alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2673 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to expand the eligibility of employees 

of the Department of Veterans Affairs to participate in the Education 

Debt Reduction Program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 4, 2015 

Mr. MOULTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to expand the eligibility of employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs 

to participate in the Education Debt Reduction Program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Retain Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. EXPANSION OF ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN 

6 EDUCATION DEBT REDUCTION PROGRAM. 

7 Subsection (a) of section 7682 of title 38, United 

8 States Code, is amended to read as follows: 


srobinson on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2673 IH

1 ‘‘(a) ELIGIBILITY.—(1) An individual is eligible to 

2 participate in the Education Debt Reduction Program if 

3 the individual— 

4 ‘‘(A)(i) is an employee in the Veterans Health 

5 Administration serving in a position (as determined 

6 by the Secretary) providing direct-patient care serv7 ices or services incident to direct-patient care serv8 ices for which recruitment or retention of qualified 

9 health-care personnel (as so determined) is difficult; 

10 or 

11 ‘‘(ii) is an employee in the Veterans Health Ad12 ministration not covered by clause (i) serving in a 

13 position specified in section 7401 of this title; and 

14 ‘‘(B) owes any amount of principal or interest 

15 under a loan, the proceeds of which were used by or 

16 on behalf of that individual to pay costs relating to 

17 a course of education or training which led to a de18 gree that qualified the individual for the position re19 ferred to in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A). 

20 ‘‘(2) In selecting individuals to participate in the 

21 Education Debt Reduction Program, the Secretary shall 

22 give priority to individuals described in paragraph 

23 (1)(A)(i).’’. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 32.1

    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of GCI, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K
for the period ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald A. Duncan, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.


Date:  March 14, 2006           /s/
                                Ronald A. Duncan
                                Chief Executive Officer
                                GCI, Inc.

                                       1
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2725 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2725

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
  at 9801 Apollo Drive in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, as the ``Wayne K. 
                     Curry Post Office Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 19, 2018

 Mr. Cardin (for himself and Mr. Van Hollen) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland 
                   Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
  at 9801 Apollo Drive in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, as the ``Wayne K. 
                     Curry Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. WAYNE K. CURRY POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 9801 Apollo Drive in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, shall be 
known and designated as the ``Wayne K. Curry Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Wayne K. 
Curry Post Office Building''.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
SEC form 10-K and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                              45
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      331
<ALLOWANCES>                                        17
<INVENTORY>                                        340
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   958
<PP&E>                                           3,341
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,819
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,913
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,121
<BONDS>                                            818
<COMMON>                                           606
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      (1,090)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,913
<SALES>                                          3,832
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,832
<CGS>                                            2,834
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,834
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    (1)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  77
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (581)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (288)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (284)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (284)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (5.50)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (5.50)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED  FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ICG COMMUNICATIONS,  INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
FOR THE  QUARTER  ENDED  MARCH 31,  1997 AS  RESTATED  TO REFLECT  THE  COMBINED
OPERATIONS  OF ICG AND NETCOM AS THOUGH THE MERGER  OCCURRED AT THE BEGINNING OF
THE PERIOD  PRESENTED  AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY BY  REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                              530,832
<SECURITIES>                         32,248
<RECEIVABLES>                        50,761
<ALLOWANCES>                          5,972
<INVENTORY>                           3,083
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                    617,993
<PP&E>                              635,734
<DEPRECIATION>                       95,890
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    1,254,297
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>               102,197
<BONDS>                             885,551
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>               261,909
<PREFERRED>                            0<F1>
<COMMON>                              5,384
<OTHER-SE>                           (1,674)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       1,254,297
<SALES>                                0<F1>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                    102,055
<CGS>                                  0<F1>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                        82,952
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     69,701
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      1,733
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   25,182
<INCOME-PRETAX>                     (70,232)
<INCOME-TAX>                              7
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 (75,992)
<DISCONTINUED>                         0<F1>
<EXTRAORDINARY>                        0<F1>
<CHANGES>                              0<F1>
<NET-INCOME>                        (75,992)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                         (1.81)
<EPS-DILUTED>                          0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>THIS VALUE IS NOT APPLICABLE.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### FREDERICKSON v. STATE.

No. 18410.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 14, 1936.

*207T. A. Bledsoe, of Abilene, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is burglary; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for two years.

The blacksmith shop of A. T. Jobe was burglarized on the night of .January 21, 1935, and an electric drill taken therefrom. This drill was found in the possession of appellant about the first of February, 1935, after officers searched his garage. When the drill was discovered, appellant fled.

Appellant did not testify, but introduced witnesses who declared that the drill in question had been purchased by appellant from John Ford. Ford testified for the state, denying that he had sold the drill to appellant.

We deem the evidence sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.

In his motion for new trial appellant set up newly discovered evidence. An •examination of the affidavits attached to the motion discloses that several of the witnesses would give testimony which is purely cumulative of that adduced on the trial, while the others would testify that the general reputation of the witness Ford for truth and veracity was bad, and that he had been frequently charged with offenses. The opinion is expressed that the trial judge was warranted in overruling the motion. It is the general rule that newly discovered testimony which is merely cumulative of that adduced on the trial affords no ground for granting a new trial. Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, § 203; Edwards v. State, 75 Tex.Cr.R. 647, 172 S.W. 227. Moreover, newly discovered testimony which would not be admissible as original evidence “but which could only be used to discredit or- impeach the testimony of a witness who had testified on the trial of a case, is not ordinarily ground for a new trial, and the discretion of the trial court in refusing a new trial sought to obtain such testimony will not be revised on appeal.” Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, § 202; White v. State, 76 Tex.Cr.R. 612, 177 S.W. 93, 95.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
#### LOUT v. STATE.

No. 15507.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 11, 1933.

Sanders & McLeroy, of Center, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction for transporting intoxicating liquor; punishment, one year in the penitentiary.

We see no need for a discussion of the facts, in view of our conclusion that this case must be reversed for misconduct of the jury. On hearing of the motion for new trial all twelve of the jurors testified. The matters relied on as misconduct wére discussions of appellant’s failure to testify, and the statement by a juror or jurors in the jury room, without any testimony to warrant same, that appellant had been tried and convicted for chicken stealing. Six jurors affirmed that these matters were discussed by various members of the jury before any vote was taken; one saying that all twelve of them discussed same. Two other jurors said that the matters were discussed, but they were not sure whether before or after a verdict of guilty was reached. Four affirmed that they did not hear such matters discussed before a vote was taken, but would not state that same might not have been so discussed by other members of the jury. We call attention of the trial courts to the growing number of cases presenting this kind of questions on appeal, in the hope that more particular attention of trial juries may be called in the charges of the courts to the fact that under no circumstances should the failure of the accused to testify be discussed or commented on in the jury room, or taken as a circumstance against him. Also that matters not in testimony should not be considered by the jury, and f urthei* that a violation of these particular instructions might be'taken as contempt of court, and the jurors so offending be punished therefor. Reversal of cases for such causes should not be so frequent; but we see no way of preventing same save by some rigorous action on the • part of the lower courts.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4254

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

MICHAEL TRACY GARNETT, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge (2:07-cr-00146-1)

Submitted: December 16, 2008 Decided: December 22, 2008 

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Mark L. French, CRISWELL & FRENCH, PLLC, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States 

Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Michael Tracy Garnett pled guilty to possession of a 

dangerous weapon in a federal facility, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 930(b) (2006). The district court sentenced Garnett to 

thirty months of imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year 

term of supervised release. Garnett contends on appeal that the 

district court clearly erred in denying a reduction in sentence 

for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2007). Finding no reversible error, 

we affirm. 

 A district court’s determination as to the defendant’s 

acceptance of responsibility is a factual question reviewed for 

clear error. United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 

1999). The burden is on the defendant to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the 

adjustment. United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 

1238-39 (4th Cir. 1989). A guilty plea does not automatically 

entitle a defendant to a reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.3). A defendant 

may not be entitled to a sentencing adjustment for acceptance of 

responsibility if the defendant engages in conduct inconsistent 

with acceptance of responsibility. Id. In this case, the 

district court found by a preponderance of evidence that Garnett 

obstructed justice in unsuccessfully attempting to influence his 

2 
3 

wife to testify falsely and that Garnett gave false testimony at 

sentencing in that regard. We find no clear error in the 

district court’s conclusion that Garnett’s conduct after he pled 

guilty was inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. 

 Accordingly, we affirm Garnett’s sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

 AFFIRMED
#### BLANTON v. STATE.

No. 20036.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 21, 1938.

Adams & McAlister, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is murder; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for five years.

It was charged in the indictment, in substance, that appellant, with malice aforethought, killed Shelby Dansby by cutting him with a knife.

According to the testimony of the state, appellant and deceased had a dispute about some ties appellant had made on deceased’s premises. In the course of their argument appellant drew a knife and stabbed deceased to death. Appellant testified that deceased attacked him with a knife and cut him on the arm; that he cut deceased in defense of himself.

 Appellant filed a first application for continuance based upon the absence of Dink Blanton, who would have testified that he met appellant within less than a minute after the difficulty and observed that appellant had a cut on his arm. Further, the witness would have testified that appellant stated to him that deceased assaulted him with a knife and that he thereupon cut deceased with his knife. Again, the witness would have testified that appellant was greatly excited. Appellant attached the witness’ affidavit to his *645motion for new trial showing that he would give the testimony set forth in the application for continuance. The diligence appears to have been sufficient, it being shown by the sheriff’s return upon the attachment issued for the witness that the witness-was unable to attend court on account of illness. The testimony of the absent witness was material. The state took the position that appellant was not cut by the deceased; but, on the contrary, that he made an unprovoked attack upon deceased with a knife and stabbed him to death. We think the court fell into error in refusing the continuance and in overruling the motion for new trial insofar as it was based upon the action of the court in overruling the application. We quote from Branch’s Ann.P.C., sec, 338, as follows: “If the absent testimony is material and probably true and would reasonably have enured to the benefit of defendant and it is reasonably probable that on another trial it might change the result, the refusal of the continuance and the denial of the motion for new trial based thereon will cause a reversal.”

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
<PAGE>



November 5, 1998

Ms. Susanna Bennett
Vice President Finance and Corporate Secretary
Printrak International Inc.
1250 North Tustin Avenue
Anaheim, CA         92807

Re:  First Amendment ("Amendment") to the Amended and Restated Agreement dated
     July 31, 1998(this Amendment, and the Amended and Restated Loan Agreement
     together called the "Agreement")
               
Dear Susanna:

     In reference to the Agreement between Union Bank of California, N.A.
("Bank") and  Printrak International Inc. ("Borrower"), the Bank and Borrower
desire to amend the Agreement. Capitalized terms used herein which are not
otherwise defined shall have the meaning given them in the Agreement.

     AMENDMENTS TO THE AGREEMENT:

     (a) Section 1.1.1, line 5 of the Agreement is hereby amended by
substituting the date "January 4, 2000" for the date "August 2, 1999."

     (b) Section 1.1.1.1, line 10 of the Agreement is hereby amended by
substitution the date "January 4, 2000" for the date "August 2, 1999." 

     Except as specifically amended hereby, the Agreement shall remain in full
force and effect and is hereby ratified and confirmed.  This  Amendment shall
not be a waiver of any existing or future default or breach of a condition or
covenant unless specified herein.

     This Amendment shall become effective when the Bank shall have received the
acknowledgment  copy of this Amendment executed by the Borrower and the
following executed  documents plus an amendment fee of Seven Thousand Five
Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), all of which must be received before November 6,
1998.
     
Very truly yours,
UNION BANK OF CALIFORNIA, N.A.

By:                           
   ---------------------------
Title:                        
      ------------------------

By:                           
   ---------------------------
Title:                        
      ------------------------


Agreed and Accepted to this __________________ day of
November, 1998.


PRINTRAK INTERNATIONAL, INC.  

By:                           
   ---------------------------
Title:                        
      ------------------------
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT ON SCHEDULES

To the Board of Directors and Stockholders
Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc. and Subsidiaries


We have audited the consolidated financial statements of Acceptance Insurance 
Companies Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and for each
of the three years in the period ended December 31, 1998, and have issued our 
report thereon dated March 5, 1999; such financial statements and report are
included elsewhere in this Form 10-K. Our audits also included the financial
statement schedules of Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc. and subsidiaries, 
listed in Item 14. These financial statement schedules are the responsibility 
of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion based
on our audits. In our opinion, such consolidated financial statement schedules,
when considered in relation to the basic consolidated financial statement taken
as a whole, present fairly in all material respects the information set forth 
therein.



/s/  DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

DELOITTE & TOUCHE  LLP
Omaha, Nebraska
March 5, 1999