THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Stephen Douglas Berry, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2015-002580 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal From Union County 

The Honorable John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27690 

Submitted November 17, 2016 – Filed December 7, 2016 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

League B. Creech, of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth 

& Detrick, P.A., of Hampton, and Chief Appellate 

Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for 

Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 
 

 

[PER CURIAM]: Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review the Court of 

Appeals' decision in State v. Berry, 413 S.C. 118, 775 S.E.2d 51 (Ct. App. 2015). 

We grant the petition, dispense with further briefing, and affirm the Court of 

Appeals' decision as modified. 

Petitioner was convicted of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree. 

At trial, the State called Kim Roseborough (Roseborough) who was qualified as an 

expert in the field of "child sexual abuse assessment and treatment." The relevant 

section of Roseborough's testimony consisted of three distinct parts: (1) testimony 

regarding the victim's demeanor witnessed by Roseborough during therapy; (2) 

testimony explaining and discussing delayed disclosure as part of the Child Sexual 

Abuse Accommodation Syndrome; and (3) testimony addressing trauma associated 

with sexual abuse and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

During the first portion of Roseborough's testimony, the State asked, "Were the 

circumstances of [the victim's] disclosure . . . consistent with the disclosure of 

sexual abuse?" Trial counsel objected, citing State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 737 

S.E.2d 490 (2013) as grounds for the objection. The trial judge sustained the 

objection, finding such a question solicited Roseborough's opinion on whether the 

victim was telling the truth. 

During the second portion of her testimony, Roseborough explained why victims 

of child sexual abuse often choose to delay disclosing abuse. The State asked if 

any factors were present in the victim's case which might have led to her delaying 

disclosure of the alleged abuse. The trial court sustained trial counsel's objection 

to this question.1

 The solicitor continued to try and ask, in many different ways, 

what factors of delayed disclosure were demonstrated by the victim. Trial counsel 

continued to object, without stating his grounds, and these objections were all 

sustained. At no point during the first two portions of Roseborough's testimony 

did trial counsel move for a mistrial, curative instructions, or to strike the 

testimony solicited immediately prior to a sustained objection. 

Finally, the State introduced the third part of Roseborough's testimony discussing 

the trauma associated with sexual abuse and possible PTSD resulting from that 

trauma. The solicitor asked Roseborough about the typical symptoms of trauma 

exhibited by a child who suffered sexual assault. Roseborough's answer discussed 

1

 The jury was excused so that the attorneys could argue this objection. The record on appeal is 

missing five pages containing a majority of this discussion, therefore, only part of the 

conversation was available for review by this Court. 
 

symptoms of trauma, including PTSD. Trial counsel objected and approached the 

bench for an off the record conference. After the conference, neither the grounds 

for the objection nor the trial judge's ruling were placed on the record, and 

Roseborough continued to testify about trauma and PTSD. Specifically, 

Roseborough testified to the trauma symptoms a child would tend to show after 

being sexually abused and began to explain the trauma symptoms she observed in 

the victim. After discussing three such symptoms demonstrated by the victim, trial 

counsel objected, but the objection was overruled. Roseborough went on to 

explain that she referred the victim to a psychiatrist because she exhibited many of 

the criteria for diagnosing PTSD listed in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual and, 

that in her opinion, the victim suffered from PTSD. 

After the State concluded its case-in-chief, trial counsel placed the objection, 

discussed at sidebar during the third portion of Roseborough's testimony, on the 

record. Trial counsel argued there was no evidence of Roseborough's 

qualifications to diagnose PTSD; specifically, trial counsel asserted Roseborough 

was qualified as a social worker and not a medical doctor. The trial judge 

reiterated his sidebar determination that you do not need to be a medical doctor to 

diagnosis PTSD. 

The Court of Appeals found the issue of whether Roseborough's testimony 

regarding trauma symptoms and PTSD violated the directives established in 

Kromah preserved for appeal. In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 

found the specific grounds for petitioner's objection to questions regarding trauma 

symptoms and PTSD were apparent from the context given his objections to the 

first two portions of Roseborough's testimony. On the merits, the Court of Appeals 

found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Roseborough to testify 

regarding behaviors she observed in the victim and the symptoms of PTSD. 

However, we find any issues regarding Roseborough's testimony, other than her 

discussion of symptoms of trauma associated with sexual assault and PTSD, are 

not preserved for review because petitioner's objections were sustained and trial 

counsel did not take any further measures to have the testimony stricken from the 

record, curative instructions given, or a mistrial granted. See State v. Wilson, 389 

S.C. 579, 698 S.E.2d 862 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Appellate courts have recognized that 

an issue will not be preserved for review where the trial court sustains a party's 

objection to improper testimony and the party does not subsequently move to strike 

the testimony or for a mistrial," because "without a motion to strike or motion for a 

mistrial, when the objecting party is sustained, he has received what he asked for 

and cannot be heard to complain about a favorable ruling on appeal."); see also 
 

 

 

State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 710 S.E.2d 55 (2011) ("When a witness answers a 

question before an objection is made, the objecting party must make a motion to 

strike the answer to preserve the issue of the statement's admissibility."). 

Additionally, to the extent petitioner asserts error in Roseborough's testimony 

regarding symptoms of trauma and PTSD, the record clearly shows that the only 

objection made to that portion of Roseborough's testimony was based upon her 

qualifications to diagnose PTSD. As such, petitioner's current arguments regarding 

that portion of Roseborough's testimony were not properly before the Court of 

Appeals, should not have been ruled upon, and are not properly before this Court. 

See State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 716 S.E.2d 91 (2011) (noting for an issue to be 

properly preserved, it has to be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court); State v. 

Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 587 S.E.2d 691 (2003) (holding a party may not argue one 

ground at trial and another ground on appeal). 

Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals' analysis, but affirm on the grounds 

set forth above. 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.