Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1574 | December 11, 2018 Page 1 of 8

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John M. Haecker

Squiller & Hamilton, LLP

Auburn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Angela N. Sanchez

Assistant Section Chief 

Criminal Appeals

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Riley M. Randall,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

December 11, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1574

Appeal from the DeKalb Superior 

Court

The Honorable Monte L. Brown, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 17D02-1706-

F3-4

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1574 | December 11, 2018 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Riley M. Randall appeals his conviction following a jury trial for level three 

felony robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. He contends that the trial 

court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. Finding no abuse of 

discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts most favorable to the verdict indicate that on May 12, 2016, Randall 

purchased marijuana from Ron Wilkinson at Wilkinson’s apartment in Garrett.

Randall was short on cash, so he used a jar full of coins to purchase the 

marijuana. After leaving, Randall believed that Wilkinson had shorted him on 

the deal. Randall called Brandon Cardone, told him that Wilkinson had 

shorted him, and asked Cardone if he had a gun. Cardone informed Randall 

that he did have a gun. Cardone and another man, Zachary Burcham, who 

were both armed with guns, drove to meet Randall. Randall also called his 

friend, Jacob Johnston, and asked him to come with all three men to go to 

Wilkinson’s apartment in order to “get a bag fixed” that “was light.” Tr. Vol. 

2. at 199. This meant that they were planning to go and “either get the monies 

[sic] worth back or get the rest of the marijuana.” Id.

[3] The men all got into Cardone’s car, and Randall directed them to Wilkinson’s

apartment. When they arrived, Johnston decided to stay in the car while the 

others went inside the building. The men knocked on Wilkinson’s door, and 

Wilkinson yelled for them to come in. Cardone and Burcham entered the 
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apartment, and Randall stood outside at the top of the stairs. Cardone and 

Burcham ordered Wilkinson to the ground at gunpoint and asked him where 

his money and drugs were. One of the men took Wilkinson’s wallet. Once 

Wilkinson was on the ground and in a position where he would not be able to 

see and identify Randall, Cardone went outside and tapped on the wall to signal 

Randall to come in to help. Randall eventually entered the apartment and 

located Wilkinson’s safe. Randall grabbed the safe, as well as the jar of coins he 

had used to purchase the marijuana, and the three men ran out of the 

apartment. They returned to Cardone’s car and reported to Johnston what had 

happened. The men had also taken Wilkinson’s cell phone but dropped it in 

the parking lot.

[4] All four men returned to the apartment where Randall had been staying and 

divided up the money and the drugs. Meanwhile, Wilkinson reported the crime 

to his apartment manager and called police. Wilkinson was later able to 

identify Randall from the apartment complex’s surveillance video, but he did 

not recognize the other two men who entered his apartment. Police were 

unable to locate Randall that night. The next day, Randall went to the police 

station and told police that he had been kidnapped and forced to rob Wilkinson. 

He later told Johnston that they both should claim that Cardone and Burcham 

forced Johnston to force Randall to get them marijuana.

[5] The State charged Randall with level 3 felony robbery while armed with a 

deadly weapon. Prior to trial, Randall tendered a proposed jury instruction on 

the statutory defense of duress, asserting that the evidence would show that he 
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was an unwilling participant in the armed robbery. The trial court subsequently

issued a written order denying the proposed instruction. Following a trial, the

jury found Randall guilty as charged. The trial court imposed a nine-year 

sentence with two years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Randall asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his tendered 

jury instruction regarding the statutory defense of duress. Thus, we must first 

determine whether the duress defense applies in the instant case. This is an 

issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo. Jones v. State, 87 

N.E.3d 450, 454 (Ind. 2017). “Our goal is to determine the legislature’s intent, 

which we do by following the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s 

unambiguous language.” Id. 

[7] We will then review whether the trial court abused its discretion. The manner 

of instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Albores v. 

State, 987 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We review the trial 

court’s decision only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. On review of a trial 

court’s decision to refuse a proposed jury instruction, we consider whether the 

instruction (1) correctly states the law, (2) is supported by the evidence, and (3) 

is covered in substance by other instructions that are given. Id. We consider jury 

instructions as a whole and in reference to each other. Evans v. State, 81 N.E.3d 

634, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We do not reverse the trial court unless the 

instructions as a whole misstate the law or mislead the jury. Id.
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[8] Randall claimed duress as a defense to armed robbery, and tendered a jury 

instruction that provided as follows:

It is at issue whether the Defendant was acting under duress.

It is a defense that the Defendant was compelled to 

commit the acts charged by threat of imminent serious bodily 

injury to himself or another person. Compulsion exists only if the 

force, threat, or circumstances would render a reasonable person 

incapable of resisting pressure.

