F OR P UB LIC AT ION



### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

V AL L E D EL S O L I

NCORPORATED ; C.M ., a min or ; J OS E ANGEL V AR GAS ; C OAL I C I ON D E D ER EC HOS H UMANOS ; U

NI TED F OOD A ND C O M M ER CI A L W O RKERS I N T ER N A T I O N A L U

NI ON ; B ORDER A C TI ON N ET WO RK ; J I M S HEE ; LUZ S ANTI AGO ; A R I Z ONA S OUTH A S I ANS FOR S AF E F AM I L I ES ; J A PA N ESE A MER I C AN C I T I ZEN S L EA GUE ; L O CA L 5 S ER VI CE E MPLOYEES I N T ER N A T I O N A L U

NI ON ; S OUTHS I DE P R ES B YTER I AN C H U RCH ; M U SL IM A MER I C AN S OC I E TY ; T O N A T I ERRA C OMMUNI TY D EV EL OP MENT I NS TI TU TE ; A S I AN C HAMB ER OF C O M M ER CE O F A R I Z ONA ; S ERV I CE E M PLO Y EE S I

N T ER N A T I O N A L U

NI ON ; A R I Z ONA H I SPAN I C C HAMB ER OF C O M M ERCE ; P ED R O E SPI N O ZA ; M AUR A C A ST I LLO ; M A R IA M ORAL ES , Plaintif

fs-Appellee

s ,

v.

M I CH A EL B. W HI TI NG ; E DW AR D G. R HEI NHEI MER ; D AVI D W. R OZ E MA ; D AI S Y F L ORES ; KEN NY AN G LE ; No. 12-15688

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01061- S RB

OPI NI ONV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

2

D EREK D. RAPI ER ; S AM V ED ER MAN ; R I C HAR D M. R OM L EY ; M AT TH EW J. S MI TH ; B R ADL EY C AR L YON ; B AR B AR A L A WA LL ; J A M ES P. W A LSH ; G EORGE S I L VA ; S HI L A S. P O LK ; J ON R. S MI TH , Co un ty Attor ne y s in the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s; J OS EP H D ED MAN , J R .; L AR R Y A. D EVER ; B I LL P R IB IL ; J OHN R. A RMER ; P R ES TON J. A L L RE D ; S TEVE N N. T UCKE R ; D O N A LD L O WERY ; J OS EP H M. A R P A IO ; T OM S HE AHAN ; KEL L Y C LARK ; C L ARENCE W. D U P N IK ; P A U L R. B ABEU ; T ONY E S TR ADA ; S TEVE W AUGH ; RAL PH O GDEN , Co un ty She ri ff s, in t he ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s, De fe nd an ts , and

S T A T E O F A R I Z ONA ; J ANI CE K. B RE WER , In te rv e no r-

De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lla nts

.

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District J udg e, Presiding
Argued and Submitted Oc tob e r 1 7, 20 12 —Sa

n F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or niaV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 3

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Filed Ma rch 4, 2013

Be fore : Ray

mond C. Fisher, Richar d C. Tallman and Con su e lo M . Ca lla

ha n, Cir c uit Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e F isher

SUMMAR

Y *

Civil Rights The pa nel af firmed the district c ourt’s g rant of a preliminary

injunction barringth e enf orce ment of two pr ov isi on s in

Ar izon a ’s Se nate B ill 10 70 , whic h ma ke it
un lawful for

a mot or ve hic le oc c up ant t o h ir e or a tte mpt to hire a person f or work a t another loc ation from a stopped c ar th a t im p e d e s tr a f

f ic , o r f o r a p e r s o n to b e h ir e d in s u c h a
manner

. The pa nel held that the district cour t corre ctly deter mined that, t ho ug h Ar izon a ha s a signif ic ant g ov e rnme nt i nte re st i n promoting tra ffic sa fety , the day l ab o r provisions failed the
re q uirement set f

orth in C e n tr a l H u d s o n G a s &E l e c tri c Cor p. v . P ub lic Se rv ic e Com mi ssi on of N

e w York, 4 47 U. S. 557, 566 (1980), that restric tions on commerc ial speec h be no
more e x tensive than ne cessa ry to serve that i n t er es t. The pa ne l he ld t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in concludi n g that the plaintiffs we re likely to succe ed on theV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

4

merits and that the other require ments for a preliminary injunction were satisfied.

CO UN SEL

J ohn J . Bouma , Robert A. He nry (ar g ued) a

n d Ke l l y A. Kszy wienski, Snell & Wilmer L .L .P., Phoenix , Arizona; J oseph Sciarr otta, J r., Off ice of Gover nor Janice K. B rew er, Pho e nix, Ari zon a , f

or Ap pe lla nts

. Thomas C. Horne, A ttorney Gene ral, Michae l Try on, Senior L itigation Counsel, an dEvan Hiller, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral, Phoenix, Ariz ona, for Appellant State of A rizona.
Thomas A. Saenz, Victor V iramontes (a rgued) a nd Nicholás Espíritu, Mex ican Ame rica n L eg al Def

ense a nd Educational Fund, L os Ang eles, California ; Omar C. J adwat and Andre Seg ura, A mer ican Civil L iberties Union F oundation I mmigran t s ’ R ights Projec t, New Yor k, New Y ork; L inton Joaq uin , K are n C. T uml in, No ra A. Pr e c ia do , M e lis sa

S. Kea ney and Álvar o M. Huerta , National Immigration L aw Center, L os Ang eles, Californ ia; Nina Pera les, Mexican Americ an L eg al Def

ense a nd Educational Fund, San Antonio, Texas; Ch ri s Newma

n and L isa Kung , National Da y L abor Or g anizi ngNe tw or

k, L os An g e le s, Ca lif or nia ; Ma ri ta Etcubañe z and J essica Chia, Asian American J ustice Center , Was hin g ton , D .C. ; Ce c ill ia D. W ang , A me ri c an Ci vil L iberties Union F oundation I mmigra nts’ Rights Project, San Fr ancisc o, California; Da niel J . Pochoda and James Duff Ly all, ACLU Founda

tion of Arizona, Phoenix , Ari z o na; Daniel R. Orte g a, Or

teg a L aw Firm, P.C., Phoenix , Arizona;V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 5

Yung suhn Park, Connie C h oi and Carmina Oc ampo, Asian Pacific A merica

n L eg al Center, a member of Asian Ame rica

n Center f or Adva ncingJ ustice, L os Ang eles, California , for Ap pe lle e s.
Aar on L eider

man, Mung er, Tolles & Olson L L P, San Fr ancisc o, Calif

o rnia; B radle y

S. Phi llips, J oseph J. Ybarra, Be njamin J . Maro, L ika C. Miy ake and Mar g are t G. Z ieg ler, Mung e r, To lle s & Ol so n L L P, L os An g e le s, Ca lif or nia , f or a ll Appellee s except M aria

Morales a

nd Service Employ ees International Union, Ser

vice Employ ees International Union, L ocal 5, United F ood and Commercia l Workers International Union and Japanese A merica n Citi zens L eague. Stephen P. Be rzon a n d J onathan Weissg lass, Altshuler Be rzon L L P, San Fr ancisc o, California, for Appellee s Service Employ ees Interna tiona l U n io n , Se rvice Employ ees Inter n ational Union, L ocal 5 a nd United Food a

nd Commercial Workers International Union.

OP IN ION

FI SHER, Ci rcuit Judge:

Tw o p ro vis ion s in

Ar izon a ’s Se nate B ill 10 70 make it
un lawf ul f or a mot or ve hicl e oc c up ant t o h ir e or a tte mpt to hire a person f or work a t a nother location from a

stopped ca

r that impedes traf

fi c, or for a pe rson to be hire d in such a
manner . These pr ovisio n s ra ise First Ame ndment conce rns beca use they re s t ri ct and pe nalize the commerc ial speec h of day labore rs and those who would hire them. Ar izona de fe nd s th e pr ov isi on s a s tr a ff ic sa fe ty me a sure s, de sig ne d to p r o mo te th e s a f

e an d order ly

f lo wo f tr a f f ic

. WeV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

6

S.B

. 10 7 0 co n ta ins other pro vi si o ns t hat , al t ho ugh t hey were 1

c h a llen g e d in the sa m e un d e rlying d istric t co u rt a c tio n , ar e no t at issu e in this a p p e a l. a c kn ow le dg e that A rizon a ha s a re a l and su bs tanti a l in te re st i ntr a f f i c s a f e ty

. A r i z o n a , h o w e v e r , h a s f a i l e d t o j u s t i f y a need to serve that inter est throug h targ eting and pena liz ing da y la bo r s oli c itatio n th a t bl oc ks tr a ff ic , r a the r t

ha n d ir e c tly targ eting those who cr eate traff ic hazards without re fer ence to the ir speec h, as curr ently proscr ibed under the State’s pre

exis ting tra ffic l aw s

. L aws like this one that re strict more pr ote c te d sp e e c h tha

n is ne c e ssa

ry vio late the First Am e ndme nt. 1
Arizona has also sing led out d ay l abor solicitation for a harsh pe nalty while leaving other ty pes of solicitation speec h that bl oc ks tr a ff

ic un bu rd e ne d. Ar izon a

de fe nd s th is c on te ntbased distinction by

invoking the “ unique” da ng ers posed by la bo r s oli c itatio n. Th a t ju sti fi c a tio n is on ly min ima lly supported by

the re cord a

nd, tellin gl y , S.B. 1070’s int ro du c tio n s ay s n oth inga bo ut t ra ff ic saf ety . Rathe r i t emphasizes that its purpose is to encoura g e self- depo rt ation by stripping undoc umented immigr ants o f t heir livelihood. Ad op tin g c on te nt- ba se d r e str ic tio ns for r e a so ns a pp are ntl y unrelated to traff

ic safe ty further supports the conc lusion that th e d ay l a b o r p r o v i s i o n s r e s tr i c t m o r e s p e e c h th ann e c e s s ar y.
Acc ording ly , the district court did not abuse its discre tion in concludingthat the pl aintiffs were likely to succe ed on the merits of their F irst Amendment challeng e to the day labor provisions. W e ther efor e af firm the district cour

t’s grant of
a pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n b arr ingthe ir

e nf or c e me nt.V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 7

Speci f i cal l y , t he day l abor pr ovi s i ons s t at e: 2

A. I t i s u n l aw f ul f or a n oc cu pan t of

a mot or veh i cl e t hat i s st op ped on a s t r eet , r oadway or hi gh way t o a t t empt t o h i r e or h i r e an d pi ck u p p as s en g er s f or
wo rk at a dif

f erent locati o n if

the m o t o r vehi cl e b l o cks or i mp edes t he nor mal mo vemen t of t r af f i c.

B. I t i s u n l a w f

u l f o r a p e r s o n t o e n t e r a m o t or veh i cl e t hat i s s t op ped on a s t r eet , r oadway or h i gh way in o rd e r to b e hir e d b y a n o c c u p a n t o f th e m o to r v e h ic le

a n d to b e tra n sp o r te d t o w o rk a t a d iff e re n t l o c a tio n if t he mo t or v ehi cl e bl ocks or i mp edes t he nor mal

mo vemen t of

t r af f i c.

A ri z. R ev. Stat

. § 1 3

- 2 9 2 8 (A )- (B ).

B ACKG ROUND The two provisions cha lleng ed her e we re inc luded as par t of Section 5 of Arizona’s rec ent compre hensive immigr ation ref orm bill, S .B. 1070. SeeAriz. R ev. S tat. §§ 13- 2 9 2 8 (A)–(B) (Sections 5(A) and (B ), collec tively the day labor provisions). Sec tion 5(A) make s it a crime f or an oc c up ant o f a

mot or ve hic le to so lic it or hir e a da y la bo re r i f th e mo to r veh icl e bl ock s o r i mp edes tr affi c. S ect io n 5 (B)
make s it a c ri me fo r a

da y la bo re r t o e nte r a

mot or ve hic le to work at a diffe rent location if the motor vehicle blocks or impedes traf

fic. Following sever al y ear s of deliber ation, the 2 Ar izona House of Repre sentatives passe d the day labor pr ov isi on s in

F e br ua ry 20 10 a s a

sta nd a lon e bil l. S tate Represe ntative J ohn Kav anagh, the provisions’ principa l leg islative sponsor, said at co m m i ttee hea ring s that the pr ov isi on s w ou ld p ro mot e tr a ff ic saf ety but w ou ld a lso dis c oura g e the “ sh a do w e c on omy” of day la bo r a nd a dd re ss ill e g a l im mig ratio n b e c a

us e “ [a] la rg e numbe r of

the se pe op leV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

8

are illega l immigra

nts and thi s is the way

they g et work, a

nd this work is one of the a nchors that k ee p s them in the country .” Af

ter the da y labor provisions passed the A rizona House of Represe ntatives, the Ariz ona Senate adopted them
a s a n ame ndme nt t o S. B . 1 07 0, an o mni bu s im mig ra tio n b ill

. S.B . 1 07 0 in c lud e s a

purp os e s c la

us e , c omm on

to a ll sect io ns of t he b il l, whi ch s tat es t hatth e “ i nt ent of [ S .B. 10 70 ] is to make a ttr iti on th roug h e nf

or c e me nt t

he pu bli c policy of all state and loc al g overnme nt ag encie s in Arizona” and that the “ provisions of th is act ar e intended to wor k toge ther t o d iscourag e and de ter the unla wful entry

and prese nce of

aliens and e conomic ac tivity by persons unlawfully

prese nt in the United States.” See S.B. 1070, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. L aws § 1.

In May 2010, the plaintiffs filed suit in the District of Ar izon a se e kin g a

de c larati on

that S. B . 1 07 0 is unconstitutional in its e ntirety

. The plaintiffs are v ar ious org anizations and individuals affec ted by S.B. 1070. The defe ndants are various county officia ls as well as the state of Arizona and Ar i z o na Gove rnor Janice B rew er, who intervene d as def

endants. I n J une 2010, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary

injunction, arguing that the day labor pr ov isi on s vio late the F ir st A me ndme nt. Th e y re ne we d th e ir motion in October 2011, af ter we held in Co mi te de Jor n a le r o s d e R e d o n d o B e a c h v

. Ci ty o

f R e d o n d o Beac h ( Redondo Beach) , 657 F.3d 936 ( 9th Cir. 2011) (en ba nc), that a Redondo B eac h ordinanc e re stri ct i n g all roadside solicitation viol ates the F irst Amendment. See id. at 950–51 (holding that the re s triction inhibit ed more speec h than
nece ssary to serve the city ’s g oal of promotingtraff ic safe ty).V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 9

The district cour

t issued a prelimi nary

injunction barring enfor ceme nt of the day labor provisions in Fe bruar y 2012. The ke y issue befo re t he district cour t was whe ther the pla int if fs are lik e ly

to s uc c e e d o n the mer it s o f t he ir F ir st Am e ndme nt cl a im. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fi rs t he ld t

hat Redondo Beac h does n o t co ntrol this case be cause the day labor provisions, unlike the Redondo Be ach or dinance , are expli ci t ly limit ed to commer cial spee ch. The court then
e va luate d th e da

y la bo r p ro vis ion s und e r t

he fo ur -p ro ng e d te st fo r r e str ic tio ns on

c omm e rc ia l sp e e c h the Sup re me Court fi rs t set out in Ce ntra l Hud

so n G as &El e c tri c Cor

p. v . P ub lic Se rv ic e Com mi

ssi on of N e w York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 ( 1980). Under that test, we fir st e valuate whether the aff ecte d speec h is misl eading or related to unlawful ac tivity

. See W orld W ide Rush, LLC

v. City of Los Angeles , 606 F.3d 676, 684 ( 9th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Metro Lights
, L.L.C

. v. City of Los A n geles , 551 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2009) ). I f not, the go v ernment be ars the burd e n o f s ho wi ngthat it ha s a su bs tanti a l in te re st, that the restric tion dire ctly advanc es that intere st and that the restric tion is not more e x tensive than ne cessa ry t o s erve the interest. See id. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ld t hat Sor r el l v. IMS Health, Inc

. , 1 3 1 S

. C t

. 2 6 5 3 ( 2 0 1 1 ) , r e qu i r e d i tt o a p p l y a more de manding version o f the “not more extensive than
nece ssary” test to content-ba sed re strictions on commercia l speec h. Finding the day labor provisions to be content- based, the district co u rt applied So rre ll and ana ly

zed whether

they
we re “ dr awn

to a c hie ve ” a

su bs tanti a l g ov e rnme nt i nte re st. Ap p l yi n g Central H

u dson ’s threshold re quirement that speec h be related to la

wful activity and not mislea d i n g, t he
c o urtr u l e d th a tb e c a

u s e d a y l a

b o r i s l aw f u l a c t i v i ty, re str ic tio ns on the so lic itatio n of da y la bo r me ri t Fir st Am e ndme nt s c rutiny . App ly in g the “ su bs tanti a l in te re st” prong , the court cre dited Arizona’s uncontrove rted a ssertionV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

10

that A ri zon a

ha s a su bs tanti a l g ov e rnme nt i nte re st i n tr a ff ic safe ty . Applying the “dire ct advan cement” prong , the cour t conclude d that the day

labor provisions di rec tly

advanc e that interest bec ause the y

prohibit traffic -b l ockingactivity that would otherwise take plac e. Unde r the “ not more exte nsive tha n n e c e ssa ry” pr on g , h owe ve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt fi rs t he ld that the day

labor provisions ar e conte nt-based restrictions and then he ld that the “[d] efe ndants have not shown that [t hey ] . . . are dra

wn to achie ve the substantial g overnme ntal interest in traf

fic saf ety .” On the c ontr ar y , t h e district cour t noted, the ordin an ce “appe ars to be struc tured to targ et particula r speech rather than a broader traff ic problem.” The court c ited the purposes c lause of S.B. 1070 and the exis tence of obvious an d l ess-burde nsome alternatives as furthe r e vid e nc e that th e da

y la bo r prov isi on s w e re no t dr awn to
a dv an c e A r i z o n a ’ s i n t e r e s ti ntr a f f i c s a f e ty.
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t th e pla int if fs are l ike ly to succe ed on the merits beca use t he day

labor provisions ar e insufficiently

tailored unde r Ce n tra l H udson ’s fourth pr ong a s m o d i f i e d b y S o rre ll

. I t then found that the other
re qu ir e me nts fo r a

pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n ( ir

re pa ra ble ha rm , balanc e of the equities and the public inter est) we re me t and g rante d a pre liminary

injun ct ion barringenfor ceme nt of the provisions. The intervenor defe ndants filed this int erloc utory
a pp e a l.

S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW

“ A pl a int if

f s e e kin g a

pr e lim ina

ry inj un c tio n mu st
e sta bli shthat he is l ike ly

to s uc c e e d o n th e me ri ts, that he i s likely to suffer irrepa

rable harm in the absenc e of pr eliminary relief , that the balanc e of equities tips in his favor, a nd that an injunction is i n the public intere st.” W inte r v . Natu ral Re

s.V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 11

Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). W e revie w an order g rantin g a pre liminary

injunction for an a

buse of discretion. Se e Kat ieA. e x re l. Lud in v

. Los An ge le

s Co un ty , 481 F.3d 1150, 1155 ( 9th Cir

. 2007). “Under this standar d, [a] s long a s the district court g ot the law rig ht, i t wi l l not be
reve rsed si m ply

beca use the a ppellate c ourt would have
arr ived at a dif

fer ent re sult if it had applied t h e l aw to the fac ts of the ca se.” Thalheimer v. City of San Diego , 645 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (a lteration in orig inal) (quoting Dominguez v. Schwarzene gger , 596 F.3d 1087, 1092 ( 9th Cir. 2010), vacate d on other grounds by Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. , 132 S. Ct. 120 4 (20 12 ))

. “ Th is r e vie w i s limit ed and def

ere ntial, and it does not ext end to the underlying me rits of the ca s e.” Id. (q u o t i n g Johnson v. Couturier , 572 F.3d 1067, 1078 ( 9t h Cir. 2009)) (inter nal quot ati on mark s o mitte d) . Wh e n th e dis tr ic t c ourt ba se s it s decision on an e rrone ous leg al st an d ar d , we r eview the underlying issues of law de novo. See Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v . Precision Lift, Inc. , 654 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “[W ]hen a district court g ra n t s a preliminary injun c ti o n p r o te c ti n g F ir s t A me n dme n t r igh ts , ‘ [i ]f the
un de rl yingc on sti tut ion a l qu e sti on is c los e

. . . w e sh ou ld uphold the injunction and reman dfor tria l on the merits.’” Thalheimer , 6 45 F .3 d a t 11 28 (s e c on d a lte ra tio n in or ig ina l) (q u o t i n g As hc ro

ft v . A CLU

, 542 U.S. 656, 664–65 (2004)).

D I S CUS S I ON Day labore rs are those who, rather than ha ving a fix ed place of employ

ment, perf

orm temporar

y work such a s gar d en i n g, t r e e t r i m m i n g, y ar dcl ea n -u p , m o v i n g, c on str uc tio n w or

k, ho us e cleanin g and

e lde r c are . B e c a

us e su c h d ay la bo re rs do no t h ave a

fi xed pla c e of e mpl oy me nt, they adver tise their ava ilability

for employ

ment by g ather ingV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

12 in a visible location and then g esturing to motorists or otherwise c ommunicating the ir ava ilability t o work. Da

y labore rs fre quently

cong reg ate on stre et cor n ers and sidewalks, and those who would hire da y labore rs often stop in the road to ne g otiate terms and c omplete the hire. The da y labor provisions re strict speec h by penalizing the solicitation of day labor wor

k when that solicitation impedes traf fic. The plaintiffs introduced de clar ations showing that, after the provisions’ passag e but be fore the district c ourt enjoined enfor ceme nt, employ ers r efr ained f rom hiring day

labore rs on public streets a

nd day labore rs re fra ined from soliciting work from the r oadside out of f ear of prose cution.

Arizona conc edes t h at the day labor provisions re strict day labore rs’ and would-be employ ers’ speec h. But it argues the provisions ar e per

missibl e bec ause it is illega l to block traff ic and be cause day

labor solicitation prese nts unique traff ic saf et y conce rns that justify

specia l treatment of suc h speec h when it blocks traf fic. Plaintiffs counter

that Arizona’s asse rted interest in tr aff ic safe ty is a sham; that the true purpose of the provisions is to r emove day labore rs from pu bli c vie w a

nd to s up pr e ss t

he ir e c on omi c op po rt

un iti e s. Reg ulations that inhibi t speec h must comport w i t h the require ments of the F irst Amendment. We rec og nize that Arizo n a h as a sig nificant intere st in protecting the safe and
or de rl y fl owof

tr a ff ic on its str e e ts. We s imi larl y c re dit Arizona’s asse rtion that the roadside solicitation of la bor may
cre ate dang erous traff

ic conditions. The First Am en d ment require s more than the i nvocation of a si g nificant g overnme nt interest, howe ver. Rathe r, it require s that the restric tion’s benef its be balanc ed aga inst the burden on protecte d speec h. How we conduct this balanc ing de pends on what ty pe of sp e e c h is re g ulate d a

nd wheth e r t

he re g ulatio n is c on te nt-V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 13

A t o ra l ar g u m e n t, A riz o n a a rg u e d tha t t h e d a y lab o r p ro v isio n s a p p ly 3

o n ly t o c o n su m m a te d tra n sa c tio n s a n d no t t o ne g o tiatio n s o r a tt e m p ts to h i r e a day l abor er

. T h at a r g u men t i s be l i ed by t h e pl ai n l an g u ag e of Sect i on 5(A) , wh i ch expl i ci t l y pena l i zes t he “ at t emp t t o hi r e .

. . an d pi ck

u p p ass engers f

o r wo rk at a d i f

f erent l o cat i o n. ” W e wi l l no t a p p ly a l i mi t i ng cons t r uct i on t hat i s co nt r ar y t o t he pl ai n l ang uag e o f t he s t at ut e. See B d. of A i r

po r t C om m ’ r s of L. A

. v. Je w s f or Jes us, I

nc. , 482 U

. S. 569, based or content-ne utral. We shall ad d ress these questions befor e turningto the ultimate question of whethe r Arizona’s interest in traf

fi c s af ety justifies its restriction on day labor solicitation.

I.

The district cour

t corre ctly deter

mined that the day

labor provisions are c ontent-base d restric tions on co m m erc ial speec h.

A. The Da y La borP r ov isi ons Re st r ic t O nly

Com m erc ial Sp eec h Commercial spee ch is t h at “w hich does ‘no mor e than propose a

commerc ial transact i o n

. ’” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citi

zens Consumer Council, Inc. , 4 25 U. S. 7 4 8 , 7 6 2 (1 9 7 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitt sburgh Co mm’n on H

uman Relations , 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). Such speec h is protected by the Fir st Amendment, but to a lesser de g ree than other ty pes of spe ech. See U

nited States v. United Foods, Inc

. , 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (“ We have use d standards f

or dete rmining the validity of spee ch re g ulations wh ic h a c c or d le ss p ro te c tio n to c omm e rc ia l s pe e c h th an to other e x pression.”) . A motorist wh o pulls over and e ither hires or attempts to hi re a day labore r has proposed a commerci al t ransa ction. By the same toke n, a day

labore r 3V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

14

575 ( 1987) ( r ef

u s i n g t o a dopt a l i mi t i n g c on s t r u ct i on be ca u s e “ t h e wor ds

o f t he res o l ut i o n s i m p l y l eave no roo m f o r a nar row i ng co nst ruct i o n”). solicit i n g work fr om the roadside pr oposes a c ommercia l tr ans a c tio n. B e c a

us e the da

y la bo r p ro vis ion s are e xplic itl y limit ed to attempts to hire, hiring , picking up and tra nsporting
wo rk e rs to wo rk a t a dif

fe re nt loc a tio n, a ll a ff

e c te d sp e e c h is either spe ech soliciting a co m merc ial transac tion or speec h
nece ssary to the consumm ation of a commerc ial transac tion. The plaintiffs, howe ver, a rgue that day

labor solicitation sp e e c h is “ c or e ” F ir st A me ndme nt s pe e c h b e c a us e it i s ine xtri c a bly int e rt wi ne d w ith cor e po lit ic a l and e c on omi c messag es. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the B lind of N .C., Inc. , 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1 988) (holdingthat commerc ial speec h do e s not “ re ta in[] it s c omm e rc ia l c ha ra c te r whe n it

is inext rica bly inte rt wined with otherw ise fully protec ted speec h”). Plaintiffs may

be cor rec t that day

labore rs conve y vital politi cal a

nd economic me ssag es whe n they solicit work from the side of

the roa d, but those messag es ar e not inext rica bly intertwined with the spee ch t h e day labor pr ov isi on s r e g ulate . N oth ing in tho se pr ov isi on s p ro hib its a worke r fr om expressing his views publicl y , nor is there any rea son such views cannot be expressed without s o l iciting work. See B d. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y . v. Fox , 4 92 U. S. 46 9, 47 4 ( 19 89 ) ( “ No law o f m an o r o f natur e make s it imp os sib le to s e ll h ou se wa re s w ith out tea c hin g ho me eco n o m i cs, or to tea ch home e conomics without selling housewa res.” ).

I mmigration policy

and economic equality are matters of public importance and the mer e pre sence of day labore rs on the stree t may

express something a

bout their own v i ew s on the se top ic s. Th e pr e se nc e of da y la bo re rs so lic iti ngwo rk

inV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 15

the stree ts may

also incre ase the salience of ec onomic or immigra tion debates to others who encounte r the da y la bo re rs . H ow e ve r c omp e lli ngthe se argume nts , th e Sup re me Court has made c lear that “adve rtising whic h ‘links a produc t to a cur rent public de bate’ is not thereby entitled t o the constitutional protection aff orded nonc ommercia l speec h.” Bolger v. Y

oungs Drug Prods. Corp. , 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (q u o t i n g Cent. Hudson , 447 U. S

. at 563 n.5)). The ac t of soliciting work a s a day labore r may communicate a political
me ssa g e , b ut the pr ima

ry purp os e of

the c omm

un ic a tio n is to adver tise a labore r’s availability for wor k and to neg otiate the terms o f such wor

k. The district cour

t corre ctly

conclude d that the day

labore r provisi ons restrict only commerc ial speec h.

B. Th e Day Labor P rovisions Are Conte nt-Based

Re st r ic ti ons
The district cour

t also corr ectly

deter m i n ed that the day labor provisions ar e conte nt-based r estrictions o n commerc ial speec h. “A r egulat ion is content-base d if either the underlying purpose of the reg ulation is to suppress par ticular ideas or if

the re g ulation, by

its v ery terms, sing les out particula r content for differe ntial treatment.” Be rge r v . Ci ty of S e att le , 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 ( 9th Cir. 20 0 9 ) (en ba nc) (citation om i t t ed ). On their fa ce, the day labor provisions targ et one ty

pe of speech – day

labor solicitation that impedes traff ic – but say

nothing a

bout o ther ty

pes of r oadside solicitation and nonsolicitation speech. The y are there fore classic e x amples of c ontent-b ased restrictions. Our conclusion is confirme d by the stated pu rp o se of the pr ov isi ons, the ir

le g isl a tiv e his tor

y and the dis pr op or

tio nate sanctions they

impose for tra ffic pr oblems arising from day labor solicitation. See Sorre ll v. IMS Health Inc

. , 1 31 S. Ct

.V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

16

26 53 , 2 66 3 ( 20 11 ) ( “ Just a s th e ‘i ne vit a ble e ff e c t of a statut e on its fac e m ay

rende r it unconstitutional,’ a statute’s stated purp os e s ma

y a lso be c on sid e re d” in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r i t i s co n t en t -b as ed

. (q u o t i n g United States v. O’ Brien , 3 91 U. S. 367, 384 (1968)) ); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc

. , 52 9 U

. S. 8 0 3 , 8 1 2 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ( n o ti n g th a t a s p e e c h b y a bill’s sponsor supported the Court’s deter mination that the bill was
c on te nt- ba se d) ; cf. Moss v. U.S. Secre t Serv. , 675 F.3d 1213, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that d i ff ere ntial treatment supports an infer ence of viewpoint discrimination).

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

re a so na bly de te rm ine d th a t th e purp os e of t he day labor provisions was to suppress labor-solicitation speec h rathe r than to pr omote traff ic safe ty . Significa

ntly , the purposes c lause introducingS.B. 1070 desc ribes it as an immigration bill , not a traff ic safe ty bill. See S.B. 1070, ch. 11 3, 20 10 Ar iz. Se ss. L aws § 1 (T he “ int e nt o f [S. B . 1 07 0] is to m ake a ttr iti on

thr ou g h e nf

or c e me nt t

he pu bli c po lic y

of a ll state and loc al g overnme nt ag encie s in Ari z o n a” and the

“ pr ov isi on s o f t

his a c t are int e nd e d to work to g e the r t o dis c o ur a g e an d d e te r th e un la w f u l e n tr y an d p r e s e n c e of
a lie ns and e c on omi c a c tiv ity by pe rs on s unla wf ull y pr e se nt i n the United States.”)

. This clear and unambiguous expression of purpose contra dicts Arizona’s ar g ument that the day labor provisions are c o n t ent-neutral traf fic re g ulations. Rather, they appea r expressly intended to de ter da y labor a ctivity

by
un do c ume nte d immig ra

nts

. Thoug h not disposit ive of leg islative intent, po rt i ons of the leg islative history

also evince hostili ty

to day labore r solicitation rather tha

n concern with traf

fic saf ety . For instance, State Repr esentative Ka v anagh, the day labor provisions’ principal leg islative sponsor, stated at c ommitt ee hear ings th at they

would promote traf

fic saf ety but that theyV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 17

would al s o discourag e the “ shadow e conomy” of da y labor and addr ess illeg al immigration be cause “[a] lar g e number of these pe o p le ar e illeg al immigra nts and this is t he wa

y they g et work, a

nd this work is one of the a nchors that ke eps them in the country .” Finally , the day

labor provisions’ punishment is far out of line with punishments for other simil ar tra ffic violations. F or e xamp le , c on du c t th a t r ec kl essl y imp e de s tr a ff

ic is p un ish a

ble by 30 da y s’ imp ri so nme nt, but day la bo r s oli c itatio n th a t is
no t da ngerous or

re c kle ss, but me re ly

imp e de s tr a ff

ic , is a c la ss 1 mis de me ano r p un ish a ble by up to s ix mon ths ’ imprisonment. Compare Ari z . R ev. S tat . § 13 -29 28 ( F) (v iol a tion of th e da

y la bo r p ro vis ion s is a

c la ss 1 misdemeanor) , and § 13-707(A) (1) ( class 1 misdemea nor punishable by

up to six months’ imp ri s o n ment), with § 13- 2906 (re cklessly interfe ring with the passag e of any highw ay o r p u b li c th o r o u g h f

ar e is a c la s s 3 mi s d e me anor), and § 13- 70 7( A) (3 ) ( c la ss 3 mis de me ano r p un ish a ble by up to 3 0 d ay s’ imprisonment). The imposition of a much har sher pe nalty for those who block tra ffic while eng ag in g i n l abor solicitation speec h evidenc es the de sire to suppress suc h speec h.

Ar izon a argue s th a t th e da

y la bo r p ro vis ion s are c on te ntneutra l beca

use they wer e ena cted to ameliorate “sec ondary eff ects” – the traf

fic proble ms created when d ay labore rs c on g re g a te and

so lic it e mpl oy

me nt f ro m pa ssi ngve hic le s. See City of Re nton v. Playtime Theatres, I nc. , 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (holding that a z oning regulation on adult theater s was content-ne utral bec ause it had be en ena cted t o “pre vent
c ri me , p ro te c t th e c ity ’s re ta il tra de , ma int a in p ro pe rt y va lue s, and g ener ally

[protect] an d [ p re serve ] t he quality of [the City ’s ] ne ig hb or

ho od s, c omm e rc ia l di str ic ts, and the qu a lity of urba n life” ( internal quotatio n marks omitted)). Ar izonaV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

18

ra ise d thi s argume nt b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , w hic h im pli c itl y reje cted it by

finding that the day

labor pro visions are content-ba sed. This reje ction was not an abuse of discre tion in light of the fac ts showing that the purpose of the day labor provisions w as to suppr ess labor-solicitation spee ch. Cf. id. (h old ing that a c on te nt- ne utr a l “ ‘p re do min a te ’ int e nt[]

. . . is more than a dequate t o establish that the city ’s [purpose] . . .
was unre lated to the suppre ssion of fre e ex p ression.”). Ar izon a ’s argume nt that the da y la bo r p ro vis ion s a

re c on te ntneutra l under Hill v. Colorado , 530 U.S. 703, 719–20 (2000), be c a us e they are “

jus tif ie d” by its int e re st i n tr a ff

ic sa fe ty suffe rs from the sa

me def ect. See A CLU of N

ev. v. City of Las Vegas , 466 F.3d 784, 793 ( 9th Cir. 2006) (“ ‘[T] he mer e asser tion of a content-ne utral purpose [is not] enoug h to save a law which, on its face , discriminates based on content.’

. . . [I ns te a d, ] we wi ll h old that [ an] ord ina nc e is c on te nt- ba se d if

. . . thema in p ur

po se in enact ing

it wa s to su

pp re ss o r e xalt sp e e c h o f a cert a in c on te nt. ” (f ir st a nd se c on d a lte ratio ns in
o ri gi n al ) (e mp h as i s ad d ed ) ( qu o t i n g Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v . FCC , 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994)))

. The district cour

t corre ctly

conclude d th at the day

labor pr ov isi on s are c on te nt- ba se d r e str ic tio ns

. II.

The dist ri ct court also corre ctly conclude d that the day l a b o r p r o v i s i o n s ar e l i k e l y unconstitutional r e s tr ic ti o n s

. We evaluate re strictions on commercia l speec h using the fourpa rt te st f ro m Central Hudson : (1) if the communication is neither misleading
no r re late d to un lawf

ul a c tiv ity , th e n it

me ri ts F ir st A me ndme nt s c rutiny a s a thr e sh oldV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 19

matter; in order

for the r estriction to withstand
su c h s c rutiny , ( 2) [t]he State mus t a sse rt a substantial interest to be ac hieved by restric tions o n commerc ial speec h; (3) the
re s tr i c t i o nmu s td i r e c t l y a dv an c e th e s t a te interest involved; and ( 4) it must not be more extensive than is necessa ry to serve that int e re st.

