In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13‐1398

BRYAN CRAIG,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RICH TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT

227, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:12‐cv‐07581 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 10, 2013 — DECIDED DECEMBER 3, 2013

____________________

Before KANNE, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. In 2012, Bryan Craig self‐

published a short book of adult relationship advice entitled

“It’s Her Fault.” And when we say “adult,” we mean it in

every sense of the word—in his book, Craig repeatedly dis‐

cusses sexually provocative themes and uses sexually explic‐

it terminology. Eventually, Craig’s employer, a school district

located in Chicago’s south suburbs, learned of the publica‐
2 No. 13‐1398

tion of Craig’s book and decided to terminate his employ‐

ment because of it. Craig sued the school district, the school

board, and several board members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that they improperly retaliated against him for en‐

gaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The

district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim

because, in its view, “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter

of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment

protection.

While we respectfully disagree with the district court’s

assessment of the “public concern” issue, we ultimately up‐

hold the dismissal of Craig’s claim on an alternative basis.

While full of objectionable content, Craig’s book deals with

adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which a large

segment of the public is concerned. However, we affirm the

district court’s dismissal because the allegations of Craig’s

complaint and the documents he relies upon to support his

claim establish that the school district’s interest in ensuring

effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s

speech interest. The school district reasonably predicted that

“It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at

Craig’s school because some students, both female and male,

who learned of the book’s hypersexualized content would be

reluctant to seek out Craig’s advice. Craig has effectively

pled himself out of court by asserting allegations and incor‐

porating documents sufficient to establish that the school

district’s interest in restricting his speech outweighed his in‐

terest in publishing his book. We therefore affirm the district

court’s judgment.
No. 13‐1398 3

I. BACKGROUND

Until recently, Bryan Craig was a tenured guidance coun‐

selor at Rich Central High School in Chicago’s south sub‐

urbs. In addition to advising students, Craig served as the

coach for Rich Central’s women’s varsity, junior varsity, and

freshmen basketball teams.1  

In July 2012, while employed at Rich Central, Craig self‐

published a book entitled “It’s Her Fault” which is a collec‐

tion of Craig’s relationship advice for women. As Craig tells

it, while “counseling people of all ages and races [he] found

himself saying the same things over and over to women dur‐

ing sessions.” Over the course of “provid[ing] counseling to

thousands of students, parents, clients, and friends,” Craig

discovered “a trail of popcorn leading back to it being her

fault.” During these encounters with female advice‐seekers,

Craig determined “that women act based on emotion alone

instead of emotion plus intellect” which leads to women be‐

                                                 

1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court generally considers the

factual allegations of the complaint and any reasonable inferences that

can be drawn from those allegations. See Gessert v. United States, 703 F.3d

1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2013). But a court may also examine information

from documents referenced in the complaint that the plaintiff relies upon

to support its claim. See Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir.

2013) (“What makes it appropriate for us to consider the documents ... is

that [plaintiff] not only cited them in the body of her complaint, but she

has, to some degree, relied on their contents as support for her claims.”).

Consistent with these principles, our factual summary includes infor‐

mation drawn from documents Craig mentioned in his complaint and

upon which his claim depends: his book, the letter from school district

superintendent Donna Leak, as well as the Charges and Bill of Particu‐

lars that Leak attached to her letter. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 14, 17‐23.
4 No. 13‐1398

ing unable to obtain the type of relationship they want. By

publishing the book, Craig hoped to give women “the road

map to having the upper hand in a relationship with a man.”

Parts of Craig’s book contain garden‐variety relationship

advice. For example, Craig highlights the need for discretion

between partners in order to develop trust in a relationship.

According to Craig, “our biggest downfall in relationships is

sharing too much information with friends or associates.”

Craig also writes of the importance of being a good listener

and instructs women to “[p]ay very close attention to con‐

tent when having serious conversations with your man.”

But not all of Craig’s advice is this mundane. Much of

“It’s Her Fault” is dedicated to exploring provocative topics.

For example, Craig devotes one chapter to informing women

of the effectiveness of using sex appeal to obtain power in a

relationship. Craig instructs by way of example:

Fellas, you ever notice how nice your girl is around

payday, or how your d—k feels even better to them

when they need something? Noooooo, most men

don’t notice, so, women, keep using that skill.

Such tactics are effective, in Craig’s mind, because all “[m]en

have sexual radar,” including Craig himself. Despite being

“beyond the highest caliber of men,” Craig nevertheless con‐

fesses “a weakness for cleavage” and other portions of a

woman’s anatomy.  

