## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Koul ogeorge v . Cam pbell , 2012 IL App (1st) 112812

Appellate Court Caption EMI L Y KOUL OGEORGE, CHARL ES D. HUNTER, AND WI L L I AM O’ S HANK, as Trustee s of the Charles Rudolph Walgr een, J r. , Dec laration of Trust, Dated November 6, 1979, as Restated September 8, 1999, Plaintiffs and Counterdef endants, v. ROBERT CAMPBEL L
, CHARL ES R. WAL GREEN I I I
, L ESL I E ANN W AL GREEN P RAT T, J AMES ALAN W AL GREEN, R OTARY/ONE FOUN DATI ON, I NC., AND ROTARY FOU

NDATI ON OF ROTARY I NTERNATI ONAL
, et al.
, Def endants (Charle s R. Walgr een I I I
, L eslie Ann Walgr een Pratt, and J ames Alan Walgr een, Counterplaintiffs and Cross-plai n t i ffs and Appellants; Rotary

/One Foundation, Inc., and the Rotary Foundation of Rotary International, Cross-defe ndants and Appellee s; and Emily Ko u l o george , Charles D. Hunter, and Wil liam O’Shank, as Trustee s, Adler Planetarium, Dix on Historic Center, ENH Resear ch Institut e of Evanston Hospital, Evanston Northwe stern Hea lthcare Corporation, International College of Surg eons, N a ti o n a l Je w is h M e d ic a l and Resear ch Center, Rehabilitation Inst itute of Chicag o, the Rotary Foundation of Rotary International, Rotary /One Foundation, Inc., T KE Educational Foundation, Inc., University of Michig an, Walgr een Be nefit Fund, and Norman E. a

nd Har riet S. Wy

mbs Foundation, Inc., Cross-de fenda nts).

District & N o. First District, F ourth Division Docke t Nos. 1-11-2812, 1-11- 3321 cons.

Filed Rehea ringdenied Dec ember 31, 2012
Fe bruar y 27, 2013Held

(Note : Thi s syl lab us

con st it ute s no pa r t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by t he Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Plaintiffs failed to establish that dece dent intended to adee m or revoke his bequest to defe ndants, even though dece dent made simil ar g ifts to defe ndants a short time bef ore his death.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 2007-P-003435; the Hon. Mary

Ellen Coghla

n, J udg e, pre siding

J udg ment No. 1-11-2812, A ffirme d. No. 1-11-3321, D ismiss ed.

Counsel on Appea l Richard D. Boonstra and J ohn C. L illig, both of Hoog endoorn & Talbot L L P, and Patrick E. Dwyer I I I , both of Chicag o, for a ppellants.

Mark E. Shure, of L atimer L eVa y Fy ock L L C, of Chicag o, for appellee s.

Panel PRES I DI NG J USTI CE L AVI

N delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Pucinski and Epstein conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs-appellants, Charles R

. W al green I I I
, L eslie Ann Walgr een Pratt, and James Alan Walgr een (her einaf

ter, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries)
, the children of the late Charles R. Walgr een, J r., appea l from the circ uit court order s denying their cross-motion for summary judgme nt and g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of defe ndants -appe llees, Rotary /One Foundation, Inc., and the Rotary Foundation of Rotary Internationa l ( h e r e inafter
, collectively ref err ed to as t he R otary Foundations). The center of the di spute conce rns t h e p ro ce ed s of Walgr een’ s living trust. T he Walg ree n Be nefic iaries c ontend the trial court err ed in f ailing
to examine evidenc e showing that the late Charles R. Walgr een intended to, and did in fac t, adee m or revoke his bequest to the R o t ary Foundations. They also contend the trial court

err ed in fa iling to consider the issue of a

ttorney fee s. For the rea sons to follow, we af firm.

-2-¶ 2 BA CKGROUND

¶ 3 The rec ord, toge ther with the motions, complaints, and attache d documents, reve als the following

. Walgr een was a m ember of and/or contributor to the Rotary Foundations. I t is undisputed that he made regular cash don at i o n s t o Rotary International and, in 1997, Walgr een urg ed Rotary

/One Foundation members to include the org anization in their estate plans, as evidenc ed by a corr espondenc e from Richard M cK ay , the cocha irman of Rota ry / On e Foundation. I t is also undisputed that on October 13, 1997, Walgr een became

a member of “Rotary

/One Foundation L eg acy Awar d” prog ram by “pledg ing a mi n i mum bequest of $25,000 or more.” Walgr een signe d this form stating he had made arr ang ements to bequest 20,000 shar es of Walg ree n company common stock to Rotary /One F oundation. ¶ 4 Walgr een died in 2007, leaving behind a will that poured o v er i n t o his living trust, of which the plaintiffs-appe llants and the defe ndants-appe lle e s a r e b o th b e n e f

ic ia r ie s. Walgr een amende d the 1979 trust thr oug hout his life, including three times in the 1980s, twice in the 1990s, and once in 200 6. Relevant here
, the rec ord shows that on September 8, 1999, Walgr een restate d his decla ration of trust in its entirety

