Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 89A01-1608-CR-1783 | April 27, 2017 Page 1 of 25

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Nicole Rutter-Hirth

Rion, Rion & Rion, LPA, Inc.

Dayton, Ohio

Jennifer Lukemeyer

Voyles, Zahn & Paul

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Todd Stigleman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

89A01-1608-CR-1783

Appeal from the Wayne Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Charles Todd, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

89D01-1405-FA-11

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 89A01-1608-CR-1783 | April 27, 2017 Page 2 of 25

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, Todd Stigleman was convicted of four counts of 

kidnapping as Class A felonies, eight counts of criminal confinement as Class C 

felonies, and two counts of stalking as Class C felonies. Todd also admitted to 

being an habitual offender. The trial court later vacated all convictions of 

criminal confinement and sentenced Todd to seventy-six years in the Indiana 

Department of Correction. Todd now appeals, raising three issues for our 

review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Todd’s 

motion to sever, (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

evidence, and (3) whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offenses and his character. Concluding the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Todd’s motion to sever or in admitting evidence and that 

Todd’s sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] Todd and Kelli Stigleman were married in 2004 and had one child, Joshua, 

during their relationship. Kelli has another son, Joseph, from a prior 

relationship. Kelli has worked for Cracker Barrel for sixteen years; Todd did 

not work during their marriage, but received social security disability payments. 

Todd and Kelli lived together in their marital residence in Cambridge City, 

 

1 We held oral argument at Valparaiso University Law School on April 7, 2017. We thank counsel for their 

oral advocacy and extend our appreciation to the faculty, staff, and students for their hospitality.
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Indiana, which Kelli purchased from her parents pursuant to an installment 

contract.

[3] In early February of 2014, Kelli left Todd and moved in with her parents. She 

offered Josh the option to live with her at her parents’ house, but he declined 

because he wished to live with his father. Josh was homeschooled and very 

close to his father. Shortly after Kelli left, Todd attempted to reconcile their 

relationship several times, but with no luck. On February 21, 2014, Todd filed 

for divorce in the Wayne County Superior Court. Thereafter, events quickly 

escalated.

[4] In March of 2014, Kelli filed an emergency motion to amend the parties’ 

provisional orders seeking to stop Todd from contacting her, as he had started 

“harassing [her], [making] several phone calls to [her] cell phone, to [her] 

parents’ house, to [her] work and just was non-stop showing up everywhere 

[she] seemed to be . . . .” Transcript, Volume II at 69. The trial court granted 

Kelli’s motion and ordered parenting time exchanges with Josh to occur at the

Cambridge City Police Station.

[5] On March 19, 2014, Kelli attended an appointment at the Wayne County 

Health Department after work. While she was filling out paperwork following 

her appointment, Josh unexpectedly appeared at the Health Department. Kelli 

and Todd were supposed to have a parenting time exchange that evening and 

she thought it strange Josh showed up at that time. Josh asked Kelli for the 

keys to her van so he could wait outside, and she complied. As she walked to 
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her van, she saw Todd walking toward her. Todd grabbed her arm and pushed 

her into her van and said, “we’re going to talk.” Id. at 74. Kelli resisted and 

said she would take Josh and leave, and Todd responded, “no, we’re going to 

talk.” Id. Todd pushed Kelli into the passenger’s seat, started the car, and 

drove to their marital residence in Cambridge City. Josh was on his cellphone 

in the backseat and it appeared to Kelli that he was giving someone directions 

to follow the van. The lock on the passenger door was broken at the time, so 

Kelli could not escape. At the marital residence, Todd took Kelli’s phone and 

kept her keys. He told her, “I’m sorry, I want you to come back, why are you 

doing this to me, I don’t understand why you’re doing this . . . .” Id. at 77. At 

one point while Kelli was sitting on the couch, she reiterated her position she 

did not want to talk to him. Todd became very upset and towered over her 

while wielding a knife. He pushed her back onto the couch, put the knife to her 

throat, and said “if you tell anybody about this, you’ll find out what the 

consequences are . . . .” Id. at 80. Todd gave Kelli the knife and told her to 

stab him in his abdomen; she declined. Josh then came downstairs to ask his 

parents to stop yelling, made eye contact with Kelli, and silently indicated to 

her that Todd “[was] faking.” Id.

[6] Several hours later, Kelli was able to obtain her keys and phone; she drove 

straight to her parents’ house where her father called the police and filed a 

police report. A few days after filing the report, Kelli made an appointment for 

Josh to speak to the police. Todd began following her in his car as she drove 

Josh to the police station. As she parked at the police station, Todd yanked 
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Josh from the car and said “he’s not talking to the cops . . . .” Id. at 83. Josh 

never gave a statement to the police.

[7] On April 4, 2014,2 Kelli finished work at Cracker Barrel around 8:00 p.m. She 

walked to her van and noticed her van door had been opened but not shut 

properly, as it was slightly ajar. As she went to close it, Todd, dressed in all 

black, jumped out from behind her van, put his hand over her mouth, and said, 

“what are you trying to do, get me put in jail?” Id. at 110. A struggle ensued 

and Todd and Kelli fell to the ground. Kelli attempted to yell for help but could 

not because Todd’s hand was covering her mouth. Todd then told her Josh was 

injured and in the hospital, so she stopped struggling and yelling for help. Kelli 

told Todd she would meet him at the hospital, and as she began backing out of 

her parking spot, Todd opened the door and jumped in her van. He told her 

that he lied to her, Josh was not hurt, and they “were going to talk.” Id. at 112. 

Todd then forced her out of the driver’s seat and drove them to the marital 

residence. When they arrived at the marital residence, Todd parked her van 

near the back of the house so it could not be seen from the street. Todd forced 

her into the home and kept her phone and her keys. Todd followed her from 

room to room, not letting her out of his sight, and begging her to get back 

together. Eventually, she obtained her keys and phone and left.

 

2 Kelli’s testimony refers to this day as April 14 and April 4. See Tr., Vol. II at 109, 143. Because the State 

uses April 4, and Todd uses “Date unknown,” Corrected Appellant’s Brief at 11, we opt to use April 4.
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[8] A similar incident occurred on April 18, 2014, when Kelli and Todd met in the 

parking lot of a carwash across from the police station to exchange custody of 

Josh. As Josh approached Kelli’s van, Todd walked behind him and pushed 

him out of the way while holding a knife at waist level. Todd again told Kelli, 

“we’re going to talk.” Id. at 117. He forced his way into her van, pushed her 

into the passenger’s seat, and drove around Cambridge City until they stopped 

in the Cambridge City Public Library’s parking lot. Todd told Josh to get out 

and walk to the Dollar Store, which was a couple blocks away. Kelli felt as 

though she could not leave the vehicle because Todd had the knife lying on his 

leg. A short while later, Josh returned and informed Todd he saw Kelli’s father 

driving around town, presumably looking for her. Todd became agitated and 

drove the van back to the marital residence. At the house, Todd forced Kelli to 

call her father and tell him everything was fine and she was going to spend the 

night at the house to help Josh with his homework. Kelli spent the night at the 

house because Todd kept her keys and phone and refused to let her leave. 

[9] When she awoke the next morning, she saw Todd outside tampering under the 

hood of her van, “pulling wires and stuff.” Id. at 120. She said she needed to 

get to work and Todd gave her the keys to her van; the van would not start so 

Todd volunteered to take her to work. But Kelli needed her work clothes, so 

Todd drove her to her parents’ house to retrieve them. Kelli went inside her 

parents’ house and did not come back out. Kelli’s father again called the police. 

This time, Kelli met with Officer Chad Wissler at the Cambridge City Police 

Department. As they were completing the interview, Kelli noticed Todd in the 
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parking lot outside the police department. Officer Wissler stepped outside and 

had a brief conversation with Todd; he then noticed Todd was holding a yellow 

“Post-It” note and a pen. After Todd left, Officer Wissler removed a note from 

the window of Kelli’s van. The note read, “you lied, I know you were here.” 

Tr., Vol. III at 148.

[10] On April 24, 2014, as Kelli was driving on the I-70 exit ramp to Cambridge 

City, Todd’s car approached her from behind at a high rate of speed. Kelli was 

speaking to her brother, David Moore, on her cell phone at the time. As she 

drove onto the exit ramp, she stopped at the stoplight and prepared to make a 

left turn; there were cars behind her and directly to her right. Todd drove his 

vehicle in between the cars in the left and right hand lanes, stopping in front of 

Kelli’s van and blocking her from driving. Todd exited his vehicle and walked 

to the driver’s side door of Kelli’s van and reached in and took her phone. He 

then proceeded to get in Kelli’s van and forced her from the driver’s seat. Todd 

drove the van a short distance away, parked, exited the van, and walked back to 

his car to move it and parked it on the edge of the interstate overpass. Todd 

then drove the van to a rural, isolated area a few minutes away.

[11] Along the way, Todd was “irate, . . . shouting and hollering and getting kind of 

up in [her] face . . . .” Tr., Vol. II at 130. Todd pulled off the side of the road 

and began yelling at Kelli, asking why she involved the police and child 

protective services. After several minutes of yelling, Todd grabbed Kelli’s arm 

and pulled her to the back of the van, telling her, “we’re going to have sex . . . .” 
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Id. at 135. Todd then forced Kelli to have sex with him. Shortly thereafter, the 

police arrived after receiving a call from Kelli’s brother and arrested Todd. 

[12] A little after midnight on April 25, Todd demanded Kelli return Josh to him, as 

it was his day to have custody. The Cambridge City Police Department 

arranged for Officer Stephen Foster to be present at the exchange. At the 

exchange, Officer Foster heard Todd tell Kelli, “you need to watch your back, 

bitch.” Tr., Vol. III at 78. 

[13] On May 2, 2014, the State charged Todd with fourteen counts: Counts I-IV, 

kidnapping, as Class A felonies; Counts V-XII, criminal confinement, as Class 

C felonies; and Counts XIII and XIV, stalking, as Class C felonies. The State 

also alleged Todd was an habitual offender. On March 21, 2016, Todd filed a 

motion for severance of the counts alleging they were joined because they are of 

the same or similar character. The trial court denied Todd’s motion. 

[14] At trial, the State presented and the trial court admitted into evidence other 

“bad acts” committed by Todd. Specifically, Officer Wissler testified that on 

May 1, 2014, he received a call from Lincoln High School to investigate an 

incident involving Kelli’s van. The van, which was driven to school by her son, 

Joe, had the driver’s side front and rear tires deflated. Officer Wissler obtained 

surveillance footage and observed a man enter the parking lot carrying a red 

and white umbrella. The man then kneeled down next to and tampered with 

each tire. Kelli told Officer Wissler the umbrella was one she recognized from 

the marital residence. Officer Wissler also stated other surveillance footage 
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caught a vehicle matching Todd’s driving around the school near that time. 

Further, on October 24, 2014, Officer Wissler responded to a complaint from 

Josh Stigleman. The complaint alleged drugs and a firearm were left on the 

front porch of Kelli’s home. At this time, Kelli was again living in the marital 

residence, as Todd had been evicted. Officer Wissler arrived at the home, 

spoke to Kelli, and noticed a yellow shoebox on the front porch. A search of 

the shoebox revealed marijuana, heroin, and a handgun. After speaking with 

Josh and obtaining a search warrant for his cell phone, Officer Wissler 

discovered text messages from Todd instructing Josh on how to plant the 

incriminating evidence. Josh stated Todd told him to do it because “[h]e didn’t 

want to go to jail.” Tr., Vol. IV at 40. The trial court also admitted into 

evidence letters written by Todd from prison asking his new girlfriend to testify 

she was with him on April 4 and April 18, 2014, even though they had not yet 

met at that point.

[15] A jury found Todd guilty as charged and the trial court entered judgment of 

conviction on all counts. At sentencing, the trial court vacated all counts of 

criminal confinement and amended its judgment of conviction to reflect only 

Todd’s convictions for kidnapping and stalking. The trial court sentenced Todd 

to forty years for each count of kidnapping, to run concurrently; six years for 

each count of stalking, to run concurrently with one another and consecutively 

to the kidnapping counts; and an additional thirty years for the habitual 

offender enhancement. Todd’s total aggregate sentence is seventy-six years 
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with no time suspended. Todd now appeals. Additional facts will be added as 

necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Motion to Sever

[16] Todd contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

sever the counts. Specifically, Todd alleges a separate trial should have been 

afforded to him for the counts related to each date on which he committed a 

crime. Todd makes two arguments to support his claim: (1) he was entitled to 

severance as a matter of right because the crimes were joined solely because 

they are of the same or similar character, and (2) severance was appropriate 

under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a). 

A. Standard of Review

[17] The basis for joinder determines the amount of deference owed to a trial court’s 

ruling on a motion for severance. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1264 (Ind. 

2015). A defendant is entitled to severance as a matter of right where the 

offenses have been joined solely because they are of the same or similar 

character. Id. Because a trial court has no discretion to deny such a motion, we 

review its decision de novo. Id. But where the offenses have been joined 

because the defendant’s underlying acts are connected together, we review the 

trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. Likewise, a trial court’s 
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refusal to sever counts under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a) is reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion. Craig v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ind. 2000).

B. Stigleman Was Not Entitled to Severance

[18] Stigleman argues he was entitled to a separate trial for each date on which he 

committed a crime; therefore, he alleges the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to sever the counts. Indiana Code section 35-34-1-9(a) permits the 

joinder of offenses when the offenses:

(1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a 

single scheme or plan; or

(2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts 

connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or 

plan.

However, when “two (2) or more offenses have been joined for trial in the same 

indictment or information solely on the ground that they are of the same or 

similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the 

offenses.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-11(a). In other words, Todd is not entitled to 

severance as of right if section 35-34-1-9(a)(2) is met. See Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 

1265.

[19] In Pierce, our supreme court succinctly summarized the law in regards to 

severance.

[Indiana Code subsection 35-34-1-9(a)(1)] refers to the nature of 

the charged offenses; subsection (9)(a)(2) refers to the operative 
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facts underlying those charges. These two subsections are not 

coextensive: offenses that are of the same or similar character 

may be premised on totally unrelated circumstances and 

evidence. For example, although a defendant may be charged 

with multiple burglaries (the same statutory offense), if the 

burglaries are factually distinct in terms of their timing, victims, 

method of entry, transport vehicle, and types of items taken, they 

fit squarely under subsection (9)(a)(1) but not (9)(a)(2), and 

severance is available as a matter of right. Maymon v. State, 870 

N.E.2d 523, 526-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 

N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In some instances, of course, 

crimes that are of the same or similar character may also be based 

[on] a series of connected acts. See, e.g., Jameison v. State, 268 

Ind. 599, 601, 377 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1978) (“In the case at bar the 

burglaries were of service stations on I-74 in Shelby County. In 

both entry was gained by breaking a window and radios were 

stolen. Thus the crimes charged undoubtedly constituted a series 

of connected acts.”), abrogated on other grounds, Mitchell v. State, 

535 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1989).

To determine whether offenses warrant joinder under subsection 

(9)(a)(2), we ask whether the operative facts establish a pattern of 

activity beyond mere satisfaction of the statutory elements. It is 

well-settled that a common modus operandi and motive can 

sufficiently link crimes committed on different victims. In Craig

v. State, the defendant molested two young girls in a strikingly 

similar way, by asking them to take a “taste test,” covering their 

eyes with tape, inserting his penis into their mouths, and 

instructing them to suck on it. 730 N.E.2d at 1264-65. And his 

common motive—“to satisfy [his] sexual desires”—further tied 

the crimes. Id. at 1265. Because “[those] similarities [were] 

sufficient to establish that the molestation of each victim was the 

handiwork of the same person,” the defendant had no absolute 

right to severance. Id.

Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1265-66 (some internal citations omitted).
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[20] Todd cites to two cases to support his assertion the offenses were joined only 

because of their similar character. Specifically, Todd cites to Wilkerson v. State, 

728 N.E.2d 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and Maymon v. State, 870 N.E.2d 523 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), 

trans. denied. In Wilkerson, the defendant was charged with raping two separate 

victims in Anderson, Indiana. In each offense, the defendant broke into a 

residence through a window and forced each victim to submit to oral sex 

followed by vaginal intercourse. The charges were joined for trial and the 

defendant was found guilty as charged. On appeal following the denial of 

defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief, this court held his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to move for a severance of the charges, as they were joined 

solely based on their similar character. This court noted the crimes occurred 

three weeks apart, at different times of day, at different locations, to different 

victims. Moreover, the defendant used different weapons and one victim was 

robbed while the other was not. Wilkerson, 728 N.E.2d at 246-47.

