Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

PATRICK J. ROBERTS THOMAS J. HILLIGOSS

Roberts Law Firm McIntyre Hilligoss Vent & Welke

Peru, Indiana Kokomo, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

PAUL D. SCHOOLMAN, )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) No. 52A02-1304-DR-344

)

TAMZEN L. SCHOOLMAN, )

)

Appellee. )

APPEAL FROM THE MIAMI SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Daniel C. Banina, Judge

Cause No. 52D02-1202-DR-48

December 12, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
2

Case Summary

Paul Schoolman appeals the trial court’s distribution of property in the dissolution 

of his marriage to Tamzen Schoolman. We affirm.

Issues

Paul raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court 

properly divided the marital estate.

Facts

Paul and Tamzen were married in 1985 and had one child who is now an adult. 

Paul was a farmer until he went to college in his forties and became a school teacher. He 

was a teacher until he retired at sixty-seven years of age. At the time of their marriage, 

Tamzen had completed a bachelor’s degree in nursing and was studying to become a 

nurse practitioner. Tamzen did not complete her nurse practitioner training after her 

marriage. She stayed at home with their son and helped with the farming. After their son 

went to school, Tamzen was a substitute teacher for a couple of years and then became a 

school nurse making $32,000 per year. 

In 1983, prior to their marriage, Paul inherited a significant amount of property. 

He also owned a farm that was subject to a mortgage. During their marriage, Paul sold 

much of the inherited property, earning more than one million dollars. Paul always put 

the proceeds of the sales into joint accounts with Tamzen. In February 2010, Paul also 

entered into a real estate contract to sell property to J.B. Ladd for $179,253.75. The 

contract included a down payment of $26,888.06 and yearly payments of $16,026 plus 

interest for ten or eleven years. 
3

In February 2012, Paul filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and a hearing 

was held in January 2013. At the time of the hearing, Paul was sixty-nine years old and 

worked occasionally as a real estate agent. However, he did not sell any properties in 

2012. Tamzen was fifty-nine years old at the time of the hearing and was still employed 

as a school nurse. Paul asked that the remaining Ladd contract proceeds be excluded 

from the marital estate. 

The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. The trial court 

included the Ladd contract in the marital estate. The trial court ordered that “[t]he net 

marital estate, not including the marital residence, should be divided as equally as 

possible, so that Paul receives $313,153.56 and Tamzen receives $313,153.55.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 18. The trial court ordered that the marital residence be sold and that 

the net proceeds of the sale be shared equally by the parties. Paul now appeals.

Analysis

The trial court here entered sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon. 

Sua sponte findings control only as to the issues they cover, and a general judgment will 

control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 

1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). We will affirm a general judgment entered with findings if it can 

be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. When a court has made 

special findings of fact, we review sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step process. 

Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of 

fact. Id. Second, we must determine whether those findings of fact support the trial 

court’s conclusions of law. Id.
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Findings will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “Findings are 

clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly 

or by inference.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal 

standard to properly found facts. Id. In order to determine that a finding or conclusion is 

clearly erroneous, an appellate court’s review of the evidence must leave it with the firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.1 Id. We neither reweigh the evidence nor 

assess the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence most favorable to the 

judgment. Fowler v. Perry, 830 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

A. Findings

Paul begins by arguing that several findings were erroneous. Many of these 

findings merely restate Tamzen’s testimony. To the extent the findings are not merely 

restatements of the testimony, our review of the record reveals conflicting evidence on 

many of the findings. Paul’s arguments regarding Findings 10, 14, 16, 17, 19, 24, 27, 

28B, 43, 44, 51, and 52 are requests that we reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility 

of the witnesses, which we cannot do. We decline to address those findings. 

 

1 Paul argues that the trial court erred by adopting verbatim portions of Tamzen’s proposed findings of 

fact and conclusions thereon. Although a trial court is discouraged from adopting a party’s proposed 

findings verbatim, this practice is not prohibited. CBR Event Decorators, Inc. v. Gates, 962 N.E.2d 1276, 

1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. The adoption of Tamzen’s proposed findings was not in and of 

itself improper. “However, the wholesale adoption of one party’s findings results in an ‘inevitable 

erosion of the confidence of an appellate court that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the 

trial court.’” Id. (quoting Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 709 (Ind. 2001)). Paul concedes that “there 

has never been a case overturned because of [this] method.” Appellant’s Br. p. 6. However, he argues 

that “the due process afforded by the U.S. Constitution and the Indiana Constitution require a fair trial.” 

Id. Paul does not explain how his due process rights were violated or how his right to a fair trial was 

violated. Consequently, Paul has waived this argument.
5

Paul is correct that Finding 6 erroneously states Paul’s age as sixty-five, but the 

evidence showed that he was sixty-nine years old at the time of the hearing. However, 

“even an erroneous finding is not fatal to a trial court’s judgment if the remaining valid 

findings and conclusions support the judgment, rendering the erroneous finding 

superfluous and harmless as a matter of law.” Curley v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Elections & 

Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. We conclude that 

this minor error was not fatal to the trial court’s judgment, and the error was harmless.

Paul also argues that Finding 9 is erroneous because it states that he was employed 

by Maconaquah Schools. This finding is supported by the evidence. Exhibit I concerns 

Paul’s school retirement records and indicates that he was employed by Maconaquah 

Schools, along with other school corporations during his teaching career. The trial 

court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.

B. Ladd Land Contract

Next, Paul argues that several of the findings concerning the Ladd land contract 

are clearly erroneous. Paul argues that the property should not have been included as a 

marital asset and that the trial court’s valuation of the property is erroneous. 

Paul argues that the remaining proceeds from the Ladd contract should not be 

included in the marital estate because they involve future proceeds of the contract. 

However, “[u]nder a typical conditional land contract, the vendor retains legal title until 

the total contract price is paid by the vendee.” Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 234, 

301 N.E.2d 641, 646 (1973), cert. denied. The Ladd contract is a typical land contract 

with legal title in the property remaining with Paul until the total contract price is paid. 
6

See Ex. 4. It is well established that all marital property goes into the marital estate for 

division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either 

spouse after the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their 

joint efforts. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a); Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Consequently, the trial court properly held that the property subject 

to the land contract was part of the marital estate.

Paul also argues that the trial court’s valuation of the property is erroneous. The 

trial court valued the land contract at $145,689.79. Tamzen presented evidence that the 

land contract was valued at $145,689.79 as of the February 29, 2012. Paul argued that 

the land contract was valued at $137,879.53 as of February 29, 2012. The differences in 

their valuations are based on differences in the payment schedule and the due dates of the 

payments. Tamzen entered into evidence a contract and payment schedule provided by 

Paul during discovery. Paul entered into evidence a revised contract with handwritten 

changes and a revised payment schedule. The trial court noted that the revised 

documents were “advantageous to Paul” and adopted a value based on the original 

contract and payment schedule. Appellant’s App. at 10. On appeal, we cannot reweigh 

the evidence or judge the parties’ credibility. Given the conflicting evidence, we cannot 

say that the trial court’s valuation is clearly erroneous.

C. Property Division

Paul argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it divided the marital 

estate. “This case turns on whether the trial court’s division of the marital property was 

just and reasonable.” Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. 2002). “Although 
7

this is in some sense an issue of law, it is highly fact sensitive and is subject to an abuse 

of discretion standard.” Id. We will not reweigh evidence, and we will consider the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. Id.

In an action for dissolution of marriage, the trial court is required to divide the 

marital property in a “just and reasonable manner.” I.C. § 31-15-7-4(b). Indiana Code 

Section 31-15-7-5 provides:

The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital 

property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, 

this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents 

relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the 

following factors, that an equal division would not be just and 

reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of 

the property, regardless of whether the contribution 

was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each 

spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the 

time the disposition of the property is to become 

effective, including the desirability of awarding the 

family residence or the right to dwell in the family 

residence for such periods as the court considers just to 

the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as 

related to the disposition or dissipation of their 

property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related 

to:
8

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of 

the parties.

A party seeking to rebut the presumption of equal division of marital property bears the 

burden of proof in doing so. Beckley v. Beckley, 822 N.E.2d 158, 163 (Ind. 2005); I.C. § 

31-15-7-5.

The division of marital assets is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). When a party 

challenges the trial court’s division of marital property, he or she must overcome a strong 

presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute. Id. 

When we review a claim that the trial court improperly divided marital property, we must 

decide whether the trial court’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, considering 

only the evidence most favorable to the court’s disposition of the property, without 

reweighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 1090-91.

The trial court here ordered an equal distribution of the marital assets. Paul seems 

to argue that he rebutted the presumption of an equal distribution. He argues that his 

economic circumstances as compared to Tamzen’s economic circumstances justify a 

deviation. We address each of the relevant statutory factors.

First, both parties contributed “to the acquisition of the property” during their 

twenty-seven-year marriage. I.C. § 31-15-7-5(1). Paul worked as a farmer, went to 

college, and became a teacher. Tamzen cared for their child, helped on the farm, and 

later became a school nurse. As to the extent to which the property was acquired by each 
9

spouse before the marriage or through inheritance or gift, the evidence demonstrated that 

Tamzen brought $18,000 to the marriage. On the other hand, Paul brought more than one 

million dollars in property that he inherited shortly before the marriage and a farm subject 

to a mortgage. During the marriage, Paul sold the properties and comingled the proceeds 

in joint accounts with Tamzen. 

As for the “conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition 

or dissipation of their property,” Tamzen testified that some guns that were in Paul’s 

possession are missing and that there were substantial empty spaces in the outbuilding 

during the appraisal. I.C. § 31-15-7-5(4). In May 2011, Tamzen withdrew $185,916.15 

from various joint certificates of deposit and accounts and deposited the money into 

accounts in her name. In March 2012, Tamzen withdrew $20,000 from a joint account 

and deposited it into a joint account with her sister. Paul then withdrew the remaining 

$107,058.95 from the account and deposited it into an account in his name. 

Finally, as for the economic circumstances and earning abilities of each party, at 

the time of the hearing, Tamzen was fifty-nine years old and Paul was sixty-nine years 

old. Paul was retired, was attempting to sell real estate, without much success, and had 

some health problems. Tamzen was still working as a school nurse. Although Paul 

argues that Tamzen could make more money working in a hospital, Tamzen testified that 

she would need significant retraining to do so, and her job prospects were limited given 

her age and time away from hospital nursing. She also testified that, at Paul’s request, 

she did not continue her education to become a nurse practitioner, which would have 

allowed her to earn significantly more money.
10

We simply cannot say that Paul has overcome the statutory presumption in favor 

of an equal distribution of the marital property. Given the parties’ lengthy marriage, 

comingling of funds, significant remaining assets, and current situations, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by ordering an equal division. See, e.g., Fobar, 771 N.E.2d at 

60 (holding that “the trial court was within its discretion in dividing the property 50-50, 

and was not required to alter its virtually equal division of the marital property to reflect 

[the wife’s] interest in the inherited . . . property”). 

Conclusion

The trial court’s division of marital property was not clearly erroneous. We 

affirm.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., and PYLE, J., concur.