In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-1967 

SHELLIE ELLISON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:20-cv-00953-RLY-MPB — Richard L. Young, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 27, 2023 — DECIDED OCTOBER 24, 2023 

____________________ 

Before HAMILTON, SCUDDER, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. 

PRYOR, Circuit Judge. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 

makes it unlawful for the United States Postal Service to exclude a person with a disability from its program solely because of that person’s disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). One of the 

central purposes of the legislation was removing “shameful 

oversights” that caused people with disabilities to “live 

among society ‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.’” 
2 No. 22-1967 

Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295–96 (1985) (quoting 117 

CONG. REC. 45974 (1971)). 

Shellie Ellison is a person with a disability who uses a 

wheelchair. She desires to visit her local post office but cannot 

because the United States Postal Service refuses to build a 

wheelchair ramp. Ellison sued the Postal Service under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act seeking an injunction. The 

district court entered summary judgment for the Postal Service, concluding that the Postal Service need not install a 

ramp at the inaccessible location because Ellison could meaningfully access the program through its website and three 

wheelchair-accessible Postal Service locations within a fifteen-minute drive of her home. 

On appeal, Ellison maintains that the district court erred 

because the record shows that she lacks meaningful access to 

the Postal Service’s program through these alternative methods. We agree. We therefore vacate and remand for the district court to consider whether Ellison’s proposed accommodation is reasonable.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

The Shelbyville Post Office is both the closest one to Ellison’s home and the largest in that area of Indiana. When a 

customer enters this location, she will find employees ready 

to assist—by offering advice about shipping options or by assembling and weighing packages for the customer. The customer will then find a fully stocked retail lobby, where she 

can buy anything from shipping supplies, such as packaging

and stamps, to gift cards. The Shelbyville location is also 

where Ellison keeps a P.O. box for her non-profit, Wheels on 
No. 22-1967 3

the Ground—an organization striving to educate the public 

about accessibility for people with disabilities. Despite all this, 

Ellison cannot enter the Shelbyville Post Office because it has

only one customer entrance: at the top of its front steps. 

Given that Ellison cannot enter the building, three potential accommodations exist for her.1 She can (1) ask for help 

from the loading dock of the Shelbyville Post Office or from a 

van-accessible parking space, (2) use the Postal Service’s website, or (3) visit wheelchair-accessible locations in surrounding towns. We cover each of these accommodations in turn. 

1. The Shelbyville Post Office’s Loading Dock Area

For a while, the Postal Service directed Ellison to the Shelbyville Post Office’s loading dock. Once there, she would

make her way up a ramp and push the call button. If an employee responded—something that did not always happen—

the employee would not let Ellison in through the back door. 

Instead, Ellison would have to wait outside on the loading 

dock while the employee traveled back and forth between the 

inside of the building and the dock to carry out her requests.

Ellison eventually grew frustrated with this setup. She 

complained to the United States Access Board, which concluded that, because of the age of the Shelbyville Post Office, 

it could not require the Postal Service to alter the front entrance. The Postal Service opted not to install a ramp on its 

own, either. Instead, it spent around $60,000 renovating the 

area around the loading dock. This money yielded a van-accessible parking space, a call button in that space, and a less 

1 As we explain later, the Rehabilitation Act does not ensure that people 

with disabilities can access each facility housing an agency’s program, but 

it does ensure that they can access the program as a whole. 
4 No. 22-1967 

steep loading ramp. But delivery trucks often blocked the 

parking space, meaning Ellison still had to stay outside while 

waiting for an employee to help her. The Postal Service also 

offered to deliver the mail from Ellison’s P.O. box to her 

home. Ellison, however, preferred to keep the mail delivered 

to her P.O. box separate from her personal mail so that executives in her non-profit could easily collect documents they 

needed.

Others were dissatisfied with these means of accessing the 

Postal Service’s program too. After a slew of complaints, the 

City of Shelbyville offered to pay for a ramp at the Shelbyville 

Post Office’s front entrance. The Postal Service declined, citing a policy of refusing donations for exterior physical improvements.

2. The Postal Service’s Website

The Postal Service has also pointed Ellison to its website. 

From there, customers can pick between several forms of 

shipping, schedule an at-home pickup, and purchase various 

retail goods. That said, according to the website, ground shipping—the cheapest shipping option for packages weighing 

more than about a pound—is not available online; shipping 

materials can take over a week to arrive; some products come 

with delivery fees; and customers cannot receive hands-on assistance online. 

3. Alternative, Accessible Postal Service Locations

The Postal Service also offers three smaller but wheelchair-accessible post offices in rural areas surrounding Shelbyville that Ellison can visit. They take her longer to reach—

eleven, thirteen, and fifteen minutes by car, as opposed to the 

seven minutes it takes her to drive to the Shelbyville Post 
No. 22-1967 5

Office. In addition, their storefronts are open for fewer 

hours—about twenty-two, thirty-two, and forty-one hours 

per week, as opposed to the forty-nine hours a week the Shelbyville Post Office is open. The record does not reveal which 

services the wheelchair-accessible locations offer or whether 

these alternative locations provide the same assistance to customers as the Shelbyville Post Office. 

Finding these options unsatisfactory, Ellison now visits a 

wheelchair-accessible private shipping company, where she 

must pay three times as much for the same services offered at 

the Postal Service. 

B. Procedural History

Ellison sued the Postal Service, alleging that it failed to 

provide her with meaningful access to its program in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 794. In her view, the Postal Service’s accommodations and 

recommendations did not make her access meaningful even 

when combined. By way of a remedy, she sought an injunction requiring the Postal Service to build a wheelchair ramp 

at the front of the Shelbyville Post Office. Both parties eventually moved for summary judgment. 

After Ellison moved for summary judgment, the Postal 

Service filed a cross motion for summary judgment pointing 

for the first time to three wheelchair-accessible post offices. 

These locations along with the website, it asserted, provided 

Ellison with meaningful access to the Postal Service’s program. In support, the Postal Service submitted evidence 

showing that the alternative locations were wheelchair accessible and had P.O. boxes. It did not, however, detail which 

services each of these alternative locations offered. 
6 No. 22-1967 

After briefing closed, the district court, to its credit, conducted a status hearing to obtain more information on the 

wheelchair-accessible post offices. At the hearing, it asked the 

parties to submit a joint stipulation on how far the alternative 

locations were from Ellison’s house. The court also asked one 

of Ellison’s attorneys during the hearing whether the retail offerings at the alternative post offices were comparable to 

those at the Shelbyville Post Office. She answered to the best 

of her recollection.

Soon after, the parties submitted the joint declaration on 

the distance of the alternative locations. The same day, Ellison 

moved to file a supplemental declaration expanding on the 

retail products sold at those post offices. The proposed affidavit explained that the alternative locations lacked shipping 

materials and carried either no retail items or fewer retail 

items than the Shelbyville location; it said nothing about the 

customer services each provides. 

The district court granted the Postal Service’s motion for 

summary judgment and denied Ellison’s. It concluded that, 

although the loading dock of the Shelbyville location did not 

furnish meaningful access, the totality of the other services 

did. Through the website and the other nearby locations, the 

court explained, Ellison could obtain the benefits of the Postal 

Service’s program. In making this ruling, the court denied Ellison’s motion to file the supplemental declaration as moot, 

reasoning that she could buy any retail items not sold at the 

alternative locations on the website.

Because the court concluded that Ellison had meaningful 

access to the Postal Service, it did not move to the second part 

of the analysis and consider whether her proposed accommodation was reasonable. Ellison now appeals, arguing that the 
No. 22-1967 7

district court should have entered summary judgment in her 

favor. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s summary judgment decision

de novo, meaning we take a fresh look at the issues. Groves v. 

S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 51 F.4th 766, 769 (7th Cir. 2022). When 

both parties move for summary judgment, we take the motions one at a time, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion 

under consideration was made. N.J. ex rel. Jacob v. Sonnabend, 

37 F.4th 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment, in turn,

is warranted when no material fact is in genuine dispute and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when, 

based on the evidence, a jury could find for the non-moving 

party. Birch|Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent Bank, 27 F.4th 1245, 

1249 (7th Cir. 2022). 

A. Legal Background

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act2 prevents the Postal 

Service from excluding people from its program solely because of their disabilities. That prohibition reads: 

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 

denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity ... 

2 Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act to ensure that, no matter how old 

and inaccessible some of a federal agencies’ facilities may be, people with 

disabilities are still granted access to the agency’s services. 
8 No. 22-1967 

conducted ... by the United States Postal Service.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Act defines “program or activity” as 

“all of the operations of” the agency. Id. § 794(b)(1)(A). 

By its terms, then, Section 504 limits its coverage to the 

Postal Service’s program. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 604 (1986). The statute, therefore, 

does not necessarily guarantee access to all facilities housing 

this program. 

Sometimes Congress compromises. It did so when deciding whether the Postal Service must make each of its buildings accessible to people with disabilities. The dividing line 

on which Congress settled was the age of the building. 

Under the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, the Postal 

Service must make any building it constructs or alters after 

that year readily accessible to people with disabilities. 42 

U.S.C. §§ 4151, 4154a, 4155. Different rules apply to structures 

built or last modified before 1968. Those structures are covered only by the more general prohibition on disability discrimination passed five years later in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Here, the parties agree that the Shelbyville Post 

Office was constructed before 1968 and has not been modified 

since, meaning the Rehabilitation Act is the only applicable 

statute.

The Rehabilitation Act’s focus on “program accessibility” 

rather than “facilities accessibility” ensures access to the benefits of the Postal Service while giving the agency flexibility 

in deciding how to make those benefits available. See Daubert 

v. Lindsay Unified Sch. Dist., 760 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(concluding the same with respect to a similarly worded 
No. 22-1967 9

provision in the Americans with Disabilities Act); Parker v. 

Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (same).3

In light of that flexibility, the Supreme Court has instructed 

this court to balance two competing considerations when interpreting Section 504: “the need to give effect to the statutory 

objectives” and “the desire to keep [the statute] within manageable bounds.” Choate, 469 U.S. at 299. 

Recognizing the tension between those goals, regulations 

interpreting the Rehabilitation Act provide additional guidance. 4 Under these regulations, the Postal Service is required

to operate its program so that each part, viewed in its entirety, 

is “readily accessible.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a). Therefore, the 

Postal Service must alter existing facilities only if other methods do not make the program readily accessible to people 

with disabilities. Id. § 84.22(b). 

In turn, a plaintiff suing under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act must show that: (1) she is a person with a disability, (2) she is qualified to participate in the relevant program, 

and (3) the defendant excluded her from or denied her the 

benefit of that program because of her disability. Khan v. Midwestern Univ., 879 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2018), as amended on 

denial of reh’g (Feb. 26, 2018). To establish causation, a plaintiff 

need not prove intentional discrimination. She may alternatively show that the defendant disparately impacted people 

3 We often draw on the ADA in Rehabilitation Act cases because the two 

statutes and their implementing regulations are nearly identical. A.H. ex 

rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2018).

4 The Supreme Court has explained that these regulations serve as an “important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504.” Choate, 469 U.S. at 

304 n.24. 
10 No. 22-1967 

with disabilities or refused her a reasonable accommodation. 

A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 

592–93 (7th Cir. 2018). Under the reasonable accommodation 

theory, the plaintiff must also show that her proposed accommodation is indeed reasonable. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 

535 U.S. 391, 401–02 (2002) (applying a burden-shifting framework to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested accommodation under the ADA).

Here, the first two elements are undisputed, but the parties disagree on the third element: whether the Postal Service 

denied Ellison the benefit of its program. Before reaching the 

merits, we elaborate on what it means to deny someone the 

benefit of a program under the Rehabilitation Act.

1. Defining the Program

First, we must map out the contours of the program in 

question. As discussed, the Rehabilitation Act defines the 

Postal Service’s program in a broad way—as “all of [its] operations.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). The statute establishing the 

Postal Service, however, provides a clearer window into its 

purpose. According to that statute, the Postal Service’s “basic 

function” is facilitating “correspondence of the people.” 39 

U.S.C. § 101(a). 

