# Official Journal C 314/2015

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 314 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5823 September 2015 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 314

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5823 September 2015

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2015/C 314/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7541 — IAG/Aer Lingus) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2015/C 314/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.7541 — IAG/Aer Lingus) (
  1
  )

1

1

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| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2015/C 314/02 | Euro exchange rates | 2 |
| 2015/C 314/03 | Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its meeting of 9 October 2014 concerning a preliminary draft decision relating to Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom — Rapporteur: Belgium | 3 |
| 2015/C 314/04 | Final report of the hearing officer — Slovak Telekom (AT.39523) | 4 |
| 2015/C 314/05 | Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom) (notified under document number C(2014) 7465 final) | 7 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2015/C 314/02

Euro exchange rates

2

2015/C 314/03

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its meeting of 9 October 2014 concerning a preliminary draft decision relating to Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom — Rapporteur: Belgium

3

2015/C 314/04

Final report of the hearing officer — Slovak Telekom (AT.39523)

4

2015/C 314/05

Summary of Commission Decision of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom) (notified under document number C(2014) 7465 final)

(notified under document number C(2014) 7465 final)

7

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2015/C 314/06 | Notice to importers — Imports of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres into the European Union from GSP beneficiary countries belonging to the regional cumulation group I and group III | 11 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2015/C 314/07 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.7769 — Gilde Fund IV/Parcom Fund IV/Koninklijke Ten Cate) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 12 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

2015/C 314/06

Notice to importers — Imports of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres into the European Union from GSP beneficiary countries belonging to the regional cumulation group I and group III

11

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2015/C 314/07

Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.7769 — Gilde Fund IV/Parcom Fund IV/Koninklijke Ten Cate) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

12

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 23.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.7541 — IAG/Aer Lingus)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2015/C 314/01)

On 14 July 2015, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 6(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English language and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7541. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32015M7541. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to the European law.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 23.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/2

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Euro exchange rates (1)

22 September 2015

(2015/C 314/02)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,1155 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 133,75 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4602 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,72230 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,3412 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,0860 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,2145 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 27,057 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 310,55 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,1970 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,4225 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 3,3881 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,5732 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4804 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 8,6451 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,7715 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,5817 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 322,15 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 15,2542 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,1129 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,6235 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 16 257,25 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,8017 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 52,041 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 73,9790 |
| THB | Thai baht | 40,164 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 4,4809 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 18,7248 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 73,5068 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,1155

JPY

Japanese yen

133,75

DKK

Danish krone

7,4602

GBP

Pound sterling

0,72230

SEK

Swedish krona

9,3412

CHF

Swiss franc

1,0860

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,2145

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

27,057

HUF

Hungarian forint

310,55

PLN

Polish zloty

4,1970

RON

Romanian leu

4,4225

TRY

Turkish lira

3,3881

AUD

Australian dollar

1,5732

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4804

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

8,6451

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,7715

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,5817

KRW

South Korean won

1 322,15

ZAR

South African rand

15,2542

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,1129

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,6235

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

16 257,25

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,8017

PHP

Philippine peso

52,041

RUB

Russian rouble

73,9790

THB

Thai baht

40,164

BRL

Brazilian real

4,4809

MXN

Mexican peso

18,7248

INR

Indian rupee

73,5068

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 23.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/3

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Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its meeting of 9 October 2014 concerning a preliminary draft decision relating to Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom

Rapporteur: Belgium

(2015/C 314/03)

I

| 1. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission’s definition of the relevant product market as encompassing:






  — | The wholesale market for access to the unbundled local loops (LLU); and |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the European Commission’s definition of the relevant product market as encompassing:

—

The wholesale market for access to the unbundled local loops (LLU); and

| — | The retail mass market for broadband services offered at a fixed location.
  A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

—

The retail mass market for broadband services offered at a fixed location.

A minority abstains.

| 2. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the relevant geographic market is the whole territory of Slovakia. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the relevant geographic market is the whole territory of Slovakia. A minority abstains.

| 3. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, at least between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010, Slovak Telekom held a dominant position in the wholesale market. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, at least between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010, Slovak Telekom held a dominant position in the wholesale market. A minority abstains.

| 4. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, at least between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010, Slovak Telekom held a dominant position in the retail market. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that, at least between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010, Slovak Telekom held a dominant position in the retail market. A minority abstains.

| 5. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Slovak Telekom abused its dominant position on the relevant market by refusing to supply its wholesale products to alternative operators between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Slovak Telekom abused its dominant position on the relevant market by refusing to supply its wholesale products to alternative operators between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010. A minority abstains.

| 6. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Slovak Telekom abused its dominant position by achieving a margin squeeze between its wholesale prices and its retail prices between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Slovak Telekom abused its dominant position by achieving a margin squeeze between its wholesale prices and its retail prices between 12 August 2005 and 31 December 2010. A minority abstains.

| 7. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees that Slovak Telekom’s abusive practices may affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees that Slovak Telekom’s abusive practices may affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. A minority abstains.

II

| 1. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on Slovak Telekom and Deutsche Telekom. A minority abstains.

| 2. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purposes of the calculation of the fine, the duration of the infringement is 5 years and 4 months. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that for the purposes of the calculation of the fine, the duration of the infringement is 5 years and 4 months. A minority abstains.

| 3. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amount of the fine. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amount of the fine. A minority abstains.

| 4. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are aggravating circumstances to be taken into account (recidivism). A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that there are aggravating circumstances to be taken into account (recidivism). A minority abstains.

| 5. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees that the fine has to be increased in order to have a deterrence effect. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees that the fine has to be increased in order to have a deterrence effect. A minority abstains.

| 6. | The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amount of the fine. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The majority of the Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amount of the fine. A minority abstains.

| 7. | The majority of the Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. A minority abstains. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The majority of the Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union. A minority abstains.

