2020 IL App (4th) 180211-U

NO. 4-18-0211

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARIA S. PACHECO,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Clark County

No. 10CF63

Honorable

Tracy W. Resch, 

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Knecht and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding defendant received reasonable assistance 

of postconviction counsel.

¶ 2 In June 2017, defendant, Maria S. Pacheco, filed a pro se postconviction petition. 

In September 2017, the State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing defendant’s actual innocence 

claim failed and her other arguments were res judicata. In March 2018, the trial court dismissed 

defendant’s postconviction petition. 

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing she received unreasonable assistance of 

postconviction counsel where counsel failed to shape her sentencing claim into proper legal 

form. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

June 18, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
- 2 -

¶ 5 In July 2010, the State charged defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of the 

offense, as an adult with three counts of first-degree murder based on her accountability for the 

death of her uncle, Arnulfo Pacheco (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2010)). The State also 

charged defendant with robbery based on a theory of accountability (720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 

2008)) and possession of a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2010)). In June 2011, 

the matter proceeded to a jury trial. In defendant’s direct appeal, this court summarized the 

relevant testimony from defendant’s codefendant, Jarrod Riley, as follows:

“Riley testified he and defendant started dating in the 

spring of 2010 and began having a sexual relationship. He was 20, 

and defendant was 15. He stated defendant was the first girl he 

loved. In June 2010, defendant had her sixteenth birthday. 

Defendant told Riley she thought her uncle, Arnulfo, was going to 

get her a car for her birthday, but this did not happen. Riley 

testified defendant was not happy at home. She told him she 

always fought with her parents and hated her uncle. She said her 

father hit her and her mother. Riley testified defendant wanted to 

run away and he wanted to help her.

Riley testified he and defendant talked and texted about 

using bleach to knock out her uncle so they could take his car. He 

sent her a text message asking if she had rope or duct tape. She 

responded she thought there was some in the garage. Defendant 

later texted Riley to say they were out of duct tape, but she would 
- 3 -

buy some and keep looking for rope. Defendant suggested taking 

her father’s checkbook with them to pay for things.

Riley texted defendant on July 10, 2010 and told her he 

wanted to leave on Monday. The texts showed the plan was for 

him to get to defendant’s house, wait for her uncle to arrive, knock 

him out, tie him up, and take his car before he woke up. Defendant 

responded the plan sounded good. She said she would need to 

make sure she was home alone. Riley sent her another text and 

said she needed to soak a rag in bleach for Monday. Defendant 

confirmed she received the text message. Riley testified the rag 

and bleach were ultimately going to be used on Arnulfo.

Riley texted defendant and said he was going to take a cab 

to Marshall on Monday. Defendant replied her uncle would leave 

for work at 10 or 11 so Riley would need to get there earlier than 

that. Riley sent her a text message asking how they would get 

Arnulfo into her house. Riley testified he sent defendant another 

message telling her not to stop him no matter what he did to her 

uncle. She responded she would not stop him.

According to Riley’s testimony, their plan later changed to 

killing Arnulfo and taking his truck. Riley testified on July 11, 

2010, he sent defendant a text message stating they were going to 

steal her uncle’s ‘shit’ after ‘i do what im doing to your uncle.’ He 

then sent defendant a text message which asked if defendant had 
- 4 -

any sharp knives at her house. Defendant responded shortly 

thereafter asking what Riley was planning to do. Riley sent her a 

text, stating he was going to “ ‘F’ him up but if he fights back well 

you understand, righ.” Defendant responded asking what Riley 

meant by “ ‘F’ him up.” She also said she did not think they 

needed to be ‘killing anyone yet.’

Riley sent defendant a text message directing her to tell her 

uncle something was wrong with their toilet as a ruse to lure him 

into the house. He asked what time her uncle would be at her 

house. Defendant responded her uncle would be there around 10 

a.m. before leaving for work. Riley sent defendant a text which 

said, ‘Then lets do this and be free and do unto ppl that has been 

done unto us.’ Riley said his intent was to kill defendant’s uncle. 

Defendant responded texting ‘yes lets.’ Riley sent another text to 

defendant, which read, ‘I love you more than anything you might 

see a side of me tomorrow very few ppl see don’t be scared cuz i 

would never hurt you.’ Riley sent defendant a message, texting, ‘I 

am already know what i am doing don’t stop me soon you will 

have to be cold.’ Defendant responded, texting, ‘Huh.’ Riley 

texted her the following message, ‘Don’t stop me no matter how it 

turns out.’

Shortly thereafter, Riley asked defendant if she found 

bleach and a rag. Defendant replied she had. Riley also texted 
- 5 -

defendant asking whether she found a good strong knife. 

Defendant responded the knives she found were not that sharp or 

strong.

According to Riley, defendant told him her uncle 

inappropriately touched her by rubbing her inner thigh and lower 

back and kissing her on the cheek. Riley sent defendant a text, 

which read, ‘Was just going to knock him out but he is touching 

little girls and tried to touch my fiancé it ends tomorrow.’ 

Defendant replied, texting, ‘yea thats wat i thought you were 

planing to do.’

Riley sent defendant another text, stating, ‘Lol i love you 

you are starting to sound and act like me thats good.’ Defendant 

responded, texting, ‘Lol I can be evil bad cruel sometimes lol.’ 

Riley replied, texting, ‘Be it more often just not to me ok baby it 

will help us in the future a lot.’ Riley sent defendant another 

message, texting, ‘Tomorrow we kill a bad man then we start our 

lives over just you and me.’ Defendant responded, texting, ‘Yes 

just you and me.’

Riley later asked defendant if she had a baseball bat. 

Defendant said she did not. Defendant sent Riley a message, 

stating, ‘Have bunch of metal rods in garage tho.’ They texted 

about the size and strength of the rods. Riley sent defendant a 

message, texting, ‘I don't want them to break i want them to be 
- 6 -

strong im thinking just cutting his throat.’ Defendant responded, 

‘They wont break. Do wat you need to do. All i ask is that i see 

none of it if possible.’ Defendant later texted Riley her uncle 

deserved ‘it,’ but she did not want to see ‘it.’

Riley testified he texted defendant shortly after midnight on 

July 12, 2010, ‘Be happy are you sure you want this to still 

happen.’ He was talking about killing her uncle and running away.

Defendant responded, ‘I am happy. Yes i'm sure that i want to do 

this.’

Riley sent defendant a text the morning of July 12, 2010, 

asking if she was ‘ready for this baby.’ Defendant responded she 

was. As he was traveling to Marshall, Riley and defendant 

exchanged text messages about her family’s whereabouts. Riley 

went to defendant’s house after her family left. Defendant got the 

bleach, and they moved a couch in front of the entryway to the 

kitchen. Riley put the bleach in a bowl and soaked the rag.

When defendant saw her uncle outside the house, she called 

to him from the kitchen window and said something was wrong 

with the bathroom. Defendant did not tell her uncle Riley was in 

the house. After Arnulfo checked on the bathroom, defendant 

pushed him at Riley. According to Riley, defendant told him to 

remember what her uncle had done to her. Riley grabbed Arnulfo 

by the throat and covered his mouth with the bleach-soaked rag. 
- 7 -

Although he could not see defendant at that time, he testified he 

could ‘tell she was there.’

Riley testified the bleach did not knock Arnulfo out like he 

expected. Instead, Arnulfo tried to hit Riley with a hammer. Riley 

took the hammer from Arnulfo and hit him with it. The struggle 

between Riley and Arnulfo went from the foyer to the dining room 

of the home. Riley testified he did not know how many times he 

hit the victim with the hammer. Arnulfo was still struggling, and 

Riley hit him over the head with a VCR and then smashed a glass 

tabletop over his head. The glass tabletop broke, and Riley 

grabbed a piece of the glass and stabbed Arnulfo twice in his neck.

Arnulfo stopped struggling at that point. Riley then taped the 

bleach-soaked rag over the victim’s mouth with the duct tape 

defendant had brought into the house.

Riley testified Arnulfo was screaming defendant’s name 

during the struggle, but she did nothing to aid him. After Riley 

taped the rag over Arnulfo’s mouth, he saw defendant in the foyer, 

shaking. Riley asked if she was okay, and she said yes. Defendant 

went upstairs and grabbed her clothes and other things, which were 

already packed. She and Riley then started loading the victim’s 

truck. They left the house within 5 to 10 minutes after Arnulfo 

was killed. After they got in Arnulfo’s truck, defendant asked 

Riley if he got Arnulfo’s wallet. He told her he did not. He 
- 8 -

testified defendant ‘gave me a look,’ and he went back in and got 

the wallet.

Riley testified defendant never tried to get away from him 

or call the police. They were arrested in Camden, Tennessee. 

According to Riley’s testimony, while he and defendant were 

driving through Indiana, defendant told him she thought they 

should live a life of crime like Bonnie and Clyde, robbing and 

killing people.” People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, 

¶¶ 13-28, 991 N.E.2d 896.

¶ 6 Following the June 2011 trial, the jury convicted defendant of robbery by 

accountability, unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, and first-degree murder by 

accountability. 

¶ 7 In March 2011, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The State argued 

defendant actively participated in Riley’s plan to murder Arnulfo and admitted Arnulfo would 

not be dead if she had not lured him into the trap. The State argued defendant’s young age was a 

mitigating factor, but it should not outweigh her participation in the premeditated murder of her 

uncle. The State recommended a sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment. 

¶ 8 Defense counsel argued a minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was 

appropriate. Defense counsel argued defendant was only 15 years old when she met Riley and 

they decided to run away. Defendant was young and unsophisticated at the time of Arnulfo’s 

murder and would not have been involved in such an event without Riley planning and executing 

the murder. Counsel argued that normally defendant would have been prosecuted in juvenile 

court because “it’s accepted that 15 and 16-year-olds do not always make rational decisions and 
- 9 -

are driven by immature decision making.” Counsel acknowledged the legislature determined the 

age for criminal prosecution should be lower for first-degree murder but “[t]hat does not change 

the fact that 15 and 16-year-olds do not think and act rationally as adults.” 

¶ 9 The trial court began by noting the sentencing hearing was under Article 5 of the 

Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-1 et seq. (West 2010)) and related only to the 

offense of first-degree murder. The court stated it “considered the presentence investigation 

report, the nature and circumstances of the offense, [defendant]’s statement in allocution, the 

evidence at trial, the arguments of counsel as to sentencing alternatives *** [and] each and every 

one of the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation.” The court noted the text messages 

between defendant and Riley left no reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly planned, aided, 

and abetted Arnulfo’s murder. The court discussed numerous factors in mitigation and 

specifically addressed defendant’s age as follows:

“Third, the [d]efendant’s age. This relates probably to 

factors eight and nine, or at least possibly nine. [Defendant] turned 

16 two weeks before the murder, approximately. No one can know 

how the actions of this juvenile were affected by her age and by 

the involvement of Jarrod Riley, who is an adult, even if an 

immature one.

The law acknowledges that juveniles are different than 

adults and presupposes that juveniles generally have a greater 

potential for rehabilitation. The evidence would suggest that 

[defendant]’s potential for rehabilitation is greater than that of 

most juveniles who probably find themselves in these 
- 10 -

circumstances as a result of their participation in murder. By the 

time [defendant] is released from prison, she will be much older. It 

is unlikely that the circumstances in which this crime was 

committed will reoccur.” 

The court again stated it “considered the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, 

character, age[,] and attitude of the [d]efendant,” and sentenced defendant to 30 years’ 

imprisonment.

¶ 10 This court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. People 

v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, 991 N.E.2d 896.

¶ 11 In June 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. In her petition, 

defendant raised a claim of actual innocence, arguing text messages show she had no knowledge 

of Riley’s plan to kill Arnulfo. Defendant further argued the State failed to prove the elements of 

first-degree murder. Defendant also alleged a violation of her eighth and fifth amendment rights

(U.S. Const., amends. VIII, V). Specifically, defendant alleged the three-year term of mandatory 

supervised release violated her constitutional rights because it extended her sentence beyond the 

maximum term of imprisonment to be served at 100%. Finally, defendant alleged she received 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel failed to seek a psychological evaluation as 

to her mental capacity. Defendant alleged “she was afraid of her codefendant whom was legally 

an adult who was in a sexual relationship with a minor, and manipulat[ed] her youth and mind[,] 

creating and facilitating the actions of this minor.” Defendant alleged trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance for failing to (1) provide that information during trial and (2) get defendant 

“psychological testing before trial in this regard.” 
- 11 -

¶ 12 In January 2018, appointed counsel filed a motion to request appointment of a 

psychiatrist to evaluate defendant to determine if Riley’s control over her would have negated 

the offense, assisted in defendant’s defense, or provided mitigation evidence at sentencing. 

During the hearing on the motion, appointed counsel asserted she would file an amended 

postconviction petition if a psychiatric evaluation helped defendant in any way. The trial court 

denied the motion to appoint an expert. 

¶ 13 In February 2018, appointed counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), asserting:

“(1) I have consulted with the [d]efendant by mail to 

ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in her pro se

[p]etition for [c]onviction [r]elief.

(2) I have examined portions of the trial court file and 

partial report of the jury trial proceedings regarding the errors cited 

in the [d]efendant’s pro se [p]etition for [p]ost [c]onviction [r]elief.

(3) Counsel does not intend to amend the defendant’s 

[p]ro se [p]etition because she is unable to obtain supporting 

affidavits from a psychiatrist based on the [c]ourt’s ruling on 

February 26, 2018.” 

In March 2018, the trial court dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition. 

¶ 14 This appeal followed. 

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues she received unreasonable assistance of 

postconviction counsel where counsel failed to shape defendant’s sentencing claim into proper 
- 12 -

legal form. Specifically, defendant argues postconviction counsel should have amended the 

petition to argue the trial court failed to take defendant’s age into account at sentencing in 

violation of the eighth amendment. The State asserts postconviction counsel was not required to 

formulate new claims and the pro se petition did not raise even a gist of a claim that the 30-year 

prison sentence violated the eighth amendment on account of defendant’s age.

