# C_2022493EN.01007001.xml

| 27.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 493/70 |
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27.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 493/70

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P9_TA(2022)0236

Security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy

European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2022 on security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (2021/2199(INI))

(2022/C 493/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular paragraphs three, four and six thereof, |
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having regard to the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular paragraphs three, four and six thereof,

| — | having regard to Title V TEU, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP), |
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having regard to Title V TEU, in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

| — | having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (1), to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (2), to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (3), to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part (4), and to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part (5), |
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having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (1), to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (2), to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (3), to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part (4), and to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part (5),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (6), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (6),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/887 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (7), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/887 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres (7),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (8), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (8),

| — | having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (9), |
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having regard to Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (9),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1792 of 11 October 2021 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (10), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1792 of 11 October 2021 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (10),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (EPF), and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (11), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility (EPF), and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528 (11),

| — | having regard to Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/748 (12), 2021/749 (13) and 2021/750 (14) of 6 May 2021 on the participation of Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the United States of America in the PESCO military mobility project, |
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having regard to Council Decisions (CFSP) 2021/748 (12), 2021/749 (13) and 2021/750 (14) of 6 May 2021 on the participation of Canada, the Kingdom of Norway and the United States of America in the PESCO military mobility project,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1537 of 22 October 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (15), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1537 of 22 October 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (15),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1127 of 30 July 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (16), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1127 of 30 July 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (16),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (17), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (17),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (18), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States (18),

| — | having regard to Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (19), and Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/813 of 20 May 2021 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (20), |
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having regard to Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP of 22 July 2014 on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (19), and Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/813 of 20 May 2021 amending Decision 2014/486/CFSP on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) (20),

| — | having regard to Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia (21), and Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1990 of 3 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia (22), |
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having regard to Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia (21), and Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1990 of 3 December 2020 amending Decision 2010/452/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia (22),

| — | having regard to the Annual Work Programme of the European Defence Fund for 2021, adopted by the Commission on 30 June 2021, |
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having regard to the Annual Work Programme of the European Defence Fund for 2021, adopted by the Commission on 30 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 December 2020 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (COM(2020)0823), |
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having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 December 2020 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (COM(2020)0823),

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 December 2020 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities (COM(2020)0829), |
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having regard to the Commission proposal of 16 December 2020 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resilience of critical entities (COM(2020)0829),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 December 2020 entitled ‘The EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade’ (JOIN(2020)0018),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2020 on the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2020)0605),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 September 2017 entitled ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ (JOIN(2017)0450), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 13 September 2017 entitled ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ (JOIN(2017)0450),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action’ (JOIN(2017)0021), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 7 June 2017 entitled ‘A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external action’ (JOIN(2017)0021),

| — | having regard to the informal meeting of the European Council held on 10 and 11 March 2022, the formal meeting of the European Council held on 24 and 25 March 2022 and the extraordinary NATO summit of 24 March 2022, |
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having regard to the informal meeting of the European Council held on 10 and 11 March 2022, the formal meeting of the European Council held on 24 and 25 March 2022 and the extraordinary NATO summit of 24 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021 on security and defence, |
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having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021 on security and defence,

| — | having regard to the new strategic agenda 2019-2024, adopted by the European Council on 20 June 2019, |
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having regard to the new strategic agenda 2019-2024, adopted by the European Council on 20 June 2019,

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 15 December 2016, 9 March 2017, 22 June 2017, 20 November 2017 and 15 December 2017, |
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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 December 2013, 26 June 2015, 15 December 2016, 9 March 2017, 22 June 2017, 20 November 2017 and 15 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises and 24 January 2022 on the European security situation, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2018 on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises and 24 January 2022 on the European security situation,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 November 2013, 18 November 2014, 18 May 2015, 27 June 2016, 14 November 2016, 18 May 2017, 17 July 2017, 25 June 2018, 17 June 2019, 10 December 2019, 17 June 2020, 12 October 2020, 20 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 10 May 2021 on the common security and defence policy, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 November 2013, 18 November 2014, 18 May 2015, 27 June 2016, 14 November 2016, 18 May 2017, 17 July 2017, 25 June 2018, 17 June 2019, 10 December 2019, 17 June 2020, 12 October 2020, 20 November 2020, 7 December 2020 and 10 May 2021 on the common security and defence policy,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 December 2021 on the Civilian CSDP Compact, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 December 2021 on the Civilian CSDP Compact,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 November 2020 on the PESCO strategic review 2020, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 November 2020 on the PESCO strategic review 2020,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 June 2020 on EU external action on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 June 2020 on EU external action on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2019 on complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2019 on complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2018 on women, peace and security, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2018 on women, peace and security,

| — | having regard to the conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council on 19 November 2018, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact, |
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having regard to the conclusions of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council on 19 November 2018, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 June 2017 on a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’), |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 June 2017 on a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (‘Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’),

| — | having regard to the final report of the first cycle of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) presented to the Council at its meeting of 20 November 2020, |
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having regard to the final report of the first cycle of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) presented to the Council at its meeting of 20 November 2020,

| — | having regard to the global strategy entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016, |
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having regard to the global strategy entitled ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’, presented by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on 28 June 2016,

| — | having regard to the joint declarations of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) summits of 2009 in Prague, 2011 in Warsaw, 2013 in Vilnius, 2015 in Riga, 2017 in Brussels and 2021 in Brussels, |
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having regard to the joint declarations of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) summits of 2009 in Prague, 2011 in Warsaw, 2013 in Vilnius, 2015 in Riga, 2017 in Brussels and 2021 in Brussels,

| — | having regard to the common declaration adopted by the Parliamentary Committees of Foreign Affairs of the Association Trio, and to those adopted by Poland and Lithuania on 13 December 2021 on strengthening the cooperation within the scope of human rights monitoring in the territories of the EaP states occupied by Russia, |
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having regard to the common declaration adopted by the Parliamentary Committees of Foreign Affairs of the Association Trio, and to those adopted by Poland and Lithuania on 13 December 2021 on strengthening the cooperation within the scope of human rights monitoring in the territories of the EaP states occupied by Russia,

| — | having regard to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014, and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and endorsed as a whole by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2202 (2015) of 17 February 2015, |
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having regard to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014, the Minsk Memorandum of 19 September 2014, and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, adopted and signed in Minsk on 12 February 2015, and endorsed as a whole by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2202 (2015) of 17 February 2015,

| — | having regard to the trilateral meetings of 14 December 2021 and 6 April 2022 between the President of the European Council Charles Michel, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, |
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having regard to the trilateral meetings of 14 December 2021 and 6 April 2022 between the President of the European Council Charles Michel, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan,

| — | having regard to the joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation of 10 July 2018 and the EU-NATO joint declaration of 8 July 2016, |
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having regard to the joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation of 10 July 2018 and the EU-NATO joint declaration of 8 July 2016,

| — | having regard to the sixth progress report of 17 May 2021 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |
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having regard to the sixth progress report of 17 May 2021 on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, |
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having regard to the common set of 74 proposals for the implementation of the Warsaw Joint Declaration endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017,

| — | having regard to the joint statement of the EU and the UN of 24 January 2022 on reinforcing the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Priorities for 2022-2024, |
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having regard to the joint statement of the EU and the UN of 24 January 2022 on reinforcing the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Priorities for 2022-2024,

| — | having regard to the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 3 December 1994, the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances) and the Vienna Document of 30 November 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures, |
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having regard to the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 3 December 1994, the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances) and the Vienna Document of 30 November 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (23), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (23),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (24), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan (24),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products (25), |
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having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC, concerning procurement in the fields of defence and security, and of Directive 2009/43/EC, concerning the transfer of defence-related products (25),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine (26), |
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having regard to its resolution of 11 February 2021 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine (26),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020 (27), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020 (27),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — annual report 2020 (28), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — annual report 2020 (28),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with the Republic of Moldova (29), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with the Republic of Moldova (29),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Georgia (30), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Georgia (30),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit (31), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit (31),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility (32), |
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having regard to its resolution of 11 December 2018 on military mobility (32),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on cyber defence (33), |
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having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on cyber defence (33),

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, especially those related to Russia’s actions in the territories of the EaP countries, its illegal annexation of Crimea, its violations of the rights of the Crimean Tatars, its occupation of parts of the territory of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and related borderisation activities, as well as its hostile propaganda and disinformation against the EU and EaP countries, |
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having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia, especially those related to Russia’s actions in the territories of the EaP countries, its illegal annexation of Crimea, its violations of the rights of the Crimean Tatars, its occupation of parts of the territory of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and related borderisation activities, as well as its hostile propaganda and disinformation against the EU and EaP countries,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0168/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0168/2022),

| A. | whereas the EaP is part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy and whereas the EU has a comprehensive approach to security and resilience, including against cyber and hybrid threats, that is specifically designed to bolster relationships with the six EaP countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, to help promote peace, stability, resilience, shared prosperity, sustainable development, reforms and human security in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, strengthen economic cooperation, support cross-sectoral reform and contribute to the overall resilience of those countries, in a spirit of shared ownership and responsibility; |
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A.

whereas the EaP is part of the EU’s neighbourhood policy and whereas the EU has a comprehensive approach to security and resilience, including against cyber and hybrid threats, that is specifically designed to bolster relationships with the six EaP countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, to help promote peace, stability, resilience, shared prosperity, sustainable development, reforms and human security in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, strengthen economic cooperation, support cross-sectoral reform and contribute to the overall resilience of those countries, in a spirit of shared ownership and responsibility;

| B. | whereas the EaP seeks to foster stability, prosperity and mutual cooperation, and to advance the commitment to the necessary reforms; whereas there is an urgent need to strengthen peaceful conflict resolution across the EaP, in particular via multilateral approaches and forums such as the OSCE; whereas there is a need to develop a strategy on how to better address security aspects of the EU’s policy on the EaP, taking the security needs of the relevant partner countries as a starting point, as the destabilisation of the EaP region poses a significant global threat and a threat to the peace, stability and security of the EaP countries and the European continent; |
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B.

whereas the EaP seeks to foster stability, prosperity and mutual cooperation, and to advance the commitment to the necessary reforms; whereas there is an urgent need to strengthen peaceful conflict resolution across the EaP, in particular via multilateral approaches and forums such as the OSCE; whereas there is a need to develop a strategy on how to better address security aspects of the EU’s policy on the EaP, taking the security needs of the relevant partner countries as a starting point, as the destabilisation of the EaP region poses a significant global threat and a threat to the peace, stability and security of the EaP countries and the European continent;

| C. | whereas the EaP has been facing serious violations of international law, security threats and conflicts in recent years, leading to the current Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas security and peace in the Eastern neighbourhood presupposes the respect for and upholding of international law, territorial integrity and fundamental rights and freedoms; whereas the EU should do its utmost to help the associated EaP countries to regain their full sovereignty and control over their territories; whereas the EU’s clear commitment to the European perspective of the associated EaP countries is crucial for pro-democratic reforms and the security, stability and prosperity of their societies; |
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C.

whereas the EaP has been facing serious violations of international law, security threats and conflicts in recent years, leading to the current Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas security and peace in the Eastern neighbourhood presupposes the respect for and upholding of international law, territorial integrity and fundamental rights and freedoms; whereas the EU should do its utmost to help the associated EaP countries to regain their full sovereignty and control over their territories; whereas the EU’s clear commitment to the European perspective of the associated EaP countries is crucial for pro-democratic reforms and the security, stability and prosperity of their societies;

| D. | whereas the EU and the EaP partners jointly decided to deepen their cooperation in the area of security, including enhancing the ability of EaP countries to tackle hybrid and cyber threats; whereas a focus on conventional threats must also be preserved, bearing in mind the recent developments that have taken place in the Eastern Partnership countries and Central Asia; |
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D.

whereas the EU and the EaP partners jointly decided to deepen their cooperation in the area of security, including enhancing the ability of EaP countries to tackle hybrid and cyber threats; whereas a focus on conventional threats must also be preserved, bearing in mind the recent developments that have taken place in the Eastern Partnership countries and Central Asia;

| E. | whereas the essential aims of the EaP are beneficial to all neighbours, including Russia, in that they help to forge a more stable region through measures that preserve international law, respect for territorial integrity and the treaties which govern relations between states and which enhance good governance, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and good neighbourly relations by promoting peace, stability, shared prosperity and prospects for the peoples of all EaP countries; whereas the destabilisation of the EaP region poses a significant threat to the EU and global peace, stability and security; |
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E.

whereas the essential aims of the EaP are beneficial to all neighbours, including Russia, in that they help to forge a more stable region through measures that preserve international law, respect for territorial integrity and the treaties which govern relations between states and which enhance good governance, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and good neighbourly relations by promoting peace, stability, shared prosperity and prospects for the peoples of all EaP countries; whereas the destabilisation of the EaP region poses a significant threat to the EU and global peace, stability and security;

| F. | whereas the EaP Summit held on 15 December 2021 reaffirmed the sovereign right of each partner to choose its level of ambition and its goals in its relations with the EU; |
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F.

whereas the EaP Summit held on 15 December 2021 reaffirmed the sovereign right of each partner to choose its level of ambition and its goals in its relations with the EU;

| G. | whereas the 2021 EaP Summit resulted in increased efforts to enhance resilience, strengthen strategic communication and the fight against disinformation, and foster security, cyber dialogue and cooperation in the areas of the CSDP; |
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G.

whereas the 2021 EaP Summit resulted in increased efforts to enhance resilience, strengthen strategic communication and the fight against disinformation, and foster security, cyber dialogue and cooperation in the areas of the CSDP;

| H. | whereas every country in the EaP area, with the exception of Belarus, has a territorial conflict on its soil, orchestrated by or involving Russia; |
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H.

whereas every country in the EaP area, with the exception of Belarus, has a territorial conflict on its soil, orchestrated by or involving Russia;

| I. | whereas on 22 February 2022, both chambers of the Russian Parliament — the Federation Council and the State Duma — unanimously endorsed the recognition of Ukraine’s breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states; |
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I.

whereas on 22 February 2022, both chambers of the Russian Parliament — the Federation Council and the State Duma — unanimously endorsed the recognition of Ukraine’s breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states;

| J. | whereas on 23 February 2022, the Russian Parliament voted to allow President Putin to use the Russian army outside the country to ‘support separatists in Ukraine’; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas on 23 February 2022, the Russian Parliament voted to allow President Putin to use the Russian army outside the country to ‘support separatists in Ukraine’;

| K. | whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded television broadcast that he had ordered ‘a special military operation’ in eastern Ukraine; whereas minutes later, missile strikes occurred in dozens of cities across the country, including the Ukrainian capital; whereas at dawn, troops and armoured vehicles crossed into eastern Ukraine from the Russian border, as well as from Belarus in the north and from Crimea, illegally annexed by Russia, to the south; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas on 24 February 2022, the Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in a pre-recorded television broadcast that he had ordered ‘a special military operation’ in eastern Ukraine; whereas minutes later, missile strikes occurred in dozens of cities across the country, including the Ukrainian capital; whereas at dawn, troops and armoured vehicles crossed into eastern Ukraine from the Russian border, as well as from Belarus in the north and from Crimea, illegally annexed by Russia, to the south;

| L. | whereas on 27 February 2022, President Putin made a decision to place Russian nuclear and missile forces on the highest level of readiness for combat; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas on 27 February 2022, President Putin made a decision to place Russian nuclear and missile forces on the highest level of readiness for combat;

| M. | whereas on 24 February 2022, having amassed over 200 000 troops in an offensive formation on the border of Ukraine, while also stepping up its hybrid and cyber warfare tactics against the elected Ukrainian authorities, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine via its northern, eastern and southern borders and the Black Sea, while heavily bombarding civilian areas using the superiority of its aerial and naval forces and weaponry; whereas this is altogether the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas on 24 February 2022, having amassed over 200 000 troops in an offensive formation on the border of Ukraine, while also stepping up its hybrid and cyber warfare tactics against the elected Ukrainian authorities, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine via its northern, eastern and southern borders and the Black Sea, while heavily bombarding civilian areas using the superiority of its aerial and naval forces and weaponry; whereas this is altogether the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War;

| N. | whereas despite initial setbacks due to intensive Ukrainian resistance efforts, Russian forces have carried out offensive operations and aerial and artillery/rocket attacks on civilian positions and infrastructure, including known evacuation corridors; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas despite initial setbacks due to intensive Ukrainian resistance efforts, Russian forces have carried out offensive operations and aerial and artillery/rocket attacks on civilian positions and infrastructure, including known evacuation corridors;

| O. | whereas on 13 March 2022 Russia escalated its war of aggression in Ukraine with strikes on a major military base less than 16 km from the Polish border, killing at least 35 people and injuring 134 more, further raising tensions in the region; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas on 13 March 2022 Russia escalated its war of aggression in Ukraine with strikes on a major military base less than 16 km from the Polish border, killing at least 35 people and injuring 134 more, further raising tensions in the region;

| P. | whereas President Putin’s Russia continues to engage in a war of aggression and continuous hybrid warfare against some EaP countries, backed by the ever-present threat of force across the region, armed aggression and illegal occupation, in order to keep states politically weak and off-balance and tied to Moscow’s self-declared sphere of influence, effectively disregarding the EaP countries’ sovereign right to territorial integrity, to make their own foreign policy choices and to choose their own alliances, in contravention of the relevant OSCE principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Paris Charter of 1990 as well as the Istanbul Document (1999) and Astana Declaration (2010); whereas Russia's aggressive actions and its attempts to weaken the European security order are causing instability both in the region and beyond and also aim to weaken and degrade the EU’s role in the region; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas President Putin’s Russia continues to engage in a war of aggression and continuous hybrid warfare against some EaP countries, backed by the ever-present threat of force across the region, armed aggression and illegal occupation, in order to keep states politically weak and off-balance and tied to Moscow’s self-declared sphere of influence, effectively disregarding the EaP countries’ sovereign right to territorial integrity, to make their own foreign policy choices and to choose their own alliances, in contravention of the relevant OSCE principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Paris Charter of 1990 as well as the Istanbul Document (1999) and Astana Declaration (2010); whereas Russia's aggressive actions and its attempts to weaken the European security order are causing instability both in the region and beyond and also aim to weaken and degrade the EU’s role in the region;

| Q. | whereas Russia’s direct military aggression against Georgia in 2008 and subsequent occupation of 20 % of its territories, its invasion, temporary occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its support for separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk have destabilised the region and served as a precedent that led to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and in clear violations of the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine; whereas the EU has strongly condemned these actions and firmly repeated its determination not to recognise Russia’s illegally annexed and occupied regions, which it has used to launch aggression against some EaP countries, leading Member States and the EU to take a range of restrictive measures; whereas Russia’s actions have demonstrated that Russia rejects the aspirations of the associated EaP countries to join the EU or NATO and is determined to contend and contest any attempts to aid democratic development in a region which it considers its ‘near abroad’; whereas the ‘near abroad’ continues to be perceived by the Kremlin as Russia’s sphere of influence; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas Russia’s direct military aggression against Georgia in 2008 and subsequent occupation of 20 % of its territories, its invasion, temporary occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its support for separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk have destabilised the region and served as a precedent that led to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and in clear violations of the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine; whereas the EU has strongly condemned these actions and firmly repeated its determination not to recognise Russia’s illegally annexed and occupied regions, which it has used to launch aggression against some EaP countries, leading Member States and the EU to take a range of restrictive measures; whereas Russia’s actions have demonstrated that Russia rejects the aspirations of the associated EaP countries to join the EU or NATO and is determined to contend and contest any attempts to aid democratic development in a region which it considers its ‘near abroad’; whereas the ‘near abroad’ continues to be perceived by the Kremlin as Russia’s sphere of influence;

| R. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine exposes major vulnerabilities in the security of Member States and aspiring EU countries, especially states in the Baltic and Black Sea regions; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine exposes major vulnerabilities in the security of Member States and aspiring EU countries, especially states in the Baltic and Black Sea regions;

| S. | whereas Belarus aided and abetted Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, having permitted Russian armed forces to perform week-long military drills on Belarusian territory before allowing its territory to serve as a launch pad for the invasion of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas Belarus aided and abetted Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, having permitted Russian armed forces to perform week-long military drills on Belarusian territory before allowing its territory to serve as a launch pad for the invasion of Ukraine;

| T. | whereas in September 2021, Russia’s joint ZAPAD military exercise with Belarus and several other countries in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) comprised as many as 200 000 troops training in counterinsurgency, urban warfare and cyberattacks in a non-transparent display of force; whereas Russia and Belarus regularly conduct joint military exercises and have agreed on a joint military doctrine; whereas the joint Russia-Belarus ‘2022 Allied Resolve’ military exercise served to demonstrate that Russia’s gap in military capabilities is rapidly closing, while it is increasingly realising its aim of deepening its political and military relations with CSTO countries; whereas these military exercises proved to be training for the eventual invasion of and war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Russian military forces in Belarus pose a threat to Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and the whole of Europe and could be part of an ultimate plan to subjugate and occupy Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas in September 2021, Russia’s joint ZAPAD military exercise with Belarus and several other countries in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) comprised as many as 200 000 troops training in counterinsurgency, urban warfare and cyberattacks in a non-transparent display of force; whereas Russia and Belarus regularly conduct joint military exercises and have agreed on a joint military doctrine; whereas the joint Russia-Belarus ‘2022 Allied Resolve’ military exercise served to demonstrate that Russia’s gap in military capabilities is rapidly closing, while it is increasingly realising its aim of deepening its political and military relations with CSTO countries; whereas these military exercises proved to be training for the eventual invasion of and war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Russian military forces in Belarus pose a threat to Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and the whole of Europe and could be part of an ultimate plan to subjugate and occupy Belarus;

| U. | whereas seeking to remain in power, the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has tightened relations with Putin’s Russia, agreed to deepen the integration of the Union State and host Russian troops along the Belarus-Ukraine border, and is providing logistical and military support for Russian troops fighting the war of aggression against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas seeking to remain in power, the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka has tightened relations with Putin’s Russia, agreed to deepen the integration of the Union State and host Russian troops along the Belarus-Ukraine border, and is providing logistical and military support for Russian troops fighting the war of aggression against Ukraine;

| V. | whereas Belarus is culpable for the war of aggression against Ukraine, having permitted and supported Russia’s invasion from within Belarusian territory, thereby clearly demonstrating its political allegiances and eliciting a strong and enhanced EU sanctions regime against Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas Belarus is culpable for the war of aggression against Ukraine, having permitted and supported Russia’s invasion from within Belarusian territory, thereby clearly demonstrating its political allegiances and eliciting a strong and enhanced EU sanctions regime against Belarus;

| W. | whereas no cooperation in the realm of security and defence should include the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, as any potential activities could be used against EU Member States or to oppress the Belarusian people; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas no cooperation in the realm of security and defence should include the illegitimate regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, as any potential activities could be used against EU Member States or to oppress the Belarusian people;

| X. | whereas following mass demonstrations against massive electoral fraud, the Belarusian regime has further increased domestic and violent repression against a large proportion of the citizens of Belarus who aspire to a democratic society, and has abandoned its aim of fostering better relations with the EU; whereas Belarus has reversed trends towards democratisation and taken to instrumentalising migrants against the backdrop of a crisis on the EU-Belarusian border, and whereas it continues to uproot domestic aspirations towards liberalisation and destabilise and divide EU Member States in order to achieve the removal of EU targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for brutal oppression; whereas the Lukashenka regime threatens regional stability by conducting a hybrid war and, to the detriment of aviation safety, forced a Ryanair flight to land in Minsk, leading the EU to impose sanctions; |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas following mass demonstrations against massive electoral fraud, the Belarusian regime has further increased domestic and violent repression against a large proportion of the citizens of Belarus who aspire to a democratic society, and has abandoned its aim of fostering better relations with the EU; whereas Belarus has reversed trends towards democratisation and taken to instrumentalising migrants against the backdrop of a crisis on the EU-Belarusian border, and whereas it continues to uproot domestic aspirations towards liberalisation and destabilise and divide EU Member States in order to achieve the removal of EU targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for brutal oppression; whereas the Lukashenka regime threatens regional stability by conducting a hybrid war and, to the detriment of aviation safety, forced a Ryanair flight to land in Minsk, leading the EU to impose sanctions;

| Y. | whereas on 27 February 2022 Belarus approved a new constitution abandoning the country’s non-nuclear status; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas on 27 February 2022 Belarus approved a new constitution abandoning the country’s non-nuclear status;

| Z. | whereas following Russia’s decision to officially recognise the Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics on 21 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the Minsk Agreements ‘no longer existed’ and that Ukraine was to blame for their collapse; whereas the Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements have so far proved ineffective and failed to end all hostilities between Ukraine and Russian-backed forces and illegal armed formations in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine; whereas the future of the Normandy Format and the Minsk I & II Agreements is highly uncertain, as the international armed conflict in Ukraine has killed thousands and displaced around 10 million people and more than 4 million refugees; whereas daily shelling and gunfights continue to injure and kill people; |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas following Russia’s decision to officially recognise the Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics on 21 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the Minsk Agreements ‘no longer existed’ and that Ukraine was to blame for their collapse; whereas the Normandy Format and Minsk I & II Agreements have so far proved ineffective and failed to end all hostilities between Ukraine and Russian-backed forces and illegal armed formations in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine; whereas the future of the Normandy Format and the Minsk I & II Agreements is highly uncertain, as the international armed conflict in Ukraine has killed thousands and displaced around 10 million people and more than 4 million refugees; whereas daily shelling and gunfights continue to injure and kill people;

| AA. | whereas the threats posed to the Eastern neighbourhood not only concern the behaviour and actions of Russia, but also encompass a wide range of threats including the influence of other authoritarian regimes, terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, corruption, the instrumentalisation of irregular migration, disinformation, climate change, cyberattacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental pollution as a result of military conflict, the weaponisation of energy supplies, hybrid actions and a host of other threats to the cohesion of societies in the neighbourhood; |
| --- | --- |

AA.

whereas the threats posed to the Eastern neighbourhood not only concern the behaviour and actions of Russia, but also encompass a wide range of threats including the influence of other authoritarian regimes, terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, corruption, the instrumentalisation of irregular migration, disinformation, climate change, cyberattacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental pollution as a result of military conflict, the weaponisation of energy supplies, hybrid actions and a host of other threats to the cohesion of societies in the neighbourhood;

| AB. | whereas hybrid threats involve the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvres, mass cyber warfare and the increased use of emerging and disruptive technologies from seabed to space, including both advanced air-breathing equipment and space-based surveillance, and the deployment of strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, nanotechnology and biological warfare; |
| --- | --- |

AB.

whereas hybrid threats involve the systematic combination of information warfare, agile force manoeuvres, mass cyber warfare and the increased use of emerging and disruptive technologies from seabed to space, including both advanced air-breathing equipment and space-based surveillance, and the deployment of strike systems, all of which will be enabled by advanced artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, nanotechnology and biological warfare;

| AC. | whereas the potential for Russia to escalate to the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons cannot be ignored; whereas the EU had been alarmed by the erosion of the global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control architecture; |
| --- | --- |

AC.

whereas the potential for Russia to escalate to the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons cannot be ignored; whereas the EU had been alarmed by the erosion of the global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control architecture;

| AD. | whereas Russian forces launched military attacks on the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants, took control of the plants and held their staff hostage for several weeks, while the International Atomic Energy Agency has been prevented from accessing the data transmitted from these facilities and from monitoring the nuclear material; whereas other nuclear power plants in Ukraine may be targeted in the event of continued hostilities; |
| --- | --- |

AD.

whereas Russian forces launched military attacks on the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants, took control of the plants and held their staff hostage for several weeks, while the International Atomic Energy Agency has been prevented from accessing the data transmitted from these facilities and from monitoring the nuclear material; whereas other nuclear power plants in Ukraine may be targeted in the event of continued hostilities;

| AE. | whereas Moscow launched a disinformation campaign alleging that the US was developing biological weapons in Ukraine; whereas China’s Foreign Ministry has supported Russia’s claims; |
| --- | --- |

