Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kay A. Beehler

Terre Haute, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of L.B., et al. 

(Minor Children)

 and

L.P. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

October 21, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JT-1040

Appeal from the Knox Superior 

Court

The Honorable Gara U. Lee, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

42D01-1909-JT-37

42D01-1909-JT-38

42D01-1909-JT-39

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 2 of 12

Case Summary

[1] L.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court judgment terminating her parental rights 

as to her children, C.B., L.B., and P.B. (collectively, “Children”).1 She raises 

two issues on appeal, but we address only the following dispositive, restated 

issue: whether the termination of her parental rights violated her due process 

rights because the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to 

provide her with needed services during the Child in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”) proceedings.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father have three children, C.B. (born May 1, 2007), and twins 

L.B. and P.B. (born November 20, 2009). In May of 2018, DCS received a 

report that Mother was using drugs. DCS visited the home and removed 

Children when a urine screen indicated Mother’s use of methamphetamine. 

Initially, Mother denied drug use, but she eventually admitted that “she was 

overwhelmed just taking care of the kids and the bills, and she slipped up and 

had used meth and took a pain pill for her back.” Tr. at 40. On May 17, 

Children were placed with Father. However, one month later, Father “dropped 

[Children] off” at the home of Mother’s brother and never returned to pick 

1

 The parental rights of J.B. (“Father”) were also terminated but he does not participate in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 3 of 12

them up. Id. at 88-89. Children have never been returned to the care of Father 

or Mother.

[4] On August 21, 2018, Mother entered into a “Stipulation for CHINS 

Adjudication,” in which she stipulated that Children were CHINS because 

“mother requires assistance with substance abuse and obtaining and 

maintaining mental health services for the family, as well as assistance 

maintaining the children’s school schedule and the home.” Ex. Vol. I at 112.2 

Mother also stipulated that the following services were “necessary to remedy 

the reasons for DCS involvement: Drug screens and treatment as 

recommended; continuing mental health treatment as recommended; and 

ensuring the provision of a safe, stable environment free of abuse or neglect.” 

Id. The court found that Children were CHINS. 

[5] In a September 17, 2018, dispositional decree, the trial court ordered that 

Mother cooperate with DCS and participate in services, including: allowing 

DCS and service providers to visit Mother’s home; enrolling in recommended 

programs; keeping appointments with DCS, service providers, and Children’s 

Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”); maintaining suitable, safe, and 

stable housing; maintaining stable income; not using illegal controlled 

2

 All citations are to the CHINS and termination of parental rights documents for L.B., unless specifically 

noted otherwise, because the exhibits are substantially the same for all three of the children.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 4 of 12

substances or alcohol; submitting to random drug screens; completing a 

substance abuse assessment and all recommendations; and attending visitations. 

[6] Following a November 5, 2018, CHINS review hearing, the trial court found 

that DCS had offered and provided Mother with “family services,” including 

“supervised visitation, therapeutic services, home based case management 

services, home-based therapy services, random drug screens, and participation 

in CFTMs [i.e., Child and Family Team Meetings].” Id. at 155. However, it 

found that Mother had “completely stopped participating in all services, except 

supervised visitation, and continue[d] to struggle with substance abuse.” Id. at 

154. The trial court noted that Mother had “failed to attend therapy with CFS

[i.e., Children and Family Services, the agency assigned to provide Mother with 

substance abuse treatment] during the month of October.” Id. The court 

further noted that Mother “had one visit with her home-based case manager 

from Raintree Consulting and that was only after the Raintree case manager did 

a drop-in visit to [Mother].” Id. The court found that Mother’s “visitations 

[with Children] had been reduced to one two-hour visit per week, due to her 

cancelling at the last minute or failing to show up.” Id. at 155. The court found 

that Mother had not cooperated with DCS and had not participated in any 

services other than some of the supervised visitations. 

[7] Following the April 22, 2019, permanency CHINS hearing, the trial court 

found that DCS continued to offer services to Mother, but Mother had not 

remained in contact with DCS and had failed to consistently participate in 

services offered. Following a September 16, 2019, review hearing, the trial 
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court found that Mother had not cooperated with DCS and was not “in 

compliance with [Children’s] case plan[s] as evidenced by [her] complete failure 

to take advantage of services, including visitation.” Id. at 229. 

[8] On September 16, 2019, DCS filed its petitions to terminate the parental rights 

(“TPR”) as to Children. The trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing in the 

TPR cases on December 10, 2019, and February 6, 2020. Mother admitted at 

the hearing that Children need a stable home and a sober caregiver, and that 

she had not provided that home or been that caregiver. She agreed that she 

could not provide for Children’s “safety, their wellbeing” as of the time of the 

termination hearing. Tr. at 140. Mother “[s]omewhat” agreed that DCS had 

provided services that would have allowed her to once again have custody of 

Children, but she agreed that she “didn’t comply fully with those services.” Id.

at 30. 

[9] In an order dated April 17, 2020, the trial court granted the TPR petition as to 

all three children. That order stated, in relevant part:

FINDINGS OF FACT

* * *

21. The mother was offered random drug screens, parent aide 

services, home based casework, visitation, in-home 

therapy, and substance abuse treatment through Samaritan 

Center.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 6 of 12

22. The mother failed to comply with providing random drug

screens so that DCS could monitor compliance or lack 

thereof.

23. The mother cancelled or no-showed for home based 

caseworker services provided by the Department and was 

unable to complete any items on the referral due to

noncompliance.

24. The mother’s in-home therapy services through Children 

and Family Services were cancelled due to missed sessions 

prior to completion of services.

25. The mother missed many scheduled visits with the 

children to the extent that her visits were reduced to one 

time per month. The children were negatively affected

when the mother missed visits.

26. According to Nicki Epperson who provided individual 

therapy to the girls and who facilitated therapeutic visits 

with the mother, the children wrote trauma narratives for 

the mother to read and the mother had not responded by

letter to those narrative[s] as requested by the therapist. 

Ms. Epperson indicated that the kids are resentful 

regarding their parents and that [C.B.] has been refusing to 

attend visits with the mother.

27. It would be harmful for the children to be placed with 

either parent because therapeutically there is a concern

that the parents would create more trauma.

28. The mother admitted that she was aware of the 

requirements outlined in the dispositional order and that 

she had failed to comply with many of them. Specifically, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 7 of 12

she admitted to failing to keep in contact with DCS, failing 

to keep DCS apprised of changes to residence and 

employment, failing to maintain suitable housing, failing 

to complete referred programs, failing to keep 

appointments with providers, failing to submit to drug 

screens regularly, failing to refrain from drug use, and 

failing to attend visits consistently with her children.

29. Mother did indicate that she was “trying now” and had 

made recent positive changes in that she was currently 

working and attending a drug treatment program not

referred by DCS. She claimed to be recently sober for one 

month. She admitted that she has not shown that she can 

support her kids and that she realized she was not what 

was best for them at the time of hearing but wanted an 

opportunity to change.

30. DCS’s plan is for the children to be adopted by separate 

families, one a relative placement and the other a foster 

placement.

31. The CASA volunteer for the children, Cheryl Hugunin, 

was appointed in June of 2018. Cheryl believes it to be in 

the best interest of the children for the parent child

relationships between the children and the mother and 

father to be terminated. She holds said position even in 

light of the fact that the children are not placed together. 

The children do attend the same school and have frequent 

contact. Due to the mother cancelling visits, Cheryl last 

saw the mother interact with the children in the Spring of

2019. Cheryl was never able to observe the children with 

their father. Cheryl informed the Court that the children 

were safe and stable in their current placements and that 

they would find permanency in those placements.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 8 of 12

Appealed Order at 3-5. 

[10] The trial court held that Mother’s parental rights as to Children were 

terminated because there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which 

resulted in Children’s removal will not be remedied, continuation of the parentchild relationships poses a threat to Children’s well-being, and termination of 

parental rights is in Children’s best interests. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Mother maintains that the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights 

violated her constitutional due process rights. Although Mother did not raise a 

due process argument in the trial court, we exercise our discretion to review 

that issue on appeal. See In re D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

(noting “we have discretion to address such [due process] claims, especially 

when they involve constitutional rights, the violation of which would be 

fundamental error”), aff’d in relevant part on reh’g, 122 N.E.3d 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2019), trans. denied.

