## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S

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T H E S T A T E O F T E X A S

O N A P P E L L A N T ’ S P E T I T I O N F O R D I S C R E T I O N A R Y R E V I E W

F R O M T H E T H I R D C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

T R A V I S C O U N T Y

C O C H R A N

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i l e d a c o n c u r r i n g o p i n i o n i n w h i c h A L C A L A

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O P I N I O N

T h i s i s n o t a s i m p l e i s s u e

. A s J u d g e M o y l a n h a s n o t e d

, “ i t i s s o m e t i m e s t h e s i m p l e s t

o f c r i m e s t h a t a r e t h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t t o m a s t e r

. [ C o n t i n u i n g c r i m i n a l e n t e r p r i s e s a n d

c o n s p i r a c i e s ] a r e a s c h i l d ’ s p l a y t o t h e f a m i l i a r s t a n d b y o f a s s a u l t a n d b a t t e r y

. ” A l t h o u g h 1

Lamb v. State

, 613 A.2d 402, 404 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). I n Lamb

, J udg e Moy lan 1

examined exhaustively the common-law development of “assa ult” and “batter

y ” in explaining why

the particula

r “assa ult” in this domestic violence case (in which the defe ndant repe atedly pointed a

g un at the victim’s head and threa tened to kill her) did not merg e with the various “batter y ” incidents

(in which he hit or held her ag ainst her will). Id. at 404-20. The sever al times that he threa tened the

victim with a g un and the three times that he used phy sical forc e ag ainst her during the three -and- a-Cooper Concurr ing O pinion Page 2

a p p e l l a n t w a s c h a r g e d w i t h v a r i o u s c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y

, t h e l e g a l i s s u e c o n c e r n s

t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n “ a s s a u l t ” a n d “ b a t t e r y

. ”

R e m e m b e r t h a t o l d l a w

- s c h o o l c o m m o n

- l a w c o n c e p t o f a s s a u l t a n d b a t t e r y ? A n

a s s a u l t w a s t h e a t t e m p t t o h i t o r i n j u r e s o m e o n e a n d b a t t e r y w a s t h e a c t u a l h i t t i n g o r i n j u r i n g

o f t h a t p e r s o n

. B o t h w e r e c r i m e s

, b u t a p e r s o n c o u l d n o t b e c h a r g e d w i t h t w o d i s t i n c t 2

o f f e n s e s f o r a s i n g l e a t t e m p t t o h i t a n d t h e n a s u c c e s s f u l h i t t i n g o r i n

j u r y o f o n e p e r s o n i n o n e

i n c i d e n t

. U n d e r t h e o l d c o m m o n l a w

, a s s a u l t w a s a n u n c o n s u m m a t e d b a t t e r y

, a n d b a t t e r y

3

half-hour ordea l wer e separ ated in time, place

, and manner

. Id. at 420-25. Howeve r, J udg e Moy lan

noted that

a more difficult question would be posed if the threa ten ed shooting (assa ult) wer e

followed by an actua l shooting (batter y ). There

, a merg er of the threa tening conduct

into the phy sical consummation of the threa t would not, under fede ral constitutional

law, be mandated by Blockburge r. Under Mary land law, on the other hand, it might

well be require d under the extended “r ule of lenity ” rec ently promulg ated by the

Court of Appea ls. . . .

Analy tically

, the s it u at i o n would be further muddi ed by the fact that wher e

an appre hended threa t is then succe ssfully car ried out, the antec edent assault is

prese nt in both of its manifestations. I t is, at the same time, both an attempted battery

and a threa tened battery

. The first would merg e under the Fe dera l Constit ution. The

second wo uld merg e only under Mary land’s extended “Rule of L enity .” I t is not a

simple subject.

Id. at n.6.

See Olivas v. State

, 203 S.W .3d 341, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (discussing common-law 2

doctrines of assault and b at tery ). Under t he early common law, the crime of “assa ult” and the tort

of “assa ult” wer e entirely distinct. Criminal assault was an attempted battery –a missed hit or injury

. The civil tor

t of assault was an intentional act of placing another in f ear of rec eiving an immediate

battery –a threa t to hit or injure. R O L L I N M. P E R K I N S & R O N A L D N. B O Y C E

, C R I M I N A L L A W 159 (3d

ed. 1982). For example, “[i] f, with the intention of hitting X, D wrong fully threw a stone that X

b ar ely manag ed to dodg e, then D would have been g uilty of a criminal assault beca use he had

attempted to co m m i t a battery

, and he would also have been liable in civil action of trespass for

assault bec ause he had wr ong fully place d X in appre hension of phy sical har m.” Id.

P E R K I N S & B O Y C E

, supra note 2, at 160 (noting that “one who has committed a battery is 3

fre quently prosec uted for assault and battery

. This doe s not me an that two offe nses are char g ed inCooper Concurr ing O pinion Page 3

w a s a c o n s u m m a t e d a s s a u l t

. E v e r y b a t t e r y i n c l u d e d a n a s s a u l t

, b u t a n a s s a u l t d i d n o t i n c l u d e 4

a b a t t e r y

. E v e n t u a l l y

, t h e c o m m o n

- l a w c o n c e p t o f t h e c r i m e o f a s s a u l t e x p a n d e d f r o m 5

a t t e m p t e d b a t t e r y ( a m i s s e d h i t ) t o i n c l u d e t h e c o m m o n

- l a w t o r t c o n c e p t o f a t h r e a t t o h i t o r

i n j u r e ( t h e p o i n t i n g o f a g u n o r w o r d s s u c h a s “ I w i l l h i t y o u ” )

. 6

separ ate co u n t s o f the accusatory pleading

, but that one offense is char g ed in one count under the

name of ‘assa ult and battery ’”)

.

See, e.g., Anderson v. Crawf ord

, 265 F. 504, 507 (8th Cir. 1920) (“While a battery alway s 4

included an assault, assaults often fa l l s h ort of a battery

. An assault is an attempt, which, if

consummated, would re sult in a battery .”).

See Hall v. State

, 309 P.2d 1096, 1100 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (“‘ Ba ttery ’ includes assault, 5

but ‘assa ult’ does not include battery

. When the assault culminates in a battery

, the offe nse is assault

and batter y , and the pr osecution shoul d be commenced for that g rade of assa ult and battery

which

is rea sonably supported by the state' s evidenc e.”) (quoting Smith v. State

, 1 5 1 P .2d 74, 76 (Okla.

Crim. App. 1944)). As the N ew Jersey Supreme Court explained, under the common law,

[a] ssault cover ed ever

y “attempt or offe r with forc e and violence, to do a corpor al

hurt to another ,” 1 H A W K I N S

, P L E A S O F T H E C R O W N

, 1 13. Bla ckstone define s it as

“an attempt or offe r to beat another

, without touching him,” 3 C O M M E N T A R I E S 120,

while acc ording to Wharton it is “an appar ent attempt by violence to do corpor al hurt

to another

, ” 1 C R I M I N A L L A W (10th ed.), sec. 603. On t he other hand a battery is a

“consummate d or complete d assault,” 2 B U R D I C K

, T H E L A W O F C R I M E

, sec. 350. I t

nece ssarily includes an assault. The offe nse i s usually ref err ed to as an as s au lt and

battery and at common law meant any unlawful bodily harm done to another person.

“I t seems that any injury whatsoeve r, be it never so small, being actua lly done to the

person of a man, in an ang ry

, or reve ng eful, or rude, or insolent m an n er

, as by

spitti ng in his face , or any way touching him in ang er, or violently justli ng him out

of the wa y , are batterie s in the ey e of the law.” 1 H A W K I N S

, P L E A S O F T H E C R O W N

, 134. “The law can n o t d ra w the line betwee n differ ent deg ree s of violence, and

there fore totally

prohibits the first and lowest stag e of it; eve ry man’s per son being

sacr ed, and no other having rig ht to meddle with it, in even the slightest manner .” 3

B L A C K S T O N E ’ S C O M M E N T A R I E S 120. Assault an d b att ery at common law rang ed

from these minor offe nses, which never theless the law cannot aff ord to overlook, to

violence f alling just short of mansla ug hter or mur der.

State v. Maie r , 99 A.2d 21, 24 (N.J. 1953).

See P E R K I N S & B O Y C E

, supra note 2, at 161-62 (noting that, “[w]hi le few jurisdictions have 6

abandone d the orig inal basis for e stablishing a criminal assault i n the abse nce of statute, there hasCooper Concurr ing O pinion Page 4

U n d e r m o r e m o d e r n s t a t u t e s

, s u c h a s t h e M o d e l P e n a l C o d e a n d T e x a s l a w

, b o t h t h e 7

c o m m o n

- l a w c r i m e o f a s s a u l t a n d t h a t o f b a t t e r y a r e c o v e r e d u n d e r t h e s i n g l e o f f e n s e o f

a s s a u l t

. F o r e x a m p l e

, S e c t i o n 2 2

. 0 1 o f t h e P e n a l C o d e d e f i n e s a n a s s a u l t a s a n o f

f e n s e i f a

p e r s o n

( 1 ) i n t e n t i o n a l l y

, k n o w i n g l y

, o r r e c k l e s s l y c a u s e s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a n o t h e r

, i n c l u d i n g t h e p e r s o n ’ s s p o u s e ( c o m m o n

- l a w b a t t e r y ) ; o r

( 2 ) i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r k n o w i n g l y t h r e a t e n s a n o t h e r w i t h i m m i n e n t b o d i l y i n j u r y

,

been a tendenc y in m an y to add the tort theory as an additional g round.”) ; W A Y N E R. L A F A V E &

A U S T I N W. S C O T T

, C R I M I N A L L A W 693 (2d ed. 1986) (“[M]any jurisd ic ti o n s h a ve extended the scope

of the crime of assault to include, in addition to (not as an alterna tive to) the attempted-ba ttery ty pe

of assault, the t ort conce pt of t he civil assault, which is commi tted when one, with intent to cause

a rea sonable appre hension of immediate bodily harm (thoug h not to inflict such ha rm), does some

act whic h cause s such appr ehension.” ) (f ootnote omitted).

Model Penal Code § 211.1 (“ Assault”). That statute rea ds as follows: 7

(1) Simple Assault. A per son is guilty of assa ult if he:

(a) attempts to cause or purposely , knowing ly

or re cklessly

cause s

bodily injury to another; or

(b) neg lige ntly

cause s bodily

injury to another w ith a deadly

wea pon;

or

(c) attempts by

phy sical mena ce to put anothe r in fea r of imminent

serious bodily

injury

. Simpl e assa

ult is a misdemeanor unless c ommitt ed in a f ight or scuff le enter ed

into by mutual consent, in which c ase it is a petty misdemeanor.

(2) Aggravat ed Assault. A per son is guilty of ag g rava ted assault if he :

(a) attempts to cause se rious bodily injury to another, or

cause s such

injury purposely , knowing ly

or re cklessly

under c ircumstance s

manifesting extreme indiffer ence to the value of human life; or

(b) attempts to cause or purposely

or knowing ly

cause s bodily

injury to

another with a dea dly

wea pon.

Ag g rava ted assault under para g raph ( a) is a f

elony of the sec ond deg ree ;

ag g rava ted assault under

para g raph ( b) is a fe lony of the third deg ree

.Cooper Concurr ing O pinion Page 5

i n c l u d i n g t h e p e r s o n ’ s s p o u s e ( c o m m o n

- l a w a s s a u l t )

. 8

R e l e v a n t t o o u r p u r p o s e s

, t h e s e a r e t w o s e p a r a t e w a y s o f c o m m i t t i n g a n a s s a u l t a n d t h e y a r e

, 9

i n f a c t

, s e p a r a t e o f

f e n s e s

– o n e i n v o l v i n g p r o h i b i t e d c o n d u c t ( a t h r e a t ) a n d t h e o t h e r i n v o l v i n g

a p r o h i b i t e d r e s u l t ( b o d i l y i n j u r y )

. O n e m a y t h r e a t e n a b o d i l y i n j u r y w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y 1 0

c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h o n t h a t t h r e a t ; o n e m a y c a u s e b o d i l y i n j u r y w i t h o u t m a k i n g a n y o v e r t t h r e a t ;

a n d o n e m a y t h r e a t e n b o d i l y i n j u r y a n d c a r r y t h r o u g h w i t h t h a t t h r e a t

. 1 1

A t b o t t o m

, t h e i s s u e i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e i s w h e t h e r d o u b l e j e o p a r d y p r e v e n t s

c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r b o t h a s s a u l t b y t h r e a t a n d a s s a u l t b y b o d i l y

