Cunningham also sued Dr. Re hana A hmed for me dical malpra ctice r elated to he r father’s 1 de a th, bu t A hme d w a s su bs e qu e ntl y

no ns uit e d a

nd is n ot a pa rt y to t his a pp e a l. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00711- CV

Che r r ie Cun ning ham , I ndiv idua llyand a s N e xtF r ie nd

of Tr oy Co nas te r , A ppe lla nt

v. Co l u mb i a / S t. Da v i d ’s H ea l th ca re S y s te m, L . P. d/b /a Sou th Austin H ospital, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN301759 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
Cherrie Cunningham, individually and as the next friend of her l at e father, Troy Conaster, filed suit ag ainst appellant Columbia/St. David’s H ealthca re Sy stem, L .P., (“Columbia”) on May 29, 2003, alleg ing that the hospital’s medica l neg lige nce c aused he r father’s de ath. The trial 1 court g rante d a no-e vidence summary judgme nt in favor of

Columbi a, dismissing ea ch of Cunningham’s medical malpr actice claims. She now appe als, urgi n g t h at (1) a lthough he r expert was not timely desig nated, the trial court should have considere d the expert’s af fidavit as summaryBe cause t h e o u t come of this appeal turns solely on the proc edura l history , it is not 2 ne c e ssa ry to d isc us s th e su

bs tanti ve fa c ts und e rl y ingCunnin g ham’ s me dic a l ma lpr a c tic e c la ims
.

2 judgme nt e vidence and (2) alternatively , the trial court should ha ve g rante d her m o t i o n for
c on tin ua nc e . We wi ll a ff

ir m. 2
DI SCU SSIO N A def endant moving for summary judgme nt unde r Rule 166a(i) must e stablish that “af ter a d eq u at e t ime for discove ry . . . there is no evidence of one or more e ssential elements of a claim or de fense on which an a dverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.” Te x . R. Civ. P. 1 66 a (i ); Fo rt W

or th O ste op ath ic Hos

p. , In c . v . R e ese , 148 S.W .3d 94, 98 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff then ca

rries the burden to put for th enoug h probative evidenc e to r aise a g enuine issue of materia l fac t on eac h of the c halleng ed ele ments. J oh ns on v . B re we r &Pr itc ha rd , P .C. , 73 S.W .3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002).

To prec lude summary

judgme nt in a medical malpr actice case , th e p la in ti ff must offe r expert testimony

on the essential elements of its c laim, inc luding the standar d of ca re, br eac h, and
causation. American Trans itional C are Ctrs., Inc. v. Palac ios , 46 S.W .3d 873, 876 (Tex. 2001); Shelton v. Sargent , 1 44 S.W. 3d 11 3, 12 4 (Tex. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 4, pe t. d e nie d) ; se e als o Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Bioscience s, Inc. , 124 S.W .3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003) (g ener ally discussing plaintiff’s burde n in no-evidenc e summary j u d gm en t); Krishnan v. Ramirez , 42 S.W .3d 205, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denie d) (discussing elements of me dical malpra ctice c laim).

I n order for a trial court to co n s i d er the plaintiff’s e x pert’s te stimony as summary judgme nt evidence , the pl aintiff mus t have timely desig nated that e x pert a s a testifying w itness. SeeFor a re tained, t es t i fying e x pert, Rule 194.2(f ) per mits di scover

y of the e x pert’s 3 biogr aphica l information; t h e s u bject matter of the e x pert’s te stimony ; a brief summary

of the expert’s opinions and the basis for the m; all doc u m en t s and it ems prepa red by , revie wed by , or p r o v i d e d t o t h e e x p e rti n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f t e s t i m o n y; an d

t h e e x p e r t ’ s c u r r e n tr e s u m e an d

b i b l i o g r a p h y. Tex. R. C iv. P. 194.2(f). Medica l malprac ti ce ca s es that we re f iled prior to September

1, 2003, as wa s the instant 4 case , are g overne d by

article 4590i. See A c t of A u g u s t 29 , 1 9 7 7 , 6 5 th L e g . , R. S. , c h
. 8 1 7 , 1 9 7 7 T e x. Gen. L aws 2039, (for

merly codified at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, §§ 1. 0 1 -1 6
. 0 2 (t he “Medic al L iability

and I mprovement Ac t”)), r epea led by Act of September 1, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 864, 884. Article 4590i, section 13.01(a )(3) , mandated that c la ima nts in h e a lthc a re lia

bil ity c la ims fi le a n ex pert re po rt wi thi n 9 0 d a y s o f f

ili ngthe c la im; section 13.01(k) expressly p ro h i b i ted the use of that repor

t as evidenc e for

any purpose. See id. Up on the re pe a l of

a rt ic le 45 90 i, the re le va

nt se c tio ns g ov e rn inge xpe rt re po rt s w e re re c od if

ie d, wi th some amendme nts, in chapter 74 of the ci v i l p ra cti ce a

nd reme dies code
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351 (West 2005). 3 Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 93 .6 . A c c or din g to T e xas R ule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 19 5. 2, a

pla int if f m a y sa tis fy thi s de sig natio n re qu ir e me nt by fu rn ish ing the inf

or ma tio n lis te d in Rul e 19 4. 2( f) in re sp on se to a re qu e st for disclosure
. Id . 194.2(f) ; 195.2. Although a plaintiff may

have supplied some inf

ormation about 3 its ex pert by

filing a n expert repor

t, as is statutorily

require d in medical malpra ctice c ases, the filing 4 of such a repor t does not satisfy

the proc edura l require ment o f “designating” an expert. Coleman

v . W oo lf , 1 29 S .W .3 d 74 4, 74 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 4, no pe t.) ; Pa tri ac c a v . F ro st , 98 S.W .3d 303, 304 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] , no pet.).

A plaintiff’s e x pert will be c onsidered de signated “timely ” if the r equeste d information i s provided either 90 day s befor e the e nd of the discove ry period or a s otherwise or dere d by the cour t, such as in a L evel I I I scheduling order
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 90 .4 ; 19 5. 2. I f a pa rt y fa ils to tim e ly de sig nate a n e xpe rt

wi tne ss— i.e. , fa ils to time ly pr ov ide an a de qu a te re sp on se to t he Rul e 194.2(f) reque st—then testimony from that expert will be ex cluded unless the trial cour t determines that the party seeking to introduce the e vidence established either (1) the e x istence of

g ood cause for4

its failure or ( 2) that it would not unfa irly surprise or

prejudice the other pa

rties to admit the evidenc e despite the inade quate discove ry response . Id . 193.6(a) , (b). Eve n if the par ty seeking to admit the evidenc e is unable to e stablish either g ood cause or a la ck of unf air surpr ise or p rejudice, the trial
c ourt ha s d isc re tio n to g ra

nt a c on tin ua nce to a llo w the pa

rt y to m a ke , ame nd , o r s up ple me nt i ts discovery response and to allow the other parties to c onduct additional discover y based on a

ny new information pre sented by

that response
. Id . 193.6(c)
. I n the instant case , acc ording to a L evel I I Ischeduli n g o rd er, Cunning ham was require d to desig nate all experts by J une 29, 2004. Cunningham filed an initial expert report by Dr. Cha r le s M a r a

b le , in c o mp li a n c e w it

h a rti c le 4 5 9 0 i, in A u g u s t 2 0 0 3
. A s o f D e cembe r 2003, Col umb ia ha d s e rv e d a

re qu e st f or dis c los ur e on Cunnin g ham see kin g a ll inf or ma tio n liste d in

Rul e 194.2 (f ), an d she had r esponded only that “Plaintiffs have not y et deter mined testify ing e x pert witnesses. Plaintiffs will supplement pursuant to the cour t’s Scheduling Orde r for

a L evel I I Icase .” When the J une dea dline passed without Cunningha m supplementing he r re sponse to Columbi a’s reque st for disclosure, Columbia moved for a no-evide nce summary judgme nt. On Aug ust 2, 2004, Columbi a urg ed that it was e ntitled to judgment as a matter of la

w bec ause, g iven Cunningha m’s failure to timely

desig nate a

n expert witness in this medical malprac tice case , she had no probative evidenc e on the e ssential elements of he r cla ims. See id . 166a(i); Palacios , 46 S.W .3d at 876, 879.

Cunningham responded to Columbi a’s summary judgme nt motion on S eptember 7, 2004, attachingMara

ble’s af fidavit for the first time. Cunningham r elied on this affidavit as pr oof that she had pr oduced mor e than a scintilla of evidenc e to ra ise g enuine issues of materi al fact on
e a c h o f h e r e sse nti a l e le me nts . A lth ou g h s he a c kn ow le dg e d th a t Ma ra ble ha d n ot b e e n ti me lyCunningham’s o b l i g ation to desig nate Ma rable as an e x pert witness wa s not satisfied 5 mere ly by having his 4590i report on file. Pa tr ia c c a v . F ro st , 9 8 S. W. 3 d

3 0 3 , 3 0 4 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .], n o p e t.) . F ur the r, a l t h o u g h Cunn ing ham di d f

ile a su pp le me nta l r e sp on se to Colum bia’s re quest for

d isc losure on August 31, 2004—naming Ma rable as a te stify ing e x pert a nd a t t a c h i n g his cu r r iculum vitae as we ll as his previously prepa red 4590i re port—this also did not satisfy her de signation requireme nt beca use it was untimely
. The L evel I I Ischeduling order require d Cunningham’s experts to be desig nated by J une 29, 2004, two month s b ef ore he r supplemental response . And , althoug h the par ties had ente red a

Rule 11 ag ree ment extending other discovery deadlines for Cunningham, the ag ree ment expressly stated that it did not e x ten d C u n n i ng ham’s deadline to de signate experts. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 11. 5 desig nated a s an exp er t witness, she urg ed the tria l court to consider his testimony

as summary jud g me nt e vid e nc e be c a

us e sh e ha d g oo d c a

us e fo r the un tim e ly

de sig natio n a

nd be c a us e it w ou ld not unduly

prejudice Columbi a. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 193.6(a) , (b). The court g rante d Columbi a’s 5 motion to strike Mara

ble’s af fidavit, g rante d Columbi a’s no- evidenc e summary judgme nt motion,
a n d d e n ie d Cun n in g h a m’ s mo ti o n f

o r c o n ti n u a n c e . Cu

n n in g h a m n o w c h a ll e n g e s th e tr ia l c o u rt’s actions. As a pre lim i n ar y matter, Cunning ham urg es that the rule s of civil proce dure g overningdiscovery

prac tices do not apply

in summar y

judgme nt proce eding s beca use such proce eding s are wholly g overne d by Rule 166a. See id. 190-215; 166a. Ac cording ly , Cunningham argues that evide nce of

fer ed for summary

judgme nt purposes nee d not satis fy t h e s tandar ds of admissibili ty

require d for tria l evidence . Henc e, she c ontends that Rule 193.6—dictating that expert testimony is inadmissi ble unless the expert has be en properly desig nated—doe s not prohibit a nondesig nated expert’s testimony from being considere d as summary judgme nt evidence
. See id. 193.6. Cunningham bases her

argument on Johnson v. Fuse lier , 8 3 S. W. 3 d 8 9 2, 8 9 7 ( T e x. Ap p . — T ex arka

na 2002, no pet.) , and Alaniz v. Hoyt , 1 0 5 S. W. 3 d 3 3 0 , 3 4 0 ( T e x. A p p . — Co rpusOther c ourts have r eac hed this same conclusion. See Col e ma n v . W oo lf , 129 S.W .3d 744, 6 747 (Tex. A

pp.—For t Worth 2004, no pet.); Villegas v. Texas De p’t of Transp. , 1 2 0 S. W. 3 d 2 6 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) ; Patriacca , 98 S.W. 3d a t 30 6; see also Soto v. Dre fke , No. 13-03-301- CV, 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 1831, at *7 n.9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi , M a r c h 1 0 , 2 0 05, no pet.) (me m. op.) (re consideringissue afte r Alan iz : “we do not wholly disag ree with the application of rule 193.6 in a

summary judgme nt context under the revise d rules”)
.

6 Christi 2003, no pet.), both of which hold that, bec ause Rule 166a provides a “ compre hensive framework” for summary judgme nt pr ocedur e, the discovery rules are inapplicable to the admission of evide nce at that stag e.

Cunningham acknowle dg es, howe ver, that in a case with fac ts nearly identical to the instant ones, t his Court has taken the c ontrary position. I n Er

se k v . D av is &Da v is, P. C. , w e he ld that, f oll ow ingthe 19 99 re vis ions to th e ru le s o f c ivi l pr oc e dure , th e dis c ov e ry ru le s a pp ly in summary judgme nt proce eding s and, as suc h, the plaintiff’s e x pert’s a ffi d av it could not be
c on sid e re d a s e vid e nc e fo r s u mma ry jud g me nt p ur

po se s w he re the pla int if

f f a ile d to tim e ly

de sig nate the e xpe rt a nd wa s una ble to e sta

bli she ith e r g oo d c a

us e fo r a late des ig natio n o r a

la c k o f u nf a ir
surp ri se or

pr e jud ic e . 6 9 S. W.3 d 2 68 , 2 73 (T e x. Ap p. —Au st in 20 02 , p e t. d e nie d) (c iti ngTe x. R. Civ. P. 193.6). We decline to depart fr om our rea soning in Ersek and, ther efor e, hold that the rule s 6

re qu ir inga n e xpe rt

to b e de sig nate d b e fo re any te sti mony fr om that e xpe rt c a n b e a dmi tte d a

pp ly in summary judgme nt proce eding s, such that a non- desig nated e x pert’s affidavit cannot be c onsidered as summary

judgme nt evidence absent a showing of g ood ca u se or a lack of unfair sur

prise or prejudice
. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 193.6.

The que stion then become s whether Cunningham satisfied her bur den to show either g o o d c a u s e f o r h e r u n t i m e l y d e s i g n a t i o n o r

a l a c k o f u n f a i r s u r p r i s e o r p r e j u d i c e t o C o l u m b i a . If7

Cunningham failed to mee t this burden, then under Rule 193.6, the co u rt ’s decision to st rike Mara ble’s af fidavit should be af

firmed. Id .; Alvarado v. Farah M fg. Co. , 8 3 0 S. W. 2 d

9 1 1 , 9 1 4 ( T e x. 1 9 9 2 ). We revie w this decision under a n abuse of

discretion standa

rd. Ersek, 6 9 S. W. 3 d

a t 271. This Court may

not substit ute its judgment for that of the trial c ourt absent a clea r ab u se of discretion. Gammill v. Jac k W illiams C hevrole t, Inc. , 98 3 S. W.2 d 1 , 5 , 1 3 ( Te x. 19 96 ). Un de r t his test, the trial cour

t’s decision will be upheld unless the recor d demonstrates that the court a cted without refe renc e to any

g uiding pr inciples of law. Id
. Cunningham contends that she e stablished g ood cause with evidence that the fa ilure to timely desig nate Ma

rable was an inadver

tent mistake based on a miscommunication betwe en her attorney and his leg al assistant. Cunningham attache d the l eg al assis tant’s affidavit to her summary judgme nt response, a

verr ing that [t he ass i s t an t ] ch ecke d to see whe ther the de signation had been f iled . . ., saw two [4590i repor

t] documents in the file . . . , [ and] believed that these documents we re the desig nations require d to be filed by J une 2 9 , 2 0 04. When [ Cunningham’s a t t o r n e y ] a s k e d

i f t h e d e s i g n a t i o n h a d

b e e n f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u rt , [t

h e a s s i s t a n t ] t old him that they

alre ady had bee n filed.
The Te x as Supreme Court ha s held that “[c]ounsel should not be excused fr om the require ments of the rule without a strict showing o f go o d cause.” Alvarado , 830 S.W .2d at 915 (discussing Rule 215, prede cessor to Rule 193.6 before 1999 amen d m en t s ). Be cause lawy ers a re responsible for

the ac tions of t he lega l assistants that they supervise, the proce dural mistakes made by a lega l assistant are imputed to the s upervising attorney
. See Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 5. 03 (r e pr int e d in

Te x. Go v’ t Cod e Ann. , tit
. 2, su bti t. G a pp . A , a rt . 1 0, § 9 (We st 2 00 5) ); se e als o8

W eave r v. E-Z Mart Stores , 942 S.W
. 2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ).

“ [I ]na dv e rt e nc e of c ouns e l, by its e lf , [is] no t g oo d c a

us e ” be c a us e , if it w e re , “ the e xce pti on wo uld
s wa l l o w u p t h e r

u l e, fo r t h er e w o u l d

b e v ery fe w ca s es i n wh i ch co u n s el wo u l d ad m i tt o m ak i n g a deliberate dec ision not t o comply with the discovery

rules.” Alvarado , 83 0 S.W. 2d a t 91 5; se e als o Agristor C

redit Corp. v. Donahoe , 568 S.W .2d 422, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.—W aco 1978, w rit ref ’d
n. r. e .) (b e c a

us e se c re tari a l mi sta

ke s are imp ute d to att orn e y a nd ina dv e rt e nc e of

c ouns e l is insufficient, counsel’s excuse that secr etar y failed to inf

orm him about discovery

deadlines w as not g ood cause ). Thus, the trial court’s deter mination that Cunningham’s excuse did not c onstitut e g ood
cause was not an a

buse of discr etion beca

use it was in ac corda

nce w ith the law. Cunningham also urg ed that, despite her fa ilure to desig nate Ma rable as a te stify ing expert witness, Columbi a would not be unf airly surprised or

prejudice d by t h e t ri al cour t’s consideration of Mara

ble’s af fidavit as summary judgme nt e vidence beca use Mara ble’s 4590i report had bee n on file since Aug ust 2003, a y ear befor e Columbia filed its summary judgme nt motion. A primary purpose of

the discover

y rules is to preve nt trial by ambush. Alvarado , 830 S.W .2d at 914. I n prepa

ring for tria l, a party oug ht to be “assur ed that a witness will not be c alled beca use opposing counsel has not ide ntified the witness in r esponse to a pr oper [discovery reque st] .” Id . at 915. Thus, even if the party knows the substance of the witness’s opinions, the non-de signated witness should not be permitted to te stify beca use the party is not on notice that the witness will be called a nd, thus, cannot ade quately prepa re. See id .; Sharp v. Broadway Nat’l Bank , 784 S .W.2d 6 6 9 , 6 7 1 ( T e x. 19 90 ); St ate O ffi c e of R isk

Mg mt . v . E sc ala nte , 1 6 2 S. W. 3 d

6 1 9 , 6 2 7
- 2 8 ( T e x. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. filed). Fur ther, “[a] par

ty should not have to a

nticipate the disclosure of9

a materia l w itness me rely beca use his or her testimony would be vital to the case . The d i scover y rules were revised to make that sort of anticipation unnecessa ry .” Ma tagor

da Cou nty

Ho sp . D ist

. v . B ur we ll , 94 S.W .3d 75, 83 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Mere ly filing a medical malpr actice expert’s 4590i repor t doe s not “ desig nate” that expert a s a te s ti f

y in g w it n e s s s o a s to p u t th e o p p o s in g p a rty o n n o ti c e to p r e p a r e a r e buttal. See Coleman , 1 29 S.W. 3d

a t 74 8; Patriacca , 98 S.W .3d at 3 0 4
. C o n s equently , the fa ct that a nondesig nated e x pert’s initial repor t has bee n filed does not pre vent the opposing party from suff ering unfair sur prise or pr ejudice if

that expert’s testimony

is t h en co n s idere d as evide nce f or summary judgme nt purposes. Ther efor e, Cunning ham’s claim that Columbi a would not be unfairly surprised or pre judiced by

the admission of Mara

ble’ s af fi d avit is unpersuasive, a nd the trial cour

t did not abuse its discre tion in determining that Cunningham fa iled to ca rry her bur den under

Rule 193.6. See E rsek , 69 S.W .3d at 271. Be cause Cunningham conce des that she f ailed to desig nate Ma

rable as an e x pert wi tness and becaus e bo th h e r a rgume nts on

the e xiste nc e of

g oo d c a us e a nd the la c k o f u

nf a ir surprise or

prejudice are without merit, we conc lude that the trial c ourt did not a buse its discretion in re fusing to consider Ma rable ’s af fidavit as summary

judgme nt evidence
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 19 3. 6; G a m m ill, 98 3 S. W.2 d at 13 . B e c a us e Mara ble ’s pr op e rl y -e xclu de d a ff ida vit wa s th e on ly probative e vidence relied on by Cunningham to support her assertion t hat s he ra ised a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t on eac h of her essential ele ments, the trial court did not err in gr anting Columbi a’s no-evide nce summar

y judgme nt, which dismissed eac h of Cunningha m’s medical malpr acticeColumbi a also soug ht a summary judgme nt on the g rounds that the expert’s a ffidavit wa s 7 conclusory , that Cunningham presente d no evidenc e that Conaster had better than a 50% chanc e of s u r v i v i n g , a n d

t h a tC u n n i n g h a m f

a i l e d t o r e s p o n d

t o t h e s u m m a r

y j u d g m e n tm o r e t h a n s e v e nd a ys befor e the he aring
. Be cause we hold that Cunning ham’s fa ilure to prese nt expert testimony on her essential ele ments was a suf ficient ba sis on which to gr ant Columbia’s no-evide nce motion, we do no t a dd re ss t he se oth e r g ro un ds
. 10 c la ims
. See King Ranch, I nc. v. Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (no-e viden ce summar y 7 judgme nt should be aff

irmed when there is a “complete absence of evidence on a vit al fa ct” or when “the c ourt is barre d by

rules of law or of evidenc e fr om giving weig ht to the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a vital fac t.”). I n the alter

native, Cunning ham ar g ues that eve n if she failed to car ry her bur den of establishing e ither g ood cause or a la ck of unf air surpr ise or pre

judice, th e t ri al court erre d by not g ranting her moti on for continuance. Rule 193.6( c) pr ovides the trial cour t with complete discre tion
o v e r w h e th e r to g r a n t a c o n ti n u a n c e in th e s e c ir c u ms ta n c e s . See Tex. R. C iv. P. 193.6(c) (“ if the pa rt y se e kin g to i ntr od

uc e the e vid e nc e . . . f

a ils to c a rr y the bu rden . . . th e c ourt may g ra nt a continuance ” (e mphasis added) ). Acc ording ly , we review this dec ision for an a buse of discr etion. Ba rr v . A AA Te

x ., LLC , 1 67 S.W .3d 32, 37 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.). In deter mining wh e the r t he c ourt a bu se d it s disc re tio n in

de nyingthe c on tin

ua nc e , w e c on sid e r “ the le ng th o f t ime the c a se ha s b e e n on fil e , the ma te ri a lity a nd purp os e of the dis c ov e ry

so ug ht, and

wh e the r t he pa rt y seekingthe continuanc e has e x erc ised due dil ige nce to obtain the di scover y soug ht.” Id . (quoting J oe v . Two Thi rty

Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004)). By the time Columbia soug ht summar y judgme nt, this case had been on file for ove r a y ear . Cunningham filed Mara ble’s 4590i re port in Aug ust 2003 and ag ree d in J anuar y 2004 thatHe r r e sp on se state d: “ Pla in ti ff s h a ve no t y e t de te rm ine d te sti fy inge xpe rt

wi tne sse s. 8 Plaintiffs will suppl ement pursua nt to the court’s Sche duling Or der f or a L evel I I Icase .” 11 sh e wo uld

de sig nate all tes ti fy in g e xpe rt s b y June 20 04 . T hu s, Cunnin g ham ha d a lmo st a y e a r t o consi d e r w h e th e r s h e w o u ld c a ll M a r a b le a s a te s ti f

y in g e xp e rt, a n d s h e w a s o n n o tic e for five months of the deadline by which she ha d to make this decision and proper ly desig nate him. Also, as is evidenc ed by

Cunningham’s initial response to Columbia’s re q u es t s for disclosure , she wa s
awa re in De cembe r 2003 (e ight months befor e Columbia sought summ a r y judg ment) that she ne eded to supplement her r esponse to desig nate a n expert. Noneth el es s , Cunningham failed to follow

8 throug h with the desig nation. Although Cunningham attempts to blame this fa ilure on the mistake of a le g al assistant, it is establish ed t h at an att orney ’s misplaced r eliance on an assistant does not constitute due dilige nce. See Agristor C redit Corp. , 5 68 S.W. 2d

a t 42 6; W

illiams v. Basham, No. 05 -93-0 04 71 -C V, 1 99 5 T ex . Ap p. L EXI S 38 55 , at *6 -7 ( Tex . Ap p. —Da ll as, Apr il 19 , 1 99 5, no writ ) (not desig nated f

or publication). Moreove r, the trial c ourt had discr etion to deny Cunningham a continuanc e base d on pro ce d u ra l d efic iencies in he r motion. Rule 251 requires that a motion for continuanc e state a
su ff ic ie nt c a us e that is su

pp or te d b y a n a ff ida vit
. Tex
. R. Ci v. P. 2 51 . Wh e n a mov a nt f a ils to comply with the require ment that a supporting a ffidavit be attached, w e g ener ally presume that the trial court acted withi n its discretion to deny the continuanc e. Villegas v. Carter , 711 S.W .2d 624, 62 6 ( Te x. 19 86 ). Cunnin g ham r e qu e ste d a c on tin ua nc e a s an al te rn a tiv e a rgume nt in h e r r e sp on se to Colum bia’s summary

judgme n t motion. C unningha m attache d only

the af fidavits of the leg al
ass is ta n t a n d M a r a

b le , b o th o f w h ic h r e late d to h e r c la im th a t th e e xp e rt’ s a f f id a v it s hould be12

c on sid e re d a s e vid e nc e to p re c lud e su mma ry jud g me nt. Cunnin g ham d id no t a tta c h a n a ff ida vit supporting her motion for continuance
. Fur ther, Cunningham did not offer a ny sufficie nt cause for the c on tin

ua nc e ; he r m oti on mer e ly

re c ite d th e lang ua g e of Rul e 19 3. 6( c ) a

nd “ re sp e c tf

ull y
re qu e ste d” that th e c ourt

g ra nt a c on tin ua nc e in t he e ve nt t hat it de te rm ine d Cunn ing ham f a ile d to show g ood cause or a la ck of pr ejudice or surprise. Gi ve n Cunn ing ham’ s la c k o f d ili g e nc e in d e sig natin g a n e xpe rt a nd her f

a ilure to provide a n aff idavit in support of her motion, we cannot say that the trial cour t abused its discretion by denying Cunning ham a c ontinuance.
CO NC LU SION

The trial c o u rt co m m i t ted no er ror in re fusing to consider the a ffidavit of Cunningha m ’s n on-desig nated e x pert, in g ranting Columbi a’s no- evidenc e summary judgme nt motion, and in denying Cunningham’s moti on for continuance. We overr ule each of Cunning ham’s iss ue s and

a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Oc tober 13, 2005