Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Alvarez CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE GUADALUPE ALVAREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

B323755

 

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA494191)

 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Affirmed. 

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

While seated in the front passenger seat of a car at a gas 

station, Jose Guadalupe Alvarez pointed a gun at a stranger. 

That stranger, Andres Septium Diaz, identified Alvarez at a field 

show-up a few hours later. Alvarez ultimately was convicted of 

assault with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a felon. 

Alvarez appeals, arguing the trial court violated his 

due process rights by admitting evidence of Septium’s 

identification. Before the show-up, an officer told Septium that 

the police were pursuing the car Septium had seen at the gas 

station, which Alvarez contends was an unduly suggestive 

comment. We conclude that, while the officer’s comment was 

somewhat suggestive, there was no due process violation because 

Septium’s identification of Alvarez was reliable under the totality 

of the circumstances. Therefore, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Alvarez Points a Gun at Septium

One night in 2021, Septium was driving alone in his car. 

As Septium pulled into a gas station, a silver Lexus sedan 

blocked him, and the driver honked at him. The front passenger 

of the Lexus pointed a gun at Septium from behind the door’s 

open window. Septium raised his hands and bent his head down, 

then backed his car out of the station and drove away. 
3

B. Septium Immediately Reports the Assault, and the 

Police Tell Septium They Are Pursuing the Lexus

Approximately 20 minutes later, Septium flagged down 

Officer Eddie Martinez of the Los Angeles Police Department to 

report the assault. Around the same time, Officer Michael 

Quezada saw a silver Lexus sedan that was reported stolen, 

which happened to be the same Lexus involved in the assault. 

When Officer Quezada attempted to conduct a traffic stop, the 

Lexus sped away. Officer Quezada pursued in his patrol car.

While Officer Quezada was pursuing the Lexus, Officer 

Martinez took Septium to a nearby police station to make a 

statement. Septium and Martinez had the following discussion:

“Officer Martinez: Right now they’re in, how do you say? 

Pursuit.

[1]

“Septium: Oh, okay.

“Officer Martinez: They have it.

“Septium: Oh, really? The Lexus?

“Officer Martinez: Yeah, a Lexus. It has to be them. . . . 

The car’s stolen.”

Septium described the incident to Officer Martinez.

Septium said the front passenger who pointed the gun at him

was skinny, 24 or 25 years old, and Hispanic, with “no hair.” 

Septium did not get a good view of the driver or see whether the 

driver had hair, but he thought the driver was a man. Septium 

said he saw another man in the backseat, who Septium also 

1 Most of the conversations between Septium and the officers 

were in Spanish. Officer Martinez, however, used the English 

word “pursuit.”
4

thought had no hair. Septium was unsure whether there were 

any other people in the back seat. 

C. The Police Pursue and Detain Alvarez

Meanwhile, Officer Quezada was pursuing the Lexus. As

the Lexus traveled 90 miles an hour on a freeway, someone in the 

car threw a gun out a passenger-side window. Eventually the 

Lexus got off the freeway and slowed down in a residential

neighborhood. Two men got out of the car and started running—

one from the front passenger-side door and one from the rear 

driver-side door. The front passenger was wearing a black 

T-shirt, light pants, and white shoes. The other one was also 

wearing a black T-shirt, but with dark pants and dark shoes. 

Officer Quezada continued to follow the Lexus, which came to a 

complete stop about a minute later. At that point, there were

only two people left in the car—both women.

An hour later, law enforcement officers found Alvarez 

hiding behind some bushes in the backyard of a house near where 

the Lexus had stopped. Alvarez was wearing a dark T-shirt, light 

pants, and white shoes (like the person who was in the front 

passenger seat of the Lexus). Officers detained Alvarez, as well 

as the other man they believed had been in the Lexus.