This goal is accomplished by providing “adequate and efficient postal services at fair and reasonable rates and fees.” 

Id. § 403(a). The phrase “postal service,” in turn, is defined as 

the “delivery of letters” and “packages,” and “other functions 

ancillary” to mailing letters and packages. Id. § 102(5). 5 Even 

5 The fact that the Postal Service’s program involves both mailing and 

functions related to mailing is endorsed by the Postal Service’s brief in this 
No. 22-1967 11

functions “incidental” to sending mail are part of the “[g]eneral duties” of the Postal Service. Id. § 403(a).6

Against this backdrop, we understand that the core benefits of the Postal Service’s program are services necessary to 

sending and receiving mail, including P.O. boxes, the availability of employees to help assemble and weigh packages, and 

the ability to purchase critical shipping supplies such as 

stamps, envelopes, and boxes. 

2. Meaningful Access

Second, after we define the parameters of the program in 

question, the Supreme Court has directed us to assess 

whether the agency in question provides “meaningful access” 

to that program. Choate, 469 U.S. at 300–01. As for what constitutes “meaningful access,” the inquiry is whether people 

with disabilities have an “equal opportunity to ... gain the 

same benefit” from the program as people without disabilities. Id. at 305 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2) (1984)); see also 

Disabled in Action v. Bd. of Elections in City of New York, 752 F.3d 

189, 199–201 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that blind voters 

lacked meaningful access to the program of voting because 

accommodations did not allow them to cast ballots in private, 

which was core to the voting program). That said, the services 

case, which defines the “program as a whole” as “various mailing and 

other services, including in-person experiences” and defines the “Postal 

Service” as “the provision of mailing services and other associated activities.” App. Dkt. 24 at 13, 17–18.

6 In another case, the Postal Service argued that ReadyPost mailers, greeting cards, and even bubble wrap were “postal services” as opposed to 

“nonpostal services” under 39 U.S.C. § 102(5). LePage's 2000, Inc. v. Postal 

Regul. Comm'n, 642 F.3d 225, 231–32 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
12 No. 22-1967 

furnished to each group need only be equivalent, not identical. Choate, 469 U.S. at 305 n.26; see also Kirola v. City & County

of San Francisco, 860 F.3d 1164, 1184 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding 

that plaintiffs had meaningful access to a park system even 

though they could not enter certain parks). 

The Supreme Court has explained that if a plaintiff cannot 

enjoy a program’s fundamental benefits, her access is unlikely 

to be meaningful. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 302 (considering 

whether the limitation denied “the benefits ... the State has 

chosen to provide”); Daubert, 760 F.3d at 987–88 (distinguishing experiences that are “incidental” to government functions 

from the functions themselves). Conversely, the inability to 

make use of a minor benefit—at least standing alone—will 

struggle to move the meaningful-access needle very far. This 

concept is embedded within the word “meaningful”: the 

smaller a benefit is, the less significance it has on a plaintiff’s 

access to the program as a whole.

To put this all together, the idea of meaningful access 

might permit small differences between the experiences of 

people with and without disabilities. The applicable standard 

is not “perfect accessibility.” Kirola, 860 F.3d at 1184. At the 

same time, a plaintiff need not show that she has been completely deprived of access to prevail. See Disabled in Action, 752 

F.3d at 198 (concluding the same); Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 

1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding the same with respect 

to the ADA). 

B. Ellison’s Access to the Postal Service’s Program

With these guideposts in mind, we pivot to the merits and 

ask whether the Postal Service could avoid making structural 
No. 22-1967 13

changes to the Shelbyville Post Office because other methods 

allow Ellison to adequately access its program. 

Ellison argues that the only way she can meaningfully access the Postal Service’s program is by entering the Shelbyville Post Office. In her view, the alternatives—the Shelbyville Post Office’s loading dock, the Postal Service’s website, and the accessible locations—don’t provide her with a 

meaningful level of access to the Postal Service’s program. 

The Postal Service responds that a patchwork of these alternatives produces meaningful access, negating the need for a 

ramp. 