[21] In Maymon, this court again found the defendant received ineffective assistance 

of counsel for failing to move for a severance when the charges were joined 

solely for their similar character. 870 N.E.2d at 528-29. There, the defendant 

committed four burglaries over the course of three months. Different types of 

items were stolen from each residence and the defendant was only successful in 

two of the four burglaries, as he was confronted by the homeowners in the other 

two attempts. Witnesses of the events in two of the burglaries observed a blue 

car at the scene, while the witnesses in the other two burglaries observed a red 
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car. This court held the “facts of each charge do not demonstrate that [the 

defendant] committed a series of connected acts or that the incidents were part 

of a single scheme or plan.” Id. at 528.

[22] Notwithstanding the cases cited by Todd, his argument that his crimes were 

joined solely on the basis of their same or similar character fails. As previously 

noted, to determine whether joinder is appropriate under subsection 9(a)(2), 

“we ask whether the operative facts establish a pattern of activity beyond mere 

satisfaction of the statutory elements.” Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1266. Here, as 

argued by the State, the incidents share much more than their criminal 

category. Todd’s actions were connected by his victim, his method, and his 

motive. Kelli was the victim of each crime, with Todd showing up 

unexpectedly at her place of work or somewhere he knew she would be. Each 

time, Todd would force himself into Kelli’s van by intimidation, threat, or trick, 

and tell her they needed to talk. Three of the four kidnappings resulted in Todd 

forcing Kelli back to their marital residence, yelling at her, and/or attempting to 

discuss their marriage. Regarding his motive, it appears as if at first Todd 

desired to reconcile their marriage; however, factoring in the incidents that 

occurred in May and October of 2014, it is clear his original motive eventually 

transformed into harassment and retaliation. In sum, Todd committed the 

same crimes multiple times, in substantially the same way, and against the 

same victim. See id. at 1267. Because the operative facts of Todd’s crimes 

establish a pattern of activity beyond the satisfaction of the statutory elements, 

subsection 9(a)(2) is satisfied and Todd is not entitled to severance as of right.
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[23] Todd next argues the trial court abused its discretion because severance was 

appropriate under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a). Indiana Code section 

35-34-1-11(a) provides, in relevant part,

In all other cases the court, upon motion of the defendant or the 

prosecutor, shall grant a severance of offenses whenever the court 

determines that severance is appropriate to promote a fair 

determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each 

offense considering:

(1) the number of offenses charged;

(2) the complexity of the evidence to be offered; and

(3) whether the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the 

evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.

[24] Thus, Section 35-34-1-11(a) mandates that a trial court, after considering the 

number of offenses, the complexity of the evidence, and whether the trier of fact 

will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently, sever the 

charges when necessary to promote a fair trial. Here, although there were 

fourteen counts, only three different crimes were charged. Moreover, there was 

only one victim of each count charged, and the State presented Kelli’s 

testimony of the events in chronological order. The offenses were easily 

distinguishable and largely based solely on Kelli’s testimony with corroborating 

evidence provided by law enforcement officers and Kelli’s family. Finally, 

Todd fails to discuss or point out how the jury would have been unable to 
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distinguish the evidence and intelligently apply the law in this case.3 Therefore, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance pursuant to 

Indiana Code section 35-34-1-11(a).4

II. Admission of Evidence

A. Standard of Review

[25] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. 

Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011). We review its rulings for 

abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the decision was clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

B. Other Bad Acts

[26] Todd argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior 

bad acts, which he asserts should have been excluded pursuant to Indiana Rule 

of Evidence 404(b). Specifically, Todd challenges the admission of (1) evidence 

he attempted to frame Kelli with drugs and a firearm, (2) evidence he tampered 

 

3 The only errors Todd discusses are (1) Kelli’s error stating the second kidnapping occurred on April 4 and 

April 14, 2014, and (2) Kelli’s misstatement (which she later corrected) that she spent the night at the marital 

residence on April 4.

4 Todd also contends the trial court was required to consider Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) in determining 

whether severance was appropriate. Todd claims “the Indiana Supreme Court held it is necessary to consider 

Evid. R. 404(b) considerations in analyzing severance[,]” and cites to Wells v. State, 983 N.E.2d 132 (Ind. 

2013). Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 26. Our supreme court heard oral argument in Wells, but ultimately 

vacated its order granting transfer and reinstated the memorandum decision of this court. Further, the 

portion of Wells cited to by Todd is a dissent from the denial of transfer. See Wells, 983 N.E.2d at 132-40 

(Rucker, J., dissenting from the denial of transfer). Therefore, Wells is not appropriately considered precedent 

for the point Todd advocates.
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with the tires on Kelli’s van, (3) evidence he tried to entice his new girlfriend to 

lie at trial, (4) testimony from the guardian ad litem and child protective 

services agent, and (5) testimony of other acts involving Kelli’s family and 

Todd.5

[27] Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) states, in relevant part,

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on 

a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 

character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be 

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

Rule 404(b) prohibits the State from presenting evidence of a person’s “crime, 

wrong, or other act” to the extent it is used to prove a person’s character and

demonstrate on a particular occasion a person acted in accordance with that 

character. Thompson v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1097, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The 

purpose of the rule is to protect against the “forbidden inference—that the 

defendant acted badly in the past, and that the defendant’s present, charged 

actions conform with those past bad acts . . . .” Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 

 

5 Todd did not object at trial to the testimony of the guardian ad litem, the child protective services agent, or 

any of the other acts involving Kelli’s family and Todd. Failure to object at trial results in the waiver of the 

claim of error on appeal. See Lashbrook v. State, 762 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ind. 2002).
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1096, 1099-1100 (Ind. 2012) (citation omitted). However, evidence of crimes, 

wrongs, or other acts are admissible if offered for another purpose, such as to 

prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2).

[28] In assessing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence, we (1) determine whether

the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue 

other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) 

balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect 

pursuant to Rule 403.6 Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997).

1. Evidence Todd tampered with Kelli’s van and tried to frame her with drugs 

and a firearm

[29] Todd first alleges it was improper for the jury to hear evidence concerning his 

tampering with Kelli’s van’s tires on May 1, 2014, and his attempt to frame 

Kelli on October 24, 2014, by having Josh place drugs and a weapon on her 

front porch. Todd asserts the charges for his actions on October 24th are 

pending, and the “proper forum for a jury to hear evidence of that act is in the 

trial for that cause.” Corrected Appellant’s Br. at 19. In rebuttal, the State 

argues these acts are admissible as evidence of Todd’s guilty knowledge.

 

6

Indiana Rule of Evidence 403 permits the trial court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 

misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
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[30] In Matthews v. State, 866 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, we 

reviewed the admission of testimony that the defendant confessed his crime to, 

threatened, and then shot at a witness for the prosecution. Like Todd, the 

defendant argued the statements were inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), but 

we held:

Threats by the accused against prosecution witnesses are 

considered attempts to conceal or suppress implicating evidence 

and are relevant and admissible into evidence. Such threats are 

viewed as admissions of guilt and therefore are relevant to 

demonstrate an accused’s guilty knowledge. Accordingly, 

evidence of [the defendant’s] threatening and intimidating 

actions against [witnesses] were admissible for a purpose other 

than to merely show his propensity to engage in wrongful acts.

Id. at 825 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Todd’s attempt to frame 

Kelli with drugs and guns on October 24, 2014 is fairly straightforward. Todd 

instructed Josh on how and when to plant this incriminating evidence hoping 

Kelli would be arrested. Josh testified Todd wanted him to do this because 

“[h]e didn’t want to go to jail.” Tr., Vol. IV at 40. Todd’s attempt to frame 

Kelli was an attempt to attack the credibility of or suppress her testimony and is 

highly probative of his consciousness of guilt. See Larry v. State, 716 N.E.2d 79, 

81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding evidence that the defendant beat up a 

prosecution witness is evidence of guilty knowledge and properly admissible 

under the knowledge exception of Rule 404(b)). 

[31] Similarly, Todd’s deflating of Kelli’s tires on May 1, 2014 is also relevant as 

consciousness of guilt. This event occurred several days after Todd was finally 
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arrested for his continuing offenses against Kelli. Following his arrest on April 

24, Todd told Kelli, “you need to watch your back, bitch.” Tr., Vol. III at 78. 

Six days later, this incident occurred. As we previously noted, “[t]hreats by the 

accused against prosecution witnesses are considered attempts to conceal or 

suppress implicating evidence and are relevant and admissible into evidence.” 

Matthews, 866 N.E.2d at 825 (citation and quotation omitted). 

[32] As to whether the probative value of this evidence is substantially outweighed 

by a danger of unfair prejudice to Todd, we note Todd’s theory at trial was that 

Kelli also wanted to reconcile their marriage and often willingly accepted his 

attempts to do so, but was blocked by her family. See Corrected Appellant’s Br. 

at 19. Given Todd’s theory of the case, we cannot say evidence of Todd’s 

guilty knowledge of the criminality of his acts was substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice to him. Therefore, we conclude the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence Todd tampered with Kelli’s 

van’s tires and instructed Josh to plant incriminating evidence on her porch.

2. Evidence Todd tried to entice his new girlfriend to give false testimony

[33] The trial court also admitted into evidence the testimony of Nicole Miller, 

Todd’s new girlfriend, and letters written by Todd asking her to give false 

testimony. Todd asserts this evidence was highly prejudicial with no probative 

value. The State again counters that the testimony and letters were offered to 

prove Todd’s guilty knowledge, not his propensity to commit bad acts.
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[34] In Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174 (Ind. 2016), the trial court admitted into 

evidence letters written by the defendant while in prison seeking to secure 

beneficial testimony from two witnesses. Most of the testimony requested by 

the defendant was patently false. Our supreme court affirmed the trial court’s 

ruling the letters were admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b)(2) as evidence of a 

guilty mind. Id. at 1180-81.

[35] Similarly, the trial court admitted Miller’s testimony and the letters sent to her 

as evidence of “[Todd’s] . . . knowledge.” Tr., Vol. IV at 192. The letters 

reveal Todd asking for favorable testimony and for her to testify she was with 

him on two of the dates he committed his crimes; Miller had not yet met Todd 

on those dates and did not meet Todd in person until May 2 or May 3, 2014. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

[36] Finally, we note any error in the admission of evidence concerning Todd’s 

other acts is harmless. “[E]rrors in the admission of evidence are to be 

disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a 

party.” VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 267 (Ind. 2013) (citation omitted). 

In determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights have been affected, a 

reviewing court must assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the jury. 

Id. The improper admission of evidence is deemed harmless if there is 

substantial independent evidence of guilt supporting a conviction such that we 

can say there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence 

contributed to the conviction. Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 

2012). Here, there was substantial independent evidence of Todd’s guilt 
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beyond that of his other crimes and wrongs. Kelli testified at length about each 

incident in chronological order. Kelli’s testimony was corroborated by 

members of her family and they detailed her relationship struggles with Todd as 

well as her fear of what he may have been capable of doing. Multiple law 

enforcement officers testified about each incident and corroborated Kelli’s 

testimony. In addition, the trial court gave multiple limiting instructions 

ordering the jury to consider the challenged evidence only for the purpose of 

“[Todd’s] intent, motive and/or knowledge.” Tr., Vol. III at 156. In sum, 

there is not a substantial likelihood the jury convicted Todd because of his 

propensity to commit crimes.

III. Inappropriate Sentence

[37] Todd’s final argument requests we exercise our constitutional authority to 

review and revise his sentence. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The 

Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of 

the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The 

defendant bears the burden of persuading this court his or her sentence is 

inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether a 

sentence is inappropriate turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity 

of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to 

light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The 

principal role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not achieve the 

perceived “correct” result in each case. Id. at 1225.
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[38] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Here, Todd 

was convicted and sentenced on four counts of kidnapping, as Class A felonies, 

and two counts of stalking, as Class C felonies. A person convicted of a Class 

A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term between twenty and fifty years, 

with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). A 

person convicted of a Class C felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term 

between two and eight years, with the advisory sentence being four years. Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-6(a). Todd received forty years for each count of kidnapping, to 

run concurrently with each other, and received six years for each count of 

stalking, to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to his kidnapping 

sentences. Todd also received an additional thirty years for being an habitual 

offender. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(a), (h) (2005).7 Todd’s aggregate sentence 

is seventy-six years.

 

7 Under the criminal code in effect when Todd committed these crimes, the trial court was obligated to 

sentence Todd to a minimum of thirty additional years for being an habitual offender. Under the criminal 

code now in effect, the trial court has discretion to sentence an habitual offender convicted of a Level 1 

through Level 4 felony to an additional term between six and twenty years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) 

(2014). Todd alleges the doctrine of amelioration should apply, allowing him to be sentenced under the 

current and more lenient statute. See Lunsford v. State, 640 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Vicory v. 

State, 272 Ind. 683, 400 N.E.2d 1380, 1381-82 (1980)). However, the doctrine of amelioration does not apply 

where the legislature, in a specific saving clause, expressly states that crimes committed before the effective 

date of the ameliorative amendment should be prosecuted under prior law. Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 

1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Here, the General Assembly, in enacting the new criminal code, specifically 

enacted savings clauses. Both Indiana Code section 1-1-5.5-21 and section 1-1-5.5-22 state that the new 

criminal code “does not affect: (1) penalties incurred; (2) crimes committed; or (3) proceedings begun” before 

the effective date of the new criminal code sections. The effective date of the new criminal code as it pertains 
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[39] As to the nature of the offenses, Todd harassed his wife over a period of two 

months and kidnapped her four times. In one instance, Todd told Kelli to stab 

him in the abdomen with a knife; in another, Todd intimidated Kelli with a 

knife. Kelli received scratches to her face during the second kidnapping and 

was forced to have sex with Todd resulting in a torn hymen during the fourth 

kidnapping. Moreover, Todd utilized his fourteen-year-old son in several of the 

kidnappings, often using him as leverage to come in contact with Kelli. Todd 

also persuaded his son to plant drugs and a weapon on Kelli’s porch in an 

attempt to have her arrested. Nothing about the nature of the offenses 

persuades us Todd’s sentence is inappropriate.

[40] Regarding Todd’s character, Todd has a criminal history beyond that used for 

the habitual offender enhancement which supports an above-advisory sentence. 

Todd has been convicted of four felonies, including a prior stalking offense.

Although only the prior stalking offense relates to his current offense, see Harris 

v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. 2008) (noting the significance of a 

defendant’s criminal history varies based upon the gravity, nature, and number 

of prior offenses in relation to the current offense), his consistent contacts with 

law enforcement and the judicial system exhibit a disregard for the law and an 

 

to the habitual offender enhancement is July 1, 2014. Todd committed his offenses in March and April of 

2014. Moreover, these sections provide that “Those penalties, crimes, and proceedings continue and shall be 

imposed and enforced under prior law as if [the new criminal code] had not been enacted.” Id. These 

sections affirmatively state: “The general assembly does not intend the doctrine of amelioration (see Vicory v. 

State [272 Ind. 683], 400 N.E.2d 1380 (1980)) to apply to any SECTION [of the new criminal code].” Id. 

Therefore, the doctrine of amelioration cannot be applied to Todd’s sentencing.
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inability or unwillingness to abide by it. Todd also violated a protective order 

and has pending criminal causes relating to his other actions. We also note 

Todd’s repeated attempts to undermine the criminal justice system by taking 

Kelli’s phone so she could not call the police, leaving a note on her van after 

she spoke with a police officer, threatening Kelli with violence if she told 

anyone about his actions, keeping Josh from speaking with police, deflating 

Kelli’s van’s tires, having Josh plant incriminating evidence in an attempt to 

have her arrested, and attempting to have his new girlfriend give false testimony 

in his favor. Simply put, nothing about the nature of the offenses or Todd’s

character persuades us his sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[41] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Todd’s motion to sever 

the counts or in admitting evidence and his sentence is not inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Accordingly, we affirm 

Todd’s convictions and sentence.

[42] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.