IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 10–1919

Filed October 26, 2012

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JULIANNE R. SCHENKELBERG

AND GARY W. SCHENKELBERG.

Upon the Petition of

JULIANNE R. SCHENKELBERG,

Appellant,

And Concerning

GARY W. SCHENKELBERG,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, Joel E. 

Swanson, Judge.

A spouse seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 

affirming a decree of dissolution. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

J.C. Salvo and Bryan D. Swain of Salvo, Deren, Schenck & 

Lauterbach, P.C., Harlan, for appellant.

Gregory J. Siemann of Green, Siemann & Greteman, P.L.C., 

Carroll, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.

On further review, a spouse asks us to determine the validity of a 

premarital agreement, the fairness of a property settlement, the 

sufficiency of the spousal support, and the denial of expert fees incurred 

by a spouse’s attorney in preparation of the case for trial. The court of 

appeals affirmed the district court decision upholding the premarital 

agreement, the property settlement, and the award of spousal support. 

The court of appeals also upheld the district court’s denial of the expert 

fees. We affirm the court of appeals opinion and the district court 

decision concerning the premarital agreement and the distribution of 

property, because we agree with the court of appeals that the premarital 

agreement was valid and the property settlement was equitable. Thus, 

the court of appeals opinion on these issues will stand as our final 

decision. However, we disagree with the court of appeals opinion and the 

district court decision regarding the spousal support award and the 

expert fees. Accordingly, we vacate that part of the court of appeals 

opinion and modify the district court decision regarding spousal support 

to require spousal support in the sum of $7000 per month until the 

spouse’s death or remarriage. We also vacate that part of the court of 

appeals opinion regarding the expert fees and modify the award of 

attorney fees to require an additional payment of $17,050 in attorney 

fees for the expert services provided to the other spouse’s attorney.

I. Prior Proceedings.

This appeal involves the dissolution of marriage between Gary and 

Julianne Schenkelberg. In a bifurcated trial, the district court found the 

parties’ premarital agreement was valid under Iowa Code chapter 596 

(2009), the Iowa Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (IUPAA). The court 

finalized its decree in October 2010. The court divided the property 
3

pursuant to the premarital agreement by awarding Julianne $312,295 in 

property and Gary $1,769,517 in property. The court also awarded 

spousal support to Julianne in the sum of $5000 per month until age 

sixty-two, her death, or her remarriage. The payments then reduced to 

$2000 until age seventy, her death, or her remarriage. Finally, the court 

denied Julianne’s request for Gary to pay her attorney for the expert fees 

incurred in preparation of the case.

Julianne appealed, contending the premarital agreement was void, 

the property settlement was inequitable, the spousal support was 

inadequate, and the denial of expert fees was improper. We transferred 

the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the 

district court on all issues. It also denied her appellate fees. Julianne 

then sought further review, which we granted.

II. Issues.

In this appeal, Julianne raises four issues. She claims (1) the 

court erred in finding the premarital agreement was valid; (2) the court 

distributed the property inequitably, considering the terms of the 

premarital agreement and provisions of the IUPAA; (3) the court awarded 

an insufficient amount of spousal support; and (4) the court erred by not 

requiring Gary to pay the expert fees incurred by her attorney.

In considering an application for further review, we have the 

discretion to review all or part of the issues raised on appeal or in the 

application for further review. In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 

824 (Iowa 2008). In exercising our discretion, we choose only to review 

the support award and the expert fees. Therefore, we will let the court of 

appeals’ affirmance of the district court’s decision concerning the 

premarital agreement and the property distribution stand as the final 
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decision of this court. See Hills Bank & Trust Co. v. Converse, 772 

N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 2009).

III. Standard of Review.

Appeals regarding the dissolution of marriage are equitable 

proceedings. Iowa Code § 598.3. Therefore, our standard of review is 

de novo. In re Marriage of Morris, 810 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Iowa 2012); see 

Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. Although we give weight to the factual 

determinations of the district court, their findings are not binding upon 

us. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); In re Marriage of Brown, 776 N.W.2d 

644, 647 (Iowa 2009). 

We review an award of attorney fees that includes expert fees for 

an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d 561, 568 

(Iowa 1999); see also In re Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439 N.W.2d 656, 662–

63 (Iowa 1989). An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court 

exercises its discretion “on grounds or for reasons that are clearly 

untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Nelson, 791 

N.W.2d 414, 419 (Iowa 2010); Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 

638 (Iowa 2000). “A ground or reason is untenable when it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous 

application of the law.” Graber, 616 N.W.2d at 638.

IV. Facts.

On our de novo review, we make the following findings of fact. 

Gary and Julianne Schenkelberg married on July 4, 1994. Both were 

previously married to others and obtained their respective dissolutions in 

1993. Julianne had four children from her first marriage. Gary had six 

children by his first wife. All of their children have attained majority. 

Prior to their nuptials, Gary and Julianne entered into a binding 

premarital agreement. 
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The couple’s Iowa tax returns for the years 2005–2009 show 

Julianne made little to no income. However, the records indicate that 

Gary’s wage, income, and dividend income for those years was as follows:

2005 $182,329

2006 $174,654

2007 $187,068

2008 $250,603

2009 $287,311

Additionally, the records reveal that his subchapter-S corporation gave 

Gary a schedule K-1, and that on the K-1, he received the following 

taxable distributions:

2005 $134,824

2006 $159,916

2007 $200,381

2008 $243,701

2009 $444,921

Gary claimed his income was limited to his wages and that the K-1 

distributions were not actually available to him. The district court 

agreed and found Gary’s average income for computing spousal support 

for the years 2005–2009 was $208,000.1 In reaching this conclusion, 

the court disregarded all distributions from the subchapter-S 

corporation. Based on this finding, the court awarded Julianne spousal 

support in the amount it did.

We disagree with the court’s calculation of Gary’s income for the 

years 2005–2009 and find his income was substantially higher. We base 

our finding on the following evidence presented at trial.

The accountant for Gary and the subchapter-S corporation 

explained that the corporation sometimes distributed additional money 

to the shareholders, including Gary, in the form of loans. Gary testified 

that he had received distributions from the corporation, which he used to 

 1In making this calculation, the district court only considered Gary’s wages and 

excluded his interest and dividend income.
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pay back his loans arising from business and tax liabilities. However, 

there are no documents in the record showing that Gary ever signed a 

note or had any indebtedness to the corporation. This testimony alone 

justifies a finding that Gary’s income was higher than what the district 

court and the court of appeals calculated. 

Gary’s individual tax returns, as well as the corporation’s tax 

returns and balance sheets, also suggest Gary’s income was higher. 

Gary’s tax returns show he paid federal and state taxes for the years 

2005–2009 as follows: 

2005 $88,482

2006 $91,474

2007 $115,102

2008 $167,097

2009 $233,091

Gary could not have afforded to pay this amount of taxes unless he 

received a distribution from the corporation. Gary argues that if he did 

receive any such funds, the distribution was in the form of a loan that he 

was obligated to pay back. However, the evidence shows that even if 

these were loans, he paid them back in full by 2009.

The subchapter-S tax returns indicate the outstanding loans to 

shareholders for the years 2005–2009 were as follows: 

2005 $1,529,501

2006 $1,462,556

2007 $1,123,155

2008 $902,287

2009 $0

These figures demonstrate that even if he received a loan from the 

corporation, there were no loans outstanding as of 2009. Therefore, the 

corporation either forgave the debt or made distributions to him to retire 

the loan. In other words, he had sufficient income to pay his taxes in full 

for the years 2005–2009 without sacrificing his lifestyle or incurring any 
7

debt. It is logical to conclude that Gary must have received more than 

just wages from the corporation, because his only source of income was 

from the corporation.

The corporate balance sheets also support our conclusion that 

Gary received more income from the corporation than just his wages. 

The tax records of the corporation indicate that the total schedule K-1 

distribution to all the shareholders2 for the years 2005–2009 was as set 

forth below: 

2005 $607,392

2006 $720,044

2007 $926,522

2008 $1,224,804

2009 $1,931,793

Additionally, the balance sheets for the subchapter-S corporation 

indicate that the shareholders’ equity in the corporation for the years 

2005–2009 was as follows: 

2005 $1,403,588

2006 $1,447,195

2007 $1,447,195

2008 $1,447,195

2009 $1,401,523

If the corporation was retaining distributions as Gary argued, the 

shareholders’ equity should have increased dramatically. As illustrated 

above, it did not.

From these documents, the figures contained therein, and the 

testimony of Gary and the accountant, it is apparent that Gary was 

getting substantial distributions from the corporation above his wages. 

This evidence leads us to find that Gary’s average income for the years

2005–2009 was more than $400,000 per year, not just $208,000 as 

found by the district court.

 2During the years from 2005–2009, Gary owned approximately twenty-five 

percent of the subchapter-S corporation.
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As for Julianne’s expenses, we agree that her estimate of $7028 in 

monthly expenses is reasonable. Although some of the estimates may 

appear high, the expenses are in line with the lifestyle she enjoyed while 

married to Gary. We will discuss additional facts as necessary to decide 

the issues on appeal.

V. Spousal Support.

Spousal support “is not an absolute right, and an award thereof 

depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.” In re Marriage of 

Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005) (quoting In re Marriage of 

Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 319 (Iowa 1996)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[P]rior cases are of little value in determining the appropriate 

alimony award.” In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 825–26.

The amount of spousal support is always calculated equitably 

based upon “all of the following” factors contained in Iowa Code section 

598.21A(1) (emphasis added). These include:

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The age and physical and emotional health of the 

parties.

c. The distribution of property made pursuant to 

section 598.21.

d. The educational level of each party at the time of 

marriage and at the time the action is commenced.

e. The earning capacity of the party seeking 

maintenance, including educational background, training, 

employment skills, work experience, length of absence from 

the job market, responsibilities for children under either an 

award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party to find appropriate employment.

f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance 

becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably 

comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the 

length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
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g. The tax consequences to each party.

h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties 

concerning financial or service contributions by one party 

with the expectation of future reciprocation or compensation 

by the other party.

i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.

j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant 

in an individual case.

Iowa Code § 598.21A(1).

A trial court has considerable latitude when making an award of 

spousal support. Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 315. Therefore, we will only 

disturb the trial court’s award of spousal support if it fails to do equity 

between the parties. Id. In reviewing the record and the factors 

contained in section 598.21(A), we conclude the award by the trial court 

failed to do equity. 

Gary and Julianne were married for sixteen years, and thus, the 

length of the marriage merits support payments. See Fenchel v. Fenchel, 

268 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1978) (upholding award of spousal support 

for marriage lasting sixteen years).

The parties had a mutual agreement that Gary would be the 

breadwinner and Julianne would stay home. The comparative income of 

the spouses is another factor for the court to consider when evaluating 

an award of spousal support. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 

N.W.2d 683, 704 (Iowa 2007) (considering comparative income of the

parties at $46,300 versus $18,900 as evidence that $500 per month in 

spousal support to wife was proper). Here, Gary’s income during the 

marriage was substantial, while Julianne’s was negligible. At age fiftyseven, with her education and employment history, even with some 

retraining, it is unlikely Julianne will ever be able to generate enough 

income to support herself in the style that Gary did during the marriage.
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Gary also received a substantial property award from the court 

because of the premarital agreement. It would be improper to increase 

the spousal support award solely to penalize him for the premarital 

agreement. However, we believe that in calculating spousal support, it is 

proper to look at the assets each party received. We do so to determine 

the income potential of the property distributed to each party. In this 

case, Gary received assets that will continue to generate substantial 

income. The assets the court awarded Julianne will not. These assets, 

together with his wages, will give Gary the ability to pay a substantial 

amount of support indefinitely into the future.

Finally, the report prepared by the expert hired by Julianne’s 

attorney indicates that the tax consequence of awarding Julianne 

substantial spousal support will only minimally affect Gary. This is true 

because of Gary’s high income and tax rate, coupled with the fact that 

any support payments he makes are deductible from his gross income.

The district court stopped Julianne’s support payments at age 

seventy. We find that it should be payable for Julianne’s life. As long as 

Gary has an interest in the corporation, there is no reason to believe that 

he will not be receiving a substantial cash distribution from the 

corporation, even if he no longer receives a salary from it. Moreover, if he 

divests himself from his ownership in the corporation, we believe the 

value he will receive for his interest in the corporation will generate 

sufficient funds to reinvest in another asset that will provide him with 

substantial income. 

On the other hand, Julianne was fifty-seven years old at the time 

of the dissolution. She received no assets that will produce a significant 

stream of income to keep her in the lifestyle she had become accustomed 

to while married to Gary. Her only retirement account had a fair market 
11

value of $1328. Based on the property distribution, her past work 

record, and age, we have no reason to believe if her support payments 

were to stop at age seventy, she would have significant income or assets 

to maintain the lifestyle she had with Gary. Realistically, her only source 

of income other than spousal support would be a share of Gary’s social 

security payments. 

Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, we find 

Julianne is entitled to traditional spousal support, which is “payable for 

life or so long as a spouse is incapable of self-support.” In re Marriage of 

Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 826 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Therefore, we modify the district court’s decree and order Gary 

to pay Julianne spousal support in the sum of $7000 per month until 

her death or her remarriage.

VI. Expert Fees.

Julianne’s attorney hired an expert to assist him with trial 

preparation. The expert is a certified public accountant practicing in a 

large firm in West Des Moines. The expert is qualified to give opinions 

regarding forensic accounting in dissolution of marriage actions. 

The expert submitted a bill for services rendered in valuing the 

subchapter-S corporation, preparing schedules dealing with the tax 

consequences involving various amounts of spousal support, and 

reviewing the tax returns and financial statements to trace shareholder 

transactions. The bill only covered the services the expert provided in 

assisting Julianne’s attorney to prepare for trial and did not cover any 

charges for testifying at the trial. The bill itemized each service provided 

and totaled $17,050. Gary did not contest the reasonableness of the fee.

The district court awarded Julianne $30,000 in attorney fees, but 

refused to reimburse her for the amount her attorney expended to pay
12

the $17,050 expert bill. The district court denied expert fees, because it 

found the expert’s report “was not necessary and contributed nothing to 

the determination of spousal support.”

The court has considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees. In 

re Marriage of Maher, 596 N.W.2d at 568. A court may consider expert 

fees in an award of attorney fees. See In re Marriage of Muelhaupt, 439 

N.W.2d at 662–63; see also Tydings v. Tydings, 567 A.2d 886, 891 (D.C. 

1989) (upholding award of expert fees for accountant to value husband’s 

corporate interest where husband was in the best financial position to 

pay); Stansberry v. Stansberry, 580 P.2d 147, 150 (Okla. 1978) (granting 

expert fees to wife for appraisers who valued the marital estate).

We disagree with the district court’s finding that the expert’s 

services were not necessary or useful in determining the spousal support 

award. The value of the assets received by Gary, the sums he obtained

from the subchapter-S corporation, and the tax consequences of 

awarding spousal support were important considerations in making our 

award of spousal support. Accordingly, we find the district court 

decision in this regard is clearly untenable and unreasonable. Therefore, 

we modify the district court’s decree and award Julianne an additional 

$17,050 towards her attorney fees for the expert’s services. We do not 

make an award for appellate attorney fees.

VII. Disposition.

We affirm the court of appeals opinion and the district court 

decision concerning the premarital agreement and the distribution of 

property. The court of appeals opinion on these issues will stand as our 

final decision. However, we vacate the court of appeals opinion as to the 

spousal support award and expert fees. Accordingly, we modify the 

district court decision on spousal support to order Gary to pay Julianne 
13

spousal support in the sum of $7000 per month until her death or her 

remarriage. We also modify the award of attorney fees and require Gary 

to pay Julianne an additional $17,050 in fees for the expert services 

provided to her attorney. We tax the costs of this action equally between 

the parties.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND

VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS 

MODIFIED.