Todd C. Emerson, #8175 444 South River Road St. George, Utah, 84790 Telephone: (435) 634-3530 Facsimile: (435) 634-3505
UNITED STATES OFAMERICA DEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORTATION OFFICE OFHEARINGS WASHINGTON, D.C.

In the Matter of: Sky West Airlines, Inc. 

# RECEIVED MAR 24 2014 

## HEARING DOCKET

REBUTTAL AND MOTION FOR DECISION FAACase No. 2011NM06005 DMS No.: FAA-2012-0777 Honorable Richard C. Goodwin

In accordance with 14 C.P.R.§ 13.218(£)(5), Respondent, by its counsel, respectfully files this Rebuttal and Motion for Decision. 1 Introduction Itis difficult, from reading theAdministrator's brief, to !mow what mechanical malfeasance must have occurred with aircraft N822SK to warrant such an impressive penalty. Surely safety must have been compromised? No, not even a little bit. We are here because ofa fault message received on one of two redtmda11t air conditioner temperature sensors- operating in manual mode. The sensor was ftmctional in automatic

1 On January 3, 2014, Complainant filed a Motion for Decision and this Court set a deadline for Respondent's response as March 7, 2014. Respondent was granted an extension tothatdeadline until and including March 21, 2014 andtherefore, this filing is timely made.mode. This means, at worst, the pilots maynot have been able to manually adjust the cabin temperature. They would have to let the computer do it for them. Itturns out the sensor was functioning normallybut not communicating properly with the aircraft's computer. But even ifthe sensor was inoperable in manual mode, the MELmerelyrequired the pilots to set the temperature automatically. Obviously, we are not dealing with safety offlight issues ifthe only problempresented bythe fault was the pilots could not fiddle with the cabin temp dials. To be clear, the air conditioning and pressurization system was always functioning
on aircraft N822SK, ifnot, the computer would have latched a "fail" message, not a sensor fault. The sensor that sent a fault message corresponds to one oftwo air conditioners that
are for passenger comfort only. They do not cool any avionic or flight control systems. In fact, the sensor fault is so minor, the MELranks it as a category "C", which means it can be deferred for up to ten days without receiving attention from maintenance2 At the time, the MEL merelyrequired that the crew interrogate the computer once a dayto see ifthe sensor was actually working and the query could occur after all the flights for that day hadbeen completed. Because the other sensor was working, the fault, at most, represented a degradation in the redundancy ofthe abilityto manually operate a passenger comfort system. The flight crews mayhave very well interrogated the computer on October 19 and 20, but theymade no record ofit. The computer was interrogated on October 21 and the

2 See MEL 21-51-4a, attached as ExhibitA. FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION Page 2sensor was found to be operable, as ithadbeen onthe 18th. Logical deduction indicates the sensor was likely operable onthe 19th and 20th as well. Still, it is important and obligatory to follow the MEL, no matter how minor the squawk, and SkyWest has a gap in its records. This short gap, onthis negligible fault, cannot possibly warrant a penalty of $142,500. This run-away demand is the result ofcompounding multiple violations on a single inadvertent error, contrarythe Administrator's own Order, and ignoring the robust changes Sky West implemented after the event occurred to block its aircraft from operating ifan MELtask was not accomplished. I. Statement ofFacts SkyWest has previously stipulated to the facts set forth 

### in the Complaint, dated July 13, 2012, pertaining to the Bombardier aircraft CRJ-900 aircraft, registered as N822SK ("the aircraft"). SkyWest aclmowledged that a once-daily maintenance check that was required to beperformed onthe aircraft as a result ofa fault indication on October 18, 2010, was not completed on October 19 and 20. 

### In accordance with Sky West's approved procedures and the aircraft's maintenance manual, a fix ofthe component in question could be "deferred" under the Minimum Equipment List ("MEL") for later investigation and correction, ifnecessary. 

### In this matter, the aircraft was properly allowedto continue operations as long as a once daily maintenance check was completed. The maintenance check involved either maintenance personnel or flight crew checking a maintenance data computer ("MDC") once per flight

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 IDMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION Page3day in order to verify the operation ofthe "pack discharge pressure sensor" and make an entry in the aircraft maintenance log accordingly. The maintenance check was completed as required on October 18 and 21 and itwas not required to be completed after thatbecause it was determined that the component in questionwas operable. The component in question was therefore cleared in accordance with the aircraft's maintenance manuals and no further dailymaintenance checks were required on the component. The FAAinvestigated the discrepancy, and even though the incident was an isolated and inadvertent oversight, it proposed a civilpenalty in the amount of$142,500 3 Sky West requested a hearing before anAdministrative Law Judge ("ALI"). Subsequently, SkyWest agreed to limit the matter to the issue ofsanctionbecause FAA's proposed civil penaltyis unwarranted, does not follow FAA guidance and does not adequately give credit for SkyWest's substantial mitigation measures4 

### II. Standard ofReview ofFAA's Proposed Civil Penalty The startingpoint for review ofComplainant's proposed sanction is the policy set forth inFAA Order 2150.3B, FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program (effective October 1, 2007) (the "Sanction Guidance") 5 The appropriate sanction is based on a

3 FAA Complaint (July 13, 2012), p. 2. 4 Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings (February 3, 2014), p. 2. 5 In the Matter of Folsom's Air Service, Inc., FAA Order No. 2008-11 (November 6, 2008), p. 14; see also In the Matter of AmericanAirNetwork. Inc., FAA Order No. 2006-5 (Febmary 10, 2006), p. 6.
FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION Page4totality ofthe circumstances,6 including the nature, extent, and gravity ofthe violation, degree ofculpability, history ofpriorviolations, financial situation, and othermatters as justice may require. 7 The ranges set forth inthe FAA's sanction guidance are for single, inadvertent violations.8 An inadvertent violation exists where the violation is a "single, isolated departure from compliance" withthe regulation.9 The FAAhas the burden ofestablishing that its proposed civil penalty is appropriate to the alleged violation. 10 The FAA's proposed sanction is "no more than a proposal or a recommendationto the ALJ." 11 The FAAmust showthat it considered the seriousness ofthe violation and the totality ofthe circumstances. The FAAmustprove to theALJ how it usedthe sanction guidance to arrive at its proposa1. 12 The FAAmust also prove the existence ofaggravating factors and must showhowitused aggravating or mitigating factors to adjust the suggested sanction.

6 In the Matter of EasternAir Center, Inc., FAA OrderNo. 2008-3 (January 28, 2008), p. 9. 7 In the Matter ofGoJetAirlines, LLC, Initial Decision (May 20, 2011), p. 8; quoting Folsom s Air Service, Inc., p. 11.
8 EasternAir Center, Inc., p. 9. 9 In the Matter of PinnacleAirlines, Inc., Docket FAA-2009-0180, Initial Decision (December 11, 2009), p. 19. 10 In the Matter of Luxemburg, FAA OrderNo. 1994-18 (June 22, 1994), p. 6. 11 EasternAir Center, Inc., p. 8. 12 !d.; see also In the Matter ofWarbelowsAir Ventures, Inc., FAA Order 2000-3 (February 3, 2000), p. 19.
FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION PageSEvidence ofswift or comprehensive corrective actionmustbe considered as a mitigating factor. 13 TheAdministrator has given significant weight to respondents' efforts to ensure that a violation will not reoccur. 14 Where remedial corrective action was not considered 

### inthe FAA's proposed sanction, it shouldbe considered bytheALJ in his initial d . . 15

ectston. 

### III. FAA's Proposed Civil Penalty is Unwarranted and Not Supported by Agency Guidance and Decisions. The FAA's proposed civil penalty inthe amount of$142,500 is unwarranted because it over counts the number ofviolations, assesses too high an amount per violation, and does not credit SkyWest's substantial mitigationmeasures. 

