P RE CE DE NT I AL
UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

N o. 09- 3189

GR E AT WE S T E R N MI NI NG & M I NE RA L CO M P ANY, A s s i gnee of

H R C /N J , I nc. , A s s i gnee of A ct i ve Ent er t ai nm ent In c ., A ppel l ant

v.
F O X R O T H S C H IL D L L P ; T H O M A S D . P A R A D IS E , E sq ., P a rtn e r, F o x R o th sc h ild LLP; R O B E R T S . T IN T N E R , E sq ., P a rtn e r, F o x R o th sc h ild L L P ;

A D R O P T IO N S , IN C .; T H O M A S B

. R U T T E R , E s q. , C E O , A D R O pt i ons

O n A p p e a l f

ro m th e D istric t C o u rt for t he D i s t r i ct of N ew J er s ey ( N o. 08- cv- 1093) D istric t Ju d g e : H o n o ra b le W ill iam H . W a lls- 2- A r gued M ar ch 25, 2010
B e f o re : M c K E E , C hi ef

Judge , and FU E N T E S and C H A G A R E S , C i r cui tJudges ( O pi ni on Fi l ed: A ugus t 5, 2010)
B enj ami n C

. W ei ner , E s q. ( ARGUE D) 19 C ount r y s i de D r i ve L i vi ngs t on, N J 07039
C ouns el f or Appel l ant
T hom as A

. C uni ff, E s q. ( ARGUE D) Fo x Rot h s c h i l d LLP 997 L enox D r i ve B ui l di ng T hr ee L aw r ence vi l l e, N J 08648
C ouns el f or Appel l ees

OPI NI ON O F THE COURT

F U E N T E S , C i r cui tJudge : H avi ng l os t i n s t at e cour t , G r eatW es t er n M i n ing &- 3- M i ner al C om pany( “G r eatW es t er n” ) b ro u g h t a civ il rig h ts ac ti on in federal court un der 42 U.S.C. § 198 3. Great W es te rn a l l e ge s that

i t s s t at e - c ourt lo sses w e r e the r e s ul t of a“ c orr

upt co n sp iracy” b etw een th e n ame d d ef en d an ts an dcertain m e m be r s of the Pe nns yl vani a s t at e judi c i ary to e xc hange f av o rab le ru lin g s f

o rf u tu re em p lo y m en t as arb itrato rs w ith A D R O p tio n s, In c. (“A D RO p tio n s”), an altern ativ e d isp u te re soluti on enti ty

. Th e D is tr ic t C ou rt dism is se d G re at We st er n’s c om pl a i nt for fa i l ur e t o s t at e ac l a i m

and de ni e d i t s m ot i on for reco n sid eratio nan dm o tio n s f o r leav e to am en dits co m p lain t. A s a th resh o ldm atter, w e ad dress D ef en d an ts’ contenti on that

the Rook

e r-Fe l dman doc tr i n e pr e c l ude s the exer ci se of

subj ec t m atte r juris dict ion o ver this a ct ion. We di s a gr e e , a s Gr e at

W e s t e rn i s no t

“ c om pl a i ni ng of

i nj ur ie s ca used by st at e- court jud gm ents re nd er ed b ef ore the dist

ri ct court procee ding s c omm e nc e d andinviti ng dist ri ct court r evie w and re ject ion of those j ud gm ents .” Ex x on Mobi l

Cor p. v
. Saudi Basic In dus

. Cor

p. , 544 U.S. 28 0, 28 4 (20 05 ). Rather , Gre at W e s t e rn a s serts an i nde pe nde nt c ons t i t ut i ona l c l a i m

that the al le ged con spir ac y

violat ed it s r ight to be hear d in an im part ia l fo rum . Turning to the m er it s, we conclude that granting G re at W e s tern l e ave t o am e nd woul d have pr ove d fut i l e a s e ve n the f in al v ersio n o f its co m

p lain t f ailed to p lead f

act s p lau sib ly su g g estin g a co n sp irato rial ag reem en t. A cco rd in g ly , w e w ill a f f i rm. I. T hi s cas e or i gi nat es out of a di s put e i nvol ving a
m i n i a t u r e g o l f c o u r s e i n whi c h Act i v e En t e r t a i n me n t , I nc.The s e fa c t s ar e t ake n fr om the a l l e gat i ons m a de i n the 1 C o m p l a in t, w h ich , o na m o tio nto d ism iss u n d er F ed eral Ru le of Ci vi l Pr oc e d u re 1 2( b) ( 6) , the c ourt m us t a c c e pt a s tr ue and v i ew inth e lig h t m o st f

av o rab le to th e p lain tif

f

. Um lan d v. P L A N C O F in . S ervs. , 542 F.3d59 , 64 (3dCir. 20 08 ).

- 4- ( “A ct i ve”) w as t he l os i ng par t y
. A ct i ve r et ai ned B r ow ns t ei n & 1 V i t al e, P

. C

. ( “B & V ”) t o r epr es ent i t i n l i t i gat i on agai ns t an ent i t y t hat A ct i ve had hi r ed t o b u il d a mi ni at ur e gol f cour s e. D i s s at i s fi ed w i t h t he damages aw ar ded i n t hat l i t i gat i on, A ct i ve br ought a mal pr act i ce s ui t agai ns t i t s couns el , G ar yB r ow ns t ei n, M ar c D

. V i t al e, and B & V

. A l l par t i es agr eed t o bi ndi ng a r b i t r a t i o n b e f

o r e T h o ma s Ru t t e r a n d Ru t t e r ’ s c o mp a n y , ADR O pt i ons
. J ames F. W i l ey , I I I , r epr ese n t ed A ct i ve; T hom as P ara d ise, a p artne r at F o x R o thsc h il d L L P (“F o x R o thsc h il d ”),
r epr es ent ed V i t al e. A ccordi ng t o the C om plai nt, A D R O pti on s i s t he lar gest p ro v id e r o f

a ltern a tiv e d isp u te r e so lu tio n (“ A D R ” ) se rv ice s in Penns y l v a n i a, N ew J er s ey , and D el aw ar e. R ut t er i s t he foundi ng shareholder and C hief E xecu t i ve O ffi cer of A D R O pti on s. M a n y o f A D R O p tio n s’s a rb itrato rs a re f o rm e r f e d e ra l an d sta te j ud ges. B efor e begi nni n g arbi t r at i on pr ocee di ngs , t he par t i es e n ter e d in to a b in d in g A D R O p tio n s A rb itratio n A g re e m e n t, w h ich p ro v id e d th a t: E ach pa r t y and p art i ci pat i ng at t or neyhas di s cl os ed any pas t or pr es ent r el at i ons hi p w i t h t he a rb itrato r, d ire c t o r in d ire c t, w h e th e r f in a n c ial,In it s federal Co m plai nt, Great W es te rn fu rther a ll eged 2 that Vi t a l e wa s an att or

ne y fo r AD R O pt i on s and Ru tt e r
. ( J

. A. at 12 4 [ P ro p osed Am . Com pl. 3, ¶ 82 ].) Great W es te rn ackn o w led g ed , h o w ev er, th at it d id n o t d isco v er th is info rm at ion un ti l after

the s tate -c ou rt

li ti gati on . ( Great W es te rn Br. 7.) As such, this all eg ation w as no t i ncluded in G re at W e s t e rn’ s pe t i t i on t o va c at e the ar bi tr at i on awar d.

- 5- pr ofes s i onal , s oci al or anyot h er k ind. T he ar bi t r at or has al s o di s cl os ed any pas t o r pre s ent re la ti o n sh ip w ith a n y p a rty o r a tto rn e y . It i s u n d e rsto o d th a t an y d o u b t h a s b e e n re so lv e d in favor of di s cl os ur e. ( J

. A

. at 114 [Pr opos ed A m
. C om pl

. 3, ¶ 14]

. ) T he r es ul t of t he a rb itratio n p ro c e e d in g s w a s a n a w a rd f o r d e f e n d a n ts B row ns t ei n, V i t al e, and B & V

. T her eaf t er , G r eatW es t ern b e c a m e th e a ss ig n e e o f

A c tiv e ’s in ter e st. G rea t W estern fil ed a p eti ti o n in P en n sy lvan ia st ate c o u rt to vac ate the arb it rati o n aw ard o n the g rou n d o f im p rop er f ail u re to d iscl o se p o tential co n fli cts. In p arti cu lar, G rea t W estern a lleg e d th a t th e m a n a g in g p a rtn e r a t F o x R o th sc h ild , L o u is Fr y m an, w as concur r ent l y empl oy ed atA D R O pt i ons as an ar bi t r at or and t hat Par adi s e mai nt ai ned a pr ofes s i onal
r el at i ons hi p w i t h R ut t er
. T he Phi l adel phi a C our t of C om m on 2 P l eas and t he S up eri or C ou rtof P enn sy lv a n ia ruled against G r eatW es t er n and confi rm ed t he arbi t r at i on aw ar d. T he Supr eme C our t of Penns y l vani a deni ed G r eatW es t er n’ s pet i t i on f o r a llo w a n c e o f

a p p e a l.- 6- W h il e it s ap p ea l w as p en d ing b ef o re the S u p erior C o u rt o f P e n n sy lv a n ia, G re a t W e ste rn f iled a se p a ra te c iv il a c tio n in t h e P h i l a d e l p h i a Co u r t o f Co mm o n P l e a s a g a i n s t Ru t t e r , ADR O p ti o n s, F o x R o thsc h il d , an d P ara d ise, raisi n g co n tr ac t and tort c l ai m s and all eging a fail ure t o d i scl ose t he p urpo rte d ly i m pr oper relati ons hi ps
. R ober t T i nt ner , a par t ner at Fox R ot hs chi l d, r epr es ent ed al l of th e d efe ndant s
. T he C our t of C om m on Pl eas di s m issed the a cti o n as c o ll aterall y esto p p ed , and G re a t W e s te r n a p p e a le d . A c c o r d in g to G r e a t W e s te r n ’ s c o u n se l, W iley , sh o rtlyth e re a f

ter T in tn e r c a lled W iley a n d in f o rm e d h im t hat “[t ] her e [w as ] no w ay t hat a P hi l adel phi a cour t [w as ] ever g o in g to f

in d a g a in st T h o m a s R u tter g iv e n h is re latio n sh ip w ith t h e P h i l a d e l p h i a c o u r t s y s t e m. ” ( J

. A. a t 1 1 8 [ P r o p o s e d Am. C om pl

. 3, ¶ 43]

. ) T he Super i or C our t of Penns y l vani a af fi r m ed t he dec i s i on of t he C our t of C om m on Pl ea s di s m i s s i ng t he act i on, and t he S u pr eme C our t of Penns y l vani a deni ed G r eat W e ste rn ’s p e tit io n f

o r a llo w a n c e o f

a p p e a l. T her eaf t er , G r eat W es t er n fi l ed a fede r al act i on under 42 U

. S. C

. § 19 8 3, cl ai m i ng depr i vat i ons of pr ocedur al and s ubs t ant i ve due pr oces s
. A s defe ndant s , G r eatW es t er n named Fox R ot hs chi l d, Par adi se, Ti nt ner , A D R O pt i ons , and R ut t er ( col l ect ively , “D efe ndant s ”)

. G r eatW es t er n al l eged t hat t he Penns y l vani a s t at e- cour t deci s i ons w er e cor r upt ed byt he i m pr oper i n fl uence of D efe ndant s , ar i s i ng bot h fr om t he Penns y l vani a cour t s ’ r el i ance on R ut t er ’ s s er vi ces and fr om P e n n s y l v a n i a j u d g e s ’ p r o s p e c t o f f u t u r e e mp l o y me n t wi t h ADR O p tio n s. S p e c if

ica lly , G re a t W e ste rn c laim e d th a t “D e f e n d a n ts had t he pow er y et fai l ed t o t ake a ct i o n t o pr eventvi ol at i on of G r eatW es t er n’ s cons t i t ut i onal r i ght s t o d u e pr oces s
. ” ( J

. A

. at 1 2 7 [P ro p o sed A m
. C o m p l. 3 , ¶ 1 0 5 ]). T h e D ist ri ct C o u rt- 7- gr ant ed D efe ndant s ’ m ot i on t o di s m i s s for fa il u re t o s t at e a cl ai m , hol di ng t hat G r eatW estern had not s uffi ci ent l y al l eged t hat D efe ndant s ac t ed undercol or of s t at e l aw
. T he D i s t r i ct C o ur t r eas oned t hat t he cor r upt i on al l eged byG r eatW est ern “exi s t s onl y t o t he ext ent t hat defe ndant s cons pi r ed w i t h t he cour t s to ens ur e t he out come of t he under l y i ng cas e” a nd concl uded t hat G r eatW es t er n had fa i l ed t o pr op erl y al l ege t he exi s t ence of a c ons pi r acybet w een D efe ndant s and t he P e n n s y lv a n ia s ta te c o u rt s y s te m
. G r eat W

. M i n ing & Mi ner al Co. v
. Fox Rot hs c hi l d LLP , N o. 08- cv- 1093, 2009 W L 704335, at *4 (D

. N

. J. M ar. 16 , 2 0 0 9 ). T her eaf t er , G r ea t W es t er n fi l ed a mot i on for re c o n sid e ra tio n a n d f

o r le a v e to a m e n d its c o m p lain t p u rsu a n t to Feder al R ul es of C i vi l P rocedur e 59( e) and 15( a) , at t achi ng a d raf t am en d ed co m p lai n t ( “P rop o sed A m en d ed C o m p lai n t 1”). W h il e the rec o n side rati o n m o ti o n w as pe n d ing , G rea t W estern f iled a se c o n d m o tio n f

o r l e a v e to a m e n d , se e k in g to su b stitu te a new pr opos ed dr aft amended compl ai nt ( “Pr opos ed A m ended C om pl ai nt 2”) , w hi ch w as at t ache d

. Sever al w eeks l at er and
w i t hout a r ul i ng on t he fi r s t t w o m ot i on s t o amend, G r eat W e st ern fi l ed a t hir d m oti on for l eave t o am end , seek in g to s ubs t i t ut e y et anot her pr opos ed d r aft amended compl ai nt (“P rop o sed A m en d ed C o m p lai n t 3”), w h ich w as a tt ac h ed

. In t hi s m ot i on, G r eat W es t er n ar gued t hat i t had new l y di s cover ed evi den c e , s p e c i f

i c a l l y Rut t e r ’ s M a y 1 4 , 2 0 0 9 a d mi s s i o n u n d er oat h i n anot her l aw s ui t t hat s om e o f the j udges w ho had r ul ed agai ns t G r eat W ester n and for A D R O pt i ons had al r eady appr oache d R ut t er r egar di ng t he pr os pect of empl oy m ent upon l eavi ng t he benc h.T o the ex te nt t hat w e have s ubj ectm at t er j ur i s di ct i on, 3
w e exe r ci s e i t under 28 U

. S. C

. § 1291.

