FILED 

MAY 7,2013 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO.1 OF ) 

OKANOGAN COUNTY, a municipal ) 

corporation, ) 

) 

Respondent! ) 

Cross Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, PETER ) 

GOLDMARK, Commissioner ofPublic ) 

Lands, ) 

) 

Respondent! ) 

Cross Appellant, ) 

) 

ood ) 

) 

CONSERVATION NORTHWEST, a ) 

nonprofit corporation, ) 

) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

CHRISTINE DAVIS, a single person, ) 

TREVOR KELPMAN, a single person, ) 

DAN GEBBERS and REBA GEBBERS, ) 

husbood ood wife, ood WILLIAM C. ) 

No. 29121-9-111 

Consolidated with 

No. 29123-5-111 

PUBLISHED OPINION 
No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

WEAVER, custodian for Christopher C. ) 

Weaver, a minor, ) 

) 

Respondents, ) 

KULIK, J. - More than 15 years ago, the Okanogan County Public Utility District 

No.1 (PUD) began the process required to construct a new transmission line and 

substation between Pateros and Twisp in the Methow Valley. Following a decade of 

environmental review and litigation, PUD obtained an environmental impact statement 

(BIS). Next, PUD needed to obtain easements over the proposed land. PUD negotiated 

with approximately 85 percent ofthe property owners for easements on their land. 

Ultimately, PUD filed a petition for condemnation against the remaining property owners. 

This included the State,l which owned school trust lands that were required for the 

project. 

Conservation Northwest (CNW), a group engaged in conservation activities, filed 

a motion to intervene. The court granted CNW's motion. Both CNW and the State filed 

motions for summary judgment, arguing that PUD lacks the authority to condemn school 

trust land. The State stipulated to the entry ofthe order on public use and necessity, 

which addressed the narrow issues of whether the transmission line project was a public 

1 We refer to the following parties collectively as the "State:" Christine Davis, 

Trevor Kelpman, Dan Gebbers, Reba Gebbers, William Weaver, Peter Goldmark, and the 

2 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

use and whether the easements sought were reasonably necessary for that use. 

The court denied the State's and CNW's motions, granted summary judgment in 

favor of PUD, and entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order on public use 

and necessity. 

CNW appealed, challenging the order of summary judgment, in addition to the 

order on public use and necessity. PUD then cross appealed, challenging the trial court's 

order granting intervention to CNW. The State also appealed the summary judgment 

order, contending that PUD had no statutory authority to condemn the State trust lands at 

issue here. 

We conclude that the State trust lands may be condemned as a matter oflaw. We 

affirm summary judgment in favor of PUD and the denial ofsummary judgment to the 

State and CNW. Given that we affirm the trial court's order on the PUD's condemnation 

authority, we need not address the PUD's cross appeal challenging CNW's limited 

intervention. 

FACTS 

Introduction. In 1889, Washington became a state. At that time, the federal 

government granted to Washington approximately three million acres of land for 

State ofWashington. 

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No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

educational purposes and the support of common schools. Enabling Act, ch. 180, 

§§ 10, 11,25 STAT. 676 (1889). The lands consisted ofsections 16 and 36 of each 

township in Washington. Id. Section 11 ofthe Enabling Act reserved these lands for 

"school purposes only" and set forth certain restrictions on their sale and lease to ensure 

that the lands would derive to the sole benefit of Washington schools. Id. This concern is 

echoed in the Washington Constitution. The Constitution provides that all "public lands 

granted to the state are held in trust for all the people" and restricts the manner in which 

such trust lands may be disposed. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 

The Department ofNatural Resources (DNR) is the state agency charged by the 

legislature with the management ofthese lands. In 1957, the management responsibilities 

were consolidated in DNR, which was created to provide effective and efficient 

management ofthese state lands. RCW 43.30.010, .030. Peter Goldmark, the elected 

Commissioner ofPublic Lands (Commissioner), serves as the administrator ofDNR. The 

Commissioner is a member ofthe Board ofNatural Resources that establishes policies 

regarding the appropriate management of state lands and resources. RCW 43.30.205, 

.215. 

4 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

DNR has been granted the exclusive statutory authority and discretion to lease trust 

lands for various purposes, including commercial, agricultural, and recreational uses. 

RCW 79.13.010. 

In 1996, Okanogan PUD proposed a new transmission line to improve electrical 

service to the citizens of Methow Valley. PUD sought to construct the transmission line 

and substation between Pateros and Twisp (hereinafter the "project,,).2 

From the initial planning for the project in 1996, the project has been subject to 

extensive scrutiny. Gebbers v. Okanogan County Pub. Util. Dist. No.1, 144 Wn. App. 

371,376, 183 PJd 324, review denied, 165 Wn.2d 1004, 198 PJd 511 (2008). As part of 

the review, PUD and the U.S. Forest Service prepared a draft EIS seeking input from 

citizens, environmental groups, and governmental agencies. Fifteen alternatives were 

identified and six alternatives and a no-action alternative were approved for 

consideration. PUD conducted two public hearings, held several public meetings, and 

responded to over 400 public comment letters. Id. A final EIS was released in March 

2006, and PUD made its selection later that month. Id. 

2 A lengthy discussion of the project is contained in this court's opinion in Gebbers 

v. Okanogan County Pub. Util. Dist. No.1, 144 Wn. App. 371, 183 PJd 324, review 

denied, 165 Wn.2d 1004, 198 P.3d 511 (2008). 

5 

No. 29 12 l-9-III; No. 29l23-5-II1 

PUDv. State 

Following 10 years ofenvironmental review, the superior court and this court 

affinned PUD's decisions regarding the project and the sufficiency of the final EIS. Id. at 

393. We held that the environmental effects ofthe project were adequately disclosed, 

discussed, and substantiated in the fmal EIS. We also held that PUD did not act 

arbitrarily and capriciously in selecting the transmission line route. Id. The Supreme 

Court denied review. Gebbers, 165 Wn.2d at 1004. 

PUD negotiated the easements required for the project with approximately 85 

percent ofthe property owners along the transmission line route, but eventually filed 

eminent domain proceedings against the remaining owners, including the State. The State 

lands in question are school trust lands managed by the DNR. PUD filed its amended 

petition for condemnation on April 14, 2010. 

At summary judgment on the condemnation petition, CNW argued that the 

proposed Pateros-Twisp transmission line would bisect the largest contiguous publicly 

owned shrub-steppe habitat in the Methow Valley and would have multiple adverse 

environmental impacts, including the introduction of noxious weeds, fragmentation of 

wildlife habitat, increased fire risk, and exacerbating erosion and sedimentation. 

The State argued that it leased these lands for cattle grazing to generate money for 

trust beneficiaries and to preserve this land as a part ofthe trust corpus for the benefit of 

6 

No. 29121-9-111; No. 29123-5-111 

PUDv. State 

future generations. To this end, the State had entered into enforceable leases for the use 

ofthese parcels and had issued pennits to allow for cattle grazing on certain parcels. In 

total, the proposed Pateros-Twisp transmission line would cross state trust lands that are 

subject to five active grazing leases and two grazing pennit range areas. These leases and 

pennits actively generate income to benefit Washington schools. 

However, the leases on the property generate less than $3,000 annually for the 

school beneficiaries, not including DNR administrative costs. PUD's proposed easements 

pass over no more than an estimated 4 percent ofthe area of anyone lease and as little as 

0.02 percent for one ofthe leased areas. PUD modified the project to eliminate all 

pennanent road construction within the project. 

Intervention. Prior to the hearing on public use and necessity, CNW filed a motion 

to intervene as a respondent in support ofthe State. It is undisputed that CNW has no 

legal or equitable property interest in the trust lands. CNW states: "The issue at stake in 

this litigation ... directly affects Conservation Northwest's ability to continue its work as 

a representative and protector ofstate trust land and its ability to protect its own interests 

as an organization involved in land conservation." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 603. Despite 

opposition by PUD, the superior court granted limited intervention under CR 24. 

