PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CINDY ROE, Plaintiff - Appellant.

v. FCA US LLC, f/k/a Ch rysler Group LLC, f/k/a Chrysler LLC, f/k/a Daimler Chrysler, Defendant - Appellee. No. 21-6073

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (D.C. No. 5:19-CV-00167-SLP)

________________ _________________ Rosalind B. Bienvenu, Durham, Pittard & Spal ding, LLP, Santa Fe, New Mexico (Caren I. Friedman and Justin R. Kaufman, Durham , Pittard & Spalding, LLP, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and David T. Bright, Si co Hoelscher Harris, Corpus Christi, Texas, with her on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant. Ryan C. Bueche, Germer Beaman, & Brown, PLLC, Austin, Texas (Robert G. Sonnier, Germer Beaman & Brown, PLLC , Austin, Texas, and Heathe r L. Hintz and Thomas G. Wolfe, Phillips Murrah, P.C., Oklahoma City , Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , EBEL , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ EBEL , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 2, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 12 Plaintiff-Appellant Cindy Roe suffered se rious injuries after her Jeep Grand Cherokee unexpectedly backed over her. Af ter the accident, she filed a lawsuit in federal district court against the manufact urer of her vehicle, FCA US (“FCA”), alleging that the shifter assembly in her ve hicle had been defectively designed in that it could be perched into a “f alse-park” position where the vehicle appears to be in park, but is actually in an unstable position that can slip into reverse. Roe further alleged that this defect caused her inju ries. To demonstrate this theory, she designated two experts, Steven Meyer and Peter Sullivan. After testing and analysis of the subject vehicle, the experts concluded that the ve hicle was in this defective false-park position when Roe exited the vehi cle, and the vehicle then slipped into reverse and backed over he r, causing her injuries. FCA moved to exclude Roe’s experts as unreliable on the issue of causation, among other objections. FCA additionally moved for summary judgement because Roe could not create a material issue of fact on the esse ntial element of causation without her experts’ testimony. The distri ct court agreed with FCA, excluded the experts, and granted summary judgment for FCA. Notably, the district court found that the experts’ theory on causation wa s unreliable because they failed to demonstrate that the shifter c ould remain in false park fo r sufficient time for Roe to move behind the vehicle and then slip into reverse without manu al assistance. Roe now appeals, arguing that the district cour t abused its discreti on in excluding Meyer and Sullivan’s testimony. Exercising ju risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
AFFIRM. Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 23 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Accident On February 26, 2017, Roe was driv ing her 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee on a rural property near Cushing, Oklahoma. Af ter driving through a gate on the property, she stopped and exited the car to close the gate behind the rear of the car. Tragically, her Jeep suddenly moved backwards and rolle d over her. Roe was eventually found by the vehicle near the gate having suffere d severe injuries including a traumatic brain injury. Roe filed suit in federal district cour t against FCA, the manufacturer of her vehicle, for product liability, ne gligence, and failure to warn , alleging that her vehicle “improperly and unexpectedly jumped into reverse on its own after she had shifted it into park and exited the vehicle, runni ng over her and causing traumatic and permanent injuries.” Aplt. A pp. at 12. Roe claimed that the shifter assembly of the subject vehicle was defectively designed in that it could be shifted into a “false-park” position where the shifter appear s to be in park, but is act ually in an unstable position where the shifter can self-enga ge into reverse. Roe a lleged this defective position allowed her Jeep to slip into re verse and caused her injuries.
B. Roe’s Experts To support her theory, Roe designated two experts, Steven Meyer and Peter Sullivan to testify as to “au tomotive defects, engineer ing issues, the automotive components involved and their functioning; the ‘false park’, ‘par k to reverse’, or ‘powered rollaway’ defect, the history of th is defect in Chrysler and other vehicles, Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 34 and other similar incidents; applicable regulations, industr y standards, and investigations; investigation and testing; and the causes of Cindy Roe’s injuries.” Id.
at 67.
i. Steven Meyer Steven Meyer is a mechanical engin eer specializing in vehicular accident reconstruction; mechanical and structural failure anal ysis; and system design, analysis, and testing. In his report, Me yer surmised two potential hypotheses for how the accident could have occurred: 1) Roe sh ifted the vehicle into a false-park position before exiting and moving behind the vehicl e when it then slipped into reverse and backed over her, and 2) Roe shifted the vehicle into reverse before exiting and moving behind the vehicle when it backed ove r her. After testi ng on Roe’s Jeep, an exemplar 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee, and an exemplar shifter, Meyer determined that the second scenario was impo ssible and that the first scenario had a reasonable scientific probability of being correct. First, Meyer inspected and tested the s ubject vehicle on a flat concrete surface at his company’s facility. In inspecting and testing the g ear shifter assembly, Meyer was able to “easily” manipulat e the shifter lever to achiev e the “perched” false-park condition. Id. at 120. He then performed te sting on two scenarios. In the first, he shifted the vehicle from drive to reverse. After releasing th e brake pedal, “the vehicle immediately began to move/acce lerate” on the flat concrete surface. Id. In the second scenario, Meyer manually perched the vehicle in the false-park position. The “shifter was then nudged rear ward, resulting in the transmi ssion to engage the reverse Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 45 gear. Once the shifter was nudged rearwa rd, the vehicle began to move rearward after a slight hesitation.” Id. at 120–21. Meyer then recorded the amount of force necessary to move the shift lever from th e false-park position to reverse, which ranged between 13 and 26 newtons. 1 Next, Meyer performed the same evalua tion and testing a second time with an exemplar vehicle at the accide nt scene and repeated it a th ird time at his facility. He noted that the “[v]ehicle response was sim ilar with little to no difference due to the ground condition or terrain.” Id. at 123. He also noted that “by leaving the vehicle in reverse, the driver could not exit the vehicle as the ve hicle moved too fast for the driver to get out of the way of the movi ng open door,” effectively ruling out his second hypothesis. Id. at 126. He did not state in his report whet her he achieved test results indicating there was sufficient time to ex it the vehicle when the shifter was left perched in false park. At Meyer’s deposition, he estimated that it would take at le ast seven to eight seconds to exit the Jeep and wa lk behind it. While he refe renced several instances of the vehicles slipping on their own from false park to reverse, he could not recall if the shifter ever slipped into reverse after staying perched for precisely seven to eight seconds. Meyer could recall one test where the vehicle st ayed perched in the false1 A newton is the “absolute unit of force in the Internationa l System of Units (SI units), abbreviated N. It is defined as that force n ecessary to provide a mass of one kilogram with an acceleration of one metre per second per second.” Encyclopedia Britannica, newton unit of measurement, https://www.britannica.com/scien ce/newton-unit-of-measurement. Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 56 park position for over four mi nutes, but in this test, he manually nudged the shifter into reverse from false park. Meyer a dditionally discussed a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) invest igation into a “park-to-reverse” defect in Jeep Grand Cherokees. 2 Meyer concluded in his rec onstruction of the accident th at a flat spot between park and reverse in the shif ter assembly is a design de fect that allowed Roe to unknowingly perch the subject vehicle in fals e park instead of park. Meyer surmised that when she exited the vehicle and moved behind it, the shifte r lever slipped into reverse and the vehicle backed over her. Meyer also concluded that FCA could have feasibly installed an out-of-park alarm that would have warned Roe and others of this unsafe condition.
ii. Peter Sullivan Roe’s other expert was Peter Sullivan. Sullivan is an auto motive specialist and master service technician w ith specialized experience as a motor vehicle systems performance analyst. Sullivan has evaluated and written on shift systems throughout his career, including numerous pa rk-to-reverse incidents. Sullivan created an exemplar demonstrative aid of the subject vehicle shifter and transmission, on which he was able to achieve the false-park position. Sullivan relied in large part on Meyer’s investigation and testing as to the ability to achieve

