[Cite as State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 132 

Ohio St.3d 47, 2012-Ohio-1861.] 

THE STATE EX REL. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 436 ET AL., APPELLEES, v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs., 132 Ohio St.3d 47, 2012-Ohio-1861.] 

Appeals from decisions of political subdivisions—R.C. Chapter 2506—Exclusion 

of one department from public employer’s early-retirement plan—

Taxpayer’s action—Standing—Declaratory judgment—Exhaustion of 

administrative remedies. 

(No. 2011-0569—Submitted December 6, 2011—Decided May 1, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 94703, 

194 Ohio App.3d 258, 2011-Ohio-820. 

__________________ 

MCGEE BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, the Board of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga 

County, appeals from a declaratory judgment in favor of appellees, Teamsters 

Local Union No. 436 and union member Kevin Lesh (collectively, “the union”), 

holding that the commissioners’ Employee Retirement Incentive Plan (“ERIP”) 

was in violation of R.C. 145.297.1

 

1. R.C. 145.297(B) provides: 

An employing unit may establish a retirement incentive plan for its eligible 

employees. In the case of a county or county agency, decisions on whether to 

establish a retirement incentive plan for any employees other than employees of 

a board of alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health services or county board of 

developmental disabilities and on the terms of the plan shall be made by the 

board of county commissioners. 

R.C. 145.297(A) provides: 

As used in this section, “employing unit” means: 
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{¶ 2} For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals. 

Background

{¶ 3} On November 6, 2008, the commissioners passed a resolution 

establishing an early-retirement incentive program, enrollment for which would 

be open from January 15, 2009, to January 14, 2010. The resolution made the 

plan available to all employees of the commissioners, except for the Sanitary 

Engineering Division. 

{¶ 4} The union represents a bargaining unit of employees who work for 

the Sanitary Engineering Division of the commissioners. Pursuant to R.C. 

6117.01(C), the commissioners supervise the Sanitary Engineering Division, set 

the compensation of its employees, and approve collective-bargaining agreements 

with the union. A few days before passage of the resolution, some employees of 

the Sanitary Engineering Division, none of whom were union members and none 

of whom are parties to this appeal, had filed a grievance on behalf of all Sanitary 

Engineering Division employees regarding eligibility for the retirement plan. The 

county administrator, James McCafferty, held a hearing on the grievance on 

January 9, 2009. Approximately 15 Sanitary Engineering Division employees, at 

least four of whom were union members, attended the hearing and were given an 

 (1) A municipal corporation, agency of a municipal corporation designated 

by the legislative authority, park district, conservancy district, sanitary district, 

health district, township, department of a township designated by the board of 

township trustees, metropolitan housing authority, public library, county law 

library, union cemetery, joint hospital, or other political subdivision or unit of 

local government. 

* * * 

(3)(a) With respect to employees of a board of alcohol, drug addiction, and 

mental health services, that board. 

(b) With respect to employees of a county board of developmental 

disabilities, that board. 

(c) With respect to other county employees, the county or any county 

agency designated by the board of county commissioners. 

(4) In the case of an employee whose employing unit is in question, the 

employing unit is the unit through whose payroll the employee is paid. 
January Term, 2012 

3

opportunity to be heard. On January 20, 2009, the administrator issued a 

decision, determining that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were not 

permitted to participate in the retirement plan. The administrator mailed the 

decision to each employee who had attended the hearing, including the four 

identified union members, Kevin Lesh, Jerry Tharp, Richard Dryer, and Thomas 

Spracale. None of the employees attempted to appeal the administrator’s 

decision. 

{¶ 5} Almost one year later, on December 22, 2009, the union sent a 

taxpayer demand letter to the Cuyahoga County prosecutor. The union urged the 

prosecutor to file an action to compel the commissioners to extend the retirement 

plan to the Sanitary Engineering Division employees, or to recover the funds used 

for the retirement plan due to its allegedly unlawful exclusion of the Sanitary 

Engineering Division. The prosecutor declined to initiate the requested action. 

