## In t he Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 23

- 00028

- CV

MICHAEL D . JACKSON, JR. , Appellant

V. DIAMOND D REALTY, ANDY GRIFFITH, AND DENISE BADGLEY , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 294th District Court Van Zandt Cou nty, Texas Trial Court No. 17

- 00276

Before Stevens , C.J., van Cleef and Rambin , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION
Mic hael D. Jackson, Jr. , sued Diamond D Realty , Andy Griffith, and Denise Badgley (collecti vely Ap p e llees ) for breach of contract, statutory fraud, and common

- law fraud involving the sale of Jackson’s residential property located at 301 Van Zan d t County Road 1906 , Fruitvale,
Texas 75127 (the Property )

. The gravamen of Jackson’s compla in t allege d t h at A ppellee s’ actions caused a delay in the sale of the Property. Noting that Jackson filed his lawsuit one month after he signed the final contract of sale for the Property , Appellees filed a traditional and

no - evidence motion for summary jud gm en t arguin g th at the “evi dence on record in fact establishe[d] the opposite of [Jackson’s] claims.” The trial co urt granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed Jackson’s claims, and entered a take

- not hing judgment against Jackson. On app ea l, Jackson arg ues that th e trial court erred by granting summary judgment against him

. Because we find that the trial court’s summary judgment was proper, we affirm its judgment. 1
I. Factual Backgroun d An understanding of Jackson’s allegations in this ca se i s required t o grasp the merits of the summary judgment motion. Jackson’s petition stated that he hired Appellees to sell the Property and that, during their representation, Appellees engaged in the following condu ct:

1 Or iginally app ealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the T e xas Supreme Court pu rs u ant to its do cket equalization efforts. See T EX
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN . § 73.001. We follow th e precedent of the Twelfth Court of App ea ls in deciding this case. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 41.3.3

• Utilized the property to hunt and f i s h

• Discharged firearms o n the property, sometimes as late as 10 p.m.

• Utilized the property to go four wheeling with

. . . friends

• Disturbed the cattle on the property

• Showed the property to parties who [ they ] knew were not credit

- worthy buy ers

• Took over ne g ot iation s with the potent ial buyer of another realtor who had the right to sell the property

• Left off 6 acres from the listing

• Did not use Plaintiff ’ s survey when originally listing the property, despite specific instructions from the P l aintiff

• Pi cked u p the on ly copy of the su rvey with permission to copy it, but never returned the copy of the survey despite instructions to do so

• Did not disclose to Plaintiff or Plaintiff ’ s other realtor that a purchase offer for the property was conti ngent on the sale of a nei ghboring property

• Placed hunting blinds and game feeders into the contract despite Plaintiff not owning them

• Requir [ed] only $200 earnest money for a $430,000 transaction

• Refused to put into the contract that the pers on with a cattle lea se had 3 0 d ays t o remove the cattl e and other belongings

• Did not put interest in the contract for owner financing

• Placed in the c ontract that Plaintiff would pay for a new survey despite Plaintiff not wanting that clause

• Took persona l pro perty from a neighborin g p roper ty , including a re frigerator4

• Refused to put a clause in the contract clarifying that Plaintiff ’ s deadline for rem oving his items from the property post

- sale was contingent on weather permitting

• Put into the contract th at P laintiff wou ld pay for m i ne ral r ights research wit hout Plaintiff ’ s consent

• Refused to mention squatter [ ’ ] s rights in the contract

• Refused to ment ion the sewer line on the property in the contract

• Trespassed on the property after signage was put up d isall owing Defend ants on the pr opert y

• Refused to term inate the contract or give up a commission despite all of the above Jackson stated t hat “[a] ll of the above caused significant delay in closing on the property with a legitimate buyer and cost [] Pl ain tiff sign ificant fund s in mort gage pa yments and other ex penses that he would not have incurred had Defendants acted promptly

. ” As for his breach of contract action, Jackson alleged that Appellees breached the contract by perfo rm ing the [bull eted] acts a nd omission s . . . . [which] s how [ed] an intention to us e the [P] roperty for personal use rather than using commercially prompt and rea sonable methods to sell the [P] roperty and a disregard for protecting Plaintiff ’ s rights in contractual language wit h the potent ial bu yers. Jackson alleged that he was damaged “ in the costs of the upkeep of the property while the sale was delayed becau se of the breaches .” As for his statutory

