# C_2022493EN.01003201.xml

| 27.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 493/32 |
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27.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 493/32

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P9_TA(2022)0224

The EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific

European Parliament resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific (2021/2232(INI))

(2022/C 493/03)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China Strategy (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China Strategy (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2), |
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having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2),

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/L.1 of 2 March 2022, which deplores Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, |
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having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/L.1 of 2 March 2022, which deplores Russia’s aggression against Ukraine,

| — | having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/L.2 of 24 March 2022 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine, |
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having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/L.2 of 24 March 2022 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine,

| — | having regard to the EU Strategic Compass, endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022, |
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having regard to the EU Strategic Compass, endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

| — | having regard to the joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China of 4 February 2022 on international relations entering a new era and global sustainable development, |
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having regard to the joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China of 4 February 2022 on international relations entering a new era and global sustainable development,

| — | having regard to the Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of 22 February 2022, |
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having regard to the Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of 22 February 2022,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regimes (3), |
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having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regimes (3),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation (4), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation (4),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2020 to the Council and the VP/HR concerning the preparation of the 10th Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) review process, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament options (5), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2020 to the Council and the VP/HR concerning the preparation of the 10th Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) review process, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament options (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations (6), |
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having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2021 on connectivity and EU-Asia relations (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2018 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion on behalf of the Union of the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Australia, of the other part (7), |
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having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2018 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion on behalf of the Union of the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Australia, of the other part (7),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on EU political relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (8), |
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having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2017 on EU political relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (8),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 29 April 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the VP/HR concerning EU-India relations (9), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 29 April 2021 to the Council, the Commission and the VP/HR concerning EU-India relations (9),

| — | having regard to its position adopted on 12 December 2018 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part (10), |
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—

having regard to its position adopted on 12 December 2018 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part (10),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (11); |
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having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2021 on the state of EU cyber defence capabilities (11);

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 October 2021, |
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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 and 22 October 2021,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the VP/HR of 16 September 2021 on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the VP/HR of 16 September 2021 on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024),

| — | having regard to the July 2021 update to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy entitled ‘The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for France’, |
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having regard to the July 2021 update to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy entitled ‘The Indo-Pacific region: a priority for France’,

| — | having regard to the EU-US High-Level Consultations on the Indo-Pacific of 3 December 2021, |
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having regard to the EU-US High-Level Consultations on the Indo-Pacific of 3 December 2021,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the VP/HR of 1 December 2021 on ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the VP/HR of 1 December 2021 on ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

| — | having regard to the 13th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit of 25 and 26 November 2021, |
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having regard to the 13th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit of 25 and 26 November 2021,

| — | having regard to the Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security of 5 October 2021, |
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having regard to the Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security of 5 October 2021,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on an EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 April 2021 on an EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,

| — | having regard to the AUKUS security pact of 15 September 2021, |
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having regard to the AUKUS security pact of 15 September 2021,

| — | having regard to the NATO Brussels Summit communiqué of 14 June 2021, |
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having regard to the NATO Brussels Summit communiqué of 14 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 June 2020 and of 10 May 2021 on security and defence, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 June 2020 and of 10 May 2021 on security and defence,

| — | having regard to EU-India Connectivity Partnership agreed on 8 May 2021, |
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having regard to EU-India Connectivity Partnership agreed on 8 May 2021,

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2188 of 22 December 2020 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (12), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/2188 of 22 December 2020 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (12),

| — | having regard to the EU-ASEAN joint ministerial statement of 1 December 2020 on connectivity, |
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having regard to the EU-ASEAN joint ministerial statement of 1 December 2020 on connectivity,

| — | having regard to the EU-China Summit of 1 April 2022, |
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having regard to the EU-China Summit of 1 April 2022,

| — | having regard to the visit of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to India of 24-25 April 2022, |
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having regard to the visit of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to India of 24-25 April 2022,

| — | having regard to the EU-Japan Summit of 12 May 2022, |
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having regard to the EU-Japan Summit of 12 May 2022,

| — | having regard to the joint communiqué issued by the G7 Foreign Ministers on 14 May 2022, |
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having regard to the joint communiqué issued by the G7 Foreign Ministers on 14 May 2022,

| — | having regard to the Netherlands’ Indo-Pacific strategy of 13 November 2020 entitled ‘Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia’, |
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having regard to the Netherlands’ Indo-Pacific strategy of 13 November 2020 entitled ‘Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia’,

| — | having regard to the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 9 November 2020, |
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having regard to the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 9 November 2020,

| — | having regard to the German Federal Government’s ‘Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region’ of September 2020, |
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having regard to the German Federal Government’s ‘Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region’ of September 2020,

| — | having regard to the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure agreed between the EU and Japan on 27 September 2019, |
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having regard to the Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure agreed between the EU and Japan on 27 September 2019,

| — | having regard to the Commission and VP/HR contribution to the European Council of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China — A strategic outlook’, |
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having regard to the Commission and VP/HR contribution to the European Council of 12 March 2019 entitled ‘EU-China — A strategic outlook’,

| — | having regard to the EU Action Plan against Disinformation of 5 December 2018, |
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having regard to the EU Action Plan against Disinformation of 5 December 2018,

| — | having regard to the decision taken at the EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting of 21 January 2019 to establish an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership, |
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having regard to the decision taken at the EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting of 21 January 2019 to establish an EU-ASEAN Strategic Partnership,

| — | having regard to the EU-Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in Brussels on 19 October 2018, |
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having regard to the EU-Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in Brussels on 19 October 2018,

| — | having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the VP/HR of 19 September 2018 entitled ‘Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ (JOIN(2018)0031), |
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having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the VP/HR of 19 September 2018 entitled ‘Connecting Europe and Asia — Building blocks for an EU Strategy’ (JOIN(2018)0031),

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 28 May 2018 on enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 28 May 2018 on enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia,

| — | having regard to ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2022, |
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having regard to ASEAN-EU Plan of Action 2018-2022,

| — | having regard to the Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation between New Zealand and the European Union of 5 October 2016, |
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having regard to the Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation between New Zealand and the European Union of 5 October 2016,

| — | having regard to the joint proposal for a Council decision of 14 April 2016 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Australia, of the other part (JOIN(2016)0008), |
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—

having regard to the joint proposal for a Council decision of 14 April 2016 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Australia, of the other part (JOIN(2016)0008),

| — | having regard to the European Union Maritime Security Strategy of 24 June 2014, |
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having regard to the European Union Maritime Security Strategy of 24 June 2014,

| — | having regard to the Framework Agreement of 23 January 2013 between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part, |
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having regard to the Framework Agreement of 23 January 2013 between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part,

| — | having regard to the summit communiqué of 14 June 2021 issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, |
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having regard to the summit communiqué of 14 June 2021 issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels,

| — | having regard to the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 12 July 2016 on the South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), |
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having regard to the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 12 July 2016 on the South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China),

| — | having regard to the first-ever in-person leaders’ summit of 24 September 2021 of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprising the political leaders of the United States, Australia, Japan and India, |
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having regard to the first-ever in-person leaders’ summit of 24 September 2021 of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), comprising the political leaders of the United States, Australia, Japan and India,

| — | having regard the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), |
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having regard the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0085/2022), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0085/2022),

| A. | whereas the EU defines the Indo-Pacific as a region spanning from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific island states; whereas the Indo-Pacific is a diverse region, home to 60 % of the world’s population and seven G20 members and is a key actor in the global international order and home to increasingly important political, trade and security partners for the EU; |
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A.

whereas the EU defines the Indo-Pacific as a region spanning from the east coast of Africa to the Pacific island states; whereas the Indo-Pacific is a diverse region, home to 60 % of the world’s population and seven G20 members and is a key actor in the global international order and home to increasingly important political, trade and security partners for the EU;

| B. | whereas approximately 90 % of the EU’s external trade is transported by sea; whereas major waterways of vital importance to EU trade, such as the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, are located in the Indo-Pacific region; |
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B.

whereas approximately 90 % of the EU’s external trade is transported by sea; whereas major waterways of vital importance to EU trade, such as the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, are located in the Indo-Pacific region;

| C. | whereas the EU and Indo-Pacific countries are facing increasingly similar security challenges as well as non-traditional challenges; whereas the EU’s outlook on the region reflects the political recognition of the need to take greater responsibility in addressing global security challenges; |
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C.

whereas the EU and Indo-Pacific countries are facing increasingly similar security challenges as well as non-traditional challenges; whereas the EU’s outlook on the region reflects the political recognition of the need to take greater responsibility in addressing global security challenges;

| D. | whereas at the invitation of President Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 a joint text by the Presidents of China and Russia was signed prior to the opening ceremony of the Olympic Winter Games in Beijing; whereas the joint statement declared, among other things, that the friendship between the two States has ‘no limits’, and whereas through this statement China for the first time officially joined Russia’s demand for a halt to NATO’s expansion; |
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D.

whereas at the invitation of President Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 a joint text by the Presidents of China and Russia was signed prior to the opening ceremony of the Olympic Winter Games in Beijing; whereas the joint statement declared, among other things, that the friendship between the two States has ‘no limits’, and whereas through this statement China for the first time officially joined Russia’s demand for a halt to NATO’s expansion;

| E. | whereas, according to media reports, Chinese officials at the 4 February 2022 summit asked senior Russian officials not to invade Ukraine before the end of the Winter Olympics in Beijing; whereas this would mean that senior Chinese officials had some level of direct knowledge about Russia’s war plans or intentions before the aggression started on 24 February 2022; |
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E.

whereas, according to media reports, Chinese officials at the 4 February 2022 summit asked senior Russian officials not to invade Ukraine before the end of the Winter Olympics in Beijing; whereas this would mean that senior Chinese officials had some level of direct knowledge about Russia’s war plans or intentions before the aggression started on 24 February 2022;

| F. | whereas at the EU-China Summit on 1 April 2022, the EU, recalling China’s responsibility as a global actor to work for peace and stability, called on China to support efforts to bring about an immediate end to the bloodshed in Ukraine, consistent with China’s role in the world as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and its uniquely close relations with Russia; |
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F.

whereas at the EU-China Summit on 1 April 2022, the EU, recalling China’s responsibility as a global actor to work for peace and stability, called on China to support efforts to bring about an immediate end to the bloodshed in Ukraine, consistent with China’s role in the world as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and its uniquely close relations with Russia;

| G. | whereas in response to the Russia’s war against Ukraine, which started with a military invasion on 24 February 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted on 2 March 2022 Resolution ES-11/1, deploring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, with a vote of 141 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions and 12 countries not voting; whereas not a single country in the Indo-Pacific voted against the resolution and only China, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, Laos, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Vietnam abstained on the final text; |
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G.

whereas in response to the Russia’s war against Ukraine, which started with a military invasion on 24 February 2022, the UN General Assembly adopted on 2 March 2022 Resolution ES-11/1, deploring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, with a vote of 141 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions and 12 countries not voting; whereas not a single country in the Indo-Pacific voted against the resolution and only China, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, Laos, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Vietnam abstained on the final text;

| H. | whereas the recently adopted joint communication on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective, reflects a deep and necessary evolution in the way the EU looks at its interests, opportunities and challenges in the Indo-Pacific and its ambition to play a greater role in upholding its values and interests in this region of growing geopolitical and economic importance; whereas promoting an open, stable and rules-based regional security architecture and building strong relations, sustainable trade links and security cooperation with Indo-Pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy; whereas the Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of 22 February 2022 brought together the Foreign Ministers of EU Member States and some 30 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and whereas the EU and its Member States underlined in the meeting their support for an increased and long-term engagement in the Indo-Pacific, through concrete actions and by enhancing security and defence dialogue and bilateral relations with partners in the region; |
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H.

whereas the recently adopted joint communication on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective, reflects a deep and necessary evolution in the way the EU looks at its interests, opportunities and challenges in the Indo-Pacific and its ambition to play a greater role in upholding its values and interests in this region of growing geopolitical and economic importance; whereas promoting an open, stable and rules-based regional security architecture and building strong relations, sustainable trade links and security cooperation with Indo-Pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy; whereas the Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific of 22 February 2022 brought together the Foreign Ministers of EU Member States and some 30 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, and whereas the EU and its Member States underlined in the meeting their support for an increased and long-term engagement in the Indo-Pacific, through concrete actions and by enhancing security and defence dialogue and bilateral relations with partners in the region;

| I. | whereas the joint communication on ‘The Global Gateway’ aims to mobilise up to EUR 300 billion in investments to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world; |
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I.

whereas the joint communication on ‘The Global Gateway’ aims to mobilise up to EUR 300 billion in investments to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world;

| J. | whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region, and in particular those stemming from the People’s Republic of China, have given rise to intense geopolitical tensions and competition, reflected by an increase in military spending, military build-up and a more aggressive rhetoric, thereby threatening the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of regional and global competition has therefore evolved in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas there is neither an overarching regional security order nor a confidence-building mechanism to mitigate the associated challenges and tensions; whereas such dynamics represent a serious threat to the stability and security of the region and the global community, with a direct impact on the EU’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the ideological struggle in the region between authoritarianism and democracy has the potential to sway the outcome of equivalent struggles worldwide, including in the vicinity of the European Union; whereas a stable and peaceful Indo-Pacific region based on respect for international law is crucial for safeguarding the EU’s security and interests; whereas tackling the root causes of instability, such as poverty, social injustice and human rights violations is a pre-condition for ensuring peace and security in the Indo-Pacific; whereas the EU is committed to human security, peace, and international law and human rights; |
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J.

whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region, and in particular those stemming from the People’s Republic of China, have given rise to intense geopolitical tensions and competition, reflected by an increase in military spending, military build-up and a more aggressive rhetoric, thereby threatening the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of regional and global competition has therefore evolved in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas there is neither an overarching regional security order nor a confidence-building mechanism to mitigate the associated challenges and tensions; whereas such dynamics represent a serious threat to the stability and security of the region and the global community, with a direct impact on the EU’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the ideological struggle in the region between authoritarianism and democracy has the potential to sway the outcome of equivalent struggles worldwide, including in the vicinity of the European Union; whereas a stable and peaceful Indo-Pacific region based on respect for international law is crucial for safeguarding the EU’s security and interests; whereas tackling the root causes of instability, such as poverty, social injustice and human rights violations is a pre-condition for ensuring peace and security in the Indo-Pacific; whereas the EU is committed to human security, peace, and international law and human rights;

| K. | whereas the EU is the number one foreign investor and development assistance provider in the Indo-Pacific; whereas the EU is an important trading partner and has already concluded and is in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the region; whereas the EU can already rely on a broad network of partnerships and agreements with a number of countries, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, New Zealand, Vietnam and Singapore, and with regional organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS); whereas the EU is present in the region through its Member State France, notably through the French overseas departments of La Réunion and Mayotte, as well as the French Southern and Antarctic Lands in the Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific Ocean through New Caledonia, as well as through the French overseas collectivities of French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna; whereas these French regions are home to roughly 1,6 million EU citizens, including over 7 000 military personnel; whereas, consequently, the EU is a resident actor in the Indo-Pacific; |
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K.

whereas the EU is the number one foreign investor and development assistance provider in the Indo-Pacific; whereas the EU is an important trading partner and has already concluded and is in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the region; whereas the EU can already rely on a broad network of partnerships and agreements with a number of countries, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, New Zealand, Vietnam and Singapore, and with regional organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS); whereas the EU is present in the region through its Member State France, notably through the French overseas departments of La Réunion and Mayotte, as well as the French Southern and Antarctic Lands in the Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific Ocean through New Caledonia, as well as through the French overseas collectivities of French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna; whereas these French regions are home to roughly 1,6 million EU citizens, including over 7 000 military personnel; whereas, consequently, the EU is a resident actor in the Indo-Pacific;

| L. | whereas more than half of the world’s fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea, which alone accounts for around 12 % of the world’s fishing; whereas the EU has concluded several sustainable fisheries partnership agreements with countries in the Indo-Pacific region (Federated States of Micronesia, the Cook Islands, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique and the Seychelles) and whereas the EU’s fishing fleet is present in both the Indian and Pacific oceans; whereas the EU is an active member of several regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) in the Indo-Pacific region (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement Parties, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and the South Pacific RFMO); whereas the EU’s application for membership of the North Pacific Fisheries Commission was accepted on 25 February 2021 and whereas it holds high-level dialogues on ocean and fisheries issues with Australia, Indonesia, Japan and New Zealand; whereas the EU has signed an ocean partnership agreement with China; whereas it also holds dialogues and has working groups on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing with Korea, Thailand and Taiwan; |
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L.

whereas more than half of the world’s fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea, which alone accounts for around 12 % of the world’s fishing; whereas the EU has concluded several sustainable fisheries partnership agreements with countries in the Indo-Pacific region (Federated States of Micronesia, the Cook Islands, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique and the Seychelles) and whereas the EU’s fishing fleet is present in both the Indian and Pacific oceans; whereas the EU is an active member of several regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) in the Indo-Pacific region (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement Parties, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and the South Pacific RFMO); whereas the EU’s application for membership of the North Pacific Fisheries Commission was accepted on 25 February 2021 and whereas it holds high-level dialogues on ocean and fisheries issues with Australia, Indonesia, Japan and New Zealand; whereas the EU has signed an ocean partnership agreement with China; whereas it also holds dialogues and has working groups on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing with Korea, Thailand and Taiwan;

| M. | whereas ensuring stability and freedom of navigation in Indo-Pacific waters is crucial for global and regional sustainability and peace and for securing the EU’s strategic interests; whereas the EU is involved in supporting regional maritime security through the common security and defence policy (CSDP) operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta; whereas Indo-Pacific partners have welcomed Operation Atalanta and its focus on preventing piracy and armed robbery, as well as monitoring weapons and drug trafficking; whereas the EU and its Member States have committed to increasing its permanent naval presence in the region through, inter alia, the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept; |
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M.

whereas ensuring stability and freedom of navigation in Indo-Pacific waters is crucial for global and regional sustainability and peace and for securing the EU’s strategic interests; whereas the EU is involved in supporting regional maritime security through the common security and defence policy (CSDP) operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta; whereas Indo-Pacific partners have welcomed Operation Atalanta and its focus on preventing piracy and armed robbery, as well as monitoring weapons and drug trafficking; whereas the EU and its Member States have committed to increasing its permanent naval presence in the region through, inter alia, the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept;

| N. | whereas France has permanently-stationed military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific area; and whereas it might be pertinent to reflect on how these permanent French positions — by way of the Armed Forces in French Polynesia (FAPF) and the Armed Forces of New Caledonia (FANC) in particular — could be used for potential European deployments; |
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N.

whereas France has permanently-stationed military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific area; and whereas it might be pertinent to reflect on how these permanent French positions — by way of the Armed Forces in French Polynesia (FAPF) and the Armed Forces of New Caledonia (FANC) in particular — could be used for potential European deployments;

| O. | whereas China’s rapid military build-up, its increasingly assertive and expansionist behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region, its military activities in the Taiwan Strait and in the East and South China Seas, including actions to hamper the freedom of navigation executed by the Chinese Coast Guard and the Maritime Militia, are driving up tensions in the Indo-Pacific, as are its deliberate and repeated violations of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, its actions to end the independence and autonomy of Hong Kong, its military build-up at the Sino-Indian border, its increasingly aggressive rhetoric, and its manipulative disinformation and media campaigns; calls for the EU to prepare a strategy based on realities on the ground that would allow it to react if need be; warns of the danger of an accelerated arms race in the region; |
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O.

whereas China’s rapid military build-up, its increasingly assertive and expansionist behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region, its military activities in the Taiwan Strait and in the East and South China Seas, including actions to hamper the freedom of navigation executed by the Chinese Coast Guard and the Maritime Militia, are driving up tensions in the Indo-Pacific, as are its deliberate and repeated violations of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, its actions to end the independence and autonomy of Hong Kong, its military build-up at the Sino-Indian border, its increasingly aggressive rhetoric, and its manipulative disinformation and media campaigns; calls for the EU to prepare a strategy based on realities on the ground that would allow it to react if need be; warns of the danger of an accelerated arms race in the region;

| P. | whereas China’s assertiveness in the region is not limited to the military realm but has also materialised through aggressive commercial practices based on diplomatic coercion and belligerent debt diplomacy policies; whereas China’s economic and financial expansion in the Indo-Pacific and Europe involves investments in critical infrastructure; whereas China is trying to gain political influence through its economic interests; whereas the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated the importance of reliable supply chains and more balanced economic ties with China; |
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P.

whereas China’s assertiveness in the region is not limited to the military realm but has also materialised through aggressive commercial practices based on diplomatic coercion and belligerent debt diplomacy policies; whereas China’s economic and financial expansion in the Indo-Pacific and Europe involves investments in critical infrastructure; whereas China is trying to gain political influence through its economic interests; whereas the COVID-19 crisis demonstrated the importance of reliable supply chains and more balanced economic ties with China;

| Q. | whereas on 12 July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in a landmark case ruled that there was no evidence that China had exercised exclusive control historically over the territories it claims within the South China Sea; whereas China has ignored this ruling and, among other actions, has created military bases on man-made islands; |
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Q.

whereas on 12 July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in a landmark case ruled that there was no evidence that China had exercised exclusive control historically over the territories it claims within the South China Sea; whereas China has ignored this ruling and, among other actions, has created military bases on man-made islands;

| R. | whereas China has shown a lack of transparency and a reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral nuclear arms control instruments, which has allowed it to stockpile unhindered a large arsenal of technologically advanced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as Dong-Feng 26s; |
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R.

whereas China has shown a lack of transparency and a reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral nuclear arms control instruments, which has allowed it to stockpile unhindered a large arsenal of technologically advanced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as Dong-Feng 26s;

| S. | whereas the digital transformation is having an increasing impact on the structure of the international system; whereas international standard-setting and breakthrough innovations in frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G and 6G are of strategic importance to the EU and its digital future and whereas there is an increasing global competition for technological supremacy, in which China is significantly invested; |
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S.

whereas the digital transformation is having an increasing impact on the structure of the international system; whereas international standard-setting and breakthrough innovations in frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G and 6G are of strategic importance to the EU and its digital future and whereas there is an increasing global competition for technological supremacy, in which China is significantly invested;

| T. | whereas in a joint statement on 24 May 2022, the leaders of the United States, Australia, India and Japan at the recent QUAD Summit reemphasised the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific: freedom, the rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity; whereas the leaders announced a series of new initiatives designed to deepen cooperation across the region, including the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness; |
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T.

whereas in a joint statement on 24 May 2022, the leaders of the United States, Australia, India and Japan at the recent QUAD Summit reemphasised the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific: freedom, the rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity; whereas the leaders announced a series of new initiatives designed to deepen cooperation across the region, including the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness;

| U. | whereas on 23 May 2022, US President Biden stated that the United States would intervene militarily if China attempts to take Taiwan by force; |
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U.

whereas on 23 May 2022, US President Biden stated that the United States would intervene militarily if China attempts to take Taiwan by force;

| V. | whereas on 24 May 2022, four Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers conducted joint flights around Japan and the Republic of Korea, prompting both countries to scramble fighter aircraft to monitor the flights; whereas the joint flights took place on the same day as US President Biden was meeting his QUAD counterparts in Tokyo; |
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V.

whereas on 24 May 2022, four Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 bombers conducted joint flights around Japan and the Republic of Korea, prompting both countries to scramble fighter aircraft to monitor the flights; whereas the joint flights took place on the same day as US President Biden was meeting his QUAD counterparts in Tokyo;

| W. | whereas on 23 May 2022, the United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam launched the process to establish the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, which is aimed at contributing to cooperation, stability, prosperity, development and peace within the region; whereas the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity offers an alternative to China’s growing commercial presence across the region; |
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W.

whereas on 23 May 2022, the United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam launched the process to establish the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, which is aimed at contributing to cooperation, stability, prosperity, development and peace within the region; whereas the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity offers an alternative to China’s growing commercial presence across the region;

| X. | whereas in April 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a security cooperation pact, which attracted international attention and led to an increased diplomatic presence and engagement with the Pacific island countries; whereas on 30 May 2022, during a visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to 10 Pacific island nations, and following increasing concern within these countries, China announced it was halting a planned regional agreement with Pacific island nations entitled the ‘China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision’, which was intended to cover free trade and security cooperation, including areas such as police training, cybersecurity, maritime mapping and resource access; whereas the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, called the proposal ‘the single most game-changing proposed agreement in the Pacific in any of our lifetimes’, and said that it ‘threatens to bring a new Cold War era at best, and a World War at worst’; whereas despite the failure to secure this far-reaching agreement, China has signed a number of smaller bilateral agreements with the Pacific nations during Wang’s regional visits; |
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X.

whereas in April 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a security cooperation pact, which attracted international attention and led to an increased diplomatic presence and engagement with the Pacific island countries; whereas on 30 May 2022, during a visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to 10 Pacific island nations, and following increasing concern within these countries, China announced it was halting a planned regional agreement with Pacific island nations entitled the ‘China-Pacific Island Countries Common Development Vision’, which was intended to cover free trade and security cooperation, including areas such as police training, cybersecurity, maritime mapping and resource access; whereas the President of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, called the proposal ‘the single most game-changing proposed agreement in the Pacific in any of our lifetimes’, and said that it ‘threatens to bring a new Cold War era at best, and a World War at worst’; whereas despite the failure to secure this far-reaching agreement, China has signed a number of smaller bilateral agreements with the Pacific nations during Wang’s regional visits;

| Y. | whereas the climate crisis is having an impact on the international system, where it has the potential to exacerbate geopolitical tensions; whereas the Union’s external action must increasingly incorporate climate change and environmental degradation as a risk multiplier and accordingly adapt its strategies and concepts and procedures, including in the Indo-Pacific; |
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Y.

whereas the climate crisis is having an impact on the international system, where it has the potential to exacerbate geopolitical tensions; whereas the Union’s external action must increasingly incorporate climate change and environmental degradation as a risk multiplier and accordingly adapt its strategies and concepts and procedures, including in the Indo-Pacific;

| Z. | whereas on 15 December 1995 ASEAN member states signed the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty) as a commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; |
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Z.

whereas on 15 December 1995 ASEAN member states signed the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty) as a commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

The EU’s response to security challenges in the Indo-Pacific

| 1. | Welcomes the recently adopted joint communication on an EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; recognises the added value of the strategy as the first foundation stone of the EU’s united approach to the region, and praises the inclusive and multifaceted nature of the strategy and the inclusion of security and defence as one of its seven priority areas; calls for the EU to use the strategy as a tool to effectively increase its presence and influence in the region through furthering strategic ties and deepening all-inclusive dialogue and cooperation on security and defence-related matters with like-minded countries and organisations in the region; believes that increased value-based EU engagement in the region would contribute to regional security and prosperity, and help overcome regional tensions and create more balanced relations among regional players; recalls that the strategy is a Team Europe project and that bilateral agreements should foster the EU approach, as well as the EU’s capacity to bring forward common responses to security challenges; underlines that preserving peace, stability and the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific remains of critical importance to the EU and its Member States; |
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1.

| 2. | Underlines that the Indo-Pacific region is very diverse, and that no one-size-fits-all approach can be applied; appreciates the holistic approach and positive agenda presented in the EU Strategy and highlights the need for the Strategy to constantly adapt to the rapidly changing power balance, while remaining firmly anchored in European values, principles and norms, in particular Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which should serve as a normative framework for the EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific; underlines the importance of the security-development-humanitarian nexus; |
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2.

| 3. | Underlines that the illegal and unprovoked Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, will have a profound and lasting impact on international relations; stresses that the EU must therefore further consolidate its international engagements, as stipulated by the Strategic Compass, including, in particular, in the key strategic area of the Indo-Pacific; while recognising the closer relationship between Russia and China, as demonstrated by, among other things, their joint statement of 4 February 2022, expresses its strong concern about the lack of a clear condemnation by the Chinese leadership of this illegal war, which violates all international norms and laws and which has already led to the death of thousands of military personnel and thousands of innocent civilians; strongly calls on the Chinese leadership to live up to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and to not only condemn this blatant violation by the Russian Federation but to also use its close contacts with the Russian President to urge him to immediately stop this violent war of aggression, remove all troops from Ukrainian territory and fully respect Ukraine’s independence and the will of its people to live in peace and freedom; |
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3.

| 4. | Welcomes the overwhelming support expressed by Indo-Pacific countries at the votes in the UN General Assembly of 2 March 2022 on Resolution ES-11/L.1 deploring Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, as well as on 24 March 2022 on Resolution ES-11/L.2 on the humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine; recalls that not a single country in the region voted against the resolution; believes that this sends a very strong message of the overall support for international law, peace and international cooperation in the region; nevertheless regrets that, alongside China, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, Laos, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Vietnam decided to abstain on the final text; encourages these countries not to close their eyes to the realities in Ukraine, the blatant violation of international law and the terrible suffering and killing of innocent civilians, and to thus review their positions and join the overwhelming majority of the international community in clearly condemning the Russian war of aggression and join international efforts to work towards peace in Ukraine and protect innocent civilians; |
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4.

| 5. | Highlights the need to ensure EU unity as a pre-condition to achieve the EU’s ambition of open strategic sovereignty amid the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the increasing multi-faced threats and competition among powers, notably the United States, Russia and China; calls for more unity in the Council of the European Union over the adoption of measures to address China’s anti-democratic policy and aggressive behaviour, which endangers the sovereignty of its neighbours and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region; recalls that the EU’s unified approach must be underpinned by a pragmatic, principled and values-based foreign and security policy that seeks to cooperate with partners if possible and act alone if needed in order to pursue the strategic solidarity and sovereignty of the Union and accompanied by credible foreign policy tools, as well as by a reform of its decision-making process, in particular through a transition to qualified majority voting, which would facilitate a swift response to serious security challenges and deliver on peace, human security, sustainable development and democracy; points out that the increasing commitment of the US to the Indo-Pacific has implications for European security and therefore reiterates the need for a capable European Defence Union; highlights that, in order to work with partners in the Indo-Pacific region, and taking into account the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU needs to strengthen its strategic autonomy for it to be an effective global partner; supports, therefore, the ambition of creating a rapid deployment capacity; |
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5.

| 6. | Stresses the EU’s determination to promote an open, stable and rules-based regional security architecture based on respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and international law, and including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and an enhanced naval presence, in accordance with the legal framework established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); invites the EU to pursue fruitful bilateral relations with partners in the region, including African Indo-Pacific countries and to also work closely with other liberal democracies and historical allies, such as NATO, the US and the UK, especially in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and an increasingly assertive and aggressive China, with a view to better addressing common regional and global security challenges; highlights the need to promote the common objective of sustainability and prosperity, and to strengthen multilateralism via the UN and other international organisations; recalls that non-compliance or an explicit violation of these values and principles would have negative repercussions for the EU’s vital economic and security interests, as well as its engagement in bilateral and regional partnerships, possibly leading to sanctions; |
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6.

| 7. | Urges the EU to fully exploit its position and reputation as a credible, reliable and autonomous global actor for peace amid the growing geopolitical competition between global and regional powers in the Indo-Pacific; recalls that the added value of EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific lies in its comprehensive range of civilian and military assistance measures, including well developed non-military contributions; recalls that the EU has a vast network of diplomatic assets to facilitate dialogue, mediation, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and denuclearisation, as well as legal solutions and expertise in the field of multilateralism and in setting up confidence-building measures, and measures aimed at fighting corruption, which can also be shared with partners that act in the spirit of good faith; considers it necessary to strengthen the diplomatic and consular network of the Member States in the region and to defend the values and interests of the EU and its Member States; calls for the EU to closer link its contributions to countries in the region and its diplomacy efforts to its values and interests; calls for the EU to step up the communication efforts on the Indo-Pacific Strategy and to involve partner countries in the implementation process in order to strengthen security relations and contribute to the achievement of the goals included in the Strategy; |
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7.

| 8. | Encourages the EU to strengthen its commitment with its Indo-Pacific partners to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), as well as to UN Security Council Resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535 on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS), with appropriate budgetary allocations for effective implementation; stresses the importance and the positive added value of women’s participation in peace-keeping and peace-building, including in negotiations and missions; |
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8.

Strategic sovereignty based on multilateralism and the rules-based international order

| 9. | Considers that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which is a blatant violation of international law, as well as the Russian refusal of mediation and to conduct honest negotiations, pose a severe threat to global security, peace and stability and to free and open communication in the maritime, air, space and cyberspace domains, which are essential to peace and to maintaining regional and global trading routes; encourages the relevant services in the European External Action Service to analyse the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on the EU’s Indo-Pacific policy, as well as of the possible consequences of a regional conflict on the EU’s economic and security interests, while assessing how the EU could respond to a deteriorating security situation in the Indo-Pacific region; expresses deep concern about the impact of the war in Ukraine on the national economies of the Indo-Pacific countries, especially with regard to the rising prices of grain, energy and fertilisers; reiterates the stabilising role that the EU could play in the region; |
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9.

| 10. | Expresses deep concern about China’s rapid military build-up, including its recently uncovered test of a hypersonic missile, and its increasingly assertive behaviour, with the aim of, among other things, advancing its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas; highlights that security hotspots and unresolved issues such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme, the recent China-India border standoffs, the crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong and Macao, China’s failure to comply with its obligations under national and international law to respect human rights, including the rights of minorities in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, and the threats posed by China to the territorial integrity of Taiwan, materialised through military actions all exert further strain on regional security and stability; condemns China’s diplomacy of intimidation and manipulative disinformation campaigns; furthermore expresses concern about China’s increased presence in other strategic arenas, such as the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific and Oceania region, and the Arabian Sea; |
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10.

| 11. | Recalls that past divisions weakened the EU’s ability to take a common position towards China; highlights that the EU’s approach towards China must be unified, pragmatic, multifaceted and principled, including cooperating on issues of shared interest with a global impact such as the fight against climate change, based on human rights and international law, rivalling China when it comes to providing economic, political and strategic alternatives to third countries, and confronting and possibly sanctioning China on matters where our respective views diverge substantially, for example in protecting EU values such as respect for democracy and human rights, and in speaking out against violent aggressions against independent countries and condemning the perpetrators of such violations, including those responsible for the killing of innocent civilians through acts of war, as the international community can currently witness in the actions of Russia in Ukraine; |
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11.

| 12. | Welcomes the very timely new EU-US dialogue on China and the establishment of EU-US consultations on the Indo-Pacific, and calls for a coordinated approach to deepen cooperation on security matters, including through transatlantic parliamentary dialogue towards strengthening multilateral institutions and regional organisations, promoting democracy and enhancing democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; welcomes the US’s intention of bolstering regional stability, resilience and security; strongly welcomes the strong unity of the transatlantic community in responding to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and sees it as a very strong signal to the entire world that we are committed to our values and ready to defend them if tested; |
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12.

| 13. | Takes note of the recent conclusion of the AUKUS trilateral security pact; regrets the lack of prior consultation in this process and reiterates its solidarity with France; is of the firm opinion that strong EU-Australia relations, based on mutual trust and consultation, are important for the stability of the region and that these should be further advanced and not affected by the conclusion of AUKUS; considers AUKUS and QUAD to be important parts of the regional security architecture and underlines that effective regional security requires an open and inclusive dialogue involving relevant regional, concerned extra-regional and also international actors; therefore calls on the VP/HR to examine with the relevant partners possibilities to set up a permanent dialogue with AUKUS and representation at the meetings of the members of QUAD also in non-military fields such as climate change, technology, health and trade in order to align efforts and strengthen synergies between our respective strategies on the Indo-Pacific; stresses the need to further develop and strengthen the EU-UK cooperation framework, including in foreign and security policy; notes the lack of interest expressed by the UK to do so, so far; |
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13.

| 14. | Highlights the fundamental role that connectivity plays in the geopolitical relations of the EU and its Member States, and welcomes the joint communication by the Commission and the VP/HR on the Global Gateway strategy presented in December 2021 aimed at increasing sustainable cooperation with like-minded states and using soft power to promote European values and secure strong and durable partnerships; believes that this initiative could be an attractive alternative to the Chinese connectivity strategy for the EU’s partners in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; highlights the importance of connectivity cooperation for the EU and the Indo-Pacific region to successfully face up to the new security challenges, including cybersecurity, digital connectivity, and critical infrastructure, and believes that this should also include efforts to ensure the security of the global internet infrastructure, including undersea cables; underlines the importance of strengthening climate security and sustainable development via connectivity investments; calls for a swift implementation of this strategy in the Indo-Pacific, including through the implementation of concrete and visible projects; |
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14.

| 15. | Acknowledges that the EU’s Strategic Compass identifies the Indo-Pacific as a region of key strategic interest for the EU while also identifying a concrete set of objectives to achieve in the region and the required capabilities to attain them, based on the joint threat assessment; highlights that in order to be a credible security actor in the region, as well as internationally, the EU needs to further increase its joint efforts in capability development, especially in the maritime field, while focusing on projects of strategic relevance; recommends further EU-NATO cooperation to respond to the security challenges related to the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in the EU Strategic Compass; |
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15.

Enhancing partnerships with regional organisations and democratic countries

| 16. | Reiterates that enhancing existing partnerships with regional actors and building new ones is a key feature of the strategy; highlights that unified action among the EU and its traditional allies in the region is key to achieving stability; welcomes the fact that the EU plans to intensify its dialogues with partners on security and defence, including on counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, non-proliferation and disarmament, capacity-building, hybrid threats, maritime security and combating interference and disinformation, in particular through sharing best practices, improving strategic communication, and gathering evidence with a view to improving collective attribution and sanctions, enhancing climate security and crisis response, and ensuring an effective multilateral response to the COVID-19 crisis and future global health crises, in addition to space and maritime security dialogues; further welcomes the fact that the EU is deploying military advisers to EU delegations in the region, as it has done in China and Indonesia; |
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16.

| 17. | Highlights the long-standing cooperation between the EU and ASEAN on security and defence matters, and welcomes the recent upgrade of bilateral relations to a strategic partnership; reiterates its strong commitment to support ASEAN’s centrality and inclusive multilateral architecture; calls for the EU to anchor and extend its presence in the region by deepening cooperation with ASEAN and its members; calls on ASEAN to involve the EU in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and in the East Asia Summit; underlines the fundamental role of parliamentary diplomacy in strengthening democracy and promoting human rights in the region, and therefore encourages the establishment of an EU-ASEAN Parliamentary Assembly and more numerous and regular parliamentary exchanges with the region, including on the occasion of the 45th anniversary summit in Brussels in 2022; stresses that the EU should explore the possibility of engaging in capacity-building measures with ASEAN in areas such as civilian conflict prevention, mediation, peace-building and reconciliation, including by cooperating with other regional partners on such measures; |
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17.

| 18. | Strongly welcomes the close coordination with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand in response to the Russian war against Ukraine and welcomes the close alignment between the EU and these four countries when it comes to sanctioning Russia and Belarus for their illegal and inhuman actions; welcomes the strengthened dialogue between NATO and its four Indo-Pacific partners, namely Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, with a view to addressing cross-cutting security issues and global challenges and enhancing common situational awareness on security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, in particular meetings of ambassadors between NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) and these four Asia-Pacific countries, commonly called the ‘NAC+4’ format; calls for the EU to develop a similar dialogue with the four Asia-Pacific partners; highlights that priority areas for cooperation with partners should focus on capacity-building, hybrid threats, non-proliferation and crisis response, cyber defence, civil preparedness and the UN’s Women, Peace and Security agenda; invites NATO to use its 2030 reflection process to enhance cooperation with its partners in order to defend shared values, consolidate democracy in the region, bolster resilience and uphold the international rules-based order, while ensuring greater consistency between policies on China with full respect for the autonomy of decision and action of the European Union; |
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18.

| 19. | Welcomes the ‘Enhancing Security Cooperation in and with Asia’ project and to support its implementation encourages regular exchanges and study trips for military officers to facilitate mutual understanding and foster a common strategic approach; |
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19.

| 20. | Reiterates the importance of the well established strategic partnership between the EU and Japan and highlights our partnership in the areas of security, defence and connectivity; notes that Japan is the only Indo-Pacific partner specifically mentioned in the EU Strategic Compass; welcomes the outcome of the 28th EU-Japan Summit held on 12 May 2022, where the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing cooperation for a free and open Indo-Pacific based on shared values and complementary strategies for the region; notes that Japan has traditionally accumulated expertise and knowledge on cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific; calls, therefore, for the EU to step up collaboration with Japan to effectively strengthen maritime security cooperation in the region, especially with ASEAN; strongly welcomes Japan’s participation in international counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, by conducting joint exercises with the EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta; calls for both partners to enhance cooperation in the area of maritime security and to further develop cooperation within the framework of the CSDP in areas such as intelligence, capacity-building and cybersecurity; welcomes the commitment made by the EU and Japan to enhance consultations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to further promote, in the context of the war in Ukraine, the strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; calls for the EU and Japan to further expand consultations in the area of hybrid threats, including dialogues on countering disinformation and interference perpetrated by state and non-state actors; strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Japan with the EU and the US when it comes to responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the issuing of sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; welcomes the rapid launch of cooperation and coordination between the EU and Japan to maintain the stability of global energy markets and expresses its appreciation for the solidarity shown by Japan in providing the EU with affordable supplies of liquefied natural gas; |
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20.

| 21. | Calls for the EU to further strengthen its strategic partnership with India; welcomes therefore the commitments by the EU and India in the area of security and defence, and the recent launch of a dialogue on maritime security; invites both parties to further strengthen their operational cooperation at sea, including joint naval exercises and port calls, as well as actions to protect and promote the sea lines of communication also as part of the recently established EU-India Connectivity Partnership; furthermore, calls for the EU and India to enhance mutual coordination and exchanges in order to reinforce maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific; welcomes the visit of the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to India of 24 and 25 April 2022; underlines that this is a positive step towards strengthening future partnerships and deepening bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; notes that India is a key partner in building a maritime security environment; reiterates that the stabilisation of Central and South Asia should be a primary objective of EU-Indian cooperation; regrets the lack of a clear condemnation by the Indian Government of Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine and calls on the Indian Government to review its position in light of the clearly demonstrated violations of international law by Russia; calls on India, as the world’s largest democracy, not to stand idly by as Ukraine, one of the largest European democracies, is brutally attacked, and calls on the Indian Government to speak out against the killing of innocent civilians and the revisionist and brutal actions pursued by Vladimir Putin; |
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21.

| 22. | Stresses that the relationship between the European Union and Australia has deep historical roots and human ties and is based on common values and principles, such as peace, security and respect for democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law, including international law; welcomes positive developments in EU-Australia security and defence cooperation in the past decade and Australia’s engagement in EU crisis management operations; calls for both partners to further enhance coordination and synergies with a view to promoting security and stability in the Indo-Pacific, including as regards freedom of navigation, and to engage in discussions with a view to identifying areas of shared interest for future cooperation on security and defence-related matters; notes, however, that the mutual trust has been impacted by the lack of consultation and information on the AUKUS agreement; expresses its wish to have good mutual cooperation on defence in the future; strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Australia with the EU and the US when it comes to responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the issuing of sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; |
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22.

| 23. | Expresses concern over China’s recent security agreement with the Solomon Islands, which might have implications for the security of the Indo-Pacific; underlines that the possible presence of the Chinese navy in the Solomon Islands could lead to the obstruction of access to maritime lanes for Australia, both for trade and military purposes; stresses that the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific waters is essential for global and regional peace, ensuring the strategic interests of the EU and of its partners; |
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23.

| 24. | Welcomes the good cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Korea, including in the field of security and defence, and warns that nuclear activities by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) present a serious threat to international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; strongly condemns the DPRK’s intensified provocations since the beginning of 2022, including the firing of three short-range ballistic missiles from the Sunan area of Pyongyang on 12 May, as well as the DPRK’s firing of three ballistic missiles on 25 May following the departure of US President Biden from the Republic of Korea; notes with regret that this is the 17th major weapons test this year; stresses the crucial role played by the Republic of Korea in supporting efforts towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to use their credibility and expertise to effectively contribute to these efforts, including by supporting a peaceful and diplomatic resolution with the DPRK in close coordination with our international partners; strongly condemns the DPRK’s ballistic missile and nuclear tests and other nuclear proliferation-related activities; urges the DPRK to swiftly sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and return to compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, while also bringing into force the Additional Protocol thereto; highlights that cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Korea on cybersecurity has proven to be an effective tool in addressing cyber-attacks originating from the DPRK and other regional countries; calls for both the EU and the Republic of Korea to further step up joint efforts to combat cybercrime and build resilient infrastructure; invites the EU and the Republic of Korea to deepen their cooperation in space policy and technology matters; strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of the Republic of Korea with the EU and the US when it comes to responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the issuing of sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Considers Taiwan to be a key partner and democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific and strongly supports its democratic path; underlines the EU’s close support and friendship with Taiwan and, also in the light of the Russian war against Ukraine, strongly refutes any attempt by Chinese propaganda to draw similarities between the Russian war in Ukraine and the overall security situation of Taiwan as these situations differ significantly, both historically and when analysing the role of Taiwan in the regional and global context; welcomes the positive role that Taiwan plays in fostering peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and specifically in the Taiwan Strait; underlines the need for closer coordination with like-minded partners to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait; reiterates that the relationship between China and Taiwan should be developed constructively through dialogues without coercion or destabilising tactics by either side; stresses its opposition to any unilateral action that may undermine the status quo of the Taiwan Strait and reiterates that any change to cross-strait relations must not be made against the will of Taiwan’s citizens; calls for the EU to enhance the existing partnership with Taiwan so as to promote common values such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance in the Indo-Pacific region, work together on topics such as secure sea lines of communication and open and safe airspace, and engage in joint efforts to tackle climate change; supports closer cooperation between relevant European and Taiwanese agencies, NGOs and think tanks and reiterates its support for the participation of Taiwan as an observer member in international organisations, including in the World Health Organization; strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Taiwan with the EU and the US when it comes to responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the issuing of sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Welcomes the positive role that New Zealand plays in regional peace and security; commends the strong focus of the EU-New Zealand Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, including in addressing weakened economic resilience, which is a key security risk factor; commends New Zealand’s contribution to EU missions such as EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta; welcomes the decision taken recently by the Joint Committee to explore further opportunities for enhancing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, in particular in areas of maritime security and to step up exchanges regarding countering terrorism, violent extremism and online terrorist content, as well as foreign interference and disinformation; looks forward to working together to uphold international law in the region; strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of New Zealand with the EU and the US when it comes to responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and the issuing of sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls for the EU to step up cooperation with Pacific states both through the Pacific Islands Forum and the new agreement between the EU and the OACPS; suggests that the new EU-OACPS Joint Parliamentary Assembly and, in particular, its EU-Pacific Regional Parliamentary Assembly should be involved in the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Underlines the important contribution, and its possible enhancement, of Indo-Pacific partners in the EU’s CSDP missions and operations through framework participation agreements with Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Vietnam, and calls for the conclusion of further framework participation agreements with partner countries; supports Indo-Pacific partners’ efforts to develop their own peace-keeping capacity; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Calls for the EU to invite like-minded Indo-Pacific partners to participate in selected Permanent Structured Cooperation projects, provided that third country participation is exceptional and decided case by case on the basis of an agreed set of political, substantive and legal conditions; stresses that such cooperation could be in the strategic interest of the EU, inter alia when it comes to providing technical expertise or additional capabilities and could improve interoperability and coherence, particularly in the case of strategic partners such as Indo-Pacific democracies; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Welcomes the G7 Foreign Ministers’ communiqué of 14 May 2022 which stresses the importance of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and governed by the values of fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, democratic principles, territorial integrity and the peaceful and inclusive resolution of disputes; strongly supports the commitment made by the G7 countries to work towards this goal by protecting and promoting the rules-based international order, improving regional connectivity and enhancing national resilience; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Freedom of the global commons: the fundamental basis for EU-Indo-Pacific relations

Maritime security dimension

| 31. | Highlights that maritime security and freedom of navigation, which must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular UNCLOS, are among the key challenges in the Indo-Pacific; calls for more EU external action, in particular diplomatic efforts, to enhance the rule of law offshore and to also enhance maritime cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific; calls on all states that have not done so to swiftly ratify UNCLOS; would also welcome the establishment of systematic and coordinated frameworks, including joint exercises, port calls and efforts to fight piracy that would advance naval diplomacy and contribute to regional maritime security; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their own maritime capacities in the region in a coordinated and autonomous way, including by exploring ways to ensure a permanent and credible European naval presence in the Indian Ocean; stresses the need to increase the EU’s capacity as an effective maritime security provider, and stresses the need to discuss and decide on a selection of most relevant and pressing challenges which can realistically be addressed with the help of the EU in close cooperation with partners in the region, including the protection of its ships and crews; highlights the fact that France is the only Member State with a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean; welcomes the fact that the Netherlands and Germany have sent frigates to the region; underlines that more naval missions, including EU-level missions, could be undertaken and will be needed in the future, embedded in a coordinated and comprehensive approach to regional security; welcomes the joint naval exercises that EUNAVFOR Atalanta has thus far undertaken with Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Vietnam, Oman and Djibouti and encourages the enhancement of such joint exercises; underlines that EUNAVFOR Atalanta has an important role to play in naval diplomacy; welcomes its strong contribution to regional security in the Indian Ocean, in particular by successfully protecting vessels of the World Food Programme and by curbing piracy, and commends synergies created with EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia; praises also the cooperation with New Zealand and the US Navy, and the work carried out jointly with NATO Operation Ocean Shield and with Operation AGENOR, the military component of the European-led Maritime Situation Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) initiative; invites coastal Member States to build up their military naval capabilities with a view to enhancing the EU’s presence and visibility in the global maritime sector and calls for the EU to expand the geographical scope of EUNAVFOR Atalanta deeper into the Indian Ocean; calls on the Member States who have already increased their naval presence in the Indo-Pacific to coordinate their approach in EU forums; welcomes in this respect the recent decision taken by the Foreign Affairs Council to launch the implementation of the Coordinated Maritime Presences concept in the North-Western Indian Ocean by establishing a maritime area of interest covering the maritime area from the Strait of Hormuz to the Southern Tropic and from the north of the Red Sea towards the centre of the Indian Ocean, building on the Member States’ individual assets; calls for strong synergies with EUNAVFOR Atalanta; welcomes the rapid launch of EUTM Mozambique; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Recalls that effective maritime security requires a broader vision of maritime stability, taking into account onshore problems of corruption, rule of law, the root causes of illegal fishing, illegal drugs, arms and people trafficking and piracy, and the environmental impact of commercial and industrial maritime activities, including fossil fuel extraction; calls for the EU to address these problems in parallel to more traditional maritime security measures; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Welcomes joint naval activities and calls for the EU and Indo-Pacific partners to further build on existing maritime cooperation frameworks; calls for the EU to evaluate with its partners the need to establish a monitoring system on breaches of international maritime law in the Indo-Pacific region; emphasises the added value for the EU of engaging in regional cooperation forums, such as the EU-ASEAN High-Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation, the Asia-Europe Meeting and the ASEAN Regional Forum; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Calls for the EU to complement its maritime presence with enhanced maritime capacity-building programmes for like-minded partners, including by continuing to implement the CRIMARIO I and II projects as part of the EU Critical Maritime Routes programme and by expanding cooperation on actions to enhance maritime domain awareness and information-sharing; invites the EU to assess the opportunity to extend the geographical scope of CRIMARIO to the South Pacific; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Points to the fact that fisheries management is a relevant aspect of the maritime environment; urges the EU to continue to promote ocean governance in the region and the sustainable management of marine resources, through the implementation of sustainable fisheries partnership agreements and its participation in regional fisheries management; calls for the EU to strengthen its cooperation with like-minded international partners to combat overfishing, overcapacity and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Indo-Pacific and to systematically include fisheries management on the agenda of maritime security dialogues with its Indo-Pacific partners; urges the EU to continue to promote the improvement of living and working conditions for fishers in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with International Labour Organization regulations and conventions; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to security and defence aspects in the next update of its communication on international ocean governance, scheduled for 2022; |
| --- | --- |

36.

Technology, cyberspace, air and space dimension

| 37. | Underlines the importance of information and cybersecurity as part of the critical infrastructure of the global economy, and for protecting democracies from disinformation and malicious attacks; welcomes the EU’s efforts to further enhance cooperation on cybercrime and cyber-resilience capacity-building for partners in the region; invites the EU and Indo-Pacific partners to enhance cooperation in the fight against hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns; highlights the need for the EU to coordinate with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners on collective attribution and on mechanisms aimed at sharing evidence and intelligence that would serve as a basis for issuing cyber sanctions; invites the EU and NATO to align their respective strategies aimed at providing adequate responses to cyber-attacks originating from the region; calls on the Council and the Commission to address the challenge of disinformation in a similar way to disinformation originating from the eastern flank of the EU; proposes the establishment of an independent EU strategic communications hub for the Indo-Pacific region with dedicated staff and resources embedded in an EU delegation in the region; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Welcomes the cooperation launched between the EU and a number of Indo-Pacific partners on cybersecurity and defence; calls for the EU to accelerate the establishment of an EU Cyber Diplomacy Network, aimed at promoting cybersecurity norms and legal frameworks in the region; calls for the EU and like-minded Indo-Pacific countries to promote a rules-based, free, open and secure cyberspace and to strengthen the international regulation of the cyber sphere, inter alia through the Budapest Convention, and to promote initiatives in the framework of the UN; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Urges the EU to develop regional and global partnerships with regional democratic producers of critical technologies with the ambition of working towards a global alliance of tech democracies for the establishment of fair, open and values-driven norms and standards on a rules-based, ethical and human-centric use of technologies that respect the privacy of individual users, in particular regarding artificial intelligence and the governance of the internet; calls for close cooperation and coordination between the EU and Indo-Pacific countries when it comes to responding to and mitigating possible strains on global supply chains as a result of international sanctions against Russian companies and economic sectors; calls for strengthened cooperation with democratic Indo-Pacific partners in developing global norms on the military use of artificial intelligence and a global ban on fully autonomous weapons systems; calls for a coordinated, European-wide strategic approach to the region with a view to securing supplies of critical technology and materials and strengthening democratic partners’ ability to produce them; calls for strict requirements, both political and technical, for purchasing such technologies from non-democratic states in the region, such as China; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Calls for equal and unhindered access to the airspace based on full respect for international law; supports the commitment to open and free movement through initiatives such as the EU-ASEAN Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Underlines the growing importance of the space dimension of international cooperation and security; expresses concerns about the increased development and proliferation of space weapons, increasing the danger of an arms race; underlines the need to enhance regional and global cooperation and dialogue on space affairs, including through the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, as a means to de-escalate tensions and prevent the weaponisation of space; calls for the EU to build on the successful cooperation on space policy and technology with the Republic of Korea and Japan and launch cooperation on space skills and technology with other regional partners; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Non-traditional security challenges

| 42. | Highlights that the fight against violent extremism and propaganda is of shared interest to the EU and Indo-Pacific countries, as well as to the international community; calls for the EU to establish a Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) project, including actions aimed at strengthening resilience to violent extremism, such as a unified platform to counter extremism in the Indo-Pacific region; invites the EU and like-minded Indo-Pacific partners to strengthen cooperation between counter-terrorism intelligence services, including by intensifying academic exchanges; highlights the need to further promote cooperation between Europol and Aseanopol, as well as between Europol and national law enforcement agencies, to facilitate exchanges of good practices and expertise in key areas of interest, such as counter-terrorism, fighting transnational crime, trafficking in humans and illicit weapons and migrant smuggling; recalls that human trafficking remains a challenge across the Indo-Pacific; calls for the EU to support regional partners in implementing the UN Trafficking Protocol and regional initiatives such as the ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Calls for closer engagement with the Indo-Pacific countries in addressing security challenges emanating from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, including terrorism and trafficking in drugs and humans, while also tackling the humanitarian crisis and threats to human security; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Highlights that the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and the rapid build-up and deployment of new technologically advanced nuclear capabilities and missile technology in the Indo-Pacific region remain major regional and global security concerns; expresses deep concern about the ongoing erosion of disarmament and arms-control architecture; urges the EU and like-minded partner countries to enhance cooperation on nuclear safety and non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and support the implementation and universalisation of the Arms Trade Treaty in the Indo-Pacific region; calls for the EU to coordinate with like-minded partners to engage in intensive diplomacy with China, taking into account the ongoing modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, including hypersonic nuclear-capable missiles, in order to reach a universal new arms control regime, and an effective disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, in particular as regards a possible successor to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, which expires in 2026, in order to protect the EU and international security interests; calls for existing international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and instruments to be maintained and upheld; calls on the states outside of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty framework in possession of nuclear weapons to refrain from the proliferation of any military-related nuclear technology and to become party to the Treaty; praises the EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence initiative, funded under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and calls on the European External Action Service to continue strengthening the training and capacity-building of our Indo-Pacific partners; supports the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, as a region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the aim of advancing nuclear disarmament; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Recalls that the Indo-Pacific region is highly exposed to climate change, which entails serious security risks; encourages the EU’s partners in the Indo-Pacific to intensify their actions to tackle climate change in accordance with the goals set in the Paris agreement and encourages the EU to support these partners in achieving lower emissions and implementing climate change mitigation measures, and to increase their capacities in assessing, anticipating and managing climate-security risks; calls for the EU to put climate-related security risks high on the agenda of EU-Indo-Pacific strategy cooperation and to fully implement the EU Defence and Climate Roadmap in its engagement in the region; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Welcomes the EU’s plan to reinforce its engagement with the Indo-Pacific region on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities; calls for the EU and its Indo-Pacific partners to make disaster prevention and resilience a priority and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030; |
| --- | --- |

46.

o

o o

| 47. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. |
| --- | --- |

47.

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(1)  OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 40.

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0052.

(3)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0504.

(4)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 170.

(5)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 240.

(6)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 117.

(7)  OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 172.

(8)  OJ C 346, 27.9.2018, p. 44.

(9)  OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 109.

(10)  OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 341.

(11)  OJ C 132, 24.3.2022, p. 102.

(12)  OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 74.

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