alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2706 

To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act to provide snow removal assistance to Indian tribes under a Federal 

emergency declaration, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 18, 2018 

Mr. TESTER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide snow removal assistance 

to Indian tribes under a Federal emergency declaration, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SNOW REMOVAL ASSISTANCE. 

4 Section 502(a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Re5 lief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5192(a)) 

6 is amended— 

7 (1) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

8 end; 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2706 IS

1 (2) in paragraph (8), by striking the period at 

2 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

3 (3) by inserting after paragraph (8) the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(9) provide snow assistance, including snow re6 moval, de-icing, salting, snow dumps, and sanding of 

7 roads and other facilities, and search and rescue, 

8 sheltering, and other emergency protective measures, 

9 to an Indian tribe that makes a request for a dec10 laration that an emergency exists because of a snow11 storm or severe winter storm.’’. 

Æ 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6282

ANTHONY LEE BELCHER,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior

District Judge. (7:13-cv-00517-JCT-RSB)

Submitted: June 19, 2014 Decided: July 2, 2014

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Lee Belcher, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Lee Belcher seeks to appeal the district

court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition as 

untimely. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Belcher has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, 

we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
3

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### TEXAS EMPLOYERS INS. ASS’N v. MARSDEN.

No. 1603-6487.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

March 18, 1936.

Lawther, Cox & Cramer and Wm. M. Cramer, all of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.

Frank S. Roberts, of Breckenridge, for defendant in error.

TAYLOR, Commissioner.

This suit is by defendant in error, D. E. Marsden, to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board allowing hernia-benefits under subdivision 4, § 12b of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Revised Statutes 1925 (article 8306). The trial court upon a jury trial rendered judgment in favor of the claimant. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment; Chief Justice Hickman dissenting, 57 S.W.(2d) 900, 903.

It is pointed out in the dissenting opinion that the question presented is the exact question that was before the Supreme Court in Tally v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, 48 S.W.(2d) 988, to wit, that the award of the board requiring an operation for hernia was not final as respects the jurisdiction of the trial court to set it aside upon appeal.

The award shows upon its face that the amount of compensation finally to be awarded is wholly dependent on certain contingencies, and is substantially identical with the award set out in the opinion in the Tally Case, supra. The statement in the dissenting opinion is correct that the holding of the Commission of Appeals in that case “was necessarily approved by the Supreme Court, which entered its judgment reversing the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals and dismissing the cause.” The personnel of the Supreme Court as then constituted was Chief Justice Cureton, and Justices Greenwood and Pierson. In a recent opinion the Supreme Court in Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Lemons, 83 S.W.(2d) 658, Justice Critz speaking for the court as presently constituted, referred with approval to the Tally Case, and'has this day adopted the opinion of the Commission in Petroleum Casualty Company v. Webb, 92 S.W.(2d) 236 (not yet reported [in State report]), which gives controlling effect to the Tally Case. It is pointed out in the Webb Case that the question here presented has been definitely settled.

The judgments of the trial court and Court of Civil Appeals are reversed, and the cause is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Opinion adopted by the Supreme Court.
[No. 44488-3-I.

Division One.

November 6, 2000.]

#### Carolyn L. Anderson, et al., *Appellants,*v. American Restaurant Group, Inc., et al., *Respondents.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 98-2-02981-1, Peter D. Jarvis, J., entered March 26, 1999. *Reversed*by unpublished opinion per Agid, C.J., concurred in by Kennedy and Becker, JJ.
# C_2022462EN.01002501.xml

| 5.12.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 462/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.12.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 462/25

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.10957 – CURA / GENERALI / T-C PEP PROPERTY)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2022/C 462/09)

1.

This notification concerns the following undertakings:

| — | KG CURA Vermögensverwaltung G.m.b.H. & Co. (‘CURA’, Germany), |
| --- | --- |

—

KG CURA Vermögensverwaltung G.m.b.H. & Co. (‘CURA’, Germany),

| — | Generali SCF S.à r.l. (‘Generali’, Luxembourg), |
| --- | --- |

—

Generali SCF S.à r.l. (‘Generali’, Luxembourg),

| — | T-C PEP Property S.à r.l. (the ‘Target’, Luxembourg). |
| --- | --- |

—

T-C PEP Property S.à r.l. (the ‘Target’, Luxembourg).

CURA and Generali will acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation joint control of the whole of the Target.

The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares.

2.

| — | CURA is active in real estate in the shopping, office, traffic, hotel, residential and industrial sectors predominantly in Europe, with minor activities in the Americas and Asia, |
| --- | --- |

—

CURA is active in real estate in the shopping, office, traffic, hotel, residential and industrial sectors predominantly in Europe, with minor activities in the Americas and Asia,

| — | Generali is ultimately controlled by Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A, the Italian parent company of an international group of companies active in the insurance and financial sector with worldwide activities, |
| --- | --- |

—

Generali is ultimately controlled by Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A, the Italian parent company of an international group of companies active in the insurance and financial sector with worldwide activities,

| — | the Target is the owner of a real estate housing the PEP Einkaufscenter Neuperlach, a shopping centre in Munich, Germany. |
| --- | --- |

—

the Target is the owner of a real estate housing the PEP Einkaufscenter Neuperlach, a shopping centre in Munich, Germany.

3.

Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified:

M.10957 – CURA / GENERALI / T-C PEP PROPERTY

Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:

Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postal address:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

1

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

2

---
EXHIBIT 32.2



Certification of Chief Financial Officer



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer
of Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended December 30, 2005 (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: February 8, 2006



/s/ JOHN M. PALUMBOJohn M. Palumbo Chief Financial Officer
#### TEXAS & N. O. R. CO. v. STANLEY.

No. 2851.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

Nov. 27, 1935.

Roy L. Arterbury, of Houston, for appellant.

Carney & Carney, of Atlanta, for appellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

This action was instituted in county court of Nacogdoches county by appellant, Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, against appellee, H. F. Stanley, to recover damages to its property in Nacogdoches county caused by a collision with one of appellee’s trucks. Appellant pleaded a trespass in Nacogdoches county by appellee. Appellee answered by plea of privilege that the case be transferred to the county of his residence. Appellant duly controverted this plea. Upon trial the plea of privilege was sustained and the case transferred, as prayed for by appellee.

If we understand appellee’s brief, he would support the judgment appealed from upon the sole ground that, under the proof, he did not own the truck and was not responsible for the collision. There was abundant proof that he was guilty of the trespass, as charged.

The proof on the issue of the ownership of the truck was as follows: After the collision appellant’s local agent at Nacog-doches had a telephone conversation with a man in the town of Nacogdoches who told him that his name was H. F. Stanley, and that he owned the' truck. Lon B/ Marshall testified that, as the agent of the Ben T. Wilson Chevrolet Company in Nacog-doches, he made an estimate of the cost of repairs on the truck; that the request was made to him by appellee, H. F. Stanley; and that Mr. Stanley told him he owned the truck. There was other testimony to the effect that appellee admitted that he owned the cargo on the truck at the time of the collision.

By its proof appellant satisfactorily established every issue essential to sustain venue in Nacogdoches county. The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERIM
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                      13,125,879
<SECURITIES>                                19,626,042
<RECEIVABLES>                                   51,358
<ALLOWANCES>                                    45,876
<INVENTORY>                                    645,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            34,895,361
<PP&E>                                       1,137,559
<DEPRECIATION>                                 201,637
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              45,866,431
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,810,897
<BONDS>                                        537,165
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,272
<OTHER-SE>                                  41,509,097
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                45,866,431
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             6,402,861
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              37,033
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (6,918,752)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (6,918,752)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (6,918,752)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  $(0.78)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  $(0.78)
        

</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER MALDONADO MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 18

- 70206

Agency No. A095

- 300

- 405

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 6, 2020 * *

Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit Judges

.

Javier Maldonado Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his motion to reopen based on

ineffective assistanc e of counsel. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 13 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 18

- 70206

Gonzales , 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its dis cretion in denying Maldonado Martinez’s

motion to reopen as untimely where his motion was filed nearly ten years after the

IJ’s November 26, 2007, in absentia removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2),

and Maldonado Martinez failed to establish the due di ligence required to warrant

tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder , 646 F.3d 672, 67 7 (9th Cir.

2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing

because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due dilige nce in discovering

such circumstances).

Maldonado Martinez has not shown a legal or constitutional error behind the

BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen sua sponte

. See Bonilla v. Lynch , 840

F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                                 0
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                                0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                  0
<EQUITIES>                                   9,454,275
<MORTGAGE>                                           0
<REAL-ESTATE>                                        0
<TOTAL-INVEST>                               9,454,275
<CASH>                                         520,020
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                                   0
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                               0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,993,264
<POLICY-LOSSES>                                  9,518
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                                  0
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                                0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                                869,205
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       183,591
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,130,180
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,993,264
<PREMIUMS>                                     114,289
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                             33,374
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                                   0
<OTHER-INCOME>                                       0
<BENEFITS>                                      36,043
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                          0
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                            51,467
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (38,415)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (13,061)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (25,354)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (25,354)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.14)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.14)
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                   9,875
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                              9,518
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                              36,400
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                  9,518
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
 /s/ J. Hicks LanierJ. Hicks LanierChairman and Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)April 1, 2009
 /s/ K. Scott Grassmyer

K. Scott GrassmyerSenior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Controller(Principal Financial Officer)April 1, 2009
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1
                           DRILEX INTERNATIONAL INC.

                           COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME
                    PER COMMON AND COMMON EQUIVALENT SHARE

              (In thousands of dollars, except per share amounts)

<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 
                                                    Three Months Ended
                                                         March 31, 
                                                 ------------------------
                                                    1997          1996 
                                                 -----------   ----------
<S>                                              <C>           <C> 
Net income....................................   $         3   $      526
Interest expense on convertible promissory       =========== 
 note, net of tax.............................                         33
                                                               ----------
As adjusted for fully diluted computation.....                 $      559
                                                               ==========
Weighted average common shares outstanding....     6,706,255    4,381,205

Incremental shares attributable to 
 outstanding stock options and warrants.......       121,261      171,051
                                                 -----------   ----------
Weighted average common and common 
 equivalent shares outstanding................     6,827,516    4,552,256
                                                 ===========
Incremental shares attributable to 
 conversion of convertible promissory note....                    361,962
                                                               ----------
As adjusted for fully diluted computation.....                  4,914,218
                                                               ==========
Net income per common and common 
 equivalent share:
   Primary....................................   $       .00   $      .12
                                                 ===========   ==========
   Fully diluted..............................                 $      .11
                                                               ==========
</TABLE> 

Note:  The computations in this exhibit are presented in accordance with
       Regulation S-K, Item 601(b)(11). Under the provisions of Accounting
       Principles Board Opinion No. 15, the fully diluted amounts are not
       presented in the Company's Consolidated Statement of Income, since such
       amounts are not dilutive.
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER ON F URTHER M OTION FOR REHEARING

Appellate case name: Ex parte Matthew Leachman

Appellate case number: 01

- 16

- 00787

- CR

Trial court case number: 1522187

Trial court: 248th District Court of Harris County

The panel has voted to deny appellant’ s Further Motion for Rehearing of this

Court’s Ju ne 19 , 2018 O pinion on Rehearing and Judgment

.

It is ordered that the further motion for rehearing is denied

.

Judge’s s ignature : /s/ Laura C. Higley

Acting for the Panel

Panel consists of: Justices Higley , Brown, and Caughey

.

Date: August 16

, 2018