M .L w as e l ev en yea rs o l d at t he t i m e o f t he i nc i d en t

. It i s o ur po l i cy t o refer t o m i no r victi m s b y t he i r i nit i als. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 3, 200 7
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. TIMOT HY RA Y A Z BILL

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Dec atur County No. 06-CR -253 C. Cr eed Mc Ginley, Judge

No. W2007-00086-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 12, 2007

The de f e n d an t, T im o thy

Ra y A zb il l, w a s f

o u n d g u il ty b y a D e c a tu r Co u n ty ju r y o f a g g r a v a te d burg lary , rape of a child, and espe cially ag g ravated kidnapping , and re ceive d an ef fec tive sentenc e of twenty -five y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. The de fenda nt challeng es the suff

iciency of the evidenc e supporting his convictions a nd the trial court’s a

pplication of sentenc ing e nhance ment fac tors. After

revie w, we c onclude that the de fenda nt’s claims are without m er i t and af firm the judgme nts. Howeve r, we additionally conclude that, as to th e co n v i cti ons for ra pe of a child and espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping , the cour t beg an at the midpoi n t o f t he ra ng e, rather than the min imum a s r e qu ir e d, and , th e re fo re , r e mand fo r r e se nte nc inga s to tho se tw o o ff e ns e s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uitCo ur t A ffirm e d and Re m ande d for Re se nt e nc ing

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Ric ha rd W. D e B e rr

y , A ssi sta nt P ub lic De fe nd e r, fo r t

he a pp e lla nt, Ti mot hy Ray Azb ill

. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r , Jr

. , A tt o r

n e y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Da

vid H. F ind le y , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Hanse l J ay

McCadams, District Attorne y Gene ral; and Je r

r y W. Wa ll a ce a

nd Ed McDa

niel, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS
The victim, M.L ., testified at t ri al that afte r she we nt to sleep on Octobe r 26, 2005, the 1 defe ndant enter ed her be droom, woke he r up, and told her that her mother

had won ten thousa

nd-2-

dollars. The defe ndant then took M.L

. from her bedroom, cover ed her mouth a s they left the house, and shoved he r into his car. M.L . testif i ed t hat the def

endant dr ove to a ne arby

churc h, wher e he punc he d he r in the jaw and a tte mpt e d to str ang le he r. She sa id the de fe nd ant h e ld a sc re wd ri ve r t o her throat and told her that if she told any one about this incident that he w ould k i l l her a nd her mother. She initiall y t es t ified that the de fenda nt made her

take he r clothes of

f, but did not do
any thi ngto h e r a ft e r that. Th e de fe nd ant t he n to ok M. L . h ome , a

nd sh e ra n in to t he ho us e and

tol d her mother

that the defen d an t had ra ped her . L ater , during direc t examination, M .L . testified that afte r the de fenda

nt pulled her c lothes off, he made he r sit on top of hi m and place d something inside h e r b o dy.
On cr oss-examination, M.L . testified that the def endant ha d been to he r house twe lve or thirteen times to visit her mother and that she had ridden in his car three or four times and attende d
a sle e po ve r at hi s h ou se wi tho ut i nc ide nt. She te sti fi e d th a t she had ne ve r h e ard he r m oth e r t a lk
a bo ut h a vin g a dr

ug pr ob le m and ha d ne ve r s e e n th e de fe nd ant a nd he r m oth e r u se dr

ug s. M. L . s a id that she did not hear her mother talk about being mad at the defe ndant shortly befor e the nig ht of the inc ide nt. The victim’s mother, E.L ., testified that she went to bed a round the same time as her da ug hter on the ni g ht of t he incident. At around 1:00 a.m., her daug hter came home cry ing and t old her that the defe ndant had rape d her. E.L

. promptly called the police, who tra nsported her

and M.L . to the ho sp ita l. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, E. L

. te sti fi e d that sh e ha d k no wn the de fe nd ant f

or a pp ro xima te ly
s i x m o n t h s a n d

t h a tM

. L. h a d

p r e v i o u s l y

s t ay e d o v e r n i g h tw i t h t h e d e f

e n d an t an d

h i s g i r l f r i e n d

. E

. L. said that on the nig ht of the incident she le ft the door to he r home unlocked a nd did not hear a

ny one enter the home. She admitted that she had used i lleg al drugs with t he def endant but denie d they

had argued about dr

ug s. She denied purc hasing drug s with the defendant on the day of the incide nt and denied that he had che ated he r out of drug s that day

. On redirect ex amination, E.L . testified that she did not give the defe ndant per mission t o ent er h er h o m e o r take her da ug hter on the nig ht of the incident.
Serg eant Tony Weber of the Dec atur County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment testified that he a

rrived at E.L ’s hom e at around 1:30 a.m. on October 27, 2005. E.L . told him t hat the def endant ha d rape d her da ug hter. He then drove E.L

. and M.L

. to the hos pital and aske d that a ra pe kit examination be perf o r me d

. Se r g e an t We b e r a c kn o w le d g e d th a t th e r e s u lt s o f th e r a p e k it w e r e n e g a ti v e f

or the prese nce of

semen. Serg eant Weber

said that a pastry wra

pper with M.L .’s finger

print was re cover ed from the de fenda

nt’s car

. Kimberly Br itt, a reg istered nur se at De catur County Gene ral Ho s pital, examined M.L . on the morning of Oc tober 27, 2005. Ms. B ritt a sked M.L

. what happene d to he r and she re sponded, “He hit me on my

ey e and nose , and then he mad e me sit on top of him,” and said that something went inside of he r. B ritt observed that M.L . had a sma ll abrasion on the lef t side of her

nose, a redde ned ar ea to t h e l ef

t o f her ey e, and br

uises on her ne ck, bac k, and che st. I n Br itt’s opinion, t h e s e i n j u ri es ap p ea re d t o h av e be en i n fl i ct ed “w i t h i n a co u p l e of h o u rs

. ” S h e te s t i fi ed t h at M

. L.D r. H a m ilt o n e x p la ine d tha t a se ro u s se q u e n c e is “a c le a r m u c o u s typ e s u b sta n c e w ith a littl e r e d d ish ti n t.” 2

-3- a pp e are d a bit ne rv ou s b ut r e la tiv e ly

c a lm. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, sh e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t sh e c ou ld not tell by

looking at a bruise whe ther it was intentionally or ac cidentally

inflicted.

Dr. Thomas H amilton, who treate d M.L

. at Dec atur County Gene ral Hospital, obser

ved that she had slig ht pain in her ne ck, abrasions to the l eft side of her nose and to the le ft of her ey e, and a small bruise on the rig ht side of her neck. D r. Hamilton performed a vag inal exam on M.L ., which
reve aled moder ate irr itation of the labia a nd the e x t er n al vaginal wa ll and a ser ous sequenc e extruding fr om the vag ina. I n his opinion “there wa s a pretty g ood possibili ty that [M.L .] had been 2 vio la te d. ” On cr os s- e xami natio n, Dr . H a mil ton te sti fi e d th a t he fo un d n o te ars or la c e ratio ns in M.L .’s vag ina.

Ba rbar a B ush, the defe ndant’s g irlfriend, te stified that she had know n th e defe ndant since Mother’s Da

y 2005. On Octobe r 27, 2005, the defe ndant picked her up around 1:45 a .m., a nd she
acc ompanied him to his mother’s house in Camden. Ms . Bush sa id the defe ndant appe are d normal to h e r t hat mo rn ingand

wa s in a hurr y , a s h e a lw ay s is

. The de fenda

nt testified that he did not do what the victim had a ccuse d him of doing to he r. He sa id that he ar

rived at E.L .’s hous e around 10:30 p.m. on the ni g ht of the incide nt and smoked drug s with he r. He testified that once they wer e “hig h,” they beg an kissing a

nd E.L . perf

ormed ora l
se x on h im. Th e de fe nd ant s a id h e the n a sk e d E. L

. to buy mor e dr ug s f or him . E .L . w ante d to wa it until morning, but the def endant could not wait t hat l ong , so he convinced E.L

. to wake M.L ., bring he r w ith the m, an d pur c ha se the dr ug s imme diate ly

. Th e de fe nd ant s a id h e too k E .L . to a ho us e in Scotts Hill , wher e she pur chase d two “eig ht balls” of methamphe tamine while he w aited in the ca r with M.L . When E.L . returne d, she passe d the drugs to the defendant through the c ar w indow, and h e t o o k t h e dr u g s an d dr o v e o f

f w i t h o u t p ay i n g h e r

. T h e d e f e n d an tt e s t i f

i e d t h a th e t h e nt o o k

M

. L. home, picked up Ms. B ush, stopped at a g as station, and drove to h i s m other’s house . He de nied
s n e a k i n g M

. L. o u to f

t h e h o u s e o r

t e l l i n g h e r

t h a th e r m o t h e r h a d w o n a p r i z e an d r e i t e r a t e d t h a tE

. L.
wo ke M. L . u

p a nd pu t he r i n th e c ar. Th e de fe nd ant o pin e d th a t E.L . an d M .L . w e re of fe ri ngfa lse te sti mony be c a us e E. L . w a s ang ry

wi th h im fo r takin g the me tha mph e tamin e wi tho ut pa

y ing fo r i t.
Shi rl e y He ns le y , th e de fe nd ant’ s mo the r, and Cr iss y F ull e r, his sis te r, te sti fi e d a bo ut h is reputation for truthfulness. Ms. Hensle y testified that he had alway s been truthful to her. She said, “The re ha ve bee n times that he’d say , ‘M o m , d on’t ask me be cause I ’m not telling y ou,’ but he’s
never looked me in the ey e and told me a lie.” Fuller testified that the defe ndant had alway s told her the truth, whethe r it hurt him or not. The jury found the de fenda

nt guilty of all charg es. With respect to the a g g ravated burg lary
c on vic tio n, the tr ia l c ourt se nte nc e d th e de fe nd ant a s a Rang e I I , mu lti ple of

fe nd e r t o e ig ht y e a rs

. For the ra pe of a child and espe cially

ag g ravated kidnapp i n g co n v i cti ons, the court se ntence d the defe ndant as a

Rang e I , violent offende r to twenty -five y ear s for e ach co n v i ct i on. All of the-4-

de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e s w e re or de re d to be ser ved c on c ur re ntl y bu t c on se c uti ve ly

to a pr ior Carr oll County sentenc e.
AN AL YSI S

The de f e n d an t p r e s e n ts tw o is s u e s f o r o u r r e v ie w

. H e ar g u e s th a t t h e e v id e n c e w as insufficient for

a rational trier of fac t to find him guilty bey ond a rea sonable doubt, a nd that the trial court incor

rec tly applied thre e of the four se ntencingenhanc ement fa ctors. The State responds that the e vid e nc e wa s suf

fi c ie nt a nd that th e de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e is n ot e xce ssi ve and do e s n ot v iol a te the principles of sentencing

. We find that both of t he def endant’ s issues are without merit and aff irm his c o n v ictions. Howeve r, we notice plain er ror c ommitt ed by

the trial cour

t at sentenc ing a

nd
re m an d fo r a n ew s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g.
I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
Where suff

iciency of the c onvicting e vi d en ce i s challenge d, the re levant question for the revie wing court is “whe ther, a fter v i ew ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond
a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789; see a lso Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e ) (“F indings of g uilt in criminal ac tions whether by the trial cour

t or jury shall be set aside if the e vidence is insufficient to support the fin d i n gs b y t h e trier of fac t of g uilt bey ond a
rea sonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.1992); State v. Ande rson, 835 S.W .2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. All questions involvi ng the cr edibility of witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven the evidenc e, and a ll factua l issues are r esolved by the trier of

fac t. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) . “A gui l t y v erdict by the jury , approve d by

the trial judg e, acc redits the testimony

of t he witnesses for the State and re solves all conflicts in favor of the the ory of the State.” State v. Gra ce, 493 S.W

. 2 d 4 7 4 , 4 7 6 (T enn. 1973). Our supreme court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-sett l ed ru l e rests on a sound foundation. The tr ial judge and the jury see the witnesses fac e to f ace , hear their testimony and observe their deme anor on the stand. Thus the trial judg e and jur y are the prim ary instrumentality of justice t o d e t e r m i n e t h e w e i g h tan d

c r e d i b i l i t y t o b e g i v e n t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f w i t n e s s e s

. In the trial for

um alone is there human atmospher e an d t h e tot ality of the e vidence cannot be repr oduced w ith a written re cord in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W .2 d 5 2 3 (1963)) . A jury conviction re moves the pre sumption of innocence with which a defe ndant is initi ally

cloake d and re place s it with one of g uil t , so that on appea l, a convicte d defe ndant has the bur den of demonstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

.T h e t r i al c ou r t a ppl i ed t h i s e n h an ce men t f ac t or on l y t o t h e of

f en s e of r ape of a c h i l d. 3

-5- A. Aggravat ed Burglary A p e r s o nc o m m i t s a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y w h o , w i t h o u tt h e e f

f e c t i v e c o n s e n to f

t h e p r o pe rt y ow ne r, e nte rs a

ha bit a tio n n ot o pe n to the pu bli c wi th i nte nt t o c om mi t a fel on y , th e ft , o r a ssa ult

. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 14-402, -403 ( 2003). A ha bitation includes an y s t ru cture desig ned or adapte d for the ove rnig ht acc ommodation of persons. Te nn. Code Ann. § 3 9 -14-401( 1)(A) . The State introduced te stimony at trial that the defe ndant enter ed E.L .’s home, re moved M.L ., and ra ped her. E.L . testified that she did not g ive the def endant pe rmission to enter her home or take M.L . The jury could re asonably

infer that the defe ndant intende d to commit a felony when he enter ed E.L ’s home. Viewe d in the light most favor able to the St ate, the e vidence was suff icient for a

rational trier of fa ct to find that the def endant c ommitt ed ag g ravated burg lary

.

B. R ape of a C hild Rape of a

child is the unlawful sexual penetration of a v i ct i m b y the def endant or the defe ndant by

a victim, if the victim is less th an t h i rt ee n y ear s of ag e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 52 2( a ) ( 20 03 ). M. L . te sti fi e d th a t th e de fe nd ant m a de he r t a ke he r c lot he s o ff and

sit on top of him , and “ pla c e [d] so me thi ng ” ins ide he r bo dy . D r. Ha mil ton te sti fi e d th a t M. L . d isp lay e d mo de rate irritation of her

labia and va g inal wall, and a ser ous sequenc e extruded fr om her va g ina. I t was uncontrove rted that M.L . was e leven y ear s old at t he ti me of the attack. The evidence was suff icient fo r a ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t to fi nd the de fe nd ant g uil ty

of ra pe of a c hil d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.

C. Espe c ial ly A gg r av at e d Kidna pping Especia lly

ag g ravated k i d n ap p i ng is, int e r a lia , the knowing remova l or confine ment of a victim under ag e thirtee n so as to interfe re substantially with the victim’s liberty . Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-302( a), - 305(a) (2) ( 2003). M.L . testified that the defenda nt took her fr om her home, sh ov e d h e r i nto his c ar, and dr ov e he r t o a

ne arb y c hurc h. F ro m th is e vid e nc e , a ratio na l jury

c ou ld conclude that the def

endant c ommitt ed the of fense of espe cially

ag g ravated ki d n ap p i n g . The de fe nd ant’ s c ha lle ng e to t he su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su pp or tin g his c on vic tio ns is w ith ou t me ri t. II. Appl ication of E nhan cem ent F actor s
The trial c ourt applied the following enhanc ement fac tors to the defe ndant’s sente nces: the de fe nd ant h a s a

