### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-20662 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

v. TERRON JERESE WILLIAMS, also known as Blak, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:09-CR-294-5

Before JONES, DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Terron Jerese Williams appeals the 188-month term of i m p risonment imposed on his guilty plea conviction for conspiring to possess w i th intent to distribute five kilograms or more o f cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base. In his plea agreement, Williams waived “the right to appeal the sentence imposed or the manner in which it was determined on any grounds set forth in

. . . 18 U.S.C. § 3742,” but he reserved “the right to appeal an illegal sentence

or an upward departure from the guidelines not requested by the United States.” U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Janu ary3, 201 3 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t hasd ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-20662 Document: 00512100471 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/03/2013No. 11-20662

The agreement did not define an illegal sentence. Because all of Williams’s claims fail even absent a contractual bar, however, we pretermit consideration of the effect of the appeal waiver. Williams contends correctly that the F a i r Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), P U B
. L. N O

. 111-220, § 2(a)(2), applies to his sentence. See Do rs e y v . U n i t ed States , 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329-36 (2012). He also asserts correctly that he would have been exposed to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence under the FSA instead of the ten-year mandatory minimum that applied previously. However, the district court sentenced Williams to a term significantly above the 10-year mandatory minimum un d e r the pre-FSA version of the statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2 0 0 9)

. N othing indicates that the district court would have imposed a different sentence had it believed that the statutory changes effected by the FSA applied to Williams’s offense. Thus, any error in not recognizing the FSA’s retroactive applicability was harmless. See United States v. Teel , 691 F.3d 578, 587 (5th Cir. 2012). We have no jurisdictio n t o entertain Williams’s claim that the district court erred by denying a downward departure, but we may review the sentence for reasonableness. See United States v. Nikonova , 480 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2007), abrogation on other grounds re c ogn ized by United States v. Delgado-Martinez , 564 F.3d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 2009). We employ the plain error standard because Williams did not properly object to the sentence in the district court. See United States v. Peltier , 505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5 th Cir. 2007). Because Williams has not sho w n any error, much less error that is clear or obvious, we do not disturb his sentence. See Puckett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). The reasons recited by th e di strict court for its sentence comport with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and Williams offers no persuasive basis for questioning the district court’s evaluation of them. See Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). AFFIRMED.
2 Case: 11-20662 Document: 00512100471 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/03/2013