AE.

whereas Moscow launched a disinformation campaign alleging that the US was developing biological weapons in Ukraine; whereas China’s Foreign Ministry has supported Russia’s claims;

| AF. | whereas Russia called for a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss its accusations concerning the use of biological weapons; |
| --- | --- |

AF.

whereas Russia called for a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss its accusations concerning the use of biological weapons;

| AG. | whereas the Russian official disinformation campaign may be laying the groundwork for the deployment of biological weapons; whereas disinformation surrounding biological weapons may be a pretext for their eventual use; |
| --- | --- |

AG.

whereas the Russian official disinformation campaign may be laying the groundwork for the deployment of biological weapons; whereas disinformation surrounding biological weapons may be a pretext for their eventual use;

| AH. | whereas Russia-sponsored disinformation campaigns and hybrid interference threaten the development of the rule of law, democratic institutions, and the European perspective in the EaP countries; whereas disinformation misleads the population in the EaP countries, spreads distrust in democratic processes and traditional media, polarises societies, undermines human rights, exacerbates the conditions of minorities and vulnerable groups, and has an overall deteriorating effect on the internal security of the EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

AH.

whereas Russia-sponsored disinformation campaigns and hybrid interference threaten the development of the rule of law, democratic institutions, and the European perspective in the EaP countries; whereas disinformation misleads the population in the EaP countries, spreads distrust in democratic processes and traditional media, polarises societies, undermines human rights, exacerbates the conditions of minorities and vulnerable groups, and has an overall deteriorating effect on the internal security of the EaP countries;

| AI. | whereas Russia is seeking to dismantle and redesign the European security architecture and extract promises from the transatlantic community not to accept Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, and is demanding that NATO troops be withdrawn from some EU Member States, thereby disrespecting the core principles of European security as agreed among European countries, including Russia; whereas the fact that Russian troops invaded Ukraine via Belarusian territory in order to aid Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine demonstrates the actions that Russia demands of its allies, thereby continuing to pose a serious threat to Poland, the Baltic states, fellow EaP countries and the whole of Europe; |
| --- | --- |

AI.

whereas Russia is seeking to dismantle and redesign the European security architecture and extract promises from the transatlantic community not to accept Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, and is demanding that NATO troops be withdrawn from some EU Member States, thereby disrespecting the core principles of European security as agreed among European countries, including Russia; whereas the fact that Russian troops invaded Ukraine via Belarusian territory in order to aid Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine demonstrates the actions that Russia demands of its allies, thereby continuing to pose a serious threat to Poland, the Baltic states, fellow EaP countries and the whole of Europe;

| AJ. | whereas the EU, NATO and their Member States are advocating a peaceful diplomatic solution that would result in Russia immediately terminating all military activities in Ukraine and unconditionally withdrawing all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, and the Member States working to enhance Ukraine’s resilience and ability to defend itself; whereas Russia deliberately and purposely ignored the European Union in the dialogue and negotiations on the situation in Ukraine, while the security of the EU is at stake; whereas there can be no discussion on European security without European countries; whereas the OSCE is the only European organisation that brings together all European countries including Russia, Central Asia and the transatlantic partners; whereas the OSCE remains a suitable framework for discussing how to strengthen the common European security architecture in the interest of all; whereas considerable efforts are being made to sustain intense cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the United States and among the Member States themselves as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas intensive bilateral talks on the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have failed to achieve any kind of breakthrough towards a sustainable solution to this crisis; |
| --- | --- |

AJ.

whereas the EU, NATO and their Member States are advocating a peaceful diplomatic solution that would result in Russia immediately terminating all military activities in Ukraine and unconditionally withdrawing all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine, and the Member States working to enhance Ukraine’s resilience and ability to defend itself; whereas Russia deliberately and purposely ignored the European Union in the dialogue and negotiations on the situation in Ukraine, while the security of the EU is at stake; whereas there can be no discussion on European security without European countries; whereas the OSCE is the only European organisation that brings together all European countries including Russia, Central Asia and the transatlantic partners; whereas the OSCE remains a suitable framework for discussing how to strengthen the common European security architecture in the interest of all; whereas considerable efforts are being made to sustain intense cooperation between the EU, its Member States and the United States and among the Member States themselves as regards Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas intensive bilateral talks on the ongoing Russian war of aggression against Ukraine have failed to achieve any kind of breakthrough towards a sustainable solution to this crisis;

| AK. | whereas the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, including both the foreign affairs and defence ministers, met on several occasions to discuss Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and decide on the EU’s strategy to deal with it; whereas the EU has countered the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine with increasing sanctions; whereas exchanges of views on the security architecture of Europe in the light of Russia’s war against Ukraine took place between Members of the European Parliament and the VP/HR; whereas Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence organised an ad hoc mission to Ukraine between 30 January and 2 February 2022; |
| --- | --- |

AK.

whereas the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council, including both the foreign affairs and defence ministers, met on several occasions to discuss Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and decide on the EU’s strategy to deal with it; whereas the EU has countered the military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine with increasing sanctions; whereas exchanges of views on the security architecture of Europe in the light of Russia’s war against Ukraine took place between Members of the European Parliament and the VP/HR; whereas Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defence organised an ad hoc mission to Ukraine between 30 January and 2 February 2022;

| AL. | whereas the OSCE remains a suitable framework for discussing how to strengthen the common European security architecture in the interest of all; |
| --- | --- |

AL.

whereas the OSCE remains a suitable framework for discussing how to strengthen the common European security architecture in the interest of all;

| AM. | whereas in direct response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU Member States, particularly Germany, have massively enhanced their defence budgets; |
| --- | --- |

AM.

whereas in direct response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU Member States, particularly Germany, have massively enhanced their defence budgets;

| AN. | whereas multiple Member States are providing bilateral military aid to Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian armed forces in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; |
| --- | --- |

AN.

whereas multiple Member States are providing bilateral military aid to Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian armed forces in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

| AO. | whereas a number of EU Member States have decided to positively respond to Ukraine’s requests for military equipment; whereas several EU Member States, starting with the Baltic states and Poland, have sent weapons to Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian armed forces with sophisticated weaponry to resist Russia’s invading forces; whereas the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade is the first and largest structure for training and manoeuvres between European and Ukrainian armed forces; |
| --- | --- |

AO.

whereas a number of EU Member States have decided to positively respond to Ukraine’s requests for military equipment; whereas several EU Member States, starting with the Baltic states and Poland, have sent weapons to Ukraine to assist the Ukrainian armed forces with sophisticated weaponry to resist Russia’s invading forces; whereas the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade is the first and largest structure for training and manoeuvres between European and Ukrainian armed forces;

| AP. | whereas the EU adopted two assistance measures under the European Peace Facility that will contribute to strengthening the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces and protecting the civilian population against the ongoing military aggression; whereas the assistance measures, worth EUR 1,5 billion in total, will finance the provision of equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces, including lethal equipment for the first time; |
| --- | --- |

AP.

whereas the EU adopted two assistance measures under the European Peace Facility that will contribute to strengthening the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces and protecting the civilian population against the ongoing military aggression; whereas the assistance measures, worth EUR 1,5 billion in total, will finance the provision of equipment and supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces, including lethal equipment for the first time;

| AQ. | whereas in November 2021, the Council announced a package of 14 new PESCO projects for land, maritime, air, cyber and space security; whereas the PESCO-funded Cyber Rapid Response Team announced the deployment of cybersecurity experts to help combat Russian cyberattacks against Ukrainian entities on 22 February 2022; |
| --- | --- |

AQ.

whereas in November 2021, the Council announced a package of 14 new PESCO projects for land, maritime, air, cyber and space security; whereas the PESCO-funded Cyber Rapid Response Team announced the deployment of cybersecurity experts to help combat Russian cyberattacks against Ukrainian entities on 22 February 2022;

| AR. | whereas the newly adopted Strategic Compass must provide the CSDP with the political and strategic ambition, capabilities and resources needed to generate positive change, particularly across its strategic neighbourhood; whereas political will among the EU Member States is crucial in implementing the Strategic Compass; whereas the aim of the Strategic Compass is to deliver a positive impact with regard to the swiftness and robustness of a common response to geopolitical and global challenges, prioritising a genuine European defence against an environment of emerging threats; |
| --- | --- |

AR.

whereas the newly adopted Strategic Compass must provide the CSDP with the political and strategic ambition, capabilities and resources needed to generate positive change, particularly across its strategic neighbourhood; whereas political will among the EU Member States is crucial in implementing the Strategic Compass; whereas the aim of the Strategic Compass is to deliver a positive impact with regard to the swiftness and robustness of a common response to geopolitical and global challenges, prioritising a genuine European defence against an environment of emerging threats;

| AS. | whereas the Commission has adopted a new EUR 1,2 billion emergency macro-financial assistance package for Ukraine in order to help the country face up to the current economic and geopolitical challenges and address its financial needs due to Russia’s aggressive actions; whereas the Commission will also allocate an additional EUR 120 million to Ukraine, significantly increasing its bilateral assistance to the country in grants this year; whereas the EU will continue to invest in Ukraine’s future through the Economic and Investment Plan, which aims to leverage up to EUR 6,5 billion in investments over the next few years; |
| --- | --- |

AS.

whereas the Commission has adopted a new EUR 1,2 billion emergency macro-financial assistance package for Ukraine in order to help the country face up to the current economic and geopolitical challenges and address its financial needs due to Russia’s aggressive actions; whereas the Commission will also allocate an additional EUR 120 million to Ukraine, significantly increasing its bilateral assistance to the country in grants this year; whereas the EU will continue to invest in Ukraine’s future through the Economic and Investment Plan, which aims to leverage up to EUR 6,5 billion in investments over the next few years;

| AT. | whereas the EU and its allies have adopted wide-ranging and unprecedented packages of sanctions and measures in response to Russia’s acts of aggression on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, cutting Russia’s access to western capital markets, freezing assets and banning transactions on three Russian banks, as well as excluding key banks from the SWIFT system; |
| --- | --- |

AT.

whereas the EU and its allies have adopted wide-ranging and unprecedented packages of sanctions and measures in response to Russia’s acts of aggression on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, cutting Russia’s access to western capital markets, freezing assets and banning transactions on three Russian banks, as well as excluding key banks from the SWIFT system;

| AU. | whereas sanctions in the energy sector make it harder and more costly for Russia to upgrade its oil refineries; whereas the EU has banned the export, sale or supply of aircraft and related equipment to Russian airlines, as well as all related repair, maintenance or financial services; whereas the airspace for all Russian-owned, Russian-registered or Russian-controlled aircraft has been closed by the West; whereas these aircraft will no longer be able to land in, take off from or fly over the territory of the EU and its allies; whereas the West is expanding the scope of export controls on dual-use goods to limit Russia’s access to crucial technology, such as semiconductors or cutting-edge software; whereas the EU has banned access for Russian diplomats and related groups and business people along with the Russian state-owned media outlets Russia Today and Sputnik, as well as their subsidiaries; whereas the EU’s fifth package of sanctions includes an additional 217 individuals and 18 entities and adds an embargo on coal to the sanctions list; |
| --- | --- |

AU.

whereas sanctions in the energy sector make it harder and more costly for Russia to upgrade its oil refineries; whereas the EU has banned the export, sale or supply of aircraft and related equipment to Russian airlines, as well as all related repair, maintenance or financial services; whereas the airspace for all Russian-owned, Russian-registered or Russian-controlled aircraft has been closed by the West; whereas these aircraft will no longer be able to land in, take off from or fly over the territory of the EU and its allies; whereas the West is expanding the scope of export controls on dual-use goods to limit Russia’s access to crucial technology, such as semiconductors or cutting-edge software; whereas the EU has banned access for Russian diplomats and related groups and business people along with the Russian state-owned media outlets Russia Today and Sputnik, as well as their subsidiaries; whereas the EU’s fifth package of sanctions includes an additional 217 individuals and 18 entities and adds an embargo on coal to the sanctions list;

| AV. | whereas the sanctions imposed on Russia and Belarus represent an unprecedented display of unity from EU Member States and have wrought significant economic damage to key pillars of the Russian and Belarusian economies, which has so far resulted in the temporary collapse of the rouble, increased risk of bond defaults, the temporary closure of the Moscow stock exchange, tremendous cuts to Russian oil trades, and the exclusion of Russia from a wide range of international organisations; |
| --- | --- |

AV.

whereas the sanctions imposed on Russia and Belarus represent an unprecedented display of unity from EU Member States and have wrought significant economic damage to key pillars of the Russian and Belarusian economies, which has so far resulted in the temporary collapse of the rouble, increased risk of bond defaults, the temporary closure of the Moscow stock exchange, tremendous cuts to Russian oil trades, and the exclusion of Russia from a wide range of international organisations;

| AW. | whereas the sanctions against Russia are doing real damage and could trigger a recession; whereas the rouble has temporarily collapsed, bond default risk spiked, the Moscow stock exchange closed and Russian oil trades are at ever-deeper discounts; |
| --- | --- |

AW.

whereas the sanctions against Russia are doing real damage and could trigger a recession; whereas the rouble has temporarily collapsed, bond default risk spiked, the Moscow stock exchange closed and Russian oil trades are at ever-deeper discounts;

| AX. | whereas Ukraine formally applied for EU membership on 28 February 2022, and was swiftly followed by applications for EU membership from the Republic of Moldova and Georgia on 3 March 2022; |
| --- | --- |

AX.

whereas Ukraine formally applied for EU membership on 28 February 2022, and was swiftly followed by applications for EU membership from the Republic of Moldova and Georgia on 3 March 2022;

| AY. | whereas in the light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the Member States are having to contend with an unprecedented number of displaced people as Ukrainians flee to safety; whereas the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is expecting there to be somewhere between 6 and 8 million refugees; whereas the majority of refugees have fled to neighbouring EU Member States, notably Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as to Ukraine’s already fragile neighbour, the Republic of Moldova, leading to tremendous pressure to provide resettlement and assistance; whereas the Commission activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to support Ukraine and bordering countries; whereas it adopted a legislative proposal entitled ‘Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)’; whereas it put forward major financial instruments, including EUR 500 million from the EU budget, the proposed extension of the implementation period for the money available to Member States under the 2014-2020 home affairs funds, and the use of the home affairs funds for 2021-2027; |
| --- | --- |

