UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JO ANN WILKERSON , Plaintiff,

v. MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, in his official capacity as Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Defendant. Case No. 1:16-cv-00909 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Jo Ann Wilkerson claims that her former employer, th e Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), di scriminated against her on th e basis of her race, sex, and age, and requests relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq ., and the Age Discrimination in Emp loyment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Am . Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 10. The FDIC moved for summary judgm ent. Upon consideration of the pleadings, relevant law, related legal memoranda in oppos ition and in support, and the e ntire record, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact e xists and that the FDIC arti culated legitimate, nondiscrimination reasons for its actions, which Ms. Wilkerson has not rebutted as pretextual. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will b e granted.2 I. BACKGROUND

A. Ms. Wilkerson’s Employment at the FDIC Ms. Wilkerson is a 58 year old, 1 African-American woman who served as a Senior Community Affairs Specialist wi thin the FDIC’s Outreach and Pro gram Development Section (the “Section”). Id. ¶ 5. She held this role, a CG- 15 level position, as a term em ployee for four years, between February 2011 and February 2015. Id. ¶ 8. Ms. Wilkerson describes her responsibilities to include “conduct[ing] research on community development issues of concern to financial institutions, and [] develop[ing] educational/outr each material to help facilitate bank investment in economic and commu nity development projects.” Id . One of the educational materials on which she worke d was a handbook called “Strategies for Community Banks to Develop Partnerships with Communi ty Development Financial Insti tutions” (the “CDFI Guide”).
See id . ¶¶ 9, 10(i). Throughout her tenure at the FDIC , Ms. Wilkerson’s first-level supervisor was Section Chief Luke Reynolds, who Ms. Wilk erson characterizes as “a whit e male in his late 30s.” Id. ¶ 8. For most of her tenure, Ms . Wilkerson’s second-level supe rvisor was Elizabeth Ortiz, Deputy Director of the FDIC’s Division of Depositor and Consume r Protection, but Janet Gordon, Associate Director of the Section, became her second-le vel supervisor for the last nine months of her term ( i.e. , June 2014 to February 2015). Def.’s Statement of Material Fa cts as to Which There is No Genuine Disput e (“Def.’s SOMF”) ¶¶ 4-5, ECF N o. 17. 2

1 As of the time of her Amended Complaint.

2 Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the Defendant’s Stat ement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Dis pute reflect facts undisputed by M s. Wilkerson.3 B. Ms. Wilkerson’s Complaint – Discrimination Claims Ms. Wilkerson alleges that the FDI C discriminated against her o n the basis of her race, sex, and age, particularly as compared to a “younger white male colleague,” James Yagley, who held the same position as Ms. W ilkerson and was another of Mr. Reynolds’ direct reports. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Her discrimination cla ims fall into three categori es. First, Ms. Wilkerson claims th at in the time leading up to Nove mber 2014, she received disparate treatment than Mr. Y agley, such as: (i) being told th at she was not permitted to travel to meetings and conferences as a term employee; (ii) being denied access to certain shared electronic resources (e.g., comput er drive, Community Affairs f older, CARDs system); (iii) not being given a laptop; (iv) not be ing provided opportunities to present at meetings of the Regional Community Affairs Officers or mode rate national webinars; (v) n ot being able to attend the meetings of the FDIC Chairpers on’s Advisory Committee of Econom ic Inclusion; and (vi) being denied attendance at the Commun ity Reinvestment Act training he ld in March 2012 and the FDIC’s Examination School for N on-Examiners held in February 20 15. Id. ¶ 10. 3 She also alleges that her performance rating of “III – Accomplished Prac titioner” on her 2013 performance evaluation was lowe r than she previously received. Id. Second, Ms. Wilkerson argues th at her 2014 performance evaluati on, where she received a “III – Accomplished Practitione r,” was lower than she deserve d vis-à-vis Mr. Yagley’s performance that year, for w hich he was rated a “IV.” Id. ¶ 9; Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4 (Aff. of Luke Reynolds) at 9, ECF No. 17-2. The 2014 evaluation period covered September 2013 to

3 Ms. Wilkerson labels these ev ents in ten sub-parts, but for c larity and brevity, the alleged actions have been summarized and similar actions have been cate gorized together.4 August 2014, and was delivered to Ms. Wilkerson in November 201 4. Id. Ex. 3, ECF No. 17-2; Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Third, Ms. Wilkerson claims that her work in 2014 on the CDFI G uide deserved a monetary award since Mr. Yagley received “substantial cash awar ds for much less important work” at the FDIC. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

C. Ms. Wilkerson’s Complaint – Retaliation Claims Approximately a week before her term at the FDIC concluded, Ms. Wilkerson filed a formal complaint of discriminati on with the FDIC’s Office of Mi nority and Women Inclusion.
Id. ¶ 11. A few days later, she appl ied to be a permanent Communi ty Affairs Specialist at either the Lexington, Kentucky or Ralei gh, North Carolina positions, b oth CG-13 level postings. Id. ¶ 13. Ms. Wilkerson conducted two rounds of interviews for the positions, but was not selected for either. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. She claims that her s econd-level supervisor, Ms. Go rdon, was aware of her discrimination complaint and retaliated against her by not selecting Ms. Wilkerson for either position. Id. ¶14.

II. LEGAL STANDARD To prevail on summary judgment, the movant must show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that the m ovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine i ssue of material fact i s one that would change the outcome of the litigation. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248. The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Johnson v. Perez , 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016).5 Discrimination and retaliation claims are evaluated under the f ramework explained in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff must fir st establish a prima facie case; the burden then shift s to the employer to “articulate a legitimate, non[-] discriminatory and/or non-retal iatory reason for the adverse employment action;” whereupon the burden shifts back to the pla intiff to “demonstrate that the offered non-discriminatory reason was, in fact, pretext for a p rohibited reason.” Mokhtar v. Kerry , 83 F. Supp. 3d 49, 70 (D.D.C. 2015). In this Circuit, at the summary judgment stage, a court need not decide whether t he plaintiff actually made a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas

. Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms , 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The central inquiry is whether the employee has “produced sufficient eviden ce for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non- discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discrimin ated against the employee on th e basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. To answer this, the court consid ers the “total circumstances of the case,” including “any evidence th e plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions, and [] any further evidence of dis crimination that may be available to the plaintiff . . . or any contrary e vidence that may be availa ble to the employer.” Evans v. Sebelius , 716 F.3d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

III. ANALYSIS

Each of Ms. Wilkerson’s claims fail as a matter of law because she has not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrat e that the FDIC’s articulated, non-discriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons for its acti ons are pretext for discriminat ion.6 A. Discrimination Claims

1. Disparate Treatment Each of Ms. Wilkerson’s allegatio ns of disparate treatment has been met by the FDIC with a legitimate, non-discrimi natory reason for the action, wh ich Ms. Wilkerson has not shown to be pretextual. With respect t o her claim that she was not p ermitted to travel to meetings and conferences as a term employee unlike Mr. Yagley, the FDIC asse rts that Ms. Wilkerson was not told that she could not travel, but rather that she was ineligi ble for a Professional Learning Account as a term employee. M em. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Mot. for Summ. J.”) 17, ECF No. 17-1. The account provides funds to FDI C employees for external training opportunities. Id. As term employees, neither Ms. Wilkerson nor Mr. Yagley were eligible for these funds. Id. at 18. Term employees, however, we re eligible to travel to me etings and conferences for work-relate d purposes, which Mr. Yagley did for certain of his assignments, and, in fact, Ms. Wilkerson did too. Id. ; Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 9 (Pl.’s Answers to Def.’s Interrogs.) at 48, ECF No. 20-9 (Ms. Wilkerson stating that she participated in four meetings that involved travel) . Though she alleges that Mr. Ya gley was afforded more travel opportunities than she was, Ms. W ilkerson has not rebutted the FDIC’s explanation that his travel was work-related or—more importantly—demonstrated that s he had fewer or was denied travel opportunities because of her race, sex, or age. Her sel f-serving allegation that race, sex, and/or age motivated the appare ntly discrepant decisions does n ot suffice. See Mokhtar , 83 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (“Summary judgment for a defendant is most likel y when a plaintiff’s claim is supported solely by the plaintiff’ s own self-serving, conclusor y statements” because these “do not create genuine issues of mate rial fact.”) (internal quotati on marks omitted).7 The record also shows that Ms. W ilkerson was granted access to the electronic resources that she complains that she di d not receive as quickly as Mr. Y agley. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 36 (email from Mr. Reynolds reque sting information technology supp ort provide Ms. Wilkerson with “full access” to the Co mmunity Affairs Folder); id. Ex. 37 (email from Ms. Wilkerson to Mr. Reynolds confirming that she wa s granted access to CARDs). Ms. Wilkerson offers no evidence that these resources w ere denied or delayed to her on account of her race, sex, and/or age, and, in any event, it is not clear that delayed access is sufficient to establish that Ms. Wilkerson suffered an adverse action. See Huang v. Wheeler , 215 F. Supp. 3d 100, 110 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing a cla im alleging discrimination for d enying sick leave that was eventually granted); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming the grant of summar y judgment to the Government beca use the plainti ff failed to show that he suffered an adverse action). With respect to being provided alaptop computer, the FDIC asse rts that laptops were reserved for employees who regul arly traveled, and that Mr. Rey nolds was not involved in approving or obtaining a laptop for Mr. Yagley. Mot. for Summ. J. 20. The record does not indicate who requested or appr oved for Mr. Yagley to receive a laptop, much less that the decision was made on a discriminatory basis between Mr. Yagley and Ms. Wilkerson. In response, Ms. Wilkerson does not offer evidence to show that th e FDIC’s proffered legitimate reason was pretextual, but asks th e Court to infer it merely fr om her statement that Mr. Yagley was given a laptop from the start of his employment while she w as not. See Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 12 (Dep. of Jo Ann W ilkerson) 109:14-22, ECF No. 2 0-12; Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 4, ECF No. 20.8 Ms. Wilkerson also claims that she was not provided the same op portunities as Mr. Yagley to present at the quart erly meetings of the Regional Community Affairs Officers or to moderate webinars. Am. Com pl. ¶¶ 10c, i. In response, the FDIC states that Mr. Yagley attended some of the quarterly meetings because part of his rol e was to evaluate one of their initiatives. Mot. for Summ. J . 20. The particular webinar tha t Ms. Wilkerson sought to moderate was instead moderated by Ms. Ortiz , the Deputy Director of the Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection. Id. Ex. 10 (Dep. of Luke Reynolds) 204-05, ECF No. 17-2. The Court detects no invidious discrimina tion in a manager’s desire to mo derate a webinar that Ms. Wilkerson herself describes as an important FDIC product. See Mot. in Opp. for Summ. J. 12-13. These reasons—which are bus iness decisions unrelated to Ms. Wilkerson’s race, sex, or age—have not been sho wn to be pretextual. Ms. Wilkerson also quarrels with not being permitted to attend the meetings of the FDIC Chairperson’s Advisory Committee of Economic Inclusion. Am. Co mpl. ¶ 10f. Mr. Reynolds explained that this was due to s pace constraints, but that an o verflow room was later opened to permit FDIC staff to attend. Mot. for Summ. J. 20-21. The rec ord does not indicate whether Ms. Wilkerson later attended the meetings via the overflow room or through a live feed on her computer. See id. at 21; Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . Ex. 9 at 49 (Ms. Wilkerson st ating that the meeting could be watched via a li ve stream on the FDIC’s websit e). It is also not clear whether these meetings were always avail able to watch via a live stream , and thus Ms. Wilkerson’s true objection is being unable to a ttend in person. In any event, n one of these outstanding questions present a genuine issu e of material fact and Ms. Wilkerson has not adequately demonstrated that her absence from these meetings was motivated by her race, sex, or age.9 The same is true for her disput e with being denied participatio n in the FDIC’s Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA ”) training and the ExaminationSchool for NonExaminers. Mr. Reynolds testifi ed that none of his staff atten ded the CRA training because the course was “specifically for exa miners.” Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 10 (Dep. of Luke Reynolds) 202:7-12. With respect to the Examination School, Mr. Reynolds explained that Ms. Wilkerson’s participation was denied because her term was s cheduled to end the same month as the training, and it did no t make sense for the FDIC t o pay for this training under these circumstances. Mot. for Summ . J. 21. Ms. Wilkerson has not of fered any evidence to rebut this legitimate, non-discriminatory e xplanation. Furthermore, she h as identified no evidence that Mr. Yagley participated in e ither of these trainings. See Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 5. Last, Ms. Wilkerson alleges that her score of “III – Accomplish ed Practitioner” during her 2013 performance evaluation was “ significant[ly] lower thanthe rating she had previously received.” Am. Compl. ¶ 10h. How ever, she does not allege tha t her evaluation was due to illegitimate reasons, but merely s tates that she was “undeservi ng” of the lower rating. See id

