No. 89-159 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

KEITH INGRAHAM, 

Claimant and Petitioner, 

-VSCHAMPION INTERNATIONAL, a Self-insured 

Plan I Employer, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Petitioner: 

Thomas C. Bulman argued; Bulman Law Associates, Missoula, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Bradley J. Luck argued; Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, 

Missoula, Montana 

James Scheier argued, Agency Legal Services, Helena, 

Montana 

For Amicus Curiae: 

John Bothe; Bothe & Lauridsen, Columbia Falls, Montana 

Filed: c ;' 

<-. - . .. (7: ;:-- 

!.: 

Submitted: March 11 1990 

~~~id~d: March 23, 1990 . * 

8 

Clerk 6. "- 

i-1 1- 

- . -- < > 
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Petitioner Keith Ingraham has filed his petition for 

.declaratory judgment on original proceedings in this Court 

requesting that parts of 55 39-71-741 (I), 39-71-741 (2) , and 39- 

71-741(3), MCA, be declared unconstitutional. 

On April 3, 1989, this Court ordered respondents Champion 

International, the Division of Workers' omp pens at ion, and the 

Attorney General for the State of Montana to file written responses 

to the petition. Champion International has filed herein its brief 

and response, and the Attorney General has responded in brief in 

his own behalf and on behalf of the Division of Workers' 

Compensation. We have in addition received an amicus brief from 

John H. Bothe, an attorney in Columbia Falls, Montana, appearing 

as a friend of the court in support of the petition for declaratory 

judgment . 

Under the facts of this case, not disputed, Keith Ingraham is 

an employee of Champion International. Champion is enrolled under 

Plan I of the Montana Workers' Compensation Act and is selfinsured. Subsequent to December 18, 1987, Ingraham had reported 

that he had suffered an industrial injury on such date in the 

course and scope of his employment when a board struck him in the 

chest. Champion accepted liability for the injury and benefits 
were initiated. At the time briefs were filed herein, Ingraham 

continued to receive temporary total disability benefits on a biweekly basis. Champion claims that issues exist in the claim 

concerning the relationship of some of Ingrahamls physical problems 

and the alleged disability from the industrial injury. Ingraham 

claims that though he is now receiving total temporary disability 

benefits, that he will probably have a permanent partial disability 

as defined in 5 39-71-116(14), MCA. The Attorney General concedes 

the standing of Ingraham to challenge the constitutionality of the 

statutes. Champion does not challenge his standing. 

Once standing is established, we determine whether there are 

necessary factors sufficient for this Court to accept original 

jurisdiction. Speaking in the context of an original action for 

declaratory judgment, this Court has stated: 

Once standing to bring the action is 

established, the question shifts to whether 

the action meets the necessary factors for 

this Court to accept original jurisdiction. 

This Court has found that an assumption of 

original jurisdiction is proper when: (1) 

constitutional issues of major state wide 

importance are involved; (2) the case involves 

pure legal questions of statutory and 

constitutional construction; and (3) urgency 

and emergency factors exist making the normal 

appeal process inadequate. (Citations 

omitted.) Moreover, this Court clearly stated 

the Court has original jurisdiction to accept 

declaratory judgment proceedings "where the 

issues have impact of major importance on a 

statewide basis, or upon a major segment of 

the state, and where the purpose of the 
declaratory judgment proceedings will serve 

the office of a writ provided by law. . . I I 

Grossman v. State, Depart. of Natural 

Resources (1984), 209 Mont. 427, 436, 682 P.2d 

1319, 1324. 

Butte-Silver Bow Local Govern. v. State (Mont. 1989) , 768 P. 2d 327, 

The issues raised by the petitioner Ingraham, and addressed 

by the respondent and the Attorney General in their replies, as 

well as by amicus, show without a doubt that the requirements for 

the acceptance of original jurisdiction are fully present in this 

case. We therefore accept original jurisdiction. 

In 1987, the legislature embarked on a comprehensive revision 

of the laws relating to Workers1 Compensation culminating in the 

adoption of Chapter 464, Laws of Montana (1987), approved by the 

Governor on April 4, 1987. Included in the legislation were 

amendments to then-existing 5 39-71-741, MCA. As amended, the 

subsections of 5 39-71-741, MCA, under attack in this case are as 

follows: 

Compromise settlements, lump-sum payments, and 