D. Septium Identifies Alvarez as the Assailant

Back at the police station, Officer Martinez told Septium,

“They’re coming in a bit with the suspects and they’re gonna talk 

to you.” Eventually Officer Quezada arrived, introduced himself 

to Septium, and gave the following admonition: “I’m going to 

take you to a place . . . to see if you can identify the person who 

was involved. Okay? So, okay the person we have right now is
5

. . . temporarily in custody and is a—is a possible suspect. Okay?

Just because the person is in police custody does not indicate that 

he is guilty of what happened. Okay? So just because . . . we now

have him detained doesn’t mean that it’s the person who did it. 

Okay?” Septium replied: “Yes, that’s fine.” Officer Quezada

continued: “The reason for—for what we are going to do . . . the 

[identification], is so you can see if the person—if we can 

eliminate the person or [identify] the person we have detained 

was the person who committed the crime against you.” Septium

replied: “Oh, okay.”

After the admonition, Officer Quezada drove Septium to a 

nearby parking lot. Officer Quezada told Septium: “We have 

four people. You tell me if anyone of [them] committed the crime 

or if anyone was inside the vehicle that you recognize.” 

Each of the suspects was seated in the back of a different 

patrol car. The first patrol car arrived in the parking lot with a 

man who was not Alvarez. When Septium saw the man, Septium

said, “Not that one.” When asked to confirm his statement, 

Septium said: “I think so. . . . It’s just that it was, when I saw 

them, it was like dark.” The first patrol car drove away.

The next patrol car arrived with Alvarez seated in the back. 

While Septium was looking at Alvarez, he and Officer Quezada 

had the following exchange:

“Officer Quezada: Is it that guy? 

“Septium: Can I see the first person again?

“Officer Quezada: The other one was taken away 

already. . . . These are gonna be women.”

“Septium: They all look the same. He looked like this guy, 

the skinny guy.

“Officer Quezada: Okay. So you think it is him? 
6

“Septium: Yeah.”

The final two patrol cars arrived with the two women, 

neither of whom Septium recognized. After Septium saw all four

suspects, Officer Quezada asked whether Septium had any 

questions. Septium said, “Well, the truth is they both looked the 

same,” but he added that “the second one” looked more like the 

assailant. Later on, Septium reiterated “it was dark” and “they 

look a little bit alike.” Officer Quezada asked: “But the guy you 

had said first . . . ‘Oh yes, that’s him’—that’s the one who looked 

like the person?” Septium again said “the second one” looked 

more like the assailant.

E. The People Charge Alvarez with Several Crimes

The People charged Alvarez with one count of assault with 

a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245; count 1)

2 and 

one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, 

subd. (a)(1); count 3).3 For count 1, the People alleged Alvarez 

personally used a firearm in committing the offense, within the 

meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). For both counts, the 

People alleged Alvarez had previously been convicted of two 

serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes 

law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).)

2 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 There was no count 2.
7

F. The Trial Court Denies Alvarez’s Motion To Exclude 

Septium’s Identification

Prior to trial, Alvarez filed a motion to exclude Septium’s 

identification of Alvarez at the field show-up, as well as any 

in-court identifications Septium might make at trial.4 Alvarez 

argued the identification procedure was unduly suggestive 

because Officer Martinez told Septium prior to the show-up that 

law enforcement officers had the people in the Lexus. 

The trial court denied the motion. The court concluded

that, “on balance, the officers’ conduct was not suggesting it was 

Mr. Alvarez” because Officer Quezada admonished Alvarez that 

the suspects “may or may not be the people involved in the 

incident” and because the officer did not “pressure [Alvarez] into 

making the identification.” The court ruled that Officer 

Martinez’s statement before the show-up, that the police had the 

suspects in the Lexus, was not enough, “on balance, to vitiate

everything that transpired after.” Finally, the court stated 

Septium’s limited opportunity to view his assailant went to the 

weight of his testimony, but was not sufficient to show the 

identification procedure was improper. 

G. The People and Alvarez Present Evidence at Trial

Septium, Officer Martinez, and Officer Quezada testified at

trial for the People. Septium identified Alvarez in court as the 

person who pointed the gun at him. During cross-examination,

counsel for Alvarez questioned Septium extensively about his 

identification of Alvarez on the night of the assault. 

4 At the preliminary hearing, Septium identified Alvarez in 

court as the person who pointed the gun at him. 
8

The People played for the jury security footage from the gas 

station showing the interaction between Septium and the people 

in the Lexus. The identities of the people in the Lexus were not 

clear from the security footage; however, the license plate of the 

Lexus matched the license plate of the Lexus that Officer 

Quezada later pursued. The People played footage from the 

dashboard camera of Officer Quezada’s patrol car showing the 

two men getting out of the Lexus (and the different clothing each 

was wearing). Both the People and Alvarez also played for the 

jury footage from body cameras worn by Officers Martinez and 

Quezada showing their interactions with Septium, including 

during the show-up.

Officer Brian Marukami of the Los Angeles Police 

Department testified he searched the area where someone threw 

a gun out a window of the Lexus during the pursuit. Officer 

Marukami found a black gun on the freeway with one round 

loaded in the chamber. 

A forensic print specialist and a fingerprint expert also 

testified for the People. Both compared fingerprints lifted from 

the inside of the front passenger window of the Lexus to Alvarez’s 

fingerprints. Both determined Alvarez’s fingerprints matched 

the fingerprints on the window.

Mitchell Eisen, an expert on “eyewitness memory and 

suggestibility,” testified for Alvarez. Eisen stated that “we use 

inference” to fill gaps in our memories and that “sometimes this 

reconstructive process leads to filling in of new information that 

may or may not be accurate.” Eisen also said that, during 

traumatic events, people have less ability to accurately remember

details about the event. 
9

When discussing eyewitness identifications, Eisen stated

the longer someone is “exposed to view [a] person . . . the better 

shot” he or she will “have later on of being able to identify and 

pick them out.” Eisen also stated a person is much more likely to 

make a false identification during a field show-up—where he or 

she is shown “a single individual for identification purposes”—

than when shown a suspect in a group. According to Eisen, 

because show-ups are inherently suggestive, it is the best 

practice for California peace officers (1) to use show-ups only 

when there are time constraints and (2) not to use the term 

“suspect” when conducting a show-up, because using the term 

makes the procedure more suggestive.

H. A Jury Convicts Alvarez, and the Trial Court 

Sentences Him

The jury convicted Alvarez on both counts and found true 

the allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), he

personally used a firearm in the commission of an assault with a 

semiautomatic firearm. Alvarez admitted he had two prior 

serious or violent felony convictions under the three strikes law. 

At sentencing, the court reduced the conviction on count 1 

from assault with a semiautomatic firearm to assault with a 

firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2))

5 and dismissed one of the prior 

serious or violent felony convictions. On count 1 the court 

sentenced Alvarez to a term of nine years (the middle term of 

5 The court ruled there was insufficient evidence the gun 

Alvarez pointed at Septium was a semiautomatic firearm

because—although the gun had a magazine—no one testified how 

the gun worked.
10

three years, doubled under the three strikes law, plus three years 

for the enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a)). On 

count 3 the court imposed but stayed under section 654 execution 

of the upper term of six years. Alvarez appealed from the 

judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“To determine whether the admission of identification 

evidence violates due process, ‘we consider (1) whether the 

identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, 

and, if so, (2) whether the identification itself was nevertheless 

reliable under the totality of the circumstances . . . .’” (People v. 

Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 768

(Holmes); accord, People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 35

(Sanchez); People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 556 (Clark); see

Sexton v. Beaudreaux (2018) 585 U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 2555, 2559]

[“‘due process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers 

use[ ] an identification procedure that is both suggestive and 

unnecessary’”].) The defendant has the burden to show the 

identification procedure was both unduly suggestive and 

unreliable under the circumstances. (People v. Cunningham

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 

412.)

“A defendant’s claim that an identification procedure was 

unduly suggestive is a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’” (People 

v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 283; see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 

at p. 557.) “‘“We review deferentially the trial court’s findings of 

historical fact, especially those that turn on credibility 
11

determinations, but we independently review the trial court’s 

ruling regarding whether, under those facts, a pretrial 

identification procedure was unduly suggestive.”’” (People v. 

Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 930-931; accord, Holmes, supra, 

12 Cal.5th at p. 768; see Wilson, at p. 283; Clark, at pp. 556-557.)

B. Even if the Identification Procedure Was Suggestive, 

Septium’s Identification of Alvarez Was Reliable 

Under the Circumstances

Alvarez contends the field show-up procedure was unduly 

suggestive and unnecessary because, prior to the show-up, Officer 

Martinez told Septium that police officers were in pursuit of a 

Lexus and “it has to be them.” All single-person show-ups are 

“‘inherently suggestive, at least to some extent.’” (Sanchez, 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 36.) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 

held “such showups are not necessarily unfair. [Citation.] 

‘Rather, all the circumstances must be considered.’” (Ibid.; 

see People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 753 (plur. opn. of 

Lucas, C. J.); People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 136.) 

“A violation occurs ‘“only if the identification procedure is ‘so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’”’” (People v. Wilson, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 283; see Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 

p. 768; Sanchez, at p. 35.)6 

6 Alvarez does not challenge the officers’ use of a field 

show-up, rather than a lineup, as unnecessary under the 

circumstances. 
12

It would have been better practice for Officer Martinez not 

to have told Septium that officers were pursuing a Lexus, that it 

“has to be them,” or that they “were coming in with the suspects.” 

But even if Officer Martinez’s comments rendered the show-up 

suggestive, there was no due process violation because Septium’s 

identification of Alvarez was nevertheless reliable under the 

totality of the circumstances. (See Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

pp. 36-37 [even where “the suggestive nature of the identification 

does raise concerns,” the identification may still be “reliable 

under the totality of the circumstances” where the “the inherent 

suggestiveness of the procedure was outweighed by other factors 

confirming the reliability of the identification”]; People v. Arias

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 168 [“When an eyewitness has been 

subjected to undue suggestion, the factfinder must nonetheless be 

allowed to hear and evaluate his identification testimony unless 

the totality of the circumstances suggests a very substantial 

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)].)

“In assessing the totality of the circumstances, we consider 

‘“such factors as the opportunity of the witness to view the 

suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of 

attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her 

prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty 

demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of 

time between the offense and the identification.” [Citations.] 

“Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the 

suggestive identification itself.”’” (People v. Wilson, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 283; see Sexton v. Beaudreaux, supra, 585 U.S. at 

p. ___ [138 S.Ct at p. 2559]; Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 768; 

Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 35-36.) 
13

As an initial matter, to the extent Officer Martinez’s 

comments about the Lexus were suggestive, their corrupting 

effect was reduced by Officer Quezada’s subsequent admonition

immediately before the show-up that, just because a person was 

in police custody, did not mean the person was involved in the 

crime. Courts have consistently held such admonitions reduce 

the suggestibility of an identification procedure. (See People v. 

Garcia (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1360-1361 [no due process 

violation, despite that police told the victim “‘they had caught the 

guys,’” where police admonished the victim that he was not to 

infer guilt from the fact that the individuals were detained and 

that he did not have to identify anyone]; People v. Rodriguez 

(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1050 [no due process violation where 

the “witnesses were shown the four suspects after being 

admonished that the shooter might or might not be among 

them”]; see also People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 

p. 990 [no “‘substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification’” during photographic lineup where the witness

“‘was instructed that he was not to assume the person who 

committed the crime was pictured therein, that it was equally 

important to exonerate the innocent, and that he had no 

obligation to identify anyone’”].) Septium confirmed he 

understood the admonition. 

Moreover, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s 

finding that no one pressured Septium into identifying Alvarez or 

any of the other suspects officers showed him. (See People v. 

Nguyen (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th at 32, 39 [trial court’s finding law 

enforcement officers did not encourage the witness to identify the 

suspect “will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence”].) 

When Septium viewed the first suspect, he said, “Not this one”; 
14

Officer Quezada said only, “Okay,” and he told the other officers 

“it’s gonna be a negative on this guy.” When Septium said he did 

not recognize either of the two women, Officer Quezada said, 

“Okay negative, . . . he doesn’t recognize them.” When Septium 

viewed Alvarez, Officer Quezada asked only whether Alvarez was

the “guy.” Septium asked whether he could see the first male 

suspect again, and Officer Quezada responded he had already 

been taken away. Only after Septium then said his attacker 

“looked like this skinny one” did Officer Quezada ask Septium to

clarify whether he thought Alvarez was the assailant. While 

Officer Martinez’s earlier comments about the Lexus may have 

suggested that one of the four suspects was probably Septium’s

assailant, no one persuaded Septium to identify Alvarez or 

anyone else specifically. (See People v. Chavez (2018) 

22 Cal.App.5th 663, 676 [no due process violation where detective 

“did not expressly or implicitly attempt to persuade [the witness]

to identify [defendant] as his assailant”]; Nguyen, at p. 39 [no due 

process violation where the police “‘did not impermissibly suggest 

in any way that [the witness] had to make an identification of the 

suspects’”].)7

Similarly, Officer Martinez’s comments—to the extent they 

were suggestive—implicated all four of the suspects, not just 

Alvarez. The fact that Septium identified Alvarez but not the 

other man indicated he was not heavily influenced by the earlier 

comments. (See In re Carlos M. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 372, 386 

[victim was not influenced by a single-person show-up procedure 

where she “positively identified one suspect but made no 

7 Indeed, Alvarez does not argue the show-up impermissibly 

suggested he was the more likely culprit than the other suspect.
15

identification of his companion”]; see also People v. Garcia, supra, 

244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1360 [witness “acted independently of any 

suggestion or pressure that may have been expressed” prior to

the lineup where he was “unable to identify any of the defendants 

as suspects but did recognize . . . the getaway car”].) 

Other factors confirmed the reliability of Septium’s 

identification of Alvarez. For one, Septium had a good 

opportunity to view Alvarez. While Septium only saw Alvarez for 

a moment during the assault and admitted to Officer Quezada it 

was dark, Septium testified Alvarez was only a few feet away 

from him. In addition, Septium’s pre-identification description of 

his assailant as 24 or 25 years old, skinny, Hispanic, and with no 

hair—while somewhat general—matched Alvarez’s appearance

during the show-up.

8 Moreover, the lapse of time between the 

assault and the identification was short; Septium identified

Alvarez at the show-up an hour and a half after the assault. 

(See Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 37 [identification was reliable 

where the “showup occurred mere hours” after crime]; People v. 

Hall (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 299, 310 [identification was reliable 

where “the length of time between the crime and the 

confrontation was approximately one hour”].) 

More importantly, there was considerable evidence 

confirming Alvarez was the person who pointed the gun at 

Septium. Courts have regularly found identifications reliable 

where other evidence corroborates the accuracy of the witness’s 

8 Alvarez was 26 years old the night of the assault. Septium 

testified he recognized Alvarez as his assailant during the showup because Alvarez was slim and because he had the same 

hairline, forehead, and eyes.
16

identification. (See Holmes, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 769 [it was

“not substantially likely that [the witness] misidentified [the 

defendant], particularly in light of all the additional evidence”]; 

Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 37 [five-year-old witness’s 

identification during a single-photograph show-up was reliable,

where “[p]art of the identification was independently 

corroborated by none other than defendant,” and “the physical 

evidence corroborated part of what [the witness] told the police”].)

There was no serious dispute Alvarez was in the frontpassenger seat of the Lexus during Officer Quezada’s pursuit. 

Alvarez’s fingerprints were on the inside of the front-passenger 

window, Officer Quezada saw a person who looked like Alvarez 

(and was wearing the same clothing) get out from the frontpassenger door (an incident captured by Quezada’s body camera), 

and police found Alvarez hiding in a backyard a short distance 

from where the pursuit ended. (See People v. Nguyen, supra, 

23 Cal.App.4th at p. 40 [identification was reliable where 

fingerprint evidence placed the defendant at the crime scene].)

The only other man in the Lexus was wearing different clothing, 

further confirming Alvarez was the person in the frontpassenger’s seat. (See People v. Chavez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 676 [identification was reliable where the victim described to 

detectives the clothing his assailant was wearing, and the 

defendant was the only person in the surveillance camera footage 

of the attack wearing matching clothing].) Although it is 

theoretically possible, as Alvarez asserts, the occupants of the 

Lexus changed seats after the assault on Septium, there was no 

evidence supporting such speculation. And there was evidence to 

the contrary. Only a short period of time elapsed between the 

assault and the beginning of Officer Quezada’s pursuit, and no 
17

one saw anyone change seats during the pursuit (though Officer 

Quezada did see someone throw a gun out the window on the 

passenger side). 

It is true Septium was not 100 percent certain of his 

identification of Alvarez at the field show-up, admitting both 

male suspects looked alike. Septium’s lack of certainty, however,

did not render the identification unreliable. People v. Wilson, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th 259 is instructive. In that case the witness 

briefly saw the defendant in court at a hearing. (Id. at p. 286.) 

A month later, the witness participated in a live lineup where he 

could not positively identify the defendant, but stated that, 

among the lineup participants, the defendant “most closely 

resembled” the person he saw commit the crime. (Ibid.) The 

Supreme Court held the witness’s “failure to definitively identify” 

the defendant at the lineup did not undermine the reliability of 

the identification. (Id. at p. 287.) In particular, the Supreme 

Court explained that, to the extent the identification was “useful 

to any degree,” it was because it “bolstered the more definitive

identifications” of the defendant by other witnesses. (Ibid.) 

Similarly, Septium may not have been certain during the field 

show-up Alvarez was the person who assaulted him, but Septium 

consistently stated Alvarez looked more like the person who 

assaulted him than the other male suspect. Like the witness’s 

less-than-certain identification in Wilson, Septium’s

identification was useful at trial to bolster the other

incriminating evidence—namely, the evidence placing Alvarez in 

the front-passenger seat of the Lexus at the time of the assault. 

Finally, at trial Alvarez had ample opportunity to (and did) 

question Septium about the identification and Officers Martinez 

and Quezada about their interactions with Septium. The
18

opportunity to question all relevant witnesses significantly 

reduced the possibility of any “‘irreparable misidentification.’” 

(Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 116; see Holmes, 

supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 770 [identification was reliable where 

“[t]he defense was able to thoroughly cross-examine [the witness]

and delve into factors bearing on the reliability of his 

identifications”]; People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 903 

[no due process violation where the “circumstances of the 

identification were disclosed to the defense, they were the subject 

of thorough cross-examination, and the jury was able to evaluate 

the reliability of [the witness’s] identification”]; People v. Cooks 

(1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 271 [identifications were reliable 

where “each witness who identified one of the defendants in court 

was cross-examined at length about his or her pretrial 

identification”].) Under the circumstances, the identification was 

sufficiently reliable that its introduction at trial did not violate 

Alvarez’s due process rights. It was up to the jury to consider 

how the procedure might have influenced Septium’s identification

of Alvarez and weigh that with the other evidence. (See Manson, 

at p. 116 [“Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure 

intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some 

questionable feature.”]; People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 

p. 903 [same]; People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 944 

[“[w]hether the witnesses were truthful when they identified 

defendant . . . presented credibility questions for the jury to 

resolve,” and “presenting the evidence to the jury for its 

resolution did not violate defendant’s rights”].) 
19

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

MARTINEZ, J.