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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 15-FM-718 

CAROLYN POPE MASSEY, APPELLANT,

V.

FREDDIE MASSEY, APPELLEE. 

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(DRB-1540-83) 

(Hon. Jennifer Di Toro, Motions Judge)

(Submitted May 15, 2017 Decided June 20, 2019)*

Frederic W. Schwartz, Jr. was on the brief for appellant.

Ashley McDowell, Stephanie Troyer, and Jonathan Levy were on the brief

for appellee. 

 Before BECKWITH and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior 

Judge.

 * The decision in this case was originally issued as an unpublished 

Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. It is now being published upon the court’s 

grant of the separate motions to publish filed by appellant, appellee, and a 

nonparty, Bread for the City. 
2

BECKWITH, Associate Judge: Appellee Freddie Massey was ordered to pay 

child support to his ex-wife, appellant Carolyn Pope Massey, at the time of their 

divorce in 1985. In 2014, Mr. Massey filed a motion to reduce arrears, which the 

trial court granted upon concluding that the statute of limitations barred the 

collection of the outstanding arrears. Ms. Pope Massey appeals the judgment 

vacating all of Mr. Massey’s outstanding child support arrears. We affirm.

I.

Mr. Massey and Ms. Pope Massey married in 1969 and had four children 

before divorcing in 1985. Mr. Massey, the defendant in the divorce action, was 

ordered to pay $450 per month in child support as part of the judgment of absolute 

divorce. The parties’ youngest child, Freddie Massey Jr., emancipated on his 

twenty-first birthday in October of 1999. Mr. Massey remained in arrears, which 

totaled approximately $49,000 at the time of the judgment under review. 

In 2007, the District of Columbia Child Support Services Division 

intercepted Mr. Massey’s federal tax refund in partial satisfaction of the arrears. 

On May 17, 2007, Mr. Massey, acting pro se, filed a motion to terminate the child 

support order and all arrears on the grounds that he was homeless and disabled and 
3

could not afford the payments. The motion was denied without prejudice on 

January 22, 2008. In 2012, Mr. Massey began receiving Social Security Disability 

Insurance (SSDI) benefits, which the government withheld in part for child 

support. On December 3, 2012, Mr. Massey filed another pro se motion to 

terminate his child support obligations on the grounds of disability, unemployment, 

and his need for his SSDI benefits. This motion was denied on January 19, 2013. 

On July 8, 2014, Mr. Massey filed a third pro se motion to terminate his 

child support obligations, which was largely identical to the second motion with 

the addition of the handwritten notation “stature [sic] of limitations Oct, 1999.” He 

subsequently obtained counsel from the Legal Aid Society of the District of 

Columbia and filed a new motion to reduce the arrears on statute-of-limitations 

grounds on October 21, 2014. At a hearing on May 6, 2015, the court heard 

argument from Mr. Massey, Ms. Pope Massey, and an Assistant Attorney General 

representing the District of Columbia.1

 On May 13, the court issued an order 

granting the motion and vacating all of the arrears as time-barred due to the statute 

of limitations. Ms. Pope Massey now challenges that order on appeal. 

 1

 The District was permitted to participate below as an intervenor. It has not 

sought to participate in this appeal.
4

II.

When a court orders a party to pay child support, those support payments 

“constitute judgment debts as each installment becomes due and payable.” Mayo 

v. Mayo, 508 A.2d 114, 115 (D.C. 1986); see also Lomax v. Spriggs, 404 A.2d 943, 

948 (D.C. 1979) (holding that “each periodic payment for support becomes a 

separate money judgment as of the date of its accrual”). Such judgments are 

enforceable for twelve years “from the date when an execution might first be 

issued thereon, or from the date of the last order of revival thereof.” D.C. Code 

§ 15-101(a) (2012 Repl.).

2

 After the expiration of those twelve years, “the 

judgment . . . shall cease to have any operation or effect” and is no longer 

enforceable “except in the case of a proceeding that may be then pending for the 

enforcement of the judgment.” D.C. Code § 15-101(b).

Mr. Massey’s final child support payment became due no later than October 

30, 1999, when his youngest child turned twenty-one. See Butler v. Butler, 496 

A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1985) (“Child support obligations in the District of Columbia 

 2

 All subsequent D.C. Code citations are to the 2012 Replacement Volume.
5

continue until age twenty-one.”).3

 The trial court determined that by October 30, 

2011—twelve years later—all of the judgment debts had expired. Ms. Pope 

Massey challenges that ruling on four grounds. Our review is de novo except 

where otherwise noted. See Daniels v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 A.3d 139, 

142–43 (D.C. 2014).

A. Waiver and Preclusion

Ms. Pope Massey first argues that Mr. Massey was barred from raising the 

statute-of-limitations issue in his 2014 motion because he had not raised it in his 

earlier 2007 and 2012 motions seeking the same relief. She offers two theories in 

support of this argument: waiver—that is, Mr. Massey did not timely assert the 

statute-of-limitations defense—and what she refers to as claim preclusion, which in 

her view would bar Mr. Massey from relying on the statute-of-limitations defense 

because he could have litigated it in an earlier motion.

“We review the trial court’s rejection of appellant’s waiver claim for abuse 

 3

 To the extent that Ms. Pope Massey argues in a footnote that Mr. Massey’s 

child support payments continued to accrue indefinitely because the divorce decree 

“does not limit the period during which the payments shall be made,” this 

contention is foreclosed by our holding in Butler. 
6

of discretion.” Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia, 40 A.3d 356, 361 (D.C. 2012). In 

general, a statute-of-limitations defense “must be set forth affirmatively in a 

responsive pleading” or else it could be waived. Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 

104 (D.C. 1993) (quoting Whitener v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 505 

A.2d 457, 458 (D.C. 1986)). In this case, however, Mr. Massey had no occasion to 

file a responsive pleading, as he is the one who raised the statute-of-limitations 

issue in an affirmative motion seeking to reduce his arrears. Cf. Mayo, 508 A.2d at

115, 117 (finding waiver where party failed to raise a statute-of-limitations defense 

in response to a claim for support arrears) (emphasis added). We are not 

persuaded that under the circumstances of this case Mr. Massey waived or 

forfeited4 his statute-of-limitations argument where he presented it in the first 

 4

 Though the parties primarily refer to “waiver” in their briefs, Ms. Pope 

Massey’s assertion that Mr. Massey failed to timely raise the defense seems better 

characterized as an alleged forfeiture. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 

right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). While the distinction can have practical 

implications—courts may apply plain error review to forfeited arguments, for 

example, see id. at 733–34, while wholly declining to address arguments a party 

has waived, see id. at 732–34—it is of no consequence here, as we ultimately

conclude that Mr. Massey timely asserted the defense in his initial motion. 
7

instance as an affirmative defense, not in belated response to a prior pleading.5

Even if we were inclined to apply the waiver doctrine when a party failed to 

raise a statute-of-limitations defense in an earlier affirmative motion, we have 

previously stated that the requirement to timely assert the defense of statute of 

limitations must not be “narrowly construed” as “[t]he trend in both this court and 

the federal courts . . . is to be flexible in the [application of the waiver doctrine], 

especially when no substantial prejudice would result from permitting the 

defendant to raise an affirmative defense at a later stage in the litigation.” 

Whitener, 505 A.2d at 459, 461. We have further held that it is an abuse of 

discretion to deny a motion to amend and assert this defense absent a showing of 

significant prejudice.6 See District of Columbia v. Tinker, 691 A.2d 57, 62 (D.C. 

1997). Ms. Pope Massey has not convinced us that she was unfairly prejudiced by 

 5

 This is not to say there may not be other circumstances in which a party 

waives a statute-of-limitations defense even after raising it in a responsive 

pleading. See, e.g., George Washington Univ. v. Violand, 940 A.2d 965, 970 (D.C. 

2008) (per curiam).

