alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-40305

Summary Calendar

 

MICHAEL BELLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MARK DAVIS ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-97-CV-251

- - - - - - - - - -

March 24, 1999

Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Belle, Texas prisoner #476226, appeals from the

dismissal of his civil rights action as frivolous. Belle

contends that the district court committed procedural errors when

considering his case; that defendant Mark Davis retaliated

against him for his use of the prison grievance system; that

Davis and other defendants deprived him of food, recreation, and

showers and conspired to do so; that defendant Dixon deprived him

of adequate ventilation in his cell; that Davis wrote a false 
No. 98-40305

-2-

offense report and deprived him of due process by having him

placed on restriction without being found guilty of a major

infraction; that Davis and Dixon were responsible for placing him

near a prison gang; that prisoner “Pony” was liable for spearing

him and that “Pony” and other gang members conspired with Davis;

and that defendants D.W. Price and Sylvia Tapia deprived him of

adequate medical care, covered up the attack by “Pony,” and

conspired against him.

Belle failed to object to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendations. Accordingly, our review is for plain error. 

Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th

Cir. 1996)(en banc).

Belle has failed to brief his contentions that the district

court erred by failing to allow him to engage in discovery (with

the exception of his claim concerning depositions regarding

Dixon’s alleged policy of allowing black inmates to be attacked);

that Davis retaliated against him; that the 24-hour deprivation

of food, recreation, and showers violated the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause; that inadequate ventilation in his cell

violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause; that Davis

wrote a false offense report and deprived him of due process;

that Davis was responsible for his placement near the prison

gang; that Tapia covered up the attack by “Pony”; or that Price

covered up the attack and failed to protect him. We do not

consider those contentions. See Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612,

632 (5th Cir. 1994).

Regarding Belle’s remaining procedural contentions, we have
No. 98-40305

-3-

reviewed his brief and the record and we find Belle’s contentions

frivolous. Regarding Belle’s remaining substantive contentions,

we have reviewed Belle’s brief and the record and we find Belle’s

contentions frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss Belle’s appeal

essentially for the reasons stated by the district court. See

Belle v. Davis, No. C-97-CV-251 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 26, 1997).

APPEAL DISMISSED. 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
#### Mechanics National Bank of Trenton *v.*Buckman. Watson’s Appeal.

Practice, *Supreme Court*— Appeals—Parties—Quashing *appeals.*

An appeal from a judgment entered in proceedings to which the appellant was not a party will be quashed.

Argued Jan. 18,1916.

Appeal, No. 260, Jan. T., 1915, by Elwood W. Watson, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Philadelphia Co., Sept. T., 1909, No. 10, for plaintiff, in case of Mechanics’ National Bank of Trenton v. W. A. Buckman and George Buckman.

Before Brown, C. J., Mestrezat, Potter, Moschzisker and Frazer, JJ.

Appeal quashed.

Foreign attachment in assumpsit.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

The court entered judgment for the plaintiff and against the garnishee for $1,571.36. Elwood W. Watson appealed.

*Error assigned*was the judgment of the court.

*E. W. Kirby,*of *Morris & Kirby,*for appellant.

*Thomas Ross,*with him *George Ross,*for appellee.

April 17, 1916 :

Per Curiam,

Elwood W. Watson, who appears in this court as an appellant was no party to the proceeding in the court below, in which the judgment of which he complains was entered against a garnishee summoned by the Mechanics’ National Bank of Trenton, and the motion to quash the appeal must, therefore, prevail.

Appeal quashed.
#### GUERRERA v. STATE.

No. 20029.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 25, 1939.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1939.

Wade & Wade, of Beeville, for appellant.

*596Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

The offense is murder; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for 99 years. ' .

It appears from bill of exception No. la that the court charged the jury on Sunday, March 6, 1938, at 1:50 p. m. Charging the jury is strictly a judicial act. Moss v. State, 131 Tenn. 94, 173 S.W. 859, Ann.Cas.1916B, 1. Courts have no right to pronounce a judgment, or do any other act strictly judicial, on Sunday, in the absence of a permissive statute. Bloss v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 216, 75 S.W.2d 694; Shearman v. State, 1 Tex.App. 215, 28 Am.Rep. 402. We have in this state no statute permitting the jury to be charged on Sunday. In Moss v. State, supra, the court said [page 863] : “Charging the jury is a high judicial function, and it cannot be lawfully exercised on Sunday.” We are constrained to hold that reversible error is presented.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the' Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.

