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*********************************************** 
DAVID BLINN v. DESH SINDWANI

(AC 40985)

Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for negligence

in connection with personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an

automobile accident that occurred in 2012. The plaintiff alleged, inter

alia, that the accident caused him to suffer mental anguish and exacerbated preexisting conditions of anxiety and depression, for which he

sought treatment in 2014 and 2015. During trial, the parties had agreed

to enter into evidence certain treatment records of a mental health

treatment provider from whom the plaintiff sought counseling in 2104

and again in 2015 and 2016. The treatment records contained references

to various incidents of the plaintiff’s prior misconduct, including a prior

conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or drugs, and a citation he had received for his alleged

involvement in a 2014 motor vehicle accident. The trial court sustained

the defendant’s objections to the plaintiff’s motions in limine, which

sought to exclude all references to his prior convictions and misconduct,

as well as the citation. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the

plaintiff, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:

1. The plaintiff’s claim that the evidence of his prior misconduct should

have been precluded was unavailing; the prior misconduct evidence was

relevant to the issue of whether the 2012 accident caused emotional

distress for which the plaintiff claimed damages and sought treatment

in 2014 and 2015, as it tended to show that the plaintiff’s treatment at

the mental health service provider did not result from the 2012 accident

but, rather, resulted from other events and stressors in his life, including

the prior misconduct, and the trial court properly determined that the

probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and

did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the defendant’s objection to

the plaintiff’s motion in limine with respect to the plaintiff’s prior convictions and other misconduct.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the

2014 motor vehicle citation; the citation was relevant to the damages

element of the plaintiff’s claim because it tended to make it less probable

that the plaintiff’s treatment with the mental health provider resulted,

in whole or in part, from the 2012 accident, and the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the

evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, as the plaintiff testified that

the citation was particularly stressful because of its bearing on his

probation status and the custody of his child.

Argued March 19—officially released September 10, 2019

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the defendant’s alleged

negligence, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Tolland, where the court, Farley, J., sustained

the defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s motions in

limine to preclude certain evidence; thereafter, the matter was tried to a jury; judgment for the plaintiff, from

which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Blake A. Driscolli, with whom was Peter J. Brown,

for the appellant (plaintiff).

Julie Harris, with whom, on the brief, was Yelena

Akim, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

BEACH, J. In this personal injury action arising out

of an automobile accident, the plaintiff, David Blinn,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered

following a jury verdict against the defendant, Desh

Sindwani. The plaintiff claims that the court erred by

sustaining the defendant’s objection to his motions in

limine that sought to preclude evidence of the plaintiff’s

(1) prior misconduct and (2) citation arising from a

motor vehicle accident that occurred on June 6, 2014,

which resulted in a violation of the plaintiff’s probation

stemming from a 2013 conviction for operating a motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor

or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a. We

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts which the jury reasonably could

have found and procedural history are relevant on

appeal. On June 15, 2012, the plaintiff was operating

his motorcycle on Route 83 in Rockville, Connecticut.

As he traveled northbound, he approached Pease Farm

Road in Ellington on his right. The defendant was

stopped at a stop sign on Pease Farm Road waiting to

proceed onto Route 83. As the plaintiff approached the

intersection, the defendant pulled out from the stop

sign. The plaintiff struck the defendant’s driver’s side

rear door and was ejected from his motorcycle. The

plaintiff commenced this action alleging that the accident was caused by the defendant’s negligence in the

operation of his motor vehicle. The plaintiff sought, in

pertinent part, damages for mental injuries suffered as

a result of the accident. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged

that the accident caused him mental anguish and exacerbated preexisting conditions of anxiety and depression. The defendant filed a special defense alleging that

the plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the accident

and damages.

The parties agreed to enter into evidence certain

treatment records from Community Health Resources

(CHR), a mental health services provider, from whom

the plaintiff sought counseling from January 7, 2014

through December 10, 2014, and again from July 9, 2015,

through October 12, 2016. These treatment records contained references to various incidents of the plaintiff’s

prior misconduct, including a ten month term of incarceration for felony larceny, harassment charges, and

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence,

as well as a citation for driving an unregistered vehicle.

Claiming lack of relevance, remoteness, and high

potential for prejudice, the plaintiff filed a motion in

limine to exclude all references to his prior nonfelony

convictions, arrests, and misconduct. The plaintiff filed

a second motion in limine to exclude all references to

a citation that he received for his alleged involvement

in a motor vehicle accident that took place on June 6,
2014, which the plaintiff said could be used to suggest

that he was involved in a subsequent motor vehicle

accident and that his alleged injuries were the result

of that accident, or to suggest bad character. The plaintiff also argued that evidence concerning the June 6,

2014 citation was a collateral matter that would distract

the jury and unduly prejudice him.

The defendant objected to the plaintiff’s motions in

limine, asserting that both the evidence of prior misconduct and the evidence of the 2014 citation would not

be offered for any impermissible use, such as showing

bad character but, rather, to dispute the claim that the

earlier accident that was the subject of the trial was a

cause of the plaintiff’s emotional distress and a reason

he sought psychotherapy at CHR. The defendant argued

in opposition to the motion in limine that ‘‘[t]o permit

the plaintiff to proceed with a claim that the therapy

he had at CHR was due to the 2012 accident, and that

his ongoing anxiety and distress was due solely to injuries he suffered in that accident, without permitting the

defendant to introduce alternative explanations for the

plaintiff’s treatment and distress, which explanations

appear in the treatment record itself, would be a miscarriage, as it is highly probative of the plaintiff’s damage claim and is admissible for that reason.’’ (Emphasis

in original.)

The court sustained the defendant’s objection for the

reasons stated in the objection but limited the defendant’s use of the misconduct evidence to that which was

related to anxiety and depression and was contained

in the treatment records. Further, the court ordered

that the defendant was not to introduce into evidence

facts of the incidents themselves, but rather only the

proceedings that were triggered by those underlying

incidents and any effects that they may have had on

the plaintiff’s mental health.

At trial, the plaintiff offered into evidence treatment

records regarding his sessions at CHR between January

7, 2014, and October 12, 2016. The treatment records

indicated that the plaintiff was ordered by the court,

in connection with dissolution proceedings, to attend

treatment at CHR.1 The plaintiff also submitted bills for

mental health treatment that he had received at CHR

and Manchester Memorial Hospital totaling $20,708.61.

When asked on direct examination about his mental

health and treatment history, the plaintiff said that he

had been in counseling for anxiety and mood disorders

for most of his life. He also was asked specifically about

what had brought him to CHR. He cited issues relating

to his divorce but also testified that the accident that

was the subject of this case was an additional reason

why he continued to seek treatment.

On cross-examination, the plaintiff testified about

various incidents of prior misconduct and their effects
on his mental health leading up to and throughout his

treatment at CHR.2 He also testified about the motor

vehicle citation issued on June 6, 2014.3 The plaintiff’s

counsel did not object to the introduction of such evidence at any point during the cross-examination, nor

did he ask for curative instructions regarding limited

use of this evidence by the jury. During closing argument, the defendant’s counsel told the jury that she did

not intend to disparage the plaintiff for his past. Instead,

she highlighted the roles that the prior misconduct and

the June, 2014 citation played in the plaintiff’s seeking

and receiving treatment at CHR.4

The jury found that the defendant was liable and that

the plaintiff was entitled to damages of $58,500. The

jury also found that the plaintiff’s negligence was 50

percent responsible for the accident, and it reduced the

total damages award to $29,250. The court accepted

the verdict and rendered judgment accordingly. This

appeal followed.

‘‘Our standard of review for evidentiary matters

allows the trial court great leeway in deciding the admissibility of evidence. The trial court has wide discretion

in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed

only if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice

appears to have been done. . . . The exercise of such

discretion is not to be disturbed unless it has been

abused or the error is clear and involves a misconception of the law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Russo, 62 Conn. App. 129, 133, 773 A.2d 965

(2001). In reviewing for abuse of discretion, ‘‘the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293,

299, 303 A.2d 709 (1972).

I

We first address the plaintiff’s claim that evidence

of his prior misconduct should have been precluded.

Specifically relying on § 4-5 of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence, the plaintiff argues that the evidence did

not fit any of the exceptions to the general rule of

inadmissibility. The defendant responds that such evidence was relevant to the plaintiff’s claim that his treatment for anxiety and depression in 2014 and 2015

resulted from the 2012 accident. We agree with the

defendant.

The Connecticut Code of Evidence provides, in relevant part, that ‘‘[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,

except as otherwise provided by the constitution of the

United States, the constitution of the state of Connecticut, the Code, the General Statutes or the common law.’’

Conn. Code Evid. § 4-2. Relevant evidence is defined

as ‘‘evidence having any tendency to make the existence

of any fact that is material to the determination of the

proceeding more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.’’ Conn. Code Evid.
§ 4-1.

‘‘Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person

is inadmissible to prove the bad character, propensity,

or criminal tendencies of that person . . . .’’ Conn.

Code Evid. § 4-5 (a). However, subsection (c) of § 4-5

provides that such evidence is admissible ‘‘for purposes

other than those specified in subsection (a), such as to

prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or

scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a

system of criminal activity, or an element of the crime,

or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.’’ Conn.

Code Evid. § 4-5 (c). This court has recognized that this

code section is applicable to both criminal and civil

cases. See Senk v. Senk, 115 Conn. App. 510, 518, 973

A.2d 131 (2009).

To determine the admissibility of prior misconduct

evidence, we use a two part test. ‘‘Under the first prong

of the test, the evidence must be relevant for a purpose

other than showing the defendant’s bad character or

criminal tendencies.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Martin V., 102 Conn. App. 381, 386, 926 A.2d 49, cert. denied,

284 Conn. 911, 931 A.2d 933 (2007). Recognized purposes include those enumerated in § 4-5 (c) but are not

limited to such. See id. Second, ‘‘[f]or prior misconduct

evidence to be admissible, it must not only be relevant

and material, but also more probative than prejudicial.’’

State v. Campbell, 328 Conn. 444, 522, 180 A.3d 882

(2018). ‘‘Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging

to one’s case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates

undue prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it

to be admitted. . . . The test for determining whether

evidence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging to the defendant but whether it will improperly

arouse the emotions of the [fact finder]. . . . The trial

court . . . must determine whether the adverse impact

of the challenged evidence outweighs its probative

value. . . . [B]ecause of the difficulties inherent in this

balancing process . . . every reasonable presumption

should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . .

Reversal is required only [when] an abuse of discretion

is manifest or [when] injustice appears to have been

done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Solomon, 150 Conn. App. 458, 463, 91 A.3d 523, cert denied,

314 Conn. 908, 100 A.3d 401 (2014).

In Campbell, our Supreme Court held that the listed

exceptions in section 4-5 (b)5 of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence are intended to be illustrative rather than

exhaustive. State v. Campbell, supra, 328 Conn. 519. ‘‘A

court is not precluded ‘from recognizing other appropriate purposes for which other crimes, wrongs or acts

evidence may be admitted, provided the evidence is not

introduced to prove a person’s bad character or criminal

tendencies . . . .’ ’’ Id., quoting Conn. Code Evid. § 4-

5 (b), commentary;6

see State v. Campbell, supra, 519

(holding that establishing means for committing crime
is appropriate alternative purpose for which prior misconduct evidence may be admissible); see also State v.

Cooper, 227 Conn. 417, 424–25, 630 A.2d 1043 (1993)

(holding that prior misconduct is admissible to complete story of crime on trial by placing it in context of

nearby and nearly contemporaneous events).

The prior misconduct was relevant to the issue of

whether the accident caused emotional distress, for

which the plaintiff claimed damages. The trial court

properly admitted the misconduct evidence for the limited purpose of providing reasons for and the context

of the plaintiff’s treatment for anxiety and depression in

2014 and 2015. During his therapy sessions, the plaintiff

discussed various stressors in his life, including court

involvement, financial difficulties, his son’s needs, and

his divorce.7 The plaintiff did not mention the 2012

accident until his session on February 18, 2014. At his

session following the June 6, 2014 citation, the plaintiff

described how the incident affected him.8 He further

elaborated on the incident’s impact, particularly as it

related to his probation status, in the sessions that followed.9 The references to the misconduct are relevant

because they tended to show that the plaintiff’s treatment at CHR did not result from the accident, but rather

from other events, including the prior misconduct.

Although issues of causation and damages in civil cases

are not among the exceptions expressly listed in § 4-5

(c), we hold that the misconduct evidence in this case

was material to the plaintiff’s claim for emotional damages and was admitted for an appropriate purpose.10

We next consider whether the trial court properly

determined that the probative value of the evidence

outweighed its prejudicial effects. The plaintiff claims

that the introduction of the evidence inappropriately

biased the jury and caused it to reduce the damages

award by 50 percent due to comparative negligence.

The defendant argues that the plaintiff put his emotional

injuries and treatment records at issue by seeking monetary compensation for his treatment at CHR. We agree

with the defendant.

Our Supreme Court has noted that ‘‘[t]he party who

initiates discussion on the issue is said to have opened

the door to rebuttal by the opposing party. . . . The

purpose of allowing the introduction of such evidence

is not to give the opposing party a license to introduce

unreliable or irrelevant evidence but to allow the opposing party to put the initial offer of evidence into its

proper context.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Somers v. LeVasseur, 230 Conn. 560,

565, 645 A.2d 993 (1994). Here, the evidence that the

plaintiff sought to preclude provided necessary context

for his claim that he required treatment for anxiety and

depression in 2014 and 2015 as a result of the 2012

accident by highlighting the extent to which there were

other stressors in his life that likely contributed to his
need for treatment at CHR. As reported in the treatment

records, the plaintiff’s general discussion of his court

involvement as an ongoing stressor was not specific; it

was unclear what court proceedings he was referring

to. The evidence elicited in cross-examination regarding

the plaintiff’s prior misconduct was highly probative

because it developed the specific nature of the court

involvement to which the plaintiff was referring.

Because the plaintiff introduced the contents of the

treatment records and claimed that his mental health

treatment was a result of the accident, he ‘‘opened the

door’’ to admitting the evidence. He was not unfairly

prejudiced by the contents of the medical records that

were related to his treatment at CHR.

In support of his claim that the evidence was more

prejudicial than probative, the plaintiff contends that

the defendant had other evidence available to dispute

that the treatment resulted from the accident. Specifically, he claims that the therapy records as a whole

sufficiently demonstrated that he ‘‘discussed stressors

in his life beyond his injuries from the accident, including his background, family and financial issues, without

exposing the highly prejudicial facts concerning his convictions for harassment of his ex-wife, [operating a

motor vehicle while under the influence], [v]iolation of

[p]robation, and a thirty-day incarceration, as well as

arrests that did not even lead to a conviction.’’ He further argued that the prejudicial effect of a criminal

record far outweighed any disadvantage that the defendant may have endured ‘‘if the jury was not made aware

that [the plaintiff] had been ordered to attend therapy

in connection with court proceedings and that during

part of those therapy sessions he discussed stressors

he was experiencing from those criminal charges.’’ We

disagree. Although the plaintiff did testify about other

noncriminal stressors in his life, it would have been

reasonable for the jury to find that the arrests and

convictions were significantly disruptive in his life and

thus were responsible, at least in part, for his treatment

at CHR.

Ultimately, the jury found partly in favor of the plaintiff on liability and awarded monetary damages to compensate him for the injuries he suffered. The plaintiff’s

claim that he was compensated unfairly because of the

introduction of evidence of misconduct is misplaced.

The jury reduced its award because it found the plaintiff’s negligence was a cause of his damages. ‘‘Upon

issues regarding which, on the evidence, there is room

for reasonable difference of opinion among fairminded

men, the conclusion of a jury, if one at which honest

men acting fairly and intelligently might arrive reasonably, must stand, even though the opinion of the trial

court and this court be that a different result should

have been reached.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trzcinski v. Richey, 190 Conn. 285, 298–99, 460

A.2d 1269 (1983). The issue of liability was contested;
there was conflicting evidence, and the jury reasonably

could have concluded on the evidence that the plaintiff’s

negligence was partly responsible for the damages.11

We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

in concluding that the introduction of the plaintiff’s

prior arrests and convictions was not so unduly prejudicial as to outweigh their probative value or in sustaining

the defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s motion in

limine with respect to the plaintiff’s prior convictions

and other misconduct.12

II

The plaintiff also claims that the court erred in failing

to preclude evidence of a motor vehicle citation dated

June 6, 2014, which resulted in a violation of the plaintiff’s probation stemming from a 2013 conviction for

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.

Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that even if evidence

of the June 6, 2014 citation were properly admissible,

the defendant’s inquiry into the matter exceeded the

scope prescribed by the trial court. For the purpose

of our analysis of admissibility, we see no material

differences between evidence of the citation and evidence of the prior arrests and convictions discussed in

Part I of this opinion. Both categories of evidence were

used to show other stressors in the plaintiff’s life. The

June 6, 2014 citation was relevant to the damages element of the plaintiff’s claim, because it tended to make

it less probable that the plaintiff’s treatment at CHR

resulted, in whole or in part, from the 2012 accident.

The plaintiff himself testified that the citation was particularly stressful because of its bearing on his probation status and the custody of his child. Accordingly,

we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

in determining that the probative value of the evidence

outweighed its prejudicial effects.

The plaintiff argues that the inquiry by the defendant’s

counsel into specific details associated with the June

6, 2014 accident exceeded the scope prescribed by the

trial court. We disagree. The plaintiff’s counsel failed

to make any objections during the line of questioning.

‘‘Appellate review of evidentiary rulings is ordinarily

limited to the specific legal issue raised by the objection

of trial counsel. . . . By failing to object . . . the

defendant failed to preserve this claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patterson, 170 Conn. App.

768, 786, 156 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 910, 158

A.3d 320 (2017). The issue was raised for the first time

in the plaintiff’s appellate brief, and we are not bound

to consider it. Practice Book § 50-5; White v. Mazda

Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 619, 99 A.3d

1079 (2014). The plaintiff’s counsel additionally did not

request curative instructions. The plaintiff contended

that ‘‘no curative instruction would have prevented the

jury from having yet another reason to possess a negative bias towards the Plaintiff.’’ Yet, in supporting his
argument that the trial court’s error was harmful, the

plaintiff highlighted the fact that ‘‘the court took no

corrective measures, such as curative instructions, to

mitigate the effect of the evidentiary impropriety.’’ The

plaintiff cannot simultaneously argue that the curative

instructions would have been ineffective, yet contend

that the trial court’s failure to provide such instructions

contributed to harmful error. We are unconvinced by

the plaintiff’s inconsistent argument. See Modaffari v.

Greenwich Hospital, 157 Conn. App. 777, 787–88, 117

A.3d 508 (holding that plaintiff’s repeated requests for

additional curative instructions and later contention

that she would have suffered further prejudice had

court given jury additional curative instructions was

inconsistent), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 904, 122 A.3d 1279

(2015). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting evidence of the June 6, 2014

citation.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The medical record included the following: ‘‘[The plaintiff] came in today

per the orders of the court. He . . . currently reports that he is only here

to do what he needs to for the courts. . . . He does report that he has been

‘on edge and stressed’ with all of the court proceedings but other than that

he reported no mental illness.’’

2 The following colloquy occurred between the defendant’s counsel and

the plaintiff:

‘‘Q. Did you say—which is what the record says, which is in evidence,

David [the plaintiff] reported that 2013 was a hard year for him as he was

going through ugly divorce, dealing with family court, juvenile court, and

criminal court.

‘‘A. Okay. That’s accurate.

‘‘Q. You were referred to CHR for services in 2015 by your probation

officer. Correct?

‘‘A. Yes, that was—yes.

‘‘Q. You had been on probation for charges which included harassment.

That was the dispute with Audra.

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Which was first pressed in 2012, and a DUI [operating a motor vehicle

while under the influence], which occurred in September, 2013. Correct?

‘‘A. I—yes, I was charged with a DUI.

‘‘Q. Okay. That was September 8, 2013?

‘‘A. Sounds correct.

‘‘Q. And as a result of both of those charges, that is the DUI and the

harassment charge, you pled guilty to a sentence which resulted in you

being placed on probation.

‘‘A. Yes, I pled guilty because given my circumstances and dispute over

custody, I was kind of forced to make a pleading in that manner.

‘‘Q. Was that a stressful event in your life?

‘‘A. It was.

* * *

‘‘Q: Okay. And in fact, the reason that you went to Community Health

Resources in 2014 was because it was ordered as part of a custody evaluation. Correct?

‘‘A. That’s correct.

‘‘Q. And in fact, separately, the court encouraged you to attend therapy

for relapse present—prevention due to the DUI.

‘‘A. It’s possible, yes.

‘‘Q. Okay. So you, you didn’t go to therapy with Community Health

Resources because of problems you were having from this 2012 motorcycle

accident. You were ordered there by the court.

‘‘A. I did not seek the treatment for that, no.’’

3 The following colloquy occurred between the defendant’s counsel and

the plaintiff:
‘‘Q. Stay with me. June, 2014, early morning, the police arrest you and

charge you with being responsible for a car leaving the road and hitting the

tree and charge you with driving an unregistered motor vehicle. Correct?

‘‘A. They gave me a ticket, but yes.

‘‘Q. Okay. And this was very stressful to you. Wasn’t it?

‘‘A. It was stressful considering—

‘‘Q. Yeah.

‘‘A. —it had nothing to do with me.

‘‘Q. Well—

‘‘A. Well, not nothing, but I wasn’t driving the vehicle.

‘‘Q. Not only that, but you were on probation at the time.

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And you knew that you potentially faced some jeopardy of going

to jail—

‘‘A. That would be correct.

‘‘Q. —for violating the terms of your probation. Correct?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. In fact, you told your health care provider at the Community Health

Resources, your therapist, that you were concerned with this latest charge,

that you’d have to go to jail and lose custody of your son and you had been

told in fact a warrant was going to be issued for your arrest on those charges.

‘‘A. Yes.’’

4 The defendant’s counsel, in closing argument, stated: ‘‘What he’s not

entitled to do is blame personal turmoil, which happened after 2012, on

[the defendant]. What you have here is a claim that court-ordered psychotherapy to the tune of $4000 in 2014. The record, which is in evidence, Exhibit

17, indicates right there, it’s in evidence, ladies and gentlemen, that [the

plaintiff] was there ordered by the court. He had a DUI. He was charged

with a restraining order violation, and he was in the midst of a custody

dispute. And the court said we want you to get therapy. That’s all well and

good and I wouldn’t be talking to you about it, except he’s monetizing this

event and claiming it’s all due to this intersection collision in 201[2]. That’s

why we’re talking about it. You can read the records, because they’re in

evidence. David reported that 2012 was a hard year for him as he was going

through ugly divorce, dealing with family court, juvenile court, and criminal

court. I bet. I bet it was. But it’s not the fault of this intersection collision,

and that’s what I mean by a tell.’’

5 The Connecticut Code of Evidence was amended in 2011, and subsection

(b) of § 4-5 was redesignated as subsection (c).

6 See footnote 5 of this opinion.

7 The records provide: ‘‘[The plaintiff] reported that 2013 was a hard year

for him as he was going through [an] ugly divorce, dealing with family court,

[j]uvenile court and criminal court.’’

8 The records provide: ‘‘[The plaintiff] reported not doing well due to a

motor vehicle incident that occurred on 6/6/14 which he is being charged

with driving an unregistered car. . . . [The plaintiff] claims he is afraid to

lose custody of son if he goes to jail.’’

9 For example, ‘‘[the plaintiff] reported has not been doing well due to

violating probation and possibly having to get a lawyer. [The plaintiff] claims

there is a chance he can go to jail but he is hopeful he doesn’t. . . . [The

plaintiff] reported he is feeling very sad about situation and is fearful that

son will be taken away.’’

10 We note that on its face, § 4-5 (a) prohibits the introduction of misconduct evidence ‘‘to prove . . . bad character, propensity, or criminal tendencies . . . .’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5 (a). The evidence in this case was not

admitted for any of the proscribed purposes.

11 Particularly contested was the speed at which the plaintiff was traveling

just before the accident occurred. The defendant contended that the plaintiff

was speeding above the forty miles per hour speed limit, which had contributed to the accident. The following colloquy occurred between the defendant’s counsel and his reconstruction expert:

‘‘Q: So if you had a motorcycle traveling at the speed of forty miles an

hour that was confronted by a vehicle pulling out of the Pease Farm Road

intersection just as it crested that hill, fair to say with all reasonable accident

reconstruction certainty, the bike should’ve been able to stop.

‘‘A: Correct.

‘‘Q: No collision?

‘‘A: No collision.

‘‘Q: All right. Same, same situation. Assume hypothetically, the bike crests

the hill at a speed of fifty-five miles per hour, how much distance will the
bike need to cover to come to a stop?

‘‘A: 252 feet .03.

‘‘Q: So if the bike is traveling at fifty-five miles per hour, is there going

to be a collision?

‘‘A: Yes.’’

12 In light of our conclusion that the evidence was properly admitted, we

need not consider the defendant’s argument that the rulings were harmless.