NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

UMAR SHUJA QURESHI, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0536

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0537

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-427046-001

No. CR2014-001042-001

The Honorable George H. Foster, Jr., Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joshua C. Smith

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Nicholaus Podsiadlik

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 11-5-2020
STATE v. QURESHI

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Umar Shuja Qureshi appeals his convictions and sentences for 

one count of aggravated assault, one count of manslaughter, and two 

counts of endangerment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. CR2013-427046

¶2 In 2012, T.K. was driving southbound on McClintock Road 

when Qureshi, driving northbound in a Ford Mustang, crossed into T.K.’s 

lane of traffic. T.K. changed lanes in an attempt to avoid a collision, but 

Qureshi moved into the same lane, mirroring T.K.’s movements. The 

Mustang collided with T.K.’s vehicle nearly head-on at a speed of eightyeight miles per hour. Just before impact, the Mustang sped up.

¶3 T.K. was badly injured and was hospitalized for seventeen 

days following the collision. He underwent stomach surgery to remove 

part of his lower intestines and lung treatments to remove blood clots. He 

had to learn to walk again.

¶4 A grand jury indicted Qureshi for one count of aggravated 

assault, a dangerous offense. After a trial, the jury found Qureshi guilty as 

charged and found in aggravation serious physical injury and emotional or 

financial harm to the victim. The superior court sentenced Qureshi to ten 

years in prison. Qureshi timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Constitution Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

II. CR2014-001042

¶5 In 2013, K.F. was driving a Honda Odyssey on the highway 

with Qureshi in the front passenger seat and her sons S.F., age fifteen, and 

J.F., age six, in the backseat. Qureshi began arguing with K.F. Without 

warning, Qureshi grabbed the steering wheel, causing the Odyssey to strike 
STATE v. QURESHI

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a pole. J.F. was ejected from the Odyssey and sustained multiple blunt force 

injuries and died.

¶6 A grand jury indicted Qureshi on one count of manslaughter 

and two endangerment counts, all dangerous offenses. In February 2019,

the case proceeded to trial. When the superior court began the jury 

selection process, Qureshi made the following outburst in front of the 

potential jurors:

The prosecution thinks I’m a Muslim terrorist, the 

prosecution thinks I’m a Muslim terrorist, that’s what the 

prosecution thinks. The prosecution thinks I’m a Muslim 

terrorist. . . . I’m out. Take me out. I’m ready to go back. The 

prosecution thinks I’m a Muslim terrorist, everybody. That’s 

what the prosecution thinks.

At the request of defense counsel, the court excused the jury panel, and the 

trial began again the next day with a new panel of jurors.

¶7 On the fifth day of trial, defense counsel filed a motion to 

withdraw. The motion cited multiple ethical rules including Arizona Rules 

of the Supreme Court 42 ER 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct for a 

lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct or 

knowingly assist another to do so), ER 8.4(c) (it is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation”), and ER 3.3(a)(3) (“[a] lawyer shall not knowingly offer 

evidence the lawyer knows to be false”). Defense counsel told the court 

that Qureshi had demanded that he do something at trial that would violate 

these ethical rules. In addition, defense counsel indicated that Qureshi had 

made over 100 harassing phone calls to counsel and had threatened to kill 

counsel’s wife. Counsel stated that he believed Qureshi made the threat to 

cause a mistrial.

¶8 When the court asked Qureshi whether he understood that

his attorney had filed a motion to withdraw, Qureshi stated that he did not 

understand the motion because he was “out of touch with reality” and did 

not know if he was “asleep or awake when [he] hear[d] things.” Qureshi

told the court that he wanted to discharge defense counsel because counsel 

had refused to watch a YouTube video that Qureshi wanted to introduce at 

trial entitled “Should the World’s Youth Drive,” which advocated for the 

driving age to be lowered to ages 9-12. Before taking the motion under 

advisement, the court discussed the possibility of Qureshi representing 

himself, and Qureshi stated, “I’m out of reality . . . I take no responsibility 
STATE v. QURESHI

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[for asking defense counsel to engage in unethical behavior] because I don’t 

know what is right or wrong . . . I don’t mind representing myself 

nonetheless.” Qureshi then interrupted the court, stating, “So I like Hitler 

because he brought the Autobahn to life.“ The next day the superior court 

granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and declared a mistrial.

¶9 Qureshi was retried later that year, represented by new 

counsel. Qureshi sought to represent himself, and the superior court 

denied the request. During the trial, Qureshi handed his attorney a note 

stating, “Mr. Linnins, withdraw or meet your demise.” Linnins filed a 

motion to withdraw, and the superior court denied the motion.

¶10 The jury convicted Qureshi as charged and found as 

aggravators the use of a dangerous instrument and physical, emotional, or 

financial injury to the victims. The superior court sentenced Qureshi to 4.5 

years in prison for each count of endangerment, and twenty years in prison 

for the manslaughter count, all to be served concurrently. The court 

ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to the sentence in CR2013-

427046. Qureshi timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction. We 

consolidated Qureshi’s appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Self-Representation in CR2014-001042

¶11 Qureshi first argues the superior court erred by denying his 

request to represent himself in CR2014-001042 because he had been found 

competent to stand trial in Rule 11 proceedings and had demonstrated an 

ability to make arguments on his behalf. We review a superior court’s 

ruling that a criminal defendant is not competent to represent himself for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Ibeabuchi, 248 Ariz. 412, 416, ¶ 15 (App. 2020). 

“We look to whether reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s 

finding,” and “consider[ ] the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the superior court’s ruling.” Id. “[R]egardless of the standard of review, an 

erroneous failure to accord a defendant his properly asserted right to 

represent himself when he is competent to waive counsel in a criminal case 

is structural error requiring reversal without a showing of prejudice.” Id.

(internal quotation omitted).

¶12 The United States and Arizona Constitutions recognize a 

criminal defendant’s right to waive counsel and represent himself. U.S. 

Const. amend. VI; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. The 

right of self-representation is not absolute, however. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 

U.S. 164, 171 (2008). In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court 
STATE v. QURESHI

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considered whether “the Constitution permits States to insist upon 

representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under 

[Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)] but who still suffer from severe 

mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial 

proceedings by themselves.” Id. at 178. The Court answered the question 

in the affirmative, concluding that judges may take realistic account of the 

particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether he is mentally 

competent to conduct his defense at trial.1 Id. at 177-78. The Court called 

these defendants “gray-area” defendants. Id. at 172-73. “[W]hile a 

defendant need only show the ability to rationally communicate with 

counsel and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings to 

stand trial to represent himself at that trial, the superior court may require 

that the defendant also have sufficient ability to manage the most basic of 

trial tasks.” Ibeabuchi, 248 Ariz. at 417, ¶ 18 (citations omitted). “[P]ursuant 

to Edwards, when a criminal defendant is mentally competent to stand trial, 

but not mentally competent to conduct that trial or hearing himself, the 

superior court may, in its sound discretion, deny the defendant the right to 

represent himself.” Id. at ¶ 19.

¶13 Citing Edwards, the superior court found that Qureshi was not 

competent to represent himself. The court noted that Qureshi had a lengthy 

history with the court and had been evaluated in Rule 11 proceedings and 

diagnosed as seriously mentally ill. The court noted that Qureshi’s past 

behavior in the courtroom had been uncontrollable, Qureshi did not 

understand the rules of evidence or procedure, and the court believed 

Qureshi would continue to seek to introduce matters that were not relevant. 

The court further stated

[G]iven the totality of the circumstances in this matter, 

including the timing of the request, including the history of 

the number of attorneys that represented the defendant in this 

case . . . all of whom had to withdraw from the case due to the 

defendant’s behaviors . . . the Court has no confidence that the 

defendant can properly and competently try this case.

1 The Edwards Court quoted with approval an amicus brief filed by the 

American Psychiatric Association which explained that “‘[d]isorganized

thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired 

expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental 

illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability to play the significantly 

expanded role required for self-representation even if he can play the lesser 

role of represented defendant.’” 554 U.S. at 176.
STATE v. QURESHI

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The court denied Qureshi’s request to waive counsel.

¶14 The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

superior court’s ruling that Qureshi could not represent himself

competently. The same superior court judge presided over both of 

Qureshi’s cases and was well aware of Qureshi’s mental health history and 

courtroom behaviors.

¶15 In Qureshi’s first trial in CR2014-001042, even though counsel

represented him, Qureshi sought to introduce an irrelevant YouTube video 

about children driving and then caused the superior court to remove an 

entire jury panel when he made an outburst in front of the jury. The court 

had to admonish Qureshi multiple times, and at least once, Qureshi refused 

to be transported for trial. Qureshi asked his attorney to engage in unethical 

behavior and harassed the attorney, causing the attorney to file a motion to 

withdraw. The attorney believed Qureshi was intentionally trying to cause 

a mistrial. Qureshi told the court that he did not understand the motion to 

withdraw because he was “out of touch with reality.” He then made a 

nonsensical argument about wanting to fire his attorney because the 

attorney would not watch his YouTube video about the merits of young 

children driving. The court once again had to explain the video was 

irrelevant.2 During this discussion, Qureshi told the court, “I’m out of

reality . . . [but] I don’t mind representing myself nonetheless.” He then 

made an outburst about admiring Hitler. The court ultimately granted the 

attorney’s motion to withdraw due to Qureshi’s unethical requests and 

threats and declared a mistrial.