lump-sum advance payments. (1) (a) Benefits 

may be converted in whole to a lump sum: 

(i) if a claimant and an insurer dispute 

the initial compensability of an injury; and 

(ii) if the claimant and insurer agree to 

a settlement. 
(b) The agreement is subject to division 

approval. The division may disapprove an 

agreement under this section only if there is 

not a reasonable dispute over compensability. 

(c) Upon approval, the agreement constitutes a compromise and release settlement and 

may not be reopened by the division or by any 

court. 

(d) The parties1 failure to reach an 

agreement is not a dispute over which a 

mediator or the workers' compensation court 

has jurisdiction. 

(2) (a) If an insurer has accepted 

initial liability for an injury, permanent 

total and permanent partial wage supplement 

benefits may be converted in whole to a lumpsum payment. 

(b) The conversion may be made only upon 

agreement between a claimant and an insurer. 

(c) The agreement is subject to division 

approval. The division may approve an 

agreement if: 

(i) thzre is a reasonable dispute 

concerning the amount of the insurer's future 

liability or benefits; or 

(ii) the amount of the insurer's 

projected liability is reasonably certain and 

the settlement amount is not substantially 

less than the present value of the insurer's 

liability. 

(d) The partiest failure to reach 

agreement is not a dispute over which a 

mediator or the workers' compensation court 

has jurisdiction. 

(e) Upon approval, the agreement 

constitutes a compromise and release 
settlement and may not be reopened by the 

division or by any court. 

(3) (a) Permanent partial wage supplement 

benefits may be converted in part to a lumpsum advance. 

(b) The conversion may be made only upon 

agreement between a claimant and an insurer. 

(c) The agreement is subject to division 

approval. The division may approve an 

agreement if the parties demonstrate that the 

claimant has financial need that: 

(i) relates to the necessities of life or 

relates to an accumulation of debt incurred 

prior to injury; and 

(ii) arises subsequent to the date of 

injury or arises because of reduced income as 

a result of the injury. 

(d) The parties1 failure to reach an 

agreement is not a dispute over which a 

mediator or the workers1 compensation court 

has jurisdiction. 

Ingraham has mounted a number of issues respecting the 

constitutionality of the foregoing subsections. Without reaching 

the merits of the other issues, we choose two as dispositive in 

this case. They are: 

1. Do the subsections contain unconstitutional delegations 

of legislative authority? 

2. Do the subsections violate the administration of justice 

clause of the Montana Constitution, Art. 11, 5 16 (1972)? 
We must be cognizant, as Champion contends in brief, that in 

analyzing constitutional challenges, this Court has certain 

boundaries surrounding the power of the Court to determine 

constitutionality. Among those is the principal of avoiding 

constitutional questions whenever possible, State ex rel. Hammond 

v. Hager (1972), 160 Mont. 391, 400, 503 P.2d 52, 57; and an act 

of the legislature will not be declared invalid because it is 

repugnant to some provision of the constitution, unless its 

invalidity is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt, Shea v. 

North-Butte Mining Company (1919), 55 Mont. 522, 530, 179 P. 499, 

501. The constitutionality of a legislative enactment is prima 

facie presumed, and every intendment in its favor will be made 

unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt. 

T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial (1982), 196 Mont. 287, 292, 641 P.2d 

1368, 1370. 

Permanent partial disability benefits for injured workers are 

provided in 5 39-71-703, MCA. The benefits available are 

impairment awards and wage supplements. A worker entitled to an 

impairment award may be paid bi-weekly or in a lump sum, at the 

discretion of the worker. Lump sums paid for impairments are not 

subject to the requirements of 5 39-71-741, MCA. A worker entitled 

to permanent partial disability benefits in the form of wage 
supplements is limited under the statute. Wage supplement benefits 

terminate at the expiration of 500 weeks minus impairment award 

weeks. Weekly compensation benefits may not exceed $149.50, at 

least until June 30, 1991. It is only a wage supplement award 

under the permanent partial disability statute which is subject to 

the provisions of 5 39-71-741, MCA. 

Ingraham claims that he is a likely candidate for permanent 

partial wage supplement benefits. His request for a lump-sum 

payment is therefore subject to subdivision (2) or (3) of 5 39- 

71-741, MCA, as set out above. 

