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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 113,235

In the Matter of RUSTIN K. RANKIN,

Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed June 12, 2015. Disbarment.

Alexander M. Walczak, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Kate F. Baird, Deputy 

Disciplinary Administrator, and Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, were on the formal complaint for 

the petitioner. 

John J. Ambrosio, of Ambrosio & Ambrosio, Chtd., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Rustin K. 

Rankin, respondent, argued the cause pro se.

Per Curiam: This is an attorney discipline proceeding against Rustin K. Rankin, 

of Fredonia, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1999. 

On August 12, 2014, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 

complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 

Conduct (KRPC). The respondent answered on September 4, 2014, admitting some 

allegations and denying others. 

A panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys held a hearing on October 

29 and 30, 2014, at which the respondent appeared in person and through counsel. The 

hearing panel determined the respondent violated KRPC 1.5(a) and (b) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. 

Annot. 515) (fees); 1.7(a)(2) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 531) (conflict of interest); 1.8(a) 
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(2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 542) (conflict of interest); 1.15(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 

567) (safekeeping property); and 8.4(c) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 680) (engaging in 

conduct involving misrepresentation) and (g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting 

on lawyer's fitness to practice law).

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and disciplinary recommendation. The respondent took no exceptions 

to the hearing panel's report. We quote the report's pertinent parts below. 

"Findings of Fact

. . . .

"7. In addition to practicing law, the respondent is involved in a family 

farming operation, Rankin Family Farms. The respondent's family farms land near 

Fredonia, Kansas.

"8. In 2006, a representative from Wells Fargo contacted the respondent and 

asked him if he would serve as the closing agent in a real estate transaction. The real 

estate transaction involved P.M.'s purchase of 360 acres of property in Benedict, Kansas. 

At that time, P.M. was a 73-year-old widow. The respondent met P.M. for the first time at 

the closing.

"9. Following that contact, the respondent and P.M. discovered that they had 

many things in common. During the period of time that followed, P.M. engaged the 

respondent as her attorney, they became friends, and they became business associates. On 

a number of occasions, the respondent and his family traveled on vacations with P.M. 

Respondent testified he grew to care more for P.M. than his own mother. [Footnote: 

P.M. testified at the hearing on the formal complaint. She was 82 years old at the time. 

P.M. suffered an injury in her home in August 2014, and was still in the process of 

recovering from the injury. The respondent objected to her testimony on the grounds of 
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competency. The competency objection was overruled. P.M. was unable to recall many 

facts but despite having a faulty memory contributed to by age and physical maladies, she 

appeared to understand her duty to tell the truth and she was capable of expressing herself 

to the hearing panel and counsel. However, the hearing panel has placed little weight on 

P.M.'s appearance, as it was apparent P.M.'s physical and mental capacities had 

significantly deteriorated since P.M.'s attorney-client and business relationships with her 

from 2007 through 2012.]

"10. In 2007, the respondent became P.M.'s attorney. The respondent did not 

send P.M. an engagement letter. There is no evidence that the respondent communicated 

the rate of his attorney fees to P.M.

"11. On October 10, 2008, the respondent drafted and P.M. executed a limited 

power of attorney, in favor of the respondent. The power of attorney granted the 

respondent extensive authority to act on behalf of P.M.

"12. On June 1, 2009, P.M. provided the following written statement: 

'To Whom It May Concern:

'I, [P.M.], have chosen to enter into a business relationship with my 

friend Rustin Rankin. I have not been forced or coerced into this 

relationship and enter it with a sound and clear mind. Over the past 

several years, Mr. Rankin has helped me in numerous ways and I trust 

him fully and completely. He has advised me that it is my right to consult 

with another attorney regarding this relationship and have now decline 

[sic] to do that. I understand that large sums of money will be involved in 

this partnership and will be transferred from time to time. It is my desire 

to allow these transactions and have communicated my wishes to Mr. 

Rankin and I believe that he has a clear understanding of them.

'We will be engaged in property management as well as various farming 

and ranching pursuits. I clearly understand that I will be contributing 
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more capital to our project and Mr. Rankin will be providing more 

management and oversight. I believe this to be fair and reasonable. I 

have known Mr. Rankin and his family for several years and have always 

enjoyed a fair and beneficial relationship.'

"13. At some point in time, P.M. created an entity called Madden Ventures. 

P.M. opened a checking account for the entity at the First National Bank in Fredonia . . . . 

The first check written on [the] account . . . was written by the respondent on April 24, 

2009. (A typographical error occurred and checks were issued under the name Madden 

Adventures. Any references to Madden Adventures in the record should be recognized as 

synonymous with Madden Ventures. Later, Madden Ventures evolved into Madden 

Ventures, LLC.)

"14. On July 15, 2009, the respondent obtained a personal loan for $15,000 

from P.M. The respondent repaid P.M. with $7,500.00 in cash and $7,500 in 'in kind 

services.' (The respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8 when he obtained the 

loan from P.M.)

"15. P.M. wished to own property located near the Rankin Family Farm 

property. Thereafter, a neighbor to the Rankin Family Farm property offered to sell 75 

acres (the 'Donahey property') to the respondent and his family for $125,000. On October 

1, 2009, the respondent and his brother purchased the property using $125,000 from P.M.

"16. Immediately after purchasing the Donahey property, the respondent and 

his brother sold the property to Madden Ventures for $125,000. Further, the respondent 

and his brother had an agreement with P.M. that if she chose to sell the Donahey property 

at a future date, she would sell it to the respondent and his brother for the same purchase 

price, $125,000.

"17. There was no closing statement offered into evidence to prove the 

financial transaction wherein the respondent and his brother, Richard Rankin, sold the 

property to Madden Ventures. However, the following financial transactions do evidence 

the same.
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a. On September 22, 2009, the respondent caused to be transferred, 

the sum of $75,000 from P.M.'s Individual Retirement Account (hereinafter 

'IRA') funds . . . unto [sic] the Madden Adventures account . . . .

b. On September 22, 2009, the respondent caused $50,000 from the 

Madden Adventures account . . . to be transferred to and deposited in the Rankin 

Law Offices Trust Account . . . .

c. On October 2, 2009, the respondent caused a check of $140,000 

to be written on [the Madden Adventures] account . . . and deposited in the 

Rankin Law Offices Trust Account. . . .

d. On October 22, 2009, the respondent caused to be transferred the 

sum of $125,000 from P.M.'s IRA . . . unto [sic] the Madden Adventures account. 

. . .

"18. In addition, the respondent testified that the funds ($125,000) went from 

P.M.'s IRA account to the Madden Adventures account to Rankin Law Offices Trust 

Account to the sellers, Donahey.

"19. On October 7, 2009, the respondent formally established a limited 

liability company with P.M., called Madden Ventures, LLC. The respondent and P.M. 

were each 50% owners of Madden Ventures, LLC. Additionally, there is evidence and 

testimony that the parties formed a business relationship and acted as partners prior to 

this date.

"20. P.M. contributed all the capital to Madden Ventures, LLC, including the 

proceeds from an IRA. Additionally, the respondent effected the transfer of real property, 

located in Kansas and elsewhere, owned by P.M. to Madden Ventures, LLC. (The 

respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8 by transferring his client's property to an 

entity in which he was an owner.)
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"21. Despite the 50% ownership interest, the respondent did not contribute 

any capital to Madden Ventures, LLC. Likewise, the respondent did not transfer any of 

his real property into Madden Ventures, LLC. Respondent testified his contributions to 

Madden Ventures, LLC, were his management skills and his financial standing enabling 

him to guarantee loans for the LLC. Thus, with regard to the Donahey property, 

notwithstanding that respondent was the seller, settlement agent, and attorney for P.M., 

the respondent also acquired an ownership interest in the Donahey property as a buyer 

because of his 50% interest in Madden Ventures LLC.

"22. Madden Ventures, LLC, purchased additional real property, which 

included working farm land, established a cattle ranching operation, and received income 

from a hunting lease. P.M. built a house on a portion of the real property owned by 

Madden Ventures, LLC.

"23. P.M. informed the respondent that she wished to make a change to her 

will and leave all her property upon her death to the respondent. The respondent informed 

P.M. that he could not draft a new will for her which named him as her heir. The 

respondent referred P.M. to John Chenoweth, a local attorney. P.M. consulted with Mr. 

Chenoweth and on November 24, 2009, P.M. executed a new will, naming the respondent 

as the executor and sole heir of her estate upon her death. The respondent paid Mr. 

Chenoweth's bill and then sought reimbursement from P.M.

"24. Respondent testified he was reluctant to be the sole beneficiary of P.M.'s 

will because, 'He had enough money.'

"25. From the time the respondent formed Madden Ventures, LLC, and 

continuing into 2012, the respondent maintained money belonging to Madden Ventures, 

LLC, in his attorney trust account. Additionally, throughout that same time period, the 

respondent was a 50% owner of Madden Ventures, LLC.

"26. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent testified that he 

stopped providing P.M. with legal services at the end of 2009. However, the record does 

not support the respondent's testimony. The respondent continued to engage in activity on 
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behalf of P.M. which constitutes the practice of law. Further, the respondent continued to 

deposit funds of Madden Ventures, LLC, owned by himself and P.M., into his attorney 

trust account, and continued to write checks on behalf of P.M. from his attorney trust 

account until sometime in 2012. At no time, did the respondent notify P.M. that he was 

no longer acting as her attorney.

"27. P.M.'s accountant, Joe Bambrick, had been receiving and paying P.M.'s 

bills for her. In April or May, 2010, the respondent's law office took over that role and 

began receiving and paying P.M.'s bills for her.

"28. On November 10, 2010, P.M. executed an IRA Change of Beneficiary 

form, changing the primary beneficiary of her IRA to Madden Ventures, LLC. On 

November 15, 2010, P.M. added the respondent as a user on two of her credit cards with 

Chase Bank.

"29. In 2011, at P.M.'s request, the respondent transferred the ownership of 

the 360 acres in Benedict, Kansas, to Madden Ventures, LLC.

"30. In December, 2011, the respondent, his family, and P.M. went on a 

Christmas cruise. Following the cruise, P.M. and the respondent had a falling out. 

According to the respondent, following the cruise, P.M. wanted the respondent and his 

family to travel to Tampa, Florida, to inspect a condominium which she wished to 

purchase. The respondent advised P.M. against the purchase. Additionally, the 

respondent refused to travel to Tampa because he and his family were tired from the 

cruise. P.M. went to Tampa and the respondent and his family returned home. Following 

his return home, (other than during her testimony at the formal hearing), the respondent 

saw P.M. on only one additional occasion, at a chance meeting in the grocery store.

"31. On January 19, 2012, without P.M.'s knowledge or permission, the 

respondent executed a contract, effecting the transfer of the Donahey property from 

Madden Ventures, LLC, to the respondent. Further, the respondent's law office was listed 

as the escrow agent. The respondent was a member of the seller, Madden Ventures, LLC, 

he was the buyer, and he acted as agent for the buyer. On the contract, the respondent 
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signed as both the seller and the buyer. The respondent received $110,000 upon the 

closing of the sale.

"32. On February 1, 2012, the respondent and his brother borrowed $600,000 

to refinance the Rankin Family Farm operation. According to the settlement sheet, two 

loans were paid off, totaling $74,968.89. The purchase of the Donahey land was included 

in the loan. It appears that the respondent received $125,000 in cash from the transaction 

to pay to Madden Ventures, LLC, for the Donahey property.

"33. The Settlement Statement and supporting documents for the $600,000 

loan contained the following language:

'Contingent Liabilities: Rustin is a 50/50 partner in Madden Ventures, 

LLC. This is basically a R/E company that owns several condos in 4 

states and farmland around Longton Kansas. Rustin's partner is an older 

widowed lady by the name of [P.M.]. She and Rustin became business 

partners a few years back (basically because she took a liking to Rustin's 

Family vs. her own) and Rustin has basically invested nothing, and been 

made partner at 50/50. Total debt on the LLC is $290,000 in MTG loans 

on 3 properties that rent covers in full so Rustin has no out of pocket 

expense and a $1.25m IRA that could be cashed out at any time to fulfill 

obligations if need be owned by [P.M.]. Madden Ventures has assets of 

roughly $2,650,000 that Rustin is half owner of but is not counted Net 

Worth for this request, simply additional peace of mind on capital 

strength for this credit package.'

"34. On March 17, 2012, P.M. wrote to the respondent. The letter provided:

'Dear Rustin:

'I am very concerned and disappointed with our current situation. I have 

requested time and again to be advised about my financial affairs. You 

have not kept me informed in any way concerning my finances. I do not 
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know how much cash I have available for my personal use and this 

sometimes creates embarrassing situations for me. I have found myself 

without even funds on my credit card. You are not keeping me informed 

when you make a business decision or purchase. You do not send me any 

financial statements. I do not know how much I have paid in taxes. I 

don't know how much I am paying you.

'Therefore I plan to hire a CPA to obtain this information and relay it to 

me in a timely manner.

'Rustin, I appreciate all you have done for me and there would not be a 

problem if you would just keep me "in the loop" and not do things 

without discussing them with me first. After all, just like you told Wells 

Fargo, it is my money. And since I am not senile yet I want to know what 

is going on.

'I further wish to revoke the power of attorney that I gave you over my 

affairs and well being. I find I no longer trust your motives and wonder if 

you really have my best interests at heart. I want proof that this has been 

done. I would like it to be effectively immediately on recipt [sic] of this 

letter.

'Please send copies of the paperwork for my Madden Ventures LLC and 

my living trust to my Mailbox Etc. in Corpus Christi. Send this registered 

with a return receipt request.

'Just because I put your name on my checking accounts does not give 

you the right to write checks and purchase items, services without 

informing me first. 

'There will have to be some changes made in order for us to consider a 

future business relationship.'
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"35. In an undated letter, the respondent responded to P.M.'s March 12, 2012, 

[sic] letter. (In the body of the letter, the respondent stated that he received her letter 

'yesterday.' Thus, it appears that the respondent's undated letter was written shortly after 

receiving P.M.'s March 12, 2012, [sic] letter.) With his response, the respondent enclosed 

a revocation of power of attorney.

"36. In the response, the respondent stated that he 'quit charging [P.M.] any 

attorney's fees when [their] relationship went from attorney/client to friends about 3 years 

ago. [He] couldn't charge one of [his] best friends.' About 3 years' prior would be March 

2009. The record is replete with evidence that the respondent charged P.M. attorney fees 

throughout 2009.

"37. In a nine (9) month period from April 2009 to December 2009, the 

respondent transferred $498,820.57 from Madden Ventures, LLC's account into the 

respondent's trust account or to himself personally, for legal fees, expenses associated 

with operation of Madden Ventures, LLC, a loan to the respondent, or for reasons not 

documented on a check.

"38. Further, the respondent's statement in his letter varied from his testimony 

at the hearing on the formal complaint. In that, he testified that he stopped representing 

her following 2009 but in his letter he stated that he stopped billing her for the 

representation.

"39. Additionally, the respondent's billing records from his law office to P.M. 

and Madden Ventures, LLC, indicate that the respondent charged Madden Ventures, 

LLC, at least $60,000 in retainers for legal services in 2010, as follows:

'January 6, 2010 Madden Ventures, LLC $20,000

January 25, 2010 Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000

March 4, 2010 Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000

April 16, 2010 Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000

May 21, 2010 Madden Ventures, LLC $10,000'
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All of the above bills were billed to Madden Ventures, LLC, c/o Rankin Law Offices, 

P.O. Box 425, Fredonia, Kansas 66736.

"40. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent explained that 

despite his records, he did not provide legal services to P.M. in 2010. He asserted that the 

$60,000 was for restaurant consulting fees and that his legal assistant 'mislabeled' the 

services on the invoices. Further, the respondent testified that he instructed his legal 

assistant to create the invoices in 2012, to account for monies received by him from P.M., 

as documentation of income for tax purposes. The respondent testified that he had failed 

to report $60,000 of income and therefore needed the bills to account for income so he 

could file an amended tax return. The creation of the bills occurred after P.M. had sent 

Disciplinary Administrator's Exhibit 4 to the respondent. The respondent never provided 

P.M. with a copy of the invoices found in Disciplinary Administrator's Exhibit 13, pp. 

192-96. No restaurant was ever opened by P.M.

"41. The memo line of the checks does not indicate that it was restaurant 

consulting fees. Rather, on two of the five checks, the respondent noted 'transfer' in the 

memo line. On the other three, the respondent made no notation. The respondent's 

notation of 'transfer' was common to many of the checks he wrote to his law office from 

the Madden Adventures account; 10 additional checks are noted in the same fashion.

"42. Other than the respondent's testimony, there is no other evidence in the 

record that the payments were for restaurant consulting fees. The hearing panel finds the 

respondent's testimony that the $60,000 was for restaurant consulting fees, rather than 

legal fees, to lack credibility. The respondent possessed no unique skills or experience to 

act as a restaurant consultant. The respondent maintained no record of his time associated 

with his restaurant consulting services, although he did indicate he gave records of his 

time to P.M. Based on all the evidence, the hearing panel finds that the invoices were for 

what they state that they were for—legal services or were simply a transfer of funds to 

the respondent for no reason other than the personal financial benefit of the respondent.
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"43. On April 24, 2012, the respondent self-reported misconduct in 

connection with his representation of P.M. to the disciplinary administrator. The 

respondent's letter provides:

'I feel it is my obligation to file a report to your office about my potential 

ethical lapses that have been made. They are in regard to a client I had 

named [P.M.]

