In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-3407

SOLOMON MONROE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RANDY J. DAVIS, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 06 C 4334—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 10, 2012—DECIDED APRIL 4, 2013

Before POSNER, ROVNER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Solomon Monroe appeals the

district court’s decision to deny his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus. Monroe v. Zimmerman, 2010 WL 3307081

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2010); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Monroe was

convicted of first-degree murder on an accountability

theory in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, and

sentenced to a term of 40 years. Monroe contends that

his federal constitutional rights were violated in three
2 No. 10-3407

respects: he was arrested without probable cause, in

violation of the Fourth Amendment; his trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to call his brother and sister-inlaw as witnesses at trial and in support of his motion to

suppress his post-arrest statements, in violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to effective legal representation; and finally that the State presented insufficient

evidence to support his conviction on an accountability

theory, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right

to due process. Finding no merit in any of these arguments, we affirm the denial of his habeas petition.

I.

In the early morning hours of November 23, 1996,

Keith Stalker was fatally bludgeoned and stabbed in

the aftermath of a drug sale gone wrong. Witnesses to the

attack on Stalker led Chicago police to Monroe and

three fellow members of the Black P-Stone Nation street

gang: Michael Thomas, Tyrone Curry, and Tory Jackson.

It turned out that these four men had been making street

sales of crack cocaine and Stalker, a member of another

gang, had been helping to recruit customers for them.

Stalker incurred the wrath of the other men after two

members of Stalker’s gang drove up to make a purchase but then sped off without paying for the cocaine

they had been given. He was beaten by Monroe and

Curry, and then stabbed by Thomas. Monroe would

later acknowledge that he did strike Stalker but

denied any foreknowledge that Thomas would stab

him. Monroe pleaded not guilty to a charge of murder
No. 10-3407 3

and proceeded to trial, contending that he harbored no

knowledge or intent that Stalker would be killed.

Jackson, after himself being acquitted on a murder

charge, opted to cooperate with the authorities and was a

key witness against Monroe at trial. Jackson explained

that on the evening of November 22-23, 1996, he, Thomas,

Curry, and Monroe were selling crack cocaine on the

4500 block of North Magnolia Avenue, in the heart of

Chicago’s Uptown neighborhood. Each of the men

played a different role in the operation of their “drug

spot”: Thomas, a ranking member of the gang, was responsible for supplying the cocaine and supervising

and enforcing discipline among the others. Jackson took

care of the retail end of the operation, locating customers

and making hand-to-hand sales. Monroe kept the stash

of cocaine hidden and supplied retail-quantity packets

of cocaine to Jackson as needed. Curry handled security,

keeping one eye on the cocaine supply and another on

Jackson, to make sure that he was not “stuck up” by a

customer. R. 31-3 at 11. Stalker, who was a member of

the Gaylord Nation street gang, helped Jackson recruit

customers. Stalker was a cocaine addict and a frequent

customer of Jackson’s, and on occasion he helped out

Jackson in exchange for cocaine when he lacked the

money to support his habit. Their role in fielding customers required Jackson and Stalker to station themselves on the street, while the others largely kept themselves out of view in nearby gangways and shrubbery.

Jackson recalled that sometime between 3:00 and

4:00 a.m. on November 23, a red Chevy Blazer drove up.
4 No. 10-3407

A passenger exited the vehicle and spoke briefly with

Stalker. The man had the letters “GLN” tattooed

across his forehead. GLN is an abbreviation for Gaylord

Nation, the gang to which Stalker belonged; and Stalker

appeared to know the man. He was interested in making

a drug purchase, so Stalker steered him to Jackson. The

man asked Jackson what $150 would buy him; the

answer was an “eight ball” (about 3.5 grams) of crack

cocaine. Jackson did not have that quantity on his

person, so he directed the Blazer to drive around the

block while he obtained the cocaine from Monroe.

When the vehicle returned, Jackson handed the cocaine

to the passenger through the open car window. Immediately after Jackson handed the cocaine over, the Blazer

sped away. Jackson, who had not been paid, grabbed

the door frame and managed to hold onto the speeding

vehicle for a couple of blocks, until the driver deliberately brushed the Blazer against an El viaduct,

knocking Jackson to the ground unconscious. Another

customer of Jackson’s, who happened to witness the

incident, roused him back to consciousness, and Jackson

made his way back to the drug spot.

Jackson found Thomas in a gangway. Thomas was

furious about the loss of the cocaine, and he knocked

Jackson to the ground with a punch to the eye. As

Jackson picked himself up, he saw that Thomas was

angrily stabbing the ground with a 12-inch long “Rambo”

hunting knife. Thomas grumbled that Jackson was

“always fucking up.” R. 31-3 at 30. As the two men

were talking, they heard Curry whistle twice, which they

recognized as a signal for the gang members to show
No. 10-3407 5

themselves. Jackson and Thomas walked out of the gangway onto Magnolia Avenue, where they saw that

Curry and Monroe were down the block, escorting

Stalker, shoulder to shoulder, toward them. According

to Jackson, as he and Thomas emerged from the gangway, Monroe struck Stalker in the face, causing him

to fall to the ground. Monroe, joined by Curry, continued

to punch Stalker. Then Monroe ran over to a nearby

construction dumpster and retrieved a two-by-four

piece of wood, which he used to strike Stalker twice.

Curry then took the board from Monroe and began to

strike Stalker with it himself. Jackson estimated that

the two men hit Stalker with the board a total of five

to seven times.

At this point, Thomas left Jackson and ran over to the

other men. As Thomas approached, Monroe backed

away from Stalker by about a foot. Without any forewarning, Thomas produced his knife and stabbed

Stalker in the stomach. After Thomas removed the

knife from Stalker’s abdomen, he along with Jackson,

Curry, and Monroe fled the scene in Monroe’s car. They

drove to an apartment belonging to friends of Thomas’s

on the south side of the city, where they spent the night.

Stalker was taken to Illinois Masonic Hospital, where

he died later that day. An autopsy would reveal

lacerations to the upper back portion of Stalker’s head

and to his shin and lower leg, abrasions on the front

and side of his head, and contusions on his cheeks and

lips—all consistent with being struck by a blunt object

(including a fist and a two-by-four)—as well as a nine-
6 No. 10-3407

inch, jagged wound to his upper abdomen. The

assistant medical examiner found evidence of swelling

of the brain resulting from the blows to Stalker’s head.

The examiner concluded that Stalker died as a result of

the stab wound to his abdomen, and that the trauma

inflicted on Stalker’s head was a significant contributing factor to his death.

Preliminary investigation led the police to Jackson,

who told them what had happened and gave them

Monroe’s address. The police took custody of Monroe

at his home and took him to a police station for questioning. There, Monroe orally acknowledged, first to

a detective and later to a prosecutor, that he had participated in the beating of Stalker and had struck him

twice with the two-by-four. In a final, corrected written

statement, Monroe indicated that he and Curry had

completed their attack on Stalker before Thomas approached with the knife; earlier, he had indicated that

the beating was still in progress when Thomas ran up

and stabbed Stalker.

Monroe was charged with murder on an accountability theory. Before trial, Monroe moved to quash his

arrest (along with the fruits of the arrest, including

his post-arrest statements), contending that the police

lacked probable cause to believe he was involved in

Stalker’s murder as of the time they took him into custody

at his home. Separately, Monroe moved to suppress

the oral and written statements he made at the police

station on the ground that they were the product of

coercion, alleging that he was improperly isolated,
No. 10-3407 7

denied access to an attorney, and physically abused by

the detectives who questioned him. The trial judge

denied both motions after a hearing. In denying the

motion to quash the arrest, the trial court rejected

Monroe’s contention that he was arrested at his home.

The court instead found that Monroe had accompanied

the police voluntarily to the police station and was

placed under arrest there at a later time, by which

point the police had ample evidence confirming his

involvement with Stalker’s death.

Monroe testified in his own defense at trial. Monroe

again acknowledged that he struck Stalker with the twoby-four. Monroe testified that he did so after Stalker

first picked up the two-by-four and swung at him (Monroe) without provocation, striking him in the hand as he

was attempting to shield his head from the blow. At

that point, Curry punched Stalker, knocking him to the

ground. Monroe, angry with Stalker over the unprovoked

assault, picked up the board and struck Stalker, but

only twice and in the legs. Then Curry snatched the twoby-four away from Monroe, and Monroe began to

walk away. He saw and heard Curry inflict one or two

blows on Stalker with the board. Curry then caught up

with Monroe as he continued to walk away from

the scene. It was at that point, Monroe testified, that

Thomas ran past Monroe and Curry to Stalker, pulled

out the knife, and stabbed Stalker. Monroe said that he

and Curry were half a block away from Stalker when

Thomas stabbed him. Thomas then joined Monroe and

Curry, and they left the scene along with Jackson and

drove to the south side, where they spent the night.
8 No. 10-3407

Monroe denied that he harbored any knowledge

or intent that Stalker would be stabbed. There was no

agreed-upon plan to kill or harm Stalker, Monroe

testified, and Thomas had never said he was going to

stab Stalker; Monroe said he did not even know that

Thomas had a knife.

Monroe’s testimony departed from his written statement in certain respects, including his assertion at trial

that Stalker had taken the first swing with the two-byfour and that Monroe and Curry were half a block

away from Stalker when Thomas stabbed him. Monroe

testified that his written statement was not accurate and

that he had signed the statement under duress. As he

had in moving to suppress his oral and written statements, Monroe testified that he was punched repeatedly

by two of the detectives who questioned him; that his

request for counsel was disregarded; and that he was

threatened with life imprisonment if he did not sign the

written statement. The State’s witnesses denied that

any such abuse or coercion had occurred.

As we noted at the outset, the jury convicted Monroe

on the murder charge. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction in an unpublished order, holding,

inter alia, that there was probable cause to arrest

Monroe and that the evidence presented at his trial was

sufficient to sustain his conviction. The Illinois Supreme

Court denied Monroe’s petition for leave to appeal. In

2002, Monroe filed a postconviction petition in state

court, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective

in failing to call as witnesses in support of his motion to
No. 10-3407 9

suppress and at trial his brother and sister-in-law, Chris

and Isabell Estavia, who lived in the same two-flat as

Monroe and his mother and were witnesses to his arrest. Monroe represented that the Estavias would

have testified that the police forced their way into the

residence, threatened the family dog, and ignored Monroe’s requests to telephone his lawyer; that testimony,

Monroe asserted, would have supported his motion to

suppress his post-arrest statements and also would

have bolstered his trial testimony about the duress

to which he was subjected at the police station. The

trial court summarily dismissed the petition as lacking

merit. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal in an

unpublished order, reasoning in view of certain conflicts

between the Estavias’ prospective testimony and certain

other evidence and arguments presented by the defense

that Monroe’s counsel had legitimate strategic reasons

not to call the Estavias as witnesses and that Monroe

had not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

failure to present their testimony. Monroe again sought

leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, but the

court denied his petition.

Having exhausted his state-court remedies, Monroe

filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

the district court. Included in that petition were the

three claims Monroe pursues in this appeal: that he was

improperly arrested without probable cause in violation

of the Fourth Amendment, such that the statements

he made following his arrest should have been suppressed; that the State’s evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction for murder on an accountability

theory; and that his trial counsel was ineffective for
10 No. 10-3407

failing to present the testimony of his brother and sister-inlaw as to the police misconduct surrounding his arrest.

(A fourth claim was dismissed on the ground of procedural default and is not at issue in this appeal.) R. 1. 

The district court denied Monroe’s petition. Monroe v.

Zimmerman, supra, 2010 WL 3307081. Because the state

court had given Monroe a full and fair opportunity to

present his motion to quash his arrest, the district court

reasoned, Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037,

3052 (1976), precluded it from considering the merits of

his Fourth Amendment claim. Monroe, 2010 WL 3307081,

at *8. As to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court

noted that under Illinois law, as summarized by the

Illinois Appellate Court in affirming Monroe’s conviction, a defendant may be convicted of murder on an

accountability theory when he enters into a common

plan to commit a battery and a murder is then committed in the course of the battery. Id., at *9. The court

noted that there was ample evidence supporting an

inference that Monroe had entered into a joint plan

with his fellow gang members to commit a battery on

Stalker in retaliation for the theft of the drugs by

members of Stalker’s gang. In view of that evidence,

the Illinois Appellate Court’s rejection of Monroe’s sufficiency argument was not objectively unreasonable. Id.

Finally, as to Monroe’s claim of attorney ineffectiveness,

the court found no reason to question the reasonableness of the Illinois Appellate Court’s conclusion

that trial counsel had legitimate reasons not to call

the Estavias as witnesses at either the suppression

hearing or the trial, in view of the conflicts between their

prospective testimony and the other evidence and argu-
No. 10-3407 11

Because Monroe had not shown that his trial counsel 1

was ineffective, the court rejected Monroe’s additional argument that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising

this claim in Monroe’s direct appeal of his conviction.

2010 WL 3307081, at *13.

ments that Monroe’s counsel presented at the suppression hearing, the fact that their credibility in view of

those conflicts and their status as Monroe’s family members was diminished, and Monroe’s omission to raise

the circumstances of his arrest at trial. The court also

discerned nothing unreasonable in the state court’s conclusion that Monroe had not demonstrated that he was

prejudiced by his counsel’s decision not to present

the Estavias’ testimony. Id., at *10-*12. The district 1

court subsequently granted Monroe’s request for a certificate of appealability in part, finding as to these

three issues that Monroe had made a substantial

showing that he was denied his constitutional rights, in

that these issues are “debatable among jurists of reason,”

and Monroe’s arguments “deserve encouragement to

proceed further.” Monroe v. Zimmerman, 2010 WL

4038787, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010) (quoting Porter v.

Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 1312 (7th Cir. 1997)); R. 40; see

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

II.

A. Denial of motion to quash arrest

Monroe challenges the denial of his motion to quash

his arrest. He contends that because the police lacked
12 No. 10-3407

probable cause to believe he had committed a crime as

of the time he was arrested at his home, he was seized

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and consequently

the statements he subsequently made while in custody

should have been barred from evidence pursuant to

the exclusionary rule.

We begin by taking note of a threshold argument that

the State has raised in response to Monroe’s appeal on

this point, which is that although Monroe has contended that he did not receive a full and fair hearing

on his motion to quash in state court, he has not

separately renewed his contention that the police

lacked probable cause to arrest him as of the time he

was taken into custody at his home. The State reads

Monroe’s brief to presume that the denial of a full and

fair hearing on his motion by itself would entitle him

to habeas relief. Such a presumption would be incorrect,

as the State maintains. As we shall discuss in greater

detail in a moment, and as the district court recognized,

Stone v. Powell, supra, 428 U.S. at 494, 96 S. Ct. at 3052,

bars a federal habeas court from reaching the merits of

a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim so long as the

state court granted him a full and fair hearing on the

claim. Establishing that the petitioner was not granted a

full and fair hearing is thus the means of surmounting

the Stone bar and opening the door to federal review of

the merits of the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim.

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 395 n.5, 127 S. Ct.

1091, 1099 n.5 (2007) (collecting habeas decisions in

which courts proceeded to merits of Fourth Amendment

claims after finding that petitioners were denied full
No. 10-3407 13

and fair hearings on these claims in state court). Relief

on a Fourth Amendment claim thus requires a habeas

petitioner to show two things: (1) that the state court

denied him a full and fair hearing on his claim, and

(2) that the claim was meritorious. Monroe’s brief never

reaches step 2. We do not read the omission by itself

as reflecting a presumption that it is unnecessary for

Monroe to show that his Fourth Amendment rights

were violated. His brief instead repeatedly contends that

because he was denied a full and fair hearing on his

claim in state court, he is entitled to habeas “review” (e.g.,

Monroe Br. 16, 18, 25, 29, 38), which is probably best

understood as a request, in the event we agree he was

denied a full and fair hearing, that we order the district

court to take up the merits of this claim. 

More troubling is the statement in Monroe’s brief

that “Monroe’s appointed counsel does not argue on

this record that his arrest can be said to have lacked

probable cause.” Monroe Br. 39. That reads like a concession that the police had probable cause to arrest him,

regardless of when the arrest occurred. If Monroe has

no argument that he was arrested without probable

cause, even if, as he contends, he was arrested at his

home, then it is not clear what is at stake in this appeal. Cf. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21, 110 S. Ct. 1640,

1644-45 (1990) (exclusionary rule does not bar admission of

post-arrest statement that defendant makes outside of

home following police officers’ warrantless and nonconsensual entry into his home to make arrest, in violation

of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980),

so long as arrest was supported by probable cause). In
14 No. 10-3407

any event, because we conclude below that the state

court did not deprive Monroe of a full and fair hearing

on his Fourth Amendment claim, we need not consider

whether the failure to contest the existence of probable

cause might constitute a forfeiture, if not a waiver, of

the Fourth Amendment claim.

Ultimately, in order to prevail on his Fourth Amendment claim, Monroe would have to show not only that

he was arrested without probable cause, but that the

state court, as a result of the improper arrest, should

have invoked the exclusionary rule to bar the admission

of his post-arrest statements at trial. See Hampton v.

Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2002). But as the

Supreme Court emphasized in Stone, 428 U.S. at 486, 96

S. Ct. at 3048, the primary aim of the exclusionary rule is

to deter the police from violating the Fourth Amendment rather than to remedy an injury to the individual.

“Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the

Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that

the frequency of future violations will decrease.” Id. at

492; 96 S. Ct. at 3051. Application of the rule comes at a

price, for excluding probative evidence of a defendant’s

wrongdoing “deflects the truthfinding process and

often frees the guilty.” Id. at 490, 96 S. Ct. at 3050. The

Court was convinced that the benefits of the exclusionary rule outweigh the costs when invoked at

trial or on direct appeal of a defendant’s conviction. Id.

at 492-93, 96 S. Ct. at 3051-52. But the Court perceived

whatever additional benefit there might be to invoking

the rule on collateral review of a defendant’s conviction to be too slight to justify its cost. 
No. 10-3407 15

The view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment

violations would be furthered rests on the dubious

assumption that law enforcement authorities would

fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws

in a search or seizure that went undetected at trial

and on appeal. Even if one rationally could assume

that some additional incremental deterrent effect

would be presented in isolated cases, the resulting

advance of the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth

Amendment rights would be outweighed by the

acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational

system of criminal justice.

Id. at 493-94; 96 S. Ct. at 3052 (footnote omitted). This

led the Court to conclude that relief on a Fourth Amendment claim should normally be unavailable to a petitioner in habeas corpus: “[W]e conclude that where

the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair

litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner

may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional

search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. at 494,

96 S. Ct. at 3052 (footnotes omitted).

Much ink has been spilled over what exactly constitutes

a full and fair hearing for purposes of Stone. See Cabrera

v. Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2003). Our decisions in Cabrera and Hampton make clear that it means

more than just the opportunity to present one’s Fourth

Amendment claim to the state court. Id. at 531-32;

Hampton, 296 F.3d at 563-64. A state court process that

amounts to a sham would not constitute a full and

fair hearing even though the petitioner had his day in
16 No. 10-3407

court on the claim. Cabrera, 324 F.3d at 531-32; Hampton,

296 F.3d at 563-64. Evaluating the adequacy of the

hearing thus requires us to give at least “some attention

to how the state court dealt with the merits” of the claim.

Id. at 564 (emphasis in original). But not too much

attention, as we added in Cabrera. 324 F.3d at 531. Our

role is not to second-guess the state court on the merits

of the petitioner’s claim, but rather to assure ourselves

that the state court heard the claim, looked to the

right body of case law, and rendered an intellectually

honest decision. See Hampton, 296 F.3d at 563-64; see

also Miranda v. Leibach, 394 F.3d 984, 997 (7th Cir. 2005).

Here, Monroe contends that a threshold error made

by the trial judge in resolving his motion to quash his

arrest reveals that the hearing he received was neither

full nor fair. It takes more than an error in the state

court’s analysis to surmount the Stone bar to collateral

relief, however. Id. at 998; Cabrera, 324 F.3d at 532;

Hampton, 296 F.3d at 564; see also Watson v. Hulick, 481

F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 2007). 

An “egregious error” in a state court’s Fourth Amendment decision may suffice for this purpose,

Turentine [v. Miller], 80 F.3d [222] at 226 [(7th Cir.

1996)], but not for the flaw it exposes in the state

court’s analysis but rather for what it reveals about

the bona fides of the state court’s handling of the

Fourth Amendment claim, Hampton, 296 F.3d at 564.

As we explained in Hampton, “a blunder, no matter

how obvious, matters only in conjunction with

other circumstances that imply refusal by the state
No. 10-3407 17

The record is silent as to how much time passed between 2

the point at which Monroe was taken into custody at his

home and the point at which the trial court believed Monroe

subsequently was arrested at the police station.

Although, as we read the record, the parties’ stipulation did 3

not identify precisely when and where Monroe was handcuffed, see R. 31-2 at 134 (prosecutor stipulates that “[Monroe]

(continued...)

judiciary to take seriously its obligation to adjudicate

claims under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. . . . .

Miranda, 394 F.3d at 998. As we shall see, the state

court’s error in this case does not betray an unwillingness on the part of the Illinois judiciary to treat

Monroe’s claim honestly and fairly.

The State more or less concedes that the trial court

indeed did err on a material point. The thrust of Monroe’s

motion to quash was that he was arrested at his home

without probable cause. In denying the motion, the

trial court found that Monroe had instead voluntarily

accompanied officers to the police station and that he

was not arrested until sometime after he arrived there;

and as of that later point in time, the court reasoned,

there was sufficient probable cause to arrest him. R. 31-2

at 185. Yet, the court’s finding that Monroe was not 2

arrested until after he reached the police station appears

to have been inconsistent with the facts stipulated to

by the parties, which acknowledged that Monroe had

been taken away from his home in handcuffs. R. 31-2 at

134. Although placing an individual in handcuffs does

3
18 No. 10-3407

(...continued)

left the house with [the police] and was subsequently handcuffed”), Monroe’s motion to quash represented that the police

had placed him in handcuffs “[a]fter leaving [Monroe’s]

apartment and while still on the porch of the building where

he then resided,” R. 31-2 at 39, and the parties stipulated

that Monroe’s mother, if called to testify, would state that

“when Solomon was taken away [from his residence], he was

taken away in handcuffs.” R. 31-2 at 134. (The parties also

stipulated that the detectives who went to Monroe’s

residence would have arrested him and taken him from the

house without his consent if he had refused to accompany

them. R. 31-2 at 135.) The State itself concedes in the brief it

filed with this court that the parties stipulated that “petitioner

was led away from his residence in handcuffs.” State Br. 15.

not invariably signal that he is under arrest, see United

States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (7th Cir. 1993) (coll.

cases), “[t]here can be little question that a suspect

placed in handcuffs is not free to leave and, for all

practical purposes, is in police custody . . . .” United States

v. Wilson, 2 F.3d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1993). There appears

to be no dispute here that once Monroe was placed

in handcuffs, he was under arrest.

But although the trial court’s resolution of the motion

to suppress hinged on its apparently erroneous understanding of the facts, the appellate court’s decision did

not. Although the appellate court did not expressly

correct the trial court’s error as to the timing of the

arrest, in the sense of acknowledging and labeling it as

error, the court certainly was aware of the mistake, as
No. 10-3407 19

Monroe had expressly pointed it out to the court in the

direct-appeal briefing. R. 20 at 8, 11. Moreover, the

State, in responding to Monroe’s appellate argument

(which was largely a broadside on the reliability of the

witnesses who had implicated Monroe in the attack on

Stalker to the police, see R. 20 at 6, 25-27), relied exclusively on information that was known to the police at

the time they took Monroe from his residence. R. 20 at 59-

65. The appellate court’s analysis, in turn, relied on

the same information recited in the State’s brief, and the

court proceeded to reject Monroe’s contention that this

information was insufficiently trustworthy as proof

of his involvement in the attack. R. 20 at 85-91. Monroe

himself makes no argument that the appellate court’s

resolution of the probable cause issue reflected an erroneous understanding of when he was arrested, as the

trial court’s ruling did. The fact that the appellate

court’s analysis did not repeat the error is important,

because its decision was the final decision of the

Illinois courts to reach the merits of Monroe’s Fourth

Amendment claim, and as such it is that decision

which matters for purposes of habeas review. See, e.g.,

Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2012),

pet’n for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3421 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2013)

(No. 12-885).

Monroe thus received a full and fair hearing on the

merits of his Fourth Amendment claim in the Illinois

courts. Both the trial court and the Illinois Appellate

Court entertained and reached the merits of his claim.

The appellate court looked to the appropriate body

of case law in resolving the claim, citing state prece-
20 No. 10-3407

dents which set forth the relevant Fourth Amendment

principles (for example, People v. Kidd, 675 N.E.2d 910,

920 (Ill. 1996), which in turn relied on the U.S. Supreme

Court’s decision in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct.

223, 225-26 (1964)); and the court correctly set forth the

standard for evaluating probable cause. R. 20 at 85-86.

Both the trial and appellate courts took the claim

seriously, and although the trial court, in resolving the

claim, committed a significant error as to the timing

of Monroe’s arrest, the appellate court’s analysis did not

repeat the error. Its analysis was consistent with the

parties’ stipulation that Monroe was handcuffed (and

thus arrested) at his home; and the court cited and

relied upon evidence which, in its view, established

probable cause to believe Monroe had committed a

crime and which was known to the police at the time

of Monroe’s arrest. Stone therefore precludes us from

reaching the merits of Monroe’s Fourth Amendment claim.

B. Attorney Ineffectiveness

Monroe contends that he was deprived of his Sixth

Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.

2052 (1984). This claim, as we have said, is based on his

counsel’s omission to present the testimony of Monroe’s

brother and sister-in-law, both in support of his motion

to suppress his post-arrest statements and at trial.

Isabell and Chris Estavia lived on the first floor of the

same two-flat building where Monroe resided, and

they were present when the police took Monroe into
No. 10-3407 21

custody. They would have testified that the police

rushed into the building, harassed the Estavias, threatened to harm the family’s dog, then forced their way

upstairs to the second floor, where Monroe lived with

his mother, and ignored Monroe when he asked to

contact a lawyer. Notably, the Estavias were not witnesses to the events culminating in Monroe’s post-arrest

statements at the police station, or to the events underlying the criminal charges against Monroe. Even so,

Monroe contends that their testimony would have supported his effort to suppress his post-arrest statements

as well as his trial defense, by simultaneously casting

doubt on the veracity of police witnesses and bolstering

his own credibility as to the events surrounding his postarrest statements.

To prevail on the claim, Monroe was required to

show both that his attorney’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and that there

was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

relevant proceedings (here, the motion to suppress

his post-arrest statements as well as the trial) would

have been different but for his counsel’s failings.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; e.g., Gutierrez

v. Anglin, 2013 WL 466074, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 8, 2013).

As we noted earlier, the Illinois Appellate Court sustained the summary dismissal of this claim, finding

that Monroe had satisfied neither of Strickland’s two

criteria. At the outset, the court pointed out that the

Estavias’ representation that the police had burst into

their home was contradicted by the parties’ stipulation,

in conjunction with Monroe’s motion to quash his
22 No. 10-3407

arrest, that the police had remained in the vestibule of

the home while waiting for Monroe. R. 20 at 246-47.

The Estavias’ additional contention that the police

had harassed them and threatened their dog was inconsistent with the argument of Monroe’s counsel, again

in connection with the motion to quash, that police

had used “trickery” to get Monroe to accompany them

to the police station. R. 20 at 247. In view of these

conflicts, the court saw no reason to doubt that counsel

made a reasonable strategic decision not to have the

Estavias testify in support of the motions to quash and

to suppress; nor could Monroe show that he was prejudiced in the sense that the trial court might

have credited Monroe’s contention that his postarrest statements were the product of coercion. R. 20 at

247-48. As for the trial, the court noted that the

Estavias’ testimony would have carried little weight

with the jury given their familial connection with

Monroe and also given that Monroe himself did not

testify about any misconduct that occurred at the time

of his arrest; it was therefore reasonable for Monroe’s

counsel to exclude them from the witness list. R. 20 at

248. Moreover, given what the court deemed to be

the overwhelming evidence of Monroe’s guilt, the

court could discern no prejudice stemming from that

decision. R. 20 at 248-49.

Because the state appellate court considered and

rejected the ineffectiveness claim on its merits, and correctly looked to Strickland as the governing precedent

in doing so, see R. 20 at 245, Monroe must show
No. 10-3407 23

that the court’s resolution constituted an unreasonable

application of Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see,

e.g., McNary v. Lemke, 2013 WL 673653, at *7 (7th Cir.

Feb. 26, 2013). He cannot satisfy this burden.

The outcome of Monroe’s motion to suppress his postarrest statements turned on what happened at the

police station rather than anything that occurred at

Monroe’s home. Monroe testified that police locked

him alone in an interview room, ignored his requests

for an attorney, and punched him when he refused their

demands to tell them what happened. In denying

the motion to suppress, the state trial court credited

the State’s witnesses over Monroe. R. 31-2 at 232-33.

The Estavias, of course were not present and had no

knowledge of what occurred at the police station;

they could only have testified to what occurred at Monroe’s home, before he was taken to the police station.

Monroe theorizes that their testimony that the police

burst into the home and threatened to kill the family

dog, and ignored his request to telephone a lawyer,

would have bolstered Monroe’s credibility with respect

to what occurred at the police station. Although not

wholly without force, Monroe’s theory is far from compelling given the Estavias’ lack of knowledge as to

what happened after Monroe was taken from his

home, and it falls far short of showing that the outcome

of the suppression hearing might have been different

had the Estavias testified.

Moreover, as the appellate court pointed out, there

were certain credibility issues with the Estavias, given
24 No. 10-3407

Counsel’s theory may have been that the police deceived 4

Monroe into leaving his residence voluntarily, only to find

himself placed in handcuffs once the police had him outside

on the front porch.

the conflict between their prospective testimony and

(a) the argument of Monroe’s counsel at the motion

to quash that the police had persuaded Monroe to accompany them through “trickery,” and (b) the parties’

stipulation at the motion to quash that the police,

upon their arrival at Monroe’s residence, had waited

for him in the building’s vestibule. Monroe has a point

when he suggests that the court may have made too

much of the purported conflict between the Estavias’

version of the arrest and his counsel’s representation to

the trial court that the police had persuaded Monroe

to accompany them to the police station by “trickery.”

As Monroe’s brief points out, counsel uttered the word

“trickery” once, just before the court ruled on the

motion to quash and as the parties were summarizing

their positions. R. 31-2 at 184. His counsel went to on

say that Monroe had not accompanied the police voluntarily, but instead had “yielded to their force.” R. 31-2

at 184-85. And, as we have discussed, there is no

dispute that the police placed Monroe in handcuffs immediately outside of his residence, whatever may

have occurred inside. So the Estavias’ version of events 4

would not necessarily have undermined the basic

premise of Monroe’s motion to quash, which was that

Monroe was arrested at his home. But their testimony

would have conflicted head-on with the parties’ stipula-
No. 10-3407 25

tion that the police, upon arriving at the residence,

had waited for Monroe in the vestibule. R. 31-2 at 134.

The State certainly would have raised the conflict in

opposing the motion to suppress, and that would have

been a significant blot on the Estavias’ credibility. Under

these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the

state court to characterize the failure to call the Estavias

as witnesses in support of the suppression motion as

a legitimate strategic decision rather than as a lapse

in professional judgment that weakened Monroe’s motion to suppress.

As to the trial, it is even more difficult to see how the

Estavias’ testimony might have made any meaningful

contribution to the defense case. Again, their testimony

would only have related to Monroe’s arrest. But the

circumstances of his arrest, beyond when and where it

took place, were not even mentioned at the trial, notwithstanding the fact that Monroe testified and the circumstances of his arrest certainly were within his knowledge. Monroe renews his assertion that his brother

and sister-in-law would have bolstered the credibility

of his own testimony that the police had punched him

repeatedly at the station, giving the jury reason to

credit his contention that his post-arrest statements,

including in particular his written statement, were the

product of coercion. But, again, the Estavias were not

witnesses to what occurred at the police station at the

hands of the detectives who interviewed Monroe; they

would only have testified as to the alleged misbehavior

of altogether different officers in arresting Monroe. And,
26 No. 10-3407

as the Illinois Appellate Court recognized, given their

familial connection to Monroe, their credibility would

have been subject to doubt. In sum, the support that

their testimony might have provided to the defense

case was too weak to have required a competent attorney to call them as trial witnesses and to show that Monroe

was prejudiced by his attorney’s omission to do so.

C. Sufficiency of the evidence

Finally, Monroe challenges the sufficiency of evidence

to support his conviction for murder on an accountability theory. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99

S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979), identifies the pertinent (and

familiar) standard: the evidence, construed in the light

most favorable to the State, is sufficient to support the

conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could

find the essential elements of the offense to have been

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As we are considering this claim on collateral review rather than on

direct appeal of the conviction, the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act engrafts an additional layer

of deference onto this inquiry: we may grant relief

on this claim only if the Illinois Appellate Court applied the Jackson standard unreasonably to the facts of

Monroe’s case. § 2254(d)(1); see, e.g., Trejo v. Hulick, 380

F.3d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 2004); Cabrera v. Hinsley, supra,

324 F.3d at 533-34. (The Illinois Appellate Court did not

cite Jackson, but it recited the same standard. R. 20 at 91.)

The state appellate court noted that under Illinois law,

Monroe could be held accountable for Stalker’s murder
No. 10-3407 27

so long as Monroe had engaged in a common design

to commit a battery on Stalker and Stalker was stabbed

in furtherance of that design. R. 20 at 93-94. The court

went on to conclude that the evidence was sufficient

to support a finding that Monroe engaged in a common plan with Thomas and Curry to severely harm

Stalker. The court noted that Monroe and fellow

members of the gang crew had reason to be upset

with Stalker given that members of Stalker’s gang had

stolen cocaine from them; Monroe himself had admitted both in his written statement and in his trial testimony that he was angry with Stalker. From the whistle

that summoned Thomas and Jackson to the street,

together with the fact that Monroe punched Stalker and

knocked him to the ground as soon as Thomas appeared,

it was reasonable to infer that Monroe was initiating

a collective plan to retaliate against Stalker for the

sale gone awry, and that Monroe’s cohorts, including

Thomas, would be expected to join him. R. 20 at 94-95.

The court acknowledged that Thomas had acted suddenly in stabbing Stalker, such that Monroe did not

have time to disassociate himself from that act. Nonetheless, the jury, in the court’s view, was entitled to

find that Monroe was present when the stabbing

occurred (and not a half block or more away, as Monroe

had testified); and Monroe’s own testimony revealed

that he not only fled the scene with Thomas and

the others, but remained with Thomas for a day or two

afterwards. Under those circumstances, Monroe’s assertion that he did not know that Thomas had a knife

and did not share his intent to stab Stalker, although

relevant to the jury’s assessment of Monroe’s culp-
28 No. 10-3407

ability, did not preclude the jury from holding Monroe

accountable for Stalker’s murder pursuant to an accountability theory. R. 20 at 92, 95-96.

Monroe makes three arguments in his effort to show

that the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably applied

the Jackson standard in finding the evidence underlying

his conviction to be sufficient. He argues first that

there is no evidence that he had advance knowledge of

any plan to harm Stalker: he argues that the incident

was essentially a fight that occurred spontaneously,

without prior discussion, and that he had no knowledge Thomas might be armed. Second, he notes that

gang membership is by itself insufficient to support an

inference that Stalker’s assailants acted pursuant to a

common design: there was no order given to attack

Stalker, and Monroe, although he helped initiate the

beating, did not hold a position of power within the

gang. Third, Monroe contends that his act of fleeing

with Thomas and the others, which the Appellate

Court cited in support of his conviction, was insufficient to support an inference that he shared Thomas’s

intent to fatally harm Stalker. In Monroe’s view, the

evidence establishes only that he had an altercation

with Stalker, stepped away when he saw Thomas approach, and subsequently fled the scene with Thomas. 

In assessing the reasonableness of the State court’s

holding as to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying Monroe’s conviction, we must of course look to

what state law requires in order to convict an individual

pursuant to an accountability theory. See Jackson, 443 U.S.
No. 10-3407 29

The language of the statute has been modified in only minor, 5

non-substantive respects since the offense at issue in this

appeal took place in 1996.

at 324 n.16, 99 S. Ct. at 2792 n.16; Bates v. McCaughtry,

934 F.2d 99, 102-03 (7th Cir. 1991). The Illinois Criminal

Code renders one person accountable for a criminal

offense committed by another person when “[e]ither

before or during the commission of an offense, and with

the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he

or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, that

other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (2012). As the Illinois Appel- 5

late Court recognized, that intent is the “cornerstone”

of liability under the accountability statute. R. 20 at 92

(citing People v. Shaw, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 1173 (Ill. 1998));

see People v. Perez, 725 N.E.2d 1258, 1265-66 (Ill. 2000);

People v. Taylor, 712 N.E.2d 326, 329-30 (Ill. 1999). But

the defendant need not necessarily share the principal’s

intent to commit a particular criminal act in order to

be held liable for that act. See Perez, 725 N.E.2d at 1265.

As relevant here, a defendant’s intent to aid in the commission of a crime by another person may be shown

by evidence of a common criminal plan or design in

which the defendant joined. Perez, 725 N.E.2d at 1265;

People v. Thompson, 730 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).

A defendant’s liability under Illinois’ common-design

rule extends not only to the particular crime that the

defendant intends to aid, but also to another offense

that the principal commits within the same course of

conduct. People v. McClain, 645 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ill. App.
30 No. 10-3407

Ct. 1995); see also Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334

(7th Cir. 1997) (Illinois law); Brumley v. DeTella, 83 F.3d

856, 865 (7th Cir. 1996) (Illinois law); People v. Terry, 460

N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ill. 1984). Thus, when a defendant

intends to aid in the commission of a battery, and

that battery culminates in a murder, the defendant’s

intent to aid the battery may render him liable for

the murder, even if he did not share the principal’s

intent to kill the victim; the defendant’s shared intent

to commit the battery, and thus to inflict serious harm

on the victim, is enough to make him culpable for the

murder as well. Terry, 460 N.E.2d at 749 (agreeing

that common-design rule “does impose liability for

murder even though a misdemeanor was only intended”); see also Brumley, 83 F.3d at 864-65; Brennan v.

People, 1854 WL 4728, at *3 (Ill. 1854); People v. Duncan,

698 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); McClain,

645 N.E.2d at 589; see also People v. Batchelor, 665

N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ill. 1996) (murder committed in course

of robbery); People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 1974)

(attempted murder committed in course of burglary).

So the critical question in this case, as the Illinois

Appellate Court recognized, is whether the evidence

supports a finding that Monroe intended to aid in the

commission of a battery on Stalker.

Granting the State the benefit of all favorable inferences, the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that there was a common design to

beat Stalker, in which Monroe joined. Gang members

were angry over the stolen cocaine, as evidenced both
No. 10-3407 31

Although the Illinois Appellate Court indicated that 6

Monroe at trial similarly acknowledged his anger over the

drug theft, in fact Monroe denied that he was angry over the

theft. R. 31-3 at 230; see also R. 31-3 at 262-263 (“I’m—to tell you

the truth, I—it didn’t matter. The eight-ball, it got stolen. It

got took. We got robbed. Oh, well, you lose some, you win

some. In order to make money, you gone lose money; that’s

what I was always taught. You gone lose some to make some.

So that little $150 worth of cocaine was not a factor to me at

that time.”). Monroe also denied the truth of his written posttrial statement, in which he stated that he began to beat

Stalker because he was angry about the drug theft. R. 31-3 at

229. The only anger that Monroe acknowledged at trial was

his anger at Stalker when Stalker took an unprovoked swing

at him with the two-by-four. R. 31-3 at 228. Of course, the

jury was not required to believe Monroe’s trial testimony

and was free to credit his written statement instead.

by Monroe’s own written post-arrest statement and by 6

the fact that Thomas punched Jackson in the face. The

fact that Curry whistled to summon Thomas and

Jackson out to the street supports an inference that

gang members were being called to action; and the fact

that Monroe and Curry, who were escorting Stalker

shoulder to shoulder, began to punch him as soon as

Thomas appeared supports an inference that the group

was going to beat Stalker in retaliation for the conduct

of Stalker’s fellow gang members. It requires no additional leap to infer that Monroe intended to aid in

the commission of a battery upon Stalker: crediting the

State’s evidence, Monroe threw the first punch, and then

as Curry joined in, Monroe walked to the nearby
32 No. 10-3407

dumpster, retrieved the discarded board, and struck

Stalker at least twice with it. Monroe’s actions were

thus consistent with an intent to inflict serious harm on

Stalker. It is noteworthy in that regard that the blows

Stalker received to the head were a contributing factor

in his death. Jackson, of course, testified that Monroe

and Curry together struck Stalker with the board a

total of five to seven times; and although Jackson did

not see what part of Stalker’s body they struck, the jury

was not required to believe Monroe’s testimony that

he only struck Stalker in the leg (although Stalker’s leg

did show injuries) or that he walked away immediately

after he struck those blows and was not present while

Curry himself struck Stalker with the board. The jury

was likewise not obliged to credit Monroe’s testimony

that he and Curry had ceased striking Stalker, and

were half a block away when Thomas stabbed him; it

could have credited Jackson’s testimony that Monroe

remained standing next to Stalker, and only backed up

a foot or so as Thomas approached. And although it

was Thomas and Thomas alone who without warning

produced a knife and stabbed Stalker, the evidence

nonetheless permitted the jury to infer that the stabbing

was the culmination of the joint design to commit

a battery upon Stalker in retaliation for the actions of

Stalker’s fellow gang members. That was enough under

Illinois law to find Monroe guilty of murder pursuant

to an accountability theory. See Terry, 460 N.E.2d at 749;

Brennan, 1854 WL 4728, at *3.

The Illinois Appellate Court did not rely improperly

on Monroe’s gang membership or his flight together
No. 10-3407 33

with Thomas in affirming his conviction. Gang affiliation was a circumstance highly relevant to explaining

why Monroe and the others were angry with Stalker

and why they would want to harm him. That was the

limited sense in which the appellate court cited and

relied upon gang membership. See People v. Knox, 608

N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“Evidence relating

to the defendant’s gang membership or gang-related

activities is admissible to show common purpose or

design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act.”); United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 251

(7th Cir. 1995) (coll. cases exemplifying proper consideration of gang membership). Nowhere in the court’s

decision is there any indication that the court attached

inappropriate significance to Monroe’s gang affiliation; the court, for example, did not assume that because

Monroe and Thomas were members of the same gang,

Monroe necessarily intended to aid Thomas’s actions.

The court likewise gave appropriate consideration to

Monroe’s flight from the attack with Thomas and the

others, along with the fact that he remained with

Thomas for at least another day, as circumstances

which, not by themselves but in conjunction with the

other facts, supported the inference that Thomas’s

actions were committed pursuant to a common design

to commit a battery on Stalker and that Monroe had

an intent to aid in the commission of that battery. See

Perez, 725 N.E.2d at 1265 (fact that defendant fled

scene and maintained close affiliation with companions

after commission of crime are among factors court may

consider in assessing defendant’s accountability) (citing

People v. Taylor, 646 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ill. 1995)).
34 No. 10-3407

As Monroe points out, the appellate court may have

erred in suggesting that it was he rather than Curry

who summoned Thomas and Jackson by whistling, see

R. 20 at 94 (indicating that “defendant and Curry, while

standing with the victim, summoned Thomas . . . with

a signal used by them to summon another member’s

presence,” and subsequently stating that “[a] reasonable

inference can be drawn from the circumstances that

defendant summoned Thomas for the purpose of

initiating a battery on Stalker . . . ”). Although Jackson’s

trial testimony did not specify whether it was Curry

or Monroe who whistled, see R. 31-3 at 31-32, the State

seems to agree that it was Curry, see State Br. 12 (“Then

the men heard Curry whistle for them to appear.”). But

that error was not material to the result of the court’s

analysis. The whistle, as we have said, represented

a call to action. Monroe was with Curry when Curry

whistled. More to the point, when Jackson and Thomas

appeared in response to the whistle, Monroe immediately initiated the attack on Stalker by striking him.

Monroe is also correct in emphasizing that there was

no evidence of a discussion among the men that resulted

in an express plan to inflict a beating on Stalker in retaliation for what Stalker’s cohorts had done. But given

the sequence of events, and the actions that Monroe,

Curry, Thomas, and (to a lesser extent) Jackson took,

the jury could permissibly infer that the men battered

Stalker pursuant to a common design, and that Monroe

intended to aid in that battery and that he did in fact

participate in the battery. And as we have said, Monroe’s

intent to assist in the commission of a battery upon
No. 10-3407 35

Stalker is sufficient, under Illinois law, to render him

responsible for the stabbing and murder that Thomas

committed in the course of that battery.

III.

As no constitutional error occurred in the prosecution of Monroe, the district court properly denied

Monroe’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We thank

Monroe’s appointed counsel for their vigorous efforts

on his behalf.

AFFIRMED.

4-4-13