. Reg arding any future amendments, Walgr een stated under “Ar ticle Ten” of the trust that: “I may at any time or times during my lifetime by instrument in writing delivere d to the trustee amend or revoke this decla ration of
trust in whole or in part. The trust proper ty to which any revoc ation relates shall be conveyed to me or otherw ise as I

may direc t. This power is per sonal to me and may not be exercised by my leg al repr esentative or others.” In addition to rest at i n g his decla ration of trust, Walgr een also amende d the restate ment that same day

. The 1999 amendment at issue in this

case stated in ty

pewr itten form: “Upon my death, the trustee shall distribute the number of share s of the common capital stock of Walgr een Co., an I llinois corporat i o n , or any other asset, set forth befor e the distributee’s name in the attache d Ex hibit A, which shall b e h an dwritten or signe d or initialed by me, to eac h person listed in that exhibi t who is living at my death and to eac h instit ution listed in that exhibi t which is in exis tence at my death. Ex hibit A, as it exis ts at my death, shall be deeme d to be an Amendment to the Dec laration of Trust, acc epted by me as trustee , if executed a fter the date of this amendment.” Walgr een signe d the September 8, 1999, amendment, which was notarized. Attache d to the amendment was “Exhibi t A,” a so-ca lled “B enef iciary L ist,” consisting of eig ht handwr itten
pag es on lined paper delineating g ifts of hi s persona l proper ty and s t o ck to various people and some 33 instit utions and org anizations. The persona l proper ty g ifts wer e decide dly of the
persona l va

riety
, rang ing from a “bra ss ta ble lamp with a g ree nshade” and “ca st iron kettle 19[-inch] diameter ,” desig nated for cer tain offspring

. In terms of stock g ifts, the list provided for the dispositi on of more than 900,000 share s of stock in Walgr een’ s company

. Of singula r importance to this appeal, Walg ree n desig nated that “ the Foundation of Rotary /One Club”

was to rec eive 10,000 share s, and Rotary International Foundation was to rec eive 10,000 share s, with half that amount t o go toward “the Polio Plus campa ign to immuniz e the children of

the World.” ¶ 5 Alleg edly
, afte r Walgr een executed the afor ementioned ty pewr itten portion of the 1999 amendment, he prese nted his trustee and financ ial advisor Emily Koulog eorg e with a seale d

-3-envelope containing the handwr itten Be nefic iary L ist. He alleg edly stated he wanted the

contents to rema in a secr et until his death and direc ted Koulog eorg e to place the seale d envelope in a fire proof c abinet at his Walg ree n company headqua rters. She c omplied. ¶ 6 In the fall of 1999, acc ording to a tax-return attachme n t , W al gre en m ad e “cha ritable contributions” of stock to 15 instit utions, i ncluding the University of Michig an (120,000 share s), Adler Planetariu m (1 0
, 0 00 share s), and the International Museum of Surg ical Science s (5,000 share s). Included in that list wer e the Rotary Founda tions, with 10,000 share s g oing to Rotary Interna tional on Sept em b er 1 5
, and 10,000 share s g oing to Rotary /One on October 4. Although Walgr een g ave the Rotary Foundation s th e s ame number of share s in 1999 that wer e set forth in t h e Be n ef iciary L ist, the amounts he g ave other instit utions varie d. For example, in th e Be n eficiary L ist, Walgr een desig nated that Adler Planetarium wa s to rece ive 6,000 share s as a bequest, but the t ax-return document ref lects

a donation of 10,000 share s. On the other hand, under the Be nefic iary L ist, the Museum of Surg ical Science was to rec eive 10,000 share s, but the tax-return document ref lects a g ift of 5,000 share s in 1999. Almost all of the instit utions in the tax-return document wer e also identified in the Be nefic iary L ist, with the exception of four (Northland College
, North Dakota State University , the Univer sity of I llinois , and the National Defe nse F und). ¶ 7 Shortly afte r the share s wer e dispensed to the Rotary Foundation of Rotary Interna tional in 1999, Kar en L aChape lle
, t h e gi ft administration supervisor for the Foundation, wrote Walgr een thanking him for his September 16 g ift of 10,000 share s to the Founda tion (value d
at $250

, 0 0 0 ) an d as sured him that, pursuant to his reque st, half that amount would be devoted to the Polio Plus campa ign. Other letters from the fall of 1999 ref lect that Walgr een prese nted “pre -beque st” donations, “pre pay ment on my bequest,” or “adva nce pay ment” of Walgr een company share s in his trust to t he National J ewish Medica l Foundation, the Rehabilitation Institut e of Chicag o, and the Tau Kappa Epsilon Foundation. Corresponde nce betwee n Walgr een and the University of Michig an reve als that Walgr een did the same throug hout the 1990s by prese nting the universi t y wi t h various “adva nces” from his trust bequest. The parties do not now dispute that, under the doctrine of ademption, these letters
sug g est Walgr een i n t ended to revoke g ifts identified in his trust to the National J ewish Medica l Founda

tion, the Rehabilitation Institut e of Chicag o, t h e T au Kappa Epsilon Foundation, and University of Michig an, by g iving these instit utions Walgr een share s during his lifetime. Ruby v . Ruby , 2012 I LApp (1st) 103210, ¶ 16 ( definingademption). ¶ 8 In Se p t em b er 2 0 0 0
, W algre en appar ently suffe red a stroke. On Dec ember 6, 2001, Walgr een’ s atto rn ey J oseph Foster
, per Foster ’s deposition testimony
, attended a meeting with the 95-y ear -old Walgr een at the company headqua rters, wher e Walgr een unveiled the 1999 trust amendment. Once there
, Walgr een, who was in a whee lchair at his desk, reque sted that Koulog eorg e secur e the afor ementioned seale d envelope from the firepr oof safe