6

 Though Ms. Pope Massey asserts that she “suffered terminal prejudice” as 

a result of Mr. Massey’s late assertion of the statute of limitations, she 

acknowledges in the same paragraph that she benefited from the District’s 

withholding of Mr. Massey’s SSDI benefits up until the trial court granted his 

motion in 2015. 
8

the trial court’s refusal to find that Mr. Massey had waived or forfeited his statuteof-limitations defense.7

Ms. Pope Massey also relies on the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res 

judicata, in arguing that Mr. Massey could have, but did not, litigate the issue of 

the statute of limitations in one of his earlier motions and therefore may not raise it 

now.8

 Claim preclusion “prevents the same parties from relitigating the same 

 7

 The trial court’s consideration of the fact that the 2014 motion was the 

first in which Mr. Massey had the assistance of counsel is also consistent with our 

case law. We have stated that “[i]n matters involving pleadings, service of 

process, and timeliness of filings, pro se litigants are not always held to the same 

standards as are applied to lawyers. What distinguishes this category of cases is 

the focus on the merely technical, rather than substantive, rules of procedure.” 

MacLeod v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 A.2d 977, 980 (D.C. 1999) 

(citations omitted); see also Pajic v. Foote Props., LLC, 72 A.3d 140, 148 (D.C. 

2013) (referring to the “latitude” that we afford to pro se litigants in matters of 

pleading). Though Ms. Pope Massey says it is “far from clear” that Mr. Massey 

was unrepresented in 2007 and 2012, she offers nothing that meaningfully casts 

doubt upon the trial court’s findings, docket entries, and Mr. Massey’s assertions in 

open court that he was pro se until counsel for Legal Aid first entered an 

appearance on September 3, 2014. We also note that Ms. Pope Massey was herself 

pro se until the time of this appeal.

8

 Though Ms. Pope Massey’s claim preclusion argument refers to both the 

2007 and 2012 motions as motions in which Mr. Massey could have raised the 

statute-of-limitations defense, he could not have raised it in the 2007 motion 

because the statute-of-limitations period had not yet expired. Ms. Pope Massey 

also argues that Mr. Massey is precluded from relitigating the claims based on his 

children having reached the age of majority and Mr. Massey himself having 

insufficient funds, but those are neither claims Mr. Massey made in his motion to 

(continued...)
9

claim, including any issue that either was or might have been raised in the first 

proceeding.” Crane v. Crane, 614 A.2d 935, 938 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Rhema 

Christian Ctr. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 

192–193 (D.C. 1986)). As that statement of the rule implies, this preclusion 

doctrine prevents relitigation of claims only in subsequent or ancillary proceedings. 

“It is clear that res judicata . . . do[es] not apply if a party moves the rendering 

court in the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment.” Arizona v. 

California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983); see also Kuhn v. State, 897 P.2d 792, 795

(Colo. 1995) (“[R]es judicata is not applicable to an earlier decision in the same 

lawsuit.”). Every motion Mr. Massey filed in this case has been filed under the 

same Superior Court case number as the original decree ordering child support 

payments, so res judicata did not preclude Mr. Massey from later asserting the 

statute of limitations in that same proceeding.

B. Renewal

Ms. Pope Massey also argues that the trial court’s denials of Mr. Massey’s 

 

(...continued)

reduce arrears (the motion decided by the order on appeal here) nor bases for the 

trial court’s decision to grant Mr. Massey relief.
10

2007 and 2012 motions served to “renew” the judgment awarding child support

and restart the clock on the twelve-year statute of limitations. She relies on D.C. 

Code § 16-916.01(a), which provides that “in any case that seeks to modify an 

existing support order, if the judicial officer finds that there is an existing duty of 

child support, the judicial officer shall conduct a hearing on child support, make a 

finding, and enter a judgment in accordance with the child support guideline . . . .”9

 

Ms. Pope Massey’s interpretation of this statute—the only support she offers for 

her contention that “renewal” is a valid method for extending the statute-oflimitations period for child support payments—stands in some tension with the 

case law on the revival of judgments. 

When a decree awards child support, each child support payment that 

becomes due matures into a separate money judgment valid only for the length of 

 9

 The parties’ briefs evince some confusion regarding which statute Ms. 

Pope Massey was relying on to support this argument. In her initial brief, Ms. 

