IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 10, 2023

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLES TIMOTHY ROWDEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lawrence County

No. 35135 Christopher V. Sockwell, Judge

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No. M2023-00262-CCA-R3-CD

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A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Charles Timothy Rowden, of first 

degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and 

aggravated arson. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed an 

effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the Defendant asserts 

that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not instruct the jury that the Defendant’s girlfriend

was an accomplice as a matter of law; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his 

convictions; and (3) his attorney was ineffective. After review, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgments and remand for entry of an additional judgment form.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

and Remanded

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

CAMPBELL, SR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

John S. Colley, III, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Charles Timothy Rowden.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Brent A. Cooper, District Attorney General; and Christi L. Thompson 

and Gary M. Howell, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

This case arises from a January 21, 2018 residential fire that killed Connis Blake, 

the victim. Investigation of the fire led to the Lawrence County grand jury indicting the 

02/09/2024
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Defendant for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, especially 

aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and aggravated arson.

A. Trial

At the State’s request, the trial court dismissed the conspiracy charge, and the case 

proceeded to trial, at which the parties presented the following evidence: After work on 

the night of January 20, 2018, Brandon Blake, the victim’s son, and his girlfriend, Lindsay 

Taylor, went to the victim’s home on Ethridge Red Hill Road in Lawrence County, 

Tennessee. When Mr. Blake arrived, he found the victim, almost asleep, on the couch. 

The victim was happy to see Mr. Blake, and they spoke for some time before Mr. Blake 

needed to go home. It was approximately 1:52 a.m. when Mr. Blake left the victim’s home. 

As he left, Mr. Blake told the victim he would lock the front door behind him. The 

victim responded, “No, don’t worry about it[,] I’ve got somebody coming.” Mr. Blake 

made two stops on his way home. Once home, at about 3:30 a.m., he received a phone call 

notifying him that the victim’s house was on fire. Mr. Blake immediately drove back to 

the victim’s home and found the house “up in flames.” He described the scene saying, 

“you couldn’t see the house for the fire.” The victim’s Ford Explorer was parked in the 

same place it had been earlier that night. After the firefighters extinguished the fire, the 

Fire Marshal notified Mr. Blake that the victim’s remains were found in the house. 

The victim had been alone when Mr. Blake had stopped by the residence after work. 

Mr. Blake noted that, at times, a woman named Sonya Beard had lived at the residence 

with the victim. Mr. Blake described the victim and Ms. Beard’s relationship as “off and 

on” and “odd.” At the time of the fire, Mr. Blake believed that the victim and Ms. Beard 

were not “together,” but that Ms. Beard likely still had personal belongings in the house. 

Mr. Blake estimated that Ms. Beard had been out of the house for a couple of days before 

the fire. Mr. Blake confirmed that the victim was an alcoholic and smoked regularly. He 

had smelled alcohol on the victim when he saw the victim earlier that night.

Lindsay Taylor, Mr. Blake’s girlfriend, testified about returning to the victim’s 

house after notification of the fire. She recalled that law enforcement drew her attention 

to a watch, a knife, and a bag that were found in the yard outside the house. The bag, 

containing some of Ms. Beard’s belongings, was lying under the victim’s Ford Explorer. 

The watch was found lying on the ground between the house and the driveway, and the 

knife was located next to the front tire of the Ford Explorer. Ms. Taylor identified the 

watch in a photograph that the trial court entered into evidence as exhibit 8. Ms. Taylor 

recognized the knife as one she had seen in the victim’s kitchen. Ms. Taylor confirmed 

that she had not seen any of these items lying outside when they left the victim’s house at 

1:52 a.m. 
3

Latonya Durham testified that in the early morning hours of January 21, 2018, 

Latonya Durham was driving home from her job at Lawrence County Hospital to 

Savannah, Tennessee. She drove westbound on Highway 64 when she noticed “an usual 

glow” in the darkness. Ms. Durham turned down a side road, confirmed that the glow was 

a fire, and called 911. Ms. Durham pulled into the victim’s driveway and noticed the fire 

was “more toward the front porch area,” not seeing any flames “toward the end of the 

home.” While still on the phone with 911, Ms. Durham exited her vehicle and walked to 

the house to see if she could hear anyone calling for help. Within a matter of minutes, 

flames shot through the roof and Ms. Durham backed away from the house. The fire was 

so intense that Ms. Durham got back into her car and moved to the side of the road.

The 911 operator instructed Ms. Durham to wait at the scene until emergency 

personnel arrived. Ms. Durham concluded her call with the 911 operator and then saw the 

porch roof collapse. She estimated that five to ten minutes elapsed between the flames 

breaking through the roof and the porch roof collapsing. Ms. Durham described a light 

pole at the end of the road and a wire that ran from the corner of the victim’s home to the 

light pole. She saw the electrical wires begin “sparking,” and she moved down the road 

away from it. Ms. Durham filmed a portion of the fire, and the State played the recording 

for the jury. Ms. Durham testified that her work day ended at a few minutes after 3:00 a.m. 

that morning, and she confirmed that she placed the 911 call at about 3:35 a.m.

