United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 21-1165

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DROEL JARED ENCARNACION,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Allison D. Burroughs, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch and Selya, Circuit Judges,

and McConnell,* District Judge.

Murat Erkan, with whom Erkan & Associates was on brief, for 

appellant.

Karen L. Eisenstadt, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom Nathaniel R. Mendell, Acting United States Attorney, was on 

brief, for appellee.

February 18, 2022

* Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation. 
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Droel Jared 

Encarnacion challenges his convictions for certain drugtrafficking offenses. In support, he questions the propriety of 

the wiretap that led to his apprehension, the district court's 

handling of the juror-selection process, and two of the court's

evidentiary rulings. Concluding, as we do, that the defendant is 

tilling barren soil, we affirm.

I

We begin by rehearsing the facts and travel of the case. 

On August 2, 2018, Michael Patterson, a local police officer

delegated to work as part of a Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) task force, sought and received authorization from the 

district court to intercept wire and electronic communications

associated with identified telephone numbers linked to suspected

drug-traffickers, including Robin Martinez Suazo (Suazo). Suazo

was no stranger to the DEA: he had come to its attention during 

an earlier drug-trafficking probe.

Before seeking this wiretap authorization, the 

government had conducted its investigation through the use of a 

variety of techniques. It had come to believe that Suazo regularly 

sought to import narcotics into Massachusetts. It had, however, 

made only limited progress in discovering the wider parameters of 

his drug-trafficking activities and the structure of his network.
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The wiretap on Suazo's telephone quickly bore fruit.1 

On five separate dates in August and September of 2018, the DEA 

intercepted calls between Suazo and a man subsequently identified 

as the defendant. During the first four calls, the pair discussed 

prices, quantities, and varieties of narcotics, frequently using 

guarded terms and references (e.g., "blue ones," "white"), but

sometimes being more explicit. In one such call, Suazo sketched 

a scenario in which a third party would purchase drugs in Utah (a

"border zone" where prices were low) and resell them for more money 

in the Boston market. That paradigm was echoed in the last of the 

intercepted calls: the defendant, who was in Salt Lake City, told 

Suazo that he had rescheduled his flight because "the guy who was 

going to give me the thing is going to give it to me today." He

added that "I have the money on me to buy the thing and I even 

have the suitcases and all my things here, to buy it, send it and 

go straight to the airport." In the course of that call, Suazo 

reminded the defendant of the lucrative prices for which the drugs 

could be resold in the Boston area. Because prices were subject 

to fluctuation, there was some urgency to the deal: in Suazo's 

words, "We have to put a couple pesos in our pocket, man, quickly."

1 On the intercepted calls, Suazo and the defendant spoke in 

Spanish. Translations were procured, and English-language 

transcripts were used at trial.
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A few hours after this call ended, the defendant boarded

a red-eye flight to Boston. When he arrived early the next 

morning, he rented a car and drove to a house at 645 Fellsway West 

in Medford, Massachusetts. He entered the house and — later that 

morning — a Federal Express package was delivered. On the same 

day, the defendant drove to East Boston and picked up Suazo. While 

the two men were driving, DEA agents stopped their vehicle. The 

unopened Federal Express package was on the floor in the front 

seat. The shipping label indicated that it had been shipped by 

"Droel Encarnacion" in Utah to "Elisida Figueroa" at the Fellsway

West address.2 When opened, the package was found to contain 427.3

grams (slightly less than a half kilo) of cocaine. Suazo and the 

defendant were arrested on the spot.

On November 7, 2018, a federal grand jury sitting in the 

District of Massachusetts returned an indictment that, as relevant 

here, charged the defendant with conspiracy to possess cocaine

with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession of 

cocaine with like intent, see id. § 841(a)(1). During pretrial 

proceedings, the defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the 

wiretap. The district court denied his motion and, in due season, 

a three-day jury trial ensued. The jury found the defendant guilty 

2 Subsequent investigation revealed that Elisida Figueroa is 

the defendant's mother.
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on both of the charged counts, and the district court thereafter 

sentenced him. This timely appeal followed.

II

On appeal, the defendant advances four claims of error. 

We deal with those claims sequentially.

A

The defendant argues that the wiretap should not have 

been authorized and that, therefore, the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. To put this argument in

perspective, some background is useful.

Through the enactment of Title III of the Omnibus Crime 

Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2510-2522, "Congress authorized wiretapping as needed to allow 

effective investigation of criminal activities while at the same 

time ensuring meaningful judicial supervision and requiring 

specific procedures to safeguard privacy rights." United States

v. Gordon, 871 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 2017). To that end, Title 

III sets out specific showings that must be made to obtain judicial 

authorization for a wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).

At the outset, the government must adduce facts showing 

probable cause to believe that a particular defendant is linked to 

a particular crime. See id. § 2518(3)(a). It must then adduce 

facts sufficient to support "probable cause for belief that 

particular communications concerning that offense" are likely to 
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be obtained through the desired wiretap. Id. § 2518(3)(b). Next, 

the government must show that either the individual or the offense 

is sufficiently connected to the means of communication that it 

seeks to surveil. See id. § 2518(3)(d). Finally, the government 

must make a showing of necessity, that is, a showing that "normal 

investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 

reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 

dangerous." Id. § 2518(3)(c).

In this instance, the defendant premised his motion to 

suppress on two theories. He alleged, first, that the wiretap 

application was insufficient because the facts supporting the 

initial probable-cause showing were stale and unreliable. Second, 

he alleged that the wiretap application was insufficient because 

the government had not made an adequate showing of necessity.

The district court found neither theory persuasive, and 

the defendant now reprises them on appeal. Our standard of review 

is familiar. When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion 

to suppress wiretap evidence, we assay its factual findings for 

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Gordon, 871 F.3d 

at 43. In conducting this tamisage, we must determine whether the 

application was at least "minimally adequate" to support the 

authorization of the wiretap. Id. (quoting United States v. 

Santana, 342 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2003)).
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1

We start with the defendant's challenge to the adequacy 

of the probable-cause showing. It is common ground that 

information in an affidavit supporting a wiretap application must 

be timely, not stale. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 87 

F.3d 562, 568 (1st Cir. 1996). Information is stale if, for 

example, "it established probable cause at some point in the past 

but does not support probable cause at the time of the warrant's 

issuance." United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 210 (1st Cir. 

2015).

Just as different kinds of produce will retain their 

freshness for varying periods, the timeliness of probable cause is 

context-dependent and will vary both with the nature of the 

information itself and with the nature of the suspected offense. 

See United States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 119 (1st 

Cir. 2008). Thus, "[w]hen evaluating a claim of staleness, we do 

not measure the timeliness of information simply by counting the 

number of days that have elapsed." Id. "Instead, we must assess 

the nature of the information, the nature and characteristics of 

the suspected criminal activity, and the likely endurance of the 

information." Id. Facts regarding an amorphous drug-trafficking 

enterprise, in which large-scale transactions may take weeks or 

months to mature, normally will have a longer shelf life. See

Schaefer, 87 F.3d at 568 (observing that longer-running nature of 
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drug-trafficking conspiracies makes it more likely that "a datum 

from the seemingly distant past will be relevant to a current 

investigation"); United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 40 (1st 

Cir. 1988) (noting that "drug trafficking, if unchecked, is apt to 

persist over relatively long periods of time" so that the shelf 

life of facts supporting probable cause may be longer). This shelf 

life sometimes may be extended when the application describes an 

ongoing pattern of conduct in the drug-trafficking arena, see

Nocella, 849 F.2d at 40, because the probable cause determination 

will not hinge on discrete pieces of standalone evidence but, 

rather, on the totality of the circumstances, see United States v. 

Anzalone, 923 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing District of 

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018)).

In this case, the information supporting probable cause 

in the wiretap application included the following:

• Early in 2017, an alias ("Jevito") used by Suazo

was mentioned on intercepted calls during a sixmonth wiretap of an international drug-trafficking 

organization regarding shipments of drugs from 

Mexico to the United States; and a telephone number 

used by Suazo was identified as participating in 

multiple coded conversations about importing drugs 

from Mexico into the United States.
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• On August 8, 2016, a source of information (SOI-1) 

identified "Jevito" as a high-level cocaine dealer 

in Massachusetts.3 SOI-1 indicated that "Jevito" 

was his/her supplier for bulk cocaine and provided 

a telephone number that was later identified as 

having once belonged to Suazo.

• On December 27, 2017, a second source of 

information (SOI-2) identified "Jevito" as an 

individual living in Chelsea, Massachusetts, who 

had once supplied him/her with 200 grams of 

fentanyl. SOI-2 gave law enforcement a photograph

of Suazo, identifying him as the man he/she knew as 

"Jevito" and confirmed that the target telephone 

number belonged to "Jevito."

• In March of 2018, another source of information

(SOI-4) confirmed that "Jevito" lived in Chelsea, 

identified as "Jevito's" several telephone numbers 

used by Suazo, and (when describing "Jevito") 

accurately described Suazo's physical appearance. 

SOI-4 also vouchsafed that "Jevito" could move 

substantial quantities of cocaine and 

heroin/fentanyl in the Boston area.

3 Our numerical references to informants (e.g., "SOI-1") track 

those employed by the district court.
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• In April of 2018, SOI-4 introduced "Jevito" to 

another target of the investigation and brokered a 

sale of a kilogram of fentanyl between the two. 

"Jevito" and the second target conducted the 

transaction in Chelsea on May 1, 2018, and "Jevito" 

agreed to pay $50,000 for the drugs within the next 

fifteen days. Telephone records and visual 

surveillance corroborated SOI-4's narrative of the 

transaction, and agents proceeded to recover a

kilogram of fentanyl.

• On July 17, 2018, another source of information

(SOI-3) identified "Jevito" as a leader in a drugtrafficking organization based in Chelsea, which

was selling ten to fifteen kilograms of cocaine, 

heroin, and fentanyl biweekly. Although SOI-3 had 

not spoken to "Jevito" for roughly seven months, 

SOI-3 had known "Jevito" for most of his/her life 

and "Jevito" (he/she said) had been dealing drugs 

for approximately twenty years.

• In the same time frame, SOI-3 identified a Chelsea 

address associated with "Jevito," which cell phone 

data later confirmed was an address where Suazo had 

been. 
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• Telephone records and pen register data reviewed by 

government agents prior to the wiretap application 

showed that the telephone number believed to be 

associated with Suazo had been used to contact

several suspected drug dealers over a substantial 

period (up to July 20, 2018).

To be sure, the bits and pieces of information garnered 

by the government do not comprise a seamless narrative. Moreover, 

the defendant notes a number of small inconsistencies in the 

government's proffer. But seamless narratives are not the stuff 

of wiretap applications, and to hold that these relatively small 

inconsistencies undermine the district court's probable cause 

determination would require us to overlook the forest for the 

trees. Taken in the aggregate, the information contained in the

wiretap application told a convincing tale of ongoing drugtrafficking activity with Suazo front and center. The whole is 

sometimes greater than the sum of the parts and — viewed with an 

eye towards the ongoing conspiracy — the information was not stale. 

It clearly established Suazo's long-term engagement in the 

wholesale drug trade in and around Boston — an engagement that 

persisted up until the weeks immediately preceding the wiretap 

application. The facts adduced by the government were timely and 

more than "minimally adequate," Gordon, 871 F.3d at 43, to support 

probable cause for belief both that Suazo was continuing to engage 
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in the drug trade and that electronic monitoring would advance the 

investigation of his nefarious activities.

2

This brings us to the defendant's contention that the 

government failed to establish necessity for the wiretap. We 

approach this contention mindful that "wiretapping is to be 

distinctly the exception — not the rule." United States v. 

Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1307 (1st Cir. 1987).

Title III's necessity requirement is designed to ensure 

that the government makes a good-faith effort to exhaust other, 

less intrusive investigative means before seeking to employ a 

wiretap. See Gordon, 871 F.3d at 45. The government, though, 

must not be held to an unrealistic standard: its explanation of 

investigative avenues taken and those left unexplored "must be 

viewed through the lens of what is pragmatic and achievable in the 

real world." Id.; see United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 556 

(1st Cir. 1989) (noting need for "practical, commonsense 

approach"). When all is said and done, an adequate showing of 

necessity "should demonstrate that the government has made a 

reasonable, good faith effort to run the gamut of normal 

investigative procedures before resorting to means so intrusive as 

electronic interception of phone calls." Gordon, 871 F.3d at 46 

(quoting United States v. Martinez, 452 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006)).
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To carry this burden, the government is "not required 

to show that other investigatory methods have been completely 

unsuccessful." United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 19 

(1st Cir. 2002). By the same token, the government need not either 

"run outlandish risks or [] exhaust every conceivable alternative 

before resorting to electronic surveillance." Id.; see Santana, 

342 F.3d at 65. Given these parameters, it is readily apparent 

that the necessity analysis demands a "context-specific" focus. 

Gordon, 871 F.3d at 46.

This context-specific focus is especially apt where, as 

here, an investigation centers on a sprawling drug-trafficking 

network. We have noted before that "drug trafficking is inherently 

difficult to detect and presents formidable problems in pinning 

down the participants and defining their roles." United States v. 

Santana-Dones, 920 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United 

States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 728 (1st Cir. 1991)). As a result, 

"investigative personnel must be accorded some latitude in 

choosing their approaches." Id.

Moving from general principles to the specific 

circumstances of this case, the defendant first suggests that the 

government's investigative goals were overly broad and 

impermissibly vague.4 At first blush, the goals of the 

4 The government's wiretap application stated that the 

overarching goal of the investigation was "establishing the full 
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investigation appear to be in step with investigative goals that 

we have approved in the past. See, e.g., Santana-Dones, 920 F.3d

at 78 (approving goals including "discovering the sources, 

delivery means, storage locations, and distribution methods for 

the narcotics; locating resources used to finance the trafficking; 

and determining how the conspiracy invested and laundered their 

drug proceeds"); United States v. Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 10 

(1st Cir. 2003) (approving wiretap authorization when 

investigative goals involved "uncovering the full scope of the 

potential crimes under investigation, as well as the identities of 

those responsible for the unlawful manufacture, possession, sale 

and distribution of narcotics in Puerto Rico" and "obtaining 

evidence of the totality of offenses in which the targets of the 

investigation were involved"). The district court did not speak 

to this point, and we need not address it here: in the court 

below, the defendant suggested that the goals of the investigation 

were too broad and too vague only in a footnote in his memorandum 

scope and nature of the criminal activities of [Suazo and the other 

targets] and others yet unknown and their criminal associates." 

The government then gave content and texture to this general goal 

by enumerating a series of more specific ones, including 

identifying suppliers; identifying redistributors and other 

downstream associates; identifying individuals who were assisting 

the targets in collecting and laundering drug proceeds; 

identifying locations used in furtherance of the targets' drugtrafficking activities; determining sources of illicit financing 

and the disposition of drug-trafficking proceeds; and illuminating 

drug-trafficking methods.
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in support of his motion to suppress. Given this glancing 

reference, unaccompanied by any developed argumentation, we deem 

this claim waived. See Teamsters Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline 

Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) ("If any principle is 

settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary 

circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower 

court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.").

The defendant's next line of argument is that a wiretap 

was not necessary because, after the May 1 transaction, the 

government "had already achieved one of the goals of the 

investigation — identifying an individual supplying drugs to

Suazo." This argument takes too myopic a view of the necessity 

requirement. Although the government may have had enough 

information to indict and convict Suazo and one of his suppliers 

after it learned of the May 1 transaction, the government had ample

reason to believe that there were more foxes in the henhouse. The 

government is not required to abjure wiretapping and terminate an

investigation once it has satisfied a limited subset of its 

investigative goals. See Santana-Dones, 920 F.3d at 77 (explaining

that the necessity inquiry "does not hinge on whether it already 

has garnered enough goods to pursue criminal prosecution"). 

Indeed, the defendant concedes that there is "no obligation to 

arrest an individual as soon as probable cause to arrest ripens."
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Here, moreover, the government explained that the 

supplier in the May 1 transaction, which had been brokered by SOI4, was not one of Suazo's regular suppliers. Consequently, the 

transaction shed little light either on Suazo's overall operations 

or on his working network of drug suppliers. Arresting Suazo at 

that juncture would likely have driven his associates underground. 

So viewed, we think that the government sufficiently explained why

its investigation should not have been concluded following the May 

1 transaction.

Relatedly, the defendant argues that the government was 

required to try a laundry list of less intrusive investigative 

methods before seeking a wiretap. As to each of these proposed 

methods, the government offered specific and reasonable 

explanations why that method (alone or in combination with others) 

would have been unproductive, too dangerous, or insufficient to 

achieve its investigative goals.5 What is more, the government 

made a cogent showing that less intrusive investigative techniques 

— such as direct surveillance by law enforcement, use of 

5 An example may be helpful. The defendant complains that 

investigators "did not even attempt to use surveillance cameras" 

or execute search warrants. The government, however, plausibly 

explained — in its wiretap application — why surveillance cameras 

would have been of limited utility in gathering information about 

the operation of the conspiracy. So, too, it paused and explained 

that executing search warrants for locations associated with Suazo 

would have been "premature" and likely to alert other members of 

the conspiracy to the ongoing investigation.
- 17 -

confidential informants, interviews with cooperating defendants in 

other cases, and review of phone and text records retrieved from 

providers — had taken the investigation about as far as it could 

go. 

In sum, the wiretap application contained reasonable 

investigative goals, and the government plausibly explained why 

traditional means of investigation, including those it had already 

attempted, were insufficient to achieve the stated goals of the 

investigation. On this record, the district court's finding that 

the government's showing of necessity was adequate easily passes 

muster.

B

The defendant's next claim of error implicates the juryselection process. He asserts that the district court abused its 

discretion in striking for cause a juror who stated during voir 

dire that she was a proponent of "defunding the police." The 

government defends the district court's ruling and argues, in any 

event, that the defendant suffered no prejudice. See, e.g., United 

States v. Brooks, 175 F.3d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Even if the 

district court abused its discretion in striking [two prospective 

jurors] for cause, [the defendants] would not be entitled to a 

reversal of their convictions because they failed to show the 

jurors who tried their case were biased against them.").
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We review a district court's decision to strike a 

potential juror for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sampson, 

486 F.3d 13, 39 (1st Cir. 2007). Because the district court has 

the benefit of observing and interacting with potential jurors, we 

cede substantial deference to that court in assessing potential 

juror bias. See United States v. Gonzalez-Soberal, 109 F.3d 64, 

69 (1st Cir. 1997). "There are few aspects of a jury trial where 

we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of 

discretion, absent clear abuse, than in ruling on challenges for 

cause in the empanelling of a jury." United States v. McCarthy, 

961 F.2d 972, 976 (1st Cir. 1992).

The very "purpose of a jury is to guard against the 

exercise of arbitrary power." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 

530 (1975). That purpose is best served when the jury reflects a 

representative cross-section of the community, free from 

preconceived viewpoints. See id. It follows that fairness is the 

sine qua non for jury service: the jury must be "capable and 

willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." 

McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) 

(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). The voir 

dire process helps to control for this concern "by exposing 

possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential 

jurors." Id. "Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on 

voir dire may result in a juror being excused for cause." Id.
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The defendant contends that the district court 

improperly struck a juror for cause due to the juror's political 

belief about "defunding the police." In the defendant's view, the 

juror's comment reflected merely a principled skepticism about 

police testimony — not bias. This contention, though, reads the 

record through rose-colored glasses.

The critical voir dire exchange took place after the 

juror had expressed her sentiments about "defunding the police": 

THE COURT: I need to push you a little bit 

more on the answer, whether or not you have 

reservations about your ability to listen 

fairly to law enforcement testimony or you're 

confident you just can listen to it fairly and 

can make an independent evaluation based on 

that testimony.

THE JUROR: I guess I do have slight 

reservations. I can't say for sure. Sorry.

Following this response, the court ruled that because the juror 

"had expressed a reservation about her ability to be fair," it 

would be necessary to excuse her for cause.

When a juror cannot assure the court and the parties 

that she will be fair, that juror should not be allowed to serve. 

Here, the juror in question expressed doubt about her ability to 

be fair. See, e.g., McDonough Power Equip., 464 U.S. at 554; 

Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165 (1st Cir. 2013). It 

was, therefore, comfortably within the encincture of the district 

court's discretion to strike the juror for cause.
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Contrary to the defendant's importunings, the fact that 

the juror described her reservations as "slight" does not change 

the calculus in any material way. Fairness is so central to the 

jury system that a juror's sincerely expressed doubts about her 

ability to be fair, even if slight, must be taken seriously. 

Except, perhaps, in the most extraordinary circumstances — not 

present here — doubts about fairness will always tilt in favor of 

disqualification.

In an effort to blunt the force of this reasoning, the 

defendant suggests that the district court should have drilled 

down more deeply. He also suggests that the court was more 

searching when questioning other members of the venire. Even if 

such considerations are relevant to the question of whether the 

court abused its discretion in removing for cause a juror who had 

expressed reservations about her ability to be fair (a matter on 

which we take no view), they are of no help to the defendant in 

this case. The court's questioning of the juror was sufficient to 

raise a legitimate fairness concern,6 and the record lends no 

6 The district court's explanation, given in connection with 

defense counsel's objection to the removal of the juror for cause, 

is informative: 

There are plenty of jurors that expressed 

various reservations about the legal system, 

their views about people that use drugs, their 

views about drug dealers. And any of those 

people, if they said they could be fair, they 

were kept on the jury irrespective of what 

those views were. [This juror, though,] 
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credible support to the intimation that the district court applied 

some unique standard to the juror in question. Our review of the

jury-empanelment transcript confirms that the court treated 

prospective jurors even-handedly in all relevant respects. 

That ends this aspect of the matter. There is simply no 

principled way — on this record — to hold that the district court 

abused its wide discretion in removing the juror for cause.7 We 

therefore reject the defendant's second claim of error.

C

The defendant's third claim is a claim of evidentiary

error: he submits that the district court abused its discretion 

in admitting expert testimony from a DEA group supervisor, Mark 

Tully. Although Agent Tully had not himself participated in the 

investigation, the government introduced his testimony concerning 

the meaning of coded language used in recorded calls between Suazo 

and the defendant.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved in limine to block 

Agent Tully from giving testimony. The district court denied his 

motion, ruling that it would admit the testimony as long as the 

government laid a proper foundation. At trial, that foundation 

expressed reservations about her ability to be 

fair. 

7 Because we find no error, we need not consider the 

government's back-up argument that the striking of the juror caused 

the defendant no prejudice.
- 22 -

was laid. And when the government presented Agent Tully as an 

expert, the defendant's counsel stated that he had "no objection." 

In this venue, the defendant suggests that the district 

court gave unconditional approval to Agent Tully's expert 

testimony and, thus, he did not need to object at trial. We do 

not agree. Taken in context, we think that the district court's 

order was conditional thus requiring the defendant to raise any 

specific objections that he might have during Agent Tully's 

testimony. Even so, the defendant did not object to Agent Tully's 

qualification as an expert during his testimony. 

Ordinarily, a defendant must object to particular 

evidence at trial in order to preserve his appellate rights. See, 

e.g., United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 496 (1st Cir. 1997). 

But when a defendant raises such an objection before trial by a 

motion in limine and the district court's rejection of the 

defendant's position is unconditional, the defendant's objection 

may be deemed preserved even if not raised again at trial. See

United States v. Grullon, 996 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2021); United 

States v. Almeida, 748 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 2014). Here, however 

— as we have explained — the ruling was conditional, and no 

contemporaneous objection was interposed during Agent Tully's 

testimony. It follows that the arguments made by the defendant on 

appeal with respect to Agent Tully's testimony engender only plain 

error review. See Almeida, 748 F.3d at 50. "Review for plain 
- 23 -

error entails four showings: (1) that an error occurred (2) which 

was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the 

defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired 

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings." United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 

2001). 

With this preface, we turn to the defendant's claim of 

error. It rests on two grounds. First, he says that Agent Tully

should not have been allowed to testify as an expert because his 

methodology was unreliable. Second, he says that Agent Tully

should not have been allowed to testify as an expert because the

communications that he purposed to interpret consisted of "plain, 

uncoded language" and, thus, expert testimony was unnecessary. 

Neither ground withstands scrutiny.

As a starting point, we note that the defendant does not 

challenge Agent Tully's qualifications as an expert, his knowledge 

of the arcane world of drug distribution, or his wide experience 

in drug-trafficking investigations. Nor does he gainsay our 

repeated approval of the use of expert testimony, given by veterans 

of narcotics investigations, to explain the meaning of "coded" 

language in drug-related communications. See, e.g., United States

v. Henry, 848 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. 

Santiago, 566 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2009); Hoffman, 832 F.2d at 

1310. Such testimony is often helpful because in "a rough-and-
- 24 -

ready field" such as drug distribution, "experience is likely the 

best teacher." Hoffman, 832 F.2d at 1310 (approving expert 

qualification of veteran DEA officer on drug-trafficking codes and 

jargon).

The defendant nonetheless argues that Agent Tully's 

methodology was flawed. That methodology was unreliable, he says, 

because it was "self-validating": as he envisions it, Agent Tully

reverse-engineered his testimony to fit the facts revealed at 

subsequent stages of the conspiracy. Stripped of rhetorical 

flourishes, this argument is composed of little more than smoke 

and mirrors. We explain briefly.

When interpreting recorded conversations, Agent Tully

frequently would be able to narrow coded language to a range of 

possible meanings. He would then determine the precise meaning of 

the coded language based, in part, on what drugs had later been 

seized. That was not reverse-engineering but, rather, a common 

sense way of isolating the precise meaning of a coded term.

Agent Tully gave the district court a helpful 

illustration of how his methodology worked. He referred to an 

earlier investigation in which suspected co-conspirators discussed 

"palomas" and "palomitas," each consisting of "four white doves." 

Only after the contraband (four-ounce packages of cocaine) had 

been seized could the precise meaning of "paloma" and "white dove" 

be ascertained.
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The case at hand, Agent Tully indicated, was analogous. 

Kilos of "white stuff," mentioned in the recorded calls, might 

refer either to cocaine or fentanyl (both drugs in which Suazo 

allegedly trafficked). Without further information — such as was 

provided by an actual seizure — Agent Tully could not pinpoint

which drug was being discussed. When cocaine was seized, the 

meaning became evident.

