Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A03-1612-CR-2896 | May 23, 2017 Page 1 of 8

 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Elizabeth A. Bellin 

Elkhart, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Monika Prekopa Talbot 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA 

Antoine D. Bates, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

May 23, 2017 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

20A03-1612-CR-2896 

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Stephen R. 

Bowers, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

20D02-1409-FB-74 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
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Case Summary 

[1] At Antoine D. Bates’s jury trial for Class B felony burglary, the State disclosed 

for the first time that a wallet (which the owner had lost over two years earlier) 

had been found in the area of the burglary. Bates argued that this late 

disclosure violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires the 

prosecution to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defendant. The trial 

court found no Brady violation, and Bates was convicted as charged. Bates now 

appeals, arguing a Brady violation and that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction. 

[2] Because Brady does not impose a general requirement of pretrial disclosure, 

Bates gives us no reason to believe that the wallet’s owner could have offered 

evidence favorable to him, and Bates did not request a continuance when the 

disclosure was first made at trial, we find no Brady violation. In addition, 

because the victim saw Bates running away from her house carrying property 

that had been inside, we find that the evidence is sufficient to support his 

burglary conviction. We therefore affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[3] In November 2013, Nancy Medina and her husband, Manuel Torres, lived at 

Nancy’s parents’ house in Harrison Ridge subdivision in Goshen along with 

Nancy’s parents and three of her younger siblings. Nancy’s youngest brother 

was one year old at the time. 
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[4] On the night of November 9, Nancy and Manuel went with another couple to a 

dance club in South Bend to celebrate Manuel’s twenty-second birthday. The 

group left the club around 3 a.m., and the other couple drove Nancy and 

Manuel home. Nancy was the first to enter the house and left the door open for 

her husband. As Nancy headed to the bathroom, she saw a man standing in the 

kitchen. Tr. Vol. II p. 227; Tr. Vol. III p. 4. The man, later identified as Bates, 

said, “Don’t yell,” but Nancy yelled for her husband and ran out of the house. 

Tr. Vol. II pp. 229-30. Bates followed Nancy out of the house and ran into the 

street. Manuel, who was in the driveway, chased Bates for a short time but 

then stopped. During this time, Nancy saw that Bates was carrying her 

brother’s Winnie the Pooh diaper bag that had been sitting on the kitchen table. 

It contained baby clothes and a camera. 

[5] Sergeant Scott Frey with the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department responded to 

a report of a burglary in progress at 3:35 a.m. After speaking with Nancy, he 

walked around the house to see if he could find a point of entry. Sergeant Frey 

found a screwdriver by the sliding-glass door. The locking mechanism on the 

sliding-glass door was damaged, as if something had been pushed into it. The 

screwdriver did not belong to Nancy or her family. 

[6] Undercover Officer (UC) 1521 also responded to the report of a burglary in 

progress. After receiving a description of Bates, he helped other officers set up a 

 

1

 This officer was not working undercover at the time of the burglary, but he was working undercover at the 

time of trial. 
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perimeter around the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, UC 152 saw a man 

matching the description walk out from a wooded area in the subdivision. UC 

152 eventually apprehended and arrested Bates. Officers did not find the diaper 

bag. 

[7] Several days later, on November 15, officers, including a K-9 officer, searched 

“every inch” of the subdivision for the diaper bag but still did not find it. Id. at 

191. The K-9 officer, however, found a wallet in the subdivision. He tracked 

down the wallet’s owner, who said he had lost his wallet over two years earlier. 

Id. at 207. The officers determined that the wallet was unrelated to this case 

and did not tell Bates about its discovery. 

[8] Thereafter, the State charged Bates with Class B felony burglary. At the jury 

trial, one of the searching officers briefly testified about the discovery of the 

wallet by the K-9 officer (who did not testify at trial). Id. at 207. Defense 

counsel cross-examined the officer about the wallet but did not ask for a 

continuance to pursue the matter. 

[9] Instead, after the State completed its case in chief, Bates argued that the State’s 

failure to disclose the existence of the wallet before trial violated Brady. The 

trial court found no Brady violation, Tr. Vol. III pp. 61, 90-91, and the defense 

rested without presenting any evidence. The jury found Bates guilty as charged. 

[10] Bates now appeals. 
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Discussion and Decision 

[11] Bates raises two issues on appeal. First, he renews his Brady challenge. 

Second, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. 

I. Brady Violation 

[12] Bates first contends that the State’s failure to disclose the existence of the wallet 

before trial violated Brady. Brady and its progeny apply to the State’s failure to 

disclose favorable evidence that is material to the accused’s guilt or punishment. 

Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. There are three 

components to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to 

the accused, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence 

must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 

(3) prejudice (materiality inquiry). Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 

(1999). Evidence is material when there is a reasonable probability that, had 

the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. Cone, 556 U.S. at 470. 

[13] Although Brady itself involved a request for pretrial disclosure, most courts 

agree that Brady does not impose a general requirement of pretrial disclosure of 

exculpatory evidence. 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b) 

(4th ed. 2015); see also Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. 1999). For 

most exculpatory evidence, the prosecution is able to satisfy its constitutional 

obligation by disclosing the evidence at trial. 6 LaFave, § 24.3(b). The burden 

rests with the defendant to establish that “the lateness of the disclosure so 
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prejudiced defendant’s preparation or presentation of his defense that he was 

prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.” Id.

(quotation omitted). Moreover, if the defendant fails to request a continuance 

when the disclosure is first made at trial, that failure may be viewed as negating 

any claim of actual prejudice. Id.; see also Braswell v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1280, 

1283 (Ind. 1990) (explaining that a continuance could have been a proper 

remedy when the evidence was disclosed during—and not before—trial; 

however, the defendant did not request a continuance). 

[14] Bates’s Brady challenge fails for two reasons. Although Bates cross-examined 

the officer about the wallet, Bates claims that he was unable to question the 

wallet’s owner. But Bates gives us no reason to believe that the owner could 

have offered evidence that was favorable to him, either because it was 

exculpatory or impeaching. This is especially so given that the evidence before 

the court was that the owner had lost the wallet two years earlier. Moreover, to 

the extent Bates argues that the State’s late disclosure prevented him from 

making such a showing, Bates did not ask the trial court for a continuance to 

pursue the matter. We therefore find no Brady violation. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

[15] Bates next contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction 

for Class B felony burglary. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Sallee v. State, 51 
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N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate 

courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine 

whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. It is not necessary that the 

evidence “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). “[T]he evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn 

from it to support the verdict.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007) 

(quotation omitted). 

[16] In order to convict Bates of Class B felony burglary as charged here, the State 

had to prove that he broke into and entered Nancy’s dwelling with intent to 

commit a felony, to wit: theft, in it. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 40; Ind. Code 

Ann. § 35-43-2-1 (West 2012). Bates’s sole argument on appeal is that “there 

was no direct evidence that [he] formed the requisite intent to commit felony 

Theft at the time entry into the home was made.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. 

[17] “Burglars rarely announce their intentions at the moment of entry.” Baker v. 

State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012). Accordingly, a burglar’s intent to 

commit a specific felony at the time of the breaking and entering may be 

inferred from the circumstances. Id. Here, when Nancy walked into the house, 

she saw Bates standing in the kitchen. She did not see anything in his hands at 

the time. But when Nancy saw Bates running away from the house moments 

later, she saw that he was carrying her brother’s diaper bag that had been sitting 

on the kitchen table. Bates does not dispute Nancy’s testimony that she saw 

him carrying her brother’s diaper bag. Possession of stolen property supports 

an inference of intent to commit theft at the time of the breaking and entering. 
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Patterson v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1035, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); McBride v. State, 

597 N.E.2d 992, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, we find that the 

evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for Class B felony burglary. 

[18] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.