STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A16-0363 In the Matter of Hibbing Taconite Mine and Stockpile Progression and Williams Creek Project Sp ecific Wetland Mitigation. Filed December 5, 2016 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Reilly, Judge Minnesota Department of Natural Resources OAH Docket No. 11-2004-31655 Gerald W. Von Korff, John C. Kolb, Rinke Noonan, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for relator Lake of the Woods County) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Max Kiel ey, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Department of Natural Resources) Susan K. Wiens, William P. Hefner, The E nvironmental Law Group, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Cli ffs Natural Resources Inc.) Considered and decided by Reilly, Presidi ng Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Johnson, Judge. S Y L L A B U S The authority of the commissioner of natura l resources, under Minnesota Statutes section 103G.222 (2014), to approve wetlands replacement for activities requiring a permit to mine does not include the authority to approve the reservation of wetland credits for future use by a permit-to-mine applicant without deposit into the state wetlands bank.2 O P I N I O N
REILLY , Judge In this certiorari appeal, relator county ch allenges a final order affirming respondent administrative agency’s approval of responde nt mine operator’s wetland replacement plan. We affirm in part, reve rse in part, and remand. FACTS In January 2014, respondent Cliffs Natura l Resources Inc. (Cliffs) submitted to respondent Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) an application for approval of a wetland replacement plan (the plan or the Cliffs’s plan) proposi ng the restoration of about 432 acres of wetlands at a specified s ite in Lake of the W oods County (the LOW site). The plan stated that the LOW site wa s projected to produce approximately 443.34 wetland credits, 14.29 of which were designate d for mitigation of wetland impacts of mine progression and stockpile development at Cli ffs’s mining operation, Hibbing Taconite, and the balance of which were “to be held for fu ture use” to mitigate wetland impacts of any of Cliffs’s mining operations’ “potential fu ture” activities requiring a permit to mine (PTM). The plan was entitled “Project-Spe cific Wetland Repla cement Plan Hibbing Taconite Mine and Stockpile Progression Project” and was submitted by Cliffs to DNR pursuant to its authority to approve wetland-replacement actions in connection with activities requiring a PTM. See Minn. Stat. § 103G.222, subd . 1(a) (2014); Minn. R. 8420.0200, subp. 1.D, .0930, subp. 1 (2015). Relator Lake of the Woods County (the county) and others submitted to DNR comments opposing Cliffs’s plan based on “numerous technical issues and its3 inconsistency with the Wetland C onservation Act.” The county also asserted that the plan, despite its title, was not a wetland replacement plan subject solely to DNR approval, but rather a wetland banking plan subject to sp ecific regulatory requirements and oversight by the Minnesota Board of Water and Soil Resources (BWSR). See Minn. Stat. § 103G.2242, subd. 9 (2014); Minn. R. 8420.0700-.0820 (2015). DNR issued a notice of decision approv ing the plan as a replacement plan and directing that “any person aggrie ved by this decision may appe al the decision in the manner provided for a contested case hearing.” Th e county both petitione d DNR for contestedcase proceedings and submitted an appeal to BW SR, asserting that the proper avenue of review was the appeal to BWSR . BWSR held the county’s appeal in abey ance, and DNR ordered contested-case proceedings before the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to adjudicate three issues: 1. Was the Commissioner’s approval of [the Cliffs’s plan] issued in conjunction with a valid [PTM] and an approved mining reclamati on plan pursuant to the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 103G.222, subd. 1 (2012)? 2. If there are surplus wetland mitigation credits developed by Cliffs [under its plan], can they be used to mitigate mining-related wetland impacts at Cliffs’ mining operations . . . pursuant to Mi nn. R. 8420.0930, subp. 4A (2013) without being deposited in a state wetland bank? 3. Did the Commissioner have cause to approve [the Cliffs’s plan] pursuant to Mi nn. Stat. § 103G.222, subd. 1 (2012) and Minn. R 8420.0930 (2013)? Cliffs successfully petitioned to intervene and brought a mo tion to dismiss the contestedcase proceedings for lack of juri sdiction or, alternatively, to li mit the proceedings to review4 on the administrative record. Bo th the county and DNR opposed Cliffs’s motion to dismiss or to limit the proceedi ngs, and the administrative-law judge (the ALJ) denied the motion. DNR moved for partial summary dispositi on, which Cliffs supported and the county opposed. The ALJ issu ed an order recommending summary disposition in favor of DNR on Issues 1 and 2, and the parties entered in to a settlement agreemen t resolving Issue 3. The ALJ issued an order reco mmending dismissal of the contested-case proceedings, in light of the partial summary-disposition re commendation and the parties’ settlement agreement. After receiving written arguments, the co mmissioner of natural resources (the commissioner) issued a final order adopting with modification the ALJ’s order denying Cliffs’s motion to dismiss th e contested-case proceedings for lack of jurisdiction and recommending summary disposition in favor of DNR on Issues 1 and 2; adopting without modification the ALJ’s order recommending dism issal of the contested-case proceedings; and affirming DNR’s notice of decision approving the plan as modified by the settlement agreement. The final order includes a conc lusion that “excess wetland credits from [wetland restoration at] the [LOW] site [may ] be used to replace future mining-related [wetland] impacts from mining operations u nder a [PTM] that is held by [Cliffs].” The county appeals, arguing that DNR lack ed jurisdiction to initiate contested-case proceedings and exceeded its au thority in approving the plan. ISSUES I. Did the county waiv e or forfeit the issues raised on appeal? II. Did DNR exceed its statutory authority in approving Cliffs’s plan?5 ANALYSIS This appeal requires us to examine the na ture and extent of DNR’s authority under the Minnesota Wetland Conservation Act (WCA ), Minn. Stat. §§ 103G.221-.2375 (2014), which was adopted by the legisl ature in 1991 for the purpose of preserving and restoring Minnesota wetlands. See Minn. Stat. § 103A.201 (2014); Drum v. Minn. Bd. of Water & Soil Res. , 574 N.W.2d 71, 73 (M inn. App. 1998). WCA requires that “[w]etlands must not be drained or filled, wholly or partially, unless replaced by actions that provide at least equal public value under a replacement plan.” Minn. Stat. § 103G.222, subd. 1(a). WCA is primarily administered by BWSR in cooperation with soil and water conservation districts and other local government units (LGUs). Drum , 574 N.W.2d at 73-74; Minn. Stat. § 103G.005, subd. 10e (2 014) (defining local government unit). Generally speaking, to engage in activities potentially impacting wetlands, one must appl y to the responsible LGU for no-loss or exemption determinations or for approval of a replacement plan. See Minn. Stat. § 103G.2242, subds. 1(a), 1(b), 4. The decisions of LGUs, including a replacement-plan decision, may be appealed to BWSR. Id. , subd. 9. In an exception to the general LGU-BW SR procedure, WCA authorizes DNR to approve replacement plans fo r wetland impacts resulting from activities requiring a PTM under Minnesota Statutes section 93.481 (2014). Minn. Stat. § 103G.222, subd. 1(a). As to wetland impacts resulting from activities re quiring a PTM, wetland replacement must take place under a mining reclamati on plan approved by the commissioner. Id. “Mining reclamation plans shall apply th e same principles and standards for replacing wetlands that are applicable to mitigati on plans approved as provided in section 103G.2242.” Id. DNR’s6 approval of wetland replacement under a mining reclamation plan is subject to review through a contested-case proceeding. See Minn. Stat. § 93.50 (2014) (providing for review under chapter 14). Pursuant to its authority under WCA, BWSRpromulgated rules in 1993 establishing a state wetland banking system. See Minn. Stat. § 103G.2242, subd. 1(a); Minn. R. 8420.0700-.0820. The state wetla nd bank is “a system of iden tifying wetlands restored or created for replacement credit and providing for, facilitating, and tracking the exchange of wetland banking credits for projec ts that require replacement plans or wetland mitigation required by other local, state, or federal auth orities.” Minn. R. 