7 

No. 29121-9-111; No. 29123-5-111 

PUDv. State 

Motions for Summary Judgment. Following intervention, both CNW and the State 

filed separate motions for summary judgment, arguing that the PUD does not have the 

authority to condemn school trust lands. PUD also filed a motion for summary judgment. 

The court rejected this statutory argument and concluded that PUD has the express 

authority to condemn school trust lands under RCW 54.16.020 and .050. The court also 

rejected the contention that school trust lands cannot be subject to condemnation because 

they are dedicated to a public use. 

The trial court entered orders denying summary judgment to CNW and the State, 

and granting summary judgment to PUD on the issue ofcondemnation authority. 

Because the State did not otherwise oppose an order on public use and necessity, the court 

also entered its "Findings ofFact, Conclusions ofLaw, and Order on Public Use and 

Necessity." CP at 14-18. 

Appeals. CNW filed a notice of appeal challenging the summary judgment in 

PUD's favor, as well as the order on public use and necessity. PUD then cross appealed 

the order granting intervention to CNW. The Attorney General declined to appeal the 

trial court's decision despite the Commissioner's request that it do so. Subsequently, the 

State filed a contingent notice of appeal ofthe order denying summary judgment and the 

order on public use and necessity. Later, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the 

8 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUD v. State 

Attorney General was required to prosecute an appeal on behalf of the Commissioner. 

Goldmark v. McKenna, 172 Wn.2d 568, 259 P.3d 1095 (2011). The State then continued 

this appeal with special counsel. 

ANALYSIS 

After the PUD filed its condemnation petition, the State and CNW filed separate 

motions for summary judgment arguing that PUD does not have the authority to condemn 

the school trust lands. The State concedes that PUD has the statutory authority to 

condemn, but the State argues that the school trust lands in question are not subject to 

condemnation because they are already devoted to a particular use by law. CNW argues 

that chapter 54.16 RCW does not grant PUD express authority to condemn. CNW 

abandoned this argument on appeal. CNW adopts the State's arguments. CNWargues 

that state school lands are dedicated to a public use as a matter of law. 

This court reviews the trial court's summary judgment orders de novo. Moeller v. 

Farmers Ins. Co., 173 Wn.2d 264,271,267 P.3d 998 (2011). We engage in the same 

inquiry as the trial court. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853,860,93 

P.3d 108 (2004). 

The property in dispute is designated school trust land. Significantly, chapter 1, 

section 6(e) of the LAWS OF 1931, codified at RCW 54.16.050, specifically authorizes 

9 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

public utility districts to condemn school lands for transmission lines. RCW 54.16.050 

reads, in part, that a public utility district 

may take, condemn and purchase, purchase and acquire any public and 

private property, franchises and property rights, including state, 

county, and school lands, and property and littoral and water rights,for 

... transmission lines, and all other facilities necessary or convenient. 

(Emphasis added.) 

The PUD statute itself does not contain any limitation on the type ofstate land that 

may be condemned. RCW 54.16.050. However, the definition of "state lands" in the 

public lands act, Title 79 RCW, excludes lands "devoted to or reserved for a particular 

use by law." RCW 79.02.01O(14)(h).3 The critical issue here is whether these school 

lands are dedicated to a particular purpose or use and, therefore, are not subject to 

condemnation. 

A. Dedicated to a Public Purpose. On appeal, the State argues that all school 

trust lands are dedicated to a public purpose and are, therefore, per se exempt from 

condemnation. 

The State's argument is not persuasive for several reasons. First, the public lands 

act defines "state lands" as including school trust lands "that are not devoted to or 

3 We refer to the current version ofRCW 79.02.010; subsequent amendments 

renumbered the sections and were not substantive. 

10 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

reserved for a particular use by law." RCW 79.02.010(14)(h). This means that not all 

school lands are so reserved or there would be no need for the qualifier. Second, the 

State's interpretation would render meaningless the many statutes that specifically allow 

local government to condemn state and school trust lands. See, e.g., RCW 8.12.030 

(cities and towns); RCW 53.34.170 (port districts), and RCW 54.16.050 (public utility 

districts). 

Finally, the State's argument ignores Washington Supreme Court precedent. In 

Roberts v. City o/Seattle, 63 Wash. 573, 574, 116 P. 25 (1911), the city of Seattle 

instituted an action to condemn a 30-foot strip ofuniversity grounds. The court 

concluded that no provision in the Enabling Act or the Constitution provided that school 

lands could not be sold. Id. at 575. The court held that the fact that school trust lands are 

devoted to the purpose of financing education was insufficient to exempt the property 

from condemnation. Moreover, the court stated: 

It is also argued that the land taken was already devoted to a public 

use-that of education-and therefore cannot be taken for another public 

use. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 30-foot strip ofland 

in question is actually in use by the university, and there is nothing to 

indicate that the taking ofthe strip of land will impair the use of the land 

remaining. On the other hand, the record shows that the remaining land 

will be benefited. Under this condition it may be taken. 

Id. at 576. 

11 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

Dedication to a public use reserves the land from subsequent sale. Contrary to the 

assertions ofthe State, dedication to a public use requires more than simply putting the 

property to a productive use. The Washington Supreme Court has described dedication 

as: (1) dedication by act ofthe 1egislature;4 (2) "platted, dedicated, and reserved" land for 

a public use;5 (3) segregating the land from the public domain and appropriating it to the 

public by "due dedication,'.6 and dedication by some "official act or declaration.,,7 Most 

significantly, the Supreme Court held that devotion to the purpose ofeducation is 

insufficient to prevent condemnation. Roberts, 63 Wash. at 576. 

The State reads State v. Jefferson County, 91 Wash. 454, 157 P. 1097 (1916) to 

hold that sovereign lands cannot be condemned. However, Jefferson County, which did 

not involve trust lands, held that the authority to sell or condemn sovereign lands must not 

be presumed, but must be expressly conferred by statute. See Jefferson County, 91 Wash. 

4 State v. Jefferson County, 91 Wash. 454,455-56, 157 P. 1097 (1916) (waterway 

permanently reserved from sale by statute). 

5 Id. at 455. 

6 City ofTacoma v. Taxpayers ofTacoma, 49 Wn.2d 781, 797,307 P.2d 567 

(1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 1209,2 L. Ed. 2d 1345 (1958). 

While this case did not explain how the land was dedicated, the case stated that the land 

was "dedicated." 

7City ofTacoma v. State, 121 Wash. 448, 452, 209 P. 700 (1922). PUD argues 

that "dedicated to a public use" is the functional equivalent of "devoted to or reserved for 

a particular use by law." See RCW 79.02.010(14)(h). 

12 
No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

at 458-59. And the PUD condemnation statute expressly allows for the condemnation of 

school lands. RCW 54.16.050. 

Since Roberts, the Supreme Court has continued to approve the condemnation of 

school trust lands, and other types oftrust lands, even though they exist for the purpose of 

serving various trust beneficiaries. See City ofSeattle v. State, 54 Wn.2d 139, 147,338 

P.2d 126 (1959); City ofTacoma v. State, 121 Wash. 448,453,209 P. 700 (1922). The 

State argues that Roberts, City ofTacoma, and City ofSeattle are erroneous. The trial 

court disagreed, and so do we. 

In City ofSeattle, the city of Seattle instituted a condemnation proceeding to 

acquire state school and capitol building lands for use in its proposed Tolt River aquifer. 

City ofSeattle, 54 Wn.2d at 141. The court concluded that the city had the power to 

condemn state property that was not dedicated to a public use. Id. at 147. In City of 

Tacoma v. Taxpayers ofTacoma, 49 Wn.2d 781, 801,307 P.2d 567 (1957), rev 'd on 

other grounds, 357 U.S. 320, 78 S. Ct. 1209, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1345 (1958), the court 

concluded that the city lacked the statutory authority to condemn state lands previously 

dedicated to a public use. State lands not dedicated to a public use are subject to 

condemnation. City ofSeattle, 54 Wn.2d at 147. Here, the school lands are not dedicated 

to a public use and are, therefore, subject to condemnation. 

13 
No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv: State 

B. Reservation from Sale. As stated above, under RCW 79.02.010(14)(h), school 

trust lands are reserved ifthey are "devoted to or reserved for a particular use." In City of 

Seattle, the court found that the capitol building trust lands-which are ofthe same 

character as school trust lands-were not devoted to or reserved for a particular use by 

law: 

It is admitted by the state in this action that the capitol building 

lands which the city ofSeattle seeks to condemn are not devoted to or 

reserved for a particular use but are subject to sale. Ifthe legislature had 

intended to exempt such state lands from condemnation, it would seem that 

it would have expressly so limited the term "state lands," as used in 

RCW 8.12.030.... This the legislature did not see fit to do, and the realtor 

suggests no reason why such a limitation should be inferred. 

City ofSeattle, 54 Wn.2d at 147. 

In other words, reservation from sale is critical to determining whether public 

lands have been reserved for a particular purpose. In Fransen v. Board ofNatural 

Resources, state forest lands were found to be reserved for a particular purpose by law 

because they are'" forever reserved from sale.'" Fransen v. Bd ofNatural Res., 66 

Wn.2d 672,673,404 P.2d 432 (1965) (quoting former RCW 76.12.120, recodified as 

RCW 79.22.050 (Laws of2003, ch. 334, § 220)). Jefferson County explained that 

dedicated land is '" severed from the mass ofpublic lands, [so] that no subsequent law, or 

proclamation, or sale would be construed to embrace it, or operate upon it.' " Jefferson 

14 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

County, 91 Wash. at 459 (quoting State v. Whitney, 66 Wash. 473, 488, 120 P. 116 

(1912». 

School lands are subject to sale. The lands at issue here are not devoted to or 

reserved for a particular use by law. Moreover, the school trust lands here are not 

dedicated to a public use. The State cannot show that the trust lands at issue have been 

dedicated to a public use. Likewise, the State cannot argue that these trust lands are 

dedicated to a public use simply because they may be actively managed by DNR. 

The fact that the State leased the trust lands for grazing does not reserve those 

lands for a particular use by law. Even trust lands subject to grazing leases shall not be 

sold during the life ofthe lease. RCW 79.11.290. And here, the specific leases involved 

reserve the State's right to sell the property, reserving the right to sell upon 60 days' 

notice. 

In short, the sale of leased school trust lands is simply limited to certain conditions, 

but these conditions are insufficient to fall within the statutory language of "devoted to or 

reserved for a particular use by law." RCW 79.02.010(14)(h). 

Furthermore, leased lands are not devoted to a particular use by RCW 79.13.370. 

This provision merely states that once a grazing lease is issued, the lessee may only use 

the land for the purposes set forth in the lease. Id. 

15 

No. 29121-9-111; No. 29123-5-111 

PUDv. State 

C. Trusts. CNW argues that school lands are exempt from condemnation because 

they are public trusts. 

The Washington Enabling Act and Constitution impose an express trust and 

corresponding trust management principles on state trust lands, including the land at issue 

here. County o/Skamania v. State, 102 Wn.2d 127, 132,685 P.2d 576 (1984) (citing 

Washington Enabling Act § 11,25 STAT. 676 (1889), amended by Act ofAugust 11, 

1921,42 STAT. 158, and Act ofMay 7, 1932,47 STAT. 150; CONST. art. XVI, § 1); see 

1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 11 (Question 1); O'Brien v. Wilson, 51 Wash. 52,97 P. 1115 

(1908); United States v. 111.2 Acres o/Land, 293 F. SUpp. 1042, 1048-49 (E.D. Wash. 

1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970). 

In 0 'Brien v. Wilson, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the application of 

adverse possession statutes to common school trust lands, holding that '" [Washington] 

accepted the trust, and by its Constitution solemnly covenanted with the United States to 

apply the granted lands to the sole use of its schools according to the purpose ofthe grant, 

and prohibited the sale of any portion of the granted land except at public sale.'" 

