F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

H E C T O R M A R

T I N R O D R I G U E Z

C A S T E L L O N , AKA Hector Martin Rodrig uez , P etitioner
,

v

.

E R I C H. H O L D E R , J R ., Attorney General, Respondent

. N o. 10-73239

Ag ency No. A035-215-035

OPI NI ON

O n Petition for Review of an Order of the B oard of I

mmig ration Appeals

Arg ued and Submitted May 10, 2013—Pasadena, California

F iled October 22, 2013

B efore: Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain, Richard A. Paez

, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by J udg e I k

utaR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 2

SUMMARY *

Im m igration

The p anel denied H ector Martin Rodrig uez -Castellon’s petition f or review from the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals’ decision finding him r emovable because his conviction under California Penal C o d e § 288(c)(1) constituted a crime o f violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

The panel held that Rodrig uez ’s conviction for lewd and lascivious acts upon a c hild is a categ orical crime of violence and therefore an a g g rava t ed f elony under 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F ). T h e p an el h eld as an issue of first impression in this circuit that a violation of CPC § 288(c)(1), in t h e o r d i n ary case, poses a substantial risk of the use o f phy sical force under § 16(b).

COUNSEL

K. L ee Hartz ler, San Dieg o , California, for Petitioner.

Kohsei Ug umori ( arg ued); Tony W est, Assistant Atto rney General; Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director; J ennifer J

. Keeney
, Senior L itig a tion Counsel

, U n ited States Department of J u stice, Civil Division, W ashing ton, D.C., for Respondent.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 3

OP INION

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e:

Hector Martin Rodrig uez -Castellon, a n ative and citiz en of Mex ico and lawful pe r

manent resident, petitions for r eview of an order of the B oard of I mmig ration Appeals (B I A) affirming the finding that h e w as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). W e hold that because Rodrig uez ’s state crime of conviction, California Penal Code section 288(c)(1), is a ca t ego r i cal crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), Rodrig u ez is an alien convicted of an ag g ravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F ). Therefore, we deny the petition.

I

I n April 2 005, Rodrig uez (at that time, a 42-y ear-old man)

was c harg ed with seventeen counts of le w d a n d lascivious
acts upon c hildren during the period between 1992 and 1997, in violation of various provisions of t h e California Penal Code. As a mended, Count 17 o f t h e felony information alleg ed that Rodrig uez had sex ual intercourse with a 15-y earold g irl in v iolation of section 288(c)(1). 1 Rodrig uez pleaded

1 Cal. P en al Co d e § 2 8 8 (c)(1 ) states:

A n y p erso n w

h o co m m i ts an act d escrib ed in

su bd iv is i o n (a) w ith th e in ten t describ ed in th at

su bd iv isio n , an d th e v ictim is a ch ild o f 1 4 o r 1 5 y ears,

an d th at p erso n is at l east 1 0 y ears o ld er th an t h e ch ild

, is g u ilty o f a p u

b li c o f f en s e an d sh all b e pu n i sh ed b y im p riso n m en t in th e st ate p riso n f or o n e, tw o , o r th ree y ears, o r b y im

priso n m en t in a co u n ty j ail f

o r n o t m ore th an o n e y ear. In determ in in g w h eth er t h e p erso n is atR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 4

nolo contendere to Count 17 on J une 7, 2005 and received a six -y ear sentence.

I n J u ne 2009, the g overnment served Rodrig uez with a Notice to Appear, w hich alleg ed that based on his conviction

u n d e r section 288(c)(1), he was subject to r emoval under 8 U. S

. C

. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for being convicted of an “ag g ra v a t e d felony ,” as defined in both 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (sex ual abuse of a minor) and 8 U

. S .C. § 1101(a)(43)(F ) (crime of violence). I n addition, t he
g overnment a lleg ed that due t o h is section 288(c)(1) conviction, Rodrig uez was removable under 8 U .S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) for a crime of child abuse.

At a h e aring before an immig ration judg e (I J ) on November 19, 2009, the I J adopted the g overnment’s f actual alleg ations and sustained all c h arg es of removal. The I J first determined that a v iolation of section 288(c)(1) constituted a crime of “sex ual abuse of a minor” as defi ned in United

least 1 0 y ears o ld er th an t

h e ch ild

, th e d if

f eren ce i n ag e sh all b e m easu red f

ro m th e b irth d ate o f th e p erso n t o th e b irth d ate o f

th e ch ild

.

Cal. P en al Co d e § 2 8 8 (a) p ro v id es, in tu rn :

(a) Ex cep t as p ro v id ed i n s u b d i v isio n (i), an y p erso n

w h o w illf

u lly an d lew d l y co m

m its an y lew d o r lasciv io u s act, in clu d in g an y o f t h e acts co n stitu

tin g

o th er crim es p ro v id ed f

o r in P art 1
, u

p o n or w ith th e b o d y , o r an y

p art o r m em

b er th ereo f

, o f a ch ild w h o is

u n d e r t h e ag e o f 1 4 y ears, w ith th e in ten t o f aro u s i n g , ap pealin g to , or g ratif

y in g th e lu st, p assio n s, o r sex u al d esires o f th at p erso n

o r th e ch ild , is g u ilty

o f a f elo n y

an d sh all b e p u n ish ed b y im p riso n m en t in th e state p riso n f o r th ree, six , o r eig h t y ears.R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 5

States v

. Medina-Villa

, 567 F

. 3 d 507, 511–12 (9th Cir. 2009). F urther, the I J determined that a v iolation of section 288(c)(1)

was also a “ crim e o f v iolence” as defined in 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F ), because the nature o f the offense, “where the perpetrator, motivated by a desire for sex ual arousal a nd in a superior p hy sical position, eng ag es in phy sical contact with the child v ictim at least ten y e ars his junior” is such that it inherently involves “a substantial r i s k that phy sical force
ag ainst the person

. . . of a n o ther may be used in the course o f committing t h e offense.” F inally

, rely ing on the statutory definition of “child abuse” as meaning “the phy sical o r mental injury

, sex u al abuse or ex p loitation, or n eg lig ent treat m en t of a child,” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(3), and the definition of “sex ual abuse” as including th e “e m ploy ment,
use, persuasion, inducement, entic e m e nt, or coercion of a child to e ng ag e in

. . . sex u a l l y ex p licit conduct,” 1 8 U .S.C. § 3509(a)(8), the I J determined that a violation o f s e c tion 288(c)(1) constituted a crime of child abuse.

Rodrig uez a p p e a led to the B I A p rimarily on the g r ound that th e g overnment had failed to p roperly certify the documents c omprising his record of conviction. On October 20, 2010, the B I A d ismissed the a ppeal. T h e BI A rejected Rodrig uez ’s certification arg ument in a footnote, and focused instead on an unbriefed issue: whether a violation of section 288(c)(1) constituted a c r i m e of “sex ual abuse of a minor.” Rely ing o n the newly d e c ided United States v

. Castro
, 607 F .3d 566 (9 t h C i r

. 2010), in w hich we held that section 288(c)(1) was not categ orically sex ual abuse of a minor, the B I A c oncluded that the I J erred in sustaining removability on that g r ound. N evertheless, the B I A upheld the I J ’ s ruling on

one of the alternative g rounds, that secti o n 2 8 8(c)(1) was a

c a teg orical crime of violence u nder 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The B I A reasoned that “[ w] heneve r an a d ult eng ag es in a lewdR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 6

and lascivious act with a child a t least 1 0 y ears y oung er, there is a substantial risk that the child will take ex ception and, as

a result, cause the adult to use force t o further effectuate the conduct o r to act in self-defense.” The B I A did not consider the third b asis f

or the I J ’s determination, that Rodr i g uez committed a crime of child abuse. Rodrig uez timely f iled this petition for review, appea ling o nly the B I A’s r uling that section 288(c)(1 ) w a s a categ orical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

I I

W e have jurisdiction over this a ppeal under 8 U.S

. C. § 1252(d). Althoug h we lack “jurisdiction to review any final order o f removal ag ainst an alien who is removable by reason of having committed” an aggr a vated f elony (among other offenses), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we retain j u r i s diction

over “constitutional c laims or questions of law,” 8 U .S.C. § 1252(d), which includes the question w hether a state crime of conviction is an ag g ravated felony

. W hile we g enerally do
not h ave jurisdiction to review unex hausted claims, we may review any issue addressed on the merits by t h e BI A
, reg ardless whether it was r aised to the B I A by the petitioner. Abebe v. Gon z a l e s , 432 F .3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005). Ac c ording ly

, we have jurisdiction to review the B I A ’s determination that Ro d r i gu ez ’s prior state conviction was a crime of v iolence, e v e n thoug h Rodrig uez did not raise this question to the B I A.

W e review questions of law de novo. W e g enerally defer to “the B I A’s interpretation of the statutes and reg ulations it is charg ed with administering

, ” F regozo v. Holder

, 576 F .3d 1 030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2 009), but do not defer to the BI A ’s interpretation of state or federal criminal statutes, because theR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 7

B I A does not adminis t er such statutes or have any special

ex p ertise reg arding t h e i r meaning

. See Fernandez-Ruiz v

. Gonzales

, 466 F .3d 1121, 1 126 n .7 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see also F

regozo , 576 F .3d at 1034. Here, § 1101(a)(43)(F ) provides that the term “crime of violence” has the definition
set f orth in 18 U.S.C. § 1 6, 2 w hich is a federal criminal
statute. A ccording l y , we do not defer to the B I A ’s interpretation of § 16.

I I I

On appeal, Rodrig uez arg ues that his conviction under

s e c t i o n 288(c)(1) is not a c o nviction for a “crime of violence,” under 18 U.S. C

. § 1 6
, a n d therefore is not an ag g r avated felony u n d er 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F ). W e beg in by considering the relevant leg al backg round.

A

An a lien “who is convicted of an ag g ravated felony at any t i m e a f t e r a d m i s s i o n i s d e p o r t a b l e

. ” 8 U

. S

. C

. § 1 2 2 7 (a)(2)(A)(iii). The g overnment has the burden o f

2 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 6 states in f u ll:

T h e term “ crim e o f

v io len ce” m ean s—

(a) an o f f en se th at h as as an elem en t t h e u se, attem

pted

u se, o r th reaten ed u se o f p h y s ical f o rce ag ain st th e p erso n o r p ro p erty

o f an o th er, o r

(b ) an y o th er o f

f en se t h at is a f elo n y an d th at, b y its

n atu re, i n v o lv es a su

b s t a n t ial risk th at p h y sical f orce ag ain st th e p erso n o r pro p erty o f an o th e r m ay b e u s ed in th e co u rse o f

co m m ittin g th e o f

f en se.R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 8

proving that a pa rticular offense qualifies as an ag g ravated felony

. See Salazar-Luviano v. M ukasey

, 551 F .3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2008). The I mmig r ation a n d Nationality A ct (I

NA) defines “ ag g ravated felony ” to mean (among other thing s) “a crime of violence,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, “for which the term of imprisonme n t [ is] at least one y ear.” 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F ).

I n order to determine whether a c o n viction under section 288(c)(1) qu a l i fies as a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, we apply the categ orical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States
, 495 U.S. 575, 6 00–02 ( 1 9 9 0 ). See Nijhawan v. H

older

, 5 57 U .S. 29, 33–38 (2009) (apply ing the categ orical approach in the contex t of immig ration offenses). Under Taylor

, we first “compare the elements of the statute of conviction with a federa l definition of the crime to determine whether conduct proscri b e d by the statute is broader than the g e neric federal def i n i tion.” QuinteroSalazar v. Keisler

, 506 F .3d 688, 692 ( 9 t h C i r. 2 007). I n identify ing the elements of the statut e o f conviction, “we consider not only the lang uag e of the state statute, b ut also the interpretation o f that lang u ag e in judicial opinions.” Covarrubias Teposte v. Holder

, 632 F .3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). I f t he federal
g eneric o ffense “is not a separat e cr ime at common law but rath e r a classification o f other crimes,” such as crimes involving moral tu r

p i t u d e, or here, crimes of violence, “we
must also c o m p a r e the crime of conviction with crimes we have p revious l y determined to” fall into that particular classification o f crimes. Cerezo v. Mukasey

, 512 F

. 3d 1163, 1166 ( 9th Cir. 2008) (citing Navarro-Lopez v. G onzales

, 503 F .3d 1063, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J
., concurring for the majori t y ) ( internal quotation marks a nd citations omitted), overrule d o n other g rounds by UnitedR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 9

States v

. Aguila-Montes de Oca , 655 F

. 3d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). 3

Under this categ o rical approach, if the state statute o f conviction criminaliz es more conduct than the f ederal g eneric offense, then the state offense is n ot categ orically included in the definition of the federal g eneric offense. United States v

. Velasquez-Bosque

, 601 F .3d 955, 9 58 (9th Cir. 2010). A state crime of conviction qualifies a s a g eneric federal offense “if and only i f t h e full rang e of conduct covered” by the state criminal st atute is included in the relevant definition of the federal offense. Barragan-Lopez v. Holder

, 70 5 F. 3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting P enuliar v

. Mukasey

, 528 F .3d 603, 608 ( 9th Cir. 2008)). I f the state statute is divisible, a nd the full rang e of c onduct in the state statute is not included in the federal offense, we may us e the modified categ orical approach so long as one o f the crimes included in the statute is a categ orical match for the federal g eneric offen s e

. S ee Descamps v

. United S

tates , 133 S. Ct. 2276
, 2285 (2013) (stating that “the modified approach merely helps implement the categ orical approach when a defendant was convicted of violating a divisible statute.”). Under the modified approach,

we ex amine certain judicial r e c ords to determine whether the defendant was necessarily c onvicted of the elements of a crime listed i n a d i v isible statute that is a f ederal g eneric offense. Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005).

