### CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 70 54 OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2009

FOREIGN APPROPRIATIONS ACT

Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Departmen t of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, which purports to prohibit all funds made available under title I of that Act from being used to pay the expenses for any United States delegation to a specialized UN agency, body, or commission that is chaired or presided over by a country with a government that the Secretary of State has determined supports international terrorism, unc onstitutionally infringes on the President’s authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomacy, and the State Department may disregard it

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June 1, 2009

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ACTING LEGAL ADVISER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

You have asked for an opinion regardi ng section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Department of State, Foreign Operations, a nd Related Programs Appropr iations Act (“Foreign Appropriations Act”), which is division H of the Fiscal Year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (H.R. 1105) (“Omnibus Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524. 1 The President signed the Omnibus Act into law on March 11, 2009. Sec tion 7054 purports to prohibit all funds made

available under title I of the Fo reign Appropriations Act from be ing used to pay the expenses for any United States delegation to a specializ ed United Nations (“U.N.”) agency, body, or commission that is chaired or presided over by a country with a government that the Secretary of State (“Secretary”) has determ ined supports international terro rism. You have asked whether section 7054 prevents the State Department from using title I funds for the prohibited function. We conclude that by purporting to bar the State Department from using title I funds for that function, section 7054 unconstitution ally infringes on the President’s authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomacy, and the State Department may disregard it.

I.

Section 7054 provides as follows:

None of the funds made availa ble under title I of this Act may be used to pay expenses for any United States delegation to any speci alized agency, body, or commission of the

United Nations if such commission is chai red or presided over by a country, the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(1)), supports

international terrorism.

Section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Ac t (“EAA”) mandates a license for the export of goods to a country the government of which th e Secretary has determined “has repeatedly

1 See Letter for David Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from Joan E. Donoghue, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State (May 4, 2009) (“Donoghue Letter”).Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 33

provided support for acts of internationa l terrorism” (“terrori st list state”). 2 The limitation imposed by section 7054 applies only to funds made available by title I of the Foreign Appropriations Act. You have informed us, ho wever, that title I is the only source of appropriated funds currently available to the St ate Department for a number of purposes related to the administration of foreign affairs, includ ing the carrying out of di plomatic and consular programs. You have further e xplained that title I appropriations are the only operating funds available to pay for State Department de legations to specialized U.N. entities. See State Department Request for Confirmation of the Views of the Office of Legal Counsel on Section 7054 at 3 (May 4, 2009) (“State Request”) (atta chment to Donoghue Letter). Section 7054 would thus effectively preclude th e State Department from includi ng any representatives in U.S. delegations to any specialized U.N. agency, comm ission or body chaired by a terrorist list state.

You have also informed us that most such government delegations are headed by a State Department official and include one or more additional State Depa rtment officials. See State Request at 3.

In signing the Omnibus Act, President Ob ama issued the following statement:

Certain provisions of the bill, in titles I and IV of Division B, title IV of Division E, and title VII of Division H, woul d unduly interfere with my c onstitutional authority in the area of foreign affairs by effectively direc ting the Executive on how to proceed or not proceed in negotiations or discussions with international organizations and foreign governments. I will not treat these provision s as limiting my ability to negotiate and enter into agreements with foreign nations.

Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. No. 2009-00145 (Mar. 1 1, 2009) (President Obama’s Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009). Sec tion 7054 is within title VII of division H, and purports to “effectively direct[] the Executive on how to proceed or not proceed in negotiations or discussions w ith international organizations and foreign governments.” Thus, although the President’s signing statemen t did not identify sect ion 7054 specifically, it encompasses that provision.

2 You have informed us that all terrorist list states were so designated by the Secretary pursuant to the EAA. The authority granted by the EAA, however, terminated on August 20, 2001. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (2000). That fact does not alter our an alysis. Since the EAA terminated, the President, acting under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000 & West Supp. 2008), has annually issued executive orders that adopt the provisions of the EAA and that continue Executive Branch actions taken initially under the authority of the EAA. See, e.g. , Notice of the President, Continuing of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 73 Fed. Reg. 43603 (2008); Exec. Order No. 13222, 3 C.F.R. 783 (2001). (The President also issued similar orders covering brief, pre-August 20, 2001 periods during which the EAA had lapsed and Congress had not yet acted to renew it. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12470, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1984); Exec. Order No. 12444, 3 C.F.R. 214 (1984).). Congress has recognized and ratified this practice. See Pub. L. No. 108- 458, § 7102(c)(3), 118 Stat. 3638, 3776 (2004) (providing that “[t]he President shall implement” certain amendments to section 6(j) of the EA A “by exercising the authorities of the President under [IEEPA]”). In light of this history, we believe that Congress intended the refe rence in section 7054 to de terminations “for purposes of 6(j)(1) of the [EAA]” to encompass, at a minimum, determinations that the Secretary made prior to EAA’s termination, but which retain their fo rce as a result of the President’s exer cise of his authority under IEEPA.

2Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act

The same restriction on the use of appropr iated funds has appeared in successive appropriations acts si nce fiscal year 2005. 3 President Bush indicated in signing statements accompanying these appropriations acts that the Executive Branch would construe such restrictions as “advisory.” 4 Consistent with President Bush’s direction, the Department sent representatives to participate from January 19, 2009 through January 23, 2009 in a session of a U.N. specialized body—the executive board of the United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) and the United Nations Population F und (“UNFPA”)—that was chaired at the time by Iran, a terrorist list state. See State Request at 4. Another m eeting of the executive board of UNDP/UNFPA, which Iran still chairs, is sche duled for May 26, 2009 to June 5, 2009, and the State Department—the lead U.S. participant in the proceedings of this body—believes it would be advantageous to United States foreign polic y objectives to send Stat e Department officials to accompany the U.S. delegation. See id. Moreover, because the State Department is contemplating participation in other upcoming mee tings of specialized U.N. entities that may fall within the restriction imposed by section 7054, an d because the Department may receive little prior notice that a terrorist list state will chair a particular U.N. entity in the future, you have asked for more general guidance on whether an d under what conditions the Department must comply with section 7054. See id. at 5.

II.

As noted, President Bush announced in prev ious signing statements that the Executive

Branch would construe as adviso ry restrictions that are functionally iden tical to section 7054.

See supra note 4. Were such a construction avai lable here, there would be no need to resolve the question of section 7054’s cons titutionality, and we are mindful that “[t]he executive branch has an obligation to attempt, inso far as is possible, to construe a statute so as to preserve its constitutionality.” Memorandum to the Honorable Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorn ey General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Myers

Amendment at 11 (Aug. 30, 1977). In our view, however , section 7054 is not susceptible to a

3 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. J (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act), § 112, 121 Stat. 1844, 2288 (2007); Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, § 637, 119 Stat. 2290, 2347 (2005); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, div. B (Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act), § 627, 118 Stat. 2809, 2920 (2004); cf. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. B (Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations), § 635, 118 Stat 3, 101 (2004) (prohibition limited to payment of expenses for delegation to United Nations Human Rights Commission, if chaired by state supporter of terrorism).

4 See 41 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1745, 1764 (Nov. 22, 2005) (“The executive branch shall construe as advisory the provisions of the Act that purport to direct or burden the Executive's conduct of foreign relations, including the authority to recognize foreign states and negotiate international agreements on behalf of the United States . . . . These provisions include section[] . . . 637.”) (President Bush’s statement on signing the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006); 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2924, 2924 (Dec. 8, 2004) (“The executiv e branch shall construe as advisory provi sions of the [Consolidated Appropriations Act] that purport to direct or burden the Executive’s con duct of foreign relations . . . . Such provisions include: in the Commerce-Justice-State Appropria tions Act, section[] . . . 627”) (President Bush’s statement on signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005); cf. 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 137, 137 (Jan. 23, 2004) (“The executive branch shall construe as advisory the provisions of the Act that purport to . . . direct or burden the Executive’s conduct of foreign relations, including section[] . . . 635 of the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Act.”) (President Bush’s statement on signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004).

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saving construction. Congress’s injunction—“None of the funds made ava ilable under title I of [the Foreign Appropriations Act] may be used . . . .”—is unambiguously phrased in mandatory terms, and we see no evidence that Congress intended the word “may” to mean “should.” Section 7054 is “plain and unambiguous,” United States v. Monsanto , 491 U.S. 600, 606 (1989), and the canon of constitutional avoidance “has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity.” United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. , 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001); see also United States v. Locke , 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (a court cannot “press statutory construction to the point of disingenuous evas ion even to avoid a constituti onal question”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we do not think th at section 7054 can be construed as merely advisory, even to avoid the serious constitutional question we now address.

III.

In our view, section 7054 impermissibly inte rferes with the Pres ident’s authority to manage the Nation’s foreign diplomacy. To be su re, a determination that a duly enacted statute unconstitutionally infringes on Ex ecutive authority must be “well-founded,” Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Re: Presidential Signing Statements , 74 Fed. Reg. 10669 (2009); see also Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional

Statutes , 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 200-01 (1994), and Congre ss quite clearly possesses significant article I powers in the area of foreign affairs, including with respect to questions of war and neutrality, commerce and tr ade with other nations, fo reign aid, and immigration. 5 As ample precedent demonstrates, however, C ongress’s power to legislate in the foreign affairs area does not include the authority to attempt to dict ate the modes and means by which the President engages in international diplomacy with fore ign countries and through international fora. Section 7054 constitutes an attempt to exercise ju st such authority: It effectively denies the President the use of his preferred agents—r epresentatives of th e State Department—to participate in delegations to spec ified U.N. entities chaired or pres ided over by certain countries. As this Office has explained, such statutor y restrictions are impermissible because the President’s constitutional authority to conduc t diplomacy bars Congress from attempting to

determine the “form and manner in which the Unit ed States . . . maintain[s] relations with foreign nations.” Issues Raised by Provisions Directi ng Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports , 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 21 (1992) (citing Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization

Bill , 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 38 (1990)).

The President’s basic authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomatic relations derives from his specific constitutional au thorities to “make Treaties,” to “appoint Ambassadors . . . and Consuls” (subject to Senate advi ce and consent), U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” id. art. II, § 3. It also fl ows more generally from the President’s status as Chief Executive, id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and from the requirement in article II,

5 See, e.g.

, Perez v. Brownell , 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (“Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legi slation for the effective regulation of fo reign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation.”), overruled on other grounds

, Afrovim v.

Rusk , 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Fong Yue Ting v. United States , 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507, 582 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress, to be sure, has a substantial and essential role in both foreign affairs and national security.”); see generally Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 72- 80 (2d ed. 1996).

4Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act

section 3 of the Constitution that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully

executed.” 6 As a result of these authorities, it is well established that the President is “the constitutional representative of the United Stat es in its dealings w ith foreign nations.” United

States v. Louisiana , 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960); see also Ex parte Hennen , 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 235 (1839) (“As the executive magistra te of the country, [the Presid ent] is the only functionary intrusted with the foreign relations of the na tion.”). As John Marshall noted in his famous speech of March 7, 1800 before the House of Repr esentatives (while still a member of that body), the Executive Branch is “entrusted with the whole foreign intercourse of the nation, with the negotiation of all its treaties, with the power of demanding a reciprocal performance of the article, which is accountable to the nation for th e violation of its engagements, with foreign nations, and for the consequences resulting from such violation.” John Marshall, Speech of March 7, 1800, in 4 The Papers of John Marshall 104-05 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984). The President is, in other words, the “organ” of the Nation’s diplomatic relations. Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of Alexander Ha milton 33, 38 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) (italics removed).

In addition, the Executive Branch has long adhe red to the view that Congress is limited in its authority to regulate the Pr esident’s conduct of diplomatic re lations. Specifically, it may not (as section 7054 would) place limits on the President’ s use of his preferred ag ents to engage in a category of important diplomatic relations, and thereby determine the form and manner in which the Executive engages in diplomacy. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, for example, set forth this view in a legal opinion that he delivered to President Washington in the midst of an ongoing debate in the first Congress over a proposed ame ndment to a bill to fund the exercise of foreign relations—a bill that eventually became the Act Providing the Means of Intercourse Between the United States and Foreign Nations, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 128 (1790) (“Foreign Intercourse Appropriations Act”). See Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), reprinted in 16 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 378-80 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961). The proposed amendment would have give n the Senate a role in approving the President’s assignments of particular grades of diplomats to partic ular foreign posts. See 12 Documentary History of the First Federal Congr ess of the United States of America 68-83 (Helen E. Veit, et al. eds., 1994). 7 Jefferson—objecting to what he believed to be the Senate’s impermissible attempt to extend its advice and consent authority over treaties and presidential appointments to Executive determinations about the conduct of diplomacy—also shed light on the special role that the Cons titution assigns to the President when it comes to the conduct of diplomatic relations. “The transaction of busin ess with foreign nations is Executive altogether

