NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

JANOLYN S. DEKKER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

JACK E. DEKKER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 12-0786

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2011-007630

The Honorable Sam J. Myers, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, 

AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Janolyn S. Dekker, Queen Creek

Petitioner/Appellee in Propria Persona

S. Alan Cook, P.C., Phoenix

By S. Alan Cook

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
DEKKER v. DEKKER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined.

P O R T L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Jack E. Dekker (“Father”) brings this appeal from a decree of 

dissolution and the denial of his motion for new trial. Because we find 

that the family court did not properly calculate the gross income of 

Janolyn S. Dekker (“Mother”) in determining the award of child support, 

we reverse the calculation, vacate the award of attorneys' fees, and 

remand this case for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother filed her petition for dissolution after twenty-five 

years of marriage, and served Father on November 21, 2011. As is 

relevant here, she requested spousal maintenance, child support for the 

parties’ two minor children, and the division of community property and 

community debts. 

¶3 Mother requested temporary child support and spousal 

maintenance, and a hearing was set. The parties, however, entered into a 

stipulation in which Father agreed to pay Mother $2300 per month in 

“temporary family support” starting from January 1, 2012, and, to cover 

the January and February payments, he agreed to give her a judgment for 

$4600. The family court approved the stipulation on February 6, 2012.

¶4 The case proceeded to trial. After taking the matter under 

advisement, the family court subsequently entered a decree that dissolved 

the marriage and awarded joint legal custody of the children. The decree 

also required Father to pay Mother $1100 per month in spousal 

maintenance for eight years beginning August 1, 2012, and $340 per 

month in child support effective from December 1, 2011. The court also 

awarded Mother an equalization payment of $10,000, and $8000 in 

attorneys’ fees. 
DEKKER v. DEKKER

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¶5 Father moved for a new trial and to alter or amend the 

decree. The family court denied the motion in a signed order. Father then 

filed this appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1) and (5)(a).1

 DISCUSSION

¶6 Father argues that the family court abused its discretion in 

various trial rulings and in denying his motion for new trial on the issues 

of child support, income calculation, disclosure violations, debt allocation, 

and attorneys’ fees. Mother did not file an answering brief. Although we 

could consider it a confession of reversible error, we will exercise our 

discretion and will consider the case on the merits because all of the 

evidence before the family court is in the record. See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 

134 Ariz. 437, 437, 657 P.2d 425, 425 (App. 1982). 

¶7 When reviewing a ruling on a motion for new trial, we grant 

the family court broad discretion and we will not disturb the ruling absent 

a clear abuse of that discretion. Pullen v. Pullen, 223 Ariz. 293, 296, ¶ 10, 

222 P.3d 909, 912 (App. 2009). An abuse of discretion occurs “when the 

record viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the [family] court’s 

decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.” Little 

v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5, 975 P.2d 108, 110 (1999) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we presume that the court 

“found every fact necessary to support the judgment” where neither party 

requested findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to Arizona Rule 

of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 82(A). See Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590, 

592, 570 P.2d 758, 760 (1977) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

I. Child Support

¶8 Father argues that the family court abused its discretion in 

calculating child support. We review an award of child support for an 

abuse of discretion, but review de novo the court’s application of the 

Arizona Child Support Guidelines, A.R.S. § 25-320 app. (the 

“Guidelines”). See In re Marriage of Robinson and Thiel, 201 Ariz. 328, 331, 

¶ 5, 35 P.3d 89, 92 (App. 2001). 

 1 We cite the current version of the applicable statute unless revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
DEKKER v. DEKKER

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¶9 In calculating child support, the court must determine the

gross income of both parents. Mead v. Holzmann, 198 Ariz. 219, 220 n.3, ¶ 

5, 8 P.3d 407, 408 n.3 (App. 2000). Section 5(A) of the Guidelines provides 

that “gross income” includes income from “spousal maintenance.” 

Although the family court ordered Father to pay $1100 in monthly spousal 

maintenance, which he does not challenge, the court did not add the

amount to Mother’s gross income. Father contends that the omission was 

erroneous. We agree. 

¶10 On remand, the family court needs to recalculate Mother’s

gross monthly income by adding the $1100 spousal maintenance award to 

her gross income, and then calculate Father’s child support obligation. 

The court will also need to consider the uncontested fact that Father is 

paying $245 per month to maintain medical insurance for the children as 

part of the child support calculation. Additionally, the court will then also 

need to recalculate the parties’ proportionate shares of the total child 

support obligation under § 10 of the Guidelines, and then adjust to the 

parties’ shares of unreimbursed medical expenses, Guidelines § 9(A). 

¶11 Father also argues that the family court is required to give 

him credit toward his child support obligation from December 2011 until 

the entry of the decree because he paid $2300 per month in “temporary 

child support” prior to the entry of the decree. Although the parties 

stipulated to the temporary family support sum, the order submitted by 

Father did not allocate the sum between child support, spousal 

maintenance or living expenses. As a result, the family court only ordered 

the stipulated temporary family support sum, and did not allocate any 

part of it as temporary child support. 

¶12 At trial, Mother testified and requested child support and 

Father agreed to pay appropriate child support. He did not testify that a 

portion of the stipulated sum was for child support nor ask that a portion 

of the sum be designated for child support. The court, as a result, ordered 

him to pay child support retroactive to December 1, 2011, the month after 

the service of the petition. Consequently, the court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Father’s argument in his post-trial motion that some 

portion of his pretrial payment should be credited towards the child 

support obligation. See A.R.S. § 25-503(A) (stating that the court may 

specify the date when child support begins). 
DEKKER v. DEKKER

Decision of the Court

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II. Calculation of Mother’s Income

¶13 Father also argues that the family court erroneously 

calculated Mother’s gross income by relying on her affidavit of financial 

information. He claims that Mother’s trial testimony was inconsistent 

with the affidavit, and proved that her business income was nearly $3917

per month and her business had grossed more than $160,000 in 2011.

A. Mother’s Trial Testimony

¶14 Mother, who had been a homemaker, was a self-employed

florist for the last two years of marriage. Because she was self-employed, 

her gross income is calculated as “gross receipts minus ordinary and 

necessary expenses.” Guidelines § 5(C). Mother’s Amended Affidavit of 

Financial Information lists her gross monthly income as $3143. 

¶15 Mother testified that her floral business earned $160,279.49 

in 2011, but she paid $92,528.88 for job materials, including flowers, vases, 

and supplies. She also paid more than $7800 in contract labor expenses, 

more than $1800 in vendor commissions, and $7342 for bank overdraft 

charges, classes, dues and subscriptions, equipment rental, janitorial 

services, and office supplies, resulting in annual income of about $47,000. 

After deducting business-related expenses for auto, computer/internet, 

and meals and entertainment, Mother’s income came to $3200 per month. 

Her testimony as to her monthly income approximates the $3143 listed in

her affidavit.

¶16 Additionally, she testified that her business was not faring as 

well in 2012 because of the economy. Given her testimony, the family 

court did not abuse its discretion by attributing Mother’s gross income as 

$3143 per month. 

B. In-Kind Services

¶17 In his motion for new trial, Father argued that he learned 

after trial that Mother had a roommate starting July 1 and the court 

needed to recalculate Mother’s gross income to account for the “trade 

outs” — the tenant’s work around the house in lieu of rent. We review the 

court’s ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion, Pullen, 

223 Ariz. at 296, ¶ 10, 222 P.3d at 912, but whether the court should have 

included additional amounts in Mother’s gross income calculation is a 

question of law we review de novo. See Patterson v. Patterson, 226 Ariz. 

356, 358, ¶ 4, 248 P.3d 204, 206 (App. 2011). 
DEKKER v. DEKKER

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¶18 Although Mother had a tenant who started living with her 

nine days before trial, the family court did not have to consider the value 

of the “trade outs” because any service for rent was not then continuing or 

recurring in nature. See Guidelines § 5(A). Because “[i]ncome from any 

sources which is not continuing or recurring in nature need not 

necessarily be deemed gross income for child support purposes,” the 

court did not err by denying Father’s post-trial argument. See id. 

III. Disclosure of Business Records

¶19 Father also contends that Mother failed to adequately 

disclose the basis of her expenses pursuant to Rule 49(C), and a new 

determination is warranted. We review the ruling on disclosure issues for 

abuse of discretion. Link v. Pima Cnty., 193 Ariz. 336, 338, ¶ 3, 972 P.2d 

669, 671 (App. 1998). 

¶20 The record belies Father’s argument. In addition to her 

Amended Affidavit of Financial Information, Mother voluntarily 

disclosed her bank account statements which she used for personal and 

business expenses. She also provided the profit and loss statements for 

her business for 2011 and 2012, which were attached to her affidavit. If 

Father wanted more information, he never sought it. He never served her 

with written discovery, filed a motion to compel production of Mother’s 

business records, or took her deposition. Moreover, the record does not 

reflect any attempt he made to schedule a conference to resolve any 

discovery dispute as provided in the family court’s pretrial order. 

Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen 

the trial based upon Father’s disclosure argument.

IV. Debts

¶21 Father further argues that the family court failed to give him 

credit for paying $27,000 in community debts owed to his mother and 

sister. He contends, as a result, that Mother is equally responsible for the

debt and should not have received a $10,000 equitable offset.

¶22 The family court enjoys broad discretion in equitably 

dividing community assets and liabilities. Flower v. Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 

535, ¶ 14, 225 P.3d 588, 592 (App. 2010). In dividing property, the court 

may consider all related debts and obligations. A.R.S. § 25-318(B). We 

will not disturb the court’s allocation absent a clear abuse of discretion. 

Inboden v. Inboden, 223 Ariz. 542, 544, ¶ 7, 225 P.3d 599, 601 (App. 2010). 
DEKKER v. DEKKER

Decision of the Court

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¶23 Father had been the owner of a drilling and blasting 

business; which, by the time of trial was defunct or bankrupt. In his 

revised pretrial statement filed on the day of trial, he disclosed that he 

sold a piece of business equipment for approximately $80,000. After 

stating that he and Mother owned fifty percent of the asset and his sister 

owned the remaining fifty percent, Father asserted that he had used their 

$40,000 from the sale to pay $27,000 in community debts: $17,000 owed to 

his sister and brother-in-law; and $10,000 owed to his parents.

¶24 Prior to the revised pretrial statement, neither party had 

listed any community debts they owed or that were outstanding from 

Father’s relatives related to the business. Mother testified that the parties 

had agreed that Father would pay the $27,000 owed to family members 

and would also receive all money he could collect from his parents, which 

was approximately $240,000. Father denied the existence of the 

agreement, but did not dispute that his parents had received $210,000 

from the parties. The conflicting testimony raised a credibility question 

that the court had to, and was in the best position to, resolve. See Gutierrez 

v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d 676, 680 (App. 1998). The 

court resolved the issue in Mother’s favor and ordered Father to pay 

$20,000 to Mother for her twenty-five percent share of proceeds from the 

sale of equipment. Because there is evidence supporting the court’s 

decision, we find no abuse of discretion.

V. Denial of Motion for New Trial

¶25 Finally, Father argues that the family court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion for new trial. Under Rule 83(A), a 

“judgment may be vacated and a new trial granted” for certain listed 

causes “materially affecting [a] party’s rights.” The causes include:

1. irregularity in the proceedings of the court 

or a party, or abuse of discretion, whereby the 

moving party was deprived of a fair trial;

2. misconduct of a party;

3. accident or surprise which could not have 

been prevented by ordinary prudence;

4. material evidence, newly discovered, which 

with reasonable diligence could not have been 

discovered and produced at the trial;
DEKKER v. DEKKER

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. . . .

6. that the ruling, decision, findings of fact, or 

judgment is not justified by the evidence or is 

contrary to law.

Id.

¶26 Father contends that the family court should increase 

Mother’s gross income by $1100, making corresponding adjustments to 

the parties’ percentage shares of the total child support obligation, revisit 

its rulings on $27,000 in debt, and modify the decree to recognize that 

Father provides medical insurance for the children. Because we have 

resolved those issues, we need not discuss them further. 

¶27 Father also contends that the court erred by: (1) excluding 

his mother, Henrietta Dekker, as a rebuttal witness on the community 

debt issue; and (2) disregarding his mother’s affidavit that he filed after 

trial. Here, Father disclosed that he wanted to call his mother to testify the 

day before trial. Mother objected to the late disclosure and the fact that 

Father failed to specify the nature of his mother’s testimony. Although 

counsel outlined the areas that he hoped she would testify about, Father 

did not make an offer of proof concerning his mother’s testimony. The 

court sustained the objection, but allowed her to testify about Father’s 

relationship with his children because that went to the issue of their best 

interests. We review the ruling for an abuse of discretion. Link, 193 Ariz. 

at 338, ¶ 3, 972 P.2d at 671. 

¶28 Although Father argues the court erred, his argument is 

devoid of relevant legal authority to support his argument that his mother 

should not have been precluded as a rebuttal witness or that the court 

should have considered her post-trial affidavit. Father did not timely 

disclose his mother as a witness pursuant to Rule 49(H) on any issue, 

much less the issue of community debts. As a result, we will not address 

the argument. See ARCAP 13(a)(6) (“[E]ach contention raised on appeal 

. . . shall be identified, with citations to relevant authority.”); see also 

Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491 n.2, ¶ 6, 154 P.3d 391, 393 n.2

(App. 2007) (recognizing that an argument is waived on appeal if the 

opening brief lacks citations to supporting authority).
DEKKER v. DEKKER

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VI. Attorneys’ Fees

¶29 Father also contends that the family court committed

procedural and legal errors in awarding Mother $8000 in attorneys’ fees 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 24-324(A). We review the award for abuse of 

discretion. Hrudka v. Hrudka, 186 Ariz. 84, 94-95, 919 P.2d 179, 189-90 

(App. 1995).

¶30 At trial, Mother testified that she had incurred more than 

$10,000 in attorneys’ fees, due in part to Father’s failure to cooperate in 

discovery, and submitted Exhibit 7, an itemization of the legal charges, 

which was admitted into evidence. She requested a fee award of $8000. 

Father objected based on his inability to cross-examine anyone about the 

reasonableness of the fees. In response, the court noted that if attorneys'

fees are granted, a China Doll affidavit2 would have to be submitted to 

“allow the other side to object.”

¶31 Although the family court subsequently determined an 

award of fees was appropriate under A.R.S. § 25-324, the court did not 

allow Father to challenge Exhibit 7 or the reasonableness of Mother's

$8000 request. Consequently, we remand the issue of attorneys' fees to 

allow the court to consider any objection Father wants to make to Exhibit 

7 and the reasonableness of the requested amount. After reviewing the 

exhibit and any objection, the court can affirm the award or modify it 

downward, as appropriate. 

¶32 Father also requests attorneys' fees and costs on appeal

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. Based on the record, we exercise our 

discretion and deny Father’s request for fees on appeal. Moreover, 

because he was not completely successful we decline to award him costs 

on appeal. See Valento v. Valento, 225 Ariz. 477, 484, ¶ 25, 240 P.3d 1239, 

1246 (App. 2010).

CONCLUSION

¶33 Based on our analysis, we reverse the family court’s 

calculation of Mother’s gross income and remand for redetermination of 

her gross income and related issues as directed by this decision. We also 

remand to allow the court to consider any objection Father has to Exhibit 

7, as well as the reasonableness of Wife’s requested and awarded $8000 in

 2 See Schweiger v. China Doll Rest., Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 188, 673 P.2d 927, 932 

(App. 1983).
DEKKER v. DEKKER

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attorneys' fees. We otherwise affirm the family court’s rulings in this 

matter.