United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 6, 2015*

Decided November 12, 2015

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2112

ALFRED O. McGEE, JR.,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE

CORPORATION,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 5989

Robert W. Gettleman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Alfred McGee defaulted on his car loan. In a complaint bearing hallmarks of the

“sovereign citizen” movement, see El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Services, Inc., 710 F.3d 748, 750

(7th Cir. 2013); Bryant v. Washington Mutual Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758–60

(W.D. Va. 2007), McGee sued the lender, Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation, because

it would not honor a “bill of exchange” that, McGee said, made the United States

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 15‐2112    Page 2

Treasury responsible for his debt. Nissan counterclaimed for the loan balance and

possession of the car. The district court granted Nissan judgment on the pleadings, and

McGee appealed. We affirm in all respects the judgment in favor of Nissan.

McGee’s complaint theorizes that, under the Uniform Commercial Code as

adopted in Illinois, Nissan’s refusal to recognize his bill of exchange operated as a

discharge of the $13,009 debt. The complaint also alleges that Nissan’s silence about the

bill of exchange in the company’s correspondence with him violated two criminal

statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights) and § 1341 (mail fraud). Nissan

countered that McGee had breached the loan contract and also engaged in a deceptive

practice by writing a bad check, see 720 ILCS 5/17‐1(B), (E). The lender demanded the car

and damages. In granting judgment for Nissan, the district court reasoned that McGee’s

bill of exchange mimics those consistently rejected by other courts as worthless. The

court awarded Nissan title to the car and $18,553, which includes costs and attorney fees.   

McGee’s claims are frivolous. He does not state claims under § 241 or § 1341; both

provisions are federal criminal statutes that do not provide a private right of action. See

Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994)

(discussing reluctance to infer private right of action from criminal prohibitions);

Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that § 241 does not

provide private right of action); Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, 167 F.3d 402, 408 (8th

Cir. 1999) (same for § 1341). McGee does not explicitly challenge the award on Nissan’s

counterclaims, and we agree with the district court that McGee’s only defense to those

counterclaims—that Nissan’s refusal to recognize his bill of exchange operated as a

discharge—is likewise frivolous.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.