O'Brien, 51 Wash. at 56-57 (quoting Murtaugh v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 

102 Mn. 52,55, 112 N.W. 860 (1907)). 

16 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

In short, the examination ofthe language of Washington's Enabling Act and 

Constitution reveal that state trust lands are administered under trust management 

principles to benefit public schools as the trust beneficiaries and are subject to statutory 

controls and authority. 

Regardless ofthe trust's purpose, the legislature granted PUDs the authority to 

condemn state trust lands. RCW 54.16.050 authorizes the condemnation of state and 

school lands. 

A statute shall not be interpreted in a manner that renders a provision meaningless 

or creates an absurd or strained result. Pierce County v. State, 144 Wn. App. 783, 852, 

185 P.3d 594 (2008). The State and CNW assert that the PUD does not have authority to 

condemn trust land generally or the trust land here. But following this logic, RCW 

54.16.050 would have meaningless terms that would create an absurd result. 

D. Easements. Regardless of whether a sale is at issue, by the State's own 

admission, easements can be granted over trust lands for grazing. Here, PUD does not 

seek fee ownership ofschool trust lands. In addition to PUD's express condemnation 

authority under RCW 54.16.050, the legislature also reserved PUD's right to condemn 

easements over state lands in DNR's land management statutes: 

The foregoing sections relating to the acquiring of rights-of-way and 

overflow rights through, over and across lands belonging to the state, shall 

17 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

not be construed as exclusive or as affecting the right ofmunicipal and 

public service corporations to acquire lands belonging to or under control of 

the state, or rights-of-way or other rights thereover, by condemnation 

proceedings. 

RCW 79.36.580. 

The State contends the trust lands at issue are dedicated to a public use because 

they are actively managed by DNR. But all school trust land is managed by DNR in some 

capacity as required under state law. See, e.g., RCW 79.10.090 (requiring periodic 

analysis of all trust lands). 

E. Compatibility. The State maintains that the courts look only at dedication to a 

public use when determining whether condemnation is allowed. 

The State misinterprets several precedents in making this assertion. For example, 

in City o/Tacoma the condemnation at issue involved the right to divert water from a fish 

hatchery and the right to condemn a 250-foot strip ofthe school lands. City o/Tacoma, 

121 Wash. at 450. In analyzing whether Tacoma could condemn the right to divert waters 

flowing past the fish hatchery, the court explained: 

This property is now devoted to a public use, and ifthe proposed diversion 

ofthe waters ofthe North fork would destroy this public use, or so damage 

it as to preclude its successful operation, our inquiry would end here. 

Id. at 453. 

18 

No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-III 

PUDv. State 

The court ultimately found that the public use would not be destroyed and that 

diversion would even benefit the hatchery. Id. Citing Roberts, the Supreme Court held 

that condemnation was permissible, despite the fact that the property was already devoted 

to a public use. Id. The court also held that Roberts authorized the condemnation ofthe 

250-foot strip of school trust lands. Id. 

PUD points out, and the State does not dispute, that the easements will not destroy 

the current uses of the State's trust land. In fact, PUD takes the position that the proposed 

easements will benefit the economic purpose behind the trust lands by providing revenue 

through compensation for the easements while still allowing the continuation of grazing. 

Significantly, the State does not challenge its own leases, which contain specific 

provisions that address the condemnation of all or part of the leased land "by any public 

authority." CP at 240 (section 10.06). These provisions not only recognize that 

condemnation can occur, they allow for continuation ofthe leases after condemnation if 

the parties desire. 

When managing the grant lands, DNR may consider only those factors consistent 

with ensuring the economic value and productivity of the federal grant land trusts. See, 

e.g., 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 11 (Question 5(c». The condemnation ofthe easements 

will not negatively impact the economic productivity ofthe trusts. 

19 
No. 29121-9-III; No. 29123-5-111 

PUDv. State 

F. Conclusion. We affinn the denial ofsummary judgment to the State and 

CNW and affinn the order on public use and necessity. Given our disposition in 

favor ofthe PUD, we need not address its cross appeal related to the trial court's 

grant of limited intervention to CNW. 

WE CONCUR: 


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