COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick,* Judges Baker and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

MARY WASHINGTON HOSPITAL and 

 HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS GROUP 

 SELF-INSURANCE ASSOCIATION 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0331-97-4 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 DECEMBER 16, 1997 

LORETTA HARRISON 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Linda M. Ziegler (Crews & Hancock, P.L.C., on 

briefs), for appellants. 

 Wesley G. Marshall (Peter M. Sweeny 

& Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 Mary Washington Hospital and Healthcare Providers Group 

Self-Insurance Association (jointly referred to herein as 

employer) appeal from an award entered by the Workers' 

Compensation Commission (commission) in favor of Loretta Harrison 

(claimant). The question presented by employer is whether 

credible evidence supports the commission's award of temporary 

partial disability benefits to claimant for the period of 

February 7, 1996 and continuing. Employer contends the award is 

not supported by a factual finding contained in the record. We 

disagree and affirm the commission's decision. 

 Pursuant to a claim for benefits filed by claimant on 

November 9, 1995, a hearing was held on July 10, 1996 before 

 

 *On November 19, 1997, Judge Fitzpatrick succeeded Judge 

Moon as chief judge. 
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Deputy Commissioner Herring. As stated by the deputy at the 

outset of the hearing, claimant sought: 

 temporary total disability benefits, 

temporary partial benefits, and medical--and 

temporary partial benefits as follows: 

Temporary total from June 7, 1995 through 

September 29, 1995, temporary partial from 

September 30, 1995 through October 27, 1995, 

temporary total from October 28, 1995 through 

February 6, 1996, and temporary partial from 

February 7, 1996 and continuing. 

At that hearing, the parties stipulated that claimant sustained a 

compensable back injury on June 7, 1995; that employer paid 

temporary total disability compensation from June 7, 1995 through 

September 30, 1995; and that employer paid temporary partial 

compensation from September 30, 1995 through October 27, 1995. 

 Relevant to this appeal, the deputy further established 

after those stipulations were confirmed that (1) claimant sought 

only "temporary total benefits from October 28, 1995 through 

February 6 [,1996] [and] temporary partial disability benefits 

from February 7, 1996 and continuing," and (2) employer "defended 

on the ground the disability claimant asserts as a basis for her 

claim [depression] was not causally related to her June 7, 1995, 

industrial accident injury." 

 While the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are in 

dispute, the following evidence is contained in the record. On 

June 7, 1995, claimant sustained a work-related back injury. 

That injury was accepted by employer as compensable, and the 

commission entered the appropriate award. On October 24, 1995, 
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Dr. John S. Moss, claimant's treating physician for her back 

injury, released her to return "to work without restriction."1

 

Nancy Daum, a diagnostic section leader of employer's radiology 

department, was assigned to discuss with claimant the hours 

claimant would work. Daum and claimant disagreed as to whether 

claimant was able to work three fourteen-hour shifts as she had 

prior to her injury. Following that disagreement, claimant 

became distraught to the extent that she contemplated suicide 

while on her way to a physical therapy appointment. When 

claimant arrived at the therapy center, she discussed her 

condition with Cynthia Starling, the center's pain management 

director, who recommended that claimant seek immediate admission 

to Snowden of Fredericksburg, an inpatient psychiatric facility. 

Starling drove claimant to the facility. Thereafter, claimant 

received inpatient and outpatient treatment from Drs. Norman 

Holden, Donald R. Reed, and P. S. Vachher, psychiatrists, and 

remained totally disabled due to her psychiatric condition 

through February 6, 1996. 

 Claimant returned to work on February 7, 1996 but worked 

only three ten-hour shifts per week, asserting that she could not 

work more than ten hours per day due to her depression. On 

December 8, 1995, Dr. Reed, who began treating claimant as an 

outpatient on November 28, 1995, opined that claimant would 

 1The effect of that letter was to require claimant to return 

to her pre-injury job. 
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recover from her depressive condition faster on a regular work 

week, preferably days. On April 17, 1996, Dr. Holden, who also 

treated claimant as an outpatient, advised employer as follows: 

 This is an update on our report [on claimant 

of] December 8, 1995. At that time, we 

advised against her working long hours. She 

reports that she has been working 14-hour 

days. We believe that she would recover 

better if she could work 8- or 10-hour days. 

 She is still suffering with depression along 

with thyroid problems which are both 

complicated by her recent pregnancy. Shorter 

hours could be beneficial for her daily 

functioning. 

 At the hearing before the deputy commissioner, claimant 

sought to introduce a letter which contained the causal 

relationship responses of Dr. Holden. The deputy first refused 

to consider the responses as evidence, but later stated that they 

would be admitted. However, in his opinion, the deputy expressly 

noted that Dr. Holden's responses were not considered. Those 

responses opined that claimant's depression was related to her 

June 7, 1995 injury. 

 The deputy made the following relevant findings: 

 We are convinced, on the record before us, 

that [claimant] was unable to work from 

October 28, 1995, through February 6, 1996, 

and that she was on a reduced schedule 

thereafter. We also find that these 

disabilities were the product of her 

psychiatric difficulties. However, we cannot 

find . . . that the claimant's depression and 

subsequent disability were the proximate 

result [or a compensable consequence] of the 

. . . industrial accident. 

(Emphasis added.) 
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 The deputy commissioner made factual findings "on the 

record" before him that claimant "was unable to work from 

October 28, 1995, through February 6, 1996," and that she was on 

a "reduced schedule thereafter." Thus, the deputy made a clear 

factual finding that claimant was temporarily partially disabled 

after February 6, 1996. However, the deputy further found that, 

although claimant was disabled during the stated periods due to a 

proved psychiatric condition, that condition had not resulted 

from her June 7, 1995 job-related injury. 

 Claimant requested the commission to review the deputy's 

findings and determine whether claimant's psychiatric condition 

was causally related to her compensable injury and, if so, 

whether she was entitled to the temporary total and temporary 

partial disability benefits claimed. On claimant's request for 

review, the full commission reversed the deputy's ruling on the 

admissibility of Dr. Holden's responses and found that claimant's 

psychiatric disability was causally related to her compensable 

injury. 

 The commission remains free to make findings of fact 

different from those made by the deputy commissioner. See

Virginia Dep't of State Police v. Dean, 16 Va. 254, 257, 430 

S.E.2d 550, 551 (1993). Emotional or psychological conditions 

resulting from an accidental event are compensable. See E.C. 

Womack, Inc. v. Ellis, 209 Va. 588, 591-93, 166 S.E.2d 265, 269 

(1969); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357, 362, 412 
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S.E.2d 185, 188 (1991). The commission entered an award for 

temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits for the 

periods sought. 

 In this appeal, employer does not contest the commission's 

finding that claimant's psychiatric disability was a compensable 

condition causally related to her June 7, 1995 industrial injury. 

 The single issue we are to decide, so states employer, is 

whether credible evidence in the record supports the commission's 

award of temporary partial disability benefits to claimant for 

the period of February 7, 1996 and continuing.2

 The deputy commissioner found that claimant's total 

inability to work from October 28, 1995 through February 6, 1996, 

and her inability to work full time thereafter, was due to her 

psychiatric condition. That finding was neither appealed by 

employer nor reversed by the commission. See Dean, 16 Va. App. 

at 257, 430 S.E.2d at 551. When the commission reversed the 

deputy's refusal to consider Dr. Holden's responses and found 

that claimant's depression was causally related to her industrial 

injury, the established, uncontested facts were that claimant's 

condition prevented her from working between October 28, 1995 and 

February 6, 1996, and prevented her from working full time 

 

 2For the first time, in its reply brief to this Court, 

employer contended that claimant's receipt of temporary partial 

disability benefits is barred because she failed to prove she 

marketed her residual capacity beyond the thirty hours per week 

she worked for employer. However, employer's failure to raise 

this issue below bars our review. See Rule 5A:18. 
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thereafter. Thus, it follows, without more, that claimant is 

entitled to temporary partial benefits continuing until it is 

otherwise proved she no longer suffers from a job-related 

condition that prevents her from returning to her pre-injury job. 

 Where reasonable inferences may be drawn from the record to 

support the commission's findings, they will not be disturbed by 

this Court on appeal. See Hawks v. Henrico Co. Sch. Bd., 7 Va. 

App. 398, 404, 374 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1988). The record contains 

credible evidence to support the commission's decision to award 

temporary partial disability beginning February 7, 1996 and 

continuing. See Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 

227, 229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991). 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the commission is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.