alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 21

                           SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT

     The following entities are subsidiaries of the Registrant, First Merchants
Corporation, as of the date hereof:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
     Name of Registrant's Subsidiary               State of Incorporation or Organization
     -------------------------------               --------------------------------------
     <S>                                                  <C>
     Decatur Bank & Trust Company                         Indiana
     520 North 13th Street
     Decatur, Indiana 46733

     First Merchants Bank, National Association           Under the laws of the United States
      (also doing business as First Merchants
      Bank of  Hamilton County)
     200 East Jackson Street
     Muncie, Indiana  47305

     First Merchants Capital Trust I                      Delaware
     200 East Jackson Street
     Muncie, Indiana  47305

     First Merchants Capital Trust II                     Delaware
     200 East Jackson Street
     Muncie, Indiana  47305

     First Merchants Capital Trust III                    Delaware
     200 East Jackson Street
     Muncie, Indiana  47305

     First Merchants Insurance Services, Inc.             Indiana
     200 East Jackson Street
     Muncie, Indiana  47305

     First United Bank                                    Indiana
     709 Mill Street
     Middletown, Indiana  47356

     Frances Slocum Bank & Trust Company                  Indiana
     1250 North Cass Street
     Wabash, Indiana  46992

     The First National Bank of Portland                  Under the laws of the United States
     112 West Main Street
     Portland, Indiana  47371

     The Madison Community Bank                           Indiana
     19 West 10th Street
     Anderson, Indiana 46016
</TABLE>


                                    Ex. 21-1

<PAGE>

                     SUBSIDIARIES OF REGISTRANT (CONTINUED)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
         Name of Registrant's Subsidiary        State of Incorporation or Organization
         -------------------------------        --------------------------------------
         <S>                                    <C>
         The Randolph County Bank               Indiana
         122 West Washington Street
         Winchester, Indiana  47394

         The Union County National Bank         Under the laws of the United States
           of Liberty
         107 West Union, Box 217
         Liberty, Indiana  47353
</TABLE>

                                    Ex. 21-2
*OPINION ISSUED JULY 24, 2007*

#### Steven R. Baisden*/*Edwin Bias

(CV-05-173)

Claimant appeared in person and by counsel James A. Walker, attorney at law.

Benjamin F. Yancey III, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of West Virginia.

ORDER

FORDHAM, JUDGE:

An application of claimant Steven R. Baisden, spouse of victim Edwina Joy Baisden, for an award under the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Act, was filed April 8, 2005. The report of the Claim Investigator, filed June 28, 2006, recommended that no award be granted, to which the claimant filed no response. An Order was issued on August 24,2006, upholding the Investigator’s recommendation and denying the claim, in response to which the claimant filed no request for hearing.

On February 13, 2007, victim advocate Jeanie Christian of Logan County filed an appeal on behalf of the victim’s parents, Edwin and Helen Bias, who had received no notice of this Court’s initial denial of the claim. The Court accepted the appeal, and the matter came on for hearing June 27, 2007. The claimant appeared in person and by counsel James A. Walker, and the State of West Virginia was represented by counsel Benjamin F. Yancey III, Assistant Attorney General.

On January 20, 2005, 28-year-old Edwina Joy Baisden was the victim of criminal conduct in Coal Branch, Logan County. According to testimony during the criminal trial of one of the defendants in Logan County Circuit Court, it was alleged that the claimant’s daughter was “doing drugs and alcohol” when she passed out. Her friends panicked, stuffed her into the trunk of a vehicle, and set it on fire, killing her. In the criminal case, one of the defendants blamed another. Apparently, the co-defendant gave different versions of what had occurred, and the jury found the other defendant not guilty. The truth of what actually happened may never be known.

*324In its initial decision, this Court found that by engaging in illegal drug activity, the victim Edwina Joy Baisden was guilty of “contributory misconduct,” a basis for denial of an award under W.Va. Code § 14-2A-14(f). Such has been the ruling of this Court in prior claims. However, the circumstances giving rise to this tragic incident point to a different result.

Even if the claimant’s actions prior to her death constituted criminal activity such that an award of victim compensation should, and would be, denied, it is the finding of this Court that the claimant, once she lost consciousness, could in no way have contributed to her subsequent demise. Her ability to think and make decisions was gone, and at that point, she did become the innocent victim of murder.

The Court is convinced by the evidence to reverse its previous ruling. The only economic losses sustained were for funeral and burial expenses totaling $4,660.82. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that an award in that sum be granted as set forth below.

Forest Lawn Cemetery

Box 310

Pecks Mill WV 25547

FEIN: 55-0344738

FIMS: 54479.$2,358.00

Edwin Bias

P.O. Box 266

Switzer WV 25647.$2.302.82

Total.$4,660.82
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Peoples Energy Corporation</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>

<P ALIGN="RIGHT"><FONT FACE="Arial">Exhibit 3(a)  </P>

<P> </P>
<U><FONT FACE="Arial"><P ALIGN="CENTER">Peoples Energy Corporation</P>
</U>
<P><CENTER>Consider Recommendation to</CENTER></P>
<P><U><CENTER>Amend the By-laws of the Company</CENTER></P></U>
<BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIR>

<P>RESOLVED, That this Board of Directors hereby approves amendments to the
 Company's By-Laws, such amendments to be effective November 3, 1999 by
 replacing Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of Article III of the By-Laws in their
 entirety with the following:</P>
</FONT>
<FONT FACE="Arial"><P>SECTION 3.2.  <U>Regular Meetings.</U>  A regular
 meeting of the Board of Directors shall be held immediately, or as soon as
 practicable, after the annual meeting of the shareholders in each year for
 the purpose of electing officers and for the transaction of such other
 business as may be deemed necessary, and regular meetings of the Board shall
 be held at such date and time and at such place as the Board of Directors may
 from time to time determine.  Not less than two days' notice of all regular
 meetings of the Board, except the meeting to be held after the annual meeting
 of shareholders which shall be held without other notice than this by-law,
 shall be given to each director personally or by mail, overnight courier,
 telegram or facsimile.</P>

<P>SECTION 3.3.  <U>Special Meetings.</U>  Special meetings of the Board may
 be called at any time by the Chairman of the Board, the President, or by any
 two directors, by causing the Secretary to send by personal delivery, mail,
 overnight courier, telegram or facsimile, to each director, not less than
 three days before the time of such meeting, a written notice stating the
 time and place of such meeting.  Notice of any meeting of the Board may be
 waived by any director.</P>

<P>RESOLVED FURTHER, That the Secretary of the Company be, and he hereby is,
 directed to initial a copy of the amended By-Laws presented at this meeting
 and place it with the important papers of this meeting.</P>

<P> </P>
</FONT><FONT SIZE=2><P> </P></DIR>
</DIR>
</FONT></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY>
</HTML>
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2945 

To require the administering authority to determine an individual 

countervailable subsidy rate upon request if four or fewer exporters 

and producers are involved in the investigation or review, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 25, 2015 

Mr. WELCH introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To require the administering authority to determine an individual countervailable subsidy rate upon request if four 

or fewer exporters and producers are involved in the 

investigation or review, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fairness in Respond5 ent Selection Act of 2015’’. 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2945 IH

1 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT TO DETERMINE INDIVIDUAL 

2 COUNTERVAILABLE SUBSIDY RATE IF FOUR 

3 OR FEWER EXPORTERS AND PRODUCERS 

4 ARE INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION OR 

5 REVIEW. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 777A(e) of the Tariff Act 

7 of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677f–1(e)) is amended by adding at 

8 the end the following: 

9 ‘‘(3) INDIVIDUAL SUBSIDY RATE UPON RE10 QUEST.— 

11 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If the administering 

12 authority determines under paragraph (2) that 

13 it is not practicable to determine an individual 

14 countervailable subsidy rate for an exporter or 

15 producer and the number of exporters and pro16 ducers involved in the investigation or review is 

17 not more than 4, the administering authority 

18 shall, at the request of the exporter or pro19 ducer, determine an individual countervailable 

20 subsidy rate for the exporter or producer. 

21 ‘‘(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subpara22 graph (A) may not be construed as specifying 

23 that more than 4 exporters and producers con24 stitutes a large number of exporters and pro25 ducers for purposes of paragraph (2).’’. 

26 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.— 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 2945 IH

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) shall apply to any investigation or re3 view initiated by the administering authority on or 

4 after March 1, 2015. 

5 (2) ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY DEFINED.—In 

6 this subsection, the term ‘‘administering authority’’ 

7 has the meaning given that term in section 771(1) 

8 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677(1)). 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### RUBACH v. STATE.

No. 19845.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 8, 1938.

Percy Foreman, of Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

The conviction is for lottery; penalty assessed at a fine of ten dollars.

The complaint and information appear regular. The record is before this court without statement of facts or bills of exception. No error has been perceived authorizing a reversal of the conviction.

The judgment is affirmed.
**Exhibit 32.1****Chief Executive Officer’s Certification required under Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**In connection with the quarterly report of TIB Financial Corp. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended June 30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I,Edward V. Lett, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that this Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that, to my knowledge, theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operation of the Company.        Date: August 9 2005 /s/ Edward V. Lett   Edward V. Lett   President and Chief Executive Officer   A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other documentauthenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed formwithin the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been providedto TIB Financial Corp. and will be retained by TIB Financial Corp. and furnished to the Securitiesand Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
26
#### WALTON v. THOMAS.

No. 11741.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

June 22, 1935.

*540Leo R. Tresp, of Dallas, for appellant.

,Baskett & Parks and G. Q. Youngblood, all of Dallas, for appellee.

LOONEY, Justice.

A. P. Thomas sued I. Walton to recover $700, as brokerage for services rendered in bringing together defendant and J. J. Easley, with whom defendant consummated an exchange of lands. On trial without a jury, the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $100, from which this appeal was taken.

The verbal contract sued upon was proven in all respects as alleged, except as to the matter of compensation. Plaintiff alleged that he was to be paid for his services 21⁄2 per cent, of $28,000, the exchange valuation of the property, or $700; "whereas, the court found and the proof justified the finding that the agreement was for $100.

The contention of defendant that the court below was without jurisdiction is overruled. This question was not raised by pleading in the lower court.

The contention that the variance between the allegation and proof presents reversible error is also overruled. A variance to be fatal must be of a substantial nature, misleading, and prejudicial. The rule is as announced in 33 Tex. Jur. 664, 665, § 197, as follows: “The rule that restricts the evidence to what is foreshadowed by the pleadings rests on the sound principle that it is unfair to try a case on issues of fact of which a party has had no intimation, and this basic principle may be said to connote the limits of its application. To be fatal, a variance must be a substantial, misleading and prejudicial departure. Or, as announced by a learned judge, ‘To determine whether or not a pleading presents a certain issue, it is a safe rule to look at the pleading from the standpoint of the party against whom it is exhibited, and ascertain if the allegations are sufficient to notify him that the evidence offered will be produced, or that he will be called upon to present evidence to meet it.’ Where a party is not taken by surprise by the evidence introduced, an objection to the reception of evidence for variance may, with propriety, be overruled. In considering whether the evidence is authorized by the pleading, a liberal rule of construction is applied.”

As defendant was notified by the pleading that a fee of $700 was claimed, we fail to understand how he was surprised or misled to his prejudice by proof that the fee agreed upon was only $100.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment below is affirmed.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF TIB FINANCIAL CORP. FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30,
1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                      16,608,669
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                          15,244
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            10,832,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 17,117,123
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      63,949,340
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        64,560,080
<LOANS>                                    201,342,543
<ALLOWANCE>                                  2,365,588
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             324,664,148
<DEPOSITS>                                 293,216,177
<SHORT-TERM>                                 1,990,967
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          3,386,696
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       444,215
<OTHER-SE>                                  25,626,093
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             324,664,148
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              8,822,185
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            2,013,432
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               619,711
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            11,455,328
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           4,694,866
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           4,717,943
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        6,737,385
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  180,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              7,203,575
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,625,920
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,696,320
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,696,320
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .39
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .37
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.91
<LOANS-NON>                                    459,246
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             2,201,974
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   21,897
<RECOVERIES>                                     5,511
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            2,365,588
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         2,365,588
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT
        32.2**
 
 CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO
 18
        U.S.C.
        SECTION 1350,
 AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
        906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of Zones, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q
        for the period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
        Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Ronald P. McFadden, Chief
        Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
        1350,
        as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
        that:
 
 (1)           The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and
 
 (2)           The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 Date:
        November 13, 2007
 
 
 /S/   RONALD
                  P MCFADDENRonald
                  P. McFaddenChief
                  Financial Officer
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

352 

CA 14-01459 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

DAMARIS A. CORZATT, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ZACHAREY A. TAYLOR, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT,

ET AL., DEFENDANT. 

 

FITZSIMMONS, NUNN & PLUKAS, LLP, ROCHESTER (JASON E. ABBOTT OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

TREVETT CRISTO SALZER & ANDOLINA P.C., ROCHESTER (ERIC M. DOLAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas

A. Stander, J.), entered June 25, 2014. The order granted the motion

of defendant Zacharey A. Taylor to dismiss the complaint against him. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is denied

and the complaint against defendant Zacharey A. Taylor is reinstated. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for

injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. She had

previously commenced an action in Rochester City Court seeking

$4,741.04 for property damage to her vehicle. In consideration of

that sum, plaintiff signed a release in favor of, inter alia,

defendant Zacharey A. Taylor (defendant), releasing him from “all

actions, causes of action . . . claims and demands whatsoever” that

plaintiff “ever had” against defendant “from the beginning of the

world to the day of the date of this RELEASE. And more particularly

for any and all property damage claims as a result of [the subject]

motor vehicle accident.”

We conclude that Supreme Court erred in granting defendant’s

motion to dismiss the complaint against him in the instant action

pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) based upon the release. “The meaning

and scope of a release must be determined within the context of the

controversy being settled” (Matter of Schaefer, 18 NY2d 314, 317; see

Kaminsky v Gamache, 298 AD2d 361, 362), and “a release may not be read

to cover matters which the parties did not desire or intend to dispose

of” (Cahill v Regan, 5 NY2d 292, 299; see Desiderio v Geico Gen. Ins.

Co., 107 AD3d 662, 663; Bugel v WPS Niagara Props., 19 AD3d 1081,

1082). “Moreover, it has long been the law that where a release

contains a recital of a particular claim, obligation or controversy
-2- 352 

CA 14-01459 

and there is nothing on the face of the instrument other than general

words of release to show that anything more than the matters

particularly specified was intended to be discharged, the general

words of release are deemed to be limited thereby” (Abdulla v Gross,

124 AD3d 1255, 1257 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here,

viewing the release in the context of the controversy being settled

and in light of the specific reference to plaintiff’s property damage

claims, we conclude that the parties intended that plaintiff release

only such property damage claims (see Bugel, 19 AD3d at 1083;

Kaminsky, 298 AD2d at 362). 

Entered: March 27, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court