O rder issued March 30, 2021

In The 

## Court of Appeals

For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01

- 20

- 00606

- CV

——————————— PORT ARTHUR STEAM ENERGY, L.P. , Appella nt V. OXBOW CALCINING L L C , A p pell e e

On Appeal from the 270th District Court

Harri s C o unty, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2020

- 18313

ORDER ON MOTION TO REVIEW SUPERSEDEAS BOND

Pursuant to Texas Rule of A p pellate Procedure 24.4, a ppellant , Port Arthur
Steam Energy, L.P. ( “ P ASE ” ) , requests that this Court review and vacate or

re verse the trial court ’ s o r der requiring a $1,207,282.97 b ond to supersede

execution of a n arbitration award that was confirmed by the trial court

. PAS E also2

requests that the bond amoun t to b e set at no more than $138,574.28

. We deny

P ASE ’ s M otion to R eview S upersedeas O rder

. 1
Background
PASE owns a waste heat recovery facility in Port Arthur, Texas. A ppellee , Oxbow Calcining L L C ( “ Oxbow ” ) , owns and operates a n a djacent coke

- c alcining
plant in Port A rthur

. PASE and Oxbow ’ s predecesso r entered i nto a Heat

Exch ange Agr eement (“HEA”), 2 the alleged breach of which caused the parties to
engage in arbitration.

On M arch 17, 20 20, an arbitration panel i ssued an arbitration award in favor

o f Oxbow. The arbitration award was confi rmed by the trial court in a July 23 ,
2020 fin a l judgment

. 3 The a rbitration panel found, among other things , that PASE

breached the HEA 4 and t hat Oxbow had no liability to PASE. The arbitration

award order ed PASE to pay the following :

1 PAS E fi led a combined M otion to R eview Supersedeas Order and Emergency Motion to Stay

. O n J anuary 7, 202 1 , the Court grant ed the portion of PASE ’ s motion requesting a stay of the trial court proceedings pending this Court ’ s di spo si tion of the motion to review supersedeas order. W e now address the remaining po rtion of P ASE ’ s combined motion.

2 Accor ding to the arb itration award, “ Broadly speaking, Oxbow pr ovide d was te heat generated by the ca lc ining process to P ASE. ”

3 The final judgment granted Oxbow ’ s motion to confirm the arbitration award and denied PAS E ’ s m otion to vacate the arbitrati on aw ard.

4 The arbitration panel found that PASE breached the HEA by bringing an action in state court and by fa ili ng to fund an escro w account.3

• $50 0,0 00 in escrow plus interest at five percent from August 31, 2 019 in t he amount of $68.49 per da y until March 17, 2020, the date of the arbitra tion award;

• An annual escro w deposit of $500,000 every A ugust 31, beginning o n August 31, 2020, until the balance equ als $2 ,000,000 ; 5

• $44,425.00 in A merican Arbitration Asso ciation administrative fees;

• $244 ,798.57 in compensation and expenses of the arbi trators;

• $138, 574.2 78 in reimbursement to Oxbow for the amount it had deposi ted with the American Arbitrati on Association ; and

• Interest at th e rate of five percent per year post award and post judgment until f ully paid.

O n April 4, 2020, Oxbow propounded post

- judgment di s c overy on PASE

. On August 7, 2020, Ox bow filed a motion to compel P ASE ’ s post

- judgment
discovery responses.

On August 21, 2020, PASE posted a bo nd of $138,574.28 to suspend

en forcement of the trial court ’ s final judgment pending appeal

. PASE fi led a
notice of appeal the next day

. 6 On October 14, 2020, Oxbo w filed a m ot i on to

increase the amount of security , asserting that the bond was insufficient to

5 The escrow payments “relate[] to PASE ’ s ongoi ng obliga tion under th e HEA and [ the arbitration award] to ‘ e xpeditious[ly] ’ disma ntle and remove its Steam Production F acility (which adjoins Oxbow ’ s Port A rthur facility)

. ”

6 PASE s tates in its motion that it is ap pealing t he arbitration panel ’ s escrow ru ling “on multiple grounds.”4

supersede the judgment of $1,185,345.99

. 7 In its mot i on, Oxbow asked the tr ial

court to order PASE to post an a ddi tional bond of $1,046,77 1.71. P ASE filed a

res ponse , and t he motion to increase the amount of security was hear d on
November 18, 2020

. On N o vem ber 24, 2 020, t he trial court signed a n Order
Increasing Amount of Security to Supersede Judgment (the “ supersedeas or der ” ) , stating in pertinent p art: The security [PA SE] must post to supersede the [j] udgment is increased by the amount of $1,068,708.6 9 and th e deadline to supersede the [j] udgment with this increased amo unt shall be Marc h 1, 2021. T he am ount of the supersedeas bond shall increase by $500,000.00 on A ugus t 31, 2021, and by $500,000.00 on August 31, 2022.

The o rder also required PASE to respond to ce rtain post

- judgment di sco very. O n
December 31, 2020 , PAS E filed in this Court its Motion to Review Supersedeas

Order

. In its motion, PASE asserts that the $138.574.28 bond it posted was a

sufficient bond be c ause (1) Oxbow was not awarded c ompensatory dama ges in the

trial court ’ s judgme nt , (2) the security amount bears no relationship to an y

po tential loss Oxbow cou ld incur while PA SE ’ s ap peal is pending , and (3) ordering

the a dditional security will cause PASE substantial economic harm and hinder its

7 Oxbow asserts tha t the trial court ’ s j udgment comprises th e $500,000 escrow pay ment d ue on August 31, 2019 , the $500,000 escrow payment due on August 31, 2020, $13,629.51 in pre

- award int erest o n the $500,00 0 August 31, 2019
e scrow payment , $ 138,574.28 in arbitration admi nistrative fees and expenses and compensation , a n d $33,142.40 in post

- award and post

- judgment interest.5

ability to pur sue its appeal and oth er litigation with Oxbow. PASE a lso asserts that

it should not have to respond to the requested po st

- judgment disco very. In

response to P ASE ’ s motion , Oxbow asserts that (1) the escrow

- paymen t awards

are com pensatory damag es and therefore the trial court ’ s supersedeas order
correctly required PASE to pa y a n additional $1,068,708.69 to supersede the

court ’ s judgment , (2 ) even if the escrow paymen ts are not compensatory damages,
requiring security for them is s till proper , (3) the sup ersedeas order is n ot excessive

and does not cause PASE substantial economic harm , a nd (4) this C ourt lacks
jurisd iction over PASE ’ s appeal o f the trial court ’ s post

- judg ment discovery ruling

. St an dard of Review

A tria l court ’ s rul ing on the amo unt of super sedeas bond is review ed for an

abuse of discret i on

. Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. Shale Expl., LLC , 510 S.W.3d 92, 94
(Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2016 , order ) ; EnviroPower, L.L.C. v. Bear,

Stearns & Co., Inc. , 265 S.W .3d 1 , 2 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2008 , order )

.
To s urvive an abuse

- of

- discretion challenge, the evidence must be legally and
factually sufficient to support t he trial court ’ s ruling

. G.M. Houser, Inc. v. Rodge rs , 204 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2006, no pet .)

. “ The test for

whether a tria l court abused its discret io n is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily

or unreasonabl y in light of all the circumstances of the c a se. ” EnviroPower, 265

S.W.3d at 2. Upon a finding that the t ria l court abused its discr etion, this Co urt h as6

the authori ty to order the amount of th e security increased o r decreased, but if
increased, it must be an amount not to exceed the lesser of fif t y percent of the
judgment debtor ’ s net worth o r $25 ,000 ,000

. T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE A NN

. § 52.006 ; T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 2 4. 2, 24.4

. Discussion

T exas Rule of Appellate P rocedure 24 governs the suspension of

e nforcement of a trial court judgment. It states in pertinent part:
(a) Methods. Unless the law or these rules provide ot herwise, a judgment debtor may s up ersede the judgm ent by:
(1) filing with t he trial court clerk a w ritten agreement with the judgment cred itor for suspending enforcement of the judgment;
(2) filing with the trial court clerk a goo d and sufficient bond;
(3 ) making a deposit with t he tr i a l court clerk in l ieu of a bond; or
(4) pro viding al ternate securit y ordered by the court.

T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 24.1 (a). When the judgment is for money, the amo u nt of the bond
or security “must equal t he sum of compensatory da mages awarded in the
judg ment , i nterest for the es timated duration of the ap peal, and costs awarded in
the judgment.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 24.2 (a) (1) ; see also T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE
§ 52.006(a)

. Wh e n the judgment is for something other th an money or a property

in terest, the tri al c ourt determ in es the amount and type of supersedeas bond t hat
the j udgment debtor must post. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 24.2(a) (3). The purpose of7

s upersedeas bond is to “ preserve [] the s tatus quo of the matters in litigation as they

existed before the issuance of the or der or judg me nt from which an a ppeal is

taken.” Smith v. Tex. Far mers Ins. Co. , 82 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. App.

— San

Anton io 2002, pet. denied)

. A. Compensatory D amages

Du ring the heari ng on Oxbow ’ s motion t o increase the amount of s ecurity ,

t he trial court determined that the funds to be escrow ed are compensatory damages.

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines “ [ c ] ompensatory damages”

as “ economic and noneconomic da mages. ” T EX

. C IV

. P RAC

. & R EM

. C ODE A NN

. § 4 1.0 01 (8) (internal quotations omitted)

. “Economi c damages” are defined a s

“ compensatory damages intended t o com pensate a claimant for actual economic or
pecuniary loss; the term does not include exemplary damage s or noneconomic
damages. ” Id. § 41.001(4) (internal quotations om itted)

. “ N one conomic damages”

are de fined as “ da mages a warded for the pu rpose of compensating a cla imant for
ph ysical pain and suffering, mental or emotional pain or anguish, loss of
consortium, disfigure m ent, physical impa irment, loss of compan ionship and

soc i ety, inconvenienc e, loss of enjoyment of li fe, inj ury to reputation , and all other
nonpecuniar y losses of any kind other than exemplary damages. ” Id. § 41.001(12)
(internal qu otations omitted)

.8

According to PASE , no security is needed for the es cr ow acco unt it was

ordered to fund be cause those funds do not const itute compensa tory damages

.
PASE asse rts that the arbitration panel ’ s aw ard o rder ing PASE to deposit funds

into an escrow account rather than awarding the funds to Oxbow “in any manner,

whether as costs, compensat ory damages, liquidated damages, pen alt ies, interest,

or otherwise,” coupled with t he fact that Oxbow “neve r claimed, ar gued, or much

less establi shed that it suffered a loss of approximately $2 million or that the
approximately $2 million in escrow fundin g r equired by the [j]udgment constit ute s compensation to Oxbow for a loss Oxbow act ually incurred” negates any possibili ty that the escrowed funds could be compensatory damages.

PASE relies on the definition of “damages” in In re Xerox C o rp. , 555

S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 20 18) (orig. proceeding)

. I n In re Xerox Corp. , the Texas

S upreme C ourt held that th e proportionate

- responsibility scheme in chapter 33 of

the T e xas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not apply t o the Texas Medicaid

Fraud Pre vention Act. 555 S.W.3d at 539

. In its analysis , the su preme cour t compared t he defin itions of “damages” and “penal ty ” : “Damages” are “[ m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury.” “Damages” compen s a te for l oss

— actual or reasonably estimable

— and no more. But, not all compe nsation cons titutes “damag es,” even when an award is necessary to make a party whole. For example, attorney ’ s fees are generally not damages, even if compensatory. More recently, w e9

reaff irmed in Wal

- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Forte , [ 8 ] that “not all
c omp ensatory recovery can be consi dered damages,” and explained that “civil penalties are different fr om compensatory damages.”

A “penalty” is “[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer,” espe cially , “a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to th e s tate or a civil wrong (as dist ingui shed from compensation f or an injured party ’ s loss).” Penaltie s “go beyond compensation” and “are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdo ers.” M o net ary liability that exists even when no loss has occurr ed can on ly be a f ine
or a penalty, not dama ges. But that does not m ean penalties do not
a nd cannot have “c ompensatory traits.” Indeed, the Legislature may choose a penalty regime precisely b ecause h a rm ensuing from a wrong may be inestimable and, therefor e, mus t b e deterre d and prevented. More over, penalties necessarily c ompensate in the sense that the hallmar k of a penalty is that it goes beyond compensating for
a loss.

Id. at 529

– 30 ( inte rnal foot notes om i tted)

. PAS E asse rts that the escrow awa rd

ca nno t be classified as compensator y damages be cause Oxbow was not awarded

the escrow fund as “compensation for a loss.” 9

Oxbow , on the other hand, asserts that the escrow funds are compensatory damages because the payment of the escrow f unds wa s o rdered b y the arbitration

pane l

. Oxbow relies on the definition of dama ges from In re Xerox Corp. to assert

8 497 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. 2016).

9 During the hearing in t he trial court , Oxbow stated that the escrowed fu nds are liquid ated damages. “L iqu idated damages constitute a pe nalty unless (1) the harm caused by the breac h is i ncapable or difficult of estimation and (2) the amount of liquidated damages is a reasonable fo re cast of just compensation

. . . . A remedy
unr elated to act ual loss is a pen alt y. ” In re Xerox Corp. , 555 S.W.3d 518 , 532

– 33 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (internal footnotes omitted)

. Oxbow did not
re

- urge its liquid a t ed damages argument in its response to PA SE ’ s motion in this Court.10

that the escrow funds need not be paid to it t o constitute damages, given t hat

Oxbow has a clai m to t he maintenance of the escrow f unds. Id. at 529.
Specifically, Ox bow states that the HEA and the arbitration award describe the

circ umstances under which it has a claim to the escrow funds

. The arbitration
award says that the HEA “did not prohibit Oxbow from de manding debts due from

P A SE in cash.” And s ection 8.6(b) of the HEA , which enumerates the

r equirements for the escrow deposits, s tates t hat the funds in the es crow acco u nt

may only be removed by PASE “upon [Oxbow ’ s] written acknowle dgm ent that

PASE has sa tisfied all of its obligations u nder [s]ection 8. 6(a)” of the HEA.

Oxbow a sserts that the escrow funds are not, as PASE argues, potentia l

comp ens a tion for a future loss but are, rather, compensation for a curr ent loss:

PASE ’ s conti nued failure to remove its equipment as requir ed at the ter m ination of

the HE A agreement

. 10 According to Oxbow , the escrow award gave it the “benefit
of its barg a in,” the typi cal measure of damages in a breach

- of

- contract sui t , but t hat

without a s ufficient supersedeas bo nd, it will not have a ccess to the escrowed
funds, i f necessary. PASE does not dispute the lack

- of

- access argument

. Ra ther, it
says it “does n o t want to put a million

- plus in escrow, and not be able to use

it

. . . for legal fees or to maintain [its] ass ets.”

10 P ASE acknowledged duri ng the trial court ’ s hea ring that it was “leavin g all of its equipment [] whil e the appeal [was] pending.” PASE subseque ntly sta ted that it “w [ou ld] not remove it s plant assets and equipment [] while the a ppea l [was] pending.”11

The cases PASE relies on are inap t

. Se e In re Xer ox Corp. , 555 S.W.3d at

532

– 33 ( liquidated damages are pe nalty unless harm ca used by breach is difficult

to estimate and d amage amount is “reasonable f orecast of just compensation”) ; In
re Longview Energy Co. , 464 S

. W

. 3d 353 , 361 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)
(disgorgement , l i k e a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s , is not measure of c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s ) ; In

re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P ’ ship , 406 S .W.3d 168, 172 (Tex. 201 3) (orig.
proceeding) (attor ney ’ s fees ar e no t compen satory damages) ; Flores v. Millenn ium

Interest s , Ltd. , 185 S.W.3 d 427 , 4 3 3

– 34 (T e x. 2005) (liquidated damage s awar d in

relevant Texas Property Code provision was pu nitive ).

The assertion that the escrow payments are compensa tory damages is

cogent , given that Oxbow has a n actual claim to $1 ,000,000 in escrow payme n ts.

B

. Economic H ar m

PASE ass e rts that the su persedeas order will ca use substantial economic
harm, de priving it of money i t needs to “manage, protect, and m aintain it s assets, and to pur sue relief in the courts.” But , d u ring the hearing on Oxbow ’ s motion to

inc r ease the amount of security , PASE stated , and its representa tive test ifi ed, that

PASE ’ s asset s

— e sp ecially the value of the equipment in its plant

— a re significant:

• “You have no ide a

. . . [of] the magnitude of

. . . the dollars that are tied up i n this equi p ment, and assets, and the value . But it, it

– it ’ s a lot

– way mo re than any $2 millio n.”

• “[T]oday

– if you were just going to rip it all out, or leave something in place and w alk away

– it, it ’ s worth, you know, over $5 million. And if12

y ou netted out the cost of scrapping som e th ings, it ’ s still way ov er $4 million.”

• “[W]e ’ ve got evidence that

. . . Oxbow was valuing this for a buy

- out purpose, at $30 million, a few year s ago.”

• “[I]t ’ s insure d f

or over $60 mil lion. This is a major p lant, with major assets .”

• “[I]f we put on [evidence of] the as sets, Judge, you will see

. . . [w]e ’ re talking about what, what ’ s insured for $60 million. This isn ’ t just so me chumpy [sic] li t tle o utfit.”

• [ W ]e came up with

. . . an overall value. T he assets themsel ves [are worth] a little o ver $ 5 million. We hav e a num b er for removal and demolition co sts

– that ’ s $740,715. And so the

. . . total ne t valu e of the assets, minus the removal an d de mo costs, was $4,427,559.

And PASE s aid that Oxbow “is f ully protected by the value of PA S E ’ s plant

assets” but that it ha s no intention of selling th e assets. 11
“[T]he co rrect measure of a company ’ s net worth for the purpose of setting a
supersedeas bond under section 52.006 of the Texas Civil Practice and Re m edies

Code and Ru le 24 of the Tex a s Rules o f Appellate Procedure i s the company ’ s

current a sse t s minus cur rent liab ilities at the time the bond is set.” EnviroPo wer , 265 S.W.3d at 5. Given PASE ’ s statements and testimony about the valu e of the

11 According to P ASE ,

it was [ not] appro priate to start selling the [] as sets that c [ould] b e e asily
rem oved, a nd tak [e] val ue away from, from t h [e] plant, without putting that

mone y in escrow. And PASE d [id] not want to put a m illion d oll a rs

- plus in escrow, and not be able to use it

. . . for le gal fe es, or to maintain these assets.13

assets, t h e trial court did not abuse its d i scretion when it concluded that PASE can

find a sourc e o f funds to pay the ad ditional bond amount

.
Further , PASE co uld have requested a hearing to enable the t rial court to

determine its net worth for estab lishing the amount of the bond. T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 24.2(c). Alt hough PA S E argued that the legislature has reco gnized a “new

ba lance” betwe en the judgment creditor ’ s right to a sufficient supersedeas bond

and th e judgment debto r ’ s right to prevent the diss ipation of its asset s during

appe a l, P ASE did not try to prove i ts net worth in challen g ing the requested bond

increase. Texas R ule of Appellate Procedure 24.2 requires the trial court to lower

the bond to “ an a mount that will not cause the judgment debto r substantial

econom i c harm i f , after notice to all parties and a hearin g, the court fi nds that
posting a bond, deposit, or sec ur ity in the amount required by [the trial court] is
likely to cause the judgment de b tor substantial economic harm.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P.

24 .2(b). The r u le conti n ues: (c) D etermination of Net Worth.
(1) Judgment Debtor ’ s Affidav it Requi red ; Contents; Prima Fac ie Evidence. A judgment debtor wh o provides a bond, deposit, or security

. . . in an amount based on the debtor ’ s net
wo rth must simultaneously file with the trial court clerk an
a f fidavit t hat s tat es the debtor ’ s net worth and stat es complete, de tailed in formation concerning the debtor ’ s assets and liabilities from which net worth can be ascertained. An affidavit that me ets these requirements is prima facie evidence of the debtor ’ s net wort h for the purpose of establishing t he
amoun t o f the bond, deposit, or security required to suspend14 e nforcement of the judgment. A trial court clerk must receive and file a net

- worth affidavit tendered for filing by a judgment debtor.
(2) Contest; Discover y

. A j udg ment creditor may file a
c ontest t o t he debtor ’ s claimed n et worth. The contest need not be sworn. The creditor may conduct reasonable discovery concerning the judgment debtor ’ s net worth.
(3) Hearing; Burden of Proof; Findings; Addition a l Securi t y. Th e t rial court must hear a jud gment cr edi tor ’ s contes t of the judgment debtor ’ s claimed net w or th promptly after any discovery has been c ompleted. The judgment debtor has the burden of proving net worth. The trial court must issue an order th a t states the d ebt or ’ s net worth and states with par tic ularity the factual b asis for that determination. If t he trial court orders additional or oth er security to supersede the j udgment, the enforcement of the judgment will be suspended for twenty days aft e r the tr i al co urt ’ s order. If the judgment debtor d oes not comply with the order within that period, the j ud gment may be enforced against the judg ment debtor.

T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 24 .2(c). PASE did not request a hearing to enable the trial court to

determine its n e t worth for posti ng bond. Rather, on t he d ay of the hearing, P ASE

tendered to the co urt in camera a bank

- balance sheet that was filed under seal in

this Court.

Even if the hearing on Oxbow ’ s mot i on t o increase the amount of s ecurity

was intended also to b e a hearing to dete r mine PASE ’ s net w orth

— whic h was not

the case

—

PASE ’ s filing of a bal ance sheet as of October 31, 2020 does n ot satisfy
the requirement that it file “complete, detailed info rmation concerning [its ] assets

and liabilities from which net wor th can be ascertain e d.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P.15

24 .2( c) (1)

. Neither t he ba lance sheet, nor t he affidavit of PASE ’ s counsel, which

was also file d the day of the hearing, addresses PASE ’ s assets. As the testimony

from th e hearing shows, PASE ’ s assets include seve ral million dollars ’ wor th of
equipme nt in its Port Arthur plan t.

Had there been a ne t

- worth hearing, the trial court would h ave had to “issue
an order that state[d] the debtor ’ s net w orth and state[d] with parti c ularity the

factual basis for that determi nat ion.” T EX

. R. A P P

. P

. 24.2(c)(3). Given P ASE ’ s
apparent de cision to not request a net

- worth hearing, its argument that it cannot

aff ord the increased bond is unavailing.

C

. Post

- J udgment D isc overy

PASE also asks this Court f or relief from the post

- judgment discovery

pr o pounded by Oxbow

. But PASE waived its objecti ons to most of the di scovery
requests during the hearing on Oxbow ’ s mot io n to increase the amo unt of security

.
P A S E stated that it d id not “h ave any particular pr oblem with

. . . answering those
questions, because the assets ha [d] been di sclosed ,” but that PAS E would not
provide i nformation about its bank balance. PAS E also said that it was “inclin ed”

to answer the discov er y, “except for ca sh positions and bank accounts.” The trial

court gave PASE until January 15, 202 1 to respond to Oxbo w ’ s post

- judgment
discovery and held that P A SE d id not need to disclose the a mou nt in i t s bank

acc ounts. The trial court ’ s order said P ASE need not respond to two16

interrogatories and one request for production that “seek information re l ating to

PASE ’ s ban k a ccounts, bank institutio ns, an d c ash balances , except that PA SE
shall be required to provide information regarding any transfer of m oney away from its bank accounts or bank institutions between January 1, 2018 and January
15, 2021. ” Given that PASE agr eed durin g t he hearing to a nswer the oth er

disco very requests, this issue is moot. 12

C o nclusion

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the

bond increased by $ 1, 068 ,708.69, inclusive of interest, and w e deny PASE ’ s

M otion to R eview S upersedeas O rder

. T he stay previously imposed by t his

Court ’ s January 7, 2 02 1 order is lifted

. We dismiss as moot Oxbow ’ s request for

reconsideration of this C o urt ’ s January 7 , 202 1 stay order.

12 Oxbow as serts that this Cou r t lacks jurisdiction over PASE ’ s complai nts a bout the post

- judgment discovery. At least one appellate court has ruled on a post

- jud g ment discovery motion in similar ci rcumsta nces. See Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Longview E nergy Co. , 510 S.W.3d 479, 48 7

– 8 8 ( Tex. App.

— San Anto nio 2014, no pet.) ( holdin g trial court , in response to rule 24.4 motion, did not ab use it s discretion in orde r ing post

- judgment production of doc uments for monitoring of trust assets during pende ncy of app eal). N oting that the court of appeals an d the trial court c o nclud ed that the post

- judgment discovery was reasonable , t he Texas S upreme C ourt held that order ing the d iscovery w a s not an abuse of discre tion

. In

re Longview Energy Co

. , 464 S. W.3d 353, 362 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proc eeding)

.17 P ER CU RIAM

Panel cons ists of J ustices Count iss , Rivas

- Molloy, and Guerra

.