AY.

whereas in the light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the Member States are having to contend with an unprecedented number of displaced people as Ukrainians flee to safety; whereas the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is expecting there to be somewhere between 6 and 8 million refugees; whereas the majority of refugees have fled to neighbouring EU Member States, notably Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as to Ukraine’s already fragile neighbour, the Republic of Moldova, leading to tremendous pressure to provide resettlement and assistance; whereas the Commission activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to support Ukraine and bordering countries; whereas it adopted a legislative proposal entitled ‘Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)’; whereas it put forward major financial instruments, including EUR 500 million from the EU budget, the proposed extension of the implementation period for the money available to Member States under the 2014-2020 home affairs funds, and the use of the home affairs funds for 2021-2027;

| AZ. | whereas shortly after the beginning of the Russian invasion, the European Council unanimously agreed on activating the Temporary Protection Directive (34) for the first time, which immediately granted a protected status as well as access to EU health, education, labour and residence to all Ukrainian citizens, refugees and long-term residents fleeing Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

AZ.

whereas shortly after the beginning of the Russian invasion, the European Council unanimously agreed on activating the Temporary Protection Directive (34) for the first time, which immediately granted a protected status as well as access to EU health, education, labour and residence to all Ukrainian citizens, refugees and long-term residents fleeing Ukraine;

| BA. | whereas the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which involves 12 countries on the EU’s eastern and southern flanks and some 112 million citizens working together to develop infrastructure, energy, transport and digital networks, is a critical development that can be expanded to include EaP countries in an effort to further strengthen ties with the EU; |
| --- | --- |

BA.

whereas the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), which involves 12 countries on the EU’s eastern and southern flanks and some 112 million citizens working together to develop infrastructure, energy, transport and digital networks, is a critical development that can be expanded to include EaP countries in an effort to further strengthen ties with the EU;

| BB. | whereas the European Parliament firmly supports the international Crimea Platform, which was launched in August 2021 in Kyiv by Ukraine, EU Member States and other international partners to develop an initiative by the President of Ukraine; whereas the platform is an important format for consultation and coordination aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the international response to the ongoing illegal occupation of Crimea, reaffirming the non-recognition of its annexation and achieving de-occupation of Crimea and its peaceful return to Ukrainian control; whereas the platform is responding to Russia’s war of aggression by increasing international pressure on the Kremlin, preventing further rights violations and protecting the victims of the occupying regime; |
| --- | --- |

BB.

whereas the European Parliament firmly supports the international Crimea Platform, which was launched in August 2021 in Kyiv by Ukraine, EU Member States and other international partners to develop an initiative by the President of Ukraine; whereas the platform is an important format for consultation and coordination aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the international response to the ongoing illegal occupation of Crimea, reaffirming the non-recognition of its annexation and achieving de-occupation of Crimea and its peaceful return to Ukrainian control; whereas the platform is responding to Russia’s war of aggression by increasing international pressure on the Kremlin, preventing further rights violations and protecting the victims of the occupying regime;

| BC. | whereas Russia is continuing its illegal passportisation of Ukrainian citizens on the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

BC.

whereas Russia is continuing its illegal passportisation of Ukrainian citizens on the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine;

| BD. | whereas on 26 February 2022, the UN Security Council drafted a text condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was vetoed by Russia and abstained from by China and the United Arab Emirates; |
| --- | --- |

BD.

whereas on 26 February 2022, the UN Security Council drafted a text condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which was vetoed by Russia and abstained from by China and the United Arab Emirates;

| BE. | whereas on 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution demanding an immediate halt to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the vote passed with an overwhelming majority of 140 countries in favour, with 5 voting against and 38 abstentions; |
| --- | --- |

BE.

whereas on 2 March 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution demanding an immediate halt to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the vote passed with an overwhelming majority of 140 countries in favour, with 5 voting against and 38 abstentions;

| BF. | whereas on 16 March 2022, the International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan, upon returning from a visit to Ukraine, stated that ‘if attacks are intentionally directed against the civilian population: that is a crime that my office may investigate and prosecute’; |
| --- | --- |

BF.

whereas on 16 March 2022, the International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan, upon returning from a visit to Ukraine, stated that ‘if attacks are intentionally directed against the civilian population: that is a crime that my office may investigate and prosecute’;

| BG. | whereas on 7 April 2022, the UN General Assembly voted to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council; |
| --- | --- |

BG.

whereas on 7 April 2022, the UN General Assembly voted to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council;

| BH. | whereas in response to Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO deployed thousands of additional defensive land, air and maritime forces in the eastern part of the Alliance; whereas the Alliance has activated the NATO Response Force; |
| --- | --- |

BH.

whereas in response to Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO deployed thousands of additional defensive land, air and maritime forces in the eastern part of the Alliance; whereas the Alliance has activated the NATO Response Force;

| BI. | whereas NATO is helping to coordinate Ukraine’s requests for assistance and is supporting its own allies in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid; |
| --- | --- |

BI.

whereas NATO is helping to coordinate Ukraine’s requests for assistance and is supporting its own allies in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid;

| BJ. | whereas NATO has reconfirmed its Open Door Policy; whereas NATO allies are putting forces on standby and sending additional ships and fighter jets to NATO deployments in Eastern Europe, reinforcing allied deterrence and defence; |
| --- | --- |

BJ.

whereas NATO has reconfirmed its Open Door Policy; whereas NATO allies are putting forces on standby and sending additional ships and fighter jets to NATO deployments in Eastern Europe, reinforcing allied deterrence and defence;

| BK. | whereas a number of Russian unmanned aircraft have entered the airspace of several NATO members before crashing on their territories, in clear violations of the airspace of NATO member countries; |
| --- | --- |

BK.

whereas a number of Russian unmanned aircraft have entered the airspace of several NATO members before crashing on their territories, in clear violations of the airspace of NATO member countries;

| BL. | whereas on 8 March 2022, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine announced that he will no longer pursue NATO accession and that Ukraine is willing to compromise on the status of the Russian-controlled Luhansk and Donetsk breakaway regions of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

BL.

whereas on 8 March 2022, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine announced that he will no longer pursue NATO accession and that Ukraine is willing to compromise on the status of the Russian-controlled Luhansk and Donetsk breakaway regions of Ukraine;

| BM. | whereas the EU should be responding to the Kremlin’s threats not only with hard security measures like delivering weapons to Ukraine to help it defend itself, but also by using soft power of European instruments such as granting accession candidate status; |
| --- | --- |

BM.

whereas the EU should be responding to the Kremlin’s threats not only with hard security measures like delivering weapons to Ukraine to help it defend itself, but also by using soft power of European instruments such as granting accession candidate status;

| BN. | whereas the CSDP must be based on even closer coordination and cooperation with NATO’s defence and deterrence posture and the Open Door Policy, with full respect for the security arrangements of EU Member States, in addition to the need for close coordination between the EU and NATO in order to ensure coherence between the EU’s Strategic Compass and the next NATO Strategic Concept; whereas some of the EaP countries have aspirations to join NATO; |
| --- | --- |

BN.

whereas the CSDP must be based on even closer coordination and cooperation with NATO’s defence and deterrence posture and the Open Door Policy, with full respect for the security arrangements of EU Member States, in addition to the need for close coordination between the EU and NATO in order to ensure coherence between the EU’s Strategic Compass and the next NATO Strategic Concept; whereas some of the EaP countries have aspirations to join NATO;

| BO. | whereas between 2014 and the beginning of the war, the United States has provided over USD 2,9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, with an annual allocation of USD 393 million as of 2021, making Ukraine the largest single recipient of foreign military aid in Europe, while the US also trains four brigades of the Ukrainian armed forces each year; whereas the US has provided lethal equipment to Ukraine and announced, most recently, a USD 800-million assistance package including heavy weapons, artillery, drones and ammunition, bringing the total amount of US security assistance for Ukraine to over USD 4 billion and rising since the start of the war; |
| --- | --- |

BO.

whereas between 2014 and the beginning of the war, the United States has provided over USD 2,9 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, with an annual allocation of USD 393 million as of 2021, making Ukraine the largest single recipient of foreign military aid in Europe, while the US also trains four brigades of the Ukrainian armed forces each year; whereas the US has provided lethal equipment to Ukraine and announced, most recently, a USD 800-million assistance package including heavy weapons, artillery, drones and ammunition, bringing the total amount of US security assistance for Ukraine to over USD 4 billion and rising since the start of the war;

| BP. | whereas on 27 January 2022, the United Kingdom Parliament and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada signed a military procurement deal to provide Ukraine with investment projects in 2022 to 2023; whereas the military deal is worth a total of GBP 1,7 billion and aims to expand Ukrainian naval capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

BP.

whereas on 27 January 2022, the United Kingdom Parliament and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada signed a military procurement deal to provide Ukraine with investment projects in 2022 to 2023; whereas the military deal is worth a total of GBP 1,7 billion and aims to expand Ukrainian naval capabilities;

| BQ. | whereas since 9 February 2022, the United Kingdom’s emergency aid to Ukraine has now reached GBP 400 million, and whereas the United Kingdom has placed a thousand troops on standby for deployment to Eastern Europe in order to provide security for Ukrainian refugees; |
| --- | --- |

BQ.

whereas since 9 February 2022, the United Kingdom’s emergency aid to Ukraine has now reached GBP 400 million, and whereas the United Kingdom has placed a thousand troops on standby for deployment to Eastern Europe in order to provide security for Ukrainian refugees;

| BR. | whereas the United Kingdom has provided capacity-building and non-lethal training to over 20 000 Ukrainian armed forces personnel and supplied defensive systems; whereas the UK has also provided Ukraine with lethal weapons equipment; |
| --- | --- |

BR.

whereas the United Kingdom has provided capacity-building and non-lethal training to over 20 000 Ukrainian armed forces personnel and supplied defensive systems; whereas the UK has also provided Ukraine with lethal weapons equipment;

| BS. | whereas Canada has launched Operation UNIFIER, the Military Training and Cooperation Program, and the Police Training Assistance Project, collectively training more than 30 000 members of Ukraine’s security forces and police services and providing tactical equipment and weapons; whereas between January and April 2022, Canada committed over CAD 118 million in military equipment to support Ukraine and allocated CAD 500 million in additional military aid for Ukraine for the 2022-2023 fiscal year; |
| --- | --- |

BS.

whereas Canada has launched Operation UNIFIER, the Military Training and Cooperation Program, and the Police Training Assistance Project, collectively training more than 30 000 members of Ukraine’s security forces and police services and providing tactical equipment and weapons; whereas between January and April 2022, Canada committed over CAD 118 million in military equipment to support Ukraine and allocated CAD 500 million in additional military aid for Ukraine for the 2022-2023 fiscal year;

| BT. | whereas Norway has donated anti-tank weaponry and air defence systems along with a comprehensive package of non-lethal military aid such as bulletproof vests, helmets, field rations and other essential supplies, while also allocating over EUR 40 million in support to Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

BT.

whereas Norway has donated anti-tank weaponry and air defence systems along with a comprehensive package of non-lethal military aid such as bulletproof vests, helmets, field rations and other essential supplies, while also allocating over EUR 40 million in support to Ukraine;

| BU. | whereas Japan has provided non-lethal military aid including bulletproof vests, helmets, power generators and food, in addition to a loan of USD 100 million to Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

BU.

whereas Japan has provided non-lethal military aid including bulletproof vests, helmets, power generators and food, in addition to a loan of USD 100 million to Ukraine;

| BV. | whereas the Defence Reform Advisory Board, comprised of high-level experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Germany and Lithuania, is the highest-level international advisory body in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

BV.

whereas the Defence Reform Advisory Board, comprised of high-level experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Germany and Lithuania, is the highest-level international advisory body in Ukraine;

| BW. | whereas the increasingly active role of China in competing in the region for political, social and economic influence is growing in the EaP countries, where Chinese investment, including through the Belt and Road Initiative, combines cheap loans that drive up debt-GDP ratios with the projected outcome being a default in the EaP countries, leading to aggressive recompense, often in the form of ownership of strategic infrastructure and policy alignment; |
| --- | --- |

BW.

whereas the increasingly active role of China in competing in the region for political, social and economic influence is growing in the EaP countries, where Chinese investment, including through the Belt and Road Initiative, combines cheap loans that drive up debt-GDP ratios with the projected outcome being a default in the EaP countries, leading to aggressive recompense, often in the form of ownership of strategic infrastructure and policy alignment;

| BX. | whereas the influence of third countries, notably Iran, in the EaP countries is largely concentrated in the South Caucasus, where Iran’s long-standing cultural, religious, political and economic influence continues to grow, which risks undermining the security and stability of some EaP countries owing to assassination attempts linked to Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives in Georgia and Azerbaijan, creating further concern for the EU’s efforts to promote security, stability and good neighbourliness among EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

BX.

whereas the influence of third countries, notably Iran, in the EaP countries is largely concentrated in the South Caucasus, where Iran’s long-standing cultural, religious, political and economic influence continues to grow, which risks undermining the security and stability of some EaP countries owing to assassination attempts linked to Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives in Georgia and Azerbaijan, creating further concern for the EU’s efforts to promote security, stability and good neighbourliness among EaP countries;

| BY. | whereas the 44-day conflict triggered by Azerbaijan fundamentally altered the political, strategic and operational status quo of the South Caucasus, resulted in thousands of casualties, tens of thousands of displaced people and led to Russia’s deployment of approximately 2 000 so-called peacekeeping troops to the Lachin corridor and in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the 10 November 2020 ceasefire agreement; whereas skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to take place and the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh has not been settled; whereas Russia will not be able to settle alone a conflict born in the post-Soviet space; whereas the EU’s lack of strategic foresight and diplomatic initiative has allowed Russia, Turkey, Iran and other actors to strengthen their influence in the South Caucasus; |
| --- | --- |

BY.

whereas the 44-day conflict triggered by Azerbaijan fundamentally altered the political, strategic and operational status quo of the South Caucasus, resulted in thousands of casualties, tens of thousands of displaced people and led to Russia’s deployment of approximately 2 000 so-called peacekeeping troops to the Lachin corridor and in and around Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the 10 November 2020 ceasefire agreement; whereas skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to take place and the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh has not been settled; whereas Russia will not be able to settle alone a conflict born in the post-Soviet space; whereas the EU’s lack of strategic foresight and diplomatic initiative has allowed Russia, Turkey, Iran and other actors to strengthen their influence in the South Caucasus;

| BZ. | whereas the main pipeline to supply gas to Nagorno-Karabakh has been damaged and left the disputed territory without access to energy supplies on 8 March 2022 as a result of ongoing military engagements between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh; |
| --- | --- |

BZ.

whereas the main pipeline to supply gas to Nagorno-Karabakh has been damaged and left the disputed territory without access to energy supplies on 8 March 2022 as a result of ongoing military engagements between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh;

| CA. | whereas at the beginning of January 2022, the forces of the CSTO (spearheaded by the Russian military and also including troops from Belarus and Armenia, among others) intervened in Kazakhstan, at the request of the country’s government, to assist in the crushing of civil unrest in order to ensure the continuation of the current ruling regime and to use the organisation in support of its interests; |
| --- | --- |

CA.

whereas at the beginning of January 2022, the forces of the CSTO (spearheaded by the Russian military and also including troops from Belarus and Armenia, among others) intervened in Kazakhstan, at the request of the country’s government, to assist in the crushing of civil unrest in order to ensure the continuation of the current ruling regime and to use the organisation in support of its interests;

| CB. | whereas the Russian Federation is continuing to further reinforce its illegal military presence in Georgia’s occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to intensify its military build-up and military exercises, to engage in passportisation and to increase ‘borderisation’ through the installation of barbed wire fences and other barriers along the Administrative Boundary Line, seriously destabilising the security situation on the ground and endangering the livelihood of the population in the conflict-affected areas; |
| --- | --- |

CB.

whereas the Russian Federation is continuing to further reinforce its illegal military presence in Georgia’s occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to intensify its military build-up and military exercises, to engage in passportisation and to increase ‘borderisation’ through the installation of barbed wire fences and other barriers along the Administrative Boundary Line, seriously destabilising the security situation on the ground and endangering the livelihood of the population in the conflict-affected areas;

| CC. | whereas the success of any CSDP mission depends on the robustness of its mandate and on the level of political will and cohesion of the EU Member States and the partner countries, as well as on the willingness of Member States to invest their expertise, assets, personnel and resources; |
| --- | --- |

CC.

whereas the success of any CSDP mission depends on the robustness of its mandate and on the level of political will and cohesion of the EU Member States and the partner countries, as well as on the willingness of Member States to invest their expertise, assets, personnel and resources;

| CD. | whereas the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) will have to consider how to protect deployed EU-led missions and EU civilian personnel against such increasing threats; |
| --- | --- |

CD.

whereas the EU’s Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) will have to consider how to protect deployed EU-led missions and EU civilian personnel against such increasing threats;

| CE. | whereas if CSDP missions are to achieve their mission objectives, their mandate should include advisory and training tasks for coping with the emerging and disruptive technologies that are rapidly entering the ‘frozen conflict’ environment; whereas CSDP missions in the associated EaP countries must remain in place as long as they are deemed necessary by recipient countries and Member States in order to ensure the accomplishment of mission objectives; |
| --- | --- |

CE.

whereas if CSDP missions are to achieve their mission objectives, their mandate should include advisory and training tasks for coping with the emerging and disruptive technologies that are rapidly entering the ‘frozen conflict’ environment; whereas CSDP missions in the associated EaP countries must remain in place as long as they are deemed necessary by recipient countries and Member States in order to ensure the accomplishment of mission objectives;

| CF. | whereas the Council is currently discussing options for increasing the CSDP presence in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

CF.

whereas the Council is currently discussing options for increasing the CSDP presence in Ukraine;

| CG. | whereas the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM) is a civilian mission launched in 2014, at the Ukrainian Government’s request, for the EU to support the reform of law enforcement and rule of law institutions, thereby re-establishing trust with Ukrainian citizens after the violent events surrounding the Ukraine revolution; |
| --- | --- |

CG.

whereas the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM) is a civilian mission launched in 2014, at the Ukrainian Government’s request, for the EU to support the reform of law enforcement and rule of law institutions, thereby re-establishing trust with Ukrainian citizens after the violent events surrounding the Ukraine revolution;

| CH. | whereas the EUAM has identified five priority areas, including national and state security, organised and cross-border crime, criminal justice, community safety and police management, and digital transformation and innovation, in supporting the reform of the civilian security sector in Ukraine with an annual budget of EUR 29,5 million and an authorised staff of 371 including Ukrainian nationals and personnel from other non-EU countries, with a mandate up for renewal in 2024; |
| --- | --- |

CH.

whereas the EUAM has identified five priority areas, including national and state security, organised and cross-border crime, criminal justice, community safety and police management, and digital transformation and innovation, in supporting the reform of the civilian security sector in Ukraine with an annual budget of EUR 29,5 million and an authorised staff of 371 including Ukrainian nationals and personnel from other non-EU countries, with a mandate up for renewal in 2024;

| CI. | whereas the EUAM covers three areas of operation: the affording of strategic advice to develop strategic documents and legislation; supporting the implementation of reforms with practical advice, training and equipment; and promoting cooperation and coordination to ensure coherence and reform efforts between Ukraine and international actors; |
| --- | --- |

CI.

whereas the EUAM covers three areas of operation: the affording of strategic advice to develop strategic documents and legislation; supporting the implementation of reforms with practical advice, training and equipment; and promoting cooperation and coordination to ensure coherence and reform efforts between Ukraine and international actors;

| CJ. | whereas the EUAM is conducting its activities in partnership with the National Security Council and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; whereas the EUAM works with Ukraine’s court system via its prosecutors to ensure the independence and efficiency of the prosecution; whereas the EUAM trains and equips Ukrainian police forces via its regional field offices and collaboration with neighbouring provinces; whereas the EUAM concentrates its police training initiatives via the provision of strategic advice and a ‘Community Safety Dialogue’ and trains local police in key areas; |
| --- | --- |

CJ.

whereas the EUAM is conducting its activities in partnership with the National Security Council and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; whereas the EUAM works with Ukraine’s court system via its prosecutors to ensure the independence and efficiency of the prosecution; whereas the EUAM trains and equips Ukrainian police forces via its regional field offices and collaboration with neighbouring provinces; whereas the EUAM concentrates its police training initiatives via the provision of strategic advice and a ‘Community Safety Dialogue’ and trains local police in key areas;

| CK. | whereas the EUAM collaborates with Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) in assisting the Ukrainian authorities in capacity-building measures and integrated border management; |
| --- | --- |

CK.

whereas the EUAM collaborates with Europol’s Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) in assisting the Ukrainian authorities in capacity-building measures and integrated border management;

| CL. | whereas the EUAM’s work in assisting the reform of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains its priority and it must concentrate its support to the implementation of the reform to ensure that the SSU phases out pre-trial investigative powers, demilitarises the service, has a clear division of competences with other security agencies, effective oversight, and that it downsizes itself; whereas, if properly implemented, Bill 3196 stipulates that the SSU concentrate its efforts on counterintelligence, counteraction to threats to state security, counterterrorism, cyber security, the protection of national statehood and territorial integrity, and the protection of state secrets; whereas the necessary reforms to ensure democratic development call for the SSU to undergo: a clear separation of functions, removal from the investigation of economic and corruption crimes (except in exceptional cases when authorised by the Attorney General), political independence, demilitarisation and further optimisation, greater transparency and accountability, and an added focus on the protection of critical infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

CL.

whereas the EUAM’s work in assisting the reform of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) remains its priority and it must concentrate its support to the implementation of the reform to ensure that the SSU phases out pre-trial investigative powers, demilitarises the service, has a clear division of competences with other security agencies, effective oversight, and that it downsizes itself; whereas, if properly implemented, Bill 3196 stipulates that the SSU concentrate its efforts on counterintelligence, counteraction to threats to state security, counterterrorism, cyber security, the protection of national statehood and territorial integrity, and the protection of state secrets; whereas the necessary reforms to ensure democratic development call for the SSU to undergo: a clear separation of functions, removal from the investigation of economic and corruption crimes (except in exceptional cases when authorised by the Attorney General), political independence, demilitarisation and further optimisation, greater transparency and accountability, and an added focus on the protection of critical infrastructure;

| CM. | whereas the EUAM’s assistance in establishing the Bureau of Economic Security (BES), targeting financial crime throughout Ukraine, is a key reform effort; whereas the transparent selection of BES personnel and the disbandment of the State Fiscal Service are critical to the gradual reduction of oligarch influence over Ukraine’s economy; whereas the BES is set to inherit pre-trial investigative powers from the SSU in the sphere of economic security and must support Ukraine’s efforts to resist pressure from law enforcement institutions; |
| --- | --- |

CM.

whereas the EUAM’s assistance in establishing the Bureau of Economic Security (BES), targeting financial crime throughout Ukraine, is a key reform effort; whereas the transparent selection of BES personnel and the disbandment of the State Fiscal Service are critical to the gradual reduction of oligarch influence over Ukraine’s economy; whereas the BES is set to inherit pre-trial investigative powers from the SSU in the sphere of economic security and must support Ukraine’s efforts to resist pressure from law enforcement institutions;

| CN. | whereas in 2020, the EUAM established its fourth field office in Mariupol to support the implementation of centrally led reforms at regional and local level such as the training and advising of local law enforcement authorities, reflecting the growing role of the EUAM in strengthening Ukraine’s resilience across the country and the desire of Ukraine to align with CSDP objectives; whereas the field office in Mariupol was evacuated and then destroyed as a result of Russia’s military assault; |
| --- | --- |

CN.

whereas in 2020, the EUAM established its fourth field office in Mariupol to support the implementation of centrally led reforms at regional and local level such as the training and advising of local law enforcement authorities, reflecting the growing role of the EUAM in strengthening Ukraine’s resilience across the country and the desire of Ukraine to align with CSDP objectives; whereas the field office in Mariupol was evacuated and then destroyed as a result of Russia’s military assault;

| CO. | whereas as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, all international personnel were forced to safely evacuate the country; whereas the Mission continues to maintain contact with Ukrainian counterparts and remains on stand-by pending further instructions from EU headquarters; |
| --- | --- |

CO.

whereas as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, all international personnel were forced to safely evacuate the country; whereas the Mission continues to maintain contact with Ukrainian counterparts and remains on stand-by pending further instructions from EU headquarters;

| CP. | whereas, as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, all Member State personnel of the CSDP EUAM Ukraine have been evacuated; |
| --- | --- |

CP.

whereas, as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, all Member State personnel of the CSDP EUAM Ukraine have been evacuated;

| CQ. | whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) is a civilian mission launched in 2005; whereas it has a non-executive mandate to enhance the border management capacities of border guards, customs authorities and law enforcement in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova with an annual budget of EUR 12 million and a staff of over 200 personnel, with a mandate up for renewal in November 2023; |
| --- | --- |

CQ.

whereas the EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) is a civilian mission launched in 2005; whereas it has a non-executive mandate to enhance the border management capacities of border guards, customs authorities and law enforcement in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova with an annual budget of EUR 12 million and a staff of over 200 personnel, with a mandate up for renewal in November 2023;

| CR. | whereas EUBAM assists the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to fulfil the obligations of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), as part of their Association Agreements with the EU, and is designed to bolster the border and customs capabilities of Moldova and Ukraine; whereas it is tasked with: combating customs fraud, drug smuggling, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings; supporting trade facilitation and integrated border management; and assisting a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through the ‘5+2’ process; |
| --- | --- |

CR.

whereas EUBAM assists the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to fulfil the obligations of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), as part of their Association Agreements with the EU, and is designed to bolster the border and customs capabilities of Moldova and Ukraine; whereas it is tasked with: combating customs fraud, drug smuggling, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings; supporting trade facilitation and integrated border management; and assisting a peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through the ‘5+2’ process;

| CS. | whereas tobacco smuggling, including counterfeit products, has been causing an estimated loss of EUR 10 billion per year to the state budgets of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Member States; whereas from 2020-2021, EUBAM thwarted multiple smuggling operations, seizing copious amounts of ammunition, tobacco, alcohol, ethanol and heroin; |
| --- | --- |

CS.

whereas tobacco smuggling, including counterfeit products, has been causing an estimated loss of EUR 10 billion per year to the state budgets of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Member States; whereas from 2020-2021, EUBAM thwarted multiple smuggling operations, seizing copious amounts of ammunition, tobacco, alcohol, ethanol and heroin;

| CT. | whereas EUBAM is assisting the border services of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the development of general common indicators used for the identification of victims of trafficking; |
| --- | --- |

CT.

whereas EUBAM is assisting the border services of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the development of general common indicators used for the identification of victims of trafficking;

| CU. | whereas EUBAM Task Force Drugs seeks to engage the Mission’s partner services with other drug enforcement authorities in the region; whereas EUBAM collaborates with multiple international organisations, including Europol, FRONTEX and the OSCE via its Arms Working Group, ORION II Joint Operations and ‘EU 4 Border Security’ initiatives; |
| --- | --- |

CU.

whereas EUBAM Task Force Drugs seeks to engage the Mission’s partner services with other drug enforcement authorities in the region; whereas EUBAM collaborates with multiple international organisations, including Europol, FRONTEX and the OSCE via its Arms Working Group, ORION II Joint Operations and ‘EU 4 Border Security’ initiatives;

| CV. | whereas EUBAM has been a consistent advocate of the re-opening of the international transport corridors that cross Transnistria and develops and acts as an advocate for technical confidence-building measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol on transport, customs, veterinary and phytosanitary, and law enforcement issues; |
| --- | --- |

CV.

whereas EUBAM has been a consistent advocate of the re-opening of the international transport corridors that cross Transnistria and develops and acts as an advocate for technical confidence-building measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol on transport, customs, veterinary and phytosanitary, and law enforcement issues;

| CW. | whereas EUBAM contributes to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through confidence-building measures and as a monitoring presence at the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border; |
| --- | --- |

CW.

whereas EUBAM contributes to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through confidence-building measures and as a monitoring presence at the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border;

| CX. | whereas the Russian Federation maintains a so-called peacekeeping mission in Transnistria of approximately 500 soldiers and the Operative Group of Russian Troops (OGRT) of approximately 1 500 soldiers, exercises control over the separatist armed groups of Transnistria and hosts over 100 joint military exercises annually with Transnistria; whereas it is concerned about the attempts by separatists from Tiraspol to obtain recognition of Transnistria’s independence on 4 March 2022; |
| --- | --- |

CX.

whereas the Russian Federation maintains a so-called peacekeeping mission in Transnistria of approximately 500 soldiers and the Operative Group of Russian Troops (OGRT) of approximately 1 500 soldiers, exercises control over the separatist armed groups of Transnistria and hosts over 100 joint military exercises annually with Transnistria; whereas it is concerned about the attempts by separatists from Tiraspol to obtain recognition of Transnistria’s independence on 4 March 2022;

| CY. | whereas as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the safety and security of CSDP EUBAM Moldova is seriously jeopardised and may lead to its eventual evacuation from the country; |
| --- | --- |

CY.

whereas as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the safety and security of CSDP EUBAM Moldova is seriously jeopardised and may lead to its eventual evacuation from the country;

| CZ. | whereas the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) is a civilian mission launched in 2008, following the EU-mediated Six Point Agreement which ended the war between Georgia and Russia; whereas in its 13 years of existence the EUMM has represented the strong political commitment of the EU in the region by contributing to confidence building and normalisation, and providing stability on the ground among the parties involved in the conflict and in the wider region; |
| --- | --- |

CZ.

whereas the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) is a civilian mission launched in 2008, following the EU-mediated Six Point Agreement which ended the war between Georgia and Russia; whereas in its 13 years of existence the EUMM has represented the strong political commitment of the EU in the region by contributing to confidence building and normalisation, and providing stability on the ground among the parties involved in the conflict and in the wider region;

| DA. | whereas the EUMM currently hosts 325 Mission members, including over 200 civilian monitors with an allocated budget of EUR 44,8 million and a mandate up for renewal in December 2022; |
| --- | --- |

DA.

whereas the EUMM currently hosts 325 Mission members, including over 200 civilian monitors with an allocated budget of EUR 44,8 million and a mandate up for renewal in December 2022;

| DB. | whereas the original mandate from 2008 remains unchanged as regards monitoring the implementation of the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between Georgia and Russia, which calls for: no recourse to the use of violence, the cessation of hostilities, granting access to humanitarian aid, the return of the Georgian armed forces to their usual quarters, the withdrawal of Russian armed forces to pre-hostility positions and the opening of international discussion on the security and stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; |
| --- | --- |

DB.

whereas the original mandate from 2008 remains unchanged as regards monitoring the implementation of the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between Georgia and Russia, which calls for: no recourse to the use of violence, the cessation of hostilities, granting access to humanitarian aid, the return of the Georgian armed forces to their usual quarters, the withdrawal of Russian armed forces to pre-hostility positions and the opening of international discussion on the security and stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia;

| DC. | whereas Russia does not comply with the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between Georgia and Russia, as it illegally maintains a presence of its armed forces, and Federal Security Service (FSB) agents and Russian Federation Border Guards in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; whereas it does not allow the establishment of international security mechanisms on the ground, likewise preventing the EUMM from entering the territories occupied by Russia, a critical obstruction to the accomplishment of mission objectives; whereas the EUMM mandate is valid throughout all of Georgia; whereas the EUMM is confronted with Russian borderisation, which involves pushing administrative boundary lines into Georgian territory and further expanding territorial occupation of Georgia; |
| --- | --- |

DC.

whereas Russia does not comply with the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement between Georgia and Russia, as it illegally maintains a presence of its armed forces, and Federal Security Service (FSB) agents and Russian Federation Border Guards in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; whereas it does not allow the establishment of international security mechanisms on the ground, likewise preventing the EUMM from entering the territories occupied by Russia, a critical obstruction to the accomplishment of mission objectives; whereas the EUMM mandate is valid throughout all of Georgia; whereas the EUMM is confronted with Russian borderisation, which involves pushing administrative boundary lines into Georgian territory and further expanding territorial occupation of Georgia;

| DD. | whereas flagrant violations of the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement and the ceasefire by the Russian Federation continues and is often met with limited responses or calls to action by Member States, or no response at all, which risks emboldening the Russian Federation to carry out more such actions; whereas there have been illegal arrests across the Administrative Boundary Lines and illegal ‘borderisation’ activities; |
| --- | --- |

DD.

whereas flagrant violations of the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement and the ceasefire by the Russian Federation continues and is often met with limited responses or calls to action by Member States, or no response at all, which risks emboldening the Russian Federation to carry out more such actions; whereas there have been illegal arrests across the Administrative Boundary Lines and illegal ‘borderisation’ activities;

| DE. | whereas the EUMM is not a typical civilian mission owing to its mandate and focus on monitoring activities, civilian competency building and to the fact that it leads confidence-building activities via small grants and targeted projects between the two sides; whereas the mandate allows it to focus on hybrid threats, human rights, minorities and the environmental aspects of security; whereas the EUMM has created an Advisory Committee on Hybrid Warfare and has regular contacts with the NATO Liaison Office and the team that implements the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package; |
| --- | --- |

DE.

whereas the EUMM is not a typical civilian mission owing to its mandate and focus on monitoring activities, civilian competency building and to the fact that it leads confidence-building activities via small grants and targeted projects between the two sides; whereas the mandate allows it to focus on hybrid threats, human rights, minorities and the environmental aspects of security; whereas the EUMM has created an Advisory Committee on Hybrid Warfare and has regular contacts with the NATO Liaison Office and the team that implements the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package;

| DF. | whereas the EUMM facilitates Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings in Ergneti and ensures the regularity of these meetings which address the security situation on the ground, and which include the Government of Georgia, the breakaway regions and the Russian Federation; whereas, unfortunately, a similar mechanism in Gali, Abkhazia, is on hold; |
| --- | --- |

DF.

whereas the EUMM facilitates Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings in Ergneti and ensures the regularity of these meetings which address the security situation on the ground, and which include the Government of Georgia, the breakaway regions and the Russian Federation; whereas, unfortunately, a similar mechanism in Gali, Abkhazia, is on hold;

| DG. | whereas the EUMM has a constant need to expand its analytical focus and capabilities to address the persistent hybrid threats and thus requires a sufficient budget and resources; |
| --- | --- |

DG.

whereas the EUMM has a constant need to expand its analytical focus and capabilities to address the persistent hybrid threats and thus requires a sufficient budget and resources;

| DH. | whereas the EUMM is a target of disinformation activities, especially by media outlets and social media channels based in occupied regions supported by Russia, forcing the EUMM to organise its internal resources to provide the necessary cooperation and explore ways to counter disinformation; |
| --- | --- |

DH.

whereas the EUMM is a target of disinformation activities, especially by media outlets and social media channels based in occupied regions supported by Russia, forcing the EUMM to organise its internal resources to provide the necessary cooperation and explore ways to counter disinformation;

| DI. | whereas the EUMM has been managing the ‘Hotline’, a confidence-building mechanism which serves as a significant 24/7 channel of communication between the Government of Georgia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the Russian Federation border guards deployed in both regions, on urgent incidents on the ground; whereas this Hotline was activated over 2 100 times in 2021; whereas the EUMM supports the negotiation formats and communication channels through participating in the Geneva International Discussions (GID) and co-chairing the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings in Ergneti; |
| --- | --- |

DI.

whereas the EUMM has been managing the ‘Hotline’, a confidence-building mechanism which serves as a significant 24/7 channel of communication between the Government of Georgia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including the Russian Federation border guards deployed in both regions, on urgent incidents on the ground; whereas this Hotline was activated over 2 100 times in 2021; whereas the EUMM supports the negotiation formats and communication channels through participating in the Geneva International Discussions (GID) and co-chairing the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings in Ergneti;

| DJ. | whereas on 24 October 2019, for the first time in over 10 years, FSB guards crossed the Administrative Boundary Line, detaining EUMM monitors and forcing the EU to negotiate their release; |
| --- | --- |

DJ.

whereas on 24 October 2019, for the first time in over 10 years, FSB guards crossed the Administrative Boundary Line, detaining EUMM monitors and forcing the EU to negotiate their release;

| DK. | whereas the EUMM’s role in addressing the human security and humanitarian needs of the local population in conflict-affected areas and in facilitating effective exchanges of information, for example in connection with medical crossings or the release of the persons and EUMM monitors detained at the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs), as well as in co-facilitating in-person discussions at IPRM meetings in Ergneti, adds tremendous value to the important role the EUMM plays in both contributing to security, conflict management and confidence building; |
| --- | --- |

DK.

whereas the EUMM’s role in addressing the human security and humanitarian needs of the local population in conflict-affected areas and in facilitating effective exchanges of information, for example in connection with medical crossings or the release of the persons and EUMM monitors detained at the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs), as well as in co-facilitating in-person discussions at IPRM meetings in Ergneti, adds tremendous value to the important role the EUMM plays in both contributing to security, conflict management and confidence building;

| DL. | whereas Georgia is one of the biggest contributors per capita to CSDP missions in Africa; |
| --- | --- |

DL.

whereas Georgia is one of the biggest contributors per capita to CSDP missions in Africa;

| DM. | whereas EaP countries remain highly vulnerable to energy insecurity, particularly the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, which repeatedly suffer from energy blackmail from Russia; |
| --- | --- |

DM.

whereas EaP countries remain highly vulnerable to energy insecurity, particularly the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, which repeatedly suffer from energy blackmail from Russia;

| DN. | whereas the EU’s measures to mitigate energy insecurity through the diversification of energy sources will strengthen security and stability in the Eastern region; |
| --- | --- |

DN.

whereas the EU’s measures to mitigate energy insecurity through the diversification of energy sources will strengthen security and stability in the Eastern region;

| DO. | whereas the Commission had already taken action to reduce Europe’s dependence on a single supplier by diversifying its gas suppliers; whereas, in response to the effects triggered by the sanctions imposed on Russia, in order to stop the dependence on Russian energy imports, the Commission devised a new plan to replace, by the end of 2022, 100 billion cubic metres of gas imports from Russia via higher liquefied natural gas and pipeline imports from non-Russian suppliers, and larger volumes of bio-methane and renewable hydrogen production and imports; whereas the plan aims to reduce the use of fossil fuels in homes, buildings, industries and power systems, and to boost energy efficiency, increase renewables and electrification, and address infrastructure bottlenecks; |
| --- | --- |

DO.

whereas the Commission had already taken action to reduce Europe’s dependence on a single supplier by diversifying its gas suppliers; whereas, in response to the effects triggered by the sanctions imposed on Russia, in order to stop the dependence on Russian energy imports, the Commission devised a new plan to replace, by the end of 2022, 100 billion cubic metres of gas imports from Russia via higher liquefied natural gas and pipeline imports from non-Russian suppliers, and larger volumes of bio-methane and renewable hydrogen production and imports; whereas the plan aims to reduce the use of fossil fuels in homes, buildings, industries and power systems, and to boost energy efficiency, increase renewables and electrification, and address infrastructure bottlenecks;