### A. FAA Over Counts the Number ofViolations. The FAAasserts that, for purposes ofcalculating the proposed civil penalty, 19 violations have occurred. It reaches this number by adding together a violation for each flight day (2) to the number offlights on those days (17). Specifically, the FAA asserts that two violations of 14 C.P.R. § 119.5(1) (operation in contrary to OpSpecs) occurred, and 17 violations of§§ 121.605 and 121.153(a)(2) occurred. 16

13 AmericanAirNetwork, Inc., p. 7. 14 In theMatter of AirtranAirways, Inc., Docket No. FAA-2010-0193, InitialDecision (June 23, 2010), p. 14.
15 Id, p. 15.
16 FAAMotion for Decision (January 30, 2014), p. 9.
FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FOR DECISION Page 6

---The FAAroutinely cites all regulations whichmay support its allegations. However,ALJs and theAdministrator have stated that the sanction should not be a mathematical addition ofthe number ofalleged violations. The sanction should reflect the totality ofthe circumstances. The FAA's Sanction Guidance advises that "[w]hen a single instance ofnoncompliance results inmultiple violations ofgeneral and specific regulations involving the same or similar conduct, the FAAordinarily does not compoundthe sanction
Furthermore, the Administrator has agreed with the ALJ infinding that a "residual" violation does notjustifY an additional penalty. In approving the Initial Decision in 

### GoJet Airlines, LLC, theAdministrator stated that a "separate sanction, however, is notjustified

... [where] the residual violation is notbased on any independent event." 18 The isolated and inadvertent oversight inthe present matter is akinto 

### GoJet. For each ofthe violations the FAAlists, the failure to document the MDC checkis the underlying event cited. The FAA cites two violations of 14 C.F.R. 

### § 119.5(g) (operating contrary to OpSpecs) and 17 violations ofeach of14 C.F.R. 

### § 121.153(a)(2) (operating an unairworthy aircraft) and 14 C.F.R. 

### § 121.605 (dispatch ofanunairworthy aircraft). The second and thirdregulations, 14 C.F.R. 

### §§ 121.153(a)(2) and 121.605, are purely residual since there is no independent event or separate facts underlying the incident. There are no distinguishing factual elements at issue between 14 C.F.R 

### § 119.5(g) onthe one hand, and

17 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, 1]6.c. "In the Matter ofGoJetAirlines. LLC, FAA Order No. 2012-5 (May 22, 2012), p. 24-25 (petition for review byrespondent on unrelated issue denied, DocketNo. 12-2719 (8th Cir., March 4, 2014)). FAACase No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION

· --· Page?.14 C.F.R. §§ 121.153(a)(2) and 121.605 onthe otherhand19 There are no extraordinary circumstances inthe present matterthatjustifyusing the secondregulation simply to 

### . h . 20 mcrease t e sanctiOn. Altogether, the FAAhas cited three regulations and 19 violations- despite only one isolated and inadvertent discrepancy present inthe matter. The separate regulations cited by the FAAdo not involve separate facts. The FAAmakes no argumenttojustifythe counting ofthe same facts as separate violations. As such, the FAA's mathematical calculation of 19 violations is contrary to sanction guidance and agency decisions. Put simply, the FAAhas over countedthe number ofregulatory violations and the result is a disproportionately harsh outcome for the conduct involved.21 B. FAAAssesses Too High an Individual Penalty perEach Violation The FAA argues that the appropriate penalty is $7,500 per violation, whichis atthe upper end ofthe range (from $2,000 to $9,999) inthe category applicable to this matter. Ofall ofthe aggravating and mitigating factors setforth inthe Sanction Guidance and in agency decisions, the FAAcites to only one as its onlyjustification for its elevated choice. It says that Sky West's "lengthy experience as an air carrier"justifies a sanctionhigherthan

