### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 041 -CR

The St at e of Te xa s , A ppe lla nt

v. Jim m ie Dale White, A ppellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 1030 299 , HO NORAB LE JO N N. WISSER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
Th e Sta te a

pp e a ls a n o rd e r d ism iss ing the ind ic tme nt in this c a us e . App e lle e Jimmie Dale Whi t e’ s m otion to dis miss the St ate’ s appea l for wa nt of jurisdiction was over ruled without written orde r on J uly 23, 2007. He has filed a motion for r ehea ring asking the Court to rec onsider the over ruling of his motion. The district cour

t’s order d i smissi ng the indictment was sig ned on Dec ember

31, 2006. The State wa s require d to “make” and file its notice of appea l no l at er than fiftee n day s therea fter, or J anuar y 15, 2007. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 44.01(d) (West 2006) ; T ex. R. App. P. 26.2( b). The State’s notice of appea l was filed on January 18, 2007. Th e a tta c he d c e rt if

ic a te of se rv ic e state s, a mon g oth e r thi ng s, “ Th is St a te ’s no tic e of a pp e a l is tim e ly if filed by J anuar y 18, 2007, since the Tr avis County Clerk’s office was closed on J anuar y 15, 2007,The notice of appe al itself was sig ned by District Attorney

Ronald Earle
. 1 W h i t e d o e s n o td i s p u t e t h a tJ a n u a r y 1 5 , 2 0 0 7 , w a s a

l e g a l h o l i d a y. 2 2 in observanc e of ML K day , and wa s closed on J anuar y 16 and 17, 2007, due to inclement we ather .” See Tex. R. App. P . 4.1. The certificate was signe d by Assistant District Attorney Holly E. Taylor. 1 I n h is m oti on

to d ism iss , Wh ite a rgue d that c ouns e l’ s c e rt if ic a te wa s in a de qu a te to satisfy rule 4.1(b) beca

use it did not state that the district cler k’s offic e, the of

fice in which the notice was filed, ha d been c losed due to incleme nt weathe r. I n its response to the motion, the State a rg ued 2 that the om ission of t he word “district” in counsel’s certific ate was a clerica l or t y pog raphic al er

ror. I n addition, the State asked the Court to take judicial notice that the Travis County District Clerk’s offi c e w a s c lo s e d

o n Ja n u a r

y 1 6 a n d 1 7 , 2 0 0 7
. A tt a c h e d

to th e mo ti o n ( a n d

a ls o to th e State ’s response ) wa s an af

fidavit signe d by Michelle Br inkman, Chief Deputy District Clerk, stating that

“ [o]n Ja nu a ry

16 and 17 of

20 07 , th e Tr a vis County Di str ic t Cle rk ’s of

fi c e wa s c los e d d

ue to th th inclement we ather .” The motion to t ake judicia l notice was g rante d on the same da y Whit e’s motion to dismi ss was over

ruled. I n h is m oti on

fo r re he a ri ng , Whit e argue s th a t c on sid e ra tio n o f B ri nk

man’ s a ff ida vit is forec losed by

the holding in State v. Muller , 8 2 9 S
. W .2d 805, 812-13 (Te x . Crim. App. 1992). We disag ree . I n Muller , the State’s orig inal, timely notice of appea l w as not signe d or authorized by the elected dis trict attorney , as required by article 44.01. Id
. a t 81 0. Ei g ht m on ths la te r, the State soug ht to cure this def

ect by filing a n amende d notice of a

ppeal. Id . at 806. The c ourt of cr iminal
a pp e a ls h e ld that the a me nd e d noti c e of a pp e a l wa s ine ff

e c tiv e be c a

us e the statut or

y fi ft e e n- da

y tim e limit for the prosec uting attorney to make an appe al under article 44.01 is a substantive limit ation3

that is not susceptible to corre cti o n b y t he “a mendment and c ure” provisions of the appellate rules. Id . at 812.

I n the instant case , the State has not soug ht to amend its notice of appe al outside the fiftee n-day

time limi t. Rather, the que stion presented is whether the State’s one a

nd only notice of appea l was file d timely . Contrary to Whi te’s ar g ument, Muller do e s n ot h old

that th e a

pp e llate
rec ord ca nnot be supp l em en t ed outs ide the fifte en-da y filing pe riod in order

to determine the applicability

of rule 4.1( b). I n fac t, the rule e x pressly provides that the closing or ina cce ssibili ty of the clerk’s of

f ic e ma y b e p r o v e d

o r c o n tr o v e rte d

b y a c e rti f ic a te o f th e c le r k o r c o u n s e l, a

p a rty ’s aff idavit, or other satisfactory proof. Te x . R. App. P. 4.1(b). We also find no support for White’s ar g ument in J o h n s o n v . S

tat e , 8 4 S .W.3d 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). I n that case , the cour t construed a

former appellate rul e t h at required a d ef en d an t wi t h a limited rig ht of appe al to rec ite in his noti ce of appea l that the prer equisites for appea l had bee n met. Se e id . at 659 n.1. The c ourt h el d t h at i f the re quired re citals wer e not
c on ta ine d in

the no tic e of

a pp e a l, t he c ourt of a ppeal s c ou ld n ot l oo k e lse wh e re in t he re c or d to deter mine if the pre requisites had be en satisf i ed. Id . at 660. We do not understand Johnson to prohibit a court of

appea ls from looking outside the noti ce o f appea l to determine whe ther a n appellate dead l i n e fe l l o n a we ekend, le g al holiday , or day the cler k’s offic e wa s closed due to bad wea

ther. We a lso un de rs tand

Whit e to a

rgue that r ule 4. 1( b) is i na

pp lic a ble to a State ’s a pp e a l. Ag ain, we disa g ree . Be cause the fiftee n-day time limi t in article 44.01(d) is a substantive limit ation
on th e St a te ’ s r ig h t o f a

p p e a l, it c a n n o t b e e xte n d e d b y th e a p p e ll a te c o u rt p u r s u a n t to rule 26.3 (m otions for extension of tim e). See M uller , 829 S.W .2d at 812 (c iting S ta tev . Demare t ,4

764 S.W .2d 857, 858 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no pet.)). How ever , t he State has not soug ht an
e xten sio n o f t

he de a dli ne fo r p e rf

e c tin g its a

pp e a l. R ule 4. 1 d oe s n ot e xten d th e su bs tanti ve tim e limit for the State to pe rfe ct an a ppeal, but mere ly provides for the eve ntuality of the de adline fa lling on a Saturda

y , Sunday , leg al holiday , or day in which the cle rk’s off

ice is closed or

inacc essible due to i nc le me nt w e athe r. As its tit le st a te s, ru le 4. 1 p ro vid e s g uid e lin e s b y wh ic h e sta

bli sh e d ti me periods ar e to be c omputed. The plain languag e of a rticle 44.01(d) does not prec lude the applica tion
o f r u l e 4
. 1 i n c a l c u l a t i n g w h e t h e r t h e S t a t e ’ s n o t i c e o f

a p p e a l w a s f

i l e d t i m e l y. Next, White a

rg ues that B rinkman’s a ffidavit is inadequate bec ause it mere ly states that the district cler

k’s offic e was closed due to inclement weather on the da y s in question. He complains that the af

fidavit does not state t hat t he office was closed during reg ular business hours fo r t he e nti re ty

of the tw o da y s or re c ite the le g a l autho ri ty by wh ic h it wa s c los e d. We d e c lin e to
rea d the af

fidavit so narr owly . Reasonably construed, the aff

idavit is sufficient to support the conclusion that the Travis County District Clerk’s off

ice wa s closed all day

due to the we ather

on Janu a ry 16 a nd 17 , 2 00 7. We a ssume that th e of fice was clo sed on the a uth or ity of the Tr a vis County District Clerk, but it is sufficient for r ule 4.1(b) that the office was c losed due to incleme nt
we at h er re gar d l es s o f w h o o rd er edt h e c l o s i n g. Courts of appea ls must construe the appe llate rules r easona bly and libera lly

so that the ri g ht to a

pp e a l is no t los t by imp os ing re qu ir e me nts no t a bs olute ly ne c e ssa

ry to e ff e c t th e purp os e
o f a r ule. Fe w v . S

tat e , N o . PD
- 0 8 6 6

- 0 6 , T e x. Cr im
. A p p . L E X I S 3 1 7 , a t * 1 3 ( T e x. Crim. App. M ar . 7 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Verburgt v. Dorne r , 959 S.W .2d 615, 617 (Tex. 19 9 7 ))
. W e co n clude that counsel’s c ertification attached to the notice of appe al and the affidavit of t he deputy district clerk attache d to both the State’s response to the motion to di smiss an d to the State’s motion to takeWhit e ref ers us to evidence that the Travis County Commi ssioner’s Court met on January 16 3 a nd 17 , 2 00 7. Th is i s n ot e vid e nc e that th e dis tr ic t c le rk ’s of fi c e wa s o pe n o n th os e date s. 5 judicial notice ar e suff

icient to make a prima fac ie showing that the district c lerk’s office was c losed due to inclement we ather

on J anuar

y 16 and 17, 2007. Whit e has ma de no probative showing to the
c o n t r a r y. Apply ing r

ule 4.1(b), the State’s not ice of appea l was ti mely filed on January 18, 2007. 3 Howeve r, complianc e with rule 4.1( b) does not obviate the strict req u i re m en t of
a rt ic le 44 .0 1( d) that th e e le c te d dis tr ic t a tto rn e y “ make ” the State ’s a pp e a l – by sig nin g or

pe rs on a lly authorizing the notice of appe al – within fifteen day s o f t h e t ri al cour t’s order , J anuar

y 15. See Muller , 829 S.W .2d at 810. Rely ing on article 44.01(d), W hite raises in his moti on for r ehea ring an issue not pre viously

prese nted in his moti on to dismiss. He obser ves that the district attorne y ’s sig natur e on

the no tic e of

a pp e a l is no t dat e d. B e c a us e the no tic e of

a pp e a l w a s n ot f

ile d unti l J anuar y 18, he urg es us to infer that the district attorney failed to “ make” the appe al timely
. Under the unusual circ umstances of this case, we cannot disce rn from the r ecor d whether the elec ted district attorney timely “made ” the State’s appea l. We note t h at t h e assist ant dis tr ic t a tto rn e y ’s c e rt if

ic a te of se rv ic e , wh ic h wa s ob vio us ly pr e pa re d on Janu a ry 18 , is o n a

se pa rate sheet of paper attache d to the notice of a ppeal sig ned by

the district attorney . These c ircumstance s
are equally

consistent with the district attorney having signe d the notice within the fifte en-da y period as they are him signing it on or near J anuar y 18. Whil e it may

be prude nt for the district attorne y to date his sig natur e on a Sta te ’s no tic e of a pp e a l to a vo id futur e dis pu te s, the re is n oth ingin a rt ic le 44.01(d) or

the appe llate rules that require s it. Nor do these provisions y ield any basis for us to dra

w presumptions here as to when the district attorney signe d the notice.6 This unresolved f

act—whe ther the e lected district attorney “made ” the State’ s appea l withi n th e s tr ic t f

if te e n - d a y d e a d li n e o f

a rti c le 4 4
. 0 1 ( d )

— c o n tr o ls o u r s u b je c t- matt e r

ju r is d ic tion
over the State’s appe al. Se e id
. at 812-13. I n simil ar instances, appe llate cour ts have a bated pe nding appea ls and rema

nded unre solved jurisdictional fac t questions to the t rial court for re solution. See Peav y v. Tex as Home M

gmt., Inc. , 16 S.W .3d 104, 1 0 5 T ex . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pe t.) (a batin g fo r f

in di ngs of fa c t on

wh e n a pp e lle e a nd

c ouns e l r e c e ive d n oti c e of a pp e llate judgme nt). We will do the same her e. Ac cording ly , we r eser ve a f inal ruling on Whit e’s motion for rehe aring , abate the appea l, a nd rema nd the cause to the district c ourt. That court shall take e vidence and make a written finding reg arding the date the elec ted district attorney signe d the State’s notice of appe al. A supplementa l rec ord conta ining the distri ct co u rt ’s writ ten finding of fa ct and a tr a ns c ri pti on

of a ny he a ri ngsh a ll b e fi le d in t his Cou rt no la te r t

ha n f if te e n d a y s a ft e r t

he date of this opinion.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Abated Filed: August 31, 2007 Pub lis h