IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 11 / 04-0758 

Filed May 5, 2006 

BRIAN GREEN, JERRY VAUGHAN, 

TAD LEGGETT, and RODGER SMITH, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

RACING ASSOCIATION OF CENTRAL 

IOWA, d/b/a PRAIRIE MEADOWS 

RACETRACK & CASINO,

 Appellee. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. 

Schemmel, Judge. 

 Appeal from a district court judgment granting summary judgment 

to defendant on due-process and tortious-interference-with-contract 

claims. AFFIRMED. 

 Rick L. Olson, Des Moines, for appellants. 

 Thomas W. Foley and Debra L. Hulett of Nyemaster, Goode, West, 

Hansell & O’Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. 
2 

CADY, Justice.

Four jockeys sued the Racing Association of Central Iowa, d/b/a 

Prairie Meadows (hereinafter RACI), alleging a violation of their due 

process rights and interference with their existing and prospective 

contracts when RACI excluded the jockeys from Prairie Meadows 

Racetrack & Casino. The district court granted RACI’s motion for 

summary judgment, finding RACI was not a state actor, and that the 

jockeys’ claim of tortious interference was insufficient as a matter of law. 

We affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings 

 This case arose from allegations by a RACI employee, Ray 

Famous,1 that four jockeys, Brian Green, Jerry Vaughn, Tad Leggett, and 

Rodger Smith, racially harassed him on August 6, 2002 at Prairie 

Meadows. The exact nature of the allegations does not affect this appeal, 

but they involved extremely offensive and threatening conduct. After 

Famous reported the incident to RACI human resources personnel, RACI 

notified the jockeys that they were “denied entrance and access to the 

facility of Prairie Meadows pending the outcome of a stewards hearing on 

the incident.”2 Furthermore, they were informed if they attempted to 

enter Prairie Meadows, they would be deemed trespassers and would be 

subject to arrest or citation. The Board of Stewards conducted an 

 1Famous was the jockey room custodian, a racing official under Iowa 

Administrative Code rule 491—10.4(11) (2001). 

2Stewards are “racing official[s] appointed or approved by the [Racing and 

Gaming C]ommission to perform the supervisory and regulatory duties relating to parimutuel racing.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 491—4.2(17A). The stewards are responsible for 

“monitor[ing], supervis[ing], and regulat[ing] the activities of occupational and parimutuel racetrack licensees,” including investigating possible violations of racing and 

gaming rules by licensees. Id. r. 491—4.6(2). The jockeys are licensees. See id. r. 

491—6.2(1) (“All persons participating in any capacity at a racing or gaming facility, 

with the exception of certified law enforcement officers while they are working for the 

facility as uniformed officers, are required to be properly licensed by the commission.”). 
3 

investigation into the claim of misconduct. It interviewed Famous, the 

jockeys, and other witnesses. On August 19, the Board concluded “the 

investigation did not reveal evidence of a rule violation committed by an 

IRGC licensee.” Immediately following the Board decision, RACI gave the 

jockeys notice that they were denied entrance or access to Prairie 

Meadows “pending an independent investigation by Prairie Meadows of 

alleged harassment.” 

 RACI completed its investigation of the alleged incident on August 

20. RACI concluded Jerry Vaughn would be allowed to re-enter Prairie 

Meadows with no further action taken. It decided Tad Leggett could reenter if he apologized to Famous. However, Rodger Smith was banned 

from Prairie Meadows for the remainder of the season and could not 

return for the 2003 season unless he completed a diversity class. RACI 

permanently banned Brian Green from Prairie Meadows. The different 

actions were taken based on the different roles of the jockeys in the 

incident as determined by the investigation. 

 The jockeys filed a petition against RACI asserting a claim of 

intentional interference with contractual relations. On August 30, 2002, 

they amended their petition to add a claim that RACI violated their due 

process rights under the Iowa and United States Constitutions.3 

 3Presumably, the action was meant to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

although the amended petition did not refer to that statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(2004) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 

proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). 

A plaintiff in a § 1983 action must establish (1) that the 

defendants deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution 

and laws of the United States, (2) that the defendant acted under color of 

state law, (3) that the conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 

damage, and (4) the amount of damages. 
4 

Following a hearing, the district court issued a temporary injunction on 

September 30, enjoining RACI from excluding Green and Smith from 

Prairie Meadows. RACI then moved for summary judgment. On April 7, 

2004, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of RACI and 

dissolved the temporary injunction. The jockeys appeal. 

II. Standard of Review 

We have previously defined our standard of review from orders 

granting summary judgment. Our review is for correction of errors at 

law. Otterberg v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 696 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 

2005). In reviewing the record, we are mindful that 

[a] motion for summary judgment should only be granted if, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” 

Id. (citations omitted). 

III. Due Process 

The jockeys claim RACI deprived them of procedural due process 

when it excluded them from Prairie Meadows without prior notice and a 

hearing. They claim this action violated their rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 

sections 1 and 9 of the Iowa Constitution. Both constitutions prohibit 

the State from depriving a person of “property, without due process of 

law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. Yet, the 

provisions only limit state action. Jensen v. Schreck, 275 N.W.2d 374, 

________________________ 

Dickerson v. Mertz, 547 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted). 
5 

384 (Iowa 1979). They do not refer to individual activity. Id. Thus, RACI 

can only be liable under a due process claim if it was a state actor.4

It is undisputed that RACI is a private, nonprofit corporation, 

licensed to do business in Iowa and licensed by the Iowa Racing and 

Gaming Commission to conduct racing and gaming activities at Prairie 

Meadows Racetrack & Casino in Altoona, Iowa. Nevertheless, “ ‘when it 

can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which 

the plaintiff complains,’ ” conduct of a private actor may be deemed state 

action and subjected to constitutional standards. Brentwood Acad. v. 

Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S. Ct. 924, 

930, 148 L. Ed. 2d 807, 816-17 (2001) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 

U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S. Ct. 2777, 2786, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 546 (1982)). 

If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced, . . . its 

ambit cannot be a simple line between States and people 

operating outside formally governmental organizations, and 

the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual is 

to be treated sometimes as if a State had caused it to be 

performed. Thus, we say that state action may be found if, 

though only if, there is such a “close nexus between the 

State and the challenged action” that seemingly private 

behavior “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 

Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S. Ct. 

449, 453, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 484 (1974)); accord Principal Cas. Ins. Co. v. 

 4The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: 

“In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been 

treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” The ultimate issue in determining whether a 

person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in 

cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged 

infringement of federal rights “fairly attributable to the State?” 

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S. Ct. 2764, 2769-70, 73 L. Ed. 2d 418, 

426 (1982) (citations omitted); accord Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929, 

102 S. Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 490 (1982) (“[I]n a § 1983 action brought 

against a state official, the statutory requirement of action ‘under color of state law’ and 

the ‘state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical.”). 
6 

Blair, 500 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Iowa 1993) (“Our inquiry must be whether 

there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged 

action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly 

treated as the action of the state.” (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358, 95 

S. Ct. at 457, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 488)). 

 The Supreme Court has held that a sufficiently close nexus 

between the State and the challenged conduct to establish state action 

exists when the State and a private corporation are joint participants in 

the challenged activity based on their interdependence. Burton v. 

Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 

(1961). In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, an African-American 

man claimed his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated 

when a coffee shop in a city parking garage denied him service. Id. at 

720, 81 S. Ct. at 859, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 49. The Wilmington Parking 

Authority, an agency of the State of Delaware, leased space in one of its 

parking garages to the business, a private corporation called Eagle Coffee 

Shoppe, Inc. Id. at 716, 81 S. Ct. at 857, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 47. The 

Authority provided gas and heat to Eagle and provided various repairs. 

Id. at 719-20, 81 S. Ct. at 858, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 49. In addition, 

improvements Eagle made to the premises were tax-exempt. Id. The 

Authority benefited from the lease arrangement by virtue of the $28,700 

in rent it received annually from Eagle. Id. at 723, 81 S. Ct. at 861, 6 

L. Ed. 2d at 51. Without the rent received from commercially leased 

portions of the parking buildings, they would have been an 

“ ‘unprofitable enterprise.’ ” Id. 

The Supreme Court found state action, reasoning, 

The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of 

interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a 

joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that 
7 

account, cannot be considered to have been so “purely 

private” as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. 

Id. at 725, 81 S. Ct. at 862, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 52. The Court observed that 

“the relationship of the restaurant to the parking facility in which it is 

located confers on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits.” Id. at 

724, 81 S. Ct. at 861, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 51. In a later case, the Court called 

the arrangement between the parking authority and the coffee shop in 

Burton a “symbiotic relationship.” Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 

163, 175, 92 S. Ct. 1965, 1972, 32 L. Ed. 2d 627, 638 (1972). 

 It is under this “symbiotic relationship” theory that the jockeys 

argue RACI is a state actor to which the Constitution applies. The 

jockeys claim RACI has a symbiotic relationship with Polk County 

because: (1) Prairie Meadows operates on public property leased from 

Polk County; (2) some members of RACI’s board of directors are 

“appointed by and are intended to represent the Polk County Board of 

Supervisors”; (3) RACI “pays property taxes only by way of agreement 

with Polk County”; (4) Polk County receives lease payments in amounts 

the jockeys believe are excessive; (5) “The stated primary purpose of the 

operation of Prairie Meadows is to stimulate the economy of Polk County 

and the surrounding area”; and (6) Polk County depended on RACI “for 

revenue to pay off existing bonds that financed the purchase and 

building of” Prairie Meadows, which Polk County owns as realty. 

 RACI submitted several exhibits along with its statement of 

undisputed material facts showing the relationship between RACI and 

Polk County. Although RACI and Polk County initially functioned under 

an operating agreement, it was terminated in 1998 and replaced with a 

lease agreement. In the lease agreement, Polk County leased the Prairie 

Meadows premises (real estate and improvements) to RACI in exchange 
8 

for $1 million per month in rent for five years. In addition, RACI was to 

pay to Polk County the first $15 million of its net receipts generated in 

each calendar year from 1998 to 2000, the first $15.5 million of its net 

receipts generated in 2001, and the first $16 million of its net receipts 

generated in 2002. The lease further provided that Polk County had no 

obligation to make repairs or improvements or perform maintenance, and 

that RACI was responsible for paying all utilities for Prairie Meadows. 

Polk County would pay all real estate taxes, and RACI would pay any and 

all personal property taxes and special assessments. Further, the lease 

reserved the power for a county representative to enter Prairie Meadows 

and have access to RACI’s books and records “in furtherance of [Polk 

County’s] responsibility to the public and in protection of its property.” 

Finally, the lease stated: “Nothing contained in this Lease shall 

constitute or be construed to be or create a partnership or joint venture 

between [Polk County], on the one part, and [RACI], on the other part.” 

 Generally, a lease between a government entity and a private 

corporation “is insufficient, standing alone, to show state action.” 

Harvey & Corky Corp. v. Erie County, 392 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (App. Div. 

1977) (citing Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 33 (5th 

Cir. 1976)); see also NBC v. Comm’ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 

1022, 1028 (11th Cir. 1988) (lease did not provide “nexus or joint action 

sufficient to constitute state action”); Greco v. Orange Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 

513 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1975) (lease insufficient when the private 

lessee “is ultimately responsible for the daily maintenance, upkeep, and 

operation of the facility,” must “maintain and operate the hospital at its 

own expense and to hold the lessor harmless from any liability incurred 

in operating the facility,” and must “provide adequate fire, tornado, and 

explosion insurance and in the event of any damage to use the proceeds 
9 

to repair the hospital”). Instead, it is only when there has been 

governmental involvement or a mutual conferring of benefits between the 

governmental lessor and the private lessee that courts have usually 

found state action. See Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 93-94 (S.D.N.Y. 

1978) (New York Yankees found to be state actors, in equal-protection 

action brought by female journalist excluded from Yankee locker-room, 

because they leased the stadium from the City of New York, “the annual 

rentals to be paid to the City for use of the stadium depend directly on 

the drawing power of Yankee games, and the City has in turn invested 

substantial sums of public money to enhance that drawing power by 

modernizing and improving the stadium itself,” and “[a]dvertising and 

massive publicity about the Yankees and individual Yankee ballplayers is 

essential to the profitability of the Yankee Stadium”); Niswonger v. Am. 

Aviation, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 1080, 1081 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (private 

corporation operating airport in premises leased from city and county 

was a state actor because “the operation of airports and air navigation 

facilities in Tennessee is declared to be a public purpose,” and the 

corporation was performing a public function). 

 In this case, the only evidence of county involvement in RACI’s 

operations was that four of RACI’s thirteen members on the board of 

directors were appointed by the Polk County Board of Supervisors. 

Other courts have found that the appointment of some of the corporate 

board members by a governmental entity does not transform the action 

of the corporation into action of the governmental entity. See Kiracofe v. 

Reid Mem’l Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (no state 

action although “the hospital’s Board of Directors consist[ed] of twentyone members, four of which are appointed by the Richmond City 

Council, the Wayne County Council, the Wayne Township Trustee, and 
10

the Wayne County Commissioners”); Renforth v. Fayette Mem’l Hosp. 

Ass’n, 383 N.E.2d 368, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (no state action when 

three of hospital’s board of trustees were appointed by governmental 

entities; evidence was they “acted independently and did not report to the 

governmental bodies which elected them”); Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, 

Inc., 402 S.E.2d 653, 658 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (“The appointment right 

[of county commissioners] of some but not all of the [hospital’s board of] 

trustees, though indicative of state action, does not alone compel the 

conclusion that the suspension and revocation of [hospital doctor’s] staff 

privileges constituted state action in this case.”); see also Crowder v. 

Conlan, 740 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1984) (no state action although two 

of hospital’s thirteen-member board of trustees were public officials). 

However, the Supreme Court has considered it to be a factor in 

determining whether the private and public entities are so entwined that 

the private entity may be deemed a state actor. See Brentwood Acad., 

531 U.S. at 300, 121 S. Ct. at 932, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 820 (considering fact 

that “State Board members are assigned ex officio to serve as members of 

the board of control and legislative council”). 

 With respect to the issue of whether Polk County and RACI 

mutually confer benefits on one another, it is obvious that Polk County 

benefits financially from the lease agreement with RACI, both directly, 

though rent and net-receipts payments, and indirectly, through 

stimulation of the local economy. In addition, RACI benefited from the 

original arrangement with Polk County in that when the legislature 

amended chapter 99F to allow slot machines at racetracks, Polk County 

issued more then $26 million in revenue bonds to pay for remodeling of 

Prairie Meadows to accommodate slots, acquisition of slot machines, and 

other start-up costs. 
11

 However, this mutual benefit does not mean that the state-action 

requirement is satisfied. Burton was the high watermark by the Supreme 

Court in the state-action arena, considering that the Wilmington Parking 

Authority was not directly involved in the Eagle Coffee Shoppe’s decision 

to deny service to African-American customers. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 

725, 81 S. Ct. at 861, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 52 (“But no State may effectively 

abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing 

to discharge them whatever the motive may be.”). In later cases, the 

Court has significantly tempered its Burton holding, repeatedly stating 

that “where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must 

have ‘significantly involved itself with invidious discrimination[]’ in order 

for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the constitutional 

prohibition.” Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 173, 92 S. Ct. at 1971, 

32 L. Ed. 2d at 637 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380, 87 

S. Ct. 1627, 1634, 18 L. Ed. 2d 830, 838 (1967)); see Brentwood 

Acad., 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S. Ct. at 930, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 816-17 

(“[C]onstitutional standards are invoked ‘when it can be said that the 

State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff 

complains.’ ” (Citation omitted; second emphasis added.)); Am. Mfrs. Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52, 119 S. Ct. 977, 986, 143 L. Ed. 2d 

130, 145 (1999) (“Whether such a ‘close nexus’ exists, our cases state, 

depends on whether the State ‘has exercised coercive power or has 

provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 

choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.’ Action taken by 

private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not 

state action.” (Citations omitted.)); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 

Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195, 109 S. Ct. 454, 464, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469, 

486-87 (1988) (“Neither UNLV’s decision to adopt the NCAA’s standards 
12

nor its minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for 

concluding that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when it 

promulgated standards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and 

academic performance.”); Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S. Ct. at 2786, 

73 L. Ed. 2d at 546-47 (“[A] State normally can be held responsible for a 

private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has 

provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the 

choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State. Mere approval of 

or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to 

justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms 

of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Citations omitted.)); Jackson, 419 U.S. 

at 357, 95 S. Ct. at 456-57, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 487 (“Approval by a state 

utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the 

commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed 

practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the 

utility and approved by the commission into ‘state action.’ ”). The key to 

Burton was that Eagle affirmatively contended that to serve African 

Americans “would injure its business.” Burton, 365 U.S. at 725, 81 

S. Ct. at 861, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 51. The Wilmington Parking Authority 

directly profited from Eagle’s discrimination, and those profits were 

“indispensable elements in[] the financial success of a governmental 

agency.” Id. 

 In this case, there is no indication Polk County profited at all from 

RACI’s exclusion of the jockeys without notice or hearing. Furthermore, 

there is no indication Polk County or the county-appointed directors on 

the RACI board of directors participated in the decision to exclude the 

jockeys from Prairie Meadows. Rather, the undisputed evidence was that 

RACI’s director of human resources made the decision to issue the 
13

trespass notices to the jockeys. This evidence is significant because 

there must be some connection between the government and “ ‘the 

specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains’ ” for the government to 

be held responsible for the private actor’s conduct. Brentwood 

Acad., 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S. Ct. at 930, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 816-17 

(citation omitted; emphasis added); accord Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 

417 U.S. 556, 573, 94 S. Ct. 2416, 2426, 41 L. Ed. 2d 304, 319 (1974) 

(stating the overriding concern is “whether there is significant state 

involvement in the private discrimination alleged” (citations omitted)). 

Our role in ascertaining this connection has been described as follows: 

The judicial obligation is not only to preserve an area of 

individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and 

avoid the imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct 

it could not control, but also to assure that constitutional 

standards are invoked when it can be said that the State is 

responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff 

complains. 

Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S. Ct. at 930, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 

816-17 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also 

Putensen v. Hawkeye Bank, 564 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Iowa 1997) 

(“Constitutions were not designed to micromanage disputes between 

citizens, and, to resolve most lawsuits, citizens must resort to statutes 

and the common law. A state due process clause becomes implicated at 

the point where the power of the state is called upon by a private party in 

such a way as to deprive another of life, liberty or property.”). Here, 

there was no evidence that Polk County controlled RACI’s decision to 

exclude the jockeys. Moreover, when the connection is based on a 

benefit received by the county, it is not enough under Burton and its 

progeny to show that Polk County benefited generally from RACI’s 

operation of Prairie Meadows. Rather, the jockeys had to show Polk 
14

County benefited from the constitutional violation alleged. Only then 

could we say Polk County was responsible for the violation. There was 

simply insufficient involvement with Polk County, as a matter of law, to 

fairly attribute RACI’s action to exclude the jockeys from Prairie Meadows 

to Polk County. The district court correctly granted summary judgment 

in favor of RACI on the jockeys’ constitutional claim. 

IV. Intentional Interference with Existing and Prospective 

Contractual Relations 

The jockeys also claim RACI tortiously interfered with existing and 

prospective riding contracts the jockeys had with horse-owners and 

trainers. The district court granted summary judgment to RACI on both 

claims. On appeal, the jockeys abandoned the claim of prospective 

contractual relations, and we consequently only consider the claim of 

interference with existing contracts. 

The elements of the tort of intentional interference with an existing 

contract are: 

“ ‘(1) plaintiff had a contract with a third-party; (2) defendant 

knew of the contract; (3) defendant intentionally and 

improperly interfered with the contract; (4) the interference 

caused the third-party not to perform, or made performance 

more burdensome or expensive; and (5) damage to the 

plaintiff resulted.’ ” 

Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 399 (Iowa 2001) (quoting

Jones v. Lake Park Care Ctr., Inc., 569 N.W.2d 369, 377 (Iowa 1997)). 

RACI conceded for purposes of summary judgment that the jockeys had 

contractual relationships with horse-owners and trainers, and RACI did 

not dispute that it knew of the relationships. Rather, RACI claimed it 

was entitled to summary judgment because there were no facts 

pertaining to the claim to establish the third element: intentional and 

improper interference. Thus, the crux of the argument on appeal boils 
15

down to whether there are any facts associated with the jockeys’ claim 

from which a rational jury could find intentional and improper 

interference. Wilson v. Darr, 553 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1996) (“[T]he 

moving party may establish a right to summary judgment by establishing 

the limits of the other part[y’s] proof. If those limits reveal that the 

resisting party has no evidence to factually support an outcome 

determinative element of that party’s claim, the moving party will prevail 

on summary judgment.” (citing Griglione v. Martin, 525 N.W.2d 810, 813-

14 (Iowa 1994))); accord Mason v. Vision Iowa Bd., 700 N.W.2d 349, 

353 (Iowa 2005) (stating that to generate a genuine issue of material fact, 

the nonmoving party must present some evidence from which a 

reasonable fact-finder could find in that party’s favor). 

 The intent to interfere with a contract does not make the 

interference improper. Berger v. Cas’ Feed Store, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 597, 

599 (Iowa 1996) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. d

(1979)). The interference must be both intentional and improper. For 

purposes of a claim for intentional interference with a contract, the 

factors used to help determine if the challenged conduct was improper 

include: 

1. The nature of the conduct. 

2. The Defendant’s motive. 

3. The interests of the party with which the conduct 

interferes. 

4. The interest sought to be advanced by the Defendant. 

5. The social interests in protecting the freedom of action of 

the Defendant and the contractual interests of the other 

party. 

6. The nearness or remoteness of the Defendant’s conduct 

to the interference. 
16

7. The relations between the parties. 

Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 767 (Iowa 

1999); accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767, at 26-27. 

In Berger, we quoted from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 

767 comment d: 

“[I]f there is no desire at all to accomplish the interference 

and it is brought about only as a necessary consequence of 

the conduct of the actor engaged in for an entirely different 

purpose, his knowledge of this makes the interference 

intentional, but the factor or motive carries little weight 

towards producing any determination that the interference 

was improper.” 

Berger, 543 N.W.2d at 599 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts

§ 767 cmt. d). Thus, conduct is generally not improper if it was merely a 

consequence of actions taken for a purpose other than to interfere with a 

contract. See id. (“[A] party does not improperly interfere with another’s 

contract by exercising its own legal rights in protection of its own 

financial interests.” (citing Wilkin Elevator v. Bennett State Bank, 522 

N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1994))). 

 In this case, RACI supported its motion for summary judgment 

with evidence that the only reason it acted to exclude the jockeys from 

the track was to responsibly respond to the allegations that the jockeys 

racially harassed the jockey room custodian. It contends this 

undisputed fact means that if its conduct did interfere with the jockeys’ 

riding contracts, the interference was not improper but only a 

consequence of actions taken for the purpose of satisfying its obligation 

under the law as an employer. See Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque 

Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Iowa 2003) (noting that 

an employer’s failure to take proper remedial action in response to 

harassment by a nonsupervisory employee is an essential element of a 
17

hostile-work-environment claim under the civil rights acts); see also 

Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[E]mployer 

toleration of a discriminatory atmosphere alone gives rise to a cause of 

action by the [employee].”). 

We recognize a legitimate need of an employer to investigate the 

allegations of harassment in the workplace and, based upon the results 

of an investigation, to take responsible action against employees who 

harass other employees. See Taylor, 653 F.2d at 1199; Farmland Foods, 

Inc., 672 N.W.2d at 744. Thus, we agree with RACI that if the evidence 

in this case only shows it acted for the purpose of satisfying its legal 

obligation to protect the interests of employees and to maintain a 

hostility-free work environment, then there can be no viable claim for 

interference with a contract. The factors used to determine the existence 

of improper conduct support this conclusion. See Revere Transducers, 

Inc., 595 N.W.2d at 767 (listing factors). If the sole motive is a legitimate 

purpose derived from the law, then any interference is not improper as a 

matter of law. See Berger, 543 N.W.2d at 599 (“[A] party does not 

improperly interfere with another’s contract by exercising its own legal 

rights in protection of its own financial interests.” (Citation omitted.)). 

See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 cmt. b, at 28 (“The 

rules stated in §§ 768-774 show[] the results of the balancing process in 

some specific situations that have been the subject of judicial decision; 

but they do not constitute an exhaustive list of situations in which it has 

been determined that an intentional interference with contractual 

relations is not improper.”). 

When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported, the 

nonmoving party is required to respond with specific facts that show a 

genuine issue for trial. See Hlubeck v. Pelecky, 701 N.W.2d 93, 95-96 
18

(Iowa 2005) (“[T]he nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere 

allegations of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing the 

existence of a genuine issue for trial.” (citing Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5); 

Hoefer v. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Ins. Trust, 740 N.W.2d 336, 338-39 (Iowa 

1991))). This means the jockeys in this case were required to set forth 

some facts in resisting RACI’s motion for summary judgment that could 

support the existence of an improper motive. 

The jockeys failed to point to any facts in resisting the motion for 

summary judgment to show RACI’s motive was improper. In fact, they 

offered no facts bearing on the issue of motive in resisting the summary 

judgment motion, but only made conclusory allegations that RACI’s 

actions were improper. Moreover, the jockeys did not remedy this 

deficiency when they provided the trial judge with a copy of the complete 

temporary-injunction record at the summary judgment hearing. Our 

rules require a nonmoving party to identify the specific facts that show 

the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5). When, 

as in this case, a party resisting summary judgment seeks to generate a 

fact issue on an actor’s motive, that party must identify specific facts 

that reveal the alleged underlying motive. See Hoefer, 470 N.W.2d at 

338-39 (“While intentional torts . . . are generally poor candidates for 

summary judgment because of the subjective nature of motive and intent 

the rule is not absolute and, . . . ‘there is no genuine issue of fact if there 

is no evidence.’ Put another way, the party resisting summary judgment 

‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading.’ The 

resistance must set forth specific facts constituting competent evidence 

to support a prima facie claim.” (Citations omitted.)). 

Notwithstanding, the jockeys argue that an inference of an 

improper motive can be drawn from the undisputed facts offered by RACI 
19

in its motion for summary judgment. They claim RACI’s threat to arrest 

the jockeys and the severity of the RACI’s responsive action, as well as 

RACI’s decision to pursue an independent investigation following the 

stewards’ investigation, all support an inference of an improper motive. 

We recognize that a nonmoving party is entitled to all reasonable 

inferences in a motion for summary judgment. See Perkins v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 525 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Iowa 1994) (“[S]ummary judgment is 

like a directed verdict: Every legitimate inference that reasonably can be 

deduced from the evidence should be given to the nonmoving party.”). 

However, the requirement to identify specific facts in response to a 

summary judgment motion includes the requirement to identify those 

facts that support the inference sought to be drawn. The jockeys have 

not done so. 

 V. Conclusion 

RACI was entitled to summary judgment on the jockeys’ due 

process claim because RACI is not a state actor. RACI was also entitled 

to summary judgment on the jockeys’ tortious interference claims. We 

affirm the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED. 

All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who takes no part.