meet the requirements within a reasonable 

time following intervention by the state may properly be 

considered unfit and have her parental rights terminated. 

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a 

child. A child needs love, protection, guidance and support. 

These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a 

merely passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation is a 

positive duty which requires affirmative performance. 

940 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2002). The Superior Court has explained: 

parental rights. In re JE. 745 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Super. 2000). See also, In re JI.R., 808 A.2d 934, 
10 

Super. 2000) (citations omitted.) The statute provides, 

physical and emotional] needs and welfare of the child." In re J E., 745 A.2d 1250, 1254-55 (Pa. 

Pursuant to Section 2511 (b ), a court must give 'primary consideration to the [ developmental, 

interests are served by terminating Mother's parental rights. 

We further found that clear and convincing evidence established that the children's best 

(a)(l),(2) and(5). 

clear and convincing evidence established grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

Although we based our termination decision upon 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ (a)(8), we also found that 

Mother's ability to maintain sobriety in the outside community for a year or two). 

was appropriate where reunification could not be contemplated based upon the need to evaluate 

Id., at 13. See also, In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 809 (Pa.Super. 2005)(termination under 2511 (a)(8) 

We recognize that the application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the parent has 

begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of her 

children. By allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to 

exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in 

abeyance while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume parental 

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for 

permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, 

we work under statutory and case law which contemplates only a short period of time, to 

wit eighteen months, in which to complete the process of either reunification or adoption 

for a child who has been placed in foster care. 

children of stability. Our Appellate Court has stated, 

in spite of her attempts, Mother's inability to independently maintain sobriety has deprived the 

repeatedly relapsed when she returned to an unsupervised setting. We are constrained to find that 

Although Mother demonstrated progress while undergoing in-house drug treatment, she 

In re I.I., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 

the conditions which led to placement of the [ child]. Instead, as we recently reaffirmed in 

an en bane decision, subsection (a)(8) 'requires only that the conditions continue to exist, 

not an evaluation of parental willingness or ability to remedy them'. 
11 

interests are well served in their foster homes. There, they receive the consistent devoted 

In contrast, we find that the children have bonded with their foster parents and that their best 

about getting high and that parting from them is difficult. (N.T. p. 76). 

Mother testified only that she can enjoy playing with the children now that she is not concerned 

upon which we may find that a bond exists which, if broken will cause detriment to the children. 

We do not question that Mother loves her children. However, Mother presented no evidence 

In re C.P ., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the 

child. The court must also discern the nature and status of the 

parent child bond, paying close attention to the effect of 

permanently severing the bond. 

K.A.R., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). The Superior Court has explained, 

emotional needs and welfare of the child under §251 l(b)." In the Matter of K.K.R.-S., K.MR., 

a parent and a child is a factor to be considered in determining the developmental, physical and 

require a bonding analysis, [ case law provides that] analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between 

In addition, the Superior Court has stated that while "Section 2511 (b) does not explicitly 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 l(b). 

Other considerations. - The court in terminating the rights of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely 

on the basis of envirorunental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if 

found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to 

any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(l),(6), or (8), the 

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy 

the condition described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 
12 

Joy W. Fleming, Esq., 91 Sylvan Ridge Road, Oberlin, PA 17113 

Owen Hoover, Esq., 101 North Sixth Street, Harrisburg, PA 17102 

Damian J. DeStefano, Esq., 3800 Market Street, Suite 205, Camp Hill, PA 17011 

Distribution: 

, 2016 

: .,•·'";!· October / .. ·) 

For all of the foregoing reasons the Decree should be affirmed. 

CONCLUSION 

have found in their foster homes. To do so would be detrimental to the childen. 

emotional and physical care they require. We will not disrupt the permanency and stability they