In the House of Representatives, U. S., 

December 12, 2018. 

Resolved, That the bill from the Senate (S. 2736) entitled ‘‘An Act to develop a long-term strategic vision and a 

comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States 

policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes.’’, 

do pass with the following 

AMENDMENT: 

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: 

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

3 ‘‘Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018’’. 

4 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

5 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 

TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 101. Policy. 

Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy. 

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Sec. 203. United States-China relationship. 

Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership. 

Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership. 

Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership. 

Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue. 

Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan. 
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Sec. 210. North Korea strategy. 

Sec. 211. New Zealand. 

Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law. 

Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation. 

Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region. 

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress. 

Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic 

summits. 

Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership. 

Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation. 

Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection. 

Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives. 

Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative. 

Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation. 

Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women’s economic rights. 

TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDOPACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 401. Findings. 

Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons. 

Sec. 403. Freedom of the press. 

Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel. 

Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement. 

Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy. 

Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea. 

Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of United 

States assistance. 

Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders. 

Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives. 

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The Indo-Pacific region— 

4 (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the glob5 al population; 

6 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic 

7 economies in the world; and 
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1 (C) poses security challenges that threaten 

2 to undermine United States national security in3 terests, regional peace, and global stability. 

4 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed 

5 international system are being challenged, including 

6 by— 

7 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili8 tarization of artificial features in the South 

9 China Sea and coercive economic practices; 

10 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu11 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and 

12 (C) the increased presence throughout 

13 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to 

14 in this Act as ‘‘ISIS’’) and other international 

15 terrorist organizations that threaten the United 

16 States. 

17 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re18 gion continues to transform, presenting opportunities 

19 and challenges to United States economic interests. 

20 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter21 est in defending human rights and promoting the rule 

22 of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although many 

23 countries in the region have improved the treatment 

24 of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific governments 

25 continue to commit human rights abuses and place 
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1 restrictions on basic human rights and political and 

2 civil liberties. 

3 (5) Without strong leadership from the United 

4 States, the international system, fundamentally root5 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment 

6 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is 

7 imperative that the United States continue to play a 

8 leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by— 

9 (A) defending peace and security; 

10 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and 

11 (C) promoting respect for fundamental 

12 human rights. 

13 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the 

14 Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the 

15 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate held a 

16 series of hearings on United States leadership in the 

17 Indo-Pacific region, in which— 

18 (A) experts, including Representative 

19 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. 

20 Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador 

21 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. 

22 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security 

23 challenges, economic opportunities, and impera24 tives of promoting the rule of law, human rights, 

25 and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
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1 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon 

2 Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy 

3 School of Government at Harvard University, 

4 testified, ‘‘As realistic students of history, Chi5 nese leaders recognize that the role the United 

6 States has played since World War II as the ar7 chitect and underwriter of regional stability and 

8 security has been essential to the rise of Asia, in9 cluding China itself. But they believe that as the 

10 tide that brought the United States to Asia re11 cedes, America must leave with it. Much as Brit12 ain’s role in the Western Hemisphere faded at 

13 the beginning of the twentieth century, so must 

14 America’s role in Asia as the region’s historic su15 perpower resumes its place.’’. 

16 (7) The United States National Security Strat17 egy (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘National Security 

18 Strategy’’), which was released in December 2017, 

19 states— 

20 (A) ‘‘A geopolitical competition between free 

21 and repressive visions of world order is taking 

22 place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, 

23 which stretches from the west coast of India to 

24 the western shores of the United States, rep25 resents the most populous and economically dy-
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1 namic part of the world. The United States in2 terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends 

3 back to the earliest days of our republic.’’; and 

4 (B) ‘‘Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex5 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit6 ment to established alliances and partnerships, 

7 while expanding and deepening relationships 

8 with new partners that share respect for sov9 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule 

10 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to 

11 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of 

12 territorial and maritime disputes in accordance 

13 with international law. We will work with allies 

14 and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and 

15 irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Pe16 ninsula and preserve the non-proliferation re17 gime in Northeast Asia.’’. 

18 TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL19 ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT20 EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE21 GION 

22 SEC. 101. POLICY. 

23 It is the policy of the United States to develop and 

24 commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen-
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1 sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for 

2 the Indo-Pacific region that— 

3 (1) secures the vital national security interests of 

4 the United States and our allies and partners; 

5 (2) promotes American prosperity and economic 

6 interests by advancing economic growth and develop7 ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu8 nity; 

9 (3) advances American influence by reflecting the 

10 values of the American people and universal human 

11 rights; 

12 (4) supports functional problem-solving regional 

13 architecture; and 

14 (5) accords with and supports the rule of law 

15 and international norms. 

