NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ARRON WILLIAM CROOK, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0423

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-443323-001 DT

The Honorable Margaret R. Mahoney, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Cynthia Dawn Beck

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 8-15-2017
STATE v. CROOK

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Patricia A. Orozco1 joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Arron William Crook appeals his conviction and 

sentence for manslaughter, a Class 2 felony. He asserts the State’s alleged 

misstatements of the law during closing argument deprived him of a fair 

trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 After an altercation in which Crook fatally shot victim J.S., the 

State charged Crook with one count of second degree murder, a Class 1 

dangerous felony. At trial, Crook requested jury instructions regarding 

self-defense, use of deadly force in self-defense, and use of force in crime 

prevention. The superior court included Crook’s requested instructions.

¶3 During closing argument, the State commented upon the 

instructions for self-defense and for use of physical force in self-defense. 

With regards to using physical force, the State commented that “[i]f 

shooting someone in the leg would stop them, you can’t shoot them in the 

chest. You can’t shoot them in the head. Only what is necessary.” He later 

said in reference to Crook’s lack of duty to retreat:

[T]here’s nothing in these instructions that merely says, ‘if

you don’t want to fight, you get to shoot someone.’ It does

not say that anywhere. But for whatever reason—maybe he’s

a little cowardly—he didn’t want to fight. He didn’t want to

get his clothes ruffled, didn’t want to get a bloody lip. And

so he keeps backing down.

¶4 A short while later, he continued:

1 The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant

to Article 6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.
STATE v. CROOK

Decision of the Court

3

[Crook] could have done any number of things other than 

shoot him in the chest. He could have run. Did he have to? 

No. But he could have run. He could have fired a warning 

shot, could have yelled for help. How about help? 

‘Somebody help me. Help, help, help.’ . . . Could have fired a 

warning shot, could have shot him in the leg. But, no. He 

shoots him and kills him. Because of that, he’s guilty of 

second-degree murder.

¶5 Crook responded by saying, “Now, does a person who is 

being pursued and attacked have to wait to defend themselves until they’re 

actually hurt? That’s not the law.” The State rebutted:

He did not have to kill him. There were so many other 

options. You were told ‘well, he can’t drop the gun.’ He 

could have thrown it. How about dropping the magazine?

How about giving it to [Crook’s friend]? How about firing it 

in the air? How about firing all the rounds up in the air or 

into the ground so that there’s no more bullets left, and it can’t 

be used? How about just continuing to point it at him and 

yelling, ‘help, help’ until police come? How about shooting it 

towards the ground?

¶6 The jury was unable to agree to a second-degree murder 

conviction but found Crook guilty of the lesser included offense of 

manslaughter. It also found the State proved the aggravating factors of 

dangerousness and causing emotional or financial harm to the immediate 

family of the victim, J.S. The superior court sentenced Crook to the 

presumptive term of 10.5 years’ imprisonment and credited him 998 days 

of presentence incarceration. Crook moved for a new trial, asserting the 

State misstated the law during closing argument by suggesting Crook could 

fire the gun into the air,

2 but the court denied his motion.

2 With limited exceptions, a criminally-negligent discharge of a 

firearm within or into the limits of any municipality constitutes a Class 6 

felony. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3107(A).
STATE v. CROOK

Decision of the Court

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¶7 Crook timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 

13-4033(A).3

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

¶8 Crook asserts the State engaged in misconduct by making 

improper statements during closing arguments. Because Crook failed to 

make a timely, specific objection at trial, we review only for fundamental 

error. See State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 465, ¶ 192, 372 P.3d 945, 989 (2016). 

We will reverse a defendant’s conviction only if: (1) misconduct is present; 

and (2) a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have 

affected the jury’s verdict. Id. at ¶ 193. Crook bears the burden of proving 

the misconduct was “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the 

entire atmosphere of the trial.” Id. (quoting State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 

335, ¶ 46, 160 P.3d 203, 214 (2007)).

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶9 Crook argues the State misstated the law by repeatedly 

indicating to the jury that Crook could have engaged in alternative conduct 

rather than using deadly force. He asserts this error was fundamental 

because it went to the foundation of his defense.

¶10 “Counsel is given wide latitude in closing argument to 

comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences from it.” State 

v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 464, ¶ 180, 94 P.3d 1119, 1159 (2004) (internal

quotations omitted). When determining whether an argument is

misconduct, “we consider two factors: (1) whether the prosecutor’s

statements called to the jury’s attention matters it should not have

considered in reaching its decision and (2) the probability that the jurors

were in fact influenced by the remarks.” State v. Nelson, 229 Ariz. 180, 189

¶ 39, 273 P.3d 632, 641 (2012). We look at “the context in which the

statements were made as well as the entire record and to the totality of the

circumstances.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “We also address the

cumulative effect of any misconduct.” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 465, ¶ 192, 372

P.3d at 989.

3 We cite the current version of relevant statutes unless revisions 

material to this decision have occurred since the events in question.
STATE v. CROOK

Decision of the Court

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¶11 We find no error. The State did not misstate the law in any of 

its statements and did not call the jury’s attention to matters it should not 

have considered in reaching its decision. The State accurately stated that 

although Crook had no duty to retreat, the justification defense of using 

physical force for self-defense requires that “the force used may not be 

greater than reasonably necessary to defend against the apparent danger.” 

Deadly physical force in self-defense is justified only when immediately 

necessary to protect against another’s use of apparent attempted or 

threatened use of deadly physical force, as viewed by a reasonable person. 

A.R.S. § 13-405(A). The fact that certain circumstances may warrant the use 

of deadly physical force presupposes that others do not. The State’s 

presentation urged jurors to find that the circumstances were such that 

deadly physical force was not apparent, attempted, nor threatened by J.S. 

and, therefore, Appellant was only justified in applying non-lethal selfdefense mechanisms. Although the State’s suggestion that one of Crook’s 

options was to fire his weapon in the air was misguided, it was not conduct 

that “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.” Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 465, ¶ 193, 372 

P.3d at 989. Furthermore, there is little probability the jurors were in fact

influenced by the remarks because the State made its comments in the

context of Crook’s instructions and, as Crook acknowledges, the State

clearly stated that Crook had no duty to retreat. We conclude that none of

the State’s comments, taken alone or cumulatively, constituted

prosecutorial misconduct.

¶12 Furthermore, even if the State’s conduct were somehow 

deemed to constitute error, it could not be fundamental error because, as 

Crook notes, the superior court properly instructed the jury as to selfdefense and the use of deadly force; to follow the jury instructions in 

deciding the case; and not to view the attorneys’ comments as evidence. See 

State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 341-42, ¶¶ 49-52, 111 P.3d 369, 383-84 (2005)

(holding State’s misstatement of the law was not fundamental error because 

the superior court properly instructed the jury, indicated the instruction 

was the law that applied to the hearing, and instructed the jury that the 

lawyers’ statements were not evidence). No fundamental error occurred in 

this case.
STATE v. CROOK

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Crook’s conviction and 

sentence.