* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 29, 2005

Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

KATHY V. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 04-3358 (D.C. No. 02-CV-2568-KHV)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before O’BRIEN , HOLLOWAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Kathy V. Williams appeals from a grant of summary j udgment in favor of the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (USPS), her employer.-2-

Williams alleges that the USPS discriminated agains t her on the bases of race, sex, religion, and disability and retaliated agains t her for protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND Williams, an African-American woman, has been an employee of the USPS since 1987. In the present lawsuit, she claims dis crimination by rejection for the Associate Supervisor Program, lack of considerationfor promotions to Supervisor of Customer Services in two locations, denial of he r bids on the positions of Clerk Stenographer and Air Records Processor, and unfair imposition of mandatory leave until her physician eased her work restrictio ns. She also makes general allegations of discriminatory and retaliatory activ ity resulting in harassment and unfounded disciplinary action. On the Postmaster’s first motion for summary judgme nt, the district court dismissed all but Williams’ race and sex claims. D uring a motions hearing, the court invited the Postmaster to file a second motio n on the remaining claims. It then denied Williams’ motion to reconsider the init ial entry of summary judgment, granted the Postmaster’s second motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment on the entire case. This appeal followed.-3-

II. DISCUSSION Because Williams is representing herself in this ap peal, we must construe her brief liberally. See Cannon v. Mullin , 383 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied , 125 S. Ct. 1664 (2005). Her first argument seems to be that she was denied due process of law by operation of the distr ict court’s administrative procedural rule generally prohibiting pro se litigants from filing their submissions electronically. D. Kan. Admin. P. for Filing, Sign ing, & Verifying Pleadings & Papers by Elec. Means in Civ. Cases, § I(A)(2). Parties proceeding pro se are directed to file paper originals, which the clerk’s office scans into the Electronic Filing System and maintains in a paper file. Id. at § III(B). Williams alleges that certain exhibits attached to her response to the Postmaster’s motion for summary judgment and to hermotion for reconsideration were missing from the Electronic Filing System. Py ramiding on this allegation, she speculates that the district court failed to co nsider these documents. The docket, however, reflects that the documents submitted by Williams were filed and made electronically accessible, except exhibits accompanying her motion for reconsideration. These documents were filed as part of the district court record, in accord with the administrative rule allowing the conventional filing of exhibits “that are not available in electronic form or that are too lengthy to electronically image, i.e., ‘scan.’” Id. at § IV(C). It is apparent that the district cou rt had1 We note that the appellate paper record includes al l exhibits filed by

Williams. See 10th Cir. R. 30.3 (exempting a pro se appellant from appendix requirements and permitting a pro se appellant to proceed on the record on appeal). -4- ready access to all of Williams’ filings. 1 There is no factual basis for a dueprocess contention. As a result, the district court did not err in denying Williams’ motion for postjudgment relief. Williams also mounts an attack on the content of th e district court’s summary-judgment orders. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Sub stance Abuse Servs ., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary j udgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of mater ial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id . “A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the gove rning law, and the dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Allen v. Muskogee, Okla. , 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997). Unsupported conclusory allegations, however , do not create an issue of fact. See Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor , 358 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 125 S.Ct. 47 (2004).-5-

To survive summary judgment on her Title VII claims , Williams relies on the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As we have explained: McDonnell Douglas first requires the aggrieved employee to establish a prima facie case of prohibited employme nt action. . . . If the employee makes a prima facie showing, the burde n shifts to the defendant employer to state a legitimate, nondiscri minatory reason for its adverse employment action. If the employermeets this burden, then summary judgment is warranted unless t he employee can show there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reasons are pretextual. Plotke v. White , 405 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations a nd quotations omitted). Using the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the district court carefully sorted through Williams’ discrimination claims. Itdetermined that Williams failed to demonstrate her prima facie case for mostof these claims and, in instances which she did, she did not establish pret ext. In making its ruling, the court informed Williams that her unsupported accusations of perjury and misrepresentation were an insufficient showing of p retext. We agree with the district court and affirm the entry of summary judg ment on Williams’ Title VII claims. Williams’ claim under the Rehabilitation Act is bas ed on the Postmaster’s failure to provide light-duty work to accommodate h er lifting restriction from September 1998 through January 1999. To determine whether an individual is disabled under the Act, a court examines the nature and severity of the-6-

impairment, along with the expected duration of the impairment and the permanent or expected long-term impact of the impairment. Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act, which defines “dis ability” in the same way as the Rehabilitation Act, see Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co ., 162 F.3d 604, 608 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998)). Williams argues that the district court erred in co ncluding that she did not have a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation Act and that the Postmaster considered her as having a permanent disability. T o the contrary, the district court correctly determined that Williams’ four-mont h restriction was of insufficient duration to qualify as a disability un der the Act. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the Postmaster did not con sider Williams to be permanently disabled. Accordingly, Williams failed to establish a prima facie case under the Act, and summary judgment in the Pos tmaster’s favor was the appropriate disposition of her claim. III. CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s orders of May 5, 2004 and August 19, 2004. As for Williams’ “Motion[] to Compel Delivery, Exte nd Appellant’s Time for-7-

Filing, for Appellee Sanction and Finding in Favor of Appellant,” her motion already has been granted to the extent it asks for leave to file a reply brief. The remainder of the motion is denied as moot. The man date shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge