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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JENNIFER BRISCOE, Guardian of the 

Minor Child K.B.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-3365 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(March 31, 2024)

On behalf of the minor child K.B., and pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities 

Education Act (“IDEA”), Plaintiff Jennifer Briscoe (“Plaintiff”), filed this action against the 

District of Columbia (the “District”) to challenge an August 29, 2022 Hearing Officer’s 

Determination (“HOD”) that dismissed her administrative due process claim filed against the 

District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”). In that HOD, the Independent Hearing Officer 

(“IHO”) concluded that: (1) DCPS timely provided Plaintiff with an authorization for her 

requested independent educational evaluation (“IEE”); (2) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 

DCPS’s December 2020 reevaluation of K.B. was inadequate; and (3) DCPS committed a 

procedural violation related to the provision of K.B.’s educational records that did not amount to 

a substantive denial of free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). See August 29, 2022 HOD, 

ECF No. 13-1, at 4-24. DCPS was directed, however, to provide a list of student documents that are 

maintained in the Special Education Database (“SEDS”). Id. at 17. 

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding that August 29, 

2022 HOD. In her Points and Authorities in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment, 

Plaintiff claims that: (1) DCPS unnecessarily delayed its response to Plaintiff’s request for an 
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IEE; (2) DCPS refused to authorize a sufficient IEE, which led to a substantive violation of the 

IDEA; (3) DCPS failed to prove the 2020-2021 reevaluation was appropriate; (4) the IHO erred 

in finding that DCPS’s failure to provide a “SEDS Document Index” was not a substantive denial 

of FAPE; and (5) DCPS has not complied with the IHO’s Order to provide the “SEDS Document 

Index.” See generally Pl.’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1. Those five arguments will be addressed 

herein. 

In response thereto, the District asserts that Plaintiff has neither established a denial of 

FAPE nor that the IHO erred in his decision, which is “entitled to deference because it is 

supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.” Defendant’s Cross Motion for 

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16, at 4. Furthermore, the District contends that “DCPS complied 

with the HOD’s remedial order.” Id. Upon review of the two motions for summary judgment 

and the record herein, for the reasons set forth in detail in this Memorandum Opinion, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff’s [15] Motion for Summary Judgment shall be DENIED and Defendant’s [16] 

Cross Motion for Summary Judgment shall be GRANTED.1 A separate Order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

The IDEA was enacted to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them 

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In connection with this Memorandum Opinion, the Court considered: (1) the Administrative 

Record (“AR”), ECF No. 13-1 [indexed at ECF No. 13]; (2) Plaintiff’s’ [15] Motion for 

Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s MSJ”), Plaintiff’s [15-1] Points and Authorities in support thereof 

(“Pl.’s P & A”), and the exhibit attached thereto; (3) Defendant’s [16] [consolidated] Opposition 

to the Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s 

CMSJ”); (4) Plaintiff’s [20] [consolidated] Opposition to Defendant’s Cross Motion and Reply in 

support of Motion (“Pl.’s Reply”); and (5) Defendant’s [22] Reply in support of Cross Motion 

(“Def.’s Reply”). In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in 

this action would not be of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
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a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that emphasizes special education and related 

services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, 

and independent living.” M.G. v. District of Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing 

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)), see also Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015). Once a child is identified as disabled, the school district must convene a meeting of a 

multi-disciplinary team to develop an individualized education program (“IEP”) for the student. 

See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(2)(A). The IEP “is the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery 

system for disabled children[.]” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137

S. Ct. 988, 994 (2017) (citation omitted). The IDEA requires that a school system “offer an IEP 

that is reasonably calculated to enable a [disabled student] to make progress in light of the child’s

circumstances.” Id. at 999. Once the IEP is developed, the school system must provide an 

appropriate educational placement that comports with the IEP.

The IDEA and accompanying regulations provide that once a child is determined to have a 

disability, a reevaluation is required to determine whether the child continues to present with a 

disability and that the child shall be assessed in all areas of suspected disability during this 

reevaluation. 34 CFR 300.304(c)(4). The reevaluation shall occur if the parent requests a 

reevaluation. 34 CFR 300.303(a)(2). The reevaluation must occur at least every 3 years unless 

the parent and the public agency agree that a reevaluation is unnecessary. 34 CFR 300.303(b)(2). 

The reevaluation is comprised of a variety of tools, including, inter alia: (1) assessments tailored 

to assess specific areas of educational need; (2) review of existing data; (3) classroom-based 

assessment; (4) observations by teachers and related service providers; (5) input from the parents. 

34 CFR 300.304(b)(2). Pursuant to 34 CFR 300.502(b)(1), “[a] parent has the right to an 

independent educational evaluation [“IEE”] at public expense if the parent disagrees with an 
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evaluation obtained by the public agency.” After the parent requests an IEE, the school system 

has two choices: “(i) [f]ile a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that its evaluation 

is appropriate; or (ii) [e]nsure an independent educational evaluation is provided at public 

expense.” 34 CFR 300.502(b)(2). If the hearing officer finds that the evaluation comports with 

the requirements of the IDEA for an initial evaluation or reevaluation, the parent is not entitled to 

an independent educational evaluation at public expense.

B. Factual History 

In April 2017, the District of Columbia Superior Court Youth and Family Services Division 

referred K.B. for a psychoeducation evaluation, which showed overall average cognitive 

functioning and moderately impaired to average academic functioning. See AR, ECF No. 13, at 

51, 63-64. The evaluator concluded that K.B. had symptoms consistent with ADHD, Combined 

Type, and K.B. was diagnosed also with an Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of 

Emotions and Conduct and recommended for tutoring and counseling. Id. at 63-64, 66-67. 

K.B.’s initial IEP was developed in January 2018, when the student was in fifth grade 

attending the Children’s Guild Public Charter School, its own Local Educational Agency (“LEA”) 

under the IDEA, id. at 99, and she was determined eligible for special education services as a 

student with Multiple Disabilities (Specific Learning Disability/Other Health Impaired). AR at 

89-111. K.B. began attending DCPS Eliot-Hine Middle School (“Eliot-Hine”) for the 2020-2021 

school year. AR at 188. Elliot-Hine provided virtual instruction that entire school year because of 

the pandemic. Id. at 660. In December 2020, K.B.’s IEP team conducted a reevaluation to see if 

K.B. remained eligible for special education, id. at 193, and the team determined that K.B. 

remained eligible with the disability classification OHI/ADHD. Id. at 201. 

K.B. next attended Paul PCS-International High School (“Paul PCS”), which is its own 
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LEA under the IDEA. AR at 246. On January 19, 2022, through counsel, Plaintiff contacted the 

principal of Eliot-Hine requesting that DCPS fund an IEE. Id. at 284. The principal responded on 

January 20, 2022, informing Plaintiff that K.B. was no longer a student at Eliot-Hine. Id. at 286. 

On January 26, 2022, Paul PCS informed Plaintiff that it would conduct a comprehensive 

psychological evaluation and a functional behavioral assessment (“FBA”) but would not fund an 

IEE. Id. at 271. 

On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff completed an application for K.B. to attend Coolidge High 

School (“Coolidge”), a DCPS school. Id. at 273-275. On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff emailed 

Coolidge requesting that DCPS fund an IEE. Id. at 287. On February 10, 2022, DCPS issued an 

authorization letter for Plaintiff to obtain an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation,

and DCPS issued a second authorization letter for Plaintiff to obtain an independent speech 

language evaluation and an independent assistive technology evaluation. Id. at 278, 280.2 DCPS 

convened an IEP meeting on March 16, 2022, and DCPS agreed to conduct an occupational 

therapy (“OT”) assessment and an FBA. Id. at 282. On June 16, 2022, DCPS issued a third 

authorization letter, with funding for independent comprehensive psychological, speech language, 

occupational therapy, and assistive technology testing. Id. at 300. That June 16, 2022 letter 

voided the two February 10, 2022 authorization letters. Id. 

On February 10, 2022, Plaintiff requested a copy of K.B.’s educational records. Id. at 391. 

Plaintiff made several requests for records during the period February 2022-July 2022, AR at 394-

413, including a motion to compel the records.3 On April 7, 2002, DCPS provided the majority of 

K.B.’s educational records in a zip file. Id. at 307. DCPS provided K.B.’s fourth quarter service 

2 While the second authorization was dated February 10, 2022, the attorney for DCPS 

acknowledged at the due process hearing that this was not provided to Plaintiff until March 16, 

2022, when counsel realized that letter had not been received previously. AR at 722-723. 

3 This motion was denied as a pre-hearing matter by the IHO. AR at 8. 
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trackers and IEP progress reports by June 2022 and enrollment documents in July 2022. Id. at 

715, 474. 

1. Due Process Proceeding

On April 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint alleging that 

DCPS denied K.B. a FAPE by: (1) failing and refusing to agree to fund an IEE; (2) failing and 

refusing to conduct an appropriate reevaluation in December 2020; (3) developing an IEP that was 

based on an inappropriate reevaluation;4and (4) failing to provide a complete copy of K.B.’s 

educational records. Id. at 308-315. By way of relief, Plaintiff requested an order that DCPS: (1) 

immediately fund an IEE; (2) convene an IEP meeting to review the IEE, find K.B. eligible for 

special education, and develop an IEP; (3) order a compensatory education assessment, review the 

assessment, and incorporate the assessment’s results into the IEP; and (4) provide K.B.’s 

educational records. AR at 313-314. An administrative due process hearing was held on July 26, 

2022. Id. at 614. 

Plaintiff was the only witness presented on her own behalf. She testified that: (1) she 

received the February 10, 2022 letter authorizing an independent psychological evaluation but 

never had K.B. evaluated, id. at 679-680; (2) during a March 2022 meeting, DCPS offered to 

conduct a speech language evaluation, OT evaluation, and an assistive technology evaluation but 

her attorney rejected DCPS’s offer, id. at 673-674; and (3) she received the June 16, 2022 letter 

authorizing her to obtain an independent comprehensive psychological evaluation, speech 

language evaluation, OT evaluation, and assistive technology evaluation, but Plaintiff never tried 

to have K.B. evaluated. Id. at 679-680. There was no testimony by Plaintiff about K.B.’s 

educational records. 

4 This claim was withdrawn on July 15, 2022. 
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On behalf of DCPS, Resolution Specialist Alexis Thom was the sole witness, and she 

testified that her duties include reviewing parental requests for IEEs. Id. at 693-694. In response 

to a parental request for an IEE, she issues a letter authorizing funding for various assessments 

and then waits to receive the assessments from the parents. AR at 696-697. IEEs generally 

include standardized and informal testing, class observations, parental input, and teacher input. 

Id. at 700-701. An independent psychological assessment usually includes the student’s 

behavioral history and the parent’s rating of the student’s behavior. Id. at 701. Ms. Thom 

testified that she received Plaintiff’s request for an IEE in February and issued authorization 

letters that month for psychological, speech language, and assistive technology assessments. AR 

at 704-705. A third authorization letter was issued in June 2022, and that included an OT 

assessment in addition to the three other assessments. Id. at 708. Ms. Thom testified that 

Plaintiff requested no other assessments, including an FBA, after DCPS issued the June 2022 IEE 

authorization letter. Id. at 713, 726. Ms. Thom explained that FBAs are conducted at the school 

and behavioral intervention plans are created after the FBA. AR at 727-728. 

Regarding educational records, Ms. Thom testified that Ms. Dabney, the LEA 

representative for Coolidge, provided K.B.’s educational records to Plaintiff in a zip file on April 

7, 2022, and Ms. Thom provided K.B.’s fourth quarter service trackers and IEP progress reports 

sometime between May 13 and June 16, 2022, and K.B.’s enrollment documents on July 19, 2022. 

Id. at 714-716. Production of the enrollment documents was delayed because hard copies were 

maintained by the school registrar, who had been on leave. AR at 716. 

Ms. Thom testified further that DCPS student educational records are contained in “SEDS” 

and “Aspen” databases that do not completely overlap in content, and a “SEDS Index” would not 

capture a complete list of educational records. Id. at 717-719. Furthermore, a “SEDS Index” is 
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not an actual document that can be printed; rather, a document tab in SEDS lists a student’s 

educational records contained in SEDS, but SEDS does not generate a printable list. Id.; see also 

AR at 729, 731. Accordingly, a user would need to take multiple screenshots of their computer 

screen while scrolling the tab in order to create such a list and then separately upload the 

screenshots into the SEDS database. Id. at 717-719.

2. HOD

IHO Coles Ruff, Esq. issued his HOD on August 29, 2022, and an amended version of the 

same (correcting typographical errors) on August 31, 2022. AR at 4-24.5 The IHO concluded 

that: (1) DCPS provided the requested IEP without unnecessary delay; (2) Plaintiff failed to meet 

her burden on the inappropriateness of the December 2020 evaluation; and (3) Plaintiff 

established a procedural violation regarding the provision of K.B.’s educational records, with

reference to the list of documents available in SEDS, but that procedural violation did not 

constitute a denial of FAPE. AR at 8-9, 11. The IHO ordered DCPS to provide to Plaintiff the 

complete list of documents pertaining to K.B.’s educational history, which were available through 

SEDS (SEDS Documents Index). AR at 9, 17.

Pending before this Court are the Plaintiff’s [15] Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting 

that this Court reverse the IHO’s HOD, and Defendant’s [16] Cross Motion for Summary 

Judgment, asking this Court to affirm the HOD. The parties’ respective cross motions are fully 

briefed and ripe for this Court’s review.

 II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Although motions for review of an HOD are called motions for summary judgment, the 

Court does not follow ‘a true summary judgment procedure.’” Middleton v. District of Columbia, 

5 The Court references that amended version herein.
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312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 128 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax v. District of Columbia, 

896 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. 2012)); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Rather, in a civil action brought to 

challenge a Hearing Officer’s determination pursuant to the IDEA, “[a] motion for summary 

judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the record and any 

additional evidence the court may receive.” D.R. v. District of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 

(D.D.C. 2009). When neither party has requested that the court hear additional evidence, the 

motion for summary judgment is “the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case

on the basis of the administrative record.” Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th

Cir. 1997); M G. v. District of Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017) (citations omitted); 

Thomas v. District of Columbia, 407 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). 

The party challenging the underlying HOD bears “the burden of persuading the 

[reviewing] court that the hearing officer was wrong.” Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 

(D.C. Cir. 1988). A court reviewing an administrative IDEA determination “shall grant such 

relief as the court determines is appropriate,” based upon “a preponderance of the evidence.” 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist.,

Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205–06 (1982). Courts, however, must refrain from 

“substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities 

which they review.” Id. at 206. Accordingly, “[c]ourts sitting on an IDEA appeal do not have 

unfettered review but must . . . give due weight to the administrative proceedings and afford 

some deference to the expertise of the [independent hearing officer] and school officials 

responsible for the child’s education.” Gill v. District of Columbia, 751 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108-109

(D.D.C. 2010) (citing Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 418 (D.D.C. 1993) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). As a general matter, factual findings from the administrative proceeding are to 
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be considered prima facie correct. District of Columbia v. Ramirez, 377 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 

(D.D.C. 2005). Furthermore, “a hearing officer’s findings ‘based on credibility determinations of

live witness testimony’ are given ‘particular deference’ where there is no supplementation of the 

record.” R.D. ex rel. McAllister v. District of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 72, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2014)

(citation omitted). Nonetheless, “a hearing decision ‘without reasoned and specific findings 

deserves little deference.’” Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F. 3d 516, 521 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). “[A] court upsetting [a hearing] officer’s decision must . . . explain its basis for 

doing so.” McKenzie, 862 F.2d at 86.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Did DCPS unnecessarily delay its response to Plaintiff’s request for an IEE?

If the parent requests an IEE, the public agency “must, without unnecessary delay,

either file a due process complaint to request a hearing to show that its evaluation is appropriate 

or ensure that an IEE is provided at public expense.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(i), (ii). 

Plaintiff contends that “Defendant acted with unnecessary delay in responding to Plaintiff’s 

request for funding for an Independent Educational Evaluation[.]” Pl’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 9. 

In this case, the IHO found that “authorization for independent assessments that DCPS provided 

Petitioner in response to her counsel’s request were provided promptly without unnecessary 

delay and that those assessments satisfied the requirements pursuant to 34 CFR 300.502.” HOD, 

ECF No. 13-1, at 14.

 Plaintiff argues that “the Hearing Officer provided no rational or factual basis for [his] 

conclusion,” but this argument misstates the record in this case and is non-persuasive. The IHO 

first discussed “unnecessary delay” and determined that it is an inquiry addressed case-by-case. 
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HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 13 (citing J.P. ex rel., E.P. v. Ripon United School Dist., 2009 WL 

1034993 (E.D. Cal. 2009)) (noting that the facts of the case are critical). The IHO next looked 

for guidance in the IDEA and its implementing regulations but found none. Hill v. District of 

Columbia, No. 14-CV-1893 (GMH), 2016 WL 4506972, at *19 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2016) (noting 

no guidance as to “unnecessary delay” in the IDEA and its regulations). The IHO looked then 

for case law to interpret the IDEA’s requirement of “prompt resolution of disputes involving the 

educational placement of learning-disabled children.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 13. The IHO 

noted that undue delay that constitutes a procedural violation of the IDEA must have “affected 

the student’s substantive rights” to be a denial of FAPE. Smith v. District of Columbia, Civil 

Action No. 08-2216, 2010 W.L. 4861757, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2010). The IHO noted that 

“[a] delay does not affect substantive rights if the student’s education would not have been 

different had there been no delay.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 13 (citing D.R. ex rel Robinson v. 

Gov’t of Dist. of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2009)). In contrast, “[a] delay of 

more than 2-3 months is likely fatal to the [school] district’s case, although the exact length will 

depend on the circumstances rather than being a bright-line test.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 14 

(citing Hill v. District of Columbia, No. 14-cv-1893 (GMH), 2016 WL 4506972, at *19 (D.D.C. 

Aug. 26, 2016)). 

In this case, Plaintiff contends that the request for an IEE was initially made on January 

19, 2022, and again on February [7], 2022, but DCPS did not make its position known until 

February 10, 2022, which is 22 days after the initial request and “constitute[s] unnecessary 

delay.” Pl’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 9-10. Plaintiff does not cite to any case law establishing 

that a 22-day period (if even applicable here since Plaintiff’s initial request was directed to EliotHine when K.B. was no longer a student there) constitutes “unnecessary delay.” 
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On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff emailed Coolidge – where K.B. was enrolled as of February 

2, 2022, AR at 273-275 – to request that DCPS fund an IEE. AR at 287. Plaintiff’s request did 

not identify any specific testing or assessments for K.B. Id. Three days later, DCPS responded 

and issued an authorization letter for Plaintiff to obtain an independent comprehensive 

psychological evaluation, and DCPS issued also a second letter for Plaintiff to obtain 

independent speech language and assistive technology assessments. Id. at 278, 280. Plaintiff 

acknowledged receipt of these two February 2022 letters (although the second letter was not 

received by Plaintiff until March 16, 2022), and she admitted she never used them to have K.B. 

independently evaluated. Id. at 679-680. 

DCPS convened an IEP meeting in March 2022, and at that time offered to conduct an OT

assessment and an FBA, both of which needed to be done at Coolidge. AR at 282. These 

assessments were not completed because K.B. became ill shortly after enrolling at Coolidge in 

February 2022, and the student did not attend school in March, April, or May 2022. Id. at 671-

672. In June 2022, DCPS issued a third authorization letter in June 2022, which permitted 

Plaintiff to obtain an independent OT assessment in addition to the comprehensive 

psychological, speech language, and assistive technology testing. Id. at 300. Plaintiff indicated 

that she received the June 2022 authorization letter but “took no action to obtain any of the 

assessments that DCPS has already authorized.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 14; AR at 679-680. By 

way of explanation, Plaintiff asserts that she was “advocat[ing] for a complete IEE, not just 

funding for several assessments.” Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 20, at 2. Ms. Thom testified that there 

were no additional requests for assessments made by Plaintiff after the issuance of the June 2022 

letter. AR at 713, 726. 

After examining the facts of this case, the IHO concluded that “authorization for 
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independent assessments that DCPS provided Petitioner . . . were provided promptly without 

unnecessary delay and that those assessments satisfied the requirements pursuant to 34 C.F.R. 

300.602.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 14. Furthermore, the IHO noted that he “did not find the case 

law cited [by Petitioner, in support of her position that the requested IEE was not provided] to be 

on point.” Id. Finally, he stated that “the other actions that Petitioner asserts are to be taken in 

an IEE are actions DCPS cannot and will not take, including conducting a review of the 

assessment data, until Petitioner has taken action to obtain the independent assessments that have 

already been authorized.” Id. Accordingly, the IHO concluded that Petitioner did not sustain 

her burden of proof. 

The undersigned finds that the IHO’s conclusion that DCPS did not act with unreasonable 

delay in responding to the Plaintiff’s IEE request and that K.B. was not denied a FAPE is 

supported by the factual record and applicable law. DCPS responded promptly to Plaintiff’s 

request and subsequently attempted to collaborate with the Plaintiff on the parameters of the IEE, 

even during the time that K.B. was out of school for a three-month period. And Plaintiff 

admittedly took no actions to effectuate any of the authorized testing for K.B. Accordingly, the 

HOD is upheld regarding this issue. 

B. Did DCPS refuse to authorize a sufficient IEE?

Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. §300.303(a), “a [local education] agency shall ensure that a 

reevaluation of each child with a disability is conducted . . . if the child’s parent or teacher 

requests a reevaluation” and that the reevaluation must be conducted at least once every three 

years. Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c), a school district must ensure that a student has 

been appropriately evaluated in all areas of suspected disability. The IHO considered these 

regulations and looked also at regulations governing the evaluation process, including what 
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information needs to be gathered to determine the content of the IEP and what needs to be 

done during an initial evaluation or reevaluation. See HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 15. The 

evaluators shall use “a variety of assessment tools and strategies [to] gather relevant 

functional and developmental information about the child, including information provided by 

the parent, and information related to enabling the child to be involved in and progress in the 

general curriculum[.]” D.C. Mun. Regs. Title 5E § 30005.9(b). All areas “related to the 

suspected disability” should be assessed, D.C. Mun. Regs Title 5E § 30005.9(g), and the 

evaluations must be “sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of the child’s special 

education and services needs.” D.C. Mun. Regs Title 5E § 30005.9(h).

The IHO then noted that DCPS did a triennial evaluation in this case, in December 2020, 

while K.B. was enrolled at Eliot-Hine, AR at 193, and he concluded that “[t]here was no 

evidence presented including testimony, that sufficiently supports a finding that DCPS’s 

reevaluation was inappropriate,” although he did note that Petitioner opined that there was 

little data available to the school because of the virtual learning due to the pandemic. HOD, 

ECF No. 13-1, at 15. The IEP team reviewed K.B.’s classroom-based assessments, first 

semester IEP progress report, a September 2020 IReady beginning of the year assessment, a 

December 2019 Reading Inventory Assessment, classwork samples, previous IEPs, and 

parental input. AR at 195-198, 205. DCPS points out that while Plaintiff argues that the 

reevaluation was incomplete and “lists several items that were not included” therein, Pl’s 

P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 18-19, that list also “includes items that were considered by the IEP 

team” such as classroom-based assessments in math and reading, work samples in written 

expression, teacher observations, and current IEP progress reports. Def.’s CMSJ, ECF No. 

16, at 20-21. Looking at the record in this case, there is no indication that the IEP team did 
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not analyze existing data during the reevaluation. And while, for example, Plaintiff points to 

the failure to analyze vision or hearing screening, there is no suggestion that analysis of this 

data would have affected the determination of special education for K.B. (insofar as there is 

no indication of any issue with vision or hearing either in the record or alleged by Plaintiff). 

The IEP team determined that K.B. remained eligible for special education under the 

classification Other Health Impairment/ADHD. Id. at 201. The IHO looked at the data that 

was considered during the reevaluation and concluded that such reevaluation was 

“appropriate and sufficient to determine Student’s continued eligibility for special education 

services.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 16. DCPS notes that [t]here is no evidence that Plaintiff 

requested any additional assessments after the team made this determination.” Def.’s CSMJ, 

ECF No. 16, at 20; see AR at 9, 16; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.305(d). “Nor does Plaintiff 

identify any evidence to rebut the hearing officer’s finding that she did not request for the 

team to conduct additional assessments in these areas, or any areas, once the IEP team 

reviewed existing data.” Def.’s CMSJ, ECF No. 16, at 21, see AR at 9 (Finding of Fact No. 

6). Accordingly, upon review of the HOD and the record in this case, the Court concludes 

that the IHO’s decision on this issue should be upheld as it is supported by substantial record 

evidence and is in accordance with the law. 

Furthermore, while Plaintiff asserts that DCPS should bear the burden of proving the 

appropriateness of the reevaluation, Pl.’s P&A, ECF No. 15-1, at 17-18; Pl.’s Reply, ECF 

No. 20, at 4, the IDEA only requires an LEA to justify the appropriateness of its own 

evaluation via its due process complaint if it refuses to authorize an IEE, and that was not the 

situation here. See 34 C.F.R. §502(b)(2)(i); HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 16 (where the IHO 

asserted that “DCPS is only required to defend the validity of its evaluation when it has failed 
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to timely respond to a requested IEE pursuant to 34 CFR 300.502” and noted that was not the 

case here). It is Plaintiff who bears the burden of proof on this claim because she challenged 

the appropriateness of the reevaluation. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 

(2005); D.C. Code Section 38-2571.03(6). Accordingly, the Court upholds also the IHO’s 

determination that Plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof on this issue. 

C. Was DCPS’s failure to provide a “SEDS document Index” a substantive denial of 

FAPE?

In this case, Plaintiff requested a copy of K.B.’s educational records on February 10, 2022. 

AR at 391. On April 7, 2022, DCPS provided the majority of K.B.’s educational records in a zip 

file. Id. at 307. In June 2022, DCPS provided K.B.’s fourth quarter service trackers and IPE 

progress reports (which were developed after April 7, 2022), and in July 2022, K.B.’s enrollment 

documents were provided. Id. at 715, 474. Ms. Thom testified that the delay in providing 

enrollment documents was attributable to the registrar being on leave. AR at 716. During the 

hearing, Defendant acknowledged that the “SEDS Document Index” had not been provided to 

Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agreed that this was the only educational record that had not been provided. 

AR at 626, 725, 730-731. 

IDEA regulations provide parents and legal representatives an opportunity to inspect and 

review all education records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational 

placement of the student and provision of FAPE to a student. See 34 C.F.R. §300.501(a); 

Friendship Edison Public Charter School Collegiate Campus v. Murphy, Civil Action No. 05-

2109 (RMU), 2006 WL 2711524, at *4 (D.D.C. 2006). DCPS must permit parents to inspect and 

review any educational records relating to their children that are collected, maintained, or used 

by the agency. See 34 C.F.R. §300.613(a). Pursuant to the District of Columbia Municipal 
17

Regulations (“DCMR”), DCPS must honor the records request as soon as possible, but in no case 

more than 45 calendar days, 5E DCMR §2600.6, and failure to timely comply with a parent’s 

request to inspect educational records is a procedural violation of the IDEA. N.P. v. E. Orange 

Bd. of Educ., No. CIV. 06-5130 DRD, 2011 WL 463037, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2011). 

If a procedural violation is alleged, a hearing officer may find that a child did not receive 

FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies impeded the child’s right to a FAPE, significantly 

impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process on provision of 

FAPE, or caused the child to be deprived of educational benefits. An IDEA claim is “viable 

only if [the] procedural violations affected the student’s substantive rights.” Lesesne v. District 

of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

The IHO found that DCPS provided Plaintiff’s counsel with K.B.’s educational records apart 

from a document sometimes referred to as a “SEDS document index.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 

17. The IHO agreed that Plaintiff made a “legitimate argument that such a document has been 

provided by DCPS in other instances.” Id. As such, the IHO directed that DCPS provide 

Plaintiff with this list so that she could be sure she had been provided all educational records. 

The IHO did not, however, find that non-production of this list was anything other than a 

procedural violation. The IHO found that “there was insufficient evidence that DCPS[‘s] [failure 

to provide a SEDS index] significantly impeded Petitioner’s opportunity to participate in the 

decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to Student or caused Student a 

deprivation of educational benefits.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 17. Accordingly, the IHO 

concluded that while Petitioner sustained the burden of persuasion on this issue, there was no 

denial of FAPE. Id. at 16. 

The Court has reviewed the argument proffered by Plaintiff in support of her contention that 
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non-provision of the SEDS index resulted in a substantive violation. See generally Pl.’s P&A, 

ECF No. 15-1, at 23-25. This Court finds that while Plaintiff makes conclusory statements about 

procedural violations rising to the level of substantive violations, and statements regarding the 

general importance of the SEDS index, Plaintiff does not identify any way in which DCPS’s 

actions deprived K.B. of educational rights or impeded Plaintiff from participating in the 

educational process attributable to the SEDS index. Nor was there any testimony by Plaintiff 

during her direct examination regarding K.B.’s educational records. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

failed to demonstrate the DCPS’s omission of the SEDS index from the records produced 

affected K.B.’s education in any way. Lattisaw v. District of Columbia, No. 1:22-CV-510, 2023 

WL 3719814, at *3 (D.D.C. May 30, 2023) (citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff has not 

carried the burden of demonstrating a substantive violation, and as such, the Court upholds the 

IHO’s findings on this issue, which are supported by the record evidence and statutory authority. 

D. Did DCPS violate the HOD?

In the August 29, 2022 HOD, the IHO directed that “DCPS, within ten (10) business days of 

the issuance of this order [ ] provide Petitioner the list of documents for Student available 

through SEDS, sometimes referred to as the SEDS document index.” HOD, ECF No. 13-1, at 

17. Plaintiff acknowledges that “[o]n or about September 9, 2022, DCPS provided Plaintiff with 

a list of documents that DCPS had developed” but argues that it was not a copy of the SEDS 

document index. Pl.’s P & A, ECF No. 15-1, at 26 (referencing a comparison of a SEDS 

document with what was provided). DCPS labels this claim as “baseless” and explains that:

As explained by [Ms.] Thom, the SEDS database cannot generate a “SEDS Document 

Index.” ¶¶ 8-9. And instead of saving or printing multiple screenshots of the documents 

viewable in the system, which could provide an incomplete, and possibly inaccurate 

accounting of the documents that are included in the student’s file, Thom manually reviewed 

[the] student’s entire profile in SEDS and then created a document identifying and listing 

every document maintained in SEDS for K.B. during his time with DCPS, which she 
19

provided to Plaintiff’s counsel. ¶¶ 10-13. 

Def.’s CMSJ, ECF No. 16, at 23-24. DCPS asserts, and this Court agrees, that this document 

produced by DCPS satisfies the directive in the HOD, which ordered the provision of a “list of 

documents for student available through SEDS, sometimes referred to as the SEDS document 

index.” Accordingly, this claim by Plaintiff is denied.6

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court has reviewed the four claims set forth by Plaintiff, which challenge the IHO’s 

findings in his HOD. As explained herein, regarding each claim, the Court has found that the 

IHO made specific and reasoned findings that were based on the factual record and consistent 

with relevant legal authority. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be 

denied, and Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted. A separate 

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

____________/s/__________________

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

6 DCPS notes in its CMSJ, ECF No. 16, at 23, that Plaintiff seeks enforcement of the HOD, but 20 

U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A) “does not provide a cause of action to enforce school district compliance 

with a hearing officer’s decision.” B.D. v. District of Columbia, 817 F.3d 792, 803 (D.C. Cir. 

2016). Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is without merit, the Court need not address 

whether Plaintiff has adequately raised this claim in her Complaint, pursuant to her mention of 42 

U.S.C. §1983.