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*********************************************** 
PETER B. VIERING ET AL. v. THE GROTON

LONG POINT ASSOCIATION, INC.

(AC 45974)

Elgo, Clark and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, each an owner of real property in the Groton Long Point

section of Groton and, as such, a member of the defendant association,

sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that they had the right to

use certain rights-of-way owned by the defendant that abutted their

respective properties to the exclusion of all other members of the defendant and the general public. The two rights-of-way at issue were five

foot wide strips of land running through a tract of land that was bounded

by a road in the northeast and by a beach along Long Island Sound in

the southwest. The entire tract was originally owned by G Co., which

subdivided the land, separately deeded the plaintiffs’ properties to their

predecessors in title and deeded to the defendant certain common area

tracts and all of its rights, title, and interest to the shore, roads, and

rights-of-way in Groton Long Point. The plaintiffs each owned one or

more road front or beachfront properties in the tract, the deeds to which

indicated that each such property was bounded by the right-of-way it

abutted. In 1999 and 2000, one of the plaintiffs sent letters to the defendant’s board of directors, urging them to recognize that the rights-ofway were not to be used by the public or residents of Groton Long

Point at large but, instead, were intended only to provide limited rightsof-way dedicated to the lots they abutted. A few years later, the defendant

sent letters to the residents of Groton Long Point, asserting ownership

of the rights-of-way and instructing adjacent property owners who had

encroached on the rights-of-way to remove any impediments that were

obstructing access. For many years, both before and after these letters

were sent, the rights-of-way were covered with vegetation. In May, 2019,

the defendant sent letters to the plaintiffs informing them that they were

going to remove bushes and other impediments from the rights-of-way.

Shortly thereafter, unnamed individuals began to clear the vegetation.

In June, 2019, the plaintiffs commenced the present action, claiming

that they had acquired title to the rights-of-way through either adverse

possession or abandonment or, alternatively, that they possessed exclusive access easements over the rights-of-way or had acquired prescriptive easements over them. They sought a declaratory judgment that

they had the right to use the right-of-way that abutted their respective

properties to the exclusion of all others and a temporary and permanent

injunction prohibiting the defendant from clearing the rights-of-way of

any vegetation or taking any other action that would open access to

the rights-of-way. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The

trial court granted the defendant’s motion and denied the plaintiffs’

motion. On the plaintiffs’ appeal to this court, held:

1. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendant

on the plaintiffs’ claim that they possessed exclusive abutters’ access

easements over the rights-of-way: contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions,

the trial court could not be faulted for considering their claims for

abutters’ access easements over the rights-of-way under principles of

law applicable to claims of easements by necessity rather than claims

of easements by implication because the plaintiffs expressly relied on

principles of law applicable to easements by necessity when making

their arguments; moreover, the plaintiffs acknowledged that the deeds

to their properties did not expressly grant them an exclusive access

easement over the rights-of-way, and, at most, the language in the deeds

indicating that the properties were bounded by the rights-of-way and

the maps cited in those deeds depicting the rights-of-way demonstrated

that G Co. had intended to grant access easements over the rights-ofway to the abutting property owners; furthermore, the evidence did not

establish that, by creating a limited number of access easements over

the rights-of-way, G Co. was surrendering its rights, or the rights of the

defendant as its successor in title, to make other further uses of that
property, including the granting of easements over the rights-of-way to

others, as long as those uses did not unreasonably interfere with the

plaintiffs’ established rights to use the property, and the plaintiffs did

not submit any evidence demonstrating that the defendant’s use of the

rights-of-way would unreasonably interfere with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of them as a means of ingress and egress to and from their own

properties; additionally, contrary to the plaintiffs’ claims, it would have

been improper for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence that

allegedly made clear G Co.’s intent that the rights-of-way were to be

used exclusively by the abutting property owners because the language

of the deeds was not ambiguous with respect to whether the access

easements were intended to confer an exclusive right to use the rightsof-way, as they contained no language expressly creating any easement

or suggesting or implying that the access easements were granted with

such an intent.

2. The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was entitled to

summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims of adverse possession and

prescriptive easement due to the lack of sufficient evidence to raise a

genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs had made open, visible,

and hostile use of the rights-of-way for a continuous period of fifteen

years: although a party’s maintenance of a disputed area, including

planting and maintaining vegetation, could demonstrate an open and

visible use of that area, the plaintiffs did not plant any of the vegetation

on the rights-of-way, which they characterized as ‘‘wild growth,’’ and

they did not submit any evidence that they maintained the vegetation

in a visible and apparent manner; moreover, given that the plaintiffs

were permitted to use the rights-of-way as a means of access, their

alleged maintenance could have been viewed as consistent with their

permitted use and was not sufficiently hostile to meet the law’s requirements; furthermore, although the plaintiffs submitted some evidence

as to other uses of certain portions of the rights-of-way, including to

congregate occasionally, to park a boat trailer, to house a grill, and to

extend their decking, they did not rely on such evidence in support of

their argument that they had made open, visible, and hostile use of the

rights-of-way, and such evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether the plaintiffs had openly and visibly used the rightsof-way for a continuous period of fifteen years.

3. The trial court did not improperly fail to address the plaintiffs’ claim that

the defendant had abandoned the rights-of-way: although the trial court

did not address the plaintiffs’ claim of abandonment as a separate cause

of action, it recognized that the plaintiffs had raised the claim and

addressed the issue in the context of the defendant’s municipal immunity

defense to the plaintiffs’ claims of adverse possession; moreover, the

plaintiffs did not provide any support for the proposition that they

could have obtained ownership of the rights-of-way on the basis of the

defendant’s alleged abandonment of that property without also proving

the elements of adverse possession; accordingly, there was no need for

the trial court to address the issue of abandonment as a separate cause

of action because it was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs’

adverse possession claim.

Argued September 20, 2023—officially released February 27, 2024

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment of

adverse possession over certain of the defendant’s real

property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New London, where

the defendant filed counterclaims; thereafter, the court,

Jacobs, J., granted the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment, and rendered judgment thereon, from which

the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Gerald T. Giaimo, with whom were Hugh I. Manke

and, on the brief, Adam B. Marks, for the appellants

(plaintiffs).
Joseph P. Williams, with whom were Chelsea McCallum and, on the brief, Sarah E. Dlugoszewski, for the

appellee (defendant).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. The present case arises from a dispute

between the plaintiffs, Peter B. Viering, Russell W. Viering, Jr., Christine Carr, Jane M. Battles, Thomas E.

Kingston, Jr., and Bobbye Lou Sims, and the defendant,

The Groton Long Point Association, Inc., concerning

the plaintiffs’ claimed right to make exclusive use of

two strips of land denominated as rights-of-way on land

owned by the defendant that abuts the plaintiffs’ residential properties in the Groton Long Point section of

Groton. The plaintiffs appeal from the judgment rendered against them by the trial court on the granting

of a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant and the denial of the plaintiffs’ own motion for

summary judgment.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that

the court erred in its summary judgment rulings by (1)

failing to consider whether access easements over the

two rights-of-way had been granted to them by deed,

and thereby conferred on them the right to use such

rights-of-way to the exclusion of all others, and failing

in so ruling to consider certain extrinsic evidence allegedly relevant to that claim; (2) concluding that the

defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on the plaintiffs’ claim that they had acquired the rightsof-way by adverse possession or, alternatively, that they

had acquired prescriptive easements over the rightsof-way; and (3) failing to address their claim that the

defendant had abandoned the rights-of-way. We affirm

the judgment of the court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts

and procedural history. The rights-of-way at issue are

two five foot wide strips of land that run north to south

through a tract of land in Groton Long Point, lying

between West Shore Avenue on the north and a beach

along Long Island Sound on the south. In this tract,

each of the plaintiffs owns one or more road front or

beachfront properties, each of which abuts one of the

rights-of-way, which the parties and the court refer to

by their relative locations in the tract as the west rightof-way and the east right-of-way. Specifically, Peter

Viering and Russell Viering, Jr. (collectively, Vierings),

own four contiguous lots—shorefront lots 327 and 328

and road front lots 343 and 344 to their immediate

north—which together abut the west right-of-way on

the east and the east right-of-way on the west; Carr

owns shorefront lot 329 and road front lot 342 to its

immediate north, which together abut the west rightof-way on the west; Battles owns shorefront lot 326,

which abuts the east right-of-way on the east; and Kingston and Sims own roadfront lot 345, which abuts the

Battles’ property on the north and the east right-of-way

on the east.

The plaintiffs’ properties were separately deeded to

their predecessors in title on divers dates in the 1920s by

the Groton Long Point Land Company, Inc. (company),
which had owned and developed them as parts of the

second of five subdivisions of the land now known as

Groton Long Point. The deed to each such property

indicates that it is ‘‘bounded’’ by the particular rightof-way it abuts.2

In 1931, the company, as ‘‘releasor,’’ transferred to

the defendant, a homeowners association to which the

plaintiffs and all other owners of residential property

in Groton Long Point belong, as ‘‘releasee,’’ five specific

common area tracts3 within Groton Long Point and ‘‘all

the right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever

as it, the said releasor, has or ought to have in or to

all of the shore, roads and rights of way located at

Groton Long Point . . . as have not heretofore already

been conveyed to this releasee by this [r]eleasor . . . .’’

The plaintiffs obtained title to their respective properties on divers dates in the 1990s and 2000s.4

Between November, 1999, and March, 2000, Peter

Viering sent a series of letters to the board of directors

of the defendant, urging it to recognize that the rightsof-way abutting the plaintiffs’ properties were not to

be used by the public or residents of Groton Long Point

at large, but instead were intended ‘‘only to provide

limited rights of way dedicated to and reserved for the

lots they abutted.’’ In October, 2003, and January, 2004,

the defendant sent letters to the residents of Groton

Long Point, asserting ownership of the rights-of-way

and instructing ‘‘adjacent property owners who have

encroached upon the [rights-of-way] to please remove

all hazardous impediments . . . that obstruct access’’

to them.

For many decades prior to the sending of those letters, and continuing through the present time, the rightsof-way have been covered with vegetation such as

beach rose and bittersweet. At the end of May, 2019,

the defendant sent letters to the plaintiffs informing

them that it intended to ‘‘commence cleanup’’ on the

rights-of-way by removing ‘‘bushes and other impediments’’ from them. Shortly thereafter, unnamed individuals began to clear vegetation from the west right-ofway.

In June, 2019, the plaintiffs commenced the present

action against the defendant. In their first amended

complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they had acquired

title to the rights-of-way through either adverse possession or abandonment, or, alternatively, that they possessed access easements over the rights-of-way for their

exclusive use as abutting property owners or had

acquired prescriptive easements over them. The plaintiffs sought the following relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that (a) the Vierings and Carr own the west rightof-way or have the right to use it to the exclusion of

all other association members and the general public,

and (b) the Vierings, Battles, Kingston, and Sims own
or have the right to use the east right-of-way to the

exclusion of all other association members and the

general public; and (2) a temporary and permanent

injunction prohibiting the defendant ‘‘from commencing any activity to clear the west [right-of-way] and east

[right-of-way] of their vegetation’’ or take ‘‘any other

action that opens access to the west [right-of-way] and

the east [right-of-way].’’

The defendant thereafter filed an answer and special

defenses,5 alleging, inter alia, that it was a municipality

that held the rights-of-way for public use and, therefore,

that the rights-of-way were immune from claims of

adverse possession and prescriptive easement.6

The parties subsequently filed motions for summary

judgment as to each count of the plaintiffs’ first

amended complaint. The plaintiffs and the defendant

submitted numerous affidavits, deeds, subdivision

maps, photographs, and other exhibits in support of

their respective positions on the motions for summary

judgment.

On October 18, 2022, the court, Jacobs, J., issued

a memorandum of decision granting the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment and denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Addressing the

plaintiffs’ claim of adverse possession, the court first

concluded that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground of municipal immunity

because, although the defendant was a quasi-municipality,7

there was a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether it intended to abandon the rights-of-way.8 Notwithstanding this ruling, the court went on to conclude

that the adverse possession claim failed as a matter of

law for two other reasons: first, there was no genuine

issue of material fact that the plaintiffs’ use of the disputed areas had not been open, visible, and hostile to the

defendant, as required to establish adverse possession;

and second, the plaintiffs’ shared dominion over and use

of the rights-of-way defeated the exclusivity element of

that claim. Next, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’

claim for access easements over the rights-of-way failed

as a matter of law because the plaintiffs already had

access to the rights-of-way as members of the defendant, and, therefore, they did not need easements by

necessity to gain such access. Finally, as to the plaintiffs’ claim for prescriptive easements over the rightsof-way, the court concluded that there was no genuine

issue of material fact that the plaintiffs had not, for a

continuous period of fifteen years, made open, visible,

and hostile use of the rights-of-way under a claim of

right. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be provided as necessary.

Before turning to the plaintiffs’ claims on appeal,

we set forth the applicable standard of review. ‘‘The

standards governing our review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well
established. Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party

seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing

the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts

[that], under applicable principles of substantive law,

entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and

the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. . . . A material fact

. . . [is] a fact [that] will make a difference in the result

of the case. . . . Finally, the scope of our review of

the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendant’s]

motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Day v. Seblatnigg, 341 Conn.

815, 825, 268 A.3d 595 (2022).

I

The plaintiffs initially raise two issues related to their

claim that they possessed abutters’ access easements

over the rights-of-way. First, they claim that the court

improperly failed to consider whether such access easements were created by deed rather than by commonlaw necessity. Second, they claim that the court erred

in failing to consider extrinsic evidence tending to show

that the company’s intent in creating the rights-of-way

was to provide them for the exclusive use of abutting

property owners. We disagree.

In the third count of the first amended complaint,

the plaintiffs raised claims for ‘‘abutters’ access easement[s].’’ The plaintiffs alleged that they ‘‘possess an

access easement to the [rights-of-way]. . . . The company created the west [right-of-way] and the east [rightof-way] to solve the access problem for lots 329, 328,

327, and 326 rather than leave those lots to commonlaw claims of easements by necessity over the roadside

lots long before the association was created. . . . It

was the narrow intent of the company for the west

[right-of-way] and the east [right-of-way] to provide

access to West Shore Road for lots 329, 328, 327, and

326, not to provide access from West Shore Road to

the beach. . . . The company intended for the west

[right-of-way] and the east [right-of-way] to be used

exclusively by the abutting plaintiffs, not by the association as a whole. . . . The west [right-of-way] and the

east [right-of-way] were created by the company for

the benefit of the plaintiff abutting owners only.’’

(Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs submitted evidence

to the court related to that claim, including copies of

the deeds to their properties, the defendant’s deed to

the rights-of-way, certain other property owners’ deeds,
and various maps of Groton Long Point, including the

1924 map depicting the ‘‘compiled plan showing all subdivisions made by the [company]’’ and the map

depicting the second subdivision of the land.

In their memorandum of law in opposition to the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and in their

memorandum of law in support of their own motion

for summary judgment, the plaintiffs elaborated on their

claim that ‘‘[t]he [rights-of-way] are access easements

derived from the plaintiffs’ deeds.’’ Specifically, they

argued that easements may be implied from deed

descriptions and that ‘‘[e]ach plaintiff’s deed specifically references a [right-of-way] as a boundary which

gives rise to an access easement over the [right-of-way]

for the benefit of their lot.’’ In addition, they argued

that the language in the deed to the defendant conveying

the rights-of-way ‘‘as have not heretofore already been

conveyed’’ demonstrated that the company had transferred title to the rights-of-way subject to the easement

rights of the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs further contended that ‘‘[t]he [rightsof-way] are not only beneficial, but are necessary, to

the plaintiffs’ use of their properties,’’ as certain lots

are landlocked and the rights-of-way ‘‘were created to

solve these access problems’’ by providing access to

West Shore Avenue. Thereafter they claimed, without

recitation of supporting authority: ‘‘It so follows that

the principles of an easement by necessity apply to

the [rights-of-way], namely the exclusive rights of the

abutters, as sole beneficiaries, to use them.’’ (Emphasis

added.) On that conclusory basis, the plaintiffs argued

that, ‘‘[e]ven though the exclusive nature of the [rightsof-way] was not articulated in the deed[s], their purpose

of solving the access problem for lots 326, 327, 328,

and 329 makes them easements by implication with

characteristics of easements by necessity.’’ (Emphasis

added.) At the hearing on the parties’ motions, the plaintiffs continued to rely on evidence of the language in

the deeds and the subdivision maps to argue that they

had been conveyed ‘‘implied easement[s]’’ over the

rights-of-way and that there was ‘‘simply no evidence

in the actual deeds and maps of any intent for these

rights-of-way to be used by anyone except for the plaintiff abutters.’’

In its memorandum of decision, the court agreed with

the plaintiffs that the rights-of-way ‘‘were established

and referenced in the deeds to the lots abutting them,

affording the owners of the shorefront lots access to

[West] Shore Avenue.’’ On that basis, it accepted as

‘‘undisputed’’ the fact that when the defendant acquired

title in fee simple to the rights-of-way in 1931, it did so

‘‘subject to the rights of the abutting property owners.’’

Thereafter, however, instead of inquiring as to what

implied rights the plaintiffs were entitled to exercise

with respect to the rights-of-way under the provisions
of their deeds, the court refocused its attention on the

plaintiffs’ supporting argument that the abutters’ access

easements they sought to enforce were akin to easements by necessity, which a claimant must show to be

reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of his or her

property. See Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 327

Conn. 431, 438–39, 174 A.3d 779 (2018). In the end, the

court rejected the plaintiffs’ abutters’ access easement

claims on the ground that, in the plaintiffs’ circumstances, abutters’ access easements were not reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of their properties

because such properties were bounded by the rightsof-way and they had the right to use such rights-of-way

to access their properties as members of the defendant

association. The plaintiffs did not file a motion for reargument or reconsideration on this issue, nor did they

seek an articulation of the relevant portion of the court’s

decision.9

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly failed to consider whether access easements over

the rights-of-way were created by their individual deeds,

arguing that ‘‘the memorandum of decision characterizes the claim as simply one for easement by necessity

and applies the very common law that the plaintiffs

allege the company designed the [rights-of-way] to

avoid.’’ The plaintiffs also argue that the court failed

to consider evidence of the company’s intent with

respect to the use of the rights-of-way. Specifically, they

contend that the court ‘‘did not undertake a meaningful

analysis of the deeds to the abutting properties and the

deed to the defendant,’’ ‘‘appears in its decision not to

have analyzed or considered [the] map [of the 1924

Groton Long Point Compiled Plan showing all subdivisions made by the company] or other maps intended

to aid in the construction of the deeds, particularly

Subdivision Plan 2, which is the map depicting the

[rights-of-way] referenced in the plaintiffs’ deeds,’’ and

‘‘ignored’’ certain other ‘‘deeds that reference the other

rights-of-way within Groton Long Point that are not at

issue but inform the intent of the [company].’’

We observe at the outset that, although the plaintiffs

criticize the court’s consideration of their claims for

abutters’ access easements over the rights-of-way under

principles of law applicable to claims of easement by

necessity rather than claims of easements by implication, the plaintiffs themselves are largely responsible for

the focus of the court’s analysis because they expressly

relied on principles of law applicable to easements by

necessity when making their arguments for abutters’

access easements. The plaintiffs’ later failure to request

reargument on those claims after the court issued its

memorandum of decision denying them, moreover, naturally confirmed for the court that its characterization

of those claims and resulting analytical approach to

deciding them were responsive to the plaintiffs’ claims.

To the extent that the plaintiffs are responsible for
recharacterizing their abutters’ access easement claims

as claims for easements by necessity, the court cannot

be faulted for deciding them on that basis.

If, however, and to the extent that the plaintiffs’ invocation of necessity principles in arguing their abutters’

access easement claims cannot reasonably be understood to have transmuted those claims from claims

of easement by implication to claims of easement by

necessity, the record before us makes it clear that the

court did not decide those claims as the plaintiffs

pleaded them.10 Even so, it must be acknowledged that,

although the court expressly found that the plaintiffs

had impliedly acquired easement rights with respect to

the rights-of-way under the provisions of their deeds,

the court never decided whether such rights included

the right to use the rights-of-way to the exclusion of

all other members of the defendant association and the

general public. The question presented by this omission

from the court’s decision is whether its failure to analyze the claims in that manner, if erroneous, had a

material impact on the court’s granting of summary

judgment for the defendant on those claims. The issue

presented, more particularly, is whether the evidence

presented in the defendant’s summary judgment motion

raised a genuine issue of material fact not only as to

whether the plaintiffs’ deeds created easements by

implication over the rights-of-way, but whether such

easements gave the plaintiffs the right to use the rightsof-way to the exclusion of all others, including other

members of the defendant association and the general

public. Although the court, as the plaintiffs have argued,

did not decide this claim explicitly, we can decide the

merits of the claim in this context because it presents

a question of law based on undisputed facts of record

that is subject to our plenary review.11 See Stone-Krete

Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 684, 911 A.2d

300 (2006) (‘‘[w]hen an issue is raised in the trial court

but the court declines to address it, an appellate court

may consider it if the facts are undisputed and the issue

is purely a question of law’’).

At the outset, we set forth the following legal principles governing easements. ‘‘[T]he benefit of an easement . . . is considered a nonpossessory interest in

land because it generally authorizes limited uses of the

burdened property for a particular purpose. . . .

[E]asements are not ownership interests but rather privileges to use [the] land of another in [a] certain manner

for [a] certain purpose . . . . Except as limited by the

terms of the servitude . . . the holder of an easement

. . . is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner

that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. . . . Likewise, [e]xcept as limited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of

the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the

servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere

with enjoyment of the servitude. . . . [T]he owner of
an easement has all rights incident or necessary to its

proper enjoyment, [although] nothing more.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, 221

Conn. App. 657, 669–70, 303 A.3d 13 (2023), cert. denied,

348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024).

It is undisputed that the defendant acquired from the

company fee simple title to the rights-of-way, albeit

subject to the rights that the company previously had

conveyed by deed to the plaintiffs’ predecessors in title.

Generally speaking, the defendant thereby became entitled, as the new owner by deed of the servient estate,

to make any use of the servient estate, including the

two rights-of-way, that did not unreasonably interfere

with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their easements. See id., 670.

The question on this aspect of the plaintiffs’ motion

thus becomes whether the easements by implication

previously conveyed by the company to the plaintiffs’

predecessors in title over the defendant’s property in

their deeds granted them such exclusive access to and

rights to use the rights-of-way as to disallow the defendant, as their fee simple owner, from making or authorizing others to make any other use of the rights-of-way.

‘‘In the construction of a deed or grant, the language

is to be construed in connection with, and in reference

to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of

the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and

the obvious purpose the parties had in view. . . . Furthermore, [a] reference to [a] map in [a] deed, [f]or a

more particular description, incorporates [the map] into

the deed as fully and effectually as if copied therein.

. . . [T]he identifying or explanatory features contained in maps referred to in a deed become part of

the deed, and so are entitled to consideration in interpreting the deed as though they were expressly recited

therein.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocamora

v. Heaney, 144 Conn. App. 658, 665–66, 74 A.3d 457

(2013).

The plaintiffs acknowledge that the deeds to their

properties do not expressly grant them an exclusive

access easement over the rights-of-way. Nevertheless,

they contend that an access easement may be implied

by virtue of the language in the deeds to their properties

indicating that the properties are bounded by the particular rights-of-way they abut. They argue that the rightsof-way were created ‘‘solely for the benefit of abutting

properties’’ and, thus, for their exclusive use, as evidenced by the map of the second subdivision plan referenced in their deeds, which depicts rights-of-way only

in the area of their properties where there are shorefront lots without frontage on any road. They further

argue that the 1924 map depicting the compiled plan

showing all subdivisions made by the company, as referenced in the deed to the defendant, demonstrates that
members of the defendant have access to the beach by

way of other entrances, separate from the rights-of-way.

Even viewing this evidence in the light most favorable

to the plaintiffs, however, the language in the deeds to

the plaintiffs’ properties indicating that they are

‘‘bounded’’ by the rights-of-way and the cited maps

depicting those rights-of-way demonstrate, at most, that

the company did indeed intend to grant access easements over the rights-of-way to and for the benefit of

the abutting property owners. See Buckley v. Maxson,

120 Conn. 511, 518, 181 A. 922 (1935); see also J. Bruce &

J. Ely, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land (2023)

§ 4.30. Such easements would provide the plaintiffs, as

the abutting property owners, a ‘‘right of ingress, egress,

and regress . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Bolan v. Avalon Farms Property Owners Assn., Inc.,

250 Conn. 135, 142, 735 A.2d 798 (1999).

The evidence does not tend to establish, however,

and it does not legally follow, that by creating a limited

number of access easements over the rights-of-way for

use by the owners of abutting properties under their

deeds, the owner of the rights-of-way was surrendering

its rights, or the rights of its successors-in-title, to make

any other or further uses of the rights-of-way, including

the granting of easement rights over them to others,

except to the limited extent that such further uses might

unreasonably interfere with other easement holders’

established rights to use the property. See Williams v.

Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 670

(‘‘[t]he owner of an easement has all rights incident or

necessary to its proper enjoyment, [although] nothing

more’’ (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)). As previously noted, the defendant, as the fee

simple owner of the land subject to an easement, is

entitled to make any use of its servient estate that does

not unreasonably interfere with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their rights to use the estate under their easements. See id. The plaintiffs do not explain how exclusive use of the rights-of-way would be ‘‘ ‘incident or

necessary to [their] proper enjoyment’ ’’ of their land, as

facilitated under their deeds by their access easements

over the rights-of-way across the defendant’s adjacent

land, nor have they claimed or submitted any evidence

to demonstrate that the defendant’s use of the rightsof-way by clearing vegetation from them—or ultimately

by permitting other members of the defendant association to use them as a means of access between the

beach and West Shore Avenue—would ‘‘ ‘unreasonably

interfere’ ’’ with their own enjoyment of the rights-ofway as a means of ingress and egress to and from their

own properties. Id. In short, the record before us lends

no support at all to the plaintiffs’ claim that their easements by implication over the two rights-of-way granted

them exclusive access to the rights-of-way as they have

claimed.
The plaintiffs also argue that they submitted to the

court certain extrinsic evidence that ‘‘makes clear’’ that

the company intended the rights-of-way to be used

exclusively by abutting property owners. That evidence

includes deeds to other properties in Groton Long Point

that abut rights-of-way not at issue in this case, deeds

to other properties in Groton Long Point that do not

abut any rights-of-way at all, and certain maps of Groton

Long Point that are referenced in such deeds. ‘‘[I]f the

meaning of the language contained in a deed or conveyance is not clear, the trial court is bound to consider

any relevant extrinsic evidence presented by the parties

for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) NPC Offices, LLC v.

Kowaleski, 320 Conn. 519, 526, 131 A.3d 1144 (2016).

If, by contrast, the language contained in a deed or

conveyance is clear, the court is bound by such language and, thus, cannot properly consider extrinsic evidence to contradict it or alter its meaning. The deeds

at issue in the present case are not ambiguous with

respect to whether the access easements granted thereunder to the plaintiffs, as the owners of properties abutting rights-of-way across the defendant’s property, were

intended to confer on them the right to use such rightsof-way to the exclusion of all others, including other

members of the defendant association or the general

public. The plaintiffs themselves, who have conceded

that the deeds contain no language expressly creating

any easement, have pointed to no language in any of

their deeds that suggests or implies that the access

easements arising under them were granted with such

an intent, and we have found none. See Freidheim v.

McLaughlin, 217 Conn. App. 767, 788, 290 A.3d 801

(2023) (deed considered ambiguous where language

was ‘‘susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation’’). In those circumstances, any consideration of

the plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence as a possible basis for

raising a genuine issue of material fact in support of

their claimed right to make exclusive use of the rightsof-way over which they have been granted abutters’

access easements under their deeds, and on that basis

for denying the relevant portion of the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, would be improper.12

Because the clear language of the plaintiffs’ deeds is

not susceptible to a reasonable interpretation that their

implied abutters’ access easements over the defendant’s

rights-of-way give them any right to use such rights-ofway to the exclusion of all others, we affirm the court’s

granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendant

on this issue.

II

The plaintiffs next claim that the court improperly

rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant

on their claims of adverse possession and prescriptive

easement. We disagree.
‘‘The general legal principles governing adverse possession are well settled. When title is claimed by adverse

possession, the burden of proof is on the claimant. . . .

The essential elements of adverse possession are that

the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept

out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of

right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of

the claimant without license or consent of the owner.’’

(Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Dowling v. Heirs of Bond, 345 Conn. 119, 143, 282 A.3d

1201 (2022).

The legal principles governing a claim for a prescriptive easement are similar, though not identical, to those

governing claims of adverse possession. See Smith v.

Muellner, 283 Conn. 510, 536–37, 932 A.2d 382 (2007).

General Statutes § 47-37 provides: ‘‘No person may

acquire a right-of-way or any other easement from, in,

upon or over the land of another, by the adverse use

or enjoyment thereof, unless the use has been continued

uninterrupted for fifteen years.’’ ‘‘In applying that section, [our Supreme Court] repeatedly has explained that

[a] party claiming to have acquired an easement by

prescription must demonstrate that the use [of the property] has been open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted for fifteen years and made under a claim of

right.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Slack v.

Greene, 294 Conn. 418, 427, 984 A.2d 734 (2009).

In support of their motion for summary judgment, and

in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, the plaintiffs submitted, among other things,

an affidavit from Peter Viering, in which he attested

that ‘‘[t]he [w]est [right-of-way] and [the] [e]ast [rightof-way] have been covered with wild growth including

beach rose and bittersweet at all times for at least the

past 60 years. . . . The [w]est [right-of-way] also

houses two utility poles that provide utilities to the

Viering Lots, which poles were erected more than fifty

years ago. The [e]ast [right-of-way] houses a utility pole

that provides utilities to Lot 345, owned by plaintiffs

Kingston and Sims. . . . Because of the plant growth

and utility poles, the [w]est [right-of-way] and [the]

[e]ast [right-of-way] have never been used by anyone

for foot passage from West Shore Avenue to [the] Boardwalk or from [the] Boardwalk to West Shore Avenue.

Rather, the [rights-of-way] have been exclusively used

for other purposes by the plaintiffs, their family and

guests. . . . Rather, there is a lawn on the Viering Lots

to the east of the [w]est [right-of-way] and the west

of the [e]ast [right-of-way] on which we have granted

permission to certain [members of the defendant] to

cross. . . . We have observed such [members of the

defendant] crossing on the lawn of the Viering Lots,

but we have never observed any non-abutter using the

[rights-of-way] as the [rights-of-way] are in large part

obstructed. . . . The obstructions of the beach rose
and bittersweet and utility poles are clearly visible both

from West Shore Avenue as well as the Boardwalk.

. . . The abutters of the [rights-of-way] have at all times

maintained the [rights-of-way], and at no time has the

[defendant] done anything to maintain the [rights-ofway].’’ Peter Viering’s interrogatory responses reflected

that, as far as maintaining the rights-of-way, the plaintiffs ‘‘collectively prune, trim and/or otherwise maintain

the vegetation on the west [right-of-way] and the east

[right-of-way] that is adjacent to their property and/or

also remove poison ivy,’’ and that he personally mowed

or arranged for the mowing of portions of the west

right-of-way and east right-of-way approximately

weekly from May to October each year.

In addition, the plaintiffs submitted affidavits from

Kingston and Sims, who attested that ‘‘[t]he majority

of the [e]ast [right-of-way] adjacent to our property is

covered in vegetation, making it impassable. . . . We

now weed the [e]ast [right-of-way] to maintain the vegetation growing thereon. . . . Additionally, the [e]ast

[right-of-way] houses a telephone pole, which further

makes use of [it] for purposes of passage impossible.’’

(Citations omitted.) The plaintiffs also submitted photographs depicting the appearance of the vegetation on

the rights-of-way.

As to the evidence of other ways in which the plaintiffs used the rights-of-way, Peter Viering’s interrogatory responses indicated that he has ‘‘occasionally used

a portion of the west [right-of-way] to congregate with

friends and family. The west [right-of-way] is also used

as a staging area for contractors performing home

improvement projects on [his] behalf . . . . The west

[right-of-way] also provides utility service to [his] property.’’ In Kingston’s and Sims’ affidavits, they attested

that ‘‘the portion [of the east right-of-way] closest to

the road . . . is used as our side yard. Over the years,

we have parked our boat trailer there, used it to house

our grill, and, for a period of multiple years, we had

decking extending from our currently existing deck

onto the [e]ast [right-of-way]. More recently, we hired

a landscaping company to place some large walkstones

in the [e]ast [right-of-way] to allow for beach access

from our property.’’ The plaintiffs submitted photographs of the grill and the recently laid stepping stones.

In its memorandum of decision, the court first

addressed the plaintiffs’ claim for adverse possession.

The court concluded that ‘‘there are genuine issues of

material fact as to whether the defendant is immune

to the claim for adverse possession,’’13 as a result of

the conflicting evidence regarding whether the defendant had intended to abandon the rights-of-way,14 but

that ‘‘[t]he same cannot be said for the claim for adverse

possession itself.’’

The court explained this conclusion as follows: ‘‘The

very nature of the rights-of-way defeats the claim for
adverse possession. They are strips of land owned in

fee by the defendant, which the plaintiffs have at all

relevant times had the right to use. As the plaintiffs’

use of the rights-of-way has at all relevant times been

permitted, there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether

that use has been hostile to the ownership right of the

defendant. By the same token, the mere fact that the

rights-of-way had over the course of decades become

overgrown, while reflective of the [defendant’s] use—

or disuse, as it were—of the rights-of-way during that

time is in no way reflective of the plaintiffs’ use of the

rights-of-way during that time, let alone probative of

their ouster of the defendant from those strips of land.

Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiffs’ open,

visible, and hostile possession of the rights-of-way, the

element of exclusive use fails as a matter of law where

each of the plaintiffs claim to have used the rights-ofway as their own. As the court in Roberson v. Aubin,

[120 Conn. App. 72, 76, 990 A.2d 1239 (2010)] wrote:

‘[S]hared dominion [over property] defeats a claim of

adverse possession . . . .’ ’’

As to the plaintiffs’ claim for a prescriptive easement,

the court concluded: ‘‘Here, there is no dispute about

the use or disuse, as it were, of the rights-of-way over

the course of many decades. Significantly, the plaintiffs

have failed to submit proof of any kind as would demonstrate that they had for a continuous period of fifteen

years openly and visibly used the rights-of-way under

a claim of right. To the contrary, the undisputed fact

is that over time the rights-of-way became impassible

by reason of the overgrowth. Ironically, it was the threat

to remove the overgrowth and make the rights-of-way

again passable—and usable by the greater populace of

Groton Long Point and their guests—which prompted

the filing of this lawsuit.’’

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs had not openly and visibly

used the rights-of-way in a hostile manner for a continuous period of fifteen years. Specifically, they argue that

they presented evidence regarding their maintenance

of the vegetation, the Vierings’ use of the west rightof-way to congregate with friends and family, and Sims’

and Kingston’s use of the east right-of-way to park their

boat trailer and house their grill, and, for multiple summers, to have a deck extending into the east right-ofway.15 They contend that such evidence is ‘‘more than

sufficient for the court to determine that the plaintiffs

openly and visibly used the [rights-of-way] for a continuous period of fifteen years, and the [court] erred in its

conclusion to the contrary.’’16 In addition, they argue

that the court erred in its analysis of hostility because

‘‘[t]here was never a consensual relationship between

the defendant and the plaintiffs,’’ as ‘‘[t]he rights of the

plaintiffs derived by deed from the company, not the
defendant,’’ and the court failed to analyze whether

the allegedly permitted use had become hostile. We

disagree.

As previously indicated, both adverse possession and

prescriptive easement require open and visible use for

a continuous period of fifteen years. See Dowling v.

Heirs of Bond, supra, 345 Conn. 143; Slack v. Greene,

supra, 294 Conn. 427. The purpose of the open and

visible use requirement is to give the owner of the

servient land, in a claim for a prescriptive easement,

‘‘knowledge and full opportunity to assert his own

rights. . . . To satisfy this requirement, the adverse use

must be made in such a way that a reasonably diligent

owner would learn of its existence, nature, and extent.

Open generally means that the use is not made in secret

or stealthily. It may also mean that it is visible or apparent. . . . An openly visible and apparent use satisfies

the requirement even if the neighbors have no actual

knowledge of it. A use that is not open but is so widely

known in the community that the owner should be

aware of it also satisfies the requirement. . . . Concealed . . . usage cannot serve as the basis [for] a prescriptive claim because it does not put the landowner

on notice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Slack

v. Greene, supra, 427–28. Similarly, with respect to a

claim of adverse possession, ‘‘[t]he open and visible

element requires a fact finder to examine the extent

and visibility of the claimant’s use of the record owner’s

property so as to determine whether a reasonable

owner would believe that the claimant was using that

property as his or her own.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Padula v. Arborio, 219 Conn. App. 432, 447,

296 A.3d 276, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 903, 301 A.3d

528 (2023).

In addition, a party asserting a claim of adverse possession of land, or a claim for a prescriptive easement

over such land, must establish that his use of the land

is hostile or adverse to the title of the record owner.

See id., 446–48; see also Blow v. Konetchy, 107 Conn.

App. 777, 783 n.7, 946 A.2d 943 (2008) (‘‘[t]o establish

an easement by prescription it is absolutely essential

that the use be adverse’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘Hostile possession can be understood as possession that is opposed and antagonistic to all other claims,

and that conveys the clear message that the possessor

intends to possess the land as his or her own.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn.

App. 803, 814, 927 A.2d 921, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907,

931 A.2d 265 (2007). Permission to use the disputed

area defeats the element of hostility. See Dowling v.

Heirs of Bond, supra, 345 Conn. 146 (‘‘use of the land

by the express or implied permission by the true owner

is not adverse and, therefore, cannot ripen into adverse

possession’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Woodhouse v. McKee, 90 Conn. App. 662, 672, 879 A.2d 486

(2005) (hostility ‘‘is the absence of consent, license or
permission to use the disputed area’’). Nevertheless,

‘‘[p]ossession that is permissive in its inception may

become hostile’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)

Woodhouse v. McKee, supra, 675; if the claimants use

the disputed area for purposes for which they do not

have permission. Dowling v. Heirs of Bond, supra, 147–

51.

This court previously has held, as the plaintiffs argue,

that a party’s maintenance of a disputed area, including

planting and maintaining vegetation, may demonstrate

an open and visible use of that area. See, e.g., Padula

v. Arborio, supra, 219 Conn. App. 460 (plaintiffs

removed soil and grass, installed sprinkler system, laid

down new sod, dug out old tree and planted new trees,

and replaced fence, among other things, in disputed

area); 98 Lords Highway, LLC v. One Hundred Lords

Highway, LLC, 138 Conn. App. 776, 811, 54 A.3d 232

(2012) (party made permanent improvements on land,

including cleaning area of underbrush, cutting some

trees down, planting lawn, trees, and garden, and installing fence in disputed area); Eberhart v. Meadow Haven,

Inc., 111 Conn. App. 636, 642, 960 A.2d 1083 (2008)

(plaintiffs planted and maintained hedges and trees and

maintained lawn, among other things, in disputed area);

Schlichting v. Cotter, 109 Conn. App. 361, 367–69, 952

A.2d 73 (plaintiff pruned and removed trees, planted

and maintained plants, removed poison ivy from trees

and removed sumac from foliage, raked leaves, mowed,

fertilized and maintained lawn, and planted, cultivated

and maintained garden, among other things, in disputed

area), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 944, 959 A.2d 1009 (2008).

