A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLANT

Donald C. Swanson, Jr. Fort Wayne, Indiana A TTORNEYS FOR A PPELLEE Gregory F. Zoeller Attorney General of Indiana Cynthia L. Ploughe Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana 

# In the 

# Indiana Supreme Court

No. 02S05-1404-CR-246
J ONATHAN D. C ARPENTER , Appellant (Defendant below),

v. S TATE OF I NDIANA , Appellee (Plaintiff below)

.

Appeal from the Allen Superior Court, No. 02D04-120 7-FD-1008

The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of A ppeals, No. 02A05-1304-CR-207

October 21, 2014 Massa, Justice.
Jonathan Carpenter appeals the admission of evidenc e recovered from his home after officers entered it without a warrant in pursuit of an aggressive and bloody dog. We are asked to decide whether that entry was reasonable. Because we find it was not, we hold that the search violated Article 1, Section 11 of our Indiana Const itution and thus we reverse the trial court.2 Facts and Procedural History
On a summer afternoon, police responded to a report of dogs fighting in Carpenter’s backyard. Officer Matthew Wilson of the Fort Wayne Police Department was the first to arrive on the scene. Neighbors told him that Carpenter wa s not home and gave him Carpenter’s cell phone number. From outside the fenced yard, Office r Wilson observed three bloody pit bulls running to and from an area underneath a deck where a wounded fourth dog had retreated. Officer Tina Blackburn arrived next, followed by Sergeant D errick Westfield. They also saw the dogs running in and out of the home through an open slid ing glass door.
When Fort Wayne Animal Care and Control Officer Bry an Miller arrived, he decided to enter the yard to corral the dogs despite Sergeant Westfield’s reservations. As the gate was locked, Miller jumped over the three-foot fence to remove t he dogs from the yard and secure them in his vehicle. Miller caught three of the dogs, includin g the most severely injured one hiding under the deck, but the fourth dog went into the house and wo uld not come out. At that point, Miller asked Sergeant Westfield to enter the house with him to r etrieve the fourth dog and ensure no one was injured.

The officers knocked on the front door, but no one answered. Sergeant Westfield then announced their presence at the open sliding door i n the back and asked if anyone was inside, but no one responded. They entered the home, and once inside, Miller and Sergeant Westfield noticed two doors with ventilation ducts protruding out of them and a strong light emanating from behind them. Sergeant Westfield opened the door to one of the rooms and found marijuana plants inside. Miller eventually located the fourth dog in an upst airs bedroom and removed it. They did not find any other dogs or people in the home.

Based on the officers’ observations, members of the Vice and Narcotics Unit obtained and executed a search warrant for Carpenter’s home, sei zing the marijuana and other controlled substances. During the search, neighbors advised t he officers that Carpenter worked at the gas station just down the street. Carpenter returned h ome, and the officers arrested him.3

The State charged Carpenter with five Class D felon ies: maintaining a common nuisance, possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana, and three counts of possession of a controlled substance. 1 It also charged him with one Class A misdemeanor: possession of paraphernalia. Carpenter moved to suppress the evidence found in h is home, arguing the search violated his rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Cons titution and Article 1, Section 11 of our Indiana Constitution. After a hearing, the trial c ourt denied Carpenter’s motion. During his bench trial, Carpenter objected to the admission of the e vidence, but the trial court overruled that objection and admitted it. The court found Carpent er guilty of all charges.
Carpenter appealed his conviction, arguing the tria l court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence and without it, his convict ion lacked sufficient evidentiary support. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial c ourt, concluding exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless entry into Carpenter’s ho me. Carpenter v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1068, 1071– 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
We granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion b elow. Carpenter v. State, 6 N.E.3d 950 (Ind. 2014) (table); Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
Although Carpenter frames his appeal as a challenge to the trial court’s denial of his pretrial suppression motion, he did not seek interlocutory r eview of that decision. Thus, we consider his appeal as what it is: a request to review the cour t’s decision to admit the evidence at trial. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014) (c iting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind.

1 Before trial, the State moved to dismiss one of th e counts of possession of a controlled substance, C ount V, and the trial court granted that motion.4

2013) (“Direct review of the denial of a motion to suppress is only proper when the defendant files an interlocutory appeal.”)).
In ruling on admissibility following the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court considers the foundational evidence presented at tr ial. Id. at 40 n.1. It also considers the evidenc e from the suppression hearing that is favorable to t he defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. Id. Because the trial co urt is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admis sibility for abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is “clearly against the logic and effec t of the facts and circumstances and the error affe cts a party’s substantial rights.” Clark, 994 N.E.2d a t 260. But the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a quest ion of law that we consider de novo. McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014).

The Trial Court Erred by Admitting the Evidence Rec overed from Carpenter’s Home.
Carpenter argues the officers’ entry into his home was unreasonable and therefore violated his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of our India na Constitution. He contends the warrant to search his home was based upon illegally obtained i nformation, and the trial court should have excluded the evidence obtained in that search. We agree.

The right of the people to be secure in their perso ns, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure , shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon prob able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Although Indiana’s Secti on 11 and the Federal Fourth Amendment are textually identical, they are analytically distinct . Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). The Fourth Amendment analysis turns on whet her the subject has a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 3 60 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), while the Section 11 analysis turns on whether the police con duct was reasonable under the totality of the5

circumstances. State v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 96 0, 965 (Ind. 2002). The State bears the burden to show the intrusion was reasonable. Id. When we evaluate the reasonableness of the officers’ actions, we consider: “1) the degree of concern, s uspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enfor cement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).
Here, the State concedes the officers’ entry was n ot based upon any concern, suspicion, or knowledge that anything illegal was going on inside the home. State’s Br. at 12 (“To be sure, when the officers entered the curtilage and the hou se, they were not concerned about any ‘violation.’”). Instead, they entered to secure th e dog and determine if any person needed help. Id. at 13 (“The police needed to determine the sour ce of the blood on the animals and, more importantly, to determine if there were humans insi de the house in need of medical assistance.”). The first factor thus weighs against the legality o f the search.
Next, we turn to the degree of intrusion, which we consider from Carpenter’s point of view. See Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 19 (Ind. 2010) ( “The degree of intrusion is viewed from the point of view of the occupants or owners of the pre mises searched.”). “Houses and premises of citizens receive the highest protection.” Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. 1994). For this reason, warrantless searches of a home are pre sumptively unreasonable. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Under this s tandard, the officers’ entry into Carpenter’s house was highly intrusive. The State argues the i ntrusion was mitigated because Carpenter’s sliding door was open. On these facts, however, th e open door is not enough to overcome the high degree of intrusion; the door may have been open so the dogs could travel in and out of the house on a hot day, and the fence and padlocked gate serv ed to secure the property against all other entrants.
Finally, we balance the needs of law enforcement. Police sometimes act not to further an investigation of wrongdoing but rather to prevent i mminent harm or to provide emergency assistance. We have said before that protection of the public is a legitimate and important law6

enforcement function. Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 941 (Ind. 2006). “It is because of concerns among citizens about safety, security, and protecti on that some intrusions upon privacy are tolerated, so long as they are reasonably aimed tow ard those concerns.” Id. at 940. Section 11 thus allows warrantless entry into a home when an o fficer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe immediate aid is needed inside. VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 266–67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, 774 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. 200 2). We previously have found such objectively reasonable grounds when police know a person is in a dangerous location. In Holder, the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evide nce of methamphetamine production. Holder, 847 N.E.2d at 933. Officers had knocked on Holder’ s door because they smelled ether, a chemical used to make methamphetamine, escaping from his hom e. Id. at 934. Holder opened the door, “resulting in a rush of ether fumes,” and told the officers his infant granddaughter and two other people were inside. Id. at 934, 939. Knowing ethe r to be highly flammable and explosive, the officers determined there was a “risk of immediate danger to a young child in the volatile atmosphere of the home” and decided to enter. Id. at 939. We found that entry to be reasonable because the evidence of the illegal drug and the ne ed to protect the people inside outweighed the nature of the intrusion into the home. Id. at 941; see also VanWinkle, 764 N.E.2d at 266 (finding, where an officer knew of explosive chemicals in an occupied home, he reasonably concluded there was an immediate need to enter).
Nevertheless, although the police unquestionably ha ve an interest in protecting the public from risk of harm from a violent dog, this interest does not confer blanket authority to enter private homes under all circumstances. Unlike Holder and V anWinkle, in which the officers knew there were people in dangerous situations, the officers i n this case had no such knowledge. In fact, the objective evidence suggested there was no one home; no one answered the door or responded to the officers’ announcements, and a neighbor told th e officers the homeowner was at work. Any threat of danger to the outside public was slight; the dog was confined in a fenced yard secured by a locked gate, and the officers could have further prevented the dog’s escape by closing the sliding door. The dogs’ aggressive behavior and bloodied a ppearance simply were not enough to give rise to a reasonable belief that a person was in da nger of imminent harm or in need of immediate assistance. Moreover, the officers did not need to enter to address the situation. They had7

Carpenter’s phone number, and calling him or his em ployer to ensure that no one was in the residence would not have been overly burdensome. S ee Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding law enforcement needs to be low, especially where “the officers made no effort to contact [the defendant] by any means othe r than direct intrusion into the dwelling”).
Taken together, these factors lead us to conclude t he officers’ entry into Carpenter’s home was unreasonable and therefore impermissible under Section 11. Because the warrant was based on the officers’ observations made during their ill egal presence inside Carpenter’s home, the admission of evidence recovered pursuant to that wa rrant was an abuse of discretion. And the State offered no other evidence against Carpenter. Accordingly, we must reverse his convictions.
Our opinion today does not mean that an animal’s co ndition or behavior could never give rise to reasonable grounds upon which a police offi cer could enter a residence without a warrant. All we hold is that on these facts, the trial court erred in concluding entry was reasonable without any objective evidence that a person required immed iate assistance. Because we have resolved this issue under our Indiana Constitution, we need not consider Carpenter’s claim that the admission of the evidence found in his home violate d his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we rever se the trial court.

Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., co ncur.