In another part of the book, Craig encourages his female

readers to engage in “a certain level of promiscuity before

marriage[:]”

Don’t go hoeing around the world, but experience

things. Women: discover different penis sizes, differ‐
No. 13‐1398 5

ent races and ethnicities ... Discover what you like so

you can prepare yourself before going into the won‐

derful world of marriage.

Craig uses sexually explicit terminology throughout “It’s

Her Fault.” One particularly graphic passage relates to

Craig’s argument that women must submit to their male

partners in order to prevent them from being unfaithful:

Let[’]s enter the wonderful world of submissiveness.

Yeah I know ladies, you all hate that s‐‐t. However, it

must be in place in order for us to feel some type of

power. Say more “yes” and a lot less “no.” He’s your

man, go ahead and let him turn you every which way

... [g]ive him oral sex without making the “ugh” face.

So what if you’re tired, ask him if he wants a meal.  

In another part of the book, Craig delves into a comparative

analysis of the female genitalia of various races which goes

into an excruciating degree of graphic detail.  

Craig references his employment at Rich Central

throughout “It’s Her Fault.” In the introduction, Craig estab‐

lishes his qualifications as an advice‐giver by relating the

significant amount of time he has spent interacting with

women. Aside from his relations with female family mem‐

bers, Craig cites his dealings with women when “coach[ing]

girls basketball, work[ing] in an office where I am the only

male counselor, and [being] responsible for roughly 425 high

school students a year, about half of whom are females.”

Craig also referenced his counseling of students in the ac‐

knowledgments section, thanking his “students and clients

who consistently reach out to me during rough times in the

world of relationships: Keep listening and learning.”  More‐
6 No. 13‐1398

over, another Rich Central teacher, Kylie Gregor, identified

herself as the author of the foreword to “It’s Her Fault” and

vouched for the value of Craig’s advice.

Eventually, school board officials became aware of “It’s

Her Fault.” On September 14, 2012, the Superintendent of

the Rich Township High School District 227, Donna Leak,

sent Craig a letter informing him that the District had re‐

ceived “concerns from members of the School District com‐

munity” regarding his book. Leak attached two documents,

a list of Charges and a Bill of Particulars (collectively, the

“Charges”), and notified Craig that she planned to recom‐

mend to the Board of Education of Rich Township High

School District 227 (the “Board”) that he be discharged.

Among other considerations, the Charges stated that: (1) the

publication of Craig’s book “ha[d] caused disruption, con‐

cern, distrust and confusion among members of the School

District community;” (2) Craig violated the School Board’s

Policy “prohibit[ing] conduct that creates ‘an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive educational environment;” and

(3) “Craig failed to present [himself as] a positive role model

and failed to properly comport himself in accordance with

his professional obligations as a public teacher.”    On Sep‐

tember 18, 2012, the Board adopted the Charges and issued a

resolution finding cause for Craig’s discharge.

Craig filed suit against the District, the Board, Leak, and

various Board members (collectively, “Defendants”) under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, Craig alleges that his dis‐

charge was in retaliation for a protected exercise of his First

Amendment rights. The district court dismissed Craig’s

complaint for failure to state a claim. In its ruling, the district

court concluded that “It’s Her Fault” was not entitled to First
No. 13‐1398 7

Amendment protection because it did not address a matter

of public concern. Instead, the district court found that the

book was “little more than a lurid account of plaintiff’s own

sexual preferences and exploits.” Craig now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Craig argues that the district court incorrectly

dismissed his First Amendment retaliation suit for failure to

state a claim. “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6), construing factual allegations and any

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plain‐

tiff.” Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 782 (7th Cir.

2013).

A. “It’s Her Fault” Addresses a Matter of Public Con‐

cern

Craig contends that the district court erred in concluding

that “It’s Her Fault” was not entitled to First Amendment

protection because it did not involve a matter of public con‐

cern. An actionable “First Amendment retaliation claim by a

public employee requires, at a minimum, that the speech be‐

ing retaliated against be constitutionally protected, which

means that the speech must involve a matter of ‘public con‐

cern.’” Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 984 (7th

Cir. 2013). Whether an employee’s speech implicates a matter

of public concern is a question of law that “must be deter‐

mined by the content, form, and context of a given state‐

ment, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick v. Myers, 461

U.S. 138, 147‐48 (1983).