¶16 At a status conference before the second trial in CR2014-

001042, Qureshi told the court he wanted to represent himself and 

attempted to introduce an untimely pro per motion to dismiss, despite being 

represented by counsel.

¶17 On the first day of trial, the superior court admonished 

Qureshi about his outbursts, but he nevertheless continued to argue with 

the court and make outbursts throughout the trial. The court also 

admonished Qureshi for staring at a victim’s family members and showing 

photos to the jury. Similar to what happened in the mistrial, Qureshi

2 Qureshi told the court he thought the video was relevant “[b]ecause 

the accident involved the fatality of an underage person [six year-old J.F.], 

and I do believe the video shows how it can be safer for everybody to drive. 

So I think it would be a mitigating factor and favorable aspect the jury can 

review.”
STATE v. QURESHI

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caused his new attorney to file a motion to withdraw and threatened the 

attorney’s life midway through the trial. The superior court denied the 

motion to withdraw and Qureshi’s motion to waive counsel and represent 

himself. The trial continued with additional interruptions and behaviors 

from Qureshi, including harassing a victim, calling the judge a racist, 

sliding onto the floor, threatening self-harm outside of the presence of the 

jury, and stating he demanded the death penalty in front of the jury. The 

superior court had to remove Qureshi from the courtroom at least four 

times during the trial.

¶18 Qureshi was often non-responsive and ill-behaved in the 

courtroom, causing his removal from proceedings. In addition, he told the 

court he was out of touch with reality on multiple occasions during 

courtroom proceedings. Qureshi persisted in trying to introduce irrelevant 

evidence even after being advised by the court that it was not relevant, 

attempted to file an untimely pro per motion to dismiss, and did not 

understand his attorney’s motion to withdraw, thereby demonstrating a 

lack of understanding of rules of evidence and procedure. By denying 

Qureshi’s motion to represent himself, the superior court ensured that 

Qureshi received a fair trial and helped maintain the proceedings’ integrity. 

See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176-77. On this record, we cannot say that the 

superior court abused its discretion.

II. Admission of YouTube Video “Speedometer Pushed Towards the 

Edge”

¶19 Qureshi next argues that the superior court erred by 

admitting into evidence in CR 2013-427046 a YouTube video showing 

Qureshi driving over 100 miles per hour on the highway. We review the 

superior court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, 523, ¶ 18 (2015). We review de novo the interpretation 

of the rules of evidence. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 502, ¶ 49 (2013).

¶20 Before the trial, Qureshi filed a motion to suppress the 

introduction of seven YouTube videos made by Qureshi showing him 

speeding and driving recklessly. Qureshi argued the videos were 

inadmissible under Arizona Rules of Evidence (“Rules”) 403 and 404. After 

a hearing, the superior court reviewed the videos and denied Qureshi’s 

motion to suppress in part, ruling that the State could introduce two of the 

seven videos.

¶21 Qureshi filed a second motion challenging the admission of 

the videos, and in addition, evidence of a collision Qureshi caused in Pinal 
STATE v. QURESHI

Decision of the Court

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County.3 The court found that evidence of the collision was relevant, 

probative, and “tends to negate any notion that his actions were a mere 

mistake or accidentally undertaken.” The court found that the probative 

value of the evidence of the Pinal County accident outweighed any 

prejudice. However, the court only allowed the State to introduce one of 

the two YouTube videos of Qureshi’s reckless driving after finding that two 

videos and the evidence of the Pinal County accident would be cumulative.

¶22 During the trial, the State introduced one YouTube video 

entitled “Speedometer Pushed Towards the Edge.” The video, recorded 

inside a vehicle, showed Qureshi driving over 100 miles per hour on a 

freeway. The video provided a view of the freeway over the steering wheel 

from the driver’s perspective and panned down to show the dashboard 

speedometer.

¶23 Qureshi argues that the superior court erred by concluding 

that the YouTube video was admissible under Rule 404(b). Relevant 

evidence is generally admissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 402. “Evidence is relevant 

if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining the 

action.” Ariz. R. Evid. 401. Rule 404(b) generally precludes “evidence of 

other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith.” Such evidence “may, however, be 

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” 

Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b). The list of permissible purposes is not exclusive. State 

v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 62 (1994).

¶24 The YouTube video showing Qureshi intentionally driving at 

a high rate of speed was admissible to establish the absence of a mistake or 

accident when he drove at a high rate of speed and crashed into T.K. nearly 

head-on. It was also relevant to rebut Qureshi’s claim to law enforcement 

that the collision could have been caused by a problem with his vehicle’s 

tires rather than his driving behavior,

4 and to refute his claim that his 

3 Qureshi does not challenge the superior court’s ruling concerning 

the Pinal County accident on appeal.

4 On cross-examination defense counsel elicited testimony from 

Detective Stefan Springstroh that Qureshi believed the collision could have 

been caused by a problem with his vehicle’s tires.
STATE v. QURESHI

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driving on the night of the accident was involuntary as raised in his noticed 

defense of involuntary intoxication. We find no abuse of discretion.

III. Motion to Disqualify MCAO in its Entirety

¶25 Finally, Qureshi argues his due process right to an unbiased 

prosecution was violated and that the superior court committed structural 

or fundamental error by failing to disqualify the entire Maricopa County 

Attorney’s Office (“MCAO”).

¶26 The superior court held a pretrial status conference for both 

of Qureshi’s cases in 2018. Before the conference, the prosecutor passed 

Qureshi in the hall, entered the courtroom, and told defense counsel, 

“Every time I see your client, he looks more and more like a Muslim 

terrorist.” The prosecutor made the statement in front of court staff and 

other attorneys. The judge was not yet on the bench, nor was Qureshi in 

the courtroom, and defense counsel did not raise the matter during the 

status conference. Subsequently, Qureshi filed a motion to dismiss both 

cases with prejudice. MCAO removed the prosecutor from the case and 

reassigned the matter to other MCAO attorneys.

¶27 At oral argument, Qureshi argued if the court did not dismiss

the case, it should remove MCAO. The superior court denied the motion 

to dismiss. The court noted that the prosecutor had been removed from the 

case, that the statements had been made on a single occasion, and they had 

not been made on the record. The court found that Qureshi had failed to 

show a denial of his due process rights

as a result of the statements by [the prosecutor]. Those 

statements and any underlying bias have not been shown to 

have been adopted by the Maricopa County Attorney’s 

Office. The Court agrees that the statements are indicative of 

a biased and bigoted mind. AS such this Court believes they 

violate the Code of Professional Responsibility and this Court 

will refer this matter to the State Bar at the appropriate time. 

The evidence is that the bigotry is solely in the mind of the 

attorney who uttered the statements. The Court further finds 

that in these unique circumstances, any notion or perception 

of bias can be cured through the process of voir dire.

The court further found that neither a change of venue nor a transfer of 

prosecution to another agency was required. Qureshi filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which the superior court denied.
STATE v. QURESHI

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¶28 Qureshi argues the prosecutor’s conduct tainted the entire 

MCAO, removing the prosecutor from the case was an insufficient remedy, 

and disqualifying the MCAO was needed to cure an appearance of 

impropriety. He further argues the State’s unwillingness to make Qureshi

plea offers demonstrated that the prosecutor’s bias infected the case.

¶29 We review a ruling on a motion to disqualify counsel for an 

abuse of discretion. Villalpando v. Reagan, 211 Ariz. 305, 307, ¶ 6 (App. 2005). 

“Only in extreme circumstances should a party to a lawsuit be allowed to 

interfere with the attorney-client relationship of his opponent. The burden 

should be upon the moving party to show sufficient reason why an attorney 

should be disqualified from representing his [or her] client.” Alexander v. 

Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 157, 161 (1984) (citations omitted). “Without 

question, certain prosecutorial conflicts may implicate due-process 

concerns, and a court does have the authority to disqualify a prosecutor or 

prosecutor’s office for a conflict of interest.” Villalpando, 211 Ariz. at 308, 

¶ 8 (citations omitted). “A defendant does not state a claim for a violation 

of his due-process rights, however, unless the conflict is so severe as to 

deprive him of fundamental fairness in a manner shocking to the universal 

sense of justice.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

¶30 We find no violation of Qureshi’s due process rights. Qureshi 

did not establish that any other MCAO attorney was biased or shared the 

original prosecutor’s views about him. MCAO removed the prosecutor and 

disavowed the comment as “inappropriate, unprofessional and 

discriminatory.” There is no indication in the record that the prosecutor 

had any further involvement in Qureshi’s cases, and the comment was 

made outside of the juries’ presence. See, e.g., In re Gentry, 316 P.3d 1020, 

1033-34 (Wash. 2014) (prosecutor’s racist comment made outside of the 

jury’s presence was not an intentional appeal to racial bias that could have 

affected the jury’s verdict and prejudiced the defendant). Although

Qureshi argues that MCAO mistreated him because it did not give him a 

plea offer, it is well-established that there is no constitutional right to a plea 

bargain. See State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 413, ¶ 14 (App. 2000). We find 

no abuse of discretion.
STATE v. QURESHI

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CONCLUSION

¶31 We affirm Qureshi’s convictions and sentences.