UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

CAMPANELLA, PENLAND, and WOLFE 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 QUINCY C. BROADEN 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20150414 

Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division 

Gregory A. Gross, Military Judge 

Colonel Williams D. Smoot, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Mary J. Bradley, JA; Major Christopher D. Coleman, JA (on 

brief and supplemental brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Courie III, 

JA; Major Steven J. Collins, JA; Captain Linda Chavez, JA (on brief); Lieutenant 

Colonel A. G. Courie III, JA; Major Scott L. Goble, JA; Captain Linda Chavez, JA 

(on supplemental brief). 

3 August 2016 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

WOLFE, Judge: 

A general court-martial composed of a military judge sitting alone convicted 

appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of conspiracy to commit 

larceny, one specification of robbery, and one specification of obstruction of justice, 

in violation of Articles 81, 122, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 

U.S.C. §§ 881, 922, 934 (2012) [hereinafter UCMJ]. The court-martial sentenced 

appellant to be discharged from the Army with a bad-conduct discharge, to be 

confined for fifty-four months, to forfeit all pay and allowances, and to be reduced 

to the grade of E-1. The military judge credited appellant with three days of pretrial confinement credit. The convening authority approved pre-trial confinement 

credit and the sentence except that, pursuant to a pretrial agreement, he approved 

only three years of confinement. 
BROADEN—ARMY 20150414 

2 

Appellant pleaded guilty to, among other offenses, conspiracy to commit 

larceny of about $527. We specified the issue of whether appellant’s plea colloquy 

adequately established that the criminal conspiracy included an agreement that the 

amount to be stolen was more than $500. We find it did not. We therefore affirm 

only the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit larceny of some value. 

BACKGROUND 

A. The Conspiracy 

As part of a pretrial agreement, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts in 

the case. 

Appellant, his girlfriend, and Privates Terrell Price and Markel McNeil 

entered into an agreement to rob a stranger. Their plan was to have appellant’s 

girlfriend, Ms. Kassandra Melendez, dress as a prostitute on Waikiki beach and lure 

the victim into a place where the three soldiers would then rob him. Appellant told 

the other soldiers Ms. Melendez had done this before with some success. To carry 

out their plan appellant drove the quartet towards Honolulu, stopping at a Walmart 

where they purchased three bandanas to cover the soldiers’ faces. The three soldiers 

also possessed realistic looking “airsoft” pistols to use in the robbery. They then 

drove to Waikiki to find a victim. 

Ms. Melendez stood on a street corner attempting to attract the attention of 

male passersby. Eventually she was approached by Mr. SO, a homeless man who 

lived in a tent on Waikiki. After attracting his interest, Ms. Melendez escorted Mr. 

SO to a nearby store to purchase condoms. As he purchased the condoms, she 

observed how much money he had. She then told appellant it appeared Mr. SO had 

“a large amount of cash on his person.” Appellant and his two co-conspirators 

waited across the street. 

The three soldiers discussed who would lead the robbery. Appellant decided 

he would lead, and the others would be “in tow.” Appellant then approached Mr. SO 

and asked him if he had any money. Mr. SO denied having cash. Appellant then 

initially displayed the airsoft pistol tucked in his waistband, and subsequently took 

weapon out in order frighten Mr. SO into giving up the money. The other two 

soldiers then similarly displayed their airsoft pistols. Mr. SO was terrified, and 

stated that he “didn’t want to die,” and asked “[i]f I give you all of my money will 

you please leave me alone?” Mr. SO then turned over his entire wallet. Appellant 

removed the money from the wallet, and returned the wallet to Mr. SO. 
BROADEN—ARMY 20150414 

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Appellant and his three co-conspirators then left. The three soldiers headed 

back to appellant’s vehicle, while Ms. Melendez walked in another direction. 

Appellant coordinated with Ms. Melendez about where to pick her up. 

Mr. SO, suspecting that Ms. Melendez was involved in the robbery, followed 

her. He also called the police. Honolulu police noticed appellant’s car matched Mr. 

SO’s description and pulled appellant over after he made an illegal U-turn. A search 

of the vehicle recovered the stolen cash, the airsoft pistols, and the bandanas. 

Appellant told police he had not taken part in the robbery, that the pistols in 

his car had been in his possession at all times, and that he had no idea why $527 was 

found hidden under the front seat of his car. Appellant’s co-conspirators, however, 

were much more cooperative with the police. 

B. The Conspiracy Charge 

As noted above, appellant stipulated that he “orchestrated a conspiracy to 

commit robbery.” The surrounding facts support such a charge. Nonetheless, 

appellant was not charged with conspiracy to commit robbery. He was charged with 

robbery and conspiracy to commit larceny of $527. 

C. The Plea Inquiry 

Confusion about the conspiracy charge continued during the plea inquiry. The 

military judge advised appellant on the elements of conspiracy to commit robbery, 

an offense with which appellant was not charged. Nonetheless, and consistent with 

the stipulation of fact, appellant was provident to the offense. 

LAW 

This court will not disturb a guilty plea unless an appellant has demonstrated 

that there is “a substantial basis” in “law or fact” for questioning the plea. United 

States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “[W]e review a military 

judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion and questions of 

law arising from the guilty plea de novo.” Id.; see also United States v. Murphy, 74 

M.J. 302, 305 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 

DISCUSSION 

As an initial matter, appellant’s plea inquiry adequately established he was 

guilty of conspiracy to commit larceny. Although he was advised on the elements of 

conspiracy to commit “robbery,” as robbery is a larceny by force or threat of force, 

every robbery includes within it a larceny. UCMJ, art. 122 (“Any person . . . who 

with intent to steal takes anything of value from [a person] . . . against his will, by 
BROADEN—ARMY 20150414 

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means of force or violence or fear of immediate or future injury . . . is guilty of 

robbery . . . .”). 

Thus, for example, robbery requires as an element that the accused have the 

specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. See Manual for 

Courts-Martial, United States (2012 ed.)[hereinafter MCM] pt. IV, ¶ 47.b(6). It is a 

complete defense to robbery that (in an armed carjacking for example) the accused 

did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of the property (by abandoning the 

car in an area where it was likely to be found and returned). 

However, the offenses of robbery and larceny differ in one key aspect. The 

maximum punishment for robbery is determined without regard to the value of the 

property stolen. MCM pt. IV, ¶ 47.e. For larceny, on the other hand, there is a 

tenfold increase in punishment if the value of the stolen property was more than 

$500. MCM pt. IV, ¶ 46.e(b) and (d). 

Here, because appellant was advised of the elements of conspiracy to commit 

robbery, the military judge never explicitly elicited from appellant whether the 

criminal agreement included an agreement to steal more than $500. 

In United States v. Barton, 60 M.J. 62 (C.A.A.F. 2004) our superior court 

addressed a similar issue. The accused in Barton had conspired to break into the 

“Powerzone” electronics store and steal electronics. In total, the Barton 

conspirators took over $10,000 worth of electronic equipment. The issue in that 

case was whether the plea inquiry adequately established that conspirators had 

agreed to steal over $100.*

As in this case, the military judge did not discuss whether the criminal 

agreement included a meeting of the minds on the amount of goods to be stolen. “As 

a result, at no point during the Care inquiry . . . did Appellant admit in declaratory 

fashion that he intended to steal more than $100 in merchandise.” Id. at 65. 

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed the 

conviction. Id. at 66. The court focused on the plea inquiry “in whole” and noted 

that the element of value “is not a complex legal element . . . . [that] require[s] and 

intimate application of law to fact.” Id. at 65.

Additionally, the CAAF noted that “[w]e cannot lose sight that this is a guilty 

plea case.” Id. They further stated that “a guilty plea case is less likely to have 

developed facts . . . . With the benefit of appellate hindsight, one might well identify 

 

*

 The threshold for increased punishment was changed from $100 to $500 in 2002. 

See Executive order 13262 § 5, April 11, 2002.
BROADEN—ARMY 20150414 

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questions unasked or be tempted to look for the factual development that only a 

contested trial might contain.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

The CAAF’s reasoning in Barton is relevant to deciding this case. Appellant’s 

criminal conspiracy continued to exist after the initial agreement. Thus, when 

appellant was informed by his girlfriend that Mr. SO had “a large amount of cash” 

on him, and continued with the planned robbery, the criminal agreement was then to 

steal “a large amount of cash.” Similarly, when appellant pulled the actual $527 out 

of Mr. SO’s wallet, the conspiracy continued to exist. We risk the dangers 

“appellate hindsight” when we “identify questions” (e.g. when did the conspirators 

know that the amount being stolen was over $500) that could have been answered in 

a contested trial. 

Nonetheless, we find this case distinguishable from Barton for several 

reasons. First, Barton involved a theft of $10,000 of equipment, over the course of 

several nights. That is, the Barton conspirators carted away an amount of goods that 

was 1000% greater than the $100 threshold applicable to that case. Although not 

explicitly stated by the Barton court, it is clear in that case that as the conspirators 

emptied the store their conspiracy clearly expanded to stealing more than a mere 

$100. The Barton court was unwilling to therefore apply an unduly technical review 

of the plea inquiry in a case where the dollar value of the theft so greatly exceeded 

the $100 threshold. As even the Barton dissent admitted, “A common sense review 

would lead one to the conclusion that Appellant was unlikely to conspire to steal 

less than $100 from the Powerzone. . . .” Id. at 68 (J. Erdmann dissenting).

In this case, in contrast, the $527 stolen from Mr. SO was just 5% above the 

legal threshold for increased punishment. Common sense would not lead one to 

believe that a passerby, especially one who turns out to be homeless, was likely to 

have over $500 in cash. 

Second, to the extent we could rely on the plea inquiry as “a whole” to resolve 

these issues, the inquiry was muddied when the military judge provided the elements 

for the wrong offense. 

Accordingly, we find there is a substantial basis in law and fact to question 

the providence of appellant’s plea. Murphy, 74 M.J. at 305. Accordingly, on these 

facts, we take view of the dissenting judge in Barton, and approve only so much of 

the charge that provides that appellant conspired to commit larceny of some value. 

See Barton, 60 M.J. at 68 (J. Erdmann dissenting).

CONCLUSION 

This court affirms only so much of the finding of guilty of the Specification 

of Charge I as finds that: 
BROADEN—ARMY 20150414 

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[appellant] did, at or near the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on 

or about 3 January 2015, conspire with Private (E-2) 

Markel D. McNeil, Private (E-2) Terrell D. Price, and 

Mrs. Kassandra Melendez to commit an offense under the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice, to wit: larceny of 

property of some value, the property of Mr. S.O., and in 

order to effect the object of the conspiracy, the said 

Private (E-2) Quincy C. Broaden and Private (E-2) Markel 

D. McNeil, Private (E-2) Terrell D. Price, and Mrs. 

Kassandra Melendez did steal $527.00 from Mr. S.O. 

The remaining findings of guilty are AFFIRMED. 

 Applying the factors set out by our superior court in United States v. 

Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11, 15-16 (C.A.A.F. 2013), we are confident that 

reassessment is appropriate. First, we look to the penalty landscape. The maximum 

punishment is reduced by four and one half years. Here, the adjudged sentence was 

a year and one half longer than the approved sentence because of the pretrial 

agreement. Second, appellant was sentenced by a military judge alone. Third, the 

gravamen of the criminal conduct included within the original offenses remains 

substantially the same. Thus, neither the penalty landscape nor the admissible 

aggravation evidence has significantly changed. Lastly, we have familiarity and 

experience with the remaining offenses to reliably determine what sentence would 

have been imposed at trial. 

Reassessing the sentence on the basis of the noted error, the remaining 

findings of guilty, and the entire record, we AFFIRM the sentence as approved by 

the convening authority. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant has 

been deprived by virtue of that portion of the findings set aside by our decision, are 

ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c) and 75(a). 

Senior Judge CAMPANELLA and Judge PENLAND concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: