NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No. 17-1996

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. JULIUS GREER a/k/a “POONY” Julius Greer, Appellant

________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-10-cr-00711-01)

District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 5, 2018 Before: MCKEE, AMBRO, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: May 16, 2018)

________________ OPINION *

________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Mc KEE , Circuit Judge
Julius G re er appeals from the sentence that was imposed following the Supreme
Court’s remand of his appeal from his original conviction for Hobbs Act robbery based on the Court’s subsequent decision in Alleyne v. United States. 1 For the reasons t hat follow, we will affirm the district c ourt’s rejection of the arguments Greer made following that remand.
I. 2 Greer raises two issues in this appeal. First, he asserts that the d istrict c ourt erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for a purported Speedy Trial Act violation. Second, he claims that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) must be vacated because Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under that statute.
A. Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be tried within seventy days of his indictment, information, or arraignment, whichever is later. 3 After seventy days have elapse d , a defendant may move to dismiss the charges against him and the indictment
“shall be dismissed.” 4 When ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment for purported Speedy Trial Act violations, the district court must identify and tally the days included on

1 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). The Court granted Greer’s petition for certiorari after we affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. See Unite d States v. Greer , 645 Fed. Appx. 205 (3d Cir. 2016). 2 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 3 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). 4 18 U.S.C. § 3162( a)(2).3 the speedy trial clock and count toward the seventy

- day limit. 5 The district court may, however, exclude certain days from this calculation, including delays that resulted from the pretrial motions and court continuances. 6 The parties agree that t his appeal centers on the d istrict c ourt’s exclusion of the thirty

- three days that elapsed from May 25, 2011 to June 27, 2011. 7 T he d istrict c ourt ostensibly excluded that time after granting the government’s April 2 8th motion for a
continuance. 8 However, the government sought that continuance because the assigned prosecutor was scheduled to be gin another trial on May 9 th

— the same day Greer’s trial

was to begin

. 9 That scheduling conflict was presumably resolved by the time the c ourt granted the government’s request on May 24th

. Accordin gly, the c ourt erred in granting the government’s continuance request based on a nonexistent scheduling conflict

. However, Greer’s coun sel did not object to th at continuance . Instead, after the court scheduled trial for June 27, 2011, he indicated his cons ent by stating: “that’s
fine.” 10 Additionally , Gre er did not specifically challenge the district court’s decision to exclude this time period from its Speedy Trial Act calculation when he moved to dismiss
the indictment. 11 When, as here, a defendant fails to object to an alleged error, that error

5 Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006). 6 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) & (7)(A). 7 Br. for Appellant, 34

– 37; Br. for Appellee, 16. 8 Specifically, in granting the order the District Court wrote that “the failure to grant this continuance would result in a miscarriage of justice, and would unreasonably deny the government continuity of counsel and the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence[.]” App. 119. 9 App. 59

– 60. 10 App. 115. 11 App. 122

– 23.4 is consid ered “forfeited” and we may review for plain error. 12 Accordingly, we may

reverse only if , inter alia , “ the error ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 13 Greer conte nds that he satisfied this standard because the violation was both “blatant and egregious.” 14 We disagree. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the district c ourt’s erroneous decision to grant the government’s moot continuance request affected the outcome of this case

. Greer does n ot allege , for example, that h e was unable to present evidence or locate
witnesses as a result of the delay. 15 In fact, he does not proffer any thing to suggest that the delay seriously affected the judicial proceedings. W e therefore decline to find plain

error and affirm the denial of his motion to dismiss

. B. Hobbs Act Robbery and § 924 Convictions
Greer also contends that his conviction under § 924(c)(3)(B) must be vacated because Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence

. ” He ad vances three arguments in support of this point. First, he claims that his Hobbs Act conviction cannot be considered a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause because that clause is void for

vagueness. 16 Next, he claims that the substantive offense of Hobbs Act robbery does not

12 U.S. v. Vampire Nation , 451 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. v. Dobson , 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005)). 13 Id. 14 Br. for Appellant, 37. 15 See Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (“If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice i f defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past.”); United States v. Young , 657 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing witness unavailability an alleged spoliation of mitigation evidence as a result of a Speedy Trial violation). 16 Br. for Appellant, 41.5 qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) because it does not require the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force.” 17 Finally, he asserts that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery d oes not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) for the sam e reason.
H owever, we have already held that Hobbs A ct robbery qualifies as a predicate
crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause when a defendant is contemporaneously convi cted of both crimes

. 18 Greer was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and carrying or using a firearm during the commission of that robbery, and it is
therefore clear that the jury found that Greer’s robbery “sprang from the barrel” of a

gun. 19 Thus, i t qualifies as a crime of violence. Accordingly, we will affirm Greer’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and need not address Greer’s other two grounds for challenging his Hobbs Act conviction. 20
II

. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

17 Id. at 41. 18 United States v. Robinson , 844 F.3d 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2016); United States v. Galati , 844 F.3d 152, 154

– 55 (3d Ci r. 2016). 19 Robinson , 844 F.3d at 144. 20 S ee Robinson , 844 F.3d at 141 (holding that we need not address a challenge to the § 924(c)’s residual clause when it is clear that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause).