UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-2120

RUBY M. HOLIDAY, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

NEW HANOVER COUNTY REGISTRAR OF DEEDS; REBECCA TUCKER SMITH, 

in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as New 

Hanover County Registrar of Deeds, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt, 

Senior District Judge. (7:05-cv-00204-BR) 

Submitted: February 11, 2009 Decided: March 13, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Angela Newell Gray, GRAY NEWELL, LLP, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. James R. Morgan, Jr., Mary Craven 

Adams, WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Ruby Holiday filed the instant action against New 

Hanover County Registrar of Deeds Rebecca Tucker Smith, in her 

official and individual capacities, alleging violations of Title 

VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 143-422.2; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), arising from Holiday’s 

employment termination. The district court granted Smith’s 

motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 

 We review a district court’s order granting summary 

judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Nader v. Blair, 549 

F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted 

only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

 To survive summary judgment, Holiday must come forth 

with either direct evidence of discrimination or establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Holiday submitted no 

direct evidence of racial discrimination. To establish a prima 

facie case of discriminatory termination under Title VII, 

§ 1983, or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2, Holiday must show that: 

(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified 

for her job and performing at a satisfactory level; (3) she was 

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terminated; and (4) she was replaced by a similarly situated 

applicant outside her protected class. See St. Mary’s Honor 

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Williams v. 

Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1989). 

Establishment of this prima facie case of discrimination “in 

effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully 

discriminated against the employee.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. 

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Where a plaintiff 

makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 

employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the 

employer produces a legitimate reason for the action, the burden 

once again shifts to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s 

rationale is just a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. 

 Here, it is not clear that Holiday established a prima 

facie case of discriminatory termination. Though both parties 

agree that Holiday is a member of a protected class, was 

terminated, and was replaced by someone not in her protected 

class, the parties differ as to whether Holiday was performing 

at a satisfactory level. Smith presented evidence that Holiday 

made slanderous statements about a co-worker’s husband, abused 

attendance policies, engaged in insubordinate behavior, and 

repeatedly engaged in conversations of a personal nature, in 

violation of office policy. 

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 Even assuming that Holiday was able to establish a 

prima facie case of discriminatory termination, however, Smith 

articulated ample legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 

Holiday’s termination. In so doing, Smith successfully rebutted 

any discriminatory presumptions raised by Holiday. 

 Though Holiday had “the full and fair opportunity to 

demonstrate . . . that the proffered reason[s] [were] not the 

true reason for the employment decision,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 

256, she failed to do so. While Holiday contends “[s]he had no 

previous written reprimands or documented work performance 

issues,” this assertion is belied by the record. Holiday 

further argues that Smith exhibited a “pattern and practice of 

disparate treatment toward black employees.” However, evidence 

of systematic discrimination alone cannot prove the elements of 

a discrimination claim. See, e.g., Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast 

Line R. Co., 676 F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (holding 

that one “proceeding as an individual under Title VII must prove 

the elements of a [discrimination] claim as set forth in 

McDonnell Douglas”). A plaintiff must provide evidence of 

discrimination she has personally experienced. Id. Holiday’s 

unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations of racial animus are 

insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion. See, e.g.,

Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 

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2002) (noting that “[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do 

not suffice” to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact). 

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order 

granting Smith’s motion for summary judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED