J-S78034-18

2019 PA Super 12

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAWN HILL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 712 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 25, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0009017-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2019

Appellant, Shawn Hill, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his second petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541-9546, 

as untimely filed. We affirm.

In our review of Appellant’s first PCRA appeal, we set forth the following 

pertinent facts and procedural history.

1

 

In April 2014, following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of 

murder in the first degree, two counts of attempted murder, 

conspiracy, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of 

Possession of a Firearm by Prohibited Person, Firearms not to be 

Carried Without a License, Carrying Firearms on a Public Street in 

Philadelphia, three counts of Recklessly Endangering Another 

____________________________________________

1 Of note, we include reference to the particular claims Appellant raised in his 

direct appeal, first PCRA petition, and PCRA appeal, respectively, as they 

provide insight into whether Appellant presently raises previously litigated 

and/or waived issues.
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Person (“REAP”), and Possession of an Instrument of Crime 

(“PIC”).

Appellant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment for 

first-degree murder, followed by consecutive sentences of ten to 

twenty years for each count of attempted murder. Appellant was 

sentenced to ten to twenty years for conspiracy, four to eight 

years for Possession of Firearm by a Prohibited Person, three to 

six years for Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License, and six 

to twelve months for REAP to run concurrently with his sentence 

for attempted murder. 

Appellant timely appealed the judgment of sentence. He 

challenged the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence and 

asserted that the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963). Appellant contended that the Commonwealth 

violated Brady by suppressing bullet fragments removed from the 

victim's body. See Appellant's 1925(b) Statement, 5/28/14. This 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. 

Regarding his Brady claim, this Court concluded that Appellant 

failed to prove that the Commonwealth suppressed evidence, or 

that the purported missing evidence was prejudicial. See 

Commonwealth v. Hill, 122 A.3d 1133 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 128 A.3d 1205 

(2015).

On January 5, 2016, Appellant timely filed [his first] PCRA petition, 

and counsel was appointed. In his petition, Appellant claimed to 

have new evidence in support of his previously raised Brady

claim, specifically, a statement from Albert Einstein Medical Center 

(“AEMC”), describing the hospital's policy of submitting all 

recovered projectiles to the Philadelphia Police Department.

In July 2016, counsel submitted a no-merit letter pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc). In September 2016, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant's petition without a 

hearing. On September 29, 2016, Appellant responded to the 

court's Rule 907 notice, raising claims of ineffective assistance of 

PCRA counsel. See Appellant's Response to 907 Notice at 2–8. 

On the same day Appellant's 907 response was received, the court 

issued an opinion and order, dismissing Appellant's petition and 

granting appointed counsel's petition to withdraw.
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Appellant then filed [a] timely [PCRA] appeal. The PCRA court did 

not direct Appellant's compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant timely filed a brief with this Court. In June 2017, 

Appellant filed a Request for Permission to File Supplemental 

Arguments Based on New Case Law. In July 2017, this Court 

granted Appellant leave to file a supplemental brief. 

Preliminarily, [this Court addressed] the issues Appellant 

purport[ed] to raise in his supplemental brief. Appellant's 

supplemental brief raise[d] the following claims:

I. Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective for unreasonably 

narrowing its investigation to the Commonwealth's illegal 

suppression of vital ballistic evidence without investigation 

of lead detective (George Pirrone's) illegal withholding of 

evidence from the Commonwealth?

II. Whether trial, appellate and PCRA counsel[']s performances 

deprived appellant of his right to meaningful review where 

counsel allowed the Commonwealth to fraudulently 

misrepresent a material fact regarding the Commonwealth's 

possession of Sakima Santos and Chasity Cannon's medical 

records prior to trial?

III. Whether PCRA counsel was deficient in his performance 

where he failed to ascertain evidence of detectives (James 

Pitts) conviction in a civil judgment/verdict, and (Ronald 

Dove's) guilty plea in a murder cover-up, both of which are 

crucial impeachable evidence surrounding Marcella Ingrum 

and Rory Hill's illegal arrests, extensive detention, and 

illegally coerced inculpatory [sic] statements used by the 

[c]ourt as definitive proof of [A]ppellant's guilty [sic]?

Appellant's Supplemental Brief at v.

[With respect to such supplemental claims, we determined 

Appellant did not preserve them] in his original brief to this Court. 

Further, this Court did not grant Appellant leave to raise new 

issues in his supplemental brief. Order, 7/7/17. As such, these 

issues [were] not properly before this Court, [we concluded], and 

we decline[d] to review them.
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Turning to those issues properly preserved, Appellant raise[d] the 

following issues for our review:

I. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt's final conclusion was deficient 

where it inexplicably quoted nearly verbatim its 1925(a) 

opinion issued on direct appeal without establishing 

independent evidentiary support for its denial of relief based 

on newly-discovered evidence?

II. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt's adverse conclusion on its on 

[sic] court ordered DNA and fingerprint analysis – of which 

was stipulated as an undisputed fact—survives a question of 

law where an interjection of personal scientific theories 

post-trial circumvented the stipulation and diminished the 

materiality of [Appellant's] Brady claim?

III. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt's conclusion on [Appellant's] 

Brady claim—now supported by newly discovered 

evidence—survives a question of law where the recent 

Dennis[4] decision qualifies the final conclusion reached in 

this case as being contrary to, and an unreasonable 

application of established Federal and State precedent 

governing the constitutionality of illegal suppression of 

exculpatory evidence, versus a determination centered 

around a sufficiency of evidence evaluation?

Appellant's Brief at vii.

Commonwealth v. Hill, No. 3534 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 5046335, at *1–3 

(Pa. Super. filed Nov. 3, 2017).

This Court rejected Appellant’s preserved claims purporting to identify

after-discovered evidence substantiating his Brady claim, as the evidence was 

neither exculpatory nor materially different from the Brady claim rejected in 

his direct appeal. Hill, supra at *3-4. Consequently, we affirmed the order 

denying Appellant PCRA relief.
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Less than 30 days later, on November 30, 2017, Appellant filed pro se

the present PCRA petition, his second, asserting the existence of newlydiscovered facts of police corruption in highly publicized, unrelated legal

matters that would likely result in a different verdict if brought to light in his 

case. Appellant’s Second PCRA Petition, filed 11/30/17. Specifically, 

Appellant centered his claim on both a 2016 civil judgment entered against 

Philadelphia Police Detectives George Pirrone and James Pitts for 

manufacturing evidence against a criminal defendant and an April 2017 guilty 

plea entered by Detective Ronald Dove for attempting to cover up a 2011 

murder committed by his longtime love interest. 

A presumption arises from such recent revelations, Appellant maintains

in his petition, that the detectives, who investigated the murder and 

attempted murders with which Appellant was eventually charged, employed 

similar coercive and deceptive practices in handling ballistics evidence and 

obtaining statements from Appellant’s mother and sister implicating him as 

the shooter: 

This PCRA action revolves around the convictions of Philadelphia 

Police Detectives for illegally withholding material evidence from 

the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, lying to the D.A. Office 

and other authorities, maliciously prosecuting innocent persons, 

and illegally arresting innocent persons. The evidence is 

presumptive to petitioner’s contention that the same illegal acts 

by these detectives were committed in the present case.

...

The new evidence submitted in [Appellant’s] 2nd PCRA petition as 

Exhibits C and D are “confirmed convictions of key detectives who 
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played a vital role in the now questionable admissibility of 

statements made by [Appellant’s] mother and sister under 

questionable coercive conditions – statements [the PCRA court] 

repeatedly rely on to deny [Appellant] relief. In addition, the 

recent confirmation at Exhibit-C attached to [Appellant’s] 2nd

petition lends relevance to [Appellant’s] new clams of illegal 

suppression of material evidence by Lead Detective George 

Pirrone; Detective James Pitts is a coconspirator/codefendant of 

Pirrone in a similar-type-case with similar-type-issues. See 2

nd

PCRA Petition at Exhibit-A1. These convictions were discovered 

on October 31, 2017, and November 5, 2017, via newspaper 

articles. 

Appellant’s Second PCRA Petition, at 3.