- 8- O n J une 24, 2009, the D i s t r i ct C our t i s s ued an unpubl i s hed L ett er O rde r de n y ing the m o ti o n fo r r econs i der at i on on t he mer i t s and deny i ng t he t hr ee m ot i ons for l eave t o amend as m oot

. I n r ul i ng on t he m ot i on for r econs i der at i on, t he D i s t r i ct C o u rt c o n sid e re d P ro p o se d A m e n d e d C o m p lain t 2 , b u t not Pr opos ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 3. I n a foot not e, t he D i s t r i ct C our t expl ai ned t hat i t decl i ned t o cons i der Pr opos ed A m ended C o m p lain t 3 b e c a u se “ [ t]o a llo w p lain tiff to re p e a te d ly su b m it d ra f ts o f its c o m p lain t w h ile p lain tiff ’s o rig in a l m o tio n s a re still p en d ing w oul d be pr ej udi ci al t o defe ndant s
. ” ( J

. A

. at 3. ) T he D ist r i ct C our t deni ed t he mot i on for r econs i der at i on, hol di ng t hat t he al l egat i ons i n Pr opos ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 2 di d not su p p o rt a c o n s p ir ac y claim

. O n ap p ea l, G rea t W estern chal l enges t he D i s t r i ct C ou rt ’ s r efus al t o cons i der Pr opos ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 3 and ar gues t hat t he mot i on for
r econs i der at i on w as er r oneous l y deni ed. II. D efe ndant s co n t es t our j ur i s di ct i on and t hat of t he D i s t r i ct C ourt , co nt endi ng t hat t hi s act i on i s bar r ed byt he R ooker

- F el dm an doct r i ne. A lth o u g h D ef en d an ts raisedth is ar gu m ent i n their

m otion to dis m is s, the Distri ct Co urt dec li ned t o a ddr e s s i t

and, e xe r c i s i ng jur i s di c t i on pur s uant t o 28 U. S. C. § § 1 3 3 1 an d1 3 4 3 , di s m i s s ed G rea t W es t er n’ s C om pl ai nt for fa i l ur e t o s t at e a c l ai m under Feder al R ul e of Ci vi l Pro ce d u re 12( b) ( 6)

. W e exer ci s e de novo r evi ew over ques t i ons of s ubj ect m at t er j ur i s di ct i on. P ennMont Secs

. v. Fr ucher , 586 F. 3d 242, 3- 9- 245 ( 3d C i r
. 2009)

. M or eover , al l cour t s “have an i ndepende nt obl i gat i on t o det er m i ne w het her s ubj ect

- m at t er j ur i s di ct i on exi s t s
. ” A r baugh v. Y

& H C or p. , 5 4 6 U

. S

. 5 0 0 , 5 1 4 (20 0 6 ). O ur s t andar d of r evi ew of a di s t r i ct c o ur t ’ s di s m i s s al
u n d e r F e d e r a l R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 1 2 ( b ) ( 6 ) i s p l e n a r y. P enn Mon tSecs. , 5 8 6 F

. 3 d at 2 4 5

. W e re v iew a d ist ri ct co u rt d e c isio n re f

u sin g lea v e to a m e n d u n d e r F e d e ra l R u le o f C iv il P ro c e d u re 1 5 (a ) f

o r a b u s e o f

d is c re tio n
. B

jo rg u n g v . W

h iteta il Res or t , LP , 550 F. 3d 263, 266 ( 3d C i r
. 2008)

. L i kew i s e, t he deni al of a m ot i on for r econs i der at i on i s r evi ew ed for abus e of d is c re tio n
. McD ow el lv. P hi l a. H ous
. A ut h. , 423 F. 3d 233, 238 (3d C ir

. 2 0 0 5 ). III .

A
. R ooker

- F eldm an D oc t r i ne In certain c ircu m stan ces, w h ere a f ed eral su it f

o llo w s a st at e s uit, the Rook

e r-Fe l dman do ctri ne proh ibit s the distri ct c o u rt f r o m e x e r c i s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n
. T h e d o c tr i n e t ak e s i t s n ame from the only two ca se s in wh ic h the Suprem e Cou rt has ap p lied it to d ef

eat f ed eral sub j ect-m atter j u risd ictio n : Ro oker v. Fi de l i t yTrus t Co. , 263 U. S. 413 ( 1923) , and D i s tr i c t of Columbi a Cour t

of Appe al s v
. Fe l dman , 46 0 U .S. 462 (198 3). In a r ec ent decis ion, the Sup re m e Cou rt held that the R o o kerFe l dman do ctri ne “i s c on fined to cas es of the kind f

rom wh ic h the doctr ine a cquire d its n ame: ca se s broug ht by st at e- court lo sers co m

p lain in g o f in

j u ries cau sedb y

state-co u rt j u d g m en ts r e nde r e d be for e the di s tr i c t c ourt pr oc e e di ngs c omm e nc e d and in v itin g d istrict co u rt rev iew an d rej ectio n o f th o se j u d g m en ts.” E xxo n M o b il , 544 U. S. at

284. Thus , any

di s c us s i on of the- 10- sco p e o f th e d o c t r i n e mu st b eg inw ith an ex am in atio no f its n am esak e cases. T h e S up rem e C o u rt ch aracterized th e law su it at issu e in R o oker a s an att e m

pt “ t o have a judgm e nt of a c i r c ui t c ou rt in Indiana, wh ic h w as affirm ed by the Sup re m e C ou rt of

the s tate , de c l ar e d nul l and voi d, and t o obt a i n othe r r e l i e f de pe nde nt

on that ou tc om e. ” 263 U.S. at

41 4. R o o ker andothers , who had l os t i n s t at e c ourt , s ought r e l i e f i n fe de r a l di s tr i c t c ourt , ar gui ng that the s t at e - c ourt

judgm e nt

wa s “ i n c on trav en t i on of” the U n itedS tates C o n stitu tio n
. I d. at 41 5. Th e Supreme C ou rt a ffi rm e dth e d i s m i s s a l b y th e d i s tr i c t

c o u rt f o r l a c kof j u risd ictio n . T h e C o u rt reaso n edth at: [u]nde r the l e gi s l at i on of C ongr e s s , no c ourt of th e U n itedS tates o th er th an th is c o u r t co u ld e nt e rt a i n apr oc e e di ng t o r e ve r s e o r m odi fy the j u d g m en t f

o r erro rs o f

th at ch aracter. T o d o so woul d be an e xe r c i s e of a ppe l l at e jur i s di c t i on. T h e j u risd ictio np o ssessedb y th e D istrict C o u rts is strictly o rig in al. I d. at 41 6 (inte rnal ci tati on s om itte d). In other wo rds, the r el ie f soug ht by

the p la inti ff

s i n f eder al court r equire d f

eder al a ppe l l at e r e vi e w of the s t at e - c ourt judgm e nt , at a s k e ntr

us t e d by statu te so lely

to th e S up rem e C o u rt. Si xty y ears l at e r , the Supr e m e Court r e vi s i t e d the i s s ue i n Fe l dman

. The pl a i nt i ffs i n Fe l dman ha d p et i t i one d the Di s tr i c t of Co l um bi aCourt o f App e a l s ( the e qu i va l e nt of a state’ s h i g h est co u rt, se e 28 U. S. C. § 1 25 7( b) ) fo r wa i ve r of a co u rt ru l e t h at requ iredap p lican ts to th e D istrict o f C o lu m b ia b ar to h av e g radu ated f

ro m an accred ited law sch o o l. Fe l dman , 46 0 U .S. at 4 63

. Th e cou rt denied thei r request s f or a wai ver, an dth e p lain tif

f s f iled a s u it inf

ed eral d istrict co u rt, ch allen g in g th e D .C . co u rt’s ref u sal to w aiv e th e ru le an dad m it them to the bar

or at le as t per

m it them to take the bar- 11- ex am in atio n
. S

ee id

. at 4 6 8

– 7 0 , 4 7 2

– 7 3 . T h e S up rem e C o u rt, affirm ing the Co urt of A p p ea ls , ree m ph as iz ed that

“a Un it ed S tates D istrict C o u rt h as n o au th o rity to rev iew f in al j u d g m en ts o f a s tate court i n j ud ic ia l proce edings.” I d. at 482. T h u s, insofar a s the plai ntiffs soug ht re view of the D.C. c ou rt ’s judgm e nt s , the di s tr i c t

c ourt l a c ke d s ubje c t

m att e r jur i s di c t i on. I d. at 48 2. To the e xtent, ho wever, that the pla inti ff

s c hall enged th e co n stitu tio n ality o f th e b ar ad m issio n ru les th em selv es, th eir su it w as n o t b arredas it d idn o t “requ ire rev iew o f a f in al state ju dg m ent i n a part ic ular

ca se .” I d. at 486. Twi c e i n Fe l

d man , the Suprem e Cou rt used the t er

m “i nextri ca bly inte rtwined” to desc ri be the ty pe of cl ai m s that plai ntiffs m ay

no t rai se in federal dist

ri ct court. Firs t, the Cou rt addres se d the ar gu m ent that i f a plai ntiff d ec li ned to ass ert ce rt ai n con st it

utional argum ents in st at e c ou rt , a federal dist ri ct co u rt co u ldex ercise j u risd ictio no v er th o se claim s as it w o u ld n o t b e rev iew in g an issu e d ecid ed b y th e state co u rt. I d. at 482 n .1 6 . T h e C o u rt rej ectedth is lin e o f reaso n in g , statin g th at: [i ]f the c ons t i t

ut i ona l c l a i m s pr e s e nt e d t o a Un it ed Stat es Distri ct

Co urt are in ex t r icab ly i nt e rtwi ne d wi th the s t at e c ourt ’ s de ni a l i n a ju dici al proceedi ng of

a parti cular p lainti ff’s a ppl i c at i on for a dm i s s i on t o the s t at e bar , the n the D istrict C o u rt is inessen ce b ei n g c a l ledup o nto re view the s tate court dec is ion. Th is the Dis tr ic t Court m ay not do. I d. I n the s e c ond i ns t anc e , the Court e m pl oy e d the t ermto di s t i ngui s h be twe e n the pl a i nt i ffs ’ c hallen g e to the co n stitu tio n ality o f th e b ar ru les th em selv es, w h ich c o u ld pr oc e e d i n f

e de r a l di s tr i c t

c ourt , and the i r

c ha l l e nge t o the de ni a l of the wa i ve r

r e que s t s , whi c h wa s pr ohi bi t e d: [I]t is cl ear t h at [the plai ntiffs’] al le gati on s that the Distri ct of

Co lum bia Cou rt of Ap peal s a ct ed- 12- arb itrarily an dcap ricio u sly

ind en yin g th e ir peti ti on s for waiver .

. . re q u ir ed the [Un it ed Stat es ] D is tr ic t Cou rt

to re view a final ju dici al de c i s i on of the hi ghe s t c ourt of a jur i s di c t i on i n a p articu lar c a s e . T h ese alleg atio n s are in ex tricab ly inte rtwined w it

h the Di stri ct

of Co lum bia Cou rt o f A p p eals’ d ecisio n s, inj u d icial p ro ceed in g s, to deny [the plai ntiffs’] peti ti on s. Th e [Un it ed St at e s ] Di stri c t

Court , the r e for e , doe s not have j u risd ictio n o v er th ese elem en ts o f the [ p lain tif f s’] co m p lain ts. I d. at 4 8 6

– 8 7

. I no t h e r w o r d s , an y o f th e p l a i n t i f

f s ’ c l a i ms contes ti ng the denia l of thei r waiver s, even if no t r ai se d b efore the Di s tr i c t of Col um

bi a c ourt , we r e “ i ne xtr i c abl y i nt e rtwi ne d” wi th judi c i a l de c i s i ons by the Di s tr i c t of Col um

bi ac ourt and, thus , we r e barr e d. Ro oker and Fe l dman es ta

blis hed the princi ple that federal dist

ri ct courts la ck ju ri sdic ti on ov er suit s that are es se ntia ll y

appeal s from st at e- court ju dg m ents , but they of fered l i t t l e i n s tr u c t i o no nh o w t o a

p p l y th at p r i n c i p l e
. S ub s e qu e nt Suprem e Cou rt

ca se law p rovided littl e further a ss is tance. Befo re E xxo n M o b il , “[t]h e f

ew deci si on s that have m enti on ed Ro oker and Fe l dman h av e d o n e so o n ly

inp assin g o r to ex p lain wh y those c as es did n ot dict at e dis missal .” E xxo n M o b il , 544 U. S. at 287. I n E

x x o n M o b il , th e C o u rt “g ran tedcertio rari to r e s ol ve c onfl i c t am ong the Court s of Appe a l s ove r the s c ope of the Rook e r-Fe l dman d o ctri ne.” I

d. at 291 ( i nt e rna l c i t at i on om itted ). A t the ou ts et , the Co urt noted that the doctr ine, as vari ou sl y inte rpre te d in the lower c ou rt s, “has som et im es been constr ued to exte ndfar beyon d the contou rs of the R o o ker and Fe l dman ca se s, ov er

ri ding Co ng re ss ’ conf

er ra l of f eder al -c ou rt j ur i s di c t i on c onc urr e nt

wi th jur i s di c t i on e xe r c i s e d by s t ate c ourt s , and s upe r s e di ng the or di nary a ppl i c at i on of

p r e c l us i on law.” I d. at 283. The Court

fou n d j u st suc h an e rr or i n the- 13- deci si on on re view, i n w hich we had h el d that “ [ o ] nce E x x o n M o b il’s claim s h ad b een litig ated to a j u d g m en t instate co u rt . . . Rook

e r-Fe l dman ‘pre cl ud e[d] [the] f ederal dist

ri ct court from

proceedi ng .’ ” I

d. at 290–91 ( quot i ng E

xxo n M o b il Cor p. v
. SaudiBas i c I

ndus

. Cor p. , 3 64 F.3d 10 2, 10 4 (3dCir. 20 04 )) (a lt er at ions in original ). We had “re j ec te d E x x o n M o b il’s arg u m en t th at Rook e r-Fe l dman co u ld n o t ap p ly be c aus e ExxonMobi l fi l e d i t s fe de r a l c om pl a i nt we l l be for e the st at e-court jud gm ent. ” I

d. at 29 0. Rathe r , we ha d c on c l ud ed that w e la cked ju ri sdic ti on beca use Exx on Mo bil was “e nd eavo ri ng in the f

eder al ac ti on to ‘i nv al idat e’ the s tate -c ou rt j u d g m e n t , ‘ th e v e ry s i t

u a t i o n , ’

