# Jurnalul Oficial L 219/2015

| | ISSN 1977-0782 |
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| Jurnalul Oficial
  al Uniunii Europene | L 219 |
| | |
| Ediţia în limba română | Legislaţie | Anul 5820 august 2015 |

ISSN 1977-0782

Jurnalul Oficial

al Uniunii Europene

L 219

Ediţia în limba română

Legislaţie

Anul 5820 august 2015

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| Cuprins | | II   Acte fără caracter legislativ | Pagina |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULAMENTE |
| | * | Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) 2015/1407 al Comisiei din 19 august 2015 de modificare a Regulamentului de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 de stabilire a unor măsuri tranzitorii în sectorul zahărului ca urmare a aderării Croației | 1 |
| | * | Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) 2015/1408 al Comisiei din 19 august 2015 privind autorizarea substanței DL-metionil-DL-metionină ca aditiv pentru hrana peștilor și a crustaceelor (
  1
  ) | 3 |
| | | Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) 2015/1409 al Comisiei din 19 august 2015 de stabilire a valorilor forfetare de import pentru fixarea prețului de intrare pentru anumite fructe și legume | 6 |
| | | DECIZII |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2015/1410 of 19 August 2015 giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit | 8 |
| | * | Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece | 12 |
| | | ACTE ADOPTATE DE ORGANISME CREATE PRIN ACORDURI INTERNAŢIONALE |
| | * | Decizia nr. 1 a Comitetului UE-Coreea pentru comerțul cu mărfuri din 28 mai 2015 privind adoptarea regulilor privind administrarea și punerea în aplicare a contingentelor tarifare [2015/1412] | 17 |

Cuprins

II   Acte fără caracter legislativ

Pagina

REGULAMENTE

*

Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) 2015/1407 al Comisiei din 19 august 2015 de modificare a Regulamentului de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 de stabilire a unor măsuri tranzitorii în sectorul zahărului ca urmare a aderării Croației

1

*

Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) 2015/1408 al Comisiei din 19 august 2015 privind autorizarea substanței DL-metionil-DL-metionină ca aditiv pentru hrana peștilor și a crustaceelor (
  1
  )

1

3

Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) 2015/1409 al Comisiei din 19 august 2015 de stabilire a valorilor forfetare de import pentru fixarea prețului de intrare pentru anumite fructe și legume

6

DECIZII

*

Council Decision (EU) 2015/1410 of 19 August 2015 giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit

8

*

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece

12

ACTE ADOPTATE DE ORGANISME CREATE PRIN ACORDURI INTERNAŢIONALE

*

Decizia nr. 1 a Comitetului UE-Coreea pentru comerțul cu mărfuri din 28 mai 2015 privind adoptarea regulilor privind administrarea și punerea în aplicare a contingentelor tarifare [2015/1412]

17

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| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE |

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(1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE

1

| RO | Actele ale căror titluri sunt tipărite cu caractere drepte sunt acte de gestionare curentă adoptate în cadrul politicii agricole şi care au, în general, o perioadă de valabilitate limitată.
  Titlurile celorlalte acte sunt tipărite cu caractere aldine şi sunt precedate de un asterisc. |
| --- | --- |

RO

Actele ale căror titluri sunt tipărite cu caractere drepte sunt acte de gestionare curentă adoptate în cadrul politicii agricole şi care au, în general, o perioadă de valabilitate limitată.

Titlurile celorlalte acte sunt tipărite cu caractere aldine şi sunt precedate de un asterisc.

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II Acte fără caracter legislativ

REGULAMENTE

| 20.8.2015 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 219/1 |
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20.8.2015

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

L 219/1

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REGULAMENTUL DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE (UE) 2015/1407 AL COMISIEI

din 19 august 2015

de modificare a Regulamentului de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 de stabilire a unor măsuri tranzitorii în sectorul zahărului ca urmare a aderării Croației

COMISIA EUROPEANĂ,

având în vedere Tratatul de aderare a Croației,

având în vedere Actul de aderare a Croației (1), în special articolele 41 și 16 coroborate cu anexa IV secțiunea 3 litera (a) punctul 4,

întrucât:

| (1) | Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 al Comisiei (2) stabilește măsuri tranzitorii în sectorul zahărului ca urmare a aderării Croației la Uniune. Capitolul II secțiunea 2 din respectivul regulament se referă la stabilirea și eliminarea cantităților excedentare de zahăr prezente în Croația la data aderării sale. Secțiunea respectivă stabilește în special termene limită pentru determinarea cantităților excedentare de zahăr, pentru eliminarea acestora și pentru prezentarea dovezilor eliminării de către operatorii identificați din Croația. Secțiunea respectivă stabilește, de asemenea, perioade de referință care să fie utilizate la calcularea sumelor care trebuie achitate de Croația în cazul în care nu sunt eliminate cantitățile excedentare de zahăr. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 al Comisiei (2) stabilește măsuri tranzitorii în sectorul zahărului ca urmare a aderării Croației la Uniune. Capitolul II secțiunea 2 din respectivul regulament se referă la stabilirea și eliminarea cantităților excedentare de zahăr prezente în Croația la data aderării sale. Secțiunea respectivă stabilește în special termene limită pentru determinarea cantităților excedentare de zahăr, pentru eliminarea acestora și pentru prezentarea dovezilor eliminării de către operatorii identificați din Croația. Secțiunea respectivă stabilește, de asemenea, perioade de referință care să fie utilizate la calcularea sumelor care trebuie achitate de Croația în cazul în care nu sunt eliminate cantitățile excedentare de zahăr.

| (2) | Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 1345/2014 al Comisiei (3) a stabilit cantitățile excedentare de zahăr care constituiau stocuri în Croația înainte de aderarea acesteia și care trebuie să fie eliminate de pe piața Uniunii pe cheltuiala Croației, în conformitate cu termenele stabilite în Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013, astfel cum a fost modificat prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 968/2014 al Comisiei (4). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 1345/2014 al Comisiei (3) a stabilit cantitățile excedentare de zahăr care constituiau stocuri în Croația înainte de aderarea acesteia și care trebuie să fie eliminate de pe piața Uniunii pe cheltuiala Croației, în conformitate cu termenele stabilite în Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013, astfel cum a fost modificat prin Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 968/2014 al Comisiei (4).

| (3) | Prin scrisoarea sa din 19 mai 2015, Croația a informat Comisia că, deși nu pune în discuție obligația de a asigura eliminarea cantităților excedentare de zahăr de pe piață, astfel cum a stabilit Comisia, până la 30 septembrie 2015, s-a confruntat cu dificultăți procedurale neprevăzute la punerea în aplicare a obligației de a-i constrânge pe operatorii în cauză să elimine aceste cantități excedentare și că are nevoie de o perioadă suplimentară pentru a depăși aceste dificultăți. Este deci necesar să se prelungească cu șase luni termenele prevăzute de Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Prin scrisoarea sa din 19 mai 2015, Croația a informat Comisia că, deși nu pune în discuție obligația de a asigura eliminarea cantităților excedentare de zahăr de pe piață, astfel cum a stabilit Comisia, până la 30 septembrie 2015, s-a confruntat cu dificultăți procedurale neprevăzute la punerea în aplicare a obligației de a-i constrânge pe operatorii în cauză să elimine aceste cantități excedentare și că are nevoie de o perioadă suplimentară pentru a depăși aceste dificultăți. Este deci necesar să se prelungească cu șase luni termenele prevăzute de Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013.

| (4) | Prin urmare, Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 ar trebui modificat în consecință. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Prin urmare, Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 ar trebui modificat în consecință.

| (5) | Măsurile prevăzute de prezentul regulament sunt conforme cu avizul Comitetului pentru organizarea comună a piețelor agricole, |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Măsurile prevăzute de prezentul regulament sunt conforme cu avizul Comitetului pentru organizarea comună a piețelor agricole,

ADOPTĂ PREZENTUL REGULAMENT:

Articolul 1

Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 se modifică după cum urmează:

| 1. | La articolul 9 alineatul (1), „30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

1.

La articolul 9 alineatul (1), „30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”.

| 2. | Articolul 10 se modifică după cum urmează:






  (a) | „30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Articolul 10 se modifică după cum urmează:

(a)

„30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”;

| (b) | „31 mai 2016” se înlocuiește cu „30 noiembrie 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

„31 mai 2016” se înlocuiește cu „30 noiembrie 2016”.

| 3. | Articolul 11 se modifică după cum urmează:






  (a) | la alineatul (1), „31 decembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „30 iunie 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Articolul 11 se modifică după cum urmează:

(a)

la alineatul (1), „31 decembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „30 iunie 2016”;

| (b) | la alineatul (2) paragraful al patrulea, „30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

la alineatul (2) paragraful al patrulea, „30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”.

| 4. | Articolul 12 se modifică după cum urmează:






  (a) | la alineatul (1), „31 ianuarie 2016” se înlocuiește cu „31 iulie 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Articolul 12 se modifică după cum urmează:

(a)

la alineatul (1), „31 ianuarie 2016” se înlocuiește cu „31 iulie 2016”;

| (b) | alineatul (2) se modifică după cum urmează:






  (i) | la primul paragraf, „30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

alineatul (2) se modifică după cum urmează:

(i)

la primul paragraf, „30 septembrie 2015” se înlocuiește cu „31 martie 2016”;

| (ii) | la paragraful al doilea, „31 mai 2016” se înlocuiește cu „30 noiembrie 2016”; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

la paragraful al doilea, „31 mai 2016” se înlocuiește cu „30 noiembrie 2016”;

| (iii) | la paragraful al treilea, „31 martie 2016” se înlocuiește cu „30 septembrie 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

la paragraful al treilea, „31 martie 2016” se înlocuiește cu „30 septembrie 2016”.

Articolul 2

Prezentul regulament intră în vigoare în a treia zi de la data publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.

Prezentul regulament este obligatoriu în toate elementele sale și se aplică direct în toate statele membre.

Adoptat la Bruxelles, 19 august 2015.

Pentru Comisie

Președintele

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  JO L 112, 24.4.2012, p. 10.

1

(2)  Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 al Comisiei din 25 februarie 2013 de stabilire a unor măsuri tranzitorii în sectorul zahărului ca urmare a aderării Croației (JO L 55, 27.2.2013, p. 1).

2

(3)  Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 1345/2014 al Comisiei din 17 decembrie 2014 privind stabilirea cantităților excedentare de zahăr, de izoglucoză și de fructoză în Croația (JO L 363, 18.12.2014, p. 80).

3

(4)  Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 968/2014 al Comisiei din 12 septembrie 2014 de modificare a Regulamentului de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 170/2013 de stabilire a unor măsuri tranzitorii în sectorul zahărului ca urmare a aderării Croației (JO L 272, 13.9.2014, p. 6).

4

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| 20.8.2015 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 219/3 |
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20.8.2015

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

L 219/3

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REGULAMENTUL DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE (UE) 2015/1408 AL COMISIEI

din 19 august 2015

privind autorizarea substanței DL-metionil-DL-metionină ca aditiv pentru hrana peștilor și a crustaceelor

(Text cu relevanță pentru SEE)

COMISIA EUROPEANĂ,

având în vedere Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene,

având în vedere Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 22 septembrie 2003 privind aditivii din hrana animalelor (1), în special articolul 9 alineatul (2),

întrucât:

| (1) | Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003 prevede autorizarea aditivilor destinați hranei animalelor, precum și motivele și procedurile de acordare a unei astfel de autorizații. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003 prevede autorizarea aditivilor destinați hranei animalelor, precum și motivele și procedurile de acordare a unei astfel de autorizații.

| (2) | În conformitate cu articolul 7 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003, a fost depusă o cerere de autorizare pentru DL-metionil-DL-metionină ca aditiv furajer. Cererea respectivă a fost însoțită de informațiile și documentele necesare în temeiul articolului 7 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

În conformitate cu articolul 7 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003, a fost depusă o cerere de autorizare pentru DL-metionil-DL-metionină ca aditiv furajer. Cererea respectivă a fost însoțită de informațiile și documentele necesare în temeiul articolului 7 alineatul (3) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003.

| (3) | Cererea respectivă se referă la autorizarea substanței DL-metionil-DL-metionină ca aditiv pentru hrana tuturor speciilor de animale acvatice, urmând ca aceasta să fie clasificată în categoria „aditivi nutriționali”. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Cererea respectivă se referă la autorizarea substanței DL-metionil-DL-metionină ca aditiv pentru hrana tuturor speciilor de animale acvatice, urmând ca aceasta să fie clasificată în categoria „aditivi nutriționali”.

| (4) | În avizul său din 27 ianuarie 2015 (2), Autoritatea Europeană pentru Siguranța Alimentară (denumită în continuare „autoritatea”) a concluzionat că, în condițiile de utilizare propuse, DL-metionil-DL-metionina nu are efecte adverse asupra sănătății animale, umane sau asupra mediului și că ea poate fi considerată o sursă eficace a aminoacidului L-metionină pentru speciile de pești și crustacee. Autoritatea nu consideră că sunt necesare cerințe specifice pentru monitorizarea ulterioară introducerii pe piață. În plus, autoritatea a verificat raportul privind metoda de analiză a aditivului destinat hranei pentru animale, prezentat de laboratorul de referință înființat în temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1831/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

În avizul său din 27 ianuarie 2015 (2), Autoritatea Europeană pentru Siguranța Alimentară (denumită în continuare „autoritatea”) a concluzionat că, în condițiile de utilizare propuse, DL-metionil-DL-metionina nu are efecte adverse asupra sănătății animale, umane sau asupra mediului și că ea poate fi considerată o sursă eficace a aminoacidului L-metionină pentru speciile de pești și crustacee. Autoritatea nu consideră că sunt necesare cerințe specifice pentru monitorizarea ulterioară introducerii pe piață. În plus, autoritatea a verificat raportul privind metoda de analiză a aditivului destinat hranei pentru animale, prezentat de laboratorul de referință înființat în temeiul Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1831/2003.

| (5) | Evaluarea substanței DL-metionil-DL-metionină arată că sunt îndeplinite condițiile de autorizare prevăzute la articolul 5 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003. În consecință, utilizarea substanței în cauză ar trebui autorizată, în conformitate cu specificațiile din anexa la prezentul regulament. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Evaluarea substanței DL-metionil-DL-metionină arată că sunt îndeplinite condițiile de autorizare prevăzute la articolul 5 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1831/2003. În consecință, utilizarea substanței în cauză ar trebui autorizată, în conformitate cu specificațiile din anexa la prezentul regulament.

| (6) | Măsurile prevăzute în prezentul regulament sunt conforme cu avizul Comitetului permanent pentru plante, animale, produse alimentare și hrană pentru animale, |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Măsurile prevăzute în prezentul regulament sunt conforme cu avizul Comitetului permanent pentru plante, animale, produse alimentare și hrană pentru animale,

ADOPTĂ PREZENTUL REGULAMENT:

Articolul 1

Substanța specificată în anexă, aparținând categoriei „aditivi nutriționali” și grupei funcționale „aminoacizi, sărurile acestora și produse analoage”, este autorizată ca aditiv pentru hrana animalelor în condițiile prevăzute în anexă.

Articolul 2

Prezentul regulament intră în vigoare în a douăzecea zi de la data publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.

Prezentul regulament este obligatoriu în toate elementele sale și se aplică direct în toate statele membre.

Adoptat la Bruxelles, 19 august 2015.

Pentru Comisie

Președintele

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  JO L 268, 18.10.2003, p. 29.

1

(2)  EFSA Journal 2015;13(2):4012.

2

EFSA Journal

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ANEXĂ

| Numărul de identificare al aditivului | Numele titularului autorizației | Aditiv | Compoziția, formula chimică, descrierea, metoda de analiză | Specie sau categorie de animale | Vârstă maximă | Conținut minim | Conținut maxim | Alte dispoziții | Sfârșitul perioadei de autorizare |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| mg/kg de furaj complet cu un conținut de umiditate de 12 % |
| Categoria aditivi nutriționali. Grupa funcțională: aminoacizi, sărurile acestora și produse analoage |
| 3c306 | — | DL-metionil-DL-metionină | Compoziția aditivului

  Pudră cristalină obținută prin sinteză chimică, cu minimum 93 % DL-metionil-DL-metionină, maximum 3 % DL-metionină și maximum 3 % sulfat de sodiu (raportat la substanța uscată)

  Caracterizarea substanței active

  DL-metionil-DL-metionină (acid 2-[(2-amino-4-metilsulfanilbutanoil)amino]-4-metilsulfanilbutanoic)
  Formula chimică: C10H20N2O3S2

  Numărul CAS: 52715-93-2

  Metodă de analiză
   (1)

  Pentru cuantificarea DL-metionil-DL-metioninei în aditivul furajer: cromatografie lichidă de înaltă performanță cu fază inversată, combinată cu detecție fotometrică la 205 nm (RP-HPLC-UV).
  Pentru cuantificarea DL-metionil-DL-metioninei în preamestecuri, în furajele combinate și în materiile prime pentru furaje: cromatografie prin schimb ionic cu derivatizare post-coloană și detecție fotometrică la 570 nm (IEC-UV). | Pești și crustacee | — | | | Conținutul de umiditate se indică pe etichetă. | 9 septembrie 2025 |

Numărul de identificare al aditivului

Numele titularului autorizației

Aditiv

Compoziția, formula chimică, descrierea, metoda de analiză

Specie sau categorie de animale

Vârstă maximă

Conținut minim

Conținut maxim

Alte dispoziții

Sfârșitul perioadei de autorizare

mg/kg de furaj complet cu un conținut de umiditate de 12 %

Categoria aditivi nutriționali. Grupa funcțională: aminoacizi, sărurile acestora și produse analoage

3c306

—

DL-metionil-DL-metionină

Compoziția aditivului

Pudră cristalină obținută prin sinteză chimică, cu minimum 93 % DL-metionil-DL-metionină, maximum 3 % DL-metionină și maximum 3 % sulfat de sodiu (raportat la substanța uscată)

Caracterizarea substanței active

DL-metionil-DL-metionină (acid 2-[(2-amino-4-metilsulfanilbutanoil)amino]-4-metilsulfanilbutanoic)

Formula chimică: C10H20N2O3S2

Numărul CAS: 52715-93-2

Metodă de analiză
   (1)

Pentru cuantificarea DL-metionil-DL-metioninei în aditivul furajer: cromatografie lichidă de înaltă performanță cu fază inversată, combinată cu detecție fotometrică la 205 nm (RP-HPLC-UV).

Pentru cuantificarea DL-metionil-DL-metioninei în preamestecuri, în furajele combinate și în materiile prime pentru furaje: cromatografie prin schimb ionic cu derivatizare post-coloană și detecție fotometrică la 570 nm (IEC-UV).

Pești și crustacee

—

Conținutul de umiditate se indică pe etichetă.

9 septembrie 2025

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(1)  Detaliile privind metodele de analiză sunt disponibile la următoarea adresă a laboratorului de referință: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/eurl/feed-additives/evaluation-reports

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| 20.8.2015 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 219/6 |
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20.8.2015

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

L 219/6

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REGULAMENTUL DE PUNERE ÎN APLICARE (UE) 2015/1409 AL COMISIEI

din 19 august 2015

de stabilire a valorilor forfetare de import pentru fixarea prețului de intrare pentru anumite fructe și legume

COMISIA EUROPEANĂ,

având în vedere Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene,

având în vedere Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1308/2013 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 17 decembrie 2013 de instituire a unei organizări comune a piețelor produselor agricole și de abrogare a Regulamentelor (CEE) nr. 922/72, (CEE) nr. 234/79, (CE) nr. 1037/2001 și (CE) nr. 1234/2007 ale Consiliului (1),

având în vedere Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 543/2011 al Comisiei din 7 iunie 2011 de stabilire a normelor de aplicare a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1234/2007 al Consiliului în ceea ce privește sectorul fructelor și legumelor și sectorul fructelor și legumelor prelucrate (2), în special articolul 136 alineatul (1),

întrucât:

| (1) | Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 543/2011 prevede, ca urmare a rezultatelor negocierilor comerciale multilaterale din cadrul Rundei Uruguay, criteriile pentru stabilirea de către Comisie a valorilor forfetare de import din țări terțe pentru produsele și perioadele menționate în partea A din anexa XVI la regulamentul respectiv. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 543/2011 prevede, ca urmare a rezultatelor negocierilor comerciale multilaterale din cadrul Rundei Uruguay, criteriile pentru stabilirea de către Comisie a valorilor forfetare de import din țări terțe pentru produsele și perioadele menționate în partea A din anexa XVI la regulamentul respectiv.

| (2) | Valoarea forfetară de import se calculează în fiecare zi lucrătoare, în conformitate cu articolul 136 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 543/2011, ținând seama de datele zilnice variabile. Prin urmare, prezentul regulament trebuie să intre în vigoare la data publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Valoarea forfetară de import se calculează în fiecare zi lucrătoare, în conformitate cu articolul 136 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 543/2011, ținând seama de datele zilnice variabile. Prin urmare, prezentul regulament trebuie să intre în vigoare la data publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene,

ADOPTĂ PREZENTUL REGULAMENT:

Articolul 1

Valorile forfetare de import prevăzute la articolul 136 din Regulamentul de punere în aplicare (UE) nr. 543/2011 sunt stabilite în anexa la prezentul regulament.

Articolul 2

Prezentul regulament intră în vigoare la data publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.

Prezentul regulament este obligatoriu în toate elementele sale și se aplică direct în toate statele membre.

Adoptat la Bruxelles, 19 august 2015.

Pentru Comisie,

pentru președinte

Jerzy PLEWA

Director general pentru agricultură și dezvoltare rurală

---

(1)  JO L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  JO L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.

2

---

ANEXĂ

Valorile forfetare de import pentru fixarea prețului de intrare pentru anumite fructe și legume

| (EUR/100 kg) |
| --- |
| Codul NC | Codul țării terțe (1) | Valoarea forfetară de import |
| 0702 00 00 | MA | 164,5 |
| MK | 51,2 |
| ZZ | 107,9 |
| 0709 93 10 | TR | 131,0 |
| ZZ | 131,0 |
| 0805 50 10 | AR | 143,0 |
| BO | 154,5 |
| CL | 163,3 |
| UY | 153,9 |
| ZA | 153,7 |
| ZZ | 153,7 |
| 0806 10 10 | EG | 253,2 |
| IL | 390,7 |
| TR | 166,5 |
| US | 339,9 |
| ZZ | 283,1 |
| 0808 10 80 | AR | 122,9 |
| BR | 92,7 |
| CL | 124,5 |
| NZ | 146,7 |
| US | 109,0 |
| UY | 141,9 |
| ZA | 120,2 |
| ZZ | 122,6 |
| 0808 30 90 | AR | 136,4 |
| CL | 152,7 |
| CN | 85,3 |
| NZ | 108,4 |
| TR | 136,3 |
| ZA | 111,8 |
| ZZ | 121,8 |
| 0809 30 10, 0809 30 90 | MK | 69,5 |
| TR | 131,7 |
| ZZ | 100,6 |
| 0809 40 05 | BA | 44,3 |
| IL | 99,6 |
| MK | 36,8 |
| XS | 57,7 |
| ZZ | 59,6 |

(EUR/100 kg)

Codul NC

Codul țării terțe (1)

Valoarea forfetară de import

0702 00 00

MA

164,5

MK

51,2

ZZ

107,9

0709 93 10

TR

131,0

ZZ

131,0

0805 50 10

AR

143,0

BO

154,5

CL

163,3

UY

153,9

ZA

153,7

ZZ

153,7

0806 10 10

EG

253,2

IL

390,7

TR

166,5

US

339,9

ZZ

283,1

0808 10 80

AR

122,9

BR

92,7

CL

124,5

NZ

146,7

US

109,0

UY

141,9

ZA

120,2

ZZ

122,6

0808 30 90

AR

136,4

CL

152,7

CN

85,3

NZ

108,4

TR

136,3

ZA

111,8

ZZ

121,8

0809 30 10, 0809 30 90

MK

69,5

TR

131,7

ZZ

100,6

0809 40 05

BA

44,3

IL

99,6

MK

36,8

XS

57,7

ZZ

59,6

---

(1)  Nomenclatura țărilor stabilită prin Regulamentul (UE) nr. 1106/2012 al Comisiei din 27 noiembrie 2012 de punere în aplicare a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 471/2009 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului privind statisticile comunitare privind comerțul exterior cu țările terțe, în ceea ce privește actualizarea nomenclatorului țărilor și teritoriilor (JO L 328, 28.11.2012, p. 7). Codul „ZZ” desemnează „alte origini”.

