# C_2023047EN.01001501.xml

| 7.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 47/15 |
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7.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 47/15

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P9_TA(2022)0276

Indo-Pacific strategy in the area of trade and investment

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2022 on the Indo-Pacific strategy in the area of trade and investment (2021/2200(INI))

(2023/C 47/02)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the joint communication of 16 September 2021 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024), |
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having regard to the joint communication of 16 September 2021 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,

| — | having regard to the Netherlands’ Indo-Pacific strategy of 13 November 2020 entitled ‘Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia’, |
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having regard to the Netherlands’ Indo-Pacific strategy of 13 November 2020 entitled ‘Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia’,

| — | having regard to the German Federal Government’s policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region of September 2020, |
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having regard to the German Federal Government’s policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region of September 2020,

| — | having regard to the joint communication of 1 December 2021 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘The Global Gateway’(JOIN(2021)0030), |
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having regard to the joint communication of 1 December 2021 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘The Global Gateway’(JOIN(2021)0030),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Trade Policy Review — An Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade Policy’ (COM(2021)0066),

| — | having regard to the joint communication of 12 March 2019 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘EU-China — A strategic outlook’ (JOIN(2019)0005), |
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having regard to the joint communication of 12 March 2019 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘EU-China — A strategic outlook’ (JOIN(2019)0005),

| — | having regard to the joint communication of 19 September 2018 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ (JOIN(2018)0031), |
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having regard to the joint communication of 19 September 2018 of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ (JOIN(2018)0031),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication of 9 March 2021 entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0118), |
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having regard to the Commission communication of 9 March 2021 entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’ (COM(2021)0118),

| — | having regard to the 2021 State of the Union address by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen of 15 September 2021, |
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having regard to the 2021 State of the Union address by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen of 15 September 2021,

| — | having regard to the joint press release of 3 December 2021 by the European External Action Service and the US Department of State on the high-level consultations on the Indo-Pacific, |
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having regard to the joint press release of 3 December 2021 by the European External Action Service and the US Department of State on the high-level consultations on the Indo-Pacific,

| — | having regard to the 11th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership meeting, hosted by Cambodia on 16 November 2021, |
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having regard to the 11th Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership meeting, hosted by Cambodia on 16 November 2021,

| — | having regard to the EU’s One China policy as outlined in the EU-China strategic outlook of 12 March 2019, |
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having regard to the EU’s One China policy as outlined in the EU-China strategic outlook of 12 March 2019,

| — | having regard to the Comprehensive Investment Agreement concluded in principle by the EU and China on 30 December 2020, |
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having regard to the Comprehensive Investment Agreement concluded in principle by the EU and China on 30 December 2020,

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation (1), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation (1),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 29 April 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-India relations (2), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 29 April 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-India relations (2),

| — | having regard to the non-paper of the Commission services of 26 February 2018 on feedback and the way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters in EU free trade agreements, and to its 15-point action plan on TSD chapters, |
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having regard to the non-paper of the Commission services of 26 February 2018 on feedback and the way forward on improving the implementation and enforcement of trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters in EU free trade agreements, and to its 15-point action plan on TSD chapters,

| — | having regard to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 16 September 2010 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part (3), |
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having regard to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 16 September 2010 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part (3),

| — | having regard to the FTA (4) and Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) of 19 October 2018 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part, |
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having regard to the FTA (4) and Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) of 19 October 2018 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the other part,

| — | having regard to the FTA (5) and the IPA of 30 June 2019 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part, |
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having regard to the FTA (5) and the IPA of 30 June 2019 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part,

| — | having regard to the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Japan (6), |
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having regard to the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and Japan (6),

| — | having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one part, and the members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part, |
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having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union, on the one part, and the members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part,

| — | having regard to the negotiations on FTAs between the EU and Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia, which are under way, and to the negotiations on FTAs between the EU and Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, which are currently on hold, |
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having regard to the negotiations on FTAs between the EU and Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia, which are under way, and to the negotiations on FTAs between the EU and Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, which are currently on hold,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on EU political relations with the EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (7), |
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having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on EU political relations with the EU-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (7),

| — | having regard to the decision taken at the ASEAN ministerial meeting of 21 January 2019 to establish an EU-ASEAN strategic partnership, |
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having regard to the decision taken at the ASEAN ministerial meeting of 21 January 2019 to establish an EU-ASEAN strategic partnership,

| — | having regard to the 29th EU-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting held on 11 February 2022, |
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having regard to the 29th EU-ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting held on 11 February 2022,

| — | having regard to the inaugural European Parliament-ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) Inter-Regional Dialogue held on 22 June 2021, |
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having regard to the inaugural European Parliament-ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) Inter-Regional Dialogue held on 22 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the Paris Agreement on climate change of 12 December 2015 and the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640), |
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having regard to the Paris Agreement on climate change of 12 December 2015 and the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

| — | having regard to the Commission report of 27 October 2021 on implementation and enforcement of EU trade agreements (COM(2021)0654), |
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having regard to the Commission report of 27 October 2021 on implementation and enforcement of EU trade agreements (COM(2021)0654),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review (8), |
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having regard to its resolution of 26 November 2020 on the EU Trade Policy Review (8),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese countersanctions on EU entities and MEPs and MPs (9), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on Chinese countersanctions on EU entities and MEPs and MPs (9),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China Strategy (10), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China Strategy (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations (11), |
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having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations (11),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (12), |
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having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (12),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 entitled ‘Implementation of the common commercial policy — annual report 2018’ (13), |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 entitled ‘Implementation of the common commercial policy — annual report 2018’ (13),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2017 on the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Korea (14), |
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having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2017 on the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Korea (14),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Fisheries, |
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having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Fisheries,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0170/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A9-0170/2022),

| A. | whereas the Indo-Pacific region has become a geopolitical and geo-economic reality; whereas the region’s growing economic, demographic and political weight makes it a key player in shaping the international order and in addressing global challenges; whereas the global economy’s centre of gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific; |
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A.

whereas the Indo-Pacific region has become a geopolitical and geo-economic reality; whereas the region’s growing economic, demographic and political weight makes it a key player in shaping the international order and in addressing global challenges; whereas the global economy’s centre of gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific;

| B. | whereas Europe and the Indo-Pacific together represent over 70 % of global trade in goods and services and over 60 % of foreign direct investment (FDI) with their annual trade reaching EUR 1,5 trillion in 2019; whereas the Indo-Pacific region accounts for 60 % of global gross domestic product (GDP) and contributes to two thirds of global economic growth; whereas the EU is the biggest investor in the region, which includes four of the EU’s top 10 global trading partners (China, Japan, South Korea and India) (15); |
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B.

whereas Europe and the Indo-Pacific together represent over 70 % of global trade in goods and services and over 60 % of foreign direct investment (FDI) with their annual trade reaching EUR 1,5 trillion in 2019; whereas the Indo-Pacific region accounts for 60 % of global gross domestic product (GDP) and contributes to two thirds of global economic growth; whereas the EU is the biggest investor in the region, which includes four of the EU’s top 10 global trading partners (China, Japan, South Korea and India) (15);

| C. | whereas the EU currently has four bilateral trade agreements in place in the region (with Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam), five strategic partnerships (with ASEAN, China, India, Japan and South Korea) and two connectivity partnerships (with Japan and India); |
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C.

whereas the EU currently has four bilateral trade agreements in place in the region (with Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam), five strategic partnerships (with ASEAN, China, India, Japan and South Korea) and two connectivity partnerships (with Japan and India);

| D. | whereas the EU and ASEAN opened a new chapter in their long-standing relations by entering into a Strategic Partnership in December 2020; |
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D.

whereas the EU and ASEAN opened a new chapter in their long-standing relations by entering into a Strategic Partnership in December 2020;

| E. | whereas enhanced inter-parliamentary relations and parliamentary diplomacy between the European Parliament and the parliaments of Southeast Asia — through the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) — should reflect the future agenda of broader and deeper EU-ASEAN relations; whereas the European Parliament and AIPA are natural partners with a significant potential to contribute towards strengthening EU-ASEAN relations; |
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E.

whereas enhanced inter-parliamentary relations and parliamentary diplomacy between the European Parliament and the parliaments of Southeast Asia — through the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) — should reflect the future agenda of broader and deeper EU-ASEAN relations; whereas the European Parliament and AIPA are natural partners with a significant potential to contribute towards strengthening EU-ASEAN relations;

| F. | whereas EU-ASEAN relations are based on the shared values and principles of a rules-based international order, effective and sustainable multilateralism, and free and fair trade; whereas EU-based entities are the largest provider of FDI to the ASEAN region; whereas the EU is ASEAN’s third largest trading partner and ASEAN as a whole is the EU’s third largest trading partner outside Europe; whereas negotiations on an EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement have been suspended by mutual agreement since 2009; |
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F.

