Supreme Court

 

 No. 2021-332-Appeal.

(PC 19-4868)

(Concurrence and Dissent 

begins on Page 13)

Enrique Sosa :

v. :

City of Woonsocket. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 

 
- 1 -

 

Supreme Court

 No. 2021-332-Appeal.

(PC 19-4868)

(Concurrence and Dissent 

begins on Page 13)

Enrique Sosa :

v. :

City of Woonsocket. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court 

on May 10, 2023, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause 

why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The 

defendant, the City of Woonsocket (defendant or city), appeals from a judgment in 

favor of the plaintiff, Enrique Sosa, declaring that the city terminated the plaintiff’s 

employment from the Woonsocket Police Department in violation of G.L. 1956 

§ 42-28.6-4 of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR), and 

ordering the defendant to comply with the procedural requirements of LEOBOR if 
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it wished to terminate the plaintiff’s employment. After considering the parties’ 

written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we are satisfied that cause 

has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or 

argument. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior 

Court.

Facts and Travel

On September 12, 2018, plaintiff was involved in a domestic disturbance at 

the home of a former girlfriend of his in Uxbridge, Massachusetts; he was arrested 

and charged with felony breaking and entering, felony assault with a dangerous 

weapon, and assault on a family/household member. At the time of his arrest, 

plaintiff was employed as a permanent full-time law enforcement officer by the city,

and was off duty at the time of these offenses. In accordance with LEOBOR, 

plaintiff was suspended without pay on September 13, 2018.

On January 4, 2019, plaintiff appeared in Uxbridge District Court to respond 

to the charges.1 At that hearing, plaintiff admitted to a recitation of the facts of the 

charged offenses as recounted by the prosecutor. In exchange for this admission, 

the case was continued without a finding for one year. The plaintiff was ordered to 

1 There is some confusion in the record regarding the date that plaintiff appeared in 

Uxbridge District Court to respond to the charges against him. The transcript of that 

court appearance states that the hearing took place on January 14, 2019. The 

plaintiff’s criminal docket however, as well as his pleadings and termination letter, 

denote the date as January 4, 2019.
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continue with his substance-abuse counseling program, provide alcohol-free 

screens, and complete a batterers’ intervention program. 

By letter dated April 3, 2019, the city informed plaintiff that his employment 

was terminated effective immediately. The letter indicated that said termination was 

a result of his plea in Uxbridge District Court, in accordance with § 42-28.6-13(i), 

which declares:

“Any law enforcement officer who pleads guilty or no 

contest to a felony charge or whose conviction of a felony 

has, after or in the absence of a timely appeal, become final 

may be dismissed by the law enforcement agency and, in 

the event of such dismissal, other provisions of this 

chapter shall not apply.”

The plaintiff filed this action on April 17, 2019, asserting that he “did not 

plead guilty nor did he plead no contest to any felony charge made against him.” He 

averred that defendant failed and/or refused to provide him with his written notice 

and hearing rights as set forth in § 42-28.6-4.

2

 He acknowledged that he was charged 

2 General Laws 1956 § 42-28.6-4(a) provides in part: 

“If the investigation or interrogation of a law enforcement 

officer results in the recommendation of some action, such 

as demotion, transfer, dismissal, loss of pay, reassignment, 

or similar action which would be considered a punitive 

measure, then, before taking such action, the law 

enforcement agency shall give notice to the law 

enforcement officer that he or she is entitled to a hearing 

on the issues by a hearing committee.”
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with felony crimes on September 13, 2018, which resulted in his suspension without 

pay and benefits pursuant to § 42-28.6-13(g).3 The plaintiff argued, however, that 

he was not convicted, nor did he plead guilty or no contest, to a felony within the 

meaning of § 42-28.6-13(i). He noted that, after his admission of sufficient facts 

before the Uxbridge District Court judge, the Assistant District Attorney requested 

that a “guilty” finding be made by the court, and, further, that if granted by the court, 

the provisions of § 42-28.6-13(i) would have been triggered as plaintiff “would have 

tendered a plea of ‘guilty’ or ‘no contest’ and a conviction would have entered.” The 

court, however, declined to do so and continued the matter without a finding for one 

year.

3 Pursuant to § 42-28.6-13(g):

“Any law enforcement officer who is charged, indicted or 

informed against for a felony or who is convicted of and 

incarcerated for a misdemeanor may be suspended without 

pay and benefits at the discretion of the agency or chief or 

highest ranking sworn officers; provided, however, that 

the officer’s entitlement to medical insurance, dental 

insurance, disability insurance and life insurance as is 

available to all other officers within the agency shall not 

be suspended. In the event that the law enforcement 

officer is acquitted of any felony related thereto, the 

officer shall be reinstated and reimbursed forthwith for all 

salary and benefits that have not been paid during the 

suspension period.”
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The plaintiff argued that Massachusetts law allows “a defendant to offer an 

admission of facts along with a request that the matter be continued without such a 

finding or specific terms or probation” and that, in the case at bar, he “merely 

tendered a plea that there were sufficient facts to support the allegations against 

him.” He asserted that “[a]n admission to sufficient facts followed by a continuance 

without a finding is not a conviction under Massachusetts law * * *.” The plaintiff

claimed that this disposition was similar to a pretrial diversion program, and that 

defendant “has improperly conflated the ‘admission to sufficient facts and continued 

without a finding’ procedures within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws Chap. 278 

Section 18, to that of the ‘plea of guilty or no contest’ provisions of * * * § 42-28.6-

13(i).”

According to plaintiff, he successfully complied with the conditions imposed 

by the Uxbridge District Court, and he asserted that the criminal charges were “ripe 

for dismissal on January 4, 2020.” On January 3, 2020, the Uxbridge District Court 

dismissed the criminal charges against plaintiff on the recommendation of the 

probation department.

A hearing on the instant case was held in Superior Court on February 18, 2020. 

The city argued that plaintiff’s admission to sufficient facts, and his subsequent 

signing of the plea form, were equivalent to a plea of no contest to the felony charges. 

It was the city’s contention that a conviction was not required for termination 
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pursuant to § 42-28.6-13(i), and it argued that plaintiff’s plea in Massachusetts was 

sufficient to trigger this section of the law. According to the city, the fact that the 

proceeding resulted in the case having been dismissed after one year had no bearing 

on his plea. The city contended that in Rhode Island, “if you plead and are not 

convicted, you can still be dismissed” under § 42-28.6-13(i).4

A decision was filed by the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court on March 

27, 2020. She found that “Rhode Island has no functional equivalent of an admission 

to sufficient facts followed by a continuation without a finding.” She declared that 

“an admission to sufficient facts is not the automatic equivalent of a guilty plea

* * *.” She noted, however, that for purposes of procedural protections and statutory 

interpretation, such an admission is treated the same. The Presiding Justice found 

no evidence that the “Uxbridge District Court intended to treat [p]laintiff’s 

admission as the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.” She further declared that 

“[p]laintiff’s signed plea [did] not have any indication of guilt” and “that the charges 

against him were ripe for dismissal as of January 4, 2020.” 

The Presiding Justice concluded that “[d]efendant was not entitled to 

terminate [p]laintiff’s employment under § 42-28.6-13(i)” and “therefore failed to 

provide [p]laintiff with the requisite pre-termination notice under § 42-28.6-4(b) and 

4 Because we are deciding this case on the basis of the law of the forum state, we 

need not and do not address the correctness of this contention.
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a pre-termination hearing before the hearing committee pursuant to §§ 42-28.6-5 and 

42-28.6-6.”5

An order was entered on April 13, 2020, that declared that “the termination of 

the employment of [plaintiff] by the [d]efendant * * * was unlawful in violation of 

* * * § 42-28.6-4 of the [LEOBOR]” and that “[d]efendant [was] hereby ordered to 

comply with the procedural requirements of the LEOB[O]R if it wishe[d] to 

terminate [p]laintiff’s employment.” The defendant appealed.

