2019 IL App (3d) 180040 

Opinion filed January 18, 2019 

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IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

2019 

RUTH J. SCHROEDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DOUG POST, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the Circuit Court 

of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

Iroquois County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-18-0040 

Circuit No. 17-L-12 

Honorable James B. Kinzer, 

Judge, Presiding. 

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PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Holdridge and McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Doug Post, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion asking the court 

to reconsider its October 2017 order in a forcible entry and detainer action in favor of plaintiff, 

Ruth J. Schroeder. In that order, the court awarded plaintiff possession of the premises and 

damages in the amount of $62,726, which included $27,000 in holdover damages. We affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 We take the following facts from the parties’ agreed statement regarding the evidence 

and testimony presented during the October 2017 bench trial. 

¶ 4 Plaintiff, defendant’s aunt, owned an undivided 75% interest of the approximately 200 

acres of land in Crescent City, Illinois, that is the subject of this lawsuit. Her brother, Robert 
 

 

 

 

Post, defendant’s father, owned the other 25% of the land. Defendant farmed the land on a cashrent basis for several consecutive years. When defendant failed to pay plaintiff the total amount 

of rent due for the 2016 crop year (he still owed $6866) by October 2016, plaintiff gave him 

written notice of termination of the lease agreement and demanded that he quit and deliver up 

possession of the property on or before February 28, 2017. 

¶ 5 Robert did not agree to terminate defendant’s farm tenancy. He instructed defendant to 

continue farming the land even after defendant received plaintiff’s notice. Defendant continued 

to farm the land during the 2017 crop year without plaintiff’s consent. During the 2017 crop 

year, defendant made no payments to plaintiff. 

¶ 6 Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court awarded plaintiff possession of the 

premises and ordered defendant to pay damages in the amount of $62,726 plus costs ($6866 for 

2016 rent and $55,860 for 2017 rent). The 2017 award includes holdover damages pursuant to 

section 9-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/9-202 (West 2016)). 

¶ 7 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, asserting that the court erred in 

awarding plaintiff (1) possession of the land that she did not prove belonged to her and 

(2) double damages where defendant “mitigated damages, saved waste, and there was no finding 

of bad faith” by continuing to farm the land in 2017. Following a hearing, the court denied 

defendant’s motion to reconsider finding that Daugherty v. Burns, 331 Ill. App. 3d 562 (2002), 

controlled the outcome. The court also stated: 

“And I also find that [defendant’s] behavior was sufficiently wrongful and 

not sufficiently colorable to avoid the penalty aspect of the holdover statute. The 

penalty is in there to keep people from holding over, and if there’s no penalty 

imposed here, any tenant out there can simply say I’m not getting off the property. 

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The worst that can happen is I farm it for next year and have to pay the cash rent 

that I would have paid last year despite the fact that perhaps insurance goes up 5 

or 10 percent. So his behavior here was sufficiently wrongful as I said and not 

sufficiently colorable to avoid the penalty aspect of a holdover statute.” 

Defendant appeals. 

¶ 8 ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant argues only that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff holdover 

damages. 

¶ 10 Section 9-202 of the Code governs holdover damages. It provides: 

“Wilfully holding over. If any tenant or any person who is in or comes into 

possession of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by, from or under, or by 

collusion with the tenant, wilfully holds over any lands, tenements or 

hereditaments, after the expiration of his or her term or terms, and after demand 

made in writing, for the possession thereof, by his or her landlord, or the person to 

whom the remainder or reversion of such lands, tenements or hereditaments 

belongs, the person so holding over, shall, for the time the landlord or rightful 

owner is so kept out of possession, pay to the person so kept out of possession, or 

his or her legal representatives, at the rate of double the yearly value of the lands, 

tenements or hereditaments so detained to be recovered by a civil action.” 735 

ILCS 5/9-202 (West 2016). 

Essentially, the holdover statute permits a landlord to recover double the yearly value of the 

lands that a tenant “willfully holds over” after the tenant received written notice demanding 

possession upon expiration of the parties’ lease. See id. 

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¶ 11 While the statute does not define “willful,” our supreme court long ago noted, “when the 

lease ha[s] expired according to its terms, the holding over, although intentional, is not within the 

statute, unless it was knowingly and willfully wrongful; that where the tenant continued to hold 

under a reasonable belief that he was doing so rightfully, he does not incur the penalty.” Stuart v. 

Hamilton, 66 Ill. 253, 255 (1872). “[A] tenant is not to be charged double rent under the 

holdover statute if [he] remains in possession of the premises for ‘colorably justifiable 

reasons.’ ” Wendy & William Spatz Charitable Foundation v. 2263 North Lincoln Corp., 2013 IL 

App (1st) 122076, ¶ 43 (quoting J.M. Beals Enterprises, Inc. v. Industrial Hard Chrome, Ltd., 

271 Ill. App. 3d 257, 261-62 (1995)). 

¶ 12 We review a trial court’s determination regarding whether a landlord is entitled to 

holdover damages under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. J.M. Beals Enterprises, 

271 Ill. App. 3d at 260; Hoffman v. Altamore, 352 Ill. App. 3d 246, 250 (2004). “A finding is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if 

the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” Best v. Best, 

223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). 

¶ 13 After reviewing the record, we find that the manifest weight of the evidence supports the 

trial court’s award of holdover damages. In Daugherty, the court held that a year-to-year tenancy 

terminates “in its entirety once unanimous consent to continue the tenancy no longer exists.” 

Daugherty, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 570. In other words, Daugherty made it clear that one or more 

joint owners of property may terminate an oral lease agreement without the unanimous consent 

of all joint owners. We find no reason to disagree with the Daugherty court. 

¶ 14 Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff, a joint owner of the farmland at issue, terminated the 

oral lease agreement by giving defendant written notice in October 2016. It is also undisputed 

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that defendant ignored plaintiff’s notice of termination and continued to farm the land during the 

2017 crop year while paying no rent. Based upon the evidence, the trial court reasonably 

concluded that defendant had no reasonable belief that he rightfully possessed the land in 2017. 

¶ 15 CONCLUSION 

¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Iroquois County. 

¶ 17 Affirmed. 

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