THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent,

v.

Stephen Douglas Berry, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002580

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT O F APPEALS

Appeal From Union County The Honorable John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27690 Submitted November 17, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

League B. Creech, of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth & Detrick, P.A., of Hampt on, and Chief Appellate

Defender Robert Michael D udek, of Columbia, for

Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McC rory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondent.[PER CURIAM]: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Berry , 413 S.C. 118, 775 S.E. 2d 51 (Ct. App. 2015). We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, and affi rm the Court of Appeals' decision as modified.

Petitioner was convicted of crimin al sexual conduct with a mino r, second degree. At trial, the State called Kim Roseborough (Roseborough) who was qualified as an expert in the field of "child s exual abuse assessment and treat ment." The relevant section of Roseborough's testim ony consisted of three distinct parts: (1) testimony regarding the victim's demeanor witnessed by Ro seborough during therapy; (2) testimony explaining and discussi ng delayed disclo sure as part of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome; a nd (3) testimony addressing trau ma associated with sexual abuse and post-trauma tic stress disorder (PTSD).

During the first portion of Rose borough's testimony, the State asked, "Were the circumstances of [the victim's] disclosure . . . consistent wit h the disclosure of

sexual abuse?" Trial c ounsel objected, citing State v. Kromah , 401 S.C. 340, 737 S.E.2d 490 (2013) as grounds for the objection. The trial judg e sustained the objection, finding such a quest ion solicited Roseborough's opin ion on whether the victim was telling the truth.

During the second portion of her testimony, Roseborough explain ed why victims

of child sexual abuse often choos e to delay disclosing abuse. The State asked if any factors were present in the victim's case which might have led to her delaying disclosure of the alleged abuse. The trial court sustained tri al counsel's objection to this question. 1 The solicitor continued to try and ask, in many different way s, what factors of delayed disclosu re were demonstrated by the vic tim. Trial counsel continued to object, without s tating his grounds, and these obj ections were all sustained. At no point during th e first two portions of Rosebo rough's testimony

did trial counsel move for a mi strial, curative instructions, o r to strike the testimony solicited immediately pr ior to a sustained objection.

Finally, the State introduced the third part of Roseborough's t estimony discussing

the trauma associated with sexua l abuse and possible PTSD resul ting from that

trauma. The solicitor asked Ro seborough about the typical symp toms of trauma exhibited by a child who suffered sexual assault. Roseborough' s answer discussed

1 The jury was excused so that t he attorneys coul d argue this ob jection. The record on appeal is missing five pages containing a majority of this discussion, th erefore, only part of the conversation was available for review by this Court.symptoms of trauma, including P TSD. Trial counsel objected and approached the

bench for an off the record conf erence. After th e conference, neither the grounds for the objection nor the trial judge's ruling were placed on t he record, and Roseborough continued to testify about trauma and PTSD. Specif ically, Roseborough testified to the tra uma symptoms a child would tend to show after being sexually abused and began to explain the trauma symptoms she observed in the victim. After discussing thr ee such symptoms demonstrated by the victim, trial counsel objected, but the objection was overruled. Roseborough went on to explain that she referred the victim to a psychiatrist because she exhibited many of the criteria for diagnosi ng PTSD listed in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual and, that in her opinion, the v ictim suffered from PTSD.

After the State concluded its case-in-chief, trial counsel plac ed the objection, discussed at sidebar during the third portion of Roseborough's testimony, on the record. Trial counsel argued ther e was no evidence of Roseboro ugh's qualifications to diagnose PTSD; specifically, trial counsel as serted Roseborough was qualified as a social worker and not a medical doctor. The trial judge

reiterated his sideba r determination that you do not need to be a medical doctor to diagnosis PTSD.

The Court of Appeals found the issue of whether Roseborough's t estimony regarding trauma symptoms and PT SD violated the directives esta blished in

Kromah preserved for appeal. In comi ng to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals found the specific grounds for petitioner's objection to questions regarding trauma symptoms and PTSD were apparent from the c ontext given his obje ctions to the first two portions of Rosebor ough's testimony. On the merits, the Court of Appeals

found the trial court did not a buse its discretion in allowing Roseborough to testify regarding behaviors she observed in the victim and the symptoms of PTSD.

However, we find any issues reg arding Roseborough's testimony, other than her discussion of symptoms of trauma associated with sexual assault and PTSD, are not preserved for review because petitioner's objections were s ustained and trial counsel did not take any further measures to have the testimony stricken from the record, curative instructions g iven, or a mistrial granted. See State v. Wilson , 389

S.C. 579, 698 S.E.2d 862 (Ct. App. 2010) (" Appellate courts have recognized that an issue will not be preserved for review where the trial court sustains a party's objection to improper testimony and the party does not subseque ntly move to strike the testimony or for a mistrial, " because "without a motion to strike or motion for a mistrial, when the objecting part y is sustained, he has receive d what he asked for and cannot be heard to complain about a favorable ruling on app eal."); see alsoState v. Byers , 392 S.C. 438, 710 S.E. 2d 55 (2011) ("When a witness answers a question before an objection is m ade, the objecting party must make a motion to strike the answer to preserve th e issue of the statement's admi ssibility.").

Additionally, to the extent pe titioner asserts e rror in Rosebor ough's testimony regarding symptoms of trauma a nd PTSD, the record clearly shows that the only objection made to that portion of Roseborough's testimony was b ased upon her qualifications to diagnose PTS D. As such, petitioner's current arguments regarding that portion of Roseborough's testimony were not properly befor e the Court of Appeals, should not have been rul ed upon, and are not properly before this Court. See State v. Jennings , 394 S.C. 473, 716 S.E.2d 91 (2011 ) (noting for an issue to be properly preserved, it has to be raised to and ruled upon by th e trial court); State v.

Dunbar , 356 S.C. 138, 587 S.E.2d 691 (2 003) (holding a party may not argue one ground at trial and anot her ground on appeal).

Accordingly, we vacate the Cour t of Appeals' analysis, but affi rm on the grounds

set forth above.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTRED GE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.