In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-2835

AHMAD J. TARRAF,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,

United States Attorney General,

Respondent.

____________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A78-851-200.

____________

ARGUED MAY 1, 2007—DECIDED JULY 30, 2007

____________

Before RIPPLE, MANION and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. On February 18, 2005, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Ahmad Tarraf’s applications for

asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and ordered him

removed from the United States. Mr. Tarraf appealed to

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”),

which adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ on June

1, 2006. Mr. Tarraf filed a petition for review in this court

on July 5, 2006. For the reasons stated in this opinion,

we deny the petition for review.
2 No. 06-2835

1 Mr. Tarraf did not seek relief from removal on the basis of this

marriage while he was in proceedings before the IJ and BIA.

Therefore, we are concerned only with Mr. Tarraf’s eligibility

for relief on the basis of his claimed fear of persecution and

torture if removed to Lebanon.

2 In order to demonstrate that he was persecuted within the

meaning of the law, Mr. Tarraf must show that the harm he

suffered was either at the hands of the government of Lebanon

(or its agents) or that the government of Lebanon was unable or

unwilling to protect him from the responsible parties. See

Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2004). Mr.

Tarraf testified that he requested assistance from the Lebanese

authorities every time he was targeted by Hezbollah, but that

(continued...)

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts and Immigration Court Proceedings

Mr. Tarraf is a native and citizen of Lebanon. Since

entering the United States unlawfully through Mexico in

2000, Mr. Tarraf has married a United States citizen; they

have two daughters, also United States citizens.1

 After a

traffic stop in October 2001, Mr. Tarraf was brought to the

attention of immigration authorities, was arrested and

placed in removal proceedings. Before the IJ, he conceded

removability on the basis of his unlawful presence, but

requested asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief.

According to his testimony at the removal hearing,

Mr. Tarraf fears persecution by Hezbollah, a group the

State Department Reports describe as an “Iranian-backed

Shi’a Muslim faction” that “undermine[s]” the central

government of Lebanon.2

 A.R. at 173. He claims that
No. 06-2835 3

2 (...continued)

they refused because Hezbollah was “part of the government.”

A.R. at 108. The Attorney General has not raised any challenge

to Mr. Tarraf’s asylum eligibility on the basis of a failure to meet

this state action requirement. We therefore take as established,

for present purposes, that if Hezbollah is responsible for

persecution, it is either an agent of the state of Lebanon or a

force within Lebanon that the Lebanese government is unable

or unwilling to control.

We note that certain language in Hor v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482

(7th Cir. 2005) (“Hor I”), if read broadly, could suggest that when

an alien has been targeted by an armed insurgency (rather than

the government itself), he can never establish that he has been

persecuted within the meaning of the law. In Hor I, we denied

Hor’s motion for a stay of removal, because we concluded that

he was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his asylum claim. We

noted that Hor claimed to be aligned with the government

against the insurgency, and that the government had been

successful in its efforts to protect Hor. Id. at 485-86. Hor’s case

was subsequently heard by a merits panel. Hor v. Gonzales, 421

F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Hor II”). In that subsequent decision,

we vacated the Board’s denial of his requests for relief. We

clarified that “nongovernmental persecution is much less

common than governmental persecution,” but that persecution

by private actors can give rise to viable asylum claim. Id. at 501

(“You cannot even claim asylum on the basis of persecution by

a private group unless the government either condones it or is

helpless to prevent it, but if either of those conditions is satisfied, the

claim is a good one.” (emphasis added)). To the extent that Hor I

might be read to suggest an opposite conclusion, Hor II instructs

that it should not be over-read.

Hezbollah both has accused him of being an Israeli collaborator or spy and has recruited him aggressively to join

its cause. Mr. Tarraf contends that, because neither he nor
4 No. 06-2835

3 Some of these return trips to Lebanon followed his own health

problems that arose while abroad in Africa. Other return trips

related to his family obligations and still others corresponded

to additional significant life events.

his family has acquiesced to these demands, they have

been repeated targets of threats and violence committed by

Hezbollah.

Prior to his merits hearing, Mr. Tarraf submitted an

asylum application with the assistance of counsel. He

attached limited supporting documents, including a brief

statement that provided certain details regarding his

claim as well as a letter from his older brother that purported to corroborate Mr. Tarraf’s history with Hezbollah.

At his removal hearing, Mr. Tarraf testified, in support of

his requests for relief, about three main incidents. First, he

stated that his brother, Mohsen Tarraf, was killed by

Hezbollah in 1990. The record included a copy of Mohsen’s

death certificate written in Arabic, but the translation

included in the record only states his name, village and

date of death, without any information about the cause.

Mr. Tarraf’s testimony itself provided few other details. He

said only that his brother drove a taxi and that Hezbollah

tried to “send stuff with him”; he testified both that

Hezbollah did not pay Mohsen and that Mohsen “declined

to take stuff from them and then they killed him.” A.R. at

109. According to Mr. Tarraf, because of his brother’s

death, he left Lebanon in fear of Hezbollah. See id. at 96. He

began living and working primarily in Côte d’Ivoire, but

returned to Lebanon for periods of one to two months

almost every year thereafter until 2000.3

According to Mr. Tarraf, the second incident occurred on

his return home to Lebanon in 1994. He testified that he
No. 06-2835 5

went to visit his ill mother in her home in Maaroub, an

hour and a half outside of Beirut. He stated that he traveled

to the house at night, and, while he was there, Hezbollah

came looking for him. They came to the door and spoke to

his father, asking whether Ahmad was home and whether

they could speak with him. Mr. Tarraf’s father apparently

sent them away, and Mr. Tarraf waited in the home for

two hours before attempting to leave. As he headed for

his car, they called to him, and he tried to run away. He

stated that they threw a grenade at him and that they

shot him in the leg and in the back. Afterwards, he was

taken to a Hezbollah clinic where he stayed for three days.

When he was asked why Hezbollah had targeted him, he

told the court, “they want me to work for them and I used

to travel a lot and they used to—they say I’m [a] spy for

Israel.” Id. at 102. Mr. Tarraf stated that he told them that

he agreed to work for them and was allowed to leave the

hospital, but that he immediately headed for Beirut

where he left again for Africa.

Mr. Tarraf also stated that, after this incident, he continued to travel back and forth between Côte d’Ivoire and

Lebanon. Although he was not sure whether he had

returned to Lebanon in 1995, he did return in 1996 to

become engaged and again in 1997 around the time of his

marriage. He told the court that, on this trip, “[Hezbollah]

knew that [he] was there” and, therefore, he “ran away

again” to Côte d’Ivoire. Id. at 104. Mr. Tarraf claimed that

Hezbollah was “looking for [him] because they wanted

[him] to work for them” and that people in his neighborhood would inform Hezbollah on each of his returns to

Lebanon. Id. at 105. On these return trips, he stayed with

his wife’s family or with friends in order to avoid

Hezbollah.
6 No. 06-2835

4 In his written statement, Mr. Tarraf had stated that he was

arrested while staying with his parents and that he was held for

only three days. The additional letter from his brother Abo

Tarraf, included with his asylum application, also written in

English, states that the detention was for a period of three days.

Mr. Tarraf stayed in Côte d’Ivoire until turmoil within

that country forced his return to Lebanon in 1998 for a

period of five months; thereafter, he went briefly to France,

and returned again to Lebanon. In November 1998, Mr.

Tarraf traveled to Syria and then to Mexico, where he

attempted to enter the United States. He claims that

Mexican officials would not allow his travel to the United

States from Mexico City, and so again he returned to

Lebanon and remained there for a year and a half.

Finally, Mr. Tarraf testified about an incident that

occurred just before his actual arrival in the United States.

He claimed that, in April of 2000, Hezbollah again came

looking for him. He stated that he moved from house to

house while in Lebanon, but that Hezbollah members

found him and arrested him at a friend’s house. He stated

that they held him for one month until he agreed to work

with them.4

 Upon prodding from the IJ about what occurred during this period of detention, he testified that

Hezbollah “beat [him] up so bad everywhere.” Id. at 111.

He escaped and traveled to Mexico; from there he entered

the United States. Mr. Tarraf stated that, since he had

arrived in the United States, his apartment in Lebanon

had been confiscated by Hezbollah and his 21 year-old

nephew had been killed by them. Id. at 113-15. He testified

that Hezbollah continued to look for him, asking even his

seven year-old daughter if she knew where he was. He

stated that, if he was returned, he feared that Hezbollah
No. 06-2835 7

was “[j]ust going to torture [him] and torture [him].” Id.

at 118.

The IJ attempted to clarify with Mr. Tarraf why he

believed that Hezbollah had targeted him for the intense

recruiting he had described. In response, Mr. Tarraf stated,

“[t]hey wanted me to execute some operation for them,

could be in Israel or anywhere outside Lebanon and they

said they pay me any amount of money but I declined.” Id.

at 109. The IJ pressed Mr. Tarraf on why Hezbollah wanted

him in particular, and he stated, “I didn’t have any training

of any kind or anything. . . . I used to travel a lot. It was

easier for me to get visas wherever I want to go.” Id. at 110.

The IJ asked why Hezbollah would assault him as part of

an attempt to recruit him, and Mr. Tarraf responded, “they

just keep beating me up until I agree.” Id. at 113.

When Mr. Tarraf had finished his substantive testimony,

the IJ confronted him with inconsistencies between his live

testimony and the statements in his asylum application

that had been prepared with the assistance of the same

attorney who represented him at the hearing. See id. at 119.

Specifically, the IJ noted that Mr. Tarraf’s written statement

said that he had been captured by Hezbollah in 2000

while at his parents’ house, although at his hearing he

repeatedly had testified that he was at his friend’s house.

The IJ also noted that the written statement indicated that

he had been held for three days, not one month, as Mr.

Tarraf had maintained in court. Finally, the IJ questioned

him regarding the varying descriptions of his detention: In

his written statement, Mr. Tarraf indicated that Hezbollah

had questioned and pressured him during this time, but he

made no mention of any physical abuse, although at his

hearing Mr. Tarraf testified several times that he was

repeatedly beaten and tortured. Mr. Tarraf stated that
8 No. 06-2835

perhaps translation difficulties troubled the earlier statement, but that he stood behind his in-court testimony

relating to his detention in 2000. See id. at 119. The IJ noted

that his attorney speaks Arabic and seemed to question

whether that explanation was plausible.

B. The Decision of the IJ

The IJ denied Mr. Tarraf’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief.

First, with respect to his asylum claim, he noted that Mr.

Tarraf had filed his application more than one year after

entering the country and had not demonstrated changed or

exceptional circumstances to overcome the statutory bar

in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

Turning to his claim for withholding of removal, the IJ

reviewed Mr. Tarraf’s in-court testimony. He noted the

claims of his brother’s murder in 1990 and of the 1994

incident in which Mr. Tarraf was shot, but continued,

“despite his refusal to support the Hezbollah, he continued

to return to Lebanon every year without great difficulty,”

including one stretch of more than a year shortly before

leaving for the United States in 2000. A.R. at 50. The IJ

noted that his final departure followed, according to Mr.

Tarraf, an arrest and detention of a month, during which

time he was beaten and pressured to join Hezbollah; he

also noted that Mr. Tarraf believed that he would be

harmed or killed for his continued refusal to cooperate

with Hezbollah.

After reviewing the Government’s objections to relief, the

IJ determined that Mr. Tarraf’s applications should be

denied. He concluded that Mr. Tarraf’s testimony was not
No. 06-2835 9

credible and that he had failed to explain the discrepancies

or provide corroborative evidence or detailed facts

“affect[ing] his credibility and also prevent[ing] him from

meeting his standard of proof.” Id. at 52.

On the credibility issue, the IJ noted that a petitioner’s

testimony alone can establish the basis for asylum, but

must be detailed, credible and persuasive, all of which he

found lacking in this case. The IJ stated that, if Mr. Tarraf

had feared persecution since 1990 when his brother was

killed, his repeated trips to Lebanon undercut his claimed

fear. The IJ next considered the 1994 incident in which

Mr. Tarraf testified that he had been shot by Hezbollah

while leaving his parents’ home. The IJ noted that

Mr. Tarraf had been taken by the shooters to receive

medical treatment and was permitted to leave the clinic

without incident. The IJ further observed that Mr. Tarraf

had provided virtually no details in his description of this

event. Again, the IJ noted that he returned home on

numerous occasions following the incident. Under these

circumstances, the IJ concluded that this incident did

not support a finding that Hezbollah sought to harm

Mr. Tarraf.

“More significant” to the credibility issue, according to

the IJ, were the “drastic” discrepancies between the written application and the in-court testimony, specifically in

regard to the final claimed incident in 2000. Id. at 54. Given

that Mr. Tarraf had left Lebanon permanently in response

to this final incident, the IJ concluded that the discrepancies

“went to the heart of” Mr. Tarraf’s credibility and his claim.

Id. The IJ did not believe that it made sense that the most

serious allegations of persecution were not presented or

were grossly understated in Mr. Tarraf’s written application submitted before trial. Therefore, the IJ concluded that
10 No. 06-2835

Mr. Tarraf’s “in-[c]ourt contention that he was held for one

month and tortured by Hezbollah [was] simply not credible

in light of this inconsistency.” Id. at 55.

The IJ went on to state that, even if Mr. Tarraf was shot in

1994 and detained in 2000 for the shorter period of

three days that he had described in his written application,

those incidents did not rise to the level of past persecution.

The IJ ruled that, if Mr. Tarraf had been shot in 1994, the

circumstances surrounding the injury as described “remain

unclear.” Id. at 56. The three-day detention and questioning

without “any evidence that he was seriously injured, that

he needed medical attention or hospitalization following

his detention” did not support a finding of past persecution. Id.

Having found no past persecution, and finding that the

fear of future persecution rested on the testimony regarding past events that he had ruled was “exaggerated and

false,” the IJ stated that Mr. Tarraf had not shown that it

was more likely than not that he would be persecuted if

returned. Id. Because he already had determined that the

testimony was not credible, the IJ further stated that the

absence of corroborative evidence was fatal to Mr. Tarraf’s

claim. The IJ denied the claim for CAT relief on the same

basis.

C. The Decision of the BIA

The Board adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ. In

its one-paragraph of analysis, the Board stated only that

(1) it concurred that no exception to the one-year deadline

for asylum applications applied; (2) it did not find the

IJ’s adverse credibility finding clearly erroneous on the

record presented to it; and (3) it agreed with the IJ that the
No. 06-2835 11

5 Mr. Tarraf has not asked this court to review the portion of the

IJ’s decision denying him asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)

(providing, in pertinent part, that no court shall have jurisdiction to review decisions regarding the timeliness of asylum

applications and the applicability of the statutory exceptions).

6 We note that the Government raised a jurisdictional challenge

in its brief, contending that Mr. Tarraf had failed to file his

petition for review in this court within the thirty-day time

period provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). We informed the

Government at oral argument that this court was closed for a

holiday at the end of the thirty-day period and, therefore, that

(continued...)

specific inconsistency between the statement and the

testimony was material, as it related to “the length of his

alleged detention and the severity of his treatment, which

suggests that [he] is attempting to embellish the basis for

his asylum claim.” Id. at 2. The Board “agree[d] with the

[IJ] that this inconsistency goes to the heart of [Mr. Tarraf’s]

claim and undermines [his] credibility.” Id. Accordingly,

the Board dismissed the appeal.

Mr. Tarraf timely petitioned for review in this court,

pursuing only his claims for withholding of removal and

CAT relief.5

II

DISCUSSION

Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the opinion of the

IJ, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by any

discussion in the BIA’s opinion. Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d

412, 416 (7th Cir. 2007). Mr. Tarraf raises three challenges

to the decision of the IJ and BIA.6

 First, he claims that the IJ
12 No. 06-2835

6 (...continued)

Mr. Tarraf’s filing was timely. The Government thereafter orally

withdrew its jurisdictional challenge.

applied an incorrect standard in making his adverse

credibility determination. Next, he claims that the IJ’s

conclusion that he did not suffer past persecution was

error. Finally, he claims that the IJ erred in denying summarily his claim for CAT relief.

We review a decision denying withholding of removal

and CAT relief under the deferential substantial evidence

standard. Boci v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2007);

Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2006).

Under this standard, we shall grant the petition only when

the record compels the conclusion that the alien was

entitled to the relief sought. Boci, 473 F.3d at 767. An alien

seeking withholding of removal bears the burden of

demonstrating a clear probability that he will face persecution if removed. Shymelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 481

(7th Cir. 2007) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 410 (1984)).

“The question under [the clear probability] standard is

whether it is more likely than not that the alien would be

subject to persecution.” INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424

(1984). The standard for establishing entitlement to CAT

relief is similarly stringent. Gomes v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 746,

757 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that, to obtain CAT relief, an

alien must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that

he will be tortured if removed). With these general constraints on our review in mind, we now examine each of

Mr. Tarraf’s claims.
No. 06-2835 13

A. Credibility Determination

Mr. Tarraf claims that the IJ focused on “only two

discrepancies” and therefore failed to consider the totality

of circumstances in making an adverse credibility determination. Appellant’s Br. at 11.

Credibility determinations are factual findings that

we review deferentially. Shmyhelskyy, 477 F.3d at 479. We

shall uphold an adverse credibility determination if the

record, considered as a whole, does not compel a conclusion to the contrary. Feto v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 907, 912

(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301,

1306 (2003)); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.

2004). “We will not overturn adverse credibility determinations simply because the evidence might support an

alternate finding.” Kllokoqi v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 336, 341

(7th Cir. 2005); see also Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 553

(7th Cir. 2006) (noting that an adverse credibility determination cannot be reversed simply because this court

would conclude that a positive credibility finding was

supported by substantial evidence). Nevertheless, this

court also has stated that it will not hesitate to overturn an

adverse credibility determination when the IJ fails to give

specific, cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the

finding. Ayi v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2006).

We thus have reversed when the discrepancies were minor,

Adekpe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 525, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2007),

when they concerned irrelevant details in light of the

alien’s broader claim of persecution, see Kllokoqi, 439 F.3d

at 341-42 (reversing the credibility determination where

“the number of traumatic and tragic events that have

happened to” the alien made his lack of memory on the

name of a high school he attended a decade earlier insufficient to support the finding), or when the IJ failed to
14 No. 06-2835

7 Adekpe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2007); see also

Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 474, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2007)

(upholding an adverse credibility determination based on the

alien’s unexplained failure in the written application to mention

the most severe allegations of detention and physical violence

that were described at trial); Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 377,

384-85 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding an adverse credibility determination when the alien failed to explain adequately the

omission from her testimony of the most recent incident

described in her written statement); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355

F.3d 1075, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect

particularly invasive events to be mentioned in asylum applications . . . .”).

consider the alien’s reasonable explanations offered for

a discrepancy, see Shtaro v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 711, 716-17

(7th Cir. 2006) (faulting an IJ for failing to “attempt to

ascertain whether [the discrepancies] could be accounted

for”).

We further have noted that the failure to mention, in an

asylum application, certain details that later appear in live

testimony does not render an alien’s testimony per se

incredible. Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1090 (7th Cir.

2004) (citing Lopez-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th

Cir. 1996)). We repeatedly have stated, however, that

when an IJ’s adverse credibility determination is based on

inconsistencies between an alien’s earlier statements and

his testimony at his hearing that go to the heart of his

claim, that are substantive and that are not easily explained or superficial, we shall uphold the adverse determination.7

The discrepancies in this case concern the most serious

allegations of persecution, and, indeed, relate to one of only
No. 06-2835 15

two events Mr. Tarraf described in which he personally

was targeted. Mr. Tarraf’s in-court testimony was that he

was taken from his friend’s home, detained, severely

beaten, tortured and interrogated for a period of thirty days

before he finally relented to his captors’ demands that he

join Hezbollah. His asylum application, by contrast,

had stated that he was taken from his parents’ home

and detained and questioned for three days; he had made

no mention of any physical violence or torture in his

asylum application.

The BIA found that the changed accounts constituted

an attempt by Mr. Tarraf to “embellish” his claim. A.R. at

2. The record, considered in whole, does not compel a

contrary conclusion. The changed account substantially

alters the length and severity of the critical incident that

Mr. Tarraf says precipitated his final journey to the United

States. In addition, although not mentioned by the IJ in his

decision, a letter submitted along with the asylum application from Mr. Tarraf’s brother states, “they found you and

put you in the prison 3 dey [sic] until you agreed to work

with them. At last you escaped to America . . . .” A.R. at

166-67. To the extent that the letter corroborates any part of

Mr. Tarraf’s claim, it supports the version of events the IJ

ultimately credited and considered, a three-day detention under less severe conditions than those alleged in

Mr. Tarraf’s in-court testimony. The IJ’s additional determination that Mr. Tarraf’s description of events lacked

sufficient detail further supports the IJ’s credibility finding. See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 499-500 (7th Cir.

2004) (noting that, among relevant considerations in

determining credibility are internal consistency and level

of detail). Mr. Tarraf’s description of the major events

involved in his claim was perfunctory; even when pressed
16 No. 06-2835

for details, Mr. Tarraf said only that he was “tortured very

badly” or “so beaten up,” A.R. at 111.

Finally, Mr. Tarraf suggests that the IJ erred in declining

to credit his explanation that perhaps language difficulties

contributed to errors in the original statement. The IJ did

not fail to inquire into the reasons for the discrepancy, see

Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2003), and

Mr. Tarraf gives no explanation of why the IJ should

have been required to credit his explanation, especially

where, as here, the IJ noted that Mr. Tarraf was represented

by the same Arabic-speaking attorney both at the time of

his application and his hearing. See A.R. at 120; see also Feto,

433 F.3d at 911 (“The IJ was not, however, compelled to

accept [the alien’s] explanation for the plain inconsistencies

in his story.”); cf. Chen v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 707, 710 (7th

Cir. 2005) (noting that, although “[s]ignificant discrepancies among different versions of an alien’s statement are

generally a permissible basis for an adverse credibility

decision [,] . . . . initial asylum applications should not

always be considered completely reliable, particularly when

filled out without the assistance of counsel”) (emphasis added).

Mr. Tarraf’s apparent language difficulties may have

contributed, in some measure, to the discrepancies between

the different versions of his story; this possibility, however, does not mean that it was impermissible for the IJ to

conclude that the character of the particular discrepancies

in issue should weigh against the petitioner.

The IJ’s credibility analysis also mentions Mr. Tarraf’s

repeated trips back into Lebanon following his brother’s

alleged murder and the shooting incident in 1994. The IJ’s

opinion states that this travel “undercut [Mr. Tarraf’s]

credibility concerning his fear.” A.R. at 39. A proposition

that any voluntary return to one’s home country renders
No. 06-2835 17

8 See Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 893 (7th Cir.

2007) (holding that, when the alien previously had entered and

left the United States on three occasions after claiming to have

endured severe incidents of past persecution, the IJ was not

“compelled to believe that . . . return trips [to the alien’s home

country] are what a person in dire fear of persecution . . . would

do”).

any claim regarding past and future persecution incredible

would be far too broad a proposition to serve as a working rule for assessing an alien’s testimony. Although we

have recognized that return travel might be an appropriate

factor weighing against an alien’s credible fear,8

 each case

must be considered in light of its own specific facts. There

well may be circumstances when a person who legitimately

fears persecution nevertheless might elect to return temporarily to his home country. Health conditions made worse

abroad, health conditions of family members and other

major life events might drive a person to choose to take

certain risks and return home, while doing his best to

mitigate them. Here, Mr. Tarraf contended that his trips

could be justified in these terms. While we may have

reached a different conclusion, we cannot say that, under

the circumstances here, the IJ erred in characterizing the

trips as he did.

In any event, even without this factor weighing against

his credibility, we believe that the other legitimate considerations that influenced the IJ’s adverse credibility

determination are sufficient to sustain that ruling. We

therefore uphold that determination as supported by

substantial evidence.
18 No. 06-2835

9 With respect to the 1994 incident, the IJ stated only that the

circumstances of this incident remain “unclear.” A.R. at 41.

B. Past Persecution

The IJ ruled that, even crediting Mr. Tarraf’s testimony

to the extent of the unembellished story of a three-day

detention in 2000 and the shooting in 1994, those incidents

did not support a finding of past persecution.9

 We review

the conclusion that the harm the petitioner may have

suffered did not rise to the level of persecution under the

substantial evidence standard. Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d

687, 698 (7th Cir. 2004). The IJ did not believe that

Mr. Tarraf had demonstrated that his final detention

resulted in serious injuries requiring medical attention or

hospitalization. That the IJ declined to credit the full extent

of Mr. Tarraf’s claimed harms does not, in and of itself,

require his subsequent conclusion that Mr. Tarraf did not

suffer past persecution. Physical abuse causing serious

injuries is not the sine qua non of persecution. Dandan v.

Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003). Persecution

can include confiscation of property, surveillance and

behavior that threatens future harm. Gomes, 473 F.3d at 754

(citing Capric, 355 F.3d at 1084). Conduct can rise to the

level of persecution without being life-threatening, including even such acts as severe economic deprivation. Capric,

355 F.3d at 1084. Frequency and severity of the harms

suffered by a petitioner, however, remain relevant factors

in an inquiry into whether those particular harms compel

a court to conclude that the alien suffered persecution. See

Dandan, 339 F.3d at 573. We further have recognized

that actions such as detention, arrest, interrogation,

prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confisca-
No. 06-2835 19

10 See also Mema v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 412, 417-18 (7th Cir. 2007)

(kidnapping at gunpoint, interrogation and beating did not

compel a finding of past persecution); Prela v. Ashcroft, 394

F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2005) (repeated interrogations and twentyfour hour detention did not compel a finding of persecution);

Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003) (three-day

detention, in which alien was deprived of food and beaten,

leaving his face swollen, did not compel a finding of past

persecution).

11 We note that the IJ did not discuss specifically any of Mr.

Tarraf’s testimony other than the two most significant incidents

of claimed persecution, in which Mr. Tarraf himself came into

contact with Hezbollah. Our conclusion that the record does not

compel a finding of past persecution, however, is based on the

totality of evidence Mr. Tarraf produced in support of his

claims. See Bejko v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 482, 486-87 (7th Cir. 2006).

tion of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture

might cross the line from harassment to persecution.

However, recognizing that these sorts of activities

might rise to the level of persecution is not the equivalent of saying that they always do. Persecution claims

cannot simply be evaluated against a generic checklist.

Review of an applicant’s past experience must be

carried out on the most specific level—it is the details

that reveal the severity of the particular situation.

Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in

original).10

As Liu acknowledges, many of the claims Mr. Tarraf

makes in his testimony as a whole could support a finding

of past persecution, and indeed, on another record, this

court might conclude that they compel such a finding.11 The

extremely scant details in Mr. Tarraf’s testimony, however,
20 No. 06-2835

12 Mr. Tarraf claims that, although he did not couch his appeal

of the denial of CAT relief in due process terms, he did fairly

present this claim to the BIA. His brief to the Board does state

that he appeals the denial of CAT relief. In substance, however, that brief discusses only the IJ’s determinations that: (1)

Mr. Tarraf is statutorily barred from asylum, (2) the harm did

not rise to the level of persecution, (3) that there was no clear

probability of future persecution, and (4) that Mr. Tarraf was

incredible and his claim was unsupported by corroboration. See

A.R. 11-14.

prevent this court from reaching that conclusion in this

case. We do not hold that a petitioner must provide a blowby-blow, minute-by-minute account of his experiences in

his home country in order to establish past persecution;

we note only that something more than the general allegations of detention and torture provided to the IJ in this

case will compel a finding of past persecution. On the

record before us, the IJ’s conclusion that Mr. Tarraf did not

carry his burden to establish past persecution is supported

by substantial evidence.

C. CAT Relief

Mr. Tarraf’s final claim in his petition is that the IJ denied

him due process of law by summarily rejecting his request

for CAT relief without applying the proper standards.

This court lacks jurisdiction to review this claim, however, because it was not presented to the BIA.12 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(d)(1); see also Pjetri v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 478, 481 (7th

Cir. 2006) (“Where . . . a due process argument is based on

procedural failings that the BIA is capable of addressing,

the petitioner must exhaust his or her remedies at the

BIA before bringing the claim in this court.”).
No. 06-2835 21

Conclusion

The agency’s conclusions that Mr. Tarraf’s in-court

testimony was not credible and that, to the extent it could

be credited, it did not demonstrate past persecution, are

conclusions supported by substantial evidence on the

administrative record as a whole. Therefore, we deny his

petition for review and affirm the decision of the Board.

PETITION DENIED

DECISION AFFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-30-07