- i n j u r y w h e n a p e r s o n f

i r s t

t h r e a t e n s t o i n

j u r e a n o t h e r p e r s o n a n d t h e n c a r r i e s t h r o u g h o n t h a t t h r e a t

. S u p p o s e

, f o r 1 2

T E X

. P E N A L C O D E § 22.01(a) (1), ( 2). 8

Section 22.01 contains a third method of assaultive conduct–“ offe nsive touching ”–which 9

was a misdemeanor battery at common-law and is a C lass C misdemeanor in Tex as. T E X

. P E N A L

C O D E § 22.01(a) (3). T h at p rovi sion is not pertinent here

, except, of course

, that ever y assault

i n v o l v i n g bodily injury includes an “off ensive” touching

, but an offe nsive touching does no t

nece ssarily

include a bodily -injury

assault.

See Landrian v. State

, 2 6 8 S

. W .3d 532, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating that, in 1 0

Section 22.01, the Texas L eg islature ena cted “ three separ ate a nd distinctive assaultive crimes” ).

See ge nerally, Lamb v. State , 613 A.2d 402, 404-20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)

. 1 1

Although appellant was convicted of two counts of ag g rava ted robber y committed ag ainst 1 2

Andre w Chaney

and two counts of agg rava ted robbery committed ag ainst J ames B arke r, the leg al

issue is whether double jeopar dy bars dual convictions for ag g rava ted robber y of X by threat (with

a deadly wea

pon) and ag g rava ted robber y of X by causing (ser ious) bodily injur y wh en t h ey are

committed as part of the same criminal act (first a threa t, then car ry ing throug h with that threa t). The

double-jeopa

rdy issue, then, depends not upon the robber y statute or the ag g rava ted robber y statute,

but upon the simple assault statute, Section 22.01(a) (1), (2). See Snowden v. State

, 583 A.2d 1056,

1059 (Md. 1991) (“Robber y is a compound larc eny

. I t is a lar ceny from the person accomplished

by either an assault (putting in fea r) or a battery (violence ). There fore

, either combination produce s

a ro b b er y

. ”). Although the robber y provision contains an additional method of “assa ult” b y

“plac [i ng ] an o t h er i n fe ar of imminent bodily injury or death” as well as by threa tening a person,Cooper Concurr ing O pinion Page 6

e x a m p l e

, t h a t D a n g e r o u s D a n h o l d s a b a t a b o v e h i s h e a d a s h e t e l l s S u z i e Q

. , “ I ’ m g o i n g t o

b e a t y o u u p

. ” S h e s h r i e k s

, a n d h e p r o m p t l y b a n g s h e r w i t h t h e b a t

. I s t h a t o n e c r i m e o r t w o ?

C o m m o n s e n s e s a y s t h a t t h i s i s j u s t o n e c r i m e

. A n d w h e n a s s a u l t b y b o d i l y

i n j u r y

– “ b a t t e r y ”

– i n c l u d e s a n a s s a u l t b y t h r e a t

– “ a s s a u l t ”

– d o u b l e j e o p a r d y w o u l d p r e v e n t

c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r b o t h w h e n t h e y o c c u r a g a i n s t t h e s a m e p e r s o n a t t h e s a m e t i m e

. T h e a s s a u l t 1 3

i s “ m e r g e d ” o r “ s u b s u m e d ” i n t o t h e c o m p l e t e d b a t t e r y

. C o n v e r s e l y

, i f D a n t h r e a t e n e d S u z i e 1 4

w i t h a b a t i n t h e b e d r o o m a n d

, w h e n s h e s h r i e k e d

, h e p u t t h e b a t d o w n

, b u t a f t e r s h e w a l k e d

o u t o f t h e r o o m

, h e p i c k e d u p t h e b a t

, f o l l o w e d h e r

, a n d b a n g e d h e r w i t h t h e b a t i n t h e

(Section 29.02(a )(2) ), that distinction does not make a diff ere nce in the pr esent a

naly sis.

See, e.g., State v. Bolarinho

, 850 A. 2 d 9 07, 909-11 (R.I

. 2004) (double jeopar dy barr ed 1 3

convictions for both assault with a deadly wea pon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury when

both offense s arose from a sing le fig ht in which the victim was re peate dly kicked)

.

See, e.g., McG hee v. State

, ___ So.3d

___, 2014 WL 560857, *1 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 1 4

(“Mc Ghee contends that beca use the burg lary of a dwelling with as s au l t and battery

, ag g rava ted

assault with a firea

rm, and battery convictions involve the same victim and occur red i n t h e s ame

incident, the convictions for battery and ag g rava ted assault with a firea rm violate the constitutional

prohibition ag ainst double jeopar dy

. McGhe e is corr ect. We, there fore

, rev er s e his conviction for

ag g rava ted assault with a firea

rm beca use it i s subsumed into the g rea ter offe nse of burg lary of a

dwelling with an assault or battery while arme d with a firea rm.

. . . The conviction for battery must

also be reve rsed beca

use a conviction for both burg lary with an assault or battery and simple battery

arising from the same criminal episode also violates double jeopar dy .”); Latimer v. State

, 44 So.3d

1239, 1240 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (double jeopar dy preve nted convictions for both robber y with

a deadly wea

pon and simple assault committed during robber y ); Cronce v. State

, 216 P.3d 568, 570

(Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (double jeopar dy prohibited convictions for assault by threa t and assault by

causing bodily injury ag ainst same victim d u ri n g one incident with same dang erous instrument);

Russo v. S t a te

, 804 So.2d 419, 421-22 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (double jeopar dy barr ed two

convictions for assault by threa tening victim with a beer bottle and assault by swing ing a shovel at

him beca use acts wer e all part of a single

, continuous assault); Gresham v. State

, 725 So.2d 419, 420

(F la. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (woman who threa tened to kill her husband with a shotgun an d t hen

immediately g rabbe d a knife and stabbed him could not be convicted of the two ty pes of assault as

the ac ts occurr ed in a sing le, uninterrupte d sequenc e and c omprised one c riminal act).Cooper Concurr ing O pinion Page 7

k i t c h e n

, d o u b l e j e o p a r d y w o u l d n o t p r e v e n t t w o c o n v i c t i o n s b e c a u s e a j u r y c o u l d f i n d t h a t

t h e y w e r e s e p a r a t e i n c i d e n t s

. 1 5

T h e l i n e b e t w e e n “ m e r g e d ” o r “ s u b s u m e d ” o f f e n s e s i n v o l v i n g m u l t i p l e a s s a u l t s o r

b a t t e r i e s

, i s n o t e a s y t o d r a w

. A s o n e j u d g e h a s n o t e d

,

A l t h o u g h t h e s e [ a s s a u l t a n d b a t t e r y ] a r e c o m m o n l a w c r i m e s

, a n d d o n o t

,

t h e r e f o r e

, i n v o l v e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t

, i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e

p r o p r i e t y o f c u m u l a t i v e p u n i s h m e n t s t o e m p l o y t h e s a m e b a s i c s t a n d a r d s o f

c o m m o n s e n s e a n d f

a i r n e s s t h a t l a r g e l y i n f

l u e n c e t h e o u t c o m e o f l e g i s l a t i v e

i n t e n t c a s e s

. C e r t a i n l y

, w h e r e o n e p e r s o n p u m m e l s a n o t h e r w i t h h i s f i s t s f o r

s e v e r a l m i n u t e s

, t h e l a w w o u l d n o t c o u n t e n a n c e a s e p a r a t e p u n i s h m e n t f o r

e a c h t i m e a b l o w i s l a n d e d

. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d

, i f o n e p e r s o n w e r e t o i n f l i c t

v a r i o u s t y p e s o f t o r t u r e u p o n a n o t h e r d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e d a y

, a l l o w i n g t h e

v i c t i m t o r e c o v e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s b e t w e e n e a c h a s s a u l t

, i t w o u l d s e e m

a p p r o p r i a t e t o p e r m i t s e p a r a t e c o n v i c t i o n s f o r t h e s e p a r a t e i n s u l t s t o t h e p e r s o n

o f t h e v i c t i m

. 1 6

D u a l c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r m a k i n g t h e t h r e a t a n d t h e n t h e i m m e d i a t e c a r r y i n g o u t o f t h a t

t h r e a t t o h a r m a n a s s a u l t v i c t i m i s n o t b a r r e d b y t h e B l o c k b u r g e r “ s a m e e l e m e n t s ” t e s t 1 7

b e c a u s e e a c h s u b s e c t i o n o f t h e a s s a u l t s t a t u e c o n t a i n s a n e l e m e n t n o t c o n t a i n e d b y t h e o t h e r

s u b s e c t i o n ( “ b o d i l y i n

j u r y ” i n s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) ( 1 ) a n d “ t h r e a t e n s ” i n s u b s e c t i o n ( a ) ( 2 ) )

.

See, e.g., State v. Fischer

, 82 A.3d 891, 900 (N.H. 2013) (def endant’ s rig hts ag ainst double 1 5

jeopar dy wer e not violated when he wa s co n v i cted of two separ ate incidents of assault, the first

o cc u rr i ng in the living room and the second in the kitchen); State v. Leavitt

, 66 A.3d 1218, 1219

(N

. H. 2 0 13) (no double jeopar dy violation when evidenc e showed that defe ndant kicked police

office r once when he came to d ef en dant’s home and then ag ain at hospital); People v. Lugo

, 542

N.W.2d 921, 926 (Mich. C t. App. 1995) (def endant’ s convictions for assault by pointing a gu n at

p o lice office r and assault by hitting police office r with a broom did not violate dou b l e j eo p ar d y

principles beca

use defe ndant first assaulted office r with the broom, then put it down, took office r’s

g un and pointed it at him; assault with the broom was complete d befor e assa ult with gun beg an).

Snowden v. State , 583 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Md. 1991) ( McAuliffe , J ., concur ring ). 1 6

Blockburge r v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 1 7Cooper Concurr ing O pinion Page 8

N o n e t h e l e s s

, I a g r e e w i t h P r e s i d i n g J u d g e K e l l e r t h a t “ t h e ‘ t h r e a t ’ a n d ‘ b o d i l y i n j u r y ’

e l e m e n t s o f

[ a s s a u l t a n d ] r o b b e r y a r e s i m p l y a l t e r n a t i v e m e t h o d s o f c o m m i t t i n g [ a n a s s a u l t

o r ] a r o b b e r y

. ” T h a t i s b e c a u s e t h e u n i t o f p r o s e c u t i o n f o r a s s a u l t i s e i t h e r o r b o t h a n 1 8

“ a s s a u l t ” ( t h r e a t ) o r a “ b a t t e r y ” ( b o d i l y i n j u r y ) u p o n o n e p e r s o n a t o n e t i m e a n d p l a c e

.

T h e r e f o r e

, t h e u n i t o f p r o s e c u t i o n f o r r o b b e r y i s e i t h e r o r b o t h a n “ a s s a u l t ” o r a “ b a t t e r y ”

u p o n o n e p e r s o n a t o n e t i m e a n d p l a c e d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f a t h e f t

. A n d

, f

i n a l l y

, t h e u n i t 1 9

o f p r o s e c u t i o n f

o r a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y i s e i t h e r o r b o t h a n “ a s s a u l t ” w i t h a d e a d l y w e a p o n o r

a “ b a t t e r y ” t h a t c a u s e s s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y u p o n o n e p e r s o n a t o n e t i m e a n d p l a c e d u r i n g

t h e c o u r s e o f a t h e f

t

.

I n s u m

, I t h i n k t h a t

, b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e p r o v e d o n l y o n e u n i t o f a s s a u l t i v e c o n d u c t

– a

t h r e a t t o h a r m w i t h a d e a d l y w e a p o n i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w e d b y c a u s i n g s e r i o u s b o d i l y

i n j u r y

– a g a i n s t e a c h r o b b e r y v i c t i m a t o n e t i m e a n d p l a c e

, d o u b l e j e o p a r d y p r i n c i p l e s b a r t w o

c o n v i c t i o n s f

o r r o b b i n g M r

. B a r k e r a n d t w o c o n v i c t i o n s f o r r o b b i n g M r

. C h a n e y

. I t h e r e f o r e

r e s p e c t f u l l y j o i n i n t h e m a

j o r i t y ’ s r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s c a s e

.

F i l e d : M a y 1 4

, 2 0 1 4

P u b l i s h

Supra , Concurring Op. at *13 (K eller, P.J., concurring ).

1 8

Snowden v. State

, 583 A.2d 1056, 1059 (Md. 1991) (robbe ry is theft from a person 1 9

acc ompanied by

either a threa t to harm or ac tual forc e).