### In the



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1390
U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

F R AN C I S G. G R

ADY , Defen dant-Appellant.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Eastern Distri ct o f Wi sconsi n. No. 1: 12 -cr- 00 07 7 — Will ia m C. Griesb ach , Chief Judg e.
A RG U E D D E C E MB E R 6, 2013

— D E C I D E D M ARC H 27, 2014

Before K AN N E and R OVN E R , Circ uit Judges , and D URKI N , District Judge. *
K AN N E, Cir cui t Judge. Fr anci s Grady w as convic ted of arson a n d in tentionally damagi ng the proper ty of a faci li ty pro vi d in g repr oducti v e health services

. Grady now appeals, arg uing that the di stric t court err ed i n defining the ter m “ ma li ci ously” i n the j ury ins tr ucti ons. For the followi ng reasons, w e affi rm.

Of the No rthern Di stric t o f Il l i noi s, si tting by desi gna tio n. *2 No. 13-1390
I. B A C K G R O U N D On April 1, 2012, Grady dro v e to Dani el W olf’s house and told W olf that he w anted to blow up the P lanned P arentho od clini c i n Grand Chute, W isc o ns i n. After W olf refused to prov i de hi m gasolin e, Grady drove to a nearby gas station and made tw o separate gasolin e purchas es, deposi tin g some i n hi s
v an and a small er amount i n a plasti c bott le. He then drove to the Plann ed P arentho od clini c, parke d his v an, and appr o ached the faci li ty wi th a hammer and the plasti c contain er of gasolin e. Grady brok e a window wi th the hammer , poured t he gasoli ne i nto t he bui lding, and set i t on fire. The next mo r nin g, after seeing news repo rt s of the fi re, W olf called poli ce and i nformed them that Grady ma y ha ve been responsible. The poli ce arr ested Grady and then questioned hi m i n a videotaped int e rv i ew

. During the i nterv i ew

, Grady admi tte d that he “lit the clini c up” an d that hi s “intention w as to li ght the bui lding.” He also stated that he told fri ends shortly after li ghting the fi r e, he “thought as far as I know I t hought it f*****’ burned right down.” Grady w as charged wi th arson and i ntentionally damagi ng the proper ty of a faci li ty prov i ding repr oducti v e he a l th services

. At tr i al, Grady conti nued to expr ess hi s di scomf or t at what w as happening at Plann ed P arentho od and reiterat ed that i t w as hi s desi re to burn down the clini c. He also clai med, prior to li ghting the fi re, to have “ sa id a pray er for all them chi ldren that pa ss ed aw ay i n there from abort i on.” Nonetheless, he admi tte d that hi s i ntent w as to damage the bui lding. A Plann ed P arentho od faci li ties coor dinator testifi ed that the fi re caused consi derable damage to the bui lding, whi ch requiredNo. 13-1390 3

ext ensi v e repairs and forced Plann ed P arentho od to canc el all clini c servic es the following day

. The parties di sputed how to define the ter m “mali ci ously” under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i ) for the arson charge i n the propo sed jury i nstructi ons. Nei ther the Sev enth Ci rcui t P att e r n Jury Instructions nor thi s court has defined the ter m. Grady w anted to uti li ze the defini tion found i n the Ei ghth Ci rcui t P atte rn Jury Instructio ns wher eas the government propo sed use of the defini tion from the Elev enth and Four th Ci rcui t P atte r n Jury Instructions

. The di stric t court elected to use the government’s defini

tion, explain i ng that Grady’s propo sed i nstructi on w ould shi ft the burden to the government to prove that the d e fendant acted wi thout j usti fi cati on. The jury found Grady gui lty of both arson and i n te n ti on a l ly damagi ng the proper ty of a faci li ty prov i ding repr oduct iv e health services

. Grady now appeals, asserti ng that the di stric t court err ed i n i nstructi ng the jury reg ardin g the defini tion of the ter m “mali ci ously” as i t a p p e ars i n the arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)

. II. A N AL Y S I S W e rev i ew jury i nstructi ons as a whole to deter mine whether they fai rly and accu rat ely sum mari ze the law

. United States v. Swan , 250 F .3d 495, 499 (7th Ci r
. 2000). In maki ng thi s deter minati on, our rev i ew of the i nstructi ons i s de novo

. United States v
. Quin ter

o , 618 F .3d 746, 753 (7th C ir

. 2 0 1 0 ). W e afford consi derable di screti on to the di stric t court “wi th respect to the preci se w or di ng of i nstructi ons so long as the final result, read4 No. 13-1390

as a whole, co mp l etely and corr ectly states the law .” United S tates v
. Lee , 439 F .3d 381, 387 (7th Ci r
. 2006). W e will r e ver se “only i f the instructi ons, when viewed i n their entirety , so mi sgui ded the jury that they led to appellant ’ s prej udi ce.” Quin tero , 618 F .3d at 753. The sole i ssu e on appeal i s whether the di stric t court fai rly and accu r a t ely sum mari zed the law wi th respect to the meaning of the w or d “mali ci ously” i n the jury i nstructi ons. The arson statute unde r whi ch Grady w as charged puni shes any one who “ maliciousl y damages o r destro ys, or atte mpts to damage or destro y

, by means of fi re or an explosiv e, any bui lding, v ehi cle, or other r e a l or personal proper ty used i n i nterstat e or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 844(i ) (emphas i s added). The statute does not define the ter m “mali ci ously .” Grady propo sed th at the ter m be defined as ”i ntentionally
caus [ing] damage wi thout just caus e or reason.” Th i s d e fin i ti on
w as tak en from the 2011 Model Criminal Jury Instructions of the E i ghth Ci rcui t. The di stric t court adopted the government’s propo sed i nstruct io n, how ev er , whi ch defined the ter m as

“ [acting] i ntentionally or wi th deliberate di sregar d of t he li kelih ood th a t damage or i njury wi ll result.” Grady objecte d to th e d e fini tion and arg ued that hi s propo sed i nstructi on offered a mor e common sens e defini tion of the ter m. Though our ci rcui t does not define “mali ci o us l y” i n our jury i nstructi ons, the defini tion used by the di stric t court i s not wi thout a legal basi s. As w e recently noted, thi s definiti on of the ter m i s “i ndeed a co mm o n defini tion of the w or d (or cognates of i t, such as ‘mali ce’), and makes perfectly g o o d
sens e when the damage i nv olv es a harm to a thi rd person.” United States v
. McBride, 724 F .3d 754, 759 (7th Ci r
. 2013)No. 13-1390 5 (ci tations omi tte d). Mor eov er , Grady’s propo sed i nstructi on i s take n from the Ei ghth Ci rcui t’s 2011 model i nstructi ons, whi ch has sin ce a dopted the defini tion that w as used by the di stric t court. See Ei ghth Ci rcui t Manual of Model Jur y I nstructi ons (Crim i nal) § 6.18.844 (2013); see also United States v
. Whaley, 552 F .3d 904, 907 (8th Ci r
. 2009). The d e fin it i on i s also found i n both the Four th and Elev enth Ci rcui t P atte rn Jury Instructions and i s how the common law tr adi tionally defined the ter m. See United States v
. Gullet, 75 F .3d 941, 9 4 7 (4th Ci r
. 1996). Fin ally , numerous other ci rcui ts hav e employ ed thi s same defini tion i n construi ng “mali ci ously” i n the arson statute. See, e.g., United States v
. Monroe, 178 F .3d 304, 3 0 7

– 08 (5th Ci r
. 1999); United States v
. W

ikto r, 146 F .3d 815, 818 (1 0 th Ci r
. 1998); Gullet, 75 F .3d at 947–48; United Stat es v

. McFadden , 814 F .2d 144, 145–46 (3d Ci r . 1987). Th e in s tru c ti on told the jury that Grady acted “mali ci ously” i f he acted i ntentionally o r wi th deliberate di sregar d of the li kelih ood that damage or injury w ould result i n setting the fi re at the Plann e d P arentho od faci li ty

. Thi s allow ed the jury to proper ly w ei gh the i ntent of Grady i n start i ng the fi re. W e find
no err or by the dis tr i ct court in app lyin g this defini tion. Grady contends that the di stric t court err ed i n rej ecti ng hi s propo sed i nstructi on and i n p a rt i cular the phrase “wi thout just
caus e or reason.” Hi s arg ument relies on our recent o pini on United States v
. McBride, whi ch held that for “the federal arson st a t ute to make sens e, ‘mali ci ously’ has to mean deliberately (or in w i llful di sregar d of known or sus pected consequen ces) using fi re to do a harmful act .” 7 2 4 F

. 3 d at 759. Y et nothin g i n McBride —whi ch concerned t he suffi ci ency of evidenc e to
e s ta b l i s h m a l i ci ous i ntent rat her than jury in s tru c ti on s

— c re a te s6 No. 13-1390
the need for a speci fi c jury i nstructi on now

. A nd as the court i n McBride recog ni zed, the defini tion used by the di stric t court i s perfectly rat i onal when the harm done i s to a thi rd party

. Id

. Grady clearly caus ed harm to a thi rd party , Pl a nn e d P arenthood, when he se t t he fi re i n their bui lding that resulted i n ext ensi v e damage and forced the faci li ty t o cancel all serv i ces for a whole day

. Regar dless , the di stric t court’s deci si on to omi t the “wi thout just caus e or reason” language from the i nstructi on i s w ellsupp or t e d by the recor d. A “jury i nstructi on should be giv en only when it a d dresses an i ssu e reasonably rais ed by the evidenc e.” United S tates v
. T anner, 628 F .3d 890, 904 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 0). Grady has fai led to poin t to any cogni zable le g a l justifi cati on for start i ng the fi re at the Plann ed P a r e nt hood fac i li ty

. Nothing i n the recor d suggests other wi se. At tr i al, Grady as serted that h i s propo sed defini tion of the term w as a “more common sens e defini tion” and di d not contend that any legal justifi cati on exis ted for hi s behavi or

. There w as si mply no legal basi s to i nclu de the phr a se and the di stric t court acted

w ell wi thi n i ts disc ret i on i n omi tting i t. Accordi ngly , w e find
no err or wi th the ins tr ucti on. III

. C ON C LU S I ON Becaus e w e find no error wi th the instructi on as giv en, w e AFF IRM Grady’s convic tion.