Todd C. Emerson, #8175 

444 South River Road 

St. George, Utah, 84790 

Telephone: (435) 634-3530 

Facsimile: ( 435) 634-3505 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the Matter of: 

Sky West Airlines, Inc. 

RECEIVED 

MAR 2 4 2014 

HEARING DOCKET 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR 

DECISION 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 

DMS No.: FAA-2012-0777 

Honorable Richard C. Goodwin 

In accordance with 14 C.P.R.§ 13.218(£)(5), Respondent, by its counsel, 

respectfully files this Rebuttal and Motion for Decision. 1 

Introduction 

It is difficult, from reading the Administrator's brief, to !mow what mechanical 

malfeasance must have occurred with aircraft N822SK to warrant such an impressive 

penalty. Surely safety must have been compromised? No, not even a little bit. We are 

here because of a fault message received on one of two redtmda11t air conditioner 

temperature sensors- operating in manual mode. The sensor was ftmctional in automatic 

1 On January 3, 2014, Complainant filed a Motion for Decision and this Court set a deadline for 

Respondent's response as March 7, 2014. Respondent was granted an extension to that deadline until and 

including March 21, 2014 and therefore, this filing is timely made. 
mode. This means, at worst, the pilots may not have been able to manually adjust the 

cabin temperature. They would have to let the computer do it for them. 

It turns out the sensor was functioning normally but not communicating properly 

with the aircraft's computer. But even if the sensor was inoperable in manual mode, the 

MEL merely required the pilots to set the temperature automatically. Obviously, we are 

not dealing with safety of flight issues if the only problem presented by the fault was the 

pilots could not fiddle with the cabin temp dials. 

To be clear, the air conditioning and pressurization system was always functioning 

on aircraft N822SK, if not, the computer would have latched a "fail" message, not a sensor 

fault. The sensor that sent a fault message corresponds to one of two air conditioners that 

are for passenger comfort only. They do not cool any avionic or flight control systems. In 

fact, the sensor fault is so minor, the MEL ranks it as a category "C", which means it can 

be deferred for up to ten days without receiving attention from maintenance2 

At the time, the MEL merely required that the crew interrogate the computer once a 

day to see if the sensor was actually working and the query could occur after all the flights 

for that day had been completed. Because the other sensor was working, the fault, at most, 

represented a degradation in the redundancy of the ability to manually operate a passenger 

comfort system. 

The flight crews may have very well interrogated the computer on October 19 and 

20, but they made no record of it. The computer was interrogated on October 21 and the 

2 See MEL 21-51-4a, attached as Exhibit A. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

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sensor was found to be operable, as it had been on the 18th. Logical deduction indicates 

the sensor was likely operable on the 19th and 20th as well. Still, it is important and 

obligatory to follow the MEL, no matter how minor the squawk, and SkyWest has a gap in 

its records. 

This short gap, on this negligible fault, cannot possibly warrant a penalty of 

$142,500. This run-away demand is the result of compounding multiple violations on a 

single inadvertent error, contrary the Administrator's own Order, and ignoring the robust 

changes Sky West implemented after the event occurred to block its aircraft from operating 

if an MEL task was not accomplished. 

I. Statement of Facts 

SkyWest has previously stipulated to the facts set forth in the Complaint, dated July 

13, 2012, pertaining to the Bombardier aircraft CRJ-900 aircraft, registered as N822SK 

("the aircraft"). SkyWest aclmowledged that a once-daily maintenance check that was 

required to be performed on the aircraft as a result of a fault indication on October 18, 

2010, was not completed on October 19 and 20. 

In accordance with Sky West's approved procedures and the aircraft's maintenance 

manual, a fix of the component in question could be "deferred" under the Minimum 

Equipment List ("MEL") for later investigation and correction, if necessary. In this matter, 

the aircraft was properly allowed to continue operations as long as a once daily 

maintenance check was completed. The maintenance check involved either maintenance 

personnel or flight crew checking a maintenance data computer ("MDC") once per flight 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

Page3 
day in order to verify the operation of the "pack discharge pressure sensor" and make an 

entry in the aircraft maintenance log accordingly. 

The maintenance check was completed as required on October 18 and 21 and it was 

not required to be completed after that because it was determined that the component in 

question was operable. The component in question was therefore cleared in accordance 

with the aircraft's maintenance manuals and no further daily maintenance checks were 

required on the component. 

The FAA investigated the discrepancy, and even though the incident was an 

isolated and inadvertent oversight, it proposed a civil penalty in the amount of $142,5003 

Sky West requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALI"). Subsequently, 

SkyWest agreed to limit the matter to the issue of sanction because FAA's proposed civil 

penalty is unwarranted, does not follow FAA guidance and does not adequately give credit 

for SkyWest's substantial mitigation measures4 

II. Standard of Review of FAA's Proposed Civil Penalty 

The starting point for review of Complainant's proposed sanction is the policy set 

forth in FAA Order 2150.3B, FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program (effective 

October 1, 2007) (the "Sanction Guidance") 5 The appropriate sanction is based on a 

3 FAA Complaint (July 13, 2012), p. 2. 

4 Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings (February 3, 2014), p. 2. 

5 In the Matter of Folsom's Air Service, Inc., FAA Order No. 2008-11 (November 6, 2008), p. 14; see also In 

the Matter of American Air Network. Inc., FAA Order No. 2006-5 (Febmary 10, 2006), p. 6. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

Page4 
totality of the circumstances, 6 including the nature, extent, and gravity of the violation, 

degree of culpability, history of prior violations, financial situation, and other matters as 

justice may require.7 The ranges set forth in the FAA's sanction guidance are for single, 

inadvertent violations. 8 An inadvertent violation exists where the violation is a "single, 

isolated departure from compliance" with the regulation.9 

The FAA has the burden of establishing that its proposed civil penalty is 

appropriate to the alleged violation. 10 The FAA's proposed sanction is "no more than a 

proposal or a recommendation to the ALJ."11 The FAA must show that it considered the 

seriousness of the violation and the totality of the circumstances. The FAA must prove to 

the ALJ how it used the sanction guidance to arrive at its proposa1.12 The FAA must also 

prove the existence of aggravating factors and must show how it used aggravating or 

mitigating factors to adjust the suggested sanction. 

6 In the Matter of Eastern Air Center, Inc., FAA Order No. 2008-3 (January 28, 2008), p. 9. 

7 In the Matter of GoJet Airlines, LLC, Initial Decision (May 20, 2011 ), p. 8; quoting Folsom s Air Service, 

Inc., p. 11. 

8 Eastern Air Center, Inc., p. 9. 

9 In the Matter of Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., Docket FAA-2009-0180, Initial Decision (December 11, 2009), p. 

19. 

10 In the Matter of Luxemburg, FAA Order No. 1994-18 (June 22, 1994), p. 6. 

11 Eastern Air Center, Inc., p. 8. 

12 !d.; see also In the Matter ofWarbelows Air Ventures, Inc., FAA Order 2000-3 (February 3, 2000), p. 19. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

PageS 
Evidence of swift or comprehensive corrective action must be considered as a 

mitigating factor. 13 The Administrator has given significant weight to respondents' efforts 

to ensure that a violation will not reoccur.

14 Where remedial corrective action was not 

considered in the FAA's proposed sanction, it should be considered by the ALJ in his initial 

d . . 15 ectston. 

III. FAA's Proposed Civil Penalty is Unwarranted and Not Supported by 

Agency Guidance and Decisions. 

The FAA's proposed civil penalty in the amount of $142,500 is unwarranted 

because it over counts the number of violations, assesses too high an amount per violation, 

and does not credit Sky West's substantial mitigation measures. 

A. FAA Over Counts the Number of Violations. 

The FAA asserts that, for purposes of calculating the proposed civil penalty, 19 

violations have occurred. It reaches this number by adding together a violation for each 

flight day (2) to the number of flights on those days (17). Specifically, the FAA asserts that 

two violations of 14 C.P.R. § 119 .5(1) (operation in contrary to OpSpecs) occurred, and 17 

violations of§§ 121.605 and 121.153(a)(2) occurred. 16 

13 American Air Network, Inc., p. 7. 

14 In the Matter of Airtran Airways, Inc., Docket No. FAA-2010-0193, Initial Decision (June 23, 2010), p. 14. 

15 Id, p. 15. 

16 FAA Motion for Decision (January 30, 2014), p. 9. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

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The FAA routinely cites all regulations which may support its allegations. 

However, ALJ s and the Administrator have stated that the sanction should not be a 

mathematical addition of the number of alleged violations. The sanction should reflect the 

totality of the circumstances. The FAA's Sanction Guidance advises that "[w]hen a single 

instance of noncompliance results in multiple violations of general and specific regulations 

involving the same or similar conduct, the FAA ordinarily does not compound the sanction 

Furthermore, the Administrator has agreed with the ALJ in finding that a "residual" 

violation does not justifY an additional penalty. In approving the Initial Decision in GoJet 

Airlines, LLC, the Administrator stated that a "separate sanction, however, is not justified 

... [where] the residual violation is not based on any independent event. " 18 

The isolated and inadvertent oversight in the present matter is akin to GoJet. For 

each of the violations the FAA lists, the failure to document the MDC check is the 

underlying event cited. The FAA cites two violations of 14 C.F.R. § 119.5(g) (operating 

contrary to OpSpecs) and 17 violations of each of14 C.F.R. § 121.153(a)(2) (operating an 

unairworthy aircraft) and 14 C.F.R. § 121.605 (dispatch of an unairworthy aircraft). The 

second and third regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.153(a)(2) and 121.605, are purely residual 

since there is no independent event or separate facts underlying the incident. There are no 

distinguishing factual elements at issue between 14 C.F.R § 119.5(g) on the one hand, and 

17 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, 1]6.c. 

"In the Matter ofGoJet Airlines. LLC, FAA Order No. 2012-5 (May 22, 2012), p. 24-25 (petition for review 

by respondent on unrelated issue denied, Docket No. 12-2719 (8th Cir., March 4, 2014)). 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

· --· Page?. 
14 C.F.R. §§ 121.153(a)(2) and 121.605 on the otherhand19 There are no extraordinary 

circumstances in the present matter that justify using the second regulation simply to 

. h . 20 mcrease t e sanctiOn. 

Altogether, the FAA has cited three regulations and 19 violations- despite only one 

isolated and inadvertent discrepancy present in the matter. The separate regulations cited 

by the FAA do not involve separate facts. The FAA makes no argument to justify the 

counting of the same facts as separate violations. As such, the FAA's mathematical 

calculation of 19 violations is contrary to sanction guidance and agency decisions. Put 

simply, the FAA has over counted the number of regulatory violations and the result is a 

disproportionately harsh outcome for the conduct involved.21 

B. FAA Assesses Too High an Individual Penalty per Each Violation 

The FAA argues that the appropriate penalty is $7,500 per violation, which is at the 

upper end of the range (from $2,000 to $9,999) in the category applicable to this matter. 

Of all of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in the Sanction Guidance and in 

agency decisions, the FAA cites to only one as its only justification for its elevated choice. 

It says that Sky West's "lengthy experience as an air carrier" justifies a sanction higher than 

19 Where FAA cite~ multiple regulatory violations, the test for multiplicity is whether each cited regulatory 

violation "required proof of a fact that the other did not." In the Matter of Frostad Atelier, FAA Order No. 

2013-5 (September 5, 2013), p. 21; citing Ball v. US., 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985). 

20 Ace Pilot Training, FAA Order No. 2005-12 (August 12, 2005), p. 9; quoting USAir, Inc., FAA Order No. 

1992-70 (December 21, 1992), p. 6. 

21 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, ~ 6.b and c. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

Page 8-
the midpoint of the range.

22 In actuality, the Sanction Guidance relating to the "Certificate 

Holder's Level of Experience" states only that"[ c ]ertificate holders with greater levels of 

experience may be held to a higher standard."23 

There is no mandate that an airline be automatically assessed sanctions at the 

higher end of the range simply because it has existed for a decade or more. Corresponding 

to experience level, the Sanction Guidance suggests the sanction should reflect the 

significance of the violation in light of the certificate holder's experience24 

The significance here, of this isolated and inadvertent oversight, is low. Sky West 

has no violation history for this MEL. There is no indication this error was systemic. It 

has all the indicia of human error. As SkyWest strives for 100% compliance and the 

highest level of safety in its operations, it also talces immediate corrective action in cases of 

mistalces, as shown below. The important point is SkyWest's attitude toward compliance 

and its steps in correcting these oversights, particularly in light of the size and complexity 

of its operations. 

As for the "gravity of violation" factor, the FAA aclmowledges there was a low 

degree of hazard because the affected component was determined to be operational-- yet it 

did not decrease the penalty accordingly for this mitigating factor25 

22 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10. 

23 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, ~ 4.c.(1). 

24 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, ~ 4.c.(2). 25 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

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Here, the appropriate starting point for the sanction calculation is below the 

midpoint of the range. The only aggravating factor cited by the FAA, Sky West's 

experience level, is more than canceled out by the low level of significance of the 

inadvertent discrepancy. Other mitigating factors, such as the low degree of hazard, and 

corrective actions (discussed infra), should further decrease the appropriate sanction. 

C. SkyWest Should Be Credited For Its Significant Mitigation Measures. 

Contrary to Sanction Guidance and agency decisions, the FAA's proposed civil 

penalty does not credit Sky West for its prompt measures in remedying the isolated and 

inadvertent discrepancy. Where the FAA does not consider mitigating factors in the 

sanction, the ALJ should review and consider the respondent's actions?6 Agency decisions 

have "given significant weight to respondents' efforts to take prompt steps to assure that 

the violations will not recur?7 

Sky West provided the FAA with a list of the thorough and concise steps it took to 

prevent a reoccurrence of the discrepancy. Sky West took five significant measures to 

prevent a reoccurrence, including: (1) creating the new position of Supervisor oflntemal 

Compliance; (2) establishing an electronic aircraft maintenance blocking program; (3) 

creating the new position of Database Administrator; ( 4) installing an enhanced phone 

system to improve crew to maintenance communications; and ( 5) adding seven additional 

26 AirtranAirways, Inc., p. 15. 

27 Id., p. 14. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

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Maintenance Controllers. Sky West invested appro:xllnately $622,000 in implementing 

these measures 

28 

In part, the FAA's reasoning for refusing to recognize and grant credit to Sky West's 

corrective steps is because it says that Sky West's fleet size was increasing and therefore all 

of Sky West's corrective measures would be expected of it.29 The FAA's claim is overly 

simplistic and its data is incorrect. In 2010, Sky West's entire aircraft fleet was 294 and in 

2011 it increased by 21 aircraft, or 6%, to 315. This modest growth hardly accounts for the 

measures detailed in Exhibit B. 

The FAA also stated that Sky West's corrective actions are not mitigating because 

the steps were necessary to bring Sky West up to the minimum regulatory and statutory 

requirements.30 The FAA's unsubstantiated claim goes on to state that SkyWest must have 

been understaffed and inadequately managed at the time of the incident. The FAA states 

that Sky West's additional positions and personnel are per se proof that it was noncompliant 

with a completely unrelated regulation, 14 C.F.R. § ll9.65(a), prior to implementing 

. . 31 correcttve actwns. 

28 See Sky West Letter to FAA (February 8, 2012) (outlining extensive corrective actions in response to the 

discrepancy), attached as Exhibit B. 

29 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 9. 

3

° FAA Motion for Decision, p. 9. 

31 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 9. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

.... Pagell.-
Suffice it to say this fresh allegation is conclusory, without a grain of evidentiary 

support. It is a smokescreen meant to distract from the substantial mitigation Sky West has 

undertaken to ensure no aircraft can fly with an open write-up. That is, after all, what 

happened here and it occurred because a human failed to follow the MEL. The mitigation 

measures add redundancies, and in particular, an aircraft blocking system that prevents a 

pilot from taking off an aircraft with an open maintenance write up. The measures were 

expensive and effective. It is confusing and contrary to the promotion of safety to have 

effective mitigation measures argued as evidence of wrongdoing. The additional positions, 

employees and systems are "above those required under the FAA's regulations" and should 

have been "considered a mitigating factor in determining an appropriate sanction."32 

The FAA also stated the fact that Sky West's corrective actions took full effect after 

it received the FAA Letter oflnvestigation, precludes any mitigating credit. 33 The 

Sanction Guidance grants greater credit to corrective actions taken prior to FAA's finding 

of a violation, however the Sanction Guidance still provides for mitigation when corrective 

actions are implemented after an investigation. 34 In this matter, time was required to 

evaluate, determine and implement the appropriate corrective steps in order to prevent 

reoccurrence. The planning for Sky West's corrective actions began immediately after the 

discrepancy occurred and was aimed at making systemic changes, not merely responding 

32 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, 'if4.m. 

33 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10. 

34 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, 'if4.m. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

- Page-12 
to a one-off record keeping error. Sky West created two new positions, increased the 

number of maintenance controllers, and improved certain support systems. Full 

implementation took several months which is not unreasonable given Sky West's size and 

complexity of operations. 

In today's modem, large air carrier operations, airlines must evaluate and plan for 

how new positions and systems coordinate with and complement existing organizational 

structures and operating systems in order to make them safe and effective. Furthermore, 

interviewing, hiring and training new employees takes time. New employees must also be 

evaluated and screened for compliance with other FAA regulations (such as criminal 

background checks) before they may be placed into the new position. Sky West took 

significant comprehensive corrective action to prevent reoccurrence of the discrepancy in 

this matter and those steps should be granted ample mitigation credit as they took place 

promptly within the limitations of the large organizational structure and other FAA 

regulations. 

While Sky West could have crafted a narrow and inexpensive fix that addressed 

only the oversight that occurred, it instead elected to more extensively evaluate and plan 

steps that improve the efficiency and safety of the broader organization. Sky West should 

not be penalized for choosing this route. 

Conclusion 

In both of the regulations cited by the FAA, the Sanction Guidance provides that a 

"minimum" civil penalty is appropriate. Appendix B, Figure B-1-1-1 of the Sanction 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

Page 13-
Guidance states that a "minimum" civil penalty is appropriate for technical nonconformity 

to the operations specifications where there is likely no effect on safety. 35 Likewise, 

Appendix B, Figure B-1-c-2 of the Sanction Guidance states that a "minimmn" civil 

penalty is appropriate for the technical"[ o ]peration contrary to the operations 

specification[.]"36 Even the FAA agrees there was a low degree of hazard related to the 

discrepancy and that the "minimum" violation category is applicable to this matter. 37 

But instead of starting at the midpoint of a minimum violation and moving down, 

the FAA ignored SkyWest's mitigation efforts and ratcheted the penalty upward to $7500. 

From there the absurd prevailed, by a factor of 19, to reach $142,500. This proposed 

penalty is simply indefensible under applicable law and the undisputed facts. 

SkyWest therefore respectfully requests that any civil penalty which the Court 

deems appropriate in this matter be minimal, according to Sanction Guidance, and be 

further reduced in recognition of its mitigation measures. 

DATED thisZQ day of March, 2014 

~ 

~~c~ Todd. C. Emerson 

Attorney for SkyWest Airlines, Inc. 

35 The regulation at issue is 14 C.F.R. § 119.5(g), for which the FAA has counted two violations for purposes 

of calculating the sanction. 

36 The regulation at issue is 14 C.F.R. § 121.153(a)(2), for which the FAA has counted 17 violations for 

purposes of calculating the sanction. 

37 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10. 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

Page 14--
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

'7 ifThe undersigned hereby certifies that on thi~_{ day of March, 2014, a true and 

correct copy of the foregoing REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION was served 

as follow~: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2W100 

Via Federal Express 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

East Building Ground Floor, Rm E12-320 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Via E-mail and Federal Express 

Jeffrey M. Harper, Complainant's Counsel 

FAA Office of Regional Counsel · 

1601 Lind Ave., SW 

Renton, Washington 98057 

Via E-mail and Federal Express 

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION 

·Page 15-
EXHIBIT A 
Page: 

MEL - CL600-2D24 (CRJ 900) 

STANDARD PRACTICE 8175 

Revision: 

Date: 

16ofl84 

06 

4/30/2010 

MEL Item Cal lnst Req 

21-51-4a Air Conditioning System c 1 1 

Remarks or Exceptions: Placarding:An Inoperative Placard will be placed on 

(M) System redundancy may be degraded as indicated by "L PACK FAULT" and/or "R the Air Conditioning Control Panel indicating which 

PACK FAULT" status message(s) provided: channel is inoperative 

(-1) Associated pack discharge pressure sensor(s) is verified operative once each 

ftight day, and 

(2) Automatic Mode of the associated Cockpit'Cabin Temperature Control System is 

·~ operative and associated MAN mode is not selected. 

,'' I NOTE: Pack Discharge Temperature Readout(s) and/or Cockpit TEMP Readout(s) 

and/or Cabin TEMP Readout(s) and/or Cockpit SEL Readout(s) may be replaced 

. by amber dashes on the EICAS ECS Synoptic Page. 

Maintenance Procedure: Operations Procedure: 

'Verify operation of the pack discharge pressure sensor by interrogating the MDC. None Required 

NOTE: This may be accomplished by the Flight Crew by coordination with NOTE: Flight Crew may accomplish Maintenance 

~-a_intenance Control. An entry is to be made in the Aircraft Maintenance LC',lg Procedure by coordination with Maintenance Control. 

lridicating the actions taken. An entry is to be made in the Aircraft Maintenance 

NOTE: Maintenance action to be accomplished once per flight day. Log indicating the action taken. 

NOTE: Maintenance action to be accomplished once 

per flight day. 

MEL Item Cat Ins! Req 

,_, 21-51-4b Air Conditioning System c 1 1 

a,emarks or Exceptions: Placardlng:An Inoperative Plac8rd will be placed on 

~.ystem redundancy may be degraded as indicated by "L PACK FAULT' and/or uR the Air Conditioning Control Panel. 

PACK FAULT" status messages provided the associated Air Conditioning Pack(s) is 

q,onsidered inoperative. 

:NOTE: This requires the associated pack to be deferred par MEL 21-51-1a or 

.?1-51-1 b as applicable. 

··. >;- ,-

Maintenance Procedure: Operations Procedure: 

None Required None Required 

· .. MEL Item Cat Ins! Req 

21-52-1a Ram Air SOY c 1 0 

Remarks or Exceptions: Placarding:Piacard Ram Air SOY switch "INOP". 

(M) (O)May be Inoperative OPEN provided: 

(1) Ram Air SOY is deactivated OPEN, 

(2) LH Air Conditioning Pack Is operative, 

(3) RH Air Conditioning Pack is selected OFF, 

{4) Operations are conduded at or below FL250, 

(5)'" Operations are conducted in accordance with the AFM Supplement (Operations 

- _with Airplane Systems Inoperative). 

Maintenance Procedure: Operations Procedure: 

Fa~ an inoperative ram alr SOY and an operative RH air condition pack, do as follows: (1) LH Air conditioning pack switch/Jlght to be pressed 

(1) On the air-conditioning control panel, verify that the ram air SOY is In the open -OUT 

~- 1 position. (2) Aircraft to be operated at or below FL 250. 

(2) Verify EICAS synoptic page shows the ram air SOV.In the open position. (3) Flight Crew will comply with procedure outlined in 

-= ~-(~) Verify that the lever on the ram alr SOY is In the open position. MEL Appendix 0- 21-52-1a. 

· (14.)_ Disconnect the electrical connector MPE15P1 off from the ram air SOV. (4) The operational requirements addressed in the 

(5) Install a protective cap on the electrical connector and receptacle of the valve. Remarks or Exceptions column above, item (5), 

(6) Stow the electrical connector. 

consist of performance adjustments which will be 

(7) Verify that the RAM-AIR push button annunciator light is on. made by dispatch. 

(B) Assure that the Ram Air Shutoff Valve is in OPEN position. Make sure the LH 

air-conditioning pack is operative. Tum the RH air conditioning pack to OFF. 

f '·' 
EXHIBIT B 
Febmary 8, 2012 

Jeffrey M. Harper 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1601 Lind Avenue S.W. 

Renton, Washington 98057 

Subject: Mitigation for case no. 2011NM06005 

Dear Jeff, 

For the purposes of settlement within the scope of the informal conference held earlier today, I 

am sending you this letter to detail the steps SkyWest has taken since October 2010 to ensure 

that an aircraft does not operate with an open maintenance item. With the five points listed 

below, all coming as a direct or indirect result of2011NM06005, SkyWest Airlines has created a 

more robust system of maintenance controls. 

• New Position Created: Supervisor Internal Compliance. This was proposed in the 

SkyWest response letter to FAA Case No. 2011NM6005. This position has daily 

oversight of the internal auditor group and tracks compliance for audit functions. If this 

position existed in October 2010, it would have caught the overfly before it happened. 

We have found it to be an effective stop gap since then. Cost: $60,000 

• Aircraft blocking program. You noted that a pilot (or pilots) should have seen the open 

write-up and cleared it prior to flight. To take the human error factor out of it, we have 

established an electronic block on aircraft that require daily inspections. This program 

prevents the crew from printing a release with an open maintenance item. Cost: $10,000 

• Maintenance Database Administrator. This new position has been created to monitor 

and enhance the database used by the maintenance control group. He ensures the aircraft 

blocking program is working. Cost: $62,000 

• Enhanced Phone System. We found at times of high call volume flight crews were not 

getting timely communication of maintenance information. This leads to impatience and 

less than ideal decision-making. This enhancement prevents call waiting and provides a 

more stable communication environment for crew contact to maintenance control. Cost: 

$120,000 

• More Maintenance Controllers. SkyWest has added seven additional controllers since 

I 0/20/10. They provide more comprehensive daily oversight and maintain operational 

control of Sky West aircraft. Cost per year: $370,400 
In addition to the above inveshnent, SkyWest Airlines is currently involved in an SAT with the 

CMO to establish that we demonstrate all the System Safety Attributes of ATOS. We are 

confident at the conclusion of the SAT, SkyWest will clearly demonstrate a compliant 

philosophy and culture. 

These steps demonstrate a serious commihnent to enhanced safety and controL As all parties 

noted today, the FAA has not seen a repeat violation of this nature in the 14 months since these 

measures have been implemented (more than 700,000 flights). 

As to mitigation, the cost of these steps outstrips the proposed penalty by an order of four to one. 

The $142,500 penalty is not necessary here to ensure compliance. Instead, those resources are 

better used in the programs noted above to enhance safety. As such, Sky West respectfully 

requests that its efforts be credited as meaningful mitigation and the penalty be lowered to 

$25,000. 

Sincerely, 

I 

1 

Todd Emerson 

Director of Goverrunent and Legal Affairs 

Sky West Airlines 

211