| 1. | Reiterates the EU’s commitment and underlines its unequivocal support to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the EaP countries within their internationally recognised borders and to supporting their efforts to fully enforce those principles; underlines the importance of the unity and solidarity of the Member States in this regard; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression on Ukraine and its related actions in the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in illegally annexed Crimea and in Belarus; stresses that the continued Russian aggression and expansion of its military activities in Ukraine has a detrimental impact on European and global security; reiterates its position that partners and allies should step up their military support to Ukraine and their provision of weapons, which is in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter that allows individual and collective self-defence; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underlines that sustainable peace and human security in the EaP region is essential for the EU; condemns in the strongest possible terms the war of aggression launched by the Russian Federation and its involvement in both military and cyber warfare in the EaP region; calls for an immediate end to the war of aggression against Ukraine and the full and immediate withdrawal of all Russian troops from all Russian-occupied territories in the EaP countries and for an end to military hostilities against Ukraine, which is claiming the lives of civilians and soldiers, and causing millions of people to become displaced, while hampering socio-economic development; condemns in the strongest possible terms the attack on and occupation by the Russian forces of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and considers that Russia’s attempts to strengthen its malign influence in the EaP region through force and coercion must fail; underlines the importance of the unity, solidarity and coherence of the Member States; calls for cooperation with like-minded democratic allies to be stepped up in order to mitigate and counteract the negative influence of third-country powers in the EaP region; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Welcomes the conclusions of the 2021 EaP Summit and further cooperation between the EU and EaP countries; taking into account the security challenges faced by the EaP countries, particularly Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, protracted conflicts, overt military actions, hybrid threats and interference in democratic processes, proposes increasing cooperation with the EaP countries in the field of security and defence, and increasing investment and assistance in security, military, intelligence and cyber cooperation with the associated EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Supports closer defence and security coordination and cooperation with some EaP countries; with a view to promoting the strategic objectives of human security and sustainable peace across the EaP region and beyond, and encouraging to this end the application of an integrated approach by realising the full potential of the CSDP in connection with relevant policy tools; strongly supports the ongoing CSDP missions in the associated EaP countries; strongly insists on strengthening the security dimension of the EU’s EaP policy, on developing strategic security partnerships with some EaP countries, on enhancing foreign and security policy dialogue and cooperation, and on developing a more active role for the EU in the de-escalation of ongoing tensions, the prevention of future conflicts, mediation and confidence-building measures, as well as in conflict resolution countering hybrid threats, disinformation and propaganda, in assisting and cooperating on civilian defence and in supporting a comprehensive security sector review in the EaP countries, which identifies areas of defence and security that need to be improved and enables the EU and the Member States to coordinate their support; considers that further promotion of the alignment and gradual convergence of the EU’s and the EaP countries’ foreign and security policy, in line with partners’ commitments with the EU, are needed; calls on the EaP countries to align to the EU’s policy of sanctions against Russia for its war against Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Stresses that the peaceful resolution of ongoing or unresolved conflicts in the region, based on international law and good neighbourly relations, is key to building and strengthening resilient and sustainable democracies in the EaP; recalls that peace and security require strong and publicly accountable institutions, good governance and respect for the rule of law; strongly encourages the EaP partners to further engage in the relevant reforms, as only internal resilience based on strong and democratic institutions will allow the necessary resilience towards external threats to be achieved; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Stresses the need for the EU to continue promoting an environment conducive to the settlement of conflicts and supporting activities that promote confidence and people-to-people contacts across conflict-divided communities, to prioritise efforts and expand funding for pre-emptive peace-building, including preventive diplomacy, as well as early warning and action mechanisms; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls on EaP states to work constantly to continue cooperation with neighbouring countries, as this would secure a deepening of the already fruitful cooperation and will avoid unnecessary friction that may arise from unresolved bilateral matters; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls for a stronger focus on reconciliation and the rebuilding of community ties in the light of the divisions present in the EaP region; encourages, in this regard, active engagement with civil society actors, as well as with religious communities, in areas such as local conflict analysis, mediation, reconciliation and the strengthening of social cohesion; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls for closer coordination with the OSCE in order to address security challenges in the EaP region, particularly in the areas of human trafficking, arms control, instrumentalised migration, confidence-building and facilitating dialogue among all parties to the crisis; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Remains concerned about the continued violations of the territorial waters and airspace of countries in the Baltic Sea, in the Black Sea region and in the Sea of Azov by the Russian regime; calls on the Member States in the Black Sea area, against the backdrop of the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, to step up military cooperation with the partners on the east of the Black Sea (Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova), both bilaterally and within NATO; underlines the importance of EU and NATO engagement with the EaP countries in the Black Sea region, in order to ensure a secure and stable Black Sea region; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and also encourages the Member States to contribute to the cooperation within the International Crimea Platform in order to address the hybrid threats to wider Black Sea region security posed by or related to Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and the militarisation of the Black and Azov Seas; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Considers that the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) can serve as one of the formats for using investment that promotes mutual security and stability in critical infrastructure and believes that it should be opened to include EaP countries within the framework of existing European policies and programmes, especially the EaP; underlines that the 3SI should work closely with the EU to avoid a duplication of efforts and initiatives, and conflicting approaches; supports the idea that the EU should take leadership of the 3SI; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Invites the EU institutions to provide a more ambitious integration agenda for Ukraine, which could include practical steps towards the first intermediate stage of Ukraine`s gradual integration into the EU’s Single Market; calls on the Commission to thoroughly assess, on the basis of merit, the applications for candidate status of Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Declares the need for Members of the European Parliament’s Committees on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights to continuously monitor the situation; |
| --- | --- |

15.

Realising the full potential of the CSDP in the EaP

| 16. | Welcomes the fact that the adopted Strategic Compass dedicates adequate focus to the EaP countries, including support to Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression and further resilience in the face of Russian provocations and threats; underlines the need to ensure that it is closely coordinated and coherent with NATO’s upcoming Strategic Concept 2022, especially in areas of countering Russian aggression, cyber defence and countering hybrid warfare, disinformation and foreign manipulation and interference, since the European security environment and European resilience cannot be achieved without the long-term security and resilience of all of the EU’s neighbours; notes that the EU’s approach must be holistic, including supporting democratic and economic reforms, strengthening institutional and societal resilience, and enhancing security and defence capacities; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Encourages Member States that share both EU and NATO membership and that lead different NATO capacity building initiatives with the EaP countries to ensure that training efforts and the transfer of best practices are coordinated with the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (EU MPCC) and CPCC; calls on the Member States to ensure that CSDP missions in the associated EaP countries embrace close coordination with NATO’s strategy and actions in the region; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Encourages PESCO-participating Member States to tailor PESCO projects to the needs of EU CSDP missions and operations, for example by developing highly encrypted secure civilian communication systems, and, in accordance with the general conditions for third-state participation in PESCO projects, to consider inviting the EaP countries that meet these general conditions to take part; notes that the inclusion of strategic partners such as the associated EaP countries in individual PESCO projects can be in the strategic interests of the EU and would be mutually beneficial, as the EaP countries would obtain unique capacities and technical expertise, particularly in addressing hybrid threats and cyber security; welcomes, in this regard, the deployment of the PESCO-funded Cyber Rapid Response Team experts to Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Encourages the EU and its Member States to expand support mechanisms for the further participation of the EaP countries in CSDP civilian and military missions and operations, when necessary, including via study and/or field trips, workshops, CSDP training and courses, etc., that would help to increase partners’ interoperability, develop common procedures and joint actions; further encourages them to cooperate with most EaP partners on cyber security, including mutual intelligence sharing, and assistance in critical infrastructure; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Considers consulting some EaP partners in the early stages of CSDP missions and/or operations planning, especially those missions and/or operations that the EaP partners are hosting or will be hosting; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Stresses the importance of the active involvement and strengthened advisory role of the European Parliament in the decision-making process with regard to the CSDP as implemented in the region of the EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Welcomes the agreement in the Council on 13 April 2022 concerning a third tranche of military support under the European Peace Facility to total EUR 1,5 billion to provide lethal military material and fuel and protective equipment, and calls for their immediate delivery; stresses the importance for the EU, given Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine and the increasingly difficult security environment affecting the stability and governance of our Eastern partners, to strengthen our security and defence cooperation; welcomes the decision of the European Council of 2 December 2021 to utilise the European Peace Facility (EPF) in providing Ukraine with a package of EUR 31 million, Georgia with a package of EUR 12,75 million and the Republic of Moldova with a package of EUR 7 million to assist in strengthening their resilience and defence capabilities, particularly cybersecurity, medical, engineering, mobile and logistics capabilities, and the fight against disinformation; encourages further utilisation of the EPF to increase the ability of associated EaP countries, particularly those facing armed aggression and those hosting CSDP missions, to further address their security needs in key areas such as the equipment necessary to exchange intelligence via secure communication lines and the technical tools needed to counter armed aggression and hybrid threats; underlines the need for the EU to improve material and monetary support to the EaP countries and also focus on capacity building with a view to improving each EaP country’s resilience, in particular in countering disinformation campaigns, as well as in national defence; underlines that the EU needs to develop an integrated approach in order to be able to assist the EaP countries in confronting the mutual interconnected threat landscape; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Underlines the importance of the EU’s and the Member States’ solidarity with Ukraine and the increasingly precarious security situation in a number of EaP countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to ensure that any provision of equipment support via the EPF to EaP countries is strictly in compliance with relevant international law regarding the supply of equipment to armed forces, is in line with the needs of the EU’s support objectives to the EaP country concerned and is carried out — where relevant — in coordination with the respective NATO capacity building initiatives for partner countries and strategic planning in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and increase efficiency; encourages Member States to develop military aid instruments enabling some EaP countries to purchase equipment from EU producers; calls on the Member States to lighten the administrative procedures in order not to block decisions which have already been taken regarding equipment provision to the EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Calls on Member States to increase the EPF’s budget to enable the EU to strengthen the EaP countries’ resilience and defence capabilities, such as those for countering hybrid threats; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Encourages Member States to further strengthen the military resilience of Ukraine through the provision of weapons, including anti-ship, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons; welcomes the decision of all of the Member States which supplied Ukraine with lethal equipment in order to boost Ukraine’s capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Welcomes the establishment of an EU Military Staff ‘clearing house cell’; acknowledges that Poland has become a logistical hub responsible for ensuring all material and financial supplies reach the Ukrainian armed forces; encourages Member States to act urgently in increasing and repositioning personnel and supplies in the eastern EU Member States, in particular secured communications equipment, medical supplies and sophisticated weaponry; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Encourages the Commission, as part of an innovative financial response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to assess when a revision of the multiannual financial framework would be appropriate and to review, among other policies, greater defence spending, divestment from Russian hydrocarbons, alleviating the socio-economic consequences of the war for EU citizens and debt relief, on top of the continued provision of military aid to the EaP countries through the EPF; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Welcomes the Commission’s approval of a new emergency macro-financial assistance (MFA) programme for Ukraine worth up to EUR 1,2 billion that will contribute to enhancing Ukraine’s macroeconomic stability and overall resilience in the context created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its impact on the economic situation; notes that the EU and European financial institutions have allocated more than EUR 17 billion in grants and loans to the country since 2014; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Calls on the Commission to strengthen the monitoring of sanctions regimes to secure compliance with existing sanctions regimes; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Enhancing collaboration with institutions and tools

| 30. | Calls for the EU and NATO allies alike to harness every means possible to support the strengthening of military-security cooperation with the EaP countries, as without this, the security and stability of the region cannot be assured; welcomes NATO’s Open Door Policy maintaining close political and operational relations with the aspirant countries concerned, namely Ukraine and Georgia; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Stresses the importance of intensive consultations and strengthened cooperation between the EU and NATO with regard to escalating situations such as the current Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines that this cooperation should respect the security arrangements of all Member States and be based on unity and solidarity among Member States, and on adherence to the principles related to the existing European security architecture and international law, including the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries; calls for the transatlantic community to leverage and expand current and future efforts to counter Russia’s direct and indirect acts of aggression and activities directed against Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Invites the EU to reinforce cooperation with NATO, also through the upcoming Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation, in supporting the defence and security capacity building of our partners in the Eastern neighbourhood; welcomes the reinforced cooperation between the United States, the EU and its Member States and the intense discussions taking place within NATO regarding the security of Europe; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Calls on the EEAS to coordinate assessment reports, threat assessments and political messaging with Member States’ embassies and NATO Liaison Offices in the associated EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Is concerned that one member of NATO is delaying Ukraine’s access to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency despite urgent needs and for reasons unrelated to the current situation; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Is concerned that a NATO member state is blocking discussions between NATO and Ukraine at ministerial level, thereby preventing this partnership from developing; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Encourages the VP/HR to devote particular attention to the security of the EaP area in the upcoming EU-US security and defence dialogue, the EU-US dialogue on Russia and the EU-US dialogue on China; notes that the EU-US Security Dialogue represents an important opportunity to maximise the added value of transatlantic relations in security and defence, and should dedicate ample time and resources to improving the security environment in the EaP region; notes that a democratic, stable and pro-European EaP is considered a threat by the Kremlin regime and is therefore under political and military pressure, especially Ukraine; recalls that the European security order cannot be discussed without European countries; underlines that the stability of the EaP region is essential to the security of the whole European continent; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Calls for the EU to support high-quality independent media and journalists in the EaP countries to strengthen pluralism, media freedom and the rule of law, counter disinformation and increase the overall resilience of democratic societies in the EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Is concerned about the increasing manipulation of information, disinformation and hybrid threats stemming, in particular, from Russia but also from other actors, affecting several theatres and CSDP missions directly and destabilising whole regions; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Deplores the Russian authorities’ efforts to maintain full secrecy vis-à-vis their own population about the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through calling the war of aggression against Ukraine a ‘special operation’ and by ending press freedom and imposing harsh legal sanctions against individuals and the independent media; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to enhance cooperation with EaP partners, in particular in the fields of strategic communication and of combating disinformation and information manipulation, as well as any malign foreign interference, in order to build state and societal resilience and to counter the weakening and fragmentation of societies and institutions; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Calls for the EU to facilitate projects for governments, civil societies, non-governmental organisations and other actors of the associated EaP countries that will help them combat disinformation and hybrid threats, including through the important work of the EEAS StratCom division, with its task forces, the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) and Hybrid Fusion Cell, the Rapid Alert System, the established cooperation at administrative level between the EEAS, the Commission and Parliament, the Commission-led network against disinformation, and Parliament’s administrative task force against disinformation; encourages Member States to extend the participation of the associated EaP countries to include the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE); |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Underlines the crucial need to boost cooperation between the EU and EaP partners in the fields of strategic communication, fighting disinformation and information manipulation, as well as any malign foreign interference; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Calls for the EEAS to enhance the capacity of EU Delegations in the EaP countries to debunk the disinformation campaigns threatening democratic principles coordinated by foreign state actors, especially Russia; calls for a structured response to hybrid threats to CSDP missions as a matter of urgency, as this is an attempt to delegitimise them; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Calls on the Council, the Commission and the EEAS to explore options to foster the cyber capability building of our partners such as adjusting advisory mandates to include specialised training in combating hybrid warfare activities, and disinformation campaigns, cyber warfare and OSINT analysis, to ensure that the EaP countries strengthen the technical infrastructure necessary for cyber resilience; encourages the launch of civilian cyber missions; notes the important training work undertaken by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in the cyber defence field and welcomes the targeted training and education events organised by the ESDC for EaP partners; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Encourages the EU to step up its cyber security policies, as the war of aggression in Ukraine represents an alarmingly high potential for unprecedented escalation, including from third parties; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Acknowledges the role of civil society in policy formulation and oversight of security sector reform, and calls for it to be provided with continuous support and funding and, where circumstances allow, its inclusion in important projects in order to facilitate greater accountability and transparency in the defence and security sector; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to increase the visibility of CSDP missions in the EaP by strengthening its strategic communication, by proactively countering disinformation against them, by including them and, in particular, the EU Delegations, in their political messaging, publicly accessible documents and engagements with the international press; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Stresses the need for the EU to boost its institutional capacities for conflict prevention, mediation, dialogue and de-escalation in the EaP region; underlines that the EU could play a stronger role in establishing confidence-building measures and could further take part in reconciliation efforts; asks the Member States and the EEAS to also work on strengthening the training and capacity building of our EaP partners in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; praises the EU Centres of Excellence on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation initiative in Tbilisi in this respect; calls on the Commission to increase the capacity building of EaP partners in boosting the resilience of their critical entities through common training activities and the sharing of best practices; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Welcomes the EU Concept on cultural heritage in conflicts and crises; is of the opinion that the CSDP can make a contribution to address the security-related challenges linked to the preservation and protection of cultural heritage, and welcomes the possibilities to explore developing such efforts in the EaP region; notes that the inclusion of cultural heritage protection and the intercultural dialogue aspect into the mission mandate would be beneficial to the process of conflict resolution and to concluding sustainable settlements; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Encourages the Member States to ensure that the digital transition undertaken in EaP countries is safeguarded from malign activities and therefore encourages the further utilisation of the EU’s existing flagship cyber capacity-building initiatives in the region — CyberEast and EU4Digital — to include the establishment of legal and administrative structures to certify software and hardware, coordinate national Computer Emergency Response Teams and cyber forensic and investigative bodies across Europe; calls on the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Centre to work closely with the EU’s Eastern partners to improve cybersecurity in the region; calls on the Council to collaborate with Ukraine to strengthen our mutual cybersecurity and our mutual resilience to cyber threats and hybrid attacks; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Encourages the Member States each to show greater political will and solidarity by deploying sufficient numbers of well-trained and qualified personnel to CSDP missions in the associated EaP countries, to ensure a large number of Member States are represented in missions throughout the region and to encourage greater participation by non-EU countries in these missions, particularly countries that have hosted successfully completed CSDP missions and have a better understanding of the local context; welcomes the participation of most EaP partner countries in CSDP missions and operations in third countries, in line with European interests and values; endorses the cooperation of a larger number of Member States with EaP partners in the area of security, such as the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Welcomes the roll-out of military advisors to EU Missions and Delegations, and encourages efforts to further strengthen security and defence expertise inside EU Delegations; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | Considers Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as a wake-up call for European defence in order to ensure that future CSDP missions in the EaP region receive more means, an increased level of ambition and reviewed mandates to confront the challenges faced, in the hope of achieving mission objectives; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Encourages Member States to implement more efficient intelligence-sharing capabilities within and between CSDP missions, and to give particular emphasis to enhanced collaboration and the secondment of personnel from Europol and Interpol to CSDP mission headquarters to facilitate seamless intelligence sharing; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Calls on the EEAS, MPCC, CPCC and CSDP headquarters to foster a new culture of understanding between civilian and military partners based on enhanced institutional relationships and shared awareness and assessment in an effort to develop a comprehensive planning framework and culture; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Encourages CSDP mission headquarters to call for closer synergies with national joint training and evaluation centres in EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Calls on the CPCC, MPCC, EU Military Committee (EUMC) and EU military staff (EUMS) to develop a model for generating and sharing best practices and know-how with regard to campaign or mission planning concepts, in particular as regards threat and risk assessments, early warning and strategic foresight, at the earliest possible stage, with partners vital to campaign success; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS, particularly the CPCC, and the EUMC to better adapt to building inter-agency working groups with exercises and training; believes that the CSDP’s access to both planning, resources and logistics gives it the potential to be used as a practice hub for societal resilience and recovery in the face of both human-induced and natural disasters; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Calls on the CPCC and the MPCC to emphasise the importance of professional civil-military education for all staff in CSDP missions; urges the EU and the Member States to provide the staff in CSDP missions with appropriate equipment and training to become more alert and more resilient; encourages the Commission to extend the Military Erasmus Programme to EaP officers to fund their studies at military academies across the EU; calls for the EU to explore the option of expanding the role of the ESDC to facilitate armed forces officer and national defence training; encourages more consistent and structured participation of relevant personnel to ESDC courses and to cooperate with mechanisms such as the Professional Development Programme (PDP); |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Encourages the expansion of the Military Erasmus Programme by accepting officers from the EaP countries, also to fund their studies in military academies across the EU; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Encourages CSDP mission headquarters to call for closer synergies with national joint training and evaluation centres in the associated EaP countries, such as joint command posts and staff exercises, on possible scenarios involving civilian and military leaders from EU Member States, CSDP mission staff and the associated EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS, the CPCC and the MPCC to enhance synergies with other policy fields and relevant stakeholders with a view to stepping up efforts in pre-emptive peace-building, preventive diplomacy, early warning, confidence-building and improving citizens’ resilience against disinformation; encourages Member States to consider engaging in joint exercises with the EaP countries in areas such as maritime exercises, common air support operations and peace support; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Expresses concerns and urges that the prevailing politicisation of and political influences on defence forces in some EaP countries be addressed, as this results in the politically motivated removal or downgrading of officers educated and trained in the programmes supported by the EU, the Member States and other partner countries; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Underlines the importance for the EU to promote the role of women and young people in peace building in the EaP region and to advance the Women, Peace and Security and the Youth, Peace and Security Agendas in the EaP region; stresses the need to share best practices on gender equality and the gender-sensitive aspects of military operations and civilian missions (design, planning, analysis, gender balance of staff, etc.), by utilising the EU’s mandatory training for the personnel of CSDP missions and operations, and by instituting dedicated gender advisers for each CSDP mission and operation; |
| --- | --- |

64.

Providing the CSDP in the EaP area with additional political and strategic capabilities

| 65. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and particularly the CPCC to ensure that the EUAM maintains as its priority the reform of the Security Service of Ukraine and to extend the scope of cooperation with the SSU on cybersecurity, countering terrorism and hybrid threats after the state of emergency is lifted; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Encourages Member States and the EU to extend EUAM cooperation to all anti-corruption structures involved in the reform of the civilian security sector and to include, either in the form of training and instruction or on the basis of sharing best practices and jointly setting future priorities, both the anti-corruption apparatus of the Ukrainian state, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, and the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court; encourages the Member States to recommend the inclusion in ongoing training courses of representatives of the Ukrainian services and administration, studies of corruption cases and analyses of the reasons for the failure of investigations and the failure to enforce accountability for perpetrators, in order to assist personnel in anti-corruption roles to avoid repeating past mistakes; welcomes the adaptability of CSDP missions in response to Russia’s war of aggression; |
| --- | --- |

66.

| 67. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the CPCC to ensure that the EUAM maintains prioritisation of the reform of Ukraine’s SSU after the state of emergency to ensure greater oversight, fewer pre-trial investigative powers and detention centres and the downsizing and demilitarisation of the SSU, with a quarterly assessment on implementation; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Encourages Member States and the EU to expand their support to the EUAM’s digitalisation efforts related to the reform of Ukraine’s civilian security sector via training and the provision of technologies that support data registry, human resource management and court filing procedures to assist in transparency, community trust building and countering corruption; welcomes the EUAM’s commitment to strengthening the role of women in law enforcement agencies; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Recalls that extended mandates must be accompanied by appropriate resources; is concerned about a risk of dispersal if the EUAM embraces broad sectors but does not have adequate means to fulfil its mission; encourages Member States to strengthen the professional component of the EUAM with special services representatives, in order to effectively implement reforms and provide practical advice; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Calls for the extension of the EUAM’s mandate in the field of combating hybrid threats, strategic communication, digital technology and cybersecurity in order to strengthen the capacity of Ukrainian government institutions to counter information threats, such as the use of communications to undermine trust in public institutions, the spread of misinformation and hostile propaganda, the polarisation of society and the formation of negative perceptions of Ukraine in the world; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Encourages the Member States to enhance their support to Ukraine in its efforts to withstand Russian aggression and further reform its defence sector, which is undergoing fundamental reforms that will have long-term consequences for the Ukrainian armed forces, their ability to ensure Ukraine’s security and public trust and confidence; invites Member States to adopt the decision as a matter of urgency following a political settlement between Ukraine and Russia to launch a CSDP military advisory and training mission to assist Ukraine in operating in densely populated urban combat areas, asymmetric and cyber warfare, and reforming its professional military education system, which is the most significant area for facilitating change and ensuring the sustainability of the transformation of the defence system; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Calls for the EU and Member States to strengthen their public reactions to provocations against the EUMM, especially ceasefire violations; recalls that the EUMM is mandated to cover the whole territory of Georgia’s internationally recognised borders and insists on unimpeded access to the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that adequate resources are provided to EUMM headquarters, especially secure information and communication channels, night vision equipment, better quality imagery and improved open source intelligence (OSINT) gathering and analysis capabilities; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Calls on the Council to maintain the EUAM, the EUMM and the EUBAM for as long as necessary on the basis of regular assessments of their implementation and of needs in the light of CSDP priorities, and supports their renewable mandate structures to ensure easier adaptation to any alteration of facts on the ground; calls for regular assessment of the needs of other or complementary missions in the light of CSDP priorities; |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Reiterates the EU’s support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and for the efforts in the framework of the 5+2 negotiation process to reach a peaceful, lasting and comprehensive political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders, with a special status for Transnistria, which would ensure the protection of human rights, also in the territories currently not controlled by constitutional authorities; recalls that on 22 June 2018, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution urging the Russian Federation to withdraw its troops and armaments unconditionally from the territory of the Republic of Moldova and reaffirms its support for the immediate implementation of that resolution; |
| --- | --- |

75.

| 76. | Expresses concern about the recent developments in the territory of the Transnistrian region and condemns these as dangerous provocations in a very volatile security situation; calls for calm with a view to preserving the security and well-being of the people living on both sides of the Dniester river and in neighbouring countries; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Expresses deep concern about the continued tensions on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the violent conflict in the autumn of 2020; calls on the Council and the EEAS to continue to build confidence, reduce tensions and work towards a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan; highlights the importance of the full exchange and release of detainees, addressing the fate of missing persons, facilitating humanitarian demining, ensuring the safe and free movement of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh, assisting conflict-affected populations, confidence-building measures, people-to-people contacts, supporting reconstruction efforts, and underlines that the preservation of cultural heritage and intercultural dialogue would be beneficial to the process of conflict resolution; is of the view that the consequences of these hostilities and the presence of so-called Russian ‘peacekeepers’ should not impact the political developments in Armenia and the future of the country’s reform agenda; |
| --- | --- |

77.

| 78. | Welcomes the outcome of the high-level meeting of the President of the European Council Charles Michel, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan on 14 December 2021, in which both leaders reaffirmed their preparedness to work on open bilateral issues and to launch negotiations on border demarcation, for which the EU is prepared to provide technical assistance; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and Member States to promote the start of negotiations on the delimitation and demarcation of state borders and a sustainable agreement that leads to peaceful co-existence; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Calls for the EU and the Member States not to let the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia become intractable; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Calls on the Commission to prevent any use or EU funding of illegal surveillance technologies, and calls for the EU and the Member States to engage with the Azerbaijani Government to end the use of such illegal surveillance technologies and repressive cybersecurity; |
| --- | --- |

80.

| 81. | Expresses deep concern about destabilising and terrorist actions by certain countries, notably Iran, in the South Caucasus; strongly condemns any acts of terrorism; welcomes the security cooperation between the EU, its Member States and EaP countries and fully supports the further deepening of counterterrorism cooperation; calls on the EEAS to enter into a security dialogue with Armenia, as it has already done with Azerbaijan, as soon as possible; calls for the EU and the Member States not to let the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia get bogged down; |
| --- | --- |

81.

| 82. | Highlights the increasing role played by China in the EaP region, such as through the conclusion of a free trade agreement with Georgia; underscores the need for the EU to make a strategic assessment as to how such an increasing role can impact the EU’s influence in and cooperation with the EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

82.

| 83. | Calls on the EEAS to monitor China’s growing presence in the EaP countries, including the consequences (and potential consequences) for the internal security of the EaP countries, as well as the wider geopolitical situation; |
| --- | --- |

83.

| 84. | Recognises that Beijing has opposed the economic sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, which it says are unilateral and not authorised by the UN Security Council; stresses that China has yet to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine or acknowledge that Russia has invaded Ukraine; notes that in China, state TV is largely ignoring the war of aggression in Ukraine and claims that the invasion was the fault of the US and NATO; |
| --- | --- |

84.

| 85. | Calls for an immediate embargo on Russian imports of oil, coal, nuclear fuel and gas and for Nord Stream I and II to be completely abandoned; points out that Nord Stream II represented an important tool for Russia to increase its political and economic leverage over Member States and EaP countries; notes that there is a high potential for the use of biofuels in the EaP countries, which can better utilise various renewable energy resources as a means to reduce energy dependency; |
| --- | --- |

85.

| 86. | Welcomes the will expressed at the most recent EaP summit in December 2021 to explore enhanced sectoral cooperation in the field of energy security with interested EaP associated partners; points to climate-security as an area of possible further cooperation between the EU and the EaP; |
| --- | --- |

86.

| 87. | Encourages Member States to consider the establishment of a climate-specific EaP fund that would include cross-border and regional cooperation, the protection of biodiversity, the sustainable use of natural resources, research and education, and a particular focus on capacity building in green technologies based on best practices in Member States; |
| --- | --- |

87.

o

o o

| 88. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU agencies involved in defence and cyber security, the Secretary General of NATO, and the national parliaments of the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

88.

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(1)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(2)  OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(3)  OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(4)  OJ L 23, 26.1.2018, p. 4.

(5)  OJ L 246, 17.9.1999, p. 3.

(6)  OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1.

(7)  OJ L 202, 8.6.2021, p. 1.

(8)  OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15.

(9)  OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1.

(10)  OJ L 359 I, 11.10.2021, p. 6.

(11)  OJ L 102, 24.3.2021, p. 14.

(12)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 106.

(13)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 109.

(14)  OJ L 160, 7.5.2021, p. 112.

(15)  OJ L 351 I, 22.10.2020, p. 5.

(16)  OJ L 246, 30.7.2020, p. 12.

(17)  OJ L 129 I, 17.5.2019, p. 13.

(18)  OJ L 331, 14.12.2017, p. 57.

(19)  OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 42.

(20)  OJ L 180, 21.5.2021, p. 149.

(21)  OJ L 248, 17.9.2008, p. 26.

(22)  OJ L 411, 7.12.2020, p. 1.

(23)  OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 105.

(24)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 156.

(25)  OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 54.

(26)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 87.

(27)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 78.

(28)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 64.

(29)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 136.

(30)  OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 40.

(31)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 114.

(32)  OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 22.

(33)  OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 57.

(34)  Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12).

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