whereas EU-ASEAN relations are based on the shared values and principles of a rules-based international order, effective and sustainable multilateralism, and free and fair trade; whereas EU-based entities are the largest provider of FDI to the ASEAN region; whereas the EU is ASEAN’s third largest trading partner and ASEAN as a whole is the EU’s third largest trading partner outside Europe; whereas negotiations on an EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement have been suspended by mutual agreement since 2009;

| G. | whereas Korea’s efforts with regard to the implementation of the TSD chapter are less than optimal; whereas more concrete improvements are needed; |
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G.

whereas Korea’s efforts with regard to the implementation of the TSD chapter are less than optimal; whereas more concrete improvements are needed;

| H. | whereas several Indo-Pacific countries benefit from EU tariff preferences under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), facilitating access to EU markets, and whereas the least developed countries in the region benefit from the duty-free, quota-free Everything but Arms (EBA) arrangement; whereas Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka are beneficiaries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+); whereas these instruments have contributed to the economic development of these countries, their respect for human and labour rights, the protection of the environment and improvements in good governance; |
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H.

whereas several Indo-Pacific countries benefit from EU tariff preferences under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), facilitating access to EU markets, and whereas the least developed countries in the region benefit from the duty-free, quota-free Everything but Arms (EBA) arrangement; whereas Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka are beneficiaries of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (GSP+); whereas these instruments have contributed to the economic development of these countries, their respect for human and labour rights, the protection of the environment and improvements in good governance;

| I. | whereas geopolitical competition in the global order between key players continues to rise, in particular between the US and China, with significant effects on global trade; whereas recent events have affected globally sustainable supply chains and the sourcing of critical raw materials, which has escalated energy and food prices; whereas EU-China relations have a multifaceted nature where China is a partner for cooperation, but is also an economic competitor and a systemic rival in a number of areas; |
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I.

whereas geopolitical competition in the global order between key players continues to rise, in particular between the US and China, with significant effects on global trade; whereas recent events have affected globally sustainable supply chains and the sourcing of critical raw materials, which has escalated energy and food prices; whereas EU-China relations have a multifaceted nature where China is a partner for cooperation, but is also an economic competitor and a systemic rival in a number of areas;

| J. | whereas the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is an open, forward-looking trade agreement that aims to secure a level playing field and a rules-based trade environment in the Indo-Pacific and provides a model of regional trade integration; whereas the US withdrew from the agreement in January 2017 while China, Taiwan and the UK formally submitted a request to accede to it in 2021; |
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J.

whereas the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is an open, forward-looking trade agreement that aims to secure a level playing field and a rules-based trade environment in the Indo-Pacific and provides a model of regional trade integration; whereas the US withdrew from the agreement in January 2017 while China, Taiwan and the UK formally submitted a request to accede to it in 2021;

| K. | whereas the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) — led by ASEAN and signed as well by Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand — entered into force in January 2022, thereby creating the world’s largest trading bloc; whereas the RCEP stands to promote greater regional cooperation in trade and investment and in digital trade while addressing regulatory issues to ease cross-border movements while including only limited provisions on labour and the environment; |
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K.

whereas the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) — led by ASEAN and signed as well by Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand — entered into force in January 2022, thereby creating the world’s largest trading bloc; whereas the RCEP stands to promote greater regional cooperation in trade and investment and in digital trade while addressing regulatory issues to ease cross-border movements while including only limited provisions on labour and the environment;

| L. | whereas the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated a number of geopolitical trends that were already under way; whereas it also highlighted the need for deepening international cooperation such as in the health sector; whereas it has also shown the lack of resilience of Member States’ economies and vulnerabilities in the global supply chains and has made clear the need for more diversification; |
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L.

whereas the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated a number of geopolitical trends that were already under way; whereas it also highlighted the need for deepening international cooperation such as in the health sector; whereas it has also shown the lack of resilience of Member States’ economies and vulnerabilities in the global supply chains and has made clear the need for more diversification;

| M. | whereas the geopolitical reality has dramatically changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and makes the EU’s further engagement with Indo-Pacific partners even more important and urgent in order to diversify our trade relations, to deepen our cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, digital issues and raw materials, to strengthen and diversify supply chains and improve their resilience and sustainability, and to help tackle global challenges; |
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M.

whereas the geopolitical reality has dramatically changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and makes the EU’s further engagement with Indo-Pacific partners even more important and urgent in order to diversify our trade relations, to deepen our cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, digital issues and raw materials, to strengthen and diversify supply chains and improve their resilience and sustainability, and to help tackle global challenges;

| N. | whereas climate change and environmental degradation are existential threats to the Indo-Pacific region, Europe and the rest of the world; whereas in 2021 alone, over 57 million people were affected by climate change disasters in the Indo-Pacific region (16); |
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N.

whereas climate change and environmental degradation are existential threats to the Indo-Pacific region, Europe and the rest of the world; whereas in 2021 alone, over 57 million people were affected by climate change disasters in the Indo-Pacific region (16);

| O. | whereas, as stated in the Trade Policy Review, the EU works together with its partners to ensure adherence to universal values, notably the promotion and protection of human rights; whereas this includes core labour standards, social protection, gender equality and the fight against climate change and biodiversity loss; |
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O.

whereas, as stated in the Trade Policy Review, the EU works together with its partners to ensure adherence to universal values, notably the promotion and protection of human rights; whereas this includes core labour standards, social protection, gender equality and the fight against climate change and biodiversity loss;

| P. | whereas the EU’s outermost regions and overseas countries and territories, which are constitutionally linked to its Member States, are an important part of the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific; |
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P.

whereas the EU’s outermost regions and overseas countries and territories, which are constitutionally linked to its Member States, are an important part of the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific;

| 1. | Welcomes the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which identifies sustainable and fair trade and investment as a priority; believes its main focus on inclusiveness and cooperation based on shared values and principles, including a commitment to respecting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, is essential; calls for the EU’s strategic approach and engagement with the Indo-Pacific region to be developed based on the multilateral, rules-based international order with a modernised World Trade Organization at its core, based on the principles of open environment for trade and investment, a level playing field, reciprocity and mutual benefit; stresses that this new approach should constitute a fundamental reorientation based on shared interests as the region is vital to EU prosperity; notes that the Indo-Pacific region hosts major waterways that are of vital importance to EU trade with 40 % of the EU’s foreign trade passing through the South China Sea, making ocean governance and stability in this region a shared concern and area of cooperation; underlines the need to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific for all and to preserve free and open maritime supply routes in full compliance with international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the principle of freedom of navigation; |
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1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to strengthen partnerships with all relevant actors in the Indo-Pacific, taking into consideration sub-regional dynamics and specificities, that reinforce the rules-based international order and address common global challenges, and calls on the Commission to work closely with its like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific to reinforce value chains by strengthening the resilience, sustainability and circularity of our economies, by diversifying trade relations in order to reduce strategic dependencies in critical supply chains with a particular focus on technologies, raw materials and agricultural products, by working towards the full implementation and better enforcement of existing trade agreements, by finalising ongoing trade negotiations and by developing cooperation in strategic sectors; underlines the importance of working together with like-minded Indo-Pacific countries on establishing technical and industrial standards, in order to further promote the EU as a global standard-setter; underlines the importance of developing new Digital Partnership Agreements, building on data protection adequacy decisions, and starting with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore; further calls on the Commission to closely work together with Indo-Pacific partners in the process of implementing the planned due diligence framework; |
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2.

| 3. | Recalls the EU’s commitment to enforce women’s rights and human rights, and to monitor the gender impact of its trade preferences; reiterates its support for gender mainstreaming in trade policy and calls for effective measures to combat the exploitation of women in export-oriented industries; |
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3.

| 4. | Stresses that the EU should make better and more strategic use of its economic leverage while respecting the political and economic specificities of its partners and their interests in order to reach its geopolitical and transformational goals, by deploying its full, integrated range of policy instruments, including the GSP mechanism, for this purpose and to promote global standards on sustainable development, the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, the circular economy, human rights, including the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, labour rights, International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, gender equality, good governance, the fight against climate change and the implementation of the Paris Agreement, combating deforestation and biodiversity loss, and sustainable fishing; |
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4.

| 5. | Calls for a swift implementation of the recently adopted EU Global Gateway strategy in coordination with the Indo-Pacific strategy in order to boost sustainable connectivity in and with the Indo-Pacific region; welcomes, in this context, the progress which has been made in the connectivity partnerships with Japan and India; advocates the establishment of a connectivity partnership with ASEAN in order to link with ASEAN’s existing master plan on connectivity; seeks increased collaboration with other regional partners such as Australia and the Republic of Korea; emphasises the need to link the Global Gateway strategy to other initiatives for trusted connectivity such as Build Back Better World and the Blue Dot Network, and to also foster cooperation on high-quality infrastructure with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD); |
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5.

FTAs and IPAs in force: enforcement, implementation and upgrading

| 6. | Welcomes the substantial growth in bilateral trade between the EU and South Korea since the FTA entered into force in 2011; is pleased with the recent steps taken by South Korea in respect of the ratification and implementation of ILO Conventions No 29, No 87 and No 98 and the implemented changes to the labour code following the TSD panel of experts’ report; awaits tangible implementation of the ratifications; recalls that the panel notes in the text of the FTA the absence of explicit targets and milestones related to the ratification of ILO conventions; calls on South Korea to speedily take the necessary steps to ratify the outstanding ILO Convention No 105 and to continue to make progress with regard to gender equality and women’s rights; supports further cooperation between the EU and South Korea on semiconductors; |
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6.

| 7. | Calls on the remaining EU Member States to proceed with the internal ratification of the EU-Singapore IPA and Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in October 2018, in particular given the importance of Singapore as the EU’s largest FDI destination in Asia, with EU FDI stocks in Singapore amounting to EUR 256 billion at the end of 2020; calls on Singapore to make increased efforts towards ratifying and implementing the fundamental ILO conventions; |
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7.

| 8. | Believes the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has been instrumental in creating more sustainable trade; welcomes the increase in the preference utilisation rates for EU exports to Japan in 2020; calls for the start of negotiations for including data flow provisions in the EPA; notes that progress has been made in the expansion of the list for geographical indication (GI) protection for both parties, the utilisation rates of tariff rate quotas opened by Japan for EU exporters and the process for ratification of ILO Convention No 105 by Japan; underlines that further swift progress is needed in the implementation of the agreement, including liberalisation of trade in services and the ratification of ILO Convention No 111; reiterates its call for an early review of the TSD chapter in order to strengthen its enforcement provisions; |
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8.

| 9. | Calls on the Member States to ratify the EU-Vietnam IPA so that it enters into force and creates favourable conditions to boost EU investment in Vietnam and in the region, in particular in areas promoting green transformation and the circular economy; underlines the importance of the TSD chapter for the EU and calls for a swift completion of setting up the domestic advisory groups; recalls concerns with regard to human rights violations; considers that a revision of the Criminal Code of Vietnam is important to ensure the effective implementation of ILO core conventions; urges Vietnam to complete its key labour reforms in accordance with the agreement and to swiftly ensure the ratification of ILO Convention No 87 by 2023; urges Vietnam to continue working to achieve equal treatment of EU Member States with regard to pharmaceuticals and to guarantee full implementation of the sanitary and phytosanitary provisions; |
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9.

| 10. | Calls for continuing actions oriented at raising awareness among businesses, stakeholders, civil society, social partners and citizens of existing FTAs in the region and the opportunities they provide; calls for strengthened technical and financial support where necessary to help partner countries to effectively implement FTAs, in particular the chapters on TSD; calls on the Commission to work together with our Indo-Pacific partners also in the context of the TSD review; |
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10.

| 11. | Recalls the importance of parliamentary diplomacy in accelerating FTA negotiations between the EU and ASEAN Member States; |
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11.

Bilateral FTA in negotiations and/or under ratification (positive trade agenda)

| 12. | Calls for substantive progress in negotiations on the EU-Australia and EU-New Zealand FTAs aiming to conclude by mid-2022 in order for the European Parliament to be able to duly ratify these balanced agreements in the current parliamentary mandate, without compromising the content of the agreement for the sake of the calendar; believes that, especially in the current geopolitical situation, it is of utmost importance that democracies strengthen their mutual relations, including when it comes to trade; underlines the importance of a comprehensive and enforceable TSD chapter and recalls the need for the Paris Agreement as an essential clause in order to reflect the ambition of achieving a gold standard agreement in these areas; reiterates the need to take the agricultural sector’s specificities and sensitivities into account and to achieve GI protection in both countries; |
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12.

| 13. | Welcomes the decision to resume negotiations with India on a comprehensive and mutually beneficial trade agreement promoting shared democratic values and human rights, core labour rights and gender equality, a commitment to promoting an inclusive, coherent and rules-based global order, effective multilateralism and strengthened enforcement on TSD with a focus on combating climate change and biodiversity loss; welcomes the decision to launch negotiations for a separate IPA and for an agreement on geographical indications; welcomes the establishment of permanent structures between the EU and India such as high-level dialogues in several sectors; welcomes India’s engagement to meet the EU’s ambition on content and timetable; welcomes the common proposal by President von der Leyen and Prime Minister Modi to create an EU-India Trade and Technology Council; |
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13.

| 14. | Underlines the need for the EU to engage in a comprehensive dialogue with China that firmly defends the EU’s interests and values, taking into account the present geopolitically challenging global context, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine; highlights that China is a cooperation and negotiating partner for the EU, but it is also a competitor in an increasing number of areas, and a systemic rival; reiterates, as underlined in its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy, its call for the EU to develop a more assertive, comprehensive and coherent EU-China strategy that unites all Member States and shapes relations with China in the interest of the EU as a whole; emphasises that this strategy should promote a rules-based multilateral order, should have the defence of EU values and interests at its core and should be based on the three principles of cooperating where possible, competing where needed, and confronting where necessary; stresses that it is particularly important to continue engaging with China to promote solutions to common challenges and to cooperate on issues of common interest such as fighting climate change; acknowledges that the support of China was vital for the conclusion of the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Acknowledges that China’s continued delay in complying with all WTO rules continues to complicate trade relations between the EU and China; considers that the main issues to be solved are the multiple barriers European companies face in accessing the Chinese market, the protection of intellectual property rights, counterfeiting, product safety concerns, social and environmental standards, forced technology transfers, obliged joint ventures, unfair subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned enterprises; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Acknowledges that the discussions on the ratification of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CAI) between the EU and China have been put on hold in the European Parliament on account of China’s decision to sanction, among others, five individual Members of the European Parliament and its standing Subcommittee on Human Rights for criticising China’s human rights record; underlines that the European Parliament cannot start the consideration and ratification process for the CAI until the Chinese sanctions against MEPs and EU institutions have been lifted; further recalls the coercive pressure China has put on Member States such as in the case of Lithuania and strongly condemns this practice; recalls that it is essential for China to abide by international standards, including with regard to its impact on climate, the environment, biodiversity, poverty, health, labour rights, human rights and related to the prevention and fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Urges the EU to launch a structured dialogue with Taiwan on cooperating in green technology and the digital economy, including the semiconductor industry, with a view to signing a memorandum of understanding that benefits both the EU and Taiwan; repeats its call on the Commission to begin an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan in preparation for negotiations to deepen bilateral economic ties; also calls on the Commission to look into options to boost cooperation on resilient supply chains with Taiwan; underlines that Taiwan is a member of the WTO; calls for closer cooperation in global health crises and the trading of medical supplies; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Welcomes recent progress in negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Indonesia, including on sustainability related areas, and the renewed commitment by both sides to conclude this agreement; stresses that according to the World Bank (17), the agreement could bring 2,13 % growth to the GDP of Indonesia by 2030; highlights the essential need for further steps to be considered before an agreement can be concluded, notably on sustainability, deforestation, with a focus on palm oil, and a more enforceable TSD chapter, as well as the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Recalls that the Philippines is a lower income country benefiting from the EU’s GSP+ mechanism; recalls that the Philippines will have to reapply for the GSP+ benefits under the new GSP Regulation as of 2024; notes that negotiations on a bilateral trade and investment agreement with the Philippines, which started in 2015, have been put on hold; recalls serious concerns with regard to human rights violations; recalls that negotiations should resume only once the worrying and critical situation concerning human rights, good governance and the rule of law has improved; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Takes note of the fact that negotiations on a bilateral trade and investment agreement with Malaysia have been put on hold since 2012; invites the Malaysian authorities to take a position on the possible resumption of negotiations and invites both parties to take stock of the findings of the sustainability impact assessment; underlines that a possible resumption of negotiations should be preceded by tangible improvement of the human rights situation in the country; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Notes that negotiations for a bilateral trade and investment agreement with Thailand were launched in 2013 and were put on hold in 2014; acknowledges that the EU in recent years has taken steps towards broadening its engagement with Thailand; stresses the importance of taking steps (in line with the Council conclusions of 2019) towards the resumption of negotiations on an ambitious and comprehensive FTA and invites the Thai authorities to provide clear indications in this respect and to engage in structural reforms; underlines that a possible resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive FTA should be preceded by a tangible improvement in the democratic situation in the country; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls on the Commission to closely monitor the situation in Myanmar after the 2021 coup and assess whether an investigation should be launched with a view to its possible withdrawal of the EBA trade preferences; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls on the Commission and the authorities of Cambodia to work towards a common understanding for the steps to be taken towards reaching the conditions for enabling the reinstatement of the EBA trade preferences for Cambodia under the EBA scheme; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Welcomes the review of the GSP Regulation; highlights that current GSP+ beneficiary countries and EBA countries graduating to lower middle income countries will be required to (re)apply for the GSP+ status under the new GSP Regulation; calls for GSP, GSP+ and EBA beneficiary countries in the region to engage in strengthening the effective implementation of their international commitments on human rights, labour rights, the environment, good governance and sustainable development; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Welcomes the long-awaited conclusion in principle of the EU’s International Procurement Instrument in order to achieve reciprocity and a level playing field in international procurement markets; underlines the need to further strengthen the EU’s trade defence toolbox by swiftly adopting a strong foreign subsidies regulation and taking a clear stance against economic coercion by third countries, such as China’s unacceptable coercion of Lithuania at the end of 2021, through a new anti-coercion instrument; |
| --- | --- |

25.

EU attitude towards regional and multilateral relations and negotiations

| 26. | Calls for further engagement with ASEAN and its member states and for the development and promotion of the EU-ASEAN strategic partnership; calls on both sides to use the momentum of the planned EU-ASEAN Summit in 2022, on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the EU-ASEAN bilateral relationship, to present a new EU-ASEAN action plan for the upcoming period to promote increased multifaceted cooperation in key areas, and emphasises the need to revive the initiative for a region-to-region FTA between the EU and ASEAN, based on shared values and principles including sustainable development and promoting fundamental rights and gender equality, once the conditions are met; calls for a parliamentary dimension to the 45th anniversary summit and reiterates its intention to create an EU-ASEAN parliamentary assembly to strengthen the democratic dimension of the partnership; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls for a new strategic approach towards the CPTPP as a core element of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy; stresses that closer cooperation would allow the EU to reap important economic benefits with regard to possible welfare gains, diversification of supply chains and reduction of strategic dependencies, and would give the EU the opportunity to continue to shape standards in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; emphasises that the EU should study the option of joining the CPTPP in the future and also explore the possibilities of linking existing agreements with partners, for instance through their rules of origin protocols, in order to increase the preference utilisation rate of those agreements and maximise their added value; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Calls on the Commission to continue to thoroughly monitor the direct economic effects of the RCEP on the EU’s economy and to evaluate its long-term strategic and geopolitical implications; |
| --- | --- |

28.

o

o o

| 29. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the Secretary-General of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and the respective countries in the Indo-Pacific region. |
| --- | --- |

29.

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(1)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 170.

(2)  OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 109.

(3)  OJ L 127, 14.5.2011, p. 6.

(4)  OJ L 294, 14.11.2019, p. 3.

(5)  OJ L 186, 12.6.2020, p. 3.

(6)  OJ L 330, 27.12.2018, p. 3.

(7)  OJ C 346, 27.9.2018, p. 44.

(8)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 155.

(9)  OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 170.

(10)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 40.

(11)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 117.

(12)  OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(13)  OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 14.

(14)  OJ C 307, 30.8.2018, p. 109.

(15)  Joint communication of 16 September 2021 on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024).

(16)  Observer Research Foundation, ‘Climate change and geostrategic ocean governance in the Indo-Pacific’, 14 January 2022.

(17)  See page 9 of the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper ‘Economic and Distributional Impacts of Free Trade Agreements. The Case of Indonesia’.

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