Despite its lofty terminology, the “matter of public con‐

cern” inquiry does not require that speech relate to an issue

of exceptional significance in order to be entitled to prima
8 No. 13‐1398

facie First Amendment protection. “[P]ublic concern is some‐

thing that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a

subject of general interest and of value and concern to the

public at the time of publication.” City of San Diego v. Roe,

543 U.S. 77, 83‐84 (2004) (per curiam). But the speech need

not address a topic of great societal importance, or even

pique the interest of a large segment of the public, in order

to be safeguarded by the First Amendment. See Dishnow v.

Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding

that speech need not address a “matter[] of transcendent

importance, such as the origins of the universe or the merits

of constitutional monarchy[,]” in order to relate to a matter

of public concern). Rather, an employee who “participat[es]

in a public dialogue on matters of interest to the public” will

“place his speech, prima facie, within the protection of the

First Amendment.” Id.; see also Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d

1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is not the case that the only

expression which the First Amendment protects is expres‐

sion that deals with ‘matters of public concern,’ unless this

formula is understood to mean any matter for which there is

potentially a public.”). “That the public was not large, that

the issues were not of global significance ... d[oes] not place

[] speech outside the orbit of protection.” Dishnow, 77 F.3d at

197. Moreover, “[t]he inappropriate or controversial charac‐

ter of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it

deals with a matter of public concern.” Rankin v. McPherson,

483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987).2

                                                 

2 We note that this case does not present a set of facts to which courts

have typically applied the “matter of public concern” analysis. The test

was designed to help courts distinguish between protected and unpro‐

(continued...)
No. 13‐1398 9

Our opinion in Dishnow provides a good example of this

principle in action. In that case, a school guidance counselor

                                                                                                             

tected speech when a public employee speaks out about her employer’s

policies, conduct, or other issues more directly related to her public em‐

ployment. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 144‐147 (evaluating whether

questionnaire submitted by assistant district attorney requesting input

on various district attorney’s office policies involved public concern or

“matters only of personal interest”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High

Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that teacher’s

letter to the editor regarding employer school board’s funding decisions

was an “issue[] of public importance” entitled to First Amendment pro‐

tection); Kristofek, 712 F.3d at 983‐85 (evaluating whether police officer

addressed matter of public concern in discussing superiors’ handling of

politically connected resident’s arrest). When the employee’s expression

centers on a topic intimately related to her job, the public concern formu‐

la helps courts to distinguish between (1) an employee’s purely personal

gripe about how the employer’s policy affects the employee (generally

not entitled to protection); and (2) an employee’s attempt to notify the

public of a work‐related issue about which the public is concerned (gen‐

erally entitled to protection). Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1026.  

When an employee speaks out about her public employer’s actions, the

public concern inquiry focuses the court’s attention on “the point of the

speech in question: was it the employee’s point to bring wrongdoing to

light? Or to raise other issues of public concern, because they are of pub‐

lic concern? Or was the point to further some purely private interest?”

Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985). The subject matter

of the expression is relevant to this analysis. We doubt, for example, that

an employee’s letter to the editor concerning her dislike of the color of

the paint on the walls of her office would qualify as a matter of public

concern based on the public’s lack of interest in the topic. But the subject

matter of the speech is just one of many factors for the court to consider

in this context. See generally Connick, 461 U.S. at 147‐48 (“Whether an em‐

ployee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be deter‐

mined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed

by the whole record.”).
10 No. 13‐1398

“was fired because he had written certain articles, which the

school board considered scandalous or disreputable, for a

local newspaper.” Dishnow, 77 F.3d at 196. One article, an in‐

stallment in a series called “Rib Lake High School Counse‐

lor’s Corner,” referenced the plaintiff’s previous alcohol con‐

sumption and cigarette smoking. Id. at 198. We concluded

that this article (as well as others written on other topics) re‐

lated to a matter of public concern even though they were

not “vital to the survival of Western civilization.” Id. at 197.  

While Craig’s book arguably contains more provocative

content than the article at issue in Dishnow, we think both

works relate to matters of public concern. The district court

correctly observed that some parts of “It’s Her Fault,” such

as Craig’s description of his own sexual exploits, would not

relate to a matter of public interest if viewed in isolation. But

we respectfully disagree with the district court’s ultimate

conclusion that just because the book happened to “touch[]

on a matter of public interest (relationships between men

and women) does not mean that it addresses a matter of

public concern.” That is precisely what public concern

means—speech directed to the public need only address a

“matter[] in which the public might be interested” in order

to be eligible for First Amendment protection. Id. Viewed as

a whole, “It’s Her Fault” addresses adult relationship dy‐

namics, a subject that interests a significant segment of the

public. The proliferation of advice columns dealing with

precisely this topic is a testament to its newsworthiness. See,

e.g., Amy Dickinson, Ask Amy: Wife May Seek Answers Else‐

where for Sexual Drought in a Marriage, DENVER POST, Oct. 7,

2013, http://www.denverpost.com/askamy/ci_24242904/dear‐

amy‐ife‐may‐seek‐answers‐elsewhere‐sexual; Carolyn Hax,

Carolyn Hax: When Partners Don’t Share Same Idea of Comforta‐
No. 13‐1398 11

ble, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 5, 2013,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/carolyn‐hax‐

when‐partners‐dont‐share‐same‐idea‐of‐comfortable/2013/

10/01/a0679166‐253c‐11e3‐ad0d‐b7c8d2a594b9_story.html.

The fact that Craig’s book dealt with a subject of general in‐

terest to the public was enough to establish prima facie First

Amendment protection. Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1026. We be‐

lieve the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

The district court also reasoned that dismissal of Craig’s

claim was warranted because “It’s Her Fault” was similar to

speech that the Supreme Court determined did not relate to

a matter of public concern in City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S.

77 (2004) (per curiam). We disagree with that comparison.

Roe dealt with a police officer’s creation of sexually explicit

videos depicting the officer “stripping off a police uniform

and masturbating.” Id. at 78. Whatever one may think of

Craig’s book, it is fundamentally different in character from

the “debased parody” at issue in Roe. Id. at 81‐82. Craig’s

book, though provocative, does address the structure of

adult relationships, an issue with which some segment of the

public would be interested. Roe’s video did not concern any

issue of any sort, much less “a subject of general interest and

of value and concern to the public.” Id. at 83‐84. By equating

Roe’s video with Craig’s book, the district court did not ac‐

count for the fundamental differences between the two ex‐

pressions.

B. Defendants’ Interests in Restricting “It’s Her Fault”

Outweighed Craig’s Speech Interest

Even though Craig’s speech implicated an issue of public

concern, Defendants argue that we can still affirm the dis‐

missal of Craig’s claim because Defendants’ interests in re‐
12 No. 13‐1398

stricting Craig’s speech outweighed Craig’s interest in mak‐

ing his views known. We may affirm a district court’s dis‐

missal order on any basis supported by the record. See Crich‐

ton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 392, 399 n.2 (7th Cir.

2009).

An employer does not necessarily violate the First

Amendment by discharging an employee that speaks out on

a matter of public concern. “The government is entitled to

restrict speech that addresses a matter of public concern ‘if it

can prove that the interest of the employee as a citizen in

commenting on the matter is outweighed by the interest of

the government employer in promoting effective and effi‐

cient public service.’” Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 714

(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 675‐

76 (7th Cir. 2004)). The employer bears the burden of justify‐

ing its restriction on its employee’s speech. Connick, 461 U.S.

at 150.  

As an initial matter, Craig argues that Defendants’ bur‐

den is particularly rigorous in this case because Craig’s

speech occurred outside of work on a topic unrelated to his

employment. In support, Craig cites the Supreme Court’s

decision in United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union

(“NTEU”), 513 U.S. 454 (1995). In NTEU, the Court was con‐

fronted with a prospective prohibition on low‐level federal

employees’ receipt of payment for speech on topics totally

unrelated to their employment. Id. at 457‐59. In rejecting the

ban, the Court held that an employer must provide a justifi‐

cation “far stronger than mere speculation” in order to re‐

strict employee speech that “has nothing to do with their

jobs.” Id. at 465, 475.  
No. 13‐1398 13

NTEU is of no help to Craig because he took “deliberate

steps to link” his book with his work as a guidance counse‐

lor at Rich Central. See Roe, 543 U.S. at 80‐81 (holding that

reliance on NTEU “was seriously misplaced” when plaintiff

deliberately linked speech to public employment). Craig in‐

cluded a number of references to his job as a high school

guidance counselor within the pages of his book: (1) in the

introduction, he informs the reader that “I coach girls bas‐

ketball, work in an office where I am the only male counse‐

lor, and am responsible for roughly 425 high school students

a year, about half of whom are females;” (2) in the acknowl‐

edgments, he thanks “students and clients who consistently

reach out to me during rough times in the world of relation‐

ships: Keep listening and learning;” (3) another Rich Central

teacher, Kylie Gregor, wrote the foreword; and (4) he de‐

scribes his experiences “counseling people of all ages and

races” and “provid[ing] counseling to thousands of students,

parents, clients, and friends.” Because of Craig’s conscious

choice to connect “It’s Her Fault” to his counseling position

at Rich Central, his speech relates to his employment and

NTEU does not apply.  

