Opinion filed November 4, 2021

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-19-00331-CR

__________

RICARDO KELLY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 142nd District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR52972

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court convicted Ricardo Kelly of assault of a peace officer. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b-2) (West Supp. 2020). The trial court assessed 

his punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division of Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice for a term of five years. Appellant challenges his conviction in 

three issues. We affirm.
2

Background Facts

On January 9, 2019, Officer Gage Smith and Officer Zachary McCammond

responded to a call for service at a residence in Midland. Both officers responded 

wearing their standard Midland police officer uniforms and driving their standard 

patrol vehicles. Dispatch advised the officers that there was a man in the house who 

was acting very erratic and was being restrained by other occupants of the house. 

Officer Smith testified that, as they approached the house, they could hear 

screaming. An occupant of the home guided the officers through the house to where 

Appellant was located. That same occupant also informed the officers that he did 

not know why Appellant was acting the way he was acting. 

When the officers found Appellant, “[h]e was sitting down, had his feet -- his 

knees brought up to his chest. He was screaming. Very wide-eyed, looking all 

around.” Appellant reacted violently when Officer Smith and Officer McCammond 

shined their flashlights on him. A nearby occupant in the home told Officer Smith 

that the flashlights were causing Appellant to react aggressively. Appellant agreed 

with the occupant’s statement, indicating to Officer Smith that Appellant understood 

what the officers were telling him. Officer Smith testified that it appeared to him 

that Appellant was hallucinating; he believed that Appellant was high on 

methamphetamine. 

Officer Smith verbally tried to calm Appellant down, but he quickly learned 

that words alone were not working. Officer Smith then tried to go “hands-on” with 

Appellant to calm him down. It was at this point when Appellant began to kick and 

grab at Officer Smith. In response to this conduct, Officer McCammond stepped in 

to aid Officer Smith in restraining Appellant. At this point, Sergeant Corson arrived 

on scene and observed a silver object in Appellant’s hand, which he believed was a 

knife. 
3

After observing the silver object in Appellant’s hand, Officer Smith decided 

that they needed to place Appellant in handcuffs as quickly as possible due to 

potential safety risks. As the officers were attempting to handcuff Appellant and get 

him to his feet, Appellant “began actively resisting, pulling away, refusing to stand 

up, still screaming and kicking, [and] grabbing onto other officers.” Once on his 

feet, Appellant began flailing his arms and pulling away from the officers. It took 

Officer Smith, Officer McCammond, and Sergeant Corson to finally get the 

handcuffs on Appellant.

After Appellant was handcuffed, the officers removed him from the residence 

and determined that he did not have a knife. While handcuffed, Appellant continued 

resisting arrest. Officer McCammond placed Appellant in the back of another 

officer’s patrol car on his stomach. Because of Appellant’s behavior while the 

officers were trying to handcuff him, and Appellant’s continued resistance once the 

handcuffs were on, Sergeant Corson and Officer McCammond decided that Officer 

McCammond should ride in the back of the patrol car with Appellant. While 

transporting Appellant to the Midland County Jail, Officer McCammond lay on top 

of Appellant to further restrain him, as he was continuing to struggle in the back of 

the patrol car. 

Once the officers arrived at the jail, Officer McCammond attempted to remove 

Appellant from the patrol car. Officer McCammond first tried to get control of 

Appellant’s legs and remove him from the car. However, instead of complying with 

Officer McCammond and exiting the car, Appellant “pulled his one leg forward and 

then kicked backwards into [Officer McCammond’s] leg.” Officer McCammond

then got back on top of Appellant to control him and remove him from the car. 

Officer McCammond then had Appellant placed in a “restraint chair” to complete 

Appellant’s booking. 
4

The State charged Appellant by indictment with assault of a peace officer. 

The State alleged that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused 

bodily injury to Officer McCammond by kicking and stomping him.

Analysis

We address Appellant’s first and third issues together because both issues 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction. In 

Appellant’s first issue, he contends that there was insufficient evidence that he 

possessed the requisite mens rea to assault a police officer. In his third issue, 

Appellant makes a general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

his conviction.

A person commits assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes 

bodily injury to another. Id. § 22.01(a)(1). The offense becomes assault on a peace 

officer and is a felony of the second degree if it is committed against a person the 

actor knows is a peace officer while the peace officer is lawfully discharging an 

official duty. Id. § 22.01(b-2).

We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard 

of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all 

of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 

When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted 

at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. 

Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Winfrey II); 

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the 
5

factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness

testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for 

the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and 

to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting 

inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the 

verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 

S.W.3d at 778. 

It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt; 

circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a 

defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish 

guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing 

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not 

point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating 

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. 

Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, appellate courts are not 

permitted to use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Instead, 

appellate courts must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. 

State, 514, S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). 

In his first and third issues, Appellant contends that he did not possess the 

requisite mens rea to assault Officer McCammond and that, therefore, his conviction 

is not supported by sufficient evidence. A person acts intentionally “when it is his 

conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” PENAL 

§ 6.03(a) (West 2021). A person acts knowingly “when he is aware that his conduct 

is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts recklessly 
6

“when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 

that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). 

Appellant suggests that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew 

that Officer McCammond was a police officer. We disagree. However, Appellant 

kicked Officer McCammond after three or four police officers handcuffed him and 

transported him to jail in a marked police car with Officer McCammond physically 

restraining him in the patrol car by lying on top of Appellant. Accordingly, the trial 

court could have reasonably inferred that Appellant knew that Officer McCammond 

was a police officer at the time Appellant assaulted him. 

Appellant next contends that because of his mental condition, and possible 

intoxication, he was incapable of forming any level of intent necessary to be guilty 

of assaulting a police officer. “Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense 

to the commission of a crime.” PENAL § 8.04(a). Furthermore, evidence of 

intoxication “does not negate the elements of intent or knowledge.” Hawkins v. 

State, 605 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Therefore, it is 

irrelevant whether Appellant was under the influence at the time he committed the 

offense. 

A person’s intent to commit a crime “can be inferred from the acts, words, 

and conduct of the accused.” Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1995). Throughout all of Appellant’s interactions with the police, Appellant 

was actively resisting the officers’ attempts to calm him down, place handcuffs on 

him, and take him to their patrol car. Because of Appellant’s actions, Officer 

McCammond and Sergeant Corson felt it was necessary for Officer McCammond to 

ride on top of Appellant to the Midland jail to prevent Appellant from further 

harming himself, other officers, or the property within the patrol car. Additionally, 

Appellant continued to struggle while being transported to the jail. Based on 

Appellant’s resistance throughout the entire interaction with the police, a reasonable 
7

factfinder could infer that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or—at the very 

least—recklessly kicked Officer McCammond in an attempt to further resist the 

police. 

Appellant also contends that he could not have acted intentionally, knowingly, 

or recklessly because he was merely acting reflexively and never took “aim” at 

Officer McCammond. The record does not support this contention. Officer 

McCammond testified as follows: 

Q. So at the point where he actually kicked you, can you describe 

for the Court how he did that? 

A. It was kind of like a donkey kick, I guess would be the best 

way to describe it. He pulled his one leg forward and then kicked 

backwards into my leg. 

Q. Did he do that more than once or just the one time? 

A. One time, sir. 

Q. And at that point in time when he did that, had you just gotten 

off of him?

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. So no question that he would have known you were still very 

close to him at the point when he kicked you, correct? 

A. Yes, sir.

The testimony shows that Appellant was aware that Officer McCammond was near 

him and that, by moving his leg forward and then kicking it back, Appellant 

disregarded the risk that his leg would strike Officer McCammond. Appellant was 

also conscious for the entire encounter with the police, and there was testimony to 

show that Appellant was able to understand the things the police said to him. 

Appellant’s final contention regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is that 

because Officer McCammond was “barely injured,” Appellant lacked a culpable 

mental state. The Penal Code defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness, or 
8

any impairment of physical condition.” PENAL § 1.07(a)(8). “Any physical pain, 

however minor, will suffice to establish bodily injury.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 

683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Here, Officer McCammond testified that the kick 

caused him pain. Accordingly, it is irrelevant that Officer McCammond did not 

experience any lasting injuries from the kick. 

Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold 

that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to have determined beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant committed assault upon a peace officer by kicking 

Officer McCammond. We overrule Appellant’s first and third issues. 

In Appellant’s second issue, he contends that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant contends that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because trial counsel “failed to call a single witness” and “minimally 

questioned the State’s witnesses.” To establish that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance at trial, Appellant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that 

the result would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Thompson v. State, 9 

S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687–88 (1984)). 

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome of the trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. There is a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance, and the defendant must overcome the presumption that the 

challenged action could be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “must be firmly founded in the 

record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged 

ineffectiveness.” Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814 (quoting McFarland v. State, 928 

S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Direct appeal is usually an inadequate 
9

vehicle to raise such a claim because the record is generally 

undeveloped. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Direct appeal is especially inadequate when counsel’s strategy does not appear in 

the record. Id. Trial counsel should ordinarily have an opportunity to explain his 

actions before an appellate court denounces counsel’s actions as 

ineffective. Id. Without this opportunity, an appellate court should not find 

deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was “so outrageous that no 

competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 57 

S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim App. 2001)).

We note at the outset that although Appellant filed a motion for new trial, he 

did not assert ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, it does not appear that 

a hearing occurred on Appellant’s motion for new trial. Accordingly, trial counsel 

has not had an opportunity to explain his actions at trial. 

Appellant asserts that trial counsel was deficient because counsel did not call 

any witnesses in favor of Appellant. To establish prejudice because of trial counsel’s 

failure to call these witnesses during the guilt/innocence phase of trial, Appellant is 

required to show that such witnesses were available and that he would have benefited 

from their testimony. Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) 

(citing King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). Nowhere in the record

does Appellant show that there were witnesses available for his trial counsel to call

that would have provided testimony beneficial to Appellant. Accordingly, Appellant 

has failed to show that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses. 

Appellant additionally contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

counsel only minimally cross-examined the State’s witnesses. As noted above, trial 

counsel has not had an opportunity to explain or defend his trial strategy in response 

to the matters that Appellant contends were deficient. Appellant essentially contends 
10

that such an inquiry is unnecessary because trial counsel’s deficient conduct is 

“evident from the record.” We disagree.

In Ex parte McFarland, the court held that a trial counsel’s decision to not 

more extensively cross-examine a State’s witness was a matter of defense strategy. 

163 S.W.3d 743, 755–56 (Tex. Crim. App 2005). Here, Appellant broadly contends 

that his trial counsel was ineffective because he minimally cross-examined the 

State’s witnesses. However, Appellant makes no suggestion as to what his trial 

counsel should have asked the State’s witnesses. Conversely, the record reflects that 

Appellant’s trial counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of the State’s 

witnesses. Appellant’s trial counsel even pointed out an inconsistency in Officer 

McCammond’s testimony regarding when the jail staff brought out the restraint chair

for Appellant. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish that his trial counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that the results 

of the proceeding would have been different but for trial counsel’s alleged 

deficiencies. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. 

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JOHN M. BAILEY

CHIEF JUSTICE

November 4, 2021

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.