NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RYAN W., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0143

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD29174

The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Laura J. Huff

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
RYAN W. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Thomas C. Kleinschmidt1 delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jon W. Thompson

joined.

K L E I N S C H M I D T, Judge:

¶1 Ryan W. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to J.W. He challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting termination. Because we conclude that the court’s 

findings are supported by reasonable evidence, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father is the biological parent of J.W., born in August 2014.2 

Father has a history of substance abuse and was incarcerated for burglary, 

retail theft, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession/use of a 

dangerous drug at the time of J.W.’s birth.

¶3 At the time of the child’s birth, both Mother and J.W. tested 

positive for opiates. As a result, J.W. remained hospitalized for several 

weeks and the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took temporary custody 

of the child after discharge.

¶4 During Father’s incarceration, the juvenile court adjudicated 

the child dependent and ordered DCS to attempt family reunification 

concurrent with severance and adoption. Father was offered paternity 

testing by DCS and encouraged to participate in all services available to him 

during his incarceration. While incarcerated, Father sent J.W.

approximately three cards and four letters but was unable to visit with the 

child.

 

1 The Honorable Thomas C. Kleinschmidt, Retired Judge of the Court 

of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 Samantha C. (“Mother”) had her parental rights terminated in the 

same proceeding, however, because she has not joined in this appeal we do 

not review her findings.
RYAN W. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 Father was released from prison in September 2015 and met 

J.W. for the first time the day after his release. Father found employment 

after his release and later obtained his own apartment. As part of his case 

plan after release, Father was required to participate in random urinalysis 

testing, substance-abuse treatment, parent-aide services, a psychological 

evaluation, and individualized counseling.

¶6 In December 2015 Father allowed Mother, who has a history 

of substance abuse and who had not participated in drug testing for over a 

year, to move into his apartment. Thereafter, as discussed in detail below, 

Father did not comply with recommended testing and counseling.

¶7 In August 2015 DCS filed a motion to terminate Father’s 

parental rights to the child and in February 2016 filed an amended motion 

for termination of the parent-child relationship on the grounds of 

abandonment and fifteen-months out-of-home placement pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(1), 8(c).3 Father 

contested the severance and the court held a two-day severance trial in 

February 2016. Afterwards, the court filed a severance order based upon

Father’s failure to remedy circumstances that caused the child to be in an 

out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months and found that 

severance was in the best interests of the child.

4 Father timely appealed and 

we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona 

Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) (2016), 12-2101 (2016) and Rule 103(A) of 

the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

DISCUSSION

¶8 The right to custody of one’s child is fundamental, but it is not 

absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12

(2000). To support termination of parental rights, one or more of the 

statutory grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing 

evidence. A.R.S. § 8-537(B); Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 

174, 176-77, ¶ 9 (App. 2014). In addition, the court must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

 

3 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute's 

current version.

4 The court did not find that DCS met its burden of proof as to Father 

regarding the ground of abandonment.
RYAN W. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

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child. Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 282, 285, ¶ 11 (App. 

2011); A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

¶9 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the juvenile court’s findings. Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 

231, 234, ¶ 13 (App. 2011). As the trier of fact, the juvenile court “is in the 

best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). We will accept the juvenile 

court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable evidence supports those 

findings. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 

2002).

Reasonable Evidence Supports a Termination of Parental Rights 

Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c)

¶10 To justify termination of parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(c), DCS must prove (1) the child has been in a court-ordered outof-home placement for fifteen months or longer; (2) the parent has been 

unable to remedy the circumstances which led to the out-of-home 

placement; and (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will be 

incapable of providing “proper and effective parental care and control in

the near future.” Father challenges the juvenile court’s findings that he 

failed to remedy the circumstances that caused the child’s out-of-home 

placement and that he would be unable to properly care for the child in the 

near future.5 Specifically, Father asserts that “despite not completing some 

of the services that DCS offered,” he “demonstrated sobriety, maintained 

employment, and secured housing.”

¶11 In determining whether the parent has been able to remedy 

the circumstances resulting in out-of-home placement, we consider the 

circumstances that prevent a parent from being able to appropriately 

provide for the child at the time of the severance. Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007). The dependency petition 

alleged that Father was unable to provide proper, effective parental care 

and control due to substance abuse. In connection with its obligation to 

provide reunification services, DCS requested that Father participate in 

 

5 DCS is also required to establish that it made diligent efforts to 

provide appropriate reunification services. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). Father 

does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that DCS made reasonable 

efforts to reunify the family.
RYAN W. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

5

random urinalysis testing, substance-abuse treatment, parent-aide services, 

a psychological evaluation, and individualized counseling.

¶12 The record reflects that Father participated in numerous 

services after his release in September 2015, including four months of clean 

urinalysis testing, substance-abuse treatment with SAGE Counseling, 

parent-aide services, supervised visits with J.W., and a psychological 

evaluation. However, after the psychological evaluation in December 2015, 

the treating psychologist and DCS recommended that Father continue

random urinalysis testing, begin long-term substance-abuse treatment, and 

participate in individualized counseling. Instead of continuing to comply 

with these services, Father failed to complete a single random urinalysis test 

after December 2015 and willfully refused to participate in a hair follicle test 

pursuant to court order. Father also refused to complete intake for longterm substance-abuse treatment or participate in individual counseling

after being referred to TERROS by DCS. These failures coincided with 

Mother’s moving into his apartment.

¶13 Father argues that it is “not a requirement that a parent 

participate in all services offered by DCS.” While there is no statutory 

requirement that a parent complete all of the reunification services DCS 

recommends, a parent’s failure to complete or finish some services, despite 

completing others, can support a court’s order of severance. See Raymond 

F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 28 (App. 2010). It was 

reasonable, based on the failure to continue random testing or long-term 

substance-abuse treatment, for the juvenile court to find that Father had not 

demonstrated complete sobriety. We therefore conclude that reasonable 

evidence supports the court’s decision that Father failed to remedy the 

circumstances causing the child’s court-ordered out-of-home placement.

¶14 We also find adequate support in the record for the court’s 

conclusion that a substantial likelihood exists that Father will not be able to 

properly parent the child in the near future. Despite his acknowledgement 

that Mother has not proven sobriety, Father failed to appreciate the 

potential danger Mother poses to the child until she is sober. Father 

allowed Mother, who has continued to refuse the substance-abuse 

treatment services offered by DCS, to move into a one-bedroom apartment 

with him, and has failed to participate in random urinalysis testing since.

While Father argues that Mother was “in the process of moving out” and 

that she would not see the child while the child was in Father’s custody, the 

court may well have suspected this plan was not sincere, and if it was, it 

would not last. In any event, we must consider the circumstances as they 
RYAN W. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

6

exist at the time of the severance hearing. See Marina P., 214 Ariz. at 330, ¶ 

22. 

¶15 Additionally, the record contains evidence of Father’s temper 

and inability to maintain emotional stability. A DCS Case Worker testified 

at trial that Father had become angry and argumentative with staff 

members at TERROS, and his outbursts during trial proceedings further 

displayed an inability to control himself. Accordingly, sufficient evidence 

exists to support the juvenile court’s determination that severance of 

Father’s parental rights was justified under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

Severance is in the Best Interest of J.W.

¶16 Father also contends that severance of his parental rights is 

not in the best interest of the child. “[A] determination of the [child’s] best 

interest must include a finding as to how the [child] would benefit from a 

severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” Raymond 

F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 30 (citing Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 

Ariz. 1, 5 (1990)). The court will consider whether (1) an adoptive 

placement is immediately available; (2) the existing placement is meeting 

the needs of the child; and (3) the child is adoptable. Id.

¶17 The juvenile court found that severance was in the child’s best 

interests because it would allow a plan of adoption to go forward which 

would benefit the child by providing him with “permanency, stability, 

safety, and protection in a substance-free home.” The court’s ruling is 

supported by the fact that the child is already in a prospective adoptive 

placement that is meeting all of the child’s needs. Furthermore, the child is 

adoptable and has no special needs.

¶18 Father does not dispute that the child benefits from his

current placement, but argues that the court did not find leaving his 

parental rights intact would impair those benefits. However, the juvenile 

court must find only that the child would benefit from severance or be 

harmed by the continuation of the parent-child relationship. Raymond F.,

224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 30. The court need not find that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship would harm the child. Thus, the juvenile court 

did not err in finding that severance was in the child’s best interest.
RYAN W. v. DCS, J.W.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Father’s parental rights.