2

On December 18, 2017, the PCRA court issued its notice to dismiss 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, after finding Appellant’s petition untimely and, 

in the alternative, meritless. Appellant filed a response arguing that his 

facially untimely second petition qualified under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s 

newly-discovered facts exception3to the PCRA’s jurisdictional requirement 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s second petition offers in support of his claims exhibits consisting 

of, inter alia, newspaper articles and court decisions pertaining to other legal 

matters filed against the detectives in their professional capacities. They 

include: 4/21/16 article on civil judgments against George Pirrone and James 

Pitts for manufacturing evidence against a homicide defendant; 11/5/13 

article regarding allegations of aggressive interrogation tactics by Detective 

Pitts; 11/5/17 article on settlement of malicious prosecution suit filed against 

City of Philadelphia by wrongfully convicted man who gave false confession 

while subject to Pitts’ coercive interrogation; 1/10/13 article on Detective 

Dove’s suspension and pending dismissal from the police force for improper 

investigatory conduct related to three murder cases; 1/23/15 article on 

criminal charges filed against Dove for his attempted cover-up of an alleged 

murder committed by his paramour; and 4/26/17 article on Dove’s guilty plea 

to six counts of conspiracy and evidence tampering related to the attempted 

cover-up.

3 See infra.
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that a petition be filed within one year of the date on which judgment of 

sentence becomes final.

Moreover, to the extent the PCRA court concluded Appellant failed to 

meet the PCRA’s requirement that a petitioner file a claimed exception within 

60 days of the date the claim could have first been presented, see Section 

9545(b)(2), Appellant responded he met the 60-day rule by filing his second 

petition 27 days after the dismissal of his first petition. See Appellant’s 

Response to Rule 907 Notice (citing to Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 

585, 588 (2000) (holding subsequent PCRA petition may not be filed until 

resolution of review of present petition; if subsequent petition would be 

patently untimely by such time, petitioner must plead timeliness exception 

and file within 60 days of date previous petition was finally resolved)). The 

PCRA court nevertheless dismissed Appellant’s second petition as untimely. 

This timely appeal followed.

Appellant presents for our consideration numerous questions asking 

whether the PCRA court erroneously found a lack of Section 9545(b)(2) due 

diligence on his part, whether prior counsel ineffectively represented his 

various interests during trial and direct appeal, and whether PCRA counsel 

ineffectively failed to assail his judgment of sentence based on news reports

and civil judgments concerning the homicide detectives’ unlawful investigative 

practices. See Appellant’s pro se brief at viii, 24-25. 

We review an order denying collateral relief under the PCRA to 

determine whether evidence of record supports the findings of the PCRA court 
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and whether its legal conclusions are free from error. Commonwealth v. 

Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014). “The PCRA court's credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; 

however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal 

conclusions.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 

2013)).

In this case, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition without a 

hearing. There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing. See 

Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2008). On 

appeal, we examine the issues raised in light of the record “to determine 

whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no genuine issues 

of material fact and in denying relief without an evidentiary hearing.” Id.

As a prefatory matter, we address the jurisdictional question of whether 

the news articles and civil judgment Appellant presents as “newly-discovered 

facts” gaining him an exception to what would otherwise be a jurisdictional 

bar to his untimely second petition are, in fact, newly-discovered as that term 

is properly understood. “The PCRA's time restrictions are jurisdictional in 

nature. Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the 

[PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply 

do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims.” 

Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (first alteration 

in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be 

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1). The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a 

petitioner (1) alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in 

Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)4 of the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this 

exception within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

This Court has explained that Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), providing an 

exception for newly-discovered facts, 

“has two components that must be alleged and proved. Namely, 

the PCRA petitioner must establish that: 1) the facts upon which 

the claim is predicated were unknown to him and 2) could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. If the 

petitioner alleges and proves these two components, then the 

PCRA court has jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection.”

____________________________________________

4 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference of government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States.

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176-177 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) 

(emphasis in original)).

Furthermore, “[our courts] have previously rejected attempts to 

circumvent the timeliness requirements of the PCRA by asserting prior 

counsel's ineffectiveness for failing timely to raise a claim.” Commonwealth 

v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 349 (Pa. 2013); see also Gamboa-Taylor, 754 

A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (“Fact” that current counsel discovered prior PCRA 

counsel had failed to develop issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness was not 

newly-discovered facts qualifying for exception to PCRA time limitations); 

Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 915 (Pa. 2000) (holding that 

claims of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness do not escape PCRA one-year time 

limitation merely because they are presented in terms of current counsel's 

discovery of “fact” that previous attorney was ineffective).

Our review of the record reveals the newspaper articles and court cases

upon which Appellant now relies were matters of public knowledge and 

concern dating back to January of 2013, when Detective Dove’s suspension 

and pending dismissal for attempting to cover-up a murder committed by his 

girlfriend made front-page news. By January of 2015, Philadelphia papers 

reported that formal criminal charges had been filed against Detective Dove. 

These stories broke more than one year before Appellant filed his first 

PCRA petition in January of 2016. With Appellant’s first PCRA challenge still 

in its early stages in April of 2016, newspapers reported that a highly 
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publicized civil suit against Detectives Pirrone and Pitts had gone to the jury, 

which found them civilly liable for manufacturing evidence to support the 

charging, arrest, and prosecution of the civil plaintiff in his prior criminal 

matter.

5

 

At the time Appellant filed his first PCRA petition, he demonstrated his

awareness of the longstanding reports and court cases by making the very 

same allegations of investigatory corruption against Detectives Pirrone, Pitts, 

and Dove that he makes now in his second PCRA petition. For example, just 

two weeks after filing his first PCRA petition, Appellant filed a pro se motion 

for transcripts and additional discovery asserting his “mother [Marcella 

Ingrum] was forced to identify him as a shooter when interrogated by 

Detective [James Pitts] who is well known throughout the criminal justice 

system for being overly aggressive when questioning witnesses and known for 

forcing the accused to admit to crimes they did not commit.” Appellant’s 

____________________________________________

5 On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed the order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying the detectives’

motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict and remanded the 

matter with instructions that the trial court enter judgment in favor of the 

detectives/appellants. See Alleyne v. Pirrone, 180 A.3d 524 (Pa.Cmwlth. 

2018). Specifically, the three-judge panel unanimously determined that civil 

liability could not lie on claims of malicious prosecution and false arrest where 

probable cause existed to support both the filing of criminal charges against 

criminal defendant Alleyne and his arrest in the underlying criminal case. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth Court reached this determination despite 

acknowledging “serious holes and inconsistencies in the Police Department’s 

investigation. While the improprieties by Appellants significantly hindered the 

criminal case against Alleyne, they did not rise to the level of preventing any 

reasonable person from believing Alleyne had committed a crime.” Id. at 544.
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Motion for Transcripts and Additional Discovery, 1/19/16, at 2. Also alleged 

in the same filing was “[o]n July 5, 2011, [Appellant’s] sister [Rory Hill] also

was forced to identify [Appellant] as the shooter when questioned by Detective 

[Ronald Dove] who himself is under indictment for illegally participating in the 

cover-up of a murder.” Id.

On June 6, 2016, Appellant filed additional arguments in support of his 

petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he asserted ineffective assistance 

of prior counsel for allowing the Commonwealth to admit his mother’s and 

sister’s incriminating statements “given to two detectives who at the time 

[were] under investigation [either] for illegal tactics during investigations [or 

for] covering up murders?” Appellant’s PCRA filing, 6/6/16, at 3, 4.

PCRA counsel acknowledged Appellant’s claims in his Turner/Finley

letter seeking permission to withdraw from representation:

[Appellant’s] seventh claim accuses prior counsel of failing to 

attack the reliability of the contents of the statements given to 

police by his mother and sister by alleging that the police who took 

those statements have been accused of using ‘illegal tactics during 

investigations and covering up murders.’ Present counsel’s review 

of this issue failed to uncover any evidence establishing that the 

detectives who interviewed [Appellant’s] mother and sister 

fabricated the contents of their statements or covered up evidence 

in the instant matter and [Appellant] has failed to present any. . . 

. Moreover, a review of the record herein shows that both 

[Appellant’s] mother and sister testified that the statements were 

theirs albeit that they were not responsible for some of the 

contents of those statements. In conclusion, a meritorious claim 

cannot be raised with respect to this issue.

PCRA Counsel’s Turner/Finley Letter of No Merit, 7/5/16, at 14.
J-S78034-18

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Following the PCRA court’s issuance of its Rule 907 Notice to Dismiss 

Appellant’s first PCRA petition without a hearing, Appellant responded by 

alleging:

[PCRA] counsel has also missed a significant opportunity to 

investigate and present an additional newly-discovered claim 

supporting Petitioner’s Brady issue, via malicious misconduct by 

the lead detective in this case [George Pirrone] and his assisting 

detective [James Pitts]. . . . This federal decision handed down in 

April 2016, two months before PCRA counsel requested 

withdrawal, is significant and relevant evidence of Detectives 

Pirrone and Pitts[’

]

illegal activities as argued in Appellant’s PCRA 

Petition.

...

Pirrone’s illegal activities are presented within [Appellant’s] Brady

claim, which accuses Pirrone of constructive possession of the 

bullets removed from Santos and Cannon via hospital protocol 

(PCRA Petition at Exhibit-A), and documented proof that ‘two .380 

shell casings were also illegally suppressed by Pirrone.’

...

[Appellant’s] case is indistinguishable from the civil action ruled 

against Pirrone and Pitts – both detectives were found liable for 

malicious prosecution and false arrest when they ‘purposefully 

downplayed or overlooked (suppressed) Internal Affairs files 

detailing the victim’s [a fellow officer of the Philadelphia Police 

Department] previous stalking and harassing of the accused, 

because those files could have suggested their colleague was at 

fault for the accident.’

Appellant’s Response to 907 Notice to Dismiss, filed 9/29/16, at 22-23. 

Appellant, therefore, asked the PCRA court to appoint new counsel who could 

file an amended petition raising these additional claims. The court, however, 

dismissed his petition and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.
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In Appellant’s pro se appeal from the order denying his first PCRA 

petition, he filed a “Brief for Appellant” raising three issues. Significantly, 

none of the briefed issues asserted ineffective assistance of PCRA and prior 

counsel for failing to contend the detectives’ unlawful investigative methods 

necessarily undermined the reliability of ballistics and testimonial evidence 

against Appellant. 

Subsequently, however, Appellant filed a “Request for Permission to File 

Supplemental Arguments Based on New Case Law[,]” which this Court 

granted. Commonwealth v. Hill, 3534 EDA 2016 at *2 (Pa.Super. Nov. 3, 

2017). Appellant submitted a supplemental brief raising three additional 

issues asserting PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness both for failing to investigate 

Detective Pirrone’s alleged withholding of ballistics evidence in the present 

case and for failing to ascertain Pirrone and Pitts’ adverse civil judgment and 

Dove’s guilty plea and use them to impeach the reliability of his mother’s and 

sister’s incriminating statements. 

This Court, however, declined to review such claims, as Appellant 

neither sought nor received permission to include them in his supplemental 

brief. Therefore, we found the issues waived. Id.

Based on this record, we conclude the newspaper articles on Detective 

Dove’s suspension and pending dismissal from the force and Detectives 

Pirrone’s and Pitts’ adverse civil judgment that underlie Appellant’s present 

claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness do not constitute “newly-discovered 

facts” that would qualify Appellant’s pro se second petition for an exception to 
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the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar. Appellant had discovered such “facts”

before the filing and during the pendency of his first PCRA petition, and he 

presented them to the PCRA court in support of his first petition, albeit to no 

avail. 

Critically, moreover, Appellant had the opportunity in his first PCRA 

appeal to present the alleged facts within an ineffective assistance of PCRA 

counsel claim that he had preserved by raising it in his pro se response to the 

PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 

1049, 1056 (Pa.Super. 2015) (recognizing petitioner preserves right to raise 

claim of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel in appeal to Superior Court by 

first raising such claim in response to PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice). 

Inexplicably, however, he failed to reassert the claim among the issues he 

properly briefed to this Court, such that we found it waived. Id. We cannot

conclude, therefore, that the same facts now incorporated in Appellant’s

second PCRA petition constitute “newly-discovered facts” qualifying him for an 

exception to the PCRA time-bar.

6

Finally, to the extent Appellant’s many ineffectiveness claims may 

otherwise be read to assert that the ineffective assistance of prior counsel, 

alone, may save his otherwise untimely petition for review, such an argument 

is at odds with settled precedent. See Gamboa-Taylor, supra (holding 

____________________________________________

6 As Appellant has not satisfied his burden under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), we 

do not address whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition under 

Section 9545(b)(2).
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“conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of [newlydiscovered fact] encompassed by the exception [at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)”). 

Accordingly, we discern no error with the PCRA court’s conclusion that it was 

without jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s facially untimely second PCRA 

petition, although we rely upon different grounds in affirming its decision.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/19