[12] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove, among other things: (A) that the child has been 

removed from the parent for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two 

months; (B) that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

the child’s removal will not be remedied or the continuation of the parent-child 
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relationship poses a threat to the child’s well-being; and (C) termination is in 

the best interests of the child.3Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). 

[13] A parent’s interest in the upbringing of his or her child is “perhaps the oldest of 

the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].” Troxel v. 

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality op.). And the “involuntary 

termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is designed to be used 

as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” In re C.G., 954 

N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. 2011). Therefore, “the certainty of a trial court’s decision 

to terminate a parent’s parental rights to his or her child is paramount.” In re 

V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016). And we review such a decision under 

a “heightened standard” requiring clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is appropriate. Id. However, we will not reweigh the evidence or 

judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id.

[14] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Usually, when a trial court’s 

judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered 

standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 

3

 We note that Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the decision to 

terminate her parent rights, and we discern no deficiency.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1040 | October 21, 2020 Page 10 of 12

143, 147 (Ind. 2005).

4

 However, in this case, Mother does not challenge either 

the findings or specific conclusions; rather, she contends that the termination 

order must be reversed because DCS failed to provide her with necessary 

services and that failure denied her due process of law.

[15] When the State seeks to terminate parental rights, “it must do so it in a manner 

that meets the requirements of due process.” In re J.K., 30 N.E.3d 695, 699 

(Ind. 2015) (quotations and citations omitted). The nature of the process due in 

proceedings to terminate parental rights is governed by a balancing of the “three 

distinct factors” specified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): the 

private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the 

State’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest 

supporting use of the challenged procedure. In re A.P., 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. 

The private interest affected by the proceeding is substantial—a 

parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her

child. And the State’s interest in protecting the welfare of a child 

is also substantial. Because the State and the parent have 

substantial interests affected by the proceeding, we focus on the 

risk of error created by DCS’s actions and the trial court’s 

actions.

4

 First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the 

findings support the judgment. Id.
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In re S.L., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing In re C.G., 954 

N.E.2d at 917). 

[16] In looking at the risk of error created by DCS’s actions, we keep in mind that 

“due process protections at all stages of CHINS proceedings are vital because 

every CHINS proceeding has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents 

in the upbringing of their children.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014)

(quotations and citations omitted). “[T]hese two proceedings—CHINS and 

TPR—are deeply and obviously intertwined to the extent that an error in the 

former may flow into and infect the latter.” Id. And “[a]ny procedural 

irregularities in a CHINS proceeding may be of such significance that they 

deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to the termination of his 

or her parental rights.” In re S.L., 997 N.E.2d at 1120; see also Matter of 

C.M.S.T., 111 N.E.3d 207, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that “the chaotic 

and unprofessional handling” of a CHINS case violated the parents’ due 

process rights, requiring reversal of the termination order). Thus, 

for a parent’s due process rights to be protected in the context of 

termination proceedings, DCS must have made reasonable 

efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS 

case (unless the no reasonable efforts exception applies). What 

constitutes “reasonable efforts” will vary by case, and ... it does 

not necessarily always mean that services must be provided to the 

parents.

In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.
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[17] Here, we have identified no procedural irregularities in either the CHINS or 

TPR proceedings. Contrary to Mother’s assertion, DCS did make reasonable 

efforts to preserve and/or reunify Mother and Children by offering Mother 

various services throughout the CHINS proceedings. DCS offered and/or 

provided Mother with drug screens, parent aide services, home based 

caseworker services, visitation, in-home therapy, and substance abuse 

treatment.5 The record shows that it was Mother who failed to avail herself of 

those services. Her contentions to the contrary are merely requests that we 

reweigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, which we will not do. See, 

e.g., In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265.

[18] The trial court did not enter the termination of parental rights order in violation 

of Mother’s due process rights.

[19] Affirmed.

Bradford, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.

5

 Because the record establishes that DCS did, in fact, provide Mother with services throughout the CHINS 

proceedings—i.e., prior to termination of her parental rights—we do not address Mother’s Equal Privileges 

and Immunities claim that Indiana Code Section 31-35-4-2(b)(2) “does not comport with Art. [1], § 23 of the 

Indiana Constitution” because it fails to require DCS to provide services prior to termination of parental 

rights. Appellant Br. at 19.