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Filed 1/9/23 P. v. Meza CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RICARDO MEDINA MEZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

E078567

(Super.Ct.No. CR57959)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. 

Reversed.

Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland , Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Alan L. 

Amann and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole following his 

convictions on multiple robberies, one of which involved a shootout in which defendant’s

co-robber was shot and killed, as was one of the victims. In 2021, defendant filed a 

petition for resentencing under the former provisions of Penal Code section 1170.95,1

hereafter referred to under its current number, section 1172.6, which was denied. He 

appeals, arguing that the fact the jury found true a special circumstances allegation does 

not automatically preclude his eligibility for resentencing. The People concede the case 

must be remanded pursuant to the recent holding of People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 

698 (Strong), for a new hearing to determine if his petition makes a prima facie showing 

of entitlement to resentencing.

BACKGROUND

We recite the facts as set forth in our opinion from defendant’s direct appeal in 

People v. Meza, E021992 (nonpub. opn., filed July 29, 1999), supplemented as needed 

with more current information.

1. The Family Basket Restaurant Robbery.

One of the victims, Patricia Castellanos, testified that she was a waitress at Family 

Basket restaurant in March 1994. Two men came in, ordered soft drinks, and sat in a 

booth. Two other men, including defendant, came in and ordered coffee. As Ms. 

Castellanos was pouring the coffee, defendant pulled a gun and announced a holdup. The 

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 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

indicated.
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first two men joined him. The robbers took cash and jewelry. They then placed the 

victims in a freezer and told them to count to a hundred before coming out.

The restaurant owner, Mr. Dimitropolus, testified that defendant was rude and 

“acting like a maniac.” Defendant poked him repeatedly with a gun and took about 

$3,500 and jewelry.

The robbers were identified from a videotape taken by a surveillance camera on a 

store across the street.

Two other restaurant employees testified and corroborated the testimony of Ms. 

Castellanos and Mr. Dimitropolus. One of the employees confirmed their identification 

of defendant.

Defendant was charged in count VI with robbing Mr. Dimitropolus, and convicted 

of second degree robbery. The jury also found that defendant personally used a firearm 

in the commission of the robbery.

2. Alvarez Fashions Robbery.

On July 11, 1994, the victim, Jose Alvarez, was working at Alvarez Fashions, a 

store in Perris. Defendant came in, pulled out a gun, and announced a robbery. 

Defendant hit Mr. Alvarez twice with the gun and kicked him as he lay on the floor. 

Three more robbers came in and took money and merchandise under defendant’s 

direction. Defendant took jewelry from Mr. Alvarez and cash from the cash drawer. Mr. 

Alvarez estimated that the robbers took $15,000 to $20,000 in merchandise.
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Defendant was charged in count VII with the robbery of Mr. Alvarez. He was 

convicted of this charge, and the jury found that he personally used a firearm in the 

commission of the offense.2

3. El Charro Zapateria Robbery and Shootout.

Maria Islas, referred to in count IV as Maria Gonzalez, testified that she and her 

husband owned a shoe store and they lived in an apartment in the rear of the store. Her 

husband was working in the store one afternoon while she ironed his clothes. A man, 

identified as defendant, entered the store through a private door and went towards her 

husband with a gun. Another man approached her, announced a robbery, and told her to 

get on the floor. Her husband went to the cash register and then sat next to her on the bed 

in the apartment. Gunfire then erupted. One of the robbers, Mr. Flores, was shot and 

subsequently died. Mr. Islas, the husband of Maria Islas, was killed. 

Defendant was also shot twice in the gun battle. In addition, bullets from the 

gunfight passed through the wall of the building and into another building. One of the 

bullets hit Ms. Ayala, an employee working in the other building. 

Defendant was charged with the murder of Mr. Islas (count I); the murder of Mr. 

Flores (count II); assault on Ms. Ayala (count III) and the robbery of Maria Gonzalez, the 

wife of Mr. Islas (count IV). The jury convicted defendant on each of these charges and 

found personal firearm use allegations to be true. Two special circumstances of murder 

in the course of a robbery were found to be true.

2 Defendant was acquitted of another robbery charged in count V when the 

victims were unable to identify him.
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On direct appeal, we reversed the murder conviction pertaining to the shooting of 

his accomplice under the provocative-act doctrine. Otherwise, we affirmed the 

convictions, and the special circumstances finding.

On March 13, 2020, Meza filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the 

changes brought about by Senate Bill No. 1437 and former section 1170.95. On April 

23, 2020, the superior court denied the petition explaining that the proper vehicle for 

defendant’s claim was through a petition pursuant to former section 1170.95. Defendant 

then filed a petition seeking resentencing pursuant section 1172.6. The court summarily 

denied that petition finding defendant was ineligible for relief by virtue of the special 

circumstances finding. Defendant appealed. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his petition on the 

ground that the special circumstances finding, made prior to the California Supreme 

Court’s opinion in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark

(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) rendered him automatically ineligible for resentencing. 

The People agree that defendant is entitled to reconsideration of his petition to determine 

if he has made a prima facie showing he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 

section 1172.6.

Under section 1172.6, the trial court must vacate a first-degree murder conviction 

that was based on a felony-murder theory, unless the petitioner either (1) was the actual 

killer, (2) had the intent to kill and aided and abetted the commission of first-degree 
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murder, or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3), incorporating § 189, subd. (e).)

When Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 189 to incorporate major participation and 

reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those requirements 

elucidated in Banks and Clark. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710, and cases there 

cited.) 

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court in Strong held that People v. 

Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 “substantially 

clarified” the requirements of a felony murder special-circumstance finding. (Strong, 

supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706.) The Supreme Court explained that “Banks elucidated what 

it means to be a major participant and, to a lesser extent, what it means to act with 

reckless indifference to human life, while Clark further refined the reckless indifference 

inquiry.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 706-707.) Therefore, it concluded a felony 

murder special-circumstance finding made before Banks and Clark were decided does not

conclusively establish ineligibility for relief under section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, at 

pp. 710-720.)

The People concede that, because the felony-murder special-circumstance finding 

in appellant’s case was made before Banks and Clark, that finding does not, in and of 

itself, render him ineligible for resentencing. Therefore, the trial court’s order summarily 

denying appellant’s petition must be reversed and this matter remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with the holding in Strong.
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Because the trial court denied the petition based on the pre-Banks and pre-Clark

felony-murder special circumstances, it has not yet considered whether the petition 

otherwise stated a prima facie case entitling defendant to an evidentiary hearing. We 

therefore reverse the order to allow the court to reconsider whether defendant is entitled 

to such a hearing. 

DISPOSITION

The order appealed from is reversed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

J.

MILLER

J.