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| 23.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/4

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Final report of the hearing officer (1)

Slovak Telekom

(AT.39523)

(2015/C 314/04)

I.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | The hearing officer originally responsible for this case was Mr Michael Albers. He organised and conducted the oral hearing and submitted an interim report to the competent member of the Commission in accordance with Article 14 of Decision 2011/695/EU. Following the departure of Mr Albers from the Commission, I took over this case as from 16 October 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The hearing officer originally responsible for this case was Mr Michael Albers. He organised and conducted the oral hearing and submitted an interim report to the competent member of the Commission in accordance with Article 14 of Decision 2011/695/EU. Following the departure of Mr Albers from the Commission, I took over this case as from 16 October 2013.

| (2) | Thus, as regards the procedural steps that took place before my appointment, this report is based on the findings of the previous hearing officer. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Thus, as regards the procedural steps that took place before my appointment, this report is based on the findings of the previous hearing officer.

II.   PROCEDURE

1.   Investigation phase

| (3) | The proceeding was initiated by the Commission ex officio in June 2008, following indications of low broadband penetration and delayed triple play launch in the Slovak Republic. Inspections were carried out at the premises of Slovak Telekom (‘ST’) from 13 to 15 January 2009 and a second time, on 13 and 14 July 2009. The proceedings were formally opened on 8 April 2009 against ST and on 13 December 2010 against Deutsche Telekom (‘DT’). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The proceeding was initiated by the Commission ex officio in June 2008, following indications of low broadband penetration and delayed triple play launch in the Slovak Republic. Inspections were carried out at the premises of Slovak Telekom (‘ST’) from 13 to 15 January 2009 and a second time, on 13 and 14 July 2009. The proceedings were formally opened on 8 April 2009 against ST and on 13 December 2010 against Deutsche Telekom (‘DT’).

| (4) | ST lodged actions for annulment against two Commission requests for information covering data from the period prior to the accession of Slovak Republic to the EU (i.e. prior to 1 May 2004), on the ground that the Commission had no competence to request and use such information. The General Court rejected both actions of ST (2). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

ST lodged actions for annulment against two Commission requests for information covering data from the period prior to the accession of Slovak Republic to the EU (i.e. prior to 1 May 2004), on the ground that the Commission had no competence to request and use such information. The General Court rejected both actions of ST (2).

2.   Statement of Objections

| (5) | A Statement of Objections (‘SO’) addressed to ST and DT was adopted on 7 May 2012. In the SO, the Commission preliminarily found that ST had abused its dominant position on the market for wholesale broadband access (‘WBA’) services in the Slovak Republic, through the following conduct: (i) refusal to supply and margin squeeze regarding the unbundled access to the local loop (‘ULL’), starting from 12 August 2005; (ii) margin squeeze and refusal to supply regarding the regional WBA, starting from 6 June 2007; and (iii) margin squeeze regarding the national WBA, starting from 1 May 2004. The Commission concluded preliminarily in the SO that the conduct of ST amounted to a violation of Article 102 TFEU, which started on 1 May 2004 and was still on-going at the time of the SO. The SO also preliminarily found DT liable for the suspected infringements of ST on the ground that it was the parent company and was in a position to exercise decisive influence and actually exercised such influence. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

A Statement of Objections (‘SO’) addressed to ST and DT was adopted on 7 May 2012. In the SO, the Commission preliminarily found that ST had abused its dominant position on the market for wholesale broadband access (‘WBA’) services in the Slovak Republic, through the following conduct: (i) refusal to supply and margin squeeze regarding the unbundled access to the local loop (‘ULL’), starting from 12 August 2005; (ii) margin squeeze and refusal to supply regarding the regional WBA, starting from 6 June 2007; and (iii) margin squeeze regarding the national WBA, starting from 1 May 2004. The Commission concluded preliminarily in the SO that the conduct of ST amounted to a violation of Article 102 TFEU, which started on 1 May 2004 and was still on-going at the time of the SO. The SO also preliminarily found DT liable for the suspected infringements of ST on the ground that it was the parent company and was in a position to exercise decisive influence and actually exercised such influence.

3.   Access to the file and extension of the time limit to reply to the SO

| (6) | ST and DT were granted access to the Commission file via access-to-file CD-ROMs on 15 and 18 May 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

ST and DT were granted access to the Commission file via access-to-file CD-ROMs on 15 and 18 May 2012.

| (7) | Upon request, ST was granted additional access to the file by DG Competition in July and August 2012. Upon ST's request, DG Competition disclosed some of the previously redacted parts of the SO. For other parts of the SO the Commission accepted DT's request for confidential treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Upon request, ST was granted additional access to the file by DG Competition in July and August 2012. Upon ST's request, DG Competition disclosed some of the previously redacted parts of the SO. For other parts of the SO the Commission accepted DT's request for confidential treatment.

| (8) | In July 2012, DT complained about the quality of the German version of the SO it received. One month later, DG Competition sent a corrigendum. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

In July 2012, DT complained about the quality of the German version of the SO it received. One month later, DG Competition sent a corrigendum.

| (9) | As a result of ST's requests for additional access to the file and DT's complaint, the deadline to reply to the SO was extended for both parties by 3 weeks, until 6 September 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

As a result of ST's requests for additional access to the file and DT's complaint, the deadline to reply to the SO was extended for both parties by 3 weeks, until 6 September 2012.