On State’s Motion for Rehearing.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The state, in its motion for a rehearing, attempts to justify the action of the trial court in charging the jury on Sunday by reason of the exigencies of the occasion, in that the term of court expired on that day and a term of court began in another county in the same Judicial District on the following day. We do not kitow of any law, nor is our attention directed to any, which would authorize such judicial act to be performed on Sunday under any circumstances.

It would have been an easy matter for the court to have extended the term until the business in which he was engaged was disposed of. The statute specifically provides for an extension 'of the term of court. See Art. 1923, R.C.S. of Texas.

The state also requests us to express an opinion as to the sufficiency of the testimony to establish the corpus delicti,. and also as to the admissibility of the alleged statements made by appellant to the officers.

We do not deem, it necessary to do so as the testimony on another trial may not be the same.

The motion for a rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### PARADIS et al. v. STATE.

No. 20095.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 22, 1939.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1939.

Rogers & Spurlock, of Fort Worth, for appellants.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

On July 31, 1936, an indictment against G. D. Paradis was returned into the Criminal District Court of Tarrant County, Texas; said indictment charging appellant with the offense of forgery and with passing a forged instrument. On August 14, 1936, Paradis entered into an appearance bond in the sum of one thousand dollars with J. A. Petty and J. E. Petty as sureties. On the 11th of December, 1936, Paradis’ case was called for trial. He failed to-appear. Judgment nisi was entered against him and his sureties in the amount of said bond. Upon proper notice the judgment nisi was made final as against Paradis and J. A. Petty, but resulted in judgment in favor of J. E. Petty. From said final judgment said J. A. Petty brings this appeal.

The evidence upon the hearing as to whether said judgment nisi should be made final is in all respects substantially the same as that found in Henry Darwin Caldwell et al. v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 126 S.W.2d 654, this day decided, and the same contentions here made as were advanced in the cause mentioned. For the same reasons there given the judgment in the present case is affirmed.

On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.

CHRISTIAN, Judge.

After carefully re-examining the record in the light of appellants’ motion for rehearing, we are constrained to adhere to the conclusion expressed in the original opinion.

The motion for rehearing is overruled.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
TERRELL M. SURRANCY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-3026

_____________________________/

Opinion filed November 1, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Washington County.

Christopher N. Patterson, Judge.

Terrell M. Surrancy, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 1708 

To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to provide that certain 

students who are family caregivers are eligible to participate in the 

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 2, 2017 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 

A BILL 

To amend the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to provide 

that certain students who are family caregivers are eligible to participate in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SNAP ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN STUDENTS 

4 RESPONSIBLE FOR CARE OF DISABLED MEM5 BERS OF HOUSEHOLDS. 

6 Section 6(e)(5) of the Food and Nutrition Act of 

7 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2015(e)(5)) is amended— 

8 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘or’’; 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 1708 IS

1 (2) in subparagraph (B), by adding ‘‘or’’ at the 

2 end; and 

3 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

4 ‘‘(C) an informal provider of in-home and 

5 community care to— 

6 ‘‘(i) a member of the household— 

7 ‘‘(I) who is not less than 60 

8 years old; and 

9 ‘‘(II) for whom a physician, phy10 sician’s assistant, nurse, nurse practi11 tioner, designated representative of 

12 the physician’s office, licensed or cer13 tified psychologist, social worker, or 

14 any other health professional deter15 mined appropriate by the State agen16 cy provides a statement that the mem17 ber of the household— 

18 ‘‘(aa) is unable to perform 

19 without substantial assistance 

20 from another individual two or 

21 more activities of daily living de22 scribed in section 

23 7702B(c)(2)(B) of the Internal 

24 Revenue Code of 1986; or 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
3 

•S 1708 IS

1 ‘‘(bb)(AA) requires substan2 tial supervision to protect the 

3 member of the household from 

4 threats to health and safety due 

5 to a severe cognitive impairment; 

6 and 

7 ‘‘(BB) is unable to perform 

8 without reminding or cuing as9 sistance one or more activities of 

10 daily living described in section 

11 7702B(c)(2)(B) of the Internal 

12 Revenue Code of 1986; or 

13 ‘‘(ii) a disabled member of the house14 hold described in paragraph (2) or (3) of 

15 section 3(j);’’. 

Æ 


dlhill on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
| INDIANA                                        | 35-1544218                        |
|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (State or other jurisdiction of incorporation) | (IRS Employer Identification No.) |

|   | o Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425) |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | o Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12) |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b)) |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c)) |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----

----

----

| 99.1   | Description                                                                   |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Press Release, dated November 30, 2010, issued by First Merchants Corporation |
Exhibit 32.1**CERTIFICATION**The undersigned officers of the registrant certify that, to their knowledge, the quarterly reporton Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 780(d)), and thatinformation contained in this report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operation of the registrant as of the dates and for the periods expressedin the report.        Date: November 9, 2005 /s/ Ludo J. Reynders, Ph.D.   Ludo J. Reynders, Ph.D.   Chief Executive Officer           Date: November 9, 2005 /s/ Matthew E. Czajkowski   Matthew E. Czajkowski   Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1  Statement of Chief Executive Officer  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer of Pacific Enterprises (the "Company") certifies that:  (i) the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the year ended December 31, 2006 (the "Annual Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and  (ii) the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.    February 22, 2007  /S/  Debra L. ReedDebra L. ReedChief Executive Officer
# Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas

December 13, 2017

No. 04

- 17

- 00784

- CV

ESTATE OF ESTELLA Q. CAMPOS, DECEASED,

From the Probate Court No 2, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014PC3884 Honorable Tom Rickhoff, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The clerk’s record in this appeal shows t he trial court signed a n appealable order on Septem ber 2 2, 201 7. The clerk’s record does not appear to contain any motion or order that would extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1(a). Thus, Appellant’s notice of appeal was due on October 23 , 201 7

. See id. A motion for extension of
time to file a notice of appeal was due not later than November 7 , 201 7

. See id. R. 26.3.

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on Novem ber 22 , 2016

. Appellant’s notice of appeal appears to be untimely. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(a); Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (“[O] nce the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Rule [26.3] has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court ’ s jurisdiction .”).

W e ORDER Appellant to SHOW CAUSE in writing within TWENTY

- ONE days of th e date of this order why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. If Appellant fails to respond within the time provided, this appeal will be dismissed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(c).

All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending further order of this court.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 13th day of December, 2017

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-10174

No. 96-10382

No. 96-10692

Summary Calendar

 

ROBERT L. AVRETT, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

POLY-AMERICA, INC.; STEVEN

GRANT ROSS; JOAN M. TASKER;

WANDA WAKELAND; JOHN DOES 1-3;

JANE DOES 1-3,

Defendants-Appellees,

EDWARD M. CAVUTO; GARY O. BOOTH;

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; JOHN DOES 1-3;

JANE DOES 1-3,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:95-CV-803-A

- - - - - - - - - -

March 14, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Robert L. Avrett, Jr., appeals the district court’s

dismissal of his action against Poly-America, Inc., and its
No. 96-10174

No. 96-10382

No. 96-10692

- 2 -

employees, Steven Grant Ross, Joan M. Tasker, and Wanda Wakeland;

the Internal Revenue Service and its employees, Edward M. Cavuto

and Gary O. Booth; and John Does 1-3 and Jane Does 1-3 for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). He argues that the defendants violated

his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by issuing and

honoring levies against his wages for income tax deficiencies. 

He argues that the district court failed to liberally construe

his complaint and erred in ordering him to file an amended

complaint asserting the facts supporting his claim against Cavuto

and Booth in their individual capacities. We have reviewed the

record and the district court’s opinions and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm for essentially the reasons given

by the district court. Avrett v. Poly-America, Inc., et al.,

Nos. 4:95-CV-803-A (Feb. 6, 1996, March 26, 1996, and April 9,

1996).

Avrett’s appeal is without arguable merit and is thus

frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.

1983). Accordingly, Avrett’s appeal is DISMISSED. 5th Cir.

R. 42.2. Avrett is cautioned that future frivolous civil suits

and appeals filed by him or on his behalf will invite the

imposition of sanctions. Avrett is cautioned further to review

any pending suits and appeals to ensure that they do not raise
No. 96-10174

No. 96-10382

No. 96-10692

- 3 -

arguments that are frivolous. 

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
Exhibit 32








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002











In connection with the Quarterly Report of Norwood Financial Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), we, Lewis J. Critelli, President and Chief Executive Officer, and William S. Lance, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.














/s/ Lewis J. Critelli

/s/ William S. LanceLewis J. Critelli

William S. LancePresident and Chief Executive Officer

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer








November 5, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

NO. 95-519

JOHN E. DONOVAN, APPELLANT,

V.

TOGO D. WEST, JR.,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

Before NEBEKER, Chief Judge, and KRAMER, FARLEY, HOLDAWAY, IVERS,

STEINBERG, and GREENE, Judges.

O R D E R

The appellant, John E. Donovan, appeals a May 1995 decision of the Board of Veterans'

Appeals (BVA or Board). The Board determined that the appellant's indebtedness resulting from

a VA home-loan guarantee had been validly established. On October 8, 1998, this Court issued an

opinion affirming the Board's decision in part, vacating the decision in part, and remanding two

matters for readjudication. See Donovan v. West, 11 Vet.App. 481 (1998) (Donovan I). Upon

motion forreconsideration, the Court issued a "clarifying" opinion reaffirming its previous decision.

See Donovan v. West, No. 95-519, 1999 WL 446035 (Vet. App. June 15, 1999) (Donovan II).

Thereafter, the Secretary filed a motion for reconsideration or in the alternative for a full Court

decision. On July 29, 1999, the Court granted the Secretary's motion for a full Court decision and

withdrew the Court's opinions in Donovan I and Donovan II. See Donovan v. West, 12 Vet.App. 500

(1999) (en banc).

On March 9, 2000, the Secretary filed a motion to dismiss this case as moot and notified the

Court that it had terminated further prosecution of this case. The Secretary assured the Court that

"action to recover any debt owed in this matter was stopped . . . and money that had been collected

by offset was refunded." On March 16, 2000, the appellant filed a motion in opposition to the

Secretary's motion to dismiss. The appellant argues that a decision in this case is necessary to

prevent VA from proceeding against others in the same manner as it did against this appellant. The

appellant did not allege that the Secretary's statement of facts was inaccurate.

After a review of the parties' pleadings, the Court will grant the Secretary's motion to dismiss

and decline the appellant's invitation to issue what would amount to an advisory opinion. The Court

finds that the controversy between the parties has been resolved.

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is 
2

ORDERED that the Secretary's motion is granted and the appeal is DISMISSED as moot.

It is further

ORDERED that the Board's May 1995 decision is VACATED. See Landicho v. Brown,

7 Vet.App. 42, 54 (1994) (citing United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-41 (1950), to

hold that a lower tribunal's judgment must be vacated when a case subsequently became moot "to

prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences").

DATED: May 9, 2000 PER CURIAM.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


Board of Directors
Riddell Sports Inc.

         We have issued our reports dated February 20, 2001, accompanying the
consolidated financial statements and schedule included in the Annual Report of
Riddell Sports Inc. and Subsidiaries on Form 10-K for the year ended December
31, 2000. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in
the Registration Statements of Riddell Sports Inc. and Subsidiaries on Form S-8
(File No. 333-34355), effective August 25, 1997, on Form S-4 (File No.
333-31525), effective August 7, 1997, and on Form S-3 (File No. 333-43247),
effective February 13, 1998.



/s/ GRANT THORNTON LLP
--------------------------
Grant Thornton LLP



Chicago, Illinois
March 29, 2001