19 Where FAA**cite~** multiple regulatory violations, the test for multiplicity is whether each cited regulatory violation "required proof of a fact that the other did not." In the Matter of FrostadAtelier, FAA Order No. 2013-5 (September 5, 2013), p. 21; citingBall v. US., 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985). 20 Ace Pilot Training, FAA Order No. 2005-12 (August 12, 2005), p. 9; quoting USAir, Inc., FAA Order No. 1992-70 (December 21, 1992), p. 6. 21 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7,**~** 6.b and c.
FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION Page 8-the midpoint ofthe range. 22 In actuality, the Sanction Guidance relating to the "Certificate Holder's Level ofExperience" states only that"[c]ertificate holders with greater levels of experience maybeheld to a higher standard."23 There is no mandate that an airline be automatically assessed sanctions at the higher end ofthe range simplybecause it has existed for a decade or more. Corresponding to experience level, the Sanction Guidance suggests the sanction should reflect the significance ofthe violation in light ofthe certificate holder's experience24 The significance here, ofthis isolated and inadvertent oversight, is low. Sky West has no violation history for this MEL. There is no indication this error was systemic. It has all the indicia ofhuman error. As SkyWest strives for 100% compliance and the highest level ofsafetyin its operations, it also talces immediate corrective action in cases of mistalces, as shown below. The important point is SkyWest's attitude toward compliance and its steps in correcting these oversights, particularly in light ofthe size and complexity ofits operations. As for the "gravity ofviolation" factor, the FAA aclmowledges there was a low degree ofhazard because the affected component was determined to be operational-- yet it did not decrease the penalty accordingly for this mitigating factor25

22 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10.
23 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7,**~** 4.c.(1).
24 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7,**~** 4.c.(2). 25 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10.
FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FOR DECISION Page·9·Here, the appropriate starting point for the sanction calculation is belowthe midpoint ofthe range. The only aggravating factor cited bythe FAA, Sky West's experience level, is more than canceled outbythe lowlevel ofsignificance ofthe inadvertent discrepancy. Other mitigating factors, such as the low degree ofhazard, and corrective actions (discussed 

### infra), should further decrease the appropriate sanction. 

### C. SkyWest Should Be Credited For Its Significant Mitigation Measures. Contraryto Sanction Guidance and agency decisions, the FAA's proposed civil penalty does not credit Sky West for its prompt measures inremedying the isolated and inadvertent discrepancy. Where the FAAdoes not consider mitigating factors in the sanction, theALJ should review and consider the respondent's actions?6 Agency decisions have "given significant weight to respondents' efforts to take prompt steps to assure that the violations will not recur?7 Sky Westprovided the FAAwith a list ofthe thorough and concise steps it took to prevent a reoccurrence ofthe discrepancy. Sky Westtook five significant measures to prevent a reoccurrence, including: (1) creating the new position ofSupervisor oflntemal Compliance; (2) establishing an electronic aircraft maintenance blocking program; (3) creating the newposition ofDatabase Administrator; (4) installing an enhancedphone system to improve crew to maintenance communications; and (5) adding seven additional

26AirtranAirways, Inc., p. 15.
27 Id., p. 14. FAA Case No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FOR DECISION Page 10Maintenance Controllers. Sky West invested appro:xllnately $622,000 inimplementing these measures28 In part, the FAA's reasoning for refusing to recognize and grant credit to SkyWest's corrective steps is because it says that Sky West's fleet size was increasing and therefore all ofSky West's corrective measures would be expected ofit.29 TheFAA's claimis overly simplistic and its data is incorrect. In2010, Sky West's entire aircraft fleet was 294 and in 2011 it increased by 21 aircraft, or 6%, to 315. This modest growth hardly accounts for the
measures detailed in Exhibit B. The FAA also statedthat Sky West's corrective actions are not mitigating because the steps were necessary to bring Sky West up to the minimum regulatory and statutory requirements. 30 The FAA's unsubstantiated claim goes onto state that SkyWest musthave beenunderstaffed and inadequately managed at the time ofthe incident. The FAA states that Sky West's additional positions and personnel are

### per se proofthat it was noncompliant with a completely unrelated regulation, 14 C.F.R. 

### § ll9.65(a), prior to implementing

. . 31 correcttve actwns.

28 See Sky West Letter to FAA (February 8, 2012) (outlining extensive corrective actions in response to the discrepancy), attached as Exhibit B. 29 FAAMotion for Decision, p. 9. 3

## °FAAMotion for Decision, p. 9. 31 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 9.
FAACase No. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FOR DECISION

.... Pagell.-Suffice it to say this fresh allegation is conclusory, without a grain ofevidentiary support. Itis a smokescreen meant to distract from the substantial mitigation SkyWesthas undertakento ensure no aircraft can fly with an openwrite-up. That is, after all, what happened here and it occurred because a humanfailed to follow the MEL. The mitigation
measures add redundancies, and inparticular, an aircraft blocking system that prevents a pilot from taking offan aircraft with an open maintenance write up. The measures were expensive and effective. It is confusing and contrary to the promotion ofsafety to have effective mitigation measures argued as evidence ofwrongdoing. The additional positions, employees and systems are "above those required underthe FAA's regulations" and should have been "considered a mitigating factor indetermining an appropriate sanction." 32 The FAA also stated the fact that SkyWest's corrective actions took full effect after it received the FAALetter oflnvestigation, precludes any mitigating credit. 33 The Sanction Guidance grants greater credit to corrective actions takenpriorto FAA's finding ofa violation, however the Sanction Guidance still provides for mitigation when corrective actions are implemented after an investigation.34 Inthis matter, time was required to evaluate, determine and implement the appropriate corrective steps in order to prevent
reoccurrence. The planning for SkyWest's corrective actions began immediately after the discrepancy occurred and was aimed at making systemic changes, not merely responding

32 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, 'if4.m. 33 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10. 34 Sanction Guidance, Chapter 7, 'if4.m. FAA CaseNo. 2011NM06005 I DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION

- Page-12to a one-off record keeping error. Sky West created two newpositions, increased the number ofmaintenance controllers, and improved certain support systems. Full implementation took several months which is notunreasonable given Sky West's size and complexity ofoperations. Intoday's modem, large air carrier operations, airlines must evaluate andplanfor hownewpositions and systems coordinate with and complement existing organizational structures and operating systems in order to make them safe and effective. Furthermore, interviewing, hiring andtraining new employees takes time. Newemployees must also be evaluated and screened for compliance with other FAAregulations (such as criminal background checks) before they may be placed into the newposition. Sky Westtook significant comprehensive corrective actionto preventreoccurrence ofthe discrepancy in this matter and those steps should be granted ample mitigation credit as they tookplace promptly withinthe limitations ofthe large organizational structure and other FAA regulations. While Sky West could have crafted a narrow and inexpensive fix that addressed only the oversight that occurred, it instead electedto more extensively evaluate and plan steps that improve the efficiency and safety ofthe broader organization. SkyWest should not be penalized for choosing this route.Conclusion Inboth ofthe regulations cited by the FAA, the Sanction Guidance provides that a "minimum" civil penalty is appropriate. Appendix B, Figure B-1-1-1 ofthe Sanction

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION Page 13-Guidance states that a "minimum" civil penalty is appropriate for technical nonconformity to the operations specifications where there is likely no effect on safety. 35 Likewise, Appendix B, Figure B-1-c-2 ofthe Sanction Guidance states that a "minimmn" civil penalty is appropriate for the technical"[o]peration contraryto the operations specification[.]"36 Even the FAA agrees there was a low degree ofhazard related to the discrepancy and that the "minimum" violation category is applicable to this matter.37 But instead ofstarting at the midpoint ofa minimum violation and moving down, the FAAignored SkyWest's mitigation efforts and ratcheted the penalty upward to $7500. Fromthere the absurd prevailed, by a factor of 19, to reach $142,500. This proposed penalty is simplyindefensible under applicable law and the undisputed facts. SkyWest therefore respectfully requests that any civil penalty which the Court deems appropriate in this matterbe minimal, according to Sanction Guidance, andbe further reduced in recognition ofits mitigation measures.

