UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHRISTOPHER STOLLER, : : Petitioner, : Civil Action No.: 15-2230 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 12 : UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. , : : Respondents. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING R ESPONDENTS ’ M OTION TO D ISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION In 2011, pro se petitioner Christopher Stoller w as convicted of theft by the Ci rcuit Court of Lake County, Illinois and sen tenced to eight years in prison . Mr. Stoller petitioned this Court for a writ of error coram nobis, 1 a rare form of post-convicti on relief. Respondents now move t o dismiss Mr. Stoller’s p etition, asserting tha t this Court lacks jurisdiction. As discussed below, Respondents’ motion to dismiss is granted.

II. BACKGROUND On October 21, 2009, Petitioner Chri stopher Stoller was indicte d in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois on one count of theft of property totalin g over $100,000. Pet’r’s Pet. ¶ 39, ECF No. 3. Following a jury tri al, Mr. Stoller was found guilt y and sentenced to eight years in prison by the same court. Id. ¶¶ 3, 45–46. On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals affirme d his

1 On December 18, 2015, Mr. Stoller filed his original Petition. Pet. Writ of Error Coram Nobis, ECF No. 1. Mr. Stoller re-f iled a corrected version on January 19, 2016. See generally Pet’r’s Pet., ECF No. 3. The C ourt cites to the corrected 2016 version of Mr. Stoller’s petition.2 conviction and denied his motion for a new trial. Id. ¶ 48; Pet’r’s App. A, People v. Stoller , No. 2-12-0442, 2013 WL 6858907 (Ill. A pp. Ct. Dec. 26, 2013). Next , the Illinois Supreme Court denied Mr. Stoller’s motion for reconsideration in May of 2014. Pet’r’s App. C, People v.
Stoller , 8 N.E.3d 1052 (Ill. 2014). Finally, in January of 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States denied Mr. Stoller’s peti tion for a writ of certiorari. Pet’r’s App. L, Stoller v. Illinois , 135 S. Ct. 966 (2015). According to Mr. Stoller’s petition, he has now “served out his sentence.” 2 Pet’r’s Pet. ¶ 3. After unsuccessfully attempting these other avenues of relief, Mr. Stoller filed the current petition for a writ of error coram nobis with this Court. See generally Pet’r’s Pet. On May 24, 2016, Respondents filed th e instant motion to dismis s Mr. Stoller’s petition for want of jurisdiction. See generally Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12. Respondents contend that because Mr. Stoller was neither convicted nor sentenced by this Court, it does not have proper subject matter jurisdiction t o hear his coram nobis petition. Id. ¶ 10. On June 29, 2016, Mr. Stoller respon ded to the motion to dismis s. See generally Pet’r’s Resp., ECF No. 18-1. Mr. Stoller a rgues that his petition is w ithin this Court’s jurisdiction because, inter alia , the All Writs Act pr ovides federal district courts with the j urisdiction to hear petitions of all writs, includi ng the writ of coram nobis. See Pet’r’s Resp. ¶¶ 7–8.

III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard Subject matter jurisdiction con cerns a court’s authority “to ad judicate the type of controversy presented” by the case in question. See Davis & Assocs. v. Williams , 892 A.2d

2 Because a court considering if it has jurisdiction must accept “the allegations of the complaint as true,” this Court assumes for the purposes of reso lving this motion that Mr. Stoller is not in custody. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham , 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).3 1144, 1148 (D.C. 2006) (citations omitted ). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and it is generally presumed that “a cause lies outs ide this limite d jurisdiction.” Rasul v. Bush , 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). If a federal court lack s subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot reach the merits of the case, but must either dismiss it or t ransfer it to another court. Amerijet Int’l Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. , 43 F. Supp. 3d 4, 20 (D.D.C. 2014). As a court of limited ju risdiction, it is imperative that this Court “b egin, and end,” with an examinatio n of its jurisdiction. Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA , 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burde n of establishing that the court h as subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). When considering whether it has jurisdiction, a court accepts “the allegations of the compl aint as true.” Banneker Ventures,
LLC v. Graham , 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). A court may also “conside r the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supp lemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Id. (quoting Herbert , 974 F.2d at 197).
A pro se complaint is held to “less string ent standards than formal plea dings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Despite t his relaxed standard, a pro se plaintiff must still establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Fontaine v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 43 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2014); Bickford v. Gov’t of U.S. , 808 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011); Newby v.
Obama , 681 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2010).4 B. Discussion Because this Court is not the sentencing court in Mr. Stoller’s case, it does not have subject matter jurisdiction t o hear Mr. Stolle r’s petition. Th erefore, the Respondents’ motion to dismiss 3 for lack of jurisdi ction is granted. A petition for a writ of coram nobis is “an extraordinary reme dy” that allows criminal defendants to attack their convi ctions after they are no longer in custody. United States v. Morgan , 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954); see also United States v. Faison , 956 F. Supp. 2d 267, 269 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Fleming v. United States , 146 F.3d 88, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that coram nobis relief is typically v iewed as “a remedy of last res ort” for petitioners who are no longer in custody pursuant t o a criminal conviction). 4 The modern writ of coram nobis allows a trial court to correct its ow n legal or factual errors, as it p rovides “an extension of the original proceeding during which the error allegedly transpired.” United States v. Denedo , 556 U.S. 904, 912–13 (2009). 5

3 The Court treats Respondents’ motion as a 12(b)(1) motion to d ismiss. 4 A writ of coram nobis diffe rs from the writ of habeas corpus because only a defendant “in custody” may pe tition for habeas corpus relief on the ground that he or she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or law s or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). Although Mr. Stoller does no t style his petition as one for habeas corpus, there would be, at least, two obstacles to suc h a claim. First, Mr. Stoller’s petition indicates that he is no longer “in custody.” Pet’r’s Pet. ¶ 3. Second, even if Mr. Stoller w ere “in custody,” a habeas corpus petition is proper only in the di strict in which his custodian is located. Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004), which appears to be Lak e County, Illinois, rather than the District of Columbia. 5 In Latin, “coram nobis” means “before us.” See United States v. Sawyer , 239 F.3d 31, 37 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing LaFav e, Israel & King, Criminal Procedure, § 28.1(c) (2d ed. 1991)). Originating in the sixteen th century, the writ of cora m nobis “before us” in the sense of being before the King’s Bench. Id. at 36–37.5 However, only the court that impos ed the sentence has jurisdict ion to grant a writ of coram nobis. 6 See Morgan , 346 U.S. at 507 n.9; Faison , 956 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (finding that jurisdiction was proper in the s ame federal district court that had previously convicted and sentenced the petitioner); cf. Baxter v. Claytor , 652 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the court without a role in the sentencing process could not he ar a coram nobis petition). If the conviction at issue is the result of a state court judgment, as it is here, a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdicti on. Every federal district or c ircuit court opinion identified by this Court has reached the same conclusion. See Rawlins v. Kansas , 714 F.3d 1189, 1196–97 (10th Cir. 2013); Finkelstein v. Spitzer , 455 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 2006); Obado v. New Jersey , 328 F.3d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding t hat the writ of coram no bis is “not available in a federal court as a means of attack on a s tate criminal judgment”); Lowery v. McCaughtry , 954 F.2d 422, 423 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that “[ petitioner’s] counsel conce ded that she had not found even one decision in the history of the Un ited States using coram nobis to set aside a judgment rendered by another court”); Sinclair v. Louisiana , 679 F.2d 513, 514 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that “the writ of error coram nobis is not a vailable in federal court to attack state criminal judgments”). In the absence of contrary guidance from the D.C. Ci rcuit, the Cou rt sees no reason to depart from the reasoning of other circuits. Mr. Stoller was convicted in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois for violating an Illinois state statute. 7 See Pet’r’s Pet. ¶ 3. Mr. Stoller’s case involves no federal convi ction or

6 Because the Federal Rules of Civ il Procedure abolished the use of the writ of coram nobis in civil cases, see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(e), the writ is only available in criminal proceedings. See United States v. Morgan , 346 U.S. 502, 505 n.4 (1954). Because Mr. Stoller’s petition involves a criminal cas e, his petition for a writ is n ot barred by Rule 60(e).

7 This Illinois statute outlaws the theft of property exceeding $100,000 in value. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16-1 (a)(1 )(A), (b)(6) (2012); see also Pet’r’s Pet. ¶ 3.6 sentence—much less in the Distr ict of Columbi a—that would provi de jurisdiction for this Court.
See Obado , 328 F.3d at 718 (holding that the writ of coram nobis is “not available in a federal court as a means of attack on a s tate criminal judgment”). This Court is unable to remedy any potential errors made by the I llinois state court through the w rit of coram nobis. Although Mr. Stoller cites sever al cases discussing the writ of coram nobis, none supports jurisdiction here. See Pet’r’s Pet. ¶ 3; Pet’r’s Res p. ¶ 10. All of Mr. Stoller’s cas es provide examples of attacks on fed eral, rather th an state, conv ictions. See Morgan , 346 U.S. at 503 (petitioner moved to set aside federal conviction and sente nce in federal sentencing court);
Porcelli v. United States , 404 F.3d 157, 158 (2d. Cir. 2005) (after serving a federal se ntence, the petitioner sought a wri t of error coram nobis from the federal sentencing court); Matus-Leva v. United States , 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2002) (defendant in custody sough t coram nobis relief from a federal conviction); Foont v. United States , 93 F.3d 76, 78–79 (2d Cir. 1996) (petitioner sought to vacate his federal convic tion in the same federal sen tencing court) . Unlike the petitioners in those cases, who attacked their federal convictions in various federal sentencing courts, Mr. Stoller is attacking his state conviction by petitioning this federal court. Therefore, those cases do not support this Court’s jurisd iction here. Mr. Stoller argues that the All Writs Act grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear petitions for all writs, includi ng his petition for a writ of c oram nobis. Pet’r’s P et. ¶ 1. However, the All Writs Act states that all courts established by an Act of Congress, “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012) (emphasis added). The Supreme Co urt has made it clear that “th e authority to issue a writ under the All Writs Act is not a font of jurisdiction.” United States v. Denedo , 556 U.S. 904, 914 (2009) (citing Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson , 537 U.S. 28, 31 (2002)). The Act does not7 serve to enlarge the jurisdict ion a court possesses but rather allows the issuance of writs “in aid of” this existing jurisdiction. See Clinton v. Goldsmith , 526 U.S. 529, 535 (1999); see also
Telecomm. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC , 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The All Writs Act is not an independent grant of jurisdiction to a court; it merely permits a court to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction acquired to grant some other form of rel ief.”). In the instant case, this Court does not have any subject matter or statutory jurisdiction over Mr. Stoller’s state conviction; thus, there is no existing jurisd iction that the All Writs Act may supplement. Contrary to Mr. Stoller’s contention, this Act alone cannot provide the necessa ry jurisdictio n in this case. 8

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Respondents’ motion to dismiss f or want of jurisdiction is
GRANTED . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separate ly and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: November 3, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

8 In his response to the motion t o dismiss, Mr. Stoller appears to argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides jurisdiction. See Pet’r’s Resp. ¶ 2 (“This Court has the power to hear this petition for writ which derives from Statute 18 U.S.C. Section 3231 . . .”). Mr. Stoller does not explain how § 3231, which relates to jurisdiction for offenses against federal laws, see United States v. Quattlebaum , 933 F. Supp. 2d 208, 210–11 (D.D.C. 2013), could support his challenge to his state law conviction. In t his circuit it is clear that “perfunctory and undeveloped arguments . . . are deemed waived.” Johnson v. Panetta , 953 F. Supp. 2d 244, 250 (D.D.C. 2013). The Court does not construct arguments on behalf of the litigants, and thus considers this argument waived.