alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 183 (Friday, September 20, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 77222]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-21495]



[[Page 77222]]

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SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD


Release of Waybill Data

    The Surface Transportation Board has received a request from the 
Harris County Toll Road Authority (WB24-42--8/20/24) for permission to 
use select data from the Board's 2022 Masked Carload Waybill Samples. A 
copy of this request may be obtained from the Board's website under 
docket no. WB24-42.
    The waybill sample contains confidential railroad and shipper data; 
therefore, if any parties object to these requests, they should file 
their objections with the Director of the Board's Office of Economics 
within 14 calendar days of the date of this notice. The rules for 
release of waybill data are codified at 49 CFR 1244.9.
    Contact: Alexander Dusenberry, (202) 245-0319

Stefan Rice,
Clearance Clerk.
[FR Doc. 2024-21495 Filed 9-19-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-01-P
#### WINERICH MOTOR SALES CO. et al. v. OCHOA.

No. 9015.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Oct. 21, 1936.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 25, 1936.

Eskridge *&*Groce, of San Antonio, and Gibson & Blackshear, of Laredo, for appellants.

Ed A. Mullally and Hicks, Dickson & Lange, all of Laredo, for appellee.

MURRAY, Justice.

This is the second submission of this cause in this court. On the first submission this court, in an opinion written by our late lamented Chief Justice FLY, held that Salinas was an independent contractor, and that therefore there could be no liability on the part of the Winerich Motor Sales Company.

A writ of error was granted, and the Supreme Court, speaking through Section B of the Commission of Appeals, reversed our judgment and decided all questions raised in favor of the injured party, Delia Ochoa, with the one exception of the excessiveness, vel'non, of the verdict of the jury, and remanded the cause to this court with the following instruction: “The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for its disposition of the assignment of error as to the excessiveness of the verdict, with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court if it finds that the verdict and judgment of that court are not excessive and to proceed in accordance with the provisions of arti-, cle 1862, Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, authorizing the requiring of remittitur, if it finds that such judgment and verdict are excessive.”

We, therefore, have but this one question before us for decision on this submission.

The facts in this case show that the injured party, a young girl about eight years of age, was run over by an automobile and her left leg crushed, causing a fracture of the femur (bone from hip to knee). It was set once, put in a plaster cast, and stretched. Eight days' later it became necessary to reset the bone and place it in another plaster cast. Eight days after, this, an operation became necessary. The leg was cut into and the ends of the bone wired together. Some eighteen months after the injury the bone had not yet knitted at the place of the fracture and the wound was still open and draining. The physician was unable to state with certainty how far in the future such condi*236tion would continue. We cannot say, in view of this evidence, that the verdict of the jury was excessive. There is no hard and fast rule for determining when a jury verdict is excessive. Each case must rest on its own peculiar facts. What has been decided in other cases is of but little help in passing upon another case with different facts and circumstances.

We conclude that the verdict of the jury, in the sum of $7,500, was not excessive, and accordingly the judgment will be affirmed.

BOBBITT, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED October 21, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-30378 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DARRYL W. TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana USDC No. 99-CV-261-B-M2 USDC No. 98-CR-24-ALL

-------------------- Before JOLLY, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Darryl W. Taylor, federal prisoner # 02975-095, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on retroactive Amendment 591 to the sentencing guidelines. Taylor also moves for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) arising out of the district court’s denial of his F ED . R.

C RIM . P. 59(e) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Because Taylor devotes his argument to the denial of hisNo. 04-30378 -2- § 3582(c)(2) motion and does not challenge the denial of his postjudgment motion, COA is DENIED as unnecessary. By filing the IFP motion, Taylor is challenging the district court’s certification decision that his appeal was not taken in good faith because it is frivolous. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);

F ED . R. A PP . P. 24(a)(5). However, Taylor has not demonstrated any nonfrivolous ground for appeal. In 1998, Taylor pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and he was sentenced based on the PSR’s determination that the offense involved 336.8 grams of cocaine base. Taylor argues that Amendment 591 dictates that he must be resentenced because no quantity of drugs was specified in the indictment. He is mistaken. Amendment 591 applies to the determination of the appropriate Chapter Two offense guideline section, and Taylor was properly sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the appropriate offense guideline section for convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Amendment 591 is irrelevant to the determination of base (or specific) offense levels within the applicable offense guideline section or to any consideration of relevant conduct. Taylor’s motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2. We caution Taylor that further frivolous filings will subject him to sanctions.No. 04-30378 -3-

COA DENIED AS UNNECESSARY; IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED;

SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 7, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-60728

Summary Calendar

 

 

PHRA KHOU GNOT VONGPHAKDY,

 

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 

Respondent.

-------------------------------------------------------

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A71 621 069

-------------------------------------------------------

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Phra Khou Gnot Vongphakdy petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA) affirming without opinion the decision of the immigration judge denying his

application for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 

Because the BIA designated the immigration judge’s decision as the final agency

determination, review is ofthe immigration judge’s decision. See Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302
-2-

(5th Cir. 1997). Vongphakdy, a Buddhist, contends that he will be unable to practice his religion as

he would like to because the Communist Party is in control in Laos. He asserts that he was

mistreated when he was in Laos due to his position as a chief monk. Vongphakdy has married and

is no longer a monk, but contends that he fears that he would be arrested by the communists if he is

returned to Laos. The immigration judge’s determination that Vongphakdy did not meet his burden

to show that he is likely to be tortured if removed issupported by substantial evidence. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 208.18(a) & 208.16(c)(2); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 353 (5th Cir. 2002);

Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996).

Vongphakdy also argues that the BIA erred in applying the summary review procedures in

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) to affirm the immigration judge’s denial of relief without opinion. He

contends, based merely on the number of such summary affirmances, that this provision is being

applied systematically. He asserts, in conclusory fashion, that his case was not thoroughly reviewed

and that the regulations were misapplied. We previously have held that the BIA’s summary

affirmance procedures do not violate due process. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832-33

(5thCir. 2003). Vongphakdy has failed to articulate why his case allegedly does not meet the criteria

for affirmance without opinion, or how his case was not properly reviewed. Accordingly, we find no

error. 

The petition for review is DENIED.
EXHIBIT 32.1    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   In connection with the Quarterly Report of Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc., (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Shelby T. Brewer, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc.    /s/Dr. Shelby T. Brewer DATE:  August 17, 2007 Dr. Shelby T. Brewer, Chief Executive Officer   A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc. and will be retained by Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc. to be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.                     1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS AMENDED AND RESTATED SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
EXTRACTED FROM THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF APPLIED ANALYTICAL INDUSTRIES, INC.
RESTATED TO REFLECT THE ACQUISITION OF MEDICAL & TECHNICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                          15,133
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,407
<ALLOWANCES>                                       290
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                65,216
<PP&E>                                          54,601
<DEPRECIATION>                                  21,066
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 119,339
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           38,862
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            16
<OTHER-SE>                                      72,459
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   118,799
<SALES>                                         69,947
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                69,947
<CGS>                                           35,274
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   59,465
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,024
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                (301)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,802
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,283
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,519
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,519
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.23
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.23
        

</TABLE>
Petition for Writ of Mandamus D ismiss ed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 17,

2012
.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14
- 12
- 00629
- CR

IN RE ANTHONY WHITNE Y NORMAN , Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS Trial Court Cause No. 1248767 262nd District Court Harris County, Texas



### M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
On July 9, 2012 , relator Anthony Whitney Norman filed a petitio n for writ of mandamus in this c ourt. See Tex. Gov’t Code §22.221 ; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator complains that this court has not issued a decision in his direct appeal from his murder c onviction

. See Norman v. State, No. 14

- 11

- 00433

- CR. Appellant was sentenced on May 12, 2011, and he filed a notice of appeal the same day. On October 11, 2011, appellant filed a pro se motion requesting that his appointed attorney be discharged and that he be permitted to represent himself on appeal. On Nov ember 29, 2011, this court abated the appeal and remanded the case to the trial2

court for a hearing and findings of fact pursuant to Martinez v. California , 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684, 691

- 92 (2000); s ee also Hadnot v. State , 14 S.W.3d 348, 349 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) (order); Massingill v. State, 14 S.W.3d 380, 381 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) (order) . The supplemental cler k ’s record containing the trial court’s findings and the record from the hearing were filed on December 19, 201 1, and December 27, 2011 , respectively . On January 10, 2012, this court reinstated the appeal , ordered that appellant may proceed pro se on appeal , and his pro se brief was accepted and filed. The State filed its brief on May 17, 2012, and the cause was su bmitted without oral argument to a panel of justices on May 22, 2012. On June 20, 2012, this court granted appellant’s request for leave to file a reply brief, and the reply brief was filed on July 9, 2012. To date, the appeal remains pending.
After t his c ourt docketed this original proceeding, we determined that relator actually seeks relief from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we have forwar ded relator’s petition to that C ourt , and we order th e original proceeding docketed in this court DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Seymore and Brown. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           1,839
<SECURITIES>                                    12,997
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,365
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (993)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                20,639
<PP&E>                                           5,458
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (2,690)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  32,635
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,257
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      1,626
<COMMON>                                            22
<OTHER-SE>                                      16,390
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    32,635
<SALES>                                         15,717
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,717
<CGS>                                           12,479
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   24,632
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,466<F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 655<F1>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (11,038)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (11,038)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (11,038)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.51)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.51)
<FN>
<F2>EQUITY IN LOSSES OF UNCONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES
<F1>NET OF INTEREST INCOME OF $507
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
(1 Q)LF( p h)

p

p

= − +

∆

p Frequency of resistance allele

Q Proportion of refuge

L Survival of RR in Bt field

F Fecundity per capita in Bt field

h Heterozygosity

0-1

>>p

>>p

Smallest Value

Second Order Approximation

Single Locus Model

High Dose

Complete Adult Dispersal

Dominates Rate

of Evolution
(1 Q)LF( p h)

p

p

= − +

∆

p Frequency of resistance allele

Q Proportion of refuge

L Survival of RR in Bt field

F Fecundity per capita in Bt field

h Heterozygosity

Larval Movement in Seed Mix

Second Order Approximation

Single Locus Model

High Dose

Complete Adult Dispersal

SS SR RR

SS

SR

RR
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS

H2 SR

1 RR
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2

H2 SR

1 RR
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2 H1L2 L2

H2 SR L1H2 H1H2 H2

1 RR L1 H1 1
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2 H1L2 L2

H2 SR L1H2 H1H2 H2

1 RR L1 H1 1
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2 H1L2 L2

H2 SR L1H2 H1H2 H2

1 RR L1 H1 1
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2 H1L2 L2

H2 SR L1H2 H1H2 H2

1 RR L1 H1 1

Empirical

Case 1
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2 H1L2 L2

H2 SR L1H2 H1H2 H2

1 RR L1 H1 1

Empirical

Case 1
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2 H1L2 L2

H2 SR L1H2 H1H2 H2

1 RR L1 H1 1

Empirical

Case 2
L1 H1 1

SS SR RR

L2 SS L1L2 H1L2 L2

H2 SR L1H2 H1H2 H2

1 RR L1 H1 1

Empirical

Case 2
#### Rothrock *v.*Nagle, Appellant.

*Mortgages*— Scire *facias sur mortgage*— Agreements *as to proceedings on mortgage*— Trials—Comments *on testimony by trial judge.*

Where in an action of scire facias sur mortgage, the defense was that plaintiff had instituted the proceedings in violation of an agreement by which he was hound not to do so, and the only complaint of the defendant on appeal from the judgment entered on the verdict in favor of plaintiff was that the trial judge commented unfairly on the evidence, but the portions of the charge assigned as error left the jury free to decide the ease, the judgment was affirmed.

Argued March 7, 1916.

Appeal, No. 440, Jan. T., 1915, by defendants, from judgment of C. P. Northampton Co., Nov. T., 1913, No. 34, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of William H. Rothrock v. Robert J. Nagle, Mortgagor, and The Bangor Choice Slate Company, Real Owner of the Land Charged.

Before Brown, C. J., Stewart, Moschzisker, Frazer and Walling, JJ.

Affirmed.

*356Scire facias sur mortgage. Before Stewart, P. J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict for plaintiff for $6,632.35 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.

*Errors assigned,*among others, were instructions to the jury.

*George W. Geiser, Jr.,*with him *George W. Geiser,*for appellant. '

*John D. Hoffman,*with him *Everett Kent,*for appellee.

April 17, 1916 :

Per Curiam,

The defense in this case on the trial in the court below was that plaintiff had instituted proceedings on his mortgage in violation of an agreement by which he was bound not to do so. The issue was one of pure fact, and the only complaint of the defendants on their appeal from the judgment entered on the verdict returned against them is that the trial judge commented upon the testimony unfairly and to their prejudice. The two portions of the charge assigned as error left the jury free to decide the case on the evidence, and no reversible error was committed by the trial judge in his comment on it: Lappe v. Gfeller, 211 Pa. 162.

Judgment affirmed.
[No. 19001-3-III.

Division Three.

November 2, 2000.]

#### Loren K. Sharp, et al., *Appellants,*v. Union Street Development Company, Inc., et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 99-2-00629-9, Carolyn A. Brown, J., entered December 2, 1999. *Reversed*by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, J., concurred in by Kurtz, C.J., and Sweeney, J.