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 The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-1722

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Western District of Missouri. 

Juan R. Sigala, *

*

Appellant. * 

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Submitted: December 10, 2007

Filed: April 3, 2008

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Before COLLOTON, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Juan Sigala pled guilty to distribution of cocaine and possession with intent to

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The district

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 sentenced Sigala to 24 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory

sentencing guideline range. Sigala appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court

impermissibly applied a presumption of reasonableness to the advisory range, failed
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to consider the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and failed to provide

adequate justification for the sentence. We affirm.

Sigala first contends that the district court erroneously applied a presumption

of reasonableness to the calculated guidelines range. In Rita v. United States, 127 S.

Ct. 2456 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a court of appeals may apply a

presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the advisory guidelines range, but

said that “the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that

the Guidelines sentence should apply.” Id. at 2465. See also United States v.

Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 718 (8th Cir. 2008). We conclude that the district court did

not apply an impermissible presumption in this case.

Sigala points to the following statement of the district court as demonstrating

an impermissible presumption: “To assist your attorney and the government and me,

for that matter, to determine what a reasonable sentence is, we use the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines.” (S. Tr. 4). When this statement is considered in context, we

think it is clear that the district court was not applying an impermissible presumption

of reasonableness, but rather was explaining the proper sentencing procedure. “[A]

district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the

applicable Guidelines range. As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide

consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.”

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007) (citation omitted). It is thus not

incorrect to say that a sentencing court uses the guidelines “to assist” in determining

what is an appropriate sentence. Nothing in the balance of the record leads us to

conclude that the district court applied an impermissible presumption. After

determining the advisory guidelines range, the court heard argument from counsel

about what sentence should be imposed. The court then stated that it was using the

guidelines as advisory, and that after “considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553,”

the court determined that a sentence of 24 months was “a reasonable and appropriate

sentence.” (Sent. Tr. 11). This approach is not inconsistent with the direction of Rita.
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We also conclude that the district court properly considered the sentencing

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as required by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,

259-60 (2005), and adequately stated the reasons for the sentence. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(c). In Rita, the Court said that “when a judge decides simply to apply the

Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy

explanation.” 127 S. Ct. at 2468. This is because “[c]ircumstances may well make

clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission’s own reasoning that the

Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of § 3[5]53(a) and other

congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case

before him is typical.” Id. 

As in Rita, the district court’s statement of reasons here was “brief but legally

sufficient.” Id. at 2469. Sigala’s counsel argued for a more lenient sentence on the

grounds that Sigala also faced removal from the United States under the immigration

laws at the conclusion of his sentence, that Sigala “did attempt to cooperate with the

government,” that he tested negative for the use of drugs during the previous four

years, and that he had maintained gainful employment. The record shows that the

court listened to these arguments, but simply found the proffered circumstances

insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the advisory sentence of 24 months. See

S. Tr. 7 (“[W]e use the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as advisory. I intend to follow

them in this case, and I’m going to assess your punishment at 24 months.”); id. at 11

(“[C]onsidering the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553, the Court determines that the

sentence of 24 months is a reasonable and appropriate sentence in this case.”). We see

no material distinction between this case and Rita, where the sentencing judge listened

to the arguments and then said that the advisory sentencing range was not

“inappropriate.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469. In United States v. Mosqueda-Estevez, 485

F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2007), we held that a similar record was sufficient to

demonstrate the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
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The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.

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