. . . except as to such portions of it as are specially submitted to the Senate,” Jefferson stated,

with “ [e]xceptions . . . to be construed st rictly.” 16 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 379. In the course of objecting to the proposal at ha nd, Jefferson not only opined that “[t]he Senate is

6 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi , 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“Although the source of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual de tail, the historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the Presid ent’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also 4 The Papers of John Marshall at 104 (obser ving that President’s duty “to execute the laws” supports his foreign affairs powers).

7 Congress ultimately rejected the proposed amendment, and the Foreign Intercourse Appropriations Act as enacted appropriated an unconditional annual diplomatic budget and made the President alone responsible for deciding how to spend the lump sum. See 1 Stat. 128-29.

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not supposed by the Constitution to be acquainted w ith the concerns of the Executive department . . . [they cannot] therefore be qualified to judge of the necessity which calls for a mission to any particular place . . . ,” but also that “[ a]ll this is left to the President.” Id. See also 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 242, 250 (1855) (affirming Jefferson’s view in concluding that the “power of determining when and at what places to appoint [consuls], and of what rank to appoint them[]” is constitutionally “intrusted to the sole discretion of the Executive”).

The available evidence suggests that Washington understood John Jay and James

Madison to share Jefferson’s views as expressed in this opinion, bot h as to the constraints on the Senate’s powers and the nature of the special diplomatic authorities the Constitution confers on

the President. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs 83 (2007) (noting Washington’s observation in his diary that “Madison’s ‘ opinion coincides with Mr. Jay’s and Mr. Jefferson’s—to wit—that they [ i.e. , the Senate] have no Constit utional right to interfere with either [the destination or grade of diplomats], . . . their po wers extending no farther than to an approbation or disapprobation of th e person nominated by the President, all the rest being Executive and vested in the President by the Constitution .’”) (quoting 4 Diaries of George Washington 122 (Apr. 27, 1790) (Jo hn Fitzpatrick ed., 1925)) (emphasis added). Indeed, prior to the Constitution’s ratification, John Jay in Federalist No. 64 , in explaining why the President

should have the discretion to decide when to se ek the Senate’s advice on treaty negotiation, had

sounded a similar theme:

Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy and the most dispatch, are those preparator y and auxiliary measures whic h are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation. For these, the president will find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see that the constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from ta lents, information, integrity, and deliberate invest igations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and dispatch

on the other.

The Federalist No. 64 at 205 (John Jay) (McLean’s ed., 1787); accord The Federalist No. 84 at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon [the President] according to general principl es concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence.”).

These Executive officials were not alone in ta king the position that the President enjoys significant discretion in determin ing how to negotiate with fore ign nations. Newspaper accounts of the House debate over the Foreign Intercour se Funding Act indicate that there was strong opposition to the proposed amendment (opposition which prompted Washington’s request for the Jefferson opinion). See 12 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of America at 68-83. According to one report, among the positions of the “considerable majority” in the House that reject ed the amendment was that “inter course with foreign nations is a trust specially committed to the President of the United States; and after the Legislature has made the necessary provision to enable him to discharge that trust, the manner how it shall be

executed must rest with him.” Id. at 72, 83.

6Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act

Members of Congress expressed similar view s in other contexts during the Nation’s early history. In 1796, for example, Senator Robe rt Ellsworth, a future Supreme Court Justice, explained that “[n]either [the le gislative nor the judici al] branch had a right to dictate to the President what he should answer [to foreign nati ons]. The Constitution left the whole business in his breast.” 5 Annals of Congress 28, 32 ( 1796). And in 1816, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made similar arguments in a report to the full Senate opposing adoption of a proposed resolution recommending that the President pursu e certain negotiations with Great Britain. See Compilation of Reports of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Doc. No. 231, pt. 8, at 22-25 (1901). The report stated that:

The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns w ith foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is responsible to the

Constitution.

Id. at 24. “[T]he interference of the Se nate in the direction of fo reign negotiations” was, the Committee thought, “calculated to diminish that re sponsibility and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety.” Id

.

Consistent with these principles, Congress may by statute affirm the President’s authority to determine whether, how, when, and through whom to engage in foreign diplomacy. 8 But when Congress takes the unusual step of purporting to impose statutory restri ctions on this well recognized authority, the Executive Branch has re sisted. For example, Congress enacted an appropriations rider in 1913, providing that “[h]ereaf ter the Executive shall not extend or accept any invitation to participate in any international congre ss, conference, or like event, without first having specific authority of law to do so.” Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 149, 37 Stat. 913 (1913) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262 (2006)). The Execu tive has not acted in accord with that requirement, see Henry M. Wriston, American Participation in International Conferences , 20 Am. J. Int’l L. 33, 40 (1926) (observing that “t here is not a single case [since 1913] where the President secured from Congress authorization to accept an invitation to a conference of a political or diplomatic character,” and that “since 1917 the whole practi ce of requesting Congress for authority to accept invitations to any sort of international conference ha s virtually fallen into disuse”), and the measure is now a “known dead letter,” Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 118 (2d ed. 1996). Indeed, when first informed of the provision’s existence (more than three years after its en actment), President Wilson reportedly termed it “utterly futile.” Wriston at 39. Wilson’s dismi ssive characterization a ccorded with the view, expressed in a leading treatise of the day, that the President “ca nnot be compelled by a resolution of either house or of both houses of Congress to exercise” his constitution al powers with respect to “instituting negotiations.” Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties: Their Making and Enforcement 74 (2d ed. 1916).

8 See, e.g. , 22 U.S.C. 287a (2006) (“[W]hen representing the United States in the respective organs and agencies of the United Nations, [U.S. repr esentatives] shall, at all times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President transmitted by the Secretar y of State unless other means of transmi ssion is directed by the President.”).

7Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 33

In more recent decades, the Executive has continued to object when Congress has attempted to impose limits on the form and manner by which the President exercises his diplomatic powers. In particular, the Executive has asserted on numerous occasions that the President possesses the “‘exclusive authority to determine the time, scope, and objectives’” of international negotiations or discussions, includ ing the authority “to determine the individuals who will” represent the United States in those diplomatic exchanges. 9 And this Office has “repeatedly objected on constituti onal grounds to Congressional attempts to mandate the time, manner and content of diplomatic negotiations,” in cluding in the context of potential engagement

with international fora. See Memorandum for Alan Kreczko, Lega l Adviser, National Security Council, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant A ttorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act at 3 (Feb. 9, 1995) (“Dellinger WTO Memo”).

For example, we concluded that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to adopt joint resolutions mandating that the President enter ne gotiations to modify the rules of the World Trade Organization. See id. Relatedly, we determined that a legislative provision purporting to prevent the State Department fr om expending appropriated funds on delegates to an international conference unless legislative representatives were included in the delegation was an “impermissibl[e] interfere[nce]” with the Presid ent’s “constitutional responsibility to represent

the United States abroad and thus to choose th e individuals th rough whom the Nation’s foreign

affairs are conducted.” 14 O p. O.L.C. at 38, 41. And the Executive Branch has objected numerous times on constitutional grounds to legisl ative provisions purporting to preclude any U.S. government employee from negotiating with (or recognizing) th e Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”) or its representative s until the PLO had met certain conditions. 10

9 14 Op. O.L.C. at 38, 41 (quoting II Pub. Papers Ronald Reagan 1541, 1542 (Dec. 22, 1987) (President Reagan’s statement in signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989)); see also Section 235A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 24 Op. O.L.C. 276, 281 (2000) (same); 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2040, 2041 (Oct. 11, 1996) (President Clinton’s statement on signing the Sustainable Fisheries Act) (“Under our Constitution, it is the President who articulat es the Nation’s foreign policy and who determines the timing and subject matter of our negotiations with foreign nations.”); 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1527, 1528 (Oct. 28, 1991) (President Bush’s statement on signing th e Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993) (“The Constitution . . . vests exclusive authority in the President to control the timing and substance of negotiations with foreign governments and to choose th e officials who will negotiate on behalf of the United States.”); The President—Authority to Participate in International Negotiations—Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2101)—Participation in Producer-Consumer Fora , 2 Op. O.L.C. 227, 228 n.1 (1978) (“[W]e think it doubtful that the President’s power to negotiate with foreign governments over subjects of national concern can ever be subject to unqualified restriction by statute.”); accord Henkin at 42 (“As ‘sole organ, ’ the President determines also how, when, where, and by whom the United States should make or receive communications, and there is nothing to suggest that he is limited as to time, place, form, or forum.”).

10 See, e.g. , Memorandum for Carol T. Crawford, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, from John O. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: H.R. 2939 at 3 (Oct. 19, 1989); see also 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 972, 973 (Aug. 8, 1985) (President Reagan’s statement on signing the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985) (objecting to such a provision as a “congressional effort to impose legisla tive restrictions or directions with respect to the conduct of international negotiations which, under article II of the Constitution, is a function reserved exclusively to the President”); accord 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 266, 267 (Feb. 16, 1990) (President Bush’s statement on signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991) (stating that provision “restrict[ing] the expenditure of appropriated funds for carrying on ‘the current dialo gue in the Middle East peace process w ith any [PLO representative]’” would, if “interpreted to prohibit negotiations with particular individuals under certain circumstances,” “impermissibly limit my constitutional authority to negotiate with foreign organizations”).

8Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act

In objecting to one such provision, this Office explained that Congress “possesses no constitutional authority to forbid the Presid ent from engaging in diplomatic contacts.” Memorandum for Carol T. Crawford, Assistant Attorn ey General, Office of Legislative Affairs, from John O. McGinnis, Deputy Assistant At torney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: H.R.

2939 at 3 (Oct. 19, 1989). Other Executive Branch precedents are to similar effect. See Bill To Relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem , 19 Op. O.L.C. 123, 126 (1995) (concluding that a proposed bill conditioning the St ate Department’s ability to obligate certain appropriated funds upon the relocation of the United States’s Isr aeli embassy to Jerusalem would

constitute an unconstitutional inva sion of the President’s authority to determine the form and manner of the Nation’s diplomatic relations ); 16 Op. O.L.C. at 24-28 (deeming it an unconstitutional “interfere[nce] with the President’s communica tions to foreign governments” and his “ability to conduct diplomacy” for Congr ess to preclude the State Department’s use of appropriated funds to issue additional diplomatic passports of a type necessary for government employees to travel to certain Arab league countries); 15 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1434 (Aug. 15, 1979) (President Carter’s statement on signin g H.R. 3363) (“I believe that Congress cannot

mandate the establishment of consular relati ons at a time and place unacceptable to the President.”). 11

Judicial support for the Executive Branch’s position can be found in Earth Island Institute v. Christopher , 6 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993). In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit st ruck down a statute purporting to require the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with, and otherwise engage, foreign go vernments for the purposes of developing and entering in to international agreements for the protection of sea turtles. The court

deemed the statute an unconstitutional “intru [sion] upon the conduct of foreign relations by the

Executive.” Id. at 653. Additional judicial support can be found in the Supreme Court’s clear

dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. , 299 U.S. 304 (1936): “[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a repres entative of the nation. . . . Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congr ess itself is powerle ss to invade it,” id. at 319.

That the President possesses th e exclusive power to determ ine how to conduct diplomacy

with other nations does not mean that Congress is without releva nt authority. For example, the Senate must approve the treaties the President negotiates, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and Congress can, by a subsequently enacted st atute, limit the effect of treaties, see Whitney v.

Robertson , 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (stati ng that if a treaty and a st atute are inconsistent, “the one last in date will control the other”). The Se nate may even refuse its consent to a treaty if an international organization makes entry into such treaty a necessa ry precondition of United States

11 See also Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical Control

, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 186 (1996) (proposed bill prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds by the Department of Defense for the activities of elements of the armed forces placed under the United Nations’s operational or tactical control woul d “impermissibly undermin[e] the Presid ent’s constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of diplomacy”); Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act , 20 Op. O.L.C. 189, 193 (1996) (legislative provision requiring the President to make a detailed certification before using appropriated funds to expand the United States’s diplomatic presence in Vietnam constituted “an unconstitutional condition on the exercise of the President’s” recognition power).

9Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 33

participation in the procee dings of that organization. 12 The statutory lim itation at issue here, however, does not constitute such an exercise of Congress’s legiti mate authority in the area of foreign affairs; rather, it purports to restrict the President from engaging in diplomacy through international fora that are organi zed pursuant to a treaty to whic h the United States is a party.

See United Nations Charter, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1031, 1213 (noting that Senate

consented to ratification of U. N. Charter on July 28, 1948). Sec tion 7054, in other words, seeks to regulate who may participate in the delegatio ns the President may send to the international fora of an organization to which the United Stat es belongs, and at which the United States would

be received were its dele gations to be sent.

Nor is the impact of section 7054 on the Pres ident’s discretion to determine the “form and manner” of the Nation’s diplomacy merely hypothetical. You have explained to us that “United Nations bodies and affiliated agencies ar e generally responsible for marshalling United Nations member state responses to issues that fa ll within their purview.” State Request at 3. Accordingly, full U.S. participation in such bodies facilitates the type of direct diplomacy that is critically important to advanci ng U.S. objectives with respect to the issues under discussion. Id. at 4. Moreover, the decision to send a full comple ment of government representatives to a class of entities that are so centrally important to th e business of the U.N. may affect the standing and influence of the U.S. within the community of nations and thereby have a deleterious effect on the President’s diplomatic efforts more broadly. That Congress has purpo rted to restrict the President’s reliance on the State Department—t he lead and most experienced and capable government agency with respect to U.N. relations , see 22 U.S.C. §§ 287, 287a (2006); see also State Request at 3-4—further heightens the exte nt to which section 7054 impermissibly restrains the President’s authority. Indeed, with refere nce to the particular context of the upcoming meeting of the executive board of UNDP/UNFPA, you have explained that “prohibiting State Department participation . . . would significantly hinder direct U.S. engagement in important diplomatic efforts, undermining U.S. strategic fo reign policy interests.” State Request at 4.

For these reasons, section 7054’s prevention of the inclusion of State Department representatives in delegations to the speci fied U.N. entities is unconstitutional.

IV.

Our conclusion is not affected by the fact th at Congress has drafted its restriction as a prohibition on the use of appropriated funds rath er than as a direct prohibition. Congress’s spending power is undoubtedly broad, and, as a general matter, Congress may decline to appropriate money altogether for a particular function, or place binding conditions on the

12 In addition, although the question is not settled, Congress may possess some authority to withdraw the United States from membership in an international organi zation—at least where the organization relates to a subject matter, such as foreign commerce, that falls within Congress ’s enumerated powers, U.S. C onst. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Dellinger WTO Memo at 4-6; cf. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984, at 222 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that Congress possesses “vast powers to de termine the bounds within which a President may be left to work out a foreign policy”).

10Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act

appropriations it does make. 13 But as the Executive Bran ch has repeatedly observed, “it does not necessarily follow that [Congress] may attach whatever condition it desires to an appropriation,” 14 for “Congress may not deploy [the spending power] to accomplish

unconstitutional ends.” 15 The Supreme Court has affirmed this fundamental proposition on a

number of occasions. The most notable case is United States v. Lovett , 328 U.S. 303 (1946). There, the Court expressly rejected the proposit ion that the appropriations power is “plenary and not subject to judicial revi ew,” and struck down as an unc onstitutional bill of attainder a provision in an appropriations act that barred the payment of salaries to named federal employees. Id. at 305, 307; see also United States v. Klein , 80 U.S. 128, 147-48 (1871) (deeming an appropriations proviso that “impair[ed] the effect of a [presidential] pardon” void as an unconstitutional “infring[ement]” on “the constitutional power of the Executive”); Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond , 496 U.S. 414, 435 (1990) (White, J ., concurring) (noting that “the [majority] does not state th at statutory restrictions on ap propriations may never fall even . . . if they encroach on the powers reserved to another branch of the Federal Government”).

Consistent with these precedents, the Executive Branch has long adhered to the view that “Congress cannot use the appropriations power to c ontrol a Presidential po wer that is beyond its

direct control.” Presidential Certification Regarding the Pr ovision of Documents to the House of Representatives Under the Mexic an Debt Disclosure Act of 1995 , 20 Op. O.L.C. 253, 267 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mutual Security Program—Cutoff of Funds from Office of Inspector General and Comptroller , 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 507, 530 (1960) (Att’y Gen. Rogers). 16

13 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”); United States v. MacCollom , 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (“The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress . . . .”) (citing Reeside v. Walker

, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850)); Authority of Congressional Committees to Disapprove Action of Executive

Branch , 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 230, 233 (1955) (Att’y Gen. Brownell) (“It is recognized that Congress may grant or withhold appropriations as it chooses, and when making an appropriation may direct the purposes to which the appropriation shall be devoted.”); Memorandum for the Acting Solicitor General from John F. Davis, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Validity of Section 207 of Current Appropriation Act Providing That None of the Funds May be Used in the Santa Margarita Litigation at 2 n.2 (June 26, 1953) (“The use of a rider to an appropriation act to control executive action is by no means novel.”).

14 Memorandum for Charles W. Colson, Special Coun sel to the President, from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the

Cambodian Sanctuaries at 21 n.3 (May 22, 1970).

15 Presidential Certification Regarding the Provision of Documents to the House of Representatives Under the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995 , 20 Op. O.L.C. 253, 266 (1996); 41 Op. Att’y Gen. at 233 (“If the practice of attaching invalid conditions to legislative enactments were permissible, it is evident that the constitutional system of the separability of the branches of Governme nt would be placed in the gravest jeopardy.”); Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds , 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 (1933) (Att’y Gen. Mitchell) (“Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a discharge of the functions of Government in a manner not authorized by the Constitution. If such a practice were permissible, Congress could subvert the Constitution.”).

16 The Supreme Court suggested in South Dakota v. Dole , 483 U.S. 203 (1987), that “the constitutional limitations on Congress when exercising its spending power” vis á vis the States “are less exacting than those on its authority to regulate directly.” Id. at 209. But the Court has since made cl ear that Congress do es not enjoy such heightened latitude when it purports to impose spending conditions on the Executive Branch, for “ Dole did not involve separation-of-powers principles.” Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc. , 501 U.S. 252, 271 (1991); see also 16 Op. O.L.C. at 29 ( Dole does not apply to spending conditions in the separation-of-powers context).

11Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 33

This proposition applies with equal fo rce in the foreign affairs context. 17 Indeed, on numerous occasions, this Office has invoked the specific prin ciple that “the spending power may not be deployed to invade core Pr esidential prerogatives in th e conduct of diplomacy.” Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act , 20 Op. O.L.C. 189, 197 (1996) (citing precedents for this principle from early 19th century i nvolving objections to a ppropriations riders by Representative Daniel Webster, then-Secretary of State John Qu incy Adams, and members of Congress); see, e.g. , supra page 9 & nn.12-13 (discussing memoranda and opinions). Section 7054, by purporting to use the appropriations power to enact a targeted restriction designed to dictate the form and manner through which th e President may conduct the nation’s diplomacy, is akin to these prior provisions. 18

V.

Accordingly, the Secretary would be justified in disregarding section 7054—and using funds appropriated in title I for the purpose of paying the expenses of delegations to U.N. entities chaired by terrorist list states.

/ s/

DAVID J. BARRON Acting Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Counsel

17 See 20 Op. O.L.C. at 266 (“‘Congress may not use its power over appropriations of public funds to attach conditions to Executive Branch appropriations requiring the President to relinquish his constitutional discretion in foreign affairs.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 16 Op. O.L.C. at 28, quoting 14 Op. O.L.C. at 42 n.3, quoting Constitutionality of Proposed Statutory Pr ovision Requiring Prior Congressional Notification for Certain CIA Covert Actions , 13 Op. O.L.C. 258, 261 (1989)).

18 Because there is no evidence that the Foreig n Appropriations Act “without [section 7054] will not

function ‘in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress,’” sectio n 7054 is “severable.” 16 Op. O.L.C. at 29 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock , 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987)). Accordingly, section 7054’s invalidity does not call into question the validity of any of the other provisions of the Act. See 20 Op. O.L.C. at 189 n. 21; 14 Op. O.L.C. at 44 (“Because the [unconstitu tional] condition is severable, the Pres ident may enforce the remainder of the provision, disregarding the condition.”); cf. Memorial of Captain Meigs , 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 469-70 (1860) (Att’y Gen. Black) (“[I]f a condition . . . is void, it can have no eff ect whatever either upon the subject-matter or upon other parts of the law to which it is appended . . . .”).

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