We evaluate Ellison’s options in turn to determine 

whether they, alone or in combination, provide meaningful 

access.

1. The Shelbyville Post Office’s Loading Dock

To start, we agree with Ellison that the Shelbyville Post 

Office’s loading dock area does not supply meaningful access 

to the Postal Service’s program. Even after the modifications 

to the van-accessible parking space, Ellison has repeatedly 

been denied access to benefits of the Postal Service’s program. 

As noted, delivery trucks often blocked the parking space and 

postal employees often ignored her calls. 

2. Website

The website alone also does not offer meaningful access. 

To be sure, we recognize that it seems to at first blush because 

Ellison can order some products and services online.

Once we dig deeper, however, problems arise. To start, the 

cheapest shipping option for packages weighing more than 

about a pound is not available on the website. In addition, the 
14 No. 22-1967 

website forces users to pay shipping and handling fees that 

they would not incur in person. Customers must also wait—

sometimes more than a week—for goods, including packaging materials, to arrive. Once items do arrive, no one is there 

to assist the customer with tasks essential to packaging and 

mailing. A customer cannot, for example, ask anyone to help 

her assemble, weigh, or tape a package. 7 The website thus requires people with disabilities to wait longer, pay more, and 

receive less assistance than someone without a disability.

A larger concern is at play as well. If brick-and-mortar establishments could use websites alone as an excuse to forgo 

physical accommodations, they could relegate people with 

disabilities to a digital world. This could in essence undermine the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act. See Choate, 469 

U.S. at 295–96 (explaining that Congress passed the statute to 

prevent people with disabilities from “liv[ing] among society 

‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored’”) (quoting 117 CONG.

REC. 45974 (1971)). 

Recognizing that forcing Ellison to rely exclusively on the 

website would undermine the statute’s purpose, the Postal 

Service points out that the website merely factors into the 

meaningful-access equation, and that the Rehabilitation Act 

allows it to combine accommodations that together create 

meaningful access. We agree that the website could play a role 

at the margins to supplement other means of access, if those 

other means provided significant levels of access on their 

own. Because the accommodations, as noted above, at the 

7 The Postal Service maintains a help line where customers can ask questions, but a customer using the website would not receive physical assistance. 
No. 22-1967 15

Shelbyville Post Office do not provide a significant level of

access, we must ask whether the three wheelchair-accessible 

locations do so. 

3. Alternative Locations

Dotted on the outskirts of Shelbyville are three wheelchair-accessible post offices relatively close to Ellison’s house. 

Through these locations, one can assume Ellison has some access to the Postal Service’s program. The question is whether 

this access is meaningful. The Postal Service tells us that the 

services at the alternative locations are comparable to those at 

the Shelbyville Post Office. According to the Postal Service, 

Ellison can still make use of the full range of the Postal Service’s benefits, interact with employees, and ask for physical 

assistance. 

The record does not support any of these claims. In essence, all we know from the record is that the alternative post 

offices have P.O. boxes and are further away and open for 

fewer hours than the Shelbyville Post Office. 

The Postal Service’s lack of evidence on the alternative locations is fatal to its argument. In moving for summary judgment, the Postal Service had to either point out that an essential element of Ellison’s claim lacked evidence or present evidence of its own that negated an essential element of her 

claim. Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 

1016 (7th Cir. 2016). Conversely, in opposing Ellison’s motion 

for summary judgment, the Postal Service had to show that a 

reasonable jury would not be required to find for her based 

on the record. Lesiv v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911 

(7th Cir. 2022). In addition, summary judgment is the proverbial “put up or shut up” moment in a lawsuit, when a party 
16 No. 22-1967 

must reveal what evidence it has to convince a jury. Wade v. 

Ramos, 26 F.4th 440, 446 (7th Cir. 2022). This means that a 

party may not manufacture a genuine issue of material fact by 

speculating about evidence not in the record. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2021).

These principles are critical to our evaluation of both the 

Postal Service’s response to Ellison’s motion for summary 

judgment and to its own cross motion. 

