Filed 2/16/22 In re Julian C. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re JULIAN C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B312544

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK92053C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RUNA K.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed. 

Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_______________________

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court declared Julian C. a dependent child of 

the court and ordered family reunification services for his 

mother, Runa K. The court subsequently terminated 

reunification services, appointed Julian’s grandmother as his 

legal guardian, and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Six 

years later, Runa filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 3881 to terminate the guardianship. The court 

denied the petition, and Runa appealed. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Juvenile Court Appoints Julian’s Grandmother

as His Legal Guardian

Runa has three children: 17-year-old Jonathan, 15-year-old 

Isayuh, and 11-year-old Julian. Jonathan and Isayuh have the 

same father; Julian has a different father.

In December 2011 the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services received a referral stating that 

Runa had been arrested for being under the influence of a 

controlled substance and for child endangerment. The reporting 

party said Runa appeared to be under the influence of 

1 Statutory references are to this code.
3

methamphetamine. Runa claimed that she ingested

benzodiazepine (which she did not have a prescription for), but 

also admitted that she used methamphetamine while pregnant 

with Julian. 

In February 2012 the juvenile court sustained a petition

under section 300. The court found true the Department’s 

allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), that Runa had 

been arrested for being under the influence of a controlled 

substance and for willful cruelty to a child and that Runa had an 

outstanding bench warrant relating to prior charges, “thereby 

leaving [her] children without adequate care and supervision.”

2

The court declared Julian a dependent child of the court, 

placed him with Runa’s mother (Julian’s grandmother), and 

ordered the Department to provide Runa with family 

reunification services. The court ordered Runa to receive

parenting training and substance-abuse counseling, submit to 

random drug testing, and participate in individual counseling. 

One year later the court terminated family reunification services

for Runa and ordered the Department to provide Julian with 

permanent placement services. In May 2014 the court appointed 

Julian’s grandmother as his legal guardian and terminated its 

dependency jurisdiction.3

2 The court also found true certain allegations regarding

Julian’s father (who was in custody at the time) under section 

300, subdivisions (b) and (g), and ordered that he would not 

receive family reunification services. Julian’s father is not a 

party to this appeal.

3 “Following establishment of a legal guardianship, the court 

. . . may terminate its dependency jurisdiction and retain 
4

B. Runa Files a Petition Under Section 388 To

Terminate the Guardianship

On December 11, 2020 Runa filed a petition under section 

388 to terminate the guardianship, using Judicial Council Forms, 

form JV-180. Runa alleged the following changed circumstances: 

She had completed a 12-week drug and alcohol treatment 

program;

4 she had obtained a “stable job” with a company that 

provided grocery delivery services; she had a car and home; and

Julian had been living with her since April 2020. Runa alleged it 

was in Julian’s best interest for the court to terminate the 

guardianship because Julian was “doing well with [Runa] in [a] 

homeschool program,” Julian had not been enrolled in school 

when he lived with his grandmother, and Julian’s father would

be released from prison in a few weeks. 

On December 31, 2020 Runa filed another JV-180 form

with a handwritten note on the top of the first page: “Amendment 

. . . to ADD information.” Runa alleged that Julian’s

grandmother came “with the police” and took Julian and that, 

since the grandmother had taken Julian, he was no longer

enrolled in school. 

C. The Department Opposes the Petition

The Department submitted a report recommending the 

court deny the petition to terminate the guardianship. The 

report included the following information: 

jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the legal guardianship

. . . .” (§ 366.3.)

4 Runa attached to the petition a certificate of completion of 

the program.
5

Living Arrangements: Runa was living with Jonathan and 

Isayuh in a hotel. Runa told a dependency investigator for the 

Department that she had a permanent home and that she had 

been living at the hotel for three to four months while the house 

was under construction. The investigator later went to the 

address Runa provided, but the house there did not appear to be 

under construction. The investigator asked a woman sitting 

outside the house whether she knew Runa, and the woman said 

she did not. When the investigator subsequently described the 

incident to Runa, Runa became “extremely upset and began to 

yell” and questioned why the investigator went to the house.

Runa told the investigator to speak to an employee of the 

hotel to confirm Julian had been living with her. The 

investigator spoke to the employee, but the employee could not 

confirm Julian was living there. 