Before the 1987 amendment to fj 39-71-741, MCA, an injured 

worker entitled to any bi-weekly payments under the Workers1 

Compensation laws could apply to the division (the predecessor of 

the department) for a lump-sum payment, with the concurrence of the 

insurer. But if the insurer did not agree, and a controversy arose 

between the claimant and the insurer regarding the conversion of 

bi-weekly payments into a lump sum, the controversy was considered 

a dispute within the jurisdiction of the Workers1 Compensation 

judge. Section 39-71-741, MCA (1985). Under that statute as now 

amended, no application for a lump-sum conversion may be made to 

the department unless the conversion is agreed upon by the claimant 

and the insurer. If they fail to agree, there is no dispute over 

which a mediator or the Workers1 Compensation Court has 
jurisdiction. Thus, under the amended statute, in practical 

effect, a worker in need of a lump-sum conversion, unless he has 

the insurer's approval, cannot apply to the department, much less 

to a court, to determine his need. The effect of the statute 

places a tilt in favor of the insurer or the worker, either of whom 

can withhold consent for any reason, or for no reason, to a request 

for a lump-sum conversion. 

The power of the legislature to fix the amounts, time and 

manner of payment of workers1 compensation benefits is not doubted. 

The legislature could, we think, deny completely any authority to 

an insurer, a worker, or the department to apply for or to allow 

lump-sum conversion of workers' benefits. Here the legislature 

has chosen, however, to permit lump-sum conversions in some cases, 

but on conditions different fromthat applying to permanent partial 

impairment benefits. Had the legislature conferred the authority 

solely upon the administrative agency, the legislature would have 

been required to lay down the policy or reasons behind the statute 

and to prescribe standards and guides for the grant of the power 

to the agency. Douglas v. Judge (1977), 174 Mont. 32, 568 P.2d 

530; Baucus v. Lake County (1960), 138 Mont. 69, 354 P.2d 1056. 

But in this sense the legislature has gone beyond that and has 

delegated an absolute discretion to the insurer (with whom a worker 

agrees) as to whether a lump-sum conversion of permanent partial 
wages settlement benefits will be converted. The legislature has 

improperly and unconstitutionally delegated its authority to 

private parties as to what terms, and under what circumstances, and 

in what amounts, a lump-sum conversion can occur. The power of the 

legislature to prescribe the amounts, time and manner of payment 

of workers' compensation benefits, which as we said at the outset 

of this paragraph is not doubted, has been delegated in subdivision 

(2) , 5 39-71-741, MCA, to others. This the legislature may not do. 

111. 

A further reason that subdivision (2), S 39-71-741, MCA, is 

constitutionally invalid is that the subsection purports to strip 

the courts of their judicial power over controversies regarding 

proposed lump-sum conversions. 

We are reminded by the respondents, and properly so, that the 

Workers1 Compensation Court is a creature of statute, without 

constitutional status, with its jurisdiction fixed by the 

legislature. State ex rel. Pac. Emp. Ins. v. Wkrs' Comp. (1988), 

230 Mont. 233, 234, 749 P.2d 522, 523. We are also reminded that 

a worker's right to compensation benefits is not fundamental, 

Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Service (1987), 299 Mont. 40, 42-43, 

744 P.2d 895, 897, and that this Court has held that a person's 

right of access to the courts is likewise not considered 

fundamental for the purposes of constitutional review. Peterson 
v. Gr. Falls Sch. Dist. No. 1 & A (Mont. 1989), 773 P.2d 316, 46 

St.Rep. 880. The 1987 amendment goes far beyond fixing the limits 

of jurisdiction in the Workers1 Compensation Court. By taking away 

the jurisdiction of the Workers1 Compensation Court unless the 

insurer agreed to the lump-sum settlement, the legislature did not 

only deprive the Workers1 Compensation Court of jurisdiction, but 

it deprived this Court of its appellate power under $5 39-71-2904 

and -2905, MCA, the only appeal allowed a Worker's Compensation 

worker or insurer under our laws. See, Billings Deaconess Hosp., 

Inc. v. Angel (1986), 219 Mont. 490, 712 P.2d 1323. Our district 

courts have not been concerned with workers1 compensation benefits 

since the establishment of the Workers1 Compensation Court in 1975. 

Thus the effect of subdivision (2) of 5 39-71-741 is to deprive the 

worker or the insurer of any right of access to the judicial 

department of this state, if the insurer and the worker do not 

agree. 

Thus, the amended section abrogates the principle that the 

judicial power cannot be taken away by legislative action. State 

ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner (1950), 123 Mont. 414, 214 P. 2d 747. The 

legislation completely negates the state constitutional mandate 

that llcourts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy 

remedy be afforded to every injury of person, property, or 

character . . .I1 Article 11, Section 16, Mont.Const. (1972). 
IV. 

The distinction between legislative and judicial powers brings 

before us always the rule that the Supreme Court is not at liberty 

to amend statutes, State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Public Employees Craft 

Coun. (1974), 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d 785, and there is a 

constitutional prohibition against the exercise of legislative 

power by courts so that this Court may not alter statutes. State 

ex rel. Grant v. Eaton (1943), 114 Mont. 199, 133 P.2d 588. 

However, the legislature provided in 5 71 of Chapter 464, Laws 

of Montana (1987), which includes the legislation we are 

considering here, that if a part of the act is invalid, all valid 

parts that are severable from the invalid part remain in effect, 

and that if a part of the act is invalid in one or more of its 

applications, the part remains in effect in all valid applications 

that are severable from the invalid applications. 

Where an enactment contains a severability clause, the 

presumption is that the valid portions would have been enacted 

without the invalid parts. State ex. re1 City of Missoula v. 

Holmes (1935), 100 Mont. 256, 47 P.2d 624. 

Applying the severability provisions of Chapter 464, Laws of 

Montana (1987) , the effect of our decision leaves subsection (2) 

of 5 39-71-741, in effect as follows: 

(2) (a) If an insurer has accepted initial 

liability for an injury, permanent total and 

12 
permanent partial wage supplement benefits may 

be converted in whole to a lump-sum payment. 

(b) [Invalid. ] 

(c) The agreement is subject to department 

approval. The department may approve an 

agreement if: 

(i) there is a reasonable dispute concerning 

the amount of the insurer's future liability 

or benefits; or 

(ii) the amount of the insurer's projected 

liability is reasonably certain and the 

settlement amount is not substantially less 

than the present value of the insurer's 

liability. 

(d) [Invalid. ] 

(e) Upon approval, the agreement constitutes 

a compromise and release settlement and may 

not be reopened by the department. 

It will be noted that the words ''or by any court1' are not 

included on the foregoing subdivision (e) of subsection 2 of 5 39- 

71-741, MCA, as a valid remaining part of the enactment. The 

deletion of those words is necessary because, again, the judicial 

power cannot be taken away by legislative action. 

After deletion of the invalid parts, as required by the 

severability clause, a controversy between an insurer and a worker 

as to the propriety of a lump-sum settlement upon which they cannot 

agree, would constitute a dispute concerning benefits subject to 

a petition to the Workers1 Compensation judge for a determination 
after satisfying the dispute resolution requirements otherwise 

provided in the Workers1 Compensation provisions. Section 39-71- 

2905, MCA. 

v. 

Subsection (3) of 5 39-71-741, MCA, also concerns itself with 

permanent partial wage supplement benefits. The principal 

difference between it and subsection (2) of the same statute is 

that subsection (2) relates to conversion of benefits in whole to 

a lump-sum payment, whereas subsection (3) relates to a conversion 

in part to a lump-sum advance. 

The same reasons for invalidity that apply to subsection (2) 

foregoing apply also to the provisions of subsection (3). There 

again it is provided that the conversion may only be made upon the 

agreement between a complainant and an insurer, and that the 

parties1 failure to reach an agreement is not a dispute over which 

a mediator or the Workerst Compensation Court has jurisdiction. 

For the reasons stated foregoing under subsection (2), we find 

those particular provisions of subsection (3) invalid, the effect 

of which is to leave subsection (3) as follows: 

(3) (a) Permanent partial wage supplement 

benefits may be converted in part to a lumpsum advance. 

(b) [Invalid. ] 

(c) The agreement is subject to department 

approval. The department may approve an 
agreement if the parties demonstrate that the 

claimant has financial need that: 

(i) relates to the necessities of life or 

relates to an accumulation of debt incurred 

prior to injury; and 

(ii) arises subsequent to the date of injury 

