NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SHAD C., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0137 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. V1300JD201880007

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer, P.C., Anthem

By Florence M. Bruemmer

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 1-14-2020
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Shad C. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to J.C. (Child). Father argues the 

Department of Child Safety (DCS) failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence the statutory grounds for severance, and by a preponderance of 

the evidence that severance was in Child’s best interests. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Rochelle W. (Mother) are the biological parents of 

Child, born in 2009.1 They shared custody of Child until February 2018, 

when Mother was arrested for driving under the influence while Child was 

in the vehicle. Around the same time, Father was receiving emergency 

medical treatment at Verde Valley Medical Center, where hospital staff 

observed Father with “track marks consistent with intravenous drug use.” 

Father stated he was willing to be placed “in [an] appropriate detox facility”

to address his drug use but decided he would “detox at home” after 

learning of Mother’s arrest. He then contacted another family member to 

pick up Child.

¶3 Because there was no parent available to care for Child, DCS 

took temporary custody of Child and placed him with a relative (Uncle). In 

March 2018, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was dependent as to Father 

on the grounds of neglect and substance abuse.2 As part of the preliminary 

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the 

juvenile court’s order.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 

549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (citing Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 

205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008)).

2 DCS also alleged the Child was dependent as to Mother. Child was 

found dependent as to Mother, and Mother’s parental rights were 
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

3

protective order, the juvenile court ordered Father to: (1) undergo a 

substance abuse assessment; (2) submit to random urinalysis (UA) testing 

eight to ten times per month; (3) submit a hair follicle sample for testing by 

March 9, 2018; (4) comply with prior imposed terms of probation; and

(5) participate in supervised visitation with Child. Father was “informed 

that all missed tests, missed calls, and diluted tests would be considered 

non-compliant.” In April 2018, the juvenile court adjudicated Child 

dependent as to Father, affirmed the case plan of family reunification 

concurrent with severance and adoption, and reminded Father to comply 

with the reunification services.

¶4 Father eventually participated in a substance abuse 

assessment and a psychological evaluation, completed a “Love & Logic” 

parenting class, and attended some individual and group therapy sessions 

for substance abuse at Spectrum Healthcare. During therapy sessions, 

Father admitted: (1) he first used methamphetamine approximately twelve 

years earlier and “use[d] methamphetamines about 2 times per week” 

intravenously until at least February 2018; (2) he first used opiates 

approximately five years earlier and had last used them in January 2017; 

and (3) he first used heroin within the past year and, at least until February 

2018, “use[d] heroin on a daily basis” through injection.

¶5 Between May and July 2018, Father missed five UA tests. But,

he missed most, if not all, of his required testing between August and

December and tested positive for heroin and opiates in September. In 

December, Father tested positive for amphetamines twice, opiates one time, 

and heroin one time. Father’s hair follicle test — submitted eight months 

after the court-ordered deadline — also tested positive for amphetamines

and opiates.

¶6 Meanwhile, the juvenile court granted DCS discretion to 

allow therapeutic visitation between Father and Child. DCS did not 

schedule visits because reports indicated that Child feared Father and his 

behavior.

¶7 In January 2019, Father pleaded guilty to two counts of 

possession of heroin-related drug paraphernalia committed in December 

2018 and January 2019. He was placed on supervised probation for three 

years and ordered to serve 120 days in jail. The same month, DCS moved 

terminated in March 2019. She did not appeal the termination of her 

parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

4

to terminate Father’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect, substance 

abuse, and the length of time Child had been in out-of-home care.

¶8 By the time of the March 2019 severance hearing, Father 

remained incarcerated. Father testified he “chose to get sober” the day he 

“stepped into prison,” had enrolled in a moral recognition therapy and 

twelve-step program, attended Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics 

Anonymous (AA/NA) meetings once every two weeks, and had attended

counseling meetings at Catholic Charities and Spectrum Healthcare prior 

to his incarceration.

¶9 The DCS case manager testified that while Father might have 

been able to participate in some services while incarcerated, he was not able 

to engage in “intensive inpatient or outpatient treatment” to address his 

drug use. The case manager noted Father had not protected Child from 

Mother’s neglect and substance abuse and expressed concern that Father 

would not be able to stop using drugs in an unsupervised setting based on 

his history of substance abuse. The case manager further testified: Father 

was unwilling or unable to meet Child’s basic needs such as providing 

supervision, food, clothing, and shelter; that Father had lived in “several 

different places . . . but was unable to maintain” any permanent residence

and was currently incarcerated for drug-related offenses; that Child had 

been placed in a drug-free environment with Uncle, which provided Child 

permanency, stability, and safety; and that Child was adoptable.

¶10 Uncle testified that Father had a significant history of 

substance abuse and that he had tried “on several occasions” since July 2017 

to help Father undergo substance abuse treatment. Although Father had 

admitted he needed help, when it came time to engage in treatment, Father 

“would bolt” because he “did not want to be contained in a substance abuse 

program.” 

¶11 Uncle also testified that Child was “at risk of failing third 

grade” when he was placed with Uncle. Since that time, Child had 

“blossomed” by working “really hard,” earned second place in a science 

fair, and been “singing and dancing and playing one of the lead roles” in a 

school theatre production. Moreover, Uncle and his wife were willing to 

continue as placement for Child and adopt him if requested.

¶12 After taking the matter under advisement, the juvenile court 

found DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence termination of 

Father’s parental rights was warranted because Father: (1) had neglected

Child or failed to protect Child from neglect; (2) was unable to discharge 
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

5

parental responsibilities because of a chronic history of substance abuse and 

the condition would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period; and (3) 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances 

that caused Child to be in out-of-home placement for nine months or longer. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-533(B)(2), (3), (8)(a).3 The court also found 

severance was in Child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence 

because Father “failed to work on [his] substance abuse issues,” and Child 

“deserve[d] permanency and stability in a drug-free environment.” Thus, 

the court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights. Father 

timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 

12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the 

Juvenile Court 103(A).

DISCUSSION

¶13 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find clear 

and convincing evidence to support at least one statutory ground for 

severance. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). The court must also find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that severance would serve the child’s best 

interests. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C); see Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, 

¶ 41 (2005). We will affirm the termination order “absent an abuse of 

discretion or unless the court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous.” 

E.R. v. DCS, 237 Ariz. 56, 58, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (quoting Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004)). A finding is clearly 

erroneous if no reasonable evidence supports it. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 

47, ¶ 8 (quoting Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JV-132905, 186 Ariz. 607, 609 

(App. 1996)). This Court will not reweigh evidence because the juvenile

court, as a direct observer of the participants, is “in the best position to 

weigh the evidence [and] judge the credibility of the parties.” Id. (quoting 

Pima Cty. Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546 (App. 1987), and 

citing JV-132905, 186 Ariz. at 609).

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that 

Father Was Unable to Parent As a Result of Substance Abuse.

¶14 A parent’s rights may be terminated when “the parent is 

unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of 

chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and 

there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for 

3 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of rules and statutes.
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

6

a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). When severance 

is sought on this ground, the court must also find that DCS “made 

reasonable efforts to reunify the family.”4 Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005) (citing Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 

191-92, ¶¶ 31-34).

A. Reasonable Belief That Chronic Substance Abuse Will 

Continue

¶15 Father first argues that the juvenile court erred in finding clear 

and convincing evidence that his substance abuse would likely continue for 

a prolonged indeterminate period.

5 Specifically, Father asserts the court’s 

finding is inconsistent with evidence that he had achieved and maintained 

sobriety throughout the proceedings leading up to and during the 

severance hearing. We disagree.

¶16 In determining whether a parent’s substance abuse is likely to 

persist for a prolonged indeterminate period, the juvenile court must: 

4 Father suggests DCS did not make reasonable reunification efforts 

because it did not facilitate therapeutic visits with Child. He does not, 

however, articulate how visits with Child would have improved his ability 

to parent during a period he was using amphetamines, heroin, and opiates. 

Moreover, DCS “is not required to provide every conceivable service,”

Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994) (citing 

Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 189 (App. 

1984)), or “undertake rehabilitative measures that are futile,” Mary Ellen C.

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999) (citing JS-5209, 

143 Ariz. at 189).

5 Father also argues the juvenile court erred in concluding his 

substance abuse was likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate 

period in the absence of expert testimony on the subject. He cites no 

authority for the proposition that A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) requires expert 

testimony on facts such as these, and we find none. See, e.g., Raymond F. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 378-79, ¶¶ 27-29 (App. 2010) (holding 

that the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that a parent’s drug abuse 

was likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period based on 

evidence that the parent had a significant history of substance abuse, had 

recently used drugs, and failed to participate in reunification services 

designed to address substance abuse).
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

7

consider the treatment history of the parent to gauge the 

likelihood the parent will be in a position to parent the child 

in the foreseeable future. Where the parent has been unable 

to rise above the addiction and experience sustained sobriety 

in a noncustodial setting, and establish the essential support 

system to maintain sobriety, there is little hope of success in 

parenting.

Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 25 (quoting In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1998)). A parent’s “temporary abstinence from drugs and 

alcohol does not outweigh his significant history of abuse or his consistent 

inability to abstain during [the dependency and termination proceedings].” 

Id. at 379, ¶ 29. Moreover, “drug abuse need not be constant to be 

considered chronic.” Id. at 377, ¶ 16. Ultimately, when determining 

whether to terminate parental rights because of a parent’s chronic substance 

abuse, “a child’s interest in permanency must prevail over a parent’s 

uncertain battle with drugs.” Jennifer S. v. DCS, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 

(App. 2016) (citing Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29).

¶17 The record reflects Father began using illegal drugs more than 

ten years ago, progressing from methamphetamines to opiates to heroin. 

Although Father reported he achieved sobriety prior to his incarceration, 

this claim is belied by his failure to consistently engage in the one service 

that would confirm his ability and commitment to remain sober: substance 

abuse testing. On at least three separate occasions, Father tested positive 

for some combination of heroin, amphetamines, and opiates. His use of 

illegal drugs continued until he was arrested and incarcerated for drugrelated offenses, just three months before the severance hearing. Moreover, 

while Father asserts that he attended meetings at Catholic Charities, emails 

from the substance abuse case manager at Catholic Charities indicated she 

could not “get any kind of a commitment from [Father] about meeting with 

[her].” 

¶18 Father presumably remained sober while serving his jail 

sentence. He failed, however, to establish his ability to maintain sobriety 

outside of a custodial setting for any portion of the proceedings. Father’s 

short period of abstinence while incarcerated does not outweigh his 

significant history of drug abuse or demonstrated inability to remain sober

outside of a custodial setting. See, e.g., Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994) (concluding a parent’s eventual 

efforts toward recovery from substance abuse, beginning eight months 

prior to the severance hearing, were “too little, too late”).
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

8

B. Inability to Discharge Parental Responsibilities

¶19 Father separately argues the juvenile court erred in finding 

clear and convincing evidence that his substance abuse rendered him 

unable to parent.6 To support this argument, Father relies on evidence that 

he had engaged in some treatment and would have a support system in 

place as well as access to further AA/NA meetings and parenting classes

upon his release.

¶20 To warrant severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), “the juvenile 

court must find that Father’s drug abuse hinders his ability to be an effective 

parent.” Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 19. Within the statute, the term 

“parental responsibilities” refers to “those duties or obligations which a 

parent has with regard to his child.” Id. at 378, ¶ 20 (quoting Maricopa Cty. 

Juv. Action No. JS-5894, 145 Ariz. 405, 408-09 (App. 1985). The term “is not 

intended to encompass any exclusive set of factors but rather . . . 

establish[es] a standard which permits a trial judge flexibility in considering 

the unique circumstances of each termination case.” Id. (quoting JS-5894, 

145 Ariz. at 409).

¶21 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father is 

unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of his history of 

chronic substance abuse. Child was initially placed in DCS’s custody

because Fatherleft Child with Mother, an unsafe caregiver who was driving 

under the influence with Child in the car, while Father was receiving 

emergency medical treatment in anticipation of entering a detox facility. 

Thereafter, despite facing the imminent loss of his Child, Father 

consistently failed to engage in services designed to address his substance 

abuse and was ultimately incarcerated for two counts of possession of 

heroin-related drug paraphernalia. These circumstances caused the DCS 

case manager to opine, among other things, that Father’s continuous

struggle with polysubstance abuse had affected his ability to provide Child 

with a stable, permanent home. See Raymond, 224 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 22.

¶22 We cannot say the juvenile court’s findings are inconsistent 

with the extensive evidence of Father’s historical and recent drug abuse and 

failure to commit to substance abuse services outside of a custodial setting, 

6 Contrary to Father’s assertions otherwise, the juvenile court did 

make an express finding that Father “is unable to discharge parental 

responsibilities because of a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, 

[and/or] controlled substances.” 
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

9

thus rendering him unable to effectively parent. We find no abuse of 

discretion.7

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding That 

Severance Was In Child’s Best Interests.

¶23 Termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests if 

the juvenile court finds “the child would benefit from a severance or be 

harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action 

No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990) (citations omitted); accord Alma S. v. DCS, 

245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018) (citing Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 

4, ¶ 16 (2016)).

¶24 Father argues the juvenile court erred in its best-interests 

determination for several reasons. First, Father argues the court should 

have explored a guardianship before it ordered severance. However, he

admits guardianship “was not discussed as a possibility at trial.” Thus, the 

issue of guardianship, raised for the first time on appeal, is waived. See 

Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 39, 44, ¶ 19 n.3 (App. 2008)

(declining to review arguments not raised in the juvenile court) (citing 

Paloma Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Jenkins, 194 Ariz. 133, 137, ¶ 17 (App. 1998)).

¶25 Second, Father argues this case “may have had a different 

outcome” had DCS facilitated visits with Child before he was incarcerated.

To be clear, DCS had discretion to allow therapeutic visits but declined to 

do so because Child was scared of Father, and the record reflects Father 

continued to abuse drugs. Regardless, the circumstances do not warrant 

reversal; even if visits had been appropriate and enabled Father to foster a 

bond with Child, “[t]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship 

between a biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not 

dispositive in addressing best interests.” Dominique M. v. DCS, 240 Ariz. 

96, 98-99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016) (citing Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 

Ariz. 345, 351, ¶ 30 (App. 2013)).

¶26 Finally, Father argues the juvenile court’s finding that

termination “would further the [current case] plan of adoption” is error 

7 Because we conclude clear and convincing evidence supports 

termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of chronic substance 

abuse, we need not address whether severance was warranted upon other 

grounds. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 

2002) (citing Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 27, and Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action 

No. JS-6520, 157 Ariz. 238, 242 (App. 1988)).
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

10

because it amounts to a finding that Child would be “better-off” with Uncle

than with Father.8 However, “[i]t is well established in state-initiated cases 

that the child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a bestinterests finding.” Demetrius L. 239 Ariz. at 4-5, ¶ 16 (citing Raymond F., 224 

Ariz. at 379, ¶ 30). Indeed, “[w]hen a current placement meets the child’s 

needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally possible and 

likely, a juvenile court may find that termination of parental rights, so as to 

permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” Id. at 4, ¶ 12 (citing Mary 

Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50-51, ¶¶ 19-21, and Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

194 Ariz. 376, 378, ¶ 6 (App. 1998)).

¶27 Here, in ruling on Child’s best interests, the juvenile court 

found termination of Father’s parental rights would “further the plan of 

adoption, which would [in turn] provide the child with permanency and 

stability” since Child’s “parents . . . failed to work on the substance abuse

issues . . . [that, in part,] caused him to be removed from their custody.” 

Additionally, the court found Child was “residing in an adoptive 

placement that [wa]s meeting all of his needs” and that Child ultimately 

“deserve[d] permanency and stability in a drug-free environment.” Thus, 

the court did not merely consider the benefit to Child from his current 

placement but also took into account Father’s history with substance abuse 

and failure to seek treatment before determining it was not in Child’s best 

interests to delay permanency any longer. 

¶28 These findings are supported by the evidence and are 

sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s determination that severance would 

benefit Child. Accordingly, the court did not err in concluding severance 

was in Child’s best interests.

8 Father also argues the juvenile court failed to consider Father’s 

rehabilitation efforts in its best-interests determination. See Alma S., 245 

Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15 (noting “that although the focus of the best-interests 

inquiry is on the child, courts should consider a parent’s rehabilitation 

efforts as part of the best-interests analysis”). The record reflects, however, 

that the court considered Father’s rehabilitation efforts, acknowledging that 

Father claimed to have achieved sobriety, but failed to complete UA testing 

or otherwise “work on the substance abuse issues . . . that caused [Child] to 

be removed from [the parties’] custody.”
SHAD C. v. DCS, J.C.

Decision of the Court

11

CONCLUSION

¶29 The juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights 

to Child is affirmed.