8420.0111, subp. 67 (2015). Deposits into the state wetland bank are ac complished through an application to the responsible LGU. Minn. R. 8420.0705, .0725. A banking plan application must be reviewed by a technical evaluation panel (TEP), which may recommend certain changes or additions before LGU approval. Minn. R. 8420.0705, subp. 3. LGU’s banking-plan decisions may be appealed to BWSR. Minn. R. 8420.0905 (2015). The expressed “purpose of the state wetland banking system is to provide a marketbased structure that allows for replacement of unavoidable impacts with preestablished replacement wetlands.” Minn. R. 8420.0700. The system may al so be used by an applicant seeking to preserve wetland credits solely for its own future use. See Minn. Stat. § 103G.2242, subd. 14(b) (per mitting lower fees for “singl e-user or other dedicated wetland banking acco unts”). In 2011, the legislature passed amendments to WCA addressing the use of the wetland bank in conn ection with activities requiring a PTM. The amendments designate DNR as the LGU “for wetland banking pr ojects established solely7 for replacing wetland impacts under a [PTM]” a nd cap the amount of fees that may be assessed for such a banking project. 2011 Minn. Laws ch. 107 §§ 63, 73, at 477, 485, codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 103G.005, subd. 10e(4 ), .2242, subd. 14 (c) (2014). Under BWSR regulations, whether ap proved by an LGU or DNR, wetland replacement must be completed in advance of or concurrent with the actual wetland impact. Minn. R. 8420.0522, subp. 8.A (2015). Replacemen t is in advance if itis accomplished by (1) withdrawal of wetland bank credits befo re the impact, or by (2) project-specific replacement that has reached certain construction milestones. Id. , subp. 8.B (2015). The regulations also allow for combined bankin g and project-specific replacement through submission of both a bank ing plan and a correspondi ng replacement plan. See Minn. R. 8420.0705, subp. 4. This appeal stems from DNR’s established practice of allowing PTM applicants to designate and carry over surplus wetland credits for the applican t’s use in connection with unspecified future PTM activitie s, without depositin g the credits into the state wetland bank. DNR describes its practice as follows: [I]f a mining permittee creates a project-specific wetland replacement site to offset wetland impacts arising under a PTM, surplus wetland mitigati on credits generated at the wetland replacement site (i.e., any credits that exceed the number of wetland credits needed to mitigate for immediate mining-related wetland impacts) ma y be held in reserve by the permittee for future mitigation of other mining-related wetland impacts associated with the permittee’s mining operations. Under this practice, review of DNR’s initial decision to approve a replacement plan that results in surplus credits may be sought through a contested- case hearing, with a final8 decision being made by the commissioner. According to DNR, the commissioner’s final decision is not subject to review by BWSR. The county objects to this practice.
I. We first address Cliffs’s arguments that the county waived some arguments by virtue of the settlement agreement, and forfe ited other arguments by failing to raise them during the contested-case proceedings. We address each argument in turn. A. The county did not waiv e its appellate arguments. Cliffs argues that the settlement agreem ent “definitively reso lved” all remaining “disputed factual and legal claims” regarding DN R’s treatment of Cliffs’s plan as a projectspecific replacement plan. “[A] settlement agreem ent is a contract.” Dykes v. Sukup Mfg.
Co. , 781 N.W.2d 578, 581-82 (M inn. 2010) (citation omitted). Appellate courts “review the language of the contract to dete rmine the intent of the parties.” Id. at 582 (citation omitted). “When the language is clear and unambiguous, [c ourts] enforce the agreement of the parties as expressed in the language of the contract.” Id. (citation omitted). We “must read and interpret contracts, like statut es, as a whole, not as separate isolated provisions.” In re Petition for Distribution of Attorney’s Fees , 870 N.W.2d 755, 768 (Minn. 2015). In this case, the settlement agreement provides: This Settlement includes and is specifically limited to resolution of Issue 3 as iden tified in [DNR’s order for contested-case proceedings before OAH].

. . . .9 This Agreement disposes only of Issue 3. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent any Party from exercising rights to appeal a final decision of [DNR] based on the [ALJ]’s recommendation on summary dispos ition of Issues 1 and 2 as identified in [the order for c ontested-case proceedings]. . . . All Parties waive their right to appeal from the final decision of [DNR] on Issue 3 as resolved by th is Agreement. Thus we must determine whether the county’s arguments ar ising from DNR’s treatment of Cliffs’s plan as a project-spe cific replacement plan relate to Issue 3 and are therefore waived. Viewing the issues in context, we c onclude that Issue 1 addresses DNR’s statutory authority to approve Cliffs’s plan as either a pr oject-specific replacement plan or a banking plan, Issue 2 addresses the legality of DNR’s treatment of Cliffs’s plan as a project-specific replacement plan that may produce surplus wetla nd credits for Cliffs’s future use without deposit into the state wetland bank, and I ssue 3 addresses the sufficiency of the evidence to show that Cliffs’s plan meets the technical requirements of a project-specific replacement plan. Consequently, we conclude that th e county’s arguments arising from DNR’s treatment of Cliffs’s plan as a project-spe cific replacement plan apply to Issue 2—not Issue 3. Because the settlement agreement pres erved the parties’ right to appeal from the commissioner’s ultimate resoluti on of Issues 1 and 2, the se ttlement agreement does not preclude our consideration of th e county’s arguments on appeal.10 B. The county’s appellate arguments are not forfeited. Cliffs also argues that the county failed to preserve for appeal its argument that DNR lacked statutory authority to initiate co ntested-case proceedings on the county’s administrative appeal of DNR’s plan-approva l decision. Cliffs presents us with two distinct failure-to-preserve, or forfeitu re, theories, neither of which we accept. Cliffs’s first theory of fo rfeiture hinges on its characte rization of a paragraph in DNR’s notice of its decision to appr ove Cliffs’s plan, which provides: Pursuant to Minn. Stat ., sec. 93.50, any person aggrieved by this decision may appeal the decision in the manner provided for a conteste d case hearing under Minn. Stat., Secs. 14.57 to 14.62 and the procedures prescribed in Minn. Rules, parts 1400.5100 to 1400.8500. An ap peal of this decision by an aggrieved part y must be received by the commissioner within 30 calendar days of the date of the mailing of this Notice. According to Cliffs, this boilerplate appeal s-process language constituted an “appealable final decision” and the only appe al available was through a cont ested-case hearing. Cliffs thus claims that the county’s “fai lure [to] file an appeal with this Court within thirty days of its receipt” of the notice of decision precludes our consider ation of th e county’s argument that DNR lacked statutory authority to initiate the contested-case proceedings. Generally, an administrativ e agency’s “final order, de cision or judgment affecting a substantial right” may be appealed to this c ourt. Minn. R. Civ. Ap p. P. 103.03(g). An order, decision, or judgment is “final,” fo r purposes of immediate appealability, if it “finally determine[s] some positive legal ri ght belonging to the [would-be appellant].” McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais Heights , 883 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Minn. 2016)11 (quotation omitted). But “[ the supreme court] ha[s] never held that an unsuccessful challenge to the subject-matter jurisdiction of an executive-branch agency either finally determines a party’s legal rights or is immediately appealable.” Beuning Family LP v. County of Stearns , 817 N.W.2d 122, 127 (Minn. 2012 ). Indeed, the supreme court has affirmatively stated that “no ri ght . . . is violated when an administrative agency wrongly asserts jurisdiction over a party.” Id. at 128 (citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. , 303 U.S. 41, 43, 58 S. Ct. 459, 460 (1938)). In this case, the supposedly final decision consists of no more than DNR’s formulaic expression of inte nt to route any future administrative appeal of its plan-approval decision through contested-case proceedings befo re OAH. In light of controlling caselaw establishing that an administrative agency’s actual assertion of jurisdiction over an objecting party is not immediately appealable by that party, Beuning Family LP , 817 N.W.2d at 127-28, Cliffs’s first forfeiture theory is meritless. Cliffs’s second forfeiture theory is that the county failed to challenge in the contested-case proceedings DNR’s statut ory authority to initiate contested-case proceedings on the county’s admi nistrative appeal of DNR’s plan-approval decision. Cliffs is correct that “[g]enerally, failure to ra ise an issue in an administrative proceeding precludes review on appeal.” Riley v. Jankowski , 713 N.W.2d 379, 398 (Minn. App. 2006), review denied (Minn. July 19, 2006) (c itation omitted). And here, the county did not just neglect to raise the issue during the conteste d-case proceedings; the county itself demanded DNR’s initiation of those proceedings, albeit with a reservation of rights. And when Cliffs challenged OAH’s jurisdiction, arguing in part that DNR lacked statutory authority to12 initiate the contested-case proceedings before OAH, the county opposed Cliffs’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In its opposition, the county argued that OAH had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; the count y neither mentioned its BWSR appeal nor characterized its invocation of the contested-case proceedings as “protective” or made only “under protest.” We are reminded of “the do ctrine of invited error[,] which precludes a party from asserting error on appeal whic h he invited or could have pr evented in the court below.” Krenik v. Westerman , 201 Minn. 255, 262, 275 N.W. 849, 852 (1937). But we do not apply that doctrine here because, if the DNR did not have statut ory authority to initiate the contested-case proceedings that culminated in the commissioner’s i ssuance of the final order, then that order is void. See Senior Citizens Coal. of Ne. Minn. v. Minn. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n , 355 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Minn. 1984) (s tating that because an administrative agency’s “lack of statutory authority betokens a lack of jurisdiction, ” an agency decision “rendered either without statutory authority or in excess of the authority granted” is void); see also Rowe v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev. , 704 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Minn. App. 2005) (“An agency’s action taken without statut ory authority ordinarily is void.”). Cf. Nelson v. Schlener , 859 N.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Minn. 2015) (“ [D]efects in subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and cannot be waived by the parties.”). 1 We therefore conclude that the county has not forfeited its arguments and we procee d to the merits of the appeal.

1 During oral argument, DNR re framed and reiterated Cliffs’s second forfeiture theory. The county subsequently filed with this court a letter supplying record citations to refute that theory; Cliffs and DNR prom ptly filed with this court th eir objections to and requests to strike the county’s post-hear ing submission. Because the county did not have leave to13 II. “Summary disposition is the administrativ e equivalent of summary judgment.” In re Gillette Children’s Specialty Healthcare , 883 N.W.2d 778, 785 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “A contested case may be resolvedon a motion for summary disposition ‘where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.’” Id . (quoting Minn. R. 1400.5500(K) (2015)). Appellate review of an order gr anting summary disposition is governed by the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (MAP A), Minnesota Statutes sections 14.001- .69 (2014). Id

. Under MAPA, an appellate court may ov erturn or modify an administrative agency’s final decision in a contested case if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are: (a) in violation of cons titutional provisions; or (b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (c) made upon unlawful procedure; or (d) affected by other error of law; or (e) unsupported by substantia l evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (f) arbitrary or capricious.

file an additional brief and did not limit its filing to citations of supplemental legal authority, we strike and do not consider the county’s post-hearing submission. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02 (providing that, be yond appellant’s brief, respondent’s brief, and reply brief, “[n]o further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court”), .05 (“If pertinent and significant authorities come to a party’s attention . . . after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly file a letter with the clerk of the appellate courts setting forth the citations.” (emphasis added)); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.05 2000 comm. cmt. (cautioning that “[a] submission [of supp lemental authority] . . . is not to contain argument” and that “[a] submission . . . that doe s not conform to the rule is subject to being stricken”).14 Minn. Stat. § 14.69. “An agency decision gene rally enjoys a presumption of correctness and will not be reversed unless the party cha llenging the decision establishes one of the statutory bases for doing so.” In re Valley Branch Watershed Dist. , 781 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Minn. App. 2010) (citations omitted). “Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and they have only those powers given to them by the legislature.” In re Hubbard , 778 N.W.2d 313, 318 (Minn. 2010). When “confronted with the threshold question of whether the legislature has granted an agency the authority to take th e action at issue,” an appellate court does not “defer to the agency’s [own] determinati on of [its] authority.” Id. at n.4. Rather, “[w]hether an administrative agency has acte d within its statutory authority is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” Id. at 318 (citation omitted). “To determine what [an administrative agency’s] powers include, we first look to the plain language of the authorizing statute.” Valley Branch Watershed Dist. , 781 N.W.2d at 421-22. “While express statutory authority ne ed not be given a cramped r eading, any enlargement of express powers by implication must be fairly drawn and fairly ev ident from the agency objectives and powers expressl y given by the legislature.” In re Qwest’s Wholesale Serv. Quality Standards , 702 N.W.2d 246, 25 9 (Minn. 2005) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). “[I]f the statutory langua ge leaves any uncertainty as to an agency’s authority, we resolve that uncertain ty ‘against the exercise of such authority.’” Valley Branch Watershed Dist. , 781 N.W.2d at 422 (quoting Qwest’s Wholesale Serv. , 702 N.W.2d at 259).15 A. DNR did not lack statutory authority to initiate contested-case proceedings; the commissioner did not la ck jurisdiction to issue the final order. The county argues that DNR lacked statutor y authority to initiate the contested-case proceedings, such that the co mmissioner lacked jurisdiction to issue the final order. The county notes that “BWSR has been expressly granted review authority over wetland . . . banking determinations” and that “BWSR, not DNR, is the agency ch arged with resolving banking disputes.” The county claims that it follows that BWSR ha d exclusive jurisdiction to make the final agency decision regarding wh ether Cliffs’s restoration plan was a banking plan or a project-specific replacement plan. E ssentially, the county asserts that because its administrative appeal of DNR’s plan-appro val decision challenged DNR’s characterization of Cliffs’s restoration plan as a project-specific replacement plan rather than a banking plan, that appeal should have been heard by BWSR. As we note above, DNR is authorized under WCA to approve wetland replacement plans in connection with ac tivities requiring a PTM. See Minn. Stat. § 103G.222, subd. 1(a); Minn. R. 8420.0200, subp. 1.D (designating DNR as “the approving authority for activities associated with proj ects requiring [PTMs]”), .0930, subp. 1 (“Wetlands must not be impacted as part of a project for whic h a [PTM] is required by Minnesota Statutes, section 93.481, except as approved by the commissioner.”). And “[a]ny person aggrieved by any order, ruling, or decision of the co mmissioner may appeal such order, ruling, or decision in the manner provided in chapter 14, ” Minn. Stat. § 93.50, which, inter alia, provides procedures for administrativ e appeal by contested-case proceedings, see generally Minn. Stat. §§ 14.57-.62 (describi ng contested-case procedures).16 In contrast, wetland-banking applications related to activities requiring PTMs are subject only to initial approval by DNR, with a right of appeal to BWSR. See Minn. Stat. §§ 103G.005, subd. 10e (designating the co mmissioner as the “[LGU] . . . for wetland banking projects established solely for replac ing wetland impacts unde r a [PTM]”), .2242, subd. 9 (providing for appeal to BWSR of decisions by LGUs, including decisions on wetland banking); see also Minn. R. 8420.0111, subp. 8 ( 2015) (“‘Application’ means a formal request for a decision by a[n] [LGU] . . . for,” inter a lia, a “banking plan.”), .0905, subp. 3 (“The decision of a[n] [LGU] to approve, appr ove with conditions, or deny an application is final if not appealed to the board within 30 days . . . .” (emphasis added)). Both Cliffs and DNR treated Cliffs’s plan as a project-specific replacement plan rather than a banking plan; 2 Cliffs has made no applicati on to deposit surplus wetland credits resulting from replacement actions at the LOW site into th e state wetland bank. 3 Moreover, the county points to no authority in dicating that an aggrieved party’s mere

2 The county makes much of the fact that an August 14, 2 012 version of Cliffs’s plan did designate the plan as a “wetland bank” plan . But a May 3, 2013 version of the plan designated the plan as a “project-specific we tland mitigation plan,” and a January 21, 2014 version of the plan designated the plan as a “project-speci fic wetland replacement plan.” The August 14, 2012 version of the plan wa s never approved by DNR and the terminology used therein is, therefore, irrelevant to the question before us, i.e., whether DNR had jurisdiction to hear th e county’s administrative appeal of DNR’s approval of the May 3, 2013 and January 21, 2014 versions of the plan.

3 For this reason, we reject the county’s ar gument that DNR erred by not treating Cliffs’s plan as a banking plan. Deposits into the state wetland bank require affirmative application, see Minn. R. 8420.0705, which was not ma de here. We believe the more apt inquiry is whether DNR was authorized to appr ove, as part of a replacement plan, Cliffs’s reservation of surplus wetland cr edits for use in conn ection with its unspecified future PTM activities. We address that issue below.17 allegation of plan mischaracterization overrides, for purposes of administrative-appeal jurisdiction, DNR’s acceptance of a plan’s de signation by the applicant that submitted the plan. Consequently, we conclude that the commissioner had jurisdiction to issue the final order. B. DNR lacks statutory authority to ap prove Cliffs’s reservation of surplus wetland credits without deposit into the state wetland bank. Although stated variously in its briefs, th e county’s remaining arguments boil down to its assertion that DNR lacks authority to essentially operate its own wetlands bank by allowing PTM applicants to re serve credits in project-specific wetlands replacement plans for use in relation to later mining activity. We agree that DNR exceeded its authority in this regard. DNR is authorized under Mi nnesota Statutes section 10 3.222, subdivision 1(a), to approve the replacement of wetla nds drained or filled by activ ities requiring a PTM. The statute does not expressly address whether DNR may allow a PTM applicant to reserve surplus wetland credits fo r future use without de positing them into the state wetlands bank. As we note above, however, the statutes and regul ations create a proced ural path for those conducting activities requiring a PTM to deposit wetlands credits into single-user wetland bank accounts. See Minn. Stat. §§ 103G.005, subd. 10i, .2242, subd. 14(b)-(c); Minn. R. 8420.0705, subp. 4. Like other deposits to the wetlands bank, a deposit by a PTM applicant is initially subject to approval by an LGU (DNR) whose decision may be appealed to BWSR. Minn. R. 8420.0705, . 0905. DNR acknowledg es the availability of this path, but18 asserts that PTM applicants are not required to use this path to reserve surplu s credits. For the reasons that follow, we reject this assertion. “[Appellate courts] are to read and construe a statute as a whole and must interpret each section in light of the su rrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl , 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2014) (stating presum ption that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”). “While statutory construction focuses on the language of the provision at issue, it is some times necessary to an alyze that provision in the context of surrounding sections.” Id. ; see also Star Windshield Repair , Inc. v. W. Nat’l Ins. Co. , 768 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2009) (analyzi ng comprehensive statutory framework to determine permissibility of co nduct not expressly addressed by statute). WCA and BWSR rules create a comprehensive statutory and regulatory structure governing wetlands replacement and banking. It is in this context that we mustdetermine the scope of DNR’s authority to approve wetlands replacement un der Minnesota Statutes section 103G.222, subdivision 1(a). Viewing the statute contextually, we conclude that Minnesota Statutes section 103G.222, subdivision 1(a), does not authorize DNR to approve the reservation of wetland credits for future use by a PTM applicant without de posit into the state wetlands bank. Although DNR is generally authoriz ed to approve wetland replacement plans for activities requiring a PTM, both the statutes and rules contemplate the deposit of surplus credits from activities requiring a PTM into the state wetlands bank. Minn. Stat. §§ 103G.005, subd. 10i, .2242, subd. 14(b)-(c); Minn. R. 84 20.0705, subp. 4. Under DNR’s19 preferred interpretation, and gi ven its current practice, thes e provisions would be unlikely to gain much use. Because we presume th at the legislature intended the statutory provisions to be effective, we ca nnot accept DNR’s interpretation. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2). DNR asserts that non-banking reservation of surplus wetland cred its is permissible because of its long-standing interpretation of “p roject” in the context of “project specific replacement” to mean “mining operations u nder a PTM.” As we note above, “projectspecific replacement” is used in Minnesota Ru le 8420.0522, subpart 8, to identify one of two possible sources of in-advance wetland repl acement, the second possible source being credits from the state wetland bank. See also Minn. R. 8420.0111, subp. 55 (2015) (defining “project-specific” to mean that “the applicant fo r a replacement plan approval provides the replacement as part of the projec t, rather than attain the replacement from a wetland bank”). Even if we accept DNR’s inte rpretation of “project,” however, we can discern nothing in the relevant statutes or rules that authorizes DNR to approve the reservation of surplus wetland credits for use in connection with an a pplicant’s unspecified future PTM activities. The only mechanism for achieving th at result is through the banking process authorized by law. DNR also argues that it is authorized to approve non-banking reservation of surplus wetland credits by Minnesota Rule 8420.09 30, subpart 4.A, which provides that “[r]eplacement wetlands approved under this part must only be used for mining-related impacts covered under a [PTM] unless the credits are approved and deposited in the state wetland bank.” DNR is incorrect. One ma y engage in wetland replacement actions20 resulting in wetland credits eligible for deposit in the state wetland bank for future use in connection with wetland impacts resulting from activities that may or may not require a
PTM. See generally Minn. R. 8420.0705, .0 725, .0745. Distinctly, one may pursue a “wetland banking project[] established sole ly for replacing wetland impacts under a [PTM],” Minn. Stat. § 103G.005, subd. 10e; any wetland credits resulting from such a project are eligible for deposit in a “ded icated wetland banking account,” Minn. Stat. § 103G.2242, subd. 14(c). The rule on which DN R attempts to rely does no more than clarify that such credits may be used to replace only wetland impacts that are caused by activities requiring a PTM. See Minn. R. 8420.0 930, subp. 4.A. D E C I S I O N The county has not challenged DNR’s approval of 14.29 wetland credits for mitigation of wetland impacts of mine progression and stockpile development at Hibbing Taconite, and we affirm the commissioner’s fi nal order in that regard. But because DNR exceeded its statutory authority by approving C liffs’s reservation of surplus credits for use in connection with its unspeci fied future PTM activities, we reverse the final order in relevant part and remand for further pro ceedings consistent with this opinion. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.