. For this perfunctory and conclu sory claim, Ms. Wilkerson has no t made out a prima facie case, and no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel , 365 F.3d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (articulating the elements of a prima facie case as (1) being a member of a protected class, (2) suffering an adverse employmen t action, and (3) the unfavorable action giv ing rise to an inferen ce of discriminatio n); see also Douglas v. Donovan , 559 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explai ning that for employm ent actions such as giving a poor performance valuation, a pla intiff must demonstrate how th e decision caused an “objectively tangible harm.”).10 In sum, Ms. Wilkerson’s complaints at most amount to “run-of-th e-mill workplace annoyances” that do not rise to the level of “materially advers e consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of emplo yment such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” See Hinds v. Mulvaney , 296 F. Supp. 3d 220, 235, 245 (D.D.C. 2018). This is legally insufficient to establish a prima facie case. Stella v. Mineta , 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002). But independent of her failure to establish a prima facie case, which under controlling precedent does not have to be deci ded at the summary judgment s tage, see Brady , 520 F.3d at 494, she has not “produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason an d that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee” for invidious reasons. See id.

2. 2014 Performance Evaluation Ms. Wilkerson’s central complai nt is about her 2014 performance evaluation, on which she received a rating of “III – A ccomplished Practitioner.” Sh e claims that this rating was discriminatory because it was lower than Ms. Yagley’s, who rece ived a “IV – Performance Leader,” and harmed her by affec ting her pay increase as well a s making her less competitive for a permanent position with the FDIC and other organizations. Am . Compl. ¶ 9. The FDIC explained that the di fference between Ms. Wilkerson’s and Mr. Yagley’s overall scores came down to each’s rating in one of four “Job S tandards,” “Demonstrates Technical Knowledge of the Program Area,” for which Ms. Wilkers on received a “3” and Mr. Yagley received a “ 4.” Mot. for Summ. J. 14. 4 The differentiators between a “3” and a “4”

4 An employee is evaluated on four “Job Standards” (“Applies Co mmunication Skills,” “Organizes and Manages Projects,” “Demonstrates Technical Knowl edge of Program Area,” and “Performs Research and Analysis ”) and four “Behavioral Standard s” (“Judgment,” “Flexibility,”11 for this standard are that the employee “[a]pplies technical kn owledge in an independent and accurate manner to complete non-routine tasks” and “[s]eeks opp ortunities to share technical knowledge and skills outside of the immediate work group.” Mot . for Summ. J. 14. Mr. Reynolds explained that Mr. Y agley met both of these criter ia, and provided concrete examples of him doing so. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 10-11 (ci ting examples where Mr. Yagley led a Community Affairs Branc h small business working group without being assigned to do so; set up a new “structured approach to goal setting” within a “si gnature FDIC initiative;” and being “heavily involved” in a strat egic plan that was a Divisio nal Goal for 2013 and 2014). Mr. Reynolds also described how and why he assessed Ms. Wilkers ons’s accomplishments to be “routine” and therefore did not meet the requirements for a “4” rating. See id . at 11 (explaining that, in comparing Ms. Wilkerson’ s work completed on the CDFI G uide for 2014 to work completed in 2013, the changes made w ere “very modest” and most ly in style, not substance; and that her developing other ag endas and presentations were “r outine” for the Section and largely involved transferring inf ormation from the CDFI Guide i nto other formats). This legitimate and non-discriminatory explanation for Ms. Wilkerson ’s rating shifts the burden back to her to “demonstrat e that the offered non-di scriminatory reas on was, in fact, pretext for a prohibited reason.” See Mokhtar , 83 F. Supp. 3d at 70. Ms. Wilkerson makes a number of unavailing arguments to attem pt to show that Mr. Reynolds’ explanation of her evaluation was pretext. First , she argues that Mr. Reynolds removed positive comments from her final evaluation about her i nteractions with an external group, the Independent Community B ankers of America, which woul d have substantiated a “4”

“Teamwork and Collaboration,” and “Accountability for Performan ce”). These are combined to form an overall performance rating. Id. Ex. 3.12 rating in the “Demonstrated Techni cal Knowledge of Program Area ” standard and elevated Ms. Wilkerson’s overall rating t o a “IV.” Opp. to Mot. for Sum m. J. 6. Second, she points out that Mr. Reynolds, in a n initial draft of he r evaluation, rated her as a “V” overall, only to reduce his evaluation to a “III” aft er consulting with his first and s econd-line supervisors, Ms. Gordon and Ms. Ortiz. Id. at 7-8. Third, Ms. Wilkerson c laims that Mr. Reynolds told he r that she would have received a higher rati ng if she “knew more people ou tside FDIC,” but that she was consistently denied the opportuni ty to share her work with thos e outside of her work group. Id