. . . ‘ c o n t e m

p l at e db y R o o kerFe l dman ’s “i nextri ca

bly inte rtwined” bar.’ ” I

d. at 291 ( quot i ng E xxo n M o b il , 364 F.3dat

10 6). Reject ing s uch an e xp ansi ve applic at ion of the R o o kerFe l dman doc tr i ne , the Court he l d that i t i s “ c onfi ne d t o c a s e s of the kind f

rom w h ich the do ctri ne ac qu ir ed it s nam e: ca se s br ought by s t at e - c ourt

l os e r s c om

pl a i ni ng of i njur i e s c aus e d by st at e- court jud g m ents re nd er ed befo re the dis tr ic t c ou rt pr oc e e di ngs c omm e nc e d and i nvi t i ng di s tr i c t c ourt r e vi e w and re ject ion o f tho se ju dg m ents .” E xxo n M o b il , 544 U. S. at

284. T h e C o u rt em

p h asizedth at “R o o ker and F eldman e xhi bi t

the lim ited circu m sta n ces inw h ich th is C o u rt’s ap p ellate ju ri sdic ti on ov er

st at e- court jud gm ents p re cl ud es a Unite d St at e s di s tr i c t c ourt fr om e xe r c i s i ng s ubje c t

- m att e r jur i s di c t i on inan a c tio nit w o u ldo th erw ise b e em p o w eredto ad

j u d icate un der a cong re ss ional g rant of authority .” I

d. at 2 9 1 (em

p h asis adde d) ( i nt e rna l c i t at i on om i tt e d)

. The Court a l s o c learly dist ingu is hed the Rook

e r-Fe l dman doc tr i ne fr om

pr e c l us i on, statin g th at “p ro p erly

i nvoke d c on cu rren t j u risd ictio n[ d o es n o t] vanish[] if a state court reac hes j ud gm ent o n the sam e or r el at ed qu estio nw h ile th e case remains sub jud ic e in a f ed eral co u rt.” I d. at 292. “ W he n the r e i s par a l l e l s t at e and fe de r a l l itig at i on, Rook e r-Fe l dman i s not

tr i gge r e d s i mpl y

by the e ntry

of ju dg m ent i n state court. ” I d. But th e “[ d ] i s pos i t i on of the- 14- federal ac ti on , once the st at e- court a dj ud ic at io n is c om plet e, wo uld be go verned by

prec lusi on law.” I

d. at 293. Fi na l l y , the C o u rt ex p lain edth at Rook e r-Fe l dman is n o t im

p licated“sim

p ly beca use a party atte m

pts to li ti gate in federal court a m atte r pr e vi ou s l y l i t i gat e d i n s t at e c ourt .” I d. If the m atte r was p rev io u sly

litig ated , as lo n g as th e “f ed eral p lain tif

f ‘p resen t[ s] som e i nd ependent cl ai m , alb ei t one that denies a l egal c onc l us i on that

as t at e c ou rt

ha s r e a c he d i n ac a s e t o whi c h he was a party
. . . , then ther e i s juris dict ion an d st at e l aw de t e rm i ne s whe the r

the de fe ndant

pr e va i l s unde r

pr i nc i pl e s of prec lusi on .’ ” I

d. ( quot i ng GASH As s ocs
. v
. Ros e mont , 995 F. 2d 72 6, 72 8 (7th C ir . 199 3)) ( fu rther c it at ion o m itte d). Br e ak i n g d o w nt

h e h o l di ng of E

xxo n M o b il , we c onc l ude that the r e ar e four

r e qui r e m e nt s that

m u s t be m e t for the Rook e r-Fe l dman d o ctrin e to ap p ly : (1 ) th e f ed eral p lain tif

f lo st in st at e c ou rt ; ( 2) the pla inti ff “c om plai n[ s] of

in j u ri es ca used by [the] state -c ou rt

ju dg men ts ”; (3) tho se ju dg m ents were r e nd e r e d b e fo r e the fe de r a l s ui t wa s fi l e d; and( 4) the pl a i nt i ff i s i n v i t i n g th e d istrict co u rt to rev iew an drej ect th e state judgm e nt s
. E

xxo n M o b il , 544 U. S. at

284. The s e c ond and fo urth re qu ir em ents ar e the key to dete rm ining w h et h er a f e d e r a l s u i t

p r e s e n t s ani n d e p e n d e n t , n o n - b arr e dc l a i m. The s eco n d r e qui r e m e nt —that apl a i nt i ff m

us t be com plai ning of

inju ri es ca

used by a s tate -c ou rt

ju dg m ent—m ay al so be thou gh t of as an inqu ir y into the s ou rc e of the plai ntiff’s in j u ry
. Se e Tu rne r

v
. Craw f or d S qu are Ap ar t

me nt s I I I , L. P. , 44 9 F .3d 5 42 , 547 (3d C ir . 200 6) (“ Here , the distri ct court e rr ed by applying the Rook

e r-Fe l dman do ctri ne ‘beyon d the contou rs of the Ro oker

and Fe l dman cases,’ b ecau se T u rn er’s actio nin the di s tr i c t

c ourt di d not c om pl a i n of in

j u ries ‘ c aus e d by

the st at e c ourt

judgm e nt

. ’ ” ( quot i ng E xxo n M o b il , 544 U.S. at 283–8 4 )). B u t

what doe s i t m e an for

apl a i nt i ff t o be c om pl a i ni ng of an i njury c aus e d by the s t at e - c ourt judgm e nt i t s e l f? A l ook at a fe w r e pr e s e nt at i ve c a s e s and e xam pl e s he l ps- 15- t o i l l um i nat e thi s c onc e pt

. I n H o b lo ck v. A lb a n

y Co u n ty B o a rd of Ele c t i ons , 422 F.3d77 , 87 (2d C ir . 200 5), the court posit ed the fol l owi ng ex am

pl e of ac a s e that

woul d be barr e d by Rook e r-Fe l dman b ecau se th e state-co u rt j u d g m en t itself wa s t he s o u r c e o f th e i n j u ry: Supp os e as t at e c ourt , ba s e d p ur e l y ons t at e l aw, t e rm i nat e s afathe r ’ s par e nt a l r i ght s and or de r s the st at e t o take c ustody of his s on . I f the father s ues i n fe d e r a l c ourt

for the r e t urn of hi s s on on g ro u n d s th at th e state j u d g m en t v i o lates h is f ed eral sub stan tiv e du e-p ro cess rig h ts as a p aren t, h e is co m p lain in g o f an in

j u ry cau sedb y

th e state j u d g m en t an dseek in g its rev ersal. To the c on tr ar

y , when the source of the injury is the defendant’s actio n s (an dn o t th e state co u rt j u d g m en ts), th e f ed eral su it is independ ent, even if it

as ks the federa l c ou rt

to deny a l egal co n clu sio nreach edb y

th e state co u rt: S up p o se a p lain ti f

f su es h is em

p lo y er in state c o u rt f o r v i o l at i n g b o th s t at e an t i

- d i s c r i m i n at i on law andTitl e VII and loses . I f the pla inti ff then br i ngs th e s am e s ui t

i n fe de r a l c ourt , he wi l l be se eking a deci si on from the federa l c ou rt that de ni e s the s t at e c ourt ’ s c onc l us i on that the e m pl oy e r i s not

l i abl e , but

he wi l l not

be a l l e gi ng in j u ry f ro m th e state j u d g m en t. In stead , h e w ill b e a l l e g i ng injuryba se d o n the employer ’s di s c r i mi nat i on . T h e f

act th at th e state co u rt ch o se not t o r e m e dy

the i njury d oe s not

tr ans form

the subsequent federal suit

onthe s am e m atte r i nto an a p p e a l , f o r b i d d e nb y Rook

e r-Fe l dman , of the state-co u rt j u d g m en t. I d. at 87 –8 8 (em

ph as is added).- 16- Th e c ri ti ca l t as k i s thus to identi fy those federa l s uits that pr ofe s s t o c om

pl a i n of i njury by a thi r d party , but actu ally c om pl a i n of i njury “ pr oduc e d by a s t at e - c ourt judgm e nt and not si m ply rati fied, acquiesc ed in, or l eft unp un is hed b y it .” I d. at 88. I n Ho block, af

ter f irst n o tin g th at th e “v o ters’ claim s inth is ca se se em at firs t to com

plai n o nly

of the [Bo ar d o f E le ct ions’] r e fus a l t o t a l l y the i r vot e s r athe r than of any i njury c aus e d by

the stat e co u rt’s j u d g m en t,” th e co u rt clarif iedth at “in ref

u sin g to ta ll y the vo t e s , the Bo ar d [w a s ] a c t i ng un de r c om pu l s i on of

a st at e- court order. ” I

d. Sp e c i fi c a l l y , the Bo ar d, “ ha d i t be e n l e ft to i t s ow n d e vi c e s , wo ul d h ave c ount e d the 40 abs e ntee b allo ts,” b u tit w as o rd eredn o t to d o so b y th e state co u rt. I

d. at 89 . Thu s, “the st at e-court jud gm ent produ ce d the Bo ar d’s re fu sa l t o coun t t

he ball ots, the ver

y inju ry of wh ic h the vo te rs com plai n.” I d. When, how ever , a federal plai ntiff ass erts inju ry ca used b y th e d ef en d an t’s actio n s an d n o t b y th e state-co u rt j u d g m en t, Rook e r-Fe l dman i s not a bar t o fe de r a l jur i s di ctio n
. Se e, e
. g. , Co les v. G ra n ville , 4 4 8 F .3 d 8 5 3 , 8 5 9 (6 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ); Dav ani v
. Va. De p’ t of Trans p. , 4 3 4 F .3 d 7 1 2 , 7 1 9 (4 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ). A us e ful gui de pos t

i s the t i m i ng of the i njury , that i s , whe the r

the inju ry com plai ned o f in f

eder al court e xist ed prior t o the st at ec o u rt p r o c e e d i n g s an dth u s c o u l dn o t h av e b e e n“ c au s e db y” th o se p ro ceed in g s. Se e Mc Ki t he n v
. Bro wn , 481 F. 3d 89, 98 (2 dC ir. 2 0 0 7 ); Tu rner , 449 F. 3d at 547. A l th o u g h th i s t e s t

i s s e e m i n g l y

s tr a i g h t f

o rw ar d, a pp l i c at i onbe c om e s m or e c om pl i c at e d wh e n a

fe de r a l pl a i nt i ff com plai ns of an inju ry that is in som e fashion r el at ed to a s tate

c ourt pr oc e e di ng. For

e xam pl e , i n Mc Cormi c k v . Brav e rman , 4 5 1 F .3 d3 8 2 , 3 8 4 (6 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ), th e p l a i n t i f f f iledsu it in federal court contending that she was the own er of ce rt ai n rea l prop erty and that the defend ants il le gall y interf er ed with her owne r s hi p. Mor e s pe c i fi c a lly , the pl a i nt i ff a l l e ge d that the d ef en dants e ng aged in fraud andm is re pres entati on in st at e-- 17- court divorce proceedi ng s invo lving t he re al prop erty

at is sue. I d. at 3 8 8 . A ssessin g th e p lain tif f’s alleg atio n s, th e co u rt h eld that wh il e s om e wer e bar

re d b y the Rook e r-Fe l dman do ctri ne, the r e m a i nde r

we r e “in d epe nde nt ” c l a i m s ove r whi c h the federal courts had juris dict ion. Th e no n-barr ed cl ai m s were as fo l l o w s : ( 1 ) th e d e f e n d an t s c o mm i tt e df

r au dand m isr e p r e s e n t at i o ni nth e d i v o r c e p r o c e e d i n g s ; (2 ) th e d ef en d an ts i nt e nt i ona l l y

di d not m ake the pl a i nt i ff a party t o the l i t i gat i on c onc e rni ng the or de r of r e c e i ve r s hi p ove r the r e a l pr ope rty ; and (3) the defend ants comm itte d an abuse of p roce ss in the divorce p ro ceed in g s. I

d. at 39 2. Fo cusi ng on the source of the a ll eged inju ri es , the court hel d that “ [n ]o n e o f th es e c la im s a ss ert an i nj ur y c aus e d b y

the s t at e c ourt

ju dg m e nt s
. . . . I ns t e a d, Pl a i nt i ff asserts in d

ep en d en t cla im s that

those s tate cour

t ju dg m e nt s we re pr oc u red b y cert a i n De fe nda nt s t hr ough fr a ud, m is re pres entati on , or other im prop er m ea n s
. . . .” I

d. Ev en th o u g h th e in

j u ries o f w h ich th e p lain tif

f co m p lain ed h elp edto ca use the adverse st at e j u d gm ents , these cl ai m s wer e “i nd ependent” beca

use they st em

m ed from “s om e o ther

source of inju ry , such as a thir d party ’s ac ti on s. ” I d. at 393. On the othe r hand, the c ourt e xpl a i ne d that the pl a i nt i ff’ s c l a i m that the s t at e c ourt ’ s “ or de r

of r e c e i ve r s hi p i n and of i t s e l f i s i l l e ga l and ca uses Plai ntiff harm ” sou gh t revie w of that order andthus was n o t i n d e p e n d e n t

an dw a s b arr e db y Rook e r-Fe l dman

. I d. at 395. I n F

ieg er v. F erry , 471 F.3d 63 7, 63 9 (6th C ir . 200 6), an attorney file d a suit

in federal court c hall enging bo th the r efusal o f certain M ich i g a n S up rem e C o u rt j u stices to recu se the m s e l ve s fr om

c a s e s i n whi c h he wa s i nvolv ed and the c ons t i t ut i ona l i ty of Mi c hi gan’ s r e c usal r ul e
. I n l i ght

of the “acrim o n io u s an d w ell-p ub licized d ialo g u e b etw een F ieg er
. . . and severa l justi ce s of the Michigan S u p re m e Cou rt ,” Fieger s ought r e c us a l of four of the jus t i c e s , but the Jus t i c e s de ni e d the recu sal m o tio n s. I

d. at 639–40 ( i n tern a l quot at i on m arks o m itted ). In f

ed eral co u rt, F ieg er alleg edth a t th is f ailure to- 18- re cuse violat ed his c on st it utional r ights andsoug ht a d e c l a r atory ju dg m ent t o this e ff

ec t. Th e cou rt

held that this cl ai m

re qu ir ed rev iew an drej ect io no f

th e “Ju stices’ p ast recu sal d ecisio n s,” whi c h w e r e r e nde r e d be for e the fe de r a l pr oc e e di ngs , and thus w a s b arr e db y Rook

e r-Fe l dman

. I d. at 644. W i th r e s pe ct to Fi e ge r’s ch a l l e nge t o Mi c hi gan’ s r e c us a l r ul e , howe ve r , the court held that it was no t barr ed, as “the source o f F ieger’ s a l l e ge d i njury

i s not the

. . . s t at e c ourt

jud g m en ts; it i s the pu rporte d u ncon st it

utionali ty of Mich igan’s re cusa l r

ule a s ap p liedinf

u tu re cases. S u ch a claim is in d ep en d en t o f

th e p ast st at e c ou rt

ju dg m ents .” I

d. at 646. As is cl ear from

the pre ce d in g d is cuss ion, the two key re qu ir em ents —that the inju ry m ust b e caused b y

the s tate -c ou rt judgm e nt and that the pl a i nt i ff m

us t i nvi t e r e vi e w and r e

je c t i on of that ju dg m e nt

—ar e c l os e l y

r e l at e d. Ye t, afe de r a l pl a i nt i ff who wa s i njur e d by

as t at e - c ourt

judgm e nt

i s not i nv ariab ly seek in g rev iew an drej ectio no f th at j u d g m en t. F o r ex am p le, in A d kin s v. R u m sfeld , 464 F. 3d 456, 460 ( 4th Ci r
. 2006) , c urr e nt and ret ir ed se rvic e m em

bers wh ose r et ir em ent pay was divided in st at e divorce proceedi ng s pursuant t o the Un iform e d S e rvic es Fo rm er Sp ou se s’ Protec ti on Act broug ht an ac ti o n in f eder al co u rt ch allen g in g th e statu te’s co n stitu tio n ality . T h e co u rt h eld that “ e ve n i f the s e pl a i nt i ff s we r e ‘ s t at e - c ourt

l os er s co m p lain in g o f

i n j u ries cau sedb y

state-co u rt j u d g m en ts ren d eredb ef

o re th e d istrict co u rt p ro ceed in g s co mm en ced ,’ .

. . they were n o t ‘ i nvi t in g di s tr i c t c ourt r e vi e w and r e

je c t i on of those ju dg m ents .’ ” I

d. at 464 ( quot i ng E

xxo n M o b il , 544 U. S. at 28 4). A decl ar at io n that the federal st at ute was un consti tuti on al as applie d w ou ld prevent the contin ued tran sm issio n o f p ay

m en ts to th e p lain tif

f s’ f o rm er sp o u ses. I

d. “S u ch a d eclaratio nw o u ld n o t , h o w ev er, am o u n t to ap p ellate rev ersal o r m o d if

icatio n o f a v alidstate co u rt d ecree en teredin an individu al p la in ti ff’s divo rc e c as e. At bo tt om , an exam inat ion o f the federal con st it utional c hall enge prese nted he r e a ga i ns t

the [statut e ] doe s not

r e qui r e s c r

ut i ni z i ng and- 19- invali dati ng any

individu al st at e court ju dg m ent. ” I d. As s uc h, th e p lain tif

f s’ f ed eral su it d idn o t requ ire th e p ro h ib itedex ercise o f ap p ellate j u risd ictio nb y

th e d istrict co u rt. I

d. What thi s r e qu i r e m e nt

t ar ge t s i s wh e the r

the pl a i nt i ff

’s c l a i m s wi l l r e qui r e a

ppe l l at e r e vi e w of s t at e - c ourt de c i s i ons by the di s tr i c t

c ourt

. Pr oh ibit eda

pp e l l at e r e vi e w “ c on s i s t s of a re view of the proce edings al re ady conducte d b y

the ‘ lower’ tr ibun al to dete rm ine wh ether i t r ea ched it s r es ult i n acc ordance with law.” B o ld

en v. C ity o

f T o p eka , K s. , 441 F. 3d 1129, 1143 (1 0 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ). It is im p o rtan t to d istin g u i s h su ch ap p ellate rev iew f ro m th o se cases in w h ich “a p arty attem p ts to litig ate in federal court a m atte r previously li ti gate d in state court, ” Ex x on M o b il , 544 U. S. at

293, or i n w h ich “ the fe de r a l pl a i nt i ff and the a dv er se party

ar e s im ultaneo usly

li ti gati ng the s am e or a si m il ar dispute i n state court, ” N o el v . H a ll , 341 F. 3d 1148, 1163 ( 9th Ci r
. 2003) ( c i t e d wi th a ppr ova l i n E

xxo n M o b il). If the m att e r wa s pr e vi ous l y l i t i gat e d, the r e i s jur i s di c t i on a s l ong as th e “f ed eral p lain tif

f p resen t[ s] so m e in d ep en d en t cl a i m ,” ev en if th at claim d en ies a leg al co n clu sio nreach edb y th e state co u rt. E xxo n M o b il , 544 U. S. at

293 ( i nt e rna l quot at i on m arks & c i t at i on om i tt e d; a l t e r at i on i n or i gi na l )

. W he n “ the s e c ond co u rt t r i e s am atter an ew an dreach es a co n clu sio nco n trary to a judgm e nt by

the fi r s t c ourt , wi thout

c onc e rni ng i t s e l f wi th the bo na fides of the prior ju dg m ent, ” the s ec on d, or federal , c ou rt “i s no t conducti ng appell at e re view, re gardle ss of w h et h er co m p lia nc e wi t h th e seco n dj u d g m en t w o u ldm ak e it im p o ssib le to com ply with the fir st

ju dg m ent. ” Bo lden , 441 F. 3d at 1143. In the c as e of sim

ultaneou s lit ig at ion, bo th suit s m ay proceed unde r the we l l

- e s t abl i s he d r ul e a l l owi ng par a l l e l s t at e and f ed eral litig atio n
. No el , 3 4 1 F .3 dat 1 1 6 3 . In n eith er o f th ese si tuat ions, un li ke in a suit se eking r evie w of a st at e- court judgm en t, “d o es Rook e r-Fe l dman bar s ub

ject m atte r jur i s di c t i on i n fe de r a l di s tr i c t c ourt , for i n ne i the r s i t uat i on i s the f ed eral p lain tif

f c o mp lain in g o f

leg al in j u ry cau sedb y

a state co u rt j u d g m en t b ecau se o f a leg al erro r co mm ittedb y th e state- 20- court. ” I d. at 1 1 6 4 . In stead , “in b o th situ atio n s, th e p lain tif f is com plai ning of

le gal i nj ury

ca used by the a dv er se party .” I

d. I n a c a s e s ubs e que nt

t o E xxo n M o b il , the Suprem e Cou rt ag ain em p h asizedth at Rook

e r-Fe l dman is a “nar

row d octr ine” that “a pp li es on ly

in li m it ed ci rc um st ance s. ” L a n ce v. D en n is , 5 4 6 U .S . 4 5 9 , 4 6 4

– 6 6 ( 2 0 0 6 ) (in tern al qu o tatio nm ark s & c i t at i o n s o m i tt e d )

. I nl i g h t o f th i s a d m o n i t i o n , w e h ave r e c og n i z e d th at “ c au t i o n i s n o w a p p r o p r i at e i n r e l yi n g o n our pre-Ex x on fo r m ul at ion o f the Rook

e r-Fe l dman d o ctri ne,” wh ic h fo cuse d o n w hether

the s tate and f

eder al suit s wer e “in extr ic ably

inte rtwined.” G a ry v. B ra d d o ck Cem etery , 517 F. 3d 195, 200 n. 5 ( 3 d C ir. 2008)

. I n E xxo n M o b il , th e p h rase
“ i ne xtr i c abl y

i nt e rtwi ne d” a

ppe ar s onl y thr e e t i m e s , twi c e i n the Co ur t ’ s de s c ri pt i onof Fe l

dman and o nce i n the Co urt’ s di s c us s i on of the l owe r c ourt ’ s de c i s i on. 544 U. S. at 286 & n. 1, 2 9 1 . T h e C o urt d elib erately d id n o t rely o n th is f o rm u latio nin i t s jur i s di c t i on a l ana l y s i s , i ns t e a d e m pl oyi ng the fo ur -part in qu iry th at w e h av e o u tlin edab o v e. See McCormick, 451 F. 3d at 394 ( “ I n Ex

x on , the Supr e m e Court i m pl i c i t l y r e pudi at e d the circu its’ p o st- Fe l

dman u s e o f

th e p h rase ‘in ex tricab ly i nt e rtwi ne d’ t o e xt e nd Rook e r-Fe l dman t o s i t

uat i ons whe r e the source of the i nj ury

was not the s tate co u rt ju dg m ent. ”)

. Al though the t e rm

“ i ne xtr i c abl y

i nt e rtwi ne d” wa s us e d twi c e by the Supr e m e Court

i n Fe l dman , re li ance on this te rm has c ause d l o w e r f e d e r a l c o u rt s t o a

p p l y Rook

e r-Fe l dman t oo br oa dl y
. The ph ra se “i nextri ca

bly inte rtwined” do es no t c re at e an add it ional l e ga l t e s t or e xp andthe s c op e of Rook e r-Fe l dman be yond c ha l l e ng e s t o s t at e - c ourt

ju dg m e nt s
. W he n a

fe de r a l pl ai nt i ff b rin g s a claim , w h eth er o r n o t raisedinstate co u rt, th at asserts i njury c aus e d by

as t at e - c ourt

judgm e nt an d s e e ks r e vi e w and rev ersal o f th at j u d g m en t, th e f ed eral claim

is “in ex tricab ly in tertw i n e d ” w ith th e state j u d g m en t. See McCormick, 451 F. 3d at 394–95; Dav ani , 4 3 4 F .3 dat 7 1 9 ; Ho block, 422 F.3dat 8 6 ; se e also Bo lden , 441 F. 3d at 1141 ( “ [T]he pur

pos e of the te rm is to high li gh t that a chal le ng e t o a ju dg m ent i s bar re d evenD ef en d a n t s cite to cases in w h ich , p o st- Ex x on M o b il , 4 we re li ed on ou r pre - Ex

x on M o b il fo rm ulat ion o f the R o o kerFe l dman doc tr i ne , s pe c i fi c a l l y th e “ i ne xtr i c abl y i nt e rtwi ne d” te st . Altho ug h w e c it ed ou r pre - E xxo n M o b il de fi ni t i on of “in ex tricab ly

in tertw in ed ,” at b o tt o m, th e h o ld in g s inth ese c a s e s r e s t e d on the s am e c onc e rns at issu e i n Ex

x on M o b il —w hether the plai ntiff’s cl ai m com plai ns of an in

j ury cause d b y

as t at e - c ourt

ju dg m e nt

r e nd e r e d b e fo r e the fe de r al p ro ceed in g a n d seek s rev iew an drej ectio no f th at j u d g m en t. Spe c i fi c a l l y , i n T

a li a ferro v. D a rb

y T o w n sh ip Z

o n in g B o a rd , 45 8 F .3d 1 81 , 193 (3d C ir . 200 6), we h el d that ther e was federal subj ec t m atter j uris dict ion as the federal ac ti on “was comm ence d . . . well befo re any st at e c ou rt j ud gm ent was reach ed , so th e d istrict co u rt co u l d n o t h av e b een in v itedto rev iew an drej ect su ch a j u d g m en t.” In two o ther

ca se s, we held that

the Rook

er-Fe l dman do ctri ne barre d the suit

beca use a favo ra

ble deci si on in federal court wou ld re qu ir e negat ing o r r eversi n g the st at e- court de c isio n
. I

n re M a d era , 5 8 6 F .3 d2 2 8 , 2 3 2 (3 dC ir. 2 0 0 9 ); In reKn ap per , 40 7 F

. 3d57 3, 58 1 ( 3d Ci r
. 20 05 )

. As s uc h, we d escrib edth e state an df ed eral su its as “in ex tricab ly i nt e rtwi ne d, ” us i ng thi s phr a s e a s as horthand for the c o n ce pt that the pl a i nt i ff c oul d not “ pr e va i l on he r fe de r a l c l a i m wi thout obt a i ni ng an o r de r

that wo ul d n e gat e the s t at e c ourt [s’] ju dg me nt[s].” In reKn ap per , 407 F.3dat

58 1 (inte rnal qu otat ion m ar

ks & c it at ion o m itte d; al te rati on s i n o ri ginal)

. A cco rd in g ly , all th ree o f

th ese cases are co n sisten t w ith E xxo n M o b il an dw i th th e a

p p r o a c h w e a d o p t

t o d a y. N ev erth eless, f

o r th e s ak e o f

clarity , w e sh o u ldex ercise

- 21- if th e claim f o rm in g th e b asis o f

th e ch allen g e w as n o t raisedin th e state p ro ceed in g s.”). T h e p h rase “in ex tricab ly in tertw in ed ,” h o w e v e r , “ h a s n o i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t e n t

. I t i s s i m

p l y a d escrip tiv e lab el attach ed to claim s th at m eet th e requ irem en ts out l i ne d i n E

xxo n M o b il .” Ho block, 422 F. 3d at 87. 4“c auti on
. . . i n rel ying o n o ur pre- Ex x on formu latio n of the Rook e r-Fe l dman do ctri ne,” part ic ular ly those c as es wh ic h m ay be r e a dt o s u g g e s t

th at th e p h r a s e “ i n e x tr i c ab l y i n t e rtw i ne d” createdan ad d itio n al leg al test. G a ry , 517 F. 3d at 200 n. 5.

