alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 266 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 266

To prohibit universal service support of commercial mobile service and 
      commercial mobile data service through the Lifeline program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 9, 2015

 Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To prohibit universal service support of commercial mobile service and 
      commercial mobile data service through the Lifeline program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``End Taxpayer Funded Cell Phones Act 
of 2015''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON LIFELINE SUPPORT FOR MOBILE SERVICE.

    (a) In General.--A provider of commercial mobile service or 
commercial mobile data service may not receive universal service 
support under sections 214(e) and 254 of the Communications Act of 1934 
(47 U.S.C. 214(e); 254) for the provision of such service through the 
Lifeline program of the Federal Communications Commission.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Commercial mobile data service.--The term ``commercial 
        mobile data service'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 6001 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation 
        Act of 2012 (47 U.S.C. 1401).
            (2) Commercial mobile service.--The term ``commercial 
        mobile service'' has the meaning given such term in section 332 
        of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 332).
                                 <all>
```
#### Nicole MALEC, Plaintiff, v. TRUSTEES OF BOSTON COLLEGE, Yoshio Saito, Defendants.

No. Civ.A.2001-11599-RBC.1

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

July 8, 2002.

*24Paul F. Wood, Law Office of Paul F. Wood, Boston, MA, for Nicole Malec, plaintiff.

Miriam J. McKendall, Boston, MA, for Trustees of Boston, Yoshio Saito defendants.

1

. With the parties’ consent, this case has been referred and reassigned to the undersigned for all purposes including trial and the entry of judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c).

*MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION FOR LEAVE TO EXTEND DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF (#21)*

COLLINGS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Defendants’ counsel has filed a Motion for Leave to Extend Deposition of Plaintiff (# 21) seeking Court authorization to depose the plaintiff for fourteen hours over two days, more than twice the limit of seven hours in one day contained in Rule 30(d)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. The motion has been filed before the deposition has commenced and before any testimony has been taken. The asserted reasons for the request are that there are three claims in the case, one of which is against both defendants, and there are a significant number items about which there is a need for testimony.

Obviously, the Court will allow more than seven hours “if needed for a fair examination of the plaintiff.” Rule 30(d)(2), Fed. R.Civ.P. However, the better practice is for the deposition to go forward to determine how much is able to be covered in the seven hours and, then, if additional time is needed, for counsel to stipulate to extend the deposition for a specific additional time period. If the parties cannot reach a stipulation, then Court intervention may be sought. *Id.*

Accordingly, the deposition shall go forward for seven hours during one day. At the conclusion of the seven hours, if counsel for the defendants needs more time, he/she shall inform plaintiffs counsel of that fact and counsel shall confer in a good faith attempt to reach a stipulation as to the additional time which will be needed to complete the deposition. *Id.*If agreement cannot be reached, defendants’ counsel may notify the Court in writing of that fact, the amount of additional time which is needed, and the reasons therefor. Counsel for the plaintiff may respond within fourteen (14) days and the Court will rule on the Motion for Leave to Extend Deposition of Plaintiff (# 21). In the meantime, the motion is pretermitted.
#### BYRD v. STATE.

No. 21021.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 1, 1940.

Russell & Edwards, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is possessing whisky in a container not having affixed thereto a stamp showing the payment of the tax due the State of Texas; the punishment, a fine of $100.

Operating under a search warrant, officers went to appellant’s home and found him in possession of a jug containing whisky. Before the officers could take possession of the whisky appellant poured most of it out. Appellant testified that he found the jug near his home shortly before the officers appeared; that he needed the jug and carried it home; that there was practically. nothing in it at the time he found it, although it probably “smelled of liquor.”

It is appellant’s contention that the state failed to prove that there was not affixed to the jug a stamp showing the payment of the tax due the State of Texas, and further, failed to prove that there was not affixed to said jug an affidavit showing that the whisky had been withdrawn from a container of whisky on which the taxes had been paid. ' We are unable to agree with this contention. One of the officers said: “There was no evidence showing any tax stamps on the container.” Another officer testified: “There was no stamp of any kind on the jug at the time, it was like it is now.” Upon cross-examination appellant said: “I didn’t see any revenue stamp on it (referring to the jug) ; it had no label on it.” Again, appellant testified: “As to whether or not, if it contained a half gallon of whisky, it would be unstamped whisky, I will say I don’t know if the tax was paid on it, it had no stamp on it when I picked it up * *

Appellant objected to the testimony of the sheriff to the effect that the jug in question had no stamp on it showing the payment of the tax due the State of Texas. It appears to be appellant’s contention that the state was required to introduce the jug in evidence. In short, appellant insists that the jug was the best evidence and that the testimony the witness gave was a mere conclusion. If it should be conceded that the objection was *805well taken — and this is not conceded — it is observed that appellant testified that the jug had neither a tax stamp nor label on it. We think the bill fails to reflect reversible error.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### STATE ex rel. SHOOK, Crim. Dist. Atty., v. ALL TEXAS RACING ASS’N et al.

Motion No. 12715; No. 6968.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jan. 6, 1937.

Martin B. Winfrey and Irving L. Goldberg, both of Dallas, William McGraw, Atty. Gen., and Vernon Coe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error.

Conger, Low & Spears, of San Antonio, for defendants in error.

GERMAN, Commissioner.

In motion for rehearing we are called upon by plaintiff in error to hold that the clause in article 4664 of the Revised Statutes 1925 reading as follows, “or where persons resort for the purpose of gambling,” should be construed to include any place where persons resort for betting or wagering upon “anything whatever,” whether expressly prohibited by provisions of the Penal Code or not. In other words, we are called upon to say that the word “gambling” in said article should be given a general and comprehensive meaning, such as it sometimes had at common law, and be made to include betting or wagering upon any matter or event involving an element of chance, and should not confine the meaning to betting upon some game or event “prohibited by law.” We think the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals in the case of Thomas v. State, 91 S. W.(2d) 716, construing almost identical language in article 625 of the Penal Code, leads to a contrary view. We therefore hold that the premises sought to be declared to be a nuisance in this action was not constituted a nuisance because people resorted thereto for betting on dog races, in view of the fact that the Legislature has not defined betting on dog races as “gambling” and affixed a penalty for doing so.

The motion of the relator for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion adopted by the Supreme Court.
Exhibit 10






Exhibit 10.2




January 23, 2003




This is to certify that I, Yulong Guo own 90% shares of Shenzhen Naiji Electrical Equipment Co., Ltd.  I am holding shares in trust for other 19 smaller shareholders.  Their capital contributions and their proportion of 24,000,000 shares of Asia Electrical Power International Group Inc. are as follows:




	 

	 

	 

	Capital 

	%

	Allocation of


	     

	Name of Shareholder and Address

	 Surname

	Contribution

	Ownership

	Shares


	 

	 

	 

	USD

	 

	 
	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	1

	Zhi-Qiang 

	Cai

	100.71

	0.02%

	5,000


	 	 	 	 	 	 
	3

	Zhen-Hua

	Du

	4,028.30

	0.83%

	200,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	4

	Da-Min

	Guo

	26,989.61

	5.58%

	1,340,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	5

	Geng-He

	Guo

	100.71

	0.02%

	5,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	6

	Rui-Qian

	Guo

	26,788.20

	5.54%

	1,330,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	7

	Shao-Zhong

	Guo

	1,923.86

	0.40%

	95,517


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	8

	Wei-Hong

	Guo

	249.41

	0.05%

	12,383


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	9

	Yu-Long 

	Guo

	216,118.30

	44.71%

	10,730,000


	 	 	 	 	 	 
	10

	Xue-Jian

	Hu

	26,788.20

	5.54%

	1,330,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	11

	Yong-Feng  Lin

	 

	1,611.32

	0.33%

	80,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	12

	Yi

	Lu

	42.30

	0.01%

	2,100


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	13

	Qing-Hai

	Qian

	2,014.15

	0.42%

	100,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	14

	Yun

	Sun

	1,007.08

	0.21%

	50,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	15

	Ying

	Yang

	50,353.75

	10.42%

	2,500,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	16

	You-Yue

	Yang

	402.83

	0.08%

	20,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	17

	Cheng-De

	Zheng

	10,070.75

	2.08%

	500,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	18

	Li-Peng

	Zheng

	6,042.45

	1.25%

	300,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	19

	Qiaojiao

	Wang

	16,113.20

	3.33%

	800,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	20

	Jiqing

	Zheng

	22,155.65

	4.58%

	1,100,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	21

	Zheng

	Liu

	22,155.65

	4.58%

	1,100,000


	 

	 

	 

	 

	 

	 
	 

	 

	Total 

	435,056

	90.00%

	21,600,000










The remaining 10% is owned by Xiaoling Chen.  Her capital contribution was $48,340 and she was allocated 2,400,000 shares.




Sincerely,




/s/ Yulong Guo

Yulong Guo

President
#### McCOMBS et al. v. ABRAMS et al.

No. 1320-5832.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

April 21, 1932.

Henderson, Kidd & Henderson and John K. Freeman, all of Cameron, Rucks & Enlow, of Angleton, John B. Atkinson, of Waco, and McCormick, Bromberg, Leftwich & Carrington, .of Dallas, for plaintiffs in error.

Murphy W. Townsend and Phillips & Phillips, all of Dallas, Baker, Botts, Parker & Gar-wood, Tom Scurry, W. H. Wilson, and Andrews, Streetman, Logue & Mobley, all of Houston, and Louis J. Wilson and Follett *&*Evans, all of Angleton, for defendants in error.

LEDDY, J.

The questions relied upon by plaintiffs in error for a reversal of the judgment rendered against them by the trial court appear to have been given a most thorough consideration by the Court of Civil Appeals. 28 S.W.(2d) 584. Three opinions were prepared and filed by that court. The majority opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court was written by Justice Lane. A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Graves, in which he discussed at length the questions raised, and reached the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. The motion for rehearing was overruled in an opinion by Chief Justice Pleasants.

The issue as to whether plaintiffs in error were entitled to have the case submitted to the jury is elaborately discussed both in the majority and dissenting opinion. The authorities relied upon to sustain the views expressed in these opinions are fully reviewed.

Because of the importance of the case and the large amount involved, we have given a most careful study of this record in the light of the exhaustive opinions of the Court of Civil Appeals and the able briefs and arguments filed by all of the parties.

Our judgment is that the majority opinion properly disposed of this case. Inasmuch as we find ourselves in harmony with the views expressed in said opinion, no useful purpose could be served by a further discussion of the legal questions involved. Such a discussion would be but a reiteration of legal propositions already clearly enunciated in such opinion.

No sound reason exists why the commission should write an additional opinion when it is in thorough accord with the opinion rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals., Under such circumstances, we think it the proper practice merely to content ourselves with an expression of approval of such opinion. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Baldwin (Tex. Com. App.) 44 S.W.(2d) 909; Josie Sledge v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 45 S.W.(2d) 1112.

We recommend that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals be affirmed.

CURETON, C. J.

Judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
#### Todd’s Estate.

*Jurisdiction, O. G.*— Determination *of rights under will*— Buie *to show cause.*

The Orphans’ Court has no ¡jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a rule to show cause why real estate of a decedent who died seized thereof should not be turned over to a beneficiary under the will by the executors.

Argued April 24, 1916.

Appeal, No. 266, Jan. T., 1915, by Sarah A. Todd Memorial Home, from decree of O. C. Cumberland Co., dismissing rule to show cause why certain real estate should not'be delivered to petitioner by the executors of the estate of Sarah A. Todd, deceased.

Before Brown, C. J., Mestrezat, Potter, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.

Affirmed.

Petition for rule to show cause why the executors of a decedent’s estate should not turn over certain real estate of which deceased died seized to the petitioner. Before Sadler, P. J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states th© case.

*Error assigned,*among others, was in dismissing the rule.

*E. M. Biddle, Jr.,*-for appellant.

*623
      *Conrad Hambleton,*of *Hambleton and Brinton,*with him *J. Webster Henderson,*for appellees.

May 15, 1916 :

Per Curiam,

Appellant’s petition in the court below was for a rule to show cause why certain real estate of which Sarah A.. Todd, deceased, had died seized, should not be turned1 over to it by her executors. Its petition was properly dismissed by the learned president judge of the court below for want of jurisdiction to entertain it: Willard’s App., 65 Pa. 265; Hazard’s Est., 253 Pa. 447.

Appeal dismissed at appellant’s costs.
# C_2022405EN.01006101.xml

| 21.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 405/61 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 405/61

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.10864 – AGC GLASS EUROPE / INTERPANE)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2022/C 405/05)

On 21 September 2022, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the ‘Competition policy’ website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the ‘Competition policy’ website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32022M10864. EUR-Lex is the online point of access to European Union law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32022M10864. EUR-Lex is the online point of access to European Union law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---
#### TAYLOR v. STATE.

No. 20491.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 14, 1939.

James E. Faulkner, of Henderson, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of burglary, and his punishment assessed at two years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. The indictment is sufficient to charge the offense, and all matters of procedure appear to be in due order.

The judgment is affirmed.
The Honorable Stephen M. Reasoner, Chief Judge, United States 1

District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

___________

No. 95-1909

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Barry Jones, *

 * (PUBLISHED)

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: November 21, 1995 

 Filed: December 4, 1995

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Barry Jones appeals his 24-month sentence imposed by the district

court after he pleaded guilty to possessing a counterfeited security, in 1

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a). For reversal, Jones argues the district

court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1) and his due

process rights when the court refused to resolve Jones's objection--raised

for the first time at sentencing--to the probation officer's recommended

denial of a mitigating-role reduction. We affirm.

Rule 32(c)(1) requires a sentencing court to "rule on any unresolved

objections to the presentence report." Under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32(b)(6)(B), however, the parties must communicate "any

objections" to the presentence report to the
-2-

probation officer within 14 days of receiving it, so that the objections

can be addressed and investigated prior to the sentencing hearing. Jones

does not dispute that he failed to present his role-reduction objection as

required under Rule 32(b)(6)(B).

Notwithstanding Rule 32(b)(6)(B), the district court had the

discretion to consider Jones's untimely objection if he satisfied Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(6)(D), which states: "[f]or good cause

shown, the court may allow a new objection to be raised at any time before

imposing sentence." Because Jones did not state any reason for his failure

to raise the objection in a timely manner, we conclude the district court

did not abuse its discretion by declining to rule on it. Cf. United States

v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 914-915 (4th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**Exhibit      32(a)**

| (1)   | The              Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)              of              the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The              information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material              respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company,              Peoples Gas and North Shore Gas. |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/                Thomas M. Patrick                    |   | January                29, 2007 |
|---------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
|                                                    |   | Date                            |
| Thomas                M. Patrick                        |   |                            |
| Chairman                of the Board,                   |   |                            |
| President                and Chief Executive Officer of |   |                            |
| Peoples                Energy Corporation               |   |                            |

| /s/                Thomas M. Patrick                                |   | January                29, 2007 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
|                                                                |   | Date                            |
| Thomas                M. Patrick                                    |   |                            |
| Chairman                of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of |   |                            |
| The                Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company               |   |                            |
|                                                                |   |                            |

| /s/                Thomas M. Patrick                                |   | January                29, 2007 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------|
|                                                                |   | Date                            |
| Thomas                M. Patrick                                    |   |                            |
| Chairman                of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of |   |                            |
| North                Shore Gas Company                              |   |                            |
|                                                                |   |                            |