. Fourth, she argues that Mr. Re ynolds’ alleged “shift in explana tion” for her ra ting—first telling her that she needed to know others outside of the FDIC and late r writing that she only made “relatively modest” updates to the CDFI Guide—meets her burden to demonstrate an illicit motive. See id . at 19-20. Last, she alleges that Mr. Yagley was undeserving of his higher rating and that Mr. Reynolds’ explanat ion for his rating is “full of e mbellishment and exaggeration.”
Id. at 9-10, 20. None of the evidenc e or arguments presented, how ever, successfully carries her burden to show that Mr. Reynolds ’ actions were motivated by dis crimination. As to her first argument, the rec ord shows that Mr. Reynolds’ i nitial draft rated Ms. Wilkerson as a “3” in “Demonstrated Technical Knowledge of Program Area,” which remained unchanged between the ini tial draft and final version. Compare Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 6 (initia l draft), ECF No. 20-6 with Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3 ( final version), ECF No. 17-2. The record also shows th at—contrary to Ms. Wilkerson ’s claim—both the initial and final versions recognized her work in “buil[ding] relationships with organizations such as [Independent Community Bankers of America] to help them know ab out the guide and formulated and pursued ideas how t o maximize the potential return of the ICBA relationship for13 the guide.” See id . This evidence does not assist in rebutting the presumption that her evaluation was made in a non-discriminatory manner. As to Ms. Wilkerson’s second argum ent, it appears that Mr. Reyn olds did initially rate Ms. Wilkerson as a “V” overall. Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 6. He sent this in itial draft, along with initial drafts for others that he supervised, id. , to Ms. Gordon, who responded that she would need explanations for any r atings that were higher than their mid-year ratings. Id . Ex. 2 (Dep. of Janet Gordon) 80:3- 12, ECF No. 20-2. Mr. Reynolds rep lied that everyone on his team at mid-year were “IIIs” but that he felt that “these are the ap propriate year-ends.” Id . at 81:4-9. 5 Ms. Gordon challenged these design ations, stating, “Okay. But some of these team members do not strike me as producing [V] l evel work without significant c oaching and guidance, which is not really what the role model or performance leader is for.” Id . at 81:21-82:12. Ms. Ortiz similarly provided feedback to Mr. Reynolds that he was “not adhering to the [rating] standard[s]” and that he “was notapplying the standards correc tly.” Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 52 (Dep. of Luke Reynolds) 152:11-16. In the end, Mr. Reynolds delivere d a performance review to Ms. Wilkerson rating her as a “3” across all standards and a“III” overall. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3. One of the standards, “Applies Communication Skills,” was later upgraded from a “3” t o a “4” after Ms. Wilkerson

5 In her opposition to the FDIC’s motion for summary judgment, Ms. Wilkerson raises, for the first time and in three sentences , that Mr. Reynolds had a “pat tern of rating his female minority subordinates lower than his white male employees.” See Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 11. Ms. Wilkerson claims that four othe r individuals received lower ratings, but the evidence contradicts her bare allega tion and does not meet her burden to show that a reasonable juror could infer discrim inatory intent. See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Su mm. J. 7-8 (explaining that Ms. Wilkerson was not similarly s ituated to one comparator because, for the evaluation year at issue, Ms. Wilkerson received a “V” and the comparator received a “III” or “IV”; another comparator who received a “III” self-rated herself the same; th e third comparator ultimately received a “V” for her 2009 eva luation; and the fourth did not earn high enough component scores to propel her total score above a “III.”).14 successfully sought reconsidera tion from Mr. Reynolds and Ms. O rtiz, but this left her overall rating unchanged. See Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 20-10. Although this evidence shows that Mr. Reynol ds did downward adjust Ms. Wilker son’s scores, notably absent is any indication that Mr. Reynol ds adjusted, or was directed b y his supervisor to adjust, Ms. Wilkerson’s evaluation due to discrimination. Indeed, Mr. Reynolds’ initial in stinct to rate Ms. Wilkerson at the top of the pe rformance scale undermines any suggestion of invidious discrimination on his part. And Ms. Wilkerson points to no evi dence indicating that Mr. Reynolds’ supervisors provi ded input on Ms. Wilkerson’s eva luation specifically. See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 10, E CF No. 21. Rather, Mr. Reyn olds’ supervisors assessed that he incorrectly applied the eval uation standards for a number of his subordinates. This feedback was appropriate and within the s cope of their roles to guide th e evaluation process, including calibrating the process across a ll subordinates. The mere fact that Ms. Wilkerson’s overall score changed during this process is ins ufficient evidence for a reas onable jury to find that the change was due to discrimination. Third, the Court has already addr essed Ms. Wilkerson’s claims about her attendance at meetings, conferences, and trainings, see supra Section III.A.1., and found that none exhibited any discriminatory motive. See Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 19 (ar guing that Mr. Reynolds’ statement that her rating woul d be higher if she “knew more peo ple outside FDIC” is pretext given that she was allegedly imp roperly excluded from meetings, conferences, and trainings). Ms. Wilkerson’s fourth argument that Mr. Reynolds’ “shift in explanation” demonstrates pretext is similarly ineffective because the record contains no indication that Ms. Wilkerson’s evaluation was made or communi cated to her as being wholly base d on a single reason, or that Mr. Reynolds jumped from one ratio nale to another in a superfic ial effort to substantiate his15 decision. See Geleta v. Gray , 645 F.3d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that “shifting and inconsistent justifications are probative of pretext.”). Ms. W ilkerson claims that Mr. Reynolds’ “first explanation” for her eval uation was that she needed to k now “more people outside FDIC” and that his “second explanation” that she only made “relativel y modest” updates to the CDFI Guide during the evaluation year constitutes sufficient evidenc e for a reasonable jury to conclude pretext. Opp. to Mot. for Summ . J. 19. To start, only Ms. Wil kerson’s self-serving declaration that Mr. Reynolds made the statement about knowing people outsi de of the FDIC supports it.
See Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Su mm. J. 3. Even assuming Mr. Reyno lds made the statement, his affidavit makes clear that it would have been one of many c omments and considerations in evaluating Ms. Wilkerson’s performance. See id .; see also Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 7-11 (explaining his rationale for he r ratings and giving examples f or the “Applies Communication Skills,” “Judgment,” and “Demonstrates Technical Knowledge of P rogram Area” standards). Given that employees are rate d on four “Job Standards” in addit ion to four “Behavioral Standards,” all combining to c reate an overall rating, it follo ws that an employee’s rating would be influenced by multiple factors and inputs. Mr. Reynolds’ st atements about his rationale for Ms. Wilkerson’s rating—that she should seek more external opportunities and that her majority of her work on the successful CDFI Guide was completed in a pri or evaluation year—thus do not conflict, nor are they shifting. T his is insufficient to demon strate pretext. Cf. Geleta , 645 F.3d at 413 (finding that a reasonable j ury could determine pretext whe re the defendant transferred the plaintiff to another job and the e vidence showed that the reaso n for the transfer was “not performance, you know, it’s just —whatever reason you feel—whate ver you’re comfortable with” but later explained as pe rtaining to busin ess reasons).16 Last, although Ms. Wilkerson strenuously asserts that Mr. Yagle y’s evaluation was undeserved and “full of embellishment and exaggeration,” she fa ils to demonstrate that his rating was inflated and that the alle ged inflation was due to his race , sex, or age. Each of Mr. Yagley’s ratings is supported by contemporan eous justifications, and eac h is consistent with Mr. Reynolds’ explanations as t o what distinguishes a “III” fro m a “IV” rating. See Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 27 at 2-3, ECF No. 17-4; id. Ex. 4 at 5-11. That she disagr ees with the outcome is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Ficken v. Clinton , 771 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[A] plaintiff’s persona l evaluation of [her] own qualif ications and performance is insufficient to rebut a defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminat ory reason for [the action]”). Similarly, Ms. Wilkerson’s asse rtion that Mr. Reynolds consider ed Mr. Yagley’s performance in previous years i n his 2014 evaluation while not considering her past performance, Opp. to Mot. for S umm. J. 10, is contradicted by the record. Mr. Reynolds stated that Mr. Yagley “wa s deeply involved during the rating year in working with several AEIs [Alliance for Economic Inclusion programs] to conduct self asse ssments and improvement plans,” which “involved him spending a considerable amount of t ime mentoring staff in those regions on how to clarify goals and outcomes, developing realis tic timeframes for achieving goals . . . and on written communica tions.” Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 10 (emphasis added). These tasks, among others that Mr. Reynolds highlighted to supp ort Mr. Yagley’s rating, were “non-routine for anyone in the Section to do.” Id . at 10-11. The record supports the agency’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reas ons to rate Mr. Yagley as a “IV” and Ms. Wilkerson has not identified any evidence t o rebut this presumption.17 3. 2014 Monetary Award Ms. Wilkerson also disputes not bei ng awarded a Mission Achieve ment Award for her work on the CDFI Guide during the 2014 evaluation cycle and con tends that “the young, white Mr. Yagley received substantial cash awards for much less important work during his tenure at FDIC.” Opp. to Mot. for Summ . J. 12. Mr. Reynolds explained that this award is “based on the extent of an employee’s contribution to the accomplishment of e ither corporate or division goals and objectives” and that the Guid e was a Section goal, but not a corporate or divisional goal. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 4. Emp loyees are recognized for ass isting with Section goals through the routine performan ce evaluation process. Id . Mr. Reynolds also noted that “Divisional leadership has on several occasi ons reminded me and the other m anagers in the Division of their expectation that we be familiar with and adhere to the rules [f or the awards programs].” Id

. Ms. Ortiz testified that these awards are “generally very hard to get” and that “[m]any good things get done in the Agency that do not get re cognized with a[Mission Achievement Award].”
Id . Ex. 9 at 3. In response, Ms. Wilkerson emphasizes the succes s of the Guide and argues that it furthers the mission of the FDI C, and that “it is simply not be lievable that Mr. Reynolds did not think the guide advanced an FDIC goal.” Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 21. But this does not meet Ms. Wilkerson’s burden to show tha t a reasonable juror could in fer discriminatory intent from not granting her a cash awar d for her work on the Guide. The Division’s goals, which are documented, describe five thematic goals and articulate specific and measurable actions to achieve each. Reply in Supp . of Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 44, ECF No. 21-1. For example, for the goal to “promote economic i nclusion to enhance public confidence in the banking system, ” the Division aimed to “plan and hold two meetings of the Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion,” to hold “over 100 ev ents” with community banks18 and stakeholders, to host a rese arch symposium, and to monitor and research certain policy proposals. Id. at 1-2. It is undisputed that Ms. Wilkerson’s work on the Gui de was well regarded and Mr. Reynolds praise d her for this work in her perf ormance review. Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3 at 2-3. But it is both possible to do one’s job well and yet not be recognized beyond the ordinary performance evaluation process. In fact, M r. Yagley did not receive a Mission Achievement Awar d for his work either. Id. Ex. 41. Mr. Reynolds’ assessment that Ms. Wilkerson’s work on the Gui de was not one of the pre-set sp ecific divisiona l or corporate goals does not raise an infer ence that he thought so due to her race, sex, or age, and no reasonable juror could find as such. Ms. Wilkerson’s attempted comparison to Mr. Yagley also fails, for the record shows that Mr. Yagley received one award for the 2014 performance year, a STAR Award of $250 for assisting at a training conference, justlike Ms. Wilkerson. Mot. for
Summ. J. Ex. 4 at 4.

B. Retaliation Claims Ms. Wilkerson alleges that Ms. G ordon, her second-level supervi sor, retaliated against her filing a discrimination compl aint with the FDIC Office of M inority and Women Inclusion by not hiring her for one of two perm anent Community Affairs Speci alist positions that Ms. Wilkerson interviewed for. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-14. But the F DIC has offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her non-selection, and no reason able jury could infer discrimination from the evidence presented. The FDIC explains that Ms. Wilkerson conducted two rounds of in terviews for the position, both panel interviews. Mot. for Summ. J. 25. The se cond panel consisted of Ms. Gordon and the first-line supe rvisors for the Lexington andRaleigh positions, the two positions to which Ms. Wilkerson applied. Id . After the second interview, the supervisors19 submitted memoranda to Ms. Gordon with their recommendation and rationale. Id . The supervisor for the Lexington pos ition, Ms. Harris, recommended James Davis, who she commended for his “specific knowle dge of the Lexington market and Kentucky territory.” Id. at 25-26. The supervisor for the Raleigh position, Mr. Stokes, re commended Victor Galloway, who understood “the FDIC community affairs program and the banking industry and community stakeholders’ roles in community development.” Id . Both Ms. Harris and Mr. Stokes selected an alternative, neither of whom was Ms. Wilkerson. Id . at 26. Ms. Gordon accepted the recommendations and selected Mes srs. Davis and Galloway for the positions. Id . This contemporaneous documentation shows a legitimate, non-discrimin atory reason for the selection of individuals other than Ms. Wilkerson. Ms. Wilkerson argues that a reas onable jury coul d infer discrim inatory intent both from Ms. Gordon’s alleged dishonesty about remembering Ms. Wilkerson ’s challenge to her 2014 performance valuation, 6 and by rejecting her explanation for Ms. Wilkerson’s non-selec tion as being banking experience-relate d. Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 22 -23. Neither argument is persuasive. That Ms. Gordon disc laimed remembering Ms. Wilkers on seeking re-consideration of her 2014 performance evaluation does not in this instance ri se to the level of showing “a party’s dishonesty about a materi al fact as ‘affirmative eviden ce of guilt.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing , 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). To begin, there was no indication in Ms. Wilkerson’s email to Ms. Ortiz and Mr. Reynol ds seeking rec onsideration of her 2014 performance ratings that she was alleging unlawful discrimination. See Broderick v. Donaldson , 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“While no ‘magic wo rds’ are required, the com plaint must in some way allege

6 In response to whether Ms. Gor don was aware that Ms. Wilkerso n “appealed her performance rating in 2014 to Ms. Ortiz,” Ms . Gordon responded, “I was not aware or I don’t remember being aware.” Opp. to Mot. for Su mm. J. Ex. 2 at 101:3-5, 18-19.20 unlawful discrimination, not jus t frustrated ambition.”). This is supported by the fact that the Amended Complaint only alleges retaliation from filing an EEO c omplaint, not from challenging her 2014 performance evaluation. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-14. Additionally, Ms. Gordon’s testim ony was that she “was not awar e or [doesn’t] remember being aware” is hardly s urprising given that there is only one email in the record in which Ms. Ortiz writes to Ms. G ordon to give her a “heads up re : one change (jo ann)” and Ms. Gordon was responsible for reviewing more than 30 performan ce evaluations for other personnel that period, none of whic h included Mr. Reynolds’ dir ect reports. Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2 at 101:3-5, 18-19; id. Ex. 10; Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 9 ( Aff. of Janet Gordon) at 4, ECF No. 17-2, id. Ex. 40 (Dep. of Janet Gordon) 65:11-15, ECF No. 17-5. Under these circumstances, it is not exceptional nor does it create a genui ne issue of material fact for Ms. Gordon not to recall rememberi ng one aspect of a performanc e evaluation for a single employee not at the time in her review purview that took place over two and a half years ago. Last, Ms. Gordon’s hiring decision rested on the recommendation s of the two first-line supervisors overseeing the posit ions, and Ms. Wilkerson does no t allege or present evidence that Ms. Gordon improperly influen ced the recommendations. See Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 9 at 7 (“I did not instruct Ms. Harris or M r. Stokes not to recommend [Ms. Wilkerson] for the vacancy in their region.”). Put slightly differently, Ms. Wilkerson has not shown that her re-consideration request for her 2014 performance valuati on was a protected activity, an d even if it was, that there was a causal connection between the pr otected activity and the advers e personnel action. See Youssef
v. Holder , 19 F. Supp. 3d 167, 199 (D.D.C. 2014) (reciting the elements of retaliation as (1) engaging in a statutorily pr otected activity, (2) being the subject of an adverse personnel21 action, and (3) a causal connecti on existing between the two). She also fails to establish a causal connection between her EEO com plaint and the hiring decision. She alleges, without more, that “[w]ithout doubt, Ms. Wilkerson’s second level supervisor, Jane t Gordon, . . . was informed of Ms. Wilkerson’s EEO claims concerning the mistreatment . . . by her subordinate Luke Reynolds.” Am. Compl. ¶ 11. But Ms. Wilkerson identifies no e vidence in the record to support this unadorned allegat ion. The EEO Counselor’s Report dated March 3, 2015— i.e ., after Ms. Wilkerson’s term at the FDIC ended—shows that the Counselor spoke with Mr. Reynolds about the complaint , but there is no indicat ion that Ms. Gordonwas aware of the complaint, much less that it played arole in the hiring decision. See Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 1, ECF
No. 20-1. Ms. Wilkerson further contends that Ms. Gordon’s reliance on cr iteria not listed in the vacancy announcement to select among candidates is sufficient t o support an inference of pretext. Opp. to Mot. for Summ . J. 23. She asserts that Ms. G ordon’s explanation that she and the panel were “most interested in learning from each candidate about their collaborations involving bankers and community l eaders” and that banking knowl edge was “particularly emphasized” was not stated in the vacancy announcement, and thi s deviation is evidence from which a jury could infer pretext. Id . However, the vacancy announcement and Ms. Gordon’s explanation are not incongrue nt. The announcement stated that the position would “[e]ngage[] in pro-active communication with co mmunity-based organizations, ac ademic researchers, government officials, bankers a nd other lenders” and to “[r]epr esent[] the FDIC as speaker or participant as designated, at ev ents designed to educate financ ial institutions, community representatives and others.” M ot. for Summ. J. Ex. 8, ECF No. 17-2. These written descriptions