{¶ 6} On December 30, 2009, the union filed a taxpayer action against 

the commissioners, on behalf of all union-member Sanitary Engineering Division 

employees, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, the union 

sought a declaration that the commissioners violated R.C. 145.297 when they 

authorized the ERIP for all board employees excluding the Sanitary Engineering 

Division and sought an order compelling the commissioners to include the 

Sanitary Engineering Division in the ERIP. The union sought similar relief in a 

separate cause of action for declaratory judgment and in a request for a writ of 

mandamus in its January 7, 2010 amended complaint. In addition to denying the 

merits of the union’s claims, the commissioners asserted that the union did not 

have standing to bring its taxpayer action and that it was otherwise barred from 

requesting equitable remedies because the Sanitary Engineering Division 

employees had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 

{¶ 7} Noting that the union had brought the present action mere days 

before the ERIP was due to terminate, the trial court denied the union’s request 
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for injunctive relief and its action in mandamus, in an entry issued on January 22, 

2010. However, the trial court did grant the union’s prayer for declaratory relief 

and held that the commissioners’ failure to include the Sanitary Engineering 

Division as part of the “employing unit” that was eligible for the ERIP did not 

comply with the definition of “employing unit” in R.C. 145.297 and that the 

commissioners were therefore in violation of the statute. 

{¶ 8} The commissioners appealed to the Eighth District Court of 

Appeals, which, in a split decision, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. State ex 

rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 194 Ohio 

App.3d 258, 2011-Ohio-820, 955 N.E.2d 1020 (Cooney, J., dissenting). We 

accepted discretionary jurisdiction to hear the commissioners’ appeal. 128 Ohio 

St.3d 1556, 2011-Ohio-2905, 949 N.E.2d 43. 

Analysis

{¶ 9} The commissioners raise three propositions of law: first, that the 

commissioners had the budgetary discretion to exclude one or more of its 

subordinate divisions from participating in the ERIP; second, that the unionrepresented Sanitary Engineering Division employees did not have standing to 

initiate a taxpayer suit, because they did not seek to vindicate a public right; and 

third, that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were required to exhaust 

the available administrative remedies prior to filing the action. Because our 

resolution of the issues of taxpayer standing and exhaustion of administrative 

remedies is dispositive, we will address them first. 

Taxpayer Standing

{¶ 10} Before a court may consider the merits of a party’s legal claim, the 

party seeking relief must establish that he or she has standing to bring the claim. 

State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469, 

715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999). The issue of standing determines “whether a litigant is 
January Term, 2012 

5

entitled to have a court determine the merits of the issues presented.” Ohio 

Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994). 

Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court is a 

question of law, which we review de novo. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. 

State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23. 

{¶ 11} An analysis of standing in a statutory taxpayer action against a 

county entity must begin with R.C. 309.12, which allows a county prosecutor to 

initiate legal action to restrain the contemplated misapplication of county funds or 

completion of illegal contracts or to recover funds or damages from illegal 

contracts that have been executed or funds that have been misapplied. If a 

taxpayer presents a written request to the county prosecutor to take action 

pursuant to R.C. 309.12 and is denied assistance from the county prosecutor, the 

taxpayer may initiate his own action on behalf of the county. R.C. 309.13. In 

addition to the satisfaction of the foregoing formal requirement, the taxpayer must 

also demonstrate that the remedy sought will benefit the public in order to have 

standing. State ex rel. White v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St.2d 37, 295 N.E.2d 665 

(1973). 

{¶ 12} “ ‘ “There are serious objections against allowing mere interlopers 

to meddle with the affairs of the state, and it is not usually allowed unless under 

circumstances when the public injury by its refusal will be serious.” ’ (Emphasis 

added.)” State ex rel. Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d at 

472, 715 N.E.2d 1062, quoting State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 

616, 64 N.E. 558 (1902), quoting People ex rel. Ayres v. Bd. of State Auds., 42 

Mich. 422, 429, 4 N.W. 274 (1888). Accordingly, only “when the issues sought 

to be litigated are of great importance and interest to the public [may they] be 

resolved in a form of action that involves no rights or obligations peculiar to 

named parties.” Sheward at 471. Conversely, when a remedy being pursued is 

one that is merely for the individual taxpayer’s benefit, the taxpayer cannot claim 
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that he is vindicating a public right, and he will not have standing to pursue a 

taxpayer action. State ex rel. Caspar v. Dayton, 53 Ohio St.3d 16, 20, 558 N.E.2d 

49 (1990). 

{¶ 13} In Caspar, police officers alleged that the city of Dayton was in 

violation of R.C. 9.44 by not recognizing the officers’ prior public service when 

computing the amount of each officer’s supplemental vacation leave. Id. at 16. 

The police officers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the city to correct its 

computation process and provide additional leave benefits. This court held that 

the goal of compelling fringe benefits for the police officers’ own benefit did not 

constitute the goal of enforcing a public right and that the police officers’ right to 

vacation pay did not constitute a public right for purposes of a statutory taxpayer 

action. Id. at 20. 

{¶ 14} Since Caspar, our state’s appellate courts have generally 

concluded that taxpayers were not attempting to benefit the public in similar 

circumstances. E.g., Cleveland ex rel. O'Malley v. White, 148 Ohio App.3d 564, 

2002-Ohio-3633, 774 N.E.2d 337, ¶ 42-47 (8th Dist.) (holding that electricians’ 

union lacked taxpayer standing to enjoin the city from using nonelectricians to 

perform certain work, because public safety was not a true concern and the union 

was merely protecting its members’ interests in keeping the work for themselves); 

Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 v. Cleveland, 156 Ohio App.3d 368, 

2004-Ohio-994, 806 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (holding that firefighters’ union 

lacked taxpayer standing to compel back pay and wage differentiation between 

different ranks of officers because the allegation of a public benefit was a pretext 

for seeking a private benefit); Cincinnati ex rel. Radford v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. 

No. C-030749, 2004-Ohio-3501, 2004 WL 1486072, ¶ 12-13 (holding that 

retirement-system trustees lacked taxpayer standing because their goal was not to 

enforce a public right but was merely to benefit the retirement system and its 

members); Home Builders Assn. of Dayton & Miami Valley v. Lebanon, 167 Ohio 
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7

App.3d 247, 2006-Ohio-595, 854 N.E.2d 1097, ¶ 54 (12th Dist.) (holding that 

homebuilders lacked standing in a taxpayer action seeking a declaration of 

unconstitutionality of a city ordinance requiring telecommunications connection 

fees, because the action was primarily to enforce the homebuilders’ private 

interests, not a public right). 

{¶ 15} This court distinguished Caspar in a subsequent decision, State ex 

rel. Fisher v. Cleveland, 109 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-1827, 845 N.E.2d 500. 

The relators in Fisher sought to enjoin the city from requiring municipal 

employees to submit copies of their tax returns in order to prove that they satisfied 

the city’s residency requirement. Although the relators’ taxpayer action in Fisher

was similar to Caspar in that the controversy arose from a public-employment 

relationship, we reached a different conclusion and held that the relators did have 

standing to pursue the action. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Specifically, 

the city’s actions constituted an unnecessary violation of privacy and therefore an 

abuse of its corporate powers, which is an appropriate target for a statutory 

municipal taxpayer action. Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. This court 

made it clear that we were not suggesting that citizens always have taxpayer 

standing to challenge the terms of public employment when we expressly 

distinguished Caspar. Id. at ¶ 12-18. Moreover, our decision in Fisher was 

supported by factors that are not present in the case at hand. 

{¶ 16} Unlike the relators in Fisher, the union here has failed to allege 

any concrete taxpayer interest that is threatened by the county’s ERIP resolution. 

Instead, the union merely alleges that the existence of a statutorily noncompliant 

county resolution constitutes an injury in and of itself. Although it is well 

established that taxpayers “may judicially contest the validity of any official act 

which directly affects prejudicially their rights as taxpayers by increasing the 

burden of taxes or otherwise,” taxpayers cannot contest official acts “merely upon 

the ground that they are unauthorized and invalid.” Pierce v. Hagans, 79 Ohio St. 
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9, 22, 86 N.E. 519 (1908). Thus, without more than the bare claim that the county 

has failed to comply with R.C. 145.297, the union cannot establish taxpayer 

standing. 

{¶ 17} Although a county’s failure to comply with a statute would 

certainly not benefit the public, allowing constant judicial intervention into 

government affairs for matters that do not involve a clear public right would also 

not benefit the public. As in Caspar, there is no vindication of public rights or 

conferral of public benefits to be found in the union’s attempt to obtain retirement 

benefits for a small number of employees. Therefore, we hold that the union 

lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the board’s ERIP resolution, and the courts 

below erred in failing to dismiss the union’s taxpayer action for that reason. 

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

{¶ 18} Because we hold that the union did not have standing to pursue its 

taxpayer action, the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies is moot as to 

the taxpayer action. However, to the extent that the union’s complaint sought 

relief that was separate from the taxpayer cause of action, we examine whether 

the union and the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were required to 

exhaust administrative remedies prior to initiating a declaratory-judgment action. 

{¶ 19} It is a “long-settled rule of judicial administration that no one is 

entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed 

administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding 

Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). Thus, a “party 

must exhaust the available avenues of administrative relief through administrative 

appeal” before seeking separate judicial intervention. Noernberg v. Brook Park, 

63 Ohio St.2d 26, 29, 406 N.E.2d 1095 (1980). “Exhaustion is generally required 

as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that 

the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to 

correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its 
January Term, 2012 

9

experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial 

review.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 

(1975). Where a party fails to exhaust available administrative remedies, 

allowing declaratory relief would serve “only to circumvent an adverse decision 

of an administrative agency and to bypass the legislative scheme.” Fairview Gen. 

Hosp. v. Fletcher, 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 152, 586 N.E.2d 80 (1992). 

{¶ 20} We first look to what administrative remedies were available to the 

union-represented Sanitary Engineering Division employees. When a board of 

county commissioners adopts regulations that allow parties to request review from 

an administrative authority, the decision of that authority constitutes a final order 

that is appealable, under R.C. 2506.01, to an applicable court of common pleas. 

R.C. 307.56. Pursuant to R.C. 145.297(B), “[e]very retirement incentive plan 

shall include provisions for the timely and impartial resolution of grievances and 

disputes arising under the plan.” 

{¶ 21} The ERIP in question complied with the above statutory 

requirements by providing: “Any employee determined to be ineligible to 

participate in this early retirement incentive plan may file a grievance * * *. Such 

grievances shall be heard and decided by the Cuyahoga County Administrator 

* * *. The decision of the Cuyahoga County Administrator shall be final.” 

Although the ERIP was made available only to employees in an “Employing 

Unit” defined to exclude the Sanitary Engineering Division, the ERIP did not 

define “Employee” to exclude any division’s employees, and thus the grievance 

process was made available to all employees under the board’s supervision. 

Accordingly, the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were required to file a 

grievance with the administrator and to file an R.C. 2506.01 administrative appeal 

from the administrator’s decision, in order to exhaust their administrative 

remedies. 
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{¶ 22} Although none of the union-represented employees was named in 

the grievance that was filed on behalf of all of the Sanitary Engineering Division 

employees, some of the union-represented employees availed themselves of the 

grievance process by participating in the hearing with the administrator. After the 

administrator issued a final order denying the grievance, none of the Sanitary 

Engineering Division employees filed an administrative appeal. Accordingly, the 

employees failed to exhaust all of their administrative remedies. 

{¶ 23} It is well settled that “[a] person entitled under R.C. Chapter 2506 

to appeal [an administrative order] is not entitled to a declaratory judgment where 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies is asserted and maintained.” 

Schomaeker v. First Natl. Bank of Ottawa, 66 Ohio St.2d 304, 421 N.E.2d 530 

(1981), paragraph three of the syllabus. Under this general rule, the union was 

not entitled to pursue its action for declaratory judgment, because it filed the 

action almost one year after the final order of the administrator without first 

attempting a timely R.C. 2506.01 appeal from the order. However, in line with 

the Eighth District’s holding below, the union asserts that an exception to the 

general rule applies and that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were 

not required to exhaust their administrative remedies, because continuing to 

participate in the grievance process would have been futile. 

{¶ 24} It is true that parties need not pursue their administrative remedies 

if doing so would be futile or a vain act. Driscoll v. Austintown Assoc., 42 Ohio 

St.2d 263, 275, 328 N.E.2d 395 (1975). However, 

a “vain act” occurs when an administrative body lacks the 

authority to grant the relief sought; a vain act does not entail the 

petitioner’s probability of receiving the remedy. The focus is on 

the power of the administrative body to afford the requested relief, 

and not on the happenstance of the relief being granted. 
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(Emphasis sic.) Nemazee v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 56 Ohio St.3d 109, 115, 564 

N.E.2d 477 (1990). Neither the decision below nor the appellees explain why it 

would have been impossible to obtain relief through an administrative appeal, 

apart from merely stating that the Sanitary Engineering Division employees were 

excluded from participating in the ERIP. As noted above, the board’s ERIP made 

the grievance process available to the employees, and union-represented 

employees were given an opportunity to be heard during the grievance hearing. 

Nothing would have prevented the union from attacking the validity of the ERIP 

in an administrative appeal. Therefore, we hold that the Sanitary Engineering 

Division employees’ continued participation in the grievance process would not 

have been a vain act, and we reverse the Eighth District’s decision allowing the 

union to pursue the declaratory-judgment action without exhausting the available 

administrative remedies. 

Conclusion

{¶ 25} We hold that the union lacked standing to bring a taxpayer action 

against the commissioners and that to the extent that the union had standing in its 

own right, the union failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Therefore, the 

issue of whether the commissioners’ ERIP was in violation of R.C. 145.297 is 

moot. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Eighth District Court of 

Appeals. 

Judgment reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER,

and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 

__________________ 

 Mangano Law Offices Co., L.P.A., Basil W. Mangano, and Joseph J. 

Guarino III, for appellee. 
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William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Dale 

Pelsozy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 

______________________