or arises because of reduced income as a 

result of the injury. 

(d) [Invalid. ] 

While Ingraham is not directly concerned with the provisions 

of subsection (1) of § 39-71-741, MCA, it is one of the three 

subsections that have been considered both in the application and 

by the respondents and the legal situation therein involved is much 

the same. There is no reason not to declare in this judgment the 

same rule with respect to subsection (1) as we said foregoing 

respecting subsections (2) and (3). Therefore the effect of this 

decision, insofar as it applies to subsection (1) would leave the 

statute in effect as follows: 

(1) (a) Benefits may be converted in whole to 

a lump sum: 

(i) if a claimant and an insurer dispute the 

initial compensability of an injury; and 

(ii) [invalid. ] 

(b) The agreement is subject to department 

approval. The department may disapprove an 

agreement under this section only if there is 

not a reasonable dispute over compensability. 
(c) Upon approval, the agreement constitutes 

a compromise and release settlement and may 

not be reopened by the department. 

(d) [Invalid. ] 

VII. 

In Phelps v. Hillhaven Corp. (1988), 231 Mont. 245, 752 P.2d 

737, we held that an injured worker's right to Workers1 

Compensation vests at the time of the injury. In Carmichael v. 

Workers Compensation Court (Mont. 1988) , 763 P. 2d 1122, 45 St. Rep. 

2012, we held that the statute mandating binding mediation was 

invalid where the injury occurred before the effective date of the 

mediation statute, which was also contained in Chapter 464, Laws 

of Montana (1987). Thus, our decision here does not affect cases 

which occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment. The 

department has recognized this. Since Carmichael, supra, it has 

been the practice in pre-1987 claims to petition the Workers1 

Compensation Court for lump-sum settlements in the same manner as 

the earlier statutes provided. In those cases where the injury 

occurred after 1987, the department has been applying provisions 

of the amended statute insofar as it relates to lump-sum 

settlements. 

This opinion has no effect upon the remaining provisions of 

5 39-71-741, MCA, as amended, which have not been discussed here, 
and about which the parties have raised no issues before this Court 

in these original proceedings. 

Otherwise, the rulings and decisions made in this opinion and 

the effect of those rulings as set forth in this opinion shall be 

and constitute a declaratory judgment and this opinion shall be and 

constitute such a judgment without further action or other 

documents or instruments being filed. 

We concur: 

chief' Justice 
Justice John C. Sheehy, specially concurring: 

I have signed the foregoing Opinion, which I agree with in 

total. I add these additional comments, because while they are not 

necessarily judicial in tone or approach, they record some vital 

reasons why the Opinion in this case is necessary. 

In Montana, there are three ways to provide coverage for 

medical expenses and wage loss when workers are injured in their 

employment. The employer, if it is financially sound enough, may 

be a self-insurer under Plan I; or an employer may provide Workers1 

Compensation coverage by contracting with a private insurer 

licensed to do business in the state, a method described as Plan 

11; or a third way to obtain such coverage is for the employer to 

apply for insurance to the State Insurance Fund, known as Plan 111. 

A student of government will discern an immediate problem with 

Plan 111: the State Insurance Fund was until 1990 operated by the 

same agency that is charged with the administration of the Workerst 

Compensation Act. The agency had two conflicting duties. It dealt 

as an insurer, adverse to the injured worker when the State 

Insurance Fund was concerned; it had to supervise the activities 

of private insurers and self-insurers, presumably to protect the 

injured worker, where the State Insurance Fund itself was not 

concerned. 
In the decade of the '80s, the adversarial attitude of the 

State Insurance Fund to the worker permeated and carried over into 

its administration of the rest of the Workers' Compensation ~ct. 

Moreover, the Fund was terribly mismanaged. The result was that 

many injured workers, in order to obtain official recognition of 

their rights, have had to hire lawyers to enforce their claims. 

The insurers, in turn, hired lawyers so that even for the simplest 

claims the whole business was awash in litigation. 

Except for a few notable cases, self-insurers and private 

insurers seemed to have met the flood of claims without serious 

financial impairment. The State Insurance Fund, however, became 

hopelessly mired in financial difficulties. The managers of the 

State Insurance Fund and the agency found an easy target to blame: 

it was the lawyers and the courts that were causing all the 

trouble. 

So it was that in 1987, state employees who were managers of 

the Division of Workers' Compensation prodded the legislature into 

a comprehensive revamping of the Workers' Compensation laws. S.B. 

315 was introduced at the request of Governor Ted Schwinden. The 

bill became law as Ch. 464, Laws of Montana (1987). Its purpose 

as far as the courts were concerned is easily extracted from the 

opening paragraphs which declare public policy, especially this 

paragraph: 

(3) Montana's Workers' Compensation and Occupational 

Disease Insurance systems are intended to be primarily 

self-administering. Claimants should be able to speedily 

obtain benefits, and employers should be able to provide 

coverage at reasonably constant rates. To meet these 

objectives, the system must be designed to minimize 
reliance upon lawyers and the courts to obtain benefits 

and interpret liabilities. 

Thus, in childlike simplicity did the legislature purport to remove 

from the courts their time-honored duty to interpret liabilities. 

Amazingly, S.B. 315 cruised easily through the two houses of 

the legislature. In the Senate, whose 50 members were composed of 

25 Democrats and 25 Republicans, that measure passed on third 

reading by a vote of 44-6. In the House of Representatives, which 

had 51 Republicans and 49 Democrats, it passed 70-29 with one 

excused. This, in spite of the fact that the measure stripped the 

worker of many important protections afforded to him under the old 

Act. One of those strippings was the requirement that to obtain 

a lump sum settlement, the injured worker must first have the 

concurrence of the insurer. Without such concurrence, as the 

foregoing opinion demonstrates, not only could the worker not get 

into the courts, he or she was unable even to petition the 

administration itself for relief, no matter how dire his or her 

circumstances might be. 

In the nearly three years since the adoption of the Act, the 

effect of the lump sum settlements provision is readily 

demonstrated. It might be said in favor of the self-insurers and 

insurers, that they are somewhat more amenable to lump sum 

settlements than is the counterpart State Insurance Fund. The 

following table will demonstrate: 
Lump-sum settlements approved May 15, 1989 

through February 13, 1990 

as reported in Montana Law Week 

Plan I and I1 (self-insurers and insurers): 

Total Pre-1987 % of Post-1987 % of 

Settlements Claims Total Claims Total 

Plan I11 (State Fund) : 

Total Pre-1987 % of Post-1987 % of 

Settlements Claims Total Claims Total 

564 538 95% 26 5% 

Some of the foregoing disparity with respect to settlements 

of pre-1987 claims compared to post-1987 claims may be explained 

by the fact that the post-1987 claims are relatively new and 

perhaps not yet ready for lump sum consideration. The three years 

since the Act was adopted, however, indicate that little progress 

was made toward any lump sum settlements of post-1987 claims. The 

cardinal reason undoubtedly is that before application for a lump 

sum settlement can be made, both the insurer and the worker must 

agree on the amount. 

To some degree, the public policy declared in the 1987 

legislation to eliminate lawyers and courts has been successful. 

A number of good lawyers have dropped out of Workers' Compensation 

practice because of the stumbling blocks placed in the way of 

aiding injured workers through lawyers under the revamped Workers' 

Compensation laws. 
In the three years since the passage of the Act, the 

management has continued to frighten employers by threats of 

increased premiums. Hoping to cure a bad situation, the 

legislature in 1989 separated the State Insurance Fund from the 

administrative division of the Workers1 Compensation Act. The 

State Insurance Fund has been converted into the "State 

Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund." It is now a ltmutual insurance 

carrier. Section 39-71-2314, MCA. My information is that the 

separated carrier, now that it is no longer subject to the wage 

increase limits imposed on other state employees, immediately 

granted large wage increases to its managers for now doing the same 

adversarial job as before. From this management, I suspect, we 

will find little improvement in the financial crisis, unless that 

management can saddle employers insured under Plan I11 with a huge 

bonded indebtedness, a plan to defer to the future the payment for 

the sins of the past. Thus, in addition to a 25% cut in benefits 

to injured workers, is the panacea devoutly wished for by 

management.