W orld W ide Rush, LLC v. C ity of

Los Angeles , 606 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration i n orig inal) (inter nal quotation
m ark s o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Metro Lights, L .L.C. v. Cit y of Los Angeles , 551 F.3d 898, 903 ( 9th C i r. 2 0 09)). The parties d i s p u t e w h e th e r

th e d ay l ab o r

p r o v i s i o n s s a t i s f

y Central Hudson ’s fi rs t, t

hir d a nd fo ur th p ro ng s. Th e pa

rt ie s a lso ra ise the challeng ing issue of

whether So rre ll , 131 S. Ct . at 2664, 2667–68, made the f

ourth Central Hudson pr on g fo r c on te ntbased r estrictions on commerc ial spee ch eve n more demandingfor the state. We conclude t h at the day labor provisions are de ficient unde r eve n the pre

- So rre ll , a rgua bly
mo r e g o v e r

n me n t- f r ie n d ly , p r e c e d e n t ur g e d b y A r iz o n a

. We will therefor e apply

that prec edent a

nd defe r extended discussion of So rre ll for a more appropriate case with a more fully develope d fac tual reco rd

. We turn to eac h of Central Hudson ’s four pr ong s in turn.
A. Day LaborerSolicitation Is Neither Misleading nor

Relate d to Unlaw fu l Activity Commercial spe ech merits First Amendment pr otection only if “the communication is neither misleadingnor re lated to un la w f u l a c ti v it y

. ” W or ld W ideRu sh , 606 F.3d at 684 (q u o t i n g Me tro Lig

hts , 551 F.3d at 903). Arizona ar g ues that the da y la bo r pr ov isi on s are pe rm iss ibl e be c a us e the y re g ulateV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

20

speec h only

when a ss o ci ated with the unlawful ac tivity of blo c kin g or

imp e din g tr a ff

ic

. Ar izon a ’s pr op os e d r

ule wo uld be a nove l ext ension of Central Hudson ’s le g a lity require ment, which has tra di tionally focuse d on the content of af fec ted spee ch – i.e. , wh ether the spee ch propose s an ill e g a l transac tio n –

ins te a d o f whe the r t

he sp e e c h is
asso ci at ed with unlawf

ul activity

. Se e W

as h. Me rc an til e Ass’n v. W

illiams , 7 3 3 F

. 2 d 6 8 7 , 6 9 1 ( 9 th Ci r . 1984) (re jecting the ar g ument that drugpara pherna lia’s association wi th i lle g a l dr

ugus e a llo ws the state t o restr ic t a ll pa ra ph e rn a lia a dv e rt isi ng ; ins te a d ho ldi ng that pa ra ph e rn a lia adver t i s i n g is not protected in states whe re suc h sales ar e ill e g a l but th a t pa

ra ph e rn a lia adver tis ingwa rr ants F ir st Amendment scr

utiny if the adve rtising pr opos es a sale in a state whe re suc h sales ar e lega l). Some decisions have expressly phrase d the leg ality

require ment as whe ther “ the transac tions proposed in the forbidde n [c o mmunication] are themselves illeg al in any

way .” Va. State Bd. of

Pharmacy , 42 5 U .S. a t 77 2; se e als o Zau de re r v

. Of fic e of Di scip lin ar

y Cou ns e l of

Su pr e meCou rt o

f O hio , 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (“The States and the F eder al Gover nment are fre e to preve nt the dissemination of commerc ial speec h that

. . . proposes a n illega l transac tion .

. . .”). Other dec isions have used Central Hudson ’ s m o r e g e n e r a l “ r e l a t e d t o u n l aw f

u l a c t i v i ty” lang uag e. Cent. Hudson , 44 7 U. S. at 56 4; se e als o Fla. Bar v. W ent For It, Inc

. , 515 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1995) (“ Under Central Hu dson , th e g ov e rnme nt m ay fr e e ly re g ulate
commerc ial speec h that conce rns unlawf ul activity . . . .”).

Ho we ve r i t is formu late d, we thi nk it c le ar t hat Central Hudson ’s leg ality

require ment require s us to evalua t e the content of a

commerc ial m essage rathe r than the me ans by which that messag e is conv ey ed. He re, that means that the pla int if fs have satis fi e d the re qu ir e me nt be c a us e it is le g a l toV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 21

hir e or be hir e d f

or d ay lab or. We f

ind su pp or t f or thi s conclusion both in Pi tts bu rg h Pre ss , the Sup re me Court

c a se up on wh ic h A ri zon a

pr inc ipa lly

re lie s, and

in t he Sup re me Court’s explanation in R.A.V. v. C i ty of St. Paul , 5 05 U. S. 377, 383–84 (1992), of

what it mea

ns for cer tain speec h to be “excluded” f

rom First Ame ndment protec tion.

Pi tts bu rg h Pre ss , the ca se fr om which Central Hudson dr e w its leg ality

require ment, considere d only the commer cial transac tion proposed by an adve rtisement. Ther e, the Sup re me Cou

rt held that a ne ws pa pe r h a s n o F ir st A me n dme n t r igh t t o p u

b li s ha d is c r im in a to r

y e mp lo y me nt adver tisement. Se e Pi tts bu rg

h Press , 413 U.S. at 388–89. The Supreme Court rea soned that, just as it would be permissible to ban an a dvertisement f or nar cotics or prostitution, i t was per

missibl e to ban g ender -speci fi c job postings bec ause sex discrimination in hiring is illeg al. See id. at 388. The Court conc luded that “[a]ny First Amendme nt interest which mig ht be serve d by adver tising an or dinary
commerc ial proposal and which might a rguably outweig h the g overnme ntal interest supporting the regulation is altoge ther absent whe n the commer cial ac tivi t y i tself is illega l and the restric tion on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic a ctivity .” Id. at 389.

In P it ts b u rgh Pr ess , unlike here , the af fec ted spee ch proposed a

n illega l transac tion – the di scriminatory hiring of
a wor ker. The day

labor provisions, on the other hand, regulate spee ch proposinga leg al tran s ac t ion where the sp e e c h is c on du c te d in

an unla wf ul m ann e r. No thi ngin Pi tts bu rg h Pre ss or any other c ase A rizona cites sug g ests that we should expand our in q u i ry beyond whether

the af fec ted speec h proposes a lawful transac tion to whether the a ffe cted speec h is conducted in a lawful manne r. More o v er , theV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

22 Supreme Court’s discu s sion in R.A.V. of c a te g or ic a l F ir st Amendment exemptions cautions th at s uch an e x pansion would be improper

.
In R

. A .V. , th e Sup re me Court dis c us se d it s a

pp ro a c h to
c a t e g o r i c a l e x e mp t i o n s f

r o m F i r s tA m e n dm e n ts c r u t i n y

. It explained that, although it has someti m es said that the

“ pr ote c tio n o f t

he F ir st Ame ndme nt d oe s n ot e xten d” to
c e rt a in c a te g or ie s o f s pe e c h, that state me nt i s n ot “ lit e ra lly true.” R.A.V. , 5 0 5 U. S

. at3 8 3 (q u o t i n g Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. , 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984)). Ins tea d, wh a t a

c a te g or ic a l e xclu sio n me ans is t hat, “ the se are a s o f s pe e c h c an, c on sis te ntl y wi th the F ir st A me ndme nt, b e reg ulated b e c a u s e o

f th e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l

yp r o s c r i b a ble content .” Id. The proposal of an illega l tr ansac tion i s , like th e obscenity

and def

amation discussed in R.A.V. , cate g orica lly

exempted from Fir st Am endment prote ction beca use it lacks social value. See U nited States v. W

illiams , 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“O ffe rs to e ng ag e in i l l egal trans a c tio ns a re c a te g or ic a lly e xclu de d f

ro m F ir st Am en dm en tp ro t ec t i o n

. ” ( ci t i n g Pi tts bu rg h Pre ss , 4 13 U. S. at 388)). The basis of this c ateg orica l e x clusion is the content of the sp e e c h, no t th e mann e r i n w hic h th a t sp e e c h is conducte d. See id. (“[O] ff e rs to g ive or

re c e ive wh a t it

is unlawful to posses s have no soc ial value a nd thus, like obscenity , enjoy

no First Amendme nt protection.” ( citing Pi tts bu rg h Pre ss , 413 U.S. at 3 8 7

– 8 9)). Thus, in dec iding whether to ap p l y a categ orica l exception, we look to the content of a

communication rather than the metho d of that communication. H ere , the content of the communication – the so lic itatio n o f l a

bo r – is p e rf e c tly le g a l. This approa ch fits with R.A.V. ’s ult imate le sso n, wh ic h is that g overnme nt may

not l everag e its power to r egulate oneV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 23

sphere of ac tivity

into the ability

t o favor cer tain speec h within that s p h ere. So, though a state may

ban all fig hting words, it may

not ban only

thos e fi gh ting wor ds that invoke
rac e, color , cre ed, re ligion or g ender

. See R .A.V. , 505 U.S. at 391–96. Simi larly , the gover nment may

prohibit all outdoor fires, but it may

not specifica lly

prohibit flagburning

. Id. at 38 5 ( “ [B ]ur

nin g a fl ag i n viol a tio n o f a

n o rd ina nc e a g a ins t
outdo or fi re s c ou ld b e punis ha

ble , w he re a s bur

nin g a fl a g in violation of an ordinanc e ag ainst dishonoring the flag is not.” (c i t i n g Texas v. Johnson , 4 9 1 U

. S

. 3 9 7 , 4 0 6

– 0 7 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ) )

. In the commer cial spee ch conte x t, R.A.V. noted that, thoug h a state may “re g ulate pric e adve rtising in on e i ndustry but not in others , b e c a

u s e th e r is k

o f f r a u d

. . . is in it s v ie w g r e ater there ,” it “may

not prohibit only that commerc ial adver tising that depicts men in a de mean i ng fashion.” Id. at 388–89 (citations omitted). Arizona may

prohibit pedestrians a

nd motorists from blocking traff

ic, and it ha s done so. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13- 29 06 (A ) ( imp os ingc ri min a l pe na lti e s f or o n e wh o “ r e c kle ssl y int e rf e re s w iththe pa ssa g e of any hi ghwa

y or pu bli c thoroug hfar e by

cre ating an unre asonable i n convenience or hazard” ). B ut as we discuss be low, i t may not, consistent with the First Amendment, use a content-ba sed law to tar g et individuals for lighte r or ha rsher punishment beca

use of the
me ssa g e the y

c onve y whi le the y

vio late an unr e late d tr a ff ic law. Suc h d isp arate tr e atm ent i mpl ic a te s th e F ir st Am e ndme nt.

In sum, it i s leg al in Arizo n a t o h i re or be hire d for da y labor. The day

labor provisions limit t he ability o f day la bo re rs and

e mpl oy e rs to s oli c it, ne g oti a te and c on summate that leg ally

permissible transa ction. The district cour t there fore corr ectly

held that the day

labor provisions ar eV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

24

Ar i z on a i de n t i f

i e s s e v e r a l ot h e r s u bs t a nt i a l i n t e r e s t s , i n c l u di n g c r i me 4

re d u c tio n , ec o n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t an d p ro te c ting the a e sth e tics o f i ts
co m m un i t i es. A s b efo re the d i st rict c o urt, A rizo na i d en t i f i es these i nt erest s as s ub st ant i al but f ai l s t o argue t hat t he d ay l ab o r provis i o ns are
na rro w l y t ail o red t o ac hiev e t he m

. W e t he refo re d ec l i ne t o ad d ress these ad d i t i o na l i ntere st s. su bje c t to F ir st A me ndme nt s c rutiny a s r e str ic tio ns on

lawf ul, nonmisleading speec h.

B. A r iz ona Has Sat isfie d Central H udson ’s Se c ond P rong by Dem onstrating that it Has a Su bstantial

Intere st in Traf

fi c Safety

Arizona asser

ts that the day labor provisions ar e justified b y th e s t a t e ’ s d e s i r e t o p r o m o t e t r a f f i c s a f e ty. Promoting 4 tr a ff ic sa fe ty is und e nia

bly a su bs tanti a l g ov e rnme nt i nte re st. See M etromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego , 453 U.S. 490, 507–08 (1981) ( hol d i n g t hat there can be no “substantial doubt that the twin goa ls that the o rdinanc e see ks to further – traff ic safe ty and the a ppear ance of the c ity

– are substantial g overnme ntal g oals”)

. Arizona has ther efor e satisfied Central Hudson ’s subs ta nti a l g ov e r n m e n t a l int e re st
re qu ir e me nt.

C. The DistrictCourt’s D ete rm ination that the Day Labo r P r ov isi ons Di r e c tl y A dva nc e Ar iz ona ’s Int e r e st in T raff ic Saf ety Was Not

an Abu se of Discret ion

Central Hudson ’s third prongrequire s that a re striction on
commerc ial speec h must “ direc tly advanc e” the s t ate’s substantial interest. Ce n t. H u d son , 447 U.S. at 564. One

“ c on sid e ratio n in

the dir e c t a dv anc e me nt i nq uir y is ‘under inclusivity

. . . .’” Me tro Lig hts , 551 F.3d at 904.V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 25

“ Central Hudson requires a log ical conne ction betwee n the inte r e s t a la wli mi ti n g c o mm e r c ia l s p e e c ha dv an c e s an d the excepti o n s a l aw make s to its own application.” Id. at 905. We term a lawthat distinguishes among ty pes of commer cial speec h without such a log ical conne ction “under inclusive.” As we discuss he re, und er i nclusivity is releva nt to Central H udson ’s d ir ectadv ancem entpro ng becau se i t “m ay dim ini sh the cr edib i lity

of the g overnme nt’s rationale for r estricting speec h in the fi rs t place .” Id. at9 0 4

– 0 5 (q u o t i n g City of La d u e v

. Gilleo , 51 2 U.S. 43 , 5 2 ( 19 94 )) . A s w e dis c us s in Section I I .D, inf

ra , und e ri nc lu siv ity

is a lso re le va

nt t o Central Hudson ’s n arro w t ai l o ri n g p ro n g.
Ab ov e , w e he ld that th e da y la bo r p ro vis ion s are c on te ntbased be cause they

distinguish betwee n day

labor solicitation speec h and all other ty

pes of r oadside solicitation. In Ballen
v. City of Redmond , 466 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2006), we struck down an or dinance that prohibited many comm erc ial signs but exempted real e state sig ns, beca use “[ t] he C ity . . . failed to show how the exempted signs r educe vehicular and pe de str ian s a fe ty

or be smi rc h c omm

un ity a e sth e tic s a

ny le ss than the prohibited sig ns.” Id. at 743. The adoption of a content-ba sed re striction, absent justification, “indicate[d] that the City

ha[d] not car efully calc ulated the c osts and benef its associated with the burde n on speec h.” Id.

Th e da y la bo r p ro vis ion s, ho we ve r, are no t a uto matic a lly
un de ri nc lus ive sim

ply be c a us e the y are c on te nt- ba se d a

nd fa il to r egulate all forms of roadside c ommunication. Se e Me tro Lig hts , 5 5 1 F.3d at 910 (noting that a re g ulation that bans
s o m e , b u tn o ta l l , a dv e rt i s i n g s i g n s i s n o ta u t o m a tic a lly
un de ri nc lus iv e). Sim ila rl y , A ri zon a

may dis c ri min a te be tw e e n d if

fe re nt t y pe s o f r oa ds ide c omm

un ic a tio n if

it d e te r mi n e s th a t r o a d s id e la

b o r s o li c it a ti o n s p r e s e n t mor eV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

26

a c ute sa fe ty

c on c e rns tha

n o the r r oa ds ide c omm

un ic a tio ns

. See id. (holding that the additi o n al dang er pose d by “uncontr olled and incohe rent prolife ration” of offsite sig ns wa s su ff ic ie nt j us tif

ic a tio n f or tr e a tin g un c on tr oll e d o ff sit e a dv e rt isi ngdif

fe re ntl y fr om r e g ulate d a dv e rt isi nga t tr ans it stops). Finally , Arizona may consider the benef

its of differ ent ty

pes of r o a d s id e c o mm

u n ic a ti o n s when de termining which communications to restrict. See id. a t 910–11 (re spectingcity ’s dec ision t h at the value it derives fr om one form of a d v ertising , but not another, “ is stronge r than the city ’s i n t erests in traffic sa fety and esthe tics.” (quoting Metrome dia, Inc. v. C i t

y o f San Diego , 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981)) ).

Ar izon a do e s n ot a

rgue tha t da y la bo r s oli cit ation is le ss valuable tha

n other ty pes of r oadside solicitation. The inquiry is theref ore whether

any thing in the r ecor d supports Arizona’s
a sse rt ion that day la

bo r s oli c itatio n c re a te s mo re a c ute tr a ff ic safe ty conce rns than other ty

pes of roadside c ommunication. T h e p l ai n t i ff

s s ay n o , ar gu i n g t h atj ay

wa l k i n g, p ro t es t i n g, selling f ood or goods at the s ide of the r oad and a number of other activities prese nt the s ame tra ffic c oncer ns as day labor
so lic itatio n b ut a

re unre gulat e d b y

the da y la bo r p ro vis ion s. Arizona counter s that the p la i n t i ffs ’ assertion is t he one
un su ppor te d b y the re c or d, wh ic h in c lud e s n e ws art ic le s, decla rations and photogr aphs of day labore rs an dv ehicles blocking traff

ic. We take the point that day labor solicitation
may c re a te tr a ff

ic sa fe ty c oncer ns . T his e vid e nc e is
no np ro bativ e , h ow e ve r, on the ke y qu e sti on of wh e the r t ho se conce rns ar e more acute than the tra ffic sa fety conce rns cause d by other ty pes of r oadside c ommunication.

Arizona introduced de clar ations from t wo former police office rs ex p l aini ng the par ticular tra ffic pr oblems cause d byV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 27

day la b o r e r s o li c it a ti o n

. M o s t o f

th e o f f ic e r s ’ d e c la

r a tions dis c uss th e ha zar ds of ro a ds ide pe de str ian- mot or ist
c o mm un ic a ti o n s g e n e r a ll y ; wh il e th e y w o u ld s u p port penalizing pe destrian- motorist int era ctions g ener ally , they do not support singling out day l ab o r solicitation. One offic er did, however , repr esent t h at day labore r intera ctions require the par ties to neg o t iate multiple terms, and so take longe r tha n o the r t y pe s o f i n- str eet so lic itatio n. Whe the r t his statement is a dmissibl e, acc urate or g ener ally applicable is far fr om c le ar, but at th is s ta g e of the pr oc e e din g s w e mus t
acc ept it as an asserted f act that mig ht justi fy

harshe r sanctions than for

other roa dside speec h that blocks traf fic.

The district cour

t applied the cor re ct l eg al standar d and de te rm in ed th at th e day lab or pro vis ion s, wh ile “under inclusive to some deg ree ,” still ban enoug h trafficblocking solicitation that they direc tly advanc e Ar izona’s interest in traf

fic saf ety . Although the evidenc e wa s weak, the cour t’s conclusion wa s not an abuse of discretion.

D. The r e Is a Subst ant ialLike liho od t hatP lai nt iffs Wi ll Suc c e e d on T he ir Cl aimth atth e Da y La borP r ov isi ons Restr ict M ore Speec h than Nec essary t o Serve Arizona’s Inter est in Traff ic Saf ety Finally , Central Hudson require s that a re g ulation “is not
more e x t en s i ve than is nec essar y to serve” a substantial g overnme nt interest. 447 U.S. at 566. The te st is sometimes phrase d as re qu ir in g a “‘ rea sonable fit’ be tween [g ov e rnme nt’ s] le g iti mate int e re sts ” and the me ans it use s to
se rv e t h o se int e re sts , City of Ci ncinnati v. Discov ery Network, Inc. , 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993), o r t hat the g overnme nt employ a “me ans nar

rowly t ailored to a chieve the desire d objective,” Bd. of Trs. of

State Univ. of N

.Y . v. Fox , 4 92 U. S.V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

28
469, 48 0 (1 989). The district c ourt conc luded that the pla int if fs ha d e sta

bli sh e d a lik e lih oo d o f s uc c e ss o n th e ir claim that t he day labor provisions are not “dra wn to achie ve” Ari z o n a’ s substantial interest in traff ic safe ty . The c ourt d e r i v e d th i s s t an d ar d

f r om S o r r ell v. IM S Health, Inc

. , 131 S. Ct

. 2653, 2667–68 (2011), whic h held that “[t] o sustain [ a] targ eted, c ontent -base d burden . . . on pr otected e x pression, the State mus t sh owa t le a st that

. . . the me a sure is d ra wn to
a c hie ve th at inte re st. ” Th e pa rt ie s d e bate wh e the r t

his standard is more string ent than Central Hudson ’s formulation that a re str ic tio n mu st b e no “ mor e ex tensiv e tha n is
nece ssary to serve that interest.” Cent. H u d s on , 447 U.S. at 5 6 6

. A t t

h e le a st, So rr ell art ic ulate s th e te st the Sup re me Court most recently

applied to a c ontent-base d restric tion on
c omm e rc ia l sp e e c h, so the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr in applying it. Whether So rre ll intended to m ak e t he
c omm e rc ia l spe e c h tes t mor e e xac tin g fo r the state to m e e t is a question that we need not de cide, be ca u s e we c onclude plaintiffs are likely

to succe ed eve n under Central Hudson ’s fo rm ulatio n o f t

he sta nd ard a nd our c a se s inte rp re tin g it.

Under those dec isions, a restriction on c o mme rcia l speec h “must not be more e x tensive than is nec essa ry t o serve ” a sub s ta n ti a l g o v e r

n me n t inte r e s t

– i. e

. , it s h o u ld n o t be overinc lusive

. W

orld W ide Rush, LLC

v. City of Los Angeles , 6 0 6 F

. 3 d 6 7 6 , 6 8 4 (9 thC i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Me tro Lig hts , 5 5 1 F

. 3d a t 9 0 3 ) ( inte r

n a l q u o tati o nma

r k s o mi tt e d )

. We
re c e ntl y e va luate d a sim ila

r in- str e e t so lic itatio n ba

n and he ld it to be impermis s i b l y

overinc lusive. See Comite de Jornaleros de Re dondo Beac h v. C i t y of Redondo Be ach ( Redondo Be ach) , 657 F.3d 936, 950 ( 9th Cir. 2011) (en b anc). Redondo Be ach a p p li e d th e “ ti me , p la c e o r

manner ” test for content-neutra l restric tions on core F irst Amendment speec h. Id. at 945. L ike Central Hudson ’s for r estrictions onV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 29

com me r c ia l s p e e c h , th a t t e s t r e qu ir e s th a t a r e g u lati o nbe
na rr ow ly ta ilo re d to se rv e a

sig nif ic ant g ov e rnme nt int e re st. See id. at 948 (“To satisfy the [ti me, place or manne r] narrow tailoring require ment, ‘the Gove rnment . . . bears the burde n of showingthat the re med y i t h as adopte d does not burden
sub s ta n ti a ll y mo r e s p e e c h th an is n e c e s s ar y to f urthe r the go v ern m en t ’s l egi t i m at e i n t er es t s

. ’” (q u o t i n g Turner Broad. S y s

. , I n c

. v

. F CC , 5 12 U.S. 622, 665 (1994))) . Be cause the tes t for commercia l speec h is “‘substantially simil ar’ to the application of the test for va lidity of time, place , and manne r restric tions,” Redondo Be ach p rovides a he lpful framework f o r an a ly zi n g th is c a se. Fox , 4 9 2 U. S

. at4 7 7 (q u o t i n g S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm. , 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987))

.
In Redondo Be ach , a s h e re , th e g ov ernm ent so ug ht t o jus tif y an in -s tr e e t so lic itatio n b an b y its int eres t in t

ra ff ic flow and sa fety

. Redondo Be ach , 657 F.3d at 947. The ba n applied to a ll in-stre et solicitation, re g ardle ss of whether the solicitation blocked traf fic. See id. a t 9 4 1

– 4 2

. We
rec og nized, as we do he re, that traff ic safe t y i s an important g ov e rnme nt int e re st and that so lic itatio n may create dang erous tra ffic c ondi t i ons. See id. at 947–48. Neve rtheless, we held that Redondo B eac h’s law wa s overinc lusive beca

use it re s tricted more speec h than
n e c e s s ar y t o s e r v e R e d o n d o B e a c h ’ s i n t e r e s t i n tr a f f i c s a f e ty. See id. at 947–51.

Arizona’s l aw is less restrictive than Re dondo Be ach’ s beca use the da

y labor provisi o ns regulate only labor solicitation that blocks traff ic, wher eas Redondo Bea ch’s
or din anc e re g ulate d a ll ro a ds ide so lic itatio n. Ne ve rt he le ss, o n e l i n e o f

an a l y s i s f

r o m R edondo Beac h is highly rele vant and pers uasive. The Redondo Be ach or dinance restric tedV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

30

more sp e e c hth ann e c e s s ar y b e c a u s e “ [t ]h e Ci ty

h a s v ar io us o th e r l aw s a t i t s d i s p o s a l th a t w o u l d a l l o w i t t o a c hie ve its stated intere sts whil e burde ning little or no spee ch.” Id. at 94 9. Th a t ho ldi ngwa s b a se d on th e lon g sta nd ingru le that, beca use restricting speec h should be the g overnme nt’s tool of last resort, the a

vailabil ity

of obvious less-re strictive alternatives rende rs a speech r estriction over inclusive. See id. at 9 5 0 (c i t i n g Di

sc ov e ry Ne two rk, 5 0 7 U

. S. a t 4 1 7 n

. 1 3 ( “ [I ]f there are numerous and obvious less-bur densome a lternatives t o th e r e s tr i c t i o no nc o m m e r c i a l s p e e c h , th a ti s c e rt a i n l y a relevant c on sid e ratio n in de te rm ini ngwh e the r t he ‘f it’ be tw e e n e nd s and

me ans is r e a so na

bl e.”) ; Village of Schaumburg v . Citi

zens for a Better Env’ t , 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980) ( “The Villag e’s leg itimate inter est in preve nting f raud can be better se rved by

measure s less intrusive than a dire ct prohibi t i o no ns o l i ci t at i o n

. Fr au d u l en tm i srepr esenta

tions can be prohibited a

nd the penal laws used to punis h such conduc t dir e c tly .” ); Schneide r v. New Je rsey , 3 0 8 U.S. 147, 162 (1 9 3 9 ) ( “T h er e a re o b v i o u s m et h o d s o f p re v e n t i n g l i t t er i n g. Among st these is the puni shment of t hose who actua lly throw paper s on the stree ts.”)).

Plaintiffs have c ited a number of pre exis ting Ar izona laws that c ou ld be us e d to a dd re ss l e g iti mate tr a ff

ic sa fe ty
conce rns without burdeningspeec h. These inc l u de Ar izona Revi sed Statutes Sections 28-873(A) (civil pena lties for sto pp ing or pa

rk ing a c ar in vari ou s si tuatio ns ), 28 -9 05 (c ivi l penalties for

openinga ca

r door if i t i n terfe res with tra ffic) , and 13 -2 90 6( A) (c ri min a l pe nalt ie s f or on e wh o “ re c kle ssl y int e rf e re s w iththe pa ssa g e of any highw ay

or pu bli c thoroug hfar e by

cre ating an unre asonable inconvenie n ce or hazard.” ). Arizona re sponds that “the exi s t i n g traff ic laws had insuff

icient or no de terre nt effe ct on in-stree tV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 31

employ ment solicitat i on.” This ar g ument misses the point and is in any

event unsupporte d.

F i r s t , A r i z o n a ’ s s u

b s t an t i a l g o v e r

n m e n t i n t e r e s t is i n tr a f f ic f lo wan d s a f e ty , n o t i nc ur

b in g in

- s tr e e t e mp lo y

ment solicitation. The quest i o n is theref ore not whe ther e x isting laws ar e s u f

f ic ie n t t o d e a l w it

hin

- s tr e e t e mp lo y

me nt
so lic itatio n, but rathe r wh e the r exis tin g laws are su ff ic ie nt t o d e a l w it h t he traffic problems that may attend in-stre et employ ment solicitation. Arizona, whic h bear s the burden of pr oo f o n th is i ssu e , h a s intr od uc e d no ev ide nc e a dd

re ssi ngit.
Second, our c onsideration is not limi ted to Arizona’s actua l traff

ic safe ty regulations, but includes any potential or actua l traff

ic safe ty regulations that are obviously ava i l able. See, e.g. , Di

sc ov e ry Ne two rk, 507 U.S. at 417 (“The fac t that the city failed to addre ss its rece ntly develope d conce rn about
newsra cks by

regulating the ir size, s h ap e, appea ranc e, or numbe r i nd ic a te s th a t” the re str ic tio n w a s not n arr ow ly tailored). A s discussed above , Redondo B ea ch identified a number of e x isting laws the c ity could have invoked that wer e broad e noug h to addre ss the traff ic c o n ce rns attendinginstreet e mploy

ment solicitation without implicating spe ech. See R edondo Be ach , 6 5 7 F

. 3 d a t9 4 9

– 5 0 ( c i t i n g C a l i f

o r nia
or din anc e s p ro hib iti ngjay wa lki ng , s to pp ingin t ra ff ic along side a red- painted curb, stopping a car “so as to obstruct the no rm a l mo ve me nt o f t ra ff ic ,” sta nd ingin a

ro a dw ay “ if such ac tion int erfere s with the lawful movement of traff ic”
and sta nd ingor sto pp ing“ e xce pt a s n e ar a s is ph y si cal ly possible to the building line or the c urb line”) . Our discussion in R e d

o n d o B e a c h highli g hts the anim a tin g F ir st Amendment princ iple that g over nment must consider pursuing its int ere sts th ro u g h conduct- based r egulations be fo re e na c tin g sp e e c h- ba se d r e g ulatio ns

.V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

32

W e rei t erat e t hat we co nsi d er onl y t he lim ited reco rd b ef o re us and 5

o n ly as a p re d ic tive m a tter a t th e p re lim ina ry in ju n c tio n sta g e . N o thin g in

o ur op i ni o n s ho uld b e read as f o recl o si ng t he p art i es f rom i nt rod uci ng ad d i t i o na l ev i d en ce as thi s ca se p ro ce ed s. Nothing in the r ec o rd shows that Arizona could not eff ectively pursue its interest in traff ic s afe ty by enfor cingor e na c tin g sim ila

r k ind s o f s pe e c h- ne utr a l tr a ff ic sa fe ty regulations. There fore , even unde r the Ce n tra l H udson standard Arizona urg es, plaintiffs are likely to succe ed on the merits of their c laim that the d ay labor provisions ar e overinc lusive beca

use they restric t m ore spe ech tha n n e c e s s ar y t o s e r v e A r i z o n a ’ s i n t e r e s ti ntr a f f i c s a f e ty. 5

The day labor provisions a re a poor fi t wi t h Arizona’s int e re st in tra ff

ic sa fe ty be c a

us e , in this c on te xt, th e y

are a lso underinclusive . As we pr eviously discussed, the district cour t did not abuse its discretion in conc l u d i n g that the day labor pr ov isi on s are un de ri nc lus ive but no t so muc h s o th a t th e y fa il to d ir e c tl y a dv an c e A r iz o n a ’ s inte r e s t in tr a f f ic s a f e ty . That the da y la bo r p ro vis ion s are und e ri nc lus ive is s til l r e le va nt, h o w e v e r , t o w h e th e r

th e y s a t i s f

y Central Hudson ’s no-more

e xten siv e -t

ha n- ne c e ssa ry pr on g

. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly noted the re levanc e of unde rinclusivity to t h is inquiry

and
c or re c tly de te rm ine d th a t th e pr ov isi ons’ un de ri nc lus ivi ty contributes to the plaintiffs’ likelihood of suc cess on the merits. Se e Me tro Lig

hts , 551 F.3d a t 9 05 n.8 (explaining that underinc lusivit y

is releva nt t o both whether

a spee ch restric tion directly

advances the g overnme nt’s interest and whether it is m ore e x tensive than ne cessa ry ).

A s tatut e th at “ dis c ri min a t[e s] on the ba sis of

c on te nt” may be “‘ more e x tensive than ne cessa ry ’ to adva

nce the g overnme nt’s interest” if ther e is no valid rea son for theV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 33

discrimination. Id. (q u o t i n g Cent. Hudson , 447 U.S. at 566) (c i t i n g Ballen , 466 F.3d at 743–44). In Ballen , w e he ld t hat, wher e ther e is no rea son related t o the g overnme nt’s asser ted interest for distinguishing based on content, a c ontent-base d law re stricts more spee ch than nece ssary beca use it indicates that th e g ov e rnme nt “ has no t c are fu lly c a lc ulate d th e c os ts and bene fits associated w ith the burden on speec h imposed by its discriminatory , content-ba sed prohibit i o n

. ” 466 F.3d at 743.

Th e day labor provisions ar e conte nt-based r estrictions desig ned to suppress the economic a ctivity of undocume nted immigra nts. Unlike in Ballen , Ar izon a ha s pr of fe re d at le a st some leg itimate basis for distinguishingbetw ee n day labor solicitation a

nd other roa dside communications. See Section I I .C, su pra . A s n ote d, ho we ve r, tha t ju sti fi c a tio n is onl y mar g in a ll y

s u p p o rte d b y th e r e c o r d

. I nit s n ar

r o w ta il o ring analy sis, the district court corr ectl y d iscounted it and emphasized S.B. 1070’s pur poses clause , the fa ct that the day l abor provisions provide penalties dra sticallyout-ofproportion to those for othe r traf fic violations and the leg islative rec ord. These fac tors al l support the cour t’s conclusion that the da

y labor p ro v i sions are unde rinclusive beca use they are “structur ed to targ et par ticular spee ch ra

ther than a br oader

traff ic problem.” That conc lusion, whether under Central Hudson or So rre ll , und er cuts Arizona’s argument that the day

labor provisions a

re na rrowly tailored t o s e r v e i t s i n t e r e s ti ntr a f

f i c s a f e ty.

In sum, Ar izon a c ou ld have a dv anc e d its inte re st i n tr a ff ic
sa fe ty dir e c tly , w ith out re fe re nc e to sp e e c h. Th e ava ila bil ity of s uch obvious and less-r estrictive a lternatives make s the da y la bo r p ro vis ion s o ve ri nc lus ive . T he y are also underinc lusive beca

use they drawcontent-ba sed distinctionsV A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG

34 that appea

r motivated by

a desire to eliminate the livelihoods of undocume nted immigra nts rather th a n to addre ss Arizona’s interest in traf

fic saf et y . Be ing both ove rinclusive and underinc lusive, the day labor provisions r estrict more speec h th ann e c e s s ar

y t o s e r v e A r i z o n a ’ s i n t e r e s ti ntr a f f i c s a f e ty. The district cour

t correctly

deter mined that plaintiffs are lik el y t o succe ed on the mer its of their First Ame ndment
c la im.

III

.
In addition to likelihood of succ ess on the mer its, a court grant i n g a p re l i m i n ary

i n j un ct i o nmu s tco n s i d er

th e l i kelihood of irre para

ble har m in the ab sence of pre liminary relief , the balanc e of e quities and the public intere st. See W inter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The district court consider ed ea ch of the se fac tors. I ts conclusion that plaintiffs would suffe r irre para ble har m in the absenc e of
an in jun c tio n w a s a

pp ro pr iate be c a

us e “ [t]he los s o f F ir st Amendment f

re edoms , for e ven minimal periods of time, unquestionably

constitutes irrepa

rable i njury .” Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347, 373 ( 1976). The c ourt corr ectly found that the equities tip in f

av or of the pla intiffs beca use they have a signif ic ant F ir st A me ndme nt a

nd e c on omi c int e re st i n eng ag ing in solicitation speech and Arizona need not impede th a ts p e e c hi no r d e r

t o p ur s u e i t s t r a f

f i c s a f e ty g o a l s

. F i n a l l y, th e c o urtc o r

r e c t l y f o un d th a tani n

j un c t i o ni s i nt h e p u

b lic int e re st b e c a

us e the da y la bo r p ro vis ion s, if

e nf or c e d, wo uld infring e the F irst Amendment rights of many persons who are
no t pa rt ie s to thi s la

ws uit

.V A LLE D EL S O L V

. W HI TI NG 35

C ONCL US I ON

L aw s th a t l im it

c o mm e r c ia l s p e e c hmu s t n o t b e more exte n s iv e th ann e c e s s ar

y to s e r v e a s u b s ta n ti a l g o v e r

nment i n t er es t

. T h e d i s tri ctco urt co rr ec t l y d et erm i n edth at , th o u gh A r iz o n a h a s a s ign if ic an t g o v e r

n me n t i n te r e s t i np r omoting tr a ff ic sa fe ty , th e da

y la bo r p ro vis ion s f

a il Central Hudson ’s requirement that re strictions on commercia l speec h be no
more extensive tha

n nece ssary to se rve that intere s t

. The district court did n o t abuse its discre tion in concluding that the plaintiffs ar e likely

to succe ed o n the merits and that the other re quirements for

a preliminary injunction are satisfied. We th er efor e af

firm the pre liminary

injunction barring
e nf or c e me nt o f t

he da y la bo r p ro vis ion s.
AF F IRM ED