# ORIGINAl 3Jn \lr:be Wniteb**~tates ~ourt**  

# ofjf 

# eberal**~laims** No. 14-430 C This Opinion Will Not Be Published in the U.S
. Court ofFederal Claims Reporter Because It Does Not Add Significantly to the Body of Law.

PERCY ALLEN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff , v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. (Filed: August 18, 2014)

OPINION and ORDER 

# FILED AUG 

### 19 2014**~ U.~~.:**  COURT 

### Oft rEDt:RAL 

### CLAIMS

On May 19, 2014 , plaintiff, Percy Allen Williams, filed a complaint for breach ofcontract and for violations ofthe Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 9(a) , seeking, inter alia, a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Plaintiff, who is presently incarcerated in a correctional institution in Polkton, North Carolina, alleges that he entered into a contract with the Department ofJustice that entitled him to $25 million in damages. On June 5, 2014, plaintiff moved to dismiss that complaint under RCFC 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(5), and to have this court deny any injunctive relief
. On June 23, 2014, plaintifffiled a motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis, but without responding to defendant's motion
. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED. This court is solemnly obliged to address obvious questions concerning its subject matter jurisdiction. See Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)
. This court recognizes that plaintiff is actingpro se before this court, and thus the court will hold the form ofplaintiff's submissions to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Reed v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 517 , 521 (1991) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976))
. Having reviewed plaintiffs complaint, as well as defendant's motion to dismiss , this court is certain that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims that plaintiffraises. When a plaintifffails to plead facts that are not, as a matter of law, sufficient to show that a contract exists with the United States, " the normal disposition would be to dismiss the

# ..

complaint for failure to state a claim, rather than for want of jurisdiction." Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1995). There is, however, an exception to the general rule "that permits dismissals onjurisdictional grounds ifthe claim is 'wholly insubstantial and frivolous."' Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). "[T]he Federal Circuit has held that insubstantial allegations as to the existence ofa money-mandating contract will warrant dismissal for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction." Twp
. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 110 (2012) (citing Rick's Mushroom Serv
. v. United States, 521F.3d1338, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Such is plainly the case here

- would be the case even ifplaintiffwere viewed as meeting the jurisdictional requirements in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). See RCFC 12(b)(6). Nor is there any legal basis for plaintiff's claim that the Department ofJustice violated the Trading with the Enemy Act. This court lacks jurisdiction to address any claims relating to that statute. See Duisberg v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (Ct. Cl. 1950); see also 

### N. V Montan Export-Metaal Handel-Maatschappij v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1952); see generally, Hoffman v. United States, 17 Fed. Appx. 980 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Clerk shall dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 

### IT IS SO ORDERED.

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