Supreme Court 

No. 2021-185-M.P. 

(PC 20-6691) 

 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical 

or other formal errors in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

 

City of Pawtucket :

v. :

The Rhode Island Department of 

Revenue et al.

 : 
- 1 - 

Supreme Court 

 No. 2021-185-M.P. 

(PC 20-6691) 

 

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N 

Justice Robinson, for the Court. The plaintiff, the City of Pawtucket (the 

City), petitioned this Court for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review a July 

27, 2021 judgment granted in favor of the defendants—the Rhode Island Department 

of Revenue (DOR); Marilyn McConaghy, in her official acting capacity as Director 

of the DOR;1 the Rhode Island Division of Municipal Finance; and Steven E. 

Coleman, Jr., in his official capacity as Chief of the Rhode Island Division of 

Municipal Finance. We granted the City’s petition on April 15, 2022. The City 

argues before this Court that the hearing justice erred in upholding the DOR’s 

1

 During the pendency of this appeal, Thomas A. Verdi became Director of the 

DOR. 

City of Pawtucket :

v. :

The Rhode Island Department of 

Revenue et al.

 : 
- 2 - 

interpretation of G.L. 1956 § 45-13-5.1 (the PILOT2 Act) to the effect that the 

properties at issue were not eligible for PILOT funds. 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the writ and affirm the 

judgment of the Superior Court. 

I 

Facts and Travel 

 This case arises out of an administrative appeal from the DOR’s 

determination that two properties owned by The Memorial Hospital (Memorial 

Hospital)—one located at 111 Brewster Street in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and a 

second located at 555 Prospect Street (also in Pawtucket)—were not eligible for state 

aid pursuant to § 45-13-5.13 for fiscal year 2021 (FY 2021) and fiscal year 2022 (FY 

2022). 

 The facts of this case are largely uncontested. In or about 2017, Care New 

England Health System (CNE), which is the parent company of Memorial Hospital, 

applied to the Rhode Island Department of Health for authorization to eliminate the 

emergency department at Memorial Hospital. In May of 2018, CNE’s application 

was approved, and Memorial Hospital’s license was deactivated. However, medical 

2

 For the purposes of this opinion, the term PILOT stands for “payment in lieu 

of taxes.” 

 

3

 See Part IV.B, infra. 
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care and treatment services have continued to be provided at the two properties 

through licenses held by Kent County Memorial Hospital (Kent County Hospital) 

and Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island (Women & Infants Hospital).4

 As it had done in previous years, in July of 2019 the City submitted its annual 

PILOT form to the DOR as a prelude to its anticipated receipt of PILOT funds for 

FY 2021.5 The DOR had sent the form to the City in June of 2019—the form being 

largely based on the form the City had submitted in 2018. Very significantly, 

however, the 2019 form sent to the City by the DOR contained a “strike through” 

relative to the two properties, and it included a new assessment of zero relative to 

the properties as well as a notation stating that “Memorial [Hospital is] no longer a 

licensed hospital.”6 After the DOR received and reviewed the City’s completed July 

4

 Throughout this opinion, when referring to them collectively, we shall refer 

to these two properties by the shorthand expression “the two properties.” 

5

 A municipality seeking appropriation of funds under the PILOT Act must, by 

the first of August each year, provide the DOR with certain information (including 

assessment data) regarding any properties for which the municipality is seeking 

PILOT funds. See G.L. 1956 §§ 45-13-5.1–5.2. Upon receipt of the requisite 

information and documentation, the DOR evaluates the submissions and determines 

which properties are eligible for the PILOT funds that will be disbursed in the 

following calendar year. See §§ 45-13-5.1(f)–5.2. 

6

 After receiving the 2019 PILOT form for FY 2021, the City’s Tax Assessor, 

Robert Burns, sent an e-mail to State Aid and Finance Specialist, Jill Barrette, stating 

that “the properties owned by Memorial Hospital are still owned by Memorial 

Hospital and we should include the assessed values this year.” On June 27, 2019, 

Ms. Barrette responded: “I received your [e-mail] and we are looking into this. We 

will be in touch.” Several minutes later, Mr. Burns replied by e-mail as follows: 
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2019 PILOT form, the parties communicated informally over eligibility for more 

than one year.7 In late July of 2020, the City received its first monthly installment 

of PILOT funds, receiving one-twelfth of $3,521, rather than an amount comparable 

to the one-twelfth of the $579,677 that it had received for FY 2020 when the 

properties were deemed eligible for PILOT funds. 

 Additionally, in July of 2020, the DOR sent the City a PILOT form to be 

submitted for FY 2022. Unlike the 2019 form, the 2020 form did not make any 

mention of the two properties. On July 29, 2020, the City submitted its 2020 PILOT 

form to the DOR; however, the City had edited the form so as to include the two 

properties with an asterisk and a notation stating that the City “believes these 

“Book 137 Page 113 of the deed from Frederick Sayles to Memorial Hospital does 

not allow for the property to be used for any other purpose than a hospital.” The 

record reveals no further correspondence between Mr. Burns and Ms. Barrette 

concerning the matter. 

7

 Beginning in the Fall of 2019, the Chief of the Rhode Island Division of 

Municipal Finance, Steven Coleman, explained to the City that the properties at issue 

“were not eligible for PILOT funds because Memorial Hospital was no longer a 

licensed hospital facility * * *.” On January 16, 2020, Mr. Coleman sent the City 

an e-mail attaching a formal report that indicated the PILOT funds which Pawtucket 

was scheduled to receive for FY 2021; and that report did not include funding for 

the two properties. On January 24, 2020, the Mayor of Pawtucket wrote a letter to 

the then-Director of the DOR, Mark Furcolo, stating in part that he was aware that 

the “appropriation made to the [City] afforded under the [PILOT Act] related to 

[Memorial Hospital] is slated to be eliminated under the Governor’s proposed Fiscal 

Year 2021 budget.” On July 30, 2020, Mr. Coleman sent the City an e-mail with an 

attachment containing the specific amount that the City was scheduled to receive in 

PILOT funds for FY 2021. 
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properties are eligible for the PILOT program.” During the month of August, the 

parties communicated by e-mail concerning the matter. In a letter dated September 

10, 2020, the Director of the DOR formally notified the City that “[s]ince Memorial 

Hospital is not a nonprofit hospital licensed by the state, the property does not qualify 

for inclusion in the grant program.” 

 On September 23, 2020, the City filed a four-count complaint in Providence 

County Superior Court. The City’s complaint requested the following: 

administrative review of the DOR’s decision to deny PILOT funds for the two 

properties (Count One); declaratory relief (Count Two); injunctive relief (Count 

Three); and a writ of mandamus (Count Four). 

On November 30, 2020, defendants filed a “Motion for Summary [Judgment] 

and Affirmance of Defendants’ Administrative Decision.” The defendants 

contended that they were entitled to summary judgment on Count One because (1) 

there was no evidence in the administrative record that the properties were owned 

by a nonprofit hospital licensed by the state; and (2) the City’s complaint was 

untimely. The defendants additionally averred that the other counts (Counts Two 

through Four) were not properly before the court because “judicial review under the 

[Administrative Procedures Act (APA)] is the sole relief available” and because they 

were derivative of Count One. 
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On January 27, 2021, the City filed an objection to defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, contending that defendants’ interpretation of the PILOT Act 

“promotes form over substance, undercuts the General Assembly’s intent, and leaves 

the City facing an absurd result * * *.” The City also asserted that its appeal from 

the DOR’s decision was timely regardless of whether the two-week appeal period 

pursuant to § 45-13-5.2 or the thirty-day appeal period pursuant to the APA applied. 

In addition, the City argued that Counts Two, Three, and Four were procedurally 

proper. 

 On February 24, 2021, a hearing on defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment took place in Superior Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing 

justice continued the matter for a decision. On March 10, 2021, the hearing justice 

requested that the parties submit additional memoranda addressing (1) whether the 

DOR’s decision on eligibility was in actuality a reevaluation for purposes of the 

appeal process set forth in § 45-13-5.2; and (2) whether declaratory relief could be 

issued given the language of § 45-13-5.1(e).8 

 On May 19, 2021, the hearing justice rendered a bench decision. Regarding 

the issue of whether the City’s appeal was timely, the hearing justice determined that 

“the question of eligibility is a question precedent to be determined by the 

8

 The City filed its memorandum on April 1, 2021; defendants submitted their 

memorandum on April 21, 2021. 
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Department of Revenue under 45-13-5.1,” and he added that, because § 45-13-5.1 

“has no appellate proceedings set out in it, and since the PILOT Act is administered 

by an agency of state government, its appellate provisions are found within the APA 

itself, 42-35-15(b).” Consequently, the hearing justice found that the appeal period 

was thirty days, as provided in G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(b). Moreover, the hearing 

justice found that the appeal period was not triggered until formal notice from the 

DOR denying eligibility to the City was provided in the form of the letter dated 

September 10, 2020. For these reasons, the hearing justice held that the appeal was 

timely. 

 Turning to the merits of the case, the hearing justice indicated that the issue 

of eligibility of the two properties for PILOT funds was controlled by the principles 

of statutory interpretation. The hearing justice found to be irrelevant the fact that all 

three nonprofit hospitals (Kent County Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital, and 

Memorial Hospital) were owned by CNE. The hearing justice ultimately ruled that 

the DOR’s interpretation of the PILOT Act was not “arbitrary or capricious, 

unsupported in the record, or an abuse of discretion.” He concluded “as a matter of 

law and statutory interpretation” that the properties “are not owned by a licensed 

hospital and, therefore, [are] ineligible for the consideration under the PILOT 

statute.” Because his decision as to Count One was dispositive, the hearing justice 

ruled that the remaining counts were moot. 
- 8 - 

 On July 27, 2021, an order reflecting the hearing justice’s decision entered; 

final judgment in favor of defendants entered on the same day. On August 16, 2021, 

both parties filed petitions for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. On April 15, 2022, 

this Court granted the City’s petition and denied the petition filed by defendants. 

II 

Issues Presented 

The City contends that its appeal to the Superior Court was timely under the 

application of either § 45-13-5.2 or § 42-35-15(b). With respect to the merits, the 

City argues that, taking into account the language and the purpose of the PILOT Act, 

the City remained eligible for PILOT Act funding. Accordingly, it asserts that the 

hearing justice erred in adopting the DOR’s determination that the City was no 

longer eligible to receive PILOT funds pursuant to § 45-13-5.1 for the two properties 

“merely because those two properties were not owned and licensed by the same 

entity.” 

III 

Standard of Review 

 Section 42-35-15(g) of the APA, which governs the Superior Court’s review 

of an administrative appeal, reads as follows: 

“The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 

agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of 

fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or 

remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse 
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or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant 

have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, 

inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 

“(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 

“(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 

“(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; 

“(4) Affected by other error of law; 

“(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, 

and substantial evidence on the whole record; or 

“(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 

discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.” 

This Court’s review of the Superior Court’s judgment in administrative 

proceedings is also limited by the APA. See § 42-35-16. When this Court conducts 

such a review, it is “limited to questions of law,” which we review in a de novo 

manner. Rossi v. Employees’ Retirement System, 895 A.2d 106, 110 (R.I. 2006). We 

accord great deference to the factual findings of the administrative agency. Id. 

IV

Analysis 

A 

Timeliness of the Superior Court Appeal 

We begin our review by addressing defendants’ contention that the City’s 

appeal to the Superior Court was untimely. The defendants assert that the two-week 
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appeal period set forth in § 45-13-5.2 was controlling. They further contend that, 

because the City’s appeal was filed on September 23, 2020, “it must have received 

notice of DOR’s determination that the properties were ineligible no sooner than 

September 9, 2020.” The defendants accordingly take the position that the City’s 

appeal was untimely because “the City received notice that DOR did not deem the 

[p]roperties to be eligible for PILOT funds many times before September 9, 2020.” 

(Emphasis in original omitted.) Additionally, defendants argue that, even if this 

Court were to apply § 42-35-15(b)’s appeal period, the City’s appeal would still be 

untimely. 

 Before determining the correct statutory appeal period to be applied in this 

case, we must first ascertain when the City received final, formal notice of the 

DOR’s decision to deny the City’s request for PILOT funds for the two properties. 

Pursuant to § 45-13-5.2: 

“The director of revenue may, on or before April 30 next 

succeeding the receipt of the statement, reevaluate any 

exempt property when, in the director’s judgment the 

valuation made by the local assessor or assessors is 

inaccurate, and shall notify the municipality of the 

reevaluation. Any municipality aggrieved by the action of 

the director of revenue under the provisions of this section 

may, within two (2) weeks of the notice, file an appeal 

consistent with the provisions of chapter 35 of title 42.” 

Turning to the APA, it instructs, in relevant part: “Proceedings for review are 

instituted by filing a complaint in the superior court of Providence County or in the 
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superior court in the county in which the cause of action arose * * * within thirty 

(30) days after mailing notice of the final decision of the agency * * *.” Section 

42-35-15(b). 

Although § 45-13-5.2 does not specify what form notice must take, and while 

§ 42-35-15(b) provides that an appeal may be made “after mailing notice of the final 

decision of the agency,” it is our opinion that the September 10, 2020 letter was the 

only final, formal, and written decision of the DOR from which an appeal could be 

taken. The DOR’s attempt to persuade this Court that various earlier 

communications and actions (including but not limited to e-mails between the parties 

informally discussing the matter; delivery of the PILOT funding report to the City 

on January 16, 2020; and receipt of the first monthly installment of PILOT funds in 

late July of 2020) put the City on notice of the DOR’s decision is unavailing. While 

it may possibly be that those communications and actions constituted some sort of 

advance indication that the eligibility of the two properties for PILOT funds was in 

question, the City did not possess any formal notice of a final decision by the DOR 

that would in effect trigger an appeal period until the September 10, 2020 letter. 

It is our definite view, therefore, that, in order to satisfy the notice requirement 

in the present case pursuant to either the PILOT Act or the APA, notice had to take 

the form of a final written decision by the DOR. And this determination aligns with 

rational public policy. When written formal notice of a final decision of an agency 
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is provided to a party, that action provides a clear and unequivocal signal that the 

clock for the exercise of appellate rights has begun to tick. Certainty as to when an 

appeal period begins is of particular importance in this domain. 

As a result of our conclusion that final, formal notice of the DOR’s decision 

to deny eligibility took the form of its September 10, 2020 letter to the City, we 

decline to determine which statutory appeal period (§ 45-13-5.2 or § 42-35-15(b)) is 

applicable. Upon receiving the DOR’s September 10, 2020 letter, the City initiated 

its action in Superior Court on September 23, 2020. Accordingly, under either

§ 45-13-5.2 (two-week appeal period) or § 42-35-15(b) (thirty-day appeal period), 

the City’s appeal was timely. 

B 

Statutory Interpretation of the PILOT Act 

 The City contends that the DOR’s interpretation of the PILOT Act9 and the 

hearing justice’s affirmance thereof are the product of an overly mechanical and 

restrictive definition of the term “nonprofit hospital facility.” It argues that the 

DOR’s interpretation of the statutory language is overly mechanical and restrictive 

“especially when weighed against the statute’s purpose and read in conjunction with 

state law governing local taxation.” Specifically, the City argues that this Court 

should “harmonize the language of the PILOT Act with its purpose, with § 44-3-3 

9

 The text of the relevant portion of the PILOT Act is set forth infra. 
- 13 - 

[the statute concerning the status of tax-exempt property], and avoid a ‘mechanical 

application of’ the ‘statutory definition’ of a ‘nonprofit hospital facility,’ which has 

‘produced an absurd result or defeated legislative intent.’” (Brackets in original 

omitted.) The City asserts that the fact that licenses were held by affiliated nonprofit 

hospital corporations rather than the property-owner (Memorial Hospital) “should 

not have altered the [p]roperties’ * * * eligibility for PILOT Act funding.” 

 For their part, defendants assert that the “Superior Court properly applied the 

plain text of the PILOT Act to the undisputed facts to affirm DOR’s determination 

that the [p]roperties are ineligible for PILOT funds because they are not owned by a 

‘nonprofit hospital licensed by the state.’” 

 This Court has “often noted [that] it is well settled that when the language of 

a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and 

must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” State v. Santos, 

870 A.2d 1029, 1032 (R.I. 2005) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). It 

is also “well established that when we examine an unambiguous statute, there is no 

room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). We have noted that the “plain statutory language 

is the best indicator of legislative intent.” Id.; see Martone v. Johnston School 

Committee, 824 A.2d 426, 431 (R.I. 2003) (“When interpreting a statute, our 

ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. * * * The best 
- 14 - 

evidence of such intent can be found in the plain language used in the statute. Thus, 

a clear and unambiguous statute will be literally construed.”). 

 Section 45-13-5.1(a) of the PILOT Act provides: 

“In lieu of the amount of local real property tax on real 

property owned by any private nonprofit institution of 

higher education, or any nonprofit hospital facility, or any 

state owned and operated hospital, veterans’ residential 

facility, or correctional facility occupied by more than one 

hundred (100) residents which may have been or will be 

exempted from taxation by applicable state law, exclusive 

of any facility operated by the federal government, the 

state of Rhode Island, or any of its subdivisions, the 

general assembly shall annually appropriate for payment 

to the several cities and towns in which the property lies a 

sum equal to twenty-seven percent (27%) of all tax that 

would have been collected had the real property been 

taxable; provided, however, said percentage shall be 

subject to adjustment pursuant to subsection (e) of this 

section.” (Emphasis added.) 

Furthermore, the PILOT Act expressly defines the term “nonprofit hospital facility” 

as “any nonprofit hospital licensed by the state and which is used for the purpose of 

general medical, surgical, or psychiatric care and treatment.” Section 45-13-5.1(c) 

(emphasis added). 

 It is plainly evident from the text of the PILOT Act that the definition of 

“nonprofit hospital facility” is comprised of two components: (1) it must be a 

nonprofit hospital licensed by the state; and (2) it must be used for the purpose of 

general medical, surgical, or psychiatric care and treatment. See § 45-13-5.1(c). We 

detect no ambiguity in the PILOT Act’s definition of “nonprofit hospital facility.” 
- 15 - 

It is clear to us that the statutory language mandates that the hospital-owner of the 

property must also be the holder of a state-issued license. Thus, in order to qualify 

for PILOT Act funds, the subject property must be owned by a nonprofit hospital 

facility that is both licensed by the state and used for the purposes of medical care 

and treatment. 

It is undisputed here that Memorial Hospital was the owner of the two 

properties at the time the City filed its PILOT forms for FY 2021 and FY 2022. 

Importantly, however, it is also undisputed that Memorial Hospital’s license was 

deactivated in May of 2018. The City’s argument—that, because Kent County 

Hospital and Women & Infants Hospital held their own licenses and provided 

medical care and/or treatment, the City was entitled to the distribution of PILOT 

funds—misses the mark. Specifically, its contention that the “undefined phrase 

‘licensed by state’ could serve only one rational purpose: ensuring that properties 

are actually used for the provision of medical care” would render the first component 

of the definition of “nonprofit hospital facility” (i.e., licensure) to be meaningless. 

See St. Clare Home v. Donnelly, 117 R.I. 464, 470, 368 A.2d 1214, 1217-18 (1977) 

(“In giving construction to a statute, the [C]ourt is bound, if it be possible, to give 

effect to all its several parts. No sentence, clause or word should be construed as 

unmeaning and surplusage, if a construction can be legitimately found which will 

give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.”); see also Wayne Distributing 
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Co. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457, 460 (R.I. 1996) 

(“Where there is no ambiguity, we are not privileged to legislate, by inclusion, words 

which are not found in the statute.”). 

The plain, blunt fact is that neither Kent County Hospital nor Women & 

Infants Hospital owned the properties at issue, and the City cannot overcome the fact 

that the owner of the properties, Memorial Hospital, is no longer a licensed nonprofit 

hospital facility. If the General Assembly desired to extend the definition of 

nonprofit hospital facility so as to include all properties used for the provision of 

medical care, we have no doubt that it could have done so; but the fact is that it did 

not do so. See State v. Fuller-Balletta, 996 A.2d 133, 140 (R.I. 2010) (“When the 

language of a statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, 

there is no room for statutory extension.”) (deletions omitted) (quoting McGuirl v. 

Anjou International Co., 713 A.2d 194, 197 (R.I. 1998)); see also Olamuyiwa v. 

Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 536 (R.I. 2012); Pizza Hut of America, Inc. v. 

Pastore, 519 A.2d 592, 594 (R.I. 1987) (“If the [C]ourt has not interpreted the statute 

in a manner consistent with the legislative intent * * *, further societal response is 

the exclusive prerogative of the Legislature.”); Little v. Conflict of Interest 

Commission, 121 R.I. 232, 237, 397 A.2d 884, 887 (1979). As this Court has 

previously noted, it is not the role of this Court to contort unambiguous language so 

as to extend it. Olamuyiwa, 45 A.3d at 536 (“It is not our role to contort the language 
- 17 - 

of an unambiguous statute in order to include within its reach a situation which it 

plainly does not encompass.”); Iselin v. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement 

System of Rhode Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008) (noting that the Court’s 

“assigned task is simply to interpret the act, not redraft it”) (quoting Sindelar v. 

Leguia, 750 A.2d 967, 972 (R.I. 2000)). 

Additionally, because the plain, unambiguous language of the PILOT Act is 

dispositive, we view the City’s argument conflating tax-exempt status with PILOT 

fund eligibility as similarly unpersuasive. The City asserts that the PILOT Act “must 

be read to effectuate its purpose: providing cities and towns with a proportional 

reimbursement for the lost revenue in taxes that they may otherwise have collected 

on certain tax-exempt property * * *.” This Court’s interpretation of the PILOT Act 

is completely consistent with its plain language and is in no way inconsistent with 

the statute’s intended purpose—providing funding for tax-exempt properties that are 

owned by nonprofit hospitals licensed by the state. Consequently, it is our view that 

the City’s assertion that what it characterizes as the “mechanical” and “overly 

restrictive” interpretation of the term “nonprofit hospital facility” produces an absurd 

result is without merit. 

Accordingly, Memorial Hospital did not meet the PILOT Act’s explicit 

definition of “nonprofit hospital facility,” and we discern no error in the DOR’s 
- 18 - 

decision to deny the disbursement of PILOT funds for FY 2021 and FY 2022 with 

respect to the two properties owned by Memorial Hospital.10 

V 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we quash the writ and affirm the 

judgment of the Superior Court. We remand this case to the Superior Court with our 

decision endorsed thereon. 

10 As a result of our conclusion that the DOR’s decision to deny PILOT Act fund 

eligibility for the two properties for FY 2021 and FY 2022 was not erroneous, we 

need not reach the other arguments addressed by the City. 
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case City of Pawtucket v. The Rhode Island Department of 

Revenue et al.

Case Number No. 2021-185-M.P.

(PC 20-6691)

Date Opinion Filed May 2, 2024

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III 

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard D. Raspallo

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Edward David Pare, III, Esq. 

For Defendants:

Katherine Connolly Sadeck, Esq.