NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

LEANNA S., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, BOARD OF BEHAVIORAL 

HEALTH EXAMINERS, MARINA GRECO, BRENDA BURSCH, Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0459

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS9877

No. JD17200

No. LC2016-000237-001

The Honorable Colleen McNally, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Leanna S., Chandler

Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Dawn Rachelle Williams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
2

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Marc H. Harris

Counsel for Appellee Arizona Board of Behavioral Health Examiners

David G. Derickson, P.C., Phoenix

By David G. Derickson

Counsel for Appellee Marina Greco

Cohen Law Firm, Phoenix

Larry J. Cohen

Counsel for Appellee Brenda Bursch

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jay M. Polk1 joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 This appeal arises out of a complaint Appellant Leanna S. 

filed with the Arizona Board of Psychologist Examiners (“Board of 

Psychologist Examiners”) against Appellee psychologist Brenda Bursch, 

Ph.D., and a complaint Leanna filed with Appellee Arizona Board of 

Behavioral Health Examiners (“Board of Behavioral Health”) against 

Appellee therapist Marina Greco. The complaints related to Dr. Bursch’s

and Greco’s involvement in 2011 proceedings to terminate Leanna’s 

parental rights to her daughters J.S. and C.R. The dispositive issues in this 

appeal are, first, whether four years later, Leanna’s request for a juvenile 

court finding that Dr. Bursch had committed perjury during the 

termination proceedings was timely; and second, whether as a matter of 

law the juvenile court correctly concluded it did not have jurisdiction to 

review the Board of Behavioral Health’s decision to dismiss Leanna’s 

complaint against Greco. We agree with the juvenile court that Leanna’s 

request for a finding of perjury was untimely and it did not have 

 

1The Honorable Jay M. Polk, Judge of the Arizona Superior 

Court, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant to Article VI, 

Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution. 
LEANNA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

jurisdiction to review the Board of Behavioral Health’s dismissal of her 

complaint against Greco. We therefore affirm the orders entered by the 

juvenile court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2010 the predecessor agency to Appellee Department of 

Child Safety (“DCS”), the Arizona Department of Economic Security 

(“ADES”), petitioned to terminate Leanna’s parental rights to J.S. and C.R.,

alleging abuse or neglect or failure to protect from abuse or neglect, 

inability to discharge her parental responsibilities due to mental illness, and 

as to C.R., out-of-home placement for 15 months or longer. The juvenile 

court held a contested hearing (the “2011 hearing”), and in January 2012

issued an order terminating Leanna’s parental rights to J.S. on the ground

of abuse or neglect or failure to protect from abuse or neglect. The court did 

not, however, terminate Leanna’s parental rights to C.R., finding that, 

because C.R. was on the verge of turning 18, termination was not in her best 

interests.

¶3 Three years later, in March 2015, Leanna filed a complaint 

with the Board of Psychologist Examiners against Dr. Bursch, an 

independent expert who had testified during the 2011 hearing on behalf of 

ADES. The complaint was directed at Dr. Bursch’s testimony during the 

2011 hearing regarding Leanna’s suspected Munchausen by proxy causing

C.R.’s previous comas (the “Munchausen by proxy diagnosis”). Leanna’s 

complaint against Dr. Bursch alleged: first, Dr. Bursch had engaged in the 

“unauthorized practice of medicine” by making the Munchausen by proxy

diagnosis because she was not licensed in Arizona (the “practice of

medicine allegation”), and second, Dr. Bursch had engaged in 

“unprofessional conduct” by falsely testifying at the 2011 hearing that she 

had instructed Greco, who was C.R.’s therapist, to wait until after the 

termination proceedings had concluded to begin treatment when she had 

actually instructed Greco to implement treatment before the conclusion of 

the termination proceedings (the “perjury allegation”).

¶4 In June 2015, the Board of Psychologist Examiners sent 

Leanna a letter stating it could not consider her complaint against Dr. 

Bursch because she had not complied with the version of Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 32-2081(B) (2012) then in effect. That statute 

provided:

The board shall not consider a complaint 

against a psychologist arising out of a judicially 
LEANNA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

ordered evaluation, treatment or 

psychoeducation of a person charged with 

violating any provision of title 13, chapter 14 to 

present a charge of unprofessional conduct 

unless the court ordering the evaluation has 

found a substantial basis to refer the complaint 

for consideration by the board. The board shall 

not consider a complaint against a judicially 

appointed psychologist arising out of a court 

ordered evaluation, treatment or 

psychoeducation of a person to present a charge 

of unprofessional conduct unless the court 

ordering the evaluation, treatment or 

psychoeducation has found a substantial basis 

to refer the complaint for consideration by the 

board.

¶5 A year later, in May 2016, Leanna filed a “Motion for Finding 

of Perjury and For Referral of Dr. Brenda Bursch to the State of Arizona 

Board of Psychologist Examiners For Investigation And Appropriate 

Disciplinary Action” (the “perjury motion”) in the closed juvenile court 

termination proceedings. The perjury motion listed both the practice of 

medicine allegation and the perjury allegation. See supra ¶ 3. In the perjury 

motion, however, Leanna only asked the juvenile court to “verify” the 

perjury allegation and authorize the Board of Psychologist Examiners to 

“accept and process the . . . complaints.”

¶6 Before filing the perjury motion in the juvenile court, Leanna

had filed a complaint against Greco with the Board of Behavioral Health. In 

that complaint, Leanna alleged Greco had refused to provide her with 

information as to whether Dr. Bursch had committed perjury when, at the 

2011 hearing, Dr. Bursch testified she had directed Greco to wait to 

implement the treatment plan for C.R. After conducting an investigation, 

the Board of Behavioral Health dismissed Leanna’s complaint in June 2016. 

Leanna then sought judicial review in the superior court of the Board of 

Behavioral Health’s dismissal of her complaint (the “administrative 

appeal”). Leanna subsequently moved to transfer and consolidate the 

administrative appeal with the closed juvenile court termination 

proceedings. The superior court granted her motion.

¶7 DCS moved to strike the perjury motion, arguing in part that 

the juvenile court had dismissed the termination proceedings years earlier,

and, therefore, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to enter any 
LEANNA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

additional orders. The Board of Behavioral Health and Greco also moved 

to dismiss the administrative appeal, arguing the juvenile court did not 

have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board of Behavioral Health’s 

dismissal because Leanna was not a “party” to the administrative 

proceeding.

¶8 The juvenile court granted DCS’s motion to strike. As relevant 

here, the juvenile court struck the perjury motion, concluding: “the Board 

cannot confer authority or jurisdiction upon this Court and the parties to 

the dependency action to open new litigation on a matter in which the 

Court no longer retains jurisdiction.” The juvenile court, however, also 

addressed the merits of the perjury motion, ruling: first, A.R.S. § 32-2081(B)

did not authorize it to reopen the termination proceedings to determine if 

there was a substantial basis to refer Dr. Bursch to the Board; second, the 

perjury motion failed to sufficiently detail and support the perjury 

allegation; and, third, the time to request a finding of perjury relating to the 

2011 hearing had “long past.” The juvenile court also granted the Board of 

Behavioral Health’s motion to dismiss, ruling it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction because Leanna was not a party in the proceeding before the 

Board of Behavioral Health and did not have a statutory right of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. The Perjury Motion

¶9 Leanna argues the juvenile court should not have granted 

DCS’s motion to strike because the juvenile court had “jurisdiction to 

investigate and take disciplinary action against an expert to [e]nsure the

integrity of the judicial process” and to address Dr. Bursch’s conduct in the 

2011 hearing. In response, DCS and Dr. Bursch argue the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction to enter any orders pertaining to the dependency concerning 

C.R. terminated when C.R. turned 18 years old, see A.R.S. § 8-202(G) (Supp. 

2016) (juvenile court’s jurisdiction of child), and, accordingly, the juvenile 

court’s jurisdiction had terminated four years before Leanna filed the 

perjury motion. Exercising de novo review, we disagree with DCS and Dr. 

Bursch and agree with Leanna that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to 

review the merits of the perjury motion. David S. v. Audilio S., 201 Ariz. 134, 

136, ¶ 4, 32 P.3d 417, 419 (App. 2001) (appellate court reviews jurisdiction 

of juvenile court de novo) (citation omitted).

¶10 The perjury motion accused Dr. Bursch of committing a fraud 

on the court, a form of “extrinsic fraud,” which was a matter the juvenile 

court had jurisdiction to review. See McNeil v. Hoskyns, 236 Ariz. 173, 176–
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Decision of the Court

6

77, ¶¶ 14-16, 337 P.3d 46, 49–50 (App. 2014) (superior court had jurisdiction 

to modify an agreed-upon non-modifiable spousal maintenance provision 

in a decree of dissolution when wife committed extrinsic fraud by failing to 

make certain material disclosures to the court and her former husband)

(citations omitted). 

¶11 As this court explained in McNeil, “[t]he court has the power 

to set aside a judgment when a party obtains a judgment by concealing 

material facts and suppressing the truth with the intent to mislead the 

court.” Id. at 177, ¶ 14, 337 P.3d at 50 (quotation and citations omitted). This 

is precisely the allegation that Leanna raised in her perjury motion, see supra

¶ 5, in arguing Dr. Bursch had engaged in “misconduct” by committing 

perjury during the 2011 hearing. Accordingly, the juvenile court should not 

have granted DCS’s motion to strike for lack of jurisdiction.

¶12 Nevertheless, for other reasons, the juvenile court correctly 

struck the perjury motion. First, as the juvenile court found, and as Leanna 

acknowledged during oral argument on the perjury motion, Dr. Bursch was 

not court appointed. Thus, A.R.S. § 32-2081(B) was inapplicable and the 

juvenile court did not need to find a substantial basis to refer Leanna’s 

complaint to the Board of Psychologist Examiners. 

¶13 Second, as the juvenile court also recognized, the perjury 

motion was untimely. If Leanna wanted to obtain a ruling from the juvenile 

court that Dr. Bursch had perjured herself during the 2011 hearing, the time 

to do so was before the termination proceedings had concluded. Yet, even 

though she conceded at oral argument on the perjury motion she was aware 

of all the underlying “misconduct stuff” during the 2011 hearing, she 

waited four years before pursuing the perjury allegation in the juvenile 

court. Here, given the substance of Leanna’s perjury allegation, the time

period imposed by Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 46(E) 

for attacking a judgment for extrinsic fraud serves as an appropriate 

benchmark to measure whether Leanna’s perjury motion was timely. 

Under that rule, a party must move to set aside a judgment for extrinsic 

fraud within three months of the judgment. Applying this standard here, 

the juvenile court properly found the time to request a finding of perjury 

relating to the 2011 hearing was “long past.”2

 

2In her briefing on appeal Leanna does not provide any 

argument regarding the unauthorized practice of medicine allegation. 

Thus, she has waived this issue. See Hahn v. Pima Cty., 200 Ariz. 167, 172, ¶ 
LEANNA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

II. Dismissal of the Administrative Appeal

¶14 Leanna argues the juvenile court should not have dismissed 

the administrative appeal because, contrary to the ruling of the juvenile 

court, she was a party to the proceedings before the Board of Behavioral 

Health. Reviewing the juvenile court’s dismissal of the administrative 

appeal de novo, we agree with the juvenile court that Leanna was not a 

“party” to the proceedings before the Board of Behavioral Health and, 

further, under the Administrative Review Act (“ARA”), the Board of 

Behavioral Health’s dismissal of her complaint was not subject to judicial 

review. See Bolser Enters., Inc. v. Ariz. Registrar of Contractors, 213 Ariz. 110, 

112, ¶ 12, 139 P.3d 1286, 1288 (App. 2006) (appellate court reviews de novo 

trial court’s dismissal of an appeal of an administrative decision for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction). Thus, the juvenile court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the administrative appeal. 

¶15 A superior court may only grant judicial review of an 

administrative decision if it is authorized to do so by law. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec. v. Holland, 120 Ariz. 371, 373, 586 P.2d 216, 217 (App. 1978) (citation 

omitted). Because judicial review of an administrative decision is granted 

by statute, the “jurisdictional requirements prescribed by statute must be 

strictly complied with to achieve entrance to appellate review.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Here, the right to judicial review of a decision by the Board of 

Behavioral Health is governed by A.R.S. § 32-3285 (2016). Under A.R.S. § 

32-3285, absent exceptions not applicable here, “final decisions” of the 

Board of Behavioral Health are subject to judicial review pursuant the 

requirements of the ARA. See A.R.S. §§ 12-901 to -914 (2016). Thus, whether 

a final decision by the Board of Behavioral Health is appealable to the 

superior court is governed by the ARA.

¶16 Section 12-908(A) specifies that the “parties of record” may 

appear in the proceedings before the superior court in an action to review 

a final decision of an administrative agency. But, Leanna was not a party to 

the administrative proceedings before the Board of Behavioral Health. On 

point and controlling on this issue is Twin Peaks Const. Inc. of Nevada v. 

Weatherguard Metal Const., Inc., 214 Ariz. 476, 154 P.3d 378 (App. 2007).

 

13, 24 P.3d 614, 619 (App. 2001) (failure to raise issue on appeal constitutes 

a waiver of the issue) (citation omitted). Additionally, even if she had not 

waived this issue, Leanna raised the unauthorized practice of medicine

allegation in the termination proceedings when she moved in limine to 

preclude Dr. Bursch from testifying. The juvenile court denied that motion.
LEANNA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

¶17 In Twin Peaks, a subcontractor filed a complaint against a 

contractor with the Arizona Registrar of Contractors after the contractor

failed to pay the entire amount it owed to the subcontractor as required by 

statute. Id. at 477, ¶ 2, 154 P.3d at 379. The Registrar ordered the contractor 

to pay the remaining amount owed as required by the statute and rejected 

the contractor’s argument that it had a “complete defense” to the 

subcontractor’s complaint because the subcontractor was unlicensed. Id. at 

477, ¶ 3, 154 P.3d at 379. The contractor then sought judicial review in the 

superior court, and the superior court affirmed the Registrar’s decision. Id. 

at 477, ¶ 4, 154 P.3d at 379.

¶18 On review, we agreed that the subcontractor’s licensing 

status was irrelevant to whether the contractor had violated the payment 

statute. Id. at 479, ¶ 12, 154 P.3d at 381. We explained that in the 

administrative proceeding before the Registrar, the complainant—the 

subcontractor—“was not a party to the administrative proceeding,”

notwithstanding that the subcontractor had filed the complaint against the 

contractor with the Registrar. Id.

¶19 Additionally, even if Leanna had been a party to the 

administrative proceedings, the Board of Behavioral Health’s decision was 

not substantively appealable. Section 12-901(2) defines an appealable

“decision” as follows:

“Administrative decision” or “decision” means 

any decision, order or determination of an 

administrative agency that is rendered in a case 

that affects the legal rights, duties or privileges 

of persons and that terminates the proceeding 

before the administrative agency.

¶20 Here, the Board of Behavioral Health’s dismissal of Leanna’s 

complaint was not a final administrative “decision” as defined in A.R.S. § 

12-901(2) because it did not affect Leanna’s legal rights, duties, or privileges. 

Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Health Exam’rs of State of Ariz., 190 Ariz. 441, 949 P.2d 

530 (App. 1997), illustrates when there is—or is not—an administrative 

decision as defined by A.R.S. § 12-901(2).

