NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ 

No. 11-3775

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MILAGROS CHALUISAN,

 Appellant

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 

_____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-05918)

District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 21, 2012

Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 4, 2012) 

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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RENDELL, Circuit Judge

Milagros Chaluisan appeals a judgment of the District Court affirming a 

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that Chaluisan is not entitled 

to supplemental security income (otherwise known as SSI) benefits for the period 

.
2

between 1984 and 1998 because she was not disabled under the Social Security 

Act during that time. We will affirm.

I.

This case has a long and complicated history. Chaluisan, who has suffered 

from scoliosis since she was a child, applied for benefits from the time of her 

diagnosis, in 1982, to the present. She has been determined disabled, and awarded 

corresponding benefits, for the periods between 1982 and 1984 and 1998 to the 

present. Two separate ALJ decisions have determined that Chaluisan was not 

disabled between 1984 and 1998.

The first of those decisions was issued on July 26, 2005. In twenty-five, 

single-spaced pages, the ALJ reviewed all of the medical and other evidence and 

applied the Zebley presumption to the portion of Chaluisan’s claim that pertained 

to the period before she turned 18 (in 1988) and the adult Social Security standards

to the remainder.

1

 1 The “Zebley presumption” arose out of a settlement entered into by class 

plaintiffs following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 

521 (1990). The settlement provided for the re-adjudication of all SSI claims that 

were denied for children before 1990 and allowed for inferences of childhood 

disability in such adjudications under certain, prescribed circumstances. See

Zebley v. Sullivan, No. 83-3314, 1991 WL 65530, at *6-7, 9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 

1991) (Stipulation and Order of Settlement).

As relevant to this appeal, the ALJ determined that 

(1) Chaluisan engaged in substantial gainful activity as a cashier, and therefore 

was not disabled as an adult, in 1988 and 1989; (2) the medical evidence did not 

support a determination of adult disability between 1990 and 1998 because 

Chaluisan did not present the range of physiological symptoms required to support 
3

a determination that she suffered from a sufficiently disabling spinal disorder 

because the records demonstrated that Chaluisan’s back pain during that time did 

not require inpatient or other extraordinary treatment or medication (other than 

with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories, for a brief period), and therefore would not 

have prevented Chaluisan from performing sedentary work; (3) disability from 

1984 to 1988 could not reasonably be inferred under Zebley because the finding of 

disability beginning in 1998 occurred after a period of adult non-disability and was 

attributable to a worsening of symptoms at that time; and (4) applying current and 

previous rules, the evidence did not support a finding of disability between 1984 

and 1998. 

Chaluisan appealed that decision to the District Court and, in a 2008 

opinion, the District Court addressed each of the issues before us in this appeal. 

First, the District Court found the ALJ had applied the correct legal standard from 

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), to Chaluisan’s claim, but remanded the 

case to the ALJ for further explanation of his conclusions and the basis for his 

reliance on the Commissioner’s medical expert. Second, the District Court 

determined that the ALJ gave proper weight to each treating physician’s opinion, 

and, with one exception, properly explained his reasons for accepting or rejecting 

each doctor’s testimony. The District Court remanded the case for further 

explanation of the ALJ’s decision to reject the testimony of one physician, Dr. 

Sabato. Third, the District Court determined Chaluisan was not denied a fair 

hearing because tapes from her previous testimony could not be located. The 
4

District Court reasoned that the same information was contained in written records 

and Chaluisan had the opportunity to testify. 

Chaluisan appealed that decision, but we dismissed Chaluisan’s appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction after the Appeals Council vacated the underlying 

administrative decision. Another hearing was held before a different ALJ, who 

provided further explanation as directed by the District Court and again 

determined that Chaluisan was not disabled for the period 1984 to 1998. 

Chaluisan again appealed to the District Court, where the case was assigned to a 

different district judge.

In a 2011 opinion, the District Court declined to reconsider any of the 

previous judge’s rulings, asserting that they were now law of the case. It found 

that, on remand, the ALJ had sufficiently explained the basis for the disability 

determinations, and it affirmed the determination that Chaluisan was not disabled 

from 1984 to 1998. Chaluisan now appeals.

II.

On appeal, Chaluisan reasserts the same arguments that she presented to the 

District Court: (1) the ALJs improperly denied her the presumption of disability 

to which she was entitled under the Zebley settlement; (2) the ALJs failed to give 

her treating physicians’ opinions adequate weight; and (3) the ALJs denied her a 

fair hearing by failing to locate tapes of her testimony from earlier hearings. In 

reviewing denials of SSI benefits, our review of legal issues is plenary. Sykes v.

Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). We apply the same deferential standard 
5

as the District Court to the Commissioner’s fact findings, asking whether those 

findings are supported by “substantial evidence.” Id. Applying those standards, 

we reject each of Chaluisan’s three arguments.

First, the ALJs did not misapply Zebley. Chaluisan argues that the Zebley

settlement requires an ALJ that finds a current disability to find disability as of the 

claimant’s earliest application for benefits within the Zebley class period unless 

there is a contrary medical judgment.

2

 While one part of the Social Security 

Administration’s “Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual” (“HALLEX”) 

supports that assertion, see HALLEX 1-5-4-28A(V), that provision has no basis in 

the language of the Zebley settlement itself, which provides only that, in cases 

(like this one) where the claimant is found to be disabled in the current 

proceedings, and evidence of the claimant’s past condition is not readily 

available,

3

 2 Chaluisan’s brief misleadingly suggests that the Zebley standards apply to the 

entire “Interim Period,” from 1984 to 1998. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 31 (“A 

presumption of disability during the Interim Period is warranted because the 

record establishes that Chaluisan meets the Zebley criteria . . . .”). In fact, the 

Zebley standards apply only to the period before a claimant “attained age 18.” 

Beginning on the day the claimant “attains age 18,” which, in this case, was 

December 10, 1988, claims are evaluated according to the same disability 

standards that apply to adults. See Social Security Administration, Office of 

Disability Adjudication and Review, HALLEX: Hearings, Appeals and Litigation 

Law Manual I-5-4-28-A-IV, available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I05/I-5-4-28-A.html#I-5-4-28-A-IV (“HALLEX”).

“the adjudicator will determine, based on the nature of the impairment, 

3 Both of those conditions are met here. The 2008 District Court opinion 

specifically found that Chaluisan did not qualify for the standard that applies to 

claimants with “subsequent” disability determinations because the relevant adult 

disability determination was made in the same 2005 ALJ decision that re-
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whether it is reasonable to presume that the class member’s past condition and 

impairments were as severe as they are currently.” Zebley, 1991 WL 65530, at *9. 

Notwithstanding HALLEX’s addition of a contrary-evidence standard in cases like 

Chaluisan’s, the Zebley settlement controls. Internal social security manuals lack 

the force of law and do not bind the Social Security Administration. See

Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1989) (per curiam); accord Moore v. 

Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2000) (“HALLEX is strictly an internal 

guidance tool, providing policy and other procedural guidelines to ALJs and other 

staff members. As such, it does not . . . carry the force and effect of law.”).

The ALJs appropriately followed the Zebley settlement in this case. In the 

2005 opinion, the ALJ opined that “it would not be reasonable to infer disability”

for the relevant period. App. 60. After the District Court remanded the case so 

the Commissioner could further explain the basis for its decision, a second ALJ 

concluded that a presumption that Chaluisan’s impairments were as severe as of 

1984 as in 1998, when Chaluisan was again determined to be disabled, was “not 

reasonable . . . in the circumstances of this case.” We find no legal error here.

 

adjudicated Chaluisan’s Zebley claim. See Chaluisan v. Astrue, No. 07-3130, 

2008 WL 5427901, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2008). Chaluisan’s brief suggests that 

she does not accept that determination, see Appellant’s Br. 34, but because she has 

not directly challenged it on appeal, we are bound to accept it. Chaluisan admits 

and, indeed, urges that evidence of her past condition is not readily available. See

id. at 35 (arguing that the “lack of records” for the “period at issue” precluded the 

expert witnesses from rendering “any opinion as to the severity or effects of 

Chaluisan’s impairments”).
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Second, the ALJs did not violate any rule concerning the evidentiary weight 

due to treating physicians’ opinions. Treating physicians’ opinions as to the 

nature and severity of a claimant’s impairment (but not as to the ultimate legal 

issue of disability, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(1)) are entitled to “controlling 

weight” if the Commissioner finds that those opinions are “well-supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and are “not 

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.972(c)(2). The District Courts properly considered and rejected Chaluisan’s 

argument in this regard, finding that the ALJs adequately explained their reasons

for accepting or rejecting each of the treating physicians’ opinions. We will not 

repeat their analyses here other than to state that we agree with and adopt them.

Third, Chaluisan’s due-process argument lacks merit. We agree with the 

District Court’s 2008 analysis: Chaluisan had ample opportunities to testify at the 

2005 hearing; her subjective complaints were further represented by her medical 

reports and the testimony of her treating physicians; and the ALJs properly 

weighed all of the evidence, including subjective complaints and objective 

medical evidence, and reached an appropriate, well reasoned determination. We 

therefore will not reverse on this ground.

III.

Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court.