The defense does not apply to a person who recklessly, 

knowingly or intentionally placed himself in a situation where it 

was foreseeable that he would be subjected to duress.

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the Defendant was not acting under duress.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 35-36. The trial court rejected this instruction,

concluding that, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-8(b)(2), the duress 

defense “does not apply to armed robbery cases.” Id. at 43. Indeed, the duress

statute provides, 

(a) It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited 

conduct was compelled to do so by threat of imminent serious 

bodily injury to himself or another person. With respect to 

offenses other than felonies, it is a defense that the person who 

engaged in the prohibited conduct was compelled to do so by 

force or threat of force. Compulsion under this section exists only 

if the force, threat, or circumstances are such as would render a 

person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure.
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(b) This section does not apply to a person who:

(1) recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally placed himself in a 

situation in which it was foreseeable that he would be subjected 

to duress; or

(2) committed an offense against the person as defined in IC 35-42.

Ind. Code § 35-41-3-8(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

[9] Randall concedes that robbery is indeed “an offense against the person” as 

defined by Indiana Code Section 35-42-5-1. Nevertheless, he asserts that 

because the jury was also instructed (and likely convicted him) on a theory of 

accomplice liability, the duress defense should have been available. We 

disagree.

[10] Indiana’s accomplice-liability statute provides, in part, “A person who 

knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit 

an offense commits that offense[.]” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. Pursuant to this 

statute, an individual who aids another person in committing a crime is as 

guilty as the actual perpetrator. Specht v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1081, 1093 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied (2006). The statute does not set forth a separate crime, 

but merely provides a separate basis of liability for the crime that is charged. Id. 

at 1092. Accordingly, a person who aids another person in committing armed 

robbery is as guilty of armed robbery as the actual perpetrator. 

[11] Contrary to Randall’s assertion, the character of an offense as one “against the 

person” as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-42 in no way depends on 
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whether the defendant is the principal or an accomplice, or whether another

inchoate basis of liability is alleged. See, e.g., Armand v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1002, 

1005 (Ind. 1985) (holding that attempted robbery is an offense against the 

person to which the duress defense is expressly excluded). Relying on our 

supreme court’s discussion of the statutory abandonment defense in Jones, 87 

N.E.3d 450, Randall makes a nuanced argument that, notwithstanding the clear 

prohibition against the use of a duress defense by one who commits an offense 

against the person, the legislature intended for the duress defense to be available 

to one who aids, induces, or causes an offense against the person. However, 

the abandonment defense, and the discussion thereof in Jones, is wholly 

inapposite. Unlike the duress statute, the abandonment statute specifically 

provides that abandonment may be asserted as a defense to crimes under 

Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-4 (aiding, inducing, or causing an offense), 

Indiana Code Section 35-41-5-1 (attempt), or Indiana Code Section 35-41-5-2 

(conspiracy). Ind. Code § 35-41-3-10. Indeed, the abandonment defense 

“applies exclusively” to those three inchoate statutory offenses. Jones, 87 

N.E.3d at 455. As stated above, the duress statute specifically prohibits its 

application to a certain type of offense, which includes the inchoate versions of 

that type of offense. Armand, 474 N.E.2d at 1005.

[12] Simply stated, the offense is the offense, and the legislature has plainly provided 

that the duress defense is unavailable to a person, such as Randall, who is 

alleged to have committed an offense against the person, regardless of the basis 

of liability. Therefore, duress was not available as a defense to Randall’s charge 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1574 | December 11, 2018 Page 8 of 8

of armed robbery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting his 

tendered duress instruction. 

[13] Randall very briefly argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

simply give his tendered instruction but limit its application to the lesserincluded offense of theft because, unlike robbery, theft is not an offense against 

the person as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-42. However, there is nothing 

in the record to indicate that Randall requested that the trial court give his

duress instruction coupled with a limiting instruction, nor did he tender an 

instruction limiting the application of the defense.

1 “[I]t has long been 

established that a party cannot complain of incomplete or omitted instructions 

when he, himself, has not tendered any instruction on that issue.” Brittain v. 

State, 565 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Law v. State, 273 Ind. 

624, 626-27, 406 N.E.2d 1185, 1186 (1980)). Randall’s failure to tender a 

limiting instruction results in waiver of the issue on appeal. See id.

[14] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.

 

1 Although Randall’s counsel mentioned during a pretrial hearing the potential of still pursuing the duress 

defense in the event the evidence presented at trial supported a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense 

of theft, it does not appear that he renewed such a request at the close of the evidence or tendered a limiting 

instruction.