pr e vio us his tor

y of cr im in al con vic tio ns or c ri min a l be havio r i n a dd iti on to t ho se ne c e ssa ry to e sta bli shthe a

pp ro pr ia te ra

ng e ; th e of

fe ns e inv olv e d a

victim a nd wa s c omm itt e d to g ratify the def endant’ s desire f

or p l ea s u re or

excitement; the def

endant possesse d or employ ed a 3 firea rm, explosi ve devic e, or other deadly wea pon during the commission of the offe nse; and at the time the felony

was c ommitt ed, the de fenda nt was re lease d on probation. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 1), (7) , (9), ( 13) (2006) . The de fenda nt attacks the trial court’s application of t he latter-6-

thr e e fa c tor s, arguin g , a s w e un de rs tand , th a t un de r B lake ly v. Was hin g ton , 542 U. S. 296 , 124 S. Ct

. 2531 (2004), a

nd Cunningham v. California, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct . 856 (2007), these fac tors may not be applied to the de fenda nt’s sentenc e bec ause the y wer e not found by

t h e jury bey ond a
rea sonable doubt. The State, w hile appar ently conce ding that these three fac tors wer e misapplied,
arg ues t hat th is c ourt

may no t r e mand

fo r r e se nte nc ingon

thi s b a sis . A s w e un de rs tand , th e State contends that the 2005 a

mendments to our sentenc ing la w limit our appellate re view to whethe r: (1) The sentenc e wa s not imposed in accor dance with this cha pter [Tennesse e Code A n n o tate d

c h a p te r 4 0 ]; (2) The sentenc e is excessive under the sentenc ing considerations set out in §§ 40- 35- 103 and 40-35- 210; or (3) The sentenc e is inconsistent with the purposes of se ntencingset out in §§ 40-35- 102 and 40-35- 103. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(b) (2006).

When an ac cused c halleng es the leng th, rang e, or ma nner of service of a sentenc e, it is the duty of this court to conduc t a de novo revie w on the re cord w ith a p re s u m p t i o n t hat “the deter minations made by

the cour t from which the a

ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2006)

. This presumption is “conditioned upon the af firmative showingin the rec ord that the trial cour

t considere d the sentenc ing pr inciples and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ um s t an ces.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The pre sum p t i o n d oes not apply to the leg al conclusions re ache d by

the trial cour

t in sentenc ing the acc used or to the determinations made by the trial court whic h are predic ated upon unc ontroverte d fac ts. St ate v. B utl er , 9 0 0 S.W .2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ; State v. Smi th, 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Bone stel, 871 S.W .2d 163, 166 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) , overr uled on other g rounds by State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000) . How ev er, this cour t is required to g ive g reat weig ht to the tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm ination o f c on tr ov e rt e d f a c ts a s th e tr ia l c ourt ' s d e te rm inatio n o f t he se fa c ts i s p re d i ca t edu

p o nth e w i t n es s es ’ d em ea n o r a n d ap p ea ra n ce wh en t es t i fy i n g.

I n conductinga de novo re v i ew o f a sente nce, this cour t must consider (a) any

evidenc e re c e iv e d a t th e tr ia l an d

/o r s e n te n c in g h e ar in g , ( b ) th e p r e s e n te n c e r e p o rt, ( c ) th e p r in c ip les of sentenc ing, ( d) the a

rg ument s of counse l relative to sente ncing alternatives, (e) the nature and char acte ristics of the off

ense, ( f) a ny mitigating or enhanc ement fac tors, (g ) any statements made by the ac cused in his own behalf, and (h) the ac cused’ s potential or lack of potential for r ehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-103, -210 ( 2006); State v. Taylor, 63 S.W

. 3 d 4 00, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). Enhanc ement fa ctors may be conside red only

if they are “appr opriate f

or the offense,” and “not themse lves essential e lements of the of fense .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114 (2006).-7-

