UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 98-4064

JAMES A. MUSE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.

James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CR-90-122-R)

Submitted: September 30, 1998

Decided: October 16, 1998

Before WIDENER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and

HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Rickey G. Young, LAW OFFICE OF RICKEY G. YOUNG, Martinsville, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States

Attorney, Karen B. Peters, Assistant United States Attorney, Tammy

L. Belinsky, Third Year Law Intern, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

James A. Muse appeals the district court's order revoking his term

of supervised release. He claims that the search warrant supporting a

search of his home was constitutionally deficient. Muse also asserts

that the district court abused its discretion in finding sufficient evidence to warrant revocation of supervised release. We affirm.

I

Muse was convicted in 1991 of conspiracy to possess with intent

to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to seventy-two months

in prison, to be followed by four years of supervised release. Muse

began his term of supervised release in May 1996. Among the terms

of his supervised release was that he "not commit another federal,

state, or local crime and . . . not illegally possess a controlled substance."

Police in Roanoke, Virginia, learned from a confidential informant

in early 1997 that a fencing operation was being conducted at Muse's

residence. Subsequently, an anonymous caller informed police that

Muse was involved in the distribution of cocaine and marijuana. Two

other confidential informants told police that they had seen Muse

dealing cocaine at the residence. And, while investigating an appliance theft in late November 1997, police developed Kelly Huffman

as a suspect. Huffman informed authorities that the stolen goods

(three refrigerators, two ranges, one air conditioner, and one dishwasher) were taken to Muse's home and sold for $1050 on or about

December 3.

On December 5, 1997, police executed a search warrant at Muse's

home. In addition to a large amount of stolen merchandise, police

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recovered eighteen grams of crack cocaine and twenty-eight grams of

powder cocaine. The drugs were packaged for sale to customers.

A supervised release violation report was issued charging that

Muse had violated his release terms by committing a crime and illegally possessing a controlled substance. The district court conducted

a hearing on the motion to revoke Muse's supervised release and

Muse's motion to suppress evidence seized in the search. At the close

of the hearing, the court ruled from the bench that Muse had violated

the terms of his supervised release by possessing controlled substances and by knowingly possessing stolen goods. The court revoked

Muse's supervised release and imposed a prison term of twenty-four

months.

II

Muse asserts that the district court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized under the allegedly invalid search warrant. He contends

that the warrant was invalid because much of the information

included in the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant

was stale. Thus, Muse argues, there was no probable cause to support

issuance of the warrant. We review de novo the sufficiency of a

search warrant and its supporting affidavit. See United States v.

Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996).

Search warrants must be supported by probable cause to satisfy the

dictates of the Fourth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. To

determine if probable cause supports a search warrant based on an

informant's tip, we look to the totality of the circumstances, considering especially the informant's reliability and basis of knowledge. See

Wilhelm, 80 F.3d at 118-19. Additionally, the affidavit supporting a

search warrant must allege criminal activity occurring close enough

to the time the warrant is issued to justify a finding of probable cause

at that time. See Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932);

United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1986). If the

criminal activities are ongoing and protracted, any passage of time

between the informant's tip and execution of the warrant is less significant. See id. We accord great deference to a determination of

probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate judge. See

United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1313 (4th Cir. 1994).

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The information in the affidavit in this case was reliable. First, this

is not a case where there was one lone informant. Rather, four informants told authorities about Muse's criminal activities: two stated that

Muse had a fencing operation; and the other two informants revealed

that they had witnessed Muse dealing cocaine out of his home. Thus,

the informants corroborated each other's stories that Muse was engaging in criminal activity at his residence. Second, the affidavit recites

that three of the informants previously had provided correct information to the police. This information led to the recovery of stolen property and several felony drug arrests and convictions. The fourth

informant, Huffman, gave information against his penal interests.

Third, all four informants gave information based on their personal

knowledge rather than hearsay. In short, the information in the affidavit was reliable.

The information also was not stale. One informant told authorities

about drug dealings in October 1997. Huffman's dealings with Muse

occurred between November 20 and December 3, 1997; the search

warrant was executed on December 5. Muse's contention that the

information in the warrant was stale lacks merit.

Our de novo review discloses that probable cause existed to issue

the search warrant. Therefore, the district court properly denied

Muse's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of

his home.

III

Muse also contends that the district court abused its discretion

when it revoked his supervised release. The search of Muse's home

yielded cocaine that was packaged for sale and great quantities of

stolen merchandise, much of which was in his bedroom and the living

areas of the house. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates

that Muse knowingly violated the terms of his supervised release. See

United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). There was

no abuse of discretion.

IV

We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are fully presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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