Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1603-CR-652 | Septmeber 16, 2016 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Zachary A. Witte

Locke & Witte

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lindsey P. Smith,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 16, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

02A03-1603-CR-652

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D05-1508-F6-731

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Lindsey P. Smith (“Lindsey”) pleaded guilty in Allen Superior Court to 

domestic battery in the presence of a child. The sentencing court sentenced 
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Lindsey to one-and-a-half years’ incarceration in the Department of Correction, 

all suspended to probation, but conditioned upon her execution of thirty days’ 

confinement in the Allen County jail. Lindsey appeals this sentence as 

inappropriate. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Late in the evening of August 3, 2015, detectives of the Fort Wayne Police 

Department were called to the apartment home of Lindsey and her thenhusband Heath Smith (“Heath”) by a report of domestic battery. Heath met the 

officers at the door, teary eyed and red faced, complaining of pain in his face 

and back. Lindsey and Heath had argued and come to blows, because Heath 

had chosen to visit his mother and brother rather than take Lindsey to her first 

day of work. Specifically, Heath reported that Lindsey struck his face and back 

repeatedly in the presence of one or both of Lindsey’s young sons, aged five and 

eight at the time of sentencing.

1 Lindsey admitted the truth of Heath’s 

accusations to the detectives, adding that, if she could get through the detectives 

to hit Heath again, she “damn well sure would.” Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 15.

 

1 The detectives reported only the presence of Lindsey’s younger son on the scene at the time of the 

argument, but both children were present in the apartment at the time of the detectives’ interview with Heath 

and Lindsey, and Lindsey affirmed at sentencing, in response to questioning by the court, that both children 

were “upstairs while all that was [going on].” Tr. p. 15. 
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[4] Lindsey was charged with domestic battery in the presence of a child. Unable to 

reach a plea agreement with the State, Lindsey pleaded guilty without the 

benefit of an agreement two days before her scheduled trial on February 2, 

2016. The court ordered a presentence investigation report and heard evidence 

and argument at Lindsey’s sentencing hearing on March 11, 2016. The court

sentenced Lindsey to 548 days in the Department of Correction, all suspended 

but conditioned on thirty days in the Allen County jail. This appeal followed.

Whether Lindsey’s Sentence Is Inappropriate

[5] Two avenues to relief are open to a convicted offender wishing to challenge her 

sentence, one substantive and one procedural. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

482, 491 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 

2007). The Indiana Constitution and Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure 

authorize substantive appellate review and revision of any sentence in a 

criminal case. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 6; Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). This 

constitutional power of revision is independent of the power, grounded in 

statute, to review procedurally the exercise of the sentencing court’s discretion

in fashioning a sentence. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491; Ind. Code § 35-38-1-

7.1(d) (court “may impose” any sentence consistent with statute and the 

Constitution). 

[6] A reviewing court invited to exercise its power of revision will do so only if, 

“after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,” the court finds the 

sentence to be “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 
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character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B). We are reluctant to substitute our 

judgment for that of the sentencing court. Hunter v. State, 854 N.E.2d 342, 344 

(Ind. 2006). The question before us is not whether some other sentence might 

be “more appropriate,” but rather whether the sentence as pronounced is 

inappropriate. Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. 

denied.

[7] The defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that she has 

been inappropriately sentenced. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008). This burden is a heavy one. “[C]onsiderable deference” is due the 

sentence pronounced below, Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1225 (Ind. 2015), in 

view of the sentencing courts’ “special expertise” in the fact-intensive 

sentencing decision, Scott v. State, 840 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), 

trans. denied, and such deference ordinarily “should prevail unless overcome by 

compelling evidence portraying [the offense and the offender] in a positive 

light.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). 

[8] We examine the sentence in its totality as it is actually to be served. Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The aggregate term of years, id., the 

time suspended and executed, Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 

2010), the placement called for in the sentence, King, 894 N.E.2d at 267, and 

any other penal consequences, Davidson, 926 N.E.2d at 1025, are examined in 

light of the defendant’s culpability, the severity of the crime, the harm done to 

others, and any other relevant facts of the individual case. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d

at 1224. We undertake such review guided by its primary purpose of 
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“leaven[ing] the outliers,” that is, promoting consistency and uniformity in 

sentencing by restraining extraordinarily harsh or lenient sentences. Id. at 1225. 

[9] Lindsey pleaded guilty without benefit of a plea agreement to a Level 6 felony. 

The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is between six months and two and 

one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year, plus a fine of up to 

$10,000. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). See Abbot v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Ind. 

2012) (identifying advisory sentence as the “starting point” of inappropriateness 

review). Lindsey’s one-and-one-half-year sentence is thus both longer and 

shorter than the advisory sentence: the aggregate term being six months longer,

but the executed time eleven months shorter, near the midpoint of the statutory 

range. We now examine whether this sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of Lindsey’s offense and of Lindsey’s character.

[10] As to the nature of her offense, Lindsey argues that her conduct was not 

“particularly egregious or severe” so as to justify deviation from the advisory 

sentence, Appellant’s Br. at 12, and, in effect, that the sentencing court

improperly weighed the underlying elements of the offense in aggravation of 

her sentence, usually referred to as “double enhancement.” She argues 

particularly that Heath’s injuries were no greater than the minimum required to 

satisfy the bodily-injury element of domestic battery, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)

(2015),

2 and that her “offense has already been enhanced” from a misdemeanor 

 

2 Simple domestic battery no longer requires bodily injury. Compare I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2016) with I.C. § 

35-42-2-1.3(a) (2015).
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to a felony by the presence of her children at the time of the battery. Appellant’s 

Br. at 12. Compare I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a) (2015) (simple domestic battery) with id.

at (b)(2) (domestic battery in presence of a child under age sixteen).

[11] We find these arguments unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the advisory 

sentence must be understood as the legislature does, as a “guideline sentence 

that the court may voluntarily consider,” I.C. § 35-50-2-1.3(a) (emphasis added), 

not as a presumptive sentence by another name. Since the legislature 

abandoned presumptive sentences, our supreme court has consistently held

that, “[b]ecause the sentencing statute no longer requires a trial court to impose 

a presumptive sentence except when deviating from it on the basis of 

aggravating or mitigating [factors], the correlation between those factors and a 

given sentence will not be as close” as under the previous scheme. Hamilton v. 

State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 726 (Ind. 2011). So long as the sentencing court provides 

a sentencing statement as required by statute, “which may or may not include 

the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, [the court] may then impose 

any sentence” permitted by statute and the Constitution. Sharkey v. State, 967 

N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added). Defendants like 

Lindsey wishing to challenge their sentences may not argue that a sentencing 

court must justify “deviation” from a preset default. 

[12] Second, it is well settled that a sentencing court evaluating aggravators and 

mitigators may properly consider the particular circumstances of the offense as 

aggravators. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589–90 (Ind. 2007). The only fact 

required to enhance domestic battery by the presence of a child is that the child 
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be capable of sensing the battery. Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008), trans. denied. The sentencing court thus did not twice weigh the 

presence of Lindsey’s children at the scene of the battery when it found as an 

aggravator the children’s actual exposure to Lindsey’s coarse language and her 

“punching, scratching, [and] whatever [else Lindsey] could do to get to 

[Heath].” Tr. pp. 14–15.

[13] Similarly, Lindsey mischaracterizes the evidence below as to Heath’s injuries. 

Lindsey argues that Heath “did not sustain any damage other tha[n] redness to 

his face,” Appellant’s Br. at 12, but Heath insisted otherwise in his victim 

impact statement. Appellant’s App. p. 67 (reporting continuing physical and 

mental pain as the result of Lindsey’s battery). In any event, the statute requires 

even less: any physical impairment, including any degree of physical pain. Bailey 

v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ind. 2012) (pain caused by repeated “pokes” to 

the forehead is bodily injury within the domestic battery statute). It was thus 

within the sound discretion of the sentencing court to find any additional 

circumstance as an aggravator. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491.

[14] Finally, to the extent that claims for double enhancement survived the 

legislature’s 2005 sentencing revisions, see Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 

2008), such claims, in their nature procedural, are properly brought as claims 

for abuse of discretion. Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 852 (Ind. 2014) 

(locating surviving double-enhancement claims in the “improper as a matter of 

law” prong of abuse-of-discretion analysis (Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491)). 

Lacking additional, substantive cogency, Lindsey’s double-enhancement 
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arguments are not cognizable in Rule 7(B) review. As we have discussed above, 

however, Lindsey’s arguments would fail on the merits even had they been 

properly raised.

[15] As to her character, Lindsey focuses on her previously unblemished criminal 

record and her quick acceptance of responsibility. These facts were presented as 

mitigators at Lindsey’s sentencing and were considered by the court on the 

record. In contrast, the sentencing court found Lindsey’s utter lack of remorse

for her conduct “extremely aggravating.” Tr. p. 14. 

[16] Lindsey argues that her lack of remorse “was not so egregious as to outweigh 

all other mitigating circumstances.” Appellant’s Br. at 13. Her argument is thus 

with the relative weight the sentencing court assigned to the aggravators and 

mitigators in her case. Again, however, the weighing of recorded aggravators 

and mitigators is within the sound discretion of the sentencing court, Anglemyer, 

868 N.E.2d at 491, and Lindsey’s argument amounts simply to request for a 

“more appropriate” sentence. However, this is not our task. Barker, 994 N.E.2d 

at 315. 

[17] Though the factual record is fairly sparse, it is clear that Lindsey repeatedly and 

violently struck her then-husband Heath on the face and back in retaliation for

his deliberate failure to transport her to her first day of work at a new job, and, 

possibly, for verbal provocation by Heath. Lindsey exposed her two sons, aged 

five and eight, to her violent conduct and violent language as they sat in an 

upstairs room of their shared home.
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[18] While Lindsey had no prior criminal record and was found to present a low risk 

of re-offense, she reported to her presentence report investigator having “some 

criminal peers” with whom she will continue to associate. Appellant’s App. p.

94. When asked at sentencing whether her battery of Heath had been a “onetime event,” Lindsey refused to answer. Tr. p. 13. Most damningly, she 

repeatedly asserted that Heath deserved the treatment he received from her,

both to the on-scene detective, Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 15, and to her presentence 

report investigator, Appellant’s App. p. 95; and she suggested as much again at

sentencing. Tr. pp. 12–13.

[19] In light of the nature of Lindsey’s offense and her character, we cannot say that 

her sentence is inappropriate.

3

[20] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur. 

 

3 The decision rendered in this opinion does not excuse Heath’s deliberate choice not to transport Lindsey to 

her first and most important day of work, a particularly inconsiderate decision at a time when work is hard to 

come by.