2 The parties argue about the relevance of this report. FCA claims that it is irrelevant because the vehicl es in the report use a differ ent transmission. While Roe agrees in her Reply Brief that they are not the same, she argues that they function “largely the same.” R. Br. at 5. Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 67 false park and the timing of the vehicle’s backward movement when the vehicle is placed in reverse versus when the vehicle s lips into reverse from fa lse park. He also discussed five forces that may cause the shift lever to move from false park to reverse. These included: [1] [S]light vibrations, [2] moveme nts, [3] impacts, or [4] weight transfers (such as a passenger openi ng or closing a door upon exiting the vehicle or opening or closing the rear lift/tail gate, or engine vibration, A/C compressor engageme nt, etc.), or [5] the gradual filling of the transmission coupling , [s ic] ‘accumulator’, with transmission fluid as a result of fluid bypass through a partially open manual valve. Id. at 206–207. Sullivan also relie d on the NHTSA report on Jeep Grand Cherokees. Like Meyer, Sullivan concluded that Roe le ft her Jeep in a de fective false park rather than reverse when sh e exited the vehicle. He as serted that th e Jeep then suddenly and without warning self-engaged in to reverse, resulting in her injuries. Sullivan also opined that an out-of-park alarm could have been implemented to provide a warning.
C. The district court’s decision After the expert reports and depositi ons had been submitted, FCA filed a motion under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar maceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), to exclude the two experts and also for summa ry judgment. FCA contended that Meyer and Sullivan were both unqualified to testif y as to a design defe ct in the shifter assembly, to opine as to the underlying accide nt, and to testify as to an out-of-park Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 78 alarm. Further, FCA contended that the methods used by both experts to conclude the alleged defect caused the ac cident were unreliable. The district court granted the motion to exclude both experts and entered summary judgment for FCA. While the district court found that Meyer was qualified to opine as to the events of the accident and causation, he lacked the expertise to be qualified to testify as to a design defect in a shifter assembly. The court did find, however, that Sullivan was qualif ied as to the defective desi gn of the shifter assembly and to opine on the events of the accident . The court found both experts to be unqualified and unreliable to testify as to the effectiveness of out-of-park alarms. As to causation, the court found that both experts used unr eliable methods due to an analytical gap in their theory about how the defective design caused the plaintiff’s injury. Specifically, the court found that they had not sufficiently shown that the shifter could self-engage into reverse from the false-park position after enough time for Roe to exit the vehicle and move behind it. Further, the court found that the experts had not shown or explained that the forces that might cause the lever to slip into reverse were present in th e subject vehicle. Based upon its rulings on FCA’s Daubert motion, the district cour t also granted FCA’s motion for summary judgment because Roe failed “to show a genuine dispute over whether the alleged defects (the Jeep’s self-shift into reverse and/or lack of an out-of-park alarm) caused Plaintiff’s injuries.” 3 Id. at 1283–85.

3 Under Oklahoma law, a product liability claim requires a plaintiff to prove Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 89 Roe now appeals, challenging the exclus ion of her experts and the resulting summary judgment order. She raises three issues, arguing th at the district court erred in 1) excluding Meyer and Sullivan’s testimon y as unreliable due to analytical gaps in their theory of causation, 2) determining that Meyer wa s not qualified to testify on the defective design of the subject vehicle’s shifter assembly, and 3) determining that Meyer and Sullivan were not qua lified or reliable to testif y on the installation of an out-of-park alarm. The partie s agree that if Roe’s expe rts were properly excluded, summary judgment must be granted in FCA’s favor.
DISCUSSION
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Meyer and Sullivan’s testimony Roe contends that the dist rict court abused its disc retion in finding her experts unreliable on causation. Importantly, “[w]e re view the district court’s application of Daubert to exclude expert testimony for a buse of discretion.” Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2004). And we review de novo whether the district court applied the proper legal standard under Daubert. Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000). The district court is afforded s ubstantial deference in its ap plication of Daubert, and we will only disturb the district court’s decision if we have “a definite and firm

that the alleged defect: (1) cau sed the injury in question, (2 ) existed at the time it left the manufacturer’s control, and (3) made the product unreasonably dangerous. Braswell v. Cincinnati Inc. , 731 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974)). Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 910 conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circ umstances.” Truck Ins. Exch., 360 F.3d at 1210 (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1986)). We conclude that the distri ct court did not abuse its br oad and substantial discretion in excluding this testimony as unreliable because the experts left an analytical gap in their theory of causation by failing to show a reasonable probability that there was sufficient time for Roe to get behind the vehi cle after placing it into false park before it would slip into reverse w ithout further human nudging. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, th e district court has an important gatekeeping function with regard to the admi ssibility of expert opini ons to ensure that all evidence is both relevant and reliable. S ee generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. In order to determine whether Meyer and Sulli van’s expert opinions were admissible, the district court had to undergo a two-step an alysis. First, the c ourt had to determine whether the experts were qualified by “kno wledge, skill, experi ence, training, or education” to render an opinion. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Second , if they were so qualified, the court had to de termine whether their opinions were “reliable” under the principles set forth under Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The reliability inquiry asks whether the methodology employed by an expert is va lid—that is, whether it is based on sufficient data, sound methods , and the facts of the case . See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. The inquiry does not typically que stion “the quality of the data used in applying the methodology or the conclusions produced.” In re Urethane Antitrust Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 1011 Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir. 2014). Ho wever, “nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a dist rict court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the e xpert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). The district court here found the experts’ testimony unreliable due to such an analytical gap in the expert s’ theory because the expert s had not demonstrated in their testing that a shifter c ould self-engage from false park to reverse after the seven to eight seconds needed for Roe to exit and move behind the vehicle. 4 Aplt. App. at 1272. Meyer’s report only referenced in stances in testing where he manually shifted the car from false pa rk to reverse and measured the force needed, and his deposition indicated that he c ould not remember if he had a result where the shifter self-engaged into reverse after the requi site time. While Sullivan listed some potential forces that could cause a shifter to slip from fals e park into reverse (slight vibrations, movements, impacts, or weight transfers, et c.), the experts did not address which, if any, of these may have been pres ent in the subject vehi cle or whether these

4 The district court found it unclear wh ether the experts had shown that the shifter could slip on its own at all. Aplt. App. at 1272. There ar e several instances in Meyer’s deposition where he refers to th e shifter slipping on its own without a manual nudge. See, e.g., Aplt. App. at 10 28 (“In some cases I perch it, I know its perched, and I go to let go, and by the tim e I move my hand out of the way, it’s moving already.”). But that scenario as sumes an almost immediate shifting into reverse after the driver lifted his or her hand from the level. By Roe’s own admission, that is not what happened here. Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 1112 forces were capable of generating the num ber of Newtons in the proper direction needed to cause the shifter to self-slip into reverse. Roe argues that the district court abus ed its discretion for essentially two reasons. First, Roe believes no such analytic al gap exists because the experts did in fact demonstrate test results showing that the lever could slip into reverse after sufficient time. Second, Roe believes the district court imperm issibly required the experts to test their theory. We disagree as to both reasons. Roe argues that no such analytical gaps ex ist in her experts’ theory as they did in fact show that a shifter could slip in to reverse from false park without a manual nudge after sufficient time. This is simp ly not supported by the record before us. Meyer does not mention any such results in his report. At his deposition, Meyer admitted that he could not recall a result of the shifter self-slippi ng into reverse after more than seven to eight seconds; inst ead, he merely stat ed that the video documenting his tests could be used to determ ine exact times. The video is not in the record before us, but Roe does cite a document purporting to summarize the video that was attached as an exhibit to her re ply brief below. However, a document that was not provided in Meyer’s report or referenced in his deposition, and which summarizes a video that is not in the r ecord, does not provide a basis for us to conclude that the district court erred in finding that these results did not actually occur. Indeed, it is unclear who created this document or if it accurately describes the video. Roe points to one reference in Meyer’s deposition to a result where the shifter remained perched in fa lse park for four minutes, but Meyer admitted that this Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 1213 four-minute result ended with a manual nudge into reverse, rather than the shifter slipping on its own. Aplt. App. at 1028. Lastly, Roe points to Sullivan’s report, which states that Meyer’s tests “result[ed] in various effects, including several instances where the tr ansmission would remain unperturbed in a ‘False Park’ for an extended period of time before eventua lly slipping into Re verse and accelerating rearwards.” Id. at 584 (cit ing Aplt. App. at 178). Bu t Meyer’s report and deposition does not support Sullivan’s statement. Thus , the district court’ s conclusion that the experts failed to document any test results showing a shifter could self-slip into reverse after being perched for longer than seven to eight seconds is supported by the record. 5
Roe’s next contention is that the distri ct court applied the wrong legal standard under Daubert by requiring tes ting. Aplt. Br. at 34 (citi ng Werth v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643, 653 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting as an improper standard an “erroneous, per se rule requiring indepe ndent testing” as “a precondition to the expert testimony”). FCA argues that the district court was fr ee to require testing because we have held previously that it is acceptable for the dist rict court to place a heavy emphasis on testing when the experts “rel[y] on novel theori es” and “the basis for [their] opinion is subj ect to debate.” Heer v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 589 F. App’x 854, 862 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpub lished) (citing Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2004)). Bitler specifically defined “novel

5 Indeed, Roe’s counsel at oral argument, contrary to briefing, conceded that Meyer had failed to demonstrate this timin g in testing. (Oral Arg. (5:24–6:24)). Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 1314 theories” as theories “that modif[y] othe rwise well-established knowledge about [a] regularly occurring phenomenon.” Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1235–36. But the theory proposed by the experts here does not m odify well-established knowledge and seems to depend largely on well-establ ished principles of physics. Thus, a requirement of independent testing could not be upheld on this basis. However, the district court did not re ly on Bitler for such a proposition or claim that testing was required because the experts presented a novel theory. Instead, the district court excluded their testimony because the experts had a self-contained analytical gap in their theo ry, relying almost entirely on testing to support their theory and yet failing to show that they actually found th at a shifter in false park could slip into reverse on its own after be ing perched for sufficient time for someone to exit the vehicle and move behind it. Aplt. App. 1271–1273. While Meyer measured the force necessary for the shifter to slip to reverse and Sullivan noted several potential forces that c ould have nudged the shifter, th ey failed to specify that the hypothetical forces could actually exer t the requisite number of newtons in the proper direction to cause the sh ifter to engage into reverse or that such forces were present in Roe’s car at the time of the accident. Without this testing or additional explanation, it is totally uns upported why the experts belie ve the shifter could shift on its own into reverse after remaining in false park for sufficient time. Roe argues that making any specific de monstration as to the timing or the exact forces was not required because he r experts used a reasoning-to-the-bestinference approach where they had two pot ential hypotheses as to the cause of the Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 1415 accident and successfully eliminated one of them. See Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1236–37 (permitting experts to engage in a process-of-elimination a pproach to the cause of an injury). Meyer did indicate that his test ing had ruled out that Roe had placed the vehicle directly into revers e because the test vehicles moved too quickly once the brake pedal was released into reverse. Ap lt. App. at 126. But Bitler requires more for this approach than mere ly eliminating one of the two hypotheses postulated by the expert: “more than mere possibility, an infere nce to the best explanation for the cause of an accident must eliminat e other possible sources as highly improbable, and must demonstrate that the cause identified is highly probable.” Bi tler, 400 F.3d at1238 (emphasis added). To demons trate this, “there must be some independent evidence that the cause identified is of the type that could have b een the cause.” Id. at 1237. Because the experts here failed to use any additional testing of their own or by others or other independent evidence to dem onstrate that the shifte r could remain in a false-park position and slip on its own into re verse after sufficient lag in time, they have not demonstrated that their sec ond hypothesis was even possible—let alone highly probable. Indeed, the reliability of Roe’s experts seems questionable when the experts would rule out one hyp othesis (e.g., that Roe hersel f placed the vehicle into reverse before exiting the vehicle) as unviab le based on infeasibility in testing, but adopt the only other hypothesis they sele cted without using the same testing procedures to demonstrate that the other hy pothesis is viable a nd indeed was “highly probable.” Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 1516 Roe’s experts did not put on any evid ence even that Su llivan’s list of hypothetical forces in the vehicle could pr oduce the requisite number of newtons of force in the proper direction needed to cause th e shifter to slip into reverse as documented by Meyer or that such forces we re highly likely to have been present in Roe’s vehicle at the time of this event. See Hoffman v. Ford Motor Co., 493 F. App’x 962, 976 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublishe d) (excluding an expert who never showed that the force necessary to trigger a defect se atbelt was present in the subject vehicle). As a result, the district court did not abuse its broad discre tion in excluding the experts’ testimony on cau sation as unreliable.
B. It is unnecessary to resolve th e remaining issues on appeal. Roe raises two additional issues. Because these issues do not affect the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of FCA, we need not address them here. 6 Roe argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding Meyer unqualified to testify regarding defectiv e design. However, summary judgment below did not rely on this holding because the district court found Sullivan was qualified to testify as to defective design. Roe also argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that Meyer and Sullivan were not qualified or reliable to testify on the inst allation of an out-of-park alar m. The feasibility of an out-of-park alarm is an issue of curing the potential defect that likewise need not be

6 We also decline to consider FCA’ s alternative grounds to support the exclusion of the experts. Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 1617 addressed when there is no evidence supporti ng that the asserted defect could cause the accident in the first place. Even if we were to agr ee with Roe on these issues, we would still have to affirm summary judgm ent in favor of FCA because Roe has no evidence to create a triable issue of fact on whether the potential defect caused her injury.
CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the di strict court’s grant of FCA’s motion for summary judgment. Appellate Case: 21-6073 Document: 010110719063 Date Filed: 08/02/2022 Page: 17