DATED thisZQday ofMarch, 2014

# ~

# ~~c~ Todd. C. Emerson Attorney for SkyWestAirlines, Inc.

35 The regulation at issue is 14 C.F.R. § 119.5(g), for which the FAA has counted two violations for purposes ofcalculating the sanction. 36 The regulation at issue is 14 C.F.R. § 121.153(a)(2), for which the FAA has counted 17 violations for purposes ofcalculating the sanction. 37 FAA Motion for Decision, p. 10. FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION Page 14--CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

## '7 ifThe undersigned hereby certifies that on

# thi~_{ day ofMarch, 2014, a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION 

### was served
as**follow~:** 

### FederalAviationAdministration 800 IndependenceAvenue SW Washington, D.C. 20591 Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk,AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2W100 Via Federal Express 

### The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin,Administrative Law Judge 

### Office ofHearings, M-20 1200 NewJerseyAvenue, S.E. East Building Ground Floor, Rm

### E12-320 Washington, D.C. 20590 Via E-mail andFederal Express 

### Jeffrey M. Harper, Complainant's Counsel 

### FAA Office ofRegional Counsel · 1601 LindAve., SW Renton, Washington 98057 Via E-mail andFederal Express

FAA Case No. 2011NM06005/ DMS No. FAA-2012-0777 REBUTTALAND MOTION FORDECISION ·Page 15-

# EXHIBIT APage: 

### MEL

- CL600-2D24 (CRJ 900)

STANDARD PRACTICE 8175 Revision: Date: 16ofl84 

### 06 4/30/2010
MEL Item Cal lnst Req 

### 21-51-4a Air Conditioning System 

### c 1 1 Remarks or Exceptions: Placarding:An Inoperative Placard will be placed on (M) System redundancy may be degraded as indicated by "L PACK FAULT" and/or "R the Air Conditioning Control Panel indicating which PACK FAULT" status message(s) provided: channel is inoperative (-1) Associated pack discharge pressure sensor(s) is verified operative once each ftight day, and (2) Automatic Mode ofthe associated Cockpit'Cabin Temperature Control System is**·~** operative and associated MAN mode is not selected. ,'' I NOTE: Pack Discharge Temperature Readout(s) and/or Cockpit TEMP Readout(s) and/or Cabin TEMP Readout(s) and/or Cockpit SEL Readout(s) may be replaced

. by amber dashes on the EICAS ECS Synoptic Page.

Maintenance Procedure: Operations Procedure: 'Verify operation ofthe pack discharge pressure sensor by interrogating the MDC. None Required NOTE: This may be accomplished by the Flight Crew by coordination with NOTE: Flight Crew may accomplish Maintenance**~-a_intenance** Control. An entry is to be made in the Aircraft Maintenance LC',lg Procedure by coordination with Maintenance Control. lridicating the actions taken. An entry is to be made in the Aircraft Maintenance NOTE: Maintenance action to be accomplished once perflight day. Log indicating the action taken. NOTE: Maintenance action to be accomplished once per flight day.
MEL Item Cat Ins! Req

,_, 

### 21-51-4b Air Conditioning System 

### c 1 1 a,emarks or Exceptions: Placardlng:An Inoperative Plac8rd will be placed on**~.ystem** redundancy may be degraded as indicated by "L PACK FAULT' and/or uR the Air Conditioning Control Panel. PACK FAULT" status messages provided the associated Air Conditioning Pack(s) is q,onsidered inoperative. :NOTE: This requires the associated pack to be deferred par MEL 21-51-1a or .?1-51-1 b as applicable.
··. >;- ,-

Maintenance Procedure: Operations Procedure: None Required None Required

·.. MEL Item Cat Ins! Req 

### 21-52-1a Ram Air SOY 

### c 1 0 Remarks or Exceptions: Placarding:Piacard Ram Air SOY switch "INOP". (M) (O)May be Inoperative OPEN provided: (1) Ram Air SOY is deactivated OPEN, (2) LH Air Conditioning Pack Is operative, (3) RH Air Conditioning Pack is selected OFF, {4) Operations are conduded at or below FL250, (5)'" Operations are conducted in accordance with the AFM Supplement (Operations

- _with Airplane Systems Inoperative). Maintenance Procedure: Operations Procedure:**Fa~** an inoperative ram alr SOY and an operative RH air condition pack, do as follows: (1) LH Airconditioning pack switch/Jlght to be pressed (1) On the air-conditioning control panel, verify that the ram air SOY is In the open -OUT**~-** 1 position. (2) Aircraft to be operated at or below FL 250. (2) Verify EICAS synoptic page shows the ram air SOV.In the open position. (3) Flight Crew will comply with procedure outlined in

-=**~-(~)** Verify that the lever on the ram alr SOY is In the open position. MEL Appendix 0- 21-52-1a.

·(14.)_ Disconnect the electrical connector MPE15P1 offfrom the ram air SOV. (4) The operational requirements addressed in the (5) Install a protective cap on the electrical connector and receptacle ofthe valve. Remarks or Exceptions column above, item (5), (6) Stow the electrical connector. consist of performance adjustments which will be (7) Verify that the RAM-AIR push button annunciator light is on. made by dispatch. (B) Assure that the Ram Air Shutoff Valve is in OPEN position. Make sure the LH air-conditioning pack is operative. Tum the RH air conditioning pack to OFF.

f '·'

# EXHIBIT BFebmary 8, 2012 Jeffrey M. Harper Federal Aviation Administration 1601 Lind Avenue S.W. Renton, Washington 98057 Subject: Mitigation for case no. 2011NM06005 DearJeff, For the purposes of settlement within the scope ofthe informal conference held earlier today, I am sending you this letter to detail the steps SkyWest has taken since October 2010 to ensure that an aircraft does not operate with an open maintenance item. With the five points listed below, all coming as a direct or indirectresult of2011NM06005, SkyWest Airlines has created a more robust system ofmaintenance controls.
• New Position Created: Supervisor Internal Compliance. This was proposed in the SkyWest response letter to FAA Case No. 2011NM6005. This position has daily oversight ofthe internal auditor group andtracks compliance for audit functions. Ifthis position existed in October 2010, it would have caught the overfly before it happened. We have found it to be an effective stop gap since then. Cost: $60,000
• Aircraft blocking program. You noted that apilot (or pilots) shouldhave seen the open write-up and cleared itpriorto flight. To take the human error factor out ofit, we have established an electronic block on aircraft thatrequire daily inspections. This program prevents the crew from printing arelease with an open maintenance item. Cost: $10,000
• Maintenance Database Administrator. This new positionhas been created to monitor and enhance the database used by the maintenance control group. He ensures the aircraft blocking program is working. Cost: $62,000
• Enhanced Phone System. We found at times ofhigh call volume flight crews were not getting timely communication ofmaintenance information. This leads to impatience and less than ideal decision-making. This enhancementprevents call waiting and provides a more stable communication environment for crew contact to maintenance control. Cost: $120,000
• More Maintenance Controllers. SkyWest has added seven additional controllers since I0/20/10. They provide more comprehensive daily oversight and maintain operational control ofSky West aircraft. Costper year: $370,400In addition to the above inveshnent, SkyWest Airlines is currently involved in an SAT with the CMO to establish that we demonstrate all the System SafetyAttributes ofATOS. We are confident at the conclusion ofthe SAT, SkyWest will clearly demonstrate a compliant philosophy and culture. These steps demonstrate a serious commihnent to enhanced safety and controL As all parties noted today, the FAAhas not seen arepeat violation ofthis nature in the 14 months since these measures have beenimplemented (more than 700,000 flights). As to mitigation, the cost ofthese steps outstrips the proposed penaltyby an order offour to one. The $142,500 penalty is not necessary here to ensure compliance. Instead, those resources are better used in the programs noted above to enhance safety. As such, Sky West respectfully requests that its efforts be credited as meaningful mitigation and the penaltybelowered to $25,000. Sincerely, I 1 ToddEmerson Director ofGoverrunent and Legal Affairs Sky West Airlines

211