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews ‘questions of statutory interpretation de novo.’” Epic 

Enterprises LLC v. Bard Group, LLC, 186 A.3d 587, 589 (R.I. 2018) (quoting State 

v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013)). “In matters of statutory interpretation our 

ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the 

Legislature.” Id. at 589-90 (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 

2001)). “It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words 

of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. at 590 (quoting Alessi v. Bowen 

Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2012)).

5 Section 42-28.6-5, entitled “Conduct of hearing,” and § 42-28.6-6, entitled 

“Evidence at hearing—Hearing record[,]” delineate the process by which LEOBOR 

hearings are conducted.
- 8 -

“It is an equally fundamental maxim of statutory construction that statutory 

language should not be viewed in isolation.” In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 

2006). “When performing our duty of statutory interpretation, this Court 

‘consider[s] the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in 

the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of 

all other sections.’” Id. (quoting Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I. 

1994)).

Analysis

The first issue we must address is whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction 

to issue declaratory relief in the case at bar. The defendant argues that, because 

plaintiff “failed to name as interested parties the City of Woonsocket (Sosa’s 

employer), or the Director of Woonsocket’s Department of Public Safety (‘DPS’) 

and Police Chief,” the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this case. In 

its answer to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant raised, as an affirmative defense,

plaintiff’s failure to join “indispensable and required parties for the declarations and 

relief sought * * *.” We have held that “[a]ll parties who have an interest that would 

be affected by a declaration are indispensable and must be joined in a declaratory 

judgment action.” Meyer v. City of Newport, 844 A.2d 148, 152 (R.I. 2004).

The defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint names “The City of 

Woonsocket Police Department[,]” which is a division within Woonsocket’s Public 
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Safety Department, and not a separate entity “that may be independently sued 

without naming the municipality and/or its DPS and Police Chief.” Rule 10(a) of 

the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states, in part, that “[i]n the complaint 

the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties * * *.” While the 

caption of plaintiff’s complaint is entitled “City of Woonsocket Police Department,” 

the body of the complaint names “The Defendant City of Woonsocket * * * a 

municipal corporation and body politic located in Providence County * * *.”6 We 

therefore conclude that the city was properly named as a defendant and the Superior 

Court had authority to proceed.

Turning to defendant’s primary argument, the city contends that plaintiff’s

admission to sufficient facts, and plea under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18, equates 

to a plea of no contest to a felony charge under § 42-28.6-13(i) of LEOBOR, 

justifying immediate termination of employment. Rhode Island does not have a 

statute or court rule that permits the type of felony disposition that occurred in this 

case. The relevant part of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18 states:

“A defendant who is before * * * a district court * * * on 

a criminal offense within the court’s final jurisdiction shall 

plead not guilty or guilty, or with the consent of the court, 

nolo contendere. Such plea of guilty shall be submitted by 

the defendant and acted upon by the court; provided, 

6 We note that plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he had received written notice of 

termination of employment from Mark W. Ferguson, Personnel Director for the City 

of Woonsocket. Further, in plaintiff’s prayer for relief, he asked the court to “[o]rder 

the City of Woonsocket to reinstate [his] employment * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
- 10 -

however, that a defendant with whom the commonwealth 

cannot reach agreement for a recommended disposition 

shall be allowed to tender a plea of guilty together with a 

request for a specific disposition. Such request may 

include any disposition or dispositional terms within the 

court’s jurisdiction, including, unless otherwise prohibited 

by law, a dispositional request that a guilty finding not be

entered, but rather the case be continued without a finding 

to a specific date thereupon to be dismissed, such 

continuance conditioned upon compliance with specific 

terms and conditions * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, we are called upon to determine whether plaintiff’s admission to sufficient 

facts made pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18 constitutes a plea of guilty or 

nolo contendere under § 42-28.6-13(i). We conclude that it does not.

Because, as the Presiding Justice correctly found, Rhode Island “has no 

functional equivalent of an admission to sufficient facts followed by a continuation 

without a finding[,]” we confine our analysis to Massachusetts law. In the 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, “[a]n admission to sufficient facts followed by a 

continuance without a finding is not a ‘conviction’ under Massachusetts law.” 

Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 777 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Mass. 2002). In the case of an 

admission to sufficient facts, the case remains pending and is continued “conditioned 

upon compliance with specific terms and conditions * * *.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 

278, § 18. “However, in the event of a violation of those conditions, the ‘admission’ 

remains and may ripen into an adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence.” 

Villalobos, 777 N.E.2d at 120. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has 
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explained that “one of the purposes underlying the disposition of continuance 

without a finding is to allow a deserving defendant to ‘avoid[ ] the consequences of 

having a criminal conviction.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Pyles, 672 N.E.2d 96, 

99 n.7 (Mass. 1996)). After a defendant admits to sufficient facts, the matter is 

continued “without entering a finding of guilt upon the requirement that the 

defendant comply with certain conditions.” Commonwealth v. Berrios, 998 N.E.2d 

782, 786 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). However, should the defendant fail to comply with

these conditions, “the defendant has already admitted to facts sufficient to prove 

guilt.” Id. “A guilty verdict enters upon proof of failing to comply with the

conditions * * *.” Id. The sentence is then imposed. See id.

We note that the Supreme Judicial Court has opined that a judge in 

Massachusetts “is entitled to treat an admission to sufficient facts as the functional 

equivalent of a guilty plea if the admission was made knowingly and voluntarily.” 

Commonwealth v. Greene, 508 N.E.2d 93, 94 (Mass. 1987). As the Presiding Justice

aptly noted in her decision, “this equivalence is generally within the context of 

procedural due process requirements, where the Massachusetts courts seek to ensure 

that defendants pleading to admission of sufficient facts receive the same rights as 

those pleading guilty or no contest.” See, e.g., Greene, 508 N.E.2d at 94 (addressing 

whether an admission of sufficient facts is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea 

for the limited purpose of determining if defendant waived nonjurisdictional 
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defects). We agree with the Presiding Justice’s determination that “an admission to 

sufficient facts is not the automatic equivalent of a guilty plea but can be equated by 

the Massachusetts courts” to a guilty plea under certain circumstances, such as the 

determination of waiver of one’s rights. (Emphasis added.)

Although “[a] judge is entitled to treat an admission to sufficient facts as the 

functional equivalent of a guilty plea if the admission was made knowingly and 

voluntarily[,]” Greene, 508 N.E.2d at 94, in the present case the judge did not do so. 

See Commonwealth v. Nydam, 484 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (“[T]he 

judge failed to explain to the defendant that he (the judge) would be entitled to treat 

admissions of sufficient facts as the functional equivalents of pleas of guilty * * * 

and that if he should decide to find the defendant guilty (as he subsequently did), the 

defendant would be precluded from appellate review of any pretrial rulings * * *.”). 

The record demonstrates that at plaintiff’s hearing, the court continued the 

matter for one year without a finding and imposed specific conditions. The plaintiff 

maintains that he complied with all the specific terms and conditions imposed upon 

him by the Uxbridge District Court, and the city does not contend otherwise. 

Because he complied with those conditions, his admission to sufficient facts never 

“ripen[ed] into an adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence.” Villalobos, 777 

N.E.2d at 120. The case was dismissed.
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As a result, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff’s 

admission to sufficient facts does not qualify as a plea of guilty or no contest 

pursuant to § 42-28.6-13(i). Having reached this conclusion, we need go no further.

Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Presiding Justice correctly 

determined that the city was not entitled to terminate the plaintiff’s employment 

under § 42-28.6-13(i) and improperly deprived him of the requisite notice and 

hearing. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

Superior Court. The papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.

Justice Long, with whom Justice Lynch Prata joins, concurring in part 

and dissenting in part. I join the majority with respect to its conclusion that the 

City of Woonsocket was properly named as a defendant, and that the Superior Court 

had jurisdiction to proceed. Nevertheless, I believe that the plea that Officer Sosa 

entered in Uxbridge District Court pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18 is 

equivalent to a no-contest plea for purposes of LEOBOR. Therefore, I respectfully 

dissent.

In conducting a de novo review of LEOBOR, I certainly agree that the 

“ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the 
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Legislature.” Epic Enterprises LLC v. Bard Group, LLC, 186 A.3d 587, 589-90 (R.I. 