When Ellison moved for summary judgment, she established that the options available to her were insufficient to 

give her meaningful access to the Postal Service program. The 

Postal Service had the burden of showing why this was not 

the case—both in opposing Ellison’s motion and in making its 

own motion. In attempting to do so, the Postal Service identified for the first time three alternative post offices. No doubt, 

under the Rehabilitation Act, alternative facilities can supply 

meaningful access. But the Postal Service had to do more than 

tell the district court that these facilities existed. To prove that 

the other locations along with the website gave Ellison meaningful access, or to create a factual dispute on that point, the 

Postal Service needed to show that the services and products 

offered at the alternative locations allowed Ellison to have 

meaningful access to the Postal Service program when 

viewed as a whole. 

Given that “we can look at the facts only with as much 

specificity as the summary judgment record allows,” Strand v. 

Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 2018), we conclude that 

the district court should not have entered summary judgment 
No. 22-1967 17

for the Postal Service.8 A reasonable jury looking at this record—which shows why the Shelbyville Post Office and website were insufficient yet contains no information about the 

services provided at the alternative post offices—would have 

to conclude that Ellison lacked meaningful access to the Postal 

Service’s program. The only way a jury could find for the 

Postal Service on this question would be by impermissibly 

speculating about what lies inside the wheelchair-accessible 

post offices. Khungar, 985 F.3d at 573. 

Ellison therefore showed that without an accommodation

she lacks meaningful access to the Postal Service’s program.

B. The Reasonableness of Ellison’s Proposed Accommodation. 

Before we can determine whether the district court should 

have granted summary judgment to Ellison, we must consider whether her proposed accommodation is reasonable. 

To meet her initial burden at this stage, Ellison needed 

only to suggest an accommodation that seemed reasonable on 

its face. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02. We think that her proposed accommodation—a ramp or other means for her to enter the Shelbyville Post Office—cleared this low bar. The 

Postal Service then had to show that, in reality, the proposed 

accommodation is not reasonable or would impose an undue 

8 Ellison also contends that the district court should have considered her 

affidavit on the lack of retail products sold at the alternative locations. Because we have determined that summary judgment for the government 

was improper regardless of the affidavit, we need not reach this argument. 
18 No. 22-1967 

hardship.9 Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2002). The problem is that 

the Postal Service has claimed work-product privilege over its 

calculations on the cost of a ramp.

Because the district court did not reach this fact-sensitive 

question, and we prefer to let district courts make factual 

findings in the first instance, United States v. Outland, 993 F.3d 

1017, 1023 (7th Cir. 2021), we remand for further proceedings 

to determine if the proposed accommodation is reasonable. 

We leave it up to the sound discretion of the district court to 

determine whether to resolve this issue through further summary judgment proceedings or through trial.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, Ellison showed that she lacks meaningful access 

to the Postal Service’s program without an accommodation. 

We therefore VACATE the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service and REMAND for further proceedings on whether Ellison’s proposed accommodation is reasonable.

9 Ellison argues that this defense is an affirmative one and that the Postal 

Service forfeited it by not asserting it in the answer. We need not decide 

whether the Postal Service’s argument amounts to an affirmative defense 

or whether the Postal Service forfeited it. Failing to plead an affirmative 

defense typically results in forfeiture only if the delay harmed the plaintiff, 

Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2019), and 

Ellison has not argued that the delay harmed her or told us why the general rule does not apply. 
No. 22-1967 19 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join Judge Pryor’s 

opinion for the court. I write separately to note that I would 

be willing to go further and reject on broader grounds the 

Postal Service’s theory that it “accommodated” plaintiff Ellison by sending her to other post offices in other towns. Judge 

Pryor’s opinion explains persuasively that sending the plaintiff to wait outside at the back door of the Shelbyville Post Office, hoping the ramp would not be blocked and that an employee would come to the door and help her, did not offer 

Ellison “meaningful access” to the Postal Service’s programs. 

Nor did leaving plaintiff to shop on the website for slow and 

incomplete access to products and services. The court’s opinion also explains persuasively how the Postal Service failed to 

show in the district court that other post offices in other towns 

offered Ellison meaningful access.

