### NUM BER 1 3-08 -007 22-CV 

## C O U R T O F AP P E AL S
T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS
C O R P U S C H R I S T I
- 

## E D I N B U R G

JUA N HERNA NDEZ, A ppell ant,

v. YOLA NDA

HERNA NDEZ, A ppell ee.

On a ppeal fr om the 197t h Di str ic t Cour t of Camer on County , Texas.



## M E M O R AN D U M O P I N I O N
Before Chi ef Justi ce Val dez and Just ic es Rodriguez a nd Ga rz a M emor andum O pini on by Chi ef Justi ce Val dez
A p p e llant, Juan Hernan dez, app eals f rom a divorce decre e w hich end ed hi s

ma rriag e to app ellee, Yolanda Hernan dez, and divi ded the com mu nity esta te. By a single issue, Juan challen ges the trial court’s divi sion of the com mu nity esta te by arguing tha t the
trial court erred in ent ering a f inding tha t the re w as no evidence of c om mu nity
inde bte dne ss. W e a f

f irm.I. B A C K G R O U N D

Juan and Yolanda ma rried on March 20, 197 3, and a f ter thirty- f our y ears of

ma rriag e, Juan f iled f or divorce on April 5, 200 7. Af ter a ben ch trial, the trial court ent ered
its “ Final Decree of

Div orce” on October 8, 2008

. T he divorce decre e neithe r ref eren ces

nor provides f or a divi sion of a n y d e b t a cquired during the ma rriag e. On Decem ber 3,
200 8, the trial court ent ered find ings of fact and conclusion s of law

. T he trial court f oun d
tha t th e co mm unity esta te co nsisted of vari ous “person al pro perty” as w ell as:
A. La Cante ra Spe cial Events Cente r [“La Cante ra”] and Juan ’s Catering busin ess, in cluding:

a. 3.9 00 acres out of the Sou th part of Block 19, Los Eba nos Prope rties Sub di v ision, Brownsv ille[,] Cam eron Coun ty, T exas[,]
b. imp rov em ent s, f urnitu re, f ix tures, equipm ent [,] and inventory[,]

c. checkin g accoun t at First Nation al Ba nk[;] an d
B. Marital reside nce [de scribed as,]

a. L o t 2 0, Block 2, Qua il Hollow Unit No. 2, Abst ract 2 , Brownsv ille, Cam eron Coun ty, Te x as[.]
T he trial court also f oun d tha t: “Neither party presen ted evidence of any liabilities of the

com mu nity esta te. T here f ore, the [c]ou rt f inds the re are no liabilities of the com mu nity
esta te.” One -half of the com mu nity esta te w as awarded to each spou se—Yoland a received prop erty v alue d at $12 9,4 64 w hich consiste d of , am ong oth er things, the ma rital
residen ce, and Juan received prop erty valued at $1, 022 ,53 5 wh ic h consiste d of , am ong oth er things, La Cante ra. In orde r to achie v e a “just and rig ht divi sion,” Juan w as orde red to p ay $446 ,53 5.5 0 to Yoland a. On app eal, Juan asserts tha t the evidence is legally insuf f icient to supp ort the trial
court’s f inding tha t the re are no liabilities of the com mu nity esta te “beca use the und ispute d

2evidence esta blishes as a ma tter of law tha t th e co mm unity esta te h ad subst ant ial deb t”

com prised of La Cante ra’s long-term liabilities—two First Nation al Ban k loan s tota lin g $65 6,5 48. 13. Juan prays tha t w e mo dif y the Final Decree of Div orce to ref lect this liability
and argues tha t the $44 6,5 35. 50 am oun t tha t he w as orde red to pay to Yolanda shou ld be
redu ced by half the abo v e-me ntion ed long-term liabilities. W hile this app eal w as pen ding,
Yolanda f iled a mo tion to dism iss. Bef ore consid ering the me rits of Juan ’s app eal, w e f irst
add ress Yolanda ’s mo tion to dism iss

