Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 

Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 

ANDREW JACKSON MARTIN 

v. Record No. 070136 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 November 2, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether a court may require a 

defendant to submit to court-ordered child support as a 

condition of a suspended sentence. For the reasons stated 

below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Proceedings Below 

On October 23, 2005, at about 7:20 p.m., Officer Huffman 

of the Chesterfield County police observed Andrew Jackson 

Martin (“Martin”) driving with a defective taillight. The 

Officer followed Martin into a service station and when Martin 

began walking towards the store, asked him to come back. 

Officer Huffman explained to Martin why he was being stopped 

and asked him for his driver’s license and registration. When 

Martin responded that he did not have a license, Officer 

Huffman initiated a records check and found out that Martin’s 

license was suspended. Martin had been adjudicated an 

habitual offender in 1997, and notified of this status in 

January of 1998. Upon presentation to the grand jury, Martin 

was indicted for driving after having been declared an 
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habitual offender. Upon trial by the court without a jury, 

Martin was found guilty. At sentencing, it was determined 

that Martin had at least six similar offenses. The court 

stated that this was “not really a driving offense but a 

failure to obey the orders of the Court.” Martin testified at 

sentencing about his children and indicated that he does “take 

care of [his] kids,” but was not under a court order to do so. 

He was sentenced to five years in prison, but the trial court 

suspended three years and six months of the sentence upon 

condition that the defendant be of good behavior, submit to 

supervised probation, and pay the costs of the proceeding. 

Additionally, the terms of the suspended sentence included a 

requirement that Martin “report to the Division of Child 

Support Enforcement and submit to an order of support for any 

child that is not in the defendant’s custody.” 

 Martin objected to the condition relating to child 

support, stating that it was unrelated to the charge, and that 

it additionally imposes an obligation on a third party – the 

mother of his child – to cooperate. He appealed to the Court 

of Appeals, which denied the appeal by order, stating that the 

condition was within the trial court’s discretion and was 

reasonable. Martin v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1598-06-2 

(December 19, 2006). We awarded him an appeal upon two 

assignments of error: 
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1. The trial court erred by ordering as a condition 

of his suspended penitentiary sentence that the 

appellant submit to court ordered child support 

for any children for which he did not have legal 

custody. 

2. The Court of Appeals of Virginia erred by finding 

that the order of the trial judge was within his 

discretion. 

II. Analysis 

The determination of sentencing lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. See e.g., Lane v. 

Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 719, 292 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1982) 

(citations omitted). A sentencing decision will not be 

reversed unless the trial court abused its discretion. See

id.

Martin argues that the child support condition of the 

sentencing order is not reasonable and that it is not related 

to the underlying offense. He claims that child support has 

no connection to the commission of the crime, that there must 

be a nexus between the crime and the conditions placed on a 

suspended sentence, and that this condition was therefore 

unreasonable. 

However, Code § 19.2-305(B) provides in relevant part 

that “[a] defendant placed on probation following conviction 

may . . . be required to provide for the support of his wife 

or others for whose support he may be legally responsible.” 

Therefore, the General Assembly has made it clear that the 
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trial court may impose this condition. At the sentencing 

hearing, Martin stated that he has two children with different 

mothers. He also explained that he lives with one of the 

children, but not the other and that there was not a child 

support order in place requiring him to support either of 

them. By requiring Martin to submit to court-ordered child 

support, the trial court simply imposed the requirements 

authorized by Code § 19.2-305(B). We note that the General 

Assembly has adopted child support guidelines in Code § 20-

108.2 and has empowered the Division of Child Support 

Enforcement to supervise and enforce child support payments. 

Code § 63.2-1901 et. seq. In light of these Code provisions, 

we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

III. Conclusion 

 The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 

affirmed. 

Affirmed.