16 SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. 

17 It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States— 

18 (1) to work with United States allies— 

19 (A) to confront common challenges; 

20 (B) to improve information sharing; 

21 (C) to increase defense investment and 

22 trade; 

23 (D) to ensure interoperability; and 

24 (E) to strengthen shared capabilities; 
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1 (2) to strengthen relationships with partners 

2 who— 

3 (A) share mutual respect for the rule of law; 

4 (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; 

5 and 

6 (C) understand the importance of civil soci7 ety, the rule of law, the free and reliable flow of 

8 information, and transparent governance; 

9 (3) to support functional problem-solving re10 gional architecture, including through the Association 

11 of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Economic 

12 Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit; 

13 (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United 

14 States— 

15 (A) to freedom of navigation under inter16 national law; 

17 (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of mari18 time and territorial disputes; and 

19 (C) to expand security and defense coopera20 tion with allies and partners, as appropriate; 

21 (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve 

22 complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization 

23 of North Korea; 

24 (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule 

25 of law, and advocate for transparent governance; 
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1 (7) to develop and grow the economy through 

2 private sector partnerships between the United States 

3 and Indo-Pacific partners; 

4 (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade 

5 agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner and 

6 build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific com7 mitted to free markets; 

8 (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific 

9 countries— 

10 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent 

11 infrastructure projects; 

12 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, open 

13 sea lines or air ways, and communication; and 

14 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis15 putes; and 

16 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the 

17 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation18 ships with allies and partners throughout the region. 

19 TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED 

20 STATES SECURITY INTERESTS 

21 IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

22 SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

23 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘appro24 priate committees of Congress’’ means— 
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1 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen2 ate; 

3 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

4 Senate; 

5 (3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 

6 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

7 House of Representatives; 

8 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

9 House of Representatives; and 

10 (6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the 

11 House of Representatives. 

12 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

13 authorized to be appropriated for the Department of State, 

14 the United States Agency for International Development, 

15 and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, 

16 $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 

17 2023, which shall be used— 

18 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in19 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in 

20 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and 

21 programs in the furtherance of United States strat22 egy; 

23 (2) to improve the defense capacity and resil24 iency of partner nations to resist coercion and deter 

25 and defend against security threats, including 
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1 through foreign military financing and international 

2 military education and training programs; 

3 (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 

4 engagements, particularly with the United States’ 

5 most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet stra6 tegic challenges, including— 

7 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the 

8 People’s Republic of China; and 

9 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear 

10 and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic 

11 People’s Republic of Korea; 

12 (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership 

13 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing 

14 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations 

15 that pose a significant threat to the United States, its 

16 allies, and its citizens’ interests abroad; 

17 (5) to help partner countries strengthen their 

18 democratic systems, with a focus on good governance; 

19 (6) to ensure that the regulatory environments 

20 for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner 

21 countries are transparent, open, and free of corrup22 tion; 

23 (7) to encourage responsible natural resource 

24 management in partner countries, which is closely as25 sociated with economic growth; and 
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1 (8) to increase maritime domain awareness pro2 grams in South Asia and Southeast Asia— 

3 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and 

4 coast guard training efforts with Southeast 

5 Asian countries; 

6 (B) by expanding cooperation with demo7 cratic partners in South Asia, including Ban8 gladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; 

9 (C) through intelligence sharing and other 

10 information-sharing efforts; and 

11 (D) through multilateral engagements, in12 cluding by involving Japan, Australia, and 

13 India in such efforts. 

14 (c) COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDERMINE

15 THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appropriated 

16 pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available for 

17 United States Government efforts to counter the strategic 

18 influence of the People’s Republic of China, in accordance 

19 with the strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the 

20 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Pro21 grams Appropriations Act, 2014 (division K of Public Law 

22 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation with the appro23 priate committees of Congress. 

24 (d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur25 suant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter-
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1 national Military Education and Training and Foreign 

2 Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the 

3 Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as 

4 ‘‘Burma’’). 

5 (e) PHILIPPINES.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appro7 priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made 

8 available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil9 ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State 

10 determines and reports to the appropriate committees 

11 of Congress that the Government of the Philippines 

12 has adopted and is implementing a counternarcotics 

13 strategy that is consistent with international human 

14 rights standards, including investigating and pros15 ecuting individuals who are credibly alleged to have 

16 ordered, committed, or covered up extrajudicial 

17 killings and other gross violations of human rights in 

18 the conduct of counternarcotics operations. 

19 (2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under para20 graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available— 

21 (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime 

22 programs, or transnational interdiction pro23 grams; or 
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1 (B) to support for the development of such 

2 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation with 

3 the appropriate committees of Congress. 

4 (f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to be 

5 appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made 

6 available for United States assistance programs that benefit 

7 the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of State 

8 certifies and reports to the appropriate congressional com9 mittees that the requirements under section 7043(b)(1) of 

10 division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 

11 (Public Law 115–141) have been met. 

12 SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE13 GION. 

14 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United 

15 States Government— 

16 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co17 operation and Security between the United States 

18 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, 

19 and all related and subsequent bilateral security 

20 agreements and arrangements concluded on or before 

21 the date of the enactment of this Act; 

22 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be23 tween the United States and Japan in promoting 

24 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
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1 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

2 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

3 United States and Japan. 

4 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI5 ANCE.—The United States Government— 

6 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty 

7 Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 

8 done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all related 

9 and subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar10 rangements concluded on or before the date of the en11 actment of this Act; 

12 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be13 tween the United States and South Korea in pro14 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; 

15 and 

16 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

17 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

18 United States and the Republic of Korea. 

19 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The 

20 United States Government— 

21 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between 

22 Australia and the United States of America, done at 

23 San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all related and 

24 subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrange-
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1 ments concluded on or before the date of the enact2 ment of this Act; 

3 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be4 tween the United States and Australia in promoting 

5 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

6 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

7 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

8 United States and Australia. 

9 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The 

10 United States Government is committed to the Mutual De11 fense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and 

12 the United States of America, done at Washington August 

13 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security 

14 agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act, including the Enhanced 

16 Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Manila April 28, 

17 2014. 

18 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is 

19 committed to— 

20 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist21 ance Between the Government of the United States of 

22 America and the Government of Thailand, done at 

23 Bangkok October 17, 1950; 

24 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 

25 done at Manila September 8, 1954; and 
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1 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security 

2 agreements and arrangements concluded on or before 

3 the date of the enactment of this Act, including the 

4 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United States 

5 Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok November 15, 

6 2012. 

7 SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

9 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions 

10 that seek— 

11 (A) to further constrain space for civil soci12 ety and religion within China; and 

13 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in the 

14 Indo-Pacific region; 

15 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role 

16 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect 

17 for the rule of law and international norms; 

18 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 

19 comprehensive relationship with China— 

20 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and 

21 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, in22 cluding over human rights, economic policies, 

23 and maritime security; and 

24 (4) is committed to working with China on 

25 shared regional and global challenges, especially— 
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1 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules2 based international system; and 

3 (B) the denuclearization of North Korea. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

5 that the United States should— 

6 (1) welcome a decision by China to change 

7 course and pursue a responsible results-oriented rela8 tionship with the United States and engagement on 

9 global issues; 

10 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role 

11 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and 

12 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un13 dermine the rules-based international system. 

14 SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

16 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic part17 nership between the United States and India in pro18 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; 

19 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 

20 diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the 

21 United States and India; and 

22 (3) is committed to— 

23 (A) the New Framework for the United 

24 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar25 lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005; 
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1 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech2 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012; 

3 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo4 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on 

5 January 25, 2015; 

6 (D) the United States-India Joint State7 ment on Prosperity Through Partnership, issued 

8 on June 26, 2017; and 

9 (E) all related and subsequent bilateral and 

10 security agreements and arrangements concluded 

11 as of the date of the enactment of this Act. 

12 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress 

13 makes the following findings: 

14 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De15 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public 

16 Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) 

17 requires the recognition of India as a major defense 

18 partner. 

19 (2) The designation of India as a major defense 

20 partner, which is unique to India— 

21 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 

22 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing 

23 between the United States and India; 

24 (B) elevates defense trade and technology co25 operation between the United States and India 
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1 to a level commensurate with the closest allies 

2 and partners of the United States; 

3 (C) facilitates technology sharing between 

4 the United States and India, including license5 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech6 nologies, after taking into account national secu7 rity concerns; and 

8 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination 

9 on defense strategy and policy, military ex10 changes, and port calls in support of defense co11 operation between the United States and India. 

12 SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER13 SHIP. 

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

15 that the United States should— 

16 (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the 

17 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

18 (referred to in this section as ‘‘ASEAN’’) relationship 

19 to a strategic partnership; 

20 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping 

21 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi22 cally integrated, and socially responsible community 

23 of nations that has common rules, norms, procedures, 

24 and standards which are consistent with inter-
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1 national law and the principles of a rules-based Indo2 Pacific community; 

3 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster 

4 greater integration among its members; 

5 (4) recognize the value of— 

6 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, po7 litical, and security partners within Asia and 

8 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu9 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor10 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and 

11 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as 

12 activities under the United States–ASEAN 

13 Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement 

14 and the United States-ASEAN Connect, which 

15 demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the 

16 ASEAN Economic Community and build upon 

17 economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re18 gion; 

19 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising 

20 ASEAN— 

21 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis22 putes in a constructive manner; and 

23 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip24 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter25 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent with 
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1 international law, including through the adop2 tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea 

3 to further promote peace and stability in the 

4 Indo-Pacific region; 

5 (6) support efforts by United States partners 

6 and allies in ASEAN— 

7 (A) to enhance maritime capability and 

8 maritime domain awareness; 

9 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and use 

10 of, international waterways in the Asia-Pacific 

11 region that are critical to ensuring the security 

12 and free flow of commerce; 

13 (C) to counter piracy; 

14 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 

15 activities such as the trafficking of persons, 

16 goods, and drugs; and 

17 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of 

18 countries or regional organizations to respond to 

19 emerging threats to maritime security in the 

20 Asia-Pacific region; and 

21 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 

22 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Per23 manent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect to 

24 the case between the Republic of the Philippines and 

25 the People’s Republic of China. 
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1 (b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN2 GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.— 

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

5 thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of 

6 State, in consultation with other Federal agencies, 

7 shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 

8 committees on a strategic framework to administer 

9 programs, projects, and activities of the United States 

10 to support diplomatic and economic engagement be11 tween the United States and ASEAN member coun12 tries for the 10-year period beginning on the date of 

13 the enactment of this Act. 

14 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

15 paragraph (1) shall address the following elements of 

16 United States strategy: 

17 (A) Promoting commercial engagement be18 tween the United States and member countries of 

19 ASEAN. 

20 (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN 

21 use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech22 nologies in their respective energy sectors. 

