Filed 3/14/24 Dowling v. Uriostegui CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

GREGORY DOWLING as 

Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DIANE URIOSTEGUI,

Defendant and Appellant.

B323346

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

16STPB03890)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Lee R. Bogdanoff, Judge. Affirmed. 

Rob Uriostegui for Defendant and Appellant.

Gifford, Dearing & Abernathy and Henry H. Dearing for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

In her prior appeal Diane Uriostegui challenged the 

probate court’s ruling that an amended trust created by Prescott 

Scott, which disinherited his son Gregory Dowling and named 

Uriostegui the trustee and sole beneficiary, was invalid because

Uriostegui procured it by undue influence and Prescott lacked 

capacity to amend the trust. We concluded substantial evidence 

supported the probate court’s findings and affirmed the 

judgment. (Dowling v. Uriostegui (Mar. 16, 2020, B294046) 

[nonpub. opn.] (Uriostegui I). 

The judgment, now affirmed, required Uriostegui to provide 

an accounting to allow the probate court to determine the amount 

of money she had wrongfully taken from the trust while she was 

trustee. When after three attempts Uriostegui failed to submit a 

proper accounting, Gregory, the successor trustee, filed a petition 

seeking restitution, damages, and interest. On July 12, 2022 the 

probate court held a hearing and awarded Gregory $1,293,138.27 

in restitution, plus $552,500 in interest. 

Uriostegui appeals from the probate court’s July 12, 2022

order, arguing that the court violated the one final judgment rule 

and that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over her. 

We conclude both arguments are legally incorrect and affirm the 

probate court’s order. We do not reach Uriostegui’s challenges to 

various other probate court rulings between 2018 and 2020 

because she did not appeal from those orders and the time to do 

so has long since expired. 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Uriostegui Uses Undue Influence To Get Prescott

To Amend the Family Trust, and the Probate Court 

Voids It

As we explained in Uriostegui I, in 2005 Prescott and Ellen 

Dowling created a revocable trust naming the couple’s two 

children, Gregory and Richard, as beneficiaries, but provided that 

Richard’s share would go to Gregory in the event Richard 

predeceased either Prescott or Ellen. The trust was amended in 

2009, but maintained essentially the same distribution

provisions. Ellen died in July 2011; Richard in March 2012. 

In March 2012 Uriostegui, who dated Richard in the 1990s, 

inherited property on Olive Street. In May 2012 Prescott 

contributed $359,138 to pay off a promissory note secured by a 

deed of trust on the Olive Street property. In a letter Prescott 

wrote Uriostegui, he described the payoff as an investment that 

would allow Uriostegui to live in the home during her lifetime 

and allow Uriostegui’s son, Rob Uriostegui, and Gregory to “have 

the option, to either sell the house or keep it for a rental at their 

discretion” after both Prescott and Uriostegui died. 

By 2014 Prescott was becoming increasingly angry with 

Gregory, and in 2015 an attorney named John Morris prepared 

an amended trust (the 2015 Trust). The 2015 Trust disinherited 

Gregory and Gregory’s children and made Uriostegui the sole 

beneficiary of the trust. 

Prescott died on June 21, 2016. Uriostegui took 

$1.8 million of trust assets, put it in her personal account, and 

began to spend it. Although she testified she could not remember 
4

how much she spent, by the time of trial Uriostegui had returned 

to her lawyers’ trust account only $750,000 of the $1.8 million.

In October 2016 Gregory filed a petition under 

Probate Code section 17200 to void the 2015 Trust on the grounds 

that Uriostegui procured it through undue influence and that 

Prescott lacked the capacity in 2015 to amend the trust. Gregory 

sought an order distributing the trust assets pursuant to the 

2009 version of the trust Prescott and Ellen had signed. Gregory 

also brought a cause of action for financial elder abuse.

Following a court trial, the probate court issued a 108-page 

statement of decision on August 15, 2018 and entered judgment 

on November 2, 2018. The probate court declared the 2015 Trust 

void because Uriostegui procured it through undue influence and 

because Prescott lacked the capacity to amend the trust as a 

result of “delusions.” The court ordered Gregory as the successor

trustee to administer the trust according to the terms of the 2009

trust documents. The court ordered Uriostegui to return the 

trust assets she had taken (plus interest), transfer title to 

Prescott’s residence to Gregory as the successor trustee of the 

trust, file an accounting as a constructive trustee, refrain from 

making any transfers that would impede the court’s orders, and 

pay Gregory his attorneys’ fees and costs. The court also ordered 

Uriostegui to transfer to Gregory an ownership interest in the 

Olive Street property “equal to the current value of the share of 

the residence purchased by Prescott Dowling” and imposed a lien 

on Uriostegui’s remaining interest in the property. Finally, the 

court found that Uriostegui committed financial elder abuse and 

that Gregory was entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Uriostegui appealed. We concluded substantial evidence 

supported the probate court’s findings that Uriostegui procured 
5

the 2015 amendment through undue influence and that Prescott 

lacked capacity in 2015 to amend the trust. We modified the 

judgment, however, to delete the provision ordering Uriostegui to 

transfer an ownership interest in the Olive Street property to 

Gregory because his petition did not include a claim seeking an

interest in the property. (Uriostegui I, supra, B294046.) 

On remand the probate court entered an amended 

judgment, dated August 31, 2020, consistent with our opinion. 

The amended judgment included a provision from the 

2018 judgment, not affected by our opinion in Uriostegui I, “that 

an evidentiary hearing regarding restitution and damages be 

held in conformity of this ruling [i.e., the 2018 judgment], said 

hearing to commence after approval of [Uriostegui’s] accounting.”

B. The Probate Court Conducts Further Proceedings on 

the Accounting

Uriostegui never filed a satisfactory accounting the court 

could approve. On February 7, 2019 she filed her first 

accounting. The probate court sustained Gregory’s objection to 

that accounting and ordered Uriostegui to prepare a new one. 

Uriostegui filed a second accounting, which the probate court 

rejected too. Uriostegui filed a third accounting, which she called 

a first supplement to her second accounting. Gregory again 

objected, arguing that Uriostegui was improperly claiming 

certain credits, that some of her claimed expenditures while she 

was trustee were improper, and that an “in-court examination is 

necessary to both explain and track such expenditures.” Gregory

also asked the court to order Uriostegui to pay him
6

$1,393,138.27,1 plus interest, to make the trust whole. The 

probate court sustained Gregory’s objections and instructed him

that, to the extent he sought affirmative relief, he should refile 

his objections as a petition. 

On February 11, 2021 Gregory, as directed, filed a petition 

seeking restitution, compensatory damages, and interest in the 

amount of $1,393,138.27. Uriostegui filed a special motion to 

strike under Code of Procedure section 425.16, arguing her 

accountings were “protected by the First Amendment and 

litigation privilege” because she submitted them to the probate 

court. The probate court denied the motion, ruling Gregory “is 

not arguing [Uriostegui’s filing of] these accountings caused 

$1,393,189.26 plus interest and remedies in damages. The 

claimed award amount is based on what [Gregory] contends is 

necessary to ‘make the trust whole’ from [Uriostegui’s] earlier 

misappropriation of Trust assets and wrongful conduct. 

[Citation.] This request follows the language of the Judgment 

which provides that an evidentiary hearing is to be held 

‘regarding restitution and damages.’ [Citation.] The fact that 

[Gregory] disputes the accuracy of the accountings and uses them 

in coming to the requested reward amount merely involves an 

evidentiary matter.” We denied Uriostegui’s petition for writ of 

mandate challenging the probate court’s order denying her 

1 Gregory claimed this amount included attorneys’ fees not 

properly chargeable to the trust ($50,000); improper cash 

withdrawals ($135,770.77); her retained portion from the 

attorney trust account ($230,655.75); insurance ($6,080.96), 

telephone charges ($5,013.10) and internet charges ($2,092.61)

that were not related to the administration of the trust; personal 

items improperly characterized as miscellaneous trust expenses 

($955,028.95); and an improper gift to her son ($8,496.13).
7

special motion to strike. (Uriostegui v. Superior Court (Nov. 3, 

2021, B315917) [order].)2

Uriostegui filed a demurrer, arguing the probate court 

lacked jurisdiction “because there is a judgment and remittitur in 

this case.” She also claimed Gregory’s petition was barred by the 

statute of limitations and claim preclusion and that he had not 

sufficiently pleaded the causes of action in the petition. The 

probate court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. 

Gregory filed a first amended petition on January 10, 2022, 

claiming an order awarding restitution, compensatory damages,

and interest was “necessary to make the trust whole without the 

necessity of an approved accounting, because it was obvious that 

Uriostegui had no intention to file an approvable accounting for 

her administration of the trust estate.” Gregory asked the court 

to order Uriostegui to return $1,393,138.27 plus interest to the 

trust. Uriostegui objected to the petition, arguing the probate 

court lacked jurisdiction. 

Uriostegui then sought to disqualify the probate court 

judge under Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1, 

subdivision (a)(6), and 170.3, subdivision (c)(1). In support of the

motion to disqualify the judge, counsel for Uriostegui (her son

Rob) submitted a declaration stating that Gregory “concocted an 

illicit scheme to collaterally attack the remittitur and amended 

judgment by filing pretextual objections to . . . Uriostegui’s 

accountings and sought exemplary damages in addition to 

compensatory damages in the objections” and that the probate 

2 An order denying a special motion to strike is appealable 

(Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World 

Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 645) and therefore generally 

not reviewable by writ.
8

court judge “allowing Gregory . . . to seek additional damages 

after the remittitur was issued would cause a reasonable person 

to have doubt that [the judge] could be impartial in this matter.” 

The probate court struck the statement of disqualification, 

stating: “To the extent Ms. Uriostegui maintains that the Court 

ruled incorrectly, . . . her remedy for an erroneous ruling is not a 

motion to disqualify, but rather review by appeal or writ from the 

ruling.” We denied Uriostegui’s ensuing petition for writ of 

mandate, which argued the probate judge showed “disobedience 

to the Remittitur of this Court” because “the Remittitur 

prohibited Gregory Dowling from filing supplemental pleadings 

post-remittitur.” (Uriostegui v. Superior Court (Aug. 3, 2022, 

B321845) [order].) 

On July 12, 2022 the probate court ruled on Gregory’s first 

amended petition. After concluding Uriostegui was entitled to a 

$100,000 credit (resulting from a malpractice action Gregory filed 

against Morris, the attorney who prepared the 2015 Trust for 

Uriostegui), the court ruled that it had previously ordered 

Uriostegui to make the trust whole and to pay interest at the rate 

of 7 percent, that the court had ordered Uriostegui to file an 

accounting, and that Uriostegui failed three times to submit an 

acceptable accounting. The probate court awarded Gregory, as 

successor trustee of the trust, $1,293,138.27, plus $552,500 in 

interest. Uriostegui timely appealed from the July 12, 2022 

order. 
9

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

“The probate court or judge is the guardian of estates of 

deceased persons and all proceedings are under the direction of 

the judge.” (County of Los Angeles v. Morrison (1940) 15 Cal.2d 

368, 371; accord, Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 103.) 

This power includes the right to order a party to provide an 

accounting. (Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 

370, 376; see Babbitt v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 

1135, 1141-1142 [Probate Code authorizes the probate court to 

compel a trustee to provide an accounting]; Christie v. Kimball

(2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413 [“Determining the need for an 

accounting is a matter within the trial court’s sound 

discretion.”].)

We review the probate court’s orders to supervise and 

protect the assets of a trust or estate for abuse of discretion. 

(Estate of Sapp, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 103-104; Estate of 

Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 718; Manson v. Shepherd

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1258.) We review de novo issues 

regarding the probate court’s jurisdiction and authority. 

(Conservatorship of Kane (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 400, 405.) 
10

B. The Probate Court’s July 12, 2022 Order Does Not 

Violate the One Final Judgment Rule

Uriostegui’s primary argument is that the probate court 

lacked jurisdiction on July 12, 2022 to enter what she calls a 

“second judgment” because “‘[t]here can only be one judgment in 

any case between the same parties.’” Uriostegui’s argument is 

doubly wrong.

Uriostegui is referring to the one final judgment rule, 

which is a procedural principle of appellate jurisdiction that 

concerns the appealability of an order or judgment; it has nothing 

to do with superior court jurisdiction. The rule avoids piecemeal 

appeals by limiting “appellate review to trial court judgments 

that finally dispose of all issues.” (Kurwa v. Kislinger (2017) 

4 Cal.5th 109, 114; see Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. 

(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 384 [“‘The one final judgment rule is a 

“fundamental principle of appellate practice that prohibits review 

of intermediate rulings by appeal until final resolution of the 

case.”’”]; Walton v. Magno (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1240 

[“‘The “one final judgment rule” has been denominated a basic 

principle of appellate practice’”].) “Under the one final judgment 

rule, ‘“an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an 

entire action.”’” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 

756; see Hoveida v. Scripps Health (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1466,

1468 [under the one final judgment rule “[a]n appeal cannot be 

taken from a judgment that fails to dispose of all causes of action 

between the parties”].) The one final judgment rule has no 

relevance to whether the probate court had jurisdiction on 

July 12, 2022 to award restitution or attorneys’ fees.

But even if this court’s jurisdiction under the one final 

judgment rule were somehow relevant to whether the probate 
11

court had jurisdiction to make the July 12, 2022 order, the rule 

would not apply. The rules governing probate appeals are 

different from those governing civil appeals.

“The right to appeal is purely statutory.” (Conservatorship 

of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67; see Estate of 

Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 801; see also Dow v. Lassen 

Irrigation Co. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 482, 483 [“The right to 

appeal is purely statutory, since neither the federal Constitution 

nor state Constitution provides for it.”].) In civil cases, the 

appellant may appeal only from a single, final judgment that 

determines “the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 577; see Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. 

Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 [“A judgment is the final 

determination of the rights of the parties [citation] ‘“‘when it 

terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the 

case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution 

what has been determined.’”’”].) Code of Civil Procedure 

section 904.1 “codifies the ‘one final judgment rule,’ which 

provides that an ‘“‘appeal may be taken only from the final 

judgment in an entire action.’”’” (Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 

Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1138; see

Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments, Inc., supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 382.)

In probate cases, however, an appellant may appeal from a 

variety of orders made appealable by the Probate Code, as set 

forth in Probate Code sections 1300 through 1304. (See Code Civ. 

Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a) [“[a]n appeal, other than in a limited civil

case, may be taken . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (10) [f]rom an order made 

appealable by the Probate Code”]; Kalenian v. Insen (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 569, 575-576 [“the Probate Code provisions 
12

concerning appealability are exclusive,” and the “appealability of 

probate disputes in general is governed by [Probate Code] 

section 1300”]; Estate of Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1118, 

1125-1126 [“It is well established that ‘[a]ppeals which may be 

taken from orders in probate proceedings are set forth in . . . the 

Probate Code, and its provisions are exclusive.’”].) This is 

because the administration of a trust or estate is a “series of 

separate proceedings, each of which is intended to be final.”

(Estate of Callnon (1969) 70 Cal.2d 150, 156; accord, In re Loring 

Estate (1946) 29 Cal.2d 423, 428; Meyer v. Meyer (2008) 

162 Cal.App.4th 983, 992; see Ross, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate 

(The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 3:3 [probate “is a continuous 

proceeding” which “involves a series of stages, each of which may 

result in an appealable order or judgment”].)

Thus, a probate court order may be appealable under the 

Probate Code even if it does not resolve all claims and issues in 

the action. Which for purposes of this appeal means that, even if 

Uriostegui were challenging our jurisdiction rather than the 

probate court’s jurisdiction, the one final judgment rule would not 

apply. Either way, the probate court had jurisdiction to make 

further orders after we issued our remittitur in Uriostegui I.

C. The Remittitur in Uriostegui I Did Not Preclude the 

Probate Court From Making Its July 12, 2022 Order

Uriostegui argues the July 12, 2022 order was a “material 

variance” from the probate court’s 2018 judgment and this court’s 

remittitur in Uriostegui I. (See Medina v. Superior Court (2021) 

65 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1226 [“‘[t]he order of the reviewing court is

contained in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the 
13

jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned’”].) 

Uriostegui mischaracterizes our opinion in Uriostegui I. 

In Uriostegui I we concluded substantial evidence 

supported the probate court’s findings that the 2015 Trust was 

invalid and that the trust’s assets should be distributed pursuant 

to the 2009 trust documents. We left undisturbed that part of the 

judgment requiring Uriostegui to return to the trust assets she 

had taken (plus interest), file an accounting as a constructive 

trustee, not make any transfers that would impede the court’s 

orders, and pay Gregory his attorneys’ fees and costs. That is 

exactly what the probate court did on July 12, 2022. (See Estate 

of Jenanyan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 703, 708 [“The probate of an estate 

consists of a series of procedures, from the initial appointment of 

an executor or administrator to the final distribution of the 

estate.”].) 

Although the amended judgment contemplated Uriostegui 

would provide an accounting before the probate court conducted

an evidentiary hearing to set the amount of restitution, 

Uriostegui never prepared an acceptable accounting, which in 

turn required Gregory (as directed by the court) to file a petition 

asking the probate court to set an amount of restitution. The 

probate court ruled on this petition on July 12, 2022 by awarding

Gregory $1,845,638.27 in restitution and interest. That’s what 

the probate court was supposed to do. (See Prob. Code, § 17206 

[“The court in its discretion may make any orders and take any 

other action necessary or proper to dispose of the matters 

presented by the petition”]; Babbit v. Superior Court, supra,

246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144 [“‘To preserve [a] trust and to respond 

to perceived breaches of trust, the probate court has wide, 

express powers to “make any orders and take any other action 
14

necessary or proper to dispose of the matters presented” by [a] 

section 17200 petition.’”]; Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427 [“Proceedings in the probate court 

‘concerning the internal affairs of the trust’ are commenced with 

the filing of a petition.”]; see also Christie v. Kimball, supra, 

202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 [probate court has “‘inherent 

equitable power’ to take ‘remedial action’”].) There was no error.3

D. The Probate Court Did Not Lack Personal 

Jurisdiction over Uriostegui

Uriostegui argues that all the orders in this case, including 

the July 12, 2022 order, are void because “[n]o summons for the 

personal appearance of [her] as an individual defendant was 

issued [or] served upon [her].” According to Uriostegui, because 

probate matters are in rem proceedings, her appearance in 

response to Gregory’s petition under Probate Code section 17200 

was not a general appearance as an individual and did not 

subject her to the jurisdiction of the probate court. Wrong again.

“Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem,” which means 

the “court’s jurisdiction is based on its authority over property 

3 Uriostegui also argues the July 12, 2022 order is void 

because the first amended petition “did not allege a cause of 

action” and “[t]here was no justiciable controversy.” She argues 

that, “[i]f trial courts are allowed to ignore these bedrock rules of 

finality by one judgment, litigation will never end”; that Gregory 

“had the audacity to attack this Court’s Remittitur improperly 

collaterally with frivolous objections and petitions,” and that 

Gregory “pulled these litigation stunts because he was enabled by 

the Superior Court.” This argument, to the extent we understand 

it, appears to be a recasting of Uriostegui’s other arguments, and 

fails for the same reasons.
15

within its territory.” (Capra v. Capra (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 

1072, 1082; see Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 434, 443 

[“A probate proceeding is essentially an in rem proceeding, in 

which the decedent’s assets within the state constitute the res.”].) 

Probate Code section 17003, subdivision (a), however, states that,

“[b]y accepting the trusteeship of a trust having its principal 

place of administration in this state the trustee submits 

personally to the jurisdiction of the court . . . .” By submitting to 

personal jurisdiction, trustees like Uriostegui do not have to be 

personally served with a summons for the probate court to have 

personal jurisdiction over the trustee (though notice is still 

required). (See Prob. Code, § 17203, subd. (a)(1) [trustees must 

be given notice by mail of petitions under section 17200].)

In any event, Uriostegui made a general appearance in the 

probate court as an individual by filing objections, a demurrer, a 

special motion to strike, and a petition to disqualify the probate 

judge, and by appearing at trial, which “is equivalent to personal 

service of summons on such party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, 

subd. (a); see Estate of Poder (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 786, 791

[“[e]ven where improper notice . . . would otherwise deprive a 

court of jurisdiction to make an order or pronounce judgment, the 

order or judgment will not be declared void if the complaining 

party has waived the defect,” and a “general appearance 

constitutes such a waiver”].)

E. We Do Not Have Jurisdiction To Review Uriostegui’s

Challenges to Other Probate Court Orders

Uriostegui challenges several orders not identified in her 

notice of appeal. For example, Uriostegui argues the 

November 2, 2018 judgment and the August 31, 2020 amended 
16

judgment after Uriostegui I are void for uncertainty because they 

provided the court would calculate the amount of restitution at a 

later time and because Gregory filed his petition pursuant to 

Probate Code section 17200 and not Probate Code section 850.

4 

Uriostegui also argues we should vacate the November 2, 2018 

judgment, as well as the August 31, 2020 amended judgment,

because the judge who conducted the trial in 2018 (and who has 

since retired) did not have jurisdiction to rule on the financial 

elder abuse cause of action,5 improperly circumvented the one

final judgment rule by requiring Uriostegui to provide an 

accounting after judgment, and was biased against her “by 

ignoring the evidence in this case.” Uriostegui also attacks the 

February 20, 2019 cost award and the March 7, 2019 attorneys’ 

fees award, arguing the probate court could not amend the

judgment to include these fees and costs while Uriostegui I was 

pending.

6 

4 Contrary to Uriostegui’s argument, Gregory properly 

challenged the validity of the 2015 Trust under Probate Code 

section 17200, subdivision (b)(3), which provides that 

“[p]roceedings concerning the internal affairs of a trust 

include . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . determining the validity of a trust 

provision.” (See Estate of Heggsted (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 

951 [the argument a petition under Probate Code section 17200 

“cannot resolve the legal status of disputed trust property

. . . defies common sense and finds no support in the law”].)

5 Which is incorrect. The probate court has concurrent 

jurisdiction over elder abuse matters. (See Estate of Bowles

(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 696; Conservatorship of Kayle (2005)

134 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.)

6 Which is also incorrect. Attorneys’ fees and costs are 

generally ancillary or collateral to the appeal. (Varian Medical 
17

Uriostegui’s notice of appeal, however, did not identify any 

of these orders or judgments. The notice of appeal states she is 

appealing only from the July 12, 2022 order. Our jurisdiction is 

limited to reviewing that order. (See Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 

Cal.App.4th 166, 170 [“We have no jurisdiction over an order not 

mentioned in the notice of appeal.”]; Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 

Cal.App.4th 963, 967 [“While a notice of appeal must be liberally 

construed, it is the notice of appeal that defines the scope of the 

appeal by identifying the particular judgment or order being 

appealed.”]; Estate of Bearns (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 221, 223 

[reviewing court does not have jurisdiction to review an order not 

mentioned in notice of appeal].)

But even if Uriostegui had listed some or all of these 

various orders and judgments in her notice of appeal, we would 

still lack jurisdiction to review them because the probate court 

made them more than 180 days ago, and her appeal would be 

untimely. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) & (e)

[appeal must be filed within 180 days of judgment or order]; see 

also Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 

113 [“the filing of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional 

Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 191; see United 

Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 

142, 161 [“‘The primary example of collateral matters not affected 

by a notice of appeal are awards of attorney fees or sanctions.’”];

Bankes v. Lucas (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 365, 369 [“filing of a notice 

of appeal . . . does not prevent the trial court from determining a 

proper award of attorney fees claimed as costs”].) In addition, 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a),

makes an award of attorneys’ fees and costs mandatory when the 

plaintiff proves financial elder abuse. (See also Prob. Code, § 859

[attorneys’ fees and costs are recoverable for elder abuse].)
18

prerequisite”]; In re A.O. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 145, 148 [“One 

of the most fundamental rules of appellate review is that the time 

for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional”]; Dakota Payphone, 

LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 509 [“‘A party who 

fails to take a timely appeal from a decision or order from which 

an appeal might previously have been taken cannot obtain review 

of it on appeal from a subsequent judgment or order.’”].) This 

rule applies equally to probate court orders. (See Estate of Reed

(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1127 [“‘orders listed as appealable in 

the Probate Code must be challenged timely or they become final 

and binding’”].) Of course, Uriostegui did appeal from the 

November 2, 2018 judgment, which resulted in Uriostegui I. 

There is no reason to decide that appeal again. (See Malatka v. 

Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082 [“on an appeal from an 

appealable ruling, an appellate court will not review earlier 

appealable rulings”]; Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement 

System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 

1370-1371 [“‘Upon an appeal’ from an appealable order or 

judgment, ‘the reviewing court may review . . . any intermediate 

ruling, proceeding, order or decision’ [citations], but it may not 

review an earlier appealable ruling. (Fn. omitted.)”]; Berge v. 

International Harvester Co. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 152, 158, fn. 1

[“On appeal from a final judgment, the appellate court may not 

review any order from which an appeal could have been taken 

but was not.”].)
19

DISPOSTION

The July 12, 2022 order is affirmed. Uriostegui’s motion to 

augment the record on appeal with documents not relevant to 

this appeal is denied. Gregory is to recover his costs on appeal.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

MARTINEZ, J.