4.   Interested Third Persons

| (10) | On 9 July 2012, the hearing officer received an application to be heard as a third person from Slovanet, an alternative telecommunication operator in the Slovak Republic. Slovanet demonstrated ‘sufficient interest’ and was therefore admitted to be heard in writing by the Commission. Slovanet did not request to participate in the oral hearing. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

On 9 July 2012, the hearing officer received an application to be heard as a third person from Slovanet, an alternative telecommunication operator in the Slovak Republic. Slovanet demonstrated ‘sufficient interest’ and was therefore admitted to be heard in writing by the Commission. Slovanet did not request to participate in the oral hearing.

III.   ORAL HEARING

| (11) | The oral hearing took place on 6 and 7 November 2012. Both ST and DT participated. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The oral hearing took place on 6 and 7 November 2012. Both ST and DT participated.

IV.   ADDITIONAL ACCESS TO THE FILE AFTER THE SO

1.   Letter of Facts

| (12) | On 6 December 2013 and 10 January 2014, the Commission addressed respectively to ST and DT a Letter of Facts bringing to their attention new evidence that it intended to rely upon in a possible future decision, and granted them the opportunity to submit written comments. The Commission also indicated that it intended to take the view that any future decision addressed to ST and DT should cover only the abuses regarding the access to the ULL, and that the infringement period would consequently start on 12 August 2005 and continued until at least 31 December 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

On 6 December 2013 and 10 January 2014, the Commission addressed respectively to ST and DT a Letter of Facts bringing to their attention new evidence that it intended to rely upon in a possible future decision, and granted them the opportunity to submit written comments. The Commission also indicated that it intended to take the view that any future decision addressed to ST and DT should cover only the abuses regarding the access to the ULL, and that the infringement period would consequently start on 12 August 2005 and continued until at least 31 December 2010.

| (13) | Together with the Letter of Facts, the Commission provided ST and DT with access to all documents which were included in the file following the SO. Upon ST's request, DG Competition disclosed previously redacted parts of a document mentioned in the Letter of Facts, and also provided ST and DT with additional documents that were not initially in the Commission file. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Together with the Letter of Facts, the Commission provided ST and DT with access to all documents which were included in the file following the SO. Upon ST's request, DG Competition disclosed previously redacted parts of a document mentioned in the Letter of Facts, and also provided ST and DT with additional documents that were not initially in the Commission file.

| (14) | Further to requests for extensions of the deadline to respond which were granted by DG Competition, ST and DT replied in writing to the Letter of Facts on, respectively, 21 February (ST) and 6 March (DT) 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Further to requests for extensions of the deadline to respond which were granted by DG Competition, ST and DT replied in writing to the Letter of Facts on, respectively, 21 February (ST) and 6 March (DT) 2014.

2.   Request of DT for an oral hearing

| (15) | In its reply to the Letter of Facts and in a subsequent letter of 8 April 2014 addressed to DG Competition, DT requested an oral hearing. DG Competition refused this request by letters of 21 March and 15 April 2014, and on 4 September 2014, DT referred the matter to me. I rejected this request on the ground that the Letter of Facts did not entitle DT to an oral hearing, and that on the other hand, the Letter of Facts could not be considered as a Supplementary SO as it did not introduce any new objections or altered the objections set out in the SO. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In its reply to the Letter of Facts and in a subsequent letter of 8 April 2014 addressed to DG Competition, DT requested an oral hearing. DG Competition refused this request by letters of 21 March and 15 April 2014, and on 4 September 2014, DT referred the matter to me. I rejected this request on the ground that the Letter of Facts did not entitle DT to an oral hearing, and that on the other hand, the Letter of Facts could not be considered as a Supplementary SO as it did not introduce any new objections or altered the objections set out in the SO.

3.   Request for access to the margin squeeze analysis

| (16) | On 16 January 2014, ST requested access to any revised margin squeeze calculations that the Commission may have made since adoption of the SO. It argued that these calculations should have been included in the Letter of Facts and that they were necessary for the proper exercise of ST's right to be heard. DT also made a similar request to DG Competition on 1 March 2014. DG Competition rejected both parties' claims pointing out that at that stage of the procedure the Commission intended to retain in a possible future decision the same margin squeeze principles and formulas used in the SO, and to update the calculations by accepting some of ST's arguments and calculations as outlined in ST's reply to the SO, and by rebutting others. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

On 16 January 2014, ST requested access to any revised margin squeeze calculations that the Commission may have made since adoption of the SO. It argued that these calculations should have been included in the Letter of Facts and that they were necessary for the proper exercise of ST's right to be heard. DT also made a similar request to DG Competition on 1 March 2014. DG Competition rejected both parties' claims pointing out that at that stage of the procedure the Commission intended to retain in a possible future decision the same margin squeeze principles and formulas used in the SO, and to update the calculations by accepting some of ST's arguments and calculations as outlined in ST's reply to the SO, and by rebutting others.

| (17) | ST subsequently referred the matter to me. By letters of 5 February and 25 April 2014, I rejected ST's claims. Firstly, the margin squeeze analysis was still ongoing at the time of ST's request, and was thus an internal document, which as such was not accessible. Secondly, I considered, on the basis of settled case law (3), that there exists no rule requiring the Commission to hear ST on the final position it intends to reach on its margin squeeze calculations, provided however that such position would not lead to raising new objections. In this respect, I had no indication that any of the Commission's intended changes of the margin squeeze calculations would alter the objections set out in the SO in a manner which would be unfavourable to ST. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

ST subsequently referred the matter to me. By letters of 5 February and 25 April 2014, I rejected ST's claims. Firstly, the margin squeeze analysis was still ongoing at the time of ST's request, and was thus an internal document, which as such was not accessible. Secondly, I considered, on the basis of settled case law (3), that there exists no rule requiring the Commission to hear ST on the final position it intends to reach on its margin squeeze calculations, provided however that such position would not lead to raising new objections. In this respect, I had no indication that any of the Commission's intended changes of the margin squeeze calculations would alter the objections set out in the SO in a manner which would be unfavourable to ST.

| (18) | However, in the interest of transparency, during state of play meetings which took place in September 2014, DG Competition showed to ST and DT the margin squeeze calculations and explained to them in detail the changes made to the calculations and the methodology used, and replied to a number of questions from the parties. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

However, in the interest of transparency, during state of play meetings which took place in September 2014, DG Competition showed to ST and DT the margin squeeze calculations and explained to them in detail the changes made to the calculations and the methodology used, and replied to a number of questions from the parties.

| (19) | On 6 October 2014, I received letters from ST and DT claiming that during the state of play meetings DG Competition had presented to them new facts and methodologies, in particular with respect to the margin squeeze calculations, and requesting the opportunity to be heard on them in writing and at an oral hearing. After a careful review, I rejected these requests on the ground that in the draft decision the Commission did not introduce any new principles and approaches to the detriment to the parties in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

On 6 October 2014, I received letters from ST and DT claiming that during the state of play meetings DG Competition had presented to them new facts and methodologies, in particular with respect to the margin squeeze calculations, and requesting the opportunity to be heard on them in writing and at an oral hearing. After a careful review, I rejected these requests on the ground that in the draft decision the Commission did not introduce any new principles and approaches to the detriment to the parties in this respect.

| (20) | DT also requested access to ST's reply to the Letter of Facts. DG Competition granted this request purely in the interest of transparency, with an opportunity to provide further comments. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

DT also requested access to ST's reply to the Letter of Facts. DG Competition granted this request purely in the interest of transparency, with an opportunity to provide further comments.

V.   THE DRAFT DECISION

| (21) | After having heard the addressees of the SO in writing and orally, the Commission decided to drop the allegations of abuses regarding the regional and national WBA, and to retain only the allegation of abuses regarding the access to the ULL (4). The overall infringement period was consequently reduced, as the starting period shifted from 1 May 2004 to 12 August 2005, and in addition, the end of the infringement period was set at 31 December 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

After having heard the addressees of the SO in writing and orally, the Commission decided to drop the allegations of abuses regarding the regional and national WBA, and to retain only the allegation of abuses regarding the access to the ULL (4). The overall infringement period was consequently reduced, as the starting period shifted from 1 May 2004 to 12 August 2005, and in addition, the end of the infringement period was set at 31 December 2010.

| (22) | Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision deals only with the objections in respect of which ST and DT have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views, and I have come to a positive conclusion. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision deals only with the objections in respect of which ST and DT have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views, and I have come to a positive conclusion.

| (23) | Overall, I conclude that all parties have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Overall, I conclude that all parties have been able to effectively exercise their procedural rights in this case.

Brussels, 10 October 2014.

Joos STRAGIER

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(1)  Pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of Decision 2011/695/EU of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (‘Decision 2011/695/EU’).

1

(2)  Judgment of the General Court of 22 March 2012 in Joined Cases T-458/09 and T-171/10 Slovak Telekom a.s. v Commission, EU:T:2012:145.

2

Slovak Telekom a.s. v Commission

(3)  Case T-392/09, garantovana a.s. v Commission, EU:T:2012:674, paragraph 74; and, Case T-15/02 BASF v Commission EU:T:2006:74, paragraph 94.

3

garantovana a.s. v Commission,

BASF v Commission

(4)  See paragraph (12) above.

4

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| 23.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/7

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Summary of Commission Decision

of 15 October 2014

relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement

(Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom)

(notified under document number C(2014) 7465 final)

(Only the English and German texts are authentic)

(2015/C 314/05)

On 15 October 2014, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA agreement. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
   (1)
  , the Commission herewith publishes the names of the parties and the main content of the decision, including any penalties imposed, having regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.

1.   INTRODUCTION

| (1) | On 15 October 2014, the Commission adopted a decision pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (‘the Decision’), addressed to Slovak Telekom (‘ST’) and Deutsche Telekom (‘DT’), its parent company, imposing a fine on ST and DT for infringing Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. The Decision concerns ST's exclusionary conduct (refusal to supply and margin squeeze), concerning its legacy broadband infrastructure. The Decision covers the period from 12 August 2005, when ST published its reference unbundling offer (‘RUO’) setting out unfair terms and conditions for access, until 31 December 2010 (overall duration of 5 years and 4 months). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 15 October 2014, the Commission adopted a decision pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (‘the Decision’), addressed to Slovak Telekom (‘ST’) and Deutsche Telekom (‘DT’), its parent company, imposing a fine on ST and DT for infringing Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. The Decision concerns ST's exclusionary conduct (refusal to supply and margin squeeze), concerning its legacy broadband infrastructure. The Decision covers the period from 12 August 2005, when ST published its reference unbundling offer (‘RUO’) setting out unfair terms and conditions for access, until 31 December 2010 (overall duration of 5 years and 4 months).

2.   PROCEDURE

| (2) | On 13-15 January 2009 the Commission carried out an inspection under Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 at ST's premises. The Commission initiated proceedings on 8 April 2009 against ST and on 13 December 2010 against DT. On 7 May 2012 the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) outlining its preliminary view that ST may have imposed a margin squeeze as concerns access to its unbundled local loops (‘ULL’) and regional as well as national wholesale broadband access (‘WBA’) to its competitors, and may have refused access to the first two of these wholesale products. The Commission took the preliminary view that DT may be liable for the conduct of its subsidiary on grounds of parental liability. On 6-7 November 2012 Oral Hearings took place. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 13-15 January 2009 the Commission carried out an inspection under Article 20(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 at ST's premises. The Commission initiated proceedings on 8 April 2009 against ST and on 13 December 2010 against DT. On 7 May 2012 the Commission adopted a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) outlining its preliminary view that ST may have imposed a margin squeeze as concerns access to its unbundled local loops (‘ULL’) and regional as well as national wholesale broadband access (‘WBA’) to its competitors, and may have refused access to the first two of these wholesale products. The Commission took the preliminary view that DT may be liable for the conduct of its subsidiary on grounds of parental liability. On 6-7 November 2012 Oral Hearings took place.

| (3) | On 6 December 2013 a Letter of Facts was sent to ST and on 10 January 2014 to DT in order to provide them with the opportunity to comment on additional evidence. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 6 December 2013 a Letter of Facts was sent to ST and on 10 January 2014 to DT in order to provide them with the opportunity to comment on additional evidence.

| (4) | On 9 October 2014 the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions was consulted. On 10 October 2014 the Hearing Officer issued his final report. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 9 October 2014 the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions was consulted. On 10 October 2014 the Hearing Officer issued his final report.

3.   FACTS

| (5) | The final decision adopted in this case concerns ST's abusive conduct regarding access to its ULL. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The final decision adopted in this case concerns ST's abusive conduct regarding access to its ULL.

| (6) | ST, the incumbent telecoms operator in the Slovak Republic, owns the only fixed nationwide copper access network. In accordance with the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications and pursuant to a regulatory Decision of the Slovak telecoms regulator (‘TUSR’), ST has to give alternative operators (‘AOs’) access to the ULL within its network. ST has a monopoly on the wholesale market for access to the ULL and a dominant position on the retail mass market for fixed broadband services. As a consequence of ST's abusive behaviour, AOs did not get access to the ULL and could thus not enter the Slovak retail broadband market in a manner which would have allowed them to offer high quality retail broadband services and compete effectively with ST. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

ST, the incumbent telecoms operator in the Slovak Republic, owns the only fixed nationwide copper access network. In accordance with the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications and pursuant to a regulatory Decision of the Slovak telecoms regulator (‘TUSR’), ST has to give alternative operators (‘AOs’) access to the ULL within its network. ST has a monopoly on the wholesale market for access to the ULL and a dominant position on the retail mass market for fixed broadband services. As a consequence of ST's abusive behaviour, AOs did not get access to the ULL and could thus not enter the Slovak retail broadband market in a manner which would have allowed them to offer high quality retail broadband services and compete effectively with ST.

4.   LEGAL ASSESSMENT

4.1.   Relevant Markets

| (7) | In line with previous Article 102 TFEU cases (Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, Telekommunikacja Polska (2)) the Decision defines a national wholesale market for access to ST's ULL. This market definition is in line with the market definition carried out by TUSR, the Slovak telecoms regulator. ST started to offer access to its ULL, in line with its regulatory obligations, by publishing a reference unbundling offer (RUO) on 12 August 2005. Access to the other possible local access networks (fibre, TV cable, Fixed Wireless Access (‘FWA’) and mobile broadband access) is not offered by the owners of these networks. It is also technically not possible for AOs to use such networks to access retail customers throughout Slovakia with a similar level of quality as over ST's ULL. WBA is not a substitute for ULL wholesale access as the monthly fees are higher than in the case of ULL, an AO invests much less on its own infrastructure and the WBA product gives the AO very little control over the connection, with practically no possibility to differentiate its retail offering from that of ST. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In line with previous Article 102 TFEU cases (Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, Telekommunikacja Polska (2)) the Decision defines a national wholesale market for access to ST's ULL. This market definition is in line with the market definition carried out by TUSR, the Slovak telecoms regulator. ST started to offer access to its ULL, in line with its regulatory obligations, by publishing a reference unbundling offer (RUO) on 12 August 2005. Access to the other possible local access networks (fibre, TV cable, Fixed Wireless Access (‘FWA’) and mobile broadband access) is not offered by the owners of these networks. It is also technically not possible for AOs to use such networks to access retail customers throughout Slovakia with a similar level of quality as over ST's ULL. WBA is not a substitute for ULL wholesale access as the monthly fees are higher than in the case of ULL, an AO invests much less on its own infrastructure and the WBA product gives the AO very little control over the connection, with practically no possibility to differentiate its retail offering from that of ST.

| (8) | The Decision defines a national retail mass market for broadband services offered at a fixed location (whether wireline or wireless). The product market comprises broadband connections over xDSL, fibre, TV cable and FWA networks. Mobile broadband services are not included in the relevant market, in particular because there exist appreciable differences in quality and data usage profiles between fixed and mobile broadband services throughout the infringement period. Also, the prices and price developments, as well as the switching evidence, do not allow to conclude that fixed and mobile broadband services are part of the same relevant market. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Decision defines a national retail mass market for broadband services offered at a fixed location (whether wireline or wireless). The product market comprises broadband connections over xDSL, fibre, TV cable and FWA networks. Mobile broadband services are not included in the relevant market, in particular because there exist appreciable differences in quality and data usage profiles between fixed and mobile broadband services throughout the infringement period. Also, the prices and price developments, as well as the switching evidence, do not allow to conclude that fixed and mobile broadband services are part of the same relevant market.

| (9) | The relevant geographic retail market for fixed broadband services and the relevant geographic wholesale market for ULL access are national because ST (both in the retail and in the wholesale market) and other operators (in the retail market) act uniformly (same price, terms and conditions) across their network area. This market definition is in line with the Commission's decisional practice in telecom cases (Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, Telekommunikacja Polska). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The relevant geographic retail market for fixed broadband services and the relevant geographic wholesale market for ULL access are national because ST (both in the retail and in the wholesale market) and other operators (in the retail market) act uniformly (same price, terms and conditions) across their network area. This market definition is in line with the Commission's decisional practice in telecom cases (Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, Telekommunikacja Polska).

4.2.   Dominance

| (10) | The Decision concludes that ST holds a monopoly position on the wholesale ULL market and that there are no direct or indirect constraints in the form of actual or potential competition, which could limit the market power of ST as a monopoly ULL services provider. The absence of competition is explained, in particular, by the existence of high barriers to entry which make impossible the replication of ST's network in terms of geographic and technical coverage. This conclusion in the Decision is consistent both with the Commission's past decisional practice and with the regulation of telecommunications markets. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The Decision concludes that ST holds a monopoly position on the wholesale ULL market and that there are no direct or indirect constraints in the form of actual or potential competition, which could limit the market power of ST as a monopoly ULL services provider. The absence of competition is explained, in particular, by the existence of high barriers to entry which make impossible the replication of ST's network in terms of geographic and technical coverage. This conclusion in the Decision is consistent both with the Commission's past decisional practice and with the regulation of telecommunications markets.

| (11) | As regards ST's position on the retail market the Decision concludes that, throughout the analysed period, ST held a dominant position on the mass-market for retail broadband services offered at a fixed location. The market share of ST on the basis of the number of subscribers varied between [35 % - 55 %] during the infringement period. The second largest competitor, UPC, had almost a five times lower (and decreasing) market share ([5 % - 15 %] in 2010). Although ST faced some competition from AOs (in particular as regards the gradual roll-out of fibre networks), these competitors could not exercise a sufficient constraint on ST. For instance, despite its heavy investment into fibre-roll out and marketing, Orange remained only a marginal market player with a market share of [0 % - 10 %] in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

As regards ST's position on the retail market the Decision concludes that, throughout the analysed period, ST held a dominant position on the mass-market for retail broadband services offered at a fixed location. The market share of ST on the basis of the number of subscribers varied between [35 % - 55 %] during the infringement period. The second largest competitor, UPC, had almost a five times lower (and decreasing) market share ([5 % - 15 %] in 2010). Although ST faced some competition from AOs (in particular as regards the gradual roll-out of fibre networks), these competitors could not exercise a sufficient constraint on ST. For instance, despite its heavy investment into fibre-roll out and marketing, Orange remained only a marginal market player with a market share of [0 % - 10 %] in 2010.

4.3.   Abuse of a dominant position

4.3.1.   Refusal to supply ULL

| (12) | The Decision demonstrates that although several AOs had a strong interest in obtaining access to ULL ST set unfair terms and conditions in its Reference Offer on Unbundling (RUO), to render unbundled access to the local loop unacceptable for AOs, thereby delaying, making difficult or preventing their entry in the retail broadband services market. In particular:






  (a) | ST withheld from AOs the information on the network necessary for the unbundling of the local loop, not allowing AOs to prepare appropriate business plans. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(12)

The Decision demonstrates that although several AOs had a strong interest in obtaining access to ULL ST set unfair terms and conditions in its Reference Offer on Unbundling (RUO), to render unbundled access to the local loop unacceptable for AOs, thereby delaying, making difficult or preventing their entry in the retail broadband services market. In particular:

(a)

ST withheld from AOs the information on the network necessary for the unbundling of the local loop, not allowing AOs to prepare appropriate business plans.

| (b) | ST artificially reduced the scope of its unbundling obligation, by:






  (i) | refusing to provide access to the lines over which no service was provided but which were covered by ST's network (‘passive lines’), therefore reserving to itself potential customers. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

ST artificially reduced the scope of its unbundling obligation, by:

(i)

refusing to provide access to the lines over which no service was provided but which were covered by ST's network (‘passive lines’), therefore reserving to itself potential customers.

| (ii) | refusing to provide shared access to the lines over which telephone social calling plans such as ‘ST Mini’ were provided, with the consequence that ST abusively reserved for itself these potential customers for DSL. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

refusing to provide shared access to the lines over which telephone social calling plans such as ‘ST Mini’ were provided, with the consequence that ST abusively reserved for itself these potential customers for DSL.

| (iii) | refusing to provide access to 75 % of the lines covered by its unbundling obligation due to a safety spectrum management rule allegedly meant to prevent interferences and cross-talk problems likely to appear when several services are used in the same telephone line. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

refusing to provide access to 75 % of the lines covered by its unbundling obligation due to a safety spectrum management rule allegedly meant to prevent interferences and cross-talk problems likely to appear when several services are used in the same telephone line.

| (c) | ST deterred AOs from unbundling by setting other unfair terms and conditions in its RUO. In particular:






  (i) | ST rendered the collocation process (3) unnecessarily burdensome and expensive and failed to provide upfront pricing information on collocation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(c)

ST deterred AOs from unbundling by setting other unfair terms and conditions in its RUO. In particular:

(i)

ST rendered the collocation process (3) unnecessarily burdensome and expensive and failed to provide upfront pricing information on collocation;

| (ii) | ST rendered the ‘qualification’ procedure (4) mandatory and subject to fees even when not needed; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

ST rendered the ‘qualification’ procedure (4) mandatory and subject to fees even when not needed;

| (iii) | ST applied disadvantageous forecasting (5) terms and conditions such as the fact that ST established a penalty fee for failure to comply with the forecasted amounts. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

ST applied disadvantageous forecasting (5) terms and conditions such as the fact that ST established a penalty fee for failure to comply with the forecasted amounts.

| (iv) | ST applied unfair terms and conditions regarding repairs, such as the possibility of shifting unilaterally its responsibility to AOs in case of insufficient cooperation in repairs; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

ST applied unfair terms and conditions regarding repairs, such as the possibility of shifting unilaterally its responsibility to AOs in case of insufficient cooperation in repairs;

| (v) | ST requested a bank guarantee whose amount was out of proportions with ST's risks and costs for providing access to the local loops. |
| --- | --- |

(v)

ST requested a bank guarantee whose amount was out of proportions with ST's risks and costs for providing access to the local loops.

4.3.2.   Margin Squeeze

| (13) | The calculations in the Decision take account of the data of ST and show that an equally efficient competitor using ST's ULL wholesale access was facing significant negative margins and could not replicate profitably the retail broadband portfolio of ST on a lasting basis. This holds true even if additional services (voice services, IPTV, multi-play services) in a downstream portfolio are taken into account. The inclusion of voice services (voice access, voice usage) serves as a sensitivity check because these markets are not addressed by the present Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The calculations in the Decision take account of the data of ST and show that an equally efficient competitor using ST's ULL wholesale access was facing significant negative margins and could not replicate profitably the retail broadband portfolio of ST on a lasting basis. This holds true even if additional services (voice services, IPTV, multi-play services) in a downstream portfolio are taken into account. The inclusion of voice services (voice access, voice usage) serves as a sensitivity check because these markets are not addressed by the present Decision.

4.4.   Likely impact on competition and consumers

| (14) | ST's behaviour deprived AOs of the possibility to compete effectively with ST and other players by relying on ULL access and engaging in the competition on the retail mass market for fixed broadband services. In line with ST's strategy, its behaviour foreclosed AOs from the key ULL based xDSL segment of the retail market. By doing so, it artificially raised barriers to entry on the retail market by making more difficult and therefore less effective competition on the retail market, including competition based on AOs' own networks (infrastructure-based competition). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

ST's behaviour deprived AOs of the possibility to compete effectively with ST and other players by relying on ULL access and engaging in the competition on the retail mass market for fixed broadband services. In line with ST's strategy, its behaviour foreclosed AOs from the key ULL based xDSL segment of the retail market. By doing so, it artificially raised barriers to entry on the retail market by making more difficult and therefore less effective competition on the retail market, including competition based on AOs' own networks (infrastructure-based competition).

| (15) | The local deployment of AOs' networks cannot outweigh these negative effects. Absent ST's exclusionary behaviour it is likely that competition would have been more effective throughout the whole territory of Slovakia and even in the densely populated areas, where infrastructure-based competition existed. Such entry and the competitive response that it would in turn have triggered from ST and other broadband providers would likely have benefited consumers through greater choice, lower prices and higher quality of services. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The local deployment of AOs' networks cannot outweigh these negative effects. Absent ST's exclusionary behaviour it is likely that competition would have been more effective throughout the whole territory of Slovakia and even in the densely populated areas, where infrastructure-based competition existed. Such entry and the competitive response that it would in turn have triggered from ST and other broadband providers would likely have benefited consumers through greater choice, lower prices and higher quality of services.

4.5.   Liability of DT

| (16) | The Decision finds that DT is liable for the infringement as a parent company. Concerning the ability to exercise decisive influence over ST, the Decision refers mainly to the fact that (i) DT is the majority shareholder with 51 % and that the Slovak State, which owns the remaining 49 %, has no particular minority rights; and (ii) that DT can nominate the majority of the Board of Directors (BoD). The exercise of decisive influence is shown in particular by setting out (i) overlaps in senior management personnel between DT and ST; (ii) evidence of DT's influence over the decision-making process at ST's BoD; and (iii) of upstream reporting from ST to DT. The evidence constitutes a body of consistent evidence establishing the existence of an economic unit between DT and ST. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Decision finds that DT is liable for the infringement as a parent company. Concerning the ability to exercise decisive influence over ST, the Decision refers mainly to the fact that (i) DT is the majority shareholder with 51 % and that the Slovak State, which owns the remaining 49 %, has no particular minority rights; and (ii) that DT can nominate the majority of the Board of Directors (BoD). The exercise of decisive influence is shown in particular by setting out (i) overlaps in senior management personnel between DT and ST; (ii) evidence of DT's influence over the decision-making process at ST's BoD; and (iii) of upstream reporting from ST to DT. The evidence constitutes a body of consistent evidence establishing the existence of an economic unit between DT and ST.

5.   FINES AND REMEDIES

| (17) | To the extent that any of the identified abusive practices are still ongoing, ST and DT are required to bring such infringement to an end, and henceforth to refrain from any practices which would have the same or similar object or effect as described in the Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

To the extent that any of the identified abusive practices are still ongoing, ST and DT are required to bring such infringement to an end, and henceforth to refrain from any practices which would have the same or similar object or effect as described in the Decision.

| (18) | The Decision imposes a fine of EUR 38 838 000 jointly and severally on DT and ST, and a fine of EUR 31 070 000 on DT. This fine is established taking into account the value of sales in the relevant market, the degree of gravity of the infringement and the period of the infringement that was 5 years and 4 months, the fact that DT has already committed a similar infringement in 2003 and the need to ensure deterrence. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The Decision imposes a fine of EUR 38 838 000 jointly and severally on DT and ST, and a fine of EUR 31 070 000 on DT. This fine is established taking into account the value of sales in the relevant market, the degree of gravity of the infringement and the period of the infringement that was 5 years and 4 months, the fact that DT has already committed a similar infringement in 2003 and the need to ensure deterrence.

---

(1)  OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

(2)  Cases AT.37451 of 21. May 2003; AT.38784 of 4 July 2007 and AT.39525 of 22 June 2011.

(3)  Collocation refers to the placement of the AOs' equipment at the level of the incumbent's Main Distribution Frame (MDF).

(4)  ‘Qualification’ refers to the process whereby ST ascertained whether a particular line was fit for unbundling.

(5)  AOs have an obligation to submit forecasts of their intended requests for qualification of the local loop.

---

V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

European Commission

| 23.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/11

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NOTICE TO IMPORTERS

Imports of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres into the European Union from GSP beneficiary countries belonging to the regional cumulation group I and group III

(2015/C 314/06)

The European Commission informs European Union operators that there are reasonable doubts concerning the proper application of the preferential treatment and the applicability of proofs of origin presented in the Union for open mesh fabrics of glass fibres of HS subheadings 7019 40, 7019 51 and 7019 59 imported from GSP beneficiary countries belonging to the regional cumulation group I and group III (1).

Following a number of investigations, it would appear that significant quantities of open mesh fabrics of glass fibres of HS subheadings 7019 40, 7019 51 and 7019 59, consigned to the EU generally from Singapore, are being declared for release for free circulation in the Union as having the preferential origin of one of the countries belonging to the regional cumulation group I or III, without being entitled to it.

European Union operators declaring origin and/or presenting proofs of origin for the products mentioned above are therefore advised to take all necessary precautions as the release of the goods in question for free circulation may give rise to a customs debt, lead to fraud and, consequently, negatively affect the European Union’s financial interests. When the possible subsequent entry in the accounts of a customs debt results from the abovementioned circumstances the person liable may not plead good faith in accordance with the fifth subparagraph of Article 220(2)(b) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (2).

---

(1)  The list of countries is set out in Article 86 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementing of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. At the time of the publication of this notice, the following beneficiary countries belong to the groups:

| — | Group I – Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar/Burma |
| --- | --- |

—

Group I – Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar/Burma

| — | Group III – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka |
| --- | --- |

—

Group III – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

(2)  OJ L 302, 19.10. 1992, p. 1.

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PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 23.9.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 314/12 |
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23.9.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 314/12

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.7769 — Gilde Fund IV/Parcom Fund IV/Koninklijke Ten Cate)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2015/C 314/07)

| 1. | On 14 September 2015, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Gilde Buy-Out Fund IV CV and Gilde Buy Out-Fund IV Coöperatief UA (Netherlands, jointly ‘Gilde Fund IV’) and Parcom Buy-Out Fund IV BV (Netherlands, ‘Parcom Fund IV’), acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of the undertaking Koninklike Ten Cate NV (Netherlands) by way of purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 14 September 2015, the Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Gilde Buy-Out Fund IV CV and Gilde Buy Out-Fund IV Coöperatief UA (Netherlands, jointly ‘Gilde Fund IV’) and Parcom Buy-Out Fund IV BV (Netherlands, ‘Parcom Fund IV’), acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of the undertaking Koninklike Ten Cate NV (Netherlands) by way of purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:
  —   for Gilde Fund IV: independent investment in mid-market companies with a portfolio spanning in a number of industries and covering mainly the Benelux, Germany, Switzerland and Austria;
  —   for Parcom Fund IV: private equity investment mainly in medium-sized companies in the Benelux;
  —   for Koninklijke Ten Cate NV: supplier of semi-manufactures and components in the field of advanced textiles and composites, geosynthethics and grass. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   for Gilde Fund IV: independent investment in mid-market companies with a portfolio spanning in a number of industries and covering mainly the Benelux, Germany, Switzerland and Austria;

—   for Parcom Fund IV: private equity investment mainly in medium-sized companies in the Benelux;

—   for Koninklijke Ten Cate NV: supplier of semi-manufactures and components in the field of advanced textiles and composites, geosynthethics and grass.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number M.7769 — Gilde Fund IV/Parcom Fund IV/Koninklijke Ten Cate, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference number M.7769 — Gilde Fund IV/Parcom Fund IV/Koninklijke Ten Cate, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

---