### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 9, 200 4

FR AN K A . B AR NA RD v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Hickman County No. 03-5074C- II Russ Held m an, Jud ge

No. M2003- 02809-CCA -R3-HC - F iled Jun e 29, 2004

T h e p e t i t i o n e r , F r a n k

A

. B ar n ar d , w a s c o n v i c t e d i n 1 9 9 2 o f f i r s td e g r e e m u r d e r , a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, and ag g ravated sexual battery , for whic h he wa s sentence d, respe ctively , to sentence s of life, eig ht y ear s, and ten y ear s, with the latter sente nce to be serve d consec utively to the first two. I n a petition for writ of habea s corpus, he claimed that the trial court was without jurisdiction to i mpose judg ment for the mur der c onviction. The t rial court dismi ssed the petition, and this timely appea l followed. Af te r r e vie w, we a ff

ir m th e dis mis sa l.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OE G. R I L EY , J J ., joined.

Fr ank A. B arna

rd, Turne y

Center Industrial Prison, Only , Tenne ssee, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; an d Da v i d H. Findley , Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

F AC TS

Th e fa c ts u po n w hic h th e pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tions were bas e d w e re se t ou t by thi s c ou rt

in
ou r c on sid e ratio n o f h is d ir e c t app e a l:

On the morning of September 18, 1990, the [petit ioner] was drivin g o n D ic k e r s o n Ro a d in N a s h v il le , T e n n e s s e e

. H e was acc ompanied by

Shane Janeksela a nd Robert Rich m o n d, co-de fendants in this c ase. The men stopped to pic k up Mary Ann Poo l e, a prostitute who wa s working along the roa d, and then p r o c e e d e d to M r

. Ja n e k s e la ' s h o u s e o s te n s ib ly to e n g a g e in s e x.-2- Al tho ug h te sti mon y

dif fe rs a s to e a c h man ' s in vo lve me nt, so me tim e during the cour se of the morning Ms. Poole wa s murdere d.

Shane J anekse la testified that upon arriving at his residence , [the pe tit ion e r] h a nd e d him $2 0. 00 a ndtol d h im t o ta ke Ms. Poo le to the bedroom. Janeksela le d Ms. Poole to the bedroom and g ave he r the $20.00. She bega n to perf orm oral sex on him at which tim e the [petit ioner] and Robert Richmond e ntere d the room. [The petitioner] handcuf fed Ms. Poole to the bed w hile Richmond c overe d her he ad with a shee t. They demande d that she g ive them her money , but she claimed to be br oke. [ T h e petitioner] then found the $20.00 that J anekse l a h ad gi ven her

and all thre e men then be g an to beat her. After war ds, [t he petitioner] and Richmond remov e d h e r c lo th e s

. [The pe tit ion e r] p la c e d a

pla sti c ba g ov e r his fi st anda tte mpt e d to fo rc ibl y insert his fist into her vag ina. He the n held her down as Richmond soug ht to insert a wooden fo rk into her va g ina. When this failed Richmond beg an to wildly punch and kic k Ms. Poole where upon the [pe tit ion e r] a ndJane ks e la le ft the ro om.
Richmond later enter ed the living room wher e the two other men were sit ting. He asked t he [petitioner] t o brea k the victim's ne ck. [The petitioner] r ef

u s ed but instructed Richmond on how to do so. The thre e men then r eturne d to the bedroom, a nd Richmond beg an twisting the victim' s neck f rom side to side. [The p eti tioner] and J anekse la left t h e ro om. At this t ime, J anekse la informed the [pe tit ion e r] that he wa s e xtre me ly up set a nddidno t w a nt this to happen i n his house. [The petitioner] tol d him not to worry . Soon there afte r, Richmond beg an play ing loud musi c. Janeksela a nd [t he petitioner] reente red the bedroom and saw Richmond standing ove r the vict i m

. He wa s singing . They turned the music of

f and Richmond aga i n asked [the petitioner] how to kill t he victim. [The pe t i t io ner] to ld hi m t o ei th er "cho ke h er" or "s mo th er he r." Richmond then place d a plastic ba g over he r he ad , and [the petitioner] and J anekse la left the r oom. L ater , Richmond w alked out of the be droom and informed t h e m en that Ms. P oole was de ad. Acc ording t o J anekse la, the [petitioner] and Richmond placed the vic ti m' s b o d y

inJa n e k s e la ' s c ar , a n d th e th r e e me n d r o v e to the [petit ioner' s] hom e. [ The pe titioner] refused to g o any further

. Ric h mo n d a n d Ja n e k s e la th e n d r o v e to a n ab a n d o n e d ar e a a nd du mpe d th e bo dy

in the wo od s.
Gra dy Eleam, a

detec tive with the Metro p o l i tan Police Depa rtment, testified that he took a ta pe-r ecor ded stateme nt from [the-3- petitioner] concerning the death of Mary Ann Poole. The tape d statement wa s then play ed to t h e jury . I n the statement, [the petitioner] admitte d placing a pair of handc uffs on the vic tim and la te r r e mov ing the ha nd c uf fs

. He de nie d an y oth e r i nv olv e me nt w ith the victim, but stated that he witnessed Richmond and J anekse la beat her. [The petiti oner] also denied assisti ng in the removal and disposal of the victim' s body , althoug h he was awa re that the body was in the
car while he wa s being driven home.
[The petitioner] t es tified at trial. He acknow ledg ed having been w ith J anekse la and Richmond on the morning in question. He also admitted placing a pa i r of handcuff s on the victim because he believed " they

wer e into kin k y s ex ." H e stated, how ever , that the victim consented to the use of the handc uffs. Af

terwa rds, [the petitioner] went int o the l iving r oom for a f ew minutes, re enter ed the bedroom to re move t he handc uffs, a nd immediately returne d to the liv i n g room. He r emained the re until J anekse la and Richmond info r me d h im

th a t th e y

h a d k il le d th e v ic ti m. [T h e p e ti tione r] te sti fi e d th a t be c aus e the re wa s lo udmus ic be ing play e d at th e tim e he had no knowledg e of what was taking placein the bedroom. Upon being informed the victim was dead, he asked to be taken home. [The petitioner] denied any

involvement in the remova l and disposal of the
v i c t i m ' s b o d y.
State v. Ba

rnar d, 899 S.W .2d 617, 620-21 (Te nn. Crim. App.), perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. 1994).

O n Ju l y 3 1 , 1 9 9 7 , t h e p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f

o r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f, w h i c h the po stconviction court dismi ssed as untimely and this court af

firmed. S ee Frank B arna rd v. State, No. 01C01-9807-CR-00296, 1999 WL 820854, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1999).

AN AL YSI S

I n his petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed on October 3, 2003, the petit ioner a rg ued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose sentenc e following his conviction for “ first deg ree fe lon y mur de r” be c aus e “ the tr ia l c ou rt la c ke d la wf ul jurisd ic tio n to imp os e the jud g me nt b e c aus e of a f atal variance betwee n the indictment and proof at trial, in that, the State off ere d no proof that Petitioner kil l ed ‘i n the per petration of or attempt to perpe trate a robbery ,’ or that Petitioner ‘intended to c ommit t he alleg ed robbery .’” He arg ues “that when the trial court granted t he new trial on the robbe ry

offe nse, this had the for ce and eff ect of nullify ing the jury ’s v er d i ct o n t h e felony
mur de r off

e ns e .” As his se c on d c la im, the pe tit ion e r a rg ue s th a t hi s mu rd e r c on vic tio n is vo id beca use “[t] he fa ce of

the re cord, an d t he fa cts of this case , clea rly reve als that Petitioner was convicted f

or this offense under the theory of criminal r esponsibility ,” and the trial court e rre d, as-4-

to this i nstruction, wh en i t failed to “ instruct the jury on the ‘natural and pr obable c onsequenc e rule.’”

As to the petitioner’s first arg ument, the State responds that the trial court did not find that the evidenc e wa s insufficient as to the r obbery conviction, and, f

urther, that his c l ai m s as to the felony m u rd er conviction ar e misplace d beca use the trial c ourt merg ed that convic tion with the petitioner’s c onviction for first de g ree preme ditated murder . See B arna rd, 899 S.W.2d at 620 n.1. As to the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in not inst ru c tin g a s to th e natur a l a ndpr ob able conseque nces r

ule, t he S tate responds that, even if this wer e error, it would not result in the judg ment be ing vo id, a nd , f

urthe r, su c h a

c la im c a n b e pr e se nte d o nly in a po st- c on vic tio n p e tit iona ndno t a pe tit ionfo r w ri t of

ha be a s c or pu s.

We w ill c on sid e r the se arg ume nts

.
I t is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d inTe nn e sse e that th e re me dy pr ov ide d b y

a writ o f h abe a s c or

pu s is limit ed in scope and may only be invoked whe re the judgme nt is void or the petitioner’s term of imp ri so nme nt h a s e xpir e d. State v. Ritc hie , 2 0 S. W.3 d 6 24 , 6 29 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Da ve np ort, 980 S.W .2d 407, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . A void, as opposed to a voida ble, j u d gm en t has been de f in e d b y o u r s u p r e me c o u r t a s “ o n e inw h ic h th e ju d g me n t i s f a c ia ll y in v a li d b e c a u s e the court did not have the statutory authority to rende r such judg ment.” Dy kes v. Compton, 978 S.W .2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998); see also Tay lor v. State, 995 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999) . The judg ment of
a c ou rt of g e ne ra l jur isd ic tio n is con c lus ive a nd pr e su me d to be va lid , an d suc h a judg me nt c a n o nly be imp e a c h e d if th e r e c o r d a f f irmati v e ly s h o w s th a t th e r e n d e r in g c o u r t w a s w ith o u t p e r s o n al or subject matter jurisdiction. Archer v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157 , 162 (Tenn. 1993) . Thus, habea s corpus relief is available only when “ ‘it appea

rs upon the fa ce of

the judg ment or the re cord of the proce eding s upon which the judgme nt is rende red’ that a convic ting c ourt was without jurisdiction or authority

to sentence a def

endant, or that a defenda nt’s sentenc e of imprisonment . . . has e x pired.” Arc her, 851 S.W.2d at 164 (citation omitted).

To obtain habe as cor

pus relief , the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evide nce that his sentence is void and not merely voidable. See D avenport, 980 S.W

. 2 d at 409. Consequently , a petitioner cannot collater ally attack a fa cially valid judgme nt of the trial court in a p et i t i o n fo r h ab ea s co rp u s r e l i ef

. Ar ch er , 8 5 1 S

. W

. 2 d at 1 6 2

. T h e p ro p erm ea n s o f c h al l en gi n g a fac ially valid judgme nt based on a const itutional viol ation is a petition for post-convic tion relief. L ewis v. Metro. G en. Sessions Court for Na shville, 949 S.W .2d 696, 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); Fr edric k v. State, 906 S.W .2d 927, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.
I n r e vie wi ng the pe tit ion e r’ s cla ims , we no te that mo st o f h is c omp la int s a re dir e c te d to his
c on vic tio n fo r fe lon y mur de r. Ho we ve r, a s th is c ou rt no te d inhis app e a l of

the dis mis sa l of

his po stc on vic tio n p e tit iona s u nti me ly , th e pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio n f or fe lon y mur de r wa s me rg e d w ithhis conviction for f

irst deg ree pre m ed i t at ed murder, be cause both arose f rom the same of

fense . See Fr ank B arna

rd, 1999 WL

820854, at *1. Thus, his claim that there was a varia nce be tween the i n d i ct m en tan d p ro o f i s m i s p l ac ed , t h er e be i n g i n h i s v i ew n o p ro o f t h at h e k i l l ed i n co m m i t t i n g a-5-

robbery , for this arg ument presuppose s that he is se rving a sentenc e only for f elony murder, w hich is not the case. Likewise, t h e claim that the trial c ourt’s g ranting a new trial as to the robbe ry conviction is w ithout merit, for it, also, ignor es that his conviction is for fir st deg ree murder a fter the merg er of first deg ree preme ditated murder and fe lony

murder. Finally , his claim t hat his conviction is void because the trial court err ed in not instructing a s to the natural a nd probable conseque nces rule is without merit for it, too, presupposes that his conviction is only for felony murder. Further, challeng es to a jury instruction a re not c og nizable in a habea s corpus proce eding . See Chester Ray Ha ll v . Davi d Mi lls , Wa

rd e n, No . 0 1C0 1- 95 10 -C V- 00 33 9, 19 96 WL 42 91 70 , at *1 (T e nn . Crim. App. Aug . 1, 1996), perm. to appeal de nied (Te nn. Dec . 2, 1996).

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the foreg oing authorities and reasoning , we a ffirm the tria l court’s dismissal of the pe tit ionfo r w ri t of

ha be a s c or pu s.

___________________________________

ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE