II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2736 

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, 

and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 24, 2018 

Mr. GARDNER (for himself, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. CARDIN, and Mr. 

YOUNG) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 

multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the 

Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018’’. 

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

7 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 


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Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. 

TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Sec. 103. United States-China relationship. 

Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership. 

Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership. 

Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership. 

Sec. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue. 

Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan. 

Sec. 110. North Korea strategy. 

Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands. 

Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law. 

Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation. 

Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region. 

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress. 

Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic 

summits. 

Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership. 

Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation. 

Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection. 

Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives. 

Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative. 

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDOPACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 301. Findings. 

Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons. 

Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement. 

Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance. 

Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations. 

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The Indo-Pacific region— 

(A) represents nearly 1 4 ⁄2 of the global pop5 ulation; 


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1 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic 

2 economies in the world; and 

3 (C) poses security challenges that threaten 

4 to undermine United States national security 

5 interests, regional peace, and global stability. 

6 (2) The core tenants of the United States7 backed international system are being challenged 

8 with increasingly coercive behavior, including— 

9 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili10 tarization of artificial features in the South 

11 China Sea; 

12 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu13 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and 

14 (C) the increased presence throughout 

15 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to 

16 in this Act as ‘‘ISIS’’) and other international 

17 terrorist organizations that threaten the United 

18 States. 

19 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re20 gion continues to transform, presenting both oppor21 tunities and challenges to United States economic 

22 interests. 

23 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter24 est in defending human rights and promoting the 

25 rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although 


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1 many countries in that region have improved the 

2 treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific 

3 countries continue to be human rights abusers and 

4 there are serious concerns with political rights and 

5 civil liberties throughout the Indo-Pacific region. 

6 (5) Without strong leadership from the United 

7 States, the international system, fundamentally root8 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment 

9 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is 

10 imperative that the United States continue to play 

11 a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by— 

12 (A) defending peace and security; 

13 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and 

14 (C) promoting respect for fundamental 

15 human rights. 

16 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, 

17 the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy 

18 of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

19 held a series of hearings on United States leadership 

20 in the Indo-Pacific region, in which— 

21 (A) experts, including Representative 

22 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, 

23 Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador 

24 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. 

25 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the secuVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:35 May 01, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2736.IS S2736

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1 rity challenges, economic opportunities, and im2 peratives of promoting rule of law, human 

3 rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific re4 gion; and 

5 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dil6 lon Professor of Government at the John F. 

7 Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 

8 University, testified, ‘‘As realistic students of 

9 history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role 

10 the U.S. has played since World War II as the 

11 architect and underwriter of regional stability 

12 and security has been essential to the rise of 

13 Asia, including China itself. But they believe 

14 that as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia 

15 recedes, America must leave with it. Much as 

16 Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded 

17 at the beginning of the twentieth century, so 

18 must America’s role in Asia as the region’s his19 toric superpower resumes its place.’’. 

20 (7) The United States National Security Strat21 egy (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘National Secu22 rity Strategy’’), which was released in December 

23 2017, states— 

24 (A) ‘‘A geopolitical competition between 

25 free and repressive visions of world order is takVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:35 May 01, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2736.IS S2736

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1 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, 

2 which stretches from the west coast of India to 

3 the western shores of the United States, rep4 resents the most populous and economically dy5 namic part of the world. The U.S. interest in 

6 a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to 

7 the earliest days of our republic.’’; and 

8 (B) ‘‘Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex9 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit10 ment to established alliances and partnerships, 

11 while expanding and deepening relationships 

12 with new partners that share respect for sov13 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule 

14 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to 

15 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution 

16 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord17 ance with international law. We will work with 

18 allies and partners to achieve complete, verifia19 ble, and irreversible denuclearization on the Ko20 rean Peninsula and preserve the non-prolifera21 tion regime in Northeast Asia.’’. 

22 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN23 GAGEMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 

24 It is the policy of the United States to develop, and 

25 to commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a comVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:35 May 01, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2736.IS S2736

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1 prehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States pol2 icy for the Indo-Pacific region that— 

3 (1) preserves peace through strength by secur4 ing the vital national security interests of the United 

5 States; 

6 (2) promotes American prosperity by advancing 

7 the economic interests of the United States; 

8 (3) advances American influence by reflecting 

9 the values of the American people and universal 

10 human rights; and 

11 (4) accords with and supports the rule of law 

12 and international norms. 

13 TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED 

14 STATES SECURITY INTERESTS 

15 IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

16 SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appro18 priated for the Department of State, the United States 

19 Agency for International Development, and, as appro20 priate, the Department of Defense $1,500,000,000 for 

21 each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall 

22 be used— 

23 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in24 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in 

25 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and 


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1 programs in the furtherance of United States strat2 egy; 

3 (2) to bolster the United States military pres4 ence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the 

5 purpose of deterring and defending against provoca6 tive actions, including by improving the defense in7 frastructure and critical munitions stockpiles of the 

8 United States Armed Forces; 

9 (3) to improve the defense capacity of partner 

10 nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend 

11 against security threats, including through foreign 

12 military financing and international military edu13 cation and training programs; 

14 (4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 

15 exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable 

16 allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, in17 cluding— 

18 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the 

19 People’s Republic of China; and 

20 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear 

21 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo22 cratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

23 (5) to build new counterterrorism partnership 

24 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing 

25 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations 


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1 that pose a significant threat to the United States, 

2 our allies, and our citizens’ interests abroad; and 

3 (6) to increase maritime domain awareness pro4 grams in Southeast Asia— 

5 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and 

6 coast guard training efforts with Southeast 

7 Asian countries; 

8 (B) through intelligence sharing and other 

9 information-sharing efforts; and 

10 (C) through multilateral exercises, includ11 ing by involving Japan, Australia, and India in 

12 such efforts and exercises. 

13 (b) COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDER14 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro15 priated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available 

16 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra17 tegic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in ac18 cordance with the strategy required under section 

19 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper20 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 

21 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and 

22 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con23 gress. 

24 (c) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur25 suant to subsection (a) may be made available for the proVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:35 May 01, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S2736.IS S2736

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1 grams, initiatives, or interactions that may benefit the de2 fense sector of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (his3 torically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 

4 (d) PHILIPPINES.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 

5 to subsection (a) may not be made available for counter6 narcotics assistance (other than maritime programs) for 

7 the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of 

8 State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees 

9 of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has 

10 adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy 

11 that complies with international norms of due process. 

12 (e) CAMBODIA.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to 

13 subsection (a) may not be made available for certain 

14 United States assistance programs that benefit the Gov15 ernment of Cambodia. 

16 (f) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap17 propriate committees of Congress’’ means— 

18 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

19 Senate; 

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

21 Senate; 

22 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

23 House of Representatives; and 

24 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

25 House of Representatives. 


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1 SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE2 GION. 

3 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United 

4 States Government— 

5 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co6 operation and Security between the United States 

7 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, 

8 and subsequent security agreements; 

9 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be10 tween the United States and Japan in promoting 

11 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

12 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

13 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

14 the United States and Japan. 

15 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI16 ANCE.—The United States Government— 

17 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty 

18 Between the United States and the Republic of 

19 Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and 

20 subsequent security agreements; 

21 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be22 tween the United States and South Korea in pro23 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; 

24 and 


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1 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

2 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

3 the United States and the Republic of Korea. 

4 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The 

5 United States Government— 

6 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be7 tween Australia and the United States of America, 

8 done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and sub9 sequent security agreements between these 2 na10 tions; 

11 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be12 tween the United States and Australia in promoting 

13 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

14 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

15 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

16 the United States and Australia. 

17 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The 

18 United States Government is committed to the Mutual 

19 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines 

20 and the United States of America, done at Washington 

21 August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security agree22 ments, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 

23 Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014. 

24 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is 

25 committed to— 


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1 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist2 ance Between the Government of the United States 

3 of America and the Government of Thailand, done 

4 at Bangkok October 17, 1950; 

5 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea6 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and 

7 (3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements, 

8 including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai9 U.S. Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 

10 15, 2012. 