Instead, the Connick‐Pickering balancing test determines

whether Defendants’ interests in disciplining Craig out‐

weighed his First Amendment speech rights. “[T]he proper

balance of these competing interests is a question of law.”

Chaklos, 560 F.3d at 715. In evaluating Defendants’ asserted

interests under this rubric, we “focus[] on the effective func‐

tioning of the public employer’s enterprise. Interference with

work, personnel relationships, or the speaker’s job perfor‐

mance can detract from the public employer’s function;

avoiding such interference can be a strong state interest.”

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. The disruption need not come to pass
14 No. 13‐1398

in order for the employer to take action; we “give substantial

weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of

disruption.” Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 685 (7th Cir. 2004);

see also Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir.

1997) (“Where employee speech carries the potential to be

disruptive, the public employer must have the ability to

move quickly” to discipline the employee). But an employ‐

er’s assessment of the possible interference caused by the

speech must be reasonable—“the predictions must be ‘sup‐

ported with an evidentiary foundation and be more than

mere speculation.’” Chaklos, 560 F.3d at 715 (quoting

Gazarkiewicz v. Town of Kingsford Heights, 359 F.3d 933, 944

(7th Cir. 2004)).

The degree of disruption or potential disruption neces‐

sary to justify the restriction varies depending on a number

of factors. One consideration is the content of the speech:

“[A] stronger showing may be necessary when an employ‐

ee’s speech more substantially involves matters of public

concern.” McGreal, 368 F.3d at 681‐82. Conversely, “[t]he less

serious, portentous, political, significant the genre of expres‐

sion, the less imposing the justification that the government

must put forth in order to be permitted to suppress the ex‐

pression.” Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1026. Courts must also con‐

sider the nature of the employee’s responsibilities. An em‐

ployer may have more leeway in restricting the speech of an

employee whose position requires contact with the public.

See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390‐91. The manner, time, and place of

the employee’s speech are also relevant to the analysis;

“[e]mployee speech which transpires entirely on the em‐

ployee’s own time ... bring[s] different factors into the Picker‐

ing calculus.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, 153 n.13.
No. 13‐1398 15

After reviewing Craig’s complaint and the other docu‐

ments that he relies upon to establish his claim for relief (i.e.,

his book and the Charges), we conclude that Defendants’ in‐

terests in remedying the potential disruption caused by his

book outweighed Craig’s speech interest. Essentially, the

Charges reflect that Defendants based their decision to ter‐

minate Craig’s employment on a prediction that “It’s Her

Fault” would “create[] an intimidating ... educational envi‐

ronment” at Rich Central. Defendants’ assessment of how

Craig’s students, and particularly his female students, would

respond upon reading or hearing about the hypersexualized

content of his book looms large in our analysis. The fact that

Craig works closely with students at a public school as a

counselor confers upon him an inordinate amount of trust

and authority. See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,

584 (1987) (“Families entrust public schools with the educa‐

tion of their children ... Students in such institutions are im‐

pressionable and their attendance is involuntary.”); see also

Melzer v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New

York, 336 F.3d 185, 198 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]e note that we

conduct our evaluation of appellant’s rights versus govern‐

mental interest bearing in mind his position as a teacher in a

public school. This position by its very nature requires a de‐

gree of public trust not found in many other positions of

public employment.”). Particularly as a guidance counselor,

Craig must maintain a safe space for his students in order to

ensure they remain willing to come to him for advice. If

Craig fails to create the appropriate environment for his stu‐

dents, they will not approach him and he cannot do his job.  

We think Defendants reasonably predicted that “It’s Her

Fault” would interfere with the learning environment at

Rich Central. For starters, Defendants reasonably inferred
16 No. 13‐1398

that some Rich Central students and parents were aware, or

would soon become aware, of the content of Craig’s book.