Krystal Risner testified that she and the Defendant were in a romantic relationship 

and lived together in Waynesboro, Tennessee, at the time of these events. Ms. Risner also 

knew the victim and had been to his house to buy marijuana “a couple of times.” The 

Defendant had gone with Ms. Risner to the victim’s house on those occasions, but he had 

remained in the car while she went inside. 

On the night of the fire, the Defendant and Ms. Risner were in their home in 

Waynesboro when the Defendant told Ms. Risner that he wanted to go to the victim’s house 

and “rob the man.” Ms. Risner told the Defendant she did not want to go, but he told her, 

“Yes, you’re going.” Ms. Risner drove the Defendant to the victim’s house but “passed 

the house a couple of times” because she did not “want to turn into the house.” The 

Defendant instructed her to turn the car around and pull into the driveway. She did so, and 

then the Defendant told Ms. Risner to “sit there and not move.” The Defendant walked 

around the front of the car to the porch of the victim’s house. Ms. Risner pulled the car 

around to the side of the house next to another “bigger” vehicle that obscured her view of 

the victim’s house. In this new location she was unable to see “[any]thing” with respect to 

the Defendant’s whereabouts. 
4

Ms. Risner recalled that the victim’s porch light was illuminated when they arrived, 

but the Defendant unscrewed the lightbulb. Because of her obscured view of the victim’s 

house, the next time she saw the Defendant he was walking from the house toward her. 

The Defendant took some items from a bag lying on the floorboard of the car and went 

back to the house, leaving the passenger door open. With the car door open, Ms. Risner 

heard the Defendant “scream,” “This is a robbery. You tell me where the stuff is, I won’t 

hurt you.” She heard a gunshot and then nothing else. When the Defendant returned the 

second time, “he was carrying stuff out.” He placed boxes with jewelry, watches, and 

electronics on the back seat of their car. The Defendant proceeded to make several trips to 

the house, each time returning with “more stuff.” Once the back seat of their car was 

completely full, the Defendant took a bottle of lighter fluid from a garbage bag on the 

passenger side floorboard.

From her location inside the vehicle, Ms. Risner could see the front porch of the 

victim’s house but not inside the house. The Defendant went inside the victim’s house 

with the lighter fluid and then returned quickly looking for a lighter. He found a “Zippo” 

and then went back to the victim’s house. That was the Defendant’s last trip inside the 

house and when he returned to the vehicle, they drove home. As they drove away, Ms. 

Risner saw, in the rearview mirror, flames through the living room window of the victim’s 

house. 

As they drove back to Waynesboro, the Defendant told Ms. Risner, “he had to have 

help, because [she] wouldn’t help him, and he hoped it didn’t bite him in the rear end.” 

The Defendant never explained this statement, and it was all he said during the drive. The 

car was dark, and the Defendant was preoccupied with something in his hand that Ms. 

Risner was unable to see. As they drove along Highway 64, the Defendant threw 

something out of the car window. At home, the Defendant told Ms. Risner that he did not 

kill the victim but that he had “knocked him out.” Ms. Risner recalled more of the 

conversation as follows:

[The Defendant] said that [the victim] was laying [sic] down and [the 

Defendant] flipped him out of the recliner or chair or whatever it was. [The 

Defendant] said that he got down there on his hands and his knees and . . . 

looked at [the victim] and told [the victim] if he would tell [the Defendant] 

where the stuff was that he wouldn’t - - he wouldn’t hurt [the victim].” 

The Defendant said that the victim did not respond to the Defendant when he made these 

statements. The Defendant told Ms. Risner that he fired his gun above his head. Ms. Risner 

did not ask the Defendant any questions because she was terrified and “didn’t want to 

know.” 
5

The State showed Ms. Risner trial Exhibit 8, the photograph of a watch recovered 

at the scene. She confirmed that the watch looked like one that the Defendant had worn. 

Ms. Risner identified blue “hospital gloves” in the photograph, stating that the Defendant 

would put Vaseline on his dry, cracked hands and then put blue hospital gloves on his 

hands over the Vaseline. Ms. Risner recalled that the Defendant wore blue hospital gloves 

on the night they were at the victim’s house. 

On cross-examination, Ms. Risner agreed that she spoke with Tennessee Bureau of 

Investigation (“TBI”) Special Agent Adam Barnes in August 2019. She did not recall 

telling Special Agent Barnes that the Defendant entered the victim’s house three times. 

She maintained that the Defendant went inside the victim’s house more than three times 

and that the Defendant’s purpose in going to the victim’s house was to rob the victim. Ms. 

Risner could not recall whether she told Special Agent Barnes that the Defendant went to 

the victim’s house to steal pills. 

On February 15, 2018, Tennessee Department of Correction Community Service 

Supervisor Shawn Reedy had a crew of inmates picking up trash along Highway 64 in 

Wayne County, Tennessee. An inmate on the work detail found a Tennessee driver’s 

license, a debit card, and a credit card on the roadside and gave them to Supervisor Reedy. 

The cards were found on the shoulder of the westbound lanes going into Waynesboro. The 

driver’s license and debit card bore the victim’s name, and the credit card was a prepaid 

Visa that had no name on it. After the work crew finished and Supervisor Reedy had 

returned to the penitentiary, he was instructed to deliver the found items to the Lawrence 

County Sheriff’s Department. 

City of Columbia Assistant Fire Marshal Nathan Keeton served as the Ethridge 

Volunteer Fire Department Chief. On January 21, 2018, he responded to a 3:35 a.m. call 

about a residential fire. He arrived within ten minutes and found the house “engulfed.” 

The fire had spread across Ethridge Red Hill Road and was “touching . . . the main power 

lines.” Chief Keeton immediately requested “utilities [ ] be notified due to the heavy fire 

conditions.” 

Due to the flames crossing the road and the utilities falling into the roadway, Chief 

Keeton notified the other responders of a safer route for entry that delayed response to the 

victim’s house. Chief Keeton confirmed that there were four tankers full of water to douse 

the fire at the victim’s house. He testified that the Ethridge water tanker carried 1800 

gallons of water and firefighters filled the tank ten times. The Ethridge tanker arrived at 

the scene at 4:01 a.m. and it was around 7:00 a.m. before the “fire was down.” He 

explained that the gas main in the house was “fully engulfed” with no way to turn it off. 

Chief Keeton notified “utilities” who were also unable to turn it off. Ultimately they dug 
6

a ditch in the road to “clip the line to get it cut off.” It took approximately three hours to 

mitigate the gas issue before firefighters could extinguish the entire fire. 

As firefighters worked to contain the fire, a law enforcement officer notified Chief 

Reedy that there was possibly someone inside the house. Approximately fifteen minutes 

after Chief Reedy arrived, he witnessed the southwest corner of the house collapse.

TBI Fire Investigator Mike Zimmerman testified as an expert in the field of fire 

investigation. Investigator Zimmerman arrived at the scene with Scooter, an accelerant 

detecting canine, after the fire had been extinguished. Accelerant detecting canines are 

trained to enter fire scenes where there is suspicion that an accelerant was used to start the 

fire, and to detect the possible presence of an ignitable liquid. In this case, firefighters 

suspected the use of an accelerant due to the “rapid-growth fire.” Scooter indicated, in the 

area of the victim’s remains in the living room, the possible presence of an ignitable liquid. 

Scooter also indicated in several places near the outer wall of the living room area. 

Investigator Zimmerman collected samples from each of the three areas that Scooter had 

indicated the possible presence of an accelerant and submitted the samples for further 

testing at the TBI.

Investigator Zimmerman explained that a canine’s olfactory gland was more 

sensitive to scent than lab equipment. Water at the scene can also move a substance from 

one place to another; however, in training Scooter has been able to alert to chemicals moved 

by water. Due to concerns about the structural integrity of the flooring, Investigator 

Zimmerman did not have Scooter search the entire house. In total, law enforcement 

gathered seven samples of the fire debris from three locations. 

TBI Latent Print Examiner Hunter Greene testified as an expert in the field of latent 

fingerprints. Mr. Greene received a knife collected at the crime scene and a driver’s 

license, a paper copy of the driver’s license, a Walmart card, and a Visa card collected from 

Highway 64. Mr. Greene processed the items and some ridges developed on the driver’s 

license and credit cards, but the ridges were insufficient for identification purposes. Mr. 

Greene also processed the knife for print evidence and did not develop any latent print 

ridge detail. 

TBI Special Agent Lisa Burgee testified as an expert in the field of forensic biology. 

Special Agent Burgee tested a watch, a latex glove, and a knife for DNA evidence. 

Analysis revealed limited DNA profiles so her findings were inconclusive. Special Agent 

Burgee conducted DNA testing on debris collected from the bathroom of the house and 

found no useable DNA samples. 
7

TBI Special Agent Lindsey Anderson testified as an expert witness in the field of 

forensic science, specifically in the discipline of microanalysis. Special Agent Anderson 

performed fire debris analysis on seven items of evidence collected at the scene, most of 

which were charred wood from different areas on the premises and one metal strip from 

the front door threshold. The first two items, charred wood from the front door area, 

revealed the presence of a product that could not be positively identified or classified due 

to the deteriorated condition of the samples. Two other pieces of charred wood from the 

front door area revealed the presence of terpenes, which are present in turpentine and some 

scented cleaners and naturally occurs in some wood products. Special Agent Anderson 

stated that she would expect terpenes to be present in a burned wood sample because it is 

present in wood; however, she reported the finding because there is the possibility that it 

came from turpentine. The final three items tested included the metal door strip, and none 

of the items revealed the presence of any ignitable liquid residue. Special Agent Anderson 

clarified that this result did not eliminate the possibility that an ignitable liquid was used 

because there is the possibility of a sampling error. She explained that the sample could 

have been taken “just far enough away from where the [canine]” was indicating that the 

accelerant was not represented in the sample. She stated that it was also possible that there 

was total degradation of the accelerant in the fire. 

Forensic Medical Management Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Thomas Deering 

testified as an expert witness in the field of forensic pathology and performed the autopsy 

on the victim’s body. Dr. Deering described the victim’s body upon initial examination as 

“severely burned, partially cremated.” The severity of the burns indicated “a really hot fire 

that burned for a long time.” Dr. Deering stated that the victim’s body encountered heat 

on all sides due to “charr[ing] all the way around.” What remained after the fire was 

approximately thirty inches long and weighed approximately thirty pounds. 

Dr. Deering x-rayed portions of the remains and did not find any bullets. Next, Dr. 

Deering inspected the organs and found no injury to the victim’s organs such as wounds 

that might result from a stab wound. Further, he found no indication of coronary artery 

disease, emphysema, or any significant natural disease that might have caused death. Dr. 

Deering believed he saw soot on the airways leading to the lungs but could not be certain 

due to damage from the “body [being] really heated for a long time” which caused 

“everything [to] get[] darkened.” In this case, Dr. Deering did not have any blood to test 

to measure levels of carbon monoxide, so he extracted liver tissue to submit to the lab. Dr. 

Deering was unable to secure information from the confirmation test of the liver tissue to 

conclude whether the victim died of smoke inhalation or another cause before the fire. 

Because Dr. Deering was unable to determine if the death was fire-related or 

occurred prior to the fire, he ultimately concluded that the cause and manner of death in 

this case was undetermined. 
8

TBI Special Agent Adam Barnes was the lead investigator in this case. In the early 

morning hours of January 21, 2018, Special Agent Barnes learned of the fire and arrived 

at the crime scene at around 7:00 a.m. The Fire Department had the fire suppressed and 

were misting the area where a gas line had been breached and there was a “shooting flame 

going north . . . to the road.” Firefighters had not yet recovered the body, but family 

members had indicated someone was in the house. Special Agent Barnes stepped up onto 

the porch and immediately saw the body. He observed the victim lying face down with his 

right arm beneath him, in front of couch springs. There was debris on top of the victim’s 

body. Based upon the state of the victim’s body, mostly bones, Special Agent Barnes 

believed there had been “a very hot and intense fire” in the living room area. 

Special Agent Barnes surveyed the damage to the house and opined that the fire 

began in the front door/ living room area to the east side of the house. He explained that 

the entry area was completely consumed by fire whereas other areas of the house were not. 

The living room area of the house had no roof, walls or flooring, only charred debris. There 

was no flooring or floor joists around the victim’s body, indicating that there was a great 

deal of heat in this area. The further officers inspected away from the body and living 

room area, the more floor material was present. Special Agent Barnes requested Officer 

Zimmerman and the arson canine detective to search the debris. 

After the canine search, officers collected samples for further testing. The victim’s 

body was then removed from the scene. Underneath the victim’s body law enforcement 

found rings and a hatchet with no handle. Special Agent Barnes opined that the handle of 

the hatchet had likely been consumed by the fire. 

After the body had been removed, law enforcement surveyed the remainder of the 

structure and found a heater in the kitchen area that one might insert in a fireplace. Law 

enforcement interviewed the victim’s family members and learned that the heater did not 

work. The electrical break box was also considered as a cause of the fire. In determining 

the point of origin for the house fire, investigators look for the “lowest point of burn,” the 

area with the most damage. In this case, Special Agent Barnes stated “it was obvious that 

the point of origin [was] in that living room area.” Based upon the state of the victim’s 

body, mostly bones, the duration of the fire, and the complete destruction of the flooring, 

Special Agent Barnes believed there had been “a very hot and intense fire” in the living 

room area that was “an incendiary fire.” 

Special Agent Barnes testified that, based upon his investigation, he believed it was 

clear that an accelerant was involved. He explained that fires that involve an accelerant 

are “high heat, high intense, and [ ] very fast fires.” He stated that fires burn “up and out” 

and that this is the expected typical burn pattern. The use of an accelerant changes the burn 
9

pattern to more localized damage. In determining that the fire was started by an accelerant 

he also considered witnesses’ accounts of the fire before firefighters arrived.

Special Agent Barnes first spoke with Ms. Risner when he arrested the Defendant 

on June 13, 2018. He spoke to Ms. Risner two to three weeks later in July 2018 and then 

he did not speak with her again until August 2019. During this August 2019 interview, 

Special Agent Barnes did not tell Ms. Risner any details related to the fire. The interview 

was recorded, and the State played the recording for the jury. In the recording, Ms. Risner 

recalled the Defendant stating that he did not kill the victim but knocked him out. Special 

Agent Barnes confirmed that he had not told Ms. Risner about the hatchet found underneath 

the victim’s body. Special Agent Barnes confirmed that Ms. Risner cried during the 

interview as she recounted the events of that night. 

Special Agent Barnes identified a photograph of the knife found in the front yard in 

front of the victim’s Ford Explorer. He also identified a photograph of the watch and the 

blue latex glove recovered from the victim’s front yard. 

The trial court included the following, with regard to accomplice testimony, in the 

jury instructions:

T.P.I. CRIM. 42.09

ACCOMPLICE

An accomplice is a person who knowingly, voluntarily, and with 

common intent with the principal offender unites with him or her in the 

commission of the crime. If a witness was an accomplice in the crime, then 

his or her testimony must be corroborated. Corroborating evidence is that 

evidence, entirely independent of the accomplices testimony, which, taken 

by itself, leads to the inference not only that a crime has been committed but 

also that the defendant was implicated in it. This independent corroborative 

testimony must include some fact or circumstance that affects the 

defendant’s identity. Corroborative evidence may be direct or entirely 

circumstantial and it need not be adequate, in and of itself, to support a

conviction. It is sufficient if the corroborative evidence fairly and 

legitimately tends to connect the defendant with the crime charged. It is a 

question for the jury to determine whether an accomplices testimony has 

been sufficiently corroborated. Accomplice testimony cannot be

corroborated by another accomplice’s testimony.

In this case it is a question for the jury to determine whether the 

witness, Kr[y]stal Risner, was an accomplice in this alleged crime. If you 
10

find from the proof that the witness was an accomplice, then the defendant 

cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of this witness. If 

you find that the witness was not an accomplice, then you will judge the 

weight to be given to her testimony just as you do that of the other witnesses 

in the case.

After deliberation, the jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense 

of second degree murder, and the charged offenses of first degree felony murder, especially 

aggravated robbery, and aggravated arson. The trial court merged the two murder 

convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. 

B. Motion for New Trial Hearing

The Defendant filed a motion for new trial. As relevant to this appeal, the Defendant 

alleged that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s oral motion for judgment of 

acquittal and that he was entitled to a new trial because the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence. The Defendant filed an amended motion asserting ineffective assistance 

of counsel because the Defendant’s trial attorney (“trial counsel”) had failed to call 

witnesses identified by the Defendant. He also claimed that trial counsel had been 

ineffective by not moving for acquittal or requesting jury instructions regarding the 

uncorroborated testimony of Ms. Risner, who he claimed was an accomplice as a matter of

law. 

The Defendant called trial counsel as the only witness at the motion for new trial 

hearing. Trial counsel testified that there was an in-chambers discussion about Ms. 

Risner’s involvement in the case. He recalled the issue of Ms. Risner being an unindicted 

accomplice and that, “we were all, basically, of the mindset that based on the evidence that 

had come out so far in the trial that [she] would be an accomplice of fact.” He confirmed 

that the trial court instructed the jury on Tennessee Pattern Instruction 42.09, referencing 

accomplice testimony. Trial counsel reiterated that there was general agreement that Ms. 

Risner was an accomplice in fact. 

Trial counsel testified that initially, three people were indicted as co-defendants in 

this case. The State’s theory had been that the Defendant, Jimmy Dale Hogan, and Paul 

McNeal had “roughed [the victim] up, robbed him, and then burned down his house. After 

Ms. Risner’s 2019 interview, the State dismissed the indictments against Jimmy Dale 

Hogan and Paul McNeal. Trial counsel stated that he wanted to introduce the dismissed 

indictments and that he subpoenaed Ms. Beard and another man but was unable to serve 

either witness. Trial counsel was hesitant regarding introduction of the dismissed 
11

indictments because he believed Ms. Risner’s testimony would rebut a defense theory 

based upon the dismissed indictments. 

Following the hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion for 

new trial:

This cause came to be heard on the Motion for New Trial filed by the 

Defendant whereby the Defendant originally argued that the Court did not 

instruct the jury on accomplice testimony when, in fact, upon review of the 

record as a whole, [the] Defendant acknowledged that the Court did instruct 

the jury on accomplice testimony and that the Court had addressed said issue. 

[The] Defendant renewed its motion for new trial in arguing that the Court 

committed a reversible error when it declined to find [Ms.] Risner to be an 

accomplice as a matter of law as to Counts 2 and 3 (First Degree 

Murder/Felony Murder and Especially Aggravated Robbery). [The] 

Defendant alleges that the Court’s reasoning that there was some issue as to 

whether Ms. Risner knew the Defendant planned to commit a murder would 

not apply to Counts 2 and 3, since Ms. Risner herself testified at trial that the 

Defendant knew they were going to Lawrence County to rob a man that night. 

The Court finds there was ample evidence that her participation was not 

voluntary, nor did the parties’ share common intent, as per her testimony. 

The Court relied upon the case of Bland v. State, WL 3793697, see State v. 

Green, 915 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Lawson, 794 

S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. Crim. App[]. 1990). When evidence is unclear, it 

becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the witness is 

an accomplice and, if so, whether there is corroborating evidence to support 

the witness’s testimony. See Green, 915 S.W2d at 831-32. Thus, it became 

a jury question as to whether she was an accomplice, especially considering 

her testimony concerning duress and coercion during the time span of her 

involvement. In Bland, the Court found that:

The evidence at trial was not clear and undisputed that 

Christopher Williams participated in the crime. Williams 

testified that he was not armed, that he remained in the alley, 

and that he did not know the defendant was going to kill the 

victim, as the plan had been for the defendant to just shoot the 

victim in the legs and rob him. We conclude, therefore, that 

the trial court properly found that whether Williams was an 

accomplice was a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 

The defendant is not entitled to relief on the basis of this issue.
12

The defendant in Bland had alleged that the trial court erred by 

denying his request to instruct the jury that Christopher Williams was an 

accomplice as a matter of law due to his participation. Participation in 

knowing that a crime was being committed does not in and of itself make the 

individual an accomplice as a matter of law. As stated previously, it may be 

a jury question. For this reason, [the] Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial is 

hereby denied.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not instruct 

the jury that Ms. Risner was an accomplice as a matter of law; (2) the evidence is 

insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) his attorney was ineffective.

A. Accomplice Instruction

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that 

Ms. Risner was an accomplice as a matter of law. The State responds that the Defendant 

has waived this claim because he failed to request the instruction. The record about this 

issue is unclear because the discussion regarding this issue occurred in chambers and is not 

part of the record before us. Counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that the 

issue was not overlooked. It was discussed in-chambers, and the trial court determined that 

Ms. Risner was not an accomplice as a matter of law. The trial court instructed the jury

consistent with the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction on accomplices. As such, we will 

consider whether the trial court erred in this determination. 

“It is well-settled in Tennessee that a defendant has a right to a correct and complete 

charge of the law so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the 

jury on proper instructions.” State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 204 (Tenn. 2001) (citing 

State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 249 

(Tenn. 1990)). Accordingly, trial courts have the duty to give “a complete charge of the 

law applicable to the facts of the case.” State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1998) (citing State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986)). An 

instruction will be considered prejudicially erroneous only if it fails to submit the legal 

issues fairly or misleads the jury as to the applicable law. State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 

48, 58 (Tenn.2005) (citing State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 101 (Tenn. 1998)).

An accomplice is defined as one who “knowingly, voluntarily, and with common 

intent participates with the principal offender in the commission of the crime alleged in the 

charging instrument.” State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 588 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). The 
13

test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice is whether the witness could be 

indicted for the same offense as the defendant. See State v. Green, 915 S.W.2d 827, 831 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Lawson, 794 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

When the evidence is clear and undisputed that a witness participated in the crime, then the 

trial court must declare the witness to be an accomplice as a matter of law and instruct the 

jury that the witness’s testimony must be corroborated. Lawson, 794 S.W.2d at 369. On 

the other hand, when the evidence is unclear, it becomes a question of fact for the jury to 

determine whether the witness is an accomplice and, if so, whether there is corroborating 

evidence to support the witness’s testimony. Id.; see Green, 915 S.W.2d at 831-32.

The evidence at trial was not clear and undisputed that Ms. Risner participated in 

the crime. Ms. Risner testified that the Defendant told her she was driving him to the 

victim’s house where he planned to rob the victim. She told him no, but he insisted. The 

Defendant ordered Ms. Risner to stay in the car where she remained for the duration of the 

offenses, and from her vantage point she was unable to see the Defendant’s movements 

and actions inside the house. She did not know that the Defendant was going to set the 

house on fire and kill the victim, as the Defendant had only stated an intent to rob the 

victim. See State v. Bland, No. W2014-00991-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3793697 at *4 

(Tenn. Crim. App. June 16, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. October 15, 2015). Ms. Risner 

testified to being terrified and an unwilling participant, saying that she even intentionally 

drove past the house until the Defendant made her drive into the driveway. We conclude, 

therefore, that the trial court properly found that Ms. Risner was not an accomplice as a 

matter of law and that whether Ms. Risner was an accomplice was a question of fact to be 

determined by the jury. The jury was so instructed. The Defendant is not entitled to relief 

on this issue.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for 

felony murder and especially aggravated robbery because the State failed to corroborate 

the testimony of Ms. Risner, who he asserts was an accomplice and, as such, her testimony 

required corroboration. The Defendant does not contend that the evidence failed to 

establish the elements of the offenses, he argues only that no evidence corroborates Ms. 

Risner’s testimony. The State responds that the evidence did not establish that Ms. Risner 

was an accomplice and that, even if she were an accomplice, there was sufficient 

corroboration to support the Defendant’s convictions.

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard 

of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Tenn. R. App. P. 
14

13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 

247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This standard applies to findings of guilt based upon direct 

evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and circumstantial 

evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing 

State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). In the absence of direct 

evidence, a criminal offense may be established exclusively by circumstantial evidence. 

Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1973). “The jury decides the weight to be 

given to circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, 

and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with 

innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 

2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958)). “The standard of 

review [for sufficiency of the evidence] ‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon 

direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) 

(quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or 

reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the 

evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Liakas v. State, 286 

S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956)). “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the 

weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the 

evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 

1997). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony 

of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” 

State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated 

the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523, 

527 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the “‘strongest legitimate 

view of the evidence’” contained in the record, as well as “‘all reasonable and legitimate 

inferences’” that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 775 (quoting 

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilt against a 

defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the 
15

convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally 

insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 

2000) (citations omitted).

The rule is well settled in Tennessee that a defendant cannot be convicted on the 

uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Sherrill v. State, 321 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1959). 

An accomplice is defined as “a person who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common 

intent with the principal offender, unites in the commission of a crime.” Clapp v. State, 30 

S.W. 214, 216 (1895). To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, “there should be 

some fact testified to, entirely independent of the accomplice’s evidence, which, taken by 

itself, leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but also that the 

defendant is implicated in it.” Clapp, 30 S.W. at 216. This corroboration must consist of 

some fact or circumstance which affects the identity of the defendant. The necessary 

corroboration, however, need be only rather slight circumstances. See, e.g., Bethany v. 

State, 565 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (citing Garton v. State, 332 S.W.2d 

169 (Tenn. 1960); Alexander v. State, 229 S.W.2d 331 (Tenn. 1950)). Furthermore, the 

jury is to determine the degree of evidence necessary to corroborate the testimony of an 

accomplice, and it is sufficient “if there is some other evidence fairly tending to connect 

the defendant with the commission of the crime.” Clapp, 30 S.W. at 217.

In this case, Ms. Risner testified that the Defendant told her she would drive him to 

the victim’s house with his stated intent to rob the victim. Ms. Risner was unaware that 

the Defendant would kill the victim and commit arson. The victim did not participate in 

any of the criminal acts that the Defendant committed at the victim’s house and remained 

in the car where the Defendant ordered her to stay. Ms. Risner testified that she was 

terrified and did not inquire any further into the Defendant’s acts. The evidence supports 

a jury’s conclusion that Ms. Risner did not voluntarily, with a common intent, participate 

in the commission of the Defendant’s crimes. Even so, if the jury found Ms. Risner was 

an accomplice, there was sufficient corroboration of her testimony.

Ms. Risner testified that the Defendant told her he intended to rob the victim. She 

stated the Defendant made numerous trips through the victim’s yard with items from the 

victim’s house. Ms. Risner testified that the Defendant owned blue “hospital gloves” that 

he commonly wore to moisturize his chapped hands. She recalled that the Defendant wore 

blue “hospital gloves” the night of these crimes. Firefighters found items from the victim’s 

house in the front yard of the residence including the remnant of a blue “hospital glove.” 

Ms. Risner testified that the Defendant took an accelerant into the residence. Arson 

investigation of the scene indicated the use of an accelerant to cause a fire of the intensity 

of the fire at the victim’s house. Additionally, an accelerant detecting canine indicated the 

presence of accelerant in the living room area of the house, the area of the house where the 

victim was found and the area that received the most significant damage. Finally, Ms. 
16

Risner testified that, as they drove home, the Defendant was manipulating something in his 

hands that she was unable to see. As they drove down Highway 64, the Defendant threw 

some items out of the car window. Later, a corrections crew picking up trash along 

Highway 64 found some of the victim’s items on the side of the road. 

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there is sufficient corroborating 

evidence which tends to connect the Defendant with the commission of the charged 

offenses. The Defendant is not entitled to relief as to this issue.

C. Ineffective Assistance at Trial

The Defendant next asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. This 

Court has consistently “warned defendants and their counsel of the dangers of raising the 

issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal because of the significant 

amount of development and fact finding such an issue entails.” Kendricks v. State, 13 

S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Raising the issue of ineffective assistance of 

counsel on direct appeal is “a practice fraught with peril.” State v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 

156, 161 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). 

Nonetheless, our supreme court has stated that claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel may be presented on direct appeal and that the reviewing court must apply the 

same standard as utilized for such claims in post-conviction proceedings. See State v. 

Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 n. 5 (Tenn. 1999). Under the Sixth Amendment, when a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel is made, the burden is on the petitioner to show (1) that

counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72 

(1993). In other words, a showing that counsel’s performance falls below a reasonable 

standard is not enough; rather, the petitioner must also show that but for the substandard 

performance, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. The Strickland standard has been applied to the right to counsel under article 

I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419, n. 2 

(Tenn. 1989).

A defendant will only prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after 

satisfying both prongs of the Strickland test. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 580 

(Tenn. 1997). The performance prong requires a defendant raising a claim of 

ineffectiveness to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness or “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate that 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a 
17

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Failure to satisfy either 

prong results in the denial of relief. Id. at 697.

In Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our Supreme Court decided 

that attorneys should be held to the general standard of whether the services rendered were 

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Also, in 

reviewing counsel’s conduct, a “fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 

perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, the fact that a particular 

strategy or tactic failed or even hurt the defense does not, alone, support a claim of 

ineffective assistance. Deference is made to trial strategy or tactical choices if they are 

informed ones based upon adequate preparation. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 

1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

In the motion for new trial, the Defendant raised two issues with respect to trial 

counsel’s representation: (1) trial counsel failed to call witnesses; and (2) trial counsel 

failed to request jury instructions for an accomplice as a matter of law. In his brief, the 

Defendant argues several claims not raised in the motion for new trial or addressed at the 

hearing. The State contends that the appellant has waived these issues because they were 

not included in the motion for a new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). We agree with the State 

and address only the issues raised in the motion for new trial and presented at the hearing.

The Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to call 

witnesses to testify on the Defendant’s behalf at trial. The State responds that the 

Defendant has failed to show trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses. We 

agree with the State.

As an initial note, the Defendant complains that trial counsel called no witnesses at 

trial; however, Defendant did not present any testimony from potential witnesses at the 

motion for new trial hearing. The Defendant only presented testimony from trial counsel. 

Because the witnesses Defendant complains of did not testify at the hearing, the Petitioner 

cannot show prejudice. See Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

Neither the trial court nor this court can “speculate or guess” about whether such testimony 

would have affected the outcome of the Defendant’s trial. See id. Therefore, the Defendant 

failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel’s decision regarding 

witnesses was deficient or caused the Defendant prejudice.

The Defendant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a 

jury instruction on corroboration of testimony from an accomplice as a matter of law. At 

the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that the role of Ms. Risner was 
18

discussed in-chambers and, ultimately, the trial court determined that it was a question of 

fact. Trial counsel stated that he agreed with the trial court’s determination and thus, he 

did not request a jury instruction that Ms. Risner was an accomplice as a matter of law. 

The trial court determined that it was a question of fact and so instructed the jury.

The Defendant has failed to present evidence that trial counsel was deficient in this 

respect. The trial court considered this issue and ultimately determined that Ms. Risner 

was not an accomplice as a matter of law. Therefore, the Defendant has failed to show that 

trial counsel would have prevailed had he challenged the trial court’s ruling. 

D. Judgment Forms

A Lawrence County grand jury indicted the Defendant for first degree premeditated 

murder (Count 1); first degree felony murder (Count 2), especially aggravated robbery 

(Count 3); conspiracy to commit first degree murder (Count 4); and aggravated arson 

(Count 5). Before trial, the State dismissed the Count 4. At the conclusion of the jury trial, 

Defendant was convicted of all the remaining charges but, for Count 1, the jury convicted 

the Defendant of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The trial court 

merged Count 1 into Count 2. In doing so, the trial court entered one judgment form for 

Count 2. In the “Special Conditions” box on the judgment form, the trial court included 

“Count 1, conviction for second degree murder merges with Count 2, conviction for felony 

first degree murder. 

In State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360 (Tenn. 2015), the supreme court explained that 

the proper procedure for entry of judgments in the event of merger of convictions is for the 

trial court to enter a separate judgment in each count. The court explained:

[W]hen two jury verdicts are merged into a single conviction, the trial court 

should complete a uniform judgment document for each count. The judgment 

document for the greater (or surviving) conviction should reflect the jury 

verdict on the greater count and the sentence imposed by the trial court. The 

judgment document for the lesser (or merged) conviction should reflect the 

jury verdict on the lesser count and the sentence imposed by the trial court. 

Additionally, the judgment document should indicate in the “Special 

Conditions” box that the conviction merges with the greater conviction. To 

avoid confusion, the merger also should be noted in the “Special Conditions” 

box on the uniform judgment document for the greater or surviving 

conviction.

Id. at 364. Therefore, on remand, the trial court should enter a judgment document for 

Count 1, following the instructions of the supreme court.
19

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. We remand the case to 

the trial court for the entry of corrected judgments reflecting proper merger.

____________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE