IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCCOA-186

No. COA20-147

Filed 4 May 2021

Guilford County, Nos. 15 CRS 93682, 93853

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

SHANION J. DONTA WATSON

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 12 July 2019 by Judge David L. 

Hall in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 March 

2021.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorneys General Anne 

M. Middleton and Sherri Horner Lawrence, for the State.

Michael E. Casterline for defendant-appellant.

ZACHARY, Judge.

¶ 1 Defendant Shanion J. Donta Watson appeals from judgments entered upon a 

jury’s verdicts finding him guilty of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule, 

felony larceny of a motor vehicle, and felony child abuse inflicting serious mental 

injury. On appeal, Defendant argues that we must vacate his first-degree murder 

conviction for two reasons: first, because the predicate felony underlying his 

conviction under the felony-murder rule—statutory rape of a child under the age of 

13—lacks an intent element, and second, because the jury acquitted Defendant of the 
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predicate felony. After careful review, we conclude that Defendant received a fair

trial, free from error.

Background

¶ 2 In December 2015, Chiquita Adams was living with her 11-year-old daughter, 

Tracy,1 in Greensboro, North Carolina. Defendant was Ms. Adams’ boyfriend. On the 

night of 24 December 2015, Ms. Adams and Tracy stayed in a hotel in High Point, 

North Carolina. Ms. Adams drove them there, and Defendant arrived at the hotel 

about an hour after Ms. Adams and Tracy checked in.

¶ 3 Tracy fell asleep at around 10:00 p.m. She awoke at approximately 2:00 a.m. 

and saw Defendant on the floor next to her bed. Defendant grabbed Tracy’s leg, picked 

her up, and carried her to the bathroom; she could not scream because he had his 

hand covering her mouth. However, Tracy was able to grab a pillow from the bed and 

threw it toward her mother. After Defendant placed Tracy on the bathroom sink and 

told her to “be quiet,” Ms. Adams opened the bathroom door. Tracy told her mother, 

“Please don’t leave me,” and Defendant told Ms. Adams, “don’t believe her.” When 

Ms. Adams approached Defendant, he knocked her to the floor and began hitting and 

choking her. After Ms. Adams lost consciousness, Defendant placed her on the bed 

and returned to the bathroom, telling Tracy, “pull your pants down.” Ms. Adams 

 

1 In accordance with N.C.R. App. P. 42, we refer to the juvenile by a pseudonym in 

order to protect her identity. 
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awakened, and she and Tracy tried to exit the hotel room, but Defendant stopped 

them. Ms. Adams and Defendant then engaged in a prolonged struggle. At one point, 

Tracy tried to use her cell phone—a Christmas gift from her father—to call 911, but 

Defendant grabbed it from her and put it in his pocket.

¶ 4 While Ms. Adams fought with Defendant, Tracy was in the bathroom 

screaming and praying. When she looked out of the bathroom, she saw her mother on 

the bed, not moving. Defendant again told Tracy to pull her pants down; this time,

she did, and Defendant had sexual intercourse with her on the bed. Eventually,

Defendant let her get up, and she ran to the bathroom and locked the door.

¶ 5 At some point, Tracy fell asleep in the hotel bed. When she awoke at around 

11:00 a.m., Defendant was still in the hotel room. Defendant told Tracy that Ms. 

Adams was asleep. Tracy touched her mother’s body and noticed that she was not 

breathing. Tracy had “a feeling that she was dead” but “didn’t want to believe it fully.” 

Defendant told Tracy to take a shower, so she did, and when she came out of the 

bathroom, Defendant had left with Ms. Adams’ car keys. The hotel housekeeper came 

to the door and asked where Tracy’s mother was. At first, Tracy told the housekeeper 

that her mother was asleep. Then she began to cry and said, “I don’t know, I don’t 

know. Help me, help me.” The housekeeper called 911.

¶ 6 The High Point Fire Department responded to the call first. After reporting

that Ms. Adams was dead, the firefighters waited for law enforcement officers and 
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paramedics to arrive. Upon arrival at the scene, a High Point Police Department 

officer spoke with Tracy, who told him that Defendant was her mother’s boyfriend

and provided Defendant’s name. She told police that her cell phone and her mother’s 

car were missing, and that she had tried to wake her mother up that morning, but 

she could not rouse her. Tracy appeared to law enforcement officers to be in shock; 

she did not tell the officers about the altercation between Defendant and her mother 

or that Defendant had sexual intercourse with her.

¶ 7 A phone carrier assisted detectives in determining the location of Tracy’s cell 

phone, which was “pinging” from an apartment in High Point. Upon their arrival to 

the apartment, the detectives spotted Ms. Adams’ tan Hyundai Sonata parked out 

front. A canine officer discovered Tracy’s cell phone behind the apartments. A phone 

carrier forwarded to detectives text messages sent from Defendant’s cell phone to his 

sister’s cell phone. Detectives went to Defendant’s sister’s apartment, and she told 

them that Defendant had been there earlier that afternoon, showered, changed his 

clothes, and left. Officers collected Defendant’s discarded clothes, which included

clothing that matched the outfit he appeared to be wearing in video-camera footage

captured when he left the hotel room. The shirt had a reddish stain on it.

¶ 8 An officer took Tracy to the Hope House Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”). 

A child interviewer with the CAC told Tracy that her mother was dead. Tracy told 

the interviewer that she had been asleep all night and did not hear anything.
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¶ 9 Detectives arrested Defendant at his sister’s apartment at around 10:00 p.m.

on 26 December 2015.

¶ 10 On 28 December 2015, the Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy of Ms. 

Adams’ body that revealed that she had facial lacerations; bruises, abrasions, and 

lacerations in her mouth and on her tongue; and evidence of strangulation, including 

hemorrhages of the eyes, an abraded contusion on her neck, hemorrhaging in the 

muscles of her neck, and two fractures of the cricoid cartilage. The medical examiner 

concluded that Ms. Adams died as a result of strangulation.

¶ 11 On 28 December 2015, Tracy’s father arrived in North Carolina from Texas to 

pick up Tracy, and Tracy moved to Texas to live with him. In Texas, Tracy struggled 

in school, did not have many friends, did not want to sleep in a room by herself, and 

suffered from panic attacks. Tracy still had not told anybody what had happened to 

her or what she saw. Finally, in July 2017, she told her father what had happened.

During an interview at a CAC in Texas, Tracy told an interviewer that Defendant 

had raped her and killed her mother.

¶ 12 On 12 July 2016, a Guilford County grand jury indicted Defendant for larceny 

of a motor vehicle, child abuse inflicting serious mental injury, and first-degree 

murder. On 15 August 2017, a Guilford County grand jury indicted Defendant for 

statutory rape of a child by an adult, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.23.

¶ 13 Defendant was tried during the 24 June 2019 session of Guilford County 
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Superior Court before the Honorable David L. Hall. Defendant represented himself, 

with standby counsel appointed. At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant 

moved to dismiss the charges for insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied 

Defendant’s motion. The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder, on the 

bases of both premeditation and deliberation and on the felony-murder rule, with 

statutory rape as the predicate felony. The trial court also instructed the jury on 

second-degree murder, statutory rape of a child by an adult, felony larceny of a motor 

vehicle, and felony child abuse inflicting serious mental injury.

¶ 14 The jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder under the felony-murder 

rule, felony larceny of a motor vehicle, and felony child abuse inflicting serious mental 

injury. The jury acquitted Defendant of statutory rape. After the jury rendered its 

verdicts, standby counsel renewed Defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of 

the evidence.

¶ 15 The trial court consolidated judgment on Defendant’s convictions for felony 

larceny of a motor vehicle and felony child abuse, entering one judgment on those 

convictions and one judgment on the conviction for first-degree murder. The trial 

court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the opportunity for parole 

for the murder conviction, and imposed a consecutive 19- to 32-month sentence for 

the larceny and child-abuse convictions. Defendant noticed appeal in open court.

Discussion
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¶ 16 On appeal, Defendant contends that this Court must vacate his conviction for 

first-degree murder based on the felony-murder rule for two interrelated reasons. 

First, Defendant contends that the predicate felony of statutory rape of a child under 

the age of 13 cannot support a felony-murder conviction because statutory rape lacks 

an intent element. Defendant argues that, because statutory rape is a strict-liability 

offense, it therefore lacks an intent element, and only attempted statutory rape—

which Defendant concedes does include an intent element—could support felony 

murder. However, Defendant argues that in the instant case, the trial court did not 

properly instruct the jury on the charge of attempted statutory rape, and therefore,

neither completed nor attempted statutory rape could support the felony murder 

conviction. 

¶ 17 Defendant also raises a second, related argument: he contends that his firstdegree murder conviction must be vacated because the jury acquitted him of the 

predicate felony underlying the State’s theory of felony murder. According to 

Defendant, because the jury was not instructed on attempted statutory rape, it could

not properly consider that offense in support of its felony-murder verdict; thus, his 

first-degree murder conviction must be vacated.

¶ 18 After careful review, we hold that statutory rape sufficiently supported 

Defendant’s felony-murder conviction on the present facts, and that he is not entitled 

to vacatur of his conviction based on his acquittal of the predicate felony. Having so 
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concluded, we need not address Defendant’s argument that the jury was not properly 

instructed on attempted statutory rape. Therefore, we conclude that Defendant 

received a trial free from error.

I. Preservation

¶ 19 As a preliminary matter, although Defendant characterizes the trial court’s 

alleged error as one relating to erroneous jury instructions, in fact, much of 

Defendant’s argument sounds in sufficiency of the evidence issues. However, defense 

counsel conceded at oral argument before this Court that the State presented 

sufficient evidence to send the charge of statutory rape to the jury. Defendant’s 

argument on appeal is, in essence, an argument that the charge of completed 

statutory rape is insufficient as a matter of law to support a felony-murder conviction, 

and in the alternative, that an acquittal of statutory rape renders the conduct 

insufficient as a matter of law to support a felony-murder conviction. The State 

argues that Defendant failed to preserve any sufficiency of the evidence issues for

appeal by failing to make a properly timed motion to dismiss. We conclude that 

Defendant adequately preserved any sufficiency arguments. 

¶ 20 At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges 

for insufficiency of the evidence, which the trial court denied. Standby counsel, on 

behalf of Defendant, renewed the motion to dismiss after the jury rendered its 

verdicts but before the trial court entered judgment. This motion complied with N.C. 
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Gen. Stat. § 15A-1227, which governs motions for dismissal for insufficient evidence:

(a) A motion for dismissal for insufficiency of the evidence 

to sustain a conviction may be made at the following times:

. . . . 

(3) After return of a verdict of guilty and before entry 

of judgment.

(b) Failure to make the motion at the close of the State’s 

evidence or after all the evidence is not a bar to making the 

motion at a later time as provided in subsection (a).

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1227(a)(3), (b) (2019). 

¶ 21 We therefore conclude that Defendant properly preserved an objection to the 

sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 246, 839 S.E.2d 782, 

788 (2020) (holding that a defendant preserves all insufficiency of the evidence issues 

by making a timely motion to dismiss). 

II. Statutory Rape as Predicate Felony

¶ 22 Defendant argues that statutory rape is a strict-liability offense, and as such, 

it cannot serve as a predicate felony for a felony-murder charge because it lacks any 

element of criminal intent. We disagree.

¶ 23 Section 14-17(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes defines first-degree 

murder and enumerates the offenses that may serve as predicate felonies for firstdegree murder under the felony-murder rule: “A murder . . . which shall be committed 

in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, 
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robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use 

of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree[.]” Our Supreme 

Court has noted that the predicate crimes listed in § 14-17(a) share a common 

requirement: “actual intent on the part of the accused to commit the crime.” State v. 

Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 169, 538 S.E.2d 917, 925 (2000). 

¶ 24 Here, the State predicated Defendant’s felony-murder charge on the crime of 

statutory rape of a child by an adult, as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.23(a): “A 

person is guilty of statutory rape of a child by an adult if the person is at least 18 

years of age and engages in vaginal intercourse with a victim who is a child under 

the age of 13 years.” The crime of statutory rape does not require proof of knowledge 

of the child’s age, and it “requir[es] nothing more than commission of the act 

prohibited” to support a conviction. State v. Anthony, 133 N.C. App. 573, 578, 516 

S.E.2d 195, 198 (1999), aff’d, 351 N.C. 611, 528 S.E.2d 321 (2000).

¶ 25 Defendant argues that statutory rape lacks the necessary intent to support a 

felony-murder charge—the “actual intent on the part of the accused to commit the 

crime.” Jones, 353 N.C. at 169, 538 S.E.2d at 925. We disagree with Defendant’s 

interpretation of “strict-liability offense.” Rape is a general-intent crime. Id. at 167, 

538 S.E.2d at 924. “[T]he forbidden conduct under the statutory rape provision is the 

act of intercourse itself[.]” State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 637, 295 S.E.2d 375, 380 

(1982) (citation omitted), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 
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54, 431 S.E.2d 188 (1993). As such, statutory rape is a strict-liability offense only in 

that consent and mistake of age are not valid defenses. Anthony, 133 N.C. App. at 

579, 516 S.E.2d at 198–99. We do not take those limitations on defenses to mean that 

the commission of statutory rape does not require the intent to commit an act, that 

is, sexual intercourse, or “the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female 

by the sexual organ of the male.” State v. Murry, 277 N.C. 197, 203, 176 S.E.2d 738, 

742 (1970). 

¶ 26 Defendant argues, however, that “[t]he Jones holding limits application of the 

felony murder rule to those felonies with an actual intent element[.]” Jones involved 

an impaired-driving collision that resulted in two deaths; the defendant was 

convicted of, inter alia, first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule, with the 

crime of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury as the predicate felony.

353 N.C. at 162–63, 538 S.E.2d at 921. The defendant operated a motor vehicle in a

culpably or criminally negligent manner such that it constituted a deadly weapon. Id. 

at 164–65, 538 S.E.2d at 922–23. 

¶ 27 The Supreme Court examined N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 and determined that 

three types of criminal conduct . . . qualify as first-degree 

murder: (1) willful, deliberate, and premeditated killings 

(category 1); (2) killings resulting from poison, 

imprisonment, starvation, torture, or lying in wait 

(category 2); and (3) killings that occur during specifically 

enumerated felonies or during a felony committed or 

attempted with the use of a deadly weapon (category 3). All 
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of these categories require that the defendant have a mens 

rea greater than culpable or criminal negligence; that is, 

they all require that the defendant had actual intent to 

commit the act that forms the basis of a first-degree 

murder charge.

Id. at 166, 538 S.E.2d at 923–24 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶ 28 Importantly, the Jones Court noted that the conduct in category 3 does not 

necessarily require an intent to kill; “however, the actual intent to commit the 

underlying felony is required. This is not to imply that an accused must intend to 

break the law, but rather that he must be purposely resolved to participate in the

conduct that comprises the criminal offense.” Id. at 167, 538 S.E.2d at 924 (emphasis 

added). 

¶ 29 Concluding that all of the enumerated felonies in the murder statute “require 

a level of intent greater than culpable negligence on the part of the accused[,]” id., 

the Jones Court held that “culpable negligence may not be used to satisfy the intent 

requirements for a first-degree murder charge[,]” id. at 163, 538 S.E.2d at 922. 

¶ 30 We disagree with Defendant that statutory rape is analogous to a culpably or 

criminally negligent offense and that it may not serve as a predicate felony for felony 

murder. Indeed, the logic of Jones seems to support a conclusion to the contrary. 

Statutory rape of a child by an adult requires that the defendant “engage[ ] in vaginal 

intercourse with a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 14-27.23(a). We cannot imagine a scenario in which a defendant could “engage[ ] in 
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vaginal intercourse with a victim” in a criminally negligent manner; rather, statutory 

rape, unlike impaired driving that results in death, such as that at issue in Jones,

requires that the perpetrator “be purposely resolved to participate in the conduct that 

comprises the criminal offense.” Jones, 353 N.C. at 167, 538 S.E.2d at 924. This is 

true regardless of the fact that “an individual may commit the crime of statutory 

[rape] regardless of the defendant’s mistake or lack of knowledge of the child’s age” 

and regardless of the victim’s alleged consent. State v. Sines, 158 N.C. App. 79, 84, 

579 S.E.2d 895, 899, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 468, 587 S.E.2d 69 (2003). 

¶ 31 Defendant argues, however, that while attempted statutory rape possesses an 

intent element, completed statutory rape does not. In Sines, the defendant argued 

that “attempted statutory sexual offense is a logical impossibility under North 

Carolina law”2 because “it is logically impossible to have the specific intent to commit 

a strict liability crime which does not require a specific intent.” Id. at 84–85, 579 

S.E.2d at 899–900. Our Court rejected this argument and explained that, in order to 

prove attempt—a specific-intent offense—“the State must show: (1) the intent to 

commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes 

 

2 Statutory sexual offense with a child by an adult is a slightly broader offense than 

statutory rape in that a defendant commits statutory sexual offense by engaging in a “sexual 

act,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.28, defined as any act of cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, anal 

intercourse, or the penetration by any object of the genital or anal opening of a person’s body, 

with a child who is under 13 years old. N.C.P.I.--Crim. 207.45A (2019)
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beyond mere preparation, but (3) falls short of the completed offense.” Id. at 85, 579 

S.E.2d at 899 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 32 In holding that attempted statutory sexual offense is a valid crime under North 

Carolina law, our Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the offense does not 

require intent:

[T]he intent required for attempted statutory sexual 

offense is the intent to engage in a sexual act. The intent 

element of attempted statutory sexual offense does not 

require that the defendant intended to commit a sexual act 

with an underage person, but only that [the] defendant 

intended to commit a sexual act with the victim. [The 

d]efendant’s knowledge of [the] victim’s age or [the] 

victim’s consent are not defenses to the crime of attempted 

statutory sexual offense, just like these defenses are not 

valid if the crime of statutory sexual offense is completed. 

Id. at 86, 579 S.E.2d at 900.

¶ 33 The logic and holding of Sines apply with equal force to the issue at hand. It is 

true that “the intent element of . . . statutory [rape] does not require that the 

defendant intend[ ]” to engage in vaginal intercourse with an underage person,

because mistake or lack of knowledge of age is not a defense. Id. Nonetheless, both 

completed and attempted statutory rape require “that [the] defendant intend[ ] to 

commit a sexual act with the victim.” Id.

¶ 34 Applying the analysis of the Jones and Sines decisions to the facts at hand, we 

conclude that the intent to commit the underlying act of sexual intercourse, inherent 
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in the offense of statutory rape, satisfies the intent required for a crime to serve as 

the basis of a felony-murder charge. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

III. Acquittal of Statutory Rape

¶ 35 Defendant further argues that his first-degree murder conviction must be 

vacated because the jury acquitted him of the predicate felony. Defendant’s argument 

is, in essence, that the jury’s verdicts—finding him guilty of felony murder, with 

statutory rape as the underlying felony, but not guilty of statutory rape—are 

inconsistent and contradictory. We disagree.

¶ 36 First-degree murder under the felony-murder rule does not require proof of 

premeditation and deliberation. State v. Wright, 282 N.C. 364, 369, 192 S.E.2d 818, 

822 (1972). Instead, in felony-murder cases, “there is a fictional transfer of the malice 

which plays a part in the underlying felony to the unintended homicide so that the 

homicide is deemed committed with malice.” State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 456, 340 

S.E.2d 701, 710 (1986). As we concluded above, statutory rape of a child under 13 by 

an adult may serve as the underlying felony in support of a charge of first-degree 

murder under the felony-murder rule. However, as explained below, the jury need 

not convict on the predicate felony where the evidence presented at trial is sufficient 

to support a conviction of both felony murder and the underlying felony. 

¶ 37 In North Carolina, our jurisprudence distinguishes between verdicts that are 
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inconsistent and those that are both inconsistent and legally contradictory. See, e.g., 

State v. Mumford, 364 N.C. 394, 398, 699 S.E.2d 911, 914 (2010). “It is firmly 

established that when there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict, mere 

inconsistency will not invalidate the verdict.” Id. (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). However, verdicts that are inconsistent and contradictory entitle a 

defendant to relief. Id.

¶ 38 Verdicts are inconsistent when they reflect some logical flaw or compromise in 

the jury’s reasoning. For example, in Mumford, the defendant was convicted of five 

counts of felony serious injury by vehicle but acquitted of the lesser offense of driving 

while impaired. Id. at 401, 699 S.E.2d at 916. Felony serious injury by vehicle, defined 

by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-141.4(a3), may be proved by a showing that the defendant 

“was engaged in the offense of impaired driving[.]” The Supreme Court concluded that 

these convictions were merely inconsistent, not legally contradictory, because

conviction of serious injury by vehicle “does not require a conviction of driving while 

impaired . . . but only requires a finding that the defendant was engaged in the 

conduct described” by the offense of driving while impaired. Mumford, 364 N.C. at 

401, 699 S.E.2d at 916. And because the State presented sufficient evidence to 

support the defendant’s convictions for felony serious injury by vehicle, the defendant 

was not entitled to relief. Id. 

¶ 39 On the other hand, a verdict is legally contradictory, or mutually exclusive, 
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when it “purports to establish that the defendant is guilty of two separate and distinct 

criminal offenses, the nature of which is such that guilt of one necessarily excludes 

guilt of the other.” Id. at 400, 699 S.E.2d at 915 (citation omitted). For example, where 

a defendant was convicted of one count of embezzlement and one count of obtaining 

property by false pretenses based on the same facts, the Supreme Court concluded

that the verdicts were legally contradictory:

[T]o constitute embezzlement, the property in question 

initially must be acquired lawfully, pursuant to a trust 

relationship, and then wrongfully converted. On the other 

hand, to constitute false pretenses the property must be 

acquired unlawfully at the outset, pursuant to a false 

representation. This Court has previously held that, since 

property cannot be obtained simultaneously pursuant to 

both lawful and unlawful means, guilt of either 

embezzlement or false pretenses necessarily excludes guilt 

of the other. . . . 

[Therefore] a defendant cannot be convicted of both 

embezzlement and false pretenses based upon a single 

transaction[.]

State v. Speckman, 326 N.C. 576, 578, 391 S.E.2d 165, 166–67 (1990) (citations 

omitted).

¶ 40 Merely inconsistent verdicts do not entitle the defendant to relief. The United 

States Supreme Court settled the issue in United States v. Powell, in which the Court 

addressed an argument that acquittal of a predicate felony necessitated relief from 

conviction for the compound felony: 
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[R]espondent’s argument that an acquittal on a predicate 

offense necessitates a finding of insufficient evidence on a 

compound felony count simply misunderstands the nature 

of the inconsistent verdict problem. Whether presented as 

an insufficient evidence argument, or as an argument that 

the acquittal on the predicate offense should collaterally 

estop the Government on the compound offense, the 

argument necessarily assumes that the acquittal on the 

predicate offense was proper—the one the jury “really 

meant.” This, of course, is not necessarily correct; all we 

know is that the verdicts are inconsistent. The Government 

could just as easily—and erroneously—argue that since the 

jury convicted on the compound offense the evidence on the 

predicate offense must have been sufficient. The problem 

is that the same jury reached inconsistent results[.]

