Present: All the Justices 

DEBORAH A. CONNER 

v. Record No. 981088 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 February 26, 1999 

NATIONAL PEST CONTROL 

ASSOCIATION, INC. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Leslie M. Alden, Judge 

 In this appeal we consider whether Code § 2.1-725 of the 

Virginia Human Rights Act (VHRA), Code §§ 2.1-714 et seq., 

prohibits a common law cause of action for wrongful 

termination based on a violation of public policies enunciated 

in both the VHRA and other provisions of state, federal, or 

local statutes or ordinances. 

 Deborah A. Conner was terminated by her employer, the 

National Pest Control Association, Inc. (NPCA), in September 

of 1995. She filed a common law cause of action for wrongful 

termination against NPCA, alleging that her termination 

"constituted discrimination . . . based on her gender" and 

that it violated the public policy against retaliation for 

complaints of discrimination in employment as articulated in 

the VHRA and other provisions of Virginia and federal law.1 

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 Specifically Conner relied on art. 1, § 1 of the 

Virginia Constitution, Chapter 11, § 11-1-1 et seq. of the 

Fairfax County Code, Virginia Code §§ 2.1-374, 8.01-42.1, 11-

44, 11-51, 15.1-37.3:8 (repealed and reenacted in substance as 

§ 15.2-965 (1997)), 15.1-48.1 (repealed and reenacted in 

substance as § 15.2-1604 (1997)), 36-96.1, 38.2-2212(C1), 
Conner sought $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, $350,000 in 

punitive damages and attorneys' fees. 

 NPCA filed a demurrer claiming that Conner's motion for 

judgment failed to state a cause of action because the common 

law cause of action asserted was eliminated by the 1995 

amendments to the VHRA. NPCA, relying on Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 

254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997), contended that the 1995 

amendments to the VHRA restricted the remedy for wrongful 

termination of employment based on a violation of a public 

policy found in the VHRA to a statutory remedy. The trial 

court agreed and entered an order dismissing Conner's motion 

for judgment for failure to state a cause of action. 

 On appeal Conner asserts, as she did in the trial court, 

that even if the 1995 amendments to the VHRA as interpreted in 

Doss "effectively prohibited a victim of discrimination from 

relying on the public policy articulated in the VHRA" as the 

basis for a common law action, they do not prohibit reliance 

"upon other state or federal laws, or upon the public policies 

enunciated elsewhere." We disagree. 

 The plaintiff in Doss, relying on Bowman v. State Bank of 

Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985), and Lockhart v. 

Commonwealth Education Systems, 247 Va. 98, 439 S.E.2d 328 

 

38.2-2213, 38.2-4312(3)(E)(1994), as amended 38.2-

4312(D)(1998), 59.1-21.21:1 and Title VII of the Civil Rights 

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(1994), filed a common law action against her employer 

claiming that her termination violated Virginia's public 

policy against discrimination on the basis of gender as 

enunciated in the VHRA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.. She maintained that the 

1995 amendments to the VHRA did not alter her common law cause 

of action. In response to a question certified to us by the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, we held 

that the plain meaning of the 1995 amendments required the 

conclusion that the General Assembly abrogated the common law 

action for wrongful termination based upon a violation of the 

public policies contained in the VHRA. Doss, 254 Va. at 372, 

492 S.E.2d at 447. Although the decision in Doss was limited 

to a cause of action for wrongful termination relying on the 

VHRA as the source of the public policy allegedly violated, 

id. at 366, 492 S.E.2d at 443, the rationale of that decision 

controls the disposition of this case. 

 Our decision in Doss centered on the application of 

subsection D of Code § 2.1-725, which was added to the VHRA in 

1995. That subsection provides: 

Causes of action based upon the public policies 

reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively 

limited to those actions, procedures and 

remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal 

 

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.. 

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or state civil rights statutes or local 

ordinances. 

We concluded that this subsection plainly manifested the 

General Assembly's intent to alter the common law and to limit 

actions based on violations of the policies reflected in the 

VHRA to applicable statutory causes of action and remedies. 

Id. at 371, 492 S.E.2d at 446. Thus, we held that the 

plaintiff in Doss could not maintain her common law action 

based on alleged violations of policy stated in the VHRA, 

because allowing her to do so would circumvent and render 

meaningless the mandate of subsection D that the actions for 

violations of such policies be "exclusively limited" to 

statutory causes of action. Id.

 In this case, just as in Doss, subsection D's exclusivity 

requirement would be circumvented and rendered meaningless if 

Conner could maintain her common law action based upon an 

alleged violation of a policy enunciated in the VHRA by simply 

citing a different Code section or other source of public 

policy which enunciated the same policy. Furthermore, the 

General Assembly did not limit the exclusivity provision to 

those causes of action relying on the VHRA itself as the 

source of the public policy statements. Rather, it made 

statutory causes of action the exclusive avenues for pursuing 

a remedy for an alleged violation of any public policy 

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"reflected in" the VHRA. Therefore, we conclude that the 

General Assembly, in enacting the 1995 amendments to the VHRA, 

eliminated a common law cause of action for wrongful 

termination based on any public policy which is reflected in 

the VHRA, regardless of whether the policy is articulated 

elsewhere. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's order 

sustaining the demurrer of NPCA and dismissing Conner's motion 

for judgment for failure to state a cause of action.2

Affirmed.

JUSTICE HASSELL, with whom JUSTICE KEENAN joins, concurring. 

 Gender discrimination should not be countenanced in any 

manner and victims of such discrimination should be accorded a 

tort remedy that fully and fairly compensates them for 

injuries caused by an employer's repugnant conduct. As this 

Court recognized in Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys., 247 

Va. 98, 105, 439 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1994): 

 "Without question, it is the public policy of 

this Commonwealth that all individuals within this 

Commonwealth are entitled to pursue employment free 

of discrimination based on race or gender. Indeed, 

racial or gender discrimination practiced in the 

 2

 We do not consider Conner's assignment of error that the 

trial court erred in holding that the 1995 amendments to the 

VHRA do not violate the equal protection clause of the United 

States Constitution, because the trial court's order does not 

reflect such a holding, and the issue of the constitutionality 

of a statute is not properly before us on review of an order 

sustaining a demurrer. 

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work place is not only an invidious violation of the 

rights of the individual, but such discrimination 

also affects the property rights, personal freedoms, 

and welfare of the people in general." 

 However, the General Assembly of this Commonwealth has 

chosen to impose limitations on the right of a woman to 

recover damages against an employer who discriminates against 

her because of her gender. See Code §§ 2.1-714, et seq. And, 

this Court, which does not, and constitutionally cannot, act 

as a super-legislative body, is required to apply these 

restrictions as expressed by the General Assembly. For this 

reason solely, I am compelled to concur with the majority's 

opinion. 

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