Filed 3/14/24 Dowling v. Urioste gui CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

GREGORY DOWLING as Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DIANE URIOSTEGUI,

Defendant and Appellant. B 323346

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 16STPB03890)

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lee R. Bogdanoff, Judge. Affirmed. Rob Uriostegui for Defendant and Appellant. Gifford, Dearing & Abernathy and Henry H. Dearing for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 INTRODUCTION

In her prior appeal Diane Uriostegui challenged the probate court’s ruling that an amended trust created by Prescott
Scott

, which disinherited his son Gregory Dowling and named Uriostegui the trustee and sole beneficiary

, was invalid because Uriostegui procured it by undue influence and Prescott lacked capacity to amend the trust

. We concluded substantial evidence supported the prob ate court’s finding s and affirmed the judgment

. ( Dowling v. Uriostegui (Mar. 16, 2020, B294046) [nonpub. opn.] ( Uriostegui I ). The judgment, now affirmed, required Uriostegui to provide an accounting to allow the probate court to determine the amount
of money she had wrongfully taken from the trust while she was

trustee. When after three attempts Uriostegui failed to submit a

proper accounting

, Gregory , the successor trustee, filed a petition seeking restitution, damages

, and interest

. On July 12, 2022 the probate court held a hearing and awarded Gregory $1,293,138.27
in restitution

, plus $552,500 in interest. Uriostegui appeals from the probate court’s July 12, 2022
order , arguing that t he court violated the one final judgment rule
and t hat the court did not have personal jurisdiction over her. We conclude both arguments are legally incorrect and affirm the probate court’s order. We do not reach Uriostegui’s challenge s to various other probate court rulings between 2018 and 2020
because she did not appeal from those orders and the time to do
so has long since expired

.3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Uriostegui Uses Undue Influence To Get Prescott
To Amend the Family Trust , and the Probate Court
Voids It As we explained in Uriostegui I

, in 2005 Prescott and Ellen Dowling created a revocable trust naming the couple’s two children, Gregory and Richard, as beneficiaries, but provided that
Richard ’ s share would go to Gregory in the event Richard predeceased either Prescott or Ellen. The trust was amended in 2009, but maintained essentially the same distribution provisions. Ellen died in July 2011 ; Richard in March 2012.
In March 2012 Uriostegui, who dated Richard in the 1990s, inherited property on Olive Street. In May 2012 Prescott contributed $359,138 to pay off a promissory note secured by a
deed of trust on the Olive Street property. In a letter Prescott wrote Uriostegui, he described the pa yoff as an investment that would allow Uriostegui to live in the home during her lifetime and allow Uriostegui’s son

, Rob Uriostegui

, and Gregory to “have the option, to either sell the house or keep it for a rental at their
discretion” after both Prescott an d Uriostegui died. By 2014 Prescott was becoming increasingly angry with Gregory, and in 2015 an attorney named John Morris prepared an amended trust (the 2015 Trust). The 2015 Trust disinherited Gregory and Gregory ’ s children and made Uriostegui t he sole beneficiary of the t rust. Prescott died on June 21, 2016. Uriostegui took $1.8 million of trust assets , put it in her personal account, and began to spend it

. Although she testified she could not remember4

how much she spent, by the time of trial Uriostegui had returned to her lawyers’ trust account only $750,000 of the $1.8 million. In October 2016 Gregory filed a petition under
Probate Code section 17200 to void the 2015 Trust on the grounds that Uriostegui procured it through undue influence an d that Prescott lacked the capacity in 2015 to amend the t rust. Gregory sought an order distributing the trust assets pursuant to the
2009 version of the t rust Prescott and Ellen had signed

. Gregory also brought a cause of action for financial elder abuse. Following a court trial, the probate court issued a 108

- page statement of decision on August 15, 2018 and entered j udgment on November 2, 2018. The probate court declared the 2015 Trust void because Uriostegui procured it through undue influence and
because Prescott lacked the capacity to amend the trust as a result of “delusions

. ” The court ordered Gregory as the successor trustee to administer the trust ac cording to the terms of the 2009
trust documents . The court o rdered Uriostegui to return the

t rust assets she had taken (plus interest), transfer title to
Prescott ’ s residence to Gregory as the successor trustee of the

t rust, file an accounting as a const ructive trustee, refrain from making any transfers that would impede the court ’ s orders, and pay Gregory his attorneys’ fees and costs. The court also ordered Uriostegui to transfer to Gregory an ownership interest in the Olive Street property “equal to t he current value of the share of the residence purchased by Prescott Dowling” and imposed a lien

on Uriostegui’s remaining interest in the property. Finally, the
court found that Uri o stegui committed financial elder abuse and that Gregory was entitled to attorney s’ fees and costs. Uriostegui appealed. W e concluded substantial evidence supported the probate court’s findings that Uriostegui procured5

the 2 0 15 amendment through undue influence and that Prescott lacked capacity in 2015 to amend t he t rust. W e modified the judgment, however, to delete the provision ordering Uriostegui to transfer an ownership interest in the Olive Street property to Gregory because his petition did not include a claim seeking an interest in the property. ( Uriosteg ui I

, supra , B294046. )
On remand the probate court entered an amended judgment , dated August 31, 2020, consistent with our opinion. The amended judgment included a provision from the
2018 judgment , not affected by our opinion in Uriostegui I , “that

an e videntiary hearing regarding restitution and damages be held in conformity of this ruling [i.e., the 2018 judgment] , said hearing to commence after approval of [Uriost e gui’s] accounting .”

B. The Probate Court Conducts Further Proceedings on
the Accounting Uriostegui never filed a satisfactory accounting the court could approve. On February 7, 2019 she filed her first accounting. T he probate court sustained Gregory’s objection to that accounting and ordered Uriostegui to prepare a new one. Urio stegui filed a second accounting, which the probate court rejected too. Uriostegui filed a third accounting , which she called

a f irst s upplement to her s econd a ccounting. Gregory again objected , arguing that Uriostegui was improperly claiming
certain cre dits

, that some of her claimed expenditures while she

was trustee were improper

, and that an “in

- court examination is necessary to both explain and track such expenditures.” Gregory
also asked the court to order Uriostegui to pay him6

$1,393,138.27, 1 plus interest

, to make the t rust whole

. T he probate court sustained Gregory’s objections and instructed him that, to the extent he sought affirmative relief, he should refile his objections as a petition. On February 11, 2021 Gregory , as directed, filed a petition seeking restitution, compensatory damages

, and interest in the amount of $1,393,138.27

. Uriostegui filed a special motion to strike under Code of Procedure section 425.16, arguing her
accountin g s were “protected by the First Amendment an d litigation privilege” because she submitted them to the probate

court. The probate court denied the motion, ruling Gregory “is not arguing [Uriostegu i ’s filing of] these accountings caused $1,393,189.26 plus interest and remedies in damages

. The
claime d award amount is based on what [Gregory] contends is necessary to ‘make the trust whole’ from [Uriostegui’s] earlier misappropriation of Trust assets and wrongful conduct. [Citation.] This request follows the language of the Judgment which provides that an evidentiary hearing is to be held ‘regarding restitution and damages.’ [Citation

. ] The fact that [Gregory] disputes the accuracy of the accountings and uses them in coming to the requested reward amount merely involves an evidentiary matter. ” We denied Uriostegui ’s petition for writ of mandate challenging the probate court’s order denying her

1 Gregory claimed this amount include d attorney s’ fees not properly chargeable to the trust ($50,000) ; improper cash withdrawals ($135,770.77) ; her retained portion from the attorney trust account ($230,655.75) ; insurance ($6,080.96)

, telephone charges ($5,013.10) and internet charges ($2,092.61) that were not related to the administration of the trust ; personal items improperly characterized as miscellaneous trust expenses ($955,028.95) ; and an improper gift to her son ($8,496.13)

.7

special motion to strike

. ( Uriostegui v. Superior Court (Nov. 3
, 20 21
, B315917 ) [order].) 2 Uriostegui filed a demurrer, arguing the probate court
lacked jurisdiction “because there is a judgment and remitt itu r in
this case .” She also claimed Gregory’s petition was barred by the
statute of limitations and claim preclusion and that he had not sufficiently pleaded the cause s of action in the petition. T he probate court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Gregory filed a first amended petition on January 10, 2022

, claiming an order awarding restitution, compensatory damages

, and interest was “necessary to make the trust whole without the
necessit y of an approved accounting, because it was obvious that Uriostegui had no intention to file an approvable accounting for
her administration of the trust estate.” Gregory asked the court

to order Uriostegui to return $1,393,138.27 plus interest to the

trust

. Uriostegui objected to the petition , arguing th e probate court lacked jurisdiction. Uriostegui then sought to disqualify the probate court judg e under Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1,
subdivision (a)(6)

, and 170.3, subdivision (c )(1)

. In support of the motion to disqualify the judge, c ounsel for Uriostegui (her son
Rob ) submitted a declaration stating that Gregory “concocted an illicit scheme to collaterally attack the remittitur and amended judgment by filing pretextual objectio ns to

. . . Uriostegui’s accountings and sought exemplary damages in addition to compensatory damages in the objection s ” and that the probate

2 An order denying a special motion to strike is appealable ( Newport Harbor Ve ntures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism ( 2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 645) and therefore generally not reviewable by writ.8

court judge “allowing Gregory

. . . to seek additional damages
after the remittitur was issued would cause a reaso nable person
to have doubt that [the judge] could be impartial in this matter.” The probate court struck the statement of disqualification

, stating: “ To the extent Ms. Uriostegui maintains that the Court ruled incorrectly

, . . . her remedy for an erroneo us ruling is not a motion to disqualify, but rather review by appeal or writ from the ruling.” We denied Uriostegui’s ensuing petition for writ of
mandate , which argued the probate judge showed “disobedience
to th e Remittitur of this Court ” because “ the Remittitur prohibited Gregory Dowling from filing supplemental pleadings
post

- remittitur.” ( Uriostegui v. Superior Court ( Aug. 3, 20 22
, B321845 ) [order].)
On July 12, 2022 the probate court ruled on Gregory’s f irst

a mended p etition. After concluding Ur iostegui was entitled to a $100,000 credit (resulting from a malpractice action Gregory filed against Morris, the attorney who prepared the 2015 Trust for Uriostegui )

, t he court ruled that it had previously ordered Uriostegui to make the t rust whole and to pay interest at the rate
of 7 percent , that the court had ordered Uriostegui to file an accounting, and that Uriostegui failed three times to submit an acceptable accounting. T he probate court awarded Gregory, as
successor trustee of the t rust, $1, 293 ,13 8.27 , plus $552,500 in
interest. Urio s tegui timely appealed from the July 12, 2022
order

.9 DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“ The probate court or judge is the guardian of estates of deceased persons and all proceedings are under the direction of the judge. ” ( County of Los Angeles v. Morrison (1940) 15 Cal.2d 368, 371 ; accord, Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 103.)
Th is power includes the right to order a party to provide an accounting. ( Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 C al.App.5th 370, 376 ; see Babbitt v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1141

- 1142 [Probate Code authorizes the probate court to compel a trustee to provide an accounting]; Christie v. Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413 [“Determining the need for an accounting is a matter within the trial court ’ s sound
discretion

. ”] .)
We review the probate court’s orders to supervise and protect the assets of a trust or estate for abuse of discretion. ( Estate of Sapp

, supra , 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 103

- 104 ; Estate of
Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 718 ; Manson v. She p herd (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1258 .) W e review de novo issues regarding the probate court’s jurisdiction and authority

. ( Conservatorship of Kane (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 400, 40 5 .)10 B. The Probate Court’s July 12, 2022 Order Does Not
Violate the One Final J udgment Rule Uriostegui ’s primary argument is that t he probate court lacked jurisdiction on July 12, 2022 to enter what she calls a “second judgment” because “‘[t]here can only be one judgment in any case between the same parties.’” Uriostegui’s argument is doubly wrong.
Ur io stegui is referring to the one final judgment rule,
which is a procedural principle of appellate jurisdiction that

concerns the appealabi lity of an order or judgment ; it has nothing
to do with superior court jurisdiction. The rule avoids piecemeal appeals by limiting “appellate review to trial court judgments that finally dispose of all issues.” ( Kurwa v. Kislinger (2017)

4 Cal.5th 109, 1 14; see Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc

. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 384 [ “ ‘ The one final judgment rule is a

“ fundamental principle of appellate practice that prohibits review of intermediate rulings by appeal until final resolution of the

case. ”’”]; Walton v. Magno (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1240 [“‘ The “one final judgment rule” has been denominated a basic principle of appellate practice’ ” ] .) “ Under the one final judgment rule, ‘“ an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an
entire act ion.” ’ ” ( In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756; see Hoveida v. Scripps Health (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1466

, 1468 [ under the one final judgment rule “ [a] n appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to dispose of all cause s of action between the parties”].) The one final judgment rule has no
relevance to whether the probate court had jurisdiction on July 12, 2022 to award restitution or attorneys’ fees.
But even if this court’s jurisdiction under the one final judgment rul e were somehow relevant to whether the probate11

court had jurisdiction to make the July 12, 2022 order, the rule would not apply. The rules governing probate appeals are different from those governing civil appeals. “The right to appeal is purely statutory .” ( Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67; see Estate of
Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 801; see also Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co . (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 482, 483 [“ The right to appeal is purely statutory, since neither the federal Constitution nor state Constitution provides for it

. ”] .) In civil cases, the appellant may appeal only from a singl e, final judgment that determines “ the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding

. ” ( Code Civ. Proc. , § 577; see Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010 ) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 [“ A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties [citation] ‘“ ‘ when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined .’”’ ” ].) Code of Civ il Procedure
section 904. 1 “ codifies the ‘one final judgment rule,’ which provid es that an ‘“ ‘ appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action. ’” ’” ( K aiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1138 ; see Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments, Inc

. , supra , 52 Cal.App. 5 th at

p. 382 .) In probate cases, however, an appellant may appeal from a variety of order s made appealable by the Probate Code

, as set forth in Probate Code sections 1300 through 1304

. ( See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a) [“[a]n appeal, other than in a limited civil case, may be taken

. . . [¶]

. . . [ ¶] (10) [f]rom an order made appealable by the Probate Code ”]; Kalenian v. Insen (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 569, 575

- 576 [“ the Probate Code provisions12

concerning appealability are exclusive ,” and the “ appealability of proba te disputes in general is governed by [Probate Code]
section 1300 ”]; Estate of Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1118,
1125

- 1126 [“ It is well established that ‘ [a]ppeals which may be taken from orders in probate proceedings are set forth in

. . . the Probate Code, and its provisions are exclusive .’ ” ].) This is
because the administration of a trust or estate is a “s eries of separate proceedings, each of which is intended to be final .” ( Estate of Callnon (1969) 70 Cal.2d 150, 156 ; accord, In re Loring
Estate (1946) 29 Cal.2d 423, 428; Meyer v. Meyer (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 983, 992 ; see Ross, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 3:3 [probate “is a continuous proceeding” which “involves a series of stages, each of which may result in an appealable order or judgment”].) Thus, a probate court order may be appealable under the
Probate Code even if it does not resolve all claims and issues in
the actio n. Which for purposes of this appeal means that, even if Uriostegui were challenging our jurisdiction rather than the probate court’s jurisdiction, the one final judgment rule would not apply . Either way , the probate court had jurisdiction to make
furthe r orders after we issued our remittitur in Uriostegui I

.

C. The Remittitur in Uriostegui I Did Not Preclude t he
Probate Court F

rom Making Its July 12, 2022 Order Uriostegui argues the July 12, 2022 order was a “material
variance” from the probate court’s 2018 judgment and this court’s
remittitur in Uriostegu i I

. (See Medina v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1226 [“‘ [t]he order of the reviewing court is contained in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the13

jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned ’ ” ].) Uriostegui mischaracterizes our opinion in Ur i ostegui I

. In Uriostegui I we concluded substantial evidence supported the probate court’s findings that the 2015 Trust was
invalid and that the trust’s assets should be distributed pursuant
to the 2009 t rust documents

. We left undisturbed that part of the judgment requiring Uriostegui to return to the t rust assets she had taken (plus interest), file an accounting as a constructive trustee, not make any transfers that would impede the court ’ s orders, and pay Gregory his attorneys’ fees and costs. That is exactly what the probate court did on July 12, 2022. (See Es tate of Jenanyan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 703, 708 [ “The probate of an estate consists of a series of procedures, from the initial appointment of
an executor or administrator to the final distribution of the

estate

. ”].) Although the amended judgment contemplated Uriostegui would provide an accounting before the probate court conducted an evidentiary hearing to set the amount of restitution,
Urio s tegui never prepared an acceptable accounting , which in

turn required Gregory (as directed by the court) to file a petit ion asking the probate court to set an amount of restitution . The

p robate court ruled on this petition on July 12, 2022 by awarding Gregory $1,845,638.27 in restitution and interest

. That’s what the probate court was supposed to do. ( See Prob. Code, § 17206 [“ The court in its discretion may make any orders and take any other action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented by the petition ”]; Babbit v. Superior Court

, sup ra , 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144 [“‘ To preserve [a] trust and to respond to perceived breaches of trust, the probate court has wide,
express powers to “ make any orders and take any other action14

necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented ” by [a] section 17200 petition

. ’ ” ]; Schwartz v. L a bow (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427 [ “ Proceedings in the probate court

‘ concerning the internal affairs of the trust ’ are commenced with the filing of a petition. ” ] ; see also Christie v. Kimball

, supra , 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 [probate court has “ ‘ inherent equitable power ’ to take ‘ remedial action ’”].) There was no error. 3

D. The Probate Court Did Not Lack Personal
Jurisdiction over Uriostegui Uriostegui argues that all the orders in this case , including the July 12, 2022 order

, are void because “[n]o summons for the personal appearance of [her] as an individual defendant w as issued [or] served upon [her] .” A ccording to Uriostegui , because probate matters are in rem proceedings

, her appearance in response to Gregory’s petition under Probate Code section 17200

was not a general appearance as an individual and did not subject her to the jurisdiction of the probate court

. Wrong again

.

“ Probate proceed ings are proceedings in rem ,” which means
the “ court ’ s jurisdiction is based on its authority over property

3 Uriostegui also argues the July 12, 2022 order is void because the first amended petition “did not allege a cause of actio n” and “[ t]here was no justiciable controversy.” She argues that, “[i]f trial courts are allowed to ignore these bedrock rules of finality by one judgment , litigation will never end ” ; that Gregory “had the audacity to attack this Court’s Remittitur improperly collaterally with frivolous objections and petitions

, ” and that Gregory “pulled these litigation stunts because he was enable d by the Superior Court.” This argument, to the exten t we understand it , appears to be a recasting of Uriostegui’s othe r arguments , and fails for the same reasons

.15

within its territory .” ( Capra v. Capra (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1082; see Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 434, 443 [“A probate proceedin g is essentially an in rem proceeding, in
which the decedent ’ s assets within the state constitute the res

. ”].) Probate Code section 17003, subdivision (a), however, states that

, “[b] y accepting the trusteeship of a trust having its principal place of admi nistration in this state the trustee submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court

. . . .” By submitting to personal jurisdiction, trustees like Uriostegui do not have to be personally served with a summons for the probate court to have personal jurisdiction over the trustee ( though notice is still required )

. (See Prob. Code, § 17203, subd. (a)(1) [ trustees must be given notice by mail of petitions under section 17200 ] .) In any event, Urios t egui made a gene ral appearance in the probate court as an individual by filing objections, a demurrer, a special motion to strike

, and a petition to disqualify the probate judge , and by appearing at trial, which “is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party. ” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a); see Estate of Poder ( 1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 786, 79 1 [“ [e] ven where improper notice

. . . would otherwise deprive a court of jurisdiction to make an order or pronounce judgment, the order or judgment will not be decl ared void if the complaining party has waived the defect ,” and a “ general appearance
constitutes such a waiver ”] .)

E

. We Do Not Have Jurisdiction To Review Uriostegui’s Challenges to Other Probate Court Orders Uriostegui challenges several orders not identified in her

n otice of a ppeal. For example, U riostegui argues the
November 2, 2018 judgment and the August 31, 2020 amended16

judgment after Uriostegui I are void for uncertainty because they provided the court would calculate the amount of restitution at a later time and because Gregory filed his petition pursuant to
Probate Code section 17200 and not Probate Code section 850

. 4 Uriostegui also argues we should vacate the November 2, 2018 judgment , as well as the August 31, 2020 amended judgment,
because t he judge who conducted the trial in 2018 ( and who has since retired) did not have jurisdiction to rule on the financial elder abuse cause of action, 5 improperly circumvented the one
final judgment rule by requiri ng Uriostegui to provide an accounting after judgment

, and was biased against her “ by ignoring the evidence in this case.” Uriostegui also attacks the February 20, 2019 cost award and the March 7, 2019 attorneys’
fees award, arguing the probate court coul d not amend the judgment to include these fees and costs while Uriostegui I was pending

. 6

4 Contrary to Uriostegui’s argument, Gregory properly challenge d the validity of the 2015 T rust under Probate Code section 17 2 00, subdivision (b)(3) , which provides that “[p] roceedings concerning the internal affairs of a trust include

. . . [¶]

. . . [¶]

. . . determining the validity of a trust provision

. ” (See Estate of Heggsted (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 951 [ the argument a petition under Probate Code section 17200

“ cannot resolve the legal status of disputed trust property

. . . defies common sense and finds no support in the law ”]. )

5 Which is incorrect. The probate court has concurrent jurisdiction over elder abuse matters. ( See Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 696 ; Conservatorship of Kayle (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 .)

6 Which is also incorrect. A ttorney s’ fees and costs are generally ancillary or collateral to the appeal. ( Varian Medical17 Uriostegui’s notice of appeal, however, did not identify any of these orders or judgments. The notice of appeal states she is

a ppealing only from the July 12, 2022 order

. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing that order. (See Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“ We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal

. ”]; Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 967 [ “ While a notice of appeal must be liberally construed, it is the notice of appeal that defines the scope of the appeal by identifying the particular j udgment or order being appealed

. ”]; Estate of Bearns (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 221, 223 [ reviewing court does n ot have jurisdiction to review an order not mentioned in notice of appeal ]

. )
But even if Uriostegui had listed some or all of these
various orders and judgments in her notice of appeal, we would
still lack jurisdiction to review them because the probate co urt made them more than 180 days ago , and her appeal would be untimely

. ( See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a) (1)(C) & (e) [appeal must be filed within 180 days of judgment or order] ; see also Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (200 9 ) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113 [“t he filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional

Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4 th 180, 191 ; see United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 161 [“‘The primary example of collateral matters not affected by a notice of appeal are awards of attorney fees or sanctions.’”] ; Bankes v. Lucas (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 365, 369 [“ filing of a notice of appeal

. . . does not prevent the trial court from determining a proper award of attorney fees claimed as costs ”] .) In addition

, Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a)

, makes an award of attorney s’ fees and costs mandatory when the plaintiff proves financial elder abuse. (See also Prob. Code, § 859 [attorney s’ fees and costs are recoverable for elder abuse] .)18

prerequisite ”] ; In re A.O. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 145, 148 [“ One of the most fundamental rules of appellate review is that the time for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional ”]; Da kota Payphone,
LLC v. Alcaraz (2 011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 509 [ “‘A party who fails to take a timely appeal from a decision or order from which an appeal might previously have been taken cannot obtain review of it on appeal from a subsequent judgment or ord er.’ ”] .) This rule applies equally to probate court orders. (See Estate of Reed (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1127 [“ ‘ o rders listed as appealable in the Probate Code must be challenged timely or they become final and binding ’ ” ].) Of course, Uriostegui did appeal from the
November 2, 2018 judgment , which resulted in Uriostegui I

. There is no reason to decide that appeal again. ( See Malatka v.
Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082 [“ on an appeal from an appealable ruling, an appellate court will not review earlier appealable rulings ”]; Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356,
1370

- 1371 [“‘Upon an appeal’ from an appealable order or judgment, ‘the reviewing court may review .

. . any intermediat e ruling, proceeding, order or decision’ [citations], but it may not review an earlier appealable ruling. (Fn. omitted.) ”]; Berge v.
International Harvester Co . (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 152, 158 , fn. 1 [“ On appeal from a final judgment, the appellate court m ay not review any order from which an appeal could have been taken
but was not. ”] .)19 DISPOSTION

The July 12, 2022 order is affirmed. Uriostegui’s motion to augment the record on appeal with documents not relevant to
this appeal is denied. Gregory is to recover his costs on appeal.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We c oncur:

FEUER, J.

MARTINEZ, J.