Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of 

res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the 

law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

YVETTE M. LAPLANTE GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Keating & LaPlante, LLP Attorney General of Indiana 

Evansville, Indiana

LARRY D. ALLEN

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ANDREW LEE BARNETT, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 82A04-1309-CR-444

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge

Cause No. 82D02-1304-FB-511

March 31, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Judge
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Case Summary and Issue

Following a jury trial, Andrew Barnett was convicted of attempted armed robbery, 

a Class B felony; attempted burglary, a Class B felony; intimidation, a Class C felony; 

carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor; and resisting law 

enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. He appeals his convictions, raising one issue for 

our review: whether sufficient evidence supports his convictions. Concluding the State 

presented sufficient evidence, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

The facts most favorable to the judgment indicate that for three months in 2013 

Barnett lived with his friends Derrick Hickerson, Terry Adams, and Adams’s wife and 

daughter. Hickerson’s name was on the lease, and he paid all of the bills. Hickerson 

asked the people staying with him to contribute to living expenses but no one did. By the 

end of March or early April, the Sheriff had placed an eviction notice on Hickerson’s 

door. Hickerson moved out. 

Hickerson moved in with Latarius Watkins and did not share his new address with 

Adams or Barnett. Late on the night of April 5, 2013, while Hickerson was putting 

together a television stand at his new residence, Barnett, Adams, Adams’s family, and 

Cassandra Kalbarchick opened Hickerson’s unlocked door and walked into Hickerson’s 

apartment. 

The women were intoxicated and sat down inside Hickerson’s apartment. Adams 

demanded money or the television from Hickerson. Adams showed Hickerson a knife 

while Barnett called Hickerson names and told Adams they should just take the 

television. Adams’s wife took the knife away from her husband and everyone, including 
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Hickerson, left the apartment and went outside. At that point, Watkins returned home 

and entered the apartment with Barnett following him in. Inside, Watkins and Barnett 

fought and later returned outside where Barnett drew a gun and pointed it at both Watkins 

and Hickerson. He again called Hickerson names, told Adams they should just take the 

television, and threatened to shoot. The group eventually left in their vehicle and 

Hickerson called 911. 

Officer Jackie Lowe, who was patrolling the area, was advised of a home invasion 

involving a possible weapon from which the suspects fled in a maroon car. She came 

upon a vehicle matching that description and initiated her overhead lights. The car came 

to a nearly complete stop, and a man exited from the rear driver’s side door and ran. 

Barnett stipulated at trial that he was the man who fled. Additional officers and a K-9 

unit were called to the scene and tracked Barnett to a nearby home from which they 

recovered Barnett’s hat and a loaded .380 caliber pistol. The gun’s safety was off and the 

hammer was cocked as if ready to fire. Barnett did not have a license to carry a handgun. 

A jury found Barnett guilty of attempted armed robbery and attempted burglary, 

both Class B felonies; intimidation, a Class C felony; and carrying a handgun without a 

license and resisting law enforcement, both Class A misdemeanors. Barnett was 

sentenced to concurrent terms totaling ten years. Barnett now appeals his convictions. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

In reviewing claims for sufficiency of evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or 

judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bocanegra v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. We only consider the evidence most favorable to the 
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verdict and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. Id. As long as each 

element of the charged crime may be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will 

be affirmed. Glenn v. State, 999 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

Barnett points to several instances where Hickerson’s deposition statements differ 

from his testimony at trial regarding Barnett’s involvement in the crime and the nature of 

the relationship between Hickerson and Barnett. He argues that Hickerson’s testimony is 

therefore inconsistent and inherently contradictory and under the incredible dubiosity 

rule, insufficient to support his convictions.1

Under the “incredible dubiosity rule,” this court may impinge upon the jury’s 

responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses only when confronted with inherently 

improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony. Manuel 

v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Application of this rule is rare, and 

the standard applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently 

improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. Id. Further, this rule “applies only 

when a witness contradicts himself or herself in a single statement or while testifying, 

and does not apply to conflicts between multiple statements.” Livers v. State, 994 N.E.2d 

1251, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

 

1 Barnett’s Appellant’s Brief does not include a Statement of Issues as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 

46(A)(4). His Summary of Argument is that Hickerson’s “testimony is inherently contradictory, [and] this Court 

should overturn [Barnett’s] conviction.” Appellant’s Brief at 4 (emphasis added). He states at the outset of his 

standard of review that “[t]he evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for attempted armed robbery.” Id. It 

may be that Barnett challenges only the single conviction of attempted armed robbery, but because Barnett 

challenges Hickerson’s testimony which was offered to prove the crimes of attempted armed robbery, attempted 

burglary, and intimidation, we address all three crimes. We assume Barnett concedes his convictions of carrying a 

handgun without a license and resisting law enforcement are supported by the evidence.
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Equivocal phrases during testimony do not necessarily make the testimony 

incredible. In Livers, the victim of a battery testified the defendant hit her in three 

different ways: through a car door window, over the door, and through the door itself. 

These accounts, while equivocal, did not make the testimony incredible because the 

victim “consistently testified” that Livers struck her on the left side of her jaw and “never

deviated from that testimony.” Id.

Here, Barnett argues that Hickerson’s testimony is equivocal and inconsistent at 

trial when compared to his deposition. Yet the incredible dubiosity rule “does not apply 

to conflicts between multiple statements.” Id.; see also Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 

1011, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“The incredible dubiosity rule applies to conflicts in 

trial testimony rather than conflicts that exist between trial testimony and statements 

made to the police before trial.”). Therefore, any inconsistences between Hickerson’s 

deposition and trial testimony are irrelevant. Further, Hickerson, like the victim in 

Livers, consistently made the same claim: Barnett entered Hickerson’s home uninvited, 

encouraged Adams to take Hickerson’s television, and pointed a gun at him. Any minor 

inconsistencies or equivocal statements in his trial testimony fail to rise to the level of 

incredible dubiosity, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury’s.

Conclusion

The State presented sufficient evidence to support Barnett’s convictions of 

attempted armed robbery, attempted burglary, and intimidation. We therefore affirm the 

convictions.

Affirmed.

BARNES, J, and BROWN, J., concur.