1. I failed to have a proper engagement letter with [P.M.].

2. I failed to have a proper disengagement letter with [P.M.].

3. I failed to write a letter explaining to [P.M.] that I would not do 

her taxes for her for the years 2009 and 2010.

4. I drafted an LLC for a client in which I am a partner and this was 

not an arms [sic] length transaction in that she did not obtain separate 

legal counsel.

5. I drafted deeds that transferred property of a Client's into an LLC 

in which I am a partner and this was not an arms [sic] length transaction 

in that she did not obtain separate legal counsel.

6. I accepted a loan from [P.M.], drawn on an account that I was a 

co-owner, and [P.M.] was a client at the time.

'I look forward to hearing from you in this matter so that it can be 

resolved.'

"44. In May, 2012, after accounting for disbursements, the respondent held 

$169,653 of P.M.'s money, which could not be accounted for by the respondent.
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"45. On March 13, 2014, P.M. filed a federal district court lawsuit against the 

respondent. In the suit, P.M. alleged that the respondent engaged in legal malpractice 

under the theories of breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, breach of trust, 

wrongful conversion, and negligence. Without admitting liability or any wrongdoing, the 

respondent settled the suit with P.M. in the amount of $150,000. The respondent 

contributed $50,000 and the respondent's malpractice carrier paid the remaining $100,000 

of the settlement amount. At the hearing on the formal complaint, the respondent testified 

that he agreed to pay $50,000 because it was a 'fair and reasonable approximation of the 

potential risk [he] stood.'

"46. At the hearing on this matter, the respondent's testimony was 

inconsistent. Further, the respondent's testimony was inconsistent with his answer to the 

formal complaint. Specifically, in his answer, the respondent admitted that he has been 

unable to provide an adequate accounting of the funds held for P.M. In contrast, during 

questioning by Mr. Cohen, the following exchange occurred:

'Q. (BY MR. COHEN) Look at paragraph 29. It alleges that not less 

than $594,150 of [P.M.]'s money was transferred to accounts of 

Madden Ventures, LLC or Rustin Rankin or Rankin Law Offices 

and that you have been unable to provide an adequate accounting 

of funds held for [P.M.] to her or the Disciplinary Administrator. 

. . . Is that correct?

. . . . 

'A. [BY THE RESPONDENT] I would say that it is—I would say 

that it is an adequate accounting. We have an accountant. We've 

accounted for all the checks. I think the question comes down to 

invoices that I wouldn't have or would have in my possession. 

But it's my understanding that all that money has been accounted 

for and we've slotted it into wherever it went.'
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"47. The respondent retained a CPA, Thomas H. Sewell, to review P.M.'s 

accounts. Mr. Sewell provided an Independent Accountants' Report on Applying Agreed 

Upon Procedures for the year ending December 31, 2009. Mr. Sewell did not conduct an 

audit. In the report, Mr. Sewell determined that there were 'uninvoiced amounts' of 

$65,364.27. But see paragraph 44.

"48. Mr. Sewell reviewed the deposits and checks for the year 2009 for P.M.'s 

personal checking account . . . and the Madden Adventures checking account, . . . both 

with the First National Bank in Fredonia.

"49. As to [P.M.'s personal checking] account . . . , Mr. Sewell found that 

checks were written to the Rankin Law Office trust account totaling $20,000 and there 

was no supporting documents for the payments.

"50. Total deposits/receipts made to [the Madden Adventures] account . . . by 

the respondent for 2009 were $521,710.57. Disbursements and checks totaled 

$521,330.39, leaving an ending balance of $380.18 on December 31, 2009. Of the 

$521,330.39 in disbursements, the sum of $173,820.57 [was] written to the respondent 

and the sum of $329,000 was written to the Rankin Law Office trust account.

"51. Mr. Sewell examined the payments made to the respondent and the 

Rankin Law Office trust account through [P.M.'s personal checking account] and [the 

Madden Adventures account]. The total payments to the respondent or the Rankin Law 

Office trust account were $522,820.57. Of that amount, P.M. was invoiced for 

$41,116.98 in attorney's fees and expenses, P.M. was invoiced for $124,308.66 (which 

represents the purchase of the Donahey property by Madden Ventures LLC) and P.M. 

was invoiced for other moving, farm and ranch and house expenses. The sum of 

$65,364.27 represents the 'Uninvoiced Amounts'. This amount does include the $20,000 

discussed above.