Viewed against this backdrop, the defendant's objection 

crumples. Context often informs interpretive judgments, and there 

is nothing problematic about an expert's methodology aligning with 

common sense. Mindful of the wide variety of matters on which 

expert testimony may be useful, Federal Rule of Evidence 702

demands that the inquiry into an expert's methodology must be 

tailored to fit the circumstances of each particular case. See

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) 

("The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible 

one."). Especially outside of scientific fields, factors bearing 

on the reliability of an expert's methodology will vary. See Kumho 

Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (noting that 

because there are "many different kinds of experts, and many 

different kinds of expertise," the factors relevant to the 

reliability inquiry will vary). The methodology used by Agent 

Tully was not beyond the pale. In point of fact, that methodology 
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is strikingly similar to methodologies that we have deemed reliable

in other cases. See, e.g., Henry, 848 F.3d at 12. 

In a variation on this theme, the defendant argues that 

the subject matter of Agent Tully's testimony was such that it did 

not allow for any expert testimony at all. As was true of his 

"methodology" argument, this dog will not hunt.

We agree, of course, that a party should not be allowed 

to confer the imprimatur of expertise upon interpretations of 

evidence that jurors need no assistance in understanding. See

United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 51 (1st Cir. 2012) 

(explaining that when "expert testimony on a subject is 'well 

within the bounds of a jury's ordinary experience,' the risk of 

unfair prejudice outweighing probative value is not improbable"

(quoting United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 784 (1st Cir. 

1994))). In this case, though, it was neither clear nor obvious 

error for the district court to conclude that the decisional scales

tipped in favor of allowing expert testimony.

To begin, it was neither clear nor obvious error for the 

district court to find that expert testimony would be helpful to 

the jury in understanding the jargon used by Suazo and his 

confederates. For instance, when Suazo and the defendant discussed 

"blue ones" and "yellow ones," the Agent's expert testimony 

rendered those terms intelligible as, respectively, 30-milligram 

Percocet pills and 10-milligram Percocet pills. His expert 
- 27 -

knowledge as to the color and strength of pills peddled by drug 

dealers in the New England market was helpful to the jury in 

understanding the recorded conversations.

We think, as well, that Agent Tully's expertise was 

helpful to the jury in explaining the nature of the transactions

to which the coded terms related. See Henry, 848 F.3d at 12 

(upholding officer's expert testimony not directly related 

"obscure jargon" admissible because officer "drew upon his 

expertise in explaining the relevance of the communications in the 

drug trade"); United States v. Monell, 801 F.3d 34, 45 (1st Cir. 

2015) (permitting expert testimony related to drug-dealer 

methods). For example, Agent Tully was able to assist the jury in 

understanding the economics behind an intercepted discussion of 

the relative advantages of "pure" cocaine versus "cut" cocaine. 

Because a pure product can be cut without degrading its potency 

below marketable quality, more profit can be reaped from increasing 

marketable volume through the use of adulterants. In contrast, a 

"cut" product yields profit mainly through price arbitrage between 

locations — "getting it here and selling it." And, relatedly, 

Agent Tully was able to explain how discussions of price tied into 

these distinctions. 

Last — but surely not least — the district court took 

appropriate steps to guard against any unfair prejudice. For one 

thing, it gave considerable latitude to the defendant in cross-
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examining Agent Tully about alternate meanings of various terms. 

For another thing, it was careful to instruct the jury to weigh 

the evidence independently.8 These safeguards were sufficient —

in the circumstances at hand — to mitigate any risk of unfair 

prejudice. See Henry, 848 F.3d at 12; Rosado-Pérez, 605 F.3d at 

56.

Nothing more need be said about Agent Tully's testimony. 

We conclude that there was no plain error in the district court's

challenged rulings concerning this testimony. Accordingly, we 

reject the defendant's third claim of error. 

D

This leaves the defendant's claim that the district 

court erred in permitting the government to introduce evidence of 

four intercepted calls between Suazo and the defendant. In those 

calls, the two men discussed, among other things, potential drug 

transactions apart from the one that led directly to the 

defendant's arrest.

8 Pertinently, the district court instructed the jury that it 

was free to "accept or reject [the expert's] testimony in whole or 

in part." The court also instructed the jury that "[i]n weighing 

the testimony, [it] should consider the factors that generally 

bear upon the credibility of a witness as well as the expert 

witness's education and experience, the soundness of the reasons 

given for the opinion and all other evidence in the case." 

Finally, the court directed that the jury alone should "decide how 

much of the expert witness's testimony to believe, and how much 

weight it should be given."
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The question is one of timing. The indictment charged 

a compressed conspiracy beginning on September 17, 2018 and ending 

on September 18 of the same year. The four challenged calls 

occurred on earlier dates (August 12, August 20, August 29, 

September 11). During pretrial proceedings, the defendant moved 

in limine to exclude evidence of these calls, contending that 

because they took place before the opening date of the charged 

conspiracy and some involved different drugs, they were "prior bad 

acts" evidence, likely to confuse the jury and cause unfair 

prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The district court denied the defendant's motion, 

holding that the four challenged calls did not reflect "separate 

acts, but rather acts intrinsic to the charged conspiracy" and, 

thus, were admissible without regard to Rule 404(b). In the 

court's view, the conversations — which dealt with the "planning

other similar narcotics transactions" — furnished "evidence of how 

the [d]efendant and his co-conspirator entered into an overarching 

conspiracy" and were admissible to "show the course of dealings

between co-conspirators." The district court held, in the 

alternative, that even if the four calls were considered "prior 

bad acts" evidence within the ambit of Rule 404(b), they 

nonetheless could be admissible to "explain the background, 

formation, and development of the illegal relationship." (quoting 

United States v. Green, 698 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)). The 
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court added that the probative value of the evidence was not 

substantially outweighed by any cognizable danger of unfair 

prejudice.

The defendant renewed this objection at trial, but the 

district court held firm. The evidence was admitted, and the 

defendant presses his claim of error on appeal. Our review is for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Simon, 12 F.4th 1, 40-

42 (1st Cir. 2021) (Rule 403); United States v. Robles-Alvarez, 

874 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2017) (Rule 404(b)).

Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other acts is not 

admissible to prove a defendant's character or propensity, but 

such evidence may be admitted if it has "special relevance." 

Henry, 848 F.3d at 8. Evidence may have special relevance if it 

is offered to show, say, "motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 

lack of accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Even if specially 

relevant, though, such evidence is inadmissible if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial 

effect. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. And when evidence is intrinsic to 

elements of a charged offense, Rule 404(b) is simply not 

implicated. See, e.g., Robles-Alvarez, 874 F.3d at 50; VillarmanOviedo, 325 F.3d at 11.

Here, the district court, in effect, used a belt and 

suspenders. The court prudently made alternative holdings. It 
- 31 -

held that the challenged calls were intrinsic to the conspiracy 

and that — even if they were not — they were admissible under Rule 

404(b). The defendant contests both rationales.

To begin, the defendant contends that the calls were not 

intrinsic to the charged conspiracy because they transpired

several weeks before the conspiracy's opening date. Moreover, 

certain of the calls focused on drugs and transactions other than 

the ones involved in the charged conspiracy. This contention is 

not without some bite, and we think it arguable that some of the 

calls were not intrinsic to the charged conspiracy. But we need 

not decide this question: rather, we assume, albeit without 

deciding, that the four earlier calls were not intrinsic to the 

charged conspiracy and that, therefore, Rule 404(b) applies.

Even on this defendant-friendly assumption, it was not 

an abuse of discretion to admit the four recorded conversations 

into evidence. In our judgment, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in determining that all the calls had special 

relevance because they were harbingers of what was to come: they 

were probative of the development of the charged conspiracy and of 

the nature of the working relationship between Suazo and the 

defendant. See United States v. Green, 698 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 

2012) (holding that "in a conspiracy case, 'evidence of other bad 

acts . . . can be admitted to explain the background, formation, 

and development of the illegal relationship, and, more 
- 32 -

specifically, to help the jury understand the basis for the coconspirators' relationship of mutual trust'" (alteration in 

original) (quoting United States v. Escobar-de Jesús, 187 F.3d 

148, 169 (1st Cir. 1999))).

The defendant demurs, insisting that even if the calls

had special relevance, their admission created an intolerable risk 

of unfair prejudice. Admitting them, he muses, likely lured the 

jury into convicting him based on general speculation that he was 

a drug dealer.

The district court rejected this plaint, and so do we. 

Particularly in light of the revelatory nature of the calls and

the other compelling evidence of the defendant's guilt, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

the probative value of the calls was not substantially outweighed 

by any unfairly prejudicial effect. See Green, 698 F.3d at 56; 

Escobar-de Jesús, 187 F.3d at 169-70; see also Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

We have made it luminously clear that "[o]nly rarely — and in 

extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista 

of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot 

judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and 

unfair effect." United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 59 (1st 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 

1340 (1st Cir. 1988)). This is a far cry from that rare case.
- 33 -

III

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

the judgment of the district court is 

Affirmed.