alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of SCPIE Holdings Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

(i) the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



|                      |  |  |  |                        
|--------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|                      |  | 
|Dated: August 4, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Robert B. Tschudy  
|                      |  |  |  | Robert B. Tschudy      
|                      |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any
general incorporation language in such filing.
|                                                |
|------------------------------------------------|
|                                                |  |
| INDIANA                                        | 35-1544218 |
| (State or other jurisdiction of incorporation) | (IRS Employer Identification No.) |

----

----

----

|             |             |
|-------------|-------------|
| Exhibit No. | Description |
EXHIBIT 21



SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY



The following is a list of subsidiaries of Registrant as of June 10, 2004, other than subsidiaries which, considered in the aggregate as a single subsidiary, would not
constitute a significant subsidiary as defined by Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation S-X.



|                                        |  |                       
|--------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------
|NAME OF SUBSIDIARY                      |  | STATE OF INCORPORATION
|American Growers Insurance Company (1)  |  | Nebraska              
|American Agrisurance Inc. (5)           |  | Iowa                  
|Acceptance Insurance Services, Inc. (5) |  | Nebraska              
|Acceptance Insurance Company (2)        |  | Nebraska              
|American Agrijusters, Inc. (3)          |  | Iowa                  
|U.S. Ag Insurance Services Inc. (4)     |  | Texas                 

---

|(1) | A wholly owned subsidiary of Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc. (the Company). American Growers Insurance Company (AGIC) was placed into rehabilitation by
the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska on December 20, 2002. Effective as of December 20, 2002, AGIC and its subsidiaries ceased to be under the control of the Company and are not included as consolidated subsidiaries of the Company after
that date.
|--- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(2) | A wholly owned subsidiary of Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------

|(3) | A wholly owned subsidiary of American Growers Insurance Company. See (1).
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(4) | An approximately 60% owned subsidiary of American Growers Insurance Company. See (1).
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(5) | A wholly owned subsidiary of Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc. formerly operating under the Agricultual Segment.
|--- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 99(e)

                         CONSENT OF RICHARD A. BOEHNING

     Pursuant to Rule 438 of the General Rules and Regulations under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, I hereby consent to being named in the Joint
Proxy Statement-Prospectus included in the Registration Statement on Form S-4 to
which this consent is an exhibit and confirm my consent to serve as a director
of First Merchants Corporation in such capacity.

                                         /s/Richard A. Boehning
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                         Richard A. Boehning


Date:  December 21, 2001

                          CONSENT OF ROBERT T. JEFFARES

         Pursuant to Rule 438 of the General Rules and Regulations under the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, I hereby consent to being named in the Joint
Proxy Statement-Prospectus included in the Registration Statement on Form S-4 to
which this consent is an exhibit and confirm my consent to serve as a director
of First Merchants Corporation in such capacity.




                                         /s/Robert T. Jeffares
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                         Robert T. Jeffares


Date:  December 21, 2001


                                  Ex. 99(e)-1
Order entered December 5, 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 19
- 00710
- CR
JOHN FRANCIS WALSH I II, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the C riminal District Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F17
- 75832
- H



### O RDER Before the Court is appellant’s December 3, 2019 second motion for extension of time to file his brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER appellant’s brief due on or be fore January 6,
2020. Appellant is cautioned that the failure to file a brief by that date may result in the appeal being abated for a hearing under rule 38. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 3 8.8(b)(3).

/s/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE
# C_2022274EN.01000101.xml

| 18.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 274/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 274/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.10506 – PARKER / MEGGITT)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2022/C 274/01)

On 11 April 2022, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the ‘Competition policy’ website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the ‘Competition policy’ website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32022M10506. EUR-Lex is the online point of access to European Union law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32022M10506. EUR-Lex is the online point of access to European Union law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON FURTHER MOTION FOR REHEARING

Appellate case name: Ex parte Matthew Leachman

Appellate case number: 01-16-00787-CR

Trial court case number: 1522187

Trial court: 248th District Court of Harris County

The panel has voted to deny appellant’s Further Motion for Rehearing of this 

Court’s June 19, 2018 Opinion on Rehearing and Judgment.

It is ordered that the further motion for rehearing is denied.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Laura C. Higley

 Acting for the Panel

Panel consists of: Justices Higley, Brown, and Caughey.

Date: August 16, 2018
Exhibit 32.3

Statement of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of
Southern California Gas Company (the "Company") certifies that:

(i)	the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission for the year ended
December 31, 2003 (the "Annual Report") fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended; and

(ii)	the information contained in the Annual Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.



February 24, 2004
                                                /S/ EDWIN A. GUILES
                                              ______________________
                                               Edwin A. Guiles
                                               Chief Executive Officer
#### SELF v. STATE.

No. 18940.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 7, 1937.

J. B. Dibrell, Jr., of Coleman, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is negligent homicide of the first degree; the punishment, a fine of $500 and confinement in jail for ninety days.

We quote the charging part of the complaint, as follows:

> “Thelbert Self was then and there engaged in the performance of a lawful act, to-wit: driving and operating an automobile upon a public highway to-wit; upon what is known as the Middle Gouldbusk road, in Coleman County, Texas, and the said Thelbert Self while so driving and operating said automobile aforesaid, there being no apparent intention to kill, did then and there by his negligence and carelessness in the operation of said automobile cause said automobile so driven and operated by him to strike and collide with an automobile occupied by Mrs. R. L. Holt on said road, thereby injuring, jarring and bruising the body of her, the said Mrs. R. L. Holt, from which injuries she, the said Mrs. R. L. Holt, then and there died; and the death of the said Mrs. R. L. Holt was then and there caused by the negligence and carelessness of the said Thelbert Self in so carelessly and negligently driving and operating said automobile so operated by him; there being then and there an apparent danger of causing the death of the said Mrs. R. L. Holt and of other persons on said highway by the said Thel-bert Self while driving as aforesaid, which danger would have been known.to the said Thelbert Self if he had used that degree of care and caution which a man of ordinary prudence would have used under like circumstances.”

The averments in the information follow those embraced in the complaint.

Appellant’s contention that the complaint and information are defective in failing to allege the facts which showed negligence and carelessness must be sustained. See Worley v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 393, 231 S. W. 391.

Article 1237, P.C., reads as follows: “Negligent homicide of the first degree shall be punished by confinement in jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.”

In the charge the court defined negligent homicide of the first degree and correctly stated the penalty. The jury returned a verdict reading as follows:

> “We the jury find the defendant guilty and assess his penalty at (90) ninety days in jail and a fine of $500 (Five) hundred dollars fine. Tom Landrum, Foreman.”

The trial court received the verdict and entered a judgment thereon condemning appellant to confinement in jail for ninety days and assessing a fine against him of $500. It has been observed that Article 1237, supra, nowhere permits the punishment to be by fine and imprisonment in jaii. Hence the verdict is void. See Thomas v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 246, 211 S.W. 453.

The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2742 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2742

To amend title 10, United States Code, to require that military working 
     dogs be retired in the United States, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 11, 2015

Mr. Paulsen (for himself and Ms. Sinema) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 10, United States Code, to require that military working 
     dogs be retired in the United States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT FOR RETIREMENT OF MILITARY WORKING DOGS IN THE 
              UNITED STATES.

    (a) In General.--Section 2583 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections 
        (g) and (h), respectively;
            (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
        subsection (f):
    ``(f) Retirement of Military Working Dogs Within the United 
States.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the retirement of a 
military working dog under this section shall occur at a location 
within the United States.
    ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the retirement of a military 
working dog abroad if a United States citizen living abroad adopts the 
dog at the time of retirement.
    ``(3) Amounts available to the military department concerned shall 
be available for the costs of the transport of military working dogs to 
the United States for retirement in accordance with the requirement in 
paragraph (1).''; and
            (3) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (1)--
                    (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by 
                striking ``the Secretary of the military department 
                concerned'' and all that follows through ``may'' and 
                inserting ``a military working dog is to be retired in 
                accordance with the requirement in subsection (f)(1) 
                and no suitable adoption is available at the military 
                facility where the dog is located at the time of 
                retirement, the Secretary of the military department 
                concerned shall''; and
                    (B) by inserting ``within the United States'' after 
                ``another location''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to 
retirements of military working dogs pursuant to section 2583 of title 
10, United States Code, that occur on or after that date.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 23, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT3

 

No. 05-40463

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROBERTO ROMERO-MONTIEL, also known as Roberto Romero,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:04-CR-1726-ALL

--------------------

Before GARZA, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Roberto Romero-Montiel appeals his conviction and sentence

under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for attempting to illegally re-enter the

United States after having been deported. Romero-Montiel argues

that the district court erred in ordering, as a condition of

supervised release, that he cooperate with the probation officer

in the collection of DNA. His claim is not ripe for judicial

review in light of our holding in United States v. Riascos-Cuenu,

428 F.3d 1100, 1102 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed
No. 05-40463

-2-

(Jan. 9, 2006) (No. 05-8662). Accordingly, we dismiss this

portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Romero-Montiel also argues that the “felony” and “aggravated

felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are unconstitutional. 

His challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United

States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Although Romero-Montiel

contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that

a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres

in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have

repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that

Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v.

Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 298 (2005). Romero-Montiel properly concedes that his

argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit

precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further

review.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.
#### TEXAS RECIPROCAL INS. ASS’N v. SMITH.

No. 12900.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

Oct. 14, 1933.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1934.

*296Weatherby & Rogers and Tom P. Scott, all of Waco, for appellant.

G-rindstaff, Zellers & Hutcheson, of Weath-erford, for appellee.

.LATTIMORE, Justice.

This is a Workmen’s Compensation Act suit, appellee claiming specific injuries to his eye while working as an employee on a producing oil lease.

He had worked at irregular intervals for the lessor during some three months at $2 a day. He contended that he was employed as a roustabout, a type of work calling for training and experience, the average wage for which'employment was set by the jury at $4.28 a day, in response to the special issue inquiring the average weekly wage of “roustabout” labor. To this issue appellant excepted because it assumed that appellee was employed by appellant as a “roustabout.” Thera was ample evidence to support such finding. However, the assistant secretary-treasurer of his employer corporation testified: “He was just an extra man. A common laborer. We paid him the same we paid other men for similar work. He did general repair work on the lease. He might be called a roustabout but still he wasn’t a roustabout in a way because we would just use him whenever we would have work on the leases.” On cross-examination: “This man can be called a common laborer. I guess you might call the work he was doing ordinarily classified as roustabout work. ■ I guess I carried him in the classification ordinarily classified as roustabout work.”

This witness was within the class “interested.” He was, however, of no higher grade than an employee, and his testimony on both sides of this issue was for the jury to determine its weight. The court could not, because of that conflict, reject a part and accept a part unless the record shows that the witness retracts that rejected part or that same is manifested by the other testimony of the witness to be conclusively untrue. Such is not the record here. The charge assumed as true a fact which the jury alone could decide.

The appellant introduced in evidence a petition in another suit by appellee for workmen’s compensation some two years before. The injuries claimed did not involve similar injuries to those sued on here. The publication of that declaration by appellant was thus proven in which appellee claimed a withered arm and total incapacity.

If on another trial the evidence should develop that one so injured could do on a •producing lease work of less compensative value than that-of a roustabout and that such injuries interfered matQrially with doing roustabout work and an issue develop as to whether appellee’s duties were those of a roustabout, then cross-examination should be permitted to determine the course' of such former injuries as bears on the doing of roustabout labor. This is one of the circumstances surrounding the employment of appel-lee by the insured as shedding light on the disputed issue of what was such employment.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.
STEAM ELECTRIC CBI REPLACEMENT PAGE

EPA

- HQ

- OW

- 200 9-0 819

DCN:___ SE00413

__ __________________________

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REMOVED BECAUSE IT
CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS I NFORMATION (CBI) PER 40 CFR PART 2, SUBPART B.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7171

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ERIC DELANO SANDERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge. (CR-95-

454-MJG, CA-96-3655-MJG)

Submitted: November 6, 1997 Decided: November 25, 1997

Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eric Delano Sanders, Appellant Pro Se. Lynne Ann Battaglia, United

States Attorney, Martin Joseph Clarke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Sanders, Nos. CR-95-454-MJG; CA-96-3655-MJG

(D. Md. July 28, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED