Filed 11/6/23 In re Sean F.H. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re SEAN F. II., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 

 B325170

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SEAN F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05311E)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Affirmed. 

David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________________

INTRODUCTION

A few months after sustaining a petition under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300 and declaring Sean F. II (Sean) a 

dependent child of the court, the juvenile court terminated its 

jurisdiction and issued a custody and visitation order granting 

Sean’s mother, April Z., sole custody of Sean.

1 Sean’s father, 

Sean F., appeals from the jurisdiction findings, arguing

substantial evidence did not support them. We conclude that 

Sean F.’s appeal is not moot and that substantial evidence 

supported the court’s findings Sean F.’s physical abuse of Sean’s 

mother and two half-siblings placed Sean at substantial risk of 

serious physical harm. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sean’s parents are April and Sean F. April has two other 

children, Lennon, born in 2011, and Zoe, born in 2010, whose 

father is not Sean F.

2

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 Neither April, Lennon, nor Zoe is a party to this appeal.
3

In May 2022, when Sean was only a few months old, the

Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services 

filed a petition under section 300 on behalf of the three children.

The Department alleged Sean F. and April had “a history of 

engaging in violent physical altercations,” including an incident 

where Sean F. threatened to kill April with a knife and an

incident where Sean F. hit April in her eye with his fist, pushed 

her onto a bed, and “straddled” her. The Department also alleged 

Sean F. physically abused Lennon by grabbing his hair and 

pushing him into a wall and physically abused Zoe by striking 

her face. In addition, the Department alleged Sean F. was 

“a current abuser of marijuana” and “used and was under the 

influence of marijuana” in the presence of Lennon and Zoe. The 

Department asserted nine counts against Sean F. on behalf of 

Sean: three under section 300, subdivision (a) (one based on

engaging in domestic violence with April, one based on abusing

Zoe, and one based on abusing Lennon), alleging there was a 

substantial risk Sean would suffer serious physical harm inflicted 

nonaccidentally; four under section 300, subdivision (b) (one 

based on engaging in domestic violence with April, one based on

abusing Zoe, one based on abusing Lennon, and one based on 

using cannabis), alleging there was a substantial risk Sean would

suffer serious physical harm because Sean F. failed and was 

unable to supervise, protect, or provide regular care for Sean; and 

two under section 300, subdivision (j) (one based on abusing 

Lennon and one based on abusing Zoe), alleging there was a 

substantial risk Sean F. would also abuse Sean. 

The juvenile court found the allegations true, sustained the 

petition and each count against Sean F., declared Sean a 

dependent child of the court, and removed Sean from Sean F. and 
4

released Sean to April. Sean F. appealed from the jurisdiction 

findings and disposition order. 

A few months after the disposition order, however, the 

court terminated its jurisdiction and issued an order under 

section 362.4 granting April sole legal and physical custody of 

Sean, with monitored visits for Sean F. at least once per week.3

Sean F. appealed from the court’s order terminating its

jurisdiction and the custody and visitation order.

DISCUSSION

A. Sean F.’s Appeal Is Not Moot

“Juvenile dependency appeals raise unique mootness 

concerns because the parties have multiple opportunities to 

appeal orders even as the proceedings in the juvenile court 

proceed.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 59.) An appeal 

“becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, 

if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant 

him any effect[ive] relief.”’ . . . [¶] . . . A reviewing court must 

‘“decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a 

juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether [its] 

decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding.”’” 

(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276; see In re Damian L. (2023) 

90 Cal.App.5th 357, 369.)

3 “When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has 

been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4 

authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation 

order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will become 

part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the 

family law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent 

order.’” (In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.)
5

“An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally 

renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D.

(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164; see In re G.Z. (2022) 

85 Cal.App.5th 857, 874; In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 

1488.) However, “when a juvenile court’s finding forms the basis 

for an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights—for 

instance, by restricting visitation or custody—that jurisdictional 

finding remains subject to challenge, even if the juvenile court 

has terminated its jurisdiction. [Citation.] Because reversal of 

the jurisdictional finding calls into question the validity of orders 

based on the finding, review of the jurisdictional finding can 

grant the parent effective relief.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 

at pp. 276-277; see In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431-

1432; In re A.R. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733, 740.)

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings were the bases of

the custody and visitation order that gave April sole physical and 

legal custody of Sean and that required Sean F.’s visits with Sean 

to be monitored. And because Sean F. appealed from the juvenile 

court’s order terminating its jurisdiction and the custody and 

visitation order, we can grant Sean F. effective relief if his appeal 

from the jurisdiction findings were successful. (See In re 

Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164, fn. omitted [“to the 

extent an appellant argues . . . the challenged jurisdiction finding 

resulted in an adverse juvenile custody order and seeks to have 

that custody order set aside, in addition to the appeal from the 

jurisdiction finding, an appeal from the orders terminating 

jurisdiction and awarding custody is necessary”].)
6

B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s 

Jurisdiction Findings Based on Sean F.’s Abuse of 

April, Lennon, and Zoe

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The purpose of section 300 ‘is to provide maximum safety 

and protection for children who are currently being physically, 

sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being 

exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and 

emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’” 

(In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601; see § 300.2, 

subd. (a); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “Although 

section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk 

of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the 

court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to 

assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. 

[Citations.] The court may consider past events in deciding 

whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (Cole L.,

at pp. 601-602; see In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411.)

“Section 300, subdivision (a), provides that jurisdiction may 

be assumed if the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk 

the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted 

nonaccidentally by the child’s parent or guardian.” (In re Cole L.,

supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; see § 300, subd. (a).)

“‘Nonaccidental’ generally means a parent or guardian ‘acted 

intentionally or willfully.’” (Cole L., at p. 601; see In re R.T.

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629.) 

Section 300, subdivision (b), authorizes the juvenile court to 

assert jurisdiction where “the ‘child has suffered, or there is a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm 
7

or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s 

parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.’” 

(See In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712.) “A jurisdiction 

finding under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), requires the 

Department to prove three elements: (1) the parent’s or 

guardian’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to protect the 

child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a 

substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re 

Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; see S.F., at p. 713.) 

“‘“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings . . . , we determine 

if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports 

them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of 

the dependency court; we review the record in the light most 

favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues 

of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.”

[Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are 

sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’” 

[Citations.] However, “[s]ubstantial evidence is not synonymous 

with any evidence. [Citation.] To be substantial, the evidence 

must be of ponderable legal significance and must be reasonable 

in nature, credible, and of solid value.”’” (In re S.F., supra, 

91 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; see In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 602.)
8

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the 

Jurisdiction Findings

Sean F. contends substantial evidence did not support the 

jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and 

(j). But it did, at a minimum for the findings under 

subdivisions (a) and (b), and substantial evidence need only 

support one valid ground of jurisdiction. (In re D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)

The evidence was that Sean F. abused April on multiple 

occasions and abused or physically harmed Lennon and Zoe. In 

November 2020 April called law enforcement and reported that 

Sean F. had “threatened to kill her” with a knife. In March 2022 

law enforcement officers responded to a report of domestic 

violence involving Sean F. and April. April told a responding

officer that Sean F. yelled at her, called her a “fucking bitch” for 

“taking too long” in the bathroom, and punched her in the face 

with a closed fist. When April tried to get away, Sean F. pushed 

her onto a bed and got on top of her. The responding officer

observed that, consistent with April’s statement, April’s cheek 

was swollen and red. Sean was in the home during the incident. 

April said that the incident was the first time Sean F. had hit

her, but that previously he had pushed and shoved her and 

thrown objects at her face. 

A few weeks later a case social worker interviewed Lennon 

and Zoe—then eight years old and 10 years old—at their school. 

Lennon said that he was “very scared” of Sean F. because Sean F. 

was a violent person and that Sean F. had once “grabbed [his] 

hair and pushed [his] head into [a] wall.” Lennon also said he 

had seen Sean F. hit his mom and throw keys at her. Zoe told the 
9

social worker she was afraid of Sean F. because Sean F. had 

slapped her on the cheek and would often yell at her and Lennon. 

When a Department investigator interviewed Zoe and 

Lennon some months later, the children repeated their 

statements. The Department also interviewed Lennon and Zoe’s 

father, Abraham Z., who stated Sean F. had “smashed [Lennon’s]

head into a wall,” which caused bruises that would not go away. 

Zoe confirmed that Sean F. had “slammed” Lennon into a wall 

and that Lennon had “a bruise or something” on his forehead.

Based on this evidence, the court could reasonably find that

there was a substantial risk Sean F. would inflict serious 

physical harm nonaccidentally on Sean (section 300, 

subdivision (a)) and that Sean would suffer serious physical harm 

because Sean F. was unable to protect him (section 300, 

subdivision (b)). (See § 300, subd. (a) [“[f]or purposes of this 

subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious 

future injury based on . . . a history of repeated inflictions of 

injuries on . . . the child’s siblings, or a combination of these and 

other actions by the parent or guardian that indicate the child is 

at risk of serious physical harm”]; In re L.B., supra,

88 Cal.App.5th at p. 411 [“[i]t is well settled that physical 

violence between a child’s parents may support the exercise of 

jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) of section 300 where there is 

evidence that the domestic violence has placed the child at risk of 

physical harm and the violence is ongoing or likely to recur”]; 

In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 239 [because “‘“[c]hildren 

can be ‘put in a position of physical danger from [spousal] 

violence,’”’” the “juvenile court may invoke jurisdiction under 

section 300, subdivision (b), even if a child has emerged 

physically unscathed from an instance of domestic violence”];
10

In re Marquis H. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 727 [although the 

parents had not abused the child, their abuse of their 

grandchildren supported jurisdiction under section 300, 

subdivision (a)]; cf. In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332 

[multiple injuries suffered by an infant’s sibling permitted 

reasonable inference the infant was at a substantial risk of 

serious physical harm because “even a single episode of corporal 

punishment could have devastating consequences to [the infant’s] 

physical health and safety”].) Sean F. had been violent with each 

member of the family and had seriously injured April and 

Lennon. The court could reasonably find it was only a matter of 

time before Sean suffered the same fate. (See In re Mariah T.

(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 439 [“a reasonable trier of fact was 

free to . . . conclude that without intervention, the severity of 

punishment could escalate even further”].)

Moreover, Sean F. refused to take responsibility for his 

actions. (See In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 622

[“‘[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge’”]; In re 

A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“‘[d]enial is a factor often 

relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify 

their behavior in the future without court supervision’”].) Sean F. 

repeatedly told social workers and investigators from the 

Department that he had never abused anyone in the family. 

Indeed, at the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, 

Sean F. testified: “I have never laid a hand on any of these 

children or the mother.” Sean F.’s denial he ever injured April or

her children only increased the risk he would at some point injure 

Sean. (See In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156 [“A parent’s 

denial of domestic violence increases the risk of it recurring.”].)
11

Sean F. argues “a single incident of recent domestic 

violence” that does “not harm the children” cannot support a 

jurisdiction finding under section 300 where there is no risk of 

ongoing harm. He further argues he had been out of April’s home 

for “months” by the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Sean F.’s 

statement of the law is generally correct (see In re M.W. (2015) 

238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453 [“domestic violence between a child’s 

parents may support the exercise of jurisdiction only if there is 

evidence that the violence harmed the children or placed them at 

risk of harm, and ‘the violence is ongoing or likely to continue’”]), 

but his application of the law to the facts of this case is not. 

There was more than one incident of domestic violence between 

him and April. While April told law enforcement officers that the 

March 2022 incident was the first time Sean F. had hit her, she 

also stated that he had previously shoved her and thrown things 

at her. In addition, she had called law enforcement within the 

previous year to report Sean F. had threatened to kill her with a 

knife.4 (See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 134 [parents’ 

“lengthy history of domestic violence” placed the child at a 

4 Sean F. asserts, without citing any authority, his threat to 

kill April with a knife “certainly” does not constitute domestic 

violence. The law is to the contrary. (See Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 

93 Cal.App.5th 1166, 1170, 1178-1179 [father’s threat he would 

beat the mother’s face in and kill her was domestic violence 

under Domestic Violence Prevention Act]; People v. Caceres

(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 920 [defendant who threatened to use 

a knife to “chop” up his daughter’s mother committed domestic 

violence for purposes of Domestic Violence Prevention Act]; see 

also Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)(3) [for purposes of the Act,

“abuse” includes “plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension 

of imminent serious bodily injury”].)
12

substantial risk of physical harm].) And April was not the only 

person Sean F. had abused in the household. He physically 

assaulted Lennon and he hit Zoe, which evidenced a propensity 

for violence against family members. (See In re M.W., supra, 

238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1454 [“past abuse or violent behavior may 

predict future abuse”]; see also In re Cole L., supra, 

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602 [“A parent’s ‘“[p]ast conduct may be 

probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that 

the conduct will continue.’”].)

Sean F. also asserts substantial evidence did not support 

the findings he abused or harmed Lennon and Zoe because 

neither child described the “details” of the abuse and their 

injuries. The record does not support that assertion. Lennon told 

a social worker that Sean F. rammed his head into a wall causing 

him to bleed, and Abraham and Zoe confirmed Lennon had a 

bruise on his forehead. (See In re David H. (2008) 

165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1644 [serious physical harm includes 

“bruises, red marks, welts, and broken skin”].) The incident was 

so traumatic for Lennon that he said he never wanted to see 

Sean F. again. Zoe similarly reported that Sean F. hit her in the 

face. While Zoe’s injury was perhaps not as serious as the head 

injury Sean F. inflicted on Lennon, the incident was yet another 

example of Sean F.’s long history of violent conduct toward his

family, for which he refused to take accountability. The juvenile

court could reasonably conclude Sean was at a substantial risk of 

serious future injury under both subdivisions (a) and (b) of 

section 300. (See § 300, subd. (a) [“a court may find there is a 

substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in 

which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated 

inflictions of injuries on . . . the child’s siblings, and a 
13

combination of these and other actions”]; In re Mariah T., supra, 

159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 438-439 [substantial evidence supported 

jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b), where

mother repeatedly used corporal punishment on children and 

“den[ied] and minimize[d] what she had done”.)5

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J. MARTINEZ, J.

5 Because we affirm the jurisdiction findings under 

subdivisions (a) and (b) based on domestic violence between 

Sean F. and April and on Sean F.’s abuse of Lennon and Zoe, we 

need not consider whether substantial evidence supported the 

jurisdiction findings based on Sean F.’s use of cannabis or the 

jurisdiction findings under subdivision (j). (See In re D.P., supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 293; In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773; In re 

J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774.)