3 Ag u ila -Mo n tes d

e Oca w as s u b s eq u en t ly ab ro g ated b y Desca mp s v. Un ited S ta tes , 1 3 3 S. Ct. 2 2 7 6 (2 0 1 3 ).R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 10

B

I n order to apply

this categ orical approach, w e must first determine the elements o r de f i n i t i on of the federal g eneric offense. Und e r 1 8 U .S.C. § 16, the phrase “crime o f violence” h a s two meaning s. F irst, u nder § 16(a), a state crime o f conviction i s a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, o r threatened use of phy sical force ag ainst the person or property of another.” B e cause the
statute does not define the term “phy sical force,” we g ive the
term its ordinary meaning

, w h i c h in this contex t is “ violent force” or “force capable o f causing p hy sical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States
, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (interpreting the phrase “phy sical force” in the c ontex t of determining whet h er a state statute of conviction constitutes a “violent f elo n y ” u nder the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), whic h i s d efined a s a f elony having “as an element the use

. . . of phy sic a l f o r c e ag ainst the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B )(i)). Second, even if the state crime does no t i n c lude o ne of the elements listed in § 16(a), it is a “cri m e o f violence” under § 16(b) if it is: (i) a felony ; and (ii) “ by its nature, involves a substantial r isk that phy sical forc e a g ainst the p erson o r property of another may be used in the course of committing
t h e o f fe n s e.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). The Supreme Court has

ex p lained that § 16(b ) c r i minaliz e s conduct that “naturally involve [ s] a person acting in disreg a rd of the risk that phy sical force mig ht be used aga i n st another in committing an offense.” Leocal v. Ashcroft , 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004).

I n determining whether a p articular state c rime presents

a substantial risk of phy sical force for purposes of § 16(b), we must determine “whether t h e c onduct covered by the crime presents the r equisite risk of i n j ury in the ordinary case.”R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 11

United States v. R amos-Medina

, 706 F

. 3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks o mitted); see also DelgadoHernandez v. Holder

, 6 97 F .3d 1125, 1128 (9th C i r

. 2 012) (holding that in determining w hether a state c rime presents a substantial risk that p hy sical force may be used, “we inquire whether th e conduct e ncompassed by the elements of the offense, in the o r d inary case, presents such a risk” (quoting James v. United States
, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) ( internal quotations omitted)); B a rragan- Lopez
, 705 F .3d at 1115 (same). Our inquiry is thus not d i r e cted to conduct “at the

ma rg ins of the statute,” Delgado-Hernandez

, 697 F .3d at 1129, but rather to a “usual or ordinary ” violation. RamosMedina

, 706 F .3d at 9 38 (emphasis removed). A c cording ly

, we have held that a state crime may categ orically

be a crime of violence under § 16(b) even thoug h it is possible to violate the state statute “without the use of any p h y s i cal force.” U n i t ed States v. Sandoval-Orellana

, 714 F .3d 1174, 1 179 ( 9 t h Cir. 2013) (holding that a statute prohibiting specified sex ual abuse is the ty

pe of f elony that, by it s nature, creates a substantial risk of p hy sical force, even thoug h some violations may occur throug h use o f psy c holog ical, rather than phy sical coercion); see a lso Un i t e d S tates v. GalvanRodriguez

, 169 F .3d 217, 219 (5th Cir

. 1999) (“[ W ] h en analy z ing the operativ e p h rase ‘substantial risk,’ it is not necessary that the risk must occur in every instance; rather a substantial r isk requires a strong probability that the event, in
t h is case the application o f phy sical force durin g t h e commission of the crime, will o cc u r.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

F urther, a state c rime m a y c a t eg orically be a crime o f violence for purposes o f § 16(b) even when a state court h as, in some cases, construed the statute as requiring something less than violent force. Th u s , i n considering whether aR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 12

violation of section 207 of the California Penal Code (which prohibits a person from kidnapping a n o t her “forcibly

, or b y any other means of instilling f ear”) was a categ orical crime o f violence, we n oted the California Supreme Court’s ruling

, in construing this section, that “‘the only force requir ed to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is the a mount necessary to move the victi m a substantial d istance.’” DelgadoHernandez

, 697 F .3d at 1 129 (quoting In re Michele D.
, 29 Cal. 4 th 6 0 0
, 6 1 2 ( 2 002)). The state court’s ruling was later codified by the state leg i s l ature and added to section 207. Id . W hile acknowledg ing that “merely picking up and
carry ing away an infant, without any other conflict, does not entail a substantial risk of force as the term is used in § 16,”

we held that the state court’s interpretation of section 207 “does not d escribe an ordinary case” of the offense conduct; “rather it merely sets a lower limit on the force required.” Id. (emphasis in orig inal). B ecause kidnapping presented a substantial risk of f

orce in the ordinary case, we c o n cl u d e d that a violation of the state statute constitut e d a c r ime o f violence for purposes of § 16(b). I d. at 1133.

I n s u mmary , in order for a state crime of conviction to constitute a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 16, it must

e i ther include as an element “the use, attempted use, o r threatened use of phy sical f orce a ga inst the person o r property of another,” § 16(a), or be a felony which “ by its nature, involves a substantial risk that phy sical force ag ainst the person o r p r o p e r t y of another may be used in the course of committing the offense,” § 16(b). To determine whether

a state c rime of conviction “ involves a substantial risk” of the

use of force, we must determine w hether the conduct covered by that crime raises a substantial risk of phy sical force “in the

o r d inary c ase,” e ven thoug h, at the marg in, some violations of the state statute may

not raise such a risk. I n

determiningR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 13

whether a particu l a r state c rime meets this criteria, we may compare the state c r ime of conviction to other crimes that we

or other courts have previously categ o riz ed as c rimes o f violence under § 16 or ot her statutes using a similar definition. 4

C

W e now turn to th e s tate crime of conviction, section 288(c)(1), a

nd c o m pare its elements with the federal de finition of § 16. Section 288(c)(1) criminaliz es the followi n g conduct: ( 1) willfully committing any lewd o r lascivious act; (2) upon or with any part of the body of a child

4 Fed eral law p ro v id es a ran g e o f d ef in itio n s fo r t h e t e r m “ crim e of

v io len ce.” So m e d ef

in itio n s in co rp o rate elem en t s o f b o th § § 1 6 (a) an d 1 6 (b ). S ee, e.g ., U.S.S.G. § 4B 1 .2 (a) (d ef in in g a crim e o f v io len ce as a crim e p u n ish ab l e b y m o re t h an a y ear im

p riso n m en t th at “ h as as an elem en t th e u se, attem

p ted u se, o r th reaten ed u se o f p h y sical f o rce ag ain st th e p erso n o f an o th er, or