¶21 In Murphy, this court addressed whether the superior court 

had authority under the ARA to review the Arizona Board of Medical 

Health Examiners’ decision to issue a letter of concern to a doctor alleged 

to have engaged in unprofessional conduct and medical incompetence. Id. 

at 448-49, 949 P.2d at 537-38. The Board resolved the complaint by issuing 
LEANNA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

9

a nondisciplinary “advisory letter of concern” against the doctor. Id. at 445, 

949 P.2d at 534. The doctor and his employer sought judicial review of the 

decision to issue the letter. Id. On appeal, this court concluded the superior 

court lacked statutory authority to review the Board’s decision because the

“advisory letter of concern” was not a “decision” under A.R.S. § 12-901(2). 

Id. at 448, 949 P.2d at 537. We explained the advisory letter of concern “[did] 

not materially affect [the doctor’s] legal rights, duties, or privileges.” Id. We 

also explained that although the letter “terminated” the complaint, it was 

not an “adjudicative decision”; rather, it was a “discretionary decision to 

end the investigation . . . .” Id. at 448-49, 949 P.2d at 537-38 (citation 

omitted). We, therefore, concluded the advisory letter of concern was “not 

a final decision subject to judicial review before the agency or the superior 

court.” Id. at 449, 949 P.2d at 538.

¶22 As in Murphy, the Board of Behavioral Health’s dismissal of 

Leanna’s complaint against Greco was not a reviewable decision under 

A.R.S. § 12-901(2). Compare A.R.S. § 32-3281(D)(1)-(3) (Supp. 2016) (if on 

completion of investigation the Board of Behavioral Health determines 

information not sufficiently serious to merit disciplinary action, Board shall 

dismiss complaint, file a letter of concern and dismiss complaint, or issue 

nondisciplinary order), with Murphy, 190 Ariz. at 448, 949 P.2d at 537

(discussing former A.R.S. § 32-1451(E); if, on completion of investigation,

board determines information is not sufficiently serious to merit 

disciplinary action, board may dismiss complaint, file an advisory letter, or 

file a letter of reprimand3). Further, the dismissal of a complaint, a lesser 

form of action than issuance of a nondisciplinary advisory letter, is, as in 

Murphy, a discretionary decision that ends an investigation. See e.g. A.R.S. § 

32-3281(E) (complaint dismissed pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-3281(D)(1) not 

disclosed in licensee’s complaint history). 

¶23 Leanna nevertheless argues the Board of Behavioral Health’s

dismissal of her complaint affected her because she was “impacted by the 

complete destruction of [her] family forever.” Section 12-901(2), however,

refers to a person’s legal rights, duties, or privileges, and the Board of 

Behavioral Health’s dismissal did not affect Leanna’s legal rights, duties, or 

privileges. Accordingly, the Board of Behavioral Health’s dismissal of her 

complaint against Greco did not constitute an appealable administrative 

 

3A.R.S. § 32-1451(E) has since been amended, in a manner not 

material to this appeal. As amended, the Board of Behavioral Health may: 

dismiss a complaint, require completion of designated continuing medical 

education courses, or file an advisory letter.
LEANNA S. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

10

decision. See generally Ariz. Physicians IPA, Inc. v. W. Ariz. Reg’l Med. Ctr., 

228 Ariz. 112, 114, ¶ 10, 263 P.3d 661, 663 (App. 2011) (scope of appeal of 

the ARA limited to “review of a final decision of an administrative agency”) 

(quotations and citation omitted).

CONCLUSION

¶24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

striking Leanna’s motion for a finding of perjury and its dismissal of her 

complaint requesting judicial review of Board of Behavioral Health’s 

decision to dismiss her complaint against Greco. Although we have 

affirmed the orders entered by the juvenile court, Leanna’s appeal was not 

completely frivolous. Thus, we deny Dr. Bursch’s request for attorneys’ fees 

under A.R.S. § 12-349 (2016). We grant, however, Dr. Bursch and Greco 

costs on appeal, see A.R.S. § 12-341 (2016), contingent upon their compliance 

with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.