alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Date: October 7, 2014

Memo to: Docket ID# EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0734

From: David Cole, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Subject: Proposed Revisions to Wood Heater NSPS – Telephone Conversation with Tomás 

Carbonell, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

On October 7, 2014, representatives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency met by 

telephone with Tomás Carbonell, EDF, at his request. The purpose of the meeting was for Mr. 

Carbonell to express EDF’s concerns about several provisions of the proposed standards as the 

Agency continues to develop the final rule. 

Specific areas of concern were the following: 

1. Cord wood testing for compliance, including joint recommendations from NESCAUM, 

WESTAR and HPBA on cord wood testing, dated August 18, 2014 (see

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0734-1712)

2. Hydronic heaters, proposed emissions standards

3. Need for hangtags

4. Data to support proposed standards for forced-air furnaces

Attending the meeting were—

EDF: Tomás Carbonell

EPA/OAQPS: Gregory Green, Chebryll Edwards, Gil Wood, Amanda Aldridge, David Cole
#### BRUTON v. STATE.

No. 19265.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 5, 1938.

Martin & Allred, of Hillsboro, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

Theft of cattle is the offense; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for two years.

The indictment appears regular. The record is before this court without statement of facts or bills of exception. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged in the indictment.

No error having been perceived justifying a reversal, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                -------------------------------------------------

                             As adopted pursuant to
                             ----------------------

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                  ---------------------------------------------

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Park Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on August 8, 2003, (the "Report"), I, David A. Remijas,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
                  amended; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.



                                         David A. Remijas
                                         President and Chief Executive Officer

                                         August 8, 2003
#### HARVEY v. STATE.

No. 18983.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 7, 1937.

C. C. McDonald and J. Earle Kuntz, both of Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction was for passing a forged instrument, punishment assessed being two years in the penitentiary.

There was only one count in the indictment. It charged that appellant knowingly passed as true to Quincy Wilson a check dated June 25, 1936, drawn on the First National Bank & Trust Company of Tulsa, Old., in favor of Thomas McNeal, for $36.50, purporting to have been executed by the Marathon Oil Company, by Ralph P. Hyatt, it being stated in the body of the check that it was for services rendered by McNeal to the company in question.

Wilson testified that appellant came into his place of business about June 29, 1936, and purchased a watch, in payment for which she tendered the check in question. Wilson made some inquiry about what bank the company did business with in Vernon and upon being told that it was the Herring National Bank he turned to telephone the bank, when appellant left the store. Wilson had not delivered the watch to appellant and had not accepted the check in payment therefor. He says: “I did not give her any money and did not give her any watch; she turned around and walked out while I was phoning.”

The uncontradicted evidence shows that if appellant was guilty of anything she was guilty of the offense of attempting to pass the instrument in question to Wilson, but was not guilty of passing the same. See Smiley v. State, 80 Tex.Cr.R. 280, 189 S.W. 482; McConnell v. State, 85 Tex.Cr. R. 409, 212 S.W. 498; Houston v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 505, 128 S.W. 618.

In view of the uncontradicted evidence we are at some loss to understand why this case should ever have reached this court. It should have been disposed of by a peremptory instruction to acquit appellant upon the charge of passing a forged instrument.

Appellant excepted to the charge of the court for a failure to instruct the jury upon the law of circumstantial evidence. We quote from Mixon v. State (Tex.Cr. App). 90 S.W.(2d) 832, 833, as follows:

> “The authorities hold that direct proof of passing a forged instrument will not relieve the trial court from the duty of charging on circumstantial evidence when the case is one for passing a forged instrument, and the fact that the document in question was *52a forgery, as well as the further fact that the accused knew same to be a forgery, depends on circumstantial evidence.”

Many authorities are cited supporting the opinion in the Mixon Case. If the evidence was sufficient to show that the document in the present case was a forgery, there is no evidence that appellant knew it was a forgery save the circumstance that she walked out of the store while Wilson was telephoning 'to the bank. The court should have responded to the exception and given a charge on circumstantial evidence.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
#### CHANCELLOR et al. v. GUERRA et al.

No. 9772.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

July 17, 1935.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 14, 1935.

*664Cameron, Hardin & Bridges, of Edin-burg, and Dan Moody and J. B. Robertson, both of Austin, for appellants.

F. B. Guerra, Jr., of Laredo, J. W. Rags-dale, of Victoria, R. D. Cox, Jr., of McAl-len, and Strickland, Ewers & Wilkins, of Mission, for appellees.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

The suit involves the mineral interest in a tract of twenty-five acres of land in a proven oil field in Hidalgo county. Francisco B. Guerra owns the surface of the land, in fee, as well as a one-eighth interest in the oil therein, but various parties, denominated as appellants here, are claiming the leasehold interest in the land, together with a seven-eighths interest in the oil therein, while *others,*appellees here, are claiming the same interest. Guerra, supporting his coappellees in their claim of the leasehold interest and seven-eighths of the mineral interest, is also contesting appellants’ claim.