. See Garz a v. Garz a , 155 S.W .3d 471 , 474 (Te x

. App .–S an Ant onio 20 04, no pe t.).
II. M O T I O N T O D I S M I S S In her mo tion to dism iss, Yolanda argues tha t Juan ’s app eal mu st b e d ismissed
und er th e a ccept ance of be nef its do ctrine. W e d isagree. 1
Unde r the acce pta nce of be nef its do ctrine, “[a] litigant cann ot t reat a judgme nt a s b o t h ri ght and w rong, and if he has v olun tarily accep ted the ben ef its of a judgme nt, h e

cann ot af

terw ard prose cute an app eal the ref rom. ” Carle v. Carle , 149 T ex. 4 69, 234
S.W .2d 100 2, 100 4 (195 0). How ever, narrow exception s to t h e a c c ept ance of ben ef its
d o c t rin e exist; the doct rine doe s not app ly if : (1) rev ersal of the judgme nt co u ld n o t possib ly af

f ect Juan ’s rig ht to the ben ef its alread y secure d und e r it , see W aite v. W aite , 150 S.W .3d 797 , 804 (Te x

. App .– Housto n [14 th Dist.] 200 4, pet

. den ied) (citing Tex. Sta te
Ban k v. Am aro , 87 S.W .3d 538 , 544 (Te x

. 200 2); Carle , 234 S.W .2d at 100 4; Blaylock v. Blaylock , 603 S.W .2d 254 , 255 (Te x

. Civ

. App .–Hou s t o n [ 1 4th Dist.] 198 0, no w rit)) ; (2)

econ om ic circumsta nces com pelled Juan to accep t ben ef its, see Sm ith v. Tex. Com m erce Ban k Corpus Christi , 822 S.W .2d 812 , 814 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 199 2, w rit den ied);

J u a n o b j e c t s t o Y o l a n d a ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s b e c a u s e Y o l a n d a d i d n o t c o n f e r w i t h h i m o r i n c l u d e a 1
c e r t i f i c a t e o f c o n f e r e n c e , a s r e q u i r e d b y T e x a s R u l e o f A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e 1 0

. 1 ( a ) ( 5 )

. S e e T E X

. R

. A P P

. P

. 1 0

. 1 ( a ) ( 5 )

. W e d o n o t c o n d o n e Y o l a n d a ’ s d i s r e g a r d o f t h e r u l e ; h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e J u a n h a s f i l e d a r e s p o n s e t o Y o l a n d a ’ s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , n o p u r p o s e w o u l d b e s e r v e d b y s t r i k i n g t h e m o t i o n a n d r e q u i r i n g a c o n f e r e n c e

. 3or (3) Juan ’s accep tan ce of cash ben ef its und er the judgme nt w as not prejud icial to

Yolanda

. See Trevino v. Trevino , 555 S.W .2d 792 , 795 -96 (Te x

. Civ

. App .–Corp us Christi
197 7, n o wr it).
Yolanda poin ts to tw o specif ic action s tha t she cont end s const itute Juan ’s v olun tary
accep tan ce of the ben ef its of the judgme nt. Yolanda asserts tha t: (1) “[o]n Octob er 14,
200 8, [Jua n] pled ged the real prop erty awarded to him in the Final Decree of D iv orce .

. .
as collate ral f or a loan from F alcon Bank in the sum of $720, 000 ”; and (2) Juan remo v ed
certif icates of dep osit tha t w ere awarded one -half to each spou se f rom First Nation al Ban k
and “dep osited the m into [Jua n]’s nam e only at Falcon Ban k.” T he record supp orts the se assertio ns; the ref ore, w e mu st gr ant Yolanda ’s mo tion to dism iss unle ss Juan satisf ies an exception to the acce pta nce of the be nef its do ctrine.
J u a n argues tha t the accep tan ce of the ben ef its doct rine doe s not bar his ap p e a l
beca use a rev ersal of the judgme nt could not possib ly af f ect his rig ht to the ben ef its—the
loan and certif icates of dep osit—alrea dy secure d und er it. Spe cif ically , Juan cont end s tha t
h is “sole issue on app eal involv es only his rig ht to a f urthe r recovery by seekin g a redu ction” of the $44 6,5 35. 50 tha t he w as orde red to pay to Yolanda ; thu s, his app eal doe s not involv e his “rig hts” in the certif icates of dep osit or the prop erty used to secure the loan