. After she did so, Walgr een direc ted her to wait outside with another trust ee while, from behind closed doors, F oster and Walg ree n discussed t he conte nts of the enve lope, which include d the two-pag e, ty

pewr itten “Trust Amendment,” dated September 8, 1999, and the eig ht-pag e handwr itten Be nefic iary L ist, serving as Ex hibit A. Foster testified the trust amendment amende d “the distributive provisions for the benef iciarie s named in [W alg ree n’s] longha nd [i n] Ex hibit A.” Foster rea d aloud the bequests identified in Ex hibit A line by line and asked

-4-Walgr een if the document corr ectly identified what he wished to distribute on his death,

whether it was Walgr een’ s signa ture on ever

y pag e, and whether the document truly ref lected Walgr een’ s intentions. Walgr een answe red these questions in the a f f ir ma ti v e

. F o ster testified that the Be nef

i ci ar y L ist thus ref

lected the desired dispositi on of the Walgr een company stock. ¶ 9 Walgr een pas s ed aw ay o n Fe b ru ary 10, 2007, at the ag e of 100. Although se vera l differ ent versions of the handwr itten Be nefic iary L ist surfa ced following Walgr een’ s death, the parties have ag ree d that Ex hibit I is the “ef fec tive amendment” to the trust. Fur thermore
, althoug h t h e p ar t i es d i d not nece ssarily ag ree below, they now ag ree that at the time of Walgr een’ s death, he owned 930,483 share s of W algre en company stock. The parties also
now agr ee that the t otal share s set forth in the B enef iciary L ist equale d 933,658, assuming the enti ties and individuals wer e exis ting at the time of Walgr een’ s death. This, they say , cre ated a shortfall of 3,175 sha

res. ¶ 10 Following Walgr een’ s death, the trust ee s fi l ed a complaint for a decla ratory judgme nt constructing the trust and naming some 100 individuals and entities with an alleg ed interest in the deter

mination. In rele vant part, the trustees soug ht decla ration reg arding the impact of
any shortfall i n Walgr een c ompany share s of s tock when Walgr een died. The trustees also
reque sted that the court deter mine whether a one-pa g e, undated document, handwr it ten in pencil on lined paper and l i s t i n g some 35 instit utions, acc ompanied by two columns of numbers (her einaf

ter the Charity L ist), was an eff ective amendment to the trust. The trustees alleg ed that the wee k befor e Walgr een died, one of his g randsons discovere d the Charity L ist in Walgr een’ s filing cabine t at his residenc e. The words “Exhibi t A” are printed upside down toward the bottom of the pag e. The org anizations on the C harity L ist, and the sequence by which they are listed
, l arge ly ref lect the Be nefic iary L ist. In a column next to eac h
org anization on the Charity L ist is a number t h at reflects share s bequeste d to the
org anizations, with the exc ep tion of Shedd Aquar ium and the University of Michig an; reg arding those two org anizations, the number listed and that bequeste d varie s. In addition,
most of the org anizations that rec eived stock contributions in 1999, as identified in the taxreturn document, ar e l i s ted on the Charity L ist, along with the share s g iven in a second column. ¶ 11 On J anuar

y 28, 2009, noting that the trustees’ complaint did not adequa tely advanc e their interests, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries filed a counter claim for decla ratory relief and under the leg al doctrine of ademption. The Walgr een Be nefic iaries alleg ed that Walg ree n’s beque sts to 11 org anizations identified in the Be nefic iary L ist, including the Rotary Founda tions, should be revoke d beca

use, during his lifetime, Walgr een had prese nted these org anizations with g ifts intended to take the place of the bequests. The Walgr een Be nefic iaries thus beca me cross-pla intiffs and the Rotary Foundations, cross-de fenda nts. The Walgr een Be nefic iaries
argued the lifetime g ifts cre ated a latent ambiguity in the trust, requiring the examination of extrinsi c evidenc e. The Walgr een Be nefic iaries thus alleg ed these entities wer e rec eiving a “double benef

it,” cre ating a shortfall of available share s. In support of their ademption claim, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries pointed to the Charity L ist, alleg ing that it r epre sented a sort of “scor eca rd” Walgr een used to keep trac k of the share s he had g iven to the subject
org anizations during his lifetime. They also relied upon the afor ementioned corr espondenc e

-5-wher ein the org anizations a cknowledg ed the share s wer e a “pre bequest” lifetime g ift or an

“adva nce pay ment” of the planned g ift. This, they sug g ested, proved Walgr een’ s prebe quest g ifting pattern. ¶ 12 In count VI
, t h e W al gre en Benefic iaries alleg ed that althoug h the Be nefic iary L ist direc ted that Rotary International rec eive 10,000 share s of Walgr een stock (with half g oing
to the Polio Plus projec t), this bequest was adee med by Wa l gre en ’s S eptember 16, 1999, donation of 10,000 share s to the org anization. The Walgr een Be nefic iaries also aver red that the September 23, 1999, letter to Walgr een from the Rotary Interna tional g ift supervisor L aChape lle supported its a lleg ations, since Walg ree n’s reque st that ha lf the donation g o to Polio Plus trac ked the languag e of his bequest. In count XI
, the Walgree n Be nefic iaries alleg ed that althoug h the September 8, 1999, Be n ef i ci ary L ist direc ted that Rotary /One

rec eive 10,000 share s of Walgr een stock, this bequest was adee emed by Walgr een’ s October 4, 1999, donation of 10,000 share s to the org anization. The Walgr een Be nefic iaries, finally
, reque sted rea sonable a

ttorney fee s be cha

rg eable ag ainst the fund or pr operty in question. ¶ 13 Followingsettlement neg otiations between the Walgr een B enef iciarie s and 7 of the 11 char ities, the trial court enter ed an agree d order on September 22, 2009, which was draf ted by the Walgr een Be nefic iaries with respe ct to the Walgr een trust. The parties stipulated three points rele vant to this appea l–(1) that the Charity L ist was not an amendment to the trust and its “impact, if any ,” on the distribution of Walgr een stock from the trust was confine d to the unresolved claims; (2) that following settlement with the Un i v ersity of Michig an, the W al green trust held sufficie nt stock to satisfy the bequests in the Be nefic iary L ist an d
, “ther efor e, no shortfall exis ts”; and (3) that no benef iciary had a basis to claim attorney fee s from the trust. The court decla red that the order deter

mined the rig hts of all parties reg arding alleg at ions in the trustees’ complaint, except the rema ining counter claim counts of the Walgr een Be nefic iaries, and then decla red the order final for the purposes of appea l. The Rotary Foundations appea led the attorney fee s issue, but ultimately dismiss ed the appea l in 2011. On Marc h 9, 2010, the trial court enter ed an ag ree d order further g ranting the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ motion for volun t ar y d i s missal of the counter claim as to the

rema ining org anizations, with the exception of the Rotary Foundations. Thus, of the 11
org anizations named in t h e co u n t erc laim suit, the onl y rema ining lit iga tion involved the 2 Rotary org anizations. ¶ 14 Follow in g discovery
, the Rotary Foundations and the Walgr een Be nefic iaries filed cr ossm o t ions for summary judgme nt. The Rotary Foundations argued that the doctrine of ademption did not apply to tr usts unde r I llinois law and that, even if it we re to a pply
, there

was no evidenc e that Walgr een intended to adee m the bequests identified in the Be nefic iary L ist, in fac t g oing so far as to argue that the evidenc e demonstrated Walgr een did not intend
to adee m these bequests. In support, the Rotary Foundations pointed to the deposition testimony of Walgr een’ s attorney , Foster
, which was attache d to their motion for summary judgme nt. ¶ 15 The Walgr een Be nefic iaries, on the other hand, argued that ademption applied to trusts and that the evidenc e demonstrated Walgr een intended to adee m his bequests to the Rotary Foundations by

g iving them the s hare s in 1999. In support of t his argument, the W alg ree n Be nefic iaries pointed to the September 23, 1999, letter from L aChape lle to Walgr een,

-6-wher ein L aChape lle assure d Walgr een that pursuant to his reque st half of the g ift would be

devoted to the Polio Plus c ampaig n. Citi ng the Be nefic iary L ist, wher e Walgr een made the

same reque st reg arding the Polio Plus prog ram, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries argued the letter raised a “pre sumption of ademption.” The Walgr een Be nefic iaries further argued that Walgr een’ s prebe quest g ifts to other char ity org anizations e stablished the same intent with
respe ct the Rotary Foundations. F inally
, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries pointed to an aff idavit from Carol Gibson, of the National J ewish Medica l & Resear ch Center, attesting to a letter and internal memoranda relating to Walgr een’ s p re bequest g ift to the rese arc h cente r. In

sever al memoranda
, Gibson stated Walgr een told her that he was prese nting prebe quest g ifts
to “all of the char ities in his L iving Trust.” Acc ording ly
, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries claimed that the Rotary Founda

tions wer e not eac h entitled to 10,000 share s of Walgr een stock, since it would be a double be nefit. ¶ 16 The Rotary Foundation subsequently filed a motion to strike Gibson’s aff idavit and the Charity L ist. After responsive motions wer e filed, the trial court held a h ea ri ng on the pending motions on Marc h 16, 2011. Although the rec ord does not contain a transcr ipt of the hear ing, an April 14 order reve als that the judge hear d arguments by the parties in open court. Following this, the court g rante d the Rotary Foundation’s motion for summary judgme nt while reje cting the Walgr een Be nefic iary ’s cross-motion for summary judgme nt. As a result, the t ri al court found the Rotary Foundations’ motions to strike wer e moot. In the written order , the cour

t held that there was “ no ambig uity in any of the trust docume nts at issue.” ¶ 17 The Walgr een Be nefic iaries filed a motion to rec onsider in which they argued the court failed to consider extrinsi c evidenc e submitt ed in support of their motion for s u m m ary judgme nt to deter

mine if there was a latent ambiguit y i n the t rust. They further argued the trial court err ed by failing to awa rd them attorney fee s “to be paid out of the proper ty or fund in question in thi s liti g ation.” ¶ 18 Following a hear ing on the motion, held August 30, 2011, the court denied the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ motion to rec onsider. In an August 31 order
, the court stated that it had considere d the “extrinsic evidenc e” submitt ed by the parties, as well as the trust documents, and reiter ated the absenc e of patent or l atent ambiguity in the trust. The court further deter mined that the W algree n Be nefic iaries had failed to raise the issue of attorney fee s in their motion for summary judgme nt or in their arg uments at the hear ing. The court added that the prior September 22, 2009, order reg ardin g att orney fee s was still pending on appea l. Following this deter

mination, the W algree n Be nefic iaries filed a mot ion for leave to file a petition for attorne y

fee s, which wa s denied on Oc tober 6, 2011. ¶ 19 The Walgr een Be nefic iaries subsequently filed a n otice of appea l of the April 14 and August 31 trial court order s disposing of the parties’ summary judgme nt motions in appea l No. 1-11-2812, a

nd a sepa rate notice of a

ppeal of the Octobe r 6 t rial cour

t order disposing of the attorney fee s claim in appea l No. 1-11-3321. This court g rante d the Walgreen Be nefic iaries’ motion to consoli date the a ppeals.

¶ 20 ANALYSI S ¶ 21 Summar y judgme nt is proper wher e the pleading s, aff idavits, depositions, admissions
,

-7-and exhibi ts, when viewed in a light most favor able to the nonmoving party , demonstrate that

there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l f act and the movant is e ntitled to judgme nt a s a matter of law. 735 I L CS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010); Ruby
, 2012 I L App (1st) 103210, ¶ 13. Where, as here
, the parties file cross-motions for summary judgme nt, they conce de there are

no g enuine issues of m ater ial fac t and invite the cour t to decide the questions prese nted as
a matter of law. Ruby , 2012 I L App (1st) 103210, ¶ 13. Noting that this court is not bound by the par ties’ conc essions (see Hagen v

. Distributed Solutions, Inc.
, 328 I ll. App. 3d 132, 137 (2002))
, we proce ed in our de novo rev i ew o f the trial court’s decision reg arding
summary judgme nt. Id

. ¶ 22 The focus of this appea l relates to construing Walgr een’ s trust and, in particula r, his 1999 amendment to the trust. The centr al purpose of trust construction is to asce rtain the settlor’s intent from the trust as a whole, and to eff ectuate that intent if not contra ry to public policy

. Ford v. Newman
, 77 I ll. 2d 335, 338 (1979); Stein v. Scott
, 252 I ll. App. 3d 611, 614 (1993). The settlor’s intent is to be deter mined solely by ref

ere nce to the plain languag e of the trust itself. Stein
, 252 I ll. App. 3 d at 6 1 5

. I n addition to the trust’s languag e, the court may consider the circ umstances surrounding the trust’s execution to deter mine the settlor’s intent ( Ruby
, 2012 I L App (1st) 103210, ¶ 19; Bollman v. Pehlman
, 352 I ll

. Ap p

. 3d 1203, 1205 (2004))
, and extrinsic evidence may be admitted to aid interpr etation onl y if the document is ambig uous, and the settlor’s intent c annot be asce rtained ( Stein
, 252 I ll. App. 3d at 615). ¶ 23 Consist ent with their position below, the Walgr een Be nefic i ar i es ar gue that while the
trust demonstrates Walgr een intended to bequest eac h of the Rotary Founda tions 10,000 of Walgr ee n company stock, Walgr een’ s lifetime g ifts to the org anizations unequivoca lly
operated as an ademption or revoc ation o f t h e b equests. Ademption is the exti nction, alienation, withdrawa l, or satis fa ct i o n of a leg acy or devise by some act of the testator by which an intention to revoke is indicated; g ener ally speaking
, ademption is u sually established by some act reg arding the subject matter of the devise that interfe res with the
operation of a will, thus signify ing an alteration in the subject matter of the leg acy or devise. Brady v. Paine
, 391 I ll. 596, 600-01 (1945); see also Ruby
, 2012 I L App (1st) 103210, ¶ 16 (citing Brady ). In o t h er wo rd s, when a testator bequeaths a specific item of proper ty to

someone but then disposes of the item befor e dying, the bequest is said to be “ade emed,” and the devisee cannot inherit that item or its value. Bollman
, 352 I ll. App. 3d at 1206. This longstanding doctrine appli es t o d evis es of both rea l estate and bequests of persona l proper ty

. Brady , 391 I ll. at 601. ¶ 24 As a result of the alleg ed ade m p t i o n , t h e W al green Be nefic iaries contend the trust

n ec essarily contained a latent ambig uity

. A latent ambig uity occur s wher e the lang uag e employ ed is clea

r and intelligible and sug g ests but a single meaning
, but some extrinsi c fac t

or extraneous evidenc e cre ates a ch oice among two or more possible meaning s. Hays v. Il l i n o i s Industrial Home for the Blind
, 12 I ll. 2d 625, 628 (1958). For the thresh o l d d eter mination of whether a will, and by implication a trust, is ambig uous, th e co u rt m ay examine the four corne rs of the will and evidenc e broug ht by the parties which tends to show

a latent ambig uity

. Coussee v. Estate of Efston
, 262 I ll. App. 3d 419, 424 (1994). I f a petition
to construe a will or trust states fac ts that, if proven, show a latent ambig uity
, only then will

a hear ing with extrinsi c evidenc e b e h eld to deter mine the possible exis tence of a latent

-8-ambig uity as alleg ed. In re Estate of Smith , 198 I ll. App. 3d 400, 402 (1990). ¶ 25 The Rotary Foundations respond that there is no ambig uity in the Walgr een t ru st and,

even if there wer e, the evidenc e adduce d did not show that Walgr een ever intended to adee m his g ifts to them. Acc ording ly
, the Rotary Foundations reque st that this court aff irm the trial court’s awa

rd of summary judgme nt in their favor and the denial of the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ cross-motion for summar y judgme nt. ¶ 26 The Rotary Foundations claim, alternatively
, that the doct ri n e o f ad em p t i o n , while applicable to wills, does not apply in the context o f t ru s t s

. They also argue that this court need not rea ch such a question if we aff irm the summary judgme n t m o t i o n in their favor

. Given that our dispositi on, not to mention that of the trial court, hinge s on whether Walgr een adee med the Rotary Founda tions’ bequests with his lifetime g ift, we think it appropr iate to consider first and foremost wh et h er the doctrine of ademption applies i n the t rust context. Fur ther analy sis would otherwise prove fruitless. In Ruby
, this court rec ently considere d whether the doctrine of ademption should be considere d in the trust context. Ruby noted that
courts use the same principles to ascertain a settlor’s intent when interpre ting a trust document as used to interpre t a will and, g iven that ademption also looks to intent, the court found “no rea son why the conce pt should not be cons i d er ed ” with reg ard to trusts. Ruby
, 2012 I L App (1st) 103210, ¶ 20. That Walgr een appar ently cre ated the trust ref ere nced in his will as part of a compre hensive estate plan, further supports applying the ademption doctrine in the t rust co ntext

. See W asserman v. Cohen
, 606 N.E.2d 901, 903-04 (Mass. 1993). The Rotary Founda

tions have not offe red any persua sive rea sons not to apply the doctrine of ademption to trusts, and we the ref ore f ollow Rubyto reviewthe merits. ¶ 27 Her e, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries find it dispositi ve that Walgr een adee med g ifts to other
org anizations or entities following his trust amendment, and they argue that this eff ectively confirme d his intent to adee m his g ifts to the Rotary Foundations as well. This, they sug g est, exposes a “latent ambig uity ” in the trust with reg ard to “all the g ifts” in the Be nefic iary L ist. In other words, their sug g estion is that ademption to o ne nece ssarily beg s the question of ademption to all, resulting in ambiguity in all the bequests. ¶ 28 The Rotary Foundations do not attempt to de ny that Walgr een adee med his be quests to the Nati o nal J ewish Medica l Foundation, the Rehabilitation Institut e of Chicag o, the Tau Kappa Epsilon Foundation, and the University of Michig an–org anizations also identified in the Be nefic iary L ist–by g ifting the money to them during his lifeti m e. Nonethele ss, they maintain t h e d o ct ri ne of ademption cannot be applied to them on the evidenc e befor e this court. We agree

. ¶ 29 As an initial matter, we note t h at al t h o u g h the rec ord sug g ests the stated bequests in Walgr een’ s Ben efic iary L ist could not be fulfilled beca use there simply wer e not enoug h

s h ar es , this shortfall appar ently was reme died. As related above, the September 22, 20 0 9
, court order draf

ted by the Walgr een Be neficiaries decla red that, following settlement
neg otiations with the University of Michig an, a shortfal l no longe r exis ted and the trust maintained sufficie nt stock to satisfy all bequests. Altho u gh the rec ord does not detail the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ neg otiations with t h e n i n e other org anizations identified in their
counter claim, we r ead the September 22 or der to mea n that there are now sufficie nt sha res

-9-to satisfy any stated beque st to the Rotary Foundations. ¶ 30 Stil l, we are require d to addre ss the Walgree n Be nefic iaries’ position that Walgr een’ s actions during the end of his lifetime prove his intent to adee m these bequests, and they rely mainly upon In re Estate of Kreitman
, 6 8 I l l

. App. 3d 523, 527 (1979). In that case , the
executor broug ht a petition to construe the dece dent’s will to decla re a specific $5,000 leg acy to responde nt Northwe st Home for the Ag ed was adee med by the dece dent’s lifetime g ift in that same amount to the named be nefic iary . Noting that the responde nt failed to answe r or otherwise plead, the appellate court deter m i n ed the trial court proper ly found the leg acy adee med because respondent ha d eff ectively admitted ever

y alleg ation in the petition. The appellate court further noted that “it wou l d not have been the intention of the dece dent to make two bequests” to the same benef iciary
, wher e the Northwe st Home alre ady had cre ated

a specia l plaque in memory of the dece dent and his wife in acc ordanc e with the lifetime g ift, thus fulfilling the very purpose of the leg acy

. In re Estate of Kreitman
, 68 I ll. App. 3d at 527. ¶ 31 We find Kreitman distinguishable from the case sub judi c e

. F irst, in contra st to Kreitman
, the Rotary Foundations have pointedly not admitted ademption occur red. And, while Kreitman demonstrates that in cer tain instances a settlor’s act of disposing of proper ty during his lifetime that he specific ally bequeste d can reve al intent to adee m, we do not believe that is case befor e us. See Brady , 391 I ll. at 601 (“The rule is well settled that if the te stator, i n his lifetime, disposes of proper ty specific ally devised by him, this wi l l operate as a

revoc ation ***.”); but see Hobin v. O’Donne ll
, 115 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d 9 4 0
, 943 (1983) (if the dece dent is incapa

ble of for ming r equisite intent, there c an be no a demption). ¶ 32 Intention as established by the evidenc e must preva il ( Pri d mo r e v. Pridmore
, 187 I ll. App. 301, 306 (1914))
, and, here
, the written communications betwee n Walgr een and cer tain
org anizations in the Benef ici ary L ist unequivoca lly show that when W alg ree n wished t hat his lifetime g ift satisfy a specific bequest, he stated as much. See Richardson v. Eve land
, 126 I ll. 37, 43 (1888) (to det er m i n e ademption, one must observe whether “ther e are words

acc ompanying the subsequent g ift sufficie ntly express to show an intention on the part of the donor that the latter benef it should be in substitut ion of the former ”). That is, had Walgr een intended to adee m his bequest t o t he Rotary Foundations, we conclude the Walgr een Be nefic iaries would have been able t o prese nt this court with some direc t evidenc e of that intention during discove ry

. ¶ 33 Whil e the Walgr een Be nefic iaries would have u s re l y u p o n i n fe re nce, the ava ilable evidenc e actua lly points the other way

. It shows that Walgr een was a member and/or contributor of the Rotary Foundations an d p resented reg ular cash donations to Rotary International and also urg ed members of Rotary / On e t o i n clude the org anization in their
estate plans. In 1997, Walgr een specific ally pledg ed to bequest 20,000 share s of Walgr een’ s stock. Although the Walgr een Be nefic iaries cer tainly prese n t ed evidenc e showing that Walgr een might have intended to adee m specific bequests to the National J ewish Medical Foundation, the Rehabilitation Institut e of Chicag o, the Tau Kappa Epsilon Foundation, and the University of Mi chig an, we decline to p re s u m e t hat W alg ree n’s i ntent reg arding those
org anizations extends to the Rotary Foundations. In a somewhat analog ous situation, this
court has held t h at wher e a testator identifies “childre n” named in his will, naming two specific children, and it comes to light he has additional children, this does not cre ate a latent

-10-ambig uity as to the intended benef iciarie s. In re Estate of

Hurst
, 329 I ll. App. 3d 326, 340-41 (2002). It is a basic principle that courts have a duty to construe wills or trusts as they find them rathe r t han chang e or rewri t e t h em ( Hu r s t , 329 I ll. App. 3d at 341), and the ultimate question befor e us is not what W algree n meant to say , but what he did say in his trust (see In re Estate of Goodkind
, 356 I ll. App. 3d 607, 615 (2005))

. To presume Walgr een intended
to adee m g ifts to the Rotary Foundations would be contra ry to the plain languag e of the trust

as a whole, including article 10’s amendment provisions and to the Be nefic iary L ist, which

as the trial court stated below, unambig uously bequests the stated shares to the Rotary Foundations, among m an y others. S ee Ruby
, 2012 I L App (1st) 103210, ¶ 19 (“where one construction of a will would rende r a portion of it meaning less and another construction would g ive eff

ect to all provisions and all l anguag e, the construction g iving eff ect to the latter construction will be adopted” (interna l quotation marks omitted)); s ee al s o Meily v. Knox
, 191 I ll. App. 126, 135 (1915) (noting that “the intention of the testator is the pole star for the direc tion of devises, and that all case s which depend upon it are best deter mined upon compar ing a ll the parts of the de vise itself without looking into a multitude of other c ases, for eac h stands pretty much upon its own circ umstance s ” ( in te r n a l q uotation marks omitted)). The Walgr een Be nefic iaries have failed to demonstrate a latent ambiguity exis ts with reg ard to the Rotary

Be nefic iaries. ¶ 34 In rea ching this conclusion, we question t h e W al green Be nefic iaries’ relianc e on the Charity L ist to show Walgr een intended to adee m his bequest to the Rotary Foundations. As stated, the Charity L ist, which was appar ently discovere d by Walgr een’ s g randson, appea rs to be a handwr itten list of g ifts and bequests made to various foundations identified in both the 1999 tax document and also in the Be nefic iary L ist, and has an upside down “Exhibi t A” ty ped at the bottom, but no signature. Be y ond that, very littl e is known about the document. “Evidenc e that would be inadmissible at trial is not admissible in support of or in opposition
to a motion for summary judgme nt.” Complete Conference Coo r d i nators, Inc. v. Kumon North Americ a , In c. , 394 I ll. App. 3d 105, 108 (2009). Ba sic evidenc e rules require a proponent of documentar

y evidenc e to lay a foundation for the introduction of that document into evidenc e, and evidenc e must be prese nted to demonstrate that the document is what its
p ro p o n en t claims it to be. Id. The Walgr een Be nefic iaries, in the fac e of the Rotary Foundations’ motion to strike the Charity L ist, simply have not provided a sufficie nt foundation for admitting the document, and we decline to consider it. Moreove r, its impact is speculative, and finding that it cre ates a latent ambig uity here would be tantamount to

rewriting the trust. See Smith
, 1 9 8 I l l

. Ap p

. 3d at 401. The same can be said reg arding Gibson’s email, wher e she conveyed that Walgr een had stated he was prese nting prebe quest g ifts to “all the char ities in his L i v i n g Trust.” Even wer e we to find this document admissible, the re is no evidenc e that Walgr een acte d consistently with G ibson’s statement, leavingthe content of

the email equivoc al at best. ¶ 35 We also reje ct the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ insistence that the t ri al co u rt re fused to examine the ex trinsic evidenc e sub m i t t ed

. The trial court appare ntly held a hear ing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgme nt and, per its April 14 order
, stated in “open court” its re as o n s for denying the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ motion. Yet, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries have failed to include a transcr ipt, a by stander’ s repor t, or an ag ree d statement

-11-of fac ts ref lecting the proce eding
, which would be nece ssary to addre ss their argument. See I ll. S. Ct. R. 323 (ef

f. Dec

. 13, 2005); Smolinski v. Vojta
, 363 I ll. App. 3d 752, 757 (2006). Moreove r, the trial court stated in response t o t h e W al gree n Be nefic iaries’ motion to

rec onsider th at i t h ad revie wed all the pleading s and evidenc e submitt ed. Reg ardle ss, we woul d re m i nd the Walgr een Be nefic iaries that our revie w of the matter is de novo , and, having revie wed the rec ord, we cannot say a g enuine issue of materia l f act exis ts suf

ficient
to warr ant a tria l. ¶ 36 Having deter

mined that Rotary was entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law, we reje ct the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ alternative reque st for trial. We note that in the context of this case involving cross-motions for summary judgme nt, and wher e t h e W alg ree n Be nefic iaries specific ally stated in their summary judgme nt motion they “conte nd that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts,” their trial re quest makes little sense. ¶ 37 We next consider the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ rema ining contention that they are entitled
to rea sonable attorney

fee s. The Rotary

Foundations respond that the S eptember 22, 2009, trial court order d en y i n g t h e claims of “all benef iciarie s” to attorney fee s from the trust fore closes the Walg ree n Be nefic iaries’ fee argument. ¶ 38 The trial court enter ed t h e September 22 order following the Walgr een B enef iciarie s’ motion, entitled “Resolution of Certain I ssues to Fa cilitate Distributions to Be nefic iaries and Settlement of Ademption Claims and for Suspension of Discover y Dea dline.” There in, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries stated they h ad settled with 7 of the 11 counter claim defe ndantsb e n e f ic ia r ie s , r e s o lv in g their asser

tions of ademption and permitting the distribution of s h a r e s to the uncontested parties to commence

. Although the agr ee d o rder noted that litigation betwee n the Walgr een Be nefic iaries and the Rotary Foundations rema ined pending
, th e o r d e r disposed of the attorney fee s issue with respe ct to “all benef iciarie s.” The trial court then
enter ed an I llinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010) finding
, thus dictating that its ruling wa s final and a

ppeala ble. See D’Agostino v. Lync h
, 382 I ll. App. 3d 639, 641-42 (2008) (an order is final if it disposes of the rig hts of the parties, either upon t h e en t i re controve rsy

or upon some def

inite and sepa

rate part ther eof)

. ¶ 39 Al t h o u gh t h e t ri al co u rt enter ed a final order as to the issue of attorne y fe es fo r benef iciarie s, the Walgr een Be nefic iaries did not appea l the order within the requisite 30-day period. See I ll. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (May 30, 2008); R. 304(a) (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). Be cause they failed to do so, this court is without jurisdiction to revie w the Sep t em b er 2 2 order or the claim the Walgr een Be nefic iaries now raise. See D’Agostino
, 382 I ll. App. 3d at 642; Leva cc a re v. Levacc are , 376 I ll. App. 3d 503, 511 (2007). Simi larly
, this court is without jurisdiction to revie w the trial court’s October 6, 2011, order denying t he Walgr een Be nefic iarie s ’ motion for attorney fee s. As the trial court no longe r had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter to consider the merits, such an order is void. See People v. Hood
, 387 I ll. App. 3d 380, 387 (2008); see also People v. Flowers
, 208 I ll. 2d 291, 306-07 (2003) (noting that a void order does not cloak the appellate court with jurisdiction to consider the

m er i t s of an appea l). Ba sed on the fore g oing, we are compelled to vacate the trial co u rt ’s order and to dismiss the W alg ree n Be nefic iaries’ appea l No. 1-11-3321, from the October 6 trial court or der, f

or lac k of jurisdiction. Hood , 387 I ll. App. 3d at 387.

-12-¶ 40 CONCL USI ON

¶ 41 Ba sed on the fore g oing, we af fi rm t he judgme nt of the circ uit court of Cook County
g rantingsummary

judgme nt in favor of the Rotary Foundations a nd denying the Walgr een Be nefic iaries’ motion for summary judgme nt in appea l N o. 1-11-2812. We dismiss appeal No. 1-11-3321 f

or lac k of jurisdiction.

¶ 42 No. 1-11-2812, A ffirme d. ¶ 43 No. 1-11-3321, D ismiss ed.

-13-