The investigator also interviewed Julian’s grandmother, 

who stated that she never allowed Julian to live with Runa, but 

that in October 2020 Runa came to her home, took Julian from 

the front yard, and drove away. The grandmother said that after 

she called Runa and asked her to return Julian, law enforcement 

had to retrieve Julian from Runa’s hotel room. The grandmother 

stated that she was “‘afraid to allow Julian to have visits’” with 

Runa and that she overheard Runa “‘telling Julian through a 

video game to say he had been living with his mom for four 

months . . . if he wanted to live with her.’”

The investigator interviewed Julian the same day she 

interviewed the grandmother. Julian stated: “‘I live with my 

grandmother. I don’t know. She let me live there for four 

months because my mom told me. I want to live with my mom 

and brothers.’” A man named Issa H., who lived at the home of 
6

Julian’s grandmother, also told the investigator that Julian lived 

in the home and never lived with Runa 

Prior Referrals to the Department About Runa: In 

December 2016 Julian’s grandmother brought him to a park to 

visit Runa, and Runa took him from the park. One week later

the grandmother spoke with a cousin who lived in Las Vegas, and 

the cousin said that she had seen Runa and that Runa said she 

had been staying in shelters in Las Vegas. Julian’s grandmother

filed a missing person report and, two weeks later, Runa, Julian, 

Jonathan, and Isayuh were found in Chicago. Julian (at the time 

five years old) said that Runa had given him cigarettes and beer 

and that she had hit him and his brothers. Julian also stated 

Runa would come to their house and start fights with his

grandmother.

In February 2018 the Department received a referral 

stating that Runa had regained custody of Jonathan and Isayuh 

under false pretenses. The reporting party stated Runa provided 

“falsified documentation in family court which stated she was 

compliant with being drug free and compliant with drug testing.” 

A social worker met with Runa, who denied using drugs. Runa 

refused to submit to a drug test, allow the social worker to verify 

her residence, or sign any Department forms. 

In January 2020 the Department received another referral 

alleging Runa neglected her children. The reporter said Runa 

was homeless and lived “‘in a black suburban truck that she 

parks in front of’” her mother’s house. The reporter stated: “‘The 

children don’t go to school and haven’t gone to school in at least 

three years. They don’t shower. . . . [Runa] is collecting money 

for the kids but she uses it for drugs and doesn’t get food or 

provide for the kids.’” The reporter added that another adult in 
7

the grandmother’s home “‘saw track marks on [Runa’s thighs]

and arms a couple days ago.’”

Runa’s Compliance with the Court-ordered Programs: 

Runa completed a parenting course in 2016. When the 

investigator asked Runa whether she had completed any other

court-ordered programs, Runa mentioned the drug and alcohol 

program certificate she attached to her section 388 petition. 

Runa did not say she received individual counseling. 

Runa also showed the investigator a negative drug test.

The test had a December 2011 date but, according to the 

investigator, “it appeared the date was bolded in with a pen.” 

The following week the investigator asked Runa to provide any 

certificates she had, and Runa responded with a text message

that stated: “‘[T]he paper u took a picture of when u were here 

for the negative test that paper should be the solution to this 

whole thing it was negative . . . . I shouldn’t have even been in 

any program because if the court really takes the time to 

investigate that negative text [sic] all this should have been 

closed and Julian should be home without any problems or issues 

from any worker . . . . And the issue isn’t bout me it’s bout [h]ow 

the officer took Julian illegally here.’”

D. The Department Files a Pre-detention Report About 

Jonathan and Isayuh

On February 10, 2021 the juvenile court asked the 

Department to file a pre-detention report explaining why
8

Jonathan and Isayuh were in Runa’s care.

5 The report stated the 

following:

A social worker for the Department spoke to Runa, who 

stated that the San Bernardino County Superior Court granted 

her custody of Jonathan and Isayuh, but that she never received

a copy of the order. The social worker also spoke to Jonathan and 

Isayuh’s father, who said that he had not seen the children in 

three years, but that he believed he had joint custody of them. 

He also stated Runa was supposed to return Jonathan and 

Isayuh to his care in August 2017, but never did. He said Runa

would leave the state and go to shelters so that he could not find

them. 

After speaking to Jonathan and Isayuh’s father, the social 

worker spoke again to Runa. Runa insisted “‘Judge Zeidler and 

[the Department]’” knew Jonathan and Isayuh had lived with her 

for the past few years. Runa said she planned to move out of 

California because she was “‘tired of dealing with’” the 

Department.

Runa also told the social worker the children were enrolled 

in a homeschool program and met with a teacher every month. 

But when the social worker asked for the phone number or email 

address of the teacher, Runa did not provide it. The social 

worker asked Runa to sign release forms to enable the 

Department to verify school enrollment and medical information 

for Jonathan and Isayuh, but Runa refused. 

5 The juvenile court previously transferred the proceeding

concerning Jonathan and Isayuh to the San Bernardino County 

Superior Court after the two children “reunified with their 

father.” 
9

The social worker spoke with Isayuh, but Runa only 

allowed the social worker to speak with him when Runa was

present. When the social worker asked Isayuh about their prior 

living conditions, Runa stated, “‘Don’t ask him about that.’” 

When the social worker asked him the name of his school and his 

teacher, Isayuh responded, “‘I don’t know,’” and said his school 

was online. 

The social worker also interviewed Julian. Julian did not 

know what school he attended, what school he had attended

previously, or the name of his teacher. He said he had been

attending the school for a month. 

On February 18, 2021 Runa took a drug test. She tested 

negative for all substances.

E. The Court Denies the Section 388 Petition

On March 1, 2021 the juvenile court held a hearing under 

section 388 and denied the petition to terminate the 

guardianship. The court ruled that Runa did not “show sufficient 

change in circumstances or sufficient new information” and that

terminating the guardianship would not be in Julian’s best 

interests. Runa timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 388, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “Any parent or 

other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent 

child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of 

circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same 

action in which the child was found to be a dependent child . . .
10

for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court 

previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” To 

prevail on a section 388 petition, the petitioner must show “‘“by a 

preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a 

change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification 

would be in the best interests of the child.”’” (In re Malick T. 

(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122; see In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 317; In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.)

Because Runa had the burden to demonstrate new evidence 

or a change of circumstance, we review the juvenile court’s 

finding that Runa failed to meet her burden by determining 

whether the evidence compels a finding in her favor on that issue 

as a matter of law. (See In re N.O. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 899, 

925-926; In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1161, 

1163.) Specifically, we determine whether “the evidence ‘was 

(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a 

character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial 

determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’”” 

(In re Luis H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1227; see In re I.W.

(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on another 

ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1003, 

fn. 4.) 

We review for abuse of discretion the juvenile court’s ruling

the proposed modification—here, terminating the guardianship—

was not in the best interest of the child. (See In re Stephanie M., 

supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318; In re Malick T., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th

at p. 1123; In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120.) “‘“The 

appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court 

exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can 

reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no 
11

authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” 

(In re Stephanie M., at pp. 318-319; see In re I.B. (2020) 

53 Cal.App.5th 133, 153.)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Ruling There Were 

No Changed Circumstances

“‘Not every change in circumstance can justify modification 

of a prior order’” under section 388. (In re N.F., supra,

68 Cal.App.5th at p. 120; see In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 

597, 612.) “‘“[T]he change in circumstances must be 

substantial.”’” (In re Malick T., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1122;

see In re I.B., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 152; In re J.M., supra, 

50 Cal.App.5th at p. 845.) And where, as here, the juvenile court 

has terminated a parent’s reunification services, a substantial 

change means “the problem that initially brought the child 

within the dependency system [has been] removed or 

ameliorated.” (In re A.A., at p. 612; see In re J.M., at p. 846 

[a “parent establishes a substantial change of circumstances for 

purposes of section 388 by showing that . . . he or she has 

resolved the previously unresolved issues supporting juvenile 

court jurisdiction”].)