- fraud cause of action, Jackson alleged that Appellees “ made fa lse
represen ta tions of p ast an d existing material fa cts for the purpose of i nducing the Plaintiff into a real estate contract and such false representations were relied on by the Plaintiff. ” For his

common - law

- fraud action, Jackson said th at Appell ees’ “ acts a nd omissi ons consti tuted common5

law fraud in th at the [Appellees] repre sented to Plaintiff that they would act as professio nal real
estate agents in selling Plaintiff ’ s property when in fact the intention was to delay any sale so that Defendants could make p erso nal use of th e property. ” After conduc t i ng discovery, Appellees filed a traditional and no

- evidence summary j udgment motion.
II. Standard of Review

“ We review a summary judgment de novo. ” Douglas v. Hardy , 600 S.W.3d 358, 36 5 (Tex. App.

— Ty ler 2019, no pet. ) (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joa c him , 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). “ When a trial court ’ s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for the ruling, summary judgment will be affir m ed on appeal i f any of the theo ries advanced are meritorious. ” Pr y or v. Moore , No. 12

- 20

- 0 0137

- CV, 2021 WL 1582722, at * 2 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Apr. 21, 2021 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (citing State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. S.S

. , 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993) )

.

“ A m ovant for tr a ditional sum mar y judgment has the burden of showing t here is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled t o judgment as a matter of law. ” Douglas , 600 S.W.3d at 365 (citing T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co

. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 54 8

– 49 (Tex. 1 985 ) ). Under a traditional motion for s u mmary judgment, “ [ a ] def endant

- movant who conclusively negates at least one essential element of a plaintiff ’ s cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. ” Id. (citing Fro st Nat ’ l Ban k v. Fernand ez , 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010) )

. A l so, “ after an adequate t ime for discovery, a party may file a no evidence motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more6

essential elements of a clai m or d efense on wh ic h an ad verse party would have the burden of
pr o o f at trial. ” Id. (citing T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 166a(i) )

. In a case like t his , where “ a party has moved for summary judgment on both traditional and no evidence grounds, we typically first rev iew th e propriety of the su mmary judgment under the no evidence st a n d a rd. ” Healey v. Healey , 5 29 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2017 , pet. denied ) (citing T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 166a(i); Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc

. , 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013 ) ). “ A no ev idenc e summary ju dgm ent motio n under Rule 166a(i) is essentially a

m o t ion for a pretrial direct ed verdict, and it requires the nonmoving party to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact supporting each element contested in the motion. ”
D ouglas , 600 S.W.3d a t 36 5 (ci ting Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez , 206 S

. W

. 3d 572, 581

– 82 (Tex.
2006 ) )

. “[A] no evidence challenge will be sustained when there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact or the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is n o more than a mere

sc intilla. ” Healy , 529 S.W.3d at 129 (citing M e r r i man , 407 S.W.3d at 248). “ More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. ” Id. (citing Wal

- Ma rt Store s, Inc. v. Spates , 186 S.W.3d 566, 56 8 ( T ex. 2006) (per curiam); F orbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc

. , 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003) )

. In our analysis, “ we review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most favora

b le to the party against whom the summary judgme n t w as render ed, crediting

ev idence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence7

unless reasonable jurors could not. ” Douglas , 600 S.W.3d at 365 (c iting Ti mpte Indus ., Inc. v. Gish , 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009 ) )

. III. The Summary Judgme nt Evidence Jackson testified that he had first tried to sell the Property in 2012 or 2013. Because “nothing really happen [ ed ] with it,” Jackson decided to e n list Diamon d D Rea lt y “so th ey could show” the Property after his n e i g hbor said he had enlisted that company to sell his property. As a result, Jackson entered into a standard Texas Association of Realtors Farm and Ranch Rea l Estate Listing Agr eement (Agr e ement) to sell “1 0 0 of the acres” of the Property

. The Agreement , s i gned by Griffith on behal f of Diamond D Realty, stated that the listing period would begin on March 23, 2015, and would terminate the following year. 2 By signing t he Agreement, Jackson a greed to pay Diam ond D Realty a six

- percent commission upon sale. Appellees attached the Ag ree ment to their summary judgment motion. Their other summary judgment evidence, detailed further below, included Ja ckson’s depo sition and showed that (1) Jac k son gave permissio n to hunt and fish on his property, (2) Jackson h a d n o personal knowledge of man y of the acts he complained of in his petition , (3) the sale was not delayed by Appellees, and (4) the remaining a cts could no t form a basis for Jack son’s ca u ses of action. We first examine Jackson’s deposition. Jackson’s f i r st two complaint s w ere t hat Appellees used the Property to hunt , fish, and shoot firearms, but his deposition testimony established that Grif

fith asked f

or permission to hunt , fish , an d shoot and that J ackson told Griffith that he “didn’t care” if he u s e d the Property in that m anner. Jackson’s third and fourth

2 It also provided that a third party owned twen t y - five percent of the mi n eral interest s in the Property and that Jackson would retai n the remaining seventy

- five p ercent

.8

complaint s said that the Property was used to go four wheeling , which distur bed cattle on the Property, but hi s depos ition sh owed t hat he did not see Appellees four wheeling on the Property.
Jac k s o n ’s fifth complaint all eged that Appellees showed the Property to buyers who were not creditworthy , but Jackso n admitted t hat he did not know the names of non - cred itworthy pa rties

an d had not checked their credi t or bank statements. Jackson also allege d t h at Appellees left six acres off the Property listing, but both the Agreement and listing showed that a 100

- acre tra ct o f the Property was for sale. Jackson also alleg ed that App ellees “ [t] ook over negotiations with the potential buyer of another re a lto r who had the right to sell t he property .” Jackson’s deposition showed that his half

- sister, Heid i Bridwell , who was also a realtor, received the first offer on the prop ert y on Jul y 4, 2015, from Dustin Breyman , but Jackson rejected the offer

. Jackso n te s t ified that Griffith “kind o f took over from Heidi, started negotiations,

. . . s ho w ed the [P ]roperty and had actual contact with [Breyman ]. ” In addition to the Pro perty, Breyman wanted to buy property from Jackson’s neighbor, Phil Bailey, who had al s o l i s ted his property with Diamond D Realty. Jackson testifi ed that he w as aggravated at Griffith, was “tired of messing with him,” a nd , as a result, concocted t he fol lowin g scheme: I decided to play along with [Griffith] and wait until the last minute t o si g n my contract with [Br eyman]

. Then I told [ Bailey ] to l et me know w hen they closed and he had his money in the bank. He notified me that he had funds for hi s prop erty

. . . in the bank, and then I retracted my contract with [Breyman]

. I did this to put [ Griffith] in a tight s pot.9

Jackson had also in structed Bridwell to “play along” with the scheme. Eventually, Breyman did
p urchase Jackson’s Prope rty. As a result, the evidence showed that Griff i th took over unsuccessful negotiations from Bridw ell a nd s u ccessfully sold the Pr operty. The f irst contrac t for sale was signed by Breyman and presented to Jackson on Septembe r 14, 2015. Jackso n testif ied that he refused to sign the contract because it included the sale of hunting blinds and game feeders , wh i c h was the basis of Jackson ’s elev enth bullete d complaint in his petition

. 3 A s for the second version, Jackson was unhappy t hat the earnest

mo ney was listed a t $200.00 , forming his twelfth bulleted complaint

. 4 The third version included gates and co r ral s belonging to Ja ckson’s les s ee and prompted a disagreement with Badgley about Appellees’ co m mission

. 5 Jackson testified, “ An d that ’ s where I g ot in a discussi on with Denise Badgley telling me I ’ m going to pay her her c ommission , and I said, no,
Dus t in B re y man is, so I added $25 ,000 t o the selling price to pay each Realtor $12,500. And that ’ s what made me mad with her. ” As a r esult, J ackson’s last bullet ed com plaint alleged that Appellees refus ed to terminate the Agreement or give up a commission

. At t ha t point, Jack son decided to communicate solely with Bridwell, who prepared the fourth and final contract for sale , whic h Jackson sign ed on Oc tober 22, 2015

. B r i dwell agreed to share the commission with Appellees , and the final closing occurred on O c t o be r 3 0

.

3 Jackson had agreed to sell h unting blinds in the Agreemen t.

4 The Agreement contain ed no provision requiring more earnest money.

5 The Agreement spec if

i ed t ha t the sale of the Property wou ld include “ perm anently installed and built
- in items ” like “ fences, gate s, . . . and corrals .”10

Jackson’s pet ition sough t damages as a result of Appellees’ alleged delay in closing the sale. When asked what c reated the delay, Jackson re spon ded th at the delay was caused by revisions to the contracts for sale. When aske d if anything els e d el ay e d the closing, Jack son said , “I can’t remember that.” Jackson’s deposition also established that the delay Jackson was blaming on Appell ees occu rred f rom September 14 to October 22, 2015. Jackson expla ine d his bel ief that Griffith should have had th e fi n al version of the co ntract to p revent the delay. Even though his mortgage was $918 .00 per month, Jackson wanted to be reimbursed $60,000 .00 for moving costs and his personal delay in moving bec aus e the gro und “started getting wet and [ his] truck w en t dow n o n [him] .” Jack son ’ s depositi on also nullified several other bulleted complaints. Although he
comp lained that Appellees r efused to mention squ atters ’ rights in the contract , he stated in his deposition that he did not “ know what that [was] abo u t. ” Ja c ks o n alleged that someone had entered the Pro perty after a “ no trespassing ” sign was pos ted but admitted that he had no knowledge of A ppellees coming onto the P roperty after the sign was placed. He admit ted that

none of his personal property was r em oved b y A ppellees. Although Jackson accused Appellees of not includi ng interest in the contra ct for owner financing , the sale to Breyman sh owed that he paid $200,000 .00 in cash and entere d into a sep arate Seller Financin g Addendum with Jackson providin g f

or si x - p e rcent interest per annum

. Jackson complained th at he was r equired to pay for

a new survey, but the final contract for sale required no new su rvey . Citi ng to Jackso n’s depo sition, Appellees argued that his testimony established that Jackson h ad no e v id e nce to support most of his bulleted complaints. T hey also ar gue d that11

Jackson’s rem aining complaints provided no evidence of his br each of co ntract an d fr aud causes

o f action

. Those remaining complaints included that Appellees (1) did not men t io n the se w er line on the property , (2) d id not use Jackson ’s survey when originally l isting the property , ( 3 ) did not return Jackson’ s survey, ( 4 ) did not di sclo se that Brey man’s p urchase offer was contingent on the sale of a neighboring property , 6 ( 5 ) d i d not i n cl u de in the sales contract that Jackson’s
lessee had thirty days to remove hi s cattle and other belongings, ( 6 ) refused to in clude a clau se in the contra ct clarifyin g tha t Jackson’s deadline to remove his personal property was contingent on weath e r pe rmi t ti n g , and ( 7 ) asked for Jackson to pay for miner al rights r esearch

. In response to the motion for summary judgment , Jackson simply r estated his bulle ted complain ts f

rom his petition. I n spite of his deposition testimony, Jackson signed an unsw o rn decl a ra t ion stating that he had personal knowledge of each of th e bulleted complaints. Jackson’s affidavit complained tha t he wa s “induced i nto signing the listing agreemen t und er representations that [Appellees] would make conventional efforts to sel l t he pr o pe r ty.” Jackson said that Appellees’ unconventi onal acts a nd omissio ns delayed the sale and required him to make add itional m ortgage payments and incur other expenses.
Because much of Jackson’s declaration contra di cted his sworn deposition tes t im ony, A pp e llees argued that the declaration was a sham and that i t should b e disregarded under the sham affida vit rule. T h e trial court grante d Appellees’ summary judgment m otion.

6 Nothing in the e vidence showed that the sale of the Property was contingent on the sale o f the n e i g hbors’ property. In f a ct, the evidence showe d that the sale of Baile y’s property cl osed before the sale of the Property

.12

IV. Analysis Raising a threshold issue, Appellees argue that Jackson’s un sworn de c laration could not be considered for any pur pose becaus e it was i mproper form

. “ In general, ‘ an un sworn declar at ion may be used in lieu of a written sworn declarat ion, verification, certification, oath, or affidavit required by statute

. . . . ’ ” Baylo r S c ott & White v. Project Rose MSO, LLC , 633 S. W.3d 263, 2 91 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Aug. 30, 2021, pet. denie d ) (quoting T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 132.001(a ) ). “ Su ch a declaration must be in writing and must be subscribed as true under penalty of perj u ry . ” Id. (citing T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 132.0 01(c ) ). “ The statute requires a jurat to app ear in ‘ subs t antially ’ the same form as the template jurat bef ore an unsworn declaration becomes operative. ” Id. (citing T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C O DE A N N
. § 132.001(d ) ). The jurat must include the declarant ’ s name , date of birth , and address ; a statement tha t “under
pen alty of p erjury that the foregoing is true and co rrect ” ; the county, state, and date of execution ; and the declarant’s signature. T EX
. C I V
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 132.001(d). Jackson’s declarat i on includes his name, d ate of bir th, and a ddress an d the county, st ate, and date of execution. It also states, “ I declare under penalty of perjury that the facts stated in this document ar e tru e a n d correct.” Even so, w ithout further specification, App ellees argue that Jack son’s declaration fa ils t o contain a proper j urat. On our review, w e find no fatal omissions in Jackson’s declaration. See Project Rose , 633 S.W.3d at 291 (quoting U ni ted R e nt a ls , Inc. v. Smith , 445 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. App.

— El Pas o 2014, no pet.) (“ Although the declaratio n jurat fails to conta in [the declarant ’ s] address and date of birth , such an omission is not fatal

. . . .” ). The Tyler Court of Appeals has wri t te n tha t “ t he ‘ key to an uns worn declaration ’ is that it must13

be si gned un der p enalty of perjury. ” Id. (quot ing Gillis v. H arris Cnty. , 554 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) )

. Because Jackson’s declaration established
that i t w as si g ne d under penalty of perjury, we apply the precedent of the Tyler Cour t and will consider it as summary judgment ev idence

. Even so, w e will not consider t he portions of Jackson’s declaration that violate the sham affidavit r u le

. Under this rule, “ i f a p arty submits an affidavit that conflicts with the a ffiant ’ s prior sworn testimony and do es not p rovide a suf ficient explanation for the c onflict, a trial co urt may disregard the affidavit when deciding whether the party has ra i se d a genuine fact is su e to

a void summary judgment. ” Lujan v. Navistar, Inc

. , 5 55 S.W.3 d 79, 82 (Tex. 2018) . “ The b asis for the rule is that al lowing manufactured a ffidavits to defeat summary judgment would thwart the very object of summary judgment, wh i ch ‘ is to separate re al and g enuine issues from those that are formal or pretend ed

. . . . ” Id. at 85 (quoting Radob enko v. Au to mated Equi p. Corp

. , 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1975) )

. “ Rewarding a party who seeks to defeat summary judgment by

‘ contradic t in g his own prior tes ti m ony . . . would gr eatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham i ssues of fac t. ’ ” Id. (quoting Perma R sch. &
Dev. Co. v. Singer Co

. , 410 F.2d 572 , 578 (2d Cir. 1969) ). Jackson’s declaration w as submitted “in lieu o f a wr itten

. . . a ffidavit required by statute or requir ed by a rule.” T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. &
R EM
. C ODE A NN
. § 132.001. M any of the statements made in the declarat ion contradicted14

Jackson’s sworn testimony without explanation. As a r e su lt, we will not con si d er th ose portions of Jackson’s declaration as summ ary judgment e vidence. 7
We also not e that Jackson’s de claration an d his appe llate brief contained restateme nts of his petition and argument. Because Jackson’s pleadings and argum e nt s are not evidence, w e will not consid er them as competent summary judgm ent evidence

. See Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas),
Inc. v. City of Wilm er , 904 S. W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995) ( “ Gen erally, pleadings are not competent evidence, even if sworn or verified

. ” ) ; Clayton v. Wisener , 1 69 S. W.3d 682, 6 84 (Tex. App.

— Tyler 2005 , no pet. ) ( “ Motions a nd arguments of counsel a re not evidence. ” )

. N ext, nothing in Jacks on’s declaration , including th e “ laundry list ” of bulleted complaints that we can consider, showed tha t A ppellees breached a ny porti on of the Agr eement. Instead, Jackson said t hat the “ laundr y list ” of complaints wa s not “contracted for a nd co nstitut e[d] a

co urse of behavior that signific antly breached the listing agreement.” In other words, Jackson

accu s es Appellees of breac hi n g the Agreement wit hout providing any proof of a breach of any
po rtion of the Agreement. As a result , his statem ent that Appellees’ extracontractual course of

co nduct constituted a breach is conclusory and disregarded because “ [c ] o n clusory statements a re not p roper summary judgment proof. ” Zerga Phin

- K er, LP v. Hartfo rd Fire Ins. Co

. , No. 1 2

- 20

- 00074

- CV , 2021 WL 14 18397, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Apr. 14, 2021 , no p et. ) (mem. op.) ; see

7 Specific ally, we find that the follow ing statements in the declaration were contradicted by Jackson’s deposition testimony: (1) t h a t Jackson did not kn ow that Griffith would make personal use of the property to hunt, fish, and shoot firearms, ( 2) that Jac kson had personal knowledge that Appe ll ees went four wheeling or disturbed cattle on the property, (3) that Jackson had personal k n o wledge that Ap pel lee s s howe d the Property to buyers who were no t creditw orthy , (4) that Appellees le ft ac reage o ff of the listing , (5) that Appellees did not “put interest in the contract for owner financing,” (6) that Appellees “[p]laced in the contra c t t hat Plaintiff would pa y for a new survey,” (7) th at Appellee s “[r]efused to mention squatters’ rig hts in the c ontract,” a nd (8) t hat Appellees trespassed on t he Property after a “ no trespassing ” sign was placed on it

.15

Haley v. Thirkill , No. 12

- 20

- 00109

- CV, 2021 WL 1 0 4 6500, at *3 (Tex. Ap p.

— Tyler Mar. 18,
2021 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (“ Bare c onclusions are i ncompetent. ”). Simply pu t, Jackson introduced no competen t evidence to support his breach of con tract claim

. Next, in addition to misrepresentation of a material f a c t , “[ f ]raud claims re qu i re sc ienter.”
Rhin e v. Priority One Ins. Co

. , 41 1 S.W.3d 651, 65 9 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2013 , no pet. ) (quo ting Air Rou ting Int’l Cor p. (Canada) v. Britannia Airw ays, Ltd

. , 150 S.W.3d 682, 692 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, n o pet. ) ). Jackson te st i fied that he “ found Diam ond D ” after speaking wit h Bailey. He argues that Appellees represen ted that they would m ake convention al efforts to sell the Proper ty

. In his declaration, Jackson said that Appellees “committed
unconvent i o n al acts and omission s , ” but his opin ion is conclusory and unsupported by competent evi dence. In other words, Jackso n’s decla ration and a ttached docume ntation do not provide
more t han a scintilla of probative evidence showing that Appellees failed to ma k e conventional efforts t o sell the P ro perty , which was sol d six months aft er the Agr eement . Further, there is no evidence show ing any scie nter on Appell ees’ part

. After reviewing Jackson’s declaration and attachments , we find the trial court properly
g r a n ted Appellees’ no

- ev id e nce s ummary j udgment motion because there was no more than a scintilla of evidence to cre ate a genuine issue of ma terial fact on Jackson’s breach of contract and fraud claims

. 8 Accordingly, we overrule Jackson’s point of error.

8 If a no - evidence sum mary judgmen t w as properly gran ted, w e do not reach arg uments regarding the t raditional motion for summary judgme nt. Se e Ford Moto r Co. v. Ridgway , 1 35 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex

. 2004).16

V. Conclusion
We a ff i rm th e trial court’s judgment.

Sc ott E. Steve ns Chief Justice Date Submitted: Jul y 20, 2023 Date Decided: August 17 , 202 3