## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate Distri ct of Texas

at Fort Worth

________________________ ___ N o. 02

- 19

- 00 273

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 325 th Di stri ct Cour t Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325

- 604900

- 16
Before Gabriel, Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ga briel 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### R. H. AND 

### R.C., C HILD REN2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant R.D. appeals the termination of his parental rights to R .H. (Ryan) , and Appellant W.C. appeals the termination of his parental r ights to R.C. ( Roman )

. 1
In two poin ts , W.C. contends t hat the trial court erred by denying his motion to
extend the dismissal d eadline found in Texas Family Code Section 263.401(a) and that
the evidence is fact ual ly insufficient to suppo rt the trial court ’ s finding t hat
termination was in Roman ’ s best interest

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401 (a).
R.D. ’ s appo inted appellate counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. C a lifornia , 386 U.S. 738, 744

– 4 5 (1967) , asser ting t hat R.D. ’ s appeal is frivolous. Because we overrule
W.C. ’ s tw o points and because , after carefully reviewing the record, we agre e with
R.D. ’ s counsel that R.D. ’ s appeal is frivo lous, we affirm the trial court ’ s te r mination

or der

. I. BACKGROUND
R yan and Roman are half

- brothers

— they share a mother, L.H. (Mother). 2 Following his June 2018 birth, Roman ’ s meconium tested pos iti ve f or

1 W e use aliases to refer to the c hildren ass oc iated with this appea l and i niti als to refer to the appellants

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann . § 109.002(d) ; Tex. R. App. P. 9.8( b)(2 ).

2 The trial court ter minated Mother ’ s par ental rights to Ryan and Roman after she signed a voluntary relinquishment of t hos e r ights

. Mother does not appeal.3

methamphetamine

. 3 T he Dep artment of Family and Protec tive Ser vices ( the
D epartment

) stepped in , and after some initial difficulty lo cating Mother and Roman, the Department tracked them to a motel in Fort Worth , where the y wer e residing with W.C. and Ry an. The Department removed Ryan and R oman on July 9, 2018 , and
filed suit to terminate the par ental rights of Mother and R.D. to Ryan and Mother and
W. C. to Roman.
Followin g removal, M eagan McDonald, a cas eworker for C hild Protective
S ervices , establis hed a service plan for W.C

. W.C. was required to engage in random drug testing, drug treatment , and individual counseling

. In addition , he was ordered

to complete a psychosocial a sse ssment and to refrain from criminal activity

. McDonald testified that s he met with W.C. on several occasions to dis cuss his
progress in completing the service plan. She testified that she met W.C . on August 22, 2018, and he ad mitted to using meth ampheta mine seven days prior. That
concerned McDonald b ecause of the short time line to achieve family reunification
and because it demonstrated that W.C. was not getting his life in o rder. McDonald

met w ith W.C. again on October 24, 2018 , and he told he r that he had not made any progress in compl eting the ser vice plan. That s ame da y, McDonal d asked W.C. to take a drug test, and she informe d him that his refusal to do so would be considered

as a presum p tively pos itive test
. Despite that warning, W.C. failed to take the drug

3 Ryan was born in July 2016. Ry an ’ s meconium also tested positive for methamphetamine at h is birth

.4

test. 4 At the termination hearing, McDonald testified that W.C. did not complete a drug assessment, did not start i ndividual counseling, did n ot complete a ps ychosocial assessment, and did not successfully complete any items on the service plan

. T he Department also presented ev idence of W.C. ’ s lengthy criminal h istory

— criminal history occur ring both before and after Ro man ’ s removal

. Prior to Ro man ’ s removal, W.C. had been convic ted of the following felonies: ( 1 ) first

- degree f el ony possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, namely cocaine, for an
offense committed on October 5, 1996 ; ( 2 ) first

- degree felony delivery of a controlled substance, namely co cain e, for an offense committed on October 5, 1996 ; ( 3 ) second

degree felony burglary of a hab itation for an offense committed on December 21,
2005 ; and ( 4

) state jail felony possession of a c ontroll ed subst ance of les s than one gram, namely methamphetamine, for an offense comm itted on Octobe r 20 , 2015

. The evi de nce also showed that W.C. committed and was convicted of the following
fel onies after Rom an ’ s removal : ( 1 ) second

- degree f elony burglary o f a buil ding for an
offense committ ed on September 11, 2018 ; ( 2 ) a second cou n t of second

- degree felony burglary of a b uil ding for an offense also c ommitted on September 11, 2018 ; (3 ) second

- degree felony th eft for an of fe nse commit ted on Nove mber 29, 2018 ; and

4 W.C. testified that he attempted to take th e drug test McDonald requested on Octobe r 24, 2018 , but the drug

- testin g faci lity was closed when he arrived , despite his arriva l at the requested time

. W.C

. testified that this occurred on other occasions as well

— he would allegedly arrive at the drug

- testing facility at the requ ested time , but the drug

- testing faci l ity woul d be c losed.5

( 4 ) second

- degree felony theft for an off ense committ ed on December 3, 2 018

. W.C. pleaded guilty to the felonies committed after Roman ’ s removal , and on April 16, 2019, the trial court sent enced him t o three year s ’ confinement , with the sentence s to run concurrently

. 5 The Dep artment also put on evidence of domestic violence between W.C. and
Mother. McDonald testified that at an initial co urt hearing in the case, she noticed
that Mother had a black e ye and bruising on h er neck

. Mother told McDonald that those injuri es were caused by W.C. McDonald testified that she did not have any

e vidence that W.C. had physically abused Ryan or Roman but that domestic violence
betwee n W.C. and Mother placed them i n da nger . On the morning of the termination h earing, W.C. filed a moti on to extend the
dismissal deadli ne . The trial court denied W.C. ’ s motion. The trial court later signed

an o rder of termination, terminating Mo ther and R.D. ’ s parental rights to Ryan , termin a tin g Mother and W.C. ’ s parental rights to Roman, and appointing the Department as Ryan and Rom an ’ s permanent managing conservator.
II. W.C. ’ S APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO EXTEN D

THE DISM IS SAL DEADLINE
In his first point , W.C. appeals the trial cou rt ’ s den ial of his mo tio n to e xtend
the dismissal de adline found in Texas Family Code Section 263.401(a)

. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a).

5 W.C. was incar cerated at the time of the termination hearing

.6

We r eview a trial court ’ s decisio n to grant or deny an extension of the dismissal
d e adline unde r the abuse of discretion standard. In re D.W. , 2 4 9 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied )

. P ursuant to Section 263.401(a), a termination suit filed by the Department is automatically dismissed on the first Monday after the f

irst annive rsary of the date a trial cour t render s a temporary order appointing the Department as temporary managing conservator if the trial court has
neither commenced the trial on the merits n or granted an exten sion

. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401(a). The trial c ourt may grant an extension of up to 1 80 days if it finds
that “ extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child rem aining in the temporary managing con servatorship of the [D]epart ment and that continuing the appoint ment of the [D ]epartment as temporary m anag ing conservator is in t he best interest of the
child. ” Id . § 263.401(b). The focus is on the needs of the child, whether extraordi nary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the tempo rary custody of th e Depar t ment , and whether co ntinuin g s u ch is in the best interest of the ch ild. Id

. Here, on the morning of the termination hearing, W.C. filed a motion to extend
the dismissal deadline. The written motion contained no argument , let alone
evi dence, that extraordina ry ci rcumstance s necessita ted an extensi on of the dismissal
deadline . Rather, W.C. ’ s motion simply state d:
The circum sta nces of th e case and the needs of the ch ildren are such that it would not be in the best interest of the Childr en to dismiss the suit on th at date or to render final orders. An extension of the d ismissal date of not longer tha n 180 days is in the best int erest of t he Children.7

Just as the termination hearing began , W.C. ’ s counsel brought the motion to the trial

cour t ’ s attention , an d the trial court took up t he mot ion for consideration

. A gain,
W.C. did not offer any evidence of extraordinary circumstances to justify an extension of the dismissal deadline; rather, W.C. ’ s counsel simply made th e following argument:
Your H onor, my c lient is [W.C .]. He is

-- he is currently in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice prison in Abilene, I believe. [ W .C.] expects to get out of pris on in early Se ptember, and he

-- he has con vinced me that he ha s ch anged his life, and he would like to t ell you about it. 6
T he tria l court denied W.C. ’ s motion. Based on this record, it was entirely within the trial court ’ s discretion to
determine that W.C. failed to present any evidence of extraordinary circumstances
that would necessitate an extension of the dismissal deadline. Se e D.W. , 2 4 9 S.W.3d at 648 (holding that because mother presented no evidence when she presented her
motion to e xtend the dismissal deadline, the trial court did n ot abuse its discretion by
d enying her motion); In re A.S.J. , No. 04

- 06

- 00051

- CV, 2006 WL 18 96 335, at *2 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio July 12, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying parents ’ motion to extend the di smissal deadline where
paren ts “ failed to provide a ny e vidence of an extraordinary circumsta nce that would

6 W.C. was n ot deprived of the opportunity to tell the trial court about how he claimed he had changed his life. He wa s present and testified at the fi nal termination hearing.8

warrant an extension of time ” ). Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying W.C. ’ s motion to extend the dismissal d eadline. 7
We overrule W.C. ’ s first point.
II I
. W .C. ’ S APPE AL OF THE TRIAL COU RT ’ S BEST

- INTE REST FIND ING
In his seco nd point , W.C. a rgues the evidence was factually insufficient to support the tria l court ’ s finding that the term ination of his pa rental right s was in
Roman ’ s best in terest
. A. S TANDARD O F R EVIEW
We must pe r form “an exacting rev iew of the entire r ecord” in determinin g the
factual suffi cienc y of the evidence support ing the trial court ’ s best

- interest finding

. In re A.B. , 43 7 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 20 14)

. Nevertheless, we gi ve due deference to
the finding and do not supplant it wi th our own. In r e H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 1 05, 108 (Tex. 2006) . We review the whole record to decide whet her a fact

- fin der could reasonably form a firm convictio n or belief that th e ter mination of W.C. and Roman ’ s parent

- child re lationsh ip would be in Roman ’ s best interest. Tex. Fam

. Code Ann. § 161.001(b) (2) ; In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If a fac t

- finder reasonably

7 We n o te that the prayer of the motion to extend the dismissal deadline contain ed a one

- sente nce request that the trial court set a new trial date. To t he extent that such sentence consti tutes a motion for cont inuanc e, the trial court was within its disc retion to deny the motion because it was not supported by an affidavit

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251 (requir ing a motion for continuance to be supported by af fidavit ).9

could form such a firm conviction or be lief, then th e ev idence is factuall y sufficient.
C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 1 8

– 19.
B. A PPLICABLE L AW Although we g enerally p resume that keeping a child with a par ent is in the
child ’ s best interest, In r

e R.R. , 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), t he best

- interest analysis is chil d

- ce ntered, focusi ng on the chil d ’ s well

- b eing, safet y, and development,
In re A.C. , 560 S.W .3d 624, 6 3 1 (Tex. 2018). Evidence probative of a child ’ s best interest may be the same evidence that is probative of a conduct gr ound. In re E.C .R. , 402 S.W. 3d 2 39, 249 (Tex. 2013 ); C.H. , 8 9 S.W.3d at 28 ; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.0 01(b)(1). We als o conside r the evidence in light of nonexclusive factors that the trier of fact may apply in deter mining the child ’ s best interest: (A) the child ’ s desires; (B ) the child ’ s emotional and physical needs, now and in the future; (C) the em oti onal and physical danger t o the child now and in the future; (D) the parental abilities of the individual s seeking custody; (E) the programs avail able to assist t hese ind ivid u als to promote the chi ld ’ s best interest; (F) the plans for the child by these individuals or b y the age n cy seeking custody; (G) the stability of the ho me or p roposed placement; (H) the pare nt ’ s acts or omissions indicating th at the existin g pare nt

chi ld re lationship is not a proper one; and10

(I ) a ny excuse f

or the parent ’ s acts o r omissions.
Hol ley v. Ad a ms , 544 S.W.2d 367, 371

– 72 (Tex. 1976) ; see E.C.R. , 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best

- interest fi nding, “ we consider, a mong other e viden c e, the Holley fac tors ” (footnote omitted) ); In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex. 2012).
These fa c to rs are not exhaustive, and some list ed factors may not apply to some cases.
C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthe rmore, undis puted evidence o f just one f actor may be
sufficient to support a finding th at terminat ion is in the child ’ s best interest. I d . On
th e other hand, the presence of scant evi dence relevant to each factor will not su pport such a finding. Id

. C. B EST - I NTERE ST A NALYSIS With regard to Roman ’ s desires, the re cord reflects that Roman was one year old at the time of the term ination hearing and did n ot testify

. “ When children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder may consider whether the childre n have
bonded with the fost er family, are well

- care d for by them, and have spent minimal time with the paren t. ” In re S.R. , 452 S.W.3d 351, 369 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). The re cord reflects that Ro man and Ryan are with the same foster family and that both are doing “ ex treme ly well. ” The foster family desires to adopt Roman and Ryan s hould they become eligible for adoption. The record als o

re flects that Roman was removed from W.C. when Roman was thre e weeks old. Due
to his incarceratio n, W.C. was unable to visit Roman i n the six to seven months prior11

to the termination hearing. Duri ng that six

- to

- seven

- month period, W.C. se nt no cards or messages to McDonald to forw ard to Roman

. The t rial court was entitled to find that this factor weigh ed in favor of terminating W.C. ’ s parental rights to Ro man. With regard to Roman ’ s emoti onal and p hysical needs now and in the future , the record reflects that his basic need s , includ ing food, clo th ing , shelter, medical care,

an d supervision , were being met wit h his foster family and that Roman was thriving

. Roman had low muscle tone and was in need o f , and while with his foster family had
been receiving , E arly C hildhood I ntervention serv ices to assist in his phys ical development

. As a result, Roman was making progress in meeting his physical
milestones. The record reflects th at W.C. was incarcerat ed at the time of the termination hearing, had no t had any contact wi t h Roman in the six to seven mont h s prior to the termination hearing, and had not been meeting R oman ’ s emotion al and physical needs. The trial court wa s entitled to find that this factor w eighed in favor of
terminati ng W.C. ’ s parental rights t o Roman. With regard to the e motional and physical d anger to Ro man now and in the future, the record reflects that W.C. has a history of methamphetamine use, including
use after Roman ’ s removal. Mi c h ael Jauss, a special investiga t or for the Department,
testified that children are en dangered when their parents use methamphetamine while
the children are in their possession. The record also reflect s that W.C. caused Mother

to sustain a black eye a nd b ru ising to her neck. McDonald testified that domestic
violence between W.C. and Mother placed Roman in danger. The record also reflects12

that W.C. has an extensive criminal history

— both prior to and a fter Roman ’ s removal. McDonald testi fied that W.C. ’ s c ri minal activit ies placed Roman in danger.
McDonal d also testified that W.C. k new th at Mother was using methamphetami ne but
allowed R oman to remain with Mother prior to removal. McDonald testifie d that allowing a child to remain with another pers on who i s actively using methamphetamine present s a danger to the child. The trial court wa s entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of terminating W.C. ’ s pa rental rights to Roman.
W i th regard to the parental abilities of W.C., the reco rd reflects tha t W.C. had not parented Roman except for the first three weeks of his life. The record fu rther
reflects that W.C. continued to use methamphetamine and to engage in criminal
activi ties following Roman ’ s removal despite knowing that he needed to abstain fro m illegal drugs and from criminal activity in order for Roman to be placed with him

. W.C. ’ s crimi nal activity continued two months after his s o n was removed by the Department. W .C. was indicted for two bu rglary

- of

- a
- building cases , both of which

were all eged t o have occurred on Septemb er 11, 2018. He was also indicted for two felony theft cases

— one alleged to have occurred o n November 29, 2018 , and the
othe r on December 3, 2018. At trial, W.C. testified he committed one crime but pled guilty to the othe rs as part of a plea bargain deal even though he was not guilty in all
four cases. Then W.C. explained to the court that once h e was transferred to his unit
at the Texa s Department of C r iminal Jus tice (TDCJ) , he began attending self

improvement classes an d prog rams. While W.C. ’ s efforts are commendable, they13

reflect only four w eeks in a forty

- three

- year lifetime. The trial court co uld have
infer red from W.C. ’ s past history of instability, criminal conduct , and d rug use that W.C. did not have the ability to mee t R oman ’ s physical and emotional need s i n the
futur e. See In re J.D

. , 436 S.W.3d 1 05 , 118 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2014 , no pet.)

. The trial court is not bound to accept the truth or accuracy of a parent ’ s testimony of future i ntentions. D.F. v . State , 525 S.W.2d 933, 939

– 40 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [ 1st Dist.] 1975 , wri t ref ’ d n.r.e. )

. A fact

- finder may measure a parent ’ s future conduct by his past conduct and determine that it is in a child ’ s best interest to terminate his pare ntal rights. I n re E .M. , 494 S.W.3d 209 , 226 (Tex. A pp.

— Waco 2015, pet. den ied)

. The trial court wa s entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of terminating W. C. ’ s parental rights to Roman. With regard to the programs available to assist W.C. in promoting Ro man ’ s best interest, the record reflects that W.C. did no t su ccessfully complete any i tems o n his service plan. He did not complete a drug as sessment, did not start individual counseling, did not complete a psychosocial assessment, and did not refrain fro m
enga ging in criminal activi ties. How ever, W.C. did take advantage of several offered
programs once he reached his TDCJ prison un it. W.C. estimated that in the month
since he had arrived , he had spent fifteen t o sixteen hours a week on self

improv emen t classe s and programs , including programs to as sist with his narcotics
addiction and programs to assist with his parenting skills

. Despite W.C. ’ s attempts to change his life and co mply with h is serv ice plan in the month prior to the te rmin ation14

hearing , th e tria l court wa s entitled to f ind that this factor weighed in favor of terminating W.C. ’ s parental rights to Roman. With regard to the plan for Roman by the individuals seeking custody, W.C.
estim ated that he would be paroled in Sept embe r

— two months afte r the termination hearing. He testified that he would be a ble to get his old job back with the cable company and that his mother had arranged housing for him with a landl ord in exchange for W.C. ’ s upkeep of the house and ot her properties. W.C. testified that h e d id not want to be with Mother but that he wished to take care of Roman and Ryan
on his own. Th e Department ’ s plan was for Roman to be adopted by the fo ster family that had been caring for Roma n and Ryan. The foster family i ndi cate d a des ire

to a dopt R oman if W.C. ’ s parental rights were terminated. The trial court wa s entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termin ating W.C. ’ s parental rights to
Roman

. W ith regard to the stab ility of the home or propo sed placement, the record
reflec ts tha t W.C. had an extensive criminal history and was incarcerated at the time of
the terminat

ion hearing. P rior to W.C. ’ s latest inc arceration, W.C. was livin g in a motel with his sister, w h o had a history of m ethamphetamine use and h ad recently
been re lease d from drug treatment. McDonald testified that W.C. had not shown an ability to provide a stable home for R o man. The trial court wa s e ntit led to find that this factor weighed in favor of terminating W.C. ’ s parental rights to Roman.15 D
. B EST - I NTERE ST C ON CLUSION Viewing all the evidence with the appropriate defe rence to the fact

- finder, we
hold that th e trial court could have reasonably f or m e d a firm conviction or b elief that
termination o f W.C. ’ s parental rights was in Roman ’ s best interest , a nd we theref ore hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court ’ s best

- int erest findi ng . See C. H. , 89 S.W.3d at 28.
We over rule W.C. ’ s second point

.

I V
. R.D. ’ S APPEAL
R.D

. appea ls the trial court’ s fi nal order t erminating h is parent al rig h ts to Ryan.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b )

. The tri al court found by clear and convincing
eviden ce that R.D. ’s conduct satisfie d th e t ermination gr ounds listed in F am il y C ode
S ect ion 161. 00 1(b)(1)(D) , (E) , (N) , (O), and ( Q ) and al leged in th e peti t ion for
termi nation. See id. § 161.001(b) (1)(D), (E) , ( N), (O) , (Q)

. The trial cour t further
fou nd by clear an d convinci ng e vidence that terminat ion of R.D. ’ s parental rig h ts was i n Ryan ’ s best i nterest
. See id. § 161.001(b) (2). Accordingly, the trial court ordered the
termination o f R.D. ’s parental rights to R yan and named t he Depa rtment as R yan ’ s per manent man agin g conservator
. On Septembe r 9 , 2019 , R.D. ’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and

corre sponding motion to withdraw, stating that s he ha s condu ct ed a professional
evaluation of the record and ha s conclud ed t hat there a r e n o argu able grounds to be
adva nced to support an appea l of the tria l co urt’s termination order and that the16

appeal is frivo lous. Counsel’ s brief present s the requir ed prof ession al evaluation of
the record dem o n s trating why there are no r ever si bl e gr oun ds o n appeal and
refere ncing any grounds that mi ght argua bly suppo rt t he a ppeal. See Anders , 386 U.S.

at 744 ; see als o In re K.M. , 98 S.W.3d 774, 776

– 7 7 (Tex . Ap p.

— For t Worth 2003,
order ) ( h o lding Anders procedu res ap ply in parental

- ter mination cas es), disp. on merits , No. 2

- 01

- 3 49

- CV, 20 03 WL 200 65 83 , at *2 (Te x. App.

— Fort Worth May 1, 2003, no pet.) (m em. op.). Further, coun sel informed R.D. of h is right to req u est t he record and to file a pro s e response. See Kelly v. St at e , 436 S.W. 3d 313, 318

– 20 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2014). In add it

ion, this c our t inform ed R.D. of these rights and gave him the
oppor tu n ity to notify this c ourt of h is intent to respond. R.D. h as not fi le d a response . The Department h a s n oti fied this court that it a gre e s with R.D. ’ s counsel

t hat there are no grounds assai li ng the trial co urt’s termination or der.
I n reviewing a brief that a sserts an app ea l is fri volous and that fu lfills the requi rement s of And

er s , this court is obligated t o u ndertake an in dependent

ex amin a tion of the record to determine i f any arguable grounds for a p peal exist. S ee In re C.J. , 50 1 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2 01 6, pets. denied) (citing
S tafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 5 03 , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ). Having carefu lly
reviewed the record and the Ande rs briefs, we conclude t he re are no argu ab l e grou nds
for reversal; t hu s, w e agree with counsel that R.D. ’ s appeal i s without merit. See In re D.D. , 279 S .W.3d 849, 850 (Tex

. Ap p.

— Dallas 2009, pet. denied ). We aff irm th e trial

co ur t’s termination order

. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a)

.17

We d eny counsel ’ s motio n to with dr aw in light of the supreme c ourt ’ s dec ision
in In re P.M. because counsel has not s how n “good cause” other t han h er determination that a n appeal w ould be f rivo lou s. S ee 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to wi thd raw brought in t he court of appea ls, in the absence of
additional grounds fo r withdrawal, may be prematur e.”); In re A.M. , 495 S.W.3d 5 73,
582

– 83 & n.2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2016, pets. denie d) (noting that since
P.M. was handed down, “most c ou rts of appeals affi rming par en tal te rmination orders
after receiving Anders b ri efs have denied the attorney ’ s motion to with draw”)

. The

s upre me court has held that i n cases su ch as thi s, “app ointe d couns el ’ s obligatio ns [in the supreme court] can be sat is fie d by filing a pe tition fo r review that satisfies the

st andards fo r an Ande rs brief.” P.M. , 520 S.W.3d at 27

– 28.
V. CONC LUSION
Ha ving ove rruled W.C. ’ s two points and having agree d with R.D. ’ s cou n sel that
R.D. ’ s appeal is frivo lous, we affirm the trial court ’ s termination order.
/s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gabriel Justice
Delivered: Dece mber 12, 2019