Appellants, by direct action, and appel-lees, by cross-action, are prosecuting in the court below, a consolidated suit in trespass to try title, and to establish the claims asserted by them, respectively, to the leasehold interest in the land. Pending disposition of that suit on the merits, the trial court, at ap-pellees’ insistence, appointed a receiver, with power to proceed with the development of the land for oil and gas purposes, pending determination of the main suit, on the merits. From the interlocutory order appointing the receiver, appellants have brought this appeal.

It appears, conclusively, from the record, that the land involved is in the center of a highly developed and fully proven oil field, and is closely surrounded by actively producing wells; that if not at once developed the tract involved will be drained of the oil which lies, apparently in large quantities, under the surface of the tract, and which, as a matter of common knowledge, will be lost to the parties litigant here if not promptly produced by or for them; that some of the claimants of the mineral interests refuse to co-operate with the others in procuring production; that because of this litigation, and the refusal of the parties to co-operate, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to procure the development necessary to save the oil to the parties, whereby the very subject-matter in litigation will be destroyed, so far as the owners’ interests are concerned.

In this state of the record, and under the authorities, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting a receivership, and the judgment will be affirmed. Article 2293, R. S. 1925; United North & South Oil Co. v. Meredith (Tex. Civ. App.) 258 S. W. 550; Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 272 S. W. 124; Saulsbury v. Clay (Tex. Civ. App.) 25 S.W(2d) 200, 201; Hunt v State (Tex. Civ. App.) 48 S.W.(2d) 466, 467.
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#### SOUTHERN LIFE & HEALTH INS. CO. v. RAMIREZ.

No. 3339.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

March 26, 1936.

*235A. H. Lumpkin, of San Antonio, for appellant.

J. R. Cade, of San Antonio, for ap-pellee.

HIGGINS, Justice

(after stating the case as above).

Complaint is made as to the submission of the issue concerning the statement relating to disease of the lungs. The issue inquired whether an untrue statement in that connection was willfully made. Appellant presents the point that a material misrepresentation is a defense without the necessity of proving the misrepresentation was willfully made. This theory is untenable under the ruling in American Central Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander (Tex.Com.App.) 56 S.W.(2d) 864, 865, where it was held that a misrepresentation or breach of warranty by the insured will not avoid a life insurance policy unless it was willful or made fraudulently with intent to deceive. The same ruling was made in Colorado Life Co. v. Newell (Tex.Civ.App.) 78 S.W.(2d) 1049, in which a writ of error was •refused.

These authorities refute the appellant’s theory that a misrepresentation of a material fact, innocently made, contained in. an applicatipn for life insurance, will avoid a policy issued upon such application. Appellant pleaded the alleged misrepresentation was willfully made evidently to meet the rulings in the cases cited. The court did not err in limiting the issue to a willful misrepresentation.

The application provided: “I do warrant that the foregoing answers and those on the reverse side are strictly correct, complete and truthful.” This warranty has no contractual force because neither the application nor copy thereof was attached to- the policy, First Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Pedigo (Tex.Com.App.) 50 S.W.(2d) 1091, and the policy provides it contains the entire agreement. See, also, Terry v. Texas Prudential Ins. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 77 S.W.(2d) 761, for-discussion concerning warranties in life insurance policies.

The refusal of the requested peremptory instruction was proper. The evidence raises an issue as to whether the insured was tubercular.

The fact that appellee may not have had an insurable interest in the life of the insured is not available as a défense to the appellant in the absence of an adverse claim to the proceeds of the policy. Acts 1931, 42d Leg., c. 195, p. 328 (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 4736a) ; Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 79 Tex. 633, 15 S.W. 478; Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S.W. 274, 47 Am.St.Rep. 107.

The court charged the burden of proof was upon appellant as to its defensive issues. This was not reversible, but the better way is to frame each question so it will indicate its own burden of proof. Phœnix Refining Co. v. Tips (Tex.Com.App.) 81 S.W.(2d) 60.

As to the assignment asserting misconduct of the jury .the evidence abundantly supports the view that the misconduct charged was not shown.

The rulings upon evidence of which complaint is made are regarded as without merit and discussion thereof unnecessary.

Affirmed.
Date: July 7 , 20 1 5

To: Docket , EPA
- HQ
- OAR
- 201 4
- 0738 From: Andrew Bouchard Subject: Meeting Record for Ju ly 7 , 2015 Meeting Between the U.S. EPA and The Dow Chemical Company
On Ju ly 7 , 2015 , representatives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agenc y (EPA) in Region 6, OECA and OAR participated in a meeting with The Dow Chemical Company
. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Dow’s projected startup schedule for their propane dehydrogenation unit and potential permitting issues with respect to usi ng a MPGF as a control technology to control emissions
. See **Attachment 1** for the names and affiliations of the meeting participants
.**Attachment 1 Participants in**  **Ju ly**  **7 , 2015**  **EPA/ Dow**  **Meeting** The Dow Chemical Company Representatives Earl Shipp Gary Hock stra Jack Ingold Lisa LaBean Cheryl Steves Russell Wozniak U.S. EPA Representatives David Gray John Blevins Phillip Brooks Cheryl Seager Sam Coleman Ron Curry Wren Stenger Steve Thompson Penny L assiter Peter Tsirigotis
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2808 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2808

 To prohibit U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement from negotiating 
   contracts with private detention companies that require a minimum 
     number of immigration detention beds, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 17, 2015

   Mr. Deutch (for himself, Mr. Foster, and Mr. Smith of Washington) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                             the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement from negotiating 
   contracts with private detention companies that require a minimum 
     number of immigration detention beds, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Taxpayers and Communities 
from Local Detention Quotas Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN PROVISIONS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
              CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT CONTRACTS REQUIRING A MINIMUM NUMBER 
              OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION BEDS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Assistant Secretary of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement may not 
negotiate with a private detention company a contract that contains any 
provision relating to a guaranteed minimum number of immigration 
detention beds at any specific facility. The prohibition described in 
this subsection shall also apply in the case of any--
            (1) negotiation relating to the extension of any such 
        contract; or
            (2) renegotiation of any such contract.
    (b) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect and apply with 
respect to any negotiation or renegotiation described in subsection (a) 
that begins on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4106

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus ZENOBIA B. PENN, a/k/a Tiny, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge. (CR-01-115-L) Submitted: May 31, 2005 Decided: June 21, 2005 Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Harold I. Glaser, GLASER & SOLOMON, L.L.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Allen F. Loucks, United States Attorney, Christopher J. Romano, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Zenobia B. Penn appeals her conviction after a jury trial of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). She asserts that the district court erred in denying her motions to suppress evidence and to exclude her grand jury testimony. We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the joint appendix, the transcript of the district court’s ruling from the bench, and the court’s order denying the motions. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. With regard to the denial of the motion to suppress, we conclude that the district court did not err. Penn’s airport encounter with law enforcement officials did not amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. SeeOrnelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (stating standard of review for denial of motion to suppress); Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1991) (providing standard to determine whether police-citizen encounter amounts to seizure); United States v. Weaver , 282 F.3d 302, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2002) (same and setting forth factors to consider). We also agree with the district court that Penn voluntarily consented to a search of her purse and person. See United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (finding that courts should consider age, maturity, and intelligence of defendant in determining whether consent to search was voluntary); United- 3 - States v. Lattimore , 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (same and noting that “conditions under which the consent to search was given” also relevant). Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Penn’s motion to exclude her grand jury testimony. See United States v. Hodge , 354 F.3d 305, 312 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm Penn’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 32**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350, asadopted), each of the undersigned officers of Maxim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the “**Company**”), hereby certifies that to thebest of his knowledge:

**1.            **The Company’sQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 31, 2004, and towhich this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32 (the “**Periodic Report**”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, and

**2.            **The informationcontained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

**                IN WITNESS WHEREOF,**each of theundersigned has set his hands hereto as of the 3rd day of February, 2005.

 
|   | /s/ Larry G. Stambaugh                       |
|--------|----------------------------------------------|
|   | Larry G. Stambaugh, Chief  Executive Officer |
|   |                                         |
|   | /s/ John D. Prunty                           |
|   | John D. Prunty, Chief  Financial Officer     |

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company andwill be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission (**“SEC”**) or its staffupon request.

 

This certification “accompanies” the Form10-Q to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the SEC and is not to beincorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the SecuritiesAct of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended(whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-Q), irrespective of anygeneral incorporation language contained in such filing.

 

----
From: McKaughan, Colleen

Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2013 5:36:00 PM

To: edward.barry@Lhoist.com

Cc: Nudd, Gregory; Webb, Thomas

Subject: New Court-Ordered Deadline for Regional Haze FIP

Dear Ed,

I’m writing to let you know that the court-ordered deadline for EPA to propose a Federal 

Implementation Plan (FIP) addressing regional haze in Arizona has been extended to September 

6, 2013. Our deadline for final action on Arizona’s State Implementation Plan (SIP) remains July 

15, 2013. The deadline for commenting on our December 20, 2012 proposed action on 

Arizona’s SIP is March 6, 2013. 

If EPA finalizes disapproval of any aspect of the Arizona Regional Haze SIP, we are obligated to 

propose and later finalize a FIP to address these disapproved portions. The deadlines for these 

proposed and final actions are set in a consent decree. The parties to the consent decree 

recently agreed to extend these deadlines and the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia issued an order granting a motion to amend the consent decree to reflect these new 

deadlines. The new deadlines of September 6, 2013 for the proposed action and February 6, 

2014 for the final action provide the agency more time for the technical work that will form the 

basis of the FIP. 

If you are planning to provide technical information that you think would be helpful to EPA in 

preparing our FIP proposal, please provide that information no later than May 10, 2013. This 

will allow us enough time to review and consider the information in preparing the proposal.

In the case of the Chemical Lime Plant in Nelson, Arizona, we are particularly interested in 

getting your feedback on whether the emission rates used in the baseline visibility modeling 

are representative of the plant’s highest 24-hour emissions. In addition, we would appreciate 

any feedback regarding the effectiveness of potential controls and the control costs estimated 

by our contractor.

If you have any questions, please let me know. We look forward to hearing from you soon.

Colleen McKaughan

520-498-0118