T h e S ta te ha s n o t f iled a b rie f. W e d o no t m a k e a rg u m e n ts fo r p a rtie s, a n d so w e e x a m ine C a n ty’s 1
a rg u m e n t f

o r o b v io u s d e fec ts a n d a lso c o n sid e r th e re a so n ing se t f o rth b y the trial c o u rt. See Ar ch er v . Tex. D ep’ t of C r i m i nalJusti ce-I

ns t i t ut i ona l

D i v. , N o. 12- 07- 00012- CV , 2008 W L 1735168, a t * 1 n

. 1 ( T ex . App. –T y l er Apr

. 16, 2 0 0 8 , no p e t.). O rd ina rily, we w o u ld a lso c o n sid e r th e a rg u m e n ts m a d e b y the S ta te b e fo re the trial c o u rt. See i d. H owever , t he St at e n eve r r eac hed t he po i nt of maki ng ar gu ment s at t he t r i al cour t l eve l

. Ad di t i onal ar gu ment s may exi st t o s up p o rt dis m i ss al t hat have no t be en co nsi d ered i n t hi s o p i ni o n.

T h e fac ts se t f

o rth in o u r o p inio n ha v e b e e n gle a n e d fro m C a n ty’s am e n d e d p e tit io n a n d the trial c o u rt’s 2
or der

. O u r opi n i on s h ou l d n ot be c on s t r u ed as a n e v al u at i on of t h e v er ac i t y or me r i t s of a n y a l l eg at i on ma de by C ant y i n t hi s exp unct i o n pro ceed i ng. 

## NO. 12-08-00257-CV

IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTR ICT

TYLER, TEXA S

VICTOR J. C

ANTY, § APPEAL F ROM THE 87TH APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRI CT COURT OF TH E ST ATEOFTEX

AS, APP ELL EE § AN DE RSON C OU

NT Y, TEX

AS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Victor J. Canty appe als the trial court’s order denying his petition for expunc tion of criminal
rec ords. In one issue, Canty argue s that the trial court erre d by denying his petition withoutholding
a he ari ng . W e a ff

irm. 1

B ACKG ROUND 2 Canty was ar

rested on A ugust 20, 1996 for assaulting a public servant. On Marc h 27, 1997, Cant y w a s c h ar g e d b y in d ic tm e n t w ith th e o f f e n s e . T h e in d ic tm e n t w a s d is mi s s e d o n O ctober 5, 1999.2

On July 13, 2007, Canty filed a pet i t i o n fo r expunction. He filed an amended pe tition for expunction on January 16, 2008. Canty alleged that he wa s entitled to expunction “pursuant to the Texas Co d e o f Cr iminal Procedure, Ar ticles 55.01( a)(2) (A)( i), 55.01(a)( 2)(B), ( C), and 55.02(2)( a) .” OnAp ri l 24 , 2 00 8, Ca nty fi le d a motionin the tria l c ou rt

statin g th a t a de qu a te tim e to set an expunction petition he aring had passed and reque sting that the trial court set an expunc tion petition hearing. In r esponse, on May 15, 2008, the trial court ma de the following notation in the do c ke t:

C on s i dere d [Cant y’s ] r eq u est f or hear i ng [ on ] expu nct i on und er Ch p 55 - T x C od e of Cri m i nal [ P] r oce dur e[

. ] [ Cant y i s ] not e nt i t l ed t o e xpunct i on unde r [ t he] Chp 55 s t at ut or y r equi rem ent s f or o b ta in in g a n e x p u n c tio n [b e c a u se th o se re q u ire m e n ts a re ] n o t p re se n t[.] [N ]o a c tio n tak e n [.] On June 11, 2008, Canty, believing the t rial court had denied his petition, filed a noticeof appeal. On July 22, 2008, the trial court signed a written orde r denying the pe tition. The trial court stated in the orde r that

[ t ] he Cour t fi nds t hat [ Cant y] i s not e nt i t l ed t o a n e xpunct i on under Chapt er 55 of t he Texa s Code of C r i m i nal Pr ocedu r e[ ]

. [ C ant y] f ai l ed t o com pl y w i t h t he s t at ut ory re q u i rem ent s f or obt ai ni ng an expunc t i on. A cc or di ngl y a nd pur s uant t o Chapt er 55 of t he Texa s Code of

C ri m i nal Pr oce dur e[ ] , t he p eti t i o n as fil ed i s d en i ed

. It i s h ere b y , O R D E R E D , A D JU D G E D A N D D E C R E E D t h at t h e re q u est of [ Cant y] i s de ni ed. This appea l followed.

D ENI AL OF P E T I T I ON W I THO U T O R A L H E ARI NG Inon e iss ue , Canty a

rg ue s th a t “ [t ]h e tria l c ou rt e rr e d inde ny ing [h im] a he ari ng on his expunction petition prior to ruling on [the] merits [of this petition.]” Stand ard of Re view Expunction proce edings areauthorize d by chapte r 55 of the T exas Code of Criminal P rocedure and areconsidere d civil cause s of ac tion. See Ex parte Wilson , 2 2 4 S. W

. 3 d 8 6 0 , 862 (Tex. A pp.–Texa

rkana 2007, no pet.). W e re view a t ri al court’s decision whe ther to hold an oral chapte r 55 expunc tion hearing unde r an a buse of discr etion s t an d ar d of re view. See id. at 863-64 (c on du c tin g s uc h a

re vie w) ; see also State v. Taylor , 266 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tex. A pp.–Tyler 2008,B e c a u se it is un n e c e ssa ry to d o o the rw ise , w e ha v e c ited to the m o st c u rr e n t ve rs io n o f ch a p te r 5 5 in this 3
o p i ni o n. 3 pet. den i ed ). A t ri al court abuses its discretion whe n its decision is arbitrary, unr easona ble, or without r efe renc e to any guiding r ules or legal princ iples. K- Ma rt C or p. v . Ho ne

y c utt , 24 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Tex. 2000)

. In conduc ting an abuse of discretion re view, weexamine the entire r ecor d. Me rc e de s- Be nz Cre dit Cor p. v . Rhy ne , 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.1996) . “The mere fac t that a trial judge may de c idea matte r w ith in [ he r] dis c re tio na ry auth ority in a dif

fe re nt ma nn e r than an a

pp e llate jud ge in a similar circ umstance doe s not de monstrate that an a buse of discr etion has occ urre d.” Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 2 4 2 (T ex . 1 9 85). Howe ver, a trial court ha s no discretion in determining wh at t he law is or a pplying the law to the fa cts. Spi tze r v . Be rry , 247 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. A pp.–Tyler 2008, pe t. denied). Discussion Canty was en t i t l ed to a hearing unde r cha pter 55. See T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P R OC
. A NN
. art
. 55 .0 2, § 2 (c ) ( Ve rn onSup p. 20 08 ) ( “ Th e c ou rt sh a ll se t a hea

ri ng on the matte r no soo ne r than th irty days fr om the filing of the petition and shall give to eac h officia l or age ncy or othe r governmental entity named in the petition r easona ble notice of the hearing .

. . .”). Howeve r, “[ n]ot eve ry hea ring 3

c a lle d f or un de r e ve ry ru le of

c ivi l pr oc e du re neces sa ri ly r e qu ir e s an o ral he ari ng , and , u nle ss requi r e d b y th e e x p r e s s lan g u a g e o r th e c o n te x t o f th e p arti c u la r ru le , th e te r m ‘ h e ar in g ’ d o e s not
nece ssarily contemplate either a persona l appea

ranc e bef ore the court or an oral prese ntation to the court.” See Wilson , 224 S.W.3d at 863. “For example, a trial court may rul e o n an ex p u n cti on pe tit ionwi tho ut c on du c tin g a fo rm a l he ari ng a ndwi tho ut the c on sid e ratio n of liv e te sti mon y, if it has at its disposal all the information it needs to re solve the issues raised by thepetition.” See id. That information might be available from the ple adings, summary judgment proof, or court re cords subject to judicial notice. See id. Her e, the r ec o rd demonstrates that the trial court de termined that Canty had not f iled an expu n ct i o n p etition satisfying the statutory require ments set forth in cha pter 55. Our

revie w of Ca nty ’s a me nd e d p e tit ionsh ow s th a t Canty faile d to se t f orth “ thedate the of

fe ns e c ha rg e d a gains t [C a nty ] w a s a lle ge d to ha ve be e n c omm itt e d, ” inf ormatio n th a t Canty wa s st a tut oril y re qu ir e d to allege. See T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P R OC
. A NN
. art. 55.02, § 2(b)( 3) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). Addre ssing4

thi s a ndoth e r r e qu ir e d inf ormatio n, c ha

pte r 55 c omm a nd s that “ [t ]h e [e xp un c tio n] pe tit ion

. . . s ha ll include the f

ollowing or an explanation for why one or more of the following is not included.” T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P R OC
. A NN
. art. 55.02, § 2(b) (Ve rnon Supp. 200 8 ). Having at its disposal Canty’s amende d petition, the trial court had everything it neede d to de termine whether Canty had included this information. See Wilson , 224 S.W.3d at 863. The right to an expunction is neither a constitutional nor a common law right, but rathe r, a statutory privilege. See Que rte rmo us v . St ate , 52 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. A pp.–Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). Wher e a cause of action is cre ated by statute, all statutory provisions aremandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in order to sust ain the ac tion. See id. Th e re fo re , Canty c ou ld
no t be e n t i t l e dt o r e l i e f

u n d e r c h ap t e r 5 5 w h e n h e f

a i l e dt o s e tf

o rth i n h i s p e t i t i o n th e sta tut or ily require d information. See id. at 864-65 (rea ching a sim ilar conc lusion regar ding jurisdiction). We hold that the only he aring require d under these circ umstances was a trial court revie w of C an t y ’s pleadings. See Wilson , 224 S.W.3d at 863. Because the recor d ref lects t hat t he trial c ourt conduc ted such a r eview, w e also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discre tion when determining the type of he ar i n g ap p ropriate to the case

. See Hon e y c utt , 2 4 S. W .3 d at 36 0. W e ov e rr uleCa nty ’s so le issue.

D I S PO S I T I ON We af fi rm theor de r o f the tria l c ou rt
.


### S AM GRI FF I T H J ustice

Opinion delivere d April 15, 2009. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)