II 

Calendar No. 616 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2736 

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, 

and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 24, 2018 

Mr. GARDNER (for himself, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. 

YOUNG, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. PERDUE, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. COONS, and Mr. 

KAINE) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

OCTOBER 3 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 28), 2018 

Reported by Mr. CORKER, with an amendment 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

A BILL 

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 

multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the 

Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018’’. 


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1 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

2 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 

Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. 

TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Sec. 103. United States-China relationship. 

Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership. 

Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership. 

Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership. 

Sec. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue. 

Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan. 

Sec. 110. North Korea strategy. 

Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands. 

Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law. 

Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation. 

Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region. 

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress. 

Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic 

summits. 

Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership. 

Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation. 

Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection. 

Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives. 

Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative. 

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDOPACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 301. Findings. 

Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons. 

Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement. 

Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States assistance. 

Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations. 

3 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

4 Congress makes the following findings: 

5 (1) The Indo-Pacific region— 


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(A) represents nearly 1 1 ⁄2 of the global pop2 ulation; 

3 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic 

4 economies in the world; and 

5 (C) poses security challenges that threaten 

6 to undermine United States national security 

7 interests, regional peace, and global stability. 

8 (2) The core tenants of the United States9 backed international system are being challenged 

10 with increasingly coercive behavior, including— 

11 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili12 tarization of artificial features in the South 

13 China Sea; 

14 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu15 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and 

16 (C) the increased presence throughout 

17 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to 

18 in this Act as ‘‘ISIS’’) and other international 

19 terrorist organizations that threaten the United 

20 States. 

21 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re22 gion continues to transform, presenting both oppor23 tunities and challenges to United States economic 

24 interests. 


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1 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter2 est in defending human rights and promoting the 

3 rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although 

4 many countries in that region have improved the 

5 treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific 

6 countries continue to be human rights abusers and 

7 there are serious concerns with political rights and 

8 civil liberties throughout the Indo-Pacific region. 

9 (5) Without strong leadership from the United 

10 States, the international system, fundamentally root11 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment 

12 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is 

13 imperative that the United States continue to play 

14 a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by— 

15 (A) defending peace and security; 

16 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and 

17 (C) promoting respect for fundamental 

18 human rights. 

19 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, 

20 the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy 

21 of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

22 held a series of hearings on United States leadership 

23 in the Indo-Pacific region, in which— 

24 (A) experts, including Representative 

25 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, 


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1 Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador 

2 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. 

3 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the secu4 rity challenges, economic opportunities, and im5 peratives of promoting rule of law, human 

6 rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific re7 gion; and 

8 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dil9 lon Professor of Government at the John F. 

10 Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 

11 University, testified, ‘‘As realistic students of 

12 history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role 

13 the U.S. has played since World War II as the 

14 architect and underwriter of regional stability 

15 and security has been essential to the rise of 

16 Asia, including China itself. But they believe 

17 that as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia 

18 recedes, America must leave with it. Much as 

19 Britain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded 

20 at the beginning of the twentieth century, so 

21 must America’s role in Asia as the region’s his22 toric superpower resumes its place.’’. 

23 (7) The United States National Security Strat24 egy (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘National SecuVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:47 Oct 04, 2018 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S2736.RS S2736

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1 rity Strategy’’), which was released in December 

2 2017, states— 

3 (A) ‘‘A geopolitical competition between 

4 free and repressive visions of world order is tak5 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, 

6 which stretches from the west coast of India to 

7 the western shores of the United States, rep8 resents the most populous and economically dy9 namic part of the world. The U.S. interest in 

10 a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to 

11 the earliest days of our republic.’’; and 

12 (B) ‘‘Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex13 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit14 ment to established alliances and partnerships, 

15 while expanding and deepening relationships 

16 with new partners that share respect for sov17 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule 

18 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to 

19 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution 

20 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord21 ance with international law. We will work with 

22 allies and partners to achieve complete, 

23 verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on 

24 the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-pro25 liferation regime in Northeast Asia.’’. 


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1 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN2 GAGEMENT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 

3 It is the policy of the United States to develop, and 

4 to commit to, a long-term strategic vision and a com5 prehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States pol6 icy for the Indo-Pacific region that— 

7 (1) preserves peace through strength by secur8 ing the vital national security interests of the United 

9 States; 

10 (2) promotes American prosperity by advancing 

11 the economic interests of the United States; 

12 (3) advances American influence by reflecting 

13 the values of the American people and universal 

14 human rights; and 

15 (4) accords with and supports the rule of law 

16 and international norms. 

17 TITLE I—PROMOTING UNITED 

18 STATES SECURITY INTERESTS 

19 IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

20 SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appro22 priated for the Department of State, the United States 

23 Agency for International Development, and, as appro24 priate, the Department of Defense $1,500,000,000 for 

25 each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which shall 

26 be used— 


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1 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in2 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in 

3 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and 

4 programs in the furtherance of United States strat5 egy; 

6 (2) to bolster the United States military pres7 ence and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the 

8 purpose of deterring and defending against provoca9 tive actions, including by improving the defense in10 frastructure and critical munitions stockpiles of the 

11 United States Armed Forces; 

12 (3) to improve the defense capacity of partner 

13 nations to resist coercion and to deter and defend 

14 against security threats, including through foreign 

15 military financing and international military edu16 cation and training programs; 

17 (4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 

18 exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable 

19 allies and partners, to meet strategic challenges, in20 cluding— 

21 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the 

22 People’s Republic of China; and 

23 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear 

24 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo25 cratic People’s Republic of Korea; 


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1 (5) to build new counterterrorism partnership 

2 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing 

3 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations 

4 that pose a significant threat to the United States, 

5 our allies, and our citizens’ interests abroad; and 

6 (6) to increase maritime domain awareness pro7 grams in Southeast Asia— 

8 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and 

9 coast guard training efforts with Southeast 

10 Asian countries; 

11 (B) through intelligence sharing and other 

12 information-sharing efforts; and 

13 (C) through multilateral exercises, includ14 ing by involving Japan, Australia, and India in 

15 such efforts and exercises. 

16 (b) COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDER17 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro18 priated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made available 

19 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra20 tegic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in ac21 cordance with the strategy required under section 

22 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper23 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 

24 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and 


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1 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con2 gress. 

3 (c) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur4 suant to subsection (a) may be made available for the pro5 grams, initiatives, or interactions that may benefit the de6 fense sector of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (his7 torically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 

8 (d) PHILIPPINES.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 

9 to subsection (a) may not be made available for counter10 narcotics assistance (other than maritime programs) for 

11 the Philippine National Police unless the Secretary of 

12 State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees 

13 of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has 

14 adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics strategy 

15 that complies with international norms of due process. 

16 (e) CAMBODIA.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to 

17 subsection (a) may not be made available for certain 

18 United States assistance programs that benefit the Gov19 ernment of Cambodia. 

20 (f) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap21 propriate committees of Congress’’ means— 

22 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

23 Senate; 

24 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

25 Senate; 


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1 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

2 House of Representatives; and 

3 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

4 House of Representatives. 

5 SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE6 GION. 

7 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United 

8 States Government— 

9 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co10 operation and Security between the United States 

11 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, 

12 and subsequent security agreements; 

13 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be14 tween the United States and Japan in promoting 

15 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

16 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

17 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

18 the United States and Japan. 

19 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI20 ANCE.—The United States Government— 

21 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty 

22 Between the United States and the Republic of 

23 Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and 

24 subsequent security agreements; 


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1 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be2 tween the United States and South Korea in pro3 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; 

4 and 

5 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

6 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

7 the United States and the Republic of Korea. 

8 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The 

9 United States Government— 

10 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be11 tween Australia and the United States of America, 

12 done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and sub13 sequent security agreements between these 2 na14 tions; 

15 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be16 tween the United States and Australia in promoting 

17 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

18 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

19 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

20 the United States and Australia. 

21 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The 

22 United States Government is committed to the Mutual 

23 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines 

24 and the United States of America, done at Washington 

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1 ments, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation 

2 Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 2014. 

3 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is 

4 committed to— 

5 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist6 ance Between the Government of the United States 

7 of America and the Government of Thailand, done 

8 at Bangkok October 17, 1950; 

9 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea10 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and 

11 (3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements, 

12 including the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai13 U.S. Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 

14 15, 2012. 

15 SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. 

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

17 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac18 tions that seek— 

19 (A) to further constrain space for civil so20 ciety within China; and 

21 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in 

22 the Indo-Pacific region; 

23 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role 

24 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect 

25 for the rule of law and international norms; 


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1 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 

2 comprehensive relationship with China— 

3 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and 

4 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, 

5 including over human rights, economic policies, 

6 and maritime security; and 

7 (4) is committed to working with China on 

8 shared regional and global challenges, especially— 

9 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules10 based international system; and 

11 (B) the denuclearization of the Korean pe12 ninsula. 

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con14 gress that the United States should— 

15 (1) welcome China’s decision to change course 

16 and pursue responsible engagement on global issues; 

17 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role 

18 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and 

19 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un20 dermine the rules-based international system. 

21 SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

23 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic 

24 partnership between the United States and India in 


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1 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re2 gion; 

3 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

4 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

5 the United States and India; and 

6 (3) is committed to— 

7 (A) the New Framework for the United 

8 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar9 lington, Virginia June 28, 2005; 

10 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech11 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012; 

12 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo13 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on 

14 January 25, 2015; and 

15 (D) all related and subsequent bilateral 

16 and security agreements. 

17 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress 

18 makes the following findings: 

19 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De20 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub21 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 

22 note) requires the recognition of India as a major 

23 defense partner. 

24 (2) The designation of India as a major defense 

25 partner, which is unique to India— 


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1 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 

2 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing 

3 between the United States and India; 

4 (B) elevates defense trade and technology 

5 cooperation between the United States and 

6 India to a level commensurate with the closest 

7 allies and partners of the United States; 

8 (C) facilitates technology sharing between 

9 the United States and India, including license10 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech11 nologies, after taking into account national se12 curity concerns; and 

13 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination 

14 on defense strategy and policy, military ex15 changes, and port calls in support of defense 

16 cooperation between the United States and 

17 India. 

18 SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER19 SHIP. 

20 It is the sense of the Senate that the United States 

21 should— 

22 (1) support and affirm the elevation of the 

23 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Na24 tions (ASEAN) relationship to a strategic partner25 ship; 


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1 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping 

2 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi3 cally integrated, and socially responsible community 

4 of nations that has common rules, norms, proce5 dures, and standards which are consistent with 

6 international law and the principles of a rules-based 

7 Indo-Pacific community; 

8 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos9 ter greater integration among its members; 

10 (4) recognize the value of— 

11 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, 

12 political, and security partners within Asia and 

13 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu14 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor15 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and 

16 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as 

17 the U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a 

18 commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Eco19 nomic Community and build upon economic re20 lationships in the Indo-Pacific region; 

21 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising 

22 ASEAN— 

23 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis24 putes in a constructive manner; and 


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1 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip2 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter3 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent 

4 with international law, including through the 

5 adoption of a code of conduct in the South 

6 China Sea to further promote peace and sta7 bility in the Indo-Pacific region; 

8 (6) support efforts by United States partners 

9 and allies in ASEAN— 

10 (A) to enhance maritime capability and 

11 maritime domain awareness; 

12 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and 

13 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa14 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se15 curity and free flow of commerce; 

16 (C) to counter piracy; 

17 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 

18 activities such as the trafficking of persons, 

19 goods, and drugs; and 

20 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of 

21 countries or regional organizations to respond 

22 to emerging threats to maritime security in the 

23 Asia-Pacific region; and 

24 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 

25 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the 


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1 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect 

2 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines 

3 and the People’s Republic of China. 

4 SEC. 106. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI5 LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. 

6 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

7 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co8 operation between the United States, South Korea, and 

9 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and 

10 other defense-related initiatives. 

11 SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE. 

12 It is the sense of Congress that— 

13 (1) the security dialogue between the United 

14 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad15 dressing pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pa16 cific region in order to promote— 

17 (A) a rules-based order; 

18 (B) respect for international law; and 

19 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and 

20 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, 

21 rather than to replace, current mechanisms. 

22 SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH23 EAST ASIA. 

24 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is 

25 committed to— 


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1 (1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partner2 ship, done in Washington November 9, 2010; 

3 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De4 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 

5 2015; and 

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se7 curity agreements between the United States and 

8 Indonesia. 

9 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is 

10 committed to— 

11 (1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partner12 ship, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014; 

13 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the 

14 Comprehensive Partnership between the United 

15 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash16 ington September 13, 2017; and 

17 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se18 curity agreements between the United States and 

19 Malaysia. 

20 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is 

21 committed to— 

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1 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington 

2 July 12, 2005; 

3 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree4 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 

5 2015; and 

6 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se7 curity agreements between the United States and 

8 Singapore. 

9 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is 

10 committed to— 

11 (1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partner12 ship, done at Washington December 16, 2013; 

13 (2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement 

14 on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 

15 2015; 

16 (3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, 

17 done at Washington May 31, 2017; and 

18 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se19 curity agreements between the United States and 

20 Vietnam. 

21 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that the United States should deepen the diplomatic, 

23 economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas 

24 of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, 

25 Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. 


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1 SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN. 

2 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It 

3 is the policy of the United States to faithfully enforce all 

4 existing United States Government commitments to Tai5 wan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 

6 (Public Law 96–8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by 

7 President Ronald Reagan in July 1982. 

8 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President shall 

9 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan 

10 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future 

11 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including 

12 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate 

13 asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and 

14 air defense capabilities, into its military forces. 

15 (c) TRAVEL.—The President shall authorize the trav16 el of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in ac17 cordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115– 

18 135). 

19 SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY. 

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find21 ings: 

22 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

23 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter24 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear 

25 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United 

26 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 


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1 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 

2 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 

3 and 2397 (2017). 

4 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

5 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights 

6 abuses against its own people and citizens of other 

7 countries, including the United States, the Republic 

8 of Korea, and Japan. 

9 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing 

10 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo11 ple’s Republic of Korea through a policy of max12 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert 

13 with its partners. 

14 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

15 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE16 PUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

17 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

18 the United States to continue to impose sanctions 

19 with respect to activities of the Government of the 

20 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons act21 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other 

22 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13687 

23 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing addi24 tional sanctions with respect to North Korea), Exec25 utive Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 


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1 blocking the property of certain persons engaging in 

2 significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Exec3 utive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 

4 blocking the property of the Government of North 

5 Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohib6 iting certain transactions with respect to North 

7 Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 

8 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions 

9 with respect to North Korea), as such Executive or10 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the 

11 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People’s 

12 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit 

13 activities described in such Executive orders, includ14 ing actions in violation of United Nations Security 

15 Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 

16 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 

17 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017). 

18 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter19 minating any sanction with respect to the activities 

20 of the Government of the Democratic People’s Re21 public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of 

22 such government, or any other person provided for 

23 in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the 

24 Secretary of State shall submit a report to the ap25 propriate congressional committees regarding the 


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1 cessation of any illicit activity that violates United 

2 Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), 

3 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 

4 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) 

5 by such Government or person. 

6 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

7 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority 

8 of the President pursuant to the International 

9 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

10 et seq.). 

11 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

12 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE13 PUBLIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE

14 PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the 

15 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and 

16 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Re17 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 

18 dismantlement of such programs. 

19 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE

20 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE

21 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

24 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee 

25 of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the approVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:47 Oct 04, 2018 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\S2736.RS S2736

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1 priate congressional committees that describes ac2 tions taken by the United States to address the 

3 threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Demo4 cratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

5 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under 

6 paragraph (1) shall include— 

7 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the 

8 United States to identify strategies and policies, 

9 including an assessment of the strengths and 

10 weaknesses of such strategies and policies— 

11 (i) to achieve peaceful denucleariza12 tion of the Korean Peninsula; and 

13 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by 

14 the ballistic missile program of the Demo15 cratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

16 (B) an assessment of— 

17 (i) potential road maps toward peace18 ful denuclearization of the Korean Penin19 sula and the elimination of the nuclear and 

20 ballistic missile threats posed by the 

21 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

22 and 

23 (ii) specific actions that the Demo24 cratic People’s Republic of Korea would 


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1 need to take for each such roadmap to be2 come viable; 

3 (C) a summary of the United States strat4 egy to increase international coordination and 

5 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or 

6 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement 

7 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by 

8 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 

9 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which 

10 shall include— 

11 (i) a description of the actions taken 

12 by the Secretary of State, or designees of 

13 the Secretary, to consult with governments 

14 around the world, with the purpose of in15 ducing such governments to diplomatically 

16 and economically isolate the Democratic 

17 People’s Republic of Korea; 

18 (ii) a description of the actions taken 

19 by such governments to implement meas20 ures to diplomatically and economically iso21 late the Democratic People’s Republic of 

22 Korea; 

23 (iii) a list of countries with govern24 ments that the Secretary has determined 

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1 menting measures to diplomatically and 

2 economically isolate the Democratic Peo3 ple’s Republic of Korea; and 

4 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and 

5 increase cooperation with respect to the 

6 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 

7 with the governments of the countries on 

8 the list described in clause (iii); and 

9 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the 

10 national export control regimes of countries 

11 that are members of the United Nations, and 

12 multilateral export control regimes, that are 

13 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re14 spect to the Democratic People’s Republic of 

15 Korea pursuant to United Nations Security 

16 Council resolutions; and 

17 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 

18 countries in adopting and using authorities nec19 essary to enforce export controls required by 

20 United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

21 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required 

22 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi23 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

24 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that— 


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1 (1) representatives of the United States shall 

2 use the voice and vote of the United States in all 

3 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo4 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s 

5 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until 

6 such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of 

7 Korea meets its commitments under United Nations 

8 Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 

9 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 

10 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 

11 (2017); 

12 (2) the Secretary of State may take such ac13 tions as are necessary to induce countries to take 

14 measures to diplomatically and economically isolate 

15 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, includ16 ing— 

17 (A) reducing the diplomatic presence in the 

18 United States of countries with governments 

19 that the Secretary has determined are non20 cooperative with respect to implementing meas21 ures to diplomatically and economically isolate 

22 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and 

23 (B) reducing the diplomatic presence of 

24 the United States in such countries; and 


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1 (3) the Secretary of State may terminate or re2 duce United States foreign assistance to countries 

3 enabling the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

4 SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that— 

6 (1) the United States supports strengthening 

7 diplomatic, economic, and the security relationship 

8 with New Zealand; 

9 (2) the United States supports strong United 

10 States engagement with the nations of the South 

11 Pacific, including Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Is12 lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 

13 Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Is14 lands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; 

15 (3) the United States recognizes the strong his16 torical, strategic and cultural ties to these countries; 

17 (4) the United States should deepen its co18 operation with New Zealand and the nations of the 

19 South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ20 ing— 

21 (A) fisheries and marine resource con22 servation; 

23 (B) environmental challenges and resil24 ience; 

25 (C) global health; 


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1 (D) development and trade; and 

2 (E) people-to-people ties; and 

3 (5) the United States should provide robust for4 eign assistance to the Pacific islands. 

5 SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; 

6 PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

7 (a) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.—It is the policy of 

8 the United States— 

9 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of 

10 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation 

11 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, 

12 in accordance with applicable international law; and 

13 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations 

14 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South 

15 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter16 national law. 

17 (b) JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.— 

18 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de19 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with 

20 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari21 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the 

22 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the 

23 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international 

24 system benefitting all countries. 


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1 SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 

2 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

3 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In4 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the 

5 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate officials, shall 

6 submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress 

7 that contains an assessment of the current and future ca8 pabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, 

9 and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that 

10 pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, 

11 and its citizens interests abroad. 

12 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub13 section (a) shall include— 

14 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al15 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af16 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia; 

17 (2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al18 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af19 filiated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia 

20 from fighting in the Middle East; 

21 (3) the current resources available to combat 

22 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other 

23 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South24 east Asia, and the additional resources required to 

25 combat such threat; 


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1 (4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of 

2 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex3 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively 

4 in countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and 

5 Malaysia; 

6 (5) a description of the capabilities and re7 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter 

8 violent extremist groups; and 

9 (6) a list of additional United States resources 

10 and capabilities that the Department of Defense rec11 ommends providing to governments in Southeast 

12 Asia to combat violent extremist groups. 

13 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

14 (1) the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con15 gress’’ means— 

16 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of 

17 the Senate; 

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

19 the Senate; 

20 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of 

21 the House of Representatives; and 

22 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

23 the House of Representatives; and 

24 (2) the term ‘‘ISIS’’ means the Islamic State of 

25 Iraq and Syria. 


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1 SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION. 

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con3 gress that there should be robust cybersecurity coopera4 tion between the United States and nations in the Indo5 Pacific region— 

6 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity 

7 threats, including state-sponsored threats; 

8 (2) to share best practices to combat such 

9 threats; and 

10 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma11 tion and propaganda. 

12 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

13 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 

14 necessary— 

15 (1) to build capacity for responding to cyberse16 curity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; 

17 and 

18 (2) to enhance cooperation between the United 

19 States and nations in such region for combating 

20 such threats. 

21 SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CON22 TROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

24 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weap25 ons, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat 

26 to international peace and security; 


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1 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal2 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il3 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North 

4 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies; 

5 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia— 

6 (A) to expand and modernize their respec7 tive nuclear arsenals; and 

8 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 

9 technologies; and 

10 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many 

11 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en12 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications. 

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con14 gress that the United States Government should under15 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec16 tive arms control and nuclear nonproliferation policies in 

17 the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of po18 tentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nu19 clear weapons. 


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1 TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED 

2 STATES ECONOMIC INTER3 ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

4 REGION 

5 SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find7 ings: 

8 (1) According to the United States Chamber of 

9 Commerce, by 2030— 

10 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 

11 population will be in Asia; and 

12 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump13 tion will be in Asia. 

14 (2) According to the Asian Development 

15 Bank— 

16 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat17 eral or regional trade agreements; and 

18 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian 

19 countries are under negotiation or concluded 

20 and awaiting entry into force. 

21 (3) The United States has signed free trade 

22 agreements with 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific re23 gion, namely Australia, Singapore, and the Republic 

24 of Korea. 


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1 (4) The member states of the Association of 

2 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section 

3 as ‘‘ASEAN’’), as a group— 

4 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in 

5 the world; and 

6 (B) have a combined gross domestic prod7 uct of $2,400,000,000,000. 

8 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member 

9 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, 

10 and the total value of bilateral trade between the 

11 United States and ASEAN member states has in12 creased by 78 percent since 2004. 

13 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by 

14 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers 

15 in the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the 

16 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro17 vided to consumers in ASEAN member states was 

18 $8,000,000,000. 

19 (7) According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Coun20 cil, Inc., goods and services exported from the 

21 United States to ASEAN member states support 

22 550,000 jobs in the United States. 

23 (8) According to the Business Roundtable— 

24 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, 

25 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 


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1 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re2 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global 

3 gross domestic product in 2017; and 

4 (B) United States bilateral trade with the 

5 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) 

6 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States. 

7 (9) According to the United States National Se8 curity Strategy— 

9 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic 

10 Cooperation (APEC) ‘‘remain centerpieces of 

11 the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture and 

12 platforms for promoting an order based on free13 dom’’; and 

14 (B) the United States will ‘‘work with 

15 partners to build a network of states dedicated 

16 to free markets and protected from forces that 

17 would subvert their sovereignty.’’. 

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con19 gress that trade between the United States and the na20 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the 

21 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs 

22 in the United States. 

23 SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE24 MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS. 

25 Congress supports— 


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1 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade 

2 agreements that increase United States employment 

3 and expand the economy; 

4 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con5 crete outcomes; 

6 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties 

7 between the United States and nations in the Indo8 Pacific region; 

9 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree10 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that 

11 include several major Asian economies; and 

12 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing 

13 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera14 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group 

15 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in 

16 the Indo-Pacific region. 

17 SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER18 SHIP. 

19 The President, acting through the United States 

20 Trade Representative, is authorized to negotiate a com21 prehensive economic engagement framework with the As22 sociation of Southeast Asian Nations. 


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1 SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI2 TATION. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

4 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build5 ing and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific re6 gion. 

7 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

8 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may 

9 be necessary to carry out subsection (a). 

10 SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

12 impose penalties on all entities found to be complicit in 

13 the theft of United States intellectual property, in accord14 ance with applicable law, including commercial cyber-en15 abled theft. 

16 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

17 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there18 after, the President shall submit a report to Congress 

19 that— 

20 (1) describes the efforts of the United States 

21 Government to combat intellectual property and 

22 commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pacific 

23 region, particularly the People’s Republic of China; 

24 and 


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1 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of 

2 priority areas for United States engagement and ca3 pacity building assistance. 

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

5 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may 

6 be necessary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities 

7 designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas 

8 described in the annual report required under subsection 

9 (b). 

10 SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES. 

11 (a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.— 

12 (1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after 

13 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

14 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation 

15 with the Secretary of Energy, shall create a United 

16 States Government strategy to increase United 

17 States exports of energy to the nations in the Indo18 Pacific region. 

19 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

20 There are authorized to be appropriated such 

21 amounts as may be necessary to carry out para22 graph (1). 

23 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the 

24 sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the President should establish bilateral and 

2 regional initiatives to increase energy security in the 

3 Indo-Pacific region; 

4 (2) the United States should authorize the sup5 ply of liquefied natural gas to the nations in the 

6 Indo-Pacific region; and 

7 (3) the United States should create a dedicated 

8 program, in partnership with the private sector and 

9 multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank 

10 and the Asian Development Bank, to promote uni11 versal access to reliable electricity in Myanmar (his12 torically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 

13 SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE. 

14 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad15 ministrator of the United States Agency for International 

16 Development, should increase regional engagement in the 

17 areas of environment, health, education, and infrastruc18 ture development with the Lower Mekong countries, in19 cluding— 

20 (1) assisting to develop programs that focus on 

21 forecasting environmental challenges and resilience; 

22 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on 

23 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with 

24 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong 

25 Basin and access to safe drinking water; 


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1 (3) assisting with education enrollment and 

2 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English 

3 training and connectivity in rural communities; and 

4 (4) improving global health in the Lower 

5 Mekong countries, including— 

6 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; 

7 and 

8 (B) helping regional partners to track and 

9 treat malaria and tuberculosis. 

10 TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED 

11 STATES VALUES IN THE INDO12 PACIFIC REGION 

13 SEC. 301. FINDINGS. 

14 Congress finds that— 

15 (1) the promotion of human rights and respect 

16 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in 

17 the United States national security interests; 

18 (2) there are serious concerns with the rule of 

19 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North 

20 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all 

21 been identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’; 

22 (3) there have been recent disturbing human 

23 rights developments in— 


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1 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been 

2 identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’; 

3 and 

4 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi5 fied by Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’; and 

6 (4) according to the National Security Strategy, 

7 the United States— 

8 (A) will ‘‘support, with our words and ac9 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes 

10 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and 

11 the rule of law’’; 

12 (B) ‘‘may use diplomacy, sanctions, and 

13 other tools to isolate states and leaders who 

14 threaten our interests and whose actions run 

15 contrary to our values’’; and 

16 (C) ‘‘will support efforts to advance wom17 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and 

18 girls, and promote women and youth empower19 ment programs.’’. 

20 SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS. 

21 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef22 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery 

23 in the Indo-Pacific region. 


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1 SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE2 TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT. 

3 The Secretary of State should— 

4 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional 

5 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re6 garding human rights and religious freedom viola7 tions; 

8 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people 

9 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par10 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and 

11 (3) establish educational exchanges and capac12 ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel13 opment. 

14 SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF 

15 UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. 

16 (a) SANCTIONS.—The President is authorized to im17 pose sanctions, in accordance with applicable law, includ18 ing financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual 

19 or entity that— 

20 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; 

21 or 

22 (2) engages in censorship activities. 

23 (b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The 

24 President is authorized, in accordance with applicable law, 

25 to terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter United States 


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1 economic assistance to any country that has engaged in 

2 serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms. 

3 SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

4 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA5 CIFIC REGION.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 

7 appropriated $150,000,000, for each of the fiscal 

8 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, 

9 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, 

10 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific 

11 region. 

12 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro13 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made 

14 available for United States Government efforts, led 

15 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

16 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, 

17 the rule of law, and human rights in the People’s 

18 Republic of China. 

19 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to 

20 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non21 governmental organizations to support activities pre22 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable 

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1 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in 

2 China, India, and Nepal. 

3 (b) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH

4 KOREA.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 

6 appropriated $10,000,000, for each of the fiscal 

7 years 2019 through 2023, to implement programs to 

8 enhance freedom of information efforts with regard 

9 to North Korea. 

10 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

11 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

12 days thereafter through September 30, 2023, the 

13 Broadcasting Board of Governors shall submit a re14 port to Congress that describes the implementation 

15 of the programs described in paragraph (1). 

16 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

17 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

18 ‘‘Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018’’. 

19 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

20 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 

TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 101. Policy. 

Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy. 

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. 


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Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Sec. 203. United States-China relationship. 

Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership. 

Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership. 

Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership. 

Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue. 

Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan. 

Sec. 210. North Korea strategy. 

Sec. 211. New Zealand. 

Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law. 

Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation. 

Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region. 

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress. 

Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic 

summits. 

Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership. 

Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation. 

Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection. 

Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives. 

Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative. 

Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation. 

Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women’s economic rights. 

TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDOPACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 401. Findings. 

Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons. 

Sec. 403. Freedom of the press. 

Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel. 

Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement. 

Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy. 

Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea. 

Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United 

States assistance. 

Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights and environmental defenders. 

Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives. 

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The Indo-Pacific region— 


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1 (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the glob2 al population; 

3 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic 

4 economies in the world; and 

5 (C) poses security challenges that threaten 

6 to undermine United States national security in7 terests, regional peace, and global stability. 

8 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed 

9 international system are being challenged, including 

10 by— 

11 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili12 tarization of artificial features in the South 

13 China Sea and coercive economic practices; 

14 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu15 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and 

16 (C) the increased presence throughout 

17 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to 

18 in this Act as ‘‘ISIS’’) and other international 

19 terrorist organizations that threaten the United 

20 States. 

21 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re22 gion continues to transform, presenting opportunities 

23 and challenges to United States economic interests. 

24 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter25 est in defending human rights and promoting the rule 


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1 of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many 

2 countries in the region have improved the treatment 

3 of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific governments 

4 continue to commit human rights abuses and place 

5 restrictions on basic human rights and political and 

6 civil liberties. 

7 (5) Without strong leadership from the United 

8 States, the international system, fundamentally root9 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment 

10 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is 

11 imperative that the United States continue to play a 

12 leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by— 

13 (A) defending peace and security; 

14 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and 

15 (C) promoting respect for fundamental 

16 human rights. 

17 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the 

18 Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the 

19 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a 

20 series of hearings on United States leadership in the 

21 Indo-Pacific region, in which— 

22 (A) experts, including Representative 

23 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. 

24 Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador 

25 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. 


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1 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security 

2 challenges, economic opportunities, and impera3 tives of promoting the rule of law, human rights, 

4 and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

5 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon 

6 Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy 

7 School of Government at Harvard University, 

8 testified, ‘‘As realistic students of history, Chi9 nese leaders recognize that the role the United 

10 States has played since World War II as the ar11 chitect and underwriter of regional stability and 

12 security has been essential to the rise of Asia, in13 cluding China itself. But they believe that as the 

14 tide that brought the United States to Asia re15 cedes, America must leave with it. Much as Brit16 ain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded at 

17 the beginning of the twentieth century, so must 

18 America’s role in Asia as the region’s historic su19 perpower resumes its place.’’. 

20 (7) The United States National Security Strat21 egy (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘National Security 

22 Strategy’’), which was released in December 2017, 

23 states— 

24 (A) ‘‘A geopolitical competition between free 

25 and repressive visions of world order is taking 


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1 place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, 

2 which stretches from the west coast of India to 

3 the western shores of the United States, rep4 resents the most populous and economically dy5 namic part of the world. The United States in6 terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends 

7 back to the earliest days of our republic.’’; and 

8 (B) ‘‘Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex9 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit10 ment to established alliances and partnerships, 

11 while expanding and deepening relationships 

12 with new partners that share respect for sov13 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule 

14 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to 

15 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of 

16 territorial and maritime disputes in accordance 

17 with international law. We will work with allies 

18 and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and 

19 irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Pe20 ninsula and preserve the non-proliferation re21 gime in Northeast Asia.’’. 


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1 TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL2 ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT3 EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE4 GION 

5 SEC. 101. POLICY. 

6 It is the policy of the United States to develop and 

7 commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen8 sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for 

9 the Indo-Pacific region that— 

10 (1) secures the vital national security interests of 

11 the United States and our allies and partners; 

12 (2) promotes American prosperity and economic 

13 interests by advancing economic growth and develop14 ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu15 nity; 

16 (3) advances American influence by reflecting the 

17 values of the American people and universal human 

18 rights; 

19 (4) supports functional problem-solving regional 

20 architecture; and 

21 (5) accords with and supports the rule of law 

22 and international norms. 

23 SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. 

24 It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States— 

25 (1) to work with United States allies— 


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1 (A) to confront common challenges; 

2 (B) to improve information sharing; 

3 (C) to increase defense investment and 

4 trade; 

5 (D) to ensure interoperability; and 

6 (E) to strengthen shared capabilities; 

7 (2) to strengthen relationships with partners 

8 who— 

9 (A) share mutual respect for the rule of law; 

10 (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; 

11 and 

12 (C) understand the importance of civil soci13 ety, the rule of law, and transparent governance; 

14 (3) to support functional problem-solving re15 gional architecture, including through the Association 

16 of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic 

17 Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit; 

18 (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United 

19 States— 

20 (A) to freedom of navigation under inter21 national law; 

22 (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of mari23 time and territorial disputes; and 

24 (C) to expand security and defense coopera25 tion with allies and partners, as appropriate; 


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1 (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve 

2 complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization 

3 of North Korea; 

4 (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule 

5 of law, and advocate for transparent governance; 

6 (7) to develop and grow the economy through 

7 private sector partnerships between the United States 

8 and Indo-Pacific partners; 

9 (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade 

10 agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and 

11 build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific com12 mitted to free markets; 

13 (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific 

14 countries— 

15 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent 

16 infrastructure projects; 

17 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open 

18 sea lines or air ways, and communication; and 

19 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis20 putes; and 

21 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the 

22 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation23 ships with allies and partners throughout the region. 


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1 TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED 

2 STATES SECURITY INTERESTS 

3 IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

4 SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

5 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘appro6 priate committees of Congress’’ means— 

7 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen8 ate; 

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

10 Senate; 

11 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

12 House of Representatives; and 

13 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

14 House of Representatives. 

15 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

16 authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State, 

17 the United States Agency for International Development, 

18 and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, 

19 $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 

20 2023, which shall be used— 

21 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in22 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in 

23 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and 

24 programs in the furtherance of United States strat25 egy; 


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1 (2) to improve the defense capacity of partner 

2 nations to resist coercion and deter and defend 

3 against security threats, including through foreign 

4 military financing and international military edu5 cation and training programs; 

6 (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 

7 engagements, particularly with the United States’ 

8 most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet stra9 tegic challenges, including— 

10 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the 

11 People’s Republic of China; and 

12 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear 

13 and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic 

14 People’s Republic of Korea; 

15 (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership 

16 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing 

17 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations 

18 that pose a significant threat to the United States, its 

19 allies, and its citizens’ interests abroad; and 

20 (5) to increase maritime domain awareness pro21 grams in South Asia and Southeast Asia— 

22 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and 

23 coast guard training efforts with Southeast 

24 Asian countries; 


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1 (B) by expanding cooperation with demo2 cratic partners in South Asia, including Ban3 gladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; 

4 (C) through intelligence sharing and other 

5 information-sharing efforts; and 

6 (D) through multilateral engagements, in7 cluding by involving Japan, Australia, and 

8 India in such efforts. 

9 (c) COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDERMINE

10 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appropriated 

11 pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available for 

12 United States Government efforts to counter the strategic 

13 influence of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance 

14 with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the 

15 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Pro16 grams Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 

17 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appro18 priate committees of Congress. 

19 (d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur20 suant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter21 national Military Education and Training and Foreign 

22 Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the 

23 Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as 

24 ‘‘Burma’’). 

25 (e) PHILIPPINES.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appro2 priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made 

3 available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil4 ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State 

5 determines and reports to the appropriate committees 

6 of Congress that the Government of the Philippines 

7 has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics 

8 strategy that is consistent with international human 

9 rights standards, including investigating and pros10 ecuting individuals who are credibly alleged to have 

11 ordered, committed, or covered up extrajudicial 

12 killings and other gross violations of human rights in 

13 the conduct of counternarcotics operations. 

14 (2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under para15 graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available— 

16 (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime 

17 programs, or transnational interdiction pro18 grams; or 

19 (B) to support for the development of such 

20 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with 

21 the appropriate committees of Congress. 

22 (f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to be 

23 appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made 

24 available for United States assistance programs that benefit 

25 the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State 


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1 certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional com2 mittees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of 

3 division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 

4 (Public Law 115–141) have been met. 

5 SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE6 GION. 

7 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United 

8 States Government— 

9 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co10 operation and Security between the United States 

11 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, 

12 and all related and subsequent bilateral security 

13 agreements and arrangements concluded on or before 

14 the date of the enactment of this Act; 

15 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be16 tween the United States and Japan in promoting 

17 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

18 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

19 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

20 United States and Japan. 

21 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI22 ANCE.—The United States Government— 

23 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty 

24 Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 

25 done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all related 


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1 and subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar2 rangements concluded on or before the date of the en3 actment of this Act; 

4 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be5 tween the United States and South Korea in pro6 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; 

7 and 

8 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

9 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

10 United States and the Republic of Korea. 

11 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The 

12 United States Government— 

13 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between 

14 Australia and the United States of America, done at 

15 San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all related and 

16 subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrange17 ments concluded on or before the date of the enact18 ment of this Act; 

19 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be20 tween the United States and Australia in promoting 

21 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

22 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

23 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

24 United States and Australia. 


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1 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The 

2 United States Government is committed to the Mutual De3 fense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and 

4 the United States of America, done at Washington August 

5 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security 

6 agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced 

8 Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 

9 2014. 

10 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is 

11 committed to— 

12 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist13 ance Between the Government of the United States of 

14 America and the Government of Thailand, done at 

15 Bangkok October 17, 1950; 

16 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 

17 done at Manila September 8, 1954; and 

18 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security 

19 agreements and arrangements concluded on or before 

20 the date of the enactment of this Act, including the 

21 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United States 

22 Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15, 

23 2012. 

24 SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. 

25 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 


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1 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions 

2 that seek— 

3 (A) to further constrain space for civil soci4 ety within China; and 

5 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in the 

6 Indo-Pacific region; 

7 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role 

8 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect 

9 for the rule of law and international norms; 

10 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 

11 comprehensive relationship with China— 

12 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and 

13 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, in14 cluding over human rights, economic policies, 

15 and maritime security; and 

16 (4) is committed to working with China on 

17 shared regional and global challenges, especially— 

18 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules19 based international system; and 

20 (B) the denuclearization of North Korea. 

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

22 that the United States should— 

23 (1) welcome a decision by China to change 

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1 tionship with the United States and engagement on 

2 global issues; 

3 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role 

4 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and 

5 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un6 dermine the rules-based international system. 

7 SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

9 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic part10 nership between the United States and India in pro11 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; 

12 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

13 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

14 United States and India; and 

15 (3) is committed to— 

16 (A) the New Framework for the United 

17 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar18 lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005; 

19 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech20 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012; 

21 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo22 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on 

23 January 25, 2015; 


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1 (D) the United States-India Joint State2 ment on Prosperity Through Partnership, issued 

3 on June 26, 2017; and 

4 (E) all related and subsequent bilateral and 

5 security agreements and arrangements concluded 

6 as of the date of the enactment of this Act. 

7 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress 

8 makes the following findings: 

9 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De10 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public 

11 Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) 

12 requires the recognition of India as a major defense 

13 partner. 

14 (2) The designation of India as a major defense 

15 partner, which is unique to India— 

16 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 

17 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing 

18 between the United States and India; 

19 (B) elevates defense trade and technology co20 operation between the United States and India 

21 to a level commensurate with the closest allies 

22 and partners of the United States; 

23 (C) facilitates technology sharing between 

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1 nologies, after taking into account national secu2 rity concerns; and 

3 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination 

4 on defense strategy and policy, military ex5 changes, and port calls in support of defense co6 operation between the United States and India. 

7 SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER8 SHIP. 

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

10 that the United States should— 

11 (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the 

12 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

13 (referred to in this section as ‘‘ASEAN’’) relationship 

14 to a strategic partnership; 

15 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping 

16 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi17 cally integrated, and socially responsible community 

18 of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures, 

19 and standards which are consistent with inter20 national law and the principles of a rules-based Indo21 Pacific community; 

22 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster 

23 greater integration among its members; 

24 (4) recognize the value of— 


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1 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, po2 litical, and security partners within Asia and 

3 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu4 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor5 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and 

6 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as 

7 the United States-ASEAN Connect, which dem8 onstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the 

9 ASEAN Economic Community and build upon 

10 economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re11 gion; 

12 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising 

13 ASEAN— 

14 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis15 putes in a constructive manner; and 

16 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip17 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter18 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent with 

19 international law, including through the adop20 tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea 

21 to further promote peace and stability in the 

22 Indo-Pacific region; 

23 (6) support efforts by United States partners 

24 and allies in ASEAN— 


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1 (A) to enhance maritime capability and 

2 maritime domain awareness; 

3 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and use 

4 of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific 

5 region that are critical to ensuring the security 

6 and free flow of commerce; 

7 (C) to counter piracy; 

8 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 

9 activities such as the trafficking of persons, 

10 goods, and drugs; and 

11 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of 

12 countries or regional organizations to respond to 

13 emerging threats to maritime security in the 

14 Asia-Pacific region; and 

15 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 

16 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Per17 manent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect to 

18 the case between the Republic of the Philippines and 

19 the People’s Republic of China. 

20 (b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN21 GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

24 thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report 

25 to the appropriate congressional committees on a 


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1 strategic framework to administer programs, projects, 

2 and activities of the United States to support diplo3 matic and economic engagement between the United 

4 States and ASEAN member countries for the 10-year 

5 period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 

6 Act. 

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

8 paragraph (1) shall address the following elements of 

9 United States strategy: 

10 (A) Promoting commercial engagement be11 tween the United States and member countries of 

12 ASEAN. 

13 (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN 

14 use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech15 nologies in their respective energy sectors. 

16 (C) Supporting economic conditions in 

17 member countries of ASEAN that promote inno18 vation, the creation of new businesses, sustain19 able growth, and the education of the region’s fu20 ture innovators, entrepreneurs, and business 

21 leaders. 

22 (D) Working with member countries of 

23 ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory en24 vironment for growth, trade, innovation, and in25 vestment. 


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1 (E) Supporting the regional integration ob2 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under the 

3 ASEAN Economic Community. 

4 (F) Partnership opportunities with the gov5 ernments of other countries friendly to the 

6 United States that have committed to a high set 

7 of standards for investment and development 

8 with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary of 

9 State. 

10 SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI11 LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. 

12 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

13 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security coopera14 tion between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, 

15 including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and other 

16 defense-related initiatives. 

17 SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE. 

18 It is the sense of Congress that— 

19 (1) the security dialogue between the United 

20 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad21 dress pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific 

22 region in order to promote— 

23 (A) a rules-based order; 

24 (B) respect for international law; and 

25 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and 


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1 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rath2 er than to replace, current mechanisms. 

3 SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH4 EAST ASIA. 

5 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is 

6 committed to— 

7 (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive 

8 Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010; 

9 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De10 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 

11 2015; and 

12 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu13 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

14 States and Indonesia concluded on or before the date 

15 of the enactment of this Act. 

16 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is 

17 committed to— 

18 (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive 

19 Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014; 

20 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Com21 prehensive Partnership between the United States of 

22 America and Malaysia, done in Washington Sep23 tember 13, 2017; and 

24 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu25 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 


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1 States and Malaysia concluded on or before the date 

2 of the enactment of this Act. 

3 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is 

4 committed to— 

5 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between 

6 the United States of America and the Republic of 

7 Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in 

8 Defense and Security, done at Washington July 12, 

9 2005; 

10 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree11 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; 

12 and 

13 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu14 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

15 States and Singapore concluded on or before the date 

16 of the enactment of this Act. 

17 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is com18 mitted to— 

19 (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive 

20 Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 2013; 

21 (2) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision 

22 Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on 

23 June 1, 2015; 

24 (3) the United States-Vietnam Joint Vision 

25 Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and 


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1 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu2 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

3 States and Vietnam concluded on or before the date 

4 of the enactment of this Act. 

5 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

6 that the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic, 

7 and security cooperation, especially in the areas of mari8 time security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malay9 sia, Singapore, and Vietnam. 

10 SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN. 

11 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It is 

12 the policy of the United States— 

13 (1) to support the close economic, political, and 

14 security relationship between Taiwan and the United 

15 States; 

16 (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United 

17 States Government commitments to Taiwan, con18 sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public 

19 Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six As20 surances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in 

21 July 1982; and 

22 (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo 

23 and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both 

24 sides of the Taiwan Strait. 


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1 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President should 

2 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that 

3 are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats 

4 from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting 

5 the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric 

6 capabilities, as appropriate, including undersea warfare 

7 and air defense capabilities, into its military forces. 

8 (c) TRAVEL.—The President should encourage the trav9 el of high-level United States officials to Taiwan, in accord10 ance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135). 

11 SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY. 

12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

13 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

14 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter15 national community by illicitly developing its nu16 clear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of 

17 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 

18 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 

19 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 

20 2397 (2017 ). 

21 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

22 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights 

23 abuses against its own people and citizens of other 

24 countries, including the United States, the Republic 

25 of Korea, and Japan. 


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1 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing 

2 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s 

3 Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pres4 sure and engagement, in close concert with its part5 ners. 

6 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

7 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE8 PUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

9 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

10 the United States to continue to impose sanctions 

11 with respect to activities of the Government of the 

12 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons act13 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other per14 sons in accordance with Executive Order 13687 (50 

15 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional 

16 sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive 

17 Order 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to block18 ing the property of certain persons engaging in sig19 nificant malicious cyber-enabled activities), Executive 

20 Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to block21 ing the property of the Government of North Korea 

22 and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohibiting cer23 tain transactions with respect to North Korea), and 

24 Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating 

25 to imposing additional sanctions with respect to 


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1 North Korea), as such Executive orders are in effect 

2 on the day before the date of the enactment of this 

3 Act, until the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

4 is no longer engaged in the illicit activities described 

5 in such Executive orders, including actions in viola6 tion of the United Nations Security Council resolu7 tions referred to in subsection (a)(1). 

8 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter9 minating any sanction with respect to the activities 

10 of the Government of the Democratic People’s Repub11 lic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of such 

12 government, or any other person provided for in an 

13 Executive order listed in subsection (a), the Secretary 

14 of State shall submit a report to the appropriate con15 gressional committees justifying the termination of 

16 the sanction and explaining the relationship between 

17 such termination and the cessation of any illicit ac18 tivity that violates any of the United Nations Secu19 rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection 

20 (a)(1) by such Government or person. 

21 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

22 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of 

23 the President pursuant to the International Emer24 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 


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1 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

2 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUB3 LIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PRO4 GRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the objec5 tive of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic 

6 missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

7 Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dis8 mantlement of such programs. 

9 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE

10 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE

11 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

13 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

14 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, or a designee 

15 of the Secretary, shall submit a report to the appro16 priate congressional committees that describes actions 

17 taken by the United States to address the threats 

18 posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic Peo19 ple’s Republic of Korea. 

20 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under 

21 paragraph (1) shall include— 

22 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the 

23 United States to identify strategies and policies, 

24 including an assessment of the strengths and 

25 weaknesses of such strategies and policies— 


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1 (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization 

2 of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

3 Korea; and 

4 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the 

5 ballistic missile program of the Democratic 

6 People’s Republic of Korea; 

7 (B) an assessment of— 

8 (i) potential road maps toward peace9 ful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo10 ple’s Republic of Korea and the elimination 

11 of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats 

12 posed by the Democratic People’s Republic 

13 of Korea; and 

14 (ii) specific actions that the Demo15 cratic People’s Republic of Korea would 

16 need to take for each such roadmap to be17 come viable; 

18 (C) a summary of the United States strat19 egy to increase international coordination and 

20 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or 

21 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement 

22 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by 

23 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 

24 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which 

25 shall include— 


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1 (i) a description of the actions taken 

2 by the Secretary of State, or designees of the 

3 Secretary, to consult with governments 

4 around the world, with the purpose of in5 ducing such governments to fully implement 

6 the United Nations Security Council resolu7 tions referred to in subsection (a)(1); 

8 (ii) a description of the actions taken 

9 by such governments to fully implement 

10 United Nations Security Council resolutions 

11 related to the Democratic People’s Republic 

12 of Korea; 

13 (iii) a list of countries with govern14 ments that the Secretary has determined are 

15 noncooperative with respect to imple16 menting the United Nations Security Coun17 cil resolutions referred to in subsection 

18 (a)(1); and 

19 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and in20 crease cooperation with respect to the Demo21 cratic People’s Republic of Korea, with the 

22 governments of the countries on the list de23 scribed in clause (iii); 

24 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the 

25 national export control regimes of countries that 


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1 are members of the United Nations, and multi2 lateral export control regimes, that are necessary 

3 to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the 

4 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pursuant 

5 to the United Nations Security Council resolu6 tions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and 

7 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 

8 countries in adopting and using authorities nec9 essary to enforce export controls required by 

10 United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

11 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required 

12 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi13 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

14 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

15 that— 

16 (1) representatives of the United States shall use 

17 the voice and vote of the United States in all inter18 national organizations, as appropriate, to advocate 

19 for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s Republic 

20 of Korea from such organizations, until such time as 

21 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its 

22 commitments under the United Nations Security 

23 Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); 

24 and 


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1 (2) the Secretary of State should work to induce 

2 countries to meet their commitments under the United 

3 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in 

4 subsection (a)(1), including by considering appro5 priate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and for6 eign assistance of the United States with governments 

7 that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative 

8 with respect to implementing the United Nations Se9 curity Council resolutions referred to in subsection 

10 (a)(1). 

11 SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND. 

12 The United States Government is committed to— 

13 (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on No14 vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out15 lined future practical cooperation between the United 

16 States and New Zealand; 

17 (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 

18 19, 2012, which strengthened the defense relationship 

19 by providing a framework and strategic guidance for 

20 security cooperation and defense dialogues; and 

21 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu22 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

23 States and New Zealand concluded on or before the 

24 date of enactment of this Act. 


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1 SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that the 

3 United States should— 

4 (1) support strong United States engagement 

5 with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, 

6 Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 

7 Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 

8 Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 

9 Vanuatu; 

10 (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the 

11 South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ12 ing— 

13 (A) fisheries and marine resource conserva14 tion; 

15 (B) environmental challenges and resilience; 

16 (C) global health; 

17 (D) development and trade; and 

18 (E) people-to-people ties; and 

19 (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific 

20 Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law, 

21 good governance, and economic development. 

22 (b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA23 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free 

24 Association entered between the United States and the Free25 ly Associated States (Republic of Marshall Islands, the Fed26 erated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau)— 


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1 (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United 

2 States in the Western Pacific; 

3 (2) reinforce United States regional commitment; 

4 (3) preempt potential adversaries from estab5 lishing positional advantage; and 

6 (4) further self-governance, economic develop7 ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated 

8 States. 

9 SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; 

10 PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

11 (a) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.—It is the policy of the 

12 United States— 

13 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of 

14 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation, 

15 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, 

16 in accordance with applicable international law; and 

17 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations 

18 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South 

19 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter20 national law. 

21 (b) JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.—It 

22 is the sense of Congress that the President should develop 

23 a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United 

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1 cific region, including the East China Sea and the South 

2 China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system 

3 benefitting all countries. 

4 SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 

5 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

6 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 

7 The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 

8 means— 

9 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

10 Senate; 

11 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

12 the Senate; 

13 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

14 House of Representatives; and 

15 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

16 House of Representatives. 

17 (2) ISIS.—The term ‘‘ISIS’’ means the Islamic 

18 State of Iraq and Syria. 

19 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

20 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel21 ligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Sec22 retary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials, 

23 shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Con24 gress that contains an assessment of the current and future 

25 capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, 


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1 and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that 

2 pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and 

3 its citizens interests abroad. 

4 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection 

5 (b) shall include— 

6 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda7 linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated 

8 fighters in Southeast Asia; 

9 (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al10 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affili11 ated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia 

12 from fighting in the Middle East; 

13 (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of 

14 ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex15 tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia; 

16 (4) the current resources available to combat the 

17 threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other vio18 lent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast 

19 Asia, and the additional resources required to combat 

20 such threat; 

21 (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of 

22 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex23 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively 

24 in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines, 

25 Indonesia, and Malaysia; 


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1 (6) a description of the capabilities and resources 

2 of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent 

3 extremist groups; and 

4 (7) a list of additional United States resources 

5 and capabilities that the Department of Defense and 

6 the Department of State recommend providing to gov7 ernments in Southeast Asia to combat violent extrem8 ist groups. 

9 SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION. 

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

11 that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation be12 tween the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific 

13 region— 

14 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, 

15 including state-sponsored threats; 

16 (2) to share best practices to combat such threats; 

17 and 

18 (3) to strengthen resilience against misinforma19 tion and propaganda. 

20 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

21 authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec22 essary for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023— 

23 (1) to build capacity for responding to cybersecu24 rity threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; 

25 and 


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1 (2) to enhance cooperation between the United 

2 States and Indo-Pacific nations for combating such 

3 threats. 

4 SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE 

5 INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

7 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and 

8 other weapons of mass destruction, and their means 

9 of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace 

10 and security; 

11 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal12 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il13 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North 

14 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies, 

15 and other weapons of mass destruction; 

16 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia— 

17 (A) to expand and modernize their respec18 tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi19 cant research and development resources in 

20 hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced 

21 technologies; and 

22 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 

23 technologies; and 


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1 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many 

2 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy 

3 for a variety of peaceful applications. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

5 that the United States Government should undertake all 

6 reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms 

7 control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific re8 gion to limit the further spread of weapons of mass destruc9 tion and their means of delivery. 

10 TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED 

11 STATES ECONOMIC INTER12 ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

13 REGION 

14 SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

16 (1) According to the United States Chamber of 

17 Commerce, by 2030— 

18 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 

19 population will be living in Asia; and 

20 (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption 

21 will take place in Asia. 

22 (2) According to the Asian Development Bank— 

23 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat24 eral or regional trade agreements; and 


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1 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian 

2 countries are under negotiation or concluded and 

3 awaiting entry into force. 

4 (3) Free trade agreements between the United 

5 States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Aus6 tralia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea) have 

7 entered into force. 

8 (4) The member states of the Association of 

9 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as 

10 ‘‘ASEAN’’), as a group— 

11 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in 

12 the world; and 

13 (B) have a combined gross domestic product 

14 of $2,400,000,000,000. 

15 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member 

16 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, 

17 and the total value of bilateral trade between the 

18 United States and ASEAN member states has in19 creased by 78 percent since 2004. 

20 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by 

21 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in 

22 the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the 

23 United States 2015 trade surplus of services provided 

24 to consumers in ASEAN member states was 

25 $8,000,000,000. 


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1 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, 

2 goods and services exported from the United States to 

3 ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the 

4 United States. 

5 (8) According to the Business Roundtable— 

6 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, 

7 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 

8 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re9 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global 

10 gross domestic product in 2017; and 

11 (B) United States bilateral trade with the 

12 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) 

13 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States. 

14 (9) According to the United States National Se15 curity Strategy— 

16 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Co17 operation ‘‘remain centerpieces of the Indo18 Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for 

19 promoting an order based on freedom’’; and 

20 (B) the United States will ‘‘work with part21 ners to build a network of states dedicated to free 

22 markets and protected from forces that would 

23 subvert their sovereignty.’’. 

24 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

25 that trade between the United States and the nations in 


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1 the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the United 

2 States economy, United States exports, and jobs in the 

3 United States. 

4 SEC. 302. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE5 MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS. 

6 Congress supports— 

7 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade 

8 agreements that increase United States employment 

9 and expand the economy; 

10 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con11 crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes; 

12 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties 

13 between the United States and nations in the Indo14 Pacific region; 

15 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree16 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that 

17 include several major Asian economies; and 

18 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high19 level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

20 forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20 

21 to pursue United States economic objectives in the 

22 Indo-Pacific region. 


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1 SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP. 

2 The President is authorized to negotiate a comprehen3 sive economic engagement framework with the Association 

4 of Southeast Asian Nations. 

5 SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI6 TATION. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

8 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build9 ing and trade facilitation strategy for the Indo-Pacific re10 gion. 

11 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

12 authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be nec13 essary to carry out subsection (a). 

14 SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

16 make enforcement of United States intellectual property 

17 laws a top priority, including taking all appropriate action 

18 to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled theft of intel19 lectual property. 

20 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

21 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there22 after, the President shall submit a report to Congress that— 

23 (1) describes the efforts of the United States Gov24 ernment to combat intellectual property violations 

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1 cific region, particularly the People’s Republic of 

2 China; and 

3 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of 

4 priority areas for United States engagement and ca5 pacity building assistance. 

6 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

7 authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be nec8 essary to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities de9 signed to build capacity in the identified priority areas de10 scribed in the annual report required under subsection (b). 

11 SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES. 

12 (a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.— 

13 (1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after 

14 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

15 thereafter, the President shall establish a comprehen16 sive, integrated, multiyear strategy to encourage the 

17 efforts of Indo-Pacific countries to implement na18 tional power strategies and cooperation with United 

19 States energy companies to develop an appropriate 

20 mix of power solutions to provide access to sufficient, 

21 reliable, and affordable power in order to reduce pov22 erty and drive economic growth and job creation. 

23 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

24 There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts 

25 as may be necessary to carry out paragraph (1). 


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1 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the 

2 sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) the President should establish bilateral and 

4 regional initiatives to increase energy security in the 

5 Indo-Pacific region; 

6 (2) the United States should reaffirm support for 

7 liquefied natural gas exports to the nations in the 

8 Indo-Pacific region; 

9 (3) the United States should seek to establish 

10 partnership between Department of Energy national 

11 laboratories and Indo-Pacific countries to provide 

12 technical assistance on electrical grid development 

13 and for the development and deployment of new and 

14 advanced energy technologies; and 

15 (4) the United States should explore opportuni16 ties to partner with the private sector and multilat17 eral institutions, such as the World Bank and the 

18 Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access 

19 to reliable electricity in Myanmar (historically known 

20 as ‘‘Burma’’). 

21 SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE. 

22 The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Ad23 ministrator of the United States Agency for International 

24 Development, should increase regional engagement in the 


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1 areas of environment, health, education, and infrastructure 

2 development with the Lower Mekong countries, including— 

3 (1) assisting in the development of programs that 

4 focus on forecasting environmental challenges and re5 silience; 

6 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on 

7 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the 

8 goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong 

9 Basin and access to safe drinking water; 

10 (3) assisting with education enrollment and 

11 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English 

12 training and connectivity in rural communities; and 

13 (4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong 

14 countries, including— 

15 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; 

16 and 

17 (B) helping regional partners to track and 

18 treat malaria and tuberculosis. 

19 SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 

20 AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION. 

21 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

22 encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific 

23 region and United States private sector interests with oper24 ations and investments in the region to deploy agriculture 

25 practices that— 


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1 (1) conserve natural resources; and 

2 (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable 

3 lands and water bodies. 

4 SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN’S 

5 ECONOMIC RIGHTS. 

6 It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 

7 should— 

8 (1) support activities that secure private prop9 erty rights and land tenure for women in developing 

10 countries in Asia, including— 

11 (A) establishing legal frameworks to give 

12 women equal rights to own, register, use, profit 

13 from, and inherit land and property; 

14 (B) improving legal literacy to enable 

15 women to exercise the rights described in sub16 paragraph (A); and 

17 (C) increasing the capacity of law enforce18 ment and community leaders to enforce such 

19 rights; 

20 (2) work with Asian civil society, governments, 

21 and multilateral organizations to increase the capa22 bility of disadvantaged women and girls in Asia— 

23 (A) to realize their rights; 

24 (B) to determine their life outcomes; 

25 (C) to assume leadership roles; and 


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1 (D) to influence decision-making in their 

2 households, communities, and societies; and 

3 (3) seek to expand access to appropriate finan4 cial products and services for women-owned micro, 

5 small, and medium-sized enterprises in Asia. 

6 TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED 

7 STATES VALUES IN THE INDO8 PACIFIC REGION 

9 SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

10 Congress makes the following findings: 

11 (1) The promotion of human rights and respect 

12 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in 

13 the United States’ national security interest. 

14 (2) Continued support for human rights, demo15 cratic values, and good governance is critical to a 

16 successful United States diplomatic strategy in the 

17 Indo-Pacific. 

18 (3) Strong support for human rights and democ19 racy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to 

20 reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat corruption, 

21 reduce the allure of extremism, and promote economic 

22 growth. 

23 (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of 

24 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North 


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1 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all 

2 been identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’. 

3 (5) There have been unacceptable human rights 

4 developments in— 

5 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been 

6 identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’, ac7 cording to the Department of State, and the De8 partment of State has declared that the violence 

9 against the Rohingya constitutes ethnic cleans10 ing; 

11 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi12 fied by Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’, and 

13 where there are continued disturbing reports of 

14 extra-judicial killings; and 

15 (C) China, where forced disappearances, ex16 tralegal detentions, and lack of due process in ju17 dicial proceedings remain troublesome. 

18 (6) according to the National Security Strategy, 

19 the United States— 

20 (A) will ‘‘support, with our words and ac21 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes 

22 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and 

23 the rule of law’’; 

24 (B) ‘‘may use diplomacy, sanctions, and 

25 other tools to isolate states and leaders who 


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1 threaten our interests and whose actions run 

2 contrary to our values’’; and 

3 (C) ‘‘will support efforts to advance wom4 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and 

5 girls, and promote women and youth empower6 ment programs’’. 

7 SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS. 

8 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef9 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery 

10 in the Indo-Pacific region. 

11 SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. 

12 It is the sense of Congress that— 

13 (1) United States Government officials should 

14 lead by example— 

15 (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of 

16 the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

17 (B) by engaging with the press corps at 

18 every appropriate opportunity; and 

19 (2) the United States should advocate and sup20 port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the 

21 Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society, 

22 including journalists, to discuss and address the chal23 lenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific region. 


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1 SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER2 SONNEL. 

3 It is the sense of Congress that— 

4 (1) United States embassies and consulates in 

5 the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap6 propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad7 vancing United States democracy, human rights, 

8 labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy 

9 interests; and 

10 (2) appropriate resources should be made avail11 able to carry out such activities. 

12 SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE13 TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT. 

14 The Secretary of State should, as appropriate— 

15 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional 

16 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re17 garding human rights and religious freedom viola18 tions; 

19 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people 

20 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par21 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and 

22 (3) establish educational exchanges and capacity23 building programs emphasizing civil society develop24 ment. 


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1 SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS 

2 HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

4 that the United States should continue to work with 

5 ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address 

6 human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in 

7 Southeast Asia. 

8 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date 

9 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 

10 submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional commit11 tees to increase cooperation with ASEAN to promote human 

12 rights, democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia. 

13 (c) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub14 section (b) should include— 

15 (1) an assessment of the types of United States 

16 Government resources available to support increased 

17 cooperation; and 

18 (2) an assessment to identify entities within 

19 ASEAN that the United States could potentially sup20 port or partner with to promote human rights, de21 mocracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia. 

22 SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA. 

23 The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en24 hance freedom of information access with regard to North 

25 Korea. 


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1 SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC2 TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES 

3 ASSISTANCE. 

4 (a) SANCTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the 

5 President should impose sanctions, in accordance with ap6 plicable law and other relevant authorities, including tar7 geted financial penalties and visa bans, on any individual 

8 or entity that— 

9 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; 

10 or 

11 (2) engages in censorship activities. 

12 (b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—It is the 

13 sense of Congress that the President should, in accordance 

14 with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter 

15 United States economic assistance to any country that has 

16 engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious 

17 freedoms. 

18 SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

19 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

20 REGION.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be ap22 propriated $210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 

23 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen 

24 civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency, 

25 and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region, includ26 ing for universities, civil society, and multilateral inVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:47 Oct 04, 2018 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\S2736.RS S2736

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1 stitutions that are focusing on education awareness, 

2 training, and capacity building. 

3 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro4 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made 

5 available for United States Government efforts, led by 

6 the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

7 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the 

8 rule of law, and human rights in the People’s Repub9 lic of China. 

10 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to 

11 paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovern12 mental organizations to support activities preserving 

13 cultural traditions and promoting sustainable devel14 opment, education, and environmental conservation 

15 in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Re16 gion and in other Tibetan communities in China, 

17 India, and Nepal. 

18 SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRON19 MENTAL DEFENDERS. 

20 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term 

21 ‘‘human rights and environmental defenders’’ means indi22 viduals, working alone or in groups, who nonviolently advo23 cate for the promotion and protection of universally recog24 nized human rights, fundamental freedoms, land issues, or 


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1 the conservation of local ecosystems if the advocacy of such 

2 issues may result in the risk of safety or life. 

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

4 that human rights and environmental defenders in the 

5 Indo-Pacific region have been facing increased difficulties 

6 with the rise of unprecedented crackdowns and conflicts. 

7 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

8 authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec9 essary to support human rights and environmental defend10 ers through the Department of State’s Human Rights De11 fenders Fund. 

12 SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA13 TIVES. 

14 There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts 

15 as may be necessary, for fiscal years 2019 through 2025, 

16 to support Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including 

17 the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN 

18 Youth Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people ex19 change programs that focus on building the capacity of de20 mocracy, human rights, and good governance activists in 

21 the Indo-Pacific region. 


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Calendar No. 616 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2736 

A BILL 

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comOother purposes. States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for prehensive, multifaceted, and principled United CTOBER 3 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 28), 2018 

Reported with an amendment 


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