### No. 13325 

### INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976

LOCAL 2390 OF 

### AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY, MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, A.F.L. 

# - C.I.O. and 

### Mrs. Ruth Ware, Plaintiffs and Respondents, -VS

# - CITY OF BILLINGS, MONTANA, 

### a quasi-municipa

### 1 corporation, Defendant and Cross Complainant and Respondent ROBERT 

### M. COOKINGHAM, and BRUCE L. ENNIS, 

### DUANE SMITH, ROXANE 

### LEE, WALT LESNIAK, NANCY LeCAPTAIN, as members of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE BILLINGS CITY LIBRARY, Defendants and Cross Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth JudicialDistrict, HonorableW. 

### IJ. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record

### : For Appellants

### : Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Gallagher & 

### Toole,

Billings, Montana Robert Edd Lee argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Rosemary Boschert argued, Billings, Montana Jones, Olsen and Christensen, Billings, Montana Frank C. 

### Richter argued, Billings, Montana

Submitted: September 10, 1976 Decided

## OC122 ,.!

, .I.

### . 

## cr-,yz;c Filed:

# -- l.lMr. Chief Justice

### James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the districtcourt of Yellowstone County. The Union and Mrs. Ware instituted the action against the City of Billings. The districtcourt ordered that the trustees of the Billings Public Library be made parties. The City cross-claimed against the trustees, who then counterclaimed against the City. The casewas submitted tothe district court on the following stipulated facts: Respondent, Ruth Ware, was terminated from her job at the Billings City Library on September 10, 1974, by the library director with the approval of the appellants, the board of trustees of the Billings City Library. On September 26, 1974, the Billings City personnel director directed the appellants to reinstate Ruth Ware, however the appellants refused tocomply with his directive. Atthis time a valid collectivebargaining agreement existed between the respondent Union and the City of Billings, hereinafter referred toas the City. The termination of Ruth 

### Ware conflictedwith the 

### termsof this agreement. The union had been established 

### as the exclusive bargaining agent for the cityemployees inan electionJanuary 20, 1972, inwhich Ruth Ware participated. On April 8, 1974, the Board of Personnel Appeals made an appropriateunitdetermination of cityemployees, which included the librarypersonnel. Atthe 

### timeof her 

### termination, Ruth Ware was a dues paying member of the union. The appellants alleged that the agreement between the City and the union was not binding upon the appellants, because they had neither negotiated it nor ratified it. However, the districtcourt held contrary tothisposition, and entered two judgments, one in favor of the union and Ruth Ware against the City and the appellants, the other infavor of the City on a cross-complaint, against the appellants. Appellants appeal both judgments.

### The only issue determinative of this appeal iswhether Ruth Ware's "public employer",within the meaning of the Collective Bargaining For Public Employees Act, sections 59-1601 et seq., R.C.M. 1947, was the City or the appellants. In the latter situation, the agreementwould not be binding on the appellants, since a separate and autonomous employer cannot be bound to a contract he has neither negotiated or ratified. Fabijanic v. Sperry Gyroscope Division, 370 F.Supp. 62 (1974). On the other hand, should her "public employer"be the City, the appellants are bound by the agreement. The appellants contend that they are the "public employer" of Ruth Ware by way of section 44-223,R.C.M. 1947, which states: 

## " 

## * * * With recommendation of the chief librarian the board shall employ and discharge such other persons asmay be necessary in the administration of the affairs of the library, fix and pay their salaries and compensation and prescribe their duties." This is the first time we have been asked to define "public employer"within themeaning of the Collective Bargaining For Public Employees Act. TheAct grants the right of collective bargaining to public employers and public employees in much the same manner as the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 USCA S141 et seq., does to employers and employees in the private sector. For this reason,we adopt the doctrine established by the United States Supreme Court to define such terms, as set forth in National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S.



### " 

## * * * In this light, the broad language of theAct's definitions,which in terms reject conventional limitations on such conceptionsas

'employee,' 'employer,'and 'labor dispute,' leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, in doubtful situations,by underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established legal classifications." To properly define "public employer"wemust appreciatethe economic realities aswell as the aims of the legislature sought by the Collective Bargaining For Public Employees Act and the Library Systems Act, sections 44-212, et seq., R.C.M. 1947, and reconcile any differences if possible. Wecannot 

### limitour examination of the legislative intent of the Library Systems Acttothe section cited by the appellants, but 

### wemust consider the entireAct. When so analyzed the library and its board of trustees 

### isnot a wholly independent and autonomous entity separateand apart from the local governing body. The local governing body and its electors decide whether tocreate a library (section44-219, R.C.M. 1947); themayor appoints themembers of the board of trustees (section 44-221, R.C.M. 1947); the local governing body establishes the levy, with certain limitations, for a special tax on the property

owners tocreate a library fund (section44-220, R.C.M. 1947); the governing body decides whether toissue bonds for the 

### erection and building of librarybuildings and thepurchase of land therefor (section 44-220, R.C.M. 1947); theboard of trustees must submit an annual financial statement tothe local governing body and also an annual budget indicating what support and maintenance 

### willbe required from public funds (section44-222, R.C.M. 1947); the treasurer of the cityhandles the library fund in accord with theorders and warrants of the board of trustees (section44-220, R.C.M. 1947); and the local governing body may create a librarydepreciation reserve fund from moneys allocated tothe library during the year but not expended by the end of that year, and invest such moneys(sections 44-230, 44-231, R.C.M. 1947). Considering the entire scheme of the Library Systems Act, theboard of trustees of the Billings City Library is granted independent powers tomanage and operate the library, but they

are 

### still an adjunct of the local government, theCity of Billings.The 

### same answer tothisunique issuewas reached by New Jersey inBoard of Trustees of the Free Pub. Lib. v. Union City, 112 N.J.Super. 484, 271 A.2d 728 

# . The New Jersey Court based its decision upon various facetsof interdependence in their legislative scheme, which 

### isvery similar toours. The economic realities show that the City, not the board of library trustees, ultimately provides the salaries and wages of the library personnel. The City has a substantial legitimate interest intheoperation of the library, which qualifies the City asthe "public employer" of the Billings City Library personnel, including Ruth Ware. Wehold there is no inconsistency between the Library Systems Actand the Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act. Under theLibrary Systems Act, as a whole, theboard of trustees 

### is given independent powers tomanage and operate the library. However, thisdoes not qualify theBoard asa "public employer" within themeaning of the Collective Bargaining For Public Employees Act, but merely as "supervisory employees"

as defined in section 59-1602(3), R.C.M. 1947. Finding the City tobe the "public employer" of Ruth Ware, we also find the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the union was binding upon the appellants. The judgments

### fle concur:

--- 

### D~S tric t 

# .Peter G. ~elob sittingin 

### ce of Mr.

Frank I. 

### Haswell.

Mr. JusticeWesley Castles did not participate inthis Opinion.