# C_2023125EN.01014901.xml

| 5.4.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 125/149 |
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5.4.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 125/149

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P9_TA(2022)0331

The situation in the Strait of Taiwan

European Parliament resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan (2022/2822(RSP))

(2023/C 125/13)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation (1), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific (2), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific (2),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2022 on the Indo-Pacific strategy in the area of trade and investment (3), |
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having regard to its resolution of 5 July 2022 on the Indo-Pacific strategy in the area of trade and investment (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (4), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy (4),

| — | having regard to the EU-China summit of 1 April 2022, |
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having regard to the EU-China summit of 1 April 2022,

| — | having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy, |
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having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,

| — | having regard to the joint communication of 16 September 2021 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024), |
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having regard to the joint communication of 16 September 2021 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024),

| — | having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022, |
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having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

| — | having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, |
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having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 on the Global Gateway (JOIN(2021)0030), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 on the Global Gateway (JOIN(2021)0030),

| — | having regard to the statement by G7 foreign ministers of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, |
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having regard to the statement by G7 foreign ministers of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

| — | having regard to the speech given by VP/HR Josep Borrell at the 29th ASEAN Regional Forum on 5 August 2022, |
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having regard to the speech given by VP/HR Josep Borrell at the 29th ASEAN Regional Forum on 5 August 2022,

| — | having regard to the US-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue of 5 August 2022, |
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having regard to the US-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue of 5 August 2022,

| — | having regard to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s statement of 4 August 2022, |
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having regard to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s statement of 4 August 2022,

| — | having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

| A. | whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas the EU continues to maintain its principled ‘One China’ policy position; |
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A.

whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas the EU continues to maintain its principled ‘One China’ policy position;

| B. | whereas between 4 and 10 August 2022, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) escalated its long-standing military intimidation against Taiwan to an unprecedented level following the visit of 2 and 3 August 2022 by the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, and launched large-scale live-fire military exercises in seven designated areas surrounding Taiwan; whereas the exercises included the use of up to 11 ballistic missiles, of which at least five flew over Taiwan; whereas these military drills constituted a virtual blockade of Taiwan’s sea and air space; |
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B.

whereas between 4 and 10 August 2022, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) escalated its long-standing military intimidation against Taiwan to an unprecedented level following the visit of 2 and 3 August 2022 by the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, and launched large-scale live-fire military exercises in seven designated areas surrounding Taiwan; whereas the exercises included the use of up to 11 ballistic missiles, of which at least five flew over Taiwan; whereas these military drills constituted a virtual blockade of Taiwan’s sea and air space;

| C. | whereas five of the PRC’s ballistic missiles landed in the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ); |
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C.

whereas five of the PRC’s ballistic missiles landed in the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ);

| D. | whereas the full-scale military exercises were coupled with intense cyber-attacks against the Taiwanese authorities and private sector; whereas the PRC’s continued military belligerence poses a grave threat to the status quo and may lead to dangerous, even unintended, escalation with a severe impact on global stability and peace, including for the EU; |
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D.

whereas the full-scale military exercises were coupled with intense cyber-attacks against the Taiwanese authorities and private sector; whereas the PRC’s continued military belligerence poses a grave threat to the status quo and may lead to dangerous, even unintended, escalation with a severe impact on global stability and peace, including for the EU;

| E. | whereas the PRC appears to be seeking to perpetuate its overly aggressive actions, trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; |
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E.

whereas the PRC appears to be seeking to perpetuate its overly aggressive actions, trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait;

| F. | whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across a vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia; |
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F.

whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across a vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

| G. | whereas in response to the renewed provocations by the PRC, Taiwan has announced that it will increase its military budget by 13,9 % year-on-year, to a record TWD 586,3 billion (EUR 19,5 billion); |
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G.

whereas in response to the renewed provocations by the PRC, Taiwan has announced that it will increase its military budget by 13,9 % year-on-year, to a record TWD 586,3 billion (EUR 19,5 billion);

| H. | whereas Australia and Japan, together with the United States, in a joint statement expressed ‘concern about [the PRC’s] recent actions that gravely affect international peace and stability’ and urged the PRC ‘to immediately cease the military exercises’; whereas the G7 foreign ministers have thoroughly criticised the PRC’s aggressive actions; |
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H.

whereas Australia and Japan, together with the United States, in a joint statement expressed ‘concern about [the PRC’s] recent actions that gravely affect international peace and stability’ and urged the PRC ‘to immediately cease the military exercises’; whereas the G7 foreign ministers have thoroughly criticised the PRC’s aggressive actions;

| I. | whereas after the visit of the US Congressional delegation led by Speaker Pelosi, the PRC suspended talks and cooperation with the United States in eight different areas, including dialogues on military matters and climate change; |
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I.

whereas after the visit of the US Congressional delegation led by Speaker Pelosi, the PRC suspended talks and cooperation with the United States in eight different areas, including dialogues on military matters and climate change;

| J. | whereas Taiwan has in recent years hosted numerous visits from lawmakers, including those from EU Member States and one Vice-President of the European Parliament; whereas such visits in the framework of parliamentary diplomacy are common practice in democracies; |
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J.

whereas Taiwan has in recent years hosted numerous visits from lawmakers, including those from EU Member States and one Vice-President of the European Parliament; whereas such visits in the framework of parliamentary diplomacy are common practice in democracies;

| K. | whereas on 9 October 2021, the PRC’s President Xi Jinping vowed to pursue ‘reunification’ with Taiwan by supposedly peaceful means, falsely claiming that biggest obstacle to it was the so-called ‘Taiwan independence’ forces; whereas this rhetoric is not supported by the PRC’s actions; whereas some PRC diplomats even threatened so-called ‘re-education’ of Taiwanese people after ‘reunification’; |
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K.

whereas on 9 October 2021, the PRC’s President Xi Jinping vowed to pursue ‘reunification’ with Taiwan by supposedly peaceful means, falsely claiming that biggest obstacle to it was the so-called ‘Taiwan independence’ forces; whereas this rhetoric is not supported by the PRC’s actions; whereas some PRC diplomats even threatened so-called ‘re-education’ of Taiwanese people after ‘reunification’;

| L. | whereas the PRC’s recently published white paper entitled ‘The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era’ removed previous reassurances offered to Taiwan about its future status after ‘reunification’, such as not stationing PRC troops or administrative personnel on the island; |
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L.

whereas the PRC’s recently published white paper entitled ‘The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era’ removed previous reassurances offered to Taiwan about its future status after ‘reunification’, such as not stationing PRC troops or administrative personnel on the island;

| M. | whereas the PRC imposed massive economic sanctions and pressure on Lithuania after it agreed to the opening of a Taiwanese representative office in Lithuania, as well as plans to open a Lithuanian trade representative office in Taipei; whereas Parliament strongly maintains the right of all EU Member States to pursue such relations with Taiwan; |
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M.

whereas the PRC imposed massive economic sanctions and pressure on Lithuania after it agreed to the opening of a Taiwanese representative office in Lithuania, as well as plans to open a Lithuanian trade representative office in Taipei; whereas Parliament strongly maintains the right of all EU Member States to pursue such relations with Taiwan;

| N. | whereas Taiwan has aligned itself with EU sanctions against Russia and whereas both the Taiwanese authorities as well as its people have made significant donations to Ukrainian refugees; |
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N.

whereas Taiwan has aligned itself with EU sanctions against Russia and whereas both the Taiwanese authorities as well as its people have made significant donations to Ukrainian refugees;

| O. | whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas the EU remains the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan; whereas there is considerable potential for increasing Taiwan’s FDI in the EU; whereas Taiwan dominates the semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait; |
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O.

whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas the EU remains the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan; whereas there is considerable potential for increasing Taiwan’s FDI in the EU; whereas Taiwan dominates the semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;

| P. | whereas, at the EU-China Summit on 1 April 2022, the EU recalled the PRC’s responsibility, as a global actor and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to work for peace and stability in the region and particularly in the Taiwan Strait; |
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P.

whereas, at the EU-China Summit on 1 April 2022, the EU recalled the PRC’s responsibility, as a global actor and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to work for peace and stability in the region and particularly in the Taiwan Strait;

| Q. | whereas the EU is committed to using every available channel to encourage initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building across both sides of the Taiwan Strait; whereas these new developments have reinforced the urgent need for EU engagement to contribute to lowering regional tensions as an instability factor; |
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Q.

whereas the EU is committed to using every available channel to encourage initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building across both sides of the Taiwan Strait; whereas these new developments have reinforced the urgent need for EU engagement to contribute to lowering regional tensions as an instability factor;

| 1. | Strongly condemns the PRC’s military exercises which began in the Taiwan Strait on 2 August 2022 and which reached an unprecedented level of intensity, and calls on the Government of the PRC to refrain from any measures which could destabilise the Taiwan Strait and regional security; |
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1.

| 2. | Underlines that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must not be unilaterally changed and insists on opposing the use or threat of force; |
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2.

| 3. | Reaffirms the international community’s commitment to maintaining the rules-based international order, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the region; reiterates the EU’s commitment to the ‘One China’ policy as the political foundation of EU-China relations; recalls that the EU China strategy emphasises that constructive cross-strait relations are part of promoting peace and security in the whole Asia-Pacific region and that the EU supports initiatives aimed at dialogue and confidence-building; is convinced that the PRC’s provocative actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea must have consequences for EU-China relations, and that the possibility of contingency planning must be considered; |
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3.

| 4. | Expresses its firm solidarity with the people of Taiwan; applauds the Taiwanese authorities and political leaders for their measured and responsible reaction to the PRC’s provocations; |
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4.

| 5. | Underlines that on the democratic island of Taiwan, it is up to the people to decide how they want to live; |
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5.

| 6. | Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight; |
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6.

| 7. | Welcomes the clear condemnation of the PRC’s military exercises by EU Member States as well as partners in the region and underlines that our unity is key in order to deter any aggression by the PRC and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait; |
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7.

| 8. | Is extremely concerned by the ballistic missiles that have been fired over Taiwan, which have landed in the exclusive economic zone of Japan, threatening the stability of the region and Japan’s national security; welcomes the spokesperson of the Japanese Government’s statements calling for a genuine dialogue to solve the issues concerning Taiwan peacefully; expresses its sympathy for and offers its full support to Japan, and stresses in this regard the need for democracies in the region to continue supporting Taiwan in the face of the PRC’s sabre-rattling, as peace and stability in the region are in everyone’s interest; |
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8.

| 9. | Urges the PRC to immediately stop all actions and intrusions into the Taiwanese ADIZ and the airspace violations above Taiwan’s outer islands, restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line, and stop all other grey-zone military actions including cyber and disinformation campaigns; |
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9.

| 10. | Condemns the PRC’s decision to suspend various political dialogues with the United States, including on climate and security matters, and urges the PRC’s leadership to return to diplomatic standards in order to avoid the risk of miscalculations and mistakes which could have catastrophic consequences; |
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10.

| 11. | Firmly rejects the PRC’s economic coercion against Taiwan and other democracies in its region, as well as against EU Member States, and underlines that such practices are not only illegal under World Trade Organization rules, but that they also have a devastating effect on the PRC’s reputation around the world and will lead to a further loss of trust in the PRC as a partner; |
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11.

| 12. | Calls for the EU to assume a stronger role when it comes to the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific as a whole in line with its own Indo-Pacific strategy; calls for the further deepening of our strategic relations with like-minded partners in the region, in particular Japan and Australia; |
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12.

| 13. | Calls on EU Member States to increase their economic and diplomatic presence throughout the Indo-Pacific region, including in Taiwan, and recalls that the world’s strategic and economic centre of gravity is shifting to this region, and that the EU therefore has a clear interest in forging a clear and credible EU-level approach to the Indo-Pacific; |
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13.

| 14. | Calls again for the EU to enhance the existing partnership with Taiwan so as to promote common values and principles, including by pursuing a resilient supply chain agreement and a bilateral investment agreement (BIA), which would help protect the interests of the EU as a whole and of its Member States; |
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14.

| 15. | Welcomes the recently announced plans by Lithuania to open a trade representative office in Taipei in the autumn of 2022; calls on other Member States who do not yet operate a trade office in Taiwan to follow this example and strengthen their relations with Taiwan; calls on the PRC to revoke its unjustified sanctions against Lithuanian officials; condemns the PRC’s trade restrictions; |
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15.

| 16. | Calls on the Commission to change the name of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taipei in order to reflect the broad scope of our ties; |
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16.

| 17. | Stresses that Taiwan is crucial for the global supply chain of key high-tech sectors, notably semiconductors, and calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to develop a strategy for resilience and swiftly start working on a resilient supply chain agreement with Taiwan with a view to addressing respective vulnerabilities in a mutually beneficial manner and aiming at preserving Taiwan’s security by strengthening its ‘silicon shield’; |
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17.

| 18. | Encourages increased economic, scientific, cultural and political interaction between the EU and Taiwan including at the most senior levels possible, so as to fully reflect the dynamic, multi-faceted and close cooperation between the EU and Taiwan as like-minded partners; |
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18.

| 19. | Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to consider connectivity projects with Pacific island states and co-investment in partnerships between the EU’s Global Gateway and Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy with a view to fostering trade and political relationships as well as stability in the Indo-Pacific region; |
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19.

| 20. | Reiterates its previous call on the Commission to launch, without delay, an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a BIA with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations to deepen bilateral economic ties; |
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20.

| 21. | Recommends further deepening cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; |
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21.

| 22. | Recognises that gestures of support, such as parliamentary visits, are valuable and believes that they can contribute to deterrence if paired with substantive cooperation in other fields; underlines its intention to send future official parliamentary delegations to Taiwan; welcomes the fact that an official invitation to visit the European Parliament was extended to Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan during the recent visit of European Parliament Vice-President Beer to Taiwan; intends to pursue actions such as the organisation of an EU-Taiwan parliamentary week; |
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22.

| 23. | Salutes Taiwan’s commitment to stand with Ukraine in the face of Russia’s brutal and unjustified aggression; |
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23.

| 24. | Recalls the importance of strengthening EU-Taiwan dialogue by deepening relations with local actors, including civil society, and fostering exchanges with Taiwanese media organisations, and stresses that such strengthened exchange will help to improve the EU’s profile and visibility inside Taiwan and contribute to joint efforts to address the threat of disinformation that both sides are increasingly confronted with; |
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24.

| 25. | Strongly advocates for Taiwan’s meaningful participation as an observer in meetings, mechanisms and activities of international bodies such as the World health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; |
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25.

| 26. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the governments and legislatures of Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, the Philippines, Russia and Ukraine, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States. |
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26.

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(1)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 170.

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0224.

(3)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0276.

(4)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 40.

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