2018) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001)). Moreover, 

although this Court must apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used in 

the statute, the Court will not do so “in a way that would result in absurdities or 

would defeat the underlying purpose of the enactment.” O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 

A.3d 422, 428 (R.I. 2017) (quoting Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 

727 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 1999)). In fact, because LEOBOR is a remedial statute, this 

Court interprets it “liberally to effectuate its purposes.” Ricci v. Rhode Island 

Commerce Corporation, 276 A.3d 903, 906-07 (R.I. 2022) (quoting In re Tavares, 

885 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 2005)).

Given these principles of statutory interpretation, it is imperative that this 

Court consider the purpose of LEOBOR. Enacted in 1976, LEOBOR is the 

“exclusive remedy for permanently appointed law enforcement officers who are 

under investigation or subject to interrogation by a law enforcement agency for any 

reason which could lead to disciplinary action, demotion[,] or dismissal.” Lynch v. 

King, 120 R.I. 868, 870 n.1, 391 A.2d 117, 119 n.1 (1978) (emphasis added). Its 

goal is “to protect police officers from infringements of their rights in the course of 

investigations into their alleged improper conduct.” In re Sabetta, 661 A.2d 80, 83 

(R.I. 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194, 1196 (R.I. 

1994)); see generally Byron L. Warnken, The Law Enforcement Officers’ Privilege 
- 15 -

Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 Univ. Balt. L. Rev. 452, 453-59, 490-92 

(1987) (discussing failed attempts to enact a federal law enforcement officers’ bill 

of rights in the 1970s in an effort to balance police officers’ Fifth Amendment 

privilege and the need for accountability from police officers). The statute 

accomplishes this goal by guaranteeing certain rights during the conduct of 

investigations, see, e.g., G.L. 1956 § 42-28.6-2(13) (“No law enforcement officer 

shall be compelled to speak or testify before, or be questioned by, any nongovernmental agency.”), and by providing notice and an opportunity for a hearing 

prior to the imposition of discipline. See § 42-28.6-4(a).1 

Notwithstanding these protections, however, LEOBOR also provides that, in 

certain limited circumstances, a law enforcement agency may dismiss an officer 

1 General Laws 1956 § 42-28.6-4(a) provides: 

“If the investigation or interrogation of a law enforcement 

officer results in the recommendation of some action, such 

as demotion, transfer, dismissal, loss of pay, reassignment, 

or similar action which would be considered a punitive 

measure, then, before taking such action, the law 

enforcement agency shall give notice to the law 

enforcement officer that he or she is entitled to a hearing 

on the issues by a hearing committee. The law 

enforcement officer may be relieved of duty subject to 

§ 42-28.6-13 of this chapter, and shall receive all ordinary 

pay and benefits as he or she would have if he or she were 

not charged.”
- 16 -

without providing notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Section 42-28.6-13(i) 

states: 

“Any law enforcement officer who pleads guilty or no 

contest to a felony charge or whose conviction of a felony 

has, after or in the absence of a timely appeal, become final 

may be dismissed by the law enforcement agency and, in 

the event of such dismissal, other provisions of this 

chapter shall not apply.” 

The language of § 42-28.6-13(i) is precise and its connection to § 42-28.6-4(a) is 

unambiguous. Under the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, a law 

enforcement officer is not entitled to the procedural protections of notice and a 

hearing prior to dismissal when the officer has entered a plea of guilty or no contest 

to a felony charge, or when the officer has been convicted of a felony and the 

conviction has become final. This makes sense: The procedural protections in place 

during an investigation and prior to the imposition of discipline are no longer 

necessary once a law enforcement officer appears in court and either formally admits 

to having committed a felony by way of a guilty plea, or impliedly confesses to 

having committed a felony by way of a plea of nolo contendere. The procedural 

protections are also no longer necessary once there has been an adjudication of guilt 

that has become final. In those instances, the plea or final conviction moots the need 

to investigate the alleged improper conduct.

On April 17, 2019, Officer Sosa filed a complaint in Providence County 

Superior Court acknowledging that he entered a plea pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws 
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ch. 278, § 18 in Uxbridge District Court after he was “involved in a domestic 

disturbance” and charged with three felonies: breaking and entering, assault on a 

family member/household member, and assault with a dangerous weapon. 

Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 18 provides: 

“A defendant who is before * * * a district court * * * on 

a criminal offense within the court’s final jurisdiction shall 

plead not guilty or guilty, or with the consent of the court, 

nolo contendere. Such plea of guilty shall be submitted by 

the defendant and acted upon by the court; provided, 

however, that a defendant with whom the commonwealth 

cannot reach agreement for a recommended disposition 

shall be allowed to tender a plea of guilty together with a 

request for a specific disposition. Such request may 

include any disposition or dispositional terms within the 

court’s jurisdiction, including, unless otherwise prohibited 

by law, a dispositional request that a guilty finding not be 

entered, but rather the case be continued without a finding 

to a specific date thereupon to be dismissed, such 

continuance conditioned upon compliance with specific 

terms and conditions or that the defendant be placed on 

probation pursuant to the provisions of section eightyseven of chapter two hundred and seventy-six. If such a 

plea, with an agreed upon recommendation or with a 

dispositional request by the defendant, is tendered, the 

court shall inform the defendant that it will not impose a 

disposition that exceeds the terms of the agreed upon 

recommendation or the dispositional request by the 

defendant, whichever is applicable, without giving the 

defendant the right to withdraw the plea.

“If a defendant, notwithstanding the requirements set forth 

hereinbefore, attempts to enter a plea or statement 

consisting of an admission of facts sufficient for finding of 

guilt, or some similar statement, such admission shall be 

deemed a tender of a plea of guilty for purposes of the 

procedures set forth in this section.” (Emphasis added.)
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Based on the transcript of the January 2019 hearing in Uxbridge District 

Court, which Officer Sosa submitted to the Superior Court, it is clear that he 

appeared before the district court with counsel, was duly sworn, and tendered a plea 

or admission of facts sufficient for a finding of guilt on the three felony counts 

charged. The transcript reveals the following exchange:

“[PROSECUTOR]: Uxbridge Police Department, on 

September 13 of this year, about 2 A.M., officers were 

dispatched to 700 Aldrich Street for a report of a female 

on a neighbor’s porch bleeding from her hand asking for 

help, saying that she had an argument with her boyfriend 

and she had been hurt. The female was later identified as 

a Kristina Langille, and the Defendant was identified as

Mr. Sosa, the Defendant before the court.

“During the conversation with Ms. Langille, she stated she 

had been out drinking at the Green Room, a local bar; and 

when she came home, she thought she heard someone on 

the first floor of her home. She grabbed a knife for 

protection. She originally thought it was her cats. 

“As she was walking around the first floor, she then saw 

Mr. Sosa come out of the closet and start yelling at her, 

asking why she’d been at the Green Room. She was —

stated she was fearful because he took the knife out of her 

hand. When he took the knife out of her hand, it cut her 

hand, Judge. At that point he pointed it towards himself.

“She attempted to call 911; but due to the blood on her 

hands, she couldn’t get the face screen on her phone to 

work. She then ran to a neighbor’s home. He followed her 

to the neighbor’s home but stayed back about 20 yards. 

When officers arrived, he identified himself and was 

cooperative with the police. He was charged with 

breaking and entering into her home, the assault and 
- 19 -

battery on her, as well as the assault with a dangerous 

weapon. 

“THE COURT: Is that what happened, sir?

“* * * 

“[OFFICER] SOSA: Yes, sir.” 

Under Massachusetts law, an admission to sufficient facts, as the one Officer 

Sosa provided, “triggers the same safeguards required when a defendant offers to 

plead guilty.” Tirado v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and 

Bonds, 34 N.E.3d 334, 339 (Mass. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lewis, 506 

N.E.2d 891, 892 (Mass. 1987)). For example, the trial justice is required to “conduct 

a hearing to determine the voluntariness of a plea or admission and the factual basis 

of the charge.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(5)). The 

procedure mirrors the requirement that, in the event of a guilty or no contest plea, 

Rhode Island trial justices must “first address[] the defendant personally and 

determin[e] that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the 

charge and the consequences of the plea” and be “satisfied that there is a factual 

basis” before accepting a guilty plea. Super. R. Crim. P. 11.2

2 Both Rhode Island and Massachusetts mandate that a defendant be informed that 

“a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may affect his or her immigration status.” 

General Laws 1956 § 12-12-22(a); Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 777 N.E.2d 116, 

119 (Mass. 2002). Although the Massachusetts statute only mentions the need for 

such an advisory in the case of a “plea of guilty or nolo contendere,” the 

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has read the statute to include admissions of 

facts sufficient for a finding of guilt. Villalobos, 777 N.E.2d at 119.
- 20 -

The transcript submitted by Officer Sosa demonstrates that his plea pursuant 

to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18 triggered the safeguards applicable to a guilty plea, 

and that the trial judge of the Uxbridge District Court proceeded accordingly. 

Specifically, the judge queried Officer Sosa about his age, level of educational 

attainment, and whether he had any mental health problems or had recently 

consumed any drugs or alcohol. He then informed Officer Sosa of his right to a jury 

trial and asked whether Officer Sosa understood those rights and was acting 

voluntarily. The judge also informed Officer Sosa of the possible immigration 

consequences of the plea and concluded the hearing by continuing the matter for one 

year without a finding, but ordering Officer Sosa to participate in outpatient 

counseling and batterers’ intervention, to receive screens, and to remain alcohol free. 

Officer Sosa signed a waiver of rights and alien rights notice form, and the trial judge 

certified that he found, “after a colloquy with the defendant [(Officer Sosa)], that the 

defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived all of the rights as 

explained during these proceedings and as set forth in this form.” 

When reading LEOBOR liberally to effectuate its purpose as a remedial 

statute, it is clear that the Legislature intended for Officer Sosa to enjoy extensive 

procedural protections once he was charged with criminal offenses. See § 42-28.6-

2-13. The record reveals that Officer Sosa did, in fact, enjoy many procedural 

protections of LEOBOR: upon his arrest, the city took limited disciplinary action by 
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suspending him without pay, but with access to benefits, while the investigation was 

pending. See § 42-28.6-13(g). The city took the further action of dismissal only after 

Officer Sosa appeared before the Uxbridge District Court, was sworn, and admitted 

to the proffer by the prosecutor. Thus, he received the procedural protections of 

LEOBOR up to the point when he admitted in court to “facts that would demonstrate 

that he * * * had violated or failed to comply with the law.” Tirado, 34 N.E.3d at 

339. Thereafter, however, he was not entitled to further procedural protections under 

LEOBOR. See § 42-28.6-13(i); Tirado, 34 N.E.3d at 340 (“Indeed, it is illogical to 

conclude that a defendant could receive the disposition of a [continuance without a 

finding] without first admitting to sufficient facts that satisfied the judge that he or 

she was guilty.”). His admission to the facts proffered by the prosecutor was 

equivalent to an implied confession of guilt by way of a plea of nolo contendere 

under § 42-28.6-13(i) and mooted the need to investigate his misconduct prior to 

dismissal; to read the plain language of § 42-28.6-13(i) otherwise would be to read 

it “in a way that would result in absurdities or would defeat the underlying purpose 

of the enactment.” O’Connell, 156 A.3d at 428 (quoting Commercial Union 

Insurance Co., 727 A.2d at 681).

It is my opinion that because Officer Sosa “enter[ed] a plea or statement 

consisting of an admission of facts sufficient for [a] finding of guilt” of three felony 

charges, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18, he is not entitled to the 
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procedural protections of notice and a hearing prior to dismissal. Accordingly, I 

would reverse the decision of the trial justice, vacate the judgment of the Superior 

Court in favor of Officer Sosa, and uphold the city’s dismissal of Officer Sosa 

following the entry of his plea in January 2019.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Enrique Sosa v. City of Woonsocket.

Case Number No. 2021-332-Appeal.

(PC 19-4868)

Date Opinion Filed July 14, 2023

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Presiding Justice Alice Bridget Gibney

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

John R. Grasso, Esq.

For Defendant:

Timothy C. Cavazza, Esq.