Unlike in those cases, however, the plaintiffs in the

present case did not themselves plant any of the vegetation, which they characterized as ‘‘wild growth,’’ and

they did not submit any evidence to demonstrate that

they maintained the vegetation in a visible and apparent

manner. Instead, the plaintiffs’ own evidence tended to

establish that the natural vegetation growth rendered

the rights-of-way ‘‘in large part obstructed’’ and

‘‘impassable.’’17

Moreover, as the court determined, given that the

plaintiffs were permitted to use the rights-of-way as a

means of access—whether by deed or by virtue of being

members of the defendant—their alleged maintenance

of the rights-of-way could be viewed as consistent with

their permitted use and, therefore, was not sufficiently

hostile to meet the law’s requirements. See Smith v.

Muellner, supra, 283 Conn. 525 n.14 (dominant estate

holder, as party benefitted by access easement, is

responsible for maintaining easement and doing whatever is reasonably necessary to make it suitable and

convenient for his use); see also Dowling v. Heirs of

Bond, supra, 345 Conn. 148–51 (acts that are consistent

with permission are not enough to prove notice of hostile claim).
Furthermore, although the plaintiffs submitted some

evidence as to other uses of certain portions of the

rights-of-way, such as the Vierings’ use of the west rightof-way to congregate ‘‘occasionally’’ with family and

friends, and Kingston’s and Sims’ use of the east rightof-way to extend their decking ‘‘for a period of multiple

years’’ and to park their boat trailer and house their

grill over the years, the plaintiffs did not rely on this

evidence in support of their argument that they had

made ‘‘open and visible’’ and hostile use of the rightsof-way.18 Such evidence did not raise a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs had openly

and visibly used the rights-of-way for a continuous

period of fifteen years.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court correctly

determined that the defendant was entitled to summary

judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims of adverse possession

and prescriptive easement due to the lack of sufficient

evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that

the plaintiffs had made open, visible, and hostile use

of the rights-of-way for a continuous period of fifteen

years, as needed to overcome the defendant’s motion

for summary judgment.

III

The plaintiffs’ final claim is that the court improperly

failed to address their claim that the defendant abandoned the rights-of-way. We disagree.

The second count of the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint set forth a claim of abandonment. The plaintiffs

alleged that, ‘‘[s]ince 1931, the [defendant] has never

asserted any rights, or taken any action to control or

maintain the west [right-of-way] and the east [right-ofway]. . . . Since at least 1931, the west [right-of-way]

and the east [right-of-way] have been controlled by the

abutting plaintiffs without interference of the [defendant]. . . . The [defendant] intentionally abandoned

the west [right-of-way] and the east [right-of-way]. . . .

Because the west [right-of-way] and the east [right-ofway] were created for the exclusive purpose of providing access to the road from lots 329, 328, 327, and 326,

the rights in the west [right-of-way] and the east [rightof-way] revert to the abutting plaintiffs. . . . The plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment concerning

their legal right to the west [right-of-way] and the east

[right-of-way].’’

In its memorandum of decision, the court recognized

that the plaintiffs had raised a claim of abandonment,

but it did not address that claim as a separate cause

of action. Instead, the court addressed the issue of

abandonment in the context of the defendant’s municipal immunity defense. Specifically, as previously

explained, the court determined that a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether the rights-ofway were immune from claims of adverse possession
because there was conflicting evidence regarding

whether the defendant intended to abandon that property.

After the present appeal was filed, the plaintiffs filed

a motion for articulation, asking the court to articulate

the factual and legal bases for its decision on their claim

that the defendant had abandoned the rights-of-way.

In the motion, the plaintiffs argued that the court’s

memorandum of decision ‘‘references the plaintiffs’

claim for abandonment in its recitation of the underlying facts and procedural history,’’ but the court ‘‘did

not address the legal arguments advanced by the parties

either in support of or in opposition to the abandonment

claim.’’ The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for articulation. The plaintiffs did not file a motion for review

of that ruling with this court pursuant to Practice Book

§ 66-7.

We conclude, consistent with the court’s analysis,

that the issue of whether the defendant abandoned the

rights-of-way was relevant to the defendant’s claim of

municipal immunity from adverse possession. ‘‘Municipal immunity from adverse possession is the rule and

not the exception, and we have consistently held that

the party seeking to acquire title by adverse possession

bears the burden of proving all the elements of adverse

possession. . . . Public rights to municipal property

will not be forfeited by lack of use absent some additional evidence indicating that the municipality

intended to abandon the property.’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis added; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Campanelli v. Candlewood Hills Tax

District, 126 Conn. App. 135, 140, 10 A.3d 1073 (2011);

see also, e.g., American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Trumbull, 215 Conn. 68, 78–80, 574 A.2d

796 (1990) (addressing issue of abandonment in context

of claim of municipal immunity from adverse possession); Benjamin v. Norwalk, 170 Conn. App. 1, 22, 153

A.3d 669 (2016) (same).

The plaintiffs cite no case law, and we have found

none, to support the proposition that they could obtain

ownership of the rights-of-way on the basis of the defendant’s alleged abandonment of that property, without

also proving the elements of adverse possession.19

Because, in the context of the present case, the issue

of abandonment was inextricably intertwined with the

plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim, there was no need

for the court to address that issue as an independent

cause of action. Accordingly, we conclude that the court

did not improperly fail to address the issue of abandonment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the appeal form filed by the plaintiffs indicates that they are

appealing from the court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment in

addition to the court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, and they mention their motion in their briefing to this court,

they also acknowledge that ‘‘the issues in the cross motions for summary

judgment were identical,’’ and they do not separately brief any issue related

to their motion. Accordingly, we do not independently address the court’s

denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

2 Carr’s deed does not specifically describe the property as being

‘‘bounded’’ by a right-of-way but does state that ‘‘a five (5) foot wide strip

. . . [is] set forth in a survey map . . . .’’

3 These five specific common area tracts are separate parcels of land that

are not at issue in the present case.

4 The Vierings have owned their property since 2003, and it has been in

their family since the 1920s; Carr has owned her property since 1996; Battles

has owned her property since 2006; and Kingston and Sims have owned

their property since 2002.

5 The defendant also filed a counterclaim seeking to quiet title with respect

to the rights-of-way and alleging trespass as to all of the plaintiffs. This

counterclaim is not at issue in the present appeal.

6

‘‘Title to realty held in fee by a state or any of its subdivisions for a

public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Campanelli v. Candlewood Hills Tax District, 126 Conn.

App. 135, 140, 10 A.3d 1073 (2011). ‘‘[P]roperty that is held in fee simple

ownership by municipalities must be presumed to be held for public use.

It follows that the party seeking title by adverse possession must bear the

burden of rebutting that presumption. Municipal immunity from adverse

possession is the rule and not the exception, and we have consistently held

that the party seeking to acquire title by adverse possession bears the burden

of proving all the elements of adverse possession.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Benjamin v. Norwalk, 170 Conn. App. 1, 18, 153 A.3d 669 (2016).

7 The court explained that the defendant ‘‘is an entity, created in May,

1921, by special act of the General Assembly, and endowed, generally, with

‘all the powers granted to boroughs under the general statutes,’ ’’ and ‘‘[t]he

legislative charter declared that the [defendant] property owners ‘are hereby

constituted a body politic.’ ’’ Thus, the court concluded that ‘‘[t]he [defendant] is not just another property owner. If not a municipality per se, it has,

by virtue of its legislative charter, all of the attributes of a municipality,’’

and ‘‘[t]hat it does not serve the general welfare of the public at large does

not defeat its quasi-municipal status (hence, the ‘quasi’).’’

8 A municipality’s property may be considered abandoned when there is

‘‘(1) nonuse by the public (2) for a long period of time (3) with the intent

to abandon,’’ and ‘‘it has long been the rule that abandonment may be

inferred from circumstances or may be presumed from long continued

neglect.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nichols v. Oxford, 182 Conn.

App. 674, 681, 191 A.3d 219, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 912, 193 A.3d 560 (2018).

9 As we subsequently explain in part III of this opinion, the plaintiffs

sought an articulation of the court’s decision only as to their claim that the

defendant had abandoned the rights-of-way.

10 Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘the test for easements by implication and easements by necessity have been confused by both trial and

appellate courts through the years. Although we agree that the line between

the two kinds of implied easements has been blurred, the intent of the

parties and the beneficial use of property are still key components of both

types of easements. The distinction between the two arises from the way

the intent is determined: by examination of the express terms of the deed

in cases of easements by implication, and by examination of the presumed

intent of the parties by the circumstances of the conveyance in cases of

easements by necessity.’’ Francini v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, supra, 327

Conn. 445 n.8.

11 Both parties fully briefed their respective positions on this issue.

12 We also note that, to the extent the plaintiffs’ claim relies on the examination of the presumed intent of the parties by the circumstances of the

conveyance, rather than the examination of the express terms of the deeds

at issue, such an analysis would support a claim for an easement by necessity,

not a claim for an easement by implication. See Francini v. Goodspeed

Airport, LLC, supra, 327 Conn. 445 n.8.

13 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined

that there was a genuine issue of material fact that existed with respect to

the defendant’s municipal immunity defense to adverse possession. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the defendant did not satisfy the ‘‘public use

requirement,’’ and, because the defendant does not hold the rights-of-way

for public use, it is not entitled to the protection of municipal immunity as
a matter of law. The defendant responds that its defense of municipal

immunity presents an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the

trial court on the adverse possession claim because the court found that it

is a ‘‘quasi-municipal’’ entity, which results in a presumption that the rightsof-way are held for public use, and, in its view, the plaintiffs failed to rebut

that presumption.

Although the parties have not raised the issue in their briefs to this court,

there is some question as to whether the plaintiffs were aggrieved by this

aspect of the trial court’s decision, insofar as the court was declining to

grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of its

municipal immunity defense, which was favorable to the plaintiffs; see C.

M. v. R. M., 219 Conn. App. 57, 66, 293 A.3d 968 (2023) (‘‘the party claiming

aggrievement must establish that [a] specific personal and legal interest has

been specially and injuriously affected by the decision’’ (emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted)); and the defendant did not file notice in

this court that it intended to raise an alternative ground for affirmance

pursuant to Practice Book § 84-11. Ultimately, however, we do not need to

address this issue because, regardless of whether the rights-of-way were

immune from a claim of adverse possession, the court properly determined

that the plaintiffs’ adverse possession claim failed as a matter of law, as we

explain in part II of this opinion.

14 Specifically, the court pointed to the evidence that the rights-of-way

had become overgrown with vegetation and the defendant’s October, 2003

and January, 2004 letters to the residents of Groton Long Point, reasserting

their ownership of the rights-of-way and instructing abutting property owners to ‘‘remove all hazardous impediments . . . that obstruct access.’’

15 The plaintiffs also suggest that the presence of utility poles in the disputed area, which provide electricity to the plaintiffs’ homes, demonstrates

their open and visible use of that area. At oral argument before this court,

however, the plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that any utility easement

would belong to the utility company and that there was no evidence in the

record as to who permitted the utility company to install the utility poles.

Accordingly, the presence of utility poles does not demonstrate the plaintiffs’

open and visible use of that area.

16 The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly determined that their

shared dominion of the rights-of-way defeated the exclusivity element of

adverse possession as a matter of law. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that

Roberson v. Aubin, supra, 120 Conn. App. 72, which the court relied on in

reaching its conclusion, is inapposite because, in that case, the shared use

was between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and, in the present case, ‘‘[t]he

shared dominion argued by the defendant is among the plaintiffs themselves,

not as among the plaintiffs and the defendant,’’ which presents an issue of

first impression.

Because we conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiffs’

adverse possession claim failed as a matter of law on the basis that there

was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs had used

the rights-of-way in an open, visible and hostile manner for a continuous

period of fifteen years, we do not reach this claim. See Alvarez v. Middletown, 192 Conn. App. 606, 611 n.2, 218 A.3d 124 (‘‘[s]ummary judgment is

appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the defendant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with respect to any one element

that the plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail at trial’’ (emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 936, 218

A.3d 594 (2019).

17 On the basis of this evidence, we disagree with the plaintiffs’ contention

that the trial court’s description of the vegetation as ‘‘overgrown’’ was a

mischaracterization of the evidence.

18 The plaintiffs relied only on the evidence of their maintenance of the

vegetation and the presence of the utility poles to demonstrate their use of

the rights-of-way.

In addition, although these other uses may be viewed as sufficiently

hostile, because they exceed the permitted use of the rights-of-way as a

means to access the road; see Dowling v. Heirs of Bond, supra, 345 Conn.

150–51; the plaintiffs have acknowledged in their reply brief to this court

that they did not argue to the trial court that their use of the rights-of-way

had become hostile.

19 There are some circumstances in which an easement may be extinguished by the abandonment of the owner of the dominant estate, wherein

the easement would cease to exist, and the property would belong, unencumbered, to the record title owner. See Smith v. Muellner, supra, 283 Conn.
527. In the present case, however, the plaintiffs are not the record title owners

of the land encumbered by the rights-of-way. In addition, the defendant is

not the owner of a dominant estate and, instead, undisputedly owns the

rights-of-way in fee simple.