1 Rule 10 (Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee). Affirmance Without Opinion . --

(a) The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm the action of the trial court by order without rendering a formal opinion when a n opinion would have no precedential value and one or more of the following circumstances exist and are dispositive of the appe al: (1) the Court concurs in the facts as found or as found by ne cessary implication by the trial cou rt. (2) there is material evidence to support the verdic t of the jury. (3) no re versible error o f law app ears. 

# FILED

October 3, 199 7 Cecil W. Crowson Ap pellate Cou rt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE WESTERN SECTION AT NASHVILLE JORDA N BAIR, M inor, b/n/f/ ) From the Circuit Court and Par ent, MA RK B AIR, ) for Dic kson County , Tennesse e Plaintif fs/Appe llants, ) The Honorable L eonard W. Mart in, Judg e ) vs. ) ) Dickson Cir cuit No. CV600 JOH N DO E, ) Appeal No. 01A01- 9610-CV-00471 ) Defendant/Appel lee. ) AFFIRMED ) ) Richard Baker ) Mark W. Str ange ) Knoxvill e, Tenness ee ) Attorney for Plaint iffs/ Appellants ) ) Lela M. Ho llabaugh ) Nashvill e, Tenness ee ) Attorney

for Def endant/Appell ee

RULE 10 ORDER

This matter appears appropriate for c onsideration pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. 1 In this case, Appellants Jordan, Whitney, Linda, and Mark Bair ( “the Bairs”) were traveling

on 1-40 near Dickson, Tennessee. Hillary Bair, a f ifteen-year-old with a learner’ s permit, took over the driving f

rom her mo ther, Lin da Bair. T en minute s later, w hile tr aveling at the speed of 65 m.p.h., the lega

l speed lim

it, Hillar y decide d to pass a

tractor -traile r in front of her. As her mother watched her, Hillary checked the

rear- view mirr

ors, put on

her lef t-hand tu rn signal , looked to her left to make sure there were no vehicles in the left-ha nd lane, and, see

ing no othe

r cars, began to p

ull into the left-hand lane. Linda Bair also looked at the lef t-han d lane an d also saw no other c ars. There was an impact from behind, on the left rear bumper of the Bair vehicle. Hillary then saw a light-colored vehicle pass by. The van began to fishtail, and Hillary lost control of it. The van ran off the r oad into a n embankm

ent and r olled, ca using var ious injuri es to the A

ppellant s. T he Bairs never identified the vehicle that struck their van or its driver . Th ey filed sui tagainst

the unidentified motorist, John Doe, alleging that the unidentified motorist was speeding and negligen tly struck th e Ba ir vehicle. A response to the Bairs’ Complaint was filed by Appellee Go vernmental Employees Insurance C ompany (“GEICO”), pursuant to Tennessee’s uninsured moto r vehicle statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201. GEICO filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Bairs were unable to produce evidence from which a jury could find negligence on the part of John Doe. In support of this motion, GEICO quote d from the deposition of the plaintiff’s expert, in which the expert admitted that he could not testify that the John Doe vehi cle was s peeding o r was othe

rwise ne gligent in

coming into

contact with the Bairs’ vehicle. In opposition to GEICO’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Bairs asserted that bec ause the

Bair vehicle was traveling at the speed limit, the jury could reasonably infer that the John Doe vehicle was speeding, because the John Doe vehicle struck the plaintiffs in the rear as they c hanged la

nes. Finding no dispute d issue of materia l fact, th e trial c ourt g ranted GEICO’s motion for summary ju dgment. Fr

om this dec ision, the

Bairs now

file this a ppeal. Our rev iew of the

trial cou rt’s orde r grantin g summary

judgment is de novo on the r ecor d before this Court, with no presumption of correctness. Carvel l v. Botto ms , 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). From our examination of therecord , the evid ence is i nsuffic ient to permit a j ury to infer that John Doe was speeding or otherwise ne gligent. Therefore, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to GEICO was appropriate. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the Appellant, for which execution may issue if necessary.

____________________________________ HOLLY KIRBY LILLARD, J.

CONCUR:

________________________________ W. FRANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S .

________________________________ ALAN E. HIGHERS, J.