. Juan f rame s his app ellate issue as a “legal suf f iciency” challen ge. How ever, in f am ily law

cases, legal suf

f iciency is not an inde pen den t gr oun d of error; instea d, it is a f acto r in our

assessm ent of w het her the trial court abu sed its discretion in its prop erty divi sion. Zorilla

v. W ahid , 83 S.W .3d 247 , 252 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 200 2, no pet .). Conclud ing tha t
the trial court abu sed its d is c re t ion in the prop erty divi sion requires rev ersal of the trial
court’s judgme nt. See Jacob s v. Jacob s , 687 S.W .2d 731 , 733 (Te x

. 198 5). Reversal of

a f inal divorce decre e of ten results in the trial court’s re-div ision of the com mu nity prop erty

4in ord er to ach ieve a just and rig ht d iv ision. See W aite , 15 0 S .W .3d at 808 (“If w e were 2
to rev erse beca use the trial court erred in chara cteriz ing [certa in prop erty] as com mu nity,
the trial court w ould alm ost certain ly re-div ide the com mu n it y p ro perty.”); Bloo m , 935
S.W .3d at 947 -48 (holdin g tha t “the ben ef its [ap pellan t] has accep ted , includin g her share
of the com mu nity esta te, relief f rom com mu nity deb ts, and the orde red child supp ort, could
be af f ecte d” w here app ellant requeste d a new trial af ter def aultin g in a divorce proce edin g)

. T he trial cou rt divi ded the com mu nity prope rty evenly between Juan and Yolanda
in the und erly ing divorce decre e. Juan doe s not cont end tha t the origi nal divi sion w as ent irely errone ous; instea d, he only a rg ues tha t the trial court f ailed to ackno w ledge and
divi de a subst ant ial am oun t of deb t incurred by the partie s. T he prop erty accep ted by Juan
is not the subje ct of his app eal. By his app eal, Juan seeks only f urthe r recovery in the f orm of a redu ction of the $44 6,5 35. 50 tha t he w as orde red to pay to Yolanda

. T hus, if w e w ere to rev erse the und erly ing judgme nt and rema nd to the trial court f or a just and rig ht divi sion,
it is highly likely tha t the trial court w ould ref rain f rom re-div iding all of the com mu ni t y
prop erty and instea d w ould simp ly redu ce the am oun t of payme nt tha t it has orde red Juan to p ay to Yoland a b y

ha lf of the amou nt of

debt. See Kli

ne v. O’ Quinn , 874 S.W .2d 776,
781 (Te x

. App

. – Ho usto n [14 th Dist.] 199 4, w rit den ied) (holdin g tha t accep tan ce of the
ben ef its doct rine did not app ly w here appellan t accepte d comp ensa tory dam ages but on
app eal raised only is s u e s regarding pun itiv e dam ages and atto rney’s f ees). T he f acts
prese nte d in this case seem to indicat e tha t the rev ersal of the judgme nt could not possib ly
af f ect Juan ’s rig ht to the ben ef its alread y secure d und er it. Altho ugh this exception is

narrow, out of an abu nda nce of caut ion, w e conclu de tha t Juan is not barred b y the
accep tan ce of ben ef its doct rine f rom assertin g this app eal. Accordin gly , Yolanda ’s mo tion

O n a p p e a l , J u a n d o e s n o t s e e k r e v e r s a l o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t

. I n s t e a d , h e a s k s t h i s C o u r t 2 t o m o d i f y , o r o r d e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o m o d i f y , t h e “ F i n a l D e c r e e o f D i v o r c e ” b y r e d u c i n g t h e a m o u n t h e i s o b l i g a t e d t o p a y Y o l a n d a

. 5to d ismiss is DENIE D.
III. L I A B I L I T I E S O F T H E C O M M U N I T Y E S T A T E

By his sole issue, Juan cont end s tha t the evidence is legally insuf f icient to supp ort
the trial court’s f in d in g t h a t the re are no liabilities of the com mu nity esta te beca use the
evidence proves a ma tter of law tha t the com mu nity esta te include d deb t t ota ling $65 6,5 48. 13.
A

. Standard of Review
T rial courts have w ide discretion in ma king a ju st and rig ht divi sion of ma rital
prop erty; w e rev iew a trial court’s divi sion f or an abu se of discretion

. T E X

. F A M

. C O D E A N N

. § 7.0 01 (Verno n 200 6); Murff v. Mu rf f , 6 1 5 S .W .2d 696 , 698 (Te x

. 198 1); Zorilla , 83
S.W .3d at 252

. As p re vio u s ly state d, in f am ily law cases, the traditio nal suf f iciency
stan dard s of rev iew overlap w ith the abu se-of -discretion stan dard of rev iew ; thu s , le gal
insuf f iciency is n o t a n in d e pen den t gr oun d of error but is a relevant f acto r in our

assessm ent of w het her the trial court abu sed its discretion

. Zorilla , 83 S.W .3d at 252

. W e
presu me the trial court did not abu se its discretion in d ivi d in g t h e esta te, and w e w ill n ot
d ist urb the divi sion on app eal unle ss the app ellant dem onst rates a clear a b u s e o f
discretion

. Murff

, 61 5 S .W .2d at 698

. T he test f or abu se of discretion is wh e t h e r the trial court acte d arbitrarily or

unre ason ably, or w het her it acte d w ithou t ref eren ce to any guiding rules or principles. See
W orford v. Sta m

per , 801 S.W .2d 108 , 109 (Te x

. 199 0); see a ls o L o z a no v. Loz ano , No.
13-0 8-00 536 -CV, 200 9 W L 4 882 816 , at *3 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi Dec. 17, 200 9, no pet .) (mem

. op. ). A trial court doe s not abu se its discretion if the re is som e evidence of a subst ant iv e and prob ative chara cter to supp ort its decision

. Garz a v. Garz a , 217 S.W .3d
538 , 549 (Te x

. App .–S an Ant onio 200 6, no pet .); see also Loz ano , 200 9 W L 488 281 6, at
6*4.
W hen an ap pellan t at tacks t he legal suf f iciency of

an adverse f inding on an issue

on w hich he has the burd en of proo f , he mu st dem onst rate on app eal tha t the evidence
esta blishes, a s a m a t t e r o f law , all v ital f acts in supp ort of his issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W .3d 237 , 241 -42 (Te x

. 200 1); see also Rojas v. Rojas , No. 13-0 2-16 7-CV,
200 4 W L 432 27, at *2 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi Jan. 8, 200 4, no pet .) (mem

. op. ). If the re is no evidence to supp ort the f inding, w e w ill examine the ent ire record and det ermin e if the
cont rary prop osition is esta blished as a ma tter of law

. Francis , 46 S.W .3d at 241

. W e w ill
conclu de tha t the evidence is legally insuf f icient only if the con trary prop osition is
conclu siv ely establishe d. Id. In a legal suf f iciency rev iew , w e must v iew the evidence in
the lig ht mo st f avorable to the v erdict, crediting f a vo rable evidence if a reaso nab le
f act-f inde r could and disregarding cont rary evidence unle ss a reaso nab le f act-f inde r could
not

. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 8 0 2 , 807 (Te x

. 200 5). T he f inal test f or legal
suf f iciency mu st alw ays be wh e t h e r the evidence at trial w ould ena ble reaso nab le and
f air-mind ed peo ple t o rea ch th e verdict un der review

. Id. at 822

. B. A naly sis
As the party seekin g ent itlem ent to an award of the prop erties alleged in his pet ition
f or divorce, it w as Juan ’s burd e n in t h e t ri a l court to ade quately d escribe the asset s and
liabilities of

the comm unity esta te and establish their respective v alue s. See C ape llen v. Cape llen , 888 S.W .2d 539 , 542 -43 (Te x

. App .–E l Paso 199 4, w rit den ied); Haley v. Haley , 713 S.W .2d 801 , 803 (Te x

. App .–Hou ston [1st Dist.] 198 6, no w rit); see a ls o S u a re z v. Sua rez , No. 13-0 4-10 8-CV, 200 6 W L 119 496 0, at *2 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi May 4,
200 6, no pet .) (mem

. op. ). J u an cont end s tha t he satisf ied his burd en beca use “[t]he
evidence adm itted esta blishes as a ma tter of law tha t the com m u n it y e state owed a
7subst ant ial de bt o f at least $65 6,5 48. 13. ” W e d isagree.
J u an poin ts to the f ollowi ng as “docu me nts of record tha t esta blish a subst ant ia l

com mu nity deb t”: (1) a f inan cial state me nt dat ed Decem ber 31, 200 6; (2) his sw orn inventor y f iled on Sep tem ber 4, 200 7; (3) his supp lem ent al sw orn inventory f iled on Sep tem ber 9, 2008 ; (4) Jua n a nd Yolanda ’s tax returns f or the y ears 200 4 and 200 5; (5)
the 200 4 and 200 5 “Gene ral Led gers” of La Cante ra; and (6) one page of an expert repo rt
adm itted into evidence by Yolanda ’s expert w itness. Juan also asserts tha t his testim ony, Yolanda ’s testim ony, and an “[a]d mission by [Yoland a]’s coun sel” esta blish deb t of the

com mu nity estate as a m atte r of law.
1. Fi nancia l State ment, Tax Returns, a nd Gene ral Ledgers
At the June 200 8 divorce proce edin g, the trial court adm itted La Cante ra’s “Financial
Sta tem ent f or the period end ing De cem ber 31, 200 6” into evidence. T h e bala nce shee t
ref lects tha t as of Decem ber 31, 200 6, L a Ca nte ra’s “long[-]term liabilities” consiste d of
three F ir s t Na tiona l Ban k not es—ide ntif ied as #34 573 2, #17 002 73, and #60 018 92—
tota ling $65 6,5 48. 13. T he trial court also adm itted Juan and Yolanda ’s tax returns f or the
y ears 200 4 and 200 5. T he tax returns ref lect tha t Juan and Yolanda paid intere st to First
Nation al Ban k in 200 4 and 200 5. La Cante ra’s 200 4 and 200 5 “Gene ral Led ger s ” w ere also adm itted into evidence. T he 200 4 Gen eral Led ger describe s La Cante ra’s long-term
liabilities as one “GMAC not e” and three F ir st Nation al Ban k not es tota ling $42 0,0 86. 22—t hese not es are iden tif ied as #30 117 2, #31 624 8, and #31 625 2. T he 200 5
Gen eral Led ger describe s La Cante ra’s long-term liabilities as one “Bank of Am erica” not e,

one “GMAC not e” and one First Nation al Ban k not e f or $ 5 1 7 , 1 3 7 .69 —iden tif ied as #34 573 2.
T he v alue of com mu nity asset s and liabilities is generally det ermin ed at the dat e of

8divorce or as close to it as possib le. See Hand ley v. Hand

ley , 122 S.W .3d 904 , 908 (Te x

. App .–Corp us Christi 200 3, no pet .); Grossnickle v. Grossnickle , 935 S.W .2d 830 , 837 (Te x

. App .–T exarkana 199 6, w rit den ied); see also Sua rez , 200 6 W L 119 496 0, at *2. Juan f ailed
to provide evidence o f L a Ca n t era’s liabilities at the time of , or close to the time of his
divorce f rom Yolanda

. Altho ugh the general ledgers and tax returns of f er evidence of La
Cante ra’s long-term liabilities in 200 4 and 200 5, t h e p a rties’ divorce hea ring was held in
June 200 8. T he general ledgers and tax returns of f er no indicat ion as to the existence or the am oun t of liabilities of the com mu nity esta te at the time of the divorce. See Hand ley , 122 S.W .3d at 908 ; Grossnickle , 935 S.W .2d at 837 ; see also Sua rez , 200 6 W L 119 496 0,
at *2. Juan also cont end s t hat La Cante ra’s Decem ber 31, 200 6 f inan cial state me nt
esta blishes “that the com mu nity esta te owed a subst ant ial deb t of at least $65 6,5 48. 13. ”
How ever, even if this w as the v alue of Juan and Yolanda ’s inde bte dne ss as of Decem ber
3 1 , 2 0 0 6 , it doe s not conclu siv ely pro v e the existence or the am oun t of inde bte dne ss a t
the time of divorce. See Hand ley , 122 S.W .3d at 908 ; Grossnickl e , 9 3 5 S

. W .2d at 837 ;

see also Sua rez , 20 06 W L 1 194 960 , at *2.
2. S w orn and Supple mental Inv entory and E xpert Re port
On Sep tem ber 4, 200 7, Juan f iled a sw orn inventory w ith the trial court listing First
Nation al Ban k accou nt num ber “170 027 93” and accou nt num ber “345 732 ,” wit h t h e
payme nt am oun ts of $1, 565 .74 and $5, 732 .21 , respe ctiv ely. T he sw orn invent o ry doe s not state t h e f re que ncy of the payme nts, and no am oun t is listed in the “Amo unt Ow ed”
colum n of the inventory. T he inf orma tion on the purp orted First Nation al Ban k loan s listed

on the supp lem ent al sw orn inventory f iled on Sep tem ber 9, 200 8, mirrors the inf orma tion

on Juan ’s Sep tem ber 4 , 20 07 sw orn in v ent ory

. A repo rt prep ared by Darry l Baird, Yolanda ’s expert w itness w ho testif ied regarding

9the v alue of La Cante ra, w as adm itted into evidence at the June 200 8 divorce proce edin g.

Juan poin ts to the “[p]rincipa l on [r]ea l [e]st ate [l]oa ns” and “[i]nte rest expense -real esta te”
listed in the repo rt f or the y ears 200 4-20 07, as proo f tha t La Cante ra had subst ant ial deb t.
Juan also poin ts to a f oot not e in the repo rt tha t state s tha t “[a] tota l of $65 ,93 6 are actu al principa l am oun ts paid on tw o real esta te loan s

. . .” as f urth e r p ro o f of La Cante ra’s
li a b il it ie s at the time of Juan and Yolanda ’s divorce. How ever, neith er the sw o rn inven tories nor the excerpt f rom Baird’s repo rt ade quately describe the liabilities of the

com mu nity esta te or esta blish the ir respe ctiv e v alue s. See Hand ley , 122 S.W .3d at 908 ; Grossnickle , 93 5 S .W .2d at 837 ; see also Sua rez , 20 06 W L 1 194 960 , at *2.
3. J uan’s Testimony
Add itiona lly , Juan asserts tha t his testim ony duri n g the June 200 8 divorce
proce edin g esta blishes the existence and am oun t of a com mu nity liability

. S pecif ically , Juan po ints to an an sw er he gav e d uring cross-ex am inatio n regarding a $12 ,50 0 liab ility
listed on a docu me nt ent itled “Prelimina ry Person al Finan cial Sta tem ent f or Mr. [an d] Mrs.
Juan Herna nde z ” w hich h ad previously be en adm itted into evidence : [Yoland a’s Cou nsel]: Okay. And it sh o ws o n t he f ollowi ng page First Nation al Ba nk $ 12, 500 . W hat w as th at? [Jua n]: I h a ve no idea w hat this is. I know tha t at First Nation al I only have tw o loa n s , o n e f or the origi nal w hich is like arou nd ma y be c lo se to 497 ,00 0, a nd the n a not her o ne f or 16 5,0 00.
No f urthe r testim ony w as giv en as to the se tw o loan s. Juan doe s not clarif y w hat
the se loans perta ined to, w hen the loans w ere obt aine d, w het her the origi nal am oun ts of
the loan s w ere $49 7,0 00 and $16 5,0 00, or w het her the se am oun ts w ere the bala nce of the
not es o n th e loa ns a t th e tim e o f the divorce. During J u an’s cross-examina tion, Yolanda ’s coun sel atte mp ted to of f er into

10evidence “payof f state me nts” dat ed April 30, 200 8, f or tw o loan s f rom First Nation al Ban k.
Juan testif ied tha t he did not have his e y eglasses a nd w as u nab le to read or iden tif y the exhibit; the exhibit w as not adm itted into evidence. During direct examina tion of Yolanda , Yolanda ’s coun sel again atte mp ted to adm it the purp o rt e d “payof f state me nts” into
evidence. Juan ’s coun sel obje cted to the “auth ent icity ” of the payof f state me nts. T he trial
court susta ined Juan ’s coun sel’s obje ction, and the exhibit w as not ent ered into evidence.
On app ea l, J u a n urges tha t w e consid er the excluded “payof f state me nts” as evidence of liability of the com mu nity esta te. How ever, excluded e vid e n c e cann ot be
consid ered proof

to esta blish that the comm unity esta te had subst ant ial deb t. See Sta te
Bar of Tex. v. Grossen bach er , 781 S.W .2d 736 , 738 (Te x

. App .–S an Ant onio 198 9, no w rit) (“In orde r f or evidence to be consid ered as proo f in a case, it mu st be adm itted at trial.”).
T hus, the “payof

f state m e n ts” of

f ered by Yolanda and excluded by the trial court do not

serv e a s proo f

of liabilities o f

the com mu nity estate at the tim e o f the divorce. See id.
4. Counse l’s A dmiss ion
Du rin g his ope ning state me nt, Yolanda ’s trial coun sel state d, “Th ere is a not e to
First Nation al Ban k, w hich is the only inde bte dne ss against La Cante ra, f or $59 9,5 64

. . . .”
Juan asserts tha t th is “a d m is s io n” by Yolanda ’s coun sel is proo f of liabilities of the

com mu nity esta te. Ope ning state me nts are not evidence. See For t W o rt h Hotel Ltd

. P’ ship v. Ense rch Corp. , 977 S.W .2d 746 , 756 (Te x

. A pp. –Fort W orth 199 8, no pet .);
Carrasco v. Tex. Transp. Inst. , 908 S.W .2d 575 , 580 (T e x. A p p

. –W aco 199 5, no w rit);
Borde r App arel-East

, Inc. v. Gua dian , 868 S.W .2d 894 , 898 n.6 (Te x

. App .–E l Paso 199 3,

no w rit). T here f ore, even if this state me nt w as an “adm ission,” w e cann ot consid er it in our

ana ly sis. See Grosse nba cher , 78 1 S .W .2d at 738

. Viewi ng the evidence in the lig ht mo st f avorable to the trial court’s f inding, crediting

11f avorable evid e n ce if a reaso nab le f act-f inde r could and disregarding cont rary evidence

unle ss a reaso nab le f act-f inde r could not , w e conclu de tha t the evidence prese nte d did not
conclu siv ely esta blish as a ma tter of la w “t hat the com mu nity esta te owed a subst ant ial
deb t of at least $65 6,5 48. 13. ” See City of Keller, 168 S.W .3d at 807

. T hus, the evidence

w as legally suf

f icient to supp ort the trial court’s adverse f inding. See Cape llen , 888 S.W .2d
at 543

. W e conclu de tha t the trial court did not abu se its discretion in divi ding the ma rital
esta te. See Zorilla , 83 S.W .3d at 252 . A ccordingly , we overr ule Ju an’s so le issue

. IV. C O N C L U S I O N W e a f f irm th e jud gmen t of

the trial cou rt.

ROGEL IO V ALDEZ

Chief Justice

Deliv ered an d f iled th e 30t h d ay of

Se pte mb er, 2 010

.

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