¶ 17 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides for the appointment of counsel at the 

second stage of proceedings. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2016). Appointed counsel must provide 

“reasonable assistance,” including compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 

1, 2017). People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 237-38, 609 N.E.2d 304, 309 (1993). “Rule 651(c)

requires that the record disclose that post-conviction trial counsel: (1) consulted with the

petitioner to ascertain his contentions of constitutional deprivation; (2) examined the record of 

the proceeding of the original trial; and (3) made any amendments to the pro se petition 

necessary to adequately present the petitioner’s constitutional contentions.” Id. at 238. 

Appointed counsel is presumed to have provided defendant reasonable assistance of counsel 

when a Rule 651(c) certificate is filed. People v. Mendoza, 402 Ill. App. 3d 808, 813, 931 

N.E.2d 703, 707-08 (2010). 

¶ 18 Here, defendant contends counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance where 

she did not amend the postconviction petition to raise a claim that defendant’s 30-year sentence 

violated the eighth amendment based on defendant’s age. Defendant argues the trial court 

“openly rejected the central concepts that must underpin a juvenile sentence.” Defendant asserts 

the trial court’s rejection of these concepts resulted in an improper sentence. The State argues 

defendant’s pro se postconviction petition did not raise a constitutional claim that her sentence 
- 13 -

was improper because the trial court rejected the notion that being a juvenile could be taken into 

account during sentencing. 

¶ 19 Defendant’s postconviction petition raised a claim of actual innocence, arguing 

text messages showed she had no knowledge of Riley’s plan to kill Arnulfo. Defendant further 

argued the State failed to prove the elements of first-degree murder. Defendant also alleged a 

violation of her eighth and fifth amendment rights. Specifically, defendant alleged the three-year 

term of mandatory supervised release violated her constitutional rights because it extended her 

sentence beyond the maximum term of imprisonment to be served at 100%. Finally, defendant 

alleged she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel where counsel failed to seek a 

psychological evaluation as to her mental capacity. Defendant alleged “she was afraid of her 

codefendant whom was legally an adult who was in a sexual relationship with a minor, and 

manipulat[ed] her youth and mind[,] creating and facilitating the actions of this minor.” 

Defendant alleged trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to (1) provide that 

information during trial and (2) get defendant “psychological testing before trial in this regard.”

¶ 20 Nothing in defendant’s pro se postconviction petition indicates a claim that her 

sentence was improper because the trial court explicitly refused to consider her age at 

sentencing. Defendant’s only eighth amendment claim addressed the propriety of a three-year 

term of mandatory supervised release. Counsel’s duty to amend a pro se postconviction petition 

is limited by the constitutional claims raised by defendant. People v. Richardson, 382 Ill. App. 

3d 248, 258, 888 N.E.2d 553, 561 (2008). Postconviction counsel is not required to formulate 

new claims. People v. Vasquez, 356 Ill. App. 3d 420, 424-25, 824 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (2005). 

¶ 21 Even if counsel had raised the claim defendant raises on appeal, we conclude this 

eighth amendment claim is frivolous and patently without merit. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 
- 14 -

460, 489 (2012), stands for the proposition that a court must have the opportunity to consider 

mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. A life 

sentence for a juvenile, whether mandatory or discretionary, is disproportionate and violates the 

eighth amendment unless the court considers the defendant’s youth and its attendant 

characteristics. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, 91 N.E.3d 849. Therefore, an eighth 

amendment claim exists where a juvenile (1) received a “life sentence, mandatory or 

discretionary, natural or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its 

attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.” People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27, 137 

N.E.3d 763. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a 40-year term of imprisonment without 

parole eligibility is long enough to be considered a de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 40.

¶ 22 Here, defendant did not receive a life sentence. Defendant was sentenced to a 

term of 30 years’ imprisonment. The Illinois Supreme Court has established a bright-line rule 

that 40 years is a de facto life sentence. Obviously, defendant’s sentence does not reach that 

threshold. Moreover, we find defendant mischaracterizes the record in this case. Defendant 

repeatedly asserts the trial court “openly rejected” the notion of taking defendant’s youth into 

account. But the trial court expressly stated it found defendant’s age to be a mitigating factor. 

The court stated, “No one can know how the actions of this juvenile were affected by her age and 

by the involvement of Jarrod Riley, who is an adult, even if an immature one.” But the court 

went on to acknowledge the law recognizes juveniles are different from adults. A fair reading of 

the trial court’s entire remarks on sentencing indicates the judge considered a wide range of 

factors and took into account defendant’s age in mitigation. The complained-of comment that 

“no one can know how” defendant’s actions were affected by her age is more fairly read as 
- 15 -

indicating an inability to quantify defendant’s age, not a refusal to consider her age. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 25 Affirmed.