alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*OPINION ISSUED FEBRUARY 20, 2009*

#### KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS SOLUTIONS VS. INSURANCE COMMISSION

(CC-08-0472)

Claimant appeared *pro se.*

Ronald R. Brown, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This claim was submitted for decision based upon the allegations in the Notice of Claim and respondent's Answer. Claimant seeks to recover from respondent the cost for six copy machines in the amount of $13,885.21.

In its Answer, respondent admits the validity of the claim in the amount of *250$4,042.12, rather than the amount of $13,885.21. Respondent states that only $4,042.12 of the claimed $13,885.21 in charges include invoices incurred during a period prior to the termination of the former Workers’ Compensation Commission and the transfer of employees and certain assets to the Insurance Commission and charges for machines that were transferred to BrickStreet Insurance from the former Workers’ Compensation Commission. These charges are not the responsibility of respondent. Claimant has agreed that the amount owed by respondent is $4,042.12.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion to and does make an award to claimant in the amount of $4,042.12.

Award of $4,042.12.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                            AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ValCom, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB/A  for  the  quarter ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities
and
Exchange Commission  on  the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Vincent Vellardita,
Chief Executive Officer of  the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies  with  the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

A  signed original of this written statement required by Section 906  has  been
provided  to ValCom, Inc. and will be retained by ValCom, Inc. and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

October 4, 2006


/s/ Vincent Vellardita
---------------------------
Vincent Vellardita
Chief Executive Officer
UNITED STATES
                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                              Washington, DC 20549

                                    FORM 8-K

                                 CURRENT REPORT
                     PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
                         SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

                         ------------------------------

       DATE OF REPORT (Date of earliest event reported): December 11, 2007

                         ------------------------------

                           FIRST MERCHANTS CORPORATION
             (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

                         -------------------------------

         INDIANA                     0-17071                     35-1544218
(State or other jurisdiction   (Commission file number)        (IRS Employer
     of incorporation)                                       Identification No.)

                             200 East Jackson Street
                                  P.O. Box 792
                              Muncie, IN 47305-2814
          (Address of principal executive offices, including zip code)

                                 (765) 747-1500
              (Registrant's telephone number, including area code)

                                 Not Applicable
          (Former name or former address, if changed since last report)

Check  the  appropriate  box  below  if the  Form  8-K  filing  is  intended  to
simultaneously  satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the
following provisions:

[ ] Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR
    230.425)

[ ] Soliciting material pursuant to  Rule 14a-12 under  the Exchange Act (17 CFR
    240.14a-12)

[ ] Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange
    Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))

[ ] Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange
    Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))

<PAGE>

ITEM 8.01  OTHER EVENTS

First Merchants Corporation Announces Stock Repurchase

At its  regularly  scheduled  meeting  held on  December  4, 2007,  the Board of
Directors of First Merchants Corporation  authorized management to repurchase up
to 500,000 of the  Corporation's  Common  Stock  through the open  market.  This
authorization expires on December 31, 2008.
J ULIE O ETTINGER M ANAGING D IRECTOR

– I NTERNATIONAL & R EGULATORY A FFAIRS (202) 296-2370 (202) 296-2869 FAX

JULIE

. OETTINGER @ UNITED

. COM

January 19, 2010

Esta Rosenberg, Chief

U.S. Carrier Licensing Division U.S. Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20590

Re: Motion of United Air Lines, Inc. for Waiver of Dormancy Condition DOT-OST-2009-0192 (U.S.-Mexico code share with Continental)

Dear Ms. Rosenberg:

This is to advise that United has comple ted its poll of U.S. carrier representatives

listed in the attached service list for th e above-referenced motion, which was filed on January 15, 2010. No carrier objects to the gr ant of United’s request. A copy of this letter is today being filed with the Department's Docket Section.

Respectfully submitted,

Julie Oettinger Managing Director—International and Regulatory Affairs

cc: Service ListCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this date served a copy of the foregoing document on

all persons named below by causing a copy to be sent via email:

byerlyjr@state.gov

carl.nelson@aa.com dkirstein@yklaw.com (Spirit) donna.kooperstein@usdoj.gov dwight.moore@ustranscom.mil efaberman@wileyrein.com (Air Tran/Frontier) hkamen@coair.com howard_kass@usairways.com jhill@dowlohnes.com (Jet Blue) john.allen@faa.gov

john.fredericksen@suncountry.com (Sun Country) jrichardson@johnlrichardson.com (Amerijet) nssparks@fedex.com pmurphy@lopmurphy.com (USA 3000) recohn@hhlaw.com (Atlantic Southeast) rpommer@atlasair.com

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com temerson@skywest.com

rbkeiner@crowell.com gmurphy@crowell.com

Annalei Avanceña Advisor—Regulatory Affairs

Dated: January 19, 2010
EXHIBIT 31.1  CERTIFICATION   I, Shelby T. Brewer, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Commodore Applied Technologies, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects, the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report. 4. The Registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The Registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the Registrant's board of directors: a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal control over financial reporting.  Date:  August 17, 2007  By:   /s/Dr. Shelby T. Brewer Dr. Shelby T. Brewer, Chief Executive Officer, Principal Executive Officer  A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant to be furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2488 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2488

To amend title 37, United States Code, to exclude the receipt of basic 
 allowance for housing for members of the Armed Forces in determining 
   eligibility for certain Federal benefits, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 1, 2018

 Ms. Duckworth (for herself, Ms. Murkowski, Mr. Udall, Mr. Jones, Mr. 
 Van Hollen, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Booker, Mrs. Murray, 
Ms. Smith, Ms. Cantwell, and Ms. Harris) introduced the following bill; 
  which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, 
                        Nutrition, and Forestry

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 37, United States Code, to exclude the receipt of basic 
 allowance for housing for members of the Armed Forces in determining 
   eligibility for certain Federal benefits, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Military Hunger Prevention Act''.

SEC. 2. BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR HOUSING AND CERTAIN FEDERAL BENEFITS.

    (a) Exclusion of Basic Allowance for Housing.--Section 403(k) of 
title 37, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
following new paragraph:
    ``(4) In determining eligibility to participate in any Federal 
program issuing benefits for nutrition assistance (including the Family 
Subsistence Supplemental Allowance program under section 402a of this 
title), the value of a housing allowance under this section shall be 
excluded from any calculation of income, assets, or resources.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 5(d) of the Food and Nutrition 
Act of 2008 (7 U.S.C. 2014(d)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (18), by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
        a semicolon;
            (2) in paragraph (19)(B), by striking the period and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(20) any allowance under section 403 of title 37, United 
        States Code.''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>


                        FUSION MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
                       (A Company in the Development Stage)
                        COMPUTATION OF NET LOSS PER SHARE
                                 (In Thousands)


                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1


                                       Three Months Ended     Three Months Ended
                                            March 31,              March 31,
                                              1997                   1996
                                          (unaudited)             (unaudited)
                                       ------------------     ------------------

Weighted average common
shares outstanding.................          7,025                   1,520

Common equivalent shares
  pursuant to Staff Accounting
  Bulletin No. 83..................            -                       423
                                           -------                 -------

Shares used in computing per
  share amounts (1)................          7,025                   1,943
                                           -------                 -------
                                           -------                 -------

Net loss...........................        $(2,090)                $(1,559)
                                           -------                 -------
                                           -------                 -------

Net loss per share.................        $ (0.30)                $ (0.80)
                                           -------                 -------
                                           -------                 -------

(1) PRIMARY AND DILUTIVE EARNINGS PER SHARE ARE THE SAME FOR ALL PERIODS 
    PRESENTED.


THE ACCOMPANYING NOTES ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THESE CONDENSED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS
#### MARTIN v. STATE.

No. 16599.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 4, 1934.

Hosea D. Edwards and Jack Varner, both of Nacogdoches, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE, Judge.

Conviction for transporting intoxicating liquor; punishment, one year in the penitentiary.

 There appears in the record but one bill of exceptions, which bfings forward complaint of the fact that a deputy sheriff of Nacogdoches county was asked on direct ex-' amination by the state:- “Did you have any-information at that time as to any activity of this defendant on that afternoon? ” To which question objection was made by appellant for the reasons advanced as follows: “Any information that the witness may have had would be hearsay -as to the defendant, being the action and statement of some third party not in the presence or hearing of the defendant, would not be binding on the defendant, prejudicial and highly inflammatory to his rights.” Which objections were overruled, and the witness testified as follows: “We had information that Clarence Martin was going to bring a gallon of whisky to the Harris house to sell to some one at six o’clock that afternoon.” It is certified that the question of search or probable cause was not an issue. The testimony for the state and appellant is in -a condition of direct conflict; the state claiming that appellant was observed with a package in his arms, which was investigated and found to • contain whisky. The place where he was was not that of his residence or where he stayed. He had just gotten out of a car and was going toward the Harris house with the package in his arms, which the state claimed contained whisky. Appellant and his witnesses claimed that it contained clothing, one Gibson testifying that appellant had a shirt and a pair of trousers in a sack, and told witness he was going down to the Harris house to carry same. Appellant’s wife testified that appellant was carrying a package containing a shirt and a pair of trousers to said house at the time he was confronted by the officers. We regret the necessity for reversing this case upon the proposition of the admission of this improper tes*424timony, and especially in view of tlie fact that it appears from the statement of facts that said question was elicited from the deputy sheriff in the absence of the jury. However, the .bill of exceptions contains the direct statement as follows: “Which objections were overruled by the court, and the witness did testify before the jury as follows.” It is the rule of this court that when there is a conflict between the statement of facts and a bill of exceptions, the latter will govern and be taken to be correct.

For the error mentioned, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

THE ESTATE OF JOEL SOTO by and 

through its independent administrator, 

MARIBEL AMADOR, and MARIBEL 

AMADOR, Indiv. and IVAN SOTO, 

JOSEL SOTO, JR., and PAULINA SOTO, 

all Indiv., By and Through Their Next 

Friend, MARIBEL AMADOR,

 Appellants,

v.

BAUDELIO GONZALEZ MIRELES,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§ 

§

§

No. 08-18-00007-CV

Appeal from the

205th Judicial District Court 

of Hudspeth County, Texas 

(TC#CV-04423-205) 

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. We further order that Appellee 

recover from Appellants and their sureties, if any, see TEX.R.APP.P. 43.5, on the judgment and all 

costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue. This decision shall be certified below for 

observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 21ST DAY OF AUGUST, 2019.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
#### CAPLES v. COLE.

No. 7198; Motion No. 12826.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 15, 1937.

For former opinion, see 102(S.W.(2d) 173.

John T. Gano, of Fort Worth, for plaintiff in error.

Bramlette & Levy and Richard B. Levy, all of Longview, for defendant in error.

William McGraw, Atty. Gen., and H. Grady Chandler and Russell Rentfro, Asst. Attys. Gen., amici curiae.

SHARP, Justice.

In our original opinion we held that that part of subdivision 4 of article 5329, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, which reads, “no sale made without condition of settlement shall be questioned by the State or any person after one year from the date of such sale,” controls this case.

Cole acquired this land from the State at a price of $12.50 per acre, and it was treated for the purposes of the sale .as surveyed school land. The sale was made without condition of settlement. Section 2 of H.B. No. 358, Acts 1931, c. 271 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St. art. 5421c, § 2), provides how all surveyed school land may be sold under said act, but also provides “that all such land within five miles of a well producing oil or gas in commercial quantities shall be subject to lease only, and the surface rights shall not be sold.” The agreed statement “that said land was within five miles of a producing oil well” is all the testimony upon this question, contained in the record. Therefore, it is not shown indisputably that the land commissioner was not called upon to determine an issue of fact and to exercise his judgment and discretion in making the sale. Under such state of facts that provision of subdivision 4, supra, would apply.

We do hold, however, that all sales of public school land must he authorized by law. As to any sale of public school land neither authorized by law nor made under color of law, the one-year statute of limitation above cited would not apply. Kirby v. Conn, 109 Tex. 540, 212 S.W. 469; Id. (Tex.Civ.App.) 156 S.W. 232; Rainer v. Durrill (Tex.Civ.App.) 156 S.W. 589 (writ refused).

Part of section 5 of H.B. No. 358 (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 5421c, § 5) reads as follows: “Any headright survey, homestead donation, pre-emption survey, scrip survey or other survey heretofore awarded or sold, which survey has been held and claimed in good faith by any party for a period of ten years prior tq the date of application for patent and which surveys cannot be patented under existing laws, may be patented on payment of One Dollar ($1.00) an acre to the Land Commissioner.”

The facts of this case do not bring before us for construction the foregoing provisions of section 5, and therefore we are not called *4upon to hold that land described therein cannot be acquired by purchase if it is situated within five miles of a producing oil or gas well. Upon that question we express no opinion herein.

With the foregoing statements, plaintiff in error’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
#### DICKENS v. STATE.

No. 18902.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 7, 1937.

W. C. Dowdy and J. W. McCullough, both of McKinney, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE, Judge.

Conviction for possessing whisky in containers' which are unstamped and bear no valid evidence of the tax being paid; punishment, a fine of $20.

Section 43 of article 1 of the Texas Liquor Control Act (Acts 1935, 2d Called Sess., c. 467 [Vernon’s Ann.P.C. art. 666— 43]) reads as follows: “If a person shall have in his possession within this State any distilled liquors not contained in a container to which is affixed a stamp or other valid evidence showing the payment of the tax on such liquor due to the State of Texas, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than Ten Dollars ($10),” etc.

Appellant was found in McKinney, Collin county, Tex., on December 21, 1935, in possession of three bottles of whis-ky, same being distilled liquor, upon none of which were any stamps or other valid evidence that the tax had been paid.

He interposed on, this trial only the defense that when he bought the whisky he paid 45 cents per bottle, and was told by the man from whom he bought same in Dallas that the liquor was 40 cents per bottle, and that the other 5 cents was for tax. Said seller gave to appellant what he called a sales slip which contained the statement that a tax of 5 cents for each bottle of whisky had been paid. Appellant said he put the slip in his pocket, but subsequent search for same failed to discover it.

There were no stamps or other evidence on the bottles showing that the tax had been *22paid on the liquor. Appellant had been convicted of illegal liquor selling in 1931; had pleaded guilty to two cases at a time when he was charged in thirteen cases. He seems also to have - admitted other prosecutions for violation of the same law.

The statute seems plain. The facts are almost without dispute. None of the contentions brought forward in the twenty-four bills of exceptions have merit. When a statute is as plain as the one under consideration, there seems no need to invoke rules of construction. Nor is the guilt of appellant in this case made by statute in any way dependent on the question of intent. If one he in such haste to possess whisky ás that he is unwilling to wait .for the Liquor Control Board to furnish the usual and regular form of stamps, the law seems written so as that .any valid evidence, showing that the tax has been paid, may be affixed to the container, and be sufficient. The words used in the statute, viz., "affixed” and “valid,” are words of ordinary use and well understood, and mean but to fasten or attach physically that which is legally sufficient for the purpose stated. Nothing was attached to or put upon the containers here involved showing any attempted compliance with the law.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.