---

DECIZII

| 20.8.2015 | EN | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 219/8 |
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20.8.2015

EN

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

L 219/8

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COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2015/1410

of 19 August 2015

giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(9) thereof,

Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) establishes that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits and sets out the excessive deficit procedure to that effect. The Stability and Growth Pact, which in its corrective arm implements the excessive deficit procedure, provides the framework supporting government policies for a prompt return to sound budgetary positions taking account of the economic situation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) establishes that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits and sets out the excessive deficit procedure to that effect. The Stability and Growth Pact, which in its corrective arm implements the excessive deficit procedure, provides the framework supporting government policies for a prompt return to sound budgetary positions taking account of the economic situation.

| (2) | On 27 April 2009, the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community that an excessive deficit existed in Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 27 April 2009, the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community that an excessive deficit existed in Greece.

| (3) | On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/320/EU (1) addressed to Greece under Article 126(9) and Article 136 TFEU with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fiscal surveillance and giving notice to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit at the latest by the deadline of 2014. The Council established 2014 as the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and annual targets for the government deficit. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/320/EU (1) addressed to Greece under Article 126(9) and Article 136 TFEU with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fiscal surveillance and giving notice to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit at the latest by the deadline of 2014. The Council established 2014 as the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and annual targets for the government deficit.

| (4) | Council Decision No 2010/320/EU was substantially amended several times. Since further amendments were to be made, it was recast, on 12 July 2011, by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2) in the interest of clarity. Subsequently, that Decision was significantly amended several times between 8 July 2011 and December 2012 (3). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Council Decision No 2010/320/EU was substantially amended several times. Since further amendments were to be made, it was recast, on 12 July 2011, by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2) in the interest of clarity. Subsequently, that Decision was significantly amended several times between 8 July 2011 and December 2012 (3).

| (5) | The very severe deterioration of the financial situation of Greece has led euro area Member States to decide to provide it stability support, with a view to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund. From May 2010 to June 2015, support provided by the euro area Member States took the form of both a bilateral Greek Loan Facility and a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The lenders' support was accompanied by extensive policy conditionality, including the respect by Greece of Council Decision 2011/734/EU and subsequent amendments thereto. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The very severe deterioration of the financial situation of Greece has led euro area Member States to decide to provide it stability support, with a view to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund. From May 2010 to June 2015, support provided by the euro area Member States took the form of both a bilateral Greek Loan Facility and a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The lenders' support was accompanied by extensive policy conditionality, including the respect by Greece of Council Decision 2011/734/EU and subsequent amendments thereto.

| (6) | On 8 July 2015, Greece requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in the form of a three-year loan, and on 12 July 2015 an agreement in principle was reached on the provision of a loan of the amount of up to EUR 86 000 million to Greece. On 17 July, the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, and with the International Monetary Fund, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) detailing the policy conditionality for a financial assistance facility covering the period 2015-2018 in accordance with Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 8 July 2015, Greece requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in the form of a three-year loan, and on 12 July 2015 an agreement in principle was reached on the provision of a loan of the amount of up to EUR 86 000 million to Greece. On 17 July, the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, and with the International Monetary Fund, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) detailing the policy conditionality for a financial assistance facility covering the period 2015-2018 in accordance with Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty.

| (7) | In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, a Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM must prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (‘the Programme’) for approval by the Council. Such a programme should ensure the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances and the regulatory environment. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, a Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM must prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (‘the Programme’) for approval by the Council. Such a programme should ensure the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances and the regulatory environment.

| (8) | The Programme prepared by Greece was approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Programme prepared by Greece was approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 (5).

| (9) | Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 also establishes that, in case a Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 7 of that Regulation is also subject to a decision under 126(9) TFEU for the correction of its excessive deficit, the annual budgetary targets in its macroeconomic adjustment programme shall be integrated into the decision to give notice under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (6); in addition, the measures conducive to those targets in the macroeconomic adjustment programme shall also be integrated into the decision to give notice in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Article 10(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 further establishes that the Member State shall be exempt from submitting reports under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Finally, Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 establishes that the monitoring shall be undertaken as provided for by Article 7(4) of that Regulation and the Member State shall be exempt from monitoring under Article 10(1) and Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and from monitoring underlying any decision under Article 6(2) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 also establishes that, in case a Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 7 of that Regulation is also subject to a decision under 126(9) TFEU for the correction of its excessive deficit, the annual budgetary targets in its macroeconomic adjustment programme shall be integrated into the decision to give notice under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (6); in addition, the measures conducive to those targets in the macroeconomic adjustment programme shall also be integrated into the decision to give notice in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Article 10(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 further establishes that the Member State shall be exempt from submitting reports under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Finally, Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 establishes that the monitoring shall be undertaken as provided for by Article 7(4) of that Regulation and the Member State shall be exempt from monitoring under Article 10(1) and Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and from monitoring underlying any decision under Article 6(2) of that Regulation.

| (10) | Economic activity in Greece is currently projected to be much weaker than was expected when the latest amendment to Council Decision 2011/734/EU was adopted in December 2012. Both real and nominal GDP are expected to be at much lower levels in 2015 and 2016 than was expected in the 2015 Spring Forecast of the Commission, due to policy uncertainty, lack of implementation of reforms, a shortfall in government revenues, bank holidays, and the imposition of capital controls. The Commission updated its forecast for GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the MoU required for an ESM programme. According to this forecast, real GDP in 2015-2016 is projected to contract by 2,3 % and 1,3 % respectively, (against a positive growth of 0,5 % and 2,9 % in the 2015 Spring Forecast for the corresponding years), before growing by 2,7 % in 2017 and 3,1 % in 2018. This marked worsening of the economic scenario in 2015-2016 implies a corresponding deterioration of the outlook for public finances given unchanged policies. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Economic activity in Greece is currently projected to be much weaker than was expected when the latest amendment to Council Decision 2011/734/EU was adopted in December 2012. Both real and nominal GDP are expected to be at much lower levels in 2015 and 2016 than was expected in the 2015 Spring Forecast of the Commission, due to policy uncertainty, lack of implementation of reforms, a shortfall in government revenues, bank holidays, and the imposition of capital controls. The Commission updated its forecast for GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the MoU required for an ESM programme. According to this forecast, real GDP in 2015-2016 is projected to contract by 2,3 % and 1,3 % respectively, (against a positive growth of 0,5 % and 2,9 % in the 2015 Spring Forecast for the corresponding years), before growing by 2,7 % in 2017 and 3,1 % in 2018. This marked worsening of the economic scenario in 2015-2016 implies a corresponding deterioration of the outlook for public finances given unchanged policies.

| (11) | Greece is estimated to have improved its structural deficit by 16 percentage points of GDP from a 15,2 % deficit in 2009 to an estimated 1 % surplus in 2014, thus ensuring an improvement in the structural balance in 2009-2014, which is significantly larger than the requirement of at least 10 percentage points of GDP over the period recommended by the Council. In 2014, the general government deficit reached 3,5 % of GDP, clearly within the 4,5 % of GDP government deficit (ESA2010 basis) ceiling for 2014 established by the Council Decision. However, the primary balance outturn of 0,4 % of GDP was substantially weaker than expected and undershot the target set at 1,5 % of GDP due to a combination of factors including the reversal in the economic cycle and the related negative impact on budget revenues, the relaxation of fiscal policy and increased economic uncertainty. The weakening macroeconomic environment accompanied with expiring temporary fiscal measures in 2015 have, however, made it impossible to achieve the primary balance target of 3 % of GDP in 2015 envisaged in the latest amendment to Decision 2011/734/EU adopted in December 2012. The fiscal targets have, therefore, been revised down substantially, taking into account the macroeconomic circumstances and the current fiscal situation, to avoid overtightening fiscal policy in the short term. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Greece is estimated to have improved its structural deficit by 16 percentage points of GDP from a 15,2 % deficit in 2009 to an estimated 1 % surplus in 2014, thus ensuring an improvement in the structural balance in 2009-2014, which is significantly larger than the requirement of at least 10 percentage points of GDP over the period recommended by the Council. In 2014, the general government deficit reached 3,5 % of GDP, clearly within the 4,5 % of GDP government deficit (ESA2010 basis) ceiling for 2014 established by the Council Decision. However, the primary balance outturn of 0,4 % of GDP was substantially weaker than expected and undershot the target set at 1,5 % of GDP due to a combination of factors including the reversal in the economic cycle and the related negative impact on budget revenues, the relaxation of fiscal policy and increased economic uncertainty. The weakening macroeconomic environment accompanied with expiring temporary fiscal measures in 2015 have, however, made it impossible to achieve the primary balance target of 3 % of GDP in 2015 envisaged in the latest amendment to Decision 2011/734/EU adopted in December 2012. The fiscal targets have, therefore, been revised down substantially, taking into account the macroeconomic circumstances and the current fiscal situation, to avoid overtightening fiscal policy in the short term.

| (12) | Greece will accordingly pursue a new fiscal path, premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with the expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Greece will accordingly pursue a new fiscal path, premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with the expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017.

| (13) | Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

| (14) | The budget for 2016 to be adopted by the Greek parliament forms part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2016-2019, with the aim to deliver a sizeable and front-loaded fiscal consolidation bringing savings of more than EUR 6 900 million, close to 4 % of GDP. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The budget for 2016 to be adopted by the Greek parliament forms part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2016-2019, with the aim to deliver a sizeable and front-loaded fiscal consolidation bringing savings of more than EUR 6 900 million, close to 4 % of GDP.

| (15) | The failure to complete the final EFSF programme review, the missed debt service payments, the expiration of the EFSF programme and the introduction of capital controls have created new circumstances that have led to a further strong deterioration in debt sustainability. This is due to lower growth estimates, a downward revision of the primary surplus targets, a downward revision of privatisation receipts, a strong deterioration in the financing needs of the banking sector following the imposition of capital controls, the need for a higher clearance of arrears following the liquidity shortage experienced by the sovereign and valuation effects due to the depreciation of the euro with respect to the SDR. As a result of these developments debt-to-GDP is expected to reach 198,3 % in 2016, before decreasing to 169,3 % in 2020, 154,5 % in 2022 and 115,9 % in 2030 in the baseline scenario. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The failure to complete the final EFSF programme review, the missed debt service payments, the expiration of the EFSF programme and the introduction of capital controls have created new circumstances that have led to a further strong deterioration in debt sustainability. This is due to lower growth estimates, a downward revision of the primary surplus targets, a downward revision of privatisation receipts, a strong deterioration in the financing needs of the banking sector following the imposition of capital controls, the need for a higher clearance of arrears following the liquidity shortage experienced by the sovereign and valuation effects due to the depreciation of the euro with respect to the SDR. As a result of these developments debt-to-GDP is expected to reach 198,3 % in 2016, before decreasing to 169,3 % in 2020, 154,5 % in 2022 and 115,9 % in 2030 in the baseline scenario.

| (16) | Taking into account those developments, the adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit needs to be updated. The commitment undertaken by Greece concerns not only the fiscal consolidation measures, but also those measures needed to enhance the growth-friendly nature and to minimise any negative social impact. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Taking into account those developments, the adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit needs to be updated. The commitment undertaken by Greece concerns not only the fiscal consolidation measures, but also those measures needed to enhance the growth-friendly nature and to minimise any negative social impact.

| (17) | Each measure required by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 is instrumental in achieving the required budgetary adjustment. Some measures have a direct impact on the budgetary situation of Greece while the others are structural measures that will result in improved fiscal governance and a sounder budgetary situation in the medium term. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Each measure required by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 is instrumental in achieving the required budgetary adjustment. Some measures have a direct impact on the budgetary situation of Greece while the others are structural measures that will result in improved fiscal governance and a sounder budgetary situation in the medium term.

| (18) | In light of the above considerations, it appears necessary to revise the previous annual budgetary targets and the measures conducive to those targets. The new annual budgetary targets and measures conducive to those targets are those contained in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411, |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In light of the above considerations, it appears necessary to revise the previous annual budgetary targets and the measures conducive to those targets. The new annual budgetary targets and measures conducive to those targets are those contained in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   Greece shall put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible, and at the latest, by 2017.

2.   The adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit shall aim to meet the annual general-government-deficit targets, as laid down in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 and will be based on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017.

3.   Greece shall adopt and fully implement all fiscal, economic and structural adjustment measures incorporated in the economic and financial adjustment programme as approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411.

4.   Greece shall stand ready to adopt further measures if risks to the budgetary plans materialise. Budgetary consolidation measures shall secure a lasting improvement in the general government structural balance in a growth-friendly manner.

Article 2

This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 19 August 2015.

For the Council

The President

J. ASSELBORN

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(1)  OJ L 145, 11.6.2010, p. 6.

1

(2)  OJ L 296, 15.11.2011, p. 38.

2

(3)  Council Decision 2011/791/EU of 8 November 2011 (OJ L 320, 3.12.2011, p. 28), Council Decision 2012/211/EU of 13 March 2012 (OJ L 113, 25.4.2012, p. 8), Council Decision 2013/6/EU of 4 December 2012 (OJ L 4, 9.1.2013, p. 40).

3

(4)  OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1.

4

(5)  See page 12 of this Official Journal.

5

(6)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

6

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| 20.8.2015 | EN | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 219/12 |
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20.8.2015

EN

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

L 219/12

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2015/1411

of 19 August 2015

approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (1), and in particular Article 7(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 136(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) foresees the possibility of adopting measures specific to Member States whose currency is the euro in order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 136(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) foresees the possibility of adopting measures specific to Member States whose currency is the euro in order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union.

| (2) | Since 2010, Greece has been granted financial assistance by the Member States and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). A first Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was been agreed on 2 May 2010: the euro area Member States agreed to provide bilateral loans, pooled by the European Commission, for a total amount of EUR 80 000 million to be disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013 and the IMF committing additional EUR 30 000 million under a stand-by arrangement. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was approved on 14 March 2012. The euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus an additional EUR 130 000 million for the years 2012-2014. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on bilateral loans, it was agreed that — on the side of euro area Member States — the second programme would be financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’), which had been fully operational since August 2010. In total, the second programme foresaw financial assistance of EUR 164 500 million until the end of 2014 (the period was later extended until the end of June 2015). Of that sum, the euro area commitment amounts to EUR 144 700 million to be provided via the EFSF, while the IMF contributed EUR 19 800 million, as part of a four-year EUR 28 000 million arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece that the IMF approved in March 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since 2010, Greece has been granted financial assistance by the Member States and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). A first Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was been agreed on 2 May 2010: the euro area Member States agreed to provide bilateral loans, pooled by the European Commission, for a total amount of EUR 80 000 million to be disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013 and the IMF committing additional EUR 30 000 million under a stand-by arrangement. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was approved on 14 March 2012. The euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus an additional EUR 130 000 million for the years 2012-2014. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on bilateral loans, it was agreed that — on the side of euro area Member States — the second programme would be financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’), which had been fully operational since August 2010. In total, the second programme foresaw financial assistance of EUR 164 500 million until the end of 2014 (the period was later extended until the end of June 2015). Of that sum, the euro area commitment amounts to EUR 144 700 million to be provided via the EFSF, while the IMF contributed EUR 19 800 million, as part of a four-year EUR 28 000 million arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece that the IMF approved in March 2012.

| (3) | On 8 July 2015, in view of the ongoing severe economic and financial disturbance, the Greek authorities requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in order to ensure a properly-functioning Greek banking system, to meet Greece's debt obligations, to support the return of Greece's economy to sustainable growth and safeguard financial stability of the euro area and of its Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 8 July 2015, in view of the ongoing severe economic and financial disturbance, the Greek authorities requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in order to ensure a properly-functioning Greek banking system, to meet Greece's debt obligations, to support the return of Greece's economy to sustainable growth and safeguard financial stability of the euro area and of its Member States.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ESM Treaty, and to form the basis for a decision of the ESM Board of Governors, in line with Article 13(2) thereof, whether to grant, in principle, stability support to Greece in the form of a loan, on 8 July 2015 the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’), with assessing the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member States; assessing, together with the IMF, whether public debt is sustainable; and estimating the actual or potential financing needs of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ESM Treaty, and to form the basis for a decision of the ESM Board of Governors, in line with Article 13(2) thereof, whether to grant, in principle, stability support to Greece in the form of a loan, on 8 July 2015 the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’), with assessing the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member States; assessing, together with the IMF, whether public debt is sustainable; and estimating the actual or potential financing needs of Greece.

| (5) | In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and with input from IMF staff, completed those assessments on 10 July 2015, concluding that conditions for the financial support for Greece, to be provided in the form of an ESM loan, are in place. The financing needs were estimated to be up to EUR 86 000 million. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and with input from IMF staff, completed those assessments on 10 July 2015, concluding that conditions for the financial support for Greece, to be provided in the form of an ESM loan, are in place. The financing needs were estimated to be up to EUR 86 000 million.

| (6) | On 17 July 2015, Greece was granted EUR 7 160 million short-term financial assistance under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (‘EFSM’), by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 (2), for facing July 2015 repayment obligations and settling its arrears to the IMF. The assistance was disbursed in one instalment on 20 July 2015, and was linked to economic policy conditionality. The ESM assistance will be used, inter alia, to repay that short-term EFSM bridge loan. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 17 July 2015, Greece was granted EUR 7 160 million short-term financial assistance under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (‘EFSM’), by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 (2), for facing July 2015 repayment obligations and settling its arrears to the IMF. The assistance was disbursed in one instalment on 20 July 2015, and was linked to economic policy conditionality. The ESM assistance will be used, inter alia, to repay that short-term EFSM bridge loan.

| (7) | On 16 July 2015, the ESM Board of Governors invited the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, the ESM, the Greek authorities, and, where appropriate, the IMF, to agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme for Greece. The programme was prepared in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013. On 11 August 2015, those institutions reached an agreement at technical level on a macroeconomic adjustment programme (the ‘Programme’) with the Greek Government. The Programme submitted by Greece to the Commission and the Council aims at ensuring the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances, as well as to ensure financial stability and to promote growth, employment, and social fairness. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 16 July 2015, the ESM Board of Governors invited the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, the ESM, the Greek authorities, and, where appropriate, the IMF, to agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme for Greece. The programme was prepared in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013. On 11 August 2015, those institutions reached an agreement at technical level on a macroeconomic adjustment programme (the ‘Programme’) with the Greek Government. The Programme submitted by Greece to the Commission and the Council aims at ensuring the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances, as well as to ensure financial stability and to promote growth, employment, and social fairness.

| (8) | Following that agreement, Greece should adopt a comprehensive policy package, to be implemented in a three-year macroeconomic adjustment programme which would span from the third quarter of 2015 to the third quarter of 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Following that agreement, Greece should adopt a comprehensive policy package, to be implemented in a three-year macroeconomic adjustment programme which would span from the third quarter of 2015 to the third quarter of 2018.

| (9) | The comprehensive policy package, to be laid down in an ESM Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’), should aim at restoring financial market confidence, re-establishing sound macroeconomic balances and enabling the economy to return to sustainable growth. It should be structured on four pillars: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The comprehensive policy package, to be laid down in an ESM Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’), should aim at restoring financial market confidence, re-establishing sound macroeconomic balances and enabling the economy to return to sustainable growth. It should be structured on four pillars: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration.

| (10) | The Commission services updated their forecast for nominal GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the ESM programme. Under this forecast, which centres around a nominal GDP growth rate of – 3,2 % in 2015, – 0,7 % in 2016, 3,4 % in 2017, 4,1 % in 2018 and 4,2 % in 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio would amount to 196,3 % in 2015, 200,9 % in 2016, 198,6 % in 2017, 190,7 % in 2018 and 182,3 % in 2019. The debt-to-GDP ratio would therefore increase until 2016 and move to a declining path thereafter, reaching an estimated 174,5 % in 2020, with debt dynamics affected by several below-the-line operations. Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The Commission services updated their forecast for nominal GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the ESM programme. Under this forecast, which centres around a nominal GDP growth rate of – 3,2 % in 2015, – 0,7 % in 2016, 3,4 % in 2017, 4,1 % in 2018 and 4,2 % in 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio would amount to 196,3 % in 2015, 200,9 % in 2016, 198,6 % in 2017, 190,7 % in 2018 and 182,3 % in 2019. The debt-to-GDP ratio would therefore increase until 2016 and move to a declining path thereafter, reaching an estimated 174,5 % in 2020, with debt dynamics affected by several below-the-line operations. Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

| (11) | The authorities will pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The authorities will pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession.

| (12) | Enhancing the long-term resilience of the Greek banking sector is critical to restoring financial stability in Greece and to preserving financial stability in the euro area as a whole. To preserve the liquidity of the Greek banking sector, temporary administrative measures were imposed, including capital controls. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Enhancing the long-term resilience of the Greek banking sector is critical to restoring financial stability in Greece and to preserving financial stability in the euro area as a whole. To preserve the liquidity of the Greek banking sector, temporary administrative measures were imposed, including capital controls.

| (13) | The implementation of comprehensive and ambitious reforms in financial, fiscal and structural areas should safeguard the medium-term sustainability of the Greek public debt. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The implementation of comprehensive and ambitious reforms in financial, fiscal and structural areas should safeguard the medium-term sustainability of the Greek public debt.

| (14) | The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, should verify at regular intervals the rigorous implementation of Greece's Programme through missions and regular reporting, on a quarterly basis, by the Greek authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, should verify at regular intervals the rigorous implementation of Greece's Programme through missions and regular reporting, on a quarterly basis, by the Greek authorities.

| (15) | Throughout the implementation of Greece's comprehensive policy package, the Commission should provide additional policy advice and technical assistance in specific areas. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Throughout the implementation of Greece's comprehensive policy package, the Commission should provide additional policy advice and technical assistance in specific areas.

| (16) | The Greek authorities should involve, in accordance with current national rules and practices, the social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Greek authorities should involve, in accordance with current national rules and practices, the social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme.

| (17) | Any form of financial assistance received by Greece to help it implement the policies under its Programme should be in line with the legal requirements and policies of the Union, in particular the Union's economic governance framework. Any intervention in support of financial institutions should be carried out in accordance with the Union's rules on competition. The Commission should ensure that any measures laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding in the context of requested ESM financial assistance are fully consistent with this Decision, |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Any form of financial assistance received by Greece to help it implement the policies under its Programme should be in line with the legal requirements and policies of the Union, in particular the Union's economic governance framework. Any intervention in support of financial institutions should be carried out in accordance with the Union's rules on competition. The Commission should ensure that any measures laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding in the context of requested ESM financial assistance are fully consistent with this Decision,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   In order to facilitate the return of the Greek economy to a path of sustainable growth and to fiscal and financial stability, Greece shall rigorously implement the Programme, the main elements of which are laid down in Article 2 of this Decision. The Programme shall address the specific risks emanating from Greece for the financial stability of the euro area and shall aim to rapidly re-establish a sound and sustainable economic and financial situation in Greece and restore its capacity to finance itself fully on the international financial markets. The Programme shall take due account of the Council recommendations addressed to Greece under Articles 121, 126, 136 and 148 TFEU as well as Greece's actions to comply with them, while aiming to broaden, strengthen and deepen the policy measures required.

2.   The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, shall monitor Greece's progress in implementing its Programme. Greece shall give the Commission and the ECB its full cooperation. It shall, in particular, provide them with all the information that they deem necessary for the monitoring of the Programme.

3.   The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, shall examine with the Greek authorities any changes and updates to the Programme that may be needed in order to take proper account of, inter alia, any significant gap between macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts and realised figures, negative spillover effects, as well as macroeconomic and financial shocks.

In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the Programme and to help the correction of imbalances in a sustainable way, the Commission shall provide continued advice and guidance on fiscal, financial market and structural reforms.

The Commission shall at regular intervals assess the economic impact of the Programme and shall recommend necessary corrections with a view to enhancing growth and job creation, securing the necessary fiscal consolidation, and minimising harmful social impacts.

Article 2

1.   The key objectives of the Programme shall be: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration.

2.   Greece shall pursue fiscal consolidation by means of high-quality permanent measures while minimising the impact on disadvantaged people. The Greek authorities commit to ensuring sustainable public finances and achieve sizeable and sustainable primary surpluses over the medium-term that will reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio steadily. The authorities shall accordingly pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 per cent of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. Greece shall target a medium-term primary surplus of 3,5 % of GDP to be achieved through a combination of upfront parametric fiscal reforms, including to its VAT and pension system, supported by an ambitious programme to strengthen tax compliance and public financial management, and fight tax evasion, while ensuring adequate protection of vulnerable groups. In addition to the measures above, the authorities commit to legislate in October 2015 credible structural measures yielding at least 0,75 % of GDP coming into effect in 2017 and 0,25 % of GDP coming into effect in 2018 to support the achievement of the medium-term primary balance target of 3,5 % of GDP. The authorities commit to take further structural measures in October 2016, if needed to secure the 2017 and 2018 targets. Those would include containing defence expenditure, the planned personal income tax reform and freezing statutory spending. Parametric fiscal measures shall be bolstered by a wide range of administrative actions to address shortfalls in tax collection and enforcement. The Greek Government shall monitor fiscal risks, including court rulings, and shall take offsetting measures as needed to meet the fiscal targets. The authorities intend to transfer at least 30 % of any over-performance to the segregated account earmarked for debt reduction. In addition, another 30 % of the over-performance would be used for clearing unpaid government obligations linked to the past.

3.   Greece shall adopt the measures specified below:

| (i) | take measures in the short term to raise revenues and to target and contain expenditure. Among the measures to raise revenue, Greece shall gradually abolish the refund of excise tax on diesel oil for farmers and increase the tonnage tax. The authorities shall take actions to launch the 2015 property tax (ENFIA) exercise in order to issue bills in October 2015 with the final instalment due in February 2016. They shall also correct identified issues with the revenue measures recently implemented. The authorities also committed to target and contain expenditure by reducing the cost of healthcare and launching the comprehensive social welfare review. The package includes further measures with budgetary impact, such as public administration reforms, reforms addressing shortfalls in tax collection enforcement, and other parametric measures; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

take measures in the short term to raise revenues and to target and contain expenditure. Among the measures to raise revenue, Greece shall gradually abolish the refund of excise tax on diesel oil for farmers and increase the tonnage tax. The authorities shall take actions to launch the 2015 property tax (ENFIA) exercise in order to issue bills in October 2015 with the final instalment due in February 2016. They shall also correct identified issues with the revenue measures recently implemented. The authorities also committed to target and contain expenditure by reducing the cost of healthcare and launching the comprehensive social welfare review. The package includes further measures with budgetary impact, such as public administration reforms, reforms addressing shortfalls in tax collection enforcement, and other parametric measures;

| (ii) | to demonstrate its commitment to credible fiscal policies, adopt in October 2015, a supplementary 2015 budget as needed, the draft 2016 budget and a 2016-2019 Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, supported by a sizable and credible package of parametric measures and structural fiscal reforms; |
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(ii)

