SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4226-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALAMEEN ADAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Argued November 15, 2021 – Decided December 7, 2021

Before Judges Sabatino and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 10-07-1735.

John J. McMahon argued the cause for appellant.

Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting 

Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel

and on the brief).

Appellant filed pro se supplemental briefs. 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Alameen Adams appeals from a February 28, 2020 order 

denying his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an 

evidentiary hearing. We reverse and remand to the trial court to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing on defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

The facts leading to defendant's convictions for murder, robbery, and 

weapons offenses are stated in our prior decisions on defendant's direct appeal, 

State v. Adams, No. A-727-11 (App. Div. March 26, 2013), certif. denied, 216 

N.J. 7 (2013), and defendant's first PCR petition, State v. Adams, No. A-4688-

16 (App. Div. June 4, 2018). We briefly recite the relevant facts to give context 

to defendant's arguments raised in his second PCR petition. 

Michael Potts and Abdul Simpkins went to buy marijuana from Ian 

Morris. Defendant accompanied Potts and Simpkins to Morris's apartment

building.

1

Defendant walked to the back of the apartment building and Potts saw 

defendant enter the building. Potts attempted to gain access to the building 

through a different door, but the door was locked. Potts then waited a while for 

defendant to return. Based on the passage of time, Potts believed the drug 

1

 Morris's apartment building contained eighty-four separate apartment units. 
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purchase fell through, so he went to a nearby restaurant and ordered food. 

Thereafter, Potts walked to another apartment building to visit a different friend.

At the second apartment building, Potts saw defendant. According to 

Potts, defendant said he "bodied" someone.2 Potts also saw a bulge in 

defendant's jacket, implying defendant had a weapon. However, on crossexamination by defense counsel during trial, Potts admitted he never told the 

police about seeing a bulge in defendant's jacket.

Morris, whose body was found on the fifth-floor landing by a resident of 

the apartment building, had a gunshot wound to his head. The resident called 

the police. 

Upon arriving at the scene, the police confirmed Morris was dead. The 

police found items related to drug trafficking near the body, including loose 

marijuana, a scale, plastic bags, and a cell phone. No shell cases were found. 

The police were unable to locate any eyewitnesses to the shooting. No other 

physical evidence was found at the scene. 

There were several security cameras located around Morris's apartment 

building, which recorded video from the night of the shooting. The videotapes 

2

 Potts testified the term "bodied" meant someone had been killed.
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led police to question Potts, who was seen in the recordings with another man. 

Potts identified defendant as the second man in the videotape recordings. 

The recordings, introduced as evidence during defendant's trial, showed 

defendant using the rear entrance to gain access to Morris's apartment building 

at 5:47 p.m. A security camera located at the front of the building showed 

defendant exiting the building at 5:56 p.m. 

The State's evidence at trial included the videotapes from the security

cameras at Morris's apartment building on the night of the shooting. The State 

also introduced testimony from Potts and Detectives Holt Walker and Vincent

Apicelli who took part in the shooting investigation. 

In cross-examining Detective Walker, defendant's trial attorney elicited 

testimony that Potts and Simpkins both told the police defendant entered the 

apartment building to rob Morris. The detective's statement was the only 

testimony adduced showing that a robbery occurred on the night of the shooting. 

There was no physical evidence supporting a robbery. No other witnesses 

offered testimony about a robbery. 

Defense counsel elicited additional inculpatory and inadmissible hearsay 

evidence during his cross-examination of Detective Walker. The detective 

testified defendant's arrest was based on statements provided to the police by 
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Potts and Simpkins. Walker stated Potts and Simpkins gave statements that 

defendant shot Morris on the fifth floor of the apartment building. However, 

the State presented no testimony or statement by either Potts or Simpkins 

identifying where Morris was shot. Defense counsel elicited further hearsay 

testimony when Walker testified Simpkins informed the police defendant 

confessed to "bod[ying] the guy." 

After Detective Walker completed his testimony, the State announced

Simpkins would not be called as a trial witness. Consequently, there was no 

testimony from Simpkins regarding a robbery, the location of the shooting, or 

any other facts related to the shooting. 

Defense counsel prompted damaging testimony from Detective Apicelli 

that Simpkins identified defendant as having committed the crime. While the 

judge instructed the jury to disregard Apicelli's testimony about Simpkins's

hearsay statements to the police, the judge did not give a similar instruction 

regarding Detective Walker's testimony related to Simpkins's statements. 

After an unsuccessful direct appeal and denial of his first PCR petition, 

defendant filed a second PCR petition. In the second PCR petition, defendant 

alleged his appellate counsel and first PCR counsel provided ineffective 
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assistance by failing to challenge his trial counsel introducing prejudicial and 

inadmissible hearsay evidence during cross-examination.

The second PCR judge heard counsels' arguments. In a February 28, 2020

order, accompanied by a twenty-eight page written decision, the judge denied 

defendant's second PCR petition. The judge held defendant's second PCR 

petition was not time barred because defendant's arguments addressed 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims directed to his appellate counsel and 

first PCR counsel, satisfying the requirements of Rule 3:22-2.3 

In reviewing defendant's second PCR petition on the merits, the judge 

found defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance 

of counsel under either prong of the Strickland/Fritz analysis.4 Without 

conducting an evidentiary hearing, the judge determined defense counsel's 

questions posed to the detectives "were not intended to elicit hearsay, rather to 

highlight the weaknesses in the State's case. The statements were not offered 

for the truth of the matter asserted." 

3 Significantly, the State did not file a cross-appeal from the judge's decision 

declining to find a procedural bar to defendant's second PCR petition. 

4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 

(1987). 
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The PCR judge noted the State raised a hearsay objection to defense 

counsel's questions during Detective Walker's cross-examination and defense 

counsel responded, "I am not asking what Mr. Simpkins said. I am just asking 

if the statements were conflicting." Based on defense counsel's response to the 

trial judge, the second PCR judge concluded the questions were "a strategic 

move by [t]rial [c]ounsel." The judge held "[w]hen [t]rial [c]ounsel's questions 

are viewed within the context of his summation, it is evident the decision to 

bring out small portions of Simpkins['s] statements was a strategic one." 

In his counseled brief, defendant argues the following:

POINT I

THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED 

IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR 

POST[-]CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT 

AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT 

HIS ATTORNEY WAS INEFFECTIVE IN 

ELICITING INCULPATORY AND INADMISSIBLE 

HEARSAY THAT CORROBORATED THE STATE'S 

MAIN WITNESS AND SUGGESTED 

UNFAVORABLE FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE.

A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES 

REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY 

HEARINGS, AND PETITIONS FOR POST[-]

CONVICTION RELIEF.
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B. DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS 

ATTORNEY ELICITED INCULPATORY AND 

INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY TESTIMONY 

DEVASTATING TO HIS DEFENSE AT TRIAL.

In his supplemental pro se brief, defendant argues the following point:

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT 

DEFENDANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS SIXTH 

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY HIS ELICITING 

HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF A NON-TESTIFYING 

WITNESS, WHICH UNDERMINED DEFENDANT'S 

DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, 

THEREFORE THE CONVICTION SHOULD BE 

REVERSED AND A NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without an 

evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 

387, 401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 157-58 (1997)). 

A hearing is only required when (1) a defendant establishes a prima facie case 

in support of PCR; (2) the court determines there are disputed issues of material 

fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record; and (3) the court 

determines an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted. 

State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). In reviewing 

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an evidentiary hearing should 

ordinarily be granted "because the facts often lie outside the trial record . . . ."
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Ibid. (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)). A PCR petition 

must be accompanied by assertions based on the record, setting forth with 

particularity "facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard 

performance." Id. at 355 (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 

(App. Div. 1999)); see also R. 3:22-10(c). We must consider a defendant's 

contentions "indulgently," by viewing the asserted facts in the light most 

favorable to the defendant. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the second PCR judge 

mistakenly exercised her discretion by denying defendant's request for an 

evidentiary hearing and we remand the matter for the trial court to conduct a 

hearing. In reviewing the transcript of the testimony from the detectives' crossexamination, it appears defense counsel did not anticipate certain responses to 

his questions. For example, defense counsel asked Detective Walker if 

defendant's arrest was based on the videotapes showing defendant entering and 

exiting Morris's apartment building. The detective answered the videotapes 

were "not what I based the arrest warrant on. I just told you [the] arrest warrant 

was on the statement of Michael Potts . . . statement from Abdul Simpkins . . . 

." There were other instances on cross-examination where Detective Walker 
10 A-4226-19

responded to defense counsel's questions by stating "[b]ased upon statements 

from Michael Potts, Abdul Simpkins." 

The State objected to Detective Walker's cross-examination testimony 

referring to statements by Simpkins as improper hearsay. In response, defense 

counsel advised the judge "I am not asking what Mr. Simpkins said. I am just 

asking if the statements were conflicting [with the statements made by Potts]." 

The judge overruled the State's objection and defense counsel questioned 

Detective Walker regarding inconsistencies in the statements provided to the 

police by Potts and Simpkins. The detective explained he was unable to answer 

defense counsel's questions without reviewing the audio recording of the 

statements. At best, Walker testified it was "possible" the statements of Potts 

and Simpkins conflicted. However, because the detective could not recall the 

statements, defense counsel was unsuccessful in his effort to have Detective 

Walker agree there were inconsistencies in the statements given by Potts and 

Simpkins.

During a sidebar conference, the judge raised a concern regarding the 

detectives' testimony in which they repeated statements allegedly made by 

Simpkins. The judge advised she would "give a curative instruction that there's 

no statement [from Simpkins]." After considering the matter during a brief court 
11 A-4226-19

recess, the State told the judge it objected to any curative instruction about the 

hearsay statements elicited during Detective Walker's cross-examination. 

The judge clarified she would tell the jury "in response to [defense 

counsel]'s questions the detective discussed a statement that may or may not 

have been given from Mr. Simpkins. We have no statement from Mr. Simpkins 

. . . . " She also stated she would tell the jury not to "speculate as to any statement 

or speculat[e] as to who may be involved in that statement or whether in fact the 

statement was made." 

The judge then asked if defense counsel reviewed Simpkins's audio 

recorded statement to the police. Counsel advised he reviewed Simpkins's 

statement but made no proffer to the judge regarding the content of the 

statement. Defense counsel merely argued "whether it's credible or not is for 

the jury to determine." Defense counsel claimed it was appropriate for the jury 

to know Simpkins made a statement to the police. However, the judge ruled the 

statement's "[c]ontents [we]re not coming in." 

After this exchange, the judge obtained counsels' agreement that the jury 

would be told Simpkins's "statement is not before you and please do not 

speculate as to what may be in that statement." Regarding Detective Walker's 

testimony on cross-examination, the judge told the jury, "in response to a 
12 A-4226-19

question from [defense counsel] about a statement that was given by Mr. 

Simpkins, I think that testimony, the contents of that statement is not before you, 

there is no statement here that's before you, all right? . . . . please do not speculate 

as to what may be in that statement because that statement is not before you." 

While defense counsel claimed his cross-examination of Detective Walker 

focused on potential conflicts in the statements given by Potts and Simpkins, 

there was no evidence presented during the trial regarding the content of

Simpkins's audio recorded statement. In fact, the judge instructed the jury not 

to speculated about any statements made to the police by Simpkins. Further, in 

reviewing the trial transcripts, there is no evidence of any conflicts in the 

statements provided to the police by Potts and Simpkins. During closing 

argument, defense counsel never even mentioned "possible" conflicting 

statements by Potts and Simpkins. Thus, we are unsure how the second PCR 

judge concluded defense counsel's questioning of Detective Walker "show[ed] 

the jury that there were conflicts in the statements the State relied on." 

In reviewing defense counsel's summation, none of the points argued to 

the jury referenced Detective Walker's hearsay testimony during crossexamination. In closing argument, defense counsel highlighted the absence of 

Simpkins as a testifying witness and focused on relationship between Simpkins 
13 A-4226-19

and Morris as drug dealers in explaining why the jury should find defendant not 

guilty. Because Simpkins's audio recorded statements to the police were not

admitted as evidence and Simpkins never testified at trial, we are unable to 

discern defense counsel's actual litigation strategy in eliciting damaging hearsay 

testimony from Detective Walker regarding statements ascribed to Simpkins. 

On this record, after reviewing the trial testimony and defense counsel's 

closing argument, defendant demonstrated he failed to receive adequate legal 

representation because his trial attorney elicited inculpatory and inadmissible 

hearsay corroborating the State's main witness, Potts, and suggesting 

unfavorable facts not supported by the evidence. An evidentiary hearing is 

required for defendant's trial counsel to explain his reasons for eliciting 

inculpatory and inadmissible hearsay testimony from Detectives Walker and 

Apicelli which seemingly undermined defendant's arguments for acquittal. 

We were advised during oral argument that defendant's trial counsel still 

actively practices law in this State. The assigned PCR judge should conduct an 

evidentiary hearing to determine, with particularity, whether defendant's trial 

counsel exercised reasonable trial strategy in eliciting hearsay testimony from 

the State's testifying detective witnesses. Or, as defendant asserts, whether his 

trial counsel made missteps when cross-examining the detectives without 
14 A-4226-19

knowing the anticipated responses to the questions posed, resulting in the jury 

hearing inculpatory and inadmissible hearsay testimony of a non-testifying 

witness, and suggesting unfavorable facts not based on the evidence. 

Accordingly, we remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing to address 

defendant's trial counsel's basis for eliciting hearsay testimony from the 

detectives given the mainly circumstantial evidence presented to the jury. 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.