Maryland Insurance Administration v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 

et al., No. 41, September Term, 2016 

MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE – PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 

COVERAGE – OWNED BUT UNINSURED EXCLUSION – MARYLAND CODE 

ANN., INS. (1997, 2011 REPL. VOL., 2016 SUPP.) § 19-505 – Court of Appeals held 

that insurer of personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy, which includes personal 

injury protection (“PIP”) coverage, is not responsible, as result of application of personal 

motor vehicle liability insurance policy’s owned but not insured exclusion, for PIP 

coverage for injuries insured sustained while driving taxicab owned by insured but not 

covered by personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy. In reaching conclusion, Court 

of Appeals determined that: (1) taxicab is “motor vehicle” for purposes of statutory 

exclusion from PIP coverage set forth in Md. Code Ann., Ins. (1997, 2011 Repl. Vol., 2016 

Supp.) (“IN”) § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and for payment of benefits under IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i); 

(2) “uninsured motor vehicle” under IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured for PIP 

coverage, such that motor vehicle, including taxicab, that is not insured for PIP coverage 

is “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii); and (3) exclusion in 

personal motor vehicle insurance policy in this case is authorized by statutory exclusion 

from PIP coverage set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii), owned but uninsured exclusion. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 41 

September Term, 2016 

______________________________________ 

MARYLAND INSURANCE 

ADMINISTRATION 

v. 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. 

______________________________________ 

Barbera, C.J. 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts 

Hotten

Getty, 

JJ.

______________________________________ 

Opinion by Watts, J. 

Barbera, C.J., Greene and McDonald, JJ., 

dissent 

______________________________________ 

Filed: January 23, 2017 

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-C-14-000883

Argued: December 5, 2016 
This case requires the Court to determine whether an insured may receive personal 

injury protection (“PIP”) coverage, under a personal motor vehicle liability insurance 

policy held by the insured, for injuries sustained while driving a taxicab owned by the 

insured but not covered by the personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy, where the 

personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy contains an exclusion for motor vehicles 

owned but not insured under the policy. Under Maryland law, generally, insurers are 

required to provide drivers with liability, PIP, and uninsured/underinsured motorist 

(“UM/UIM”) coverage. See Md. Code Ann., Ins. (1997, 2011 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.) 

(“IN”) §§ 19-504, 19-505, 19-509; Md. Code Ann., Transp. (1977, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 

Supp.) (“TR”) § 17-103. And, where a motor vehicle insurance policy contains PIP 

coverage and UM/UIM coverage, an insurer is required to provide PIP coverage to an 

insured or an insured’s resident family member who is injured in a motor vehicle accident 

“while occupying a motor vehicle for which the coverages described in [IN] §§ 19-505 

[(PIP coverage)] and 19-509 [(UM/UIM coverage)] are not in effect[.]” IN § 19-

513(d)(1)(i). The definition of a “motor vehicle” set forth in IN § 19-501(b)(2)(ii), 

however, expressly excludes taxicabs as “motor vehicles” for purposes of Subtitle 5 of 

Title 19 of the Insurance Article; thus, IN § 19-505(a) does not require insurers to offer PIP 

coverage in policies insuring taxicabs. 

This case raises the overall issue of whether an insurer of a personal motor vehicle 

liability insurance policy, which includes PIP coverage, is responsible for PIP coverage for 

injuries that an insured sustained while driving a taxicab owned by the insured but not 

covered by the personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy, or whether the personal 
- 2 - 

motor vehicle liability insurance policy’s owned but not insured exclusion applies, such 

that the insurer is not responsible for PIP coverage under those circumstances. To answer 

that overarching question, this Court must determine three very specific issues: (1) whether 

a taxicab is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the statutory exclusion from PIP coverage 

under IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and for the payment of benefits under IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i); (2) 

whether “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured 

altogether, uninsured for PIP coverage, or not insured under the relevant motor vehicle 

liability insurance policy; and (3) whether the exclusion in the personal motor vehicle 

liability insurance policy in this case—which excluded coverage, in pertinent part, for the 

insured “while occupying a motor vehicle owned by [the insured] . . . and which is not 

insured under the liability coverage of this policy” (capitalization omitted)—is authorized 

by the statutory exclusion from PIP coverage set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii), the “owned 

but uninsured” exclusion. 

As to the primary question presented in this case, we hold that an insurer of a 

personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy, which includes PIP coverage, is not 

responsible, as a result of the application of the personal motor vehicle liability insurance 

policy’s owned but not insured exclusion, for PIP coverage for injuries the insured 

sustained while driving a taxicab owned by the insured but not covered by the personal 

motor vehicle liability insurance policy. As to the more specific underlying issues, we 

conclude that: (1) a taxicab is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the owned but uninsured 

exclusion from PIP coverage set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and for the payment of 

benefits under IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i); (2) “uninsured motor vehicle” under IN § 19-
- 3 - 

505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured for PIP coverage, such that a motor vehicle, including a 

taxicab, that is not insured for PIP coverage is an “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes 

of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii); and (3) the exclusion in the personal motor vehicle insurance 

policy in this case is authorized by the owned but uninsured exclusion from PIP coverage 

set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Special Appeals. 

BACKGROUND 

 On November 14, 2011, Alhassan Bundu-Conteh (“Bundu-Conteh”), Respondent, 

was rear-ended by a motor vehicle while driving his taxicab. Bundu-Conteh sustained 

personal injuries. At the time of the accident, Bundu-Conteh owned two vehicles: a 1997 

Jeep Grand Cherokee (“the Jeep”) and a 2006 Ford Crown Victoria taxicab (“the taxicab”). 

The Jeep was insured under a liability and no-fault policy with State Farm Mutual 

Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), Respondent, which included PIP 

coverage. The taxicab was insured by Amalgamated Insurance Company 

(“Amalgamated”) and carried liability-only coverage, which does not include PIP 

coverage.

1

Following the accident, Bundu-Conteh submitted a PIP claim to State Farm for the 

injuries that he sustained. State Farm denied Bundu-Conteh’s PIP claim, relying on the 

 

1As discussed in more detail below, under Maryland law, taxicabs are not required 

to carry PIP or UM/UIM coverage. See Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., Inc., 

305 Md. 807, 813, 506 A.2d 641, 644 (1986) (“[T]here was no facial inconsistency between 

the stated purpose ‘of exempting certain vehicles . . . from certain required primary 

coverage insurance provisions’ and the effect of excluding taxicabs from PIP and UM 

coverage.”). 
- 4 - 

following exclusion (“the third exclusion”) for no-fault coverage: 

Exclusions

THERE IS NO COVERAGE:

* * * 

3. FOR YOU OR ANY RESIDENT RELATIVE WHILE OCCUPYING A 

MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU OR ANY RESIDENT RELATIVE 

AND WHICH IS NOT INSURED UNDER THE LIABILITY COVERAGE 

OF THIS POLICY[.] 

Bundu-Conteh subsequently filed a complaint with the Maryland Insurance Administration 

(“the MIA”), Petitioner. In the complaint, Bundu-Conteh contended that the third 

exclusion was inapplicable to him because, at the time of the accident, he was driving a 

taxicab, which IN § 19-501(b)(2)(ii) excludes from the definition of “motor vehicle.”2 

Alternatively, Bundu-Conteh argued that, even if the taxicab were categorized as a “motor 

vehicle,” the third exclusion in the State Farm policy is incompatible with well-settled 

Maryland law. 

 

2

IN § 19-501(b) provides: 

(1) “Motor vehicle” means a vehicle, including a trailer, that is 

operated or designed for operation on a public road by any power other than 

animal or muscular power. 

(2) “Motor vehicle” does not include:

(i) a bus as defined in [TR] § 11-105 []; or

(ii) a taxicab as defined in [TR] § 11-165 []. 
- 5 - 

On December 27, 2012, after completing its review of the case, the MIA concluded 

that State Farm’s denial of Bundu-Conteh’s PIP claim violated IN §§ 4-113,3 19-505,4 19-

513,5

 and 27-303.6 Specifically, the MIA determined that, pursuant to IN § 19-513(d), 

 

3

IN § 4-113(b)(5) provides: 

(b) Discretionary grounds. – The Commissioner may deny a certificate of 

authority to an applicant or, subject to the hearing provisions of Title 2 of 

this article, refuse to renew, suspend, or revoke a certificate of authority if 

the applicant or holder of the certificate of authority: . . . (5) refuses or delays 

payment of amounts due claimants without just cause[.] 

(Paragraph break omitted). 

4The “owned but uninsured” exclusion under IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) provides: 

(1) An insurer may exclude from the coverage described in this section 

benefits for: 

. . . 

(ii) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who 

resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs 

while the named insured or family member is occupying an uninsured 

motor vehicle owned by: 

1. the named insured; or 

2. an immediate family member of the named insured who 

resides in the named insured’s household.

5

IN § 19-513 provides, in relevant part: 

(d) Payment of benefits – Coverage under subtitle not in effect. – (1) The 

insurer under a policy that contains the coverages described in §§ 19-505 and 

19-509 of this subtitle shall pay the benefits described in §§ 19-505 and 19-

509 to an individual insured under the policy who is injured in a motor 

vehicle accident: 

(i) while occupying a motor vehicle for which the coverages 

described in §§ 19-505 and 19-509 of this subtitle are not in effect; or 

(ii) by a motor vehicle for which the coverages described in §§ 

19-505 and 19-509 of this subtitle are not in effect as a pedestrian, 

while in, on, or alighting from a vehicle powered by animal or 

muscular power, or while on or alighting from an animal. 

6

IN § 27-303(2) provides: 
- 6 - 

State Farm is obligated to provide PIP benefits to its insured policy holders who are injured 

in a motor vehicle accident, subject to limited exclusions. According to the MIA, the third 

exclusion in State Farm’s policy is incompatible with the exclusions under IN § 19-505(c)

and thus constitutes “an arbitrary and capricious denial of a claim without just cause[.]” 

On January 25, 2013, State Farm appealed the MIA’s determination and requested 

a hearing. Specifically, State Farm contended that the third exclusion fell squarely within 

the “owned but uninsured” exclusion under IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and, thus, was 

permissible. According to State Farm, the taxicab was “uninsured” for the purposes of IN 

§ 19-505(c)(1)(ii) because it was not insured under the State Farm policy. Both State Farm 

and the MIA, on Bundu-Conteh’s behalf, filed with the Maryland Insurance Commissioner 

(“the Commissioner”) cross-motions for summary decision. On August 15, 2013, the 

Commissioner held a hearing on the cross-motions for summary decision. On January 24, 

2014, the Commissioner issued a Memorandum and Final Order, concluding that State 

Farm’s denial of coverage to Bundu-Conteh violated IN §§ 19-505 and 19-513. The 

Commissioner determined that the third exclusion is not a permissible exclusion under IN 

§ 19-505(c). Specifically, the Commissioner determined that, under the plain language of 

 

It is an unfair claim settlement practice and a violation of this subtitle for an 

insurer, nonprofit health service plan, or health maintenance organization to: 

. . . (2) refuse to pay a claim for an arbitrary or capricious reason based on all 

available information[.]

(Paragraph break omitted). 
- 7 - 

IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii), the meaning of “uninsured motor vehicle” is “a motor vehicle 

without insurance.” Thus, the Commissioner concluded that to interpret IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii) as excluding coverage for individuals like Bundu-Conteh, who carried PIP 

coverage on their vehicles and were not injured while in an “uninsured” vehicle, “would 

be contrary to the remedial legislative purpose of assuring compensation for damages to 

victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to fault.” The Commissioner, therefore, 

granted the MIA’s motion for summary decision and ordered State Farm to pay BunduConteh’s PIP claim arising from the accident plus 1.5% interest for each intervening month 

starting 30 days after Bundu-Conteh first submitted his PIP claim. 

 On February 20, 2014, State Farm filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (“the 

circuit court”) a petition for judicial review. On January 9, 2015, the circuit court issued a 

Memorandum and Order reversing the Commissioner’s Final Order. On January 29, 2015, 

the MIA noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion dated 

March 15, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 

State Farm subsequently requested that the Court of Special Appeals report the opinion. 

On June 1, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals reported the opinion. See Md. Ins. Admin. 

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 228 Md. App. 126, 137 A.3d 310 (2016). The MIA 

thereafter filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on 

September 2, 2016. See Md. Ins. Admin. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 450 Md. 102, 146 

A.3d 463 (2016).
- 8 - 

DISCUSSION 

The Parties’ Contentions 

 The MIA contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred by not affording 

deference to the Commissioner’s interpretation of IN § 19-505. According to the MIA, the 

Commissioner correctly determined that, at the time of the accident, Bundu-Conteh was 

not driving an “uninsured motor vehicle” and, thus, the exclusion under IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii) does not apply. Indeed, the MIA argues that the taxicab was neither a “motor 

vehicle” nor “uninsured.” Furthermore, the MIA asserts that the third exclusion of State 

Farm’s policy is not authorized by IN § 19-505(c), and thus is invalid. 

 State Farm responds that the Commissioner’s interpretation of “uninsured” for 

purposes of IN § 19-505 was erroneous. Specifically, State Farm argues that wellestablished Maryland law requires that the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” be 

interpreted contextually, and, in this context, “uninsured motor vehicle” refers to vehicles 

without PIP coverage. Thus, State Farm asserts that Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab was, by 

definition, an uninsured motor vehicle at the time of the accident. 

State Farm further contends that the Commissioner’s interpretation of the taxicab as 

“insured” for the purposes of IN § 19-505 provides a windfall for individuals like BunduConteh, who, theoretically, could carry PIP coverage on only one vehicle, purchase 

multiple other vehicles, insure them at the bare minimum level of coverage, and 

subsequently rely on the single PIP policy to cover all of the vehicles. State Farm also 

argues that the Commissioner misapplied relevant Maryland case law. Specifically, State 

Farm argues that the Commissioner erroneously relied on Nasseri v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 
- 9 - 

390 Md. 188, 888 A.2d 284 (2005), which, according to State Farm, is distinguishable from 

the instant case, as it did not contemplate the owned but uninsured exclusion under IN § 

19-505(c)(1)(ii). 

In reply, the MIA contends that the Commissioner’s plain language interpretation 

of “uninsured motor vehicle” is consistent with the underlying legislative intent underlying 

the no-fault provisions of the Insurance Article. The MIA argues that the General 

Assembly enacted the owned but uninsured exclusion to specifically address “uninsured” 

vehicles— i.e. vehicles entirely lacking insurance—not those lacking only PIP coverage. 

Additionally, the MIA asserts that the statutes in the Insurance Article are remedial, and 

should be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Furthermore, the MIA maintains that 

the Commissioner’s interpretation of IN § 19-505 would not provide insured motorists like 

Bundu-Conteh with a windfall, but, in the event that it did, this would be an issue for the 

General Assembly to resolve. 

Standard of Review

In Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005), 

this Court stated: 

A court’s role in reviewing an administrative agency adjudicatory decision 

is narrow; it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the 

record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to 

determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous 

conclusion of law. 

 

(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Charles Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 295, 855 A.2d 313, 319 (2004) (“When an agency makes 

‘conclusions of law’ in a contested case, the [Administrative Procedure Act] permits the 
- 10 - 

court, on judicial review, to decide the correctness of the agency’s conclusions and to 

substitute the court’s judgment for that of the agency’s.” (Citations omitted)). 

Furthermore, “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute 

which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing 

courts.” Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 

(1999) (citations omitted). “However, if we determine that the agency’s decision is based 

on an erroneous conclusion of law, no deference is given to those conclusions.” Kenwood 

Gardens Condos., Inc. v. Whalen Props., LLC, 449 Md. 313, 325, 144 A.3d 647, 655 

(2016). 

In addition, because the issue in this case involves statutory interpretation, we set 

forth the pertinent rules of statutory construction: 

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intent of the General Assembly. 

As this Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look 

first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. 

We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have 

meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is 

clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the 

General Assembly’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according 

to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and 

express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. In 

addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute 

to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assembly 

used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or 

limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, either 

inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry 

as to legislative intent ends. 

If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not 

only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect 

in light of the setting, the objectives, and the purpose of the enactment under 
- 11 - 

consideration. We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when 

there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. 

When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court 

is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the 

resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal.

If the true legislative intent cannot be readily determined from the statutory 

language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized 

indicia—among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; 

how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the 

derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by 

authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments 

proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the 

relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.

In construing a statute, we avoid a construction of the statute that is 

unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. 

In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context 

in which is appears. As this Court has stated, because it is part of the context, 

related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental 

issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only 

are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the 

context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part.

Bottini v. Dep’t of Fin., 450 Md. 177, 187-89, 147 A.3d 371, 378 (2016) (citation omitted). 

Relevant Law

 In 1972, the General Assembly required PIP coverage as part of a larger statutory 

scheme that introduced no-fault coverage to the Maryland insurance marketplace and 

created the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (“the MAIF”) to expand access to motor 

vehicle insurance. See 1972 Md. Laws 281-82 (Ch. 73, H.B. 444). This Court has 

remarked that “[t]he requirement of [PIP] coverage was a major innovation in 1972; it 

represented the State’s limited endorsement of the concept of no-fault automobile 

insurance, then being widely touted as the answer to perceived flaws in our system of 
- 12 - 

compensating those injured in motor vehicle accidents.” Md. Auto. Ins. Fund v. Perry, 356 

Md. 668, 675, 741 A.2d 1114, 1118 (1999). Broadly, “[t]he thrust of the 1972 law was to 

extend, not restrict, insurance protection, especially a limited amount of primary, no-fault 

benefits for wage loss and basic medical expenses.” Id. at 675, 741 A.2d at 1118. Indeed, 

this Court has explained: 

PIP is a form of no fault insurance, that allows the insured to recover for 

medical expenses and lost income resulting from a motor vehicle accident. 

Its main purpose is to assure financial compensation to victims of motor 

vehicle accidents without regard to the fault of a named insured or other 

persons entitled to PIP benefits. 

TravCo Ins. Co. v. Williams, 430 Md. 396, 403, 61 A.3d 50, 53-54 (2013) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bishop v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 360 Md. 

225, 230, 757 A.2d 783, 785 (2000) (same). 

Under IN § 19-505(a), insurers are required to provide PIP coverage as part of their 

policies:7

(a) Coverage required. – Unless waived in accordance with § 19-506 of this 

subtitle or rejected in accordance with § 19-506.1 of this subtitle, each insurer 

that issues, sells, or delivers a motor vehicle liability insurance policy in the 

State shall provide coverage for the medical, hospital, and disability benefits 

described in this section for each of the following individuals: 

(1) except for individuals specifically excluded under § 27-609 of this 

article:

(i) the first named insured, and any family member of the first 

named insured who resides in the first named insured’s household, 

who is injured in any motor vehicle accident, including an accident 

 

7

In the 2016 Legislative Session, the General Assembly amended IN §§ 19-505 and 

19-506 and TR § 17-103, and enacted IN § 19-506.1, to permit an insured to reject certain 

PIP benefits in some instances. See 2016 Md. Laws 5844-45 (Vol. VII, Ch. 426, H.B. 

900). The recent legislation has no bearing on the decision in this case. 
- 13 - 

that involves an uninsured motor vehicle or a motor vehicle the 

identity of which cannot be ascertained; and 

(ii) any other individual who is injured in a motor vehicle 

accident while using the insured motor vehicle with the express or 

implied permission of the named insured;

(2) an individual who is injured in a motor vehicle accident while 

occupying the insured motor vehicle as a guest or passenger; and 

(3) an individual who is injured in a motor vehicle accident that 

involves the insured motor vehicle:

(i) as a pedestrian; or

(ii) while in, on, or alighting from a vehicle that is operated by 

animal or muscular power. 

As to the amount of PIP coverage required, IN §19-505(b)(2) provides that “[t]he minimum 

medical, hospital, and disability benefits provided by an insurer under this section shall 

include up to $2,500 for” various payments. 

Under IN § 19-506(a), however, an insured may waive PIP coverage.8 If an insured 

waives PIP coverage, the insured is prevented from making a claim for PIP under any

policy. See Perry, 356 Md. at 676, 741 A.2d at 1118 (“In allowing insureds to waive PIP 

benefits under their own policies, however, the [General Assembly] determined that a 

 

8

In relevant part, IN § 19-506(a) provides as follows: 

(1) If the first named insured does not wish to obtain the benefits 

described in § 19-505 of this subtitle, the first named insured shall make an 

affirmative written waiver of those benefits. 

(2) If the first named insured does not make an affirmative written 

waiver under this section, the insurer shall provide the coverage described in 

§ 19-505 of this subtitle. 
- 14 - 

waiver of PIP benefits was a total waiver, and that, if an insured waived such benefits under 

his/her own policy, the insured could not collect those benefits from any other insurer.” 

(Emphasis in original)).9

 Similarly, an insured may also waive higher levels of UM/UIM 

coverage, provided that the insured carries liability insurance in excess of the minimum 

coverage required under Maryland law. See IN § 19-510(a) and (b); Swartzbaugh v. 

Encompass Ins. Co. of Am., 425 Md. 614, 618, 42 A.3d 587, 589 (2012) (“Under the State 

insurance code, UM coverage under a motor vehicle insurance policy is by default equal 

to the liability coverage under the policy. This level of coverage may be waived, however, 

in favor of a lesser amount at least equal to the minimum coverage required by the motor 

vehicle law.” (Citations omitted)). 

IN § 19-513(d)(1) governs the payment of benefits where coverage under IN §§ 19-

505 and 19-509 is not in effect, providing as follows: 

The insurer under a policy that contains the coverages described in §§ 19-

505 and 19-509 of this subtitle shall pay the benefits described in §§ 19-505 

and 19-509 to an individual insured under the policy who is injured in a motor 

vehicle accident: 

(i) while occupying a motor vehicle for which the coverages described 

in §§ 19-505 and 19-509 of this subtitle are not in effect; or 

(ii) by a motor vehicle for which the coverages described in §§ 19-

505 and 19-509 of this subtitle are not in effect as a pedestrian, while 

in, on, or alighting from a vehicle powered by animal or muscular 

power, or while on or alighting from an animal. 

 

9Additionally, pursuant to IN § 19-506.1(a), an applicant for a motor vehicle liability 

insurance policy may reject PIP coverage under certain circumstances. 
- 15 - 

Indeed, unlike liability coverage, generally, PIP coverage follows the insured, not the 

motor vehicle. See Nasseri, 390 Md. at 196, 888 A.2d at 288 (“The language of the 

Insurance Article, as well as numerous opinions by this Court, make it clear that an insured, 

who has PIP coverage under a policy on the insured’s motor vehicle, and who is injured in 

an accident while occupying a different motor vehicle owned by someone else, is ordinarily 

entitled to PIP coverage under the policy on the insured’s vehicle.”). 

 One exception to the requirement of PIP coverage—aside from waiver or rejection 

of PIP coverage under IN §§ 19-506 and 19-506.1, respectively—involves taxicabs. IN § 

19-501(b)(2)(ii), states that the term “motor vehicle” “does not include . . . a taxicab as 

defined in § 11-165 of the Transportation Article.” A taxicab is not required to be insured 

under a policy that includes PIP coverage.10

 In Nasseri, 390 Md. at 195-96, 888 A.2d at 

288, we noted that the purpose of the legislation excluding a taxicab from the definition of 

“motor vehicle” “was simply to provide that the compulsory automobile liability insurance 

policies on taxicabs and certain other vehicles did not have to contain policy provisions for 

PIP and some other statutory coverages.” See also id. at 191, 888 A.2d at 285 (“At the 

time of the accident, the taxicab was covered only by liability insurance, in accordance 

with the minimum requirements of Maryland law applicable to taxicabs.”). 

 

10At oral argument, the MIA emphasized that Bundu-Conteh had not waived PIP 

coverage with Amalgamated, but rather had never been offered PIP coverage by 

Amalgamated. Under IN §§ 19-501(b)(2)(ii) and 19-505, however, Amalgamated was not 

obliged to offer PIP coverage, as taxicabs are excluded from the requirement that an insurer 

provide PIP coverage unless waived or rejected by the insured. 
- 16 - 

Additionally, under certain circumstances, an insurer may exclude PIP coverage. 

See IN § 19-505(c). Relevant to this case is the “owned but uninsured” exclusion set forth 

in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii): 

An insurer may exclude from the coverage described in this section benefits 

for:

 . . . 

(ii) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides 

in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs while the named 

insured or family member is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned 

by: 

1. the named insured; or 

2. an immediate family member of the named insured who resides in 

the named insured’s household. 

The General Assembly created the owned but uninsured exclusion through the enactment 

Chapter 573 of the Acts of 1982 (“Chapter 573”). 1982 Md. Laws 3442-43 (Vol. IV, Ch. 

573, S.B. 983); see also Nasseri, 390 Md. at 200-01, 888 A.2d at 291. Chapter 573 

introduced the following language regarding PIP coverage: 

THE INSURER MAY EXCLUDE FROM THE COVERAGE 

PRESCRIBED IN § 539, BENEFITS FOR THE NAMED INSURED OR 

MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY RESIDING IN THE HOUSEHOLD WHEN 

OCCUPYING AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS OWNED 

BY THE NAMED INSURED OR A MEMBER OF HIS IMMEDIATE 

FAMILY RESIDING IN HIS HOUSEHOLD. 

1982 Md. Laws 3444 (Vol. IV, Ch. 573, S.B. 983).11 Chapter 573 provided similar 

language regarding exclusion of UM/UIM coverage: 

 

11As stated above, the owned but uninsured exclusion is now codified as IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii). 
- 17 - 

HOWEVER, THE INSURER MAY EXCLUDE FROM COVERAGE 

BENEFITS FOR THE NAMED INSURED OR MEMBERS OF HIS 

FAMILY RESIDING IN THE HOUSEHOLD WHEN OCCUPYING, OR 

STRUCK AS A PEDESTRIAN BY, AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 

THAT IS OWNED BY THE NAMED INSURED OR A MEMBER OF HIS 

IMMEDIATE FAMILY RESIDING IN HIS HOUSEHOLD. 

1982 Md. Laws 3443 (Vol. IV, Ch. 573, S.B. 983).12 

The General Assembly created the owned but uninsured exclusion on the heels of 

this Court’s decision in Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 

734 (1980). In that case, the plaintiff, Doris Gartelman (“Gartelman”), was injured while 

driving her husband’s moped when another motor vehicle forced the moped off the road. 

See id. at 153, 416 A.2d at 735. At the time of the accident, the moped was uninsured, but 

Gartelman claimed PIP and UM coverage under her husband’s insurance policy with 

Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance (“Pennsylvania National”). See id. at 

153, 416 A.2d at 735. Pennsylvania National denied Gartelman’s claim, relying on an 

owned but uninsured exclusion in the policy. See id. at 155, 416 A.2d at 736. Given that 

Maryland’s motor vehicle insurance statutes did not include or authorize an owned but 

uninsured exclusion, this Court invalidated Pennsylvania National’s policy exclusion, 

explaining: 

[The statute] expressly provides for only four exclusions from the required 

PIP coverage. It does not expressly provide an exclusion for an insured 

occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned by a named insured. We 

decline to insert such an exclusion which would be contrary to the remedial 

legislative purpose of assuring compensation for damages to victims of 

motor vehicle accidents without regard to fault. 

 

12The owned but uninsured exclusion for UM/UIM coverage is now codified as IN 

§ 19-509(f)(1). 
- 18 - 

Id. at 156-157, 416 A.2d at 737. Indeed, following Gartelman, we remarked that “this

Court has consistently held that exclusions from statutorily mandated insurance coverage 

not expressly authorized by the [General Assembly] generally will not be recognized.” 

Nasseri, 390 Md. at 198, 888 A.2d at 290 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

 In rendering the Final Order, the Commissioner relied on Nasseri, 390 Md. 188, 888 

A.2d 284, so we set forth the facts and holdings of that case in detail. In Nasseri, id. at 

196, 888 A.2d at 288-89, we held that a taxicab driver was entitled to PIP coverage from 

the insurance policy on his personal vehicle when he sustained injuries in a motor vehicle 

accident while driving a taxicab that he did not own. The plaintiff, Ebrahim Nasseri 

(“Nasseri”), was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a taxicab that belonged 

to Action Taxicab, Inc. See id. at 191, 888 A.2d at 285. The taxicab was covered under a 

liability-only policy, but Nasseri maintained insurance coverage, including PIP coverage, 

on his personal vehicle through GEICO General Insurance Company (“GEICO”). See id. 

at 191, 888 A.2d at 285-86. Nasseri filed a claim on his GEICO policy for the injuries that 

he sustained in the accident. See id. at 191, 888 A.2d at 286. GEICO denied the claim, 

arguing that, because Nasseri was driving a taxicab at the time of the accident, he was not 

injured in a “motor vehicle accident” for purposes of IN § 19-505. Nasseri, 390 Md. at 

191, 888 A.2d at 286. Furthermore, GEICO asserted that Nasseri’s policy did not apply 

because it included an exclusion that specified that an insured was “not covered if injured 

while in, or through being struck by, any motor vehicle which is not an insured auto if it is 

. . . available for the regular use of the insured.” Id. at 190-92, 888 A.2d at 285-86 (ellipsis
- 19 - 

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court found in favor of GEICO. 

See id. at 192, 888 A.2d at 286. We reversed. See id. at 193, 888 A.2d at 286.

Turning first to the issue of whether Nasseri was involved in a “motor vehicle 

accident,” we observed the following: 

For purposes of this case, we shall assume arguendo that the statutory phrase 

“motor vehicle accident” in subsection [IN § 19-501](c)(1) incorporates the 

taxicab exclusion in subsection [IN § 19-501](b)(2)(ii), and that an accident 

between two taxicabs might not be a “motor vehicle accident” within the 

meaning of subsection [IN § 19-501](c)(1). Nevertheless, as long as another 

motor vehicle, which is not a taxicab or bus, is involved in the accident, such 

accident plainly comes within the definition of “motor vehicle accident” in 

subsection [IN § 19-501](c)(1). The subsection requires only the 

involvement of one motor vehicle for there to be a motor vehicle accident; it 

does not require that all vehicles involved in the collision be “motor 

vehicles.” 

 . . . 

Nasseri was certainly injured in a motor vehicle accident under the language 

of the statute, and [IN] § 19-505 provides PIP coverage for anyone injured 

in any motor vehicle accident. 

Nasseri, 390 Md. at 193-94, 888 A.2d at 287 (italics in original). Interpreting the language 

of IN § 19-513, we explained that the circumstances of Nasseri’s accident appeared to fall 

squarely within the coverage contemplated under the Insurance Article: 

The applicability of [IN] § 19-505, under the circumstances of this case, is 

reinforced by the language of [IN] § 19-513(d)(1)(i) []. [IN §] 19-

513(d)(1)(i) states: 

“[](1) The insurer under a policy that contains the coverages described 

in §§ 19-505 and 19-509 of this subtitle shall pay the benefits 

described in §§ 19-505 and 19-509 to an individual insured under the 

policy who is injured in a motor vehicle accident: 
- 20 - 

(i) while occupying a motor vehicle for which the coverages 

described in §§ 19-505 and 19-509 of this subtitle are not in effect. 

. . .” 

It would appear that the above-quoted language was directly aimed at 

circumstances like those presented here. The vehicles “for which the 

coverages described in [IN] §§ 19-505 and 19-509” would legally not be “in 

effect” are taxicabs, buses, vehicles owned by the State of Maryland, and 

vehicles for which the first named insured has made “an affirmative written 

waiver of PIP benefits.” In this case, Nasseri had an insurance policy 

providing PIP benefits, and he was occupying a motor vehicle for which PIP 

benefits were not in effect. A holding that he was not entitled to PIP 

benefits, precisely because he was occupying a vehicle for which PIP 

benefits were not in effect, could not be reconciled with [IN] § 19-

513(d)(1)(i).

Nasseri, 390 Md. at 194-95, 888 A.2d at 287-88 (emphasis added) (ellipsis in original) 

(brackets and footnotes omitted). We considered the legislative intent behind excluding 

taxicabs from classification as “motor vehicles” and observed that the rationale for doing 

so was merely to exclude taxicabs and certain other vehicles from compulsory PIP and 

similar coverage. See id. at 195-96, 888 A.2d at 288. Thus, we explained that “[t]he 

purpose was not to negate required PIP and other required coverages, under policies on all 

other types of motor vehicles, whenever a taxicab happened to be involved in an accident 

with another type of motor vehicle.” Id. at 196, 888 A.2d at 288. We, therefore, concluded 

that “an insured, who has PIP coverage under a policy on the insured’s motor vehicle, and 

who is injured in an accident while occupying a different motor vehicle owned by someone 

else, is ordinarily entitled to PIP coverage under the policy on the insured’s vehicle.” Id.

at 196, 888 A.2d at 288. 
- 21 - 

 We also considered whether GEICO’s “regular use” exclusion was permissible 

under IN § 19-505. See Nasseri, 390 Md. at 197, 888 A.2d at 288.13 Looking to the plain 

language of IN § 19-505(c), we concluded that the “regular use” exclusion was not one of 

the exclusions contemplated by the General Assembly, and thus was impermissible. See 

Nasseri, 390 Md. at 197-98, 888 A.2d at 289. We observed that, under well-settled law in 

Maryland, this Court will not expand the exclusions to insurance coverage beyond those 

explicitly enumerated by the General Assembly. See id. at 198, 888 A.2d at 289. 

 As to an owned but uninsured exclusion, in Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Comer, 419 

Md. 89, 98, 18 A.3d 830, 835 (2011), this Court upheld the exclusion of UM/UIM coverage 

under IN § 19-509(f)(1) when the vehicle was owned by the insured but covered under a 

different insurance policy. IN § 19-509(f)(1) pertains to UM/UIM benefits, and includes 

language that closely mirrors IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii): 

 

13Significant to the instant case, our analysis in Nasseri applied only to the “regular 

use” exclusion and not an exclusion in which the uninsured vehicle is owned by the insured, 

i.e., an owned but uninsured exclusion; specifically, we described the “regular use” 

exclusion at issue in Nasseri, 390 Md. at 190 n.2, 888 A.2d at 285 n.2, as follows: 

The same exclusion in the GEICO insurance policy also applies to “an . . . 

auto if it is owned by you or a relative . . . .” The entire PIP exclusion is as 

follows: 

“You and your relatives are not covered if injured while in, or 

through being struck by, any motor vehicle which is not an 

insured auto if it is owned by you or a relative or available for 

the regular use of either.”

This case does not present any issue with regard to being in or struck by an 

“owned” vehicle.

(Ellipses in original) (emphasis omitted).
- 22 - 

(f) Exclusions. – An insurer may exclude from the uninsured motorist 

coverage required by this section benefits for:

(1) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who 

resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs 

when the named insured or family member is occupying or is struck 

as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the 

named insured or an immediate family member of the named insured 

who resides in the named insured’s household[.] 

In Comer, 419 Md. at 98, 18 A.3d at 835, we concluded that a motorcycle was 

“uninsured” for purposes of IN § 19-509(f)(1), and thus was excluded from coverage. In 

that case, the plaintiff, Ray Comer (“Comer”), was injured in a motor vehicle accident 

when his motorcycle collided with another vehicle. See id. at 91-93, 18 A.3d at 831-32. 

The medical costs associated with Comer’s injuries exceeded $200,000. See id. at 92, 18 

A.3d at 831. Comer had insured the motorcycle under a policy with Progressive Insurance 

Co., which included an UM/UIM limit of $50,000. See id. at 92, 18 A.3d at 831. At the 

time of the accident, Comer was living with his father, who owned a 2000 Buick that was 

covered under a policy with GEICO with a UM/UIM limit of $300,000. See id. at 92, 18 

A.3d at 831. Comer filed a claim with GEICO, asserting that he qualified as “insured” 

because he lived with his father. See id. at 92, 18 A.3d at 832. GEICO denied Comer’s 

claim on the ground of the following policy exclusion: 

“EXCLUSIONS 

* * * 

4. Bodily Injury sustained by an insured while occupying a motor vehicle 

owned by an insured and not described in the declarations and not covered 

by the bodily injury and property damage liability coverages of this policy is 

not covered.” 
- 23 - 

Id. at 93, 18 A.3d at 832 (emphasis in original). Comer filed a complaint against GEICO, 

and the trial court ultimately issued a declaratory judgment in Comer’s favor, finding that 

GEICO’s exclusion was ambiguous and impermissible under IN § 19-509(f)(1). See 

Comer, 419 Md. at 93-95, 18 A.3d at 832-33. We reversed. See id. at 100, 18 A.3d at 836. 

Turning first to the issue of ambiguity, we determined that the language in GEICO’s 

exclusion was not ambiguous, and observed that the language of the exclusion “clearly 

preclude[d] coverage of Comer’s claim under the GEICO policy[]” because he was driving 

a vehicle that he owned and that was not covered under the GEICO policy. Id. at 96, 18 

A.3d at 834. We then considered whether the exclusion was permissible under IN § 19-

509(f)(1), and concluded that it was: 

In determining whether exclusion number 4, as applied to this case, is 

authorized by the statute, the only possible ambiguity is the statute’s 

reference to “an uninsured motor vehicle” owned by the family member. 

Nevertheless, Comer’s motorcycle was “uninsured” under the declarations 

and liability coverage of the GEICO policy. Moreover, as earlier noted . . . 

the word “uninsured” in [IN] § 19-509 includes “underinsured.” Comer’s 

motorcycle was clearly an underinsured motor vehicle. 

Comer, 419 Md. at 98, 18 A.3d at 835. In reaching this conclusion, we observed that 

invalidating the owned but uninsured UM/UIM exclusion could potentially produce an 

illogical result: 

One purpose of exclusion 4 in the GEICO policy, as well as a purpose of [IN] 

§ 19-509(f)(1), is obviously to prevent a family, owning several motor 

vehicles, from insuring only one or two of them with an insurer, leaving the 

other vehicles uninsured, or underinsured under a different policy, and being 

able to claim uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits from the first 

insurer even though no premium was paid to the first insurer for coverage of 

the other vehicles. An interpretation of the Insurance Code that would allow 

this would be unreasonable.
- 24 - 

Comer, 419 Md. at 98, 18 A.3d at 835. 

 Our holding in Comer, id. at 100, 18 A.3d at 836, was informed by the Court of 

Special Appeals’s decision in Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 98, 

585 A.2d 286 (1991). Specifically, in Powell, id. at 100, 115, 101, 585 A.2d at 287, 294, 

the Court of Special Appeals concluded that an owned but uninsured exclusion was 

authorized by IN § 19-509(f)(1)’s predecessor.14 In that case, Kenneth Powell (“Mr. 

Powell”) was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving his wife (“Mrs. Powell”)’s

vehicle. See id. at 100, 585 A.2d 286-87. Mrs. Powell’s vehicle was covered under a 

policy with State Farm, which included $20,000/$40,000 in UM/UIM coverage. See id. at 

100, 585 A.2d 286-87. Mr. Powell’s vehicle, also covered under a policy with State Farm, 

included $100,000/$300,000 in UM/UIM coverage. See id. at 100, 585 A.2d at 287. 

Following the accident, Mr. Powell submitted a claim to State Farm under the policy 

covering his vehicle. See id. at 100, 585 A.2d at 287. State Farm denied the claim, relying 

on the following exclusion contained in the policy: 

THERE IS NO COVERAGE: 

* * * * * * 

2. FOR BODILY INJURY TO YOU . . . WHILE OCCUPYING . . . A MOTOR 

VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE, and 

which is not insured under the liability coverage of this policy. 

Id. at 100, 585 A.2d at 287 (emphasis in original). Mr. Powell contended that the exclusion 

was invalid, because, as the named insured on the policy, Mr. Powell had coverage that 

 

14At the time that the Court of Special Appeals decided Powell, IN § 19-509 was 

codified as Art. 48A, § 541. 
- 25 - 

followed him and applied to any vehicle he drove. See id. at 100-01, 585 A.2d at 287. The 

Court of Special Appeals disagreed, explaining: 

We do not believe the statute, by extending coverage to the insured 

when involved in any accident, enlarged the class of “insured motor 

vehicles” under policies of insurance. Thus, when [Mr. Powell’s] policy’s 

language excludes coverage for a vehicle owned by the named insured or his 

spouse and which was not insured under the liability coverage of “this 

policy,” it was referring to vehicles not described in the policy of insurance 

at issue, such as [Mrs. Powell’s vehicle]. The clause provides that the 

uninsured motorist coverage under Mr. Powell’s policy does not apply if he 

was occupying a motor vehicle owned by his wife that was not described as 

an insured vehicle in his policy. 

Id. at 102-03, 585 A.2d at 288 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court of Special Appeals 

concluded that the policy clearly excluded coverage for vehicles owned by the insured or 

a member of the insured’s family and not covered under the policy. See id. at 103, 585 

A.2d at 288. 

As to the policy’s compliance with IN § 19-509(f)(1)’s predecessor, the Court of 

Special Appeals observed that “when a policy provision is not in conflict with the statute, 

that provision will be enforced, the statute’s underlying purpose notwithstanding.” Id. at 

107, 585 A.2d at 290 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court 

of Special Appeals noted that the underlying policy considerations for the exclusions 

contained in IN § 19-509(f)(1)’s predecessor would be contravened by Mr. Powell’s 

interpretation of the statute as granting coverage to the insured regardless of which vehicle 

was involved in the accident: 

The obvious purpose of the policy exclusion as to uninsured vehicles is to 

prohibit a person from purchasing insurance for one car only and utilizing 

that coverage as to other vehicles owned by the insured through the “in any 

accident” provision of the policy. This type of prohibition is not against 
- 26 - 

public policy. To apply its language as [Mr. Powell] urges would invite 

multi-vehicle families to insure only one vehicle. It would play havoc with 

premium determinations and otherwise be detrimental to the process of 

providing liability protection to the motorists, and others, of Maryland. [Mr. 

Powell]’s interpretation of the clause, if adopted, would be, as we see it, 

contrary to public policy. 

Id. at 107-08, 585 A.2d at 290. The Court of Special Appeals was unpersuaded by Mr. 

Powell’s contention that his wife’s vehicle was not “uninsured” for the purpose of the 

exclusion: 

To hold as [Mr. Powell] also urges, i.e., that [Mrs. Powell]’s vehicle was not 

uninsured because it was covered under another policy, would be to permit 

an owner to buy excess coverage under one policy for one vehicle at a 

relatively small premium and coverage under a separate policy for his other 

vehicles at a lesser cost, and have the excess coverage of the first policy apply 

to the vehicles covered under the subsequent policies. 

Id. at 110, 585 A.2d at 291 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Court of Special 

Appeals found support for its holding in the legislative intent behind IN § 19-509(f)(1)’s 

predecessor. See Powell, 86 Md. App. at 111, 585 A.2d at 292. Indeed, the Court of 

Special Appeals observed that the General Assembly’s addition of the “owned but 

uninsured” exclusion following this Court’s decision in Gartelman evinced the General 

Assembly’s intent “that the exclusion extend to vehicles owned by a named insured’s 

spouse that are not covered under the policy at issue.” Powell, 86 Md. App. at 111, 585 

A.2d at 292. Thus, the Court of Special Appeals declined to “increas[e] the minimum 

required coverage by judicial fiat.” Id. at 113, 585 A.2d at 293. 

In Gonzalez v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 628 A.2d 101, 101-02 (D.C. 1993), a case 

factually similar to the instant case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (“DC Court 

of Appeals”) relied on Powell in concluding that a taxicab was an “uninsured motor 
- 27 - 

vehicle” for purposes of an owned but uninsured UM/UIM coverage exclusion. The 

insured, Mario Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), owned a taxicab and a personal vehicle, which he 

insured under different policies. See id. at 101. Gonzalez maintained only liability 

coverage on the taxicab, but carried UM/UIM coverage under his policy with the MAIF on 

his personal vehicle. See id. Gonzalez sustained personal injuries when an uninsured 

motorist struck his taxicab. See id. He subsequently filed a claim for coverage with the 

MAIF, which denied his claim on the grounds that the taxicab was an “uninsured motor 

vehicle.” See id. at 101-02. Applying Maryland law, the DC Court of Appeals agreed with 

the MAIF, concluding that, “under the reasoning of the Powell [C]ourt, the exclusion from 

[Gonzalez]’s MAIF policy of his taxi is not contrary to public policy and thus applies.” 

Gonzalez, 628 A.2d at 103. 

Analysis 

Here, as to the overall question presented in this case, we hold that an insurer of a 

personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy, which includes PIP coverage, is not 

responsible, as a result of the application of the personal motor vehicle liability insurance 

policy’s owned but not insured exclusion, for PIP coverage for injuries that the insured 

sustained while driving a taxicab owned by the insured but not covered by the personal 

motor vehicle liability insurance policy. Stated in terms of this case, we hold that the third 

exclusion in State Farm’s policy applies and that State Farm is not responsible for PIP 

coverage for the injuries that Bundu-Conteh sustained while driving the taxicab, which was 

owned by Bundu-Conteh, but not insured with State Farm; i.e., Bundu-Conteh is not 

entitled to PIP coverage under the State Farm policy. As to the more specific issues 
- 28 - 

underlying that predominant holding, we conclude that: (1) a taxicab is a “motor vehicle” 

for purposes of the owned but uninsured exclusion from PIP coverage set forth in IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii) and the payment of benefits under IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i); (2) “uninsured motor 

vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured for PIP coverage, such that 

a motor vehicle, including a taxicab, that is not insured for PIP coverage is an “uninsured 

motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii); and (3) the third exclusion in the State 

Farm policy in this case is authorized by the owned but uninsured exclusion from PIP 

coverage set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). 

In this case, we are confronted with a circumstance in which broad application of 

the statutorily provided definition of “motor vehicle” in IN § 19-501(b), and specifically 

IN § 19-501(b)(2)(ii)’s exclusion of a taxicab as a “motor vehicle,” potentially renders 

other sections of Subtitle 5 of Title 19 of the Insurance Article illogical. To discern the 

meaning of the term “motor vehicle” as it is defined in IN § 19-501(b) and as it is used in 

IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) (“uninsured motor vehicle”) and IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i) (“motor 

vehicle”), we apply the rules of statutory construction. We begin by examining the 

language of IN § 19-501(b), which provides: 

(b) Motor vehicle. – 

(1) “Motor vehicle” means a vehicle, including a trailer, that is 

operated or designed for operation on a public road by any power other than 

animal or muscular power. 

(2) “Motor vehicle” does not include:

(i) a bus as defined in § 11-105 of the Transportation Article; 

or 
- 29 - 

(ii) a taxicab as defined in § 11-165 of the Transportation 

Article.

By its language, IN § 19-501(b) excludes certain vehicles—namely, buses and taxicabs—

that would otherwise be considered “motor vehicles” under IN § 19-501(b)(1)’s definition, 

because a bus or a taxicab certainly is a vehicle “that is operated or designed for operation 

on a public road by [] power other than animal or muscular power.” 

We observe, however, that IN § 19-501(b)’s definition of “motor vehicle” and its 

exclusion of a taxicab as a “motor vehicle” differ from the ordinary, commonsense 

meaning and understanding of the term “motor vehicle.” See Bottini, 450 Md. at 195, 147 

A.3d at 382 (“To ascertain the natural and ordinary meaning of [a term], we look to 

dictionary definitions as a starting point.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Merriam-Webster defines a “motor vehicle” as “an automotive vehicle not operated on 

rails; especially: one with rubber tires for use on highways[.]” Motor Vehicle, MerriamWebster (2016), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/motor+vehicle [https:// 

perma.cc/2RJX-P5JH]. And, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “motor vehicle” as “[a] 

wheeled conveyance that does not run on rails and is self-propelled, esp[ecially] one 

powered by an internal-combustion engine, a battery or fuel-cell, or a combination of 

these.” Motor Vehicle, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Thus, under the ordinary 

meaning of the term “motor vehicle” and even under IN § 19-501(b)(1)’s basic definition 

of “motor vehicle,” a taxicab is a motor vehicle. 

Moreover, the ordinary meaning of “motor vehicle” closely aligns with the 

definition of “motor vehicle” in TR § 11-135(a), which does not contain any exclusions for 
- 30 - 

taxicabs or buses as IN § 19-501(b) does. For purposes of the Maryland Vehicle Law, TR 

§ 11-135(a) defines a “motor vehicle” as follows: 

(a) In general. – (1) “Motor vehicle” means . . . a vehicle that:

(i) Is self-propelled or propelled by electric power obtained from 

overhead electrical wires; and

(ii) Is not operated on rails.

(2) “Motor vehicle” includes a low speed vehicle.[15]

As stated above, IN § 19-501(b) provides a similar definition of the term “motor vehicle,” 

but excludes certain specified vehicles that would otherwise be considered “motor 

vehicles,” i.e., buses and taxicabs. 

Significantly, the Insurance Article does not define the term “taxicab,” but instead

references the definition in TR § 11-165. See IN § 19-501(b)(2)(ii) (“‘Motor vehicle’ does 

not include . . . a taxicab as defined in § 11-165 of the Transportation Article.”). TR § 11-

165(a) defines “taxicab” as follows: 

(a) In general. – “Taxicab” means, except as provided in subsection (b) of 

this section, a motor vehicle for hire that: 

(1) Is designed to carry seven or fewer individuals, including the 

driver; and 

(2) Is used to accept or solicit passengers for transportation for hire 

between those points along highways in this State as the passengers 

request.

 

15TR § 11-135(b) provides that a “motor vehicle” does not include a moped, a motor 

scooter, or an electric bicycle. 
- 31 - 

(Emphasis added).16 In other words, under TR § 11-165(a), a taxicab is a “motor vehicle,” 

just as it is under the plain meaning of the term. 

Thus, IN § 19-501(b)’s definition of “motor vehicle,” with the exclusion of a taxicab 

as a motor vehicle, sharply conflicts with the ordinary meaning of the term “motor vehicle” 

and the definition of a “taxicab” in TR § 11-165(a). Considering these differing 

definitions, it is apparent that the term “motor vehicle” is subject to more than one 

reasonable interpretation, specifically as it pertains to taxicabs, and thus is ambiguous. 

Indeed, in excluding taxicabs from categorization as “motor vehicles,” IN § 19-

501(b)(2)(ii) specifically references TR § 11-165, in which a “taxicab” is defined as a 

“motor vehicle.” Furthermore, importantly, the provisions of the Insurance Article relevant 

to the present case, IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i), discuss exclusions and 

benefits only in the context of “motor vehicles.” IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) provides: 

An insurer may exclude from the coverage described in this section benefits 

for: 

. . . 

(ii) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who 

resides in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs 

while the named insured or family member is occupying an 

uninsured motor vehicle owned by: 

1. the named insured; or 

2. an immediate family member of the named insured who 

resides in the named insured’s household. 

 

16TR § 11-165(b) provides that a “taxicab” “does not include a motor vehicle 

operated on regular schedules and between fixed termini with the approval of the Public 

Service Commission.” 
- 32 - 

(Emphasis added). And IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i) provides: 

The insurer under a policy that contains the coverages described in §§ 19-

505 and 19-509 of this subtitle shall pay the benefits described in §§ 19-505 

and 19-509 to an individual insured under the policy who is injured in a motor 

vehicle accident: 

(i) while occupying a motor vehicle for which the coverages 

described in §§ 19-505 and 19-509 of this subtitle are not in effect; 

(Emphasis added). And, IN § 19-505(a)(1)(i) provides that PIP coverage shall be provided, 

in pertinent part, to “the first named insured . . . who is injured in any motor vehicle 

accident, including an accident that involves an uninsured motor vehicle or a motor 

vehicle the identity of which cannot be ascertained[.]” (Emphasis added). 

This definitional conundrum becomes problematic in circumstances, such as those 

of the instant case, wherein an individual occupying a taxicab or other non-motor vehicle 

seeks to avail him- or herself of the protections provided by IN §§ 19-505 and 19-513, i.e.,

PIP coverage. Although the definition of “motor vehicle” under IN § 19-501(b) expressly 

excludes taxicabs, we observe that, when that definition is applied to other provisions of 

the Insurance Article—namely, IN §§ 19-505 and 19-513—it produces an unreasonable 

and indeed illogical result. Were we to exclude taxicabs from classification as “motor 

vehicles” for purposes of IN §§ 19-505 and 19-513, any passenger who is injured while 

riding in a taxicab and who personally carries PIP coverage through his or her own motor 

vehicle liability insurance policy would be unable to make a claim for PIP coverage. This 

is so because, as discussed above, a taxicab is not required to obtain PIP coverage; 

accordingly, because PIP coverage is not in effect, IN § 19-513(d)(1) applies. IN § 19-

513(d)(1) provides: 
- 33 - 

The insurer under a policy that contains [PIP and UM/UIM] coverages . . . 

shall pay the benefits . . . to an individual insured under the policy who is 

injured in a motor vehicle accident: (i) while occupying a motor vehicle for 

which [PIP and UM/UIM] coverages . . . are not in effect; or (ii) by a motor 

vehicle for which [PIP and UM/UIM] coverages . . . are not in effect as a 

pedestrian[.] 

(Paragraph breaks omitted). 

In other words, for an insured’s PIP coverage to follow the insured, the insured 

would need to be injured in a motor vehicle accident while occupying a motor vehicle (not 

a taxicab) that does not have PIP coverage, or would need to be injured in a motor vehicle 

accident by being struck by a motor vehicle (not a taxicab) as a pedestrian. Under these 

circumstances, a passenger of a taxicab that did not have PIP coverage, but who had PIP 

coverage under his or her own motor vehicle liability insurance policy and who was 

involved in a motor vehicle accident, would have PIP coverage only if the passenger 

jumped or fell out of the taxicab and was hit, as a pedestrian, by the motor vehicle. In that 

case, IN § 19-513(d)(1)(ii) would apply, and PIP coverage would follow the passenger. 

For example, had Bundu-Conteh been a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle, there would 

be no dispute as to his PIP coverage, subject to any applicable exclusions. This is, 

obviously, an absurd result that the General Assembly could not have intended.

 Although we did not directly decide in Nasseri whether a taxicab was a “motor 

vehicle” for the purpose of IN § 19-513(d)(1), we highlighted the illogical result that would 

arise were we to determine that passengers of a taxicab were unable to avail themselves of 

PIP coverage contained in their own motor vehicle liability insurance policies simply 

because they were in a taxicab at the time of an accident: 
- 34 - 

Nasseri was injured in an accident involving his taxicab and a motor vehicle 

which was neither a taxicab nor a bus. Nasseri was certainly injured in a 

motor vehicle accident under the language of the statute, and [IN] § 19-505 

provides PIP coverage for anyone injured in any motor vehicle accident. 

 The applicability of [IN] § 19-505, under the circumstances of this 

case, is reinforced by the language of [IN] § 19-513(d)(1)(i) . . . . 

It would appear that the [] language [of IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i)] was directly 

aimed at circumstances like those presented here. The vehicles “for which 

[PIP and UM/UIM] coverages . . .” would legally not be “in effect” are 

taxicabs, buses, vehicles owned by the State of Maryland, and vehicles for 

which the first named insured has made “an affirmative written waiver of PIP 

benefits.” In this case, Nasseri had an insurance policy providing PIP 

benefits, and he was occupying a motor vehicle for which PIP benefits were 

not in effect. A holding that he was not entitled to PIP benefits, precisely 

because he was occupying a vehicle for which PIP benefits were not in effect, 

could not be reconciled with [IN] § 19-513(d)(1)(i). 

Nasseri, 390 Md. at 194-95, 888 A.2d at 287-88 (footnotes and brackets omitted). Plainly, 

such a result would run entirely counter to the remedial nature of the motor vehicle 

insurance statutes and the purpose of PIP coverage. 

Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history of 1977 Md. Laws 2656-57 (Ch. 655, 

H.B. 1272), which deleted taxicabs from the definition of “motor vehicles” in what is now 

IN § 19-501(b)(2)(ii), indicates that the General Assembly intended to prevent taxicab 

passengers from availing themselves of PIP coverage contained in their own motor vehicle 

liability insurance policies, should they be injured in a motor vehicle accident. As we 

explained in Nasseri, 390 Md. at 195-96, 888 A.2d at 288, “[t]he legislative enactment 

which deleted taxicabs from the definition of ‘motor vehicles’ for purposes of certain 

coverages mandated by the Insurance Code . . . was not” a “sweeping” change; rather, “the 

purpose of Ch[apter] 655 was simply to provide that the compulsory automobile liability 
- 35 - 

insurance policies on taxicabs and certain other vehicles did not have to contain policy 

provisions for PIP and some other statutory coverages.” Indeed, in Nasseri, id. at 196, 888 

A.2d at 288, we specifically stated that House Bill 1272’s “purpose was not to negate 

required PIP and other required coverages, under policies on all other types of motor 

vehicles, whenever a taxicab happened to be involved in an accident with another type of 

motor vehicle.” 

In House Bill 1272’s file, in discussing the impact of House Bill 1272, the MAIF 

characterized the bill as a money-saving measure, which was forecasted to save the MAIF 

$577,465 annually. The Taxicab Association of Baltimore City also supported the measure 

on the ground that mandatory PIP coverage was not intended to apply to taxicabs. The 

General Assembly’s intent was not to leave otherwise insured individuals unprotected the 

moment they set foot inside a taxicab. Our construction of the definition of “motor vehicle” 

under IN § 19-501(b) is informed by the remedial purpose of the motor vehicle insurance 

statutes. As we observed in Gartelman, 288 Md. at 159, 416 A.2d at 738, “Maryland’s 

uninsured motorist statute is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed in order 

to promote its purpose of recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents.” 

(Citation omitted). To exclude taxicabs from classification as “motor vehicles” for 

purposes of IN §§ 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and 19-513(d)(1)(i) would flout the statutes’ remedial 

purpose. 

Taking into account the language of IN § 19-501(b) and its legislative history, and 

to avoid an illogical and contrary result, we conclude that a taxicab is a “motor vehicle” 

for purposes of the owned but uninsured exclusion from PIP coverage set forth in IN § 19-
- 36 - 

505(c)(1)(ii) and for the payment of benefits under IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i), i.e., that the term 

“motor vehicle,” as used in IN §§ 19-505 and 19-513, encompasses taxicabs for the 

purposes of PIP coverage and benefits as well as exclusion from PIP coverage. In so 

concluding, we do not disturb prior case law interpreting IN § 19-501 as exempting 

taxicabs from mandatory PIP and UM/UIM coverage, but not from mandatory liability 

coverage. See, e.g., Md. Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., Inc., 305 Md. 807, 813, 506 A.2d 

641, 644 (1986). Stated otherwise, nothing in this opinion stands for the proposition that 

taxicabs are now required to carry PIP coverage. We also note that our conclusion that 

taxicabs are “motor vehicles” for purposes of the owned but uninsured exclusion from PIP 

coverage set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and for the payment of benefits under IN § 19-

513(d)(1)(i) is wholly consistent with how the terms “taxicab” and “motor vehicle” are 

defined in TR §§ 11-165(a) and 11-135(a), respectively. 

Applying this interpretation of the term “motor vehicle” in this case leads to the 

determination that Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of IN §§ 19-

505 and 19-513.17

 Thus, under IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i), Bundu-Conteh, as an insured who has 

PIP coverage under his personal motor vehicle liability insurance policy with State Farm 

 

17We observe that our conclusion that Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab is a motor vehicle is 

consistent with the definition of “motor vehicle” contained in the no-fault PIP coverage 

section of Bundu-Conteh’s State Farm policy. Specifically, “motor vehicle” means “a selfpropelled vehicle” or “a trailer[,]” and “does not include a vehicle: 1. propelled solely by 

human power; 2. propelled by electric power obtained from over-head wires; 3. operated 

on rails or crawler treads; 4. located for use as a residence or premises; or 5. which is a 

lawn or garden tractor, mower or similar vehicle.” (Paragraph breaks omitted). In other 

words, the no-fault PIP coverage section of the State Farm policy does not exclude a taxicab 

as a motor vehicle. 
- 37 - 

and who was injured in a motor vehicle accident18 while occupying a motor vehicle—i.e.,

the taxicab—for which PIP coverage was not in effect, ordinarily would be entitled to PIP 

coverage through State Farm, unless an exclusion precluded PIP coverage. Cf. Nasseri, 

390 Md. at 196, 888 A.2d at 288-89 (“[A]n insured, who has PIP coverage under a policy 

on the insured’s motor vehicle, and who is injured in an accident while occupying a 

different motor vehicle owned by someone else, is ordinarily entitled to PIP coverage under 

the policy on the insured’s vehicle. . . . [T]he fact that Nasseri was driving a taxicab 

furnished no valid basis for denying him PIP benefits required by the Insurance Code.” 

(Footnote omitted)). Accordingly, having determined that Bundu-Conteh was injured in a 

motor vehicle accident while occupying a motor vehicle, we turn to the exclusions 

authorized by IN § 19-505(c). 

Relevant to this case is the owned but uninsured exclusion set forth in IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii), which provides, in pertinent part, that the “insurer may exclude from the 

coverage described in this section benefits for . . . the named insured . . . for an injury that 

occurs while the name insured . . . is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owed by . . . 

the named insured[.]” (Emphasis added). The phrase “uninsured motor vehicle” is not 

 

18In its request for a hearing before the Commissioner, State Farm conceded that, 

because a motor vehicle rear-ended Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab, Bundu-Conteh was involved 

in a “motor vehicle accident” as that term is defined in IN § 19-501(c)(1), which states that 

a “‘[m]otor vehicle accident’ means an occurrence involving a motor vehicle that results 

in damage to property or injury to a person.” 
- 38 - 

defined in IN § 19-505 or in the definitional statute, IN § 19-501.19 Indeed, what 

“uninsured motor vehicle” means for purposes of the exclusion set forth in IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii) appears to be a matter of first impression. As to that, we are presented with 

several alternatives: namely, that “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii) could mean uninsured altogether, uninsured for PIP coverage, or not insured 

under the relevant motor vehicle liability insurance policy. We conclude that “uninsured 

motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured for PIP coverage, 

such that a motor vehicle that is not insured for PIP coverage is an “uninsured motor 

vehicle” for purposes of the owned but uninsured exclusion set forth in IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii). We explain. 

First, we are not persuaded that “uninsured motor vehicle” in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) 

simply means not insured under the relevant motor vehicle liability insurance policy. 

Obviously, any motor vehicle, including a taxicab, insured under one motor vehicle 

liability insurance policy would not be insured under a different motor vehicle liability 

insurance policy. Not being insured under a particular motor vehicle liability insurance 

policy does not squarely answer what “uninsured motor vehicle” means in the context of 

IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). As explained below, this is entirely consistent with Comer and 

 

19We recognize that “uninsured motor vehicle” is defined in IN § 19-509(a) for 

purposes of IN § 19-509 and UM/UIM coverage. Importantly, however, that definition is 

applicable only to “uninsured motor vehicle” as used in that statute. See IN § 19-509(a) 

(“In this section, ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle . . . .”). In other words, 

the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” in IN § 19-509(a) is not applicable to, or 

dispositive of, “uninsured motor vehicle” as used in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). 
- 39 - 

Powell, where the vehicles at issue were not insured with UM/UIM coverage under the 

relevant motor vehicle liability insurance policies in those cases.

We also disagree that “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii) broadly means a vehicle without any insurance at all. Specifically, the MIA 

contends that “uninsured motor vehicle” in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured 

altogether—i.e., without any insurance—and argues that the General Assembly’s intent in 

enacting the owned but uninsured exclusion was to exclude only motor vehicles totally 

lacking insurance. In support of its position, the MIA relies on information contained in 

Senate Bill 983’s file, which indicates that the General Assembly was aware of this Court’s 

holding in Gartelman and, indeed, enacted Chapter 573, which created the owned but 

uninsured exclusion, as a result of Gartelman.20 Thus, the MIA asserts that the General 

Assembly sought to prevent only individuals operating a motor vehicle entirely without 

insurance, as Gartelman was, from availing themselves of the PIP coverage contained in 

another policy. We disagree with the MIA’s interpretation of the General Assembly’s 

intent. Here, we review the plain language of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) with an eye toward the 

real-world outcome that the General Assembly sought to address. See Bottini, 450 Md. at 

 

20In a reply brief, the MIA pointed out that the legislative record for Senate Bill 983 

included “a marked up copy of the Gartelman decision[,]” as well as the following 

language in what “appears to be a draft of Senate Bill 983”: 

IN RESPONSE TO PENN. NATIONAL MUT. CAS. INSURANCE CO. V. 

GARTELMAN 288 MD. 131 (1980) WHICH INTERPRETED § 539 (PIP) 

AND § 541 (UNINSURED) AS INVALIDATING EXCLUSIONS FOR AN 

INSURED OCCUPYING AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED 

BY A NAMED INSURED SINCE THIS CLASS WAS DEEMED TO BE 

COVERED. 
- 40 - 

188, 147 A.3d at 378 (“[T]he meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context 

in which is appears.” (Citation omitted)). Although Gartelman was operating the moped 

without any insurance, the outcome for the insurer in that case would have been the same 

had Gartelman carried liability-only insurance—i.e., Pennsylvania National would have 

been required to pay Gartelman’s UM coverage for an accident occurring while Gartelman 

drove a motor vehicle owned by her husband but uninsured under the Pennsylvania 

National policy. See Gartelman, 288 Md. at 153, 416 A.2d at 735. This is the outcome 

that the General Assembly sought to mitigate through the enactment of Chapter 573. We 

observe that, were we to adopt the MIA’s broad interpretation of “uninsured,” the 

legislative intent underpinning IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) would not be effectuated as the 

outcome would essentially be the same as in Gartelman. 

Rather, we conclude that, when read in context, the plain language of “uninsured 

motor vehicle” in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured for PIP coverage. IN § 19-505 

concerns PIP coverage only, with IN § 19-505(a) mandating PIP coverage, IN § 19-505(b) 

setting forth the minimum benefits required, and IN § 19-505(c) setting forth permissible 

exclusions from PIP coverage. IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii), the owned but uninsured exclusion, 

specifically begins with the clause “[a]n insurer may exclude from the coverage described 

in this section benefits for[.]” The plain language of that clause relates solely to PIP 

coverage—i.e., the coverage described in IN § 19-505. The owned but uninsured exclusion 

states that PIP coverage may be excluded for the named insured “for an injury that occurs 

while the named insured . . . is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned by[] the 

named insured[.]” IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). Because IN § 19-505 concerns only PIP 
- 41 - 

coverage, it is reasonable to read the plain language of “uninsured” to mean uninsured for 

purposes of PIP—i.e., not insured for PIP coverage. Indeed, given IN § 19-505’s sole focus 

on PIP coverage, it would not make sense for the term “uninsured motor vehicle” in IN § 

19-505(c)(1)(ii) to apply to a motor vehicle that is uninsured altogether. 

Our reading of “uninsured motor vehicle” in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) to mean 

uninsured for PIP coverage is consistent with the manner in which Maryland courts have 

interpreted the owned but uninsured exclusion as it relates to UM/UIM coverage to mean 

uninsured for UM/UIM coverage under the applicable policy, and not to mean uninsured 

altogether. Indeed, the owned but uninsured exclusions for PIP and UM/UIM coverage 

closely mirror one another, and were enacted as part of the same legislation. See Chapter 

573; IN §§ 19-505(c)(1)(ii), 19-509(f)(1). Thus, analogizing to the owned but uninsured 

exclusion for UM/UIM coverage is instructive. 

As an example, in Powell, 86 Md. App. at 115, 585 A.2d at 294, the Court of Special 

Appeals concluded that an owned but uninsured exclusion was authorized under IN § 19-

509(f)(1)’s predecessor, which was the owned but uninsured exclusion for UM/UIM 

coverage. Again, in that case, both vehicles were insured and had UM/UIM coverage, 

albeit in different amounts. See id. at 100, 585 A.2d at 286-87. In other words, neither 

vehicle was uninsured altogether. Mr. Powell sought coverage under the policy insuring 

the vehicle not involved in the accident, which had the higher UM/UIM coverage. See id.

at 100, 585 A.2d at 286-87. That policy, however, had an exclusion for bodily injury to 

the insured that occurred while the insured occupied a motor vehicle owned by the insured 

or his or her spouse and that was not insured under the liability coverage of the policy. See 
- 42 - 

id. at 100, 585 A.2d at 287. Despite the circumstance that the vehicle involved in the 

accident was insured under a separate policy and thus not uninsured altogether, the Court 

of Special Appeals concluded that the owned but uninsured exclusion was authorized, and 

operated to preclude coverage under the policy at issue. See id. at 103, 115, 585 A.2d at 

288, 294. In so concluding, the Court of Special Appeals specifically rejected the 

contention that the vehicle involved in the accident was not “uninsured”—i.e., essentially 

an argument that, if the vehicle were considered insured, then the exclusion would not 

apply—explaining: 

To hold as [Mr. Powell] also urges, i.e., that [Mrs. Powell]’s vehicle was not 

uninsured because it was covered under another policy, would be to permit 

an owner to buy excess coverage under one policy for one vehicle at a 

relatively small premium and coverage under a separate policy for his other 

vehicles at a lesser cost, and have the excess coverage of the first policy apply 

to the vehicles covered under the subsequent policies.

Id. at 110, 585 A.2d at 291 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The same could be 

said concerning PIP coverage—i.e., concluding that a vehicle that is insured under another 

policy without PIP coverage is “insured” such that the owned but uninsured exclusion is 

not applicable could result in permitting an insured to purchase PIP coverage under one 

policy for one vehicle and to not purchase PIP coverage under a second policy for a 

different vehicle, yet have the PIP coverage of the first policy apply to vehicles covered 

under the second policy. 

 Similarly, in Comer, 419 Md. at 97-98, 18 A.3d at 835, this Court held that an owned 

but uninsured exclusion in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy was authorized under 

IN § 19-509(f)(1) and applicable in the case, even though the vehicle involved in the 
- 43 - 

accident was insured under a separate policy, that had different UM/UIM coverage. In 

other words, as in Powell, the vehicle at issue in Comer was not uninsured altogether. And, 

in Comer, 419 Md. at 98, 18 A.3d at 835, this Court explained that one purpose of the 

insurance policy’s exclusion and the owned but uninsured exclusion set forth in IN § 19-

509(f)(1) 

is obviously to prevent a family, owning several motor vehicles, from 

insuring only one or two of them with an insurer, leaving the other vehicles 

uninsured, or underinsured under a different policy, and being able to claim 

[UM/UIM] benefits from the first insurer even though no premium was paid 

to the first insurer for coverage of the other vehicles.

Again, the same concern is present as to PIP coverage. 

 The MIA contends that Comer and Powell are inapplicable to the present case, as 

UM/UIM and PIP coverage are distinguishable. To be sure, UM/UIM coverage and PIP 

coverage are distinct. However, as discussed above, in the context of the owned but 

uninsured exclusions, the public policy considerations underpinning those decisions are 

equally applicable to the instant case. Indeed, to hold, as the MIA contends, that an insured 

who carries no-fault insurance on one vehicle can then extend that coverage to other 

vehicles owned by the insured but covered under liability-only coverage, such that that 

other vehicle is considered “insured” and not “uninsured” for purposes of IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii), would create an unreasonable result wherein the insurer providing PIP 

coverage on one vehicle becomes responsible for claims made on another vehicle for which 

the insured has chosen not to obtain PIP coverage. Cf. Powell, 86 Md. App. at 102, 585 

A.2d at 288 (“We do not believe the statute, by extending coverage to the insured when 
- 44 - 

involved in any accident, enlarged the class of ‘insured motor vehicles’ under policies of 

insurance.”).21 

 Having concluded that “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of the owned but 

uninsured exclusion set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means uninsured for PIP coverage, 

we consider whether Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab, which was a motor vehicle as determined 

above, was an “uninsured motor vehicle.” We conclude that Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab was, 

in fact, an “uninsured motor vehicle” because it was uninsured for PIP coverage; indeed, it 

is clear from the record that Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab had liability-only coverage and did 

not have PIP coverage. Thus, although, as discussed above, Bundu-Conteh would 

generally have PIP coverage through State Farm, even for injuries sustained while driving 

his taxicab, such PIP coverage properly may be excluded pursuant to IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) 

because Bundu-Conteh, the named insured, was injured while occupying an uninsured 

motor vehicle that he owned. Accordingly, we must next determine whether the third 

exclusion in the State Farm policy in this case is authorized by the owned but uninsured 

exclusion from PIP coverage set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). We conclude that third 

exclusion is authorized and applicable, and explain. 

 

21We note that an insured who waives PIP coverage would not be able to claim that 

coverage under any policy. See IN § 19-506(b). In the context of a driver-owned taxicab, 

however, an insurer could find itself in a similar situation. It is undisputed that 

Amalgamated, the insurer of the taxicab, did not offer PIP coverage to Bundu-Conteh for 

the taxicab; under IN §§ 19-501(b)(2)(ii) and 19-505(a), Amalgamated was not required to 

offer PIP coverage for the taxicab. State Farm alleges that, as the owner of the taxicab, 

Bundu-Conteh was free to purchase PIP coverage for the taxicab if he so chose. The MIA 

does not directly assert that Bundu-Conteh was unable to purchase PIP coverage, but refers 

to State Farm’s contention that PIP coverage could be purchased for a taxicab as a “red 

herring[.]” 
- 45 - 

 The third exclusion in the no-fault coverage section of the State Farm policy 

provides: 

Exclusions

THERE IS NO COVERAGE:

* * * 

3. FOR YOU OR ANY RESIDENT RELATIVE WHILE OCCUPYING A 

MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU OR ANY RESIDENT RELATIVE 

AND WHICH IS NOT INSURED UNDER THE LIABILITY COVERAGE 

OF THIS POLICY[.] 

In other words, the provision excludes from no-fault coverage—i.e., PIP coverage—any 

personal injury to the insured while the insured was occupying a motor vehicle owned by 

the insured, but not covered by liability provisions of the State Farm policy. The third 

exclusion is unambiguous, and clearly precludes coverage of Bundu-Conteh’s PIP claim 

under the State Farm policy. 

As to whether the exclusion is authorized by the General Assembly, we note that 

“[t]his Court has consistently held that exclusions from statutorily mandated insurance 

coverage not expressly authorized by the [General Assembly] will not be recognized.” 

Comer, 419 Md. at 97, 18 A.3d at 834 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

We conclude that the third exclusion in the State Farm policy is authorized by the General 

Assembly, and thus is valid. IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) provides: 

An insurer may exclude from the coverage described in this section benefits 

for: 

 . . . 
- 46 - 

(ii) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides 

in the named insured’s household for an injury that occurs while the named 

insured or family member is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned 

by: 

1. the named insured; or 

2. an immediate family member of the named insured who resides in 

the named insured’s household. 

Here, Bundu-Conteh was the named insured, he was occupying a motor vehicle (the 

taxicab) owned by him when he was injured, and the taxicab was not insured for PIP 

coverage and, as such, was “uninsured” within the meaning of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). What 

we said in Comer, 419 Md. at 98, 18 A.3d at 835, on this point rings equally true in this 

case—obviously, one purpose of the third exclusion in the State Farm policy and IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii) is to prevent a named insured, who owns several motor vehicles, from insuring 

only one of them with an insurer, leaving the other vehicles uninsured for PIP coverage 

under a different policy, and then being able to claim PIP coverage and benefits from the 

first insurer even though no premium was paid to the first insurer for coverage of the other 

vehicles. Indeed, “[a]n interpretation of the Insurance Code that would allow this would 

be unreasonable.” Comer, 419 Md. at 98, 18 A.3d at 835. Put simply, the third exclusion 

in the State Farm policy is authorized by IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and is applicable under the 

circumstances of this case. Thus, State Farm properly denied Bundu-Conteh’s PIP claim, 

as Bundu-Conteh was not entitled to PIP coverage and benefits for the injuries that he 

sustained while driving the taxicab.

In sum, we conclude that a taxicab is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the owned 

but uninsured exclusion from PIP coverage set forth in IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) and for the 
- 47 - 

payment of benefits under IN § 19-513(d)(1)(i), and that Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab is a 

motor vehicle for those purposes. We further determine that an “uninsured motor vehicle” 

for purposes of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii) means a motor vehicle uninsured for PIP coverage, 

such that a motor vehicle, including a taxicab, that is not insured for PIP coverage is an 

“uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). Applying that term to the 

circumstances of this case leads to the conclusion that Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab, which was 

not insured for PIP coverage, is an “uninsured motor vehicle” for purposes of IN § 19-

505(c)(1)(ii), such that an insurer may properly exclude PIP coverage under the owned but 

uninsured exclusion. And, we conclude that the third exclusion in the State Farm policy is 

a valid exclusion that is permissible under IN § 19-505(c)(1)(ii). Accordingly, we hold 

that the third exclusion in the State Farm policy applies in this case, and that State Farm is 

not responsible for PIP coverage for injuries that Bundu-Conteh sustained while driving 

the taxicab, which was owned by Bundu-Conteh, but not insured with State Farm. Stated 

otherwise, we determine that Bundu-Conteh is not entitled to PIP coverage under the State 

Farm policy under the circumstances of this case. As such, we affirm the judgment of the 

Court of Special Appeals.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 

APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY 

COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 41 

September Term, 2016 

______________________________________ 

MARYLAND INSURANCE 

ADMINISTRATION 

v. 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL. 

______________________________________ 

Barbera, C.J. 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts 

Hotten

Getty, 

JJ.

______________________________________ 

Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J., 

which Barbera, C.J., and Greene, J., join.

______________________________________ 

Filed: January 23, 2017 

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-C-14-000883

Argued: December 5, 2016 
Much of the Majority opinion consists of background information and detailed 

descriptions of cases with which I have no quarrel. My disagreement is with the Majority 

opinion’s conclusion that a properly insured taxicab is an “uninsured” vehicle for purposes 

of the personal injury protection (“PIP”) statute – Maryland Code, Insurance Article 

(“IN”), §19-505.1 That conclusion is not only contrary to the plain language of the statute 

and its legislative history, but also inconsistent with our most recent decision on PIP 

coverage and the construction of the statute by the agency charged with administering it. 

 As the Majority Opinion recounts, Alhassan Bundu-Conteh entered into an 

insurance contract with State Farm for his personal motor vehicle under which part of the 

premium he paid was for PIP coverage. He also owned a car that he used for his taxicab 

business, which he insured with another company that insures taxicabs. Consistent with 

Maryland law, that insurer did not provide PIP coverage in its policy. (There is no dispute 

that taxicabs are excluded from the State law concerning PIP coverage – that is, automobile 

insurers are not required to offer PIP coverage for taxicabs – and there is no indication in 

the record that they do.)

 As the Majority opinion indicates, it is often said that PIP coverage follows the 

person – i.e., the insured. Majority slip op. at 15. It is thus undisputed that, if Mr. Bundu-

 

1The Majority opinion also devotes considerable space to explaining why a taxicab 

is a “vehicle” for purposes of the PIP statute despite the exclusion of taxicabs from the 

definition of the term “vehicle” in the statute. Majority slip op. at 28-37. While the 

Majority opinion must surmount that significant hurdle in order to agree with State Farm 

on the outcome of this case, we need not decide that question in order to decide this case 

correctly. See footnote 15 below. 
- 2 - 

Conteh were walking down the street and hit by a car, he would receive PIP benefits under 

the policy. If he were riding a bicycle and were involved in a motor vehicle accident, he 

would be covered. If he were a passenger in a taxicab when it collided with another car, 

he would be covered. If he were driving a taxicab owned by someone else, he would be 

covered.2

 State Farm argues, and the Majority opinion apparently agrees, that PIP coverage 

does not follow Mr. Bundu-Conteh if he is in an accident while driving a taxicab that he 

owns and that he has fully insured in accordance with the requirements of State law. The 

Maryland Insurance Administration (“MIA”), which administers the State Insurance Law, 

rejected such an incongruous interpretation. So should we. 

PIP Coverage

As the Majority opinion recounts, beginning in 1972, State law required PIP 

coverage as part of motor vehicle insurance to cover economic losses resulting from 

automobile accidents. As the Majority opinion also notes, this requirement was 

indisputably remedial legislation. See Majority slip op. at 11-12, 35. PIP coverage was 

part of the no-fault automobile insurance reforms that were adopted in a number of states 

during the 1970s and 1980s. It was intended to compensate victims of automobile 

accidents for economic damages more quickly and efficiently, with lower administrative 

costs and without regard to fault. See generally J.M. Anderson, P. Heaton, & S. J. Carroll, 

The U.S. Experience with No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Retrospective (Rand 

 

2 Nasseri v. GEICO, 390 Md. 188 (2005). 
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Corporation 2010). 

 “PIP is a pure social risk-allocating mechanism. By mandating PIP, the State has 

made a public policy decision to provide monetary relief to nearly every victim of a motor 

vehicle accident occurring in Maryland. Mandatory PIP shifts the risk of caring for these 

victims from the State to the private sector.” A. Janquitto, Maryland Motor Vehicle 

Insurance (3d ed. 2011) §9.1 at 497.

Pertinent to this case, while Maryland law requires PIP coverage on most vehicle 

policies, it does not require PIP coverage in policies covering taxicabs or buses. IN §19-

501(b).3

 According to the record in this case, the insurer of Mr. Bundu-Conteh did not 

offer PIP coverage and there is no indication in the record that such coverage is available 

in Maryland from any insurer. 

 The Statutory Authorization for an “Owned but Uninsured” Exclusion 

When an insured has PIP coverage through a policy, the insurer must pay PIP 

benefits whenever the insured is involved in a “motor vehicle accident” unless the law 

provides for an exclusion and the insured’s policy includes that exclusion. IN §19-505(c). 

 

3

 Taxicabs and buses were excluded from the requirement to have PIP coverage by 

the General Assembly in the late 1970s. Chapter 655, Laws of Maryland 1977; Chapter 

819, Laws of Maryland 1978. There is some indication in the legislative history, in 

testimony apparently provided by proponents of the bill excluding taxicabs, that PIP 

coverage had not been intended for commercial enterprises such as cab companies and 

common carriers, and that the PIP coverage of taxicabs had proved duplicative of other 

coverage, such as worker’s compensation insurance. See Bill file for House Bill 1272 

(1977).

The Public Service Commission specifies insurance coverage for taxicabs for which 

a permit is required. Maryland Code, Public Utilities Article, §10-207. The Commission 

does not specify PIP coverage in its regulations. See COMAR 20.90.02.19, 20.90.03.17. 
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The exclusion at issue in this case appears in IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii)1. That provision allows 

an insurer to have certain exclusions from PIP coverage, including an exclusion for “an 

injury that occurs while the named insured ... is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle 

owned by ... the named insured....” 

 What the “Owned but Uninsured” Exclusion Means 

 In denying PIP coverage to Mr. Bundu-Conteh, State Farm relied on an exclusion 

in its policy that it traces to the authorization for an “owned but uninsured” exclusion in IN 

§19-505(c)(1)(ii). On its face, the statutory provision does not apply to this case. Mr. 

Bundu-Conteh was not occupying an “uninsured” motor vehicle. The taxicab was insured

– indeed, it is undisputed that the vehicle had all the insurance coverage required by State 

law for taxicabs, although that coverage does not include PIP coverage. (Indeed, the record 

indicates that the insurance company that provided the policy for Mr. Bundu-Conteh’s 

taxicab does not even offer PIP coverage). State Farm’s argument that its denial of 

coverage is justified by this provision requires one to rewrite the statute – i.e., that the 

exclusion extends to “an injury that occurs while the named insured ... is occupying an 

uninsured a motor vehicle that, even if insured by another policy, lacks PIP coverage and 

that is owned by ... the named insured....” 

 If the statute were rewritten in that manner, it would be quite at odds with the other 

exclusions in the statute. Other than an exclusion for a non-resident pedestrian involved in 
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an accident outside Maryland,4 the other exclusions all are designed to deny benefits to a 

person involved in some kind of wrongdoing. In particular, the other exclusions are for (1) 

a person who intentionally causes the accident,5

 (2) a person operating a vehicle he knows 

is stolen,6 and (3) a person committing a felony or attempting to elude the police at the time 

of the accident.7 In this context, it is evident that the exclusion for an accident involving 

an “owned but uninsured” vehicle is meant to allow insurers to deny benefits to those who 

fail to comply with the compulsory automobile insurance requirement.8

 The Majority opinion suggests that the exclusion is meant to prevent one who owns 

multiple automobiles from waiving PIP coverage on all but one of the vehicles and then 

collecting PIP benefits if the individual happened to be in an accident in one of the cars for 

which he had waived PIP coverage.9

 See Majority slip op. at 8, 21-27, 46. However, the 

 

4

 IN §19-505(c)(1)(i)2. Another provision permits an insurer to exclude certain 

benefits, but not all PIP coverage, with respect to motorcycles, mopeds, and motor scooters. 

IN §19-505(c)(2). 

5

IN §19-505(c)(1)(i)1. 

6

IN §19-505(c)(1)(i)3. 

7

IN §19-505(c)(1)(i)4. 

8 See Maryland Code, Transportation Article, §17-104. 

9

 The Majority opinion relies primarily on GEICO v. Comer, 419 Md. 89 (2011), by 

analogy for this proposition. Majority slip op. at 21-24, 42-44. The analogy does not work. 

In that case, Mr. Comer was injured while riding a motorcycle in an accident with an underinsured motorist. He was eligible for uninsured motorist (“UM”) benefits under both the 

policy that covered the motorcycle, as well as a more generous policy covering his father’s 

automobile. The UM provision of the motorcycle policy was exhausted as a result of a setoff by benefits obtained from the tortfeasor’s policy and Mr. Comer therefore sought UM 
- 6 - 

statute already eliminates that possibility. As the Majority opinion notes elsewhere, under 

IN §19-506(b), a waiver of PIP coverage for one vehicle means that the insured forgoes 

PIP benefits anywhere. See Majority slip op. at 13-14. But that is not this case. Mr. 

Bundu-Conteh did not waive PIP coverage in his State Farm policy. Nor did he waive PIP 

coverage for his taxicab; under State law, the insurer did not offer it to him and was not 

required to do so. 

 The legislative history of the statute confirms this understanding of the statute. 

Authorization for an “owned but uninsured” exclusion was added to the statute by the 

 

benefits under the more generous provisions of his father’s policy. The insurer of the 

father’s policy declined to provide UM benefits to Mr. Comer under an exclusion that 

pertained to injuries suffered while occupying a vehicle not covered by that policy. This 

Court held that the policy exclusion was permissible under a provision of the UM statute. 

The Court reasoned that the purpose of such an exclusion “is obviously to prevent a family, 

owning several motor vehicles, from insuring only one or two of them with an insurer, 

leaving the other vehicles uninsured, or underinsured under a different policy, and being 

able to claim uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits from the first insurer ....” 419 

Md. at 98.

As noted in the text above, in contrast to the UM statute, the PIP statute contains a 

waiver provision under which a waiver for one vehicle would waive PIP coverage for all. 

Thus, the circumstance imagined in the Majority opinion – obtaining PIP coverage for one 

vehicle, waiving it for other vehicles owned by the same person, and attempting to collect 

PIP benefits for accidents involving the other vehicles – would not occur. 

State Farm made a similar “windfall” argument in its brief but, presumably because 

it does not work, abandoned it at oral argument in favor of a “windfall” scenario that might 

be termed “Seven Cabs for Seven Brothers.” Under this scenario, several siblings would 

all live in the same household, would all have PIP coverage under the same vehicle owned 

by a parent, would all own taxicabs insured without PIP coverage, and would all have 

claims resulting from motor vehicle accidents involving their respective cabs. Perhaps that 

is possible in some universe, but it appears to be in the same realm as the monkey who 

pecks at a typewriter for eternity and eventually produces a complete copy of Hamlet. 
- 7 - 

Legislature in 1982. Chapter 573, Laws of Maryland 1982. That bill was evidently a 

response to this Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman,

288 Md. 151 (1980), in which the claimant sought PIP benefits under her husband’s 

automobile policy after she was injured while occupying a vehicle (a moped) that had no 

insurance at all. This Court held that, in the absence of legislative authorization, an insurer 

could not deny PIP benefits to one who was insured under a policy including such benefits, 

but who was injured while operating an uninsured vehicle.10

The legislative file contains copies of the Gartelman decision; it also contains a 

copy of a floor report, which notes that the bill was “in response to” that decision. As 

indicated above, the Gartelman decision involved a situation in which the injured party 

was operating a vehicle without any insurance.

11

 It is also notable that, in the synopsis of 

the bill that appears in the floor report, the only definition of “uninsured vehicle” in the 

synopsis refers to a “vehicle whose coverage is less than the coverage required to be 

provided by law.” (emphasis added). 

 

10 The Court also held that a policy provision that excluded uninsured motorist 

(‘UM”) coverage for individuals like the claimant in Gartelman was also not authorized 

by the statute in that the statutory authorization only permitted exclusion of UM benefits 

for the owner of an uninsured vehicle involved in the accident and not other insured parties, 

such as the claimant.

11 In its analysis of the Gartelman decision, the Majority opinion concludes that a 

construction of IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii) to refer to a vehicle without any insurance would lead 

to the same result in Gartelman as under the prior statute and therefore be contrary to 

legislative intent. Majority slip op. at 40. That conclusion is incorrect. The vehicle 

occupied by the claimant in Gartelman lacked any insurance. 
- 8 - 

Thus, neither the plain language of IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii) nor its legislative history 

supports a denial of PIP coverage to an insured who also owns and operates a properly 

insured taxicab. As this Court has stated on numerous occasions: “Where statutory 

language is plain and unambiguous, and expresses a definite meaning consonant with the 

statute’s purpose, courts must not insert or delete words to make a statute express an 

intention different from its clear meaning.”12

 Moreover, given the remedial purpose of the 

statutory requirement of PIP coverage, the statute should be construed liberally to promote 

its purpose.13

 

 Given the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, it is perhaps 

unsurprising that the agency charged with administering the State insurance law agrees 

with this interpretation. As the Majority opinion notes, the Insurance Commissioner 

concluded that the authorization for an “owned but uninsured” exclusion in IN §19-

505(c)(1)(ii) refers to a motor vehicle without any insurance. Majority slip op. at 7. The 

MIA’s construction of the statute is entitled to considerable weight. Crofton Convalescent 

Center, Inc. v. DHMH, 413 Md. 201, 215 (2010); Maryland Aviation Administration v. 

Noland, 386 Md. 556, 572 (2005); Maryland Insurance Commissioner v. Kaplan, 434 Md. 

280, 298 (2013). 

 

12 Gartelman, 288 Md. at 159. 

13 See Gartelman, 288 Md. at 159-60 (discussing remedial purpose of uninsured 

motorist coverage). 
- 9 - 

Moreover, an authoritative treatise on the State motor vehicle insurance law 

likewise agrees with this interpretation. See A. Janquitto, Maryland Motor Vehicle 

Insurance (3d ed. 2011) §9.8(A)(7) at pp. 541-44. The treatise author ties this interpretation 

of the exclusion to the rest of the motor vehicle insurance law: 

In many respects, the exclusion of insureds who own uninsured 

vehicles is a common denominator running through Maryland’s 

comprehensive motor vehicle insurance scheme. This exclusion appears, in 

various forms, in Subtitle 5’s regulation of PIP and uninsured motorist 

coverages, and in the Uninsured Division [of the Maryland Automobile 

Insurance Fund] sections of Subtitle 6. The purpose of the exclusion is 

simple. It furthers Maryland’s comprehensive insurance scheme by 

encouraging the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle to become insured by 

imposing on him the penalty of exclusion form coverage for failure to obtain 

insurance.

Id. at p. 543 (quotation marks and citations omitted). After analyzing IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii) 

in some detail, the treatise author concludes that “uninsured should be given its ordinary 

meaning – a vehicle without insurance – though, arguably it also includes a vehicle insured 

by a policy with liability insurance that did not meet the requirements of Title 17 of the 

Transportation Article.” Id. at p. 544. In the case before us, Mr. Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab 

is not a vehicle without insurance; nor is it a vehicle whose policy does not comply with 

the requirements of Title 17 of the Transportation Article.

It is also notable that a related provision of the State insurance law provides that an 

insurer who provides a policy with PIP coverage “shall pay [PIP] benefits . . . to an 

individual insured under the policy who is injured in a motor vehicle accident . . . while 

occupying a motor vehicle for which [PIP] coverage[] [is] not in effect.” IN §19-

513(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added). This indicates that the absence of PIP coverage does not 
- 10 - 

equate to “uninsured” for purposes of IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii).14 This Court has opined that 

this provision is directly aimed at accidents in which the insured occupies a taxicab or bus, 

as taxicabs and buses are vehicles for which PIP coverage would not be in effect. Nasseri 

v. GEICO, 390 Md. 188, 194-95 (2005). “Section 19-513(d) guarantees that persons who 

have purchased PIP . . . coverage are entitled to [that] coverage, even when the vehicles 

insured under their policy are not involved in the accident.” Janquitto, supra, §9.14(B) at 

p. 586. 

Summary 

 For the reasons outlined above, I would hold that a properly insured taxicab is not 

an “uninsured” vehicle for purposes of the exclusion authorized by IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii).15 

 

14 State Farm asserts that such an interpretation contradicts the authorized exclusion 

for an “owned but uninsured” vehicle in IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii). But there is only a 

contradiction if one adopts the extremely broad interpretation of the exclusion advanced 

by State Farm. If one interprets these provisions according to their plain language, they 

are perfectly compatible. A well-known canon of statutory construction prefers compatible 

constructions of statutory language over contradictory constructions. E.g., CashCall, Inc. 

v. Maryland Commissioner of Financial Regulation, 448 Md. 412, 431 (2016). The 

“owned but uninsured” exclusion provision (IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii)) allows exclusion of 

benefits when the insured occupies a vehicle that the insured owns and that carries no 

insurance. By contrast, IN §19-513(d)(1)(i) makes clear that PIP benefits are to be paid 

when the insured is injured while occupying a vehicle without PIP coverage. In this case, 

Mr. Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab was properly insured; therefore, the exclusion authorized by 

IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii) does not apply. But that taxicab, consistent with Maryland law, did 

not itself have PIP coverage and thus PIP coverage was “not in effect.” IN §19-513(d)(1)(i) 

makes clear that, in that situation, PIP benefits are to be paid. 

15 As noted earlier, the decision reached by the Majority opinion also depends on its 

conclusion that a taxicab is a “vehicle” for purposes of IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii), despite the 

fact that taxicabs are excluded from the definition of “vehicle” in IN §19-501(b) – a 

definition that applies to IN §19-505(c)(1)(ii). I see no need to reach that issue. That is 

because: (1) there is no dispute in this case that Mr. Bundu-Conteh was involved in a 
- 11 - 

Accordingly, I would confirm the decision of the agency in this case. 

 Chief Judge Barbera and Judge Greene advise that they join this dissent. 

 

“motor vehicle accident” because, as in Nasseri, 390 Md. at 193-94, the other car involved 

in the accident was not a taxicab; and (2) Mr. Bundu-Conteh’s taxicab was not “uninsured” 

for the reasons set forth in the text.