UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ TRISTA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. NATIONWIDE HOMES, INC.; THE MEADOWS PARK; TAMMY AKERS; DENNIS RUPP, Defendants - Appellees. No. 18-1306 (D.C. No. 1:18- CV-01237-LTB) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , MATHESON , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Trista Rodriguez filed a pro se c omplaint in the district court against the manufacturer of her mobile home, t he mobile home park where she leased a lot, her attorney, and the mobile home pa rk’s attorney. She alleged var ious statutory and constitutional claims about the c ondition of her mobile home an d an eviction action brought against her in state c ourt. A magistrate judge ordered Ms. Rodriguez to file an

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument wo uld not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral argument . This order and judgment is no t binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, an d collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuas ive value consistent with Fed . R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 27, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 amended complaint complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 8. The district court dismissed that complaint with out prejudice for failure to satis fy Rule 8 and because the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Ms. Rodriguez’s attempt to challenge the state court’s eviction judgment in federal cour t. Ms. Rodriguez now appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background In 2013, Ms. Rodrigue z leased a mobile home from Nationwide Hom es, Inc. (“Nationwide Homes”). She execute d a separate lease agreement on a lot at The Meadows Park (“TMP”), a mobile hom e community in Colorado Sprin gs, Colorado. In June 2015, TMP served Ms. Rodri guez with a demand for unpaid re nt, and filed a detainer action in state court to evict her. Ms. Rodriguez sou ght to dismiss the action, alleging the summons was not sig ned and her home was uninhabita ble. She ultimately settled with TMP for the unpaid re nt, and judgment was entered in state court. Ms. Rodriguez retained attorney Tammy Akers to represent her in the eviction proceeding and to bring a separat e lawsuit against Nationwide H omes for breach of its warranty of habitability based on the poor condition of the mob ile home. Ms. Akers did not file the lawsuit. 1

1 The record provides little information as to why the suit was never filed. Ms. Rodriguez attached to her complai nt a 2016 email from Ms. Akers stating, “The separate case you wanted to bring against mobile home manufacturer would have involved a great3 B. Procedural Background On May 21, 2018, Ms. R odriguez filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Nationwide Homes, TMP, Ms. Akers, and Dennis Rupp, TMP’s attorney . The complaint alleged a litan y of constitutional and statutory violations, including unfair or deceptive practices a ffecting commerce under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); “Gross Neglig ence, Exigent Health and Safety Failure to Disclose, Fraud, Misrepresentation, [Ame ricans with Disabilities Act] Dis ability and Housing Discrimination;” ROA at 11, breac h of fiduciary duty; breach of contract; and a variety of state statutory violations. The magistrate judge ordered Ms. R odriguez to file an amended complaint, finding the or iginal complaint lacked both a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction and for h er claims, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires. On June 6, 2018, Ms. Rodriguez f iled an amended complaint. The injuries it alleged can be grouped into thos e (1) claiming Ms. Rodriguez su ffered because of her eviction proceeding and the en suing settlement, (2) arising out of the poor condition of her mobile home, and (3) resulti ng from her dealings with Ms. A kers. The district court dismissed Ms . Rodriguez’s amended complaint without prejudice. It concluded that Ms . Rodriguez’s federal claims co ntained the same Rule 8 defects the magistrate judge had identified in the original com plaint. It also noted that, to

deal of out of pocket cost for e xperts and depositions, which y ou had said you could not afford. There was nothing else I could do to assist you. I am sorry.” ROA at 99.4 the extent Ms. Rodrigu ez sought to vacate the state court’s jud gment in the eviction case, the jurisdictional doctrine of Rooker-Feldman barred her claims. The district court then declined to exercise supplementa l jurisdiction over any state l aw claims Ms. Rodriguez asserted because it had dismissed her federal claims. The court also denied Ms. Rod riguez’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“ ifp ”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3 ) because “any appeal from [its] order would not be taken in good faith.” ROA at 17 3. Ms. Rodriguez filed a timel y notice of appeal and moved to proceed ifp

. II. DISCUSSION Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine implicates a feder al court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we first conside r its application by the district court. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner , 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010). We conclude the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Ms. Rodriguez’s cl aims to the extent she seeks to undo the state court’s judgment in the eviction case. We next review Ms. Rodriguez’s remaining federal claims for sufficiency under Rule 8 and affirm the district court’s di smissal. Without any extant federal claims, we affirm dismi ssal of Ms. Rodriguez’s state la w claims. Finally, we deny Ms. Rodriguez’s ifp motion.
A. Application of Rooker-Feldman We review the district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de

novo. In re Miller , 666 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2012). Because Ms. Rodriguez5 proceeds pro se, we liberally construe her filings. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a losing party in state court who complains of injury caused by t he state-court judgment from bri nging a case seeking review and rejection of that judgment in federal court.” In re Miller , 666 F.3d at 1261. Thus, “an element of the claim mus t be that the state court wro ngfully entered its judgment.” Campbell v. City of Spencer , 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012). When applicable, the doctrine imposes a jurisdictional barrier “on l ower federal courts exercising appellate jurisdicti on over state-court judgments.” Id. at 1281. To the extent Ms. Rodriguez asks us to review the state court’s judgment in the eviction case, we conclude Rooker-Feldman bars her request. The amended complaint contains several attacks on the judgment. Ms. Rodriguez allege s it was the result of improper service because Mr. Rupp never signed the summons; tha t she was never notified of the proceeding’s conc lusion, which “impair[ed] [her ] opportunity to file a timely appeal,” ROA at 42; and m ore generally, that it violated her due process rights under the “Fifth and Fourteen th Amendments.” ROA at 39. Although her desired remedy is unclear, Rooker-Feldman bars her request to the extent it is based on an allega tion that the state court’s judg ment was defective. See Williams v. HSBC Bank USA N.A. , 681 F. App’x 693 , 696 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (concluding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s request for return of home that was allegedly “wr ongfully foreclosed upon” in state court) ; Crawford v. Countrywide6 Home Loans, Inc. , 647 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2011) (same result where plaintif fs claimed “foreclosure and eviction deprived them of their fundam ental fairness and equal protection rights” and that no “q uasi-contractual theories” sup ported foreclosure).

B. Rule 8 Sufficiency We next address Ms. Rodriguez’s federal claims about her home’s alleged uninhabitability and he r attorney’s alleged conduct. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s dismissal of Ms. Rodriguez’s complaint wit hout prejudice under Rule 8(a). See Nasious v. Two Un known B.I.C.E. Agents , 492 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). Rule 8(a) provides that a compl aint “must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’ s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en titled to relief; and (3) a deman d for the relief sought, which may include relief in the altern ative or different types of rel ief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). We have explained that a complaint “explain[ing] what each defenda nt did to [the plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how th e defendant’s ac tion harmed hi m or her; and, what specific right the plaintiff belie ves the defendant violated” i s sufficient to satisfy Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” standard. Nasious , 492 F.3d at 1163. If a complaint fails to meet these basic pleading requir ements, a district court may di smiss the action sua sponte for failure to comp ly with Rule 8. See id. at 1161 & n.2. As noted above, we construe p ro se pleadings liberally. See Diversey v. Schmidly , 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013). But w e do not act as Ms. Rodriguez’s advocate.7 See Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10t h Cir. 2008). In analyzing the sufficiency of any complaint, we “accept as true only the plain tiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not [her] conclusory allegations.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Like the district court, we conf ine our Rule 8 review to Ms. Ro driguez’s federal claims. We agree that Ms. Rodri guez’s amended complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8’s pleading requirements. The amende d complaint does not include a valid jurisdictional statement. In the portion alle ging federal question jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 2 Ms. Rodriguez cites 28 U.S.C. § 5 001, but she misunderstands th at statute. Rather than conferring jurisdiction, § 5001 provides that state law governs actions for personal injuries that occur “in a place subject to the exclusive jurisd iction of the United States within a State.” 28 U.S.C. § 5001. In addition, she lists var ious other statutes under which her claims allegedly aris e: federal prohibitions on disc rimination in jury service, 28 U.S.C. § 1862; the Fair Hou sing Act; the Air Quality Act of 1967; the False Claims Act; the Americans with Disabilitie s Act; and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ROA at 39. But she does not link any facts alleged in the amended complain t to any of these statutes. The result—a laundry list of sta tutes without any explanation o f how they provide federal question jurisdiction—is far from a “plain” statement.

2 Under the “Jurisdiction” headin g in her amended complaint, Ms. Rodriguez checked the box for “federal ques tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 331” and did not check the box for “diversity of citizensh ip pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 332.” ROA at 36. She does not otherwise claim that s he and the defendants are citize ns of different states.8 Even if her insufficient statem ent of jurisdiction were not fa tal to her case, the amended complaint also lacks a s hort and plain statement of Ms. Rodriguez’s federal claims. Ms. Rodriguez’s claims a gainst Nationwide Homes concer n water damage and mold growth in the mobile home’ s bathroom, which Ms. Rodriguez alleges caused her to suffer an allergic reaction. The mold is the basis for Ms. Rod riguez’s “Non-Disclosure Toxic Tort Claim.” ROA at 45. A nd because Nationwide Homes al legedly knew of these defects before it leased t he home, she claims the company engaged in “false representation of known material facts.” Id. at 44. But Ms. Rodri guez does not state what these misrepresentations w ere, when they were made, or whi ch federal statutory or constitutional rights they violated. Ms. Rodriguez’s amended complaint contains neither a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s ju risdiction” nor a “short and p lain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” s ufficient to meet the deman ds of Rule 8. We are satisfied the district court di d not abuse its discretion with its Rule 8 ruling.
C. State Law Claims Ms. Rodriguez’s remaining clai ms arise under state law. In pa rticular, her allegations about Ms. Akers app ear to claim professional neglig ence under state law. Without any federal claims over w hich to exercise original juri sdiction, the district court properly declined to exercise supp lemental jurisdiction over an y state law claims Ms. Rodriguez raises. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).9 D. Ifp Status Ms. Rodriguez’s brief on appeal restates the allegations she r aised in her amended complaint. We conclude Ms. Rodri guez presents no “reasoned, no nfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal. ” Watkins v. Leyba , 543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Ci r. 2008) (quotations omitted). We therefo re deny Ms. Rodriguez’s motion to proceed ifp

. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the district court’s order dismissing Ms. Rodriguez’s amended complaint without prejudice and deny her motion to proceed ifp

.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, J r. Circuit Judge