23 (C) Supporting economic conditions in 

24 member countries of ASEAN that promote inno25 vation, the creation of new businesses, sustain-
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1 able growth, and the education of the region’s fu2 ture innovators, entrepreneurs, and business 

3 leaders. 

4 (D) Working with member countries of 

5 ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory en6 vironment for growth, trade, innovation, and in7 vestment. 

8 (E) Supporting the regional integration ob9 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under the 

10 ASEAN Economic Community. 

11 (F) Partnership opportunities with the gov12 ernments of other countries friendly to the 

13 United States that have committed to a high set 

14 of standards for investment and development 

15 with ASEAN, as determined by the Secretary of 

16 State. 

17 SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI18 LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. 

19 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

20 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security coopera21 tion between the United States, South Korea, and Japan, 

22 including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and other 

23 defense-related initiatives. 

24 SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE. 

25 It is the sense of Congress that— 
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1 (1) the security dialogue between the United 

2 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad3 dress pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific 

4 region in order to promote— 

5 (A) a rules-based order; 

6 (B) respect for international law; and 

7 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and 

8 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rath9 er than to replace, current mechanisms. 

10 SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH11 EAST ASIA. 

12 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is 

13 committed to— 

14 (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive 

15 Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010; 

16 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De17 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 

18 2015; and 

19 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu20 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

21 States and Indonesia concluded on or before the date 

22 of the enactment of this Act. 

23 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is 

24 committed to— 
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1 (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive 

2 Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014; 

3 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Com4 prehensive Partnership between the United States of 

5 America and Malaysia, done in Washington Sep6 tember 13, 2017; and 

7 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu8 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

9 States and Malaysia concluded on or before the date 

10 of the enactment of this Act. 

11 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is 

12 committed to— 

13 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between 

14 the United States of America and the Republic of 

15 Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in 

16 Defense and Security, done at Washington July 12, 

17 2005; 

18 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree19 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; 

20 and 

21 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu22 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

23 States and Singapore concluded on or before the date 

24 of the enactment of this Act. 
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1 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is com2 mitted to— 

3 (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive 

4 Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 2013; 

5 (2) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision State6 ment on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on June 

7 1, 2015; 

8 (3) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision State9 ment, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and 

10 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu11 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

12 States and Vietnam concluded on or before the date 

13 of the enactment of this Act. 

14 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

15 that the United States should deepen diplomatic, economic, 

16 and security cooperation, especially in the areas of mari17 time security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malay18 sia, Singapore, and Vietnam. 

19 SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN. 

20 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It is 

21 the policy of the United States— 

22 (1) to support the close economic, political, and 

23 security relationship between Taiwan and the United 

24 States; 
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1 (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United 

2 States Government commitments to Taiwan, con3 sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public 

4 Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six As5 surances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan in 

6 July 1982; and 

7 (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo 

8 and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both 

9 sides of the Taiwan Strait. 

10 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President should 

11 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that 

12 are tailored to meet the existing and likely future threats 

13 from the People’s Republic of China, including supporting 

14 the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate asymmetric 

15 capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, survivable, 

16 and cost-effective capabilities, into its military forces. 

17 (c) TRAVEL.—The President should encourage the trav18 el of highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in accord19 ance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135). 

20 SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

22 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

23 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter24 national community by illicitly developing its nu25 clear and ballistic missile programs, in violation of 
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1 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 

2 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 

3 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 

4 2397 (2017). 

5 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

6 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights 

7 abuses against its own people and citizens of other 

8 countries, including the United States, the Republic 

9 of Korea, and Japan. 

10 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing 

11 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic People’s 

12 Republic of Korea through a policy of maximum pres13 sure and engagement, in close concert with its part14 ners. 

15 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

16 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE17 PUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

18 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

19 the United States to continue to impose sanctions 

20 with respect to activities of the Government of the 

21 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons act22 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other per23 sons in accordance with Executive Order No. 13551 

24 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of 

25 certain persons with respect to North Korea), Execu-
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1 tive Order No. 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating 

2 to imposing additional sanctions), Executive Order 

3 No. 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking 

4 the property of certain persons engaging in signifi5 cant malicious cyberenabled activities), Executive 

6 Order No. 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 

7 blocking the property of the Government of North 

8 Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohib9 iting certain transactions with respect to North 

10 Korea), and Executive Order No. 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 

11 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions with 

12 respect to North Korea), as such Executive orders are 

13 in effect on the day before the date of the enactment 

14 of this Act, until the Democratic People’s Republic of 

15 Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities de16 scribed in such Executive orders, including actions in 

17 violation of the United Nations Security Council reso18 lutions referred to in subsection (a)(1). 

19 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter20 minating any sanction with respect to the activities 

21 of the Government of the Democratic People’s Repub22 lic of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of such 

23 government, or any other person provided for in an 

24 Executive order listed in subsection (a), the Secretary 

25 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
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1 Treasury, shall submit a report to the appropriate 

2 congressional committees justifying the termination of 

3 the sanction and explaining the relationship between 

4 such termination and the cessation of any illicit ac5 tivity that violates any of the United Nations Secu6 rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection 

7 (a)(1) by such Government or person. The reporting 

8 requirement under this paragraph shall terminate on 

9 the date that is 5 years after the date of the enact10 ment of this Act. 

11 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

12 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of 

13 the President pursuant to the International Emer14 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). 

15 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

16 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUB17 LIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PRO18 GRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the objec19 tive of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic 

20 missile programs of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

21 Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dis22 mantlement of such programs. 

23 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE

24 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE

25 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.— 
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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

3 days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary 

4 of State, or a designee of the Secretary, in consulta5 tion with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit 

6 a report to the appropriate congressional committees 

7 that describes actions taken by the United States to 

8 address the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, 

9 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

10 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under 

11 paragraph (1) shall include— 

12 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the 

13 United States to identify strategies and policies, 

14 including an assessment of the strengths and 

15 weaknesses of such strategies and policies— 

16 (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization 

17 of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

18 Korea; and 

19 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the 

20 ballistic missile program of the Democratic 

21 People’s Republic of Korea; 

22 (B) an assessment of— 

23 (i) potential road maps toward peace24 ful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo25 ple’s Republic of Korea and the elimination 
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1 of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats 

2 posed by the Democratic People’s Republic 

3 of Korea; and 

4 (ii) specific actions that the Demo5 cratic People’s Republic of Korea would 

6 need to take for each such roadmap to be7 come viable; 

8 (C) a summary of the United States strat9 egy to increase international coordination and 

10 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or 

11 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement 

12 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by 

13 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 

14 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which 

15 shall include— 

16 (i) a description of the actions taken 

17 by the Secretary of State, or designees of the 

18 Secretary, to consult with governments 

19 around the world, with the purpose of in20 ducing such governments to fully implement 

21 the United Nations Security Council resolu22 tions referred to in subsection (a)(1); 

23 (ii) a description of the actions taken 

24 by such governments to fully implement 

25 United Nations Security Council resolutions 
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1 related to the Democratic People’s Republic 

2 of Korea; 

3 (iii) a list of countries with govern4 ments that the Secretary has determined are 

5 noncooperative with respect to imple6 menting the United Nations Security Coun7 cil resolutions referred to in subsection 

8 (a)(1); and 

9 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and in10 crease cooperation with respect to the Demo11 cratic People’s Republic of Korea, with the 

12 governments of the countries on the list de13 scribed in clause (iii); 

14 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the 

15 national export control regimes of countries that 

16 are members of the United Nations, and multi17 lateral export control regimes, that are necessary 

18 to enforce sanctions imposed with respect to the 

19 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea pursuant 

20 to the United Nations Security Council resolu21 tions referred to in subsection (a)(1); and 

22 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 

23 countries in adopting and using authorities nec24 essary to enforce export controls required by 

25 United Nations Security Council resolutions. 
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1 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required 

2 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi3 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

4 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

5 that— 

6 (1) representatives of the United States shall use 

7 the voice and vote of the United States in all inter8 national organizations, as appropriate, to advocate 

9 for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s Republic 

10 of Korea from such organizations, until such time as 

11 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea meets its 

12 commitments under the United Nations Security 

13 Council resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); 

14 and 

15 (2) the Secretary of State should work to induce 

16 countries to meet their commitments under the United 

17 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in 

18 subsection (a)(1), including by considering appro19 priate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and for20 eign assistance of the United States with governments 

21 that the Secretary has determined are noncooperative 

22 with respect to implementing the United Nations Se23 curity Council resolutions referred to in subsection 

24 (a)(1). 
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1 SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND. 

2 The United States Government is committed to— 

3 (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on No4 vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out5 lined future practical cooperation between the United 

6 States and New Zealand; 

7 (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on June 

8 19, 2012, which strengthened the defense relationship 

9 by providing a framework and strategic guidance for 

10 security cooperation and defense dialogues; and 

11 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and secu12 rity agreements and arrangements between the United 

13 States and New Zealand concluded on or before the 

14 date of enactment of this Act. 

15 SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that the 

17 United States should— 

18 (1) support strong United States engagement 

19 with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, 

20 Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 

21 Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 

22 Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 

23 Vanuatu; 

24 (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of the 

25 South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ26 ing— 
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1 (A) fisheries and marine resource conserva2 tion; 

3 (B) environmental challenges and resilience; 

4 (C) global health; 

5 (D) development and trade; and 

6 (E) people-to-people ties; and 

7 (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific 

8 Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law, 

9 good governance, and economic development. 

10 (b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA11 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of Free 

12 Association entered between the United States and the Free13 ly Associated States (Republic of Marshall Islands, the Fed14 erated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau)— 

15 (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United 

16 States in the Western Pacific; 

17 (2) reinforce United States regional commitment; 

18 (3) preempt potential adversaries from estab19 lishing positional advantage; and 

20 (4) further self-governance, economic develop21 ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated 

22 States. 
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1 SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; 

2 PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

3 (a) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.—It is the policy of the 

4 United States— 

5 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of 

6 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation, 

7 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, 

8 in accordance with applicable international law; and 

9 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations 

10 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South 

11 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter12 national law. 

13 (b) JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.—It 

14 is the sense of Congress that the President should develop 

15 a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United 

16 States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime train17 ing and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pa18 cific region, including the East China Sea and the South 

19 China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system 

20 benefitting all countries. 

21 SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 

22 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

23 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 

24 The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 

25 means— 
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1 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

2 Senate; 

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

4 the Senate; 

5 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

6 House of Representatives; and 

7 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

8 House of Representatives. 

9 (2) ISIS.—The term ‘‘ISIS’’ means the Islamic 

10 State of Iraq and Syria. 

11 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

12 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel13 ligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Sec14 retary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal officials, 

15 shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Con16 gress that contains an assessment of the current and future 

17 capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, 

18 and other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that 

19 pose a significant threat to the United States, its allies, and 

20 its citizens interests abroad. 

21 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection 

22 (b) shall include— 

23 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda24 linked, and other violent extremist group-affiliated 

25 fighters in Southeast Asia; 
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1 (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, al2 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-affili3 ated fighters expected to return to Southeast Asia 

4 from fighting in the Middle East; 

5 (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of 

6 ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex7 tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia; 

8 (4) the current resources available to combat the 

9 threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other vio10 lent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast 

11 Asia, and the additional resources required to combat 

12 such threat; 

13 (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of 

14 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex15 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively 

16 in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines, 

17 Indonesia, and Malaysia; 

18 (6) a description of the capabilities and resources 

19 of governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent 

20 extremist groups; and 

21 (7) a list of additional United States resources 

22 and capabilities that the Department of Defense and 

23 the Department of State recommend providing to gov24 ernments in Southeast Asia to combat violent extrem25 ist groups. 
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1 SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION. 

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

3 that there should be robust cybersecurity cooperation be4 tween the United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific 

5 region— 

6 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, 

7 including state-sponsored threats; 

8 (2) to share best practices to combat such threats; 

9 (3) to strengthen resilience against cyberattacks, 

10 misinformation, and propaganda; and 

11 (4) to strengthen the resilience of critical infra12 structure. 

13 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

14 authorized to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of the 

15 fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to enhance cooperation be16 tween the United States and Indo-Pacific nations for the 

17 purposes of combatting cybersecurity threats. 

18 SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE 

19 INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

21 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and 

22 other weapons of mass destruction, and their means 

23 of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace 

24 and security; 

25 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal26 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il-
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1 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North 

2 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies, 

3 and other weapons of mass destruction; 

4 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia— 

5 (A) to expand and modernize their respec6 tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi7 cant research and development resources in 

8 hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced 

9 technologies; and 

10 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 

11 technologies; and 

12 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many 

13 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy 

14 for a variety of peaceful applications. 

15 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

16 that the United States Government should undertake all 

17 reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effective arms 

18 control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo-Pacific re19 gion to limit the further spread of weapons of mass destruc20 tion and their means of delivery. 
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1 TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED 

2 STATES ECONOMIC INTER3 ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

4 REGION 

5 SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

7 (1) According to the United States Chamber of 

8 Commerce, by 2030— 

9 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 

10 population will be living in Asia; and 

11 (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption 

12 will take place in Asia. 

13 (2) According to the Asian Development Bank— 

14 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat15 eral or regional trade agreements; and 

16 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian 

17 countries are under negotiation or concluded and 

18 awaiting entry into force. 

19 (3) Free trade agreements between the United 

20 States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region (Aus21 tralia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea) have 

22 entered into force. 

23 (4) The member states of the Association of 

24 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section as 

25 ‘‘ASEAN’’), as a group— 
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1 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in 

2 the world; and 

3 (B) have a combined gross domestic product 

4 of $2,400,000,000,000. 

5 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member 

6 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, 

7 and the total value of bilateral trade between the 

8 United States and ASEAN member states has in9 creased by 78 percent since 2004. 

10 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by 

11 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers in 

12 the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the 

13 United States 2015 trade surplus of services provided 

14 to consumers in ASEAN member states was 

15 $8,000,000,000. 

16 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, 

17 goods and services exported from the United States to 

18 ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in the 

19 United States. 

20 (8) According to the Business Roundtable— 

21 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, 

22 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 

23 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re24 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global 

25 gross domestic product in 2017; and 
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1 (B) United States bilateral trade with the 

2 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) 

3 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States. 

4 (9) According to the United States National Se5 curity Strategy— 

6 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Co7 operation ‘‘remain centerpieces of the Indo8 Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for 

9 promoting an order based on freedom’’; and 

10 (B) the United States will ‘‘work with part11 ners to build a network of states dedicated to free 

12 markets and protected from forces that would 

13 subvert their sovereignty.’’. 

14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

15 that trade between the United States and the nations in 

16 the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the United 

17 States economy, United States exports, and jobs in the 

18 United States. 

19 SEC. 302. INDO-PACIFIC TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILAT20 ERAL AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL ECO21 NOMIC SUMMITS. 

22 Congress supports— 

23 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade 

24 agreements with partners that— 
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1 (A) comply with trade obligations and re2 spect, promote, and strictly adhere to the rule of 

3 law; and 

4 (B) increase United States employment and 

5 expand the economy; 

6 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con7 crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes; 

8 (3) negotiations under the auspices of the World 

9 Trade Organization, including negotiations to enter 

10 into appropriate plurilateral and sectoral agreements; 

11 (4) full implementation of the World Trade Or12 ganization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement by Indo13 Pacific countries; and 

14 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high15 level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

16 forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group of 20 

17 to pursue United States economic objectives in the 

18 Indo-Pacific region. 

19 SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP. 

20 The President should seek to develop to negotiate a 

21 comprehensive economic engagement framework with the 

22 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
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1 SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI2 TATION. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

4 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build5 ing and trade facilitation strategy, including leveling the 

6 playing field for American companies competing in the 

7 Indo-Pacific region. 

8 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

9 authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be nec10 essary to carry out subsection (a). 

11 SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should takes steps to 

13 strengthen the enforcement of United States intellectual 

14 property laws as a top priority, including taking all appro15 priate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled 

16 theft of intellectual property. 

17 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

18 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there19 after for the following 5 years, the President shall submit 

20 a report to Congress that— 

21 (1) describes the efforts of the United States Gov22 ernment to combat intellectual property violations 

23 and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the Indo-Pa24 cific region, particularly the People’s Republic of 

25 China; and 
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1 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of 

2 priority areas for United States engagement and ca3 pacity building assistance. 

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

5 authorized to be appropriated to the United States Trade 

6 Representative such amounts as may be necessary to spon7 sor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build 

8 capacity in the identified priority areas described in the 

9 annual report required under subsection (b). 

10 SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES. 

11 (a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.— 

12 (1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after 

13 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

14 thereafter for the following 5 years, the President shall 

15 establish a comprehensive, integrated, multiyear strat16 egy to encourage the efforts of Indo-Pacific countries 

17 to implement national power strategies and coopera18 tion with United States energy companies and the 

19 Department of Energy national laboratories to de20 velop an appropriate mix of power solutions to pro21 vide access to sufficient, reliable, and affordable power 

22 in order to reduce poverty, drive economic growth and 

23 job creation, and to increase energy security in the 

24 Indo-Pacific region. 
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1 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

2 There are authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 

3 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to 

4 carry out paragraph (1). 

5 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the 

6 sense of Congress that the United States should explore op7 portunities to partner with the private sector and multilat8 eral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian 

9 Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable 

10 electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar 

11 (historically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 

12 SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE. 

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coopera14 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency 

15 for International Development, should increase regional en16 gagement in the areas of environment, health, education, 

17 and infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong 

18 countries, including— 

19 (1) assisting in the development of programs that 

20 focus on forecasting environmental challenges and re21 silience; 

22 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on 

23 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the 

24 goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong 

25 Basin and access to safe drinking water; 
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1 (3) assisting with education enrollment and 

2 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English 

3 training and connectivity in rural communities; and 

4 (4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong 

5 countries, including— 

6 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; 

7 and 

8 (B) helping regional partners to track and 

9 treat malaria and tuberculosis. 

10 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

11 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

12 through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with 

13 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter14 national Development, shall submit a report to Congress 

15 that includes— 

16 (1) a list and evaluation of Lower Mekong Ini17 tiative activities since its inception in 2009; 

18 (2) a strategy for any increased regional engage19 ment and measures of success for the activities de20 scribed in paragraph (1); and 

21 (3) an accounting of funds used to execute Lower 

22 Mekong Initiative activities. 
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1 SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 

2 AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION. 

3 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

4 encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pacific 

5 region and United States private sector interests with oper6 ations and investments in the region to deploy agriculture 

7 practices that— 

8 (1) conserve natural resources; and 

9 (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable 

10 lands and water bodies. 

11 SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN’S 

12 ECONOMIC RIGHTS. 

13 It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 

14 should— 

15 (1) support activities that secure private prop16 erty rights and land tenure for women in developing 

17 countries in Asia, including— 

18 (A) establishing legal frameworks to give 

19 women equal rights to own, register, use, profit 

20 from, and inherit land and property; 

21 (B) improving legal literacy to enable 

22 women to exercise the rights described in sub23 paragraph (A); and 

24 (C) increasing the capacity of law enforce25 ment and community leaders to enforce such 

26 rights; 
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1 (2) work with Asian civil society, governments, 

2 and multilateral organizations to increase the capa3 bility of disadvantaged women and girls in Asia— 

4 (A) to realize their rights; 

5 (B) to determine their life outcomes; 

6 (C) to assume leadership roles; and 

7 (D) to influence decision-making in their 

8 households, communities, and societies; and 

9 (3) seek to expand access to appropriate finan10 cial products and services for women-owned micro, 

11 small, and medium-sized enterprises in Asia. 

12 TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED 

13 STATES VALUES IN THE INDO14 PACIFIC REGION 

15 SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

16 Congress makes the following findings: 

17 (1) The promotion of human rights and respect 

18 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in 

19 the United States’ national security interest. 

20 (2) Continued support for human rights, demo21 cratic values, and good governance is critical to a 

22 successful United States diplomatic strategy in the 

23 Indo-Pacific. 

24 (3) Strong support for human rights and democ25 racy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to efforts to 
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1 reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat corruption, 

2 reduce the allure of extremism, and promote economic 

3 growth. 

4 (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of 

5 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North 

6 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all 

7 been identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’. 

8 (5) There have been unacceptable human rights 

9 developments in— 

10 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been 

11 identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’, 

12 and the Department of State has declared that 

13 the violence against the Rohingya constitutes eth14 nic cleansing; 

15 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi16 fied by Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’, and 

17 where there are continued disturbing reports of 

18 extra-judicial killings; and 

19 (C) China, where forced disappearances, ex20 tralegal detentions, invasive and omnipresent 

21 surveillance, and lack of due process in judicial 

22 proceedings remain troublesome. 

23 (6) according to the National Security Strategy, 

24 the United States— 
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1 (A) will ‘‘support, with our words and ac2 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes 

3 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and 

4 the rule of law’’; 

5 (B) ‘‘may use diplomacy, sanctions, and 

6 other tools to isolate states and leaders who 

7 threaten our interests and whose actions run 

8 contrary to our values’’; and 

9 (C) ‘‘will support efforts to advance wom10 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and 

11 girls, and promote women and youth empower12 ment programs’’. 

13 SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS. 

14 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef15 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery 

16 in the Indo-Pacific region. 

17 SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. 

18 It is the sense of Congress that— 

19 (1) United States Government officials should 

20 lead by example— 

21 (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom of 

22 the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

23 (B) by engaging with the press corps at 

24 every appropriate opportunity; and 
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1 (2) the United States should advocate and sup2 port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the 

3 Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society, 

4 including journalists, to discuss and address the chal5 lenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific region. 

6 SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER7 SONNEL. 

8 It is the sense of Congress that— 

9 (1) United States embassies and consulates in 

10 the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap11 propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad12 vancing United States democracy, human rights, 

13 labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy 

14 interests; and 

15 (2) appropriate resources should be made avail16 able to carry out such activities. 

17 SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE18 TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT. 

19 The Secretary of State should, as appropriate— 

20 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional 

21 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re22 garding human rights and religious freedom viola23 tions; 
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1 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people 

2 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par3 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and 

4 (3) establish educational exchanges and capacity5 building programs emphasizing civil society develop6 ment. 

7 SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS 

8 HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY. 

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

10 that the United States should continue to work with 

11 ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address 

12 human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in 

13 Southeast Asia. 

14 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date 

15 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, after 

16 consultation with the Administrator of the United States 

17 Agency for International Development, shall submit a strat18 egy to the appropriate congressional committees to increase 

19 cooperation with ASEAN to promote human rights, democ20 racy, and good governance in Southeast Asia. 

21 (c) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub22 section (b) should include— 

23 (1) an assessment of the types of United States 

24 Government resources available to support increased 

25 cooperation; and 
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1 (2) an assessment to identify entities within 

2 ASEAN that the United States could potentially sup3 port or partner with to promote human rights, de4 mocracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia. 

5 SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA. 

6 The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en7 hance freedom of information access with regard to North 

8 Korea. 

9 SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC10 TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES 

11 ASSISTANCE. 

12 (a) SANCTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the 

13 President should impose targeted financial penalties and 

14 visa ban sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and 

15 other relevant authorities, on any individual or entity 

16 that— 

17 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; 

18 or 

19 (2) engages in censorship activities. 

20 (b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—It is the 

21 sense of Congress that the President should, in accordance 

22 with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise alter 

23 United States economic assistance to any country that has 

24 engaged in serious violations of human rights or religious 

25 freedoms. 
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1 SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

2 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

3 REGION.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be ap5 propriated $210,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 

6 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, strengthen 

7 civil society, human rights, rule of law, transparency, 

8 and accountability in the Indo-Pacific region, includ9 ing for universities, civil society, and multilateral in10 stitutions that are focusing on education awareness, 

11 training, and capacity building. 

12 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro13 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made 

14 available for United States Government efforts, led by 

15 the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

16 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the 

17 rule of law, and human rights in the People’s Repub18 lic of China. 

19 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to 

20 paragraph (1) shall be made available for nongovern21 mental organizations to support activities preserving 

22 cultural traditions and promoting sustainable devel23 opment, education, and environmental conservation 

24 in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Re25 gion and in other Tibetan communities in China, 

26 India, and Nepal. 
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1 SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS. 

2 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term 

3 ‘‘human rights defenders’’ means individuals, working 

4 alone or in groups, who nonviolently advocate for the pro5 motion and protection of universally recognized human 

6 rights and fundamental freedoms if the advocacy of such 

7 issues may result in the risk of safety or life. 

8 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

9 that human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific region have 

10 been facing increased difficulties with the rise of unprece11 dented crackdowns and conflicts. 

12 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

13 authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the 

14 fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to provide critical assistance 

15 to human rights defenders through the Department of 

16 State’s Human Rights Defenders Fund. 

17 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

18 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

19 through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with 

20 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter21 national Development, shall submit a report to Congress 

22 that includes— 

23 (1) a list and evaluation of the Human Rights 

24 Defenders Fund activities since its inception; 
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1 (2) a strategy for any increased regional engage2 ment and measures of success for the activities de3 scribed in paragraph (1); and 

4 (3) an accounting of funds used to execute the 

5 Human Rights Defender Fund activities. 

6 SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA7 TIVES. 

8 There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 

9 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support 

10 Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young 

11 Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Vol12 unteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange pro13 grams that focus on building the capacity of democracy, 

14 human rights, and good governance activists in the Indo15 Pacific region. 

16 SEC. 412. SAVINGS PROVISION. 

17 Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing 

18 the use of military force. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2736 

AMENDMENT