. . . is b u rg lary o f a d w ellin g , arso n , o r ex to rtio n , in v o lv es th e u se o f ex p lo siv es, o r o t h erw ise i n v o lv es co n d u ct th at p resen ts

a serio u s p o t en tial ri sk o f p h y sical in j u ry t o an o th er”); 1 8 U.S.C. § 9 2 4(e)(2 )(B )(ii) (g iv in g th e term “ v io len t f elo n y ” th e sam e def

in i tio n as

“ crim e o f v i o l e n c e ” i n § 4 B 1 .2 (a)(2 )). In o th er cases, th e f ed eral d e fi n itio n is m o re sim ilar to th e d ef in i tio n o f “ crim e o f v io len ce” i n § 1 6(a), rath er th an to th at in § 1 6 (b ). S ee U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1 .2 cm

t. 1 (B )(iii) (d ef in in g a “ crim e o f v i o len ce” as on e o f a n u m b e r o f l i s ted o f

f en ses, in clu d in g sex u al ab u se o f a m in o r, statu to ry rap e, o r an y o th er o f f en s e

“ t h at h as as an elem en t t h e u se, attem p ted u s e, o r th reaten ed u se of
p h y sical f o rce ag ain st th e p erso n

o f an o th er.”). B ecau se “ [w ]h at m ay b e

a p red icate o f

f en se u n d er o n e ap p ro ach [to d ef in in g ‘ crim e o f

v i o len ce’ ] is n o t n ecessarily a p red i cate o f f en s e u n d er an o th er ap p ro ach ,” Lo p ezCa rd o n a v. H o ld er , 6 6 2 F.3 d 1 1 1 0
, 1 11 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 1 ), w e m u st u s e

cau tio n i n rely i n g o n

cases co n stru in g o th er f

ed eral d ef in itio n s o f “ crim e

o f v io len ce.”R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 14

who is 14 or 15 y ears old; (3) with the intent of arousing

, appealing to, or g ratify

ing the lust, passions, or sex ual desires of the defendant or the child; ( 4 ) wh e n the defendant is at least ten y e ars older than the child. Castro
, 607 F

. 3d a t 568.

Section 288(c)(1) is n ot c ateg orically a crime of violence

as d e f i n ed in § 16(a), because it does not include as an element “the use, attempted u se, or threatened use of phy sical force a g ainst the person or property of a n other.” § 16(a). W e turn then to the question whether sect ion 288(c)(1) is categ orically a crime o f violence as defined in § 16(b). There is no dispute that a viol a t ion o f section 2 88(c)(1) is a felony under California law, Ca s tro , 6 07 F

. 3d at 567, and so we must d etermine, as an issue of first impression in this circuit, whether a violation of section 288(c)(1), in the ordinary c ase, poses a substantial risk of the u se of phy sical for c e under § 16(b).

To characteriz e an ordinary case “in the absence o f detailed statistical information that is unlike l y to be available,” United S

tates v. Sonnenberg

, 628 F .3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 2010), “the best we can do is use common sense a nd

ex p erience,” id. , and look to persuasive authority from other
courts that have consi d e r ed whether similar statutes qualify

as crimes of violence for purposes of § 16(b), as we do in

cases analy

z ing c r imes involving moral turpitude. See Cerezo
, 512 F .3d at 1 1 6 6 ; see also Delgado-Hernandez

, 697 F .3d a t 1129–30 (looking to California cases and out-ofcircuit authority to evaluate whether attempted kidnapping

was a c ateg orical crime of violence under § 16(b)); Prakash

v. Holder

, 579 F .3d 1033, 1036 ( 9th Cir. 2009) (adopting the reasoning of a Third Circuit case in deciding whether solicitation to commit murder was a crime of violence under § 16(b)). B ased on such a review, set out in detail b elow, weR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 15

conclude that the weig ht o f authority supports the conclusion that the sort o f sex ual conduct described in section 288(c)(1) raises a substantial risk that an adult may use phy sical force
ag ainst the 14- or 15-y ear-old child in the ordinary case.

Although we have n ot y et considered w hether section 288(c)(1) or a

not h e r s t a t e s t a tute criminaliz ing sex ual conduct by an older adult with children who are 14 or 15 y e a rs old constitutes a “crime of violence” as defined in § 16(b), other circuits c onsidering this issue have g enerally concluded that such state c ri m e s by their nature create a substantial risk o f phy sical force. S

ee, e.g ., U

nited States v

. A u s t in
, 426 F .3d 1 2 6 6, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005) (recogniz ing the “g eneral

consensus that sex ual abuse in touching a minor inherentl y , or by its nature, c onstitutes a c rime of violence [ under § 1 6] because it involves a substantial r isk of phy sical force”). The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ramsey v. I.N.S. , 55 F .3d 580 (11th Cir. 1995), is directly on point. I n Ramsey
, a p etitioner
soug h t revi e w o f the B I A’s determination that he was deportable because his state conviction for attempted lewd assault was a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 16(b), a nd therefore constituted an a g g rava t e d f e lony

. The state crime of conviction provide d t h at any person who “[ h] andles, fondles, or assaults any child under the ag e of 16 y ears in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner

. . . without committing the crime o f sex u al battery

, commits a felony of the second deg ree.” Id. at 583. T he statute also provid e d that the vi c t i m ’ s consent was not a d efense to the crime. I d. W hile acknowledg ing that a v iolation of thi s s t atute c ould be committed “witho u t the u se of phy sical force,” the court concluded that the offense w as a felony “which inv o l v es a substantial risk that phy sical force may be used ag ainst the victim in the course o f committing the offense.” I n reaching this conclusion, Ramsey relied on United States v. Re ye s-R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 16

Castro
, 13 F

. 3d 377 (10th Cir. 1993) a nd United States v

. R o d r i guez , 9 79 F .2d 138 (8th Cir. 1 992). I n Reyes-Castr o , the T enth Circuit held that a state crime of conviction (involving an a dult touching the anus , b u ttocks, or g e nitalia of a female child y oung er than 14 y ears) poses a “substantial risk” of the use of ph y s i c al f o rce for purposes of § 16(b), because “when an older person attempts to sex u ally t o uch a child

. . . there is alway s a substantial risk that p hy sical force will b e used t o ensure the child’s compliance.” 13 F .3d at 379; see a lso Rodriguez

, 9 79 F .2d at 141 (holding that a state statute making it unlawful f or a person 18 or older to sex ually touch a child or solicit a child to eng ag e in a sex act (among other thing s) is inherently an ag g ravated felony f

or purposes of U .S.S. G

. § 2L 1.2(b)(2), which at that time defined “ag g ravated felony ” as any crime of v iolenc e a s defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16). 5

United States v. Velazquez-Overa

, 100 F .3d 418 (5th Cir. 1996), followed much the same reasonin g. Here, the F ifth Circuit determined that a state statute making it a crime for an adult to “ eng ag e[ ] in sex ual contact ” “ with a child y oung er than 17 y ears and not his spouse” w as a “crime of violence”

as defined in § 16(b), because the offense inherently involved

a substantial r isk that phy sical force may be used. 6 Id. at 421

5 In 2 00 1
, t

h e Sen ten cin g Co m

m i ssio n am en ded § 2 L 1 .2 to elim in ate th e ref eren ce to § 1 6

.

6 A lth o u g h th e Fif

th C ircu it w as co n sid erin g th is issu e fo r p u rp o ses of

sen ten cin g en h an cem en t u n d er § 2 L 1 .2
, at t h e tim e of th e o p i n io n th at g u id elin e p ro v i sio n

in co rp orated th e d ef

in itio n o f “ crim e o f

v io len ce” in § 1 6 (b ).R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 17

n.3 (citing Tex

. Penal Code § 2 1

. 11(a)(1)). The court reasoned that it was “obvious that such crimes ty pically occur in clos e quarters, and a

r e g enerally perpetrated b y an adult
upon a victim who is n o t o nly smaller, weaker, and less

ex p erienced, but is also g ener ally susceptible to acceding to the coercive p ower of adult authority f ig ures.” Id. at 422. B ecause “[ a] c hild has v ery few, if any , resources to deter the

use of phy sical force by an adult intent on touching the child,” t h e c ourt concluded that “there is a sig nificant likelihood that phy sical force m a y b e used to perpetrate the crime.” Id.

The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Costa

v. Holder

, 6 1 1 F. 3 d 110 (2d Cir. 2010). I n Costa
, the court considered a state statute providing that “a person is g uilty o f

sex ual assault in the second deg ree when such person eng ag e s in sex ual intercourse w ith a nother person and: (1) Such other
person is thirteen y ears of ag e or older but under six teen y ears of ag e and the actor is more than three y ears older than such other person.” Id. at 114 n.3 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a71(a)). The Second Circuit determined that this offense was

a “ c rime of vi o lence” for purposes of § 16, citing the reasoning in Rodriguez

. Se e id. at 115. F urther, the court endorsed and a p p lied the r easoning in Reyes-Castro that “when an older person attempts to sex ually touch a child

. . . there is a lways a substantial risk that phy sical force will be used to ensure the child’s c ompliance.” Id. at 1 16. The court

ex p lained that “the risk of the use of force is inherent in e ach of the offens es s et f

o rth in the statute,” even thoug h a defendant could be convicted of the state offense by eng a g ing in “ consensual sex ual intercourse” without force. Id. at 115;

see also Chery v. Ashcroft

, 347 F

. 3d 404, 409 (2d Cir. 2 003) (endorsing the reasoning

in Reyes-Castro ).R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 18

Courts have likewise determined that state crimes involving sex ual contact between children and older adul t s g ive rise to a risk o f f

o rc e and were therefore crimes o f violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2, which requires a showing that the o ffense “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” See United States v. Curtis
, 4 81 F .3d 8 36, 838–39 ( D.C. Cir. 2007) (no t ing that it is “universally recog niz ed” that sex ual offenses ag ainst c hildren a r e c r i m e s of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2 “because o f the substantial likelihood that the perpetrator will use phy sical force to ensure t h e c hild’s compliance” with his demands). 7 I n United States v. Pierce
, 278 F .3d 282, 289–90 (4th Cir. 2002), abrogat e d in part by Begay v. United States
, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), for instance, the
court c onsidered whether a state statute d escribed a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2, w hich at the time simply required a c ourt to analy z e whethe r the state crime “otherwise involves conduct that presents a potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” The state s t atute at issue
p r ovided that it was a felony to “[ w] illfully commit

. . . a n y lewd or lascivious act upon or with t h e body or any part o r member of the body o f any c hild o f e i ther sex under the ag e

7 A lth o u g h

th e d ef in itio n o f “ crim e o f

v io len ce” in § 4 B 1 .2 is d if f eren t f ro m th at in § 1 6 (b ), co u rts h av e f req u en t ly relied o n o p in io n s an aly zin g U.S.S.G. § 4 B1 .2 in co n sid erin g w h eth er a state crim e co n stitu tes a “ crim e

o f v io l en ce” f

o r pu rp o ses o f § 16 (b ). S

ee, e.g

. , Vela zq uez-Overa
, 1 0 0 F.3 d
at 4 2 1 n .4 (rely in g o n o u r d ecisio n in Un ited S t a tes v. W o o d

, 5 2 F.3 d 2 7 2
, 2 7 5 (9 th Cir. 19 9 5 ), c o ns t r u in g U.S.S.G. § 4 B1 .2
, as rein f o rcin g th e

co n clu sio n “ t

h at of f en ses in v o lv in g p h y sical sex u al ab u s e o f ch ild ren are acts o f v io len ce” f

o r p u rp o ses § 1 6 (b ), ev en th o u g h a “ crim e o f v io len ce”

u n d er § 4 B 1 .2 “ d if

f ers so m ew

h at” f ro m t h a t i n § 1 6 ); see a lso Un ited S ta tes v

. C

o r on a d o -Cerva n tes , 1 5 4 F.3 d 1 2 4 2
, 1 2 4 3 (1 0 th Cir. 19 9 8) (h o ld i n g th at a case co n s t r u i n g U.S.S.G. § 4 B 1 .2 p ro v id ed p ersu asiv e

au th ority f o r co n s tru in g § 1 6 (b )).R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 19

o f 16 y ears” if the perpetrator was at least five y ears ol d e r than the child. Id. a t 2 8 2 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14- 202.1(a)). A lthoug h the state supreme court had d efined the
statute as not requiring any phy sical touching

, the F o u r th Circuit determined there wa s a risk of phy sical injury

, because (among other reasons) “[ w] hen a child is the victim of adult conduct, f

orce can be inferred.” Id. at 2 9 0

. I n reaching t h i s c onclusion, the F ourth Circuit asserted that it joined “every o ther circuit that has considered the question.” Id. a t 291 (citing cases); see also United States v. Scu d der , 648 F

. 3d 630, 633–34 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that fondling

or touching a child between 12 and 16 is crime of violence for
purposes of 1 8 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B )(ii), which uses the same definition of the term as U .S.S.G. § 4B 1.2). W e have reached

a similar conclusion in analy z ing a state statute that criminaliz ed sex ual offenses involving y o ung er children. See United States v. W

ood

, 52 F

. 3d 2 7 2, 275 (9th Cir. 1 995) (holding that a statute involving sex u al contact with children under 1 4 involved a “ serious potential r isk of phy sical injury ” under the c atch-all provision of U.S.S

. G

. § 4B 1.2, because “the risk of violence is implicit in the siz e, ag e and authority position of the adult in dealing with a child”).

These concerns are a mplified where the perpetr a t o r is sig nificantly

older than the victim. I n United States v. AlasCastro
, 184 F

. 3d 8 12, 8 1 3 (8th Cir. 1999), for ex ample, the Eig hth Circuit concluded that a statute p rohibiting adults over 19 from “subject[ ing ] another person fourteen y ears of ag e o r y oung er to sex ual contact” was a crime of violence as defined by § 16(b ) because “this ty pe of contact between parties o f differing phy sical and emotional maturity carries a substantial ris k t h a t phy sical force

. . . may b e used in the course o f committing the offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted). W h en the state statute does not specify the perpetrator’s a g e ,R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 20

the analy sis may be different. F or instance, in Xiong v. I.N.S.
, the Seventh Circuit considered a c a s e involving an 18-y earold man who had been convicted of eng ag ing in c o n sensual

sex with h is 15-y ear-old g ir l f r i e n d

. 173 F .3d 601, 603, 607 (7th Cir. 1 999). The court co n c l u d e d that the state c rime o f conviction

, w h ich prohibited “ sex ual contact or sex ual intercourse with a person w ho has not attained the ag e of 16
y ears,” id. a t 603, but d i d not specify the ag e of the perpetrat o r , was not a crime of violence f or purposes o f § 1 6 ( b), id. at 607. I n reaching this conclusion, the co u r t

re a s o n ed that “the conduct of which [the defendant] was convicted c onsisted of consensual sex between a boy friend and his fifteen y ear old g irlfriend,” and therefore “[ a] bsent a substantial a g e difference, this conduct did not, ‘by its nature, involve a substantial risk o f phy sica l f o r c e.’” Id. (internal alterations omitted). The c ourt’s proviso sug g ests that when

a “substantial a g e difference” between the perpetrator a nd the victim is an element of the state crime o f c onviction, the court would reach a different conclusion. See id. at 607. 8

Our decision in U

n i t ed States v. Pereira-Salmeron

, 337 F .3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003), thoug h not directly on point, is consistent with the rea s o n ing of these circuits. PereiraSalmeron c onsidered whether a p rior felony conviction under
state law for “carnally k

now[ ing ]
, without the use of force, a child thirteen y ears of ag e or older but under fifteen y ears of

a g e” constituted a crime of violence for purpos e s o f § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Gu i d e l ines, which at that time

8 Fu rth e r , b e c a u s e th e Sev en th Circu it d i d n o t co n sid er w h eth er th e

co n d u ct co v ered b y th e statu te presen ts a risk o f i n j u r y “ i n th e o rd in ary case,” b u t n o t ed m erely th at th e statu te en co m p assed a statu to r y r a p e

o f f en se, Xio n g , 17 3 F.3 d at 6 0 5
, its a naly sis is n o t d irectly ap p l icab le in

o u r circu i t.R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 21

included “forcible sex offenses (including sex u al abuse of a minor).” I

d

. a t 1 150–51 (emphasis omitted). 9 Even thoug h the state crime “ ex plicitly addresse[ d] conduct undertaken ‘without the use of force,’” id. a t 1151 (citing Va. Code § 18.2-63), we concluded that “sex ual contact with a m i n o r inherently presents a risk of force sufficient to charac t e r i z e such mi s c o n d uct a s a ‘crime of v iolence’ under the Sentencing Guide l i n es.” Id. at 1 153–54. I n so holding

, we quoted with approval the F if t h Circuit’s ex planation that because sex u al offenses involving minors “ty pically occur in close quarters, and are g enerally perpetrated by an adult upon

a victim who is n ot only smaller

, weaker, and less

ex p erienced, but is also g enerally susceptible to acceding to the coercive power of a d ult authority fig ures

. . . . I n such circumstances, there is a sig nificant l i kelihood that phy sical force may be used to perpetrate the crime.” Id. (quoting Velazquez-Overa

, 100 F .3d at 418). According ly

, we concluded that because “sex u al contact with a minor

9 T h e Sen ten cin g Gu id elin es d ef in ed “ crim e o f v io len ce” in th e A p plicatio n

No tes to § 2 L 1 .2 , w

h ich at th e tim e p ro v id ed :

Crim e o f v io len ce-

(I) m ean s an o f

f e n s e u n d er f

ed eral, state, o r lo cal law th at h as as an ele m en t th e u se, attem p ted u se, or th reaten ed u se o f f

o rce ag ain st th e p erso n o f an oth er;

an d

(II) in clu d es m

u rd er, m an slau g h ter, k id n ap p in g , ag g rav ated assau l t , f

o rcib le sex o f

f en ses (in clu d in g

sex u al ab u se o f a m in o r), ro b b ery , arso n , ex to rtio n , e xto rtio n ate ex t en sio n o f cred it, an d b u rg lary o f a d w ellin g

.
U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1 .2 , cm t. n . 1 (B )(ii) (2 0 0 2 ).R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 22

inherently presents a risk of force,” a state crime prohibiting

a “sex ual offense a g a inst a minor m a y c onstitute a crime o f violence for sentencing purposes e ven thoug h an element o f force—actual, attempted, or threatened—is not required.” Id.
at 1153. Althoug h P ereira-Salmeron considered a state cr ime protecting 14-y ear-olds, while section 288(c)(1) protects 14- and 15-y ear-olds, we find this reasoning equally applicable to children who are 15 y

ears of ag e.

Our review thus i n dicates that c ourts have g enerally classified state crimes a nalog ous to section 288(c)(1) a s crimes that present “a substantial risk that phy sical force will be used to ensure the child’s c o mpliance.” Velazquez-Overa

, 100 F .3d at 422. These cases emp h as i z e t hat older adults
may impose u nwanted sex ual c o n t act o n children by taking advantag e of their lesser siz e, streng th, and maturity

. Under this re a s o n ing

, section 288(c)(1) r aises the substantial risk that a much older perpetrator (ag e 24 o r 25 y e ar s ) will use force to commit sex ual acts “upon or w i t h t h e b o dy ” of a child (ag e 14 or 15 y e a

rs) if the child do e s not comply with
t h e adult’s demands. W e ag ree with this reasoning

, a n d therefore conclude that section 288( c )( 1 ) is a felony that raises a substantial risk o f t h e use of force in the ordinary

case.

D

Rodrig uez contends that this conclusion is erroneous for
two reasons. F irst, he asserts that section 2 8 8 (c)(1) is not analog ous to the state crimes of conviction considered above, because it may be violated by consensual conduct. Rodrig uez

r e lies o n Valencia v. Gonzales

, 439 F .3d 1046 (9th C i r. 2006), where we held that a Californi a statute criminaliz ing “an a ct of unlawful sex ual inter c o urse with a minor [i.e., aR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 23

p e r s o n under 18 y ears of a g e] who is more than three y ear s y oung er than the perpetrator,” id. at 1049, did not constitute

a crime of violence under § 16(b) b ecause it could invo l ve “consensual sex ual intercourse with a minor between the ag e s of seventeen and eig

hteen,” id. at 1051.

Valencia is n ot o n point here for sev e r a l reasons. The
state crime of conviction in Valencia

, California Penal Code section 2 61.5(c), criminaliz es “statutory rape” situations that

can involve minors “one day shy of eig hteen,” id. at 1052,
eng ag ing in consensual sex ual co n d u ct with adults w ho a re only t h r e e y e ars older. W e have previously stated that the risks associated w ith sex ual acts committed with older adolesce n t s are different from those associated with adolescents between 14 a nd 16 y ears old. See EstradaEspinoza v. Mukasey

, 5 46 F .3d 1 1 4 7, 1154 (9th Cir. 2 008) (en banc) (“W e and o ur sister circuits have been careful on other o ccasions to d isting uish laws go v erning the sex ual behavior of y oung er teenag ers from those g overn i n g the b e h a vior of 1 6- and 17-y e a r-olds” and acknowledg ing “a sig nificant difference between sex u al relations with someone under 16 and sex ual relations w ith someone between the ag e s of 16 a nd 18”), overruled on o ther g rounds by Aguila-Montes de Oca
, 655 F .3d at 928. 1 0 W e have n ot e x tended Valencia ’s log ic to 14- or 15-y ear-olds.

Despite this key distinction, Rodrig uez asserts that we a re bound to ex tend the reasoning in Valencia to 14- a nd 15-y earolds g iven our decision in United Sta tes v. Castro

. W e disag ree. I n Castro
, we held that a violation of section 288(c) (1) did not constitute the f ederal g eneric offense o f “sex ual abuse of a minor” because “sex ual conduct with a 15-

10 S ee su pra n ote 3

.R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 24

y ear-old child is n o t per se abusive.” 607 F .3d at 5 69. I n apply ing the c ateg orical a pproach in this contex t, w e look to state cases construing the statute a t issue and consider whether the statute can be v iolated by conduct that is n o t “sex ual,” o r does not constitu t e “ a b use.” See id. at 568–69;

see a lso Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez

, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (holding that a court must f ind a “realistic probability

. . . that the State would apply its statute to conduct that f alls outside the g eneric definition of a crime” in order to f ind that a “state statute creates a crime outside the g eneric definition of a listed crime in a federal statu t e

. ” )

. I n United States v

. Baza-Martinez
, for instance, we h eld that a state statute prohibiting “indecent liberties” w ith a child under 16 was not categ orically “se x u a l a

b use of a minor” for purposes o f U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b) ( 1 ) ( A) because at least some of the conduct proscribed b y the statute did not c onstitut e a b u se. 464 F .3d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 200 6 ). I n reaching this conclusion, we relied on a state case holding that an adult who filmed a minor undr e s s ing without her knowledg e violated the statute, even thoug h the mino r d i d not know about the film until after she was 21, and therefore “was not psy cholog ically harmed until she was no long er a minor.” Id. B ut this framework for determining whether a state crime is categ orically “sex ual abuse of a m i n o r ” d oes not g u ide our analy sis of w h e t h er a state crime poses a substantial risk o f
p h y s i cal force. I n this latter contex t, our task is to d ecide whether s u c h a risk is present in the ordinary case, even if there may be situations, on the marg in, where no r isk is present because of the child’ s consent. See Ramos-Medina

, 706 F .3d at 938. Said otherwise, a court considering whether

a state statute meets the d e finition of “sex ual abuse of a min or” must consider cases “at the marg ins of the statute,” but a court performing an analy sis of “ substantial risk” under § 16(b) may not d o so. Delgado-Hernandez

, 6 97 F .3d atR O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 25

1129. T herefore, Castro does not answer t h e f u ndamental question here, which is whether, in the ordinary case, sex ual conduct b y a 24- or 25-y e a r-old adult with a 14- or 15-y earold child poses a substantial risk of force.

Rodrig uez ’s arg ument that Valencia c ontrols our analy sis here also neg lects an important element of section 288(c)(1): the perpetrator must be at least 10 y ears older than the victim. The statute at issue in Valencia , by contrast, involved only a three-y ear ag e difference, indicating that the s t a t u te was intended to cover c o nsensual “statutory rape” crimes, which

are distinct f

rom thos e crimes covered by section 288(c)(1). See Valencia

, 439 F .3d at 1 0 53. I n deed, Cali f o r n i a courts have noted that the state le gislature included a ten-y ear ag e differe n c e b e tween the perpetrator a nd the victim in section 288(c)(1) precisely to avoid prosecutions for “ sex ual conduct short of intercourse b etween c onsenting t e e n a gers,” and to aim only at “protect[ ing ] 1 4 [ -] and 15-y ear-o l d s from predatory older adults.” People v

. Paz
, 80 Cal. App. 4th 293, 296–97 (2000). B ecause older adults may use their position of auth ority or phy sical superiority to compel y oung er adolescents to eng a g e in u nwanted sex ual conduct, there is a far g reater risk of force when a n a d u l t more than ten y ears older prey s on a 14- or 15-y ear-old than when a y oung adolescent eng ag es in sex ual conduct with someone just a few y ears older. See V

a lencia

, 439 F .3d at 1 0 51 (sug g esting that the phy sical and emotional disparities between a y oung er child and an older adult may r a i s e d ifferent concerns than those associated with a statutory rape case i n v olving parties closer in ag e); see also United States v. Cadieux

, 500 F .3d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 2007) ( noting that the defendant was in his mid-R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 26

t w e n ties when he assaulted a 14-y ear-old, and that “[ t] hi s chronolog ical ag e g ap falls squarely w i thin the sex ual touching caselaw h o l ding that ag e differences o f this
mag nitude necessarily create a serious potential risk o f phy sical injury

to another”).

Second, Rodrig uez arg ues that b e c ause California courts have held that section 288(c)(1) may be violated without any phy sical contact between the perpetra t o r a nd the victim, the
statute does not categ o r icall y p o se a substantial risk o f phy sical force. I n making this a rg u ment, Rodrig uez points to the California cas e s which have h eld that a violation o f section 288(a) or (c)(1) could occur w hen the defendant, with the requisite sex ual intent, orders the victim to eng a g e i n

sex ual touching of the victim’s own body

. See, e.g. , People

v. M ickle

, 54 Cal. 3d 1 40, 176 ( 199 1) (acknowledg ing that section 288 may be v iolated where defendant instructed victim to disrobe); People v. Austin
, 111 Cal

. A p p

. 3d 110, 114 (1980) (holding that there must be t o uching to violate section 288, but it could be done by the child v i c t i m “ o n its

own person providing such touching was at the instig ation o f

a p erson who had the required specific intent”) ( i n i t ial capitals omitted). 1 1

11 Ro drig u ez also cites Peo ple v. Cra b tree , 16 9 Cal. A p p

. 4 t h 1 2 9 3 (2 0 0 9), w h ich u p h eld a co n v ictio n u n d er sectio n 2 8 8 (c)(1 ) o f a d ef en d an t

w h o h ad en g ag ed in sex u ally ex p licit in tern et ch at w ith a ch ild u n d er 1 5
y ears o ld . B u t th e relev an t q u estio n in th at case w as s im p ly w h eth er th e

v ictim w as y ou n g er th an 16 ; th e co u rt d i d n o t ad d ress w h eth er su ch

co n d u ct w as su f

f icien t to v io late th e statu te. Id

. at 1 3 23

– 24

.R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 27

I n our view, these c ases are “at the marg in” of violations of section 288, and merely set the “lower limit ” as to the ty pe

o f contact required; they tell us little about whether the so r t of sex ual conduct proscribed by section 288(c)(1) inherently
poses a substantial risk o f force in a n o r d inary case. 1 2 See Delgado-Hernandez

, 697 F. 3 d at 1129 (concluding that kidnapping in violation o f section 2 07 of the California Penal Code was a crime of violence for purposes of § 16( b), even th o u gh the state court h ad held the statute could be v iolated by merely moving an unresisting infant). Althoug h we have
not undertaken an empirical analy sis, our “common sense a nd

ex p erience,” S

onnenberg

, 628 F

. 3d at 366, and our review o f authority from other courts, leads to the conclusion that a violation of section 288(c)(1) in the ordinary case (as described in many California opinions) involves the so r t o f

12 In d eed

, a n

u m b er of co u rts h av e in d i c a t e d t h at sex u al en co u n t ers b etw een ad u l t s an d ch ild ren f req u en tly escalate to m o re sev ere o f f en ses

ev en w h en th e ad u lt d o es n o t in itially t o u ch th e ch ild

. A s t h e Elev en th Circu it stated in Un ited S ta t es v. S ea r cy , 41 8 F.3 d 1 1 9 3 (1 1 th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ),

an ad u l t’ s attem

p t to e n t i ce a m in o r to en g ag e i n sex u al activ ity alw ay s

“ presen ts th e po ssib ility of an en co u n ter th at co u ld resu lt in ‘ a serio u s risk

o f p h y sical in

j u ry ’ ” o r a serio u s risk o f p h y sical f o rce. S ee id

. at 11 9 7; see

a lso Peo p le v. Memro
, 1 1 Cal. 4 th 7 8 6, 8 7 1

– 7 2 (1 9 9 5 ) (d ef en d an t b ro u g h t 7

- y ear- o ld v ictim to h is ap artm en t, eith er f o rcib ly d isro b ed h im or in stru cted h im to d isro b e, th en so d om ized an d stran g led h im ); M ickle

, 5 4 Cal. 3 d at 1 7 5– 7 6 (d ef en d an t in stru cted ch ild to d isro b e th en f o rcib ly
rap ed an d m

u rd ered h er).R O D R I G U E Z -C A S T E L L O N V

. H O L D E R 28

conduct that raises a substantial r isk of force. 1 3 A c cording ly

, we reject Rodrig

uez ’s arg uments to the contrary

.

I V

I n lig ht of our review, we conclude that section 288(c)(1) is a felony that r aises a substantial risk of phy sical force in the ordinary c as e

. A ccording ly

, Rodrig uez ’s state crime o f

co n v i ction constitutes a categ orical “crime of violence,” for
purposes of § 16(b). As such, it is an “ag g ravated felony ” for
purposes of § 1 101(a)(43)(F ), and the B I A did not err in upholding this basis for removal.

P ETITION DENIED.

13 S ee, e.g

. , Peo

p le v. Ma rtin ez , 1 1 Cal. 4 t h 4 3 4
, 4 4 4 (1 9 9 5 ) (ex plain in g th at “ th ro u g h o u t [sectio n 2 8 8 ’ s] h isto ry , th e cases h av e m ad e clear th at a

‘ to u ch in g ’ o f th e v ictim is req u ired

, an d th at sex u al g ratif icatio n m u st b e p resen t ly in ten ded at th e tim e s u ch ‘ to u ch i n g ’ occu rs,” th o u g h th e u ltim ate f o rm o f th e to u ch in g is im

m aterial); Peo

p le v. Orteg a , —Cal. Rp tr. 3 d —, 2 0 1 3 W L 44 4 7 5 5 4
, * 1 (Ct. A p p

. 2 0 1 3 ) (u

p h o ld in g co n v ictio n o f an ad u l t

u n d er sectio n 28 8 (c)(1 ) w h ere th e ad u lt sex u ally m o l ested h i s 15

- y ear- old d au g h ter by to u ch in g h er b reasts an d v ag in a w h ile sh e w as asleep ); Peo

p le

v. To mp kin s , 1 8 5 Cal. A

p p

. 4 th 1 2 53
, 1 2 57 (2 0 10 ) (u p h o ld in g co n

v ictio n

o f an ad u lt u

n d er sectio n 2 88 (c)(1 ) f

o r sex u ally m o l e s tin g a 14

- y ear- old
g irl b y slap p in g o r to u ch in g h er b reasts o n m u ltip le o ccasio n s); Peo

p le v. Ca va l la r o , 1 78 C al. A

p p

. 4 t h 1 0 3
, 1 0 6

– 0 7 (2 00 9) (u

p h o ld in g co n

v ictio n

o f a 2 7

- y ear- o ld d ef

en d an t u n d er sectio n 28 8 (c)(1 ) f o r sex u ally m o l estin g t w o g i rls, ag e 14 an d 1 5
, b y ru bb in g th eir b reasts, b u tto ck s, th i g h s an d

v ag in a, am o n g o t h er t

h in g s, d esp ite th eir resistan ce); Peo p le v. L o p ez , 4 2 Cal. 4 th 9 6 0
, 9 6 3

– 6 5 (2 0 0 8 ) (u p h old in g co n v ictio n o f ad u lt u n der sectio n 28 8 (c)(1 ) f

o r sex u ally m olestin g a 1 4- o r 1 5

- y e a r -o l d c h ild b y

“ on ce to u ch in g h is p e ni s, tw i ce m astu rb atin g h im

, an d o n ce o rally

co p u latin g h im ”); Peo

p le v. Mejia
, 1 5 5 Cal. A

p p

. 4 th 8 6
, 9 0
, 10 1 (2 0 0 7) ( u p h o ld in g co n

v i ctio n o f ad u l t u n d er s ectio n 2 8 8 (c)(1 ) f o r sex u ally

m o lestin g a 1 4

- y ear- o ld g irl b y t o u ch in g h er v ag in a o v er h er clo th es th o u g h sh e “ tried to p u sh

h im o f f ”).