[Cite as State v. Crutchfield, 2011-Ohio-6681.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

MICHAEL E. CRUTCHFIELD 

 Appellant 

C.A. Nos. 10CA009931 

10CA009932 

10CA009933 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE Nos. 08CR076382 

09CR077591 

10CR080368 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 27, 2011 

 

BELFANCE, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Michael Crutchfield appeals his three convictions for operating a vehicle while 

impaired. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} On July 18, 2008, Mr. Crutchfield was stopped by a Lorain County Sheriff 

Deputy on suspicion of operating a vehicle while impaired. Trooper Allen Marcum of the Ohio 

State Highway Patrol drove to the scene to provide backup. According to Trooper Marcum, Mr. 

Crutchfield was clearly intoxicated and also admitted that he was drunk. 

{¶3} On January 19, 2009, Officer Richard Walker of the Elyria Police Department 

observed a vehicle, which he later learned was operated by Mr. Crutchfield, make a wide turn 

and hit a snow bank. Officer Walker attempted to initiate a traffic stop, but Mr. Crutchfield did 
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not stop until he reached his apartment complex, committing various traffic infractions along the 

way. 

{¶4} According to Officer Walker, when he approached the vehicle, Mr. Crutchfield 

refused to turn off the engine. After Officer Walker repeatedly rapped on the window, Mr. 

Crutchfield lowered it just enough so he could tell Officer Walker that he was home, that he was 

fine, and that Officer Walker should go away. Eventually, Mr. Crutchfield unlocked the car 

door, but, instead of exiting the vehicle, he turned the radio up and looked straight ahead, holding 

“a sausage gravy container in his right hand.” 

{¶5} Officer Walker, with the assistance of other officers who had arrived on the scene, 

removed Mr. Crutchfield from his vehicle and put him in one of the police cruisers. Officer 

Walker testified that Mr. Crutchfield smelled of alcohol, was confused, stared blankly, and had 

watery and glassy eyes. By the time the officers transported Mr. Crutchfield to the police 

station, he had passed out and they could not administer the breathalyzer. Officer Walker 

marked this as a refusal. 

{¶6} On February 5, 2010, Officer Nick Eichenlaub of the Elyria Police Department 

observed Mr. Crutchfield exit a bar at approximately 2:30 a.m. and begin to drive. Officer 

Eichenlaub knew Mr. Crutchfield did not have a driver’s license and believed there was a 

warrant out for Mr. Crutchfield’s arrest. Using his cruiser’s computer, Officer Eichenlaub 

confirmed the warrant, initiated a traffic stop, and arrested Mr. Crutchfield. According to Officer 

Eichenlaub, Mr. Crutchfield smelled of alcohol, exhibited slurred speech, and had glassy and 

bloodshot eyes. He arrested Mr. Crutchfield and took him to the police station where he 

administered the horizontal nystagmus test, which, according to Officer Eichenlaub, Mr. 
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Crutchfield failed. Officer Eichenlaub requested that Mr. Crutchfield submit to a breathalyzer, 

but he refused. 

{¶7} Following two separate bench trials, the trial court convicted Mr. Crutchfield of 

three counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He has appealed, raising four assignments 

of error for review. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

“THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR 

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR OPERATING A VEHICLE UNDER THE 

INFLUENCE (HEREINAFTER ‘OVI’) IN CASE NUMBER 10CR080368.” 

{¶8} In Mr. Crutchfield’s first assignment of error, he argues that, because there was no 

evidence of “bad driving[]” on his part, his conviction for operating his vehicle while intoxicated 

was supported by insufficient evidence. We disagree. 

{¶9} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law 

that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. No. 24731, 2009–Ohio–6955, at 

¶18, citing State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386. The relevant inquiry is whether 

the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a 

conviction. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). In reviewing the evidence, 

we do not evaluate credibility and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State 

v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273. The State’s evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of 

fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Id.

{¶10} The trial court found that Mr. Crutchfield had violated R.C 4511.19(A)(2), which 

provides that: 
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“No person who, within twenty years of the conduct described in division 

(A)(2)(a) of this section, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a 

violation of this division, a violation of division (A)(1) or (B) of this section, or 

any other equivalent offense shall * * * (a) [o]perate any vehicle * * * within this 

state while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of 

them[ and,] (b) [s]ubsequent to being arrested for operating the vehicle, * * * 

being asked by a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test or tests 

under section 4511.191 of the Revised Code, and being advised by the officer in 

accordance with section 4511.192 of the Revised Code of the consequences of the 

person’s refusal or submission to the test or tests, refuse to submit to the test or 

tests.” 

{¶11} Notably absent from R.C. 4115.19(A)(2) is any requirement that the driver exhibit 

impaired driving, rather, the driver’s ability to drive must be impaired. See State v. Zentner, 9th 

Dist. No. 02CA0040, 2003-Ohio-2352, at ¶19 (concluding that the State “need only show an 

impaired driving ability[]” under R.C. 4115.19(A)(1), which prohibits operation of a vehicle 

under the influence of alcohol). 

{¶12} Mr. Crutchfield does not dispute that the State produced evidence that he was 

driving, that he had another conviction for OVI in the last 20 years, or that he refused to submit 

to a chemical test. Instead, he challenges the trial court’s finding that he was intoxicated, 

contending that the “only” indicators that he was intoxicated were “the smell of alcohol, the 

[failure of] the horizontal nystagmus gaze test[,] and the officer’s observations of slurred speech 

and bloodshot, glassy eyes.” Mr. Crutchfield correctly summarizes the evidence against him; 

however, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the combination of indicators to 

which Officer Eichenlaub testified was certainly sufficient to support a finding that Mr. 

Crutchfield was intoxicated and, therefore, his driving ability was impaired. 

{¶13} Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. 

Crutchfield violated R.C. 4511.19(A)(2). His first assignment of error is overruled. 
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

“APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR OVI WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN CASE NUMBER 10CR080368.” 

{¶14} Though Mr. Crutchfield makes the same argument in his second assignment of 

error as in his first, “[t]he legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the 

evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386. 

While sufficiency is a test of whether the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a verdict as a 

matter of law, weight of the evidence “concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible 

evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.” (Internal 

citations and quotations omitted.) (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 386-387. 

{¶15} In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the appellate court “must 

review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of 

fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340. 

{¶16} Mr. Crutchfield reiterates his contention that, in order to sustain a conviction, 

there must be evidence of impaired driving. As discussed above, this argument is without merit. 

See Zentner at ¶19. As related above, Mr. Crutchfield does not dispute that he was driving, 

refused a chemical test, or had been convicted of an OVI in the previous 20 years. He also does 

not argue that Officer Eichenlaub lacked credibility or that the trial court lost its way when it 

believed Officer Eichenlaub’s testimony that Mr. Crutchfield exhibited multiple signs of 

intoxication, thereby providing evidence that Mr. Crutchfield’s driving ability was impaired. 

Accordingly, Mr. Crutchfield has failed to demonstrate that his conviction for operating a vehicle 

while intoxicated was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
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{¶17} His second assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE DETRIMENT OF APPELLANT BY 

ENHANCING APPELLANT’S SANCTIONS BY RELYING ON FINAL 

JOURNAL ENTRIES THAT WERE NOT FINAL APPEALABLE ORDERS.” 

{¶18} Mr. Crutchfield argues that many of the journal entries of his previous convictions 

for operating a vehicle while intoxicated are not final, appealable orders because they do not 

comply with Crim.R. 32(C), and, therefore, the trial court erred by admitting them as evidence of 

his previous convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. He also contends that the 

judgment entries submitted by the State are insufficient for enhancement purposes because they 

do not show the level of the offense of which Mr. Crutchfield was convicted. 

{¶19} Mr. Crutchfield has not cited any authority supporting his position, nor has he 

developed any argument in support of this assignment of error. App.R. 16(A)(7); see also, 

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Taylor, 9th Dist. No. 25281, 2011-Ohio-435, at ¶7. 

Nevertheless, we note that this Court has previously held that “compliance with [Crim.R.] 32(C) 

is not a prerequisite to proving a prior offense for purposes of increasing a subsequent charge 

under [R.C.] 4511.19 or [R.C.] 2941.14.13.” State v. McCumbers, 9th Dist. No. 25169, 2010-

Ohio-6129, at ¶13. This is true because: 

 “if evidence of a prior guilty plea is sufficient to enhance the level of the offense 

under the statute, it seems unlikely that the legislature intended the word 

convicted in the same phrase to require evidence to establish all the elements of 

Criminal Rule 32(C) * * * [and because] the State may prove a prior conviction 

using evidence other than the sentencing entry from the prior case.” (Internal 

quotations and citations omitted.) Id. 

Furthermore, R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d) provides that “an offender who, within six years of the 

offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or four violations of division 

(A) or (B) of this section or other equivalent offenses [or,] * * * within twenty years of the 
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offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more violations of that 

nature is guilty of a felony of the fourth degree.” There is no requirement that the previous 

convictions be felonies. 

{¶20} Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it admitted the certified copies of 

journal entries. The entries demonstrated that Mr. Crutchfield had pleaded guilty or been 

convicted of violations of R.C. 4511.19(A), (B), or an equivalent offense at least four times in 

the prior six years and at least five times within the prior twenty. Mr. Crutchfield’s third 

assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE DETRIMENT OF APPELLANT BY 

ADMITTING BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES (HEREINAFTER ‘BMV’) 

WITHOUT A PROPER FOUNDATION OR AUTHENTICATION.” 

{¶21} Mr. Crutchfield argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his 

driving record into evidence because it was not a business record under Evid.R. 803(6). 

However, because Mr. Crutchfield forfeited this error and because he does not argue or 

demonstrate plain error on appeal, we overrule his assignment of error. 

{¶22} There were two separate trials in this case. In the first trial, which concerned the 

convictions at issue in 10CA009932 and 10CA009933, Mr. Crutchfield’s counsel did not object 

to the admission of the BMV records, remarking, “[I] don’t have a problem with [them].” 

Because Mr. Crutchfield did not object to the admission of the BMV records and, in fact, 

acquiesced to their admission, he forfeited this alleged error for the purposes of appellate review. 

State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, at ¶23. 

{¶23} In the second trial, which concerned the conviction at issue in 10CA009931, Mr. 

Crutchfield did not object when Officer Eichenlaub testified that the records in question were the 
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BMV records of Mr. Crutchfield and that the records would show Mr. Crutchfield’s prior 

convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Furthermore, while Mr. Crutchfield did 

object to admission of the BMV records at the end of the State’s case, he did so by arguing that 

“the information as reflected in the BMV records can be rebutted because it’s not [based on] a 

final[,] appealable order[.]” However, he did not object on the basis of Evid.R. 803(6) and, thus, 

did not preserve the alleged error for review. See State v. McCallum, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0037-

M, 2009-Ohio-1424, at ¶19. 

{¶24} Accordingly, Mr. Crutchfield forfeited the alleged error he raises in this 

assignment of error. While “[a] mere forfeiture does not extinguish a claim of plain error[,]” Mr. 

Crutchfield has not argued plain error on appeal. (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) 

Payne at ¶23. Nevertheless, we are unconvinced that the alleged error of the court could 

constitute plain error given the officer’s testimony and the fact that Mr. Crutchfield has not 

suggested that the journal entries fail to contain sufficient identifying information to demonstrate 

that they are his prior convictions. Compare McCallum at ¶25. 

{¶25} Mr. Crutchfield’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶26} Mr. Crutchfield’s assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment of the 

Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
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 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 EVE V. BELFANCE 

 FOR THE COURT 

WHITMORE, J. 

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

KENNETH N. ORTNER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.