469 U.S. 57, 68, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 470–71 (1984). 

¶ 41 Inconsistent verdicts, therefore, 

present a situation where “error,” in the sense that the jury 

has not followed the court’s instructions, most certainly has 

occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored. Given 

this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government is 

precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly 

satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on 

the conviction as a matter of course.

Id. at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 468–69.

¶ 42 Here, Defendant’s convictions are not legally contradictory. The State 

submitted three theories of murder to the jury: (1) first-degree murder based on 

premeditation and deliberation, (2) first-degree murder based on felony murder, and 

(3) second-degree murder. The trial court’s instructions allowed the jury to find 

Defendant guilty of felony murder if it found that he killed Ms. Adams “while 
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committing or while attempting to commit the crime of statutory rape of a child under 

the age of thirteen[.]” The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder based 

on felony murder but not guilty of the separately charged offense of statutory rape. 

But the jury may rely on the act of committing or attempting statutory rape in 

support of felony murder without a conviction of statutory rape. See Mumford, 364 

N.C. at 401, 699 S.E.2d at 916; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) (“A murder . . . 

which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, 

rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or 

attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first 

degree[.]” (emphasis added)). 

¶ 43 Further, had the jury found Defendant guilty of both felony murder and the 

predicate felony, the trial court would have been required to arrest judgment on the 

predicate felony because “a defendant may not be punished both for felony murder 

and for the underlying, ‘predicate’ felony, even in a single prosecution.” State v. 

Coleman, 161 N.C. App. 224, 234, 587 S.E.2d 889, 896 (2003) (quoting Gardner, 315 

N.C. at 460, 340 S.E.2d at 712). Moreover, the State could have proceeded solely on 

felony murder based on statutory rape without charging statutory rape; indeed, our 

Supreme Court in State v. Carey suggested that 

the better practice where the State prosecutes a defendant 

for first-degree murder on the theory that the homicide was 

committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a 
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felony under the provisions of G.S. 14-17, would be that the 

solicitor should not secure a separate indictment for the 

felony. If he does, and there is a conviction of both, the 

defendant will be sentenced for the murder and the 

judgment will be arrested for the felony under the merger 

rule.

288 N.C. 254, 274, 218 S.E.2d 387, 400 (1975), vacated in part on other grounds and 

remanded, 428 U.S. 904, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1209 (1976). Under those circumstances, where 

the State presented sufficient evidence of the predicate felony, we would not doubt 

the jury’s determination that the defendant committed the underlying offense merely 

because there was no conviction on the underlying offense. 

¶ 44 That the jury’s verdicts seem inconsistent does not entitle Defendant to relief 

because “it is unclear whose ox has been gored.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d

at 469. Defendant suggests that the jury reached the conclusions it did because it was 

unconvinced that Defendant perpetrated a statutory rape. However, “[i]t is equally 

possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the 

[felony-murder charge], and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at 

an inconsistent conclusion on the [predicate] offense.” Id. at 65, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 468. 

Here, Defendant “is given the benefit of h[is] acquittal on the counts on which [ ]he 

was acquitted, and it is neither irrational nor illogical to require h[im] to accept the 

burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury convicted.” Id. at 69, 83 L. Ed. 

2d at 471. 
STATE V. WATSON

2021-NCCOA-186

Opinion of the Court

Conclusion

¶ 45 We conclude that statutory rape sufficiently supported Defendant’s felonymurder conviction and that the jury’s verdicts were not legally contradictory. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free from error. 

NO ERROR.

Judges WOOD and JACKSON concur.