Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 30 , 2020.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 18

- 00336

- CV

DEVON HARRISON & ROBERT HARRISON , Appellant s
V. MERITZ FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO., LTD , Appellee

On Appeal from the 400th District Co ur t F ort Bend County , Texas T rial Court Cause No. 12

- DCV

- 202473

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee Meritz Fire & Mari ne In surance Company, Limited su ed Devon Harrison, Rober t Harrison , an d No rthern & Western I n surance Company for fraud, conspiracy, and viola ti o n s o f the Texas T hef t Li ability A ct

. 1 Meritz obtained a

1 Meritz file d additional cla ims but abandoned them at trial. Within Meritz ’s fraud claim , M eritz ple d a fr audulent i nduce ment claim. N o p arty argues this claim wa s aban doned a t tri al.2

summary judgment against Northern & Western I n surance Company

. 2 After a bench trial, the trial court en tered a final judgment in favor of Meritz

. The H arrisons filed this appeal r a isin g three is sues. F irst , appellant s conten d
that the statute of limitations bars all claims asserted aga i nst them , except Merit z ’ s fraudulent inducement claim . Appellants argue that the fraudulent inducement
claim fails be c ause reliance is not justifie d as a matter of law

. Secon d, app ellants
arg ue t hat the evidence is legally and factually ins ufficient to support the judgme nt

. Third, appellants contend tha t the trial court e rred in failing to apportion responsibility betw e en appellants and Sh ann on John son , a designated resp ons ible
third

- party.

W e conclude that a ppellants f ailed to establish reliance was not justified as a
matter of law , and the trial court ’ s judgment can be affirmed on th is ground

. Therefore , w e do not address appellan t ’ s f irst i ss ue ( regard ing limitations ) or their
second issue ( regarding the sufficiency o f the evidence )

. 3 I nstead we address onl y part of appellan ts ’ fir st issue regarding justifiable r eliance and a ppellant s ’ thir d
issue regarding apportionment of damages be tween ap pellants and the designat ed responsibl e third

- party.

I. BACKGROUND

Mer i tz is a So uth Korean

- based insuranc e compan y. Part of i ts business
includes i nsuring “ refund guarantee s ” in South Ko rea ’ s shipbui lding i n du stry. To mitigate this risk, Mer itz look s to a r einsurer to shift all or p art of its e xp osure

2 Th e summary judgment ruling is not at issue in this appeal

. 3 A ppellants ’ second issue only challe nge s s ufficiency relate d to the initial fraud, conspiracy , a nd T heft L iability A ct clai ms , not the fraudul ent inducem ent claim

. Lik e appellants ’ limitat ion s argument , we wo uld st il l up hold the judgment on the fr audulent inducement claim even if we were to conclud e the evidence is insufficient to uphold th e judgment on th e claims for fraud, c onspir acy , or the T heft L iability A ct

.3

under the refun d guara ntees. Mer itz used London Special Risks as its broker t o help it locate appropriate reinsur e r s

. Northern & W estern Insur ance Com pany ( “ NWIC ” ) wa s one such reins urer

. At al l releva nt times , appellant Devon Harr iso n was the president , managing
director , and sole owner of NWIC . A ppellant Ro ber t Harrison , Devon ’ s husband,

was a senior underwriter for NWIC

. From September 2007 to September 20 08 , Me r it z and NWIC entered into f ive reins u rance co nt racts totaling more tha n $350
million dolla r s in reinsurance c overage

. To assure Me ritz that NWIC could insure such a large liabilit y, NWIC , through Robert and Devon Harrison , represente d that
i t had as sets avai la

ble on deposit with ABN AMRO Bank more th an suff icient t o cover th e obligations and provided documentation t o that effect. I n e x change for the reinsurance obligations, Meritz paid $4,200,408.14 in premiums to NW IC.

M eritz was audite d in 2008 . As par t of this process , Meritz needed
additio nal info rmation re garding the NWI C accounts at ABN AMRO Bank. Unable to o btain the info rmation t hat it needed from NWIC, Meritz ’ s broker requested the information fr om A BN AMRO Bank

. As a result of this exchange,
M er itz became concerned that the document ation pr ovided by NWIC purporting to be from ABN AMRO Bank was fraud u lent.

On O ct ober 21, 2008, Meritz sent NWIC a written deman d to verify the
ABN AMRO accounts by o ne of two possi ble methods on or before October 24 , 2008. NWI C failed to satisfactorily perform the requested veri ficati on by the
deadli ne or thereafter. During this period, NWIC represented to Meritz that NWIC
had plenty of a ssets to secure the reinsuran ce obligations between the partie s

. Rober t H arri so n flew to South Korea in an effort to reassure Meritz that NW IC had
the fund s at ABN AMRO Bank and that NWI C would p rovide a secure bank

com municat ion to Merit z to confirm

. Shortly there afte r , Ro bert sent an email4

ind icat ing that t he secur e b ank messa ge wa s sent and wo uld be re ceived by Merit z shortly . N o secure bank message was received from ABN AMRO Bank. Around this same perio d, M eritz receiv ed a secure bank communic ation
from a bank in the Ukraine . The secure message s tated th at NWIC “ wi shes to
confi rm its full reser vation s of capital in support of i ts [ reinsurance oblig ations]

. . . . to expiration of each unle ss sooner released o f liability eac h to the benefit of
Merit z

. . . . ” No account num ber was provided and n o amounts in any such

accounts w er e listed to confir m tha t N W IC ha d reserved asse ts for the reinsu rance

o bligations

. At trial, Meritz ’ s corporate representative testif ied that t he sec ured
message s ent by NWIC was “ totally different ” f rom w hat Meritz requested

. O n October 27, 2008 , Me ritz ins tructed it s br oker to rescin d or cancel the five reinsurance agre eme nts with NWIC and to obtain a full ref u nd of the premiums. In its written inst ructions to its broker, Mer itz state d that “ [u] nder the

cu rrent situ ation , we cam e t o [a] conclusion that the [reinsurance obl igations ]
pr ov ide d by NWIC are false and fake and t hat no sufficient fund covering our potential claim exists under each rein surance con tr act is deposi t ed in ABN
AMRO

. ”

I n November 2008, Meritz and NWIC en tered i nto a settlement ag re ement

. NWIC agreed to repay the pr emiums to Mer itz, minus some fees pai d to third parti es , in exchange for a release. F rom Decembe r 2008 through March 2009, appellant Devon Harrison r epr esented that the settl ement payment woul d be m ad e but that NWIC was f

acing difficulties in p aying the se ttlement amou nt for various

reasons

. The settlem ent payment was never made

. On November 21 , 20 12, Meritz filed its petition again st NWIC, Devon , and
R ober t . A summa ry judgment was taken a ga inst NWIC and the remainder of the case proceeded to a bench trial

. A t trial , M eritz agreed to pursue only its claims of5

fraud, civil conspiracy , and T hef t L iability A ct violations against the H a r risons

. The trial court rendered jud gment for Meritz agains t the Harrisons , jointly and severall y , for dam ages in the amount of $4,200,408.00

. This appe al follo wed.

II. JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE Assuming wit hout deci ding t hat Meritz ’ s claims for fraud, civil conspiracy,
and claims under the T heft L i ability A ct for the rep re sentations made in and
surroundi ng the reinsu rance agreem ents a re barred by limitations, the re is o ne remaining claim

— fraudu lent indu cem en t related to the settlement agre ement between the parties

. Appellants do not argue that the fraudulent inducement c la im 4 is barred by limit ations, bu t ins tead assert that reli ance was not justified as a matter
of law

. A. Applicable Law

In a benc h trial in which the trial court does not file fin dings of fact or conclusio ns of law, we imply all findi ngs and conclusions nec es sary to support the ju dgment. 5 AMPD Holdings, Inc. v. Pra esidi um Med. Prof ’ l L i ab

. Ins. Co. , 5 55
S .W.3d 697 , 706 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Implied findings
of fact have the same wei ght as a jury ’ s verdict. Id

. The judgment must be a ff irmed if it can be up h eld on any legal theory that finds s uppor t in the evidence. Wood v.
Kenn edy , 473 S.W.3d 329, 334 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Di st.] 2014, no pet.). When the appella te record includes the reporter ’ s and clerk ’ s re cords, implied findings a re not conclusive and may be c hallenged fo r legal and fact ual sufficiency. Id

.

4 Meritz also pled a conspiracy to defraud, and specifically alleged that “ [a ]s part of the conspiracy and t o further its objectives , De fendants, and e ach of them, fur ther fraudulent ly induced Me ri tz to enter into th e November 2 4, 2008 Agreement

. ”

5 Here, appellants filed a request for fin d ings of fact and conclusions of law but did not file a notice of past du e fin dings. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 297.6

We review the tr ial court ’ s decision f or legal su fficiency of the evidence by
the same standards applied in reviewing the evidence supporting a ju ry ’ s finding.
I d

. We revi ew the evidence in the l ight mos t favorable to the challenge d f inding and indulge every reasonabl e inference that would s upport it. Id . (citing City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005) )

. We credit favorable evidence
if a reasonable fact fi nd er could and disregard cont rary evidence unless a
reasonab le fact finder co uld not. Id

. Texas law has long imposed a duty to abstain from indu cing another to enter into a contract through the use of fraudulent misrepresentations. Formos a Plastics Corp. U SA v. Presidio E

ng ’ rs & Contractors, Inc. , 960 S.W. 2d 4 1, 46 ( Tex. 1998). A p romise of futu re performance constitu tes an actionable misrepr esentation if the promise was made with no intention of performing at the time it was ma de. Id . at 48.

In a fra ud ulent inducement cl aim , the plaintiff must show that it ac tu ally
relied on the representation a nd that reliance w as ju stifiable. 6 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orc a Assets G.P., L.L.C. , 546 S. W.3d 648, 65 3 (Tex. 20 18).
Justifiable reliance is typically a q u estion of fact

. Id . a t 654

. The element can be negated as a matte r of law where reliance i s not justified based on th e particular
circums tances

. I

d . (citing N

at ’ l Prop. Holdings, L .P. v. Wes tergren , 45 3 S.W.3d
41 9, 424 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) )

. “ [A] par ty to a written co ntract cannot justifiably rely on o ral mis re presen tations regarding the contrac t ’ s unambiguous

terms. ” Id. at 658 ; see also Barrow

- Shaver Res

. Co . v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc. , 590 S.W.3d 471 , 499

– 500 ( T ex . 2019) (same ); AKB Hen drick
, LP v. Musgrave

6 App ellants asser t i n a single foo t note that Mer it z did not actually rely on the
re prese ntations rel ated to the fraudulent indu cement claim but did not cite to any authority or porti on of the record to support or furt her analyze this po int. As a result , appel lants have waive d this issue on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (i).7

En te r s ., Inc. , 380 S.W.3d 221, 232 (Te x. App.

— Dallas

. 2012, no pet .) ( “ Ge ner ally,
reli ance on representations ma de in a bu si ness or commercial transaction is not justified when the representation takes place in an adversarial context. ” )

. In determining w het he r justifiable reliance is ne gated as a ma tter of law, a court must

con si der the na t ure of the parties ’ relationship and the contract. Orc a Assets , 546 S.W.3d at 65 3

. B. Analys is

Meritz claim s that a p p el lants f raudulent ly induced it to enter into the

set tle m e nt agree ment by promising to pay t he settlement amount when ap pellants

n ever inte n ded to do so

. Mer it z co ntends that it relie d on these promise s to i ts detriment, namely , in delay ing leg al action against NWIC and appellants and in the

“ t otal loss ” of the p remium payment s

. Meritz also provided a release to NWIC and
its rel ated entities and officers in exchange for the settlement payment. 7
Appellants cit e tw o cases to support its argu ment that , in an adv ersari al

context , reliance is ne ga ted as a matt er of law. In Ortiz v. Collins , the defendants purchas ed real prope rty a t a forecl osure sale. 203 S.W.3d 414, 418 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Defendants filed a forcible detain er suit to

e vict p laintiff , the prior owner , f rom t he real property but were unable to gain
pos session. Id

. Def

endants then hi red a n a ttorney to file a forcible detainer suit.
Id

. During the second lawsuit, the parties entered into settlem ent negotiation s. Id

. Plain tiff a llege d that defendants ora ll y agreed to s ell him the property and that
defend ant s ’ attorney ind icated he wou ld not execute a w r i t of possession unless plaintiff failed to perform under the settlement agreement

. Id

. at 418

– 19.

7 A t tr ia l Meritz testified that the release provided b y t he settlement agreement was conditioned on the settlement payment being made

.8

Based on t he alleged a greeme nt, plaintiff did not defe nd the evictio n lawsuit which proceeded to judgment

. Id

. at 419. I t was undispu ted that there was n o executed written agreem ent between the part ies. See Id. Defendants and their

a ttorney denied ever agreeing t o se ll , reje cted p laintiff ’ s draft written s et tlement
agre e ment , and evicted plaintiff

. Id

. Th is c ourt held tha t plaintiff ’ s reliance on
defenda nts ’ oral statements was not justified as a matte r of law because the pa r ties
were in a n adv ersarial relationsh ip

. Id

. at 420

– 2 2

. In V all s v. Joh anson & F

ai rless, L.L. P. , the plaintiff sued opposing counse l for negligent m isrepresentat ion. 314 S.W.3d 6 24, 635 (Tex . App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). “ Courts have repeatedly held a party m ay not justifiably rely

on stat ements made by opposing counsel du ring settle me nt negoti ations

. ” Id

. at 635

– 36 (em ph asis added) (ci ting Am

. Phys icians In s. Excha nge v. Garcia , 876 S.W.2d 842, 849 (Tex. 1994) (“We recognize that settlement negotiations are adversarial and tha t reasonable negot iation often involves hard b argai ning b y both sides.”) )

. This court concluded that be ca use the parties had an adver sarial
relat ionsh ip and the negotiation process involved an arms

- length transaction in which both sides were rep resented and advise d by their o wn cou nsel , reliance was not jus t i fied as a mat ter o f law. Id . at 636.
Here, t her e is no evidence that appellan ts ’ counsel made a n y misrepresentation

. Additionally, t here is no evidence that Meritz was represented by counsel in negotiati ng or drafting the sett le ment a greeme nt or that it relied on any oral statement incons istent with the written, executed agre ement between the parties. Meritz and NWIC executed a written agree ment that is consistent with the representations made b efore and a fter th e agree ment was executed

. T h er e are no
extra

- contractual oral mi srepresentations upon which Meritz relie d ; instead , all th e9

represen tations made are contained within the contract . Thus, th is case is distinguishable from both Valls and Ortiz

. Ap pellants argue tha t any reliance on stat emen ts made during an adversarial negotiation proce ss is unjustified and unreasonabl e as a matter of l aw. “ Although
reliance on s tatem ents made in a n adversarial context is not gene rally justifiable

. . . we have fo un d [no case] hold ing that a party ’ s r elianc e on an opposi ng party ’ s statement during litigation is unjustified as a matter of law. ” Anderson v. Coche u , 176 S.W.3d 685, 690 (T ex. App.

— Dallas 2005, pet. denied)

. There is also no
indication that Meritz coul d have disc ove red the fraud was an obv ious l ie , or that with a reasonable inves tigation the statement could have been refu te d

. See id .; see

a lso Atl. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler , 137 S.W.3d 199 , 226 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) ( “ [I]n t he context of two opposing parties eng aged i n liti gation and negotiating at arm ’ s length and f rom equal bargaining positions , one party cannot prevail in a subsequent action for fraud based on its ‘ reliance ’ on its
oppo nents obvious lie or on a mis represen tation that , with reasonable diligence , coul d easily have been refuted. ” )

. Other than stating that the parties ’ relationsh ip was adversarial at the time the settlement agreement was execut ed, a ppellants fail to argue or po int t o evidence th at would suppo rt their cont ention that reliance w as n ot just ified as a

matt er of law. “ A party may not rely justifiably on a fraudulent mi srepresentation
wh en ‘ he knows that it is false or its falsity is obvious to him. ’ ” Wyrick v. Bus. Bank of Tex., N.A ., 577 S.W.3d 336, 3 49 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (quoting Triesch v. Triesch , No. 03

- 15

- 00102

- CV, 2016 WL 1039035, at

* 2 (Tex. App.

—

Austi n Mar. 8, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) )

. Appellants do not direct

us to conclusive pro of establ ishing that Meritz knew or should h ave known that the promis e to repay the premiums contai ned in the sett lement agreement was false10

and that Merit z knew or should h ave known appellant s had no intent or ability to perform that promise

. Our review of the record reveals at least a scintilla of evidence that Mer itz ju stif iably relied on the prom ise to repay premiums made in the settl ement agreement. I n early November , Devon Harrison sent a le tt er re garding cancellation of the reinsurance agreements and agree d to the can cellation and refund o f premium payments to Londo n Special ty Ris ks an d Meritz. Devon remarked tha t Merit z “ made a f

ull informed decisi on . . . we are in no way obligat ed to con si der
this most un usual re quest and our de cision to do so is based solel y on our tenured relationship with London Spe cialty Risk s Ltd. and not [Meri tz ’ s] demands. ”
N WIC continued to di spute that it had do ne anyth in g wrong th r ougho ut the
relati onships between the parties and it insisted it could hono r the reinsurance obligations issued to Meritz

. Simi larly, o n N ovember 21, 20 08, D evon sent a le tte r to Doug la s Min, Senior Vice President of Meritz, ind icating that their counsel ha d
d r afted the rel ease of liability for Merit z ’s review and co nsideratio n. The parties were not dealing with one another so lely through counsel but were al so communicating di rectly , a tt empting (before this case was filed) to res olve their
di sput e

. C onsidering the evidence in the light mo st fa vo rable to the challen ged
find ings and indu lging every reasonable inference t hat supports th e m , we conclude
that the re is le gally suffic ient evide nce o f justif iable reliance

. We overrule a ppellants ’ fi rst issue as i t rel a tes to Meritz ’ s fraudulent
inducement claim

. We do not ana lyze the statute of limitations is su e because it woul d not c hange the result even if we decided in appellants ’ f a vo r. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; s ee al so Lance v. Robinson , 543 S.W.3d 723 , 740 (Tex. 2 018) ( “ Rule 47 .1 requires only that the court of appeals add ress issues necessary to dispose of the appeal

. ” ).11 III. A PPORT I ONMENT OF DAMAGES
In their third issue, a ppellants a rgue that t h e trial court e r re d in failing t o apportion r esponsibility betwee n them a nd the designated responsible third

- pa rty , Shannon John son , for thei r independent acts

. A. Applicable Law Under Chapte r 3 3 of the Texas Civil Prac tice and Remed ies Code, the tri er of fact must d etermine t he p ercentage of responsibility t o certain pers ons for the
harm at issue. See Tex . Civ. Pr ac. & Rem. C ode § 33 .003(a). The trier of fact is

a fforded wide latitude in determ i ning the parties ’ propo r tionate respon sibility. See
J a ckson v. William Bros. Con s t r. Co. , 364 S.W .3d 317, 325 (Tex. App.

–– Hou ston [1 st Di st.] 20 11, pet. denied). We may set aside the f act find er ’ s determination of
propo rtionate responsibility onl y if the f inding is so against the great weight and prepondera nce of the evidence that it is c learly wrong and unju st. Id

. Even if the evi dence co uld support a different percentage allocation, an appel late court may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Id .; Samco Props ., Inc. v. Che atham , 977 S.W .2d 469, 478 (Tex. App.

–– Hou st on [14 th Dist.] 199 8, pet.
deni ed).

“ If respo nsib ility for the plaintiff ’ s injur y cannot be apport io ned wit h reasonable certainty among the defendants and other responsibl e parties

. . . then by definition th e tri er of fact canno t find any of them ‘ respon si bl e f or a p erc entage of the harm , ’ and Chapt er 33 doe s not apply. ” Lakes of Rosehill Homeown ers Ass ’ n, Inc. v. J

ones , 552 S.W.3d 414 , 420 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) ; see also Onyung v. On yung , No. 01

- 10

- 00 519

- CV, 2013 WL 3875548 , a t *11 ( Tex. A pp.

— Houston [1st Dist.] July 25, 201 3, pet. d enied ) ( “ When injuries resulting f

rom t he conduct of mu ltip le tort feasors cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty, the plaintiff ’ s injuries are in divisi ble and the tor tfeasors are12

liable for the wh ole

. ” ) (citing Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 644 (Tex. 1996) ).

B. Analysis

The trial court implicit ly found that Meritz ’ s inju ry could not be app ortione d with reasonable certainty between appellan ts and that the des ignated respo nsible
third

- p arty was not respon sible for any portion of the harm. S ee Shields L td

. P ’ ship v. Bradberry , 52 6 S.W. 3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017) ; AMPD Holdings, Inc. , 5 55
S.W.3d at 706 ( “ I n a bench trial in which the trial court d oes not file findi ngs of
fact or c onclusions o f law, we imply all findings of fact nece ssary to suppor t the judgment

. ” ). Appellants contend that the damages are not indivi sible because appellants

m ade separate representations which prompted different p remium payments a t dif ferent time s and that as a result, res po nsibility can be a ssigne d betwee n appellant s

. Even a ssuming that this is true, this argument does not take into
considerat ion Meritz ’ s fraudulent inducem ent claim . Appellants make no argument as to ho w or why the injury caused by the fraudu le nt inducement can be apportioned betw een them in regard t o this c laim , and it is their burden to do so. See Amstadt , 919 S.W. 2d at 654

. H er e , the ha rm inflicted as a result of the fraudulent ind ucement w as the
failure to pay the s ettleme nt amount in accordan ce with t he a greement when
Mer i tz perform ed its part of the bargain

. In thi s case the harm resulted f ro m a single, indivisible injur y and joint and several li ab ility among appel lants is thus appropriat e in such a case

. 8 See Onyung , 2 013 WL 3875548 at *11

. W e disagree

8 Appe llants do not assert that th ere is no evidence to support th e judgment, but only that th e trial court erred in faili ng t o apportion or impli citly fin ding that Chap ter 33 was inapplicable as between appellants.13

with app el lants that the inj u ry it self was not indivisible

. T he trial court did not err in failing to appor tion damages among appellants under C h apter 33

. A ppellan ts argue in this poi nt t hat the trial court ’ s refusal to as sign any percentage of responsibility to Joh nson is against t he great we ig ht and
prepo nderance of the evidence a nd is manifestly unjust. Appellants contend that Johnson defrauded NWIC an d ap pellants in his represen ta tions regarding t he

accounts a nd asse t availability at ABN AMRO Bank, and appellants r elied on
th ose representa t ions w hen rela ying them to Meritz. However, a ppellants fail to point to any evidence in the record that shows that Joh nson was responsible for t he
fr audulent ind ucemen t damag es

. In a factual sufficiency review, we must consider a n d weigh all of the
evidenc e in a neutral light. Golden Eagle Archery , In c . v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 76 1 (Tex. 2003). T h e evidence is fa ctua lly insufficient only if w e con clude
that t he verdict is so aga inst the great weig ht and pre ponde rance of the ev idence as to be manifestly unju st

. Id

. The trial court is the sole judge of the cr edibility of the witnesses and the w eight to be given to thei r testimony. Siddiqui v

. Fancy Bites,
LLC , 504 S.W.3d 3 49, 364 (Tex. App.

–– Houston [14 th Dist.] 2016 , pet. deni ed). We may not substitute our judgment f or the fact finder merely because we rea ch a
different conclusion. Id

.

“ Our fraud jurisprudence has tra ditionally focused not o n whet her a misrepr esen tation is direct ly transmi tted to a known person alleged to be in pr ivity with t he fraudfe asor, but on wh ether the misrepresentation was intended to reach a third person and in duce reliance. ” Ernst & Youn g , L .L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life In s. C o. , 51 S.W.3d 573, 57 8 ( Te x. 2001 ). “ If the fals e representations be made with a
view of reachin g the thir d person to who m it is repeated, and for the purpose of
influen cing him ” then a fraud cause of action e xists. Gain esvi lle Nat ’ l Bank v.14

Bamber ge r , 7 7 Tex. 48, 13 S.W. 959 (18 90) ; se e also Ernst & Young, L.L.P. , 51 S.W.3d at 57 8. W h ere a party m akes a fal se represen tati on to another with the
intent that it should be repe ated to a third party the thir d pa rty can maintain an

act i on in tort against the party mak ing the false statement fo r the damages resulting
from t he fraud. Am. Indem. Co. v. Ernst & Ern st , 106 S.W .2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.

–– Wac o 1937, w r it ref ’ d). Even taking all of appellants ’ arg umen ts regarding Johnson as tr ue as far as the initial fraud in the re i ns urance agreements , there is no evidence tha t J o hnson
ha d a nything to do with the s e ttl ement agreeme nt and the misrepresentations forming the bas is of the fraudul ent inducem ent claim

. Devon Harrison testified
tha t s h e be gan to b ecome suspicious abo ut the legitimacy of the A BN AMRO bank

accounts in the summer of 2 008. De vo n also testified t hat she had suspicion of the
ABN AMRO a ccounts and funds allegedly therein when Meritz and NWIC
reached settlement. According to Devon , s he was d esperately t r yin g to repay the premium s a nd reaching out to Johnson to secure mone y for that purpose

. In
Decem ber 2008, NWIC filed a lawsuit against Johnson a nd other s alleging fraud
and conspiracy , and detailing the frau d perpetuated on NWIC by J o hnson and others relating to the fa ke accounts a t ABN AMRO. Devo n conta cted the FBI with her attorney before filing t he laws uit against Johnson

. At some point in time, she
testified bef

ore a grand j ury ag ain st Johnson and his wife. Notwit hstanding the
lawsuit agains t Johnson , or her parti cipation in an FBI inve stigation into Johnson ’ s fraud , Devon testified that she co ntinued to rely o n J o hnson ’ s communications
regar ding fund s an d their a vailability to repay the pre mium s owed under the
settlement ag reement , implying that J o hnson ’ s conti nui ng fraud was responsible for the continued repayment issues.15

The trial court weigh s the evide nce and is the sole judge of credibili ty. Johnson did not m ake any re presentations to Mer itz to induce it into a sett lement ; the Harrisons did

. M o re o v er, b a sed on th e evid ence that Devon kn e w that Johnso n was defrauding NWI C, the t ri al court co uld have reasonably c oncluded that
Devon ’ s alleg ed reliance on Joh n son ’ s continuing representations was not
reasonabl e or credible. Th e trial court ’ s conclu sion that J ohnson was not responsible fo r the fraudule nt in ducemen t claim is not so aga in st the grea t weig ht and pre pond e rance of the evidence as to be manifestly unju st

. We overrule appellants ’ third issue.

IV. CONCLUSION Having overruled appellant s ’ issue s on fraudu lent in ducement and apportionment , there is no n eed for the c o ur t to address t he remaini ng issues raised by a ppellant s

. Even if appel la nts ’ first and second i ssues were me ritorious , the judgment w ould be upheld on the f raudulent inducement claim, and ther e is no
cause to remand on apport ionment

. As a r esult , the judgm ent of the t ri al cour t i s affi rmed.

/s/ K en Wise Justice

Panel co nsists of Jus tices Wise, Jewell, and Hassan.