The book was self‐published and the allegations do not sug‐

gest any age restriction that would prevent students from

accessing the book. In addition, Craig’s complaint quotes a

letter from the District Superintendent that cited “concerns

from members of the School District community regarding

the publication of your book.” Compl. ¶ 18. Moreover, Craig

anticipated that his students would read “It’s Her Fault”—

why else would he thank his “students and clients who con‐

sistently reach out to me during rough times in the world of

relationships” and encourage them to “[k]eep listening and

learning”?

When faced with the inevitability of Craig’s book becom‐

ing common knowledge at Rich Central, Defendants reason‐

ably gauged how students’ response would impact condi‐

tions at the school. For example, we can easily see how fe‐

male students may feel uncomfortable seeking advice from

Craig given his professed inability to refrain from sexualiz‐

ing females. In his book, Craig confesses a “weakness for

cleavage” and another portion of a woman’s anatomy and

admits that this momentarily distracts him during his en‐

counters with women. Knowing Craig’s tendency to objectify

women, Defendants could reasonably anticipate that some

female students would feel uncomfortable reaching out to

Craig for advice. Indeed, some students may forego receiv‐

ing the school’s counseling services entirely rather than take

the risk that Craig would not view them as a person but in‐

stead as an object. Defendants had an interest in terminating

Craig’s employment in order to ensure effective delivery of

counseling services to female students at Rich Central.
No. 13‐1398 17

Moreover, Defendants reasonably expected that some

students would be apprehensive about asking Craig for help

given his views on women. For example, Craig asserts that

women do not succeed in relationships because of their ten‐

dency to “act based on emotion alone instead of emotion

plus intellect.” Is it unreasonable to think a female Rich Cen‐

tral student who learned that Craig believed women are not

inclined to rational thought may decide against visiting his

office for career or other advice? We think not. Nor would it

be unreasonable to believe a high school girl would keep her

relationship problems to herself knowing that Craig stressed

in his book the importance of a woman’s sexual “submis‐

siveness” to her male partner. These portions of “It’s Her

Fault” addressed subjects inextricably related to issues for

which a female high school student may seek the advice of

her guidance counselor. Defendants reasonably concluded

that some of these students, knowing Craig’s views on these

topics, would decline to ask for his help.  

Defendants’ interests in protecting the integrity of coun‐

seling services at Rich Central dwarfed Craig’s interest in

publishing “It’s Her Fault.” Although Craig’s book touched

on a matter of public concern, his view of relationships is not

the sort of topic of expression that Defendants would require

a compelling reason to restrict. See Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1027

(“The less serious, portentous, political, significant the genre

of expression, the less imposing the justification that the

government must put forth in order to be permitted to sup‐

press the expression.”). In light of the minimal weight of

Craig’s speech interest, we conclude that Defendants’ inter‐

ests in preventing a likely disruption of their guidance coun‐

seling service was sufficient to justify Craig’s discharge.

Craig’s termination did not offend the First Amendment.
18 No. 13‐1398

Craig argues that upholding his termination based on

the reaction of students and parents would amount to an

impermissible “heckler’s veto” in which unpopular speech is

silenced by the possibility of the community’s reaction to it.

See generally Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (“We

are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections

of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speak‐

er.”). But this argument does not account for the unique rela‐

tionship between Craig and his students at Rich Central or

the nature of his speech; his students are not “outsiders seek‐

ing to heckle [Craig] into silence, rather they are participants

in public education, without whose cooperation public edu‐

cation as a practical matter cannot function.” Melzer, 336 F.3d

at 199. Given the nature of this case, we think it appropriate

to consider Defendants’ interests in preserving a safe coun‐

seling environment at Rich Central as part of our analysis.

Craig also maintains that we cannot affirm the dismissal

of his suit on this ground because the record is not devel‐

oped enough to weigh Defendants’ and Craig’s respective

interests. We have previously noted that this analysis “can

seldom be done on the basis of the pleadings alone.” Delgado

v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Gustafson v.

Jones, 117 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Normally, applica‐

tion of the Pickering balancing test will be possible only after

the parties have had an opportunity to conduct some dis‐

covery.”). But this is one of those rare “case[s] where a plain‐

tiff, by pleading too much, has pled [him]self out of court.”

Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1016. By incorporating “It’s Her Fault”

and the Charges into his allegations, Craig provided us with

an adequate basis to perform the Pickering balancing test.

While most First Amendment retaliation claims will not be

amenable to resolution on the pleadings, Craig’s complaint
No. 13‐1398 19

and supporting documents place this case in the category of

the exception rather than the rule.  

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.