REVISED FEBRUARY 3, 2015

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30026

ESMA L. ETIENNE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

SPANISH LAKE TRUCK & CASINO PLAZA, L.L.C., 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Esma Etienne was a waitress and bartender at Spanish Lake Truck & 

Casino Plaza. When she was not promoted to a managerial position, she filed 

this Title VII suit, alleging that Bernard Terradot, Spanish Lake’s general 

manager, had failed to promote her to the position because of her race and 

color.1 To support her allegations, Etienne submitted the affidavit of Jeannene 

1 As a preliminary to this suit, Etienne filed the required charge with the EEOC, in 

which she claimed that a “less qualified” white former co-worker was hired as manager 

instead of her. On appeal, Spanish Lake contends that we lack jurisdiction to hear Etienne’s 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 2, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 
No. 14-30026

Johnson, a former manager of Spanish Lake. The affidavit states that 

Terradot allocated responsibilities to Spanish Lake employees according to the 

color of their skin, that Terradot would not let “a dark skinned black person 

handle any money,” and that Terradot and his wife on several occasions told 

Johnson “that they thought Esma Etienne was too black to do various tasks at 

the casino.” The district court granted summary judgment to Spanish Lake, 

holding that Etienne had failed to make out a prima-facie case of 

discrimination.2 For the reasons stated below, we VACATE and REMAND.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Ford 

Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2001). Summary 

judgment is appropriate when the evidence “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In undertaking this inquiry, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmonvant; that is, the “evidence 

of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 

current contentions, since they allege primarily the assertions of the former manager’s 

affidavit—not Etienne’s qualifications relative to the person hired. This argument, however, 

is meritless: our jurisdiction depends on “the scope of the EEOC investigation which can 

reasonably be expected to grow out of” Etienne’s EEOC complaint, Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 

F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), and the affidavit is within 

the scope of an investigation which would be expected to grow out of an EEOC complaint 

regarding a discriminatory failure to promote because of race.

Etienne was eventually discharged by Spanish Lake, and her suit originally included 

an additional claim that this discharge constituted retaliation in violation of Title VII. The 

district court dismissed this claim on summary judgment, and, in Etienne v. Spanish Lake 

Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 547 F. App’x 484 (5th Cir. 2013), we affirmed.

2 Notably, the district court seemed to pass over Etienne’s claim that she was 

discriminated against on the basis of both race and her dark color because, when granting 

summary judgment, it relied heavily on the fact that most of the managers at Spanish Lake 

were of the black race. Though we have never explicitly recognized “color” as a separate, 

unlawful basis for discrimination by employers, the text of Title VII is unequivocal on the 

matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination against an 

individual because of the individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 

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No. 14-30026

in [her] favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

A Title VII plaintiff may make out a prima-facie case of discrimination 

using either direct or circumstantial evidence. See Portis v. First Nat’l Bank, 

34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994). If the plaintiff presents only circumstantial 

evidence, then she must prove discrimination inferentially using “[t]he threestep McDonnell Douglas-Burdine ‘minuet.’” Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 

F.3d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994). If, however, the plaintiff presents direct 

evidence of discrimination, “the burden of proof shifts to the employer to 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would 

have been made regardless of the forbidden factor.” Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. 

Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Price Waterhouse v. 

Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).3

To determine whether comments in the workplace constitute “direct 

evidence,” or only “stray remarks,” we have looked to four factors: whether the 

comments are (1) related to the plaintiff’s protected characteristic; (2) 

proximate in time to the challenged employment decision; (3) made by an 

individual with authority over the challenged employment decision; and (4) 

related to the challenged employment decision. See Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. 

3 Neither party explains whether or how this dichotomy between direct and 

circumstantial evidence was affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. 

v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Compare, e.g., Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 

341 (5th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Desert Palace to “answer a disputed question from [Price 

Waterhouse], clarifying that direct evidence . . . is not needed to shift the burden of proof to 

the employer to affirmatively show that it would have treated the plaintiff the same in the 

absence of the unlawful motivating factor; circumstantial evidence of the motivating factor 

can be enough”) and Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 310, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(holding that, under Desert Palace, “the direct evidence requirement has been removed from 

mixed-motive cases,” justifying the use of an “integrated,” “modified McDonnell Douglas

approach” (internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Gross v. FBL 

Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009); with, e.g., Jones, 427 F.3d at 992 (continuing to apply 

the direct-evidence requirement without mentioning Desert Palace). 

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No. 14-30026

Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2001). In applying this test, our ultimate focus 

is on whether the comments prove, “without inference or presumption, that 

race was a basis in employment decisions” in the plaintiff’s workplace. Jones 

v. Robinson Prop. Group, L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 2005). Notably, 

when the proximity in time of the comments to the challenged employment 

decision is unclear, we have found the proximity-in-time factor to be satisfied 

when the comments were “routine,” see Brown, 989 F.2d at 861, or “made over 

a lengthy period of time.” See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222.

This discussion leads us to Etienne’s argument that Johnson’s affidavit 

constitutes “direct evidence” of discrimination. According to Johnson’s 

affidavit, Terradot—Spanish Lake’s general manager who was charged with 

filling the managerial opening—allocated responsibilities to Spanish Lake 

employees according to the color of their skin, did not allow “dark skin black 

person[s to] handle any money at” Spanish Lake, and told Johnson “on several 

occasions” that he “thought Esma Etienne was too black to do various tasks at 

the casino.” This last statement, if made, is direct evidence that color is likely 

to have played a role in Spanish Lake’s employment decisions. Put differently, 

“no inference or presumption” is required to get from this statement—that 

Etienne was “too black to do various tasks at the casino”—to the conclusion 

“that race was a basis in employment decisions” made at Spanish Lake with 

regard to Etienne. See Jones, 427 F.3d at 993. The statement is therefore, for 

purposes of summary judgment, direct evidence of discrimination.

Applying the four factors, to which we have earlier referred, for 

distinguishing direct evidence from stray remarks yields the same conclusion. 

See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222. Factors (1), (3), and (4) are easily satisfied:

Terradot’s comments explicitly reference Etienne’s color; they were made by 

Terradot, the person who indisputably had authority over the managerial 

hiring process; and they are related to the challenged employment decision in 

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No. 14-30026

that they have to do with who can handle money at Spanish Lake, a task that 

neither side disputes is required of the manager position. Only the second, 

proximity-in-time factor raises a concern, since Johnson’s affidavit is unclear 

when Terradot made his comments. Nonetheless, the affidavit alleges that the 

comments were made “on several occasions,” that Terradot “determined” his 

employees’ duties based on the color of their skin, and that Terradot “would 

not allow” a dark-skinned black person to handle money at Spanish Lake. 

Taken together, these statements constitute a justifiable inference that 

Terradot’s comments were not isolated or anomalous, but instead were in 

keeping with a “routine,” ongoing practice of allocating employment duties by 

skin color. See Brown, 989 F.2d at 861. This being the summary-judgment 

stage, that inference is one we reasonably draw; and so the four-factor 

consideration reinforces the conclusion that Johnson’s affidavit constitutes 

direct evidence of discrimination.

Finally, the comments described in Johnson’s affidavit are strikingly 

similar to comments that we have held before to constitute direct evidence of 

discrimination. In Jones, another case involving race discrimination in a 

casino, the plaintiff alleged that he was not hired as a poker dealer because he 

was of the black race. 427 F.3d at 991. According to other employees, the

casino’s poker-room manager stated that he did not hire black dealers because 

“good old white boys don’t want black people touching their cards,” and “maybe 

[he’d] been told not to hire too many blacks in the poker room.” Id. at 993. The 

Jones court held that these statements “clearly and explicitly indicate[d] that 

decision maker(s) in the poker room used race as a factor in employment 

decisions, which is by definition direct evidence of discrimination.” Id. Like 

the statements in Jones, Terradot’s comments indicate that Etienne was 

disqualified from performing certain tasks at the casino because of her skin 

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No. 14-30026

color. Moreover, they do so “clearly and explicitly.” Thus, under Jones, 

Terradot’s comments are “by definition direct evidence of discrimination.” Id. 

Summary judgment, then, was appropriate only if Spanish Lake carried 

its burden of showing that it would have made the same decision absent the 

evidence of discrimination. Although the district court did not reach this issue 

(holding that Etienne had not made out a prima-facie case), it is clear that 

Spanish Lake did not carry its burden. Spanish Lake contends that it did not 

hire Etienne because the person it hired was more qualified than Etienne. But 

to prevail on summary judgment, Spanish Lake must do more than merely 

identify a legitimate basis for its decision—it must show that any reasonable 

jury would conclude that it would have made the same decision absent the 

discrimination. See Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 417–18 

(5th Cir. 2003). Etienne has offered evidence that she too was qualified,4 and 

this evidence, alongside her direct evidence that she was not even considered

for the opening on account of her skin color, is surely enough to create a 

genuine issue for trial. 

For these reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is 

VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.

4 For instance, the record shows that Etienne had worked at Spanish Lake for more 

than three years at the time she was not promoted; that she had trained the person 

eventually hired as manager when the latter was originally hired to work at Spanish Lake 

as a waitress; and that, according to Etienne and Johnson, at least, Etienne’s performance at 

work was excellent and exceeded the “requirements for her position.”

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