Pope Massey cites D.C. Code § 16-916.01(a) as part of her argument that the 

judgment was renewed with each denial by the trial court. Mr. Massey responds to 

the renewal argument by arguing in his brief that the statute providing for revival 

of a judgment or decree, D.C. Code § 15-103, requires an order of revival, which 

was never issued in this case. In her reply brief, Ms. Pope Massey disclaims 

reliance on D.C. Code § 15-103, acknowledging that it “requires some 

specificity[,]” and instead reiterates her position that the trial court’s denials of the 

2007 and 2012 motions were judgments that led to new statute-of-limitations 

periods under D.C. Code § 16-916.01(a).
11

the enforcement period specified in § 15-101(a), beginning from the date of its 

accrual. See Lomax, 404 A.2d at 948; Jasper v. Carter, 451 A.2d 46, 48 (D.C. 

1982). “[U]nless an order reviving such a judgment is issued within twelve years 

of the date on which the court-ordered support payment matures, the judgment 

‘cease[s] to have any operation or effect.’” Id. (citing D.C. Code §§ 15-101(b), 

-103) (alterations in original)). See also Mayo, 508 A.2d at 115. Before denying 

Mr. Massey’s 2007 motion, the trial court did hold several hearings, but ultimately 

did not make any findings (other than noting Mr. Massey’s current balance owed), 

let alone issue an order of revival, which Ms. Pope Massey acknowledges requires 

clear language of that intent. See, e.g., Michael v. Smith, 221 F.2d 59, 60 (D.C. 

Cir. 1955). Instead, the court denied the motion without prejudice in order to allow 

Mr. Massey to “re-fil[e] if [he had] some evidence to support [his] claim.” The 

trial court similarly did not make any findings when it denied his 2012 motion, and 

entered no judgment or order that would start a new twelve-year period.

10 

Ms. Pope Massey cites another statute in her reply brief, D.C. Code § 46-

204(b), that acknowledges that each payment Mr. Massey owed vested upon the 

 10 Moreover, if the 2007 motion did not restart the clock, the 2012 motion 

came after the statute of limitations had already expired, as the last payment was 

due October 30, 1999, when Mr. Massey’s youngest child turned twenty-one.
12

date it became due. See id. (“An award of alimony, child support, or maintenance 

is a money judgment that becomes absolute, vested, and upon which execution 

may be taken, when it becomes due.”); see also Kephart v. Kephart, 193 F.2d 677,

684 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (en banc) (“When a decree awards alimony payable in future 

installments, the right to each installment becomes absolute and vested when it 

becomes due, provided no modification of the decree had been made prior to its 

maturity.”). Once an installment matures under an unmodified decree, it “becomes 

a judgment debt similar to any other judgment for money.” Id. In this case, the 

court’s orders did not modify the original decree prior to the maturity of any of the 

installments,11 nor was a stay issued that would have tolled the statute-oflimitations period. See Dickey v. Fair, 768 A.2d 540, 541–42 (D.C. 2001) (“A stay 

must be affirmatively ordered by a court, or a supersedeas bond must be obtained 

and filed, before the twelve-year enforcement period can be tolled under section

15-101(a)(2).”). In the absence of authority suggesting a statute-of-limitations 

period for child support payments may be “renewed,” as opposed to explicitly 

revived or tolled, we are not persuaded that the statute of limitations may be 

 11 Even if the orders did modify the original decree, this would not have 

affected the payments already owed. See D.C. Code 46-204(c) (“No modification 

of an award of alimony, child support, or maintenance may be retroactive . . . .”).
13

restarted or extended in this manner.

Mr. Massey’s judgment debts date back to the period prior to October 30, 

1999. As twelve years had elapsed since the last of those judgments became due, 

and no order of revival had been issued, the trial court did not err in deeming them 

to be unenforceable.12

C. Nullum tempus occurrit regi

Ms. Pope Massey argues that Mr. Massey cannot assert the statute of 

limitations under the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi (“no time runs 

against the sovereign”), which provides the sovereign with “a common-law 

immunity from the operation of statutes of limitations and repose.” District of 

Columbia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 572 A.2d 394, 400–401 (D.C. 

1989). Under this doctrine, we have held that “the District of Columbia is immune 

from the running of the statutes of limitations and repose when it brings suit 

 12 Ms. Pope Massey also argues for the first time in her reply brief that the 

judgments against Mr. Massey were renewed by Mr. Massey’s acknowledgements 

of the debt in his 2007 and 2012 motions. We decline to reach this claim, as “[i]t 

is the longstanding policy of this court not to consider arguments raised for the first 

time in a reply brief.” Marshall v. United States, 15 A.3d 699, 711 n.2 (D.C. 2011) 

(quoting Stockard v. Moss, 706 A.2d 561, 566 (D.C. 1997)) (alteration in original).
14

seeking to vindicate public rights and involving the performance of public 

functions.” Id. at 406; see also New 3145 Deauville, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. 

Co., 881 A.2d 624, 629 (D.C. 2005) (“The common law has long accepted the 

principle nullum tempus occurrit regi—neither laches nor statutes of limitations 

will constitute a defense to suit by the sovereign in the enforcement of a public 

right.”). 

We need not decide whether this case involves “the enforcement of a public 

right,” because it is not a “suit by the sovereign.”13 Id. This is a case between two 

private parties in which Mr. Massey contests the continued validity of judgment 

debts in favor of Ms. Pope Massey. The District’s sole involvement in this case 

was through its withholding of money to pay off Mr. Massey’s arrears. Although 

the District participated below as an intervenor, it did not assert any immunity 

under nullum tempus and it has not participated in this appeal. Even if this were a 

case to which the doctrine applied, Ms. Pope Massey does not explain why she 

 13 As we observed in New 3145 Deauville, nullum tempus “is now codified 

in perhaps even broader application in D.C. Code § 12-301.” 881 A.2d at 629. 

That statute provides in relevant part that various statutes of limitations, though not 

the one contained in D.C. Code § 15-101, do not apply to “actions brought by the 

District of Columbia government.”
15

would be entitled to assert the District’s immunity.14 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 

400, 410 (1991) (“In the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal 

rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests 

of third parties.”). We are therefore not persuaded that this is a proper case or that 

Ms. Pope Massey is a proper party to invoke the nullum tempus doctrine.

D. D.C. Code § 46-215

Finally, Ms. Pope Massey points to D.C. Code § 46-215, which provides 

that an order to withhold based on a judgment for support and issued within twelve 

years of that judgment “shall not lapse or become invalid before complete 

satisfaction solely by reason of the expiration of the period of limitation set forth in 

§ 15-101.” The docket does reflect two withholding orders issued within the 

limitations period: one was directed to OPM (presumably the United States Office 

of Personnel Management) in 1991, and the other to Pinkerton’s in 1993. There is 

no indication that either withholding order is still in effect, and we can surmise that

 14 Ms. Pope Massey does assert that she “is both acting as a party and as a 

private attorney general” vindicating the public policy in favor of child support 

enforcement. The case she cites, McReady v. Department of Consumer and 

Regulatory Affairs, 618 A.2d 609, 614 (D.C. 1992), refers to the “private attorney 

general” concept in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides for an award of attorney’s 

fees to prevailing parties in proceedings to enforce specific civil rights statutes.
16

Mr. Massey once worked for these employers but, given his statement in his 2012 

motion that he is unemployed, no longer does. The docket does not reflect when 

the government began withholding portions of Mr. Massey’s SSDI benefits, but the 

trial court found that Mr. Massey began receiving those benefits only in 2012, 

more than twelve years after the final child support judgment accrued in October 

1999. The record thus does not demonstrate that any withholding order was in 

effect when the final statute-of-limitations period expired.15

III.

Finding no error in the trial court’s grant of Mr. Massey’s motion to reduce 

arrears, we affirm.

So Ordered.

 15 Ms. Pope Massey also argues that, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, 

Mr. Massey could not rely on his disability, his unemployment, or his children’s 

emancipation in his 2014 motion because his earlier motions, which did rely on 

these grounds, were denied. But these arguments were made in Mr. Massey’s 

2014 motion to modify, not the motion on appeal here. The trial court had not 

previously addressed the statute-of-limitations argument in Mr. Massey’s motion 

to reduce arrears, and we therefore agree with Mr. Massey that the law-of-the-case

doctrine does not apply. See Tompkins v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 433 A.2d 1093, 

1098 (D.C. 1981); Nunnally v. Graham, 56 A.3d 130, 142 (D.C. 2012).