11 SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

13 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac14 tions that seek— 

15 (A) to further constrain space for civil so16 ciety within China; and 

17 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in 

18 the Indo-Pacific region; 

19 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role 

20 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect 

21 for the rule of law and international norms; 

22 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 

23 comprehensive relationship with China— 

24 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and 


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1 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, 

2 including over human rights, economic policies, 

3 and maritime security; and 

4 (4) is committed to working with China on 

5 shared regional and global challenges, especially— 

6 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules7 based international system; and 

8 (B) the denuclearization of the Korean pe9 ninsula. 

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con11 gress that the United States should— 

12 (1) welcome China’s decision to change course 

13 and pursue responsible engagement on global issues; 

14 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role 

15 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and 

16 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un17 dermine the rules-based international system. 

18 SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. 

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

20 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic 

21 partnership between the United States and India in 

22 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re23 gion; 


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1 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

2 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

3 the United States and India; and 

4 (3) is committed to— 

5 (A) the New Framework for the United 

6 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar7 lington, Virginia June 28, 2005; 

8 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech9 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012; 

10 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo11 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on 

12 January 25, 2015; and 

13 (D) all related and subsequent bilateral 

14 and security agreements. 

15 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress 

16 makes the following findings: 

17 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De18 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub19 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 

20 note) requires the recognition of India as a major 

21 defense partner. 

22 (2) The designation of India as a major defense 

23 partner, which is unique to India— 


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1 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 

2 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing 

3 between the United States and India; 

4 (B) elevates defense trade and technology 

5 cooperation between the United States and 

6 India to a level commensurate with the closest 

7 allies and partners of the United States; 

8 (C) facilitates technology sharing between 

9 the United States and India, including license10 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech11 nologies, after taking into account national se12 curity concerns; and 

13 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination 

14 on defense strategy and policy, military ex15 changes, and port calls in support of defense 

16 cooperation between the United States and 

17 India. 

18 SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER19 SHIP. 

20 It is the sense of the Senate that the United States 

21 should— 

22 (1) support and affirm the elevation of the 

23 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Na24 tions (ASEAN) relationship to a strategic partner25 ship; 


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1 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping 

2 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi3 cally integrated, and socially responsible community 

4 of nations that has common rules, norms, proce5 dures, and standards which are consistent with 

6 international law and the principles of a rules-based 

7 Indo-Pacific community; 

8 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos9 ter greater integration among its members; 

10 (4) recognize the value of— 

11 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, 

12 political, and security partners within Asia and 

13 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu14 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor15 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and 

16 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as 

17 the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a 

18 commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Eco19 nomic Community and build upon economic re20 lationships in the Indo-Pacific region; 

21 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising 

22 ASEAN— 

23 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis24 putes in a constructive manner; and 


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1 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip2 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter3 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent 

4 with international law, including through the 

5 adoption of a code of conduct in the South 

6 China Sea to further promote peace and sta7 bility in the Indo-Pacific region; 

8 (6) support efforts by United States partners 

9 and allies in ASEAN— 

10 (A) to enhance maritime capability and 

11 maritime domain awareness; 

12 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and 

13 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa14 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se15 curity and free flow of commerce; 

16 (C) to counter piracy; 

17 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 

18 activities such as the trafficking of persons, 

19 goods, and drugs; and 

20 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of 

21 countries or regional organizations to respond 

22 to emerging threats to maritime security in the 

23 Asia-Pacific region; and 

24 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 

25 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the 


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1 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect 

2 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines 

3 and the People’s Republic of China. 

4 SEC. 106. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI5 LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. 

6 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

7 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co8 operation between the United States, South Korea, and 

9 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and 

10 other defense-related initiatives. 

11 SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE. 

12 It is the sense of Congress that— 

13 (1) the security dialogue between the United 

14 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad15 dressing pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pa16 cific region in order to promote— 

17 (A) a rules-based order; 

18 (B) respect for international law; and 

19 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and 

20 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, 

21 rather than to replace, current mechanisms. 

22 SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH23 EAST ASIA. 

24 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is 

25 committed to— 


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1 (1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partner2 ship, done in Washington November 9, 2010; 

3 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De4 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 

5 2015; and 

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se7 curity agreements between the United States and 

8 Indonesia. 

9 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is 

10 committed to— 

11 (1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partner12 ship, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014; 

13 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the 

14 Comprehensive Partnership between the United 

15 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash16 ington September 13, 2017; and 

17 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se18 curity agreements between the United States and 

19 Malaysia. 

20 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is 

21 committed to— 

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1 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington 

2 July 12, 2005; 

3 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree4 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 

5 2015; and 

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se7 curity agreements between the United States and 

8 Singapore. 

9 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is 

10 committed to— 

11 (1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partner12 ship, done at Washington December 16, 2013; 

13 (2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement 

14 on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 

15 2015; 

16 (3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, 

17 done at Washington May 31, 2017; and 

18 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se19 curity agreements between the United States and 

20 Vietnam. 

21 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that the United States should deepen the diplomatic, 

23 economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas 

24 of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, 

25 Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. 


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1 SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN. 

2 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It 

3 is the policy of the United States to faithfully enforce all 

4 existing United States Government commitments to Tai5 wan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 

6 (Public Law 96–8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by 

7 President Ronald Reagan in July 1982. 

8 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President shall 

9 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan 

10 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future 

11 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including 

12 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate 

13 asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and 

14 air defense capabilities, into its military forces. 

15 (c) TRAVEL.—The President shall authorize the trav16 el of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in ac17 cordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115– 

18 135). 

19 SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY. 

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find21 ings: 

22 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

23 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter24 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear 

25 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United 

26 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 


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1 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 

2 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 

3 and 2397 (2017). 

4 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

5 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights 

6 abuses against its own people and citizens of other 

7 countries, including the United States, the Republic 

8 of Korea, and Japan. 

9 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing 

10 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo11 ple’s Republic of Korea through a policy of max12 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert 

13 with its partners. 

14 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

15 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE16 PUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

17 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

18 the United States to continue to impose sanctions 

19 with respect to activities of the Government of the 

20 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons act21 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other 

22 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687 

23 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing addi24 tional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Exec25 utive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 


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1 blocking the property of certain persons engaging in 

2 significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Exec3 utive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 

4 blocking the property of the Government of North 

5 Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohib6 iting certain transactions with respect to North 

7 Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 

8 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions 

9 with respect to North Korea), as such Executive or10 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the 

11 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People’s 

12 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit 

13 activities described in such Executive orders, includ14 ing actions in violation of United Nations Security 

15 Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 

16 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 

17 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017). 

18 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter19 minating any sanction with respect to the activities 

20 of the Government of the Democratic People’s Re21 public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of 

22 such government, or any other person provided for 

23 in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the 

24 Secretary of State shall submit a report to the ap25 propriate congressional committees regarding the 


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1 cessation of any illicit activity that violates United 

2 Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 

3 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 

4 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) 

5 by such Government or person. 

6 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

7 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority 

8 of the President pursuant to the International 

9 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

10 et seq.). 

11 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

12 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE13 PUBLIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE

14 PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the 

15 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and 

16 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Re17 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 

18 dismantlement of such programs. 

19 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE

20 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE

21 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

24 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee 

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1 priate congressional committees that describes ac2 tions taken by the United States to address the 

3 threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Demo4 cratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

5 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under 

6 paragraph (1) shall include— 

7 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the 

8 United States to identify strategies and policies, 

9 including an assessment of the strengths and 

10 weaknesses of such strategies and policies— 

11 (i) to achieve peaceful denucleariza12 tion of the Korean Peninsula; and 

13 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by 

14 the ballistic missile program of the Demo15 cratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

16 (B) an assessment of— 

17 (i) potential road maps toward peace18 ful denuclearization of the Korean Penin19 sula and the elimination of the nuclear and 

20 ballistic missile threats posed by the 

21 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

22 and 

23 (ii) specific actions that the Demo24 cratic People’s Republic of Korea would 


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1 need to take for each such roadmap to be2 come viable; 

3 (C) a summary of the United States strat4 egy to increase international coordination and 

5 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or 

6 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement 

7 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by 

8 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 

9 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which 

10 shall include— 

11 (i) a description of the actions taken 

12 by the Secretary of State, or designees of 

13 the Secretary, to consult with governments 

14 around the world, with the purpose of in15 ducing such governments to diplomatically 

16 and economically isolate the Democratic 

17 People’s Republic of Korea; 

18 (ii) a description of the actions taken 

19 by such governments to implement meas20 ures to diplomatically and economically iso21 late the Democratic People’s Republic of 

22 Korea; 

23 (iii) a list of countries with govern24 ments that the Secretary has determined 

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1 menting measures to diplomatically and 

2 economically isolate the Democratic Peo3 ple’s Republic of Korea; and 

4 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and 

5 increase cooperation with respect to the 

6 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 

7 with the governments of the countries on 

8 the list described in clause (iii); and 

9 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the 

10 national export control regimes of countries 

11 that are members of the United Nations, and 

12 multilateral export control regimes, that are 

13 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re14 spect to the Democratic People’s Republic of 

15 Korea pursuant to United Nations Security 

16 Council resolutions; and 

17 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 

18 countries in adopting and using authorities nec19 essary to enforce export controls required by 

20 United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

21 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required 

22 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi23 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

24 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that— 


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1 (1) representatives of the United States shall 

2 use the voice and vote of the United States in all 

3 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo4 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s 

5 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until 

6 such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of 

7 Korea meets its commitments under United Nations 

8 Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 

9 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 

10 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 

11 (2017); 

12 (2) the Secretary of State may take such ac13 tions as are necessary to induce countries to take 

14 measures to diplomatically and economically isolate 

15 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, includ16 ing— 

17 (A) reducing the diplomatic presence in the 

18 United States of countries with governments 

19 that the Secretary has determined are non20 cooperative with respect to implementing meas21 ures to diplomatically and economically isolate 

22 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and 

23 (B) reducing the diplomatic presence of 

24 the United States in such countries; and 


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1 (3) the Secretary of State may terminate or re2 duce United States foreign assistance to countries 

3 enabling the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

4 SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that— 

6 (1) the United States supports strengthening 

7 diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship 

8 with New Zealand; 

9 (2) the United States supports strong United 

10 States engagement with the nations of the South 

11 Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Is12 lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 

13 Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Is14 lands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; 

15 (3) the United States recognizes the strong his16 torical, strategic and cultural ties to these countries; 

17 (4) the United States should deepen its co18 operation with New Zealand and the nations of the 

19 South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ20 ing— 

21 (A) fisheries and marine resource con22 servation; 

23 (B) environmental challenges and resil24 ience; 

25 (C) global health; 


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1 (D) development and trade; and 

2 (E) people-to-people ties; and 

3 (5) the United States should provide robust for4 eign assistance to the Pacific islands. 

5 SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; 

6 PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

7 (a) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.—It is the policy of 

8 the United States— 

9 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of 

10 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation 

11 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, 

12 in accordance with applicable international law; and 

13 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations 

14 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South 

15 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter16 national law. 

17 (b) JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.— 

18 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de19 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with 

20 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari21 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the 

22 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the 

23 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international 

24 system benefitting all countries. 


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1 SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 

2 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

3 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In4 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the 

5 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate officials, shall 

6 submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress 

7 that contains an assessment of the current and future ca8 pabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, 

9 and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that 

10 pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, 

11 and its citizens interests abroad. 

12 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub13 section (a) shall include— 

14 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al15 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af16 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia; 

17 (2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al18 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af19 filiated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia 

20 from fighting in the Middle East; 

21 (3) the current resources available to combat 

22 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other 

23 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South24 east Asia, and the additional resources required to 

25 combat such threat; 


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1 (4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of 

2 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex3 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively 

4 in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and 

5 Malaysia; 

6 (5) a description of the capabilities and re7 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter 

8 violent extremist groups; and 

9 (6) a list of additional United States resources 

10 and capabilities that the Department of Defense rec11 ommends providing to governments in Southeast 

12 Asia to combat violent extremist groups. 

13 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

14 (1) the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con15 gress’’ means— 

16 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of 

17 the Senate; 

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

19 the Senate; 

20 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of 

21 the House of Representatives; and 

22 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

23 the House of Representatives; and 

24 (2) the term ‘‘ISIS’’ means the Islamic State of 

25 Iraq and Syria. 


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1 SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION. 

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con3 gress that there should be robust cybersecurity coopera4 tion between the United States and nations in the Indo5 Pacific region— 

6 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity 

7 threats, including state-sponsored threats; 

8 (2) to share best practices to combat such 

9 threats; and 

10 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma11 tion and propaganda. 

12 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

13 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 

14 necessary— 

15 (1) to build capacity for responding to cyberse16 curity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; 

17 and 

18 (2) to enhance cooperation between the United 

19 States and nations in such region for combating 

20 such threats. 

21 SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CON22 TROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

24 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weap25 ons, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat 

26 to international peace and security; 


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1 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal2 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il3 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North 

4 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies; 

5 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia— 

6 (A) to expand and modernize their respec7 tive nuclear arsenals; and 

8 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 

9 technologies; and 

10 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many 

11 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en12 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications. 

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con14 gress that the United States Government should under15 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec16 tive arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in 

17 the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of po18 tentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nu19 clear weapons. 


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1 TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED 

2 STATES ECONOMIC INTER3 ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

4 REGION 

5 SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find7 ings: 

8 (1) According to the United States Chamber of 

9 Commerce, by 2030— 

10 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 

11 population will be in Asia; and 

12 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump13 tion will be in Asia. 

14 (2) According to the Asian Development 

15 Bank— 

16 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat17 eral or regional trade agreements; and 

18 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian 

19 countries are under negotiation or concluded 

20 and awaiting entry into force. 

21 (3) The United States has signed free trade 

22 agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific re23 gion, namely Australia, Singapore, and the Republic 

24 of Korea. 


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1 (4) The member states of the Association of 

2 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section 

3 as ‘‘ASEAN’’), as a group— 

4 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in 

5 the world; and 

6 (B) have a combined gross domestic prod7 uct of $2,400,000,000,000. 

8 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member 

9 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, 

10 and the total value of bilateral trade between the 

11 United States and ASEAN member states has in12 creased by 78 percent since 2004. 

13 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by 

14 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers 

15 in the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the 

16 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro17 vided to consumers in ASEAN member states was 

18 $8,000,000,000. 

19 (7) According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Coun20 cil, Inc., goods and services exported from the 

21 United States to ASEAN member states support 

22 550,000 jobs in the United States. 

23 (8) According to the Business Roundtable— 

24 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, 

25 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 


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1 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re2 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global 

3 gross domestic product in 2017; and 

4 (B) United States bilateral trade with the 

5 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) 

6 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States. 

7 (9) According to the United States National Se8 curity Strategy— 

9 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic 

10 Cooperation (APEC) ‘‘remain centerpieces of 

11 the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and 

12 platforms for promoting an order based on free13 dom’’; and 

14 (B) the United States will ‘‘work with 

15 partners to build a network of states dedicated 

16 to free markets and protected from forces that 

17 would subvert their sovereignty.’’. 

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con19 gress that trade between the United States and the na20 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the 

21 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs 

22 in the United States. 

23 SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE24 MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS. 

25 Congress supports— 


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1 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade 

2 agreements that increase United States employment 

3 and expand the economy; 

4 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con5 crete outcomes; 

6 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties 

7 between the United States and nations in the Indo8 Pacific region; 

9 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree10 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that 

11 include several major Asian economies; and 

12 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing 

13 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera14 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group 

15 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in 

16 the Indo-Pacific region. 

17 SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER18 SHIP. 

19 The President, acting through the United States 

20 Trade Representative, is authorized to negotiate a com21 prehensive economic engagement framework with the As22 sociation of Southeast Asian Nations. 


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1 SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI2 TATION. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

4 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build5 ing and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific re6 gion. 

7 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

8 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may 

9 be necessary to carry out subsection (a). 

10 SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

12 impose penalties on all entities found to be complicit in 

13 the theft of United States intellectual property, in accord14 ance with applicable law, including commercial cyber-en15 abled theft. 

16 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

17 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there18 after, the President shall submit a report to Congress 

19 that— 

20 (1) describes the efforts of the United States 

21 Government to combat intellectual property and 

22 commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific 

23 region, particularly the People’s Republic of China; 

24 and 


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1 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of 

2 priority areas for United States engagement and ca3 pacity building assistance. 

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

5 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may 

6 be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities 

7 designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas 

8 described in the annual report required under subsection 

9 (b). 

10 SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES. 

11 (a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.— 

12 (1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after 

13 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

14 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation 

15 with the Secretary of Energy, shall create a United 

16 States Government strategy to increase United 

17 States exports of energy to the nations in the Indo18 Pacific region. 

19 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

20 There are authorized to be appropriated such 

21 amounts as may be necessary to carry out para22 graph (1). 

23 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the 

24 sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the President should establish bilateral and 

2 regional initiatives to increase energy security in the 

3 Indo-Pacific region; 

4 (2) the United States should authorize the sup5 ply of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the 

6 Indo-Pacific region; and 

7 (3) the United States should create a dedicated 

8 program, in partnership with the private sector and 

9 multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank 

10 and the Asian Development Bank, to promote uni11 versal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar (his12 torically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 

13 SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE. 

14 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad15 ministrator of the United States Agency for International 

16 Development, should increase regional engagement in the 

17 areas of environment, health, education, and infrastruc18 ture development with the Lower Mekong countries, in19 cluding— 

20 (1) assisting to develop programs that focus on 

21 forecasting environmental challenges and resilience; 

22 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on 

23 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with 

24 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong 

25 Basin and access to safe drinking water; 


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1 (3) assisting with education enrollment and 

2 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English 

3 training and connectivity in rural communities; and 

4 (4) improving global health in the Lower 

5 Mekong countries, including— 

6 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; 

7 and 

8 (B) helping regional partners to track and 

9 treat malaria and tuberculosis. 

10 TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED 

11 STATES VALUES IN THE INDO12 PACIFIC REGION 

13 SEC. 301. FINDINGS. 

14 Congress finds that— 

15 (1) the promotion of human rights and respect 

16 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in 

17 the United States national security interests; 

18 (2) there are serious concerns with the rule of 

19 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North 

20 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all 

21 been identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’; 

22 (3) there have been recent disturbing human 

23 rights developments in— 


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1 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been 

2 identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’; 

3 and 

4 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi5 fied by Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’; and 

6 (4) according to the National Security Strategy, 

7 the United States— 

8 (A) will ‘‘support, with our words and ac9 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes 

10 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and 

11 the rule of law’’; 

12 (B) ‘‘may use diplomacy, sanctions, and 

13 other tools to isolate states and leaders who 

14 threaten our interests and whose actions run 

15 contrary to our values’’; and 

16 (C) ‘‘will support efforts to advance wom17 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and 

18 girls, and promote women and youth empower19 ment programs.’’. 

20 SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS. 

21 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef22 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery 

23 in the Indo-Pacific region. 


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1 SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE2 TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT. 

3 The Secretary of State should— 

4 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional 

5 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re6 garding human rights and religious freedom viola7 tions; 

8 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people 

9 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par10 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and 

11 (3) establish educational exchanges and capac12 ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel13 opment. 

14 SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF 

15 UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. 

16 (a) SANCTIONS.—The President is authorized to im17 pose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, includ18 ing financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual 

19 or entity that— 

20 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; 

21 or 

22 (2) engages in censorship activities. 

23 (b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The 

24 President is authorized, in accordance with applicable law, 

25 to terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States 


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1 economic assistance to any country that has engaged in 

2 serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms. 

3 SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

4 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA5 CIFIC REGION.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 

7 appropriated $150,000,000, for each of the fiscal 

8 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, 

9 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, 

10 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific 

11 region. 

12 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro13 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made 

14 available for United States Government efforts, led 

15 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

16 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, 

17 the rule of law, and human rights in the People’s 

18 Republic of China. 

19 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to 

20 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non21 governmental organizations to support activities pre22 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable 

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1 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in 

2 China, India, and Nepal. 

3 (b) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH

4 KOREA.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 

6 appropriated $10,000,000, for each of the fiscal 

7 years 2019 through 2023, to implement programs to 

8 enhance freedom of information efforts with regard 

9 to North Korea. 

10 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

11 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

12 days thereafter through September 30, 2023, the 

13 Broadcasting Board of Governors shall submit a re14 port to Congress that describes the implementation 

15 of the programs described in paragraph (1). 

Æ 


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