- 22- As a final st ep, s ho uld the Rook e r-Fe l dman doc tr i ne not a ppl y s uc h that the di s tr i c t c ourt ha s jur i s di c t i on, “ [d]i s pos i t i on o f th e f ed eral actio n , o n ce th e sta t e - c o u rt ad j u d icatio nis com plet e, wo uld b e gov er

ned b y pr e c lusi on law.” E

xxo n M o b il , 544 U. S. at 293. I n othe r wor ds , the fe de r a l c ourt

m us t “ ‘ gi ve the s am e pre cl usive e ff

ec t t o a st at e- court ju dg m ent a s ano ther court o f th at

Stat e wou ld give.’ ” I

d. ( quot i ng P a rso n s Steel, I nc
. v
. Fi r s t Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 51 8, 52 3 (19 86 )) (further citatio no m itted ). A s E

xxo n M o b il mak es cl ear, the R o o kerFe l dman in qu iry

is d istin ct f

ro m th e qu estio n o f w h eth er claim p reclu sio n(res j u d icata) o r issu e pr e c lus i o n(co llateral esto p p el) de fe ats the fe de r a l s ui t

. I m port ant l y , pr e c l us i on i s not j u risd ictio n al. I

d. “ I n par a l l e l l i t i gat i on, afe de r a l c ourt m ay be bo un d t o r e c og ni z e the c l a i m - and i s s ue - pr e c l us i ve e ff e c t s of a s t at e - c ourt

judgm e nt , but

fe de r a l jur i s di c t i on ove r an a c t i on doe s not t e rm i nat e aut om at i c a l l y on the e ntry

of judgm e nt

i n the st at e c ou rt .” I

d. T u rn in g t o th e in stan t case, th e critical qu estio nis whe the r Gr e at W e s t e rn i s a“ s t at e - c ourt l os e r [] c om

pl a i ni ng of i njur i e s c aus e d by

s t at e - c ourt

judgm e nt s r e nde r e d be for e the dist ri ct court procee ding s c omm ence d andinviti ng di s t r i c t c ou rt re view and r ejec ti on of those jud gm ents .” I d. at 2 8 4

. C l e ar l y, G reat Western lo st in state co u rt, an dth e state-co u rt j u d g m en ts w ere ren d ered befor e Gr e at Western co mm en cedits f ed eral su it. T h e rem ain in g requi r e m e nt s , howev er, p resen t clo ser qu estio n s. Great W es te rn al le ges an extensi ve co nspira cy am on g Rutte r, nu m er ou s att orney s, and var ious st at e- court jud ges t o eng inee r G reat Western ’s d ef

eat in state co u rt. It claim s th at, p u rsu an t to thi s c ons pi r a c y , “ the c ourt de c i s i ons we r e pr e de t e rm i ne d pr i orNot e that e ve n i f the s t at e - c ourt de c i s i on wa s jus t i fi e d, 5 apl a i nt i ff c oul d ne ve rthe l e s s be e nt i t l e d t o s om e r e l i e f ba s e d on the violati on of

his or her

du e proces s r ights, wh ic h is an in d ep en d en t in

j u ry
. See Car e

yv
. Pi phus , 435 U. S. 247, 266 (197 8). The Suprem e Cou rt has hel d th at

plai ntiffs wh o are d en ieddu e p ro cess can reco v er m en tal o r em o tio n al d istress d am ag es o r n o m in al d am ag es. I d. at 262–64, 266 ( “ Be c aus e the rig h t to p ro cedu ral du e p ro cess is ‘ab so lu te’ in th e sen se th at it doe s not de pe nd upon the m e r i t s of ac l a i m ant ’ s s ubs t ant i ve assertio n s, an db ecau se o f th e im p o rtan ce to o rg an izedso ciety that pr oc e dur a l due pr oc e s s be obs e rve d, we be lie ve that the

- 23- t o th e b e g i n n i n g o f

th e h e ar i n g
. ” ( J

. A

. at

1 2 6 [ P r o p o s e dA m. C o m p l. 3 , ¶ 9 3 ] .) A s a resu lt, G reat Western w as p u rp o rted ly f o rced to litig ate in a rig g ed sy stem an d co u ld n o t “receiv e a f air h earin g inP en n sylv an ia ag ain st A D R O p tio n s a n d Ru tter,” in v i o l at i o no f

i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . (

I d. [ P ro p o sedA m . C o m

p l. 3, ¶ 94] .) Do es such a cla im as se rt inju ry ca used by st at e- court j u d g m en ts an dse e krev iew an drej ectio no f th o se j u d g m en ts? We th in kn o t. G rap p lin g w ith sim ilar claim s, in tw o cases th e S ev en th C ircu it h as h eldth at Rook e r-Fe l dman di d not ope r at e t o bar the fe de r a l pr oc e e di ngs
. I n N esses v. S h ep a rd , 68 F. 3d 1003, 1004 (7 th C ir. 1 9 9 5 ), th e f

ed eral p lain tif

f alleg edth at h is lo sses in st at e c ou rt

were the p rodu ct of a con spir ac y am on g the jud ges an d th e law y ers. T h e co u rt ackn o w led g edth at N esses “w as in a s ense atta cking the ruling by the state court that h e h ad been i ne xc us abl y

di l at ory i n c om pl yi ng wi th adi s c ov ery

or de r ; he was i n the sam e s ense atta cking the deci si on s themsel v es that dism is se d h is suit .” I

d. A n o th er asp ect o f

N esses’s su it co u ld also b e v iew edas an attacko nth e state-co u rt j u d g m en ts: Ness es cann ot sho w inj ury from the a ll eged co n sp iracy u n less th e d ecisio n d ism issin g h is su it for br e a c h of c ontr a c t

wa s e rr o n e ous
. For 5de ni a l of pr oc e dur a l due pr oc e s s s houl d be a c t i on ab le for no m inal dam ag es w it

ho ut proo f o f act

ual i nj ury .” (i nter

nal ci tati on s om itte d)).

- 24- s uppos e that

a l though the r e wa s thi s ne far i ous co n sp iracy

h is su it h adn o m erit an d s o w o u ld h av e f a i l e de v e n i f th e r e h a d b e e n n o c o n s p i r a c y. The n the c ons pi r a c y di d hi m no harm and wi thout harm the r e i s no t ort

. . . . To s how harm and thus k eep th e p resen t su it aliv e, N esses w o u ldh av e to sh o w th at th e d ecisio n b y th e In d ian a co u rt inh is s ui t for br e a c h o f co ntr a c t

wa s e rr one ous , and th at, it m ay

ap p e a r, Rook

e r-Fe l dman b ars h im fr om doi ng. I d. at 10 05 (i nter

nal c it at ions om itte d). But the Rook e rFe l dman do ctri ne, the court c on cl ud ed, “i s not that broad.” I d. N esses w as n o t m erely

clai mi n g th at th e d ecisio no f th e state co u rt w as in co rrect o r th at th e d e c i s i o nitself v io latedh is c ons t i t ut i ona l r i ght s ; s uc h c l a i m s wou ld b e barr e d. I ns t e a d, b ecau se N esses alleg edth at “ pe ople i nv olv e d i n t

he de c i s i on vio la ted so m e in d ep en d en t righ t o f h is , su ch as th e rig h t (if

it is ar i g h t ) t o b e j u d g e d b y a tr i b u n a l th at i s u n c o n t am i n at e d by pol i t i c s , the n he [c oul d], wi thout b ein g bl oc ke d by

the Rook e r-Fe l dman do ctri ne, s ue to v indicate that ri gh t. ” I

d. (emp h a s is ad d ed ). M o reo v er, N esses co u ld , “as p art o f h is c l a i m for dam a ge s , ” s how “ that

the v io lati on c aus e d the deci si on to b e ad vers e t o h im and thu s did him

harm .” I d. If R o o ker-F eld m an ba r r e d juris dict ion, “there wo uld b e no f eder al rem edy f o r a v io latio no f

f ed eral rig h ts w h en ev er th e v io lato r so f ar su c ceed edinco rrup tin g th e state j u d icial p ro cess as to ob ta in a favorable judg m ent. ” I d. I n Brokaw v. We aver , 305 F.3d 66 0, 66 2 (7th C ir . 200 2), th e p lain tif

f alleg edth at h er relativ es an d o f f icials co n sp iredto ca use the st at e to fo rc ibly

re m ov e her

from her par ents ’ hom e.In ho lding that t he R o o k e r-F e ldman doc tr i ne di d not 6 a ppl y , both Brok

aw and Ern st

a l s o relied on an a l t e rnat i ve g ro u n d

—th at th e p lain tif

f d idn o t h av e an o p p o rtu n ity to p resen t th e cu rren t co n stitu tio n al claim s in state co u rt. Brok aw , 3 0 5 F .3 d at 6 6 8 ; Ern st , 108 F.3dat 49 2. Th is , how ever , was an ad d itio n al reaso nf

o r co n clu d in g th at Rooke r-Fe l dman is inapplic able wh en a pla inti ff pres ents a cl ai m

in federal court that individu al s i nv olved in a st at e- cour t d ecis ion v iolate d an independ ent c o nsti tuti on al ri gh t. We need no t dec ide t od ay wh ether this e xcepti on to the Rook e r-Fe l dman doc tr i ne r e m a i ns good l aw fol l owi ng E

xxo n M o b il

.

- 25- She c ont e nde d that

“ th e d ef e ndant s c ons pi r e d—pr i or t o any judi c i a l i nvol ve m e nt

—t o c aus e fa l s e c hi l d ne gl e c t pr oc e e di ngs t o be fi l e d, r e s ul t i ng i n he r r e m ova l fr om

he r hom e i n vi ol at i on of he r
. . . s ubs t an tiv e and pr oc e dur a l due pr oc e s s r i ght s ” and e x p l a i n e d“ th at

s h e [ w a ] s s e e k i n g d am a g e s f o r th e c o n s p i r a c y, no t for the state court’ s dec is ion in the chil d n egle ct proceedi ng .” I

d. at 6 6 5

. T h e co u rt h eldth at Ness es applie d as the pl a i nt i ff wa s “ a l l e gi ng that the pe opl e i nvol ve d i n the deci si on to fo rc ibly

re m ov e her

from her hom e andher par e nt s
. . . vi ol at e d he r c ons t i t ut i ona l r i ght s , i nde pe nde nt l y of the s tate court dec is ion.” I d. Eve n i f the plai nt i ff woul d not have s uffe r e d any

dam a ge s fr om

the a l l e ge d c ons pi r a c y

abs e nt th e s t at e - c o u rt

o r d e r , h e r

c l a i m w a s n o t b arr e db y R o o kerFe l dman “bec ause her c la im

fo r dam ages is base d on an all eged in d ep en d en t v io latio no f

h er co n stitu tio n al rig h t s
. I t w as th is sep arate co n stitu tio n al v io latio nw h ich cau sedth e ad v erse state court dec is ion.” I

d. at 6 6 7 ; see a lso Ern st v. Ch ild & Y o u th S ervs. , 1 0 8 F .3 d4 8 6 , 4 9 1

– 9 2 (3 dC ir. 1 9 9 7 ) (h o ld in g th at a claim alleg in g th at d ef

en d an ts v io latedp lain tif

f’ s d u e p ro cess rig h ts b y m ak in g b iasedreco mm en d atio n s to th e state co u rt, r e s u l t i n g i nani m

p r o p e r r u l i n g , w a s n o t

b arr e db y RookerFe l dman as it

was s epar at e from

the s tate -c ou rt

ju dg m ent)

. 6- 26- W e fi nd the r e a s oni ng of the Se ve nth Ci r c ui t pe r s ua s i ve and c onc l ude that i t a

ppl i e s he r e
. As i n Ness es , Gr e at W e s t e rn, by a l l e gi ng ac on spi r a c y be twe e n De fe ndant s and the Pe nn s ylv ani aju di c i ary

t o r ul e i n f avo r of Ru tt e r andAD R O p t i o n s , i s att a c k i n g th e s t at e - c o u rt j u d g m e n t s
. B u t , l i ke Ness es , Gre at

We st er n is not m er el y contending that the s tate

co u rt d e c i s io n s w ere in co rrect o r th at th ey w ere th em selv es in v i o l at i o no f

th e C o n s t i t

u t i o n
. I n s t e a d , G r e at

W e s t e rnc l a i ms that “ pe opl e i nvol ve d i n the d e c i s i o n vi ol at e d s om e i nde pe nde nt rig h t,” th at is, th e rig h t to an im p artial f o ru m
. Ness es , 68 F. 3d at 10 05 . The al le ged agreem ent t o rea ch a prede te rm ined ou tc om e i n a ca se w o uld its el f v iolate Great W es te rn’s consti tuti on al ri gh ts , i n depend entl y of the s ub se qu ent s tate

co u rt d ecisio n s. See Marshall v

. Je rr ic o, Inc. , 446 U. S. 238, 24 2 (19 80 ) ( “The Du e Proce ss Clause en ti tl es a per son to an im part ia l anddisi nter es te d tri bu nal i n b ot h civil and cri m inal cases.”). “[ B ] ecau se [ G reat Western ’s] claim f o r d a ma g e s is base d on an al le ged independ ent v iolati on of [its ] con st it

utional r i ght s , ” the s our c e of Gr e at W e s t e rn’ s pur port e d i njury

wa s the actio n s o f

D ef en d an ts an dm em

b ers o f th e P e n n s y lv an ia j u d i c i ary , n o t

th e s t at e - c o u rt

d e c i s i o n s th em selv es. Brok aw , 305 F.3d at 66 7. “I t was this se parate consti tuti on al violat ion w hich ca used the a dv er se st at e c ou rt deci si on ” andthe inj ury

to Great Western

. I

d. ; a cc ord M

cCormick, 451 F.3dat

39 2. Th us, a s the s t at e - c ourt

judgm e nt s we r e not

the m s e l ve s th e c aus e of Great Wes te rn’s al le ged inj urie s, the Rook e r-Fe l dman doc tr i ne did n ot deprive the Distri ct Co urt of j uris dict ion o ver Great Western ’s claim s. Th e fact that Defend an ts ’ act ions, r ather than the st at eco u rt j u d g m en ts, w ere th e so u rce o f G reat Western ’s in j u ries is al on e suf fici ent t o m ake Rook

e r-Fe l dman inapplic able here

. Ne ve rthe l e s s , i t i s wo rthw hi l e t o di s c us s the othe r key r e qui r e m e nt

—whe the r

Gr e at W e s t e rn s e e ks r e vi e w and rej ectio no f

th e state-co u rt j u d g m en ts.- 27- R eg ard less o f

th e m eri t s o f th e state-co u rt d ecisio n s, if G r e a t W estern co u ldp ro v e th e ex isten ce o f a co n sp iracy

to re ac h a predet er

m ined ou tc om e i n state court, it co uld rec ov er nom i na l dam a ge s for thi s due pr oc e s s vi ol at i o n
. Ca rey , 435 U.S. at 26 2– 64 , 266

. G reat

We st er n’s e ntit le m ent t o such dam ages could b e a ss es se d w it ho ut any anal y si s of the st at ec ou rt judgm e nt s
. To r e c ove r for m or e than the a l l e ge d due pr oc e s s vi ol at i on, howe ve r , Gr e at W e s t e rn woul d have t o s how th at th e a d v e r s e s t at e - c o u rt

d e c i s i o n s w e r e e n t e r e de rr o n e o u s l y. See Nes ses , 6 8 F .3 dat 1 0 0 5 . T h i s i s n o t th e ty p e o f ap p ellate re view of st at e- court dec is ions contem plat ed by the R o o k

erFe l dman doc tr i ne
. I n both Ro oker and Fe l dman , the pl a i nt i ff

s so u g h t to h av e th e state-co u rt d ecisio n s u n d o n e o r d eclaredn u ll and voi d by the fe de r a l c ourts. See Roo ke r , 263 U. S. at 414; Fe l dman , 460 U. S. at 468–69, 472–73. The r e l i e f r e que s t e d by the pla inti ff

s i n the federal courts wo uld h ave r equire d e ffe c t i ve l y

ove rr ul i ng the s t at e - c ourt

judgm e nt s
. Thi s i s not

the c a s e he r e
. Gr e at

Western m ay , “ a s part of [i t s ] c l a i m

for dam a ge s , ” s how “ that the [c ons t i t ut i ona l ] vi ol at i on c aus e d the deci si on [s] to b e advers e to [it] and thu s did [it] harm .” Ness es , 68 F.3d at 10 05

. A find ing by the D is tr ic t C ou rt that st at e- court d ecisio n s w ere erro n eo u s an dth u s in j u redG reat Western w o u ld n o t resu lt ino v erru l i n g th e j u d g m en ts o f th e P en n sylv an ia c ourt s
. Pur s uant

t o Ex x on M o b il , afe de r a l pl a i nt i ff m ay not s e e k “ r e vi e w and r e

je c t i on” of s t at e - c ourt judgm e nt s
. 544 U. S. at 28 4. He r e , wh i l e Gr e at W e s t e rn’ s c l a i m

fo r dam a ge s m ay r e qui r e r e vi e w of s t at e - c ourt judgm e nt s and e ve n ac onc l us i on that the y we r e e rr one ous , thos e judgm e nt s woul d not have t o be rej ectedo r o v erru ledf o r G rea t Western to p rev ail. Ac c or di ngl y , th e r e vi e w and r e je c t i on r e qui r e m e nt

of the R o ok e r-Fe l dman do ctri ne is no t m et , andthe Dis tr ic t Cou rt p ro p erly ex ercisedj u risd ictio no v er G reat Western ’s su it. O r d i n ar i l y, h av i n g c o n c l u d e do u r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n qu i ry, the ne xt s t e p woul d be t o a

ppl y s t at e l aw to de t e rm i ne the p reclu siv e ef

f ect o f th e p rio r state-co u rt j u d g m en ts. D ef en d an ts- 28- d idn o t raise th e issu es o f res j u d icata o r co llateral esto p p el in thei r m otion to d is m is s or before thi s Cou rt . E st o pp el , a s an a ffi rm at i ve d ef

en se, m ay

be r a i s e d i n an ans we r

and i s not w aiv edth ro u g h f

ailu re to in clu d e it ina m o tio nto d ism iss. See Fe d. R. Ci v. P. 8( c ) , 1 2 (h ). Pr e c l us i on, howe ve r , i s not j u risd ictio n al. E

xxo n M o b il , 544 U.S. at

29 3. As the parti es have no t brie fed this is sue and a s we can a ff ir m th e D is tr ic t Court on the m erit s , we ne e d not r e a c h the que s t i on of the pr e c l us i ve e ff

e c t of the pr i or s t at e - c ourt

ju dg m e nt s
. I ns t e a d, we turn to the m er it s o f G re at We st er n’s argum ents that

the Dis tr ic t Court e rr one ous l y

de ni e d i t s fi na l m ot i on for l e ave t o am e nd the c om pl a i nt and i t s m ot i on for

r e c ons i de r at i on. B. M ot i on f

or Leav e t o Am e nd A s w e have di s cus s ed, af t er t he D i s t r i ct C our t gr ant ed D efe ndant s ’ m ot i on t o di s m i s s , G r eatW es t er n fi l ed a mot i on for
r econs i der at i on and a mot i on for l eave t o amend, att achi ng a dr aft amended compl ai nt , Pro p os ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 1. W hi l e t he mot i on for r econ side r at i on w as pendi ng, G r eat W es t er n fi l ed t w o addi t i onal m ot i ons for l eave t o amend, eac h t i m e at t ac hi ng a new dr aft amended compl ai nt

— Pr opos ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 2, t hen P roposed A m ended Com pl ai nt 3. In ruli n g o n the m o ti o n fo r rec o n side rati o n , the D ist ric t C o u rt cons i der ed Pr opos ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 2, but not Pr opos ed A m en d ed C o m p lai n t 3. In a fo o tno te, the D ist ri ct C o u rt expl ai ned t hat “[t ] o al l ow pl ai nt i ff t o r epea t edl y s ubm i t dr aft s of i t s compl ai nt w hi l e pl ai nt i ff’ s or i gi nal m ot i ons ar e s t i l l pendi ng w o u ld b e p rejud ici al t o d ef en d an ts. ” (J.A

. at 3

. ) G rea t W estern c h a llen g e s th is ru lin g b y th e D istric t C o u rt. A m e n d m e n ts to p lea d in g s a re g o v e rn e d b y F e d e ra l R u le of C i vi l Pr ocedur e 15( a) , w hi ch pr ovi des t hat “a pa r t y m ay amend it s pl eadi ng onl y w i t h t he oppos i ng par t y ’ s w r i t t en cons ent or t he cour t ’ s l eave
. T he cour t s houl d fr eel y gi ve l eave wh e n j u s t i c e s o r e q u i r e s
. ” I n t e rp r e t i n g Ru l e 1 5 ( a ) , t h e S u p r e me C our t has hel d:- 29- I n t he abs ence of an y appar ent or decl ar ed rea so n

— su ch as u n d u e d elay , b ad fa it h o r dil atory m o ti v e o n the pa rt o f t h e m o v an t, rep ea ted f ail u re to c u re d e f

icie n c ies b y a m e n d m e n ts p re v io u sly al l ow ed, undue pr ej udi ce t o t he opposi ng par t y by vi r t ue of al l ow ance of t he amendm ent , fut i l i t y of amendm ent , et c.

— t he l eave s ought s houl d, as t he
r ul es r equi re, b e “fr eel y gi ven. ” O f cour s e, t he g ra n t o r d e n ial o f

a n o p p o rtu n ity to a m e n d is
w i t hi n t he di s cr et i on of t he D i s t r i ct C our t , but out r igh t refus al t o gr ant t he l eave w i t hout any j us t i fy i ng r eas on appea r i ng for t he deni al i s not an exer ci s e of di s cr et i on; i t i s m er el y abus e of t hat di s cr et i on and i n consi s t ent w i t h t he s pi r i t of t he F ederal R ules

. F o m a n v . D a v is , 37 1 U

. S

. 1 78, 182 ( 1962)

. A s w e have expl ai ned, “[d] i s t r i ct cour t s ar e t he exper t s i n t he fi el d of appl i ed trial p ro c e d u r e , s o a p p e llate c o u rts s h o u ld n o t b e q u ick to rev er s e .
. . . T hat s ai d, w e al s o have a cknow l edged t hat t he lib e ra l p le a d in g p h ilo so p h y o f th e f e d e ra l ru les d o e s lim it a di s t r i ct cour t ’ s di s cr et i on t o denyl eave t o amend. ” B jorgung , 550 F. 3d at 266 ( ci t i ng A d a m s v . G o u ld , 739 F. 2d 858, 864 ( 3d C i r
. 1984) )

. Fur t her gui ding d ist r i ct cour t s ’ exer ci s e of d isc re tio n , w e h a v e h e ld th a t “ if a c o m p lain t is su b

jec t to a R u le 12( b) ( 6) di s m i s s al , a di s t r i ctcour t m us t per m i t a cur at i ve amendm ent unl es s s uch an a m endment w oul d be i nequi t abl e or fut i l e. ” P hi l l i

ps v. C ount

y of A l l egheny , 515 F. 3d 224, 245 ( 3d C i r
. 2008) ( ci t i ng A l

s t on v. P ar ker , 3 6 3 F

. 3 d 2 2 9 , 2 3 5 (3d C ir

. 2 0 0 4 )). T he D i s t r i ct C our t concl uded t hat al l ow i ng G r eat W e ste rn to su b m it a th ird p ro p o se d a m e n d e d c o m p lain t w o u ld b e p re ju d icia l to d e f

e n d a n ts a n d d e n ied lea v e to a m e n d o n th is g rou n d

. W e a g ree w it h G rea t W estern that the D ist ri ct C o u rt ’sA l t hough D efen d an ts op p o sed G rea t W estern ’s m o ti ons 7 for l eave t o amend be for e t he D i s t r i ct C our t , t heydi d not ar gue t h a t g r a n t i n g l e a v e t o a m e n d w o u l d p r e j u d i c e t h e m
. S i m i l a r l y, t hey d o n o t ma k e t h a t a r g u me n t i n t h e i r b r i e f o n a p p e a l

. T hey contend be for e us , as t heyas s er t ed i n t he D i s t r i ct C our t , t hat gr ant i ng l eave t o amend w oul d be fut i l e as al l ver s i ons of G r eat W e ste rn ’s c o m p lain t f

a iled to sta te a c laim o n w h ich re lief c o u ld be gr ant ed. I n deny i ng l eave t o amend on t he gr ound of pr ej udi ce, t he D i s t r i ct C our t di d not ar t i cul at e s peci fi cal l y how p e rm ittin g a m e n d m e n t w o u ld p re ju d ic e D e f

e n d a n ts

. See C u reto n v. N

a t’ l C o ll eg iate A thleti c A ss’n , 252 F. 3d 267, 276 (3 d C ir . 2 0 0 1 ) (“ [ T ]h e o b lig a tio n o f th e d istric t co u rt . . . is to a rticu late th e p re

ju d ice c a u se d b y th e [ a m e n d m e n t] a n d to bal ance t hos e conc er ns agai ns t t he r eas ons for [t he am en d m en t]

. ”). N ot hi ng i n t he fa ct s of t hi s cas e demon str ates any par t i cul ar pr ej udi ce t hat w oul d have r es ul t ed fr om all ow i ng G r eatW es t er n t o s ubs t i t ut e Pr opos ed A m ended C om pl ai nt 3, as lo n g a s th e D istric t C o u rt h a d g iv e n D e f e n d a n ts a n o p p o rtu n ity t o r e s p o n d

. W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e Di s t r i c t Cou r t ’ s c o n c l us i on t hat per m i t t i ng G r eat W es t er n t o r epea t edl y amend i t s compl ai nt w oul d pr ej udi ce D efe ndant s i s ent i t l ed t o s ubs t ant i al defe r ence
. N ever t hel es s , i n l i gh t o f t he r ecor d and t he abs ence of a
r eas oned expl anat i on of how D efe ndant s w oul d be p rej udi ced by t he amendm en t, w e concl ude t hat t he D i s t r i ct C our t er r ed
w hen i t deni ed G r eat W es t er n’ s t hi r d m ot i on for l eave t o amend on gr ounds of pr ej udi ce.

- 30- con cl usi on re g ardi ng prej ud i ce w as er roneou s. N evert heles s, 7
w e w i l l aff

i r m t he D ist r i ct C our t on t he gr ound t hat gr ant i ng l e a v e to a m e n d w o u ld h a v e b e e n f u tile

. S e e Uni t e d

S t a t e s v. Sanchez , 562 F. 3d 275, 279 ( 3d C i r
. 2009) ( hol di ng t hat an ap p ell ate c o u rt m ay af

firm the resu lt rea ch ed b y the d ist ri ct co u rt on al t er nat i ve gr ounds , pr ovi ded t hatt he re co r d s uppor t s t he jud g m en t)

.I n the Or de r de nyi ng Gr e at

W e s t e rn’ s m ot i on for 8 r e c ons i de r at i on, the Di s tr i c t Court e va l uat e d whe the r a l l owi ng G reat Western to sub stitu te P ro p o sedA m en d edC o m p lain t 2 w o u ld b e f

u tile. T h e D istrict C o u rt d idn o t assess f u tility w ith resp ect to P ro p o sedA m en d edC o m p lain t 3 , in steadd eclin in g to consider that vers ion o n the grou ndthat it wo uld be pre ju dici al to Defend ants . As we h av e noted, the re fu sa l t o con si der P ro p o sedA m en d edC o m p lain t 3 o nth e b a s i s o f

p rej u d ice to De fe ndant s wa s an abus e of di s cretio n. W e s e e no r e a s on for r e m and, howe ve r , be c aus e for the r e a s ons s t at e d i n our opi ni on, it is clear th at sub stitu t i n g P ro p o sedA m en d edC o m p lain t 3

- 31- U nder R ul e 15( a) , fut i l i t y of amendm ent i s a s uffi ci ent ba s i s t o d e n y l e a v e t o a me n d

. Fu t i l i t y “ me a n s t h a t t he compl ai nt , as amended, w oul d fai l t o s t at e a cl ai m upon w hi ch
r el i ef c oul d be gr ant ed. ” In r e Me r c k & C o
. S e c ., D e r iv a tiv e , & ERI S A Li t ig. , 493 F. 3d 393, 400 ( 3d C i r
. 2007) ( i nt er nal quot at i on m ar ks & ci t at i on om i t t ed)

. T he s t andar d for as s es s i ng fut i li ty is t he “s ame st andar d of l egal s uffi ci encyas appl i es under [Feder al ] R ul e [of C i vi l Pr ocedur e] 12( b) ( 6)

. ” Shane v. F auver , 21 3 F

. 3d 11 3, 11 5 (3d C i r. 20 00 ). In ot her w ords, “[t ] he D i s t r i ct C our t det er m i nes fu t i l i t y by t aki ng al l pl eade d a lleg a tio n s a s tru e a n d v iew in g th e m in a lig h t m o st f a v o ra b le to t he pl aintiff. ” W

i nerF am i l

y Tr us tv. Q ueen , 503 F. 3d 319, 330–31 ( 3d C i r
. 2007) ( ci t i ng I n r e A lph ar m a, I

nc. Sec. Li t ig. , 372 F. 3d 137, 153–54 ( 3d C i r
. 2004) )

. T ypi cal l y , “[w ] e r evi ew for abus e of di s cr et i on, and t her e i s none w here p leadi ng defi ci en ci es w oul d not have be en r emedi ed bypr opos ed am en d m ent s
. ” K a n ter v . B a re lla , 489 F. 3d 170, 181 ( 3d C ir

. 2007) ( ci t i ng I

n r e Ad a ms Gol

f , I n c
. S e c
. Li t ig. , 3 8 1 F. 3d 267, 280 ( 3d C i r
. 2004) )

. I n t he i ns t ant cas e, how ev er, t he D i s t r i ct C o u rt d id n o t co n sid e r w h e th e r p e rm itt in g G r e a t W e ste rn to a m e n d a n d s u b stitu te P ro p o se d A m e n d e d C o m p lain t 3 w o u ld h a v e b e e n f

u t i l e , t h u s o u r r e v i e w i s d e n o v o , a p p l y i n g t h e s a me sta n d a rd th a t w o u ld h a v e b e e n a p p lied b y th e D istric t C o u rt. 8wo uld b e futil e.

- 32- T o det er m i ne w het her t he s ubs t i t ut i on of Pr opos ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 3 w oul d have be en fut i l e, w e cons i der t he
m er i t s o f Gr e a t W e s t e r n ’ s mot i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d t he a d d iti o n a l alle g a tio n c o n tain e d in th a t v e rsio n o f th e c o m p lain t. Speci fi cal l y , w e quest ion w het her t he addi t i on of t he new al l egat i on i s s uffi ci ent t o s t at e a c l ai m under 42 U

. S. C

. § 1983 su ch that the D ist ri ct C o u rt sh o u ld h av e g ran ted G rea t W estern ’s m ot i on for r econs i der at i on. T o pr evai l on a § 1983 cl ai m , a pl ai nt i ff m us t al l ege t hat t he defenda nt act ed under col or of s t at e l aw , i n ot her w or ds , t hat th e re w a s s ta te a c tio n
. Lugar v

. E dm onds on O i lC o. , 45 7 U. S. 9 2 2 , 9 2 9 (19 8 2 ). A s relev an t t o this case , the S u p rem e C o u rt has hel d t hat “[p] r i vat e par t i es w h o corr upt l y cons pi r e w i t h a j udge i n connec t i on w i t h [an offi ci al j udi ci al act ] ar e .
. . act i ng under col or of s t at e l aw w i t hi n t he meani ng of § 1983. ” D e n n is
v. Spar ks , 4 4 9 U .S . 2 4 , 2 9 (1 9 8 0 ); s ee al s o Lugar , 457 U

. S. at 9 4 1 (“ [ A ] p riv a te p a rty ’s jo in t p a rticip a tio n w ith sta te o f f icia ls i n t he s ei zur e of di s put ed pr oper t y i s s uffi ci ent t o char act er i ze th a t p a rty a s a ‘sta te a c to r’ f o r p u rp o se s o f

th e F o u rte e n th A m endment

. ”)

. T hus , i n or der t o s t at e a c l ai m under § 1983, Pr opos ed A m ended C om pl ai nt 3 m us t have adequa t el y pl ed t he e x iste n c e o f

a c o n sp ira c y b e tw e e n D e f e n d a n ts, w h o a re p riv a te p a r t i e s , a n d t h e j u d g e s o f t h e P e n n s y l v a n i a c o u r t s y s t e m. In t w o rec en t land m ark ca ses, the S u p rem e C o u rt r eexa m i ned Feder al R ul e of Ci vi l Pr ocedur e 8 and t he pl eadi ng st a n d a r d s th a t a p lain tiff m u st m e e t to sta te a c laim th a t w ill s ur vi ve a mot i on t o di s m i s s u n d er R u l e 12( b) ( 6)

. T he fi r s t of th e s e tw o c a s e s , B e ll A tla n tic C o rp . v . T w o m b ly , focus ed on “t he proper st and ard for pl eading [a S herm an A ct ] ant i t rust c on s pi r a c y t hr ou gh a l l e ga t i on s of pa r a l l el c on du c t

. ” 55 0 U. S. 544, 553 ( 2007)

. T he C our t r eaf fi r m ed t hat “Feder al R ul e of C i vi l Pr ocedur e 8( a) ( 2) r equi r es onl y a s hor t and pl ai n s t at ement- 33- of t he cl ai m s how i ng t hat t he pl eade r i s ent i t led to r el i ef” and th a t th is s ta n d a rd d o e s n o t re q u ir e “ d e ta ile d f a c tu a l a lle g a tio n s .” I d. at 55 5 (i n terna l qu o tat ion m ark s & cit ati o n o m itt ed ). M oreove r, t he C ou rt reem ph asi zed t hat at t he m oti on t o d i sm i ss s t age, t he fa ct ual m at t er i n t he com pl ai nt m us t be t aken a s t r ue and “a w el l -pl eaded com plai nt m ay proceed even i f i t st ri kes a s avvyj udge t hat act ual pr oof of t hos e fact s i s i m pr obabl e. ” I d. at 556. I n T

w o m b ly , how ever , t he Supr eme C our t announce d “t w o new conce pt s
. ” P hi l l i ps , 515 F. 3d at 231. First , the T w o m b ly C ou rt e x plai ned t hat R ule 8( a)( 2) “r equ i res a ‘sh o w in g ,’ ra th e r th a n a b lan k e t as se rtio n , o f e n tit lem e n t to reli ef

. ” 5 5 0 U

. S

. at 55 5 n
. 3

. In o th e r w o rds, “a p lai n ti ff ’s o b lig a tio n to p ro v id e th e ‘g ro u n d s’ o f h is ‘e n tit le[ m e n t] to r el i ef’ requi r es m or e t han l abel s and conc l us i ons , and a for m ul ai c r eci t at i on of t he el ement s of a caus e of ac t i on w i l l not do. ” I d. at 555 ( quot i ng P a

p a sa n v . A lla in , 47 8 U

. S

. 2 65, 286 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ) ( a l t e r a t i o n i n o r i g i n a l )

. Th e c o mpl a i n t ’ s “ [ f ] act ual al l egat i ons m us t be enough t o r ai s e a r i ght t o r el ief ab o ve t he s pecul at i ve l evel

. ” I

d. Second, t he T

w o m b ly C our t r ej ect ed t he oft

- ci t ed C onl ey s t andar d “‘ t hat a compl ai nt s houl d not be di s m i s s ed for fai l ur e t o s t at e a c l ai m unl es s i t appea r s bey ond d o u b t th a t th e p lain tiff

c a n p ro v e n o se t o f f

a c ts in su p p o rt o f

h is cl ai m w hi ch w oul d ent i t l e hi m t o r el i ef. ’ ” I d. at 561 ( quoti ng C onl ey , 355 U

. S. at 45–46)

. T he C our t r et i r ed t hi s t es t as “an i ncomplete, ne gat i ve gl os s on an ac cept ed pl eadi ng s t andar d: once a cl ai m has been s t at ed ade quat el y , i t m aybe s uppor t ed by s how ing any s et of fa ct s cons i s t ent w i t h t he al l egat i ons i n t he compl ai nt

. ” I

d. at 563. A ppl y i ng t hes e gene r al s t andar ds t o t he t as k of pl eadi ng a n a n tit ru st c o n sp ira c y , the C o u rt e x p lain e d th a t: [A ]n a ll eg ati o n o f p ara ll el co n d u ct an d a b are as s er t i on of cons pi r acy w i l l not s uffi ce. W i t hout
m ore, paral l el con du ct do es n ot s ug gest- 34- cons pi r acy , and a concl us or y al l egat i on of agr eement at s om e uni dent i fi ed poi nt doe s not s uppl y fac t s adequa t e t o s how i l l egal i t y
. H ence , w h e n a lleg a tio n s o f p a ra llel c o n d u c t ar e se t o u t in o rd e r to m a k e a § 1 c laim , the y m u st be p lac e d in a cont ext t hat r ai s es a s ugges t i on of a pr ece di ng a g re e m e n t, n o t m e re ly p a ra llel co n d u c t th a t co u ld j us t as w el l be i ndepende nt act i on. I d. a t 5 5 6

– 5 7 . A n a ly z in g th e c o m p lain t a t is su e , th e C o u rt h e ld t hat i t w as i ns uffi ci ent as i t fai l ed t o “s et for t h a s i ngl e fa ct i n a cont ext t hat s ugges t s an agr eement

. ” I d. at 561–62. A l t hough t he compl ai nt al l eged par al l el conduct , i t gave t he C our t “no r eas on t o i nfer t hat t he compani es had agr eed a m ong t hemsel ves t o d o wha t was o n l y n a t u r a l a n y w ay
. ” I d. at 566. Fi ndi ng an “obvi ous al t er nat i ve expl anat i on” fort he par al l el conduct , t he C o u rt c o n c lu d e d th a t th e “ p lain tiff s h e re h a v e n o t n u d g e d th e ir c laim s ac ro ss th e lin e f

ro m c o n c e iv a b le to p lau sib le, [ a n d ] th e ir compl ai nt m us t be di s m i s s ed. ” I d. at 567, 570. T h e s e c o n d c a s e , A s hcr of tv. I qbal , conce r ned al l egat i ons o f d isc rim in a tio n o n th e b a sis o f ra c e , re lig io n , o r na tio n a l o rig in i n t he w a ke of

t he Se pt e mber 11 , 20 01 t e r r or i s t a t t a c ks

. — U

. S.

— , 129 S. C t

. 1937, 1942 ( 2009)

. T he S upr eme C our t cl ar i fi ed t hat “[o] ur deci s i on i n T w o m b ly expounded t he pl eadi ng s t andar d for ‘ al l ci vi l act i ons
. ’ ” I d. a t 1 9 5 3 ( qu o t i n g F e d

. R. C i v. P. 1)

. A nal y zi ng T w o m b ly , t he Iq b a l C our t expl ai ned t hat “[t ] w o w or ki ng pr i nci pl es under l i e our deci s i on .
. . . Fi r s t , t he t e n e t t h a t a c o u r t mus t a c c e p t a s t r u e a l l o f t h e a l l egat i ons c o n ta in e d in a c o m p la in t is in a p p lic a b le to le g a l c o n c lu s io n s
. . . . Second, onl y a com pl ai nt t hat s t at es a pl aus i bl e cl ai m for r el i ef s ur vi ves a mot i on t o di s m i s s
. ” I d. at 1949–50 ( i nt er nal ci t at i ons om i t t ed)

. I n l i ght of t hes e pri nci pl es , t he C our t l ai d out a t w opr onged appr oach: [A ] cour t co n side r i ng a mot i on t o di s m i s s can c h o o se to b e g in b y id e n tify in g p lea d in g s t h a t,- 35- b ec au se th ey are n o m o re tha n co n clus ion s, are not ent i t l ed t o t he as s um pt i on of t r ut h.

. . . W hen there are w ell -plea d ed fa ctua l allega ti o n s, a c o u rt s h o u ld as s um e t hei r ver aci t y and t hen det er m i ne w het her t heypl aus i bl y gi ve ri s e t o an ent i t l ement t o r el i ef. I d. at 19 5 0

. W it h resp ec t to co n clus o ryall eg ati o n s, the C o u rt cl ar i fi ed t hat “w e do not r ej ectt hes e bal d al l egat i ons on t he gr ound t hat t heyar e unr eal i s t i c or nons ens i cal

. . . . I t i s t he c o n c lu so ry n a tu re o f

[ su c h ] a lleg a tio n s, ra th e r th a n th e ir ext r avaga nt l y fanc i ful nat ur e, t hat di s ent i t l es t hem t o t he pr es um pt i on of t r ut h. ” I d. at 1951. I n l i ght of T

w o m b ly , “i t i s n o l onger s uffi ci ent t o al l ege m ere el em ents of a c ause of act i on ; in ste a d ‘a com plai nt m ust al l ege f act s s ugges t i ve of [t he pros cr i bed] conduct

. ’ ” P hi l l i ps , 515 F. 3d at 233( quot i ng T w o m b ly , 550 U

. S. at 563 n. 8) ( al t er at i on i n or i gi nal )

. N ot i ng t hat “[c ] ont ext m at t er s i n not i ce pleadi ng , ” w e held t hat “s om e com plai nts w i l l requi re at l east s om e fa ct ual al l egat i ons t o m ake outa ‘ s how i ng t hat t he pl eade r i s ent i t l ed t o r el i ef, i n or der t o gi ve t he defenda nt fai r not i ce of
w hat t he

. . . cl ai m i s and t he gr ounds upon w hi ch i t r es t s
. ’ ” I d. at 232 ( quot i ng T

w o m b ly , 550 U

. S. at 555)

. W e s um m ed up t he T w o m b ly p lea d in g sta n d a rd a s f o llo w s: “ ‘[ S ]ta tin g
. . . a c laim
r equi r es a compl ai nt w i t h enough fact ual m at t er ( t aken a s t r ue) to s ugges t ’ t he r equi r ed el ement

. T hi s ‘ does not i m pos e a pr obabi l i t y r equi r ement at t he pl eadi ng stage, ’ but i ns t ead

‘ s i m pl y cal l s for enough fac t s t o r ai s e a r eas onabl e expe ct at i on th a t d is c o v e ry w ill re v e a l e v id e n c e o f ’ th e n e c e s s a ry e le m e n t.” I d. at 234 ( quot i ng T

w o m b ly , 55 0 U

. S

. at 55 6). In ot her w ords, “t her e must be s om e s how i ng s uffi ci ent t o justi fy m ovi ng t he cas e bey ond t he pl eadi ngs t o t he nexts t age of l i t i gat i on. ” I

d. at 234–35. W e have hel d t hat t o pr oper l y pl ead a n uncons t i t ut i onal co n spi r acy , a pl ai nt i ff must as s er t fac t s fr om w hi ch a- 36- c o n s p ir a to ri a l a g re e m e n t c a n b e in f e rr e d

. D

. R

. v. M i ddl e Bucks A r ea Vocat i onal T

ech. Sch. , 9 7 2 F

. 2 d 1 3 6 4 , 1 3 7 7 (3d C ir

. 1 9 9 2 ); see al

so S ta rtz e ll v. C ity o

f P h ila d e lp h ia , 533 F. 3d 183, 205 ( 3d C i r
. 2008) ( s t at i ng t hat a cons pi r acy r equi r es a “meet i ng of t he mi nds ”) ( fur t her ci t at i on om i t t ed)

. T hi s hol di ng r emai ns good l aw fol l ow i ng T w o m b ly and I

qbal , w hi ch, i n t he cons pi r acycont ext , r equi r e “e n ough fac t ual m at t er ( t aken a s t rue) t o s ug gest t hat an agreem ent w as m ade,” i n ot her w ords, “pl aus i bl e gr ounds t o i nfer an agr eement

. ” T w o m b ly , 55 0 U. S. a t 5 5 6 . G re a t W e ste rn ’s P ro p o se d A m e n d e d C o m p lain t 3 f a ils t o m eett hi s s t andar d. U n d er I qbal , t o as s es s t h e s uffi ci encyof Pr opos ed A m e n d e d C o m p lain t 3 , w e “ b e g in b y id e n tify in g p lea d in g s th a t, b e c a u se th e y a re n o m o re th a n c o n c lu s io n s, a re n o t en tit led to t h e a s s u mp t i o n o f t r u t h

. ” 1 2 9 S

. Ct

. a t 1 9 5 0

. Ac c o r d i n g l y , we do not cons i der anyconcl us or y al l egat i ons t hat the r e w as “a c o rru p t co n sp ira c y ,” “ a n a g re e m e n t,” o r “ a n u n d e rsta n d in g in pl ace bet w een t he D efe ndan ts a nd t he Phi l adel phi a j udi ci al s y s te m .” (J .A . a t 1 1 2 , 1 1 9 [ P ro p o s e d A m . C o m p l. 3 , ¶ ¶ 2 , 5 1 ].) A s t he I qbal C o u rt c lar if

ied , “ w e d o n o t re

jec t th e s e b a ld al l egat i ons on t he gr ound t hat t heyar e unr eali sti c or no nsensi cal

. . . . Iti s t he co nclusor y natur e of [ such] al l egati on s” t hat m akes t hem unaccept abl e. 129 S. C t

. at 1951. T he Supr eme C our t has hel d t hat “mer el y r es or t i ng t o t he cour t s and bei ng on t he w i nni ng s i de of a l aw s ui t does not m ake [t he w i nni ng] par t y a co -conspi r at or or a j oi nt act or w i t h t he j udge. ” D e n n is , 44 9 U

. S

. at 28

. Inst ead, G reat W este rn m u st pl ead a n agr eement bet w een t h e st at e cour t j udges and Def e n d a n t s t o r u l e i n f

a v o r o f AD R O p t i o n s a n d Rut t e r
. To pr oper l y pl ead s uch an agr eement , “a ba r e as s er t i on of cons pi r acyw i l l not s uffi ce. ” T w o m b ly , 550 U

. S. at 556. A ppl y i ng T

w o m b ly , G r eatW es t er n’ s s t at ement t hat

“ D e f e n d a n ts e n g a g e d in a c o n c e rte d a c tio n o f a k in d n o t li k e ly to o c c u r in th e a b se n c e o f a g re e m e n t” is in a d e q u a te to p ro p e rly- 37- pl ead a n agr eement

. ( J

. A

. at 120 [Pr opos ed A m
. C om pl

. 3, ¶ 55]

. ) T he fa ct ual al l egat i ons of agr eement on w h i ch G r eat W e s t e r n r e s t s i t s c l a i m a r e a s f o l l o w s : ( 1 ) a c c o r d i n g t o W i l e y, on or ab o u t M arc h 1, 2006, T i nt ner s t at ed t hat t her e w as “no
w ay t hat a Phil adelphi a cou rti s ever going t o find ag a inst T h o m as R u tt er g iven h is r elati o n sh ip w it h the P hi l adel p h ia co u rt s y s t em” ( i d. a t 1 1 8 [ Pr o p o s e d Am

. Co mp l

. 3 , ¶ 4 3 ] ) ; ( 2 ) ADR O pt i ons i s t he l ar ges t pr ovi der of A D R s er vi ces i n Penns y l vani a, has a l ar ge r os t er of for m er j udges empl oy ed as ar bi t r at or s , and pay s i t s ar bi t r at or s hands om el y ; and ( 3) i n M ay2009, R u tt er t es t i fi ed ata depos i t i on t hat s o m e o f the j udges w ho had r ul ed for A D R O pt i ons and aga i n st G reat W es t er n had al r eady appr oache d hi m about empl oy m ent aft er t heyl eave t he benc h. G r eatW es t er n al l eges t hat t h es e fa ct ual al l egat i ons , w hen vi ew ed i n conce r t w i t h t he dec i s i ons r ender ed byt he Penns y l vani a s t at e cour t s , evi dence “unnat ur al par al l el i s m ” and a q u id p ro q u o re la tio n s h ip . (G re a t W e s te rn B r. 1 8 , 2 0 .) A t m o st, G re a t W e ste rn h a s a lleg e d th a t P e n n sy lv a n ia s t a t e - c o u r t j u d g e s h o p e d t o s e c u r e e mp l o y me n t wi t h ADR O p tio n s a f

ter lea v in g th e b e n c h a n d th u s h a d a n in c e n tiv e to ru le i n t he company ’ s favor

. Fat al t o i t s cl ai m , how ever , G r eat W es t er n fai l ed t o m ake a ny fac t ual cont ent i ons conce r ni ng c o n d u c t b y R u t t e r o r a n y o f t h e o t h e r D e f e n d a n t s
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, even Pr opos ed A m ended Com pl ai nt 3 i s devoi d of al l egat i ons t hat R ut t er or anyof t he D efe ndant s di d or s ai d s om et hi ng t o t he ju d g e s to c re a te a n u n d e rsta n d in g th a t f a v o ra b le r u lin g s c o u ld
r es ul t i n fut ur e empl oy m ent

. I ns t ead, t he al l egati o ns i n t he c o m p lain t, ev e n w h e n v iew e d in th e lig h t m o st f a v o ra b le to G re a t W e ste rn , d e sc rib e u n ilate ra l a c tio n o n th e p a rt o f c e rta in j udges

. For a j udge t o appr oach a par t y for w hom he or s he has ju st ru led to d is c u ss th e p o ss ib ili tyo f w o rk in g f

o r th a t p a rty c e rta in lyc re a te s a stro n g a p p e a ra n c e o f im p ro p rie ty . Y e t th is al l egat i on, w i t hout a compl ement ar y al l egat i on of conduc t by t he non- j udi ci al act or , does not pl aus i bl y s ugges t t he exi s t ence- 38- of a c ons pi r acy b etw een t he par t y and t he j udge t o excha nge f a v o ra b le r u lin g s f

o r f u tu re e m p lo y m e n t. A c o mpa r i s o n b e t wee n t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h i s c a s e and t hos e i n D e n n is , w hi ch t he Supr eme C our t hel d w er e s uffi ci ent t o s ur vi ve a m ot i on t o di s m i s s , fur t her emphasi zes t he deficien ci es i n G r eatW es t er n’ s compl ai nt

. I n D e n n is , a s tate cour t enj o ine d t he pl ai nt i ffs fr om pr oduci ng m i ner al s fr om ce rt ain o il lease s. 4 4 9 U

. S

. a t 2 5

. T h e state a p p ell ate c o u rt d iss o lv e d th e in

ju n c tio n a s illeg a l, an d th e p lain tiff s b ro u g h t a § 1 9 8 3 c laim , co n ten d in g th a t “ th e in ju n c tio n h a d b e e n c o rru p tly i s s ued as t he r es ul t of a conspi r acybet w een t he j udge and t he o th e r d e f

e n d a n ts , th u s c a u s i n g a d e p ri v a tio n o f p ro p e rt y
. . . w i t hout due pr oces s of law

. ” I d. at 26. Speci fi cal l y , t he pl ai nt i ffs cl ai m ed t hat t he pr i vat e par ty d efendant s had br i bed th e sta te- c o u rt ju d g e to c a u se h im to iss u e a n in ju n c tio n in th e ir f a v o r. I d. at 28. T hi s al l eged act of br i ber y w as conductby t he
n o n -ju d icia l d e f

e n d a n ts th a t r e su lted in a c o rru p t co n sp ira c y to rule a g ains t t h e p lai n ti f f s
. In c o n tr ast, G rea t W estern ’s compl ai nt cont ai ns no s i m i l ar al l egat i ons of s peci fi c conductby t he non- j udi ci al act or s t hat caus ed t he j udges t o enter into a n u n l a w f u l c o n s p i r a c y. F u rth e rm o re , G re a t W e ste rn h a s n o t p lea d e d a n y f a c ts t hat pl aus i bl y s ugges t a meet i ng of t he mi nds b etw een Rut t er a n d m e m b e rs o f

th e P e n n s y lv a n ia ju d ic ia ry. See T w o m b ly , 550 U

. S

. at 55 6 (holdi n g t hat a pl ai nti ff clai m i ng con spi racym ust pl ead “ enough fa ct t o r ai s e a r eas onabl e expec tat ion t hat di s cover y w i l l r evea l evi dence of i l l egal agr eeme n t ”)

. T he compl ai nt s et s for t h m er el y a “c oncl us or y all egat i on of a g re e m e n t at s o m e u n id e n tifie d p o in t[ , w h ich ] d o e s n o t su p p ly fac t s adequ ate to show i l l egal i t y
. ” I d. a t 5 5 7

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, G r eatW es t er n has fai l ed t o al l ege e xceptin gener al t er m s t he a p p ro x im a te tim e w h e n th e a g re e m e n t w a s m a d e , the sp e c if ic par t i es t o t he agr eement ( i

. e. , w hi ch j udges ) , the per i od of t he c o n s p ir a c y , o r th e o b

je c t o f th e c o n s p ir a c y
. See, e. g. , Shear i n v.Gr e at W e s t e rn a l s o a

ppe a l s the de ni a l of i t s m ot i on for 9 re consider at ion, ar gu ing that r ec on si derati on was warr ante d ba s e d on pr e vi ous l y unava i l abl e e vi de nc e —Rutt e r ’ s s t at e m e nt at the May 14 , 200 9 d eposit ion— and the need to corre ct cl ear er rors of law. Having thorou gh ly consider ed al l of G re at W e s t e rn’ s ar gum e nt s i n favor of r e c ons i de r at i on, we c onc l ude th at th ey are w ith o u t m erit.

- 39- E

. F

. H ut t on G r o u

p , Inc. , 885 F. 2d 1162, 1166 ( 3d C i r
. 1989) (“ T o p lea d c o n sp ira c y a d e q u a tely , a p lain tiff m u st s e t f o rth al l egat i ons t hat addr es s t he per i od of t he conspi r acy , t he obj ect of t he c o n s pi r acy , and t he ce r t ai n act i ons of t he al l eged c o n s p ir a to rs ta k e n to a c h ie v e th a t p u rp o s e .” ), abr ogat ed on
o th e r g ro u n d

s b y B e c k v . P ru p is , 5 2 9 U

. S

. 4 9 4 (20 0 0 ). G r eatW es t er n’ s Pr opos ed A m ended Co m p l ai nt 3 l acks su f f icie n t f a c tu a l alle g a tio n s to c re a te “ p lau sib le g ro u n d s to i n f e r a n a g r e e m e n t , ” a s i s r e q u i r e d b y T w o m b ly

. 55 0 U

. S. at 556. A ny eff

or t t o amend by s ubs t i t ut i ng Pr o p o sed A m ended C o m p l ai nt 3 t her efor e w as fut i l e, and w e i n t ur n aff i r m t he D i s t r i ct C our t ’ s deni al of l eave t o amend on t hat gr ound. 9 IV . Fo r the fo re go ing rea sons, we hold that the Distri ct Co urt prop er ly exer ci se d j uris dict ion. We will affirm the Dis tr ic t Cou rt’s d eni a l of Gr e at

W e s t e rn’ s m ot i on for

l e ave t o am e nd and i t s m ot i on for

r e c ons i de r at i on.