RENDERED: OCTOBER 30, 2020; 10:00 A.M.

TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2018-CA-0840-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE ALISON C. WELLS, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CR-00199

HOLLY COMBS APPELLEE

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND K. THOMPSON, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from the 

Perry Circuit Court’s interlocutory order granting Holly Combs’s motion to 

suppress her blood test following her arrest for DUI. The Commonwealth argues 

that the circuit court erred because Combs validly offered her consent after being 

read the implied consent warnings.
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On August 6, 2017, Combs hit two pedestrians with her car while they 

were walking through a crosswalk in front of a Walmart entrance in Hazard, 

Kentucky. After her arrest, police read Combs the implied consent warnings, 

which included the information that if she refused consent and was convicted of 

DUI, her mandatory minimum sentence would be doubled. Combs consented to 

the blood draw and the results of her blood test were incriminating.1

On October 9, 2017, Combs was indicted for one count of firstoffense driving under the influence, three counts of first-degree wanton 

endangerment, one count of no registration plates, one count of no insurance, one 

count of first-degree possession of a controlled substance, two counts of seconddegree assault, one count of prescription drugs not in the proper container, and one 

count of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Combs filed a motion 

to suppress the results of her blood test, arguing “the taking of the blood test 

through coercion of the implied consent warning without a search warrant is 

unconstitutional” and “the implied consent law is unconstitutional[.]”

At the suppression hearing held on April 23, 2018, Officer John 

Holbrook testified for the Commonwealth and Combs testified for the defense. 

 

1 The toxicology report was not introduced into the record. The Commonwealth submitted it in 

response to a motion to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 

arguing the suppressed results were vital to its case. The toxicology report itself, beyond the fact 

that it was incriminating, is not relevant on appeal.
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Officer Holbrook testified that when he was investigating what happened, Combs 

volunteered to him that she takes Suboxone and Keppra for seizures. Officer 

Holbrook administered field sobriety tests and recognized many signs of 

intoxication, the specifics of which he testified to, before arresting Combs for DUI. 

Officer Holbrook testified that in a search of Combs’s purse incident to arrest, he 

found a prescription bottle for buprenorphine which contained five and a half pills 

of buprenorphine and two Xanax bars. 

Officer Holbrook testified there was no odor of alcohol on Combs or 

her vehicle and based on all of the circumstances, he believed Combs was impaired 

by drugs or medication and determined that a blood test would be needed to 

determine what substances were causing her impairment. Therefore, he took 

Combs to Hazard Appalachian Regional Hospital (ARH) for a blood draw. 

According to Officer Holbrook, while at ARH Combs told him that she had gotten 

out of such charges before because she has seizures.

Officer Holbrook testified he read Combs the implied consent 

warnings. After she tried and failed to reach an attorney, Combs consented to a 

blood draw and signed paperwork at ARH. Officer Holbrook testified that the 

blood draw was performed but he did not know the results of the blood test.

Officer Holbrook testified that after the blood draw he took Combs to 

the Kentucky River Regional Jail (KRRJ). Before taking her inside, he asked 
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Combs if she had any illegal substances on her and warned her that taking such 

substances inside would be a felony; Combs denied having any illegal substances. 

Officer Holbrook testified that while they were in the entrance of KRRJ, he noticed 

a substance sticking out of Combs’s sock which he seized; the substance was later 

determined to be methamphetamine. According to Officer Holbrook, Combs told 

him that she was taking the drug to her boyfriend at KRRJ.

Officer Holbrook testified he reviewed surveillance video from 

Walmart and saw Combs’s car drive through the Walmart crosswalk, which was 

occupied by five people. Combs made no attempt to stop and hit two people while 

the others jumped back. He testified the injured pedestrians were sisters, an 

eleven-year-old and an eighteen-year-old.

Officer Holbrook acknowledged that in the police report, which he 

prepared approximately two days after the accident, he did not mention Combs’s 

statements that she had beaten such charges before or that she was taking the 

methamphetamine to her boyfriend at the jail. He also acknowledged that the 

implied consent warning he read to Combs included the language that “[i]f you are 

convicted of KRS [Kentucky Revised Statutes] 189A.010, your refusal will subject 

you to a mandatory minimum sentence which is twice as long as the mandatory 

minimum jail sentence that would be imposed if you submit to all requested tests.” 

The implied consent warning was entered into evidence.
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Combs testified very briefly. She testified that the officer read her the 

implied consent warning, which included a warning that if she failed to take the 

blood test she would be penalized and her mandatory minimum sentence would be 

doubled. Combs testified she consented to give blood based on the warning about 

increased penalties. Combs testified she did not remember stating that she had 

gotten out of a DUI before based on her seizures and denied having previous 

seizures while driving. She stated she believed she had a seizure when she hit the 

pedestrians.

Neither party made any argument at the suppression hearing. Instead,

both parties agreed to submit briefs. The circuit court ordered the parties to 

simultaneously submit briefs by April 27, 2018, at 4 p.m. Combs did not submit 

her brief until May 1, 2018; the Commonwealth never submitted a brief but did 

submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.2

On May 4, 2018, an order was entered granting the motion to 

suppress. As to Combs’s testimony regarding her consent to give blood, the circuit 

court only found that “Combs testified that she was read the implied consent form 

 

2 Although the Commonwealth’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law are not 

contained in the record, we are confident that they were submitted. The circuit court references 

that the Commonwealth’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were submitted in its 

order on the motion to suppress. Another mention is made in the Commonwealth’s designation 

of record, which includes “Commonwealth Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated 4-

27-2018” and “Thread of email between Commonwealth’s Attorney, Circuit Court and defense 

attorney dated 4-21-2018 through 5-1-2018[.]” As to the email thread, the Commonwealth 

attached it to its designation of record as an exhibit as it was not contained in the record. 
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which included being advised that failure to give blood would result in penalties 

being enhanced and additional penalties.” The circuit court’s conclusions of law 

included summaries of what could constitute an exigent circumstance and 

determined that pursuant to Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186, 195 

L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016), “motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to 

a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.” The circuit court 

concluded:

[T]he Court cannot find that exigent circumstances 

existed because the accident occurred at approximately 

1:00 and the Officer was at the emergency room with the 

Defendant at 1:35 p.m. There was no attempt to get a 

search warrant and no testimony presented as to why one 

could not have been obtained.

The Commonwealth appealed from this interlocutory order granting 

Combs’s motion to suppress pursuant to KRS 22A.020(4). Parker v. 

Commonwealth, 440 S.W.3d 381, 383 (Ky. 2014).

Initially we address Combs’s arguments regarding whether we should 

even address the Commonwealth’s argument on the merits. Combs criticizes the 

Commonwealth for submitting a late brief3and argues that the brief which was 

submitted failed to follow CR 76.12(4) by failing to: contain an introduction, 

specifically reference the record, and state how the issue was preserved for review. 

 

3 Although the time for filing its brief elapsed before the Commonwealth filed a motion to extend 

the time for filing it, our Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion and its late brief was 
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Combs is correct that the Commonwealth’s brief fails to comply with

CR 76.12(4)(c)(i) by failing to contain a separate introduction,4(iv) by failing to 

cite with specificity where items are contained in the record,5and (v) by failing to 

contain ample references to the record and not showing whether the issue was 

properly preserved.

6

 Although “[c]ompliance with CR 76.12 is mandatory[,]” 

noncompliance “is not automatically fatal[.]” Smothers v. Baptist Hospital East, 

468 S.W.3d 878, 881-82 (Ky.App. 2015). We have discretion in deciding what the 

consequence of such failures shall be. CR 76.12(8)(a) provides that “[a] brief may

be stricken for failure to comply with any substantial requirement of this Rule 

76.12.” (Emphasis added.) We may also dismiss the appeal pursuant to CR 

73.02(2)(a) or apply other sanctions such as only reviewing for manifest injustice. 

French v. French, 581 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Ky.App. 2019). 

 

accepted. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.12(8)(b) provides that “[i]f the appellant’s 

brief has not been filed within the time allowed, the appeal may be dismissed.” (Emphasis 

added.) Clearly our Court declined to sanction the Commonwealth by dismissing its appeal and 

determined to consider this appeal on the merits. Therefore, the late filing of the 

Commonwealth’s brief is irrelevant now.

4 The information which should be included in a separate introduction was contained in the 

statement of the case.

5 The Commonwealth generally referenced the indictment, the video of the hearing (without any 

time stamps), and the order granting the motion to suppress.

6 The summary of the testimony in the argument section fails to contain any references to where 

in the video of the suppression hearing specific statements were made.
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However, in this case where there is no dispute that Combs consented 

to the blood draw after receiving the implied consent warnings, the issue before us 

is strictly to be determined as a matter of law and specific citations to the record 

are of less importance. Therefore, we chose not to impose a sanction. However, 

we caution that non-compliance in another case could result in sanctions or even 

dismissal of the appeal. See Koester v. Koester, 569 S.W.3d 412 (Ky.App. 2019).

Combs also argues that we should decline to review the alleged error 

because the Commonwealth failed to preserve its argument that the results of the 

blood draw should not be suppressed because the Commonwealth never submitted 

a brief below and we may only review for palpable error. 

Combs’s preservation argument is not well taken. Although the 

Commonwealth failed to explain how it preserved its argument, a failure to comply 

with CR 76.12(4)(c)(v) does not render a properly preserved issue unpreserved. 

While the Commonwealth did not make an oral argument during the suppression 

hearing or file a brief explaining its opposition to the motion to suppress, it did 

submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law opposing suppression 

which adequately preserved its argument for review. Accordingly, it is appropriate 

to review the circuit court’s grant of the motion to suppress on the merits.

An appellate court’s standard of review of the trial 

court’s decision on a motion to suppress requires that we 

first determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact 

are supported by substantial evidence. If they are, then 
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they are conclusive. Based on those findings of fact, we 

must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s 

application of the law to those facts to determine whether 

its decision is correct as a matter of law.

Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002) (footnotes omitted).

The Commonwealth argues that Combs voluntarily consented to the 

blood test and so neither a warrant nor exigent circumstances was necessary to 

justify the blood draw. The facts are not in dispute that Combs consented to the 

blood draw after receiving appropriate warnings. It is well established that consent 

is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. Commonwealth v. Erickson, 132 

S.W.3d 884, 887 (Ky.App. 2004). The only issue is whether Combs’s receiving an 

accurate warning that our DUI law imposes mandatory minimum sentences on 

convicted defendants who refuse consent could render her consent involuntary.

In Birchfield, the United States Supreme Court examined whether 

“laws that . . . make it a crime for a motorist to refuse to be tested after being 

lawfully arrested for driving while impaired . . . violate the Fourth Amendment’s 

prohibition against unreasonable searches.” Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2166-67. Its 

holding that “motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood 

test on pain of committing a criminal offense” was necessarily addressed to the 

laws before it which made refusal a separate crime. Id. at 2186. As applied to 

petitioner Beylund, who consented to a blood test after being advised that his 

refusal would constitute a crime, the Court explained that because his blood test 
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could not be compelled incident to arrest, whether his consent was voluntary 

needed to be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Kentucky does not have a separate crime for refusing to consent to a 

blood test, making our law distinguishable from the North Dakota and Minnesota 

laws at issue in Birchfield. Instead, in Kentucky pursuant to KRS

189A.010(11)(e), “[r]efusing to submit to any test or tests of one’s blood, breath, 

or urine requested by an officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person 

was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of subsection 

(1) of this section,” which prohibits operating a motor vehicle while impaired by 

alcohol or drugs, constitutes an aggravating circumstance which doubles the 

mandatory minimum sentence a defendant who is convicted for DUI will receive 

as set out in KRS 189A.010(5)(a)-(d). KRS 189A.105(2)(a) specifies the 

information which shall be given to the person from whom a test is requested and 

provides warnings about the consequences of refusing or submitting to a test, 

which includes the doubling of mandatory minimum sentences for refusing 

consent.

In Commonwealth v. Brown, 560 S.W.3d 873 (Ky.App. 2018), which 

was decided after the circuit court’s ruling below, our Court considered whether 

warnings about enhanced penalties for a DUI conviction could vitiate consent.

After examining Birchfield, our Court noted that “[i]t is the use of new criminal 
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charges to strong-arm an accused into consent for a blood test which the Supreme 

Court found so repugnant.” Id. at 878. Our Court explained how Kentucky’s 

statutory scheme differs from the ones at issue in Birchfield and, therefore, why the 

Supreme Court’s reasoning did not apply to invalidate an otherwise voluntary 

consent:

[T]he doubling of a mandatory minimum jail sentence is 

unquestionably a criminal sanction. Yet, that sanction is 

contingent on conviction on the underlying charge. . . . It 

lacks the coercive force of mandating the accused 

undergo an intrusive test or else accrue an additional 

criminal charge. Indeed, if a defendant . . . is not 

convicted on an aggravated DUI charge, the sanction 

does not even apply. 

Id. 

We note that Kentucky is not alone in such an interpretation. Our 

sister court in Maine rendered a decision consistent with the reasoning in Brown,

holding “when probable cause exists, a warrantless blood test is not unreasonable 

when a driver has consented to testing after being warned that the lower limit of a 

court’s sentencing range will increase if the driver refuses to submit to testing and 

is ultimately convicted of [DUI].” State v. LeMeunier-Fitzgerald, 2018 ME 85, ¶ 

31, 188 A.3d 183, 193 (2018), cert. denied 139 S. Ct. 917, 202 L. Ed. 2d 648

(2019).

The circuit court made no finding as to whether Combs’s consent was 

a result of being warned about the doubling of mandatory minimum sentences if 
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she refused consent, apparently assuming Birchfield foreclosed any consent to a 

blood draw after the implied consent warnings were read from ever being 

voluntary. It appears that the circuit court believed that the Commonwealth was 

required to either obtain a warrant or establish exigent circumstances in order to 

lawfully collect and test Combs’s blood and, in the absence of either, believed that 

suppression of the analysis of her blood was required as a matter of law.

While such an analysis of Birchfield is possible, the decision in Brown

foreclosed such an interpretation relative to our laws in Kentucky. We are bound 

by Brown no matter where our sympathies may lie. Therefore, the circuit court 

erred as a matter of law in its decision to suppress the results of a consensual blood 

draw on its reasoning below and we must reverse. However, on remand the circuit 

court may consider whether there are any other avenues of legal reasoning that 

may permit suppression.

Accordingly, we reverse as the Perry Circuit Court erred as a matter 

of law in granting Combs’s motion to suppress her blood test based on her consent

being involuntary and remand for a new hearing. 

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Andy Beshear

Attorney General of Kentucky

John Hansen

Special Assistant Attorney General

Hazard, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Steven Nathan Goens

Assistant Public Advocate

Department of Public Advocacy

Frankfort, Kentucky