PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 10-1510

 

 

BIMBO BAKERIES USA, INC.

v.

CHRIS BOTTICELLA,

Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00194)

Honorable R. Barclay Surrick, District Judge

 

Argued June 3, 2010

 

BEFORE: SMITH, FISHER, and 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: July 27, 2010)

 
2

Michael L. Banks (argued)

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

1701 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

 Attorney for Appellee

Elizabeth K. Ainslie

Joseph Anclien (argued)

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP

1600 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

 Attorneys for Appellant

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge,

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before this Court on an

interlocutory appeal from an order of the District Court dated

February 9, 2010, and entered on February 12, 2010, granting

appellee’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Bimbo

Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, No. 10-0194, 2010 WL
3

571774 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2010). The issue on appeal is

whether the District Court erred in enjoining appellant Chris

Botticella, formerly a senior executive at appellee Bimbo

Bakeries USA, Inc. (“Bimbo”), from working for one of

Bimbo’s competitors until after the Court resolved the merits

of Bimbo’s misappropriation of trade secrets claim against

Botticella. The Court intended that the preliminary injunction

would last for about two months until the trial but, because of

this appeal and a stay of the District Court proceedings

following the filing of this appeal, the preliminary injunction

has remained in effect. For the reasons we set forth below,

we will affirm the order of the District Court.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Botticella’s Employment at Bimbo

Bimbo, a Delaware corporation with its principal place

of business in Pennsylvania, is one of the four largest

companies in the United States baking industry. Bimbo and

its affiliates produce and distribute baked goods throughout

the country under a number of popular brand names including

Thomas’, Entenmann’s, Arnold, Oroweat, Mrs. Baird’s,

Stroehmann, and Boboli. Botticella, a California resident,

who already had experience in the baking industry, began

working for Bimbo in 2001 and was, until January 13, 2010,

its Vice President of Operations for California. In that

position in which Botticella earned an annual salary of

$250,000, he was directly responsible for five production

facilities and oversaw a variety of areas including product
4

quality and cost, labor issues, and new product development.

In addition Botticella worked closely with Bimbo’s sales staff

on sales promotion and capacity planning, and also was

responsible for overseeing the operations of “co-packers” in

his region, i.e., third-party manufacturers under contract with

Bimbo.

As one of Bimbo’s senior executives, Botticella had

access to and acquired a broad range of confidential

information about Bimbo, its products, and its business

strategy. For example, he was one of a select group of

individuals with access to the code books containing the

formulas and process parameters for all of Bimbo’s products.

He also regularly attended high-level meetings with other top

Bimbo executives to discuss the company’s national business

strategy. Significantly, as Bimbo repeatedly has noted

throughout these proceedings, Botticella was one of only

seven people who possessed all of the knowledge necessary to

replicate independently Bimbo’s popular line of Thomas’

English Muffins, including the secret behind the muffins’

unique “nooks and crannies” texture. Thomas’ English

Muffins is the source of approximately half a billion dollars

worth of Bimbo’s annual sales income. 

While employed at Bimbo, Botticella signed a

“Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Invention Assignment

Agreement” with Bimbo on March 13, 2009, in which he

agreed not to compete directly with Bimbo during the term of

his employment, not to use or disclose any of Bimbo’s

confidential or proprietary information during or after the

term of his employment with Bimbo, and, upon ceasing

employment by Bimbo, to return every document he received
5

from Bimbo during the term of his employment. App. at 214-

18. The agreement, however, did not include a covenant

restricting where Botticella could work after the termination

of his employment with Bimbo. The agreement contained a

choice of law provision providing that Pennsylvania law

would govern any dispute arising from the agreement.

Moreover, the agreement provided that certain state and

federal courts in Pennsylvania would have jurisdiction over

litigation arising from the agreement and over the parties to

that litigation. Thus, although this litigation seems only

marginally related to Pennsylvania, Bimbo filed it in the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, which has exercised jurisdiction. 

B. The Hostess Job Offer

On September 28, 2009, one of Bimbo’s primary

competitors in the baking industry—Interstates Brand

Corporation, which later changed its name to Hostess Brands,

Inc. (collectively, “Hostess”)—offered Botticella a position in

Texas as Vice President of Bakery Operations for its eastern

region. The proposed position carried a base salary of

$200,000, along with various stock option and bonus

opportunities. On October 15, 2009, Botticella accepted the

Hostess position and agreed to begin in January 2010.

Botticella did not disclose his plans to Bimbo for several

months, and he therefore continued to be engaged fully in his

work at Bimbo and to have full access to Bimbo’s

confidential and proprietary information even after he

accepted the Hostess position. Botticella maintains that he
The agreement stated: 1

I acknowledge that [Hostess] has advised

me that it is not interested in, nor does it want,

any confidential information or trade secrets or

other proprietary information that I may have

acquired through any prior employment or

business relationship, including without limitation

any information or ‘know-how’ related to the

manufacturing of Thomas brand products. I

further acknowledge that I have not previously,

and will not in the future, disclose to Hostess any

confidential or proprietary information belonging

to any previous employer. Specifically, I

acknowledge that Hostess has instructed me not to

disclose to it or to use in the course of any job for

it that I may be [sic] have at any time, any

confidential or proprietary information belonging

6

continued working for Bimbo notwithstanding his acceptance

of the Hostess position in order to receive his 2009 year-end

bonus and to complete two Bimbo projects for which he had

responsibility. 

After Botticella accepted the Hostess offer and while

Bimbo still employed him, Hostess directed him to execute an

“Acknowledgment and Representation Form,” which

essentially indicated that Hostess was not interested in any

confidential information, trade secrets, or other proprietary

information that Botticella had acquired from Bimbo, and that

Botticella would not disclose such information to Hostess.1
to any previous employer. I represent that I have

and will not bring to Hostess’[s] work place, use

for the benefit of, or in any way share with

Hostess any confidential or proprietary

information belonging to any previous employer.

I represent that I am not a party to any

currently effective employment contract, covenant

not to compete or other agreement that could

potentially have any bearing on my ability to

accept employment with Hostess, and that

Hostess has instructed me that I am not to perform

any action, directly or indirectly, in the course of

any duties or responsibilities that I may have at

any time for it, that would violate the terms of any

currently effective contract to which I am a party.

App. at 272.

Botticella asserts that he testified in his deposition that he 2

advised “his boss” at Bimbo in early December of 2009 “that he

would be leaving” Bimbo. Appellant’s br. at 8 n.1. But he

indicates that this testimony was not introduced at the hearing

on the preliminary injunction. He does not claim, however, that

at that time he advised Bimbo that he was joining Hostess.

7

App. at 272. Botticella signed the form on December 7, 2009.

Botticella informed his supervisor at Bimbo on January

4, 2010, that he was planning to leave Bimbo on January 15.2

But Botticella did not at that time indicate that he was leaving
Because Botticella had accrued eleven weeks of vacation time 3

with Bimbo, he remained on the company’s payroll throughout

the District Court proceedings. Botticella’s present employment

status is not apparent from the record.

8

to work for a competitor. Moreover, there is no indication in

the record that Bimbo asked him about his future employment

plans. On January 12, Hostess announced that its Vice

President of Bakery Operations for the eastern region was

retiring and that Botticella would be replacing him, effective

January 18. Bimbo personnel learned of the announcement

and the next day, January 13, the company’s Vice President

for Human Relations requested that Botticella contact him.

Botticella did so at approximately 10:00 a.m. PST and in the

course of the ensuing telephone conversation disclosed his

intention to work for Hostess. Bimbo directed Botticella to

vacate its offices that day.3

C. Botticella’s Use of Confidential Information

Following the Hostess Offer

In the period between when Botticella accepted the

Hostess offer on October 15, 2009, and when he ceased

working for Bimbo on January 13, 2010, he continued to have

all the access to Bimbo’s confidential and proprietary

information befitting a trusted senior executive. For instance,

Botticella attended a meeting with Bimbo’s president and

other Bimbo officers in December 2009 at which the

participants discussed confidential information regarding the
We are quite uncertain as to how an individual can block out 4

information from his head for a human mind does not function

like a computer from which, through an electronic process,

materials may be deleted.

9

company’s strategic plan for California. Botticella concedes

that if he had disclosed his intention to work for Hostess,

Bimbo would have restricted his access to this and other types

of information. Indeed, Botticella maintains that he no longer

felt “comfortable” being privy to Bimbo’s confidential

information following his acceptance of the Hostess offer and

that, accordingly, when he received emails and electronic

documents containing confidential information, he deleted

them, and that when he was exposed to confidential

information during presentations at meetings, he “blocked it”

out of his head. App. at 195, 197. 

4

In one instance over the Christmas holiday, Botticella

deleted a number of documents from his company-issued

laptop computer. These documents included both items of a

personal nature, such as his resume, and a number of workrelated documents containing confidential information.

Botticella claimed that he deleted these documents because he

“didn’t think th[ey] would [have] any value to anybody.”

App. at 198. Nevertheless, when Botticella returned to his

office at Bimbo on January 4, 2010, he asked a computer

technician to restore the files because “he wanted to have

them back just in case for the next weeks we needed to have a

meeting or something.” App. at 198. Bimbo’s technician

then restored the files to the computer.
Botticella does not deny that he was the person logging in under 5

his name.

10

Following Botticella’s departure, Bimbo hired E. Brian

Harris, a computer forensics expert, to investigate Botticella’s

use of his company laptop during December 2009 and

January 2010. Harris’s testing revealed that a user who

logged in as Botticella had accessed a number of confidential

documents during the final weeks of Botticella’s employment

at Bimbo. In particular, the testing revealed that the person

logging in as Botticella had accessed twelve files within a

span of thirteen seconds on January 13, 2010, Botticella’s last

day at Bimbo. Significantly this access occurred minutes 5

after the phone call in which Botticella finally disclosed to

Bimbo his plans to work for Hostess and Bimbo told him to

cease working for it. 

There were several similar patterns of access in the

weeks leading up to January 13. According to Harris, this

type of activity—multiple files being accessed more or less

simultaneously—was “inconsistent with an ordinary usage

whereby individual files are opened and either read or edited.”

App. at 238. Harris concluded that the activity was, however,

consistent with copying a group of files at the same time, but

he could not determine conclusively whether the files

Botticella had accessed had been copied and deleted or never

copied at all. App. at 238. The testing also revealed that

three external storage devices—a portable device known as a

“thumb” or “flash” drive and two external hard drives—had at

one time or another been connected to Botticella’s computer,

although it was unclear exactly when these devices had been
11

used. Bimbo located the thumb drive and one of the hard

drives but Harris could not determine conclusively whether or

not any files had been copied onto the devices from

Botticella’s computer. Harris was not provided with the

second external hard drive. According to Bimbo, that device

“is unaccounted for.” Appellee’s br. at 11.

A number of the files accessed from Botticella’s laptop

during his final days at Bimbo were highly sensitive and their

possession by a competitor would have been damaging to

Bimbo. As described by the District Court, these documents

include “Bimbo’s cost-reduction strategies, product launch

dates, anticipated plant and line closures, labor contract

information, production strengths and weaknesses of many

Bimbo bakeries, and the cost structure for individual products

by brand.” Bimbo Bakeries, 2010 WL 571774, at *7. There

were, however, more mundane documents such as a

presentation titled “Safety Short - Wet Floors” included in

these groups of files. App. at 237. In his video-taped

deposition, portions of which were presented at the

preliminary injunction hearing, Botticella admitted to copying

files periodically from his laptop to external devices during

his final weeks at Bimbo, but maintained that he had done so

only to practice his computer skills in preparation for his new

position at Hostess. Despite an earlier denial, he eventually

admitted to conducting such “practice” exercises in January

2010. The District Court found that Botticella’s explanation

of his use of the laptop computer and the external devices was

“confusing at best” and “not credible.” Bimbo Bakeries, 2010

WL 571774, at *6.
12

D. Procedural History

After Botticella left Bimbo and joined Hostess, Bimbo

brought this action seeking to protect its trade secrets and then

promptly moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The

District Court held a hearing on Bimbo’s motion at which

Bimbo presented portions of Botticella’s video taped

deposition as well as live testimony from Harris and Daniel

Babin, one of Bimbo’s senior executives. Botticella’s counsel

cross-examined Bimbo’s witnesses but did not present any

evidence on Botticella’s behalf. The District Court granted

Bimbo’s motion and preliminarily enjoined Botticella from

commencing employment with Hostess and from divulging to

Hostess any confidential or proprietary information belonging

to Bimbo. The Court further ordered Botticella to return to

Bimbo any of the company’s confidential or proprietary

information in his possession. The Court issued the

preliminary injunction on February 9, 2010, and provided that

it was to remain in effect until a determination on the merits

of the controversy at a trial, which the Court scheduled to

begin on April 12, 2010. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the

early trial date, Botticella appealed from the February 9, 2010

order to this Court on February 16, 2010. The case remains

untried and pending in the District Court as that Court on

March 5, 2010, after a conference with the attorneys,

postponed the trial and stayed all proceedings until its further

order. We have expedited our consideration of this appeal.

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Bimbo is a citizen of Delaware and Pennsylvania and Botticella 6

is a citizen of California.

13

The District Court had jurisdiction over this diversity

of citizenship action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We 6

exercise jurisdiction over Botticella’s interlocutory appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). When reviewing a

district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, we review

the court’s findings of fact for clear error, its conclusions of

law de novo, and the ultimate decision granting the

preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Miller v.

Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing McTernan

v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009)). 

IV. DISCUSSION

In determining whether to grant a preliminary

injunction, a court must consider whether the party seeking

the injunction has satisfied four factors: “(1) a likelihood of

success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable

harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not

result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4)

the public interest favors such relief.” Miller, 598 F.3d at 147

(citing Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey Inc. v.

Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004)).

We turn first to the question of whether Bimbo has

demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, an inquiry

that was the primary focus of the District Court, and,
14

consequently, also is the primary focus of the parties on this

appeal.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The District Court found that Bimbo was likely to

prevail on the merits of its misappropriation of trade secrets

claim. Under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act

(“PUTSA”), which is applicable in this case, a trade secret is

defined as: 

Information, including a formula, drawing,

pattern, compilation including a customer list,

program, device, method, technique or process

that:

(1) Derives independent economic value,

actual or potential, from not being

generally known to, and not being

readily ascertainable by proper means by,

other persons who can obtain economic

value from its disclosure or use. 

(2) Is the subject of efforts that are

reasonable under the circumstances to

maintain its secrecy. 
“The PUTSA displaced Pennsylvania’s common law tort for 7

misappropriation of trade secrets, but there is no indication that

the statute effected a substantive shift in the definition of ‘trade

secret.’” Youtie v. Macy’s Retail Holding, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d

511, 522 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 2009).

15

12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5302 (West 2004); see also Rohm

and Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 143 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2010) (“A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,

device or compilation of information which is used in one’s

business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an

advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”)

(internal citation omitted). The Pennsylvania courts look to

the following factors to determine whether information is

protected as a trade secret: (1) the extent to which the

information is known outside of the company’s business; (2)

the extent to which the information is known by employees

and others involved in the company’s business; (3) the extent

of the measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of

the information; (4) the value of the information to the

company and its competitors; (5) the amount of effort or

money the company spent in developing the information; and

(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be

acquired or duplicated legitimately by others. Crum v. 7

Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC, 907 A.2d

578, 585 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 

Applying these standards, the District Court

determined that during Botticella’s employment at Bimbo, he

had access to and acquired a number of Bimbo’s trade secrets,

including:
16

a. Information in Bimbo’s code books, as well

as and including formulas and designs for

Thomas’ English Muffins, Oroweat brand

products, Sandwich Thins products, and other

Bimbo products.

b. Bimbo’s strategy for increasing profitability,

embodied in a road map in January of 2009,

which included line closures, plant closures,

n ew p ro c e ss imp ro veme n ts, fo rmu la

optimizations, and new product launches, and

which achieved cost savings of $75 million over

the course of a year.

c. Knowledge of how Bimbo produces bread

‘from scratch’ instead of using pre-mixed

ingredients.

d. Documents copied by [Botticella] from his

work computer onto an external storage device

with no credible explanation. . . .

e. Bimbo’s promotional strategies with respect

to specific customers.

f. Bimbo’s cost positions.

g. Identities of Bimbo’s customers targeted for

upcoming bids.

Bimbo Bakeries, 2010 WL 571774, at *10. The District

Court then determined that Bimbo likely would be able to
17

prove at trial that Botticella would misappropriate these trade

secrets if allowed to work at Hostess.

A person has misappropriated a trade secret under

Pennsylvania law when he acquires knowledge of another’s

trade secret in circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain

its confidentiality and then discloses or uses that trade secret

without the other’s consent. 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5302

(West 2004). A court may enjoin the actual or threatened

misappropriation of a trade secret. Id. § 5303(a). After

determining that Bimbo was seeking an injunction on the

basis of threatened misappropriation, the District Court found

there was “a substantial likelihood, if not an inevitability, that

[Botticella] will disclose or use Bimbo’s trade secrets in the

course of his employment with Hostess.” Bimbo Bakeries,

2010 WL 571775, at **11-14. Accordingly, the Court

concluded that Bimbo had demonstrated a likelihood of

succeeding on the merits of its claim.

Botticella contends this conclusion was wrong as a

matter of law because (a) a court only can enjoin a defendant

from beginning a new job to protect a former employer’s

technical trade secrets, (b) such an injunction only can issue

where it would be “virtually impossible” for the defendant to

perform his new job without disclosing trade secrets, (c)

Bimbo did not present any evidence from which the District

Court could conclude that Botticella’s responsibilities at

Hostess would lead him to disclose Bimbo’s trade secrets, and

(d) the District Court drew impermissible adverse inferences

against Botticella in a way that effectively shifted the burden

of proof from Bimbo to Botticella.
18

1. Air Products and Inevitable Disclosure

The parties disagree about the circumstances that must

be found to exist before a court can enjoin a defendant from

beginning new employment. In its opinion granting the

preliminary injunction, the District Court stated:

When analyzing threatened misappropriation of

trade secrets, Pennsylvania courts apply the

‘inevitable disclosure doctrine.’ That doctrine

essentially posits that ‘a person may be enjoined

from engaging in employment or certain aspects

of his employment where that employment is

likely to result in the disclosure of information,

held secret by a former employer, of which the

employee gained knowledge as a result of his

former employment situation.[’] The scope of

the injunctive relief depends on the particular

circumstances of the case. 

Bimbo Bakeries, 2010 WL 571774, at *11 (citing Victaulic

Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (omitting

citations); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d

1114, 1120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)). In other words, the

District Court concluded, albeit somewhat paradoxically, that

Pennsylvania courts apply the “inevitable disclosure doctrine”

to grant injunctions based not on a trade secret’s inevitable

disclosure but on its likely disclosure. Cf. Pepsico, Inc. v.

Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[a] plaintiff

may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by
While courts across the country have considered the 8

applicability and scope of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, see

generally Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of Individual

States’ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine

or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. Rev. 621, 626-49 (2002), our

focus in this diversity action is on the decisions of the

Pennsylvania courts.

“‘On-site’ gas serves large industrial customers. Gas is piped 9

to the customer.” Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1116.

19

demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will

inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”)

(emphasis added). While we agree with the District Court

that Pennsylvania law empowers a court to enjoin the

threatened disclosure of trade secrets without requiring a

plaintiff to show that disclosure is inevitable, we do not

consider that an injunction granted absent such a showing was

issued pursuant to the “inevitable disclosure doctrine.” 

The leading Pennsylvania decision to discuss the

inevitability of trade secret disclosure is Air Products &

Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson. In that case Air Products, a 8

manufacturer and distributor of industrial gas, sought an order

enjoining Johnson, one of its former employees who primarily

was responsible for selling on-site gas, from working in the

on-site gas division of a competitor, Liquid Air, that lagged

behind Air Products in the on-site gas market. 442 A.2d at 9

1116-18. The trial court determined that Johnson, who had an

engineering background, had acquired a number of technical

and commercial trade secrets relevant to the operation and
20

sale of on-site gas during his employment at Air Products, and

that an injunction prohibiting Johnson from working in on-site

sales at Liquid Air was necessary because “[i]t would be

impossible [for Johnson] to perform his managerial functions

in on-site work without drawing on the knowledge he

possesses of Air Product[s]’s confidential information.” Id. at

1122 (quoting trial court opinion). 

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, agreeing with

the trial court that Johnson possessed trade secrets belonging

to Air Products that included technological innovations as

well as commercial information such as “the status of

negotiations with customers, proposed plant configurations

and methods of delivery as well as analysis of market

opportunities.” Id. at 1121 (quoting trial court opinion). In

reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that “trade

secrets need not be technical in nature” to be protected under

Pennsylvania law. Id. at 1124 (citing Macbeth-Evans Glass

Co. v. Schnelbach, 86 A. 688 (Pa. 1913)). 

With respect to the probability of disclosure required to

warrant an injunction, the Superior Court stated at the outset

of its analysis that Pennsylvania law permits the issuance of

an injunction where a defendant’s new employment “is likely

to result in the disclosure” of a former employer’s trade

secrets. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added). The Court then

determined that it was reasonable for the trial court to issue an

injunction based on the inevitability that Johnson would

disclose trade secrets, but the Superior Court explicitly chose

“not [to] adopt the reasoning of the trial court or its use of the

term inevitable.” Id. at 1124. Based on these statements it

seems clear that the Superior Court believed that the trial
21

court permissibly could have granted the injunction even if

the disclosure of trade secrets was not inevitable.

2. Protection for Non-Technical Trade

Secrets

Botticella argues that “[w]hile confidential information

concerning either technical or commercial issues can be

protected as a trade secret, the inevitable disclosure doctrine,

which prevents the defendant from taking on employment in

his chosen field, applies only to technical trade secrets.”

Appellants br. at 28 (citing Iron Age Corp. v. Dvorak, 880

A.2d 657, 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Oberg Indus., Inc. v.

Finney, 555 A.2d 1324, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)). Our

review of the relevant decisional law leads us to reject

Botticella’s proposed distinction between technical and other

information. To start with, it is clear that “trade secrets need

not be technical in nature” to be protected fully by

Pennsylvania law, Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1124; see also DenTal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1228

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (en banc) (“[T]he particular character of

the information is not relevant . . . . [It] may consist of

compilations of purely commercial information.”) (citing

Morgan’s Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838 (Pa.

1957)). Furthermore, courts applying Pennsylvania law are

empowered to enjoin both the actual and the threatened

misappropriation of trade secrets. 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §

5303(a) (West 2004). An injunction against employment

therefore is simply one weapon in an equity court’s arsenal to

prevent the threatened misappropriation of trade secrets,
22

regardless of those secrets’ technical or non-technical

character. 

In arguing that a court only may enjoin a defendant

from beginning a new job to protect a former employer’s

technical trade secrets, Botticella relies primarily on two

opinions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court applying Air

Products. In Oberg Industries, Inc. v. Finney, the trial court

had enjoined the general sales manager of a company that

manufactured carbide stamping dies from working for one of

that company’s competitors. 555 A.2d at 1325. The court

believed the employee, Finney, inevitably would disclose the

trade secrets of his former employer, Oberg Industries, if

allowed to work in the new position. Id. at 1326. The

information the trial court classified as trade secrets consisted

of customer information reports, including a master customer

directory and histories of quoted prices and completed sales

for various customers. Id. at 1325. 

On appeal the Superior Court did not clearly state

whether or not it considered this information to constitute

trade secrets under Pennsylvania law. Nevertheless, the Court

vacated the injunction because (1) the case did not involve a

restrictive covenant, (2) there was no evidence that Finney

took Oberg’s confidential information to use in his new

position, (3) some of the confidential reports at issue, “such as

the list of customers and their contact persons, were so

voluminous that they could not have been committed to

memory,” and (4) Finney’s position at Oberg and the

knowledge he obtained while in that position did not

demonstrate an inevitability of disclosure comparable to that

found in Air Products. Id. at 1327. With respect to the latter
23

point, the Court opined that the focus of Air Products was on

the employee’s “engineering background and the special

knowledge he possessed relating to a method of oil recovery

not yet developed by the competitor company,” despite the

circumstance that the employee, like Finney, was involved in

sales. Id. at 1327.

In Iron Age Corp. v. Dvorak, both the trial court and

the Superior Court refused to enjoin a former district sales

manager of a footwear manufacturer from using or contacting

any of the company’s current or prospective customers. 880

A.2d 567. The employee, Dvorak, had left the company, Iron

Age, to work for a competitor. Id. at 661. The Superior

Court affirmed the denial of the requested injunction because

the trial court reasonably concluded that the information at

issue—Iron Age’s customer lists—was “available to

competitors through legitimate means and cannot be declared

a trade secret.” Id. at 664. The Court went on to distinguish

Air Products on the ground that:

In Air Products, the employee possessed

intimate knowledge of his former employer’s

research and development data for on-site gas

delivery technologies. The employee’s new

employer was attempting to develop similar

technologies, and the employee was hired to

provide research and development data obtained

through his previous employment. In the instant

case, [Dvorak] possesses no such technical

knowledge, and [his] new employer already has

an extensive customer base. [Dvorak] was not
24

hired to provide information he obtained

through his employment with [Iron Age]. 

Id. at 665 (citing Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1117). The Court

also noted that Dvorak had signed an agreement with his new

employer promising not to disclose any of Iron Age’s secrets.

 Id.

Though some passages in Oberg and Iron Age suggest

that Pennsylvania courts will enjoin new employment more

readily when the disclosure of technical trade secrets, as

distinguished from other materials, is threatened, those cases

do not purport to establish an inflexible rule defining the

scope of materials that can be subject to trade secret

protection, nor do they limit the granting of injunctive relief

affecting new employment to circumstances involving

technical trade secrets. Rather, these opinions reach factspecific conclusions that the former employer was not entitled

to injunctive relief against its departing employee barring him

from working for a competitor. Overall, we conclude that the

relevant Pennsylvania decisions, viewed as a group, suggest

that (1) a determination of whether to grant injunctive relief in

a trade secrets case and, if so, the proper scope of the relief,

depends on a highly fact-specific inquiry into the situation in

the case the court is considering and (2) a court conducting

this inquiry has discretion to enjoin a defendant from

beginning new employment if the facts of the case

demonstrate a substantial threat of trade secret

misappropriation. 
By contrast, in Iron Age the Superior Court found that the 10

relevant information in that case did not even qualify as a trade

secret. 880 A.2d at 664-65. Hence, there was no threat that the

defendant’s change in employment would cause him to

misappropriate a trade secret. Likewise, the court in Oberg did

not find any threat that trade secrets would be misappropriated,

although its reasoning underlying that conclusion was not

particularly clear. See 555 A.2d at 1327 (“Finney’s position in

the company and the knowledge he obtained while in that

position do not demonstrate an inevitability of disclosure as that

found in Air Products which would require the issuance of an

injunction in this case.”). 

25

Putting aside the fact that Botticella had access to and

acquired confidential information of a technical nature about

the formulas and ingredients for a variety of Bimbo products,

he also had access to and acquired confidential information

about Bimbo’s long term strategies, operating costs, and

customer negotiations. Botticella does not dispute that these

types of information qualify as trade secrets under

Pennsylvania law. See Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1121-22. 10

Accordingly, the District Court had discretion to enjoin

Botticella from working at Hostess to the extent this proposed

employment threatened to lead to the misappropriation of

these trade secrets.

3. The District Court Applied the Correct

Standard

Botticella next argues that an injunction against

employment can issue under Pennsylvania law only when it
While the threat of trade secret disclosure in Den-Tal-Ez arose 11

from a proposed merger between two companies and not from

an employee leaving one company to work for another, there is

no indication that the Superior Court’s discussion of the relevant

26

would be “virtually impossible” for an employee to fulfill his

responsibilities for a new employer without disclosing a

former employer’s trade secrets. Appellant’s br. at 23.

Accordingly, Botticella contends that the District Court erred

as a matter of law when it granted Bimbo an injunction on the

basis that Botticella’s employment with Hostess would lead to

a “sufficient likelihood or substantial threat of disclosure of a

trade secret,” a lesser showing than it would have been

“virtually impossible” to avoid the disclosure of trade secrets

during Botticella’s employment at Hostess. Appellant’s br. at

22. Notwithstanding dictum to the contrary in one of our own

recent opinions, see Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 234, we conclude

that the District Court applied the correct standard. 

The trial court in Air Products enjoined the defendant

from working in on-site gas sales at his new employer

because it concluded it would be impossible for the defendant

to work in that field without disclosing his former employer’s

trade secrets. 442 A.2d at 1122. On appeal the Superior

Court affirmed, but noted it was “not adopt[ing] the reasoning

of the trial court or its use of the term inevitable.” Id. at 1124.

The Superior Court subsequently has stated that “[t]he proper

inquiry” in determining whether to grant an injunction to

prevent the threatened disclosure of trade secrets is “whether

there is sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat” of a

defendant disclosing trade secrets. Den-Tal-Ez, 566 A.2d at 11
standard for injunctive relief in trade secrets cases, which was

gleaned from Air Products, was intended to be limited to the

merger situation. See Den-Tal-Ez, 566 A.2d at 1232-33.

27

1232 (citing Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1122-25; SI Handling

Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1263-64 (3d Cir. 1985));

see also A.M. Skier Agency, Inc. v. Gold, 747 A.2d 936, 942

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (citing Den-Tal-Ez, 566 A.2d at 1232).

The District Court in this case applied the standard that the

Superior Court applied in Den-Tal-Ez.

In arguing for a “virtual impossibility” standard,

Botticella understandably relies heavily on our decision in

Victaulic. In that case, Tieman, a sales representative, had

violated a covenant not to compete with his former employer

Victaulic, a mechanical device manufacturer, by working for

a competitor. Victaulic, 499 F.3d at 230-31. Victaulic

brought a misappropriation of trade secrets claim in addition

to asserting several claims based on the covenant not to

compete. Victaulic sought injunctive relief in the action. Id.

at 231. The District Court dismissed Victaulic’s covenant

claims and requested additional briefing on the trade secrets

claim. Id. But before the trade secrets claim was resolved

Victaulic filed an interlocutory appeal, asserting that we had

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) on the ground that

the District Court’s dismissal of the covenant claims

effectively denied Victaulic’s request for a preliminary

injunction. Id. 

In determining that we had jurisdiction to hear the

appeal, we concluded that “Victaulic did not request a
28

preliminary injunction on its trade secrets claim, so the

District Court’s dismissal of the covenant claims left it with

no means of receiving preliminary relief.” Id. at 232. We

then went on to state that “[e]ven if we believed that Victaulic

requested a preliminary injunction on its trade secrets claim,

we would find jurisdiction” because any trade secrets

injunction potentially available to Victaulic necessarily would

be narrower than that requested on the covenant claims. Id.

We stated:

[S]omething like Victaulic’s requested relief

(preventing Tieman from selling similar

products for [his new employer] for a year)

could fit a trade secrets claim, as it is possible

for a court to enjoin an employee working in the

relevant industry or soliciting customers for

some period of time. But such a wide-ranging

injunction is atypical; rather, the usual

injunction merely prevents the employee from

disclosing specified trade secrets. . . . Under

Pennsylvania law, a broader injunction only lies

when it is ‘virtually impossible . . . [for the

employee] to perform his . . . duties for [his new

employer] without in effect giving [it] the

benefit of [his] confidential information.’

Id. at 234 (quoting Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1123). Because

Victaulic “had not alleged or argued inevitable disclosure” in

its trade secrets claim, we concluded that the District Court

lacked the authority to issue a broad injunction based on that

claim. Id.
29

In light of the scope of the District Court’s injunction

in the case now on appeal before us, we acknowledge that

after one reads Victaulic it is possible to conclude that the

District Court erred by granting the injunction without

requiring Bimbo to show that it would be “virtually

impossible” for Botticella to work at Hostess without

disclosing Bimbo’s trade secrets. But that reading would

leave the following questions: (1) did Victaulic correctly

interpret Pennsylvania law, and (2) if not, are we nevertheless

bound by that interpretation in the present case because

Victaulic is a precedential opinion issued by a prior panel of

this Court?

Our review of Victaulic leads us to conclude that in

that case we did not interpret Air Products in a way precisely

consistent with Pennsylvania state precedents. The Court in

Air Products took the passage that Victaulic quoted and

containing the “virtually impossible” language directly from a

decision of a United States District Court in Ohio in a case

under Ohio law that had facts very similar to those in Air

Products. See 442 A.2d at 1123 (quoting Emery Indus., Inc.

v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978)). The Superior

Court in Air Products found the reasoning of the Emery

decision “persuasive” and held that the trial court in Air

Products acted reasonably by granting a preliminary

injunction based on “precisely the reasoning of the court in

Emery.” Id. at 1124-25. Nevertheless, the Superior Court

explicitly chose “not [to] adopt the reasoning of the trial

court.” Id. at 1125. It follows that the Superior Court also

chose not to adopt the reasoning of the Emery court, it being

“precisely” the same as that of the trial court in the case on

appeal before the Superior Court. 
A second panel has the obligation to follow the law that a prior 12

panel set forth even when the prior panel decision applied state

law unless “there is persuasive evidence that [the law] has

undergone a change” in which case “we are not bound by our

previous panel decision if it reflected our reliance on state law

prior to its modification.” Robinson v. Jiffy Executive

Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237, 239-40 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Smith

v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1343 (3d Cir. 1990)).

30

The Superior Court subsequently stated that the

“proper inquiry” in determining whether to grant an

injunction to prevent the threatened disclosure of trade secrets

is not whether a defendant inevitably will disclose a trade

secret in the absence of injunctive relief, but instead whether

“there is sufficient likelihood, or substantial threat, of

defendant doing so in the future.” Den-Tal-Ez, 566 A.2d at

1232 (citing Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1122-25; SI Handling

Sys.,753 F.2d at 1263-64). We therefore conclude that Air

Product’s repetition of the phrase “virtually impossible” in

describing the Emery holding should not be interpreted as a

statement of Pennsylvania’s standard for granting injunctions

in trade secrets cases, our suggestion to the contrary in

Victaulic notwithstanding. 

Inasmuch as we have concluded that Victaulic

questionably interpreted Pennsylvania law, we next must

determine whether we nevertheless are bound by its statement

of that law. In this regard we start by recognizing that it is

“the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a

precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels” and

cannot be overruled absent consideration en banc. Internal 12
We decided Victaulic in 2007, and since that time so far as we

are aware there has not been a “clear statement by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to the contrary or other persuasive

evidence of a change in Pennsylvania law.” See Smith, 917

F.2d at 1343 (emphasis removed). Accordingly, the holdings of

the Victaulic panel bind us in the present case.

31

Operating Procedure 9.1. It is also well established, however,

that we are not bound by dictum in an earlier panel opinion.

Abdelfattah v. Dept. of Homeland §., 488 F.3d 178, 185 (3d

Cir. 2007) (citing Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 201 (3d

Cir. 2003)). 

We conclude that the Victaulic panel’s discussion of

Air Products and the interplay between virtual impossibility

and the inevitable disclosure doctrine was dictum and does

not bind us in the present case. That discussion was not

necessary to the panel’s jurisdictional holding that Victaulic

had failed to request a preliminary injunction on its trade

secrets claim. On the contrary, the discussion occurred only

in the context of a counterfactual hypothetical in which the

Victaulic panel posited that, even if Victaulic had requested a

preliminary injunction on its trade secrets claim, the Court

nevertheless would have had jurisdiction. While we

recognize that “where a decision rests on two or more

grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter

dictum,” Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n -Int’l

Longshoremen’s Ass’n. Pension Fund v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d

140, 147 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Woods v. Interstate

Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 1237 (1949)),

we do not consider the Victaulic decision on jurisdiction to
Botticella further argues for an “impossibility” standard by 13

pointing to an unpublished memorandum opinion of the

Pennsylvania Superior Court in Bacharach, Inc. v. Testo, Inc.,

No. 1257 WDA 2001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), App. at 279-301.

In that case, an employer argued that the Court could issue an

injunction pursuant to Air Products based on “the mere

‘likelihood’” that a trade secret might be disclosed. App. at 291.

The Superior Court rejected this argument noting that in Air

Products it only had “determined that the inevitable disclosure

doctrine might be properly applied because ‘it would be

impossible for the employee to perform his duties at the new

employer without disclosing trade secrets.’” App. at 291-92

(quoting Air Prods., 442 A.2d at 1124-25). Pursuant to

Pennsylvania Superior Court Rule 65.37, an unpublished

decision such as Bacharach cannot be considered as precedent

or cited for any purpose relevant to the present case. Thus,

Bacharach’s interpretation of Air Products deserves little weight

to the extent it conflicts with the Superior Court’s precedential

opinions. See A.M. Skier Agency, 747 A.2d at 942; Den-TalEz, 566 A.2d at 1232. In any event, Bacharach stopped well

short of requiring rigid adherence to the legal reasoning used by

the trial court in Air Products. App. at 287 (rejecting notion that

32

have rested on its interpretation of Pennsylvania’s law of

trade secrets with respect to its actual holding because with or

without discussion of the counterfactual hypothetical, we

would have held that we had jurisdiction. At bottom we

merely held that the District Court had denied Victaulic all

preliminary relief and thus we had jurisdiction. Accordingly,

Victaulic does not prevent us from concluding that the

District Court in this case applied the correct legal standard.13
“Air Products enshrines the ‘inevitable disclosure’ doctrine as

an inviolable rule of law”). 

The District Court also noted that in his position at Hostess, 14

Botticella would report to Hostess’s Senior Vice President for

Bakery Operations. Bimbo Bakeries, 2010 WL 571774, at *13.

33

4. Evidence of Botticella’s Responsibilities

at Hostess

Botticella next contends that the District Court erred by

determining the probability that Botticella would disclose

trade secrets while working at Hostess without requiring

Bimbo to provide more detailed evidence of Botticella’s

anticipated responsibilities at Hostess. The record before the

District Court contained little evidence in this regard apart

from what could be inferred from Botticella’s compensation

package at Hostess and his title as the Vice President of

Baking Operations for the eastern region. Nevertheless the 14

District Court concluded that Botticella’s prospective position

at Hostess was “substantially similar” to his former position at

Bimbo, noting that the Hostess position was “an executive

level position, with a salary comparable to his salary at

Bimbo.” Bimbo Bakeries, 2010 WL 571774, at *13. We

agree that the record supports the conclusion that in his new

position at Hostess, Botticella would have broad oversight

over bakery operations, just as he had at Bimbo.

Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by

preliminarily determining that the Bimbo and Hostess

positions were substantially similar.
34

5. Adverse Inference Based on Botticella’s

Failure to Testify

The District Court determined that Botticella’s conduct

following his acceptance of the Hostess job offer

demonstrated his intention to use Bimbo’s trade secrets during

his employment with Hostess. The District Court bolstered

this determination by drawing an adverse inference from

Botticella’s failure to testify at the preliminary injunction

hearing. In so doing, the District Court relied on our decision

in SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, where we stated that

because the misappropriation of a trade secret often must be

proved by “construct[ing] a web of perhaps ambiguous

circumstantial evidence” that outweighs the defendants’ direct

denial, the failure of defendants to testify in the face of a

strong showing that a misappropriation or misuse occurred

“justifies the inference that their testimony would be

unfavorable to their cause.” 753 F.2d at 1261 (internal

citations omitted). On the other hand, Botticella contends that

an adverse inference was inappropriate because he chose not

to put forward any evidence at the preliminary injunction

hearing. In support of this position he points to Stowe

Township v. Standard Life Ins. Co. of Indiana, where we

stated that “whatever inference might otherwise be available

from the failure to call a witness is not permissible when a

defendant chooses to put on no evidence at all, in apparent

reliance on its determination that plaintiff has not met its

burden.” 507 F.2d 1332, 1338 (3d Cir. 1975). 

Even assuming that the District Court erred by drawing

an adverse inference from Botticella’s failure to testify, the

conclusion that Botticella intended to use Bimbo’s trade
35

secrets during his employment with Hostess rests on a solid

evidentiary basis, namely, Botticella’s “not disclosing to

Bimbo his acceptance of a job offer from a direct competitor,

remaining in a position to receive Bimbo’s confidential

information and, in fact, receiving such information after

committing to the Hostess job, and copying Bimbo’s trade

secret information from his work laptop onto external storage

devices.” Bimbo Bakeries, 2010 WL 571774, at *13.

Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by

determining that Bimbo demonstrated a likelihood of success

on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim.

B. Irreparable Harm

The District Court concluded that Bimbo would suffer

irreparable harm absent injunctive relief because the

disclosure of its trade secrets to Hostess would put Bimbo at a

competitive disadvantage that a legal remedy could not

redress. On appeal, Botticella does not contest this finding

apart from arguing that any harm Bimbo potentially might

suffer from Botticella’s employment at Hostess could be

prevented by a narrow injunction—to which Botticella would

stipulate—prohibiting Botticella only from disclosing

Bimbo’s trade secrets. We recognize that the evidence at trial

may show that if Bimbo is entitled to relief that relief might

be narrow yet adequate, just as Botticella suggests.

Nevertheless, at this preliminary stage of the proceedings, the

District Court did not abuse its discretion when, faced with

evidence of Botticella’s suspicious conduct during his final

weeks at Bimbo, it determined that a stronger remedy was
Botticella in effect extended the duration of the preliminary 15

injunction by pursuing an interlocutory appeal for, as we

indicated above, the District Court has stayed this case during

this appeal.

36

needed in the interim to protect Bimbo from imminent

irreparable harm. See Den-Tal-Ez, 566 A.2d at 1232 (“It is

clear that under Pennsylvania law a court of equity may

fashion a trade secrets injunction that is broad enough to

ensure that the information is protected.”) (quoting SI

Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1265) (internal alteration

removed). 

C. Harm to Botticella Caused by Injunctive Relief

The District Court concluded that the harm of Bimbo’s

trade secrets being disclosed to Hostess outweighed the harm

to Botticella of not being able to commence employment at

Hostess until the Court made a final determination of the

merits following a trial, which it scheduled to start about two

months from the date it issued the preliminary injunction.15

The Court noted that Botticella would continue to receive

compensation for the eleven weeks of vacation time that he

had accrued before leaving Bimbo. We agree with the

District Court’s determination. In so doing, however, we note

that even a temporary injunction prohibiting someone from

pursuing his livelihood in the manner he chooses operates as a

severe restriction on him that a court should not impose

lightly. Nevertheless, such a temporary restriction on his
37

employment is warranted where, as here, the facts

demonstrate that the restriction is necessary to prevent greater

irreparable harm from befalling another party. Following a

disposition on the merits which in the normal course of events

will follow the disposition of this appeal and the remand of

the case to the District Court, if the Court holds that Bimbo is

entitled to relief, the Court should fashion a remedy

appropriate to protect Bimbo’s trade secrets without unduly

imposing on Botticella’s right to pursue his chosen

occupation.

D. The Public Interest

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that

granting the preliminary injunction was consistent with the

public interest. There are several public interests at play in

this case. As noted by the District Court, there is a

generalized public interest in “upholding the inviolability of

trade secrets and enforceability of confidentiality

agreements.” Bimbo Bakeries, 2010 WL 571774, at *16.

Additionally, there is a public interest in employers being free

to hire whom they please and in employees being free to work

for whom they please. Of these latter two interests,

Pennsylvania courts consider the right of the employee to be

the more significant. See Renee Beauty Salons, Inc. v. BloseVenable, 652 A.2d 1345, 1347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“[T]he

right of a business person to be protected against unfair

competition stemming from the usurpation of his or her trade

secrets must be balanced against the right of an individual to

the unhampered pursuit of the occupations and livelihoods for
38

which he or she is best suited.”) (internal citation omitted);

see also Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa.

1960) (noting a societal interest in employee mobility). We

are satisfied on the facts of this case that the public interest in

preventing the misappropriation of Bimbo’s trade secrets

outweighs the temporary restriction on Botticella’s choice of

employment. See SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1265 (finding

unnecessary an “extended analysis of the public interest

[because] extensive precedent supports an injunctive remedy

where the elements of a trade secret claim are established”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order

of the District Court dated February 9, 2010, and entered on

February 12, 2010, granting Bimbo’s motion for a preliminary

injunction and will remand the case to that Court for further

proceedings.