The pa rty challeng ing the sentenc e im posed by the trial cour

t has the burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401 ( 2006), Sentenc ing Commission Cmts.; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. I n this c ase, the defe ndant has the burden of illust rating t he sentenc e imposed by

the t rial court is err oneous. I f our revie w reflects that the t rial court, following the statutory

sentenc ing proce dure, imposed a lawful sentenc e, afte r having g iven due c onsideration
an d p ro p er we i gh tt o t h e f

ac t o rs an d

p ri n ci p l es s et o u t u n d er th e s en t en ci n g l aw an d m ad e f i n d i n gs of fa ct that ar e ade quately supported by the re cord, the n we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we would have pr efe rre d a diffe rent re sult. State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).

We note initially that beca use t he defenda

nt did not raise this issue at hi s sentenc ing he aring
or in his motion for new trial, he has waived plenar y appellate revie w. State v. Gomez, 163 S.W .3d 63 2, 64 8- 65 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) , v a c a te d o n o the r g ro un ds by Go me z v. Te nn e sse e , __ U .S.
__ , 1 27 S. Ct. 1209 (2007). Even if w e we re to re ach the merits of the de fenda nt’s cl ai m , h e wo u l d not be entitled to relief on this ba sis. This court considere d a cha lleng e to the applica tion of enhanc ement fac tors under the 2005 amendments in State v. Devin B anks, No. W2005-02213-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 1966039 (Tenn. Crim

. Ap p. J uly 6, 2007), applic. f

or per m. to appeal f

iled (Tenn. July

17, 20 07 ). Th ere, we he ld t

hat “ e rr or in t he a pp lic a tio n o f e nh anc e me nt f a c tor s w ill no t ne c e ssa

ri ly result in modification of the se ntence if the trial cour t, i n d eter

mining the spe cific se ntence , c on sid e re d th e natur e and

c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f t

he c ri me , th e c ha

ra c te r a n d b a c kg ro un d o f t

he de fe nd a nt,
and that th e imp os e d s e nte nc e is not inc on sis te nt w iththe purp os e s o f t he Se nte nc ingAc t.” De vin Ba nks, 2007 WL 1966039, at *48.

The trial c ourt did not err in its application of the three challeng ed enha nceme nt fac tors. The United States Supreme Court has he ld that judicial fac t-finding runs af oul of the Six th Amendment ri g ht t o a jur y tr ia l on ly wh e n it is mand a tor y . U nit e d St a te s v . B oo ke r, 54 3 U .S. 22 0, 25 9, 12 5 S. Ct. 738, 764 (2005) (const ru i n g t h e F ed er al S en t en ci n g Gu i d el i n es ). T h e 2 0 0 5 am en d m en t s re n d ered the enha nceme nt and mitigatingfac tors advisory only ; theref

ore the ir exis tence need not be proven to a jur y be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

III. Plain Error in App lying Pre sumptive Sentence t o Ra pe of a C hild a nd Esp e c ial ly A gg r av at e d Kidna pping Co nvi c ti ons Although not c alled to our attention by either pa rty , we discern plain err or elsewhere in the tr ia l cou rt ’s imp os iti on of se nte nc e s for ra pe of a c hil d an d esp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d k idn a

pp ing . B oth
o ff en s es ar e C l as s A fe l o n i es wh i ch ca rry a s en t en ci n g ra n ge o f f

i ft ee nt o t we n t y -f

i v e y ea rs fo r R an ge I offe nders. I t a

ppear s that the trial court imposed sente nces f or both by

beg inning at the midpoint of the statutory rang e and then apply ing r eleva nt enhanc ement fa ctors. This is inconsistent with our
curr e n t s e n te n c in g la

w , w h ic h r e qu ir e s a tr ia l c o u rt to c o n s id e r a s an a d v is o r y g u id e li n e th a t the minimum sentenc e within the rang e of punishment is the s entenc e that should be imposed, abse nt additional considerations. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c )(1) (2006).-8-

“When nec essar

y to do substantial justice, an appellate court may consider an err or that has aff ecte d the substantial rig hts of an ac cused at any time, e ven thoug h the er ror wa s not raised in the motion for a new

trial or assig ned as e rror

on appea l.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b). I n State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court adopted the te st for plain er ror f irst announce d by this court in State v

. Ad k i s s o n , 8 9 9 S.W .2d 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . I n order for us to find plain err or, Adkisson requir es that “( a) the rec ord must c lear ly establish what occ urre d in the trial court; (b) a cle ar a

nd unequivoca l r

ule of law must have been brea ched; (c) a substantial rig ht of the
acc used must have be en adve rsely affecte d; (d) the a ccuse d did not waive the issue f or tac tical
rea sons; and (e) consideration of the err or i s ‘nec essar y to do substantial justice.’” Smit h, 24 S.W .3d at 282 (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 641-42).

All five Adkisson fa ct o rs ar e pre sent here . The re cord on a ppeal is cle ar. The trial court beg an with the minimum sentence on the ag g ravated burg lary conviction, then said:

Con c e rn ingthe oth e rs , y ou sta rt a t the mid -r ang e , w hic h w ou ld b e 20 y e ars , and dete rmine the e nhancingfac tors. And as I ’ve said, particula rly , the prior c riminal history s hows a re al problem with this particular defe ndant, and then the other enhanc ing f

actor s also would . . . be used in this case

. The Court finds that on both Clas s A’ s t h at he should be sentence d to the maxi mum within the ra

ng e that’s a

pplicable to him, due to the enha ncing fac tors and the la c k o f m iti g a tin g fa c tor s, be a 25 y e ar se nt ence on eac h o f t ho se . H is classification be 100 perc ent [sic]

. Tenne sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -2 10 (c ) s ta te s th a t tr ia l c ourt s sh all c o n s id e r that the mi n im u m s e n te n c e w it

h in th e r an g e o f

p u n is h me n t i s th a t w h ic h s h o u ld b e im p o s e d

. We r e c o g n iz e that beca use the guidelines set forth in section 40-35-210(c) are advisory only , the trial cour

t was not
re qu ir e d to imp os e the min imum se nte nc e , e ve n if it f ound no e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s. Ho we ve r, it i s a pp are nt f ro m th e re c or d th a t by

be g inn inga t th e mid

po int of the statut or

y ra ng e , th e tr ia l c ourt

did not appropriately

consider the minimum sentenc e g uideline, as wa s require d.

As for the rema ining Adkisson fa ctors, this court has he ld t h at a de fenda nt’s rig ht to be
se nte nc e d in

a c c or da nc e wi th t he law i n ef

fe c t on the date the of

fe ns e wa s com mit te d is su bs tanti a l. State v. B la c kmo n, 78 S.W. 3d 32 2, 33 5-3 6 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ). B e c a us e dis c ov e ry

of thi s err or would likely have resulted only in a new se ntencinghear ing, w e have no rea son to believe that the def endant wa ived the e rr o r fo r tactica l rea sons. And wher e, as he re, a substantial rig ht of the
ac cu s edh as b ee nad v er s el y af fe ct ed , co n s i d er at i o n o f t h e i s s u e i s n ec es s ary t o p re v en ta m i s ca rr i age of justice. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 643; s ee a lso St ate v. Ricky L y nn P ay n e, No. M2006-007 6 2 -C C A- R 3 -C D, 2 0 0 7 W L2 0 4 2 4 9 4 , at * 1 1 -1 2 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. J u l y 1 6 , 2 0 0 7 ) (where the def endant wa s not sentence d in acc orda nce w ith the law in eff ect on the date the off

ense w as committed, plain error

revie w was a

ppropriate ).-9- CO NC LU SION

Ba sed on the for eg oing a uthorities an d re asoni ng , we a ffirm a ll three of the defe ndant’s convictions but remand to the tr ial court for rese ntencingas t o the convictions for rape of a c hild and
es p ec i al l y aggr av at edk i dn ap p i n g.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE