Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-105 | September 16, 2019 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark K. Leeman

Leeman Law Office

Cass County Public Defender

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samantha M. Sumcad

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Terrance Lonnell-Collier,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 16, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-105

Appeal from the

Cass Superior Court

The Honorable

Richard A. Maughmer, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09D02-1710-F1-5

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-105 | September 16, 2019 Page 2 of 11

[1] Terrance Lonnell-Collier (“Collier”) appeals his convictions for attempted 

murder,

1 a Level 1 felony, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery,2 a Level 3 

felony, and he raises two issues:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for attempted murder; and

II. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the months leading up to October 2017, Cody Tunis (“Tunis”) gave Alicia 

Hill3(“Hill”) marijuana and advanced her about $300 to $400 for a deposit on 

her apartment in Logansport, Indiana. Tr. Vol. 2 at 237-38. Sometime before 

October, Tunis began asking Hill to pay him back for both the rent 

advancement and the marijuana. Id. at 196, 238. 

[4] On October 1, 2017, Hill contacted Tunis and asked him if he would be home 

that evening because she wanted to pay him the money she owed for the rent 

advancement. Id. at 239. That same day, Hill spoke with Collier, but the 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2); Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a).

2

See Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a); Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2(a).

3 At trial, several witnesses referred to Hill by her nickname, “Noonie.” See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2 at 144, 173, 186, 

229, 237.
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content of that conversation is unknown. Id. at 147. Later in the day, Hill 

spent time with Collier at his home. Id. at 150. As cousins, Hill and Collier

had a close relationship. Id. at 198, 241. 

[5] Later that evening, Collier, Hill, and two unidentified men (“the two men”)

departed from Collier’s home together in Collier’s girlfriend’s black Jeep. Id. at 

150-51. Hill drove the group to Tunis’s home and parked in an alley behind the 

home. Id. at 244-45. Collier and the two men exited the Jeep and sat down at a 

picnic table in Tunis’s backyard while Hill walked to the front door. Id.; Tr. 

Vol. 3 at 24. Hill left the Jeep running. Tr. Vol. 3 at 6.

[6] As Hill approached Tunis’s front door, she was greeted by Andrea Melton

(“Melton”), Tunis’s fiancé. Tr. Vol. 2 at 194-95, 236. Tunis, Melton, their two 

children, and a mutual friend were eating fajitas and Hill shared a bite, eating 

some food off of Tunis’s plate. Id. at 195, 241; Tr. Vol. 3 at 25. When Tunis 

asked Hill about the money she owed him, Hill told Tunis that Collier wanted 

to speak with him outside because Collier wanted to “holler” at Tunis. Tr. Vol. 

2 at 241. When Tunis looked out the window and saw Collier and the two men 

sitting in his yard, he feared that he was going to get jumped. Id. at 242-43. 

Before Hill led Tunis outside to meet with Collier, Tunis told Melton to lock 

the front door. Tr. Vol. 3 at 26. 

[7] When Tunis walked outside, Collier and the two men stood up from the picnic 

table, and Collier walked toward Tunis. Tr. Vol. 2 at 245. Tunis stuck his hand 

out to Collier in an attempt to greet him cordially, but Collier pulled a gun out 
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of the front of his pants and pointed it directly at Tunis’s face, eventually resting 

the barrel of the gun against Tunis’s forehead. Id. at 246-47. Collier demanded, 

“give me the dope and the money.” Id. at 247. Tunis explained that he did not 

have any money, so Collier instead insisted that Tunis give Collier his vehicle, a 

Chrysler 300. Id. at 201, 247. Tunis agreed to get the keys for the car from 

inside his house, but Collier withdrew his request for the car keys because he 

believed that Tunis had guns inside the house. Id. at 248-49. Collier then 

grabbed Tunis by the shirt. Id. at 249. Collier briefly turned away from Tunis 

and looked at the two men; Tunis, believing this gave him the opportunity to 

flee, swatted at Collier’s gun, momentarily pushing it aside, and turned back 

toward his house. Id. at 249-50; Tr. Vol. 3 at 28-29. Two or three seconds later, 

Collier shot Tunis at point blank range in Tunis’s lower back, with the bullet

striking just above Tunis’s right buttock and close to his tailbone. Tr. Vol. 2 at 

202, 249; Tr. Vol. 3 at 7, 36. Collier, Hill, and the two men ran to the Jeep, 

entered it, and sped away. Tr. Vol. 3 at 30. Tunis was rushed to the hospital, 

where he was placed in a medically-induced coma for several days. Id. at 31. 

His injuries left him permanently disabled. Id. at 78.

[8] On October 3, 2017, the State charged Collier with attempted murder, a Level 1 

felony, and on June 18, 2018, it filed two more charges: attempted robbery 

resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 2 felony, and conspiracy to commit 

armed robbery as a Level 3 felony. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 16, 53.

[9] The charge for conspiracy to commit armed robbery reads as follows: 
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Lonnell Collier did knowingly or intentionally agree with Alicia 

Hill and other persons to take property from Cody Tunis using 

force or by threatening the use of force, while . . . Lonnell Collier 

was armed with a deadly weapon, and a party to this agreement 

did take a substantial step in furtherance thereof: Alicia Hill 

contacted Cody Tunis and arranged a meeting with him as a 

pretext to lure him outside of his home[.]

Id. at 54. 

[10] Collier was tried before a jury on November 14 and 15, 2018, and at the end of 

the second day, he was found guilty on all three counts. Id. at 121; Tr. Vol. 3 at 

67. On December 11, 2018, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 

thirty-five years for attempted murder and nine years for conspiracy to commit 

armed robbery, and it vacated the conviction for attempted robbery resulting in 

serious bodily injury. Tr. Vol. 3 at 78-79. Collier now appeals. Additional facts 

will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Collier argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence for both of his 

convictions. When reviewing sufficiency claims, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses but will only consider the 

evidence most favorable to the verdict, together with all reasonable inferences 

that flow therefrom. Neville v. State, 802 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 

trans. denied. However, an inference cannot be based on evidence that is 

uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility. 

Vasquez v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. 2001). We will affirm a 
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conviction only when each material element of the charge is supported by 

evidence in the record from which a rational trier of fact could have found guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Seketa v. State, 817 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004).

I. Sufficiency of Evidence – Attempted Murder

[12] Collier argues that the evidence for his attempted murder conviction was 

insufficient because the State failed to prove that he acted with the requisite 

specific intent to kill Tunis.

Typically, to prove that a person has committed an attempt 

crime, the State must show that the defendant engaged in 

conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission 

of the crime attempted, while acting with the same culpability of 

that crime. I.C. § 35-41-5-1. However, our supreme court has 

emphasized the importance of requiring specific intent to kill 

before a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder, despite 

that the culpability requirement for murder includes the lesser 

standard of knowingly. 

Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. Therefore, the State was required to 

prove that Collier acted with the specific intent to kill Tunis, and while doing 

so, engaged in a substantial step toward killing Tunis. See id. 

[13] Collier argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with specific 

intent because the evidence merely “suggests an accidental firing” of the gun. 

Appellant’s Br. at 15. In support, he correctly observes that as Tunis turned 
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away from Collier to flee, Tunis tried to swat Collier’s gun away and that the 

gun fired only shortly thereafter. Tr. Vol. 2 at 249-50; Tr. Vol. 3 at 28-29. 

Relying on Harris v. State, Collier argues that this evidence is not “strongly 

corroborative” of the “firmness” of his intent to kill Tunis. 425 N.E.2d 112, 

115-16 (Ind. 1981) (quoting Zickefoose v. State, 270 Ind. 618, 622-23, 388 N.E.2d 

507, 510 (1981)).

[14] We disagree. Here, Collier drew a gun and pressed it against Tunis’s forehead. 

Tr. Vol. 2 at 246-47. Contrary to his argument, Collier did not fire his gun 

simultaneously with the swatting of the gun but fired it two or three seconds 

later. Tr. Vol. 3 at 36. Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly 

weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury. Fry, 885 

N.E.2d at 750. “[D]ischarging a weapon in the direction of a victim is 

substantial evidence from which the jury could infer intent to kill.” Corbin v. 

State, 840 N.E.2d 424, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Collier did not inadvertently 

fire the gun. Because Collier fired the gun two or three seconds after Tunis 

swatted it, the evidence was sufficient to show that he fired the gun with the 

calculated purpose and specific intent to kill Tunis. See Fry, 885 N.E.2d at 850. 

Thus, despite Collier’s argument to the contrary, the State’s evidence was 

“strongly corroborative” of Collier’s specific intent to kill Tunis. Moreover, 

Collier’s shooting of Tunis was a “substantial step” toward the commission of 

attempted murder. See Harris, 425 N.E.2d at 115-16. Thus, the State presented 

sufficient evidence to prove that Collier acted with specific intent to kill Tunis

and to support his conviction for attempted murder.
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II. Sufficiency of Evidence – Conspiracy to Commit 

Armed Robbery

[15] Even though Collier was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, he 

first contends the evidence was insufficient even to prove he committed 

conspiracy to commit robbery. A conspiracy involves an intelligent and 

deliberate agreement, i.e., a meeting of minds, between the parties. Woods v. 

State, 274 Ind. 624, 631, 413 N.E.2d 572, 576 (1980); Conn v. State, 948 N.E.2d 

849, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Mere association with a co-conspirator, standing 

alone, is insufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy, Porter v. State, 715 

N.E.2d 868, 871 (Ind. 1999), and a “conspiracy may not be established by mere 

suspicion.” Woods, 413 N.E.2d at 576. However, the State need not prove a 

formal agreement; circumstantial evidence implying an agreement is enough. 

Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 164 (Ind. 2017). An agreement may be inferred 

from a defendant’s actions and the circumstances surrounding his involvement. 

Conn, 948 N.E.2d at 853. “[A] conviction for conspiracy may, and often will, 

rest solely on circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Minniefield v. State, 512 

N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (Ind. 1987)). Thus, to prove that Collier conspired to rob4

Tunis, the State was required to show that Collier, with the intent to commit 

robbery, agreed with Hill or the two men to rob Tunis, and that Hill or the two 

 

4 A person commits robbery, a Level 5 felony, if the person “knowingly or intentionally takes property from 

another person or from the presence of another person: (1) by using or threatening the use of force on any 

person; or (2) by putting any person in fear[.]” I.C. § 35-42-5-1(a).
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men performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. See Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II at 54; see also Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2; Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.

[16] Here, the State presented sufficient evidence that Collier conspired with Hill 

and the two men to rob Tunis. The evidence plainly shows that Collier, Hill, 

and the two men hatched a coordinated, calculated plan. Collier and Hill spoke 

earlier in the day. Tr. Vol. 2 at 147. Hill arranged the meeting with Tunis at his 

home, under the pretense of paying money back to Tunis, and brought Collier

and the two men over to Tunis’s home. Id. at 147, 239. Hill left the Jeep 

running to allow them to quickly flee the scene after they committed their 

crime. Tr. Vol. 3 at 6. While at Tunis’s home, instead of paying Tunis the 

money she owed him, Hill lured Tunis outside to talk to Collier. Tr. Vol. 2 at 

241. As Collier confronted Tunis, the two men arose from the picnic table and 

walked toward Tunis, as if to provide backup for Collier. Id. at 245. Collier 

then demanded money, “dope,” and the keys to Tunis’s Chrysler 300 while 

pressing the barrel of his gun against Tunis’s forehead. Id. at 201, 246-47. 

Once Collier shot Tunis, Collier, Hill, and the two men ran together to the Jeep 

and sped away. Tr. Vol. 3 at 30. Post-crime conduct, such as fleeing together 

from the scene, as here, can support a conspiracy conviction. See Shane v. State, 

716 N.E.2d 391, 397 (Ind. 1999). These facts establish that Collier, Hill, and 

the two men conspired to rob Tunis and committed at least one overt act in 

furtherance of that conspiracy. See I.C. § 35-41-5-2; Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 164. 

[17] We also reject Collier’s argument that the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence for the crime for which he was actually convicted - conspiracy to 
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commit armed robbery. To support Collier’s conviction, the State was required 

to prove that Collier, with the intent to commit armed robbery, agreed with 

another person to commit armed robbery and that Collier or an accomplice 

performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. See I.C. § 35-41-5-2; 

Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 164. 

[18] Here, Collier’s actions, viewed in context of the actions of Tunis, Hill, and the 

two men, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to support his conviction 

for conspiracy to commit armed robbery. See Taylor, 83 N.E.3d at 164. For 

instance, because Tunis admitted that he was a drug dealer, the jury could have 

reasonably concluded that Tunis possessed a gun, and was willing to use it, 

because of the dangers inherent to selling illegal drugs. Tr. Vol. 2 at 196, 237-38, 

243. This conclusion would have been especially reasonable to the jury because

during the confrontation, Collier withdrew his command that Tunis retrieve his 

car keys because Collier feared that Tunis would retrieve a gun if he went inside 

his house. Id. at 248-49. Moreover, this inference was reasonable also because 

Collier did not attempt to rob Tunis without help but instead brought the two 

men to serve as backup if Collier’s confrontation with Tunis went awry. The 

behavior of the two men during the confrontation also supported the inference 

that Collier agreed with the Hill and the two men to rob Tunis while Collier 

was armed: 1) there was no evidence that the two men appeared to be surprised

when Collier drew his gun from his waistband; 2) the two men arose from the 

picnic table when Collier confronted Tunis; and 3) the two men moved closer to 

Tunis and Collier as the confrontation between Collier and Tunis reached its 
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apex. Id. at 245. As to Hill’s claim that she was surprised that Collier brought a 

gun, id. at 202, the jury was free to discount Hill’s testimony, especially since 

she admitted on the stand that she had perjured herself earlier in her testimony 

when she claimed she had never bought drugs from Tunis. Id. at 190, 196-97.

Thus, based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could have inferred an 

agreement between Collier and Hill and the two men based on Collier’s actions 

and “the circumstances surrounding [his] involvement.” See Conn, 948 N.E.2d 

at 853. The State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Collier committed conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

[19] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.