Runa argues her completion of parenting classes, 

completion of the alcohol-and-drug treatment program, clean 

drug test, employment and housing situation, and ability to care 

for her children “collectively demonstrate the relevant and 

material change that section 388 requires.” But Runa did not 

submit uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence requiring the 

juvenile court to find a substantial change in circumstances that

removed or ameliorated the problems that brought Julian within 

the jurisdiction of the court. There were (at least) two problems 
12

that brought Julian under the court’s jurisdiction: Runa’s 

substance abuse and her cruelty toward her children.6

Runa showed some progress toward ameliorating the first 

problem. She completed a 12-week drug-and-alcohol treatment 

program in 2018 and a four-hour, introductory drug-and-alcohol 

course after she filed her petition. And she tested negative for 

controlled substances once, immediately before the hearing on 

her petition. But “in the context of a substance abuse problem 

that has repeatedly resisted treatment in the past, a showing of 

materially changed circumstances requires more than a 

relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in yet another 

program.” (In re N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) Runa’s 

efforts were a good start, but they fell far short of unimpeached 

and uncontradicted evidence of a substantial change in 

circumstances. (See In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 

223 [“Appellant’s completion of a drug treatment program, at this 

late a date, though commendable, is not a substantial change of 

circumstances.”]; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 

[court did not err in denying a section 388 petition where the 

parents’ “recent efforts at rehabilitation were only three months 

old”]; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 463 [court did not 

err in denying a section 388 petition where, although the mother 

“had completed [a] drug program, the time she had been sober 

6 As stated, the juvenile court sustained the allegation Runa 

was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled 

substance and for willful cruelty of a child. The juvenile court 

also found true the allegation Runa had an outstanding bench 

warrant, but the Department did not discover any criminal 

charges filed against Runa since 2011. 
13

was very brief compared to her many years of drug addiction”]; 

In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [“seven months of 

sobriety” were insufficient for a father to meet his burden under 

section 388, where he had a long history of drug abuse].)

Moreover, there was evidence Runa had recently used

drugs. (See In re N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 122 [mother 

failed to show a substantial change in circumstances where there 

was “conflicting evidence about her sobriety” and a “brief period 

of sobriety and completion of a treatment program was only the 

most recent attempt in a series of unsuccessful attempts to 

overcome her substance abuse”].) In January 2020—less than a 

year before Runa filed her petition under section 388—the 

Department received a referral stating that Runa used drugs and 

had track marks on her legs and thighs. In 2018 the 

Department, while investigating whether Runa had submitted 

documents to the court falsely stating she had complied with 

drug testing requirements, asked Runa to take a drug test, and 

she refused. 

Even Runa’s completion of the 2018 treatment program 

provided little (if any) evidence Runa was not abusing substances

during that period. A representative of the program told the 

Department the course Runa completed was “entirely online, 

with reading, video and homework assignments, but no one on 

one.” 

In addition, Runa did not show she had insight into, or had 

taken any responsibility for, why Julian was no longer in her 

care. (Cf. In re Jaden E. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1289 

[order terminating reunification services for the mother was not 

an abuse of discretion where the mother “continued to obstinately 

and belligerently maintain that she did not require any services 
14

to reunify with the minor; and remained completely oblivious to 

the significantly detrimental impact that her actions were having 

on her son”].) Rather than attempt to show she had stopped

using drugs for any considerable length of time, Runa gave the

Department investigator a drug test purportedly from 2011, 

which the investigator did not believe was authentic. Runa 

stated the nearly 10-year-old negative test “should be the solution 

to this whole thing,” believed the Department’s case “should have 

been closed,” and blamed law enforcement (rather than herself) 

for the fact that Julian was not in her care. (See In re Casey D. 

(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 49 [no change of circumstances where 

the mother had a “pattern of maintaining drug treatment only 

when motivated by the desire to reunify the family and required 

by outside agencies”], disapproved on another ground in In re 

Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636, fn. 5.)

Nor did Runa provide compelling and uncontradicted

evidence she had ameliorated or resolved the second reason the 

court sustained the Department’s section 300 petition—Runa’s 

cruelty to her children. On the one hand, Runa completed a 

parenting course in November 2016, and Julian and Isayuh 

denied Runa abused them. And the investigator who interviewed 

Julian did not see any marks or bruises on him. On the other 

hand, Julian said in December 2016—only one month after Runa 

completed the parenting course—that Runa gave him beer and 

cigarettes and that she had hit him and his brothers during the 

incident where she took him to Chicago. And Runa failed to 

present any evidence that she had received individual counseling, 

which could have reduced the likelihood of abuse.
15

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Ruling That Terminating the Guardianship Was Not 

in Julian’s Best Interests

Runa does not address the juvenile court’s ruling it was not 

in Julian’s best interests to terminate the guardianship. For this 

reason alone, she has failed to show the court erred in denying 

her petition. (See In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 [“The 

juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is 

appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error.’”]; In re 

Priscilla D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1218 [under section 388 

“the parent bears the burden of proving the change serves the 

child’s best interest”].)

But even if Runa had addressed the issue, the juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion. “[B]est interests is a complex 

idea” that requires the court to consider a variety of factors. 

(In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530; see Jennifer S. 

v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1124 [“‘“The 

concept of a child’s best interest ‘is an elusive guideline that 

belies rigid definition.’”’”].) “When, as in this case, a section 388 

petition is filed after family reunification services have been 

terminated, the juvenile court’s overriding concern is the child’s 

best interests. [Citation.] The parent’s interests in the care, 

custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount; 

and the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and 

stability.” (In re Malick T., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1122-1123; see In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; 

In re J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 847.) 

In her petition Runa asserted three reasons why 

terminating the guardianship was in Julian’s best interests: 

Julian was doing well in a homeschool program while in Runa’s 
16

care; Julian was not enrolled in school when he lived with his 

grandmother; and Julian’s father would be released from prison 

soon. None of these reasons holds up. The evidence Julian was 

in a homeschool program while he was in Runa’s care, or even 

that he was in Runa’s care for any appreciable period of time, was 

highly suspect. According to Julian, Julian’s grandmother, and 

Issa, who resided in the grandmother’s house, Julian lived with 

his grandmother, not Runa. The grandmother told a Department 

investigator which school Julian attended, and an administrator 

from the school confirmed Julian was enrolled there. The 

registrar and an education specialist from another school 

informed the investigator that Julian was briefly enrolled at their

school from October 23, 2020 to November 4, 2020 (around the 

same time, according to the grandmother, Runa took Julian), but

that Julian did not attend classes.

7

Runa also failed to provide evidence confirming Jonathan

and Isayuh were in a homeschool program, further undermining 

any claim by Runa that Julian would do well in a homeschool 

program in her care. Runa refused to sign forms to enable the 

Department to verify whether Jonathan and Isayuh were 

enrolled. She did not give the social worker the phone number or 

email address of the teacher she claimed Jonathan and Isayuh 

met with monthly. And, when asked by a Department social 

worker, (15-year-old) Isayuh could not name his school or one of 

his teachers.

Runa’s other contention—that Julian’s father would soon 

be released from prison—was similarly not a reason to terminate 

7 The school disenrolled Julian when it learned the 

grandmother was his legal guardian.
17

the guardianship. Runa did not submit any evidence Julian’s 

father was able or available to care for him. And the Department 

filed a declaration of due diligence stating it could not “ascertain 

the whereabouts” of Julian’s father.

Moreover, putting aside the conflicting evidence of Runa’s 

recent drug use and prior abuse of her children, the Department 

provided evidence that terminating the guardianship would not 

further Julian’s interest in a permanent and stable living 

arrangement. Julian had been in his grandmother’s care for the 

past nine years, except for, at most, the few weeks Runa took 

him. In contrast, Runa’s living situation was turbulent.

Although she told the Department she had been living at a hotel

for only a few months, she did not appear to live in the 

permanent home she claimed she lived in, and the Department 

received a referral earlier in 2020 stating that Runa slept in her 

car. And Runa interrupted when the case social worker 

attempted to ask Isayuh about his prior living situation with 

Runa. 

Finally, Runa’s future intentions were uncertain. She had 

previously taken Julian and her other children out of the state, 

and she told the Department social worker she wanted to move 

again because she was “tired of dealing with [the Department].” 

True, Julian said he wanted to live with Runa and his brothers. 

But the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that 

terminating the guardianship would not promote the permanency 

and stability Julian needed. (See In re C.J.W., supra, 

157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081 [even assuming the parents had 

successfully completed drug rehabilitation, “there was no 

showing whatsoever of how the best interests of [their] young 
18

children would be served by depriving them of a permanent, 

stable home in exchange for an uncertain future”].)

DISPOSITION

The order denying Runa’s petition under section 388 is 

affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.