At a more fundamental level, though, the Postal Service 

should not be allowed to refuse to make the Shelbyville Post 

Office itself wheelchair accessible, regardless of the precise offerings and hours of the other post offices. The federal government itself reports that nearly one in eight American 

adults cannot manage to go up and down stairs. Centers for 

Disease Control, Disability Impacts All of Us, 

https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/infographic-disability-impacts-all.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2023)

(12.1% of adults in the U.S. have “serious difficulty walking 

or climbing stairs).

It’s 2023, for heaven’s sake. The Rehabilitation Act was enacted 49 years ago. The Americans with Disabilities Act was 

enacted more than 30 years ago. One would be hard pressed 

to find any institution other than the Postal Service that would 
20 No. 22-1967

even dare make the arguments the defense has made in this 

case.

Imagine a fast-food chain with an inaccessible restaurant 

telling wheelchair-bound customers they should be satisfied 

driving to another restaurant across town, or to the next town 

over, or even to the next county. Or suppose one of the Postal 

Service’s competitors—FedEx or UPS or DHL—operated an inaccessible facility. Imagine they told wheelchair-bound customers, or even the United States Attorney, that it’s sufficient 

that another wheelchair-accessible facility is located in the 

next town over. Those defenses would be laughed out of court 

these days. And ironically, a federal enforcement action 

against that hypothetical fast-food chain or Postal Service 

competitor would be brought by the same United States Attorney’s Office defending the Postal Service’s refusal to build 

a ramp in this case. 

All members of the panel agree that plaintiff met her burden of proposing an apparently reasonable accommodation—

installing a ramp at the Shelbyville Post Office. Ante at 17. 

That shifted the burden to the Postal Service to show that 

plaintiff’s proposed accommodation is not reasonable. There 

are at least three major problems with the Postal Service’s objections to plaintiff’s proposal. First, safe ramps for wheelchairs are surely the most common, ordinary, and visible accommodation required under the Rehabilitation Act (as well 

as the Americans with Disabilities Act). See Disabled in Action 

v. Board of Elections, 752 F.3d 189, 201 (2d Cir. 2014) (ordering 

broad injunctive relief to make all polling places in New York 

City accessible). Plaintiff seeks a perfectly ordinary accommodation.
No. 22-1967 21

Second, in this case, the record shows that the Postal Service has studied the costs of building a ramp. But it has refused to disclose the cost estimate to plaintiff or the court, 

claiming attorney work-product privilege. Whether that privilege claim is valid or not, the Postal Service simply has not 

offered evidence that a ramp would be unreasonable. We 

could just as well order summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on this point rather than order further proceedings on remand.

Third, at the risk of stating the obvious, the proposed 

ramp will benefit not just plaintiff Ellison, but thousands of 

other residents of Shelby County who would like to use the 

Shelbyville Post Office but cannot cope with its inaccessible 

entrance. These broader benefits need to be part of any calculation of reasonableness.

I recognize that the standard is not “perfect accessibility.” 

Kirola v. City and County of San Francisco, 860 F.3d 1164, 1184 

(9th Cir. 2017); Disabled in Action, 752 F.3d at 198–99. But the 

specific context is important. In Kirola, for example, the plaintiffs were seeking complete access to all parks in San Francisco. Not all obstacles to wheelchair access could be eliminated without changing the nature of the parks (although 

there was apparently plenty of room for reasonable improvements). A local post office is inarguably very different from 

an entire parks system. This self-evident difference explains 

why ordering the Postal Service to build a ramp at the Shelbyville Post Office would not inexorably require the National 

Park Service to build ramps throughout the Grand Canyon. 

More pointedly, as the Second Circuit wrote in Disabled in Action: “It is not enough to open the door for the handicapped 

...; a ramp must be built so the door can be reached.” 752 F.3d 
22 No. 22-1967

at 200, quoting with approval Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 

644, 652 (2d Cir. 1982), in turn quoting with approval plaintiffs’ brief. 

Just so, and that was more than forty years ago. In 2023, 

the refusal to make a post office wheelchair-accessible should 

be deemed “discrimination” under the Rehabilitation Act 

without further ado.