to demonstrate its commitment to credible fiscal policies, adopt in October 2015, a supplementary 2015 budget as needed, the draft 2016 budget and a 2016-2019 Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, supported by a sizable and credible package of parametric measures and structural fiscal reforms;

| (iii) | enact reforms of both direct and indirect taxation to improve efficiency, collectability and boost labour supply. To break from past practice and improve the tax and social security payment culture, the Government shall take strong action to improve collection, and neither introduce new instalment or other amnesty or settlement schemes nor extend existing schemes; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

enact reforms of both direct and indirect taxation to improve efficiency, collectability and boost labour supply. To break from past practice and improve the tax and social security payment culture, the Government shall take strong action to improve collection, and neither introduce new instalment or other amnesty or settlement schemes nor extend existing schemes;

| (iv) | continue reforms that aim at improving the budget process and expenditure controls, clearing arrears, and strengthening budget reporting and cash management. The Government is committed to making the Fiscal Council operational; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

continue reforms that aim at improving the budget process and expenditure controls, clearing arrears, and strengthening budget reporting and cash management. The Government is committed to making the Fiscal Council operational;

| (v) | take further action in the area of public procurement to increase efficiency and transparency of the Greek public procurement system, prevent misconduct, and ensure more accountability and control. Policies will be agreed with the European Commission, which shall assist with the implementation of an action plan; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

take further action in the area of public procurement to increase efficiency and transparency of the Greek public procurement system, prevent misconduct, and ensure more accountability and control. Policies will be agreed with the European Commission, which shall assist with the implementation of an action plan;

| (vi) | implement fully the existing reforms and also proceed with further reforms to strengthen long-term sustainability, targeting savings of around 0,25 % of GDP in 2015 and around 1 % of GDP by 2016. The package inter alia aims to create strong disincentives for early retirement through increasing early retirement penalties and by the gradual elimination of the grandfathering of rights to retire before the statutory retirement age; |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

implement fully the existing reforms and also proceed with further reforms to strengthen long-term sustainability, targeting savings of around 0,25 % of GDP in 2015 and around 1 % of GDP by 2016. The package inter alia aims to create strong disincentives for early retirement through increasing early retirement penalties and by the gradual elimination of the grandfathering of rights to retire before the statutory retirement age;

| (vii) | continue reforming the healthcare sector, controlling public expenditure, managing prices of pharmaceuticals, improve hospital management, increase centralised procurement of hospital supplies, manage demand for pharmaceuticals and health care through evidence-based e-prescription protocols, commission private sector healthcare providers in a cost-effective manner, modernise IT systems, developing a new electronic referral system for primary and secondary care that allows the formulation of care pathways for patients; |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

continue reforming the healthcare sector, controlling public expenditure, managing prices of pharmaceuticals, improve hospital management, increase centralised procurement of hospital supplies, manage demand for pharmaceuticals and health care through evidence-based e-prescription protocols, commission private sector healthcare providers in a cost-effective manner, modernise IT systems, developing a new electronic referral system for primary and secondary care that allows the formulation of care pathways for patients;

| (viii) | adopt by March 2016 a further series of guaranteed employment support schemes with individualised active labour market measures for participants, using local partnerships, involving the private and social economy sectors and ensuring the efficient and effective use of the resources available.
  Achieving a fairer society will require that Greece improve the design of its welfare system, so that there is a genuine social safety net which targets scarce resources at those in most need. The authorities plan to benefit from available technical assistance from international organisations for the social welfare review and for the guaranteed minimum income implementation. |
| --- | --- |

(viii)

adopt by March 2016 a further series of guaranteed employment support schemes with individualised active labour market measures for participants, using local partnerships, involving the private and social economy sectors and ensuring the efficient and effective use of the resources available.

Achieving a fairer society will require that Greece improve the design of its welfare system, so that there is a genuine social safety net which targets scarce resources at those in most need. The authorities plan to benefit from available technical assistance from international organisations for the social welfare review and for the guaranteed minimum income implementation.

4.   To safeguard financial stability, Greece shall immediately take steps to tackle Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and restore liquidity and capital in the banking system. A recapitalisation process of banks should be completed before the end of 2015, which shall be accompanied by concomitant measures to strengthen the governance of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (‘HFSF’) and of banks. Further measures involve the resolution of Non-Performing Loans (‘NPLs’) and the governance of the HFSF and of banks.

5.   To promote growth, competitiveness and investment, Greece shall design and implement a wide range of reforms in labour markets and product markets (including energy) that not only ensure full compliance with European Union requirements, but also aim at achieving European best practices. More open markets are essential to create economic opportunities and improve social fairness, by curtailing rent-seeking and monopolistic behaviour, which has translated into higher prices and lower living standards. In line with their growth strategy, the authorities shall intensify their efforts to bring key initiatives and reform proposals to fruition as well as enrich the agenda with further ambitious reforms that shall support the country's return to sustainable growth, attract investments and create jobs.

6.   The Greek energy markets need wide-ranging reforms to bring them in line with Union legislation and policies, make them more modern and competitive, reduce monopolistic rents and inefficiencies, promote innovation, favour the wider adoption of renewables and gas, and ensure the transfer of benefits of all these changes to consumers. The authorities shall adopt the reform of the gas market and its specific roadmap, leading inter alia to full eligibility to switch supplier for all customers by 2018, and notify the reformed capacity payments system (including a temporary and a permanent mechanism) and New Organisation of Markets in Electricity products to the Commission. In any case, by 2020 no undertaking shall be permitted to produce or import, directly or indirectly, more than 50 % of total electricity produced and imported in Greece.

7.   There shall be an ambitious privatisation programme and policies which support investment. The Government commits to facilitate the privatisation process and complete all needed Government actions to allow tenders to be executed successfully. In this respect the Government shall complete all actions needed as agreed on a quarterly basis between the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (‘HRADF’), the institutions and the Government. The List of Government Pending Actions has been approved by the Board of Directors of the HRADF. In line with the statement of the Euro Summit of 12 July 2015, a new independent fund (the ‘Fund’) shall be established and have in its possession valuable Greek assets. The overarching objective of the Fund is to manage valuable Greek assets; and to protect, create and ultimately maximise their value which it shall monetise through privatisations and other means.

8.   A modern state and public administration shall be a key priority of the Programme. Particular attention shall be paid to increasing the efficiency of the public sector in the delivery of essential public goods and services. Measures shall be taken to enhance the efficiency of the judicial system and to upgrade the fight against corruption. Reforms shall strengthen the institutional and operational independence of key institutions such as the revenue administration and the statistics institute (Elstat).

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 19 August 2015.

For the Council

The President

J. ASSELBORN

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(1)  OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ L 192, 18.7.2015, p. 15.

2

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ACTE ADOPTATE DE ORGANISME CREATE PRIN ACORDURI INTERNAŢIONALE

| 20.8.2015 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | L 219/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

L 219/17

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DECIZIA NR. 1 A COMITETULUI UE-COREEA PENTRU COMERȚUL CU MĂRFURI

din 28 mai 2015

privind adoptarea regulilor privind administrarea și punerea în aplicare a contingentelor tarifare [2015/1412]

COMITETUL UE-COREEA PENTRU COMERȚUL CU MĂRFURI,

având în vedere Acordul de liber schimb dintre Republica Coreea (denumită în continuare „Coreea”), pe de o parte, și Uniunea Europeană și statele membre ale acesteia, pe de altă parte (denumite în continuare „părțile” și „acordul”), în special articolele 2.16, 15.2.1 și punctele 2 și 3 din apendicele 2-A-1,

întrucât:

| (1) | Articolul 15.1 din acord instituie un Comitet pentru comerț care, printre altele, se asigură că acordul funcționează corect și monitorizează activitățile tuturor comitetelor specializate. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Articolul 15.1 din acord instituie un Comitet pentru comerț care, printre altele, se asigură că acordul funcționează corect și monitorizează activitățile tuturor comitetelor specializate.

| (2) | În conformitate cu articolul 15.2 din acord, au fost instituite comitete specializate, sub auspiciile Comitetului pentru comerț. Comitetul pentru comerțul cu mărfuri, în conformitate cu articolul 2.16 din acord, este unul dintre aceste comitete specializate. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

În conformitate cu articolul 15.2 din acord, au fost instituite comitete specializate, sub auspiciile Comitetului pentru comerț. Comitetul pentru comerțul cu mărfuri, în conformitate cu articolul 2.16 din acord, este unul dintre aceste comitete specializate.

| (3) | În conformitate cu punctul 2 din apendicele 2-A-1 din acord, Coreea poate folosi un sistem de licitație pentru administrarea și punerea în aplicare a contingentelor tarifare (denumite în continuare „CT”) aplicate de Coreea anumitor mărfuri originare din Uniunea Europeană în temeiul acordului. Termenii sistemului de licitație trebuie să fie stabiliți de comun acord de către părți prin intermediul unei decizii a Comitetului pentru comerțul cu mărfuri. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

În conformitate cu punctul 2 din apendicele 2-A-1 din acord, Coreea poate folosi un sistem de licitație pentru administrarea și punerea în aplicare a contingentelor tarifare (denumite în continuare „CT”) aplicate de Coreea anumitor mărfuri originare din Uniunea Europeană în temeiul acordului. Termenii sistemului de licitație trebuie să fie stabiliți de comun acord de către părți prin intermediul unei decizii a Comitetului pentru comerțul cu mărfuri.

| (4) | În conformitate cu punctul 3 din apendicele 2-A-1 din acord, Coreea poate folosi un sistem de licențe pentru administrarea și punerea în aplicare a anumitor contingente tarifare. Părțile se pun de acord în cadrul Comitetului pentru comerțul cu mărfuri asupra politicilor și procedurilor sistemului de licențe, inclusiv asupra eligibilității pentru a primi cantități din contingentul tarifar, precum și asupra oricăror schimbări sau modificări la acestea, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

În conformitate cu punctul 3 din apendicele 2-A-1 din acord, Coreea poate folosi un sistem de licențe pentru administrarea și punerea în aplicare a anumitor contingente tarifare. Părțile se pun de acord în cadrul Comitetului pentru comerțul cu mărfuri asupra politicilor și procedurilor sistemului de licențe, inclusiv asupra eligibilității pentru a primi cantități din contingentul tarifar, precum și asupra oricăror schimbări sau modificări la acestea,

DECIDE:

| 1. | Coreea va administra și va pune în aplicare contingentele tarifare aplicate de Coreea anumitor mărfuri originare din Uniunea Europeană în temeiul Acordului de liber schimb dintre Republica Coreea, pe de o parte, și Uniunea Europeană și statele membre ale acesteia, pe de altă parte, în conformitate cu normele stabilite în anexa la prezenta decizie. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Coreea va administra și va pune în aplicare contingentele tarifare aplicate de Coreea anumitor mărfuri originare din Uniunea Europeană în temeiul Acordului de liber schimb dintre Republica Coreea, pe de o parte, și Uniunea Europeană și statele membre ale acesteia, pe de altă parte, în conformitate cu normele stabilite în anexa la prezenta decizie.

| 2. | Prezenta decizie intră în vigoare în ziua adoptării. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Prezenta decizie intră în vigoare în ziua adoptării.

Adoptată la 28 mai 2015.

Pentru Comitetul pentru comerțul cu mărfuri

Helena KÖNIG

Director interimar

Director general al Biroului politici comerciale a Comisiei Europene

Chang K. KIM

Direcția Generală Comerț

Ministerul Comerțului, Industriei și Energiei din Republica Coreea

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ANEXĂ

REGULI PRIVIND ADMINISTRAREA ȘI PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A CONTINGENTELOR TARIFARE

Articolul 1

Calendarul licitațiilor și al cererilor de licențe

(1)   Licitațiile pentru lapte praf degresat, lapte praf integral și lapte condensat și miere naturală preced perioada de import, și anume în luna iunie pentru cotele deschise în luna iulie.

(2)   Orientările specifice ale Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation prevăd că anunțurile publice pentru licitații se publică cu opt zile calendaristice înainte de termenul limită al cererii de participare la licitații.

(3)   Pentru produse al căror calendar pentru cererile de acordare a unei licențe aferente contingentului nu este stabilit în Acordul de liber schimb UE-Coreea, orientările specifice ale agențiilor desemnate să gestioneze contingente tarifare (CT) (denumite în continuare „agenții care formulează recomandări”) vor prevedea o perioadă pentru cererile de acordare a unei licențe de cel puțin șapte zile calendaristice începând cu prima zi lucrătoare din anul de execuție menționat în anexa 2-A, punctul 5 din Acordul de liber schimb UE-Coreea.

Articolul 2

Depozit și redevențe

(1)   Nu se vor percepe costuri administrative sau redevențe, altele decât depozitul – suma plătită de către ofertanții care participă la licitație – pentru serviciile aferente unei cereri de atribuire a unui contingent tarifar prin licitație.

(2)   Instrucțiunile generale pentru ofertanți pentru fiecare licitație vor prevedea că depozitul trebuie să fie returnat ofertanților de îndată ce este permis de procedurile normale de administrare, după încheierea licitației.

(3)   Nicio garanție și niciun depozit nu vor fi necesare pentru solicitanții de licențe.

Articolul 3

Comunicarea și valabilitatea unei recomandări

(1)   În urma unei licitații sau a unei cereri de licență, agențiile care formulează recomandări vor publica o recomandare privind contingentele tarifare la import în temeiul ALS UE-Coreea (denumită în continuare „recomandarea”).

(2)   Recomandările comunicate solicitanților se publică în termen de două zile calendaristice, cu condiția ca cererea de recomandare prezentată privind contingentele tarifare să respecte cerințele recomandării.

(3)   O recomandare pentru contingente tarifare la import va fi valabilă 90 de zile. Perioada de valabilitate poate fi prelungită cu încă 30 de zile, dar nu poate depăși ultima zi din anul de execuție menționat în anexa 2-A, punctul 5 din Acordul de liber schimb UE-Coreea.

Articolul 4

Publicarea informațiilor referitoare la administrarea CT

(1)   Orientările Ministerului Agriculturii, alimentației și afacerilor rurale din Coreea (denumit în continuare „MAFRA”) și orientările specifice ale agențiilor care formulează recomandări vor fi publicate pe site-urile lor de internet.

(2)   Agențiile care formulează recomandări vor publica în mod periodic pe site-urile lor de internet, informații care cuprind anunțurile publice privind cererile de licență și licitațiile, perioadele de eliberare a licențelor și cantitățile alocate, cantitățile restante pentru fiecare contingent tarifar și data planificată pentru următoarea perioadă de licitație/eliberare de licențe.

(3)   Criteriile de bază pentru licitații, inclusiv eligibilitatea, plata, returnarea depozitelor, datele licitațiilor, codul licitațiilor și informațiile aferente vor fi incluse în orientările specifice ale Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation sau în instrucțiunile generale pentru ofertanți pentru fiecare licitație.

Articolul 5

Regulile de acordare a CT

Orientările MAFRA permit repartizarea volumului anual al contingentului tarifar de-a lungul întregului an prin împărțirea volumului anual al contingentelor tarifare în mai multe sub-volume, a căror sumă este egală cu volumul anual al contingentului tarifar. Volumul total al contingentului tarifar pentru fiecare an de execuție, așa cum se prevede în Acordul de liber schimb UE-Coreea nu se reduce.

Administrarea contingentelor tarifare (CT): Glosar

| Agenții care formulează recomandări | Agențiile coreene desemnate să administreze CT: Korea Dairy Industries Association, Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation, Korea Feed Ingredients Association și Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association
  Site-uri internet: | Korea Dairy Industries Association (numai versiunea în limba coreeană este disponibilă):
  http://www.koreadia.or.kr/ |
| --- | --- | --- |

Agenții care formulează recomandări

Agențiile coreene desemnate să administreze CT: Korea Dairy Industries Association, Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation, Korea Feed Ingredients Association și Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association

Site-uri internet:

Korea Dairy Industries Association (numai versiunea în limba coreeană este disponibilă):

http://www.koreadia.or.kr/

| | Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation:
  http://www.at.or.kr/home/apen000000/index.action |
| --- | --- |

Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation:

http://www.at.or.kr/home/apen000000/index.action

| | Korea Feed Ingredients Association (numai versiunea în limba coreeană este disponibilă):
  http://www.kfeedia.org/main.html |
| --- | --- |

Korea Feed Ingredients Association (numai versiunea în limba coreeană este disponibilă):

http://www.kfeedia.org/main.html

| | Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association (numai versiunea în limba coreeană este disponibilă):
  http://milkreplacer.or.kr/ |
| --- | --- |

Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association (numai versiunea în limba coreeană este disponibilă):

http://milkreplacer.or.kr/

Depozit

Suma plătită de ofertanții care solicită participarea la o licitație. Depozitul este restituit tuturor ofertanților imediat după recomandarea privind contingentul.

Recomandare

Acordarea unui CT la import în urma unei licitații sau a unei cereri de licență.

Perioada de validitate

Perioada în care este valabilă o recomandare pentru un CT la import.

Anul de execuție

Perioada de 12 luni între datele aniversare consecutive ale ALS (1 iulie) pentru care este stabilit un volum anual de CT în Acordul de liber schimb UE-Coreea.

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