"52. There was no evidence from the Disciplinary Administrator that these 

funds were used inappropriately. Conversely, there was no evidence that the respondent 

could account for the funds.
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"Conclusions of Law

"53. Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 

of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, and 

KRPC 8.4, as detailed below.

"KRPC 1.5

"54. Lawyers must charge reasonable fees. KRPC 1.5(a). In this case, the 

respondent failed to charge reasonable fees. Applying the factors in KRPC 1.5(a)(1)-(8), 

there is no way for the respondent to reasonably account for the amount of fees assessed 

to P.M. In one attempt to justify fees charged or to try to account for money transferred to 

him, the respondent created invoices approximately 2 years after the work was 

purportedly done. The respondent charged P.M. $60,000 and provided no written 

documentation for what work was being billed for, nor did he ever provide the invoices to 

his client. As stated above, the hearing panel finds the respondent's testimony that the 

$60,000 was for restaurant consulting fees to lack credibility. Moreover, the $60,000 

came out of his attorney trust account. Charges for a total of $60,000 without explanation 

is per se unreasonable. The cavalier attitude shown by the respondent during his 

testimony about a substantial amount of money being paid to him, unbeknownst to his 

client and business partner, causes the hearing panel to place little weight on his attempt 

to explain the total mismanagement of his trust account and P.M.'s money. Accordingly, 

the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.5(a) by charging P.M. 

an unreasonable fee.

"55. KRPC 1.5 also requires lawyers to communicate the basis of the fee to a 

client, when the lawyer has not regularly represented the client.

'When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or 

rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, 

before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation.'
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KRPC 1.5(b). In this case, the respondent admitted that he failed to provide an 

engagement letter to P.M. Based upon the respondent's admission that he failed to 

provide P.M. with an engagement letter and the lack of other evidence establishing that 

the respondent otherwise communicated the rate of his fee to P.M., whether it was for 

legal services or the nebulous restaurant consulting fee, the hearing panel concludes that 

the respondent violated KRPC 1.5(b).

"KRPC 1.7

"56. In this case, the respondent represented P.M. when he had a concurrent 

conflict of interest, in violation of KRPC 1.7. According to KRPC 1.7(a)(2), a concurrent 

conflict of interest exists if there is 'a substantial risk that the representation of one or 

more clients will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.' There was 

a substantial risk that the representation of P.M. would be materially limited by the 

respondent's own interests after the respondent became business partners with P.M., the 

sole heir under her will, and the beneficiary of her IRA.

"57. In order to continue to represent P.M. following the existence of the 

conflict, the respondent had to take certain steps, identified in KRPC 1.7(b):

'Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest 

under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer 

will be able to provide competent and diligent 

representation to each affected client; 

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion 

of a claim by one client against another client 

represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 

or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
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(4) each affected client gives informed consent, 

confirmed in writing.'

Although Disciplinary Administrator's Exhibit 7 could be construed as P.M.'s informed 

consent, confirmed in writing, the record is replete with transactions that clearly show 

respondent's representation of P.M., as her attorney, was materially limited by 

respondent's personal interests to financially benefit from his unfettered access to, and 

use of, P.M.'s assets. Further, P.M.'s March 17, 2012, letter clearly establishes that the 

respondent failed to properly inform P.M. as to the business transactions. As such, based 

on the totality of the circumstances, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 

violated KRPC 1.7(a)(2).

"KRPC 1.8

"58. KRPC 1.8(a) limits the types of relationships an attorney can enter with 

clients:

'A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client 

or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other 

pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: 

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer 

acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to 

the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted 

in writing to the client in a manner which can be 

reasonably understood by the client; and

(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability 

of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity 

to seek the advice of independent legal counsel 

on the transaction; and
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(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing 

signed by the client, to the essential terms of the 

transaction and the lawyer's role in the 

transaction, including whether the lawyer is 

representing the client in the transaction.'

The respondent stipulated that his conduct violated KRPC 1.8(a) in two respects. First, 

the respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8(a) by receiving a loan of $15,000, 

from P.M. Second, the respondent stipulated that he violated KRPC 1.8(a) by transferring 

P.M.'s property into Madden Ventures, LLC, in which he was an owner. This was not a 

business relationship where the respondent had contributed a substantial amount of assets 

to the LLC. He had contributed none. All the risk of loss was on P.M. The hearing panel 

accepts the respondent's stipulations and concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 

1.8(a).

"KRPC 1.15

"59. Lawyers must safeguard client's property. KRPC 1.15. In this case, the 

respondent failed to properly safeguard P.M.'s property—he was unable to account for at 

least $65,364 or as much as $169,653. Based upon the respondent's failure to properly 

account for P.M.'s funds, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 

1.15.

"60. Additionally, the respondent violated KRPC 1.15 in two additional ways. 

According to KRPC 1.15(a):

'A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 

lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the 

lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 

maintained in the state of Kansas. Other property shall be identified as 

such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account 

funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be 
19

preserved for a period of five years after termination of the 

representation.'

From the time the respondent established Madden Ventures, LLC, in 2009, and 

continuing into 2012, the respondent maintained Madden Ventures, LLC, funds in his 

attorney trust account. The respondent was an owner of Madden Ventures, LLC. 

Additionally, the respondent maintained other clients' funds, his own personal funds, and 

funds of the Rankin Family Farm in the account. Thus, the respondent commingled his 

funds with those of his clients in his attorney trust account. Further, the respondent failed 

to keep complete records of his attorney trust account by failing to maintain invoices 

which related to his representation of P.M. The manner in which the respondent kept 

records and accounted for P.M.'s money in his trust account, pales in comparison to the 

standards expected of attorneys when handling client funds. The extraordinarily difficult 

task experienced by the respondent, Larry Pfannenstiel, Mr. Sewell, or the disciplinary 

administrator to account for P.M.'s money is the reason the exacting standards required 

for client trust accounts were imposed. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) by commingling his funds with his client's funds and 

by failing to maintain proper records.

"KRPC 8.4

"61. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [and to] engage in any other 

conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.' KRPC 8.4(c) and 

KRPC 8.4(g). The respondent engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty and adversely 

reflected on his fitness to practice law when he back-dated billing records in 2012 to 

attempt to justify the transfer of $60,000 to him in 2010. Further, the respondent engaged 

in conduct that involved dishonesty and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law 

when he transferred the Donahey property from Madden Ventures, LLC to himself 

without the knowledge or permission of P.M. The respondent engaged in a number of 

transactions, which, when considering each individually may not be inappropriate on its 

own accord, but become self-serving and self-enriching when considering the totality of 

the circumstances and the amount of funds involved over a period of time from 2008 
20

through 2012. The respondent had total control over P.M.'s money and other assets, while 

acting as P.M.'s attorney, business partner, and close personal friend. The conduct was 

detrimental to his client and troubling to the panel. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that 

the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c) and KRPC 8.4(g).

"American Bar Association

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

"62. In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 

considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 

to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 

injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 

factors.

"63. Duty Violated. The respondent violated three duties owed to his client. 

First, the respondent violated his duty to properly safeguard his client's property. Next, 

the respondent violated his duty to charge reasonable attorney fees. Finally, the 

respondent violated his duty to his client to refrain from engaging in conflicts of interest. 

In addition, to violating duties owed to his client, the respondent also violated his duty to 

the public and to the legal profession to maintain his personal integrity.

"64. Mental State. The respondent knowingly violated his duties.

"65. Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 

actual serious injury to P.M. and to the legal profession. 

"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

"66. Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

aggravating factors present:
21

"67. Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent's misconduct included both 

dishonest conduct and selfish conduct. The hearing panel concludes, therefore, that the 

respondent's misconduct was motivated by both dishonesty and selfishness.

"68. A Pattern of Misconduct. Over a period of years, the respondent failed to 

properly safeguard and account for P.M.'s property. Additionally, the respondent's 

conflicts of interest also spanned years. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the 

respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct.

"69. Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 

The respondent violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.8, KRPC 1.15, and KRPC 8.4. 

Further, the respondent violated some of the rules in multiple ways. Accordingly, the 

hearing panel concludes that the respondent's committed multiple offenses.

"70. Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct. The respondent 

has refused to acknowledge that he violated KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.7, KRPC 1.15, and 

KRPC 8.4. The respondent, however, acknowledged that his conduct violated KRPC 1.8. 

Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent refused to completely 

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.

"71. Vulnerability of Victim. P.M. was vulnerable to the respondent's 

misconduct if only because she had misplaced her trust in the respondent. She was often 

traveling and relied on the respondent to manage her affairs. The respondent testified 

P.M. was sharp, witty, and active all the time. He also testified P.M. was not a 

sophisticated client. Finally, the respondent referred to P.M. as 'a lonely woman scared of 

being alone.'

"72. Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 

justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 

recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 

mitigating circumstances present:
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"73. Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The respondent has not 

previously been disciplined.

"74. Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including 

Any Letters from Clients, Friends, and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General 

Reputation of the Attorney. The respondent is an active and productive member of the bar 

of Fredonia, Kansas. The respondent also enjoys the respect of his peers and generally 

possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by many letters received by the 

hearing panel. The hearing panel would recognize that the support letters are from 

members of the public, former or current clients, distinguished members of the bar, 

prosecutors, and a retired District Court Judge. All found the respondent to be a caring, 

professional attorney, who practices law honestly and with high ethical standards. Many 

of the letters emphatically emphasize the respondent's outstanding, uncompromising 

character, and his adherence to personal and community values beyond reproach. It is 

difficult for the hearing panel to perceive the person praised in the support letters to be 

the same person who engaged in the conduct giving rise to the instant disciplinary case.

"75. In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 

examined and considered the following Standards:

'4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or 

should know that he is dealing improperly with client property 

and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

'4.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a 

conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the 

possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential 

injury to a client.

'4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 

deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the 

client.
23

'5.11(b) Disbarment is generally appropriate when . . . a lawyer engages 

in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 

deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on 

the lawyer's fitness to practice.'

"Recommendation

"76. The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be 

disbarred. Counsel for the respondent characterized the matter as an atrocious record 

keeping situation, and recommended that the respondent be censured and that the censure 

be published in the Kansas Reports.

"77. The hearing panel is called upon to weigh the evidence, determine 

credibility, and assess the tone and quality of each witnesses' testimony. In the hearing 

panel's observation, it appeared that the respondent was cavalier in his approach and he 

failed to grasp the gravity of his failure to adhere to the applicable sections of the KRPC. 

Overall, it appeared that the respondent failed to appreciate the situation in which he now 

finds himself and, more importantly, he failed to understand the substantial injury he 

caused to P.M. and to the legal profession as a whole by his egregious misconduct. The 

hearing panel is troubled by the respondent's attitude.

"78. The nature of the respondent's misconduct is very extreme and 

disbarment is warranted. However, because the respondent has not previously been 

disciplined, the hearing panel recommends that the Supreme Court indefinitely suspend 

the respondent's license to practice law in Kansas.

"79. Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 

the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator."
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DISCUSSION

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the disciplinary 

panel's findings, and the parties' arguments to determine whether KRPC violations exist 

and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct must be 

established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 258 P.3d 

375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 363). Clear and 

convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth of 

the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 

(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]).

Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 

an answer. As noted, respondent filed no exceptions to the final hearing report. As such, 

the panel's findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) 

(2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 383).

The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing 

evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.5(a) and (b) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 

515) (fees); 1.7(a)(2) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 531) (conflict of interest); 1.8(a) (2014

Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 542) (conflict of interest); 1.15(a) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 567) 

(safekeeping property); and 8.4(c) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 680) (engaging in conduct 

involving misrepresentation) and (g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on 

lawyer's fitness to practice law). The evidence also supports the panel's conclusions of 

law. We adopt the panel's conclusions.

The only remaining issue for this court is determining the appropriate discipline 

for respondent's violations. At the hearing before this court, the office of the Disciplinary 

Administrator recommended respondent's disbarment. The respondent recommended a 
25

finite 2-year suspension, subject to a reinstatement hearing. The hearing panel

recommended respondent be indefinitely suspended. The hearing panel's 

recommendations are advisory only and do not prevent us from imposing greater or lesser 

sanctions. Supreme Court Rule 212(f) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 383); see In re Kline, 

298 Kan. 96, 212-13, 311 P.3d 321 (2013).

After careful consideration, a majority of the court agrees with the office of 

Disciplinary Administrator that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. The facts, which 

are undisputed before this court, show a flagrant pattern of misrepresentation, conflict of 

interest, and exploitation of a vulnerable client over a number of years, all of which 

resulted in a substantial loss of the client's property. This is not simply a matter of 

"atrocious" record keeping, as the respondent characterized it. A minority of the court 

would follow the hearing panel's recommendation of indefinite suspension. 

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Rustin K. Rankin be disbarred from the practice 

of law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with 

Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 306).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that respondent shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 

218 (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 414).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 

respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.