Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 1 of 12

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Abbigail A. Rohmiller

Amy Noe Law

Richmond, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

R. Scott Hayes

Joel E. Harvey

Hayes Copenhaver Crider Harvey, 

LLP

New Castle, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeffery Allen Ring,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Kimberly S. Ring,

Appellee-Petitioner.

March 17, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

33A01-1507-DR-1024

Appeal from the Henry Circuit

Court

The Honorable Mary G. Willis,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

33C01-1210-DR-282

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 2 of 12

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, Jeffery A. Ring (Jeffery), appeals the trial court’s Order 

Appointing Commissioner to Operate and Sell Farm Real Estate to Satisfy 

Petitioner’s Judgment following its Decree of Dissolution of Marriage to 

Appellee-Petitioner, Kimberly S. Ring (Kimberly). 

[2] We affirm in part, and reverse in part.

ISSUES

[3] Jeffery raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: 

1) Whether the parties’ subsequent agreement to sell a small parcel of a farm

was a permissible modification of the dissolution decree; and

2) Whether the trial court’s appointment of a commissioner to operate and sell 

the farm following Jeffery’s non-compliance with the terms of the 

dissolution decree was an impermissible modification of the dissolution 

decree. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Jeffery and Kimberly were married in October 1991. During their marriage, 

they had two children, both of whom are emancipated. Jeffery was a farmer 

and Kimberly worked for the Union School Corporation. Jeffery farmed his 

own land as well as rented agricultural land. By the time the parties separated, 

they had acquired two parcels of farmland, one consisting of approximately 145 

acres (Parcel A) and one consisting of approximately 79 acres (Parcel B), silage, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 3 of 12

farming equipment, machinery, livestock, and other property. Parcel A was 

valued at $929,500, and Parcel B was valued at $471,600. Both parcels secured

three loans with a total amount of approximately $170,000.

1

 At the time of the 

separation, the total marital estate, after subtracting liabilities, had a value of 

$2,353,854.89. 

[5] On October 18, 2012, Kimberly filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage. 

The trial court held a final dissolution hearing on November 19, 2014 and 

entered its Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on December 9, 2014. The trial 

court determined that an equal division of the marital estate between the parties 

was equitable and granted Jeffery possession of the marital home, Parcel A and 

Parcel B, and farming equipment. To realize the equitable distribution of the 

martial estate, the trial court ordered Jeffery to pay $1,140,825.45 to Kimberly

under the following conditions:

[Jeffery] has testified that he has made [an] effort to borrow funds 

and that he is able to borrow the sum of $400,000. The [trial 

court] directs him to do so immediately and directs [Kimberly] to 

cooperate by signing such documents as are necessary to enable 

[Jeffery] to borrow against [Parcel A and Parcel B]. In the event 

[Jeffery] is unable to borrow said sum, he is directed to borrow 

the maximum amount that he can borrow and to pay the same to 

[Kimberly] immediately. [Jeffery] shall have ninety (90) days 

from the date of this [D]ecree to complete the loan application 

 

1 Jeffery admits to the total loan amount, but does not specify the distribution of it as to the parcels of land. 

(Ex. 2); (Transcript p. 35).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 4 of 12

process. Upon receiving funds, they shall be paid over to 

[Kimberly] immediately. 

* * *

[After payment of $400,000 to Kimberly, the balance] shall be 

paid in full with interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum within ten 

(10) years of the date hereof with a minimum of $75,000 being 

paid each year on or before the anniversary of this Decree. The 

judgment shall be a lien on all real estate owned by [Jeffery] 

junior in priority only to the loan [Jeffery] has been directed to 

obtain in this paragraph.

(Appellant’s App. pp. 51-52).

[6] Shortly thereafter, Jeffery and the parties’ son borrowed $413,000 from a bank 

to purchase a farm for the son. The new loan was secured by Parcel A. Due to 

the new loan, Jeffery was unable to obtain $400,000 to satisfy the judgment. 

[7] On March 23, 2015, Kimberly filed a Citation for Contempt alleging that 

Jeffery had failed to comply with the trial court’s order to complete the loan 

application process within ninety days from the Decree of Dissolution of 

Marriage.

2

 On May 18, 2015, Kimberly filed a Request for Orders to Enforce 

Decree of Dissolution of Marriage requesting the trial court to appoint a 

commissioner to sell the farms to satisfy the judgment. The trial court held a 

hearing on June 17, 2015, and, on June 30, 2015, the trial court entered its 

 

2 There is no indication in the record that Jeffery was found in contempt for failing to complete the loan 

application.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 5 of 12

order appointing Halderman Farm Management Service, Inc. (Commissioner)

as a commissioner. The trial court authorized Commissioner to

[U]se its best efforts to maximize the value of the farms and the 

farming operation to achieve satisfaction of the judgment held by 

[Kimberly].

* * * 

a. [T]ake possession and operate the two (2) farms . . . .

b. [P]ay to the [c]ourt for the benefit of [Kimberly] all revenue 

generated by the farm operations over and above the costs 

expended to generate said revenue.

c. [P]ay itself for services consistent with its usual and customary

management fees. 

* * * 

e. [S]ell so much of the farm real estate as Commissioner believes 

to be prudent to maximize the value of the said farm real estate . . 

. . 

(Appellant’s App. pp. 76-77). 

[8] On August 26, 2015, Kimberly filed another Citation for Contempt alleging 

that Jeffery made misleading representations to the trial court regarding his 

efforts to borrow the funds and that Jeffery failed to cooperate with 

Commissioner. On October 5, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the

citation. At the conclusion of the hearing, Jeffery and Kimberly agreed that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 6 of 12

Commissioner would sell Parcel B to satisfy the judgment and that the citation 

would remain pending. The trial court approved the parties’ agreement in its 

order on October 7, 2015. 

[9] Jeffery now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Permissible Modification

[10] Jeffery’s appeal is centered on the trial court’s appointment of Commissioner. 

After filing the appeal, however, Jeffery and Kimberly agreed to sell Parcel B 

with the help of Commissioner to satisfy the judgment. Property distribution 

settlements approved as part of a dissolution may be modified only where both 

parties consent or where there is fraud, undue influence, or duress. Johnson v. 

Johnson, 920 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2010); see also Marriage of Snow v. 

England, 862 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind. 2007) (as with other contracts, a division of 

property may only be modified according to the terms of the agreement, if the 

parties consent, or if fraud or duress occurs); Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 42 

(Ind. 1990) (a property settlement agreement incorporated into a final 

dissolution decree and order may not be modified unless the agreement so 

provides or the parties subsequently consent). As such, following our review of 

the record, we conclude that the parties’ subsequent agreement to sell Parcel B

approved by the trial court was a permissible post-dissolution modification of 

their property distribution settlement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 7 of 12

II. Impermissible Modification

[11] As to Parcel A, Jeffery argues that the appointment of Commissioner to operate 

and, if needed, sell the farms was an impermissible modification of the 

dissolution decree. Kimberly responds that it was not a modification but an 

enforcement remedy pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-15-7-10.3

 

[12] Recently, our supreme court provided a comprehensive analysis of the law 

concerning the post-dissolution modification of property distribution between 

former spouses in Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 2012). The Ryan court 

reviewed the language of Indiana Code sections 31-15-2-17(c) and -7-9.1 and 

reiterated that the legislature unambiguously prohibited the post-dissolution 

modification of property distribution agreements between former spouses, 

except in case of fraud or where both parties consent, because they are 

economic in nature—ordinary contracts—and as with other contracts, may only 

be modified according to their terms. Ryan, 972 N.E. at 361-63. 

[13] Jeffery specifically points to the language of the dissolution decree and asserts 

that he was only required “to complete the loan application process within 

ninety days” and, if he failed to obtain the loan, to “borrow the maximum 

amount that he [could] borrow.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 5). Jeffery insists that 

there was no obligation to seek an outside person to manage or sell the land to 

satisfy the judgment. Although a court has no authority to modify a property-

 

3 Kimberly does not allege that their original agreement incorporated into the dissolution decree was made 

fraudulently.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 8 of 12

settlement agreement, it does not mean that a court has no authority to resolve 

a dispute over the interpretation of a settlement agreement or property-division 

order. Ryan, 972 N.E2d at 363. When a party asks a court to clarify a 

settlement agreement, the court’s task is one of contract interpretation. Id. This 

is because settlement agreements are contractual in nature and binding if 

approved by the trial court. Id. As such, a settlement agreement is interpreted 

according to the general rules for contract construction. Id. at 364. That is, 

unless the terms of the contract are ambiguous, they will be given their plain 

and ordinary meaning. Id. Clear and unambiguous terms in the contract are 

deemed conclusive, and when they are present we will not construe the contract 

or look to extrinsic evidence but will merely apply the contractual provisions. 

Id. As this dispute requires us to interpret the decree of dissolution, our 

standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs of Cnty. of Jefferson v. Teton 

Corp., 30 N.E.3d 711, 713 (Ind. 2015).

[14] In Ryan, the parties agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the 

proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale 

yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d at 360. 

After almost 20 months on the market, the parties were unable to sell their 

properties, so the former husband moved the trial court to order the properties 

to be sold at the prevailing fair market value. Id. at 361. The trial court denied 

the motion and, on appeal, our supreme court affirmed. Id. at 371. The Ryan

court found that there was “no ambiguity in the language of the parties’ 

agreement that would permit [the court] to conclude as a matter of contract law 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 9 of 12

that [the former wife was] bound to agree to sales prices for the properties ... 

less than those stated in the agreement.” Id. at 364-65. Even though, the 

former husband was trying to label his request as a clarification, in fact, it was a 

request to modify the original agreement. Id. at 365. 

[15] Here, similarly, the language of the parties’ agreement was unambiguous. 

According to the dissolution decree, Jeffery was required to submit his loan 

application, and if denied, try again. There was no language requiring the 

parties to sell the land to satisfy the judgment in their original agreement. 

[16] Kimberly, in turn, maintains that Jeffery’s assertion was a 

“mischaracterization” of the trial court’s order. (Appellee’s Br. p. 6). The trial 

court’s appointment of Commissioner, she continues, was an enforcement 

remedy consistent with the appointment of a receiver, which was a permitted 

method of enforcing an order issued in a dissolution proceeding. To support 

her argument, Kimberly cites to Gore v. Gore, 527 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1988). 

[17] In Gore, the former husband operated a pub. Id. at 192. After finding the 

former husband in contempt three times for violating the order restraining him 

from disposing of potential marital assets, the trial court appointed a receiver 

over the pub. Id. On appeal, the Gore court reversed the imposition of the 

receivership over the pub because there was no evidence presented to show that 

the receivership was necessary to secure ample justice to the parties. Id. at 199. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 10 of 12

“[A] receivership [over a business operation] is a dangerous remedy which 

could injure rather than protect the marital estate.” Id.

The appointment of a receiver is essentially a prerogative of 

equity, which may be exercised as a means of conserving the 

property or assets for the benefit of all parties in interest. The 

court will be authorized to appoint a receiver if it appears that, 

through fraud, mismanagement, misconduct, or otherwise, there 

is a likelihood that the property will be squandered, wasted, 

misappropriated or unlawfully diverted without the 

court’s intervention. But, absent threatened destruction or 

dissipation of the property, or where there is no good cause to 

believe that benefit would result from the appointment of a 

receiver, then the court should decline to make such an 

appointment. The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one 

which is reluctantly exercised by the courts. The power to act 

rests very largely within the sound discretion of the court. A 

receiver should be appointed only when the court is satisfied that 

the appointment will promote the interests of one or both parties, 

that it will prevent manifest wrong, imminently impending, and 

that the injury resulting will not be greater than the injury sought 

to be averted.

Id. at 196-97 (citations omitted).

[18] We find the Gore court’s decision instructive. The evidence and circumstances 

of the present case, similarly, do not warrant the imposition of the receivership 

over Jeffery’s farm. There was no evidence presented to show that Jeffery was 

mishandling his farming operation. Conversely, the record reveals that Jeffery 

was farming the land even after the appointment of Commissioner. There was 

no evidence presented to show that Jeffery lacked experience or ability to farm. 

In fact, farming was his and his family’s livelihood for generations. Jeffery did 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 11 of 12

not do anything wrong with his farm to warrant the court’s intervention. His 

alleged refusal to cooperate with Commissioner and an attempt to make himself 

less attractive to the lending institutions have nothing to do with the successful 

handling of his farm, which is the crux of the receivership law. See, e.g., 

Tormohlen v. Tormohlen, 1 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. 1936) (held that a receivership was 

not warranted over a large chicken hatchery because a farmer left trusted 

persons to handle the farm to prevent waste before fleeing the state to escape 

the dissolution court’s jurisdiction). 

[19] Accordingly, because the language of the dissolution decree was unambiguous, 

we conclude that the trial court’s appointment of Commissioner to operate and, 

if needed, sell Parcel A was an impermissible modification of the original terms 

between the parties because it went beyond Jeffery’s obligation to attempt to 

obtain a loan to satisfy the judgment. Also, we reverse the appointment of 

Commissioner as to Parcel A because no evidence was presented to show that 

Jeffery was likely to mismanage, waste, misappropriate, or otherwise harm his 

farm which could have warranted the court’s intervention and would have been 

necessary to secure ample justice to the parties. Finally, we reiterate that this 

decision is limited to Parcel A because Jeffery and Kimberly had successfully 

modified their property dissolution agreement as to Parcel B by subsequently 

agreeing to sell Parcel B with the help of Commissioner. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 33A01-1507-DR-1024 | March 17, 2016 Page 12 of 12

CONCLUSION

[20] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parties’ subsequent agreement to sell 

Parcel B was a permissible modification of their original marital property 

disposition settlement, and, as to Parcel A, the trial court’s appointment of 

Commissioner without Jeffery’s consent and without assertion of fraud was an 

impermissible modification of the parties’ original agreement. 

[21] Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

[22] Najam, J. and May, J. concur