In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 4, 2022

S22A0720. LEE v. THE STATE.

 MCMILLIAN, Justice.

After a jury trial in 2019, Harvey Lee was convicted of malice 

murder in connection with the shooting death of George Young.1 On

 1 George was killed on November 16, 2017, and on June 27, 2018, a 

Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Lee and Tia Young for malice murder 

(Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). Tia was 

also separately indicted for criminal attempt to commit a felony (Count 4) and 

criminal attempt to commit a misdemeanor (Count 5). 

At a trial conducted from March 25 through April 5, 2019, a jury found 

Lee guilty of Counts 1 through 3 and Tia guilty of Counts 2 through 5. On April 

15, 2019, the trial court sentenced Lee to serve life in prison without the 

possibility of parole for Count 1; the remaining counts were either merged for 

sentencing purposes or vacated by operation of law. Tia was sentenced to serve 

life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count 2, plus three years for 

Counts 4 and 5 to be served consecutively to Count 2. Tia’s appeal (Case No. 

S22A0969) is docketed to the August 2022 term of this Court and is not 

consolidated with the current appeal. 

On May 9, 2019, Lee timely filed a motion for new trial, which was 

amended by new counsel on November 2, 2020. Following a hearing on January 

4, 2022, the trial court denied the motion on February 2, 2022. Lee filed a 

timely notice of appeal on February 3, 2022. The case was docketed to the April 

2022 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2

appeal, Lee claims that trial counsel rendered constitutionally 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to (a) evidence of George’s 

good character, (b) a photograph of George in life with his children, 

and (c) the presentation of and comments on Lee’s silence after he 

was advised of his rights under Miranda.2 Because Lee has not 

shown reversible error, we affirm his convictions. 

The evidence presented at trial showed that George and Tia

Young were married and lived in Gwinnett County with their three 

children. George worked in security and, in an effort to help Lee, a 

family friend, hired Lee as a subcontractor and allowed him to live 

in the family’s home. 

Late on the night of November 16, 2017, George arrived home 

from work and was shot twice on his front porch. Phone records show 

that George was on the phone with his co-worker, Latanya Knowles, 

while in the car on his way home until the call ended at 11:23 p.m.

Knowles testified at trial that she and George spoke until he said he 

 2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) 

(1966).
3

arrived home and that George did not mention anything out of the 

ordinary during this call. 

At 11:31 p.m., Tia called 911, and at 11:40 p.m., police officers 

arrived to find George deceased, lying on his back on the front porch 

with his feet facing the door. The autopsy showed that two gunshot 

wounds had entered the front of George’s body, and the medical 

examiner testified that these wounds were the cause of George’s 

death. George’s keys were still in the door, and a shell casing was 

recovered from the porch. The home had a security system with a 

camera facing the front door, but the device was not working at the 

time of the shooting. George’s eldest son testified that the camera 

had been broken for many months.

When interviewed by police officers at the scene, Lee said that 

he was sitting at the kitchen table on his computer when he heard 

gunshots. He then ran upstairs to get his pistol, came downstairs, 

and saw George. Lee ran back upstairs, put the gun away, and told 

Tia to call 911. Lee told the officers that he returned to George and 

performed CPR until a neighbor arrived and took over for him.
4

Tia told officers at the scene that she woke up to the sound of 

two gunshots. She said that Lee went to grab his gun and told her 

to call 911, which she did. When asked about problems in the home, 

Tia told officers that they “stay broke.” She said she recently lost her 

job and that George had been borrowing money from different 

people. She also told officers that George had previously mentioned 

that a white SUV followed him on two occasions, and that, on one of 

these occasions, the SUV tried to run George off the road.

One neighbor testified that he heard gunshots and, after 

consulting with his family about the noise, looked out of his window

where he could see the front of the Young house. Less than ten 

minutes after hearing the gunshots, the neighbor noticed a person 

moving from the direction of the Young house to a vehicle in the 

Young driveway and testified that the person was “hunched over or

. . . did something to the vehicle” before running back toward the 

house. The neighbor continued watching and saw the person do the 

“exact same thing again” a minute or two later. 

George and Tia’s three children slept through the events and 
5

neither heard nor saw anything. The oldest child testified that he 

was a heavy sleeper. Another of the children was prescribed sleeping 

medication, and although he did not take it regularly, Tia had given

him a sleeping pill that night. Tia’s mother, who also lived in the 

home, explained that she did not hear anything because her 

television’s volume was high. Seven neighbors testified at the trial 

about hearing the gunshots, but only one testified about hearing a 

car leave the scene after the gunshots.

Officers searched the home and found two handgun holsters 

and one handgun in Lee’s room, as well as a rifle in Lee’s truck. A 

GBI firearms examiner determined that the shooter used a .40-

caliber Smith and Wesson. This weapon was never located, and 

there was no evidence that Lee owned a .40-caliber Smith and 

Wesson. Crime scene technicians performed gunshot residue tests 

and found no residue on Lee’s hands. No fingerprints were found on 

the bullets. 

On November 17, the morning after the shooting, George’s 

employer went to the Young home, and Tia asked him to help her 
6

find George’s one-million-dollar life insurance policy, of which she 

was the primary beneficiary. Tia located the policy and notified the 

insurance company of George’s death later that day.

That same day, Lee went to George’s office building. He told 

one of George’s co-workers that George had been shot and killed. The 

co-worker asked about the home’s surveillance camera, and Lee 

replied that the camera was not working. Lee then asked the coworker if he could continue to work for the security company as a 

subcontractor.

Later that same day, police officers asked Lee and Tia to go to 

the police station to speak with a detective, and they agreed. During

Lee’s interview, investigators questioned Lee about an individual 

going to the victim’s vehicle after George was shot. Lee told officers 

that he was removing a tracking device that he had placed under 

George’s car. Lee also said that George had asked Lee to buy the 

tracking device, and if anything happened to George, George wanted 

Lee to know where George’s car was and to take the tracking device 

off. Lee did not provide evidence of this agreement with George, and 
7

further, text messages between George and Lee introduced at trial 

contradicted the idea that George was aware of or consented to the 

tracking device on his car. Lee told the investigators that the 

tracking device was in his bedroom.

The evidence introduced at trial also showed that, while away 

from home on November 17, Tia called a friend who had come to the

Young home after hearing of George’s death. Tia asked the friend to 

find the cell phones belonging to both Tia and Lee and place the 

phones in Tia’s room. The friend did not comply with this request. 

At trial, the friend testified that Tia apologized and explained that 

she made the request because one of Lee’s texts would have made 

him seem violent. The friend testified that Tia did not give an 

explanation for why she also asked the friend to move her phone as 

well. 

After the interviews, officers went to the Young home with a 

search warrant, seized the tracking device from Lee’s bedroom, and 

subpoenaed records from the device. Officers also recovered cell 

phones from the home. Lee’s phone revealed internet searches on 
8

October 28, 2017, about poisonous snake or spider venom for sale. 

Lee’s phone history also showed that on the night of the shooting, 

while officers were still on the scene, Lee looked up a different 

murder case and an article about the defendant in that case pleading 

guilty. Tia’s phone revealed a meme that said: “The fortuneteller 

says your husband will meet a violent end. The lady responds, will I 

be convicted?” The cell phone also contained emails showing a 

romantic affair between Lee and Tia. Both Lee and Tia were 

arrested for George’s murder. 

1. Lee asserts that he received constitutionally ineffective 

assistance of counsel on the grounds that his counsel failed to object 

to (a) evidence of George’s good character, (b) a photograph of George 

in life with his children, and (c) the introduction of and comment on 

Lee’s post-Miranda silence.

To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance, Lee must 

prove both that “his counsel’s performance was professionally 

deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.” Washington v. 

State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022). To show deficient 
9

performance, Lee “must prove that his counsel acted or failed to act 

in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the 

circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” 

Kennebrew v. State, 299 Ga. 864, 868 (2) (792 SE2d 695) (2016). Lee 

bears the burden of overcoming the “strong presumption” that 

counsel performed reasonably. Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3) 

(citation and punctuation omitted). To show prejudice, Lee “must 

demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Kennebrew, 299 

Ga. at 868 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). Additionally,

“there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance 

claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry if the defendant 

makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 697 (IV) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

(a) Lee asserts that his trial counsel performed deficiently by 

failing to object to the State’s evidence of, and repeated references
10

to, George’s good character throughout the trial. We disagree. 

At trial, the State introduced evidence regarding George’s good 

character as part of its trial theme: “beloved became betrayed” when 

George, a “beloved” man, was betrayed and killed by Lee and Tia.

Discussion of George’s character began in the State’s opening 

statement.3 During the State’s opening statement, Lee’s counsel

objected to references of George’s good character, asserting that the 

State was being argumentative after the prosecutor said, “George 

has no enemies. George is beloved by all.” The State responded that 

it was introducing what the evidence would show in this case. The 

trial court overruled the objection, but agreed to give a jury 

instruction that the State was speaking about what it anticipated

the evidence would show.4 Afterwards, Lee’s counsel alleged during 

their opening statement that evidence would show that George led 

 3 For example, the prosecutor stated, “George Young was beloved. There 

is hardly anybody who had a negative word to say about George Young. . . . 

This case is about an individual who was beloved. He had a work ethic that 

was unparalleled, not to be touched[.]” 

4 Lee does not assert this ruling as error on appeal.
11

a “double life,” did “bad things,” and had “some serious gambling 

problems.” During the presentation of the evidence, the prosecution 

continued to discuss George’s good character throughout the direct 

examination of the State’s witnesses5 and the cross-examination of 

Lee’s witnesses6 and referenced George’s character in the State’s 

closing argument.7

At the motion for new trial hearing, one of Lee’s trial counsel 

testified that they did not consider the evidence at issue to be “good 

character” evidence “in the strictest sense under the evidence rule.” 

Trial counsel continued that, even if this was good character 

evidence, the counsel team believed it to be a proper rebuttal of their 

strategy of questioning George’s character to suggest that others 

may have had a motive to kill George because George had financial 

 5 During the direct examination of George’s employer, the prosecutor 

asked, “Were your customers satisfied with his work performance?” The 

employer replied, “Absolutely. There was a saying going around the office that 

everyone loved George[.]” 

6 During the cross-examination of another witness, the prosecutor asked 

if George was a hard worker, a good father, and a good husband, and the 

witness replied in the affirmative to each question. 

7 The prosecutor argued in closing: “Now, how did beloved, as I indicated 

to you all, become this, betrayed?” and “[George] . . . was an exceptionally hard 

worker, was an exceptionally good father, was an exceptional human being[.]” 
12

issues and “serious gambling problems” and was possibly involved 

in gun-running. Additionally, trial counsel testified that “some of 

those objections would have been futile because at the end of the day 

when it went to the jury[,] the jury wasn’t gonna determine who 

killed George Young based on how much he showed up to work” or 

based on “how good of a father or husband he was.” As such, they 

focused their trial strategy on refuting the evidence about the 

tracking device, which they considered to be extremely damaging, 

and other possible suspects.

To establish deficient performance by his trial counsel, Lee

must overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct 

“falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct” and 

demonstrate that his counsel “performed in an objectively 

unreasonable way, considering all circumstances and in the light of 

prevailing professional norms.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) 

(770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, 

“[t]rial tactics or strategy are almost never adequate grounds for 

finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so patently 
13

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.” 

Watts v. State, 308 Ga. 455, 460 (2) (841 SE2d 686) (2020) (citation 

and punctuation omitted). And “[t]he matter of when and how to 

raise objections is generally a matter of trial strategy.” Robinson v. 

State, 278 Ga. 31, 36 (3) (c) (597 SE2d 386) (2004) (citation and 

punctuation omitted).

Here, trial counsel articulated that part of the defense strategy 

at trial involved questioning George’s character to argue that others 

had the motive to shoot him and that they believed that the State 

would have been able to introduce evidence of George’s good 

character in response. OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2) addresses when 

character evidence of the victim may be introduced in a criminal 

trial and allows “evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 

alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the 

prosecution to rebut the same” subject to limitations not relevant 

here. See also Revere v. State, 302 Ga. 44, 48-49 (2) (a) (805 SE2d 69) 

(2017) (Rule 404 (a) (2) requires that the “defendant first introduce 

evidence of a pertinent character trait of the victim . . . before the 
14

State may introduce evidence to rebut that which was presented by 

the defendant” (emphasis in original)). Thus, trial counsel may have 

been able to object to some of the State’s references to George’s good 

character, which occurred before the defense introduced their 

character evidence. But we need not parse those issues here because 

we conclude that it fell within the wide range of reasonable 

professional conduct to forbear from objecting to the good character 

evidence, knowing that the State would eventually be able to 

introduce that evidence in rebuttal. See Green v. State, 291 Ga. 579,

580 (2) (731 SE2d 359) (2012) (reasonable trial strategy to forgo 

objecting when police officer testified to statements made by 

eyewitness when counsel knew that the eyewitness would also be 

testifying and he wanted to use the testimony to show 

inconsistencies in her statement); Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 326, 328 

(3) (565 SE2d 453) (2002) (The attorney’s decision not to object to 

“the detective’s testimony, which was cumulative of other witnesses’ 

testimony, and to the properly admitted public document was a 

legitimate trial strategy that falls within the range of reasonable 
15

professional conduct.”); Woods v. State, 271 Ga. 452, 454 (2) (c) (519 

SE2d 918) (1999) (explaining that “there is no deficient performance 

when an attorney fails to object to admissible evidence”). This

enumeration of error fails.

(b) Lee next asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to the introduction and display of a

photograph of George in life with his children. We are not persuaded.

After George’s employer testified at trial that he knew George, 

Tia, and their three children, the State introduced a photograph of 

George standing with his three children. The picture was displayed 

on a screen visible to the jury for “at least an hour” while the State 

asked George’s employer about details of George’s work experience, 

as well as details about the night of the murder. The photograph

also remained on display throughout Lee’s cross-examination of 

George’s employer and the State’s re-direct. 

Lee’s trial counsel did not object to the display of the 

photograph during this time, but Tia’s trial counsel did raise the

issue with the trial judge afterwards, outside the presence of the 
16

jury. He argued that the State had the exhibit displayed for “a full 

hour,” well after the exhibit was identified and published to the jury, 

and asked that future pictures not be kept up for so long. The trial 

court agreed.

Lee argues that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to 

object to the introduction and display of this photograph because the 

photograph was highly prejudicial and improperly elicited sympathy 

from the jury. Lee further argues that the photograph was of low 

probative value since the State later introduced a picture of George 

alone and that only the photograph of George alone should have 

been admitted because the children were not victims in the shooting. 

At the motion for new trial hearing, one of Lee’s trial counsel 

testified that he did not object to the photograph of George with his 

children because the photograph “did not impact the means and the 

way” they had decided to represent Lee and again referenced the 

strategy to focus on explaining away Lee’s actions with respect to 

the tracking device. His counsel also testified that he understood 

that the children were going to be part of this case regardless of the 
17

photograph. Also, the jury was aware of George’s relationship with 

his three children, two of whom testified at trial.

Assuming without deciding that trial counsel performed 

deficiently by not objecting to the introduction and display of the 

photograph, we determine that Lee has failed to show prejudice.

Because the children were at home at the time of the shooting, two 

of the children were called as witnesses at trial, so the jury was 

aware of their existence and relationship with George. Further, the 

photograph was proffered during the testimony of a non-family 

member. See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 238 (3) (862 SE2d 285) 

(2021) (factors that help make a photograph of a victim in life less 

prejudicial include the victim being alone and the photograph being 

proffered through “witnesses other than the victim’s relatives”).

Also, due to the circumstances of this crime, the jury was well aware 

of the impact that the crime had on the children where their mother 

and a close family friend were on trial for murdering their father, so 

it is not clear that the photograph of George with his children 

elicited much additional improper sympathy, if any, from the jury.
18

For these reasons, we conclude that there is no reasonable 

probability that the trial result would have been different if not for 

the failure to object to the photograph. See Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 

828, 833 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016) (concluding there was harmless 

error where, independent of the photographs, the jury was “well 

aware” that the victim was both a wife and a mother); Martin v. 

State, 310 Ga. 658, 666-67 (5) (b) (ii) (852 SE2d 834) (2020)

(photograph of victim holding his son was not overly prejudicial, as 

the son was also a victim in this case, and the jury was “well aware” 

of the son and “aspects of their relationship”). This enumeration of 

error fails.

(c) Lee next asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to the improper presentation of and 

comments on Lee’s post-Miranda silence. We disagree. 

The record shows that Lee and Tia went to the police station 

on April 2, 2018, for additional interviews. The recording of Lee’s

interview shows that the detective read Lee his rights under
19

Miranda, although Lee was not under arrest at that time.8

The detective eventually showed Lee emails between Lee and 

Tia that revealed a romantic relationship between the two. After the 

detective told Lee that it was obvious that Lee and Tia were having 

some kind of relationship, Lee read the emails and paused without 

saying anything. Then, Lee requested counsel, and the detective 

terminated the interview.9

At trial, the State played the video recording of the interview

for the jury, including the portion during which Lee remained silent 

after he was confronted with the emails, and cut off the video right 

before Lee requested an attorney. The State then examined the 

interviewing detective: 

 8 The detective testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing that he did not 

read Lee his Miranda rights during previous interviews but did on April 2, 

2018, because of “all of the follow up information and investigation” that had 

been done. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) 

(1964).

9 Prior to trial, Lee’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress Lee’s 

statements taken by police officers “on but not limited to November 17, 2017, 

and November 18, 2017.” However, counsel did not raise Lee’s “silence” from 

the April 2, 2018 interview in the motion to suppress or during the JacksonDenno hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court denied Lee’s motion to 

suppress. 
20

Q: Really wasn’t a good answer to that question that you posed 

to him, was it?

A: No, sir.

Q: There was a long pregnant pause, wasn’t there?

A: Yes, sir.

Lee argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently in

failing to ask for a redaction of his silence in the video10 because 

invocation of his right to remain silent cannot be used against him. 

In addition, Lee argues that trial counsel was deficient in failing to 

object to the State’s examination of the interviewing detective 

regarding his silence. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (II) (96 

SCt 2240, 49 LE2d 91) (1976) (explaining that Miranda warnings 

carry an implicit assurance that silence will not carry a penalty).

Pretermitting whether these failures to object constituted 

deficient performance, Lee cannot show the requisite prejudice.

First, evidence of the romantic affair between Lee and Tia was 

 10 Before the trial began, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the 

State provided the defense with a copy of this interview, but removed the 

portion when Lee “invokes his right to remain silent, forward. And then when 

he invoked his right to an attorney as well. And then there’s a whole long pause 

and we just deleted that Judge.” It is unclear if this statement referred to the 

same silence by Lee that is at issue in this appeal. 
21

introduced separately from the interview, so Lee’s silence when 

confronted with the emails, to the extent that it can be considered a 

confirmation of the relationship and thus incriminating, was 

cumulative of other evidence introduced at trial. “The failure of trial 

counsel to object to such cumulative evidence does not support a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Wilson v. State, 297 Ga. 

86, 88 (2) (772 SE2d 689) (2015). 

Moreover, even without the recording of the interview and 

comment on Lee’s silence while examining the emails, the evidence 

supporting Lee’s guilt was substantial. George was found shot on 

the front porch lying on his back with his feet toward the door and 

his keys still in the lock, indicating that he was shot from inside the 

house, and Lee admitted that he was inside the house at the time of 

the shooting. In the minutes after George’s death, Lee chose to 

remove a tracking device from George’s car. Also, Lee’s cell phone 

showed internet searches about poisonous venom and an article 

about a murder case. It is also undisputed that Lee and Tia were in 

a romantic relationship and that Tia called George’s life insurance 
22

company the day after George was killed regarding his one-milliondollar policy, which supplies a potential motive for the shooting. 

Because of the strength of this evidence, Lee cannot show that, but 

for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability 

that the outcome of his trial would have been different. See Moore v. 

State, 278 Ga. 397, 400 (2) (a) (603 SE2d 228) (2004) (explaining that 

“strength of the circumstantial evidence” of the defendant’s guilt is 

a factor in determining prejudice); State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585, 

595 (826 SE2d 36) (2019) (holding that, while failure to object to 

prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s post-Miranda silence was 

deficient performance, it was not sufficiently prejudicial in part 

because evidence of the defendant’s guilt was “not weak”). 

2. Lee also asserts that the cumulative prejudice from his trial 

counsel’s deficient performance entitles him to a new trial. We 

disagree. 

To establish cumulative error, Lee “must show that . . . at least 

two errors were committed in the course of the trial” and that 

“considered together along with the entire record, the multiple 
23

errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the 

petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.” See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 

21 (4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Although we have assumed error with respect to two of Lee’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we conclude that the 

cumulative prejudice from any assumed deficiencies is insufficient 

to show a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding 

would have been different but for the alleged deficiencies. See Jones 

v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 757 (4) (e) (827 SE2d 879) (2019). 

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.