## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 06-2835

A HMAD J. T ARRAF , Petitioner

,
v

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A LBERTO R. G ONZALES , United States Attorney General, Respondent

.

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Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A78-851-200.

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A RGUEDM AY1, 2007—D ECIDEDJ ULY 30, 2007

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Before R IPPLE , M ANIONand W ILLIAMS , Circuit Judges

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RIPPLE , Circuit Judge. On February 18, 2005, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Ah mad Tarraf’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and ordered him removed from the United States. Mr. Tarraf appealed to the Board of Immigration A ppeals (“BIA” or “Board”), which adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ on June 1, 2006. Mr. Tarraf filed a petition for review in this court on July 5, 2006. For the reason s stated in this opinion, we deny the petition for review.2 No. 06-2835

1 Mr. Tarraf did not seek relief from removal on the basis of this marriage while he was in proceedings before the IJ and BIA. Therefore, we are concerned only with Mr. Tarraf’s eligibility for relief on the basis of his claimed fear of persecution and
torture if removed to Lebanon.

2 In order to demonstrate that he was persecuted within the meaning of the law, Mr. Tarraf must show that the harm he suffered was either at the hands of the government of Lebanon (or its agents) or that the government of Lebanon was unable or unwilling to protect him from the responsible parties. See Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 2004). Mr. Tarraf testified that he requested assistance from the Lebanese authorities every time he was targeted by Hezbollah, but that (continued...) I

BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Immigration Court Proceedings

Mr. Tarraf is a native and citizen of Lebanon. Since entering the United States unlawfully through Mexico in 2000, Mr. Tarraf has married a United States citizen; they have two daughters, also United States citizens. 1 After a traffic stop in October 2001, Mr. Tarraf was brought to the attention of immigration authorities, was arrested and placed in removal proceedings . Before the IJ, he conceded removability on the basis of his unlawful presence, but requested asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief.
According to his testimony at the removal hearing, Mr. Tarraf fears persecution by Hezbollah, a group the State Department Reports desc ribe as an “Iranian-backed Shi’a Muslim faction” that “undermine[s]” the central government of Lebanon. 2A.R. at 173. He claims thatNo. 06-2835 3

2 (...continued) they refused because Hezbollah was “part of the government.” A.R. at 108. The Attorney Genera l has not raised any challenge to Mr. Tarraf’s asylum eligibility on the basis of a failure to meet this state action requirement. We therefore take as established, for present purposes, that if Hezbollah is responsible for persecution, it is either an agent of the state of Lebanon or a force within Lebanon that the Lebanese government is unable or unwilling to control.

We note that certain language in Hor v. Gonzales , 400 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005) (“ Hor I ”), if read broadly, could suggest that when an alien has been targeted by an armed insurgency (rather than the government itself), he can never establish that he has been persecuted within the meaning of the law. In Hor I, we denied Hor’s motion for a stay of remo val, because we concluded that he was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his asylum claim. We noted that Hor claimed to be aligned with the government against the insurgency, and th at the government had been successful in its efforts to protect Hor. Id. at 485-86. Hor’s case was subsequently heard by a merits panel. Hor v. Gonzales , 421 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2005) (“ Hor II ”). In that subsequent decision, we vacated the Board’s denial of his requests for relief. We clarified that “nongovernmental persecution is much less common than governmental persec ution,” but that persecution by private actors can give rise to viab le asylum claim. Id. at 501 (“You cannot even claim asylum on the basis of persecution by a private group unless the government either condones it or is helpless to prevent it, but if either of those conditions is satisfied, the claim is a good one .” (emphasis added)). To the extent that Hor I might be read to suggest an opposite conclusion, Hor II instructs
that it should not be over-read.Hezbollah both has accused him of being an Israeli collaborator or spy and has recruited him aggressively to join
its cause. Mr. Tarraf contends that, because neither he nor4 No. 06-2835

3 Some of these return trips to Lebanon followed his own health problems that arose while abroad in Africa. Other return trips related to his family obligations and still others corresponded to additional significant life events. his family has acquiesced to these demands, they have been repeated targets of th reats and violence committed by
Hezbollah.
Prior to his merits hearing, Mr. Tarraf submitted an asylum application with the assistance of counsel. He attached limited supporting do cuments, including a brief statement that provided ce rtain details regarding hisclaim as well as a letter from his older brother that purported to corrobora te Mr. Tarraf’s history with Hezbollah.
At his removal hearing, Mr. Ta rraf testified, in support of his requests for relief, about three main incidents. First, he stated that his brother, Mohsen Tarraf, was killed by
Hezbollah in 1990. The record in cluded a copy of Mohsen’s death certificate written in Arabic, but the translation included in the record only states his name, village and date of death, without any information about the cause. Mr. Tarraf’s testimony itself provided few other details. He said only that his brother drove a taxi and that Hezbollah tried to “send stuff with him”; he testified both that Hezbollah did not pay Mohsen and that Mohsen “declined to take stuff from them and then they killed him.” A.R. at 109. According to Mr. Tarraf, because of his brother’s death, he left Lebanon in fear of Hezbollah. See id. at 96. He began living and working primarily in Côte d’Ivoire, but returned to Lebanon for periods of one to two months almost every year thereafter until 2000. 3

According to Mr. Tarraf, the second incident occurred on
his return home to Lebanon in 1994. He testified that heNo. 06-2835 5

went to visit his ill mother in her home in Maaroub, an
hour and a half outside of Beir ut. He stated that he traveled to the house at night, and, while he was there, Hezbollah came looking for him. They came to the door and spoke to his father, asking whether Ahmad was home and whether they could speak with him. Mr. Tarraf’s father apparently sent them away, and Mr. Tarra f waited in the home for two hours before attempting to leave. As he headed for his car, they called to him, and he tried to run away. He stated that they threw a grenade at him and that they shot him in the leg and in the back. Afterwards, he was
taken to a Hezbollah clinic wh ere he stayed for three days. When he was asked why Hezbollah had targeted him, he told the court, “they want me to work for them and I used to travel a lot and they used to—they say I’m [a] spy for
Israel.” Id. at 102. Mr. Tarraf stated that he told them that he agreed to work for them and was allowed to leave the hospital, but that he immediately headed for Beirut where he left again for Africa.

Mr. Tarraf also stated that, after this incident, he continued to travel back and forth between Côte d’Ivoire and Lebanon. Although he was not sure whether he had returned to Lebanon in 1995, he did return in 1996 to become engaged and again in 1997 around the time of his marriage. He told the court that, on this trip, “[Hezbollah] knew that [he] was there” and, therefore, he “ran away again” to Côte d’Ivoire. Id. at 104. Mr. Tarraf claimed that Hezbollah was “looking for [him] because they wanted [him] to work for them” and th at people in his neighborhood would inform Hezbollah on each of his returns to
Lebanon. Id. at 105. On these return trips, he stayed with his wife’s family or with friends in order to avoid
Hezbollah.6 No. 06-2835

4 In his written statement, Mr. Tarraf had stated that he was arrested while staying with his parents and that he was held for only three days. The additional letter from his brother Abo Tarraf, included with his asylum application, also written in English, states that the detention was for a period of three days. Mr. Tarraf stayed in Côte d’Ivoire until turmoil within that country forced his return to Lebanon in 1998 for a period of five months; thereafter, he went briefly to France, and returned again to Lebanon. In November 1998, Mr. Tarraf traveled to Syria and then to Mexico, where he attempted to enter the United States. He claims that
Mexican officials would not a llow his travel to the United States from Mexico City, an d so again he returned to Lebanon and remained there for a year and a half.
Finally, Mr. Tarraf testified about an incident that occurred just before his actual arrival in the United States. He claimed that, in April of 2000, Hezbollah again came looking for him. He stated that he moved from house to house while in Lebanon, but that Hezbollah members
found him and arrested him at a friend’s house. He stated that they held him for one month until he agreed to work
with them. 4Upon prodding from the IJ about what occurred during this period of detention, he testified that Hezbollah “beat [him] up so bad everywhere.” Id. at 111. He escaped and traveled to Mexico; from there he entered the United States. Mr. Tarraf stated that, since he had arrived in the United States, his apartment in Lebanon had been confiscated by Hezbollah and his 21 year-old nephew had been killed by them. Id. at 113-15. He testified that Hezbollah continued to look for him, asking even his seven year-old daughter if she knew where he was. He stated that, if he was returned, he feared that HezbollahNo. 06-2835 7

was “[j]ust going to torture [him] and torture [him].” Id.
at 118.
The IJ attempted to clarify with Mr. Tarraf why he believed that Hezbollah had targeted him for the intense recruiting he had described. In response, Mr. Tarraf stated, “[t]hey wanted me to execut e some operation for them, could be in Israel or anywhere outside Lebanon and they said they pay me any amountof money but I declined.” Id. at 109. The IJ pressed Mr. Tarraf on why Hezbollah wanted
him in particular, and he stated, “I didn’t have any training of any kind or anything. . . . I used to travel a lot. It was easier for me to get visas wherever I want to go.” Id. at 110. The IJ asked why Hezbollah would assault him as part of an attempt to recruit him, and Mr. Tarraf responded, “they just keep beating me up until I agree.” Id. at 113.
When Mr. Tarraf had finished his substantive testimony, the IJ confronted him with inconsistencies between his live testimony and the statements in his asylum application that had been prepared with the assistance of the same attorney who represented him at the hearing. See id. at 119. Specifically, the IJ noted that Mr. Tarraf’s written statement said that he had been captured by Hezbollah in 2000 while at his parents’ house, although at his hearing he repeatedly had testified that he was at his friend’s house. The IJ also noted that the written statement indicated that he had been held for three days, not one month, as Mr. Tarraf had maintained in court. Finally, the IJ questioned him regarding the varying descriptions of his detention: In his written statement, Mr. Tarraf indicated that Hezbollah had questioned and pressured him during this time, but he made no mention of any physic al abuse, although at his hearing Mr. Tarraf testified several times that he was repeatedly beaten and tortured. Mr. Tarraf stated that8 No. 06-2835

perhaps translation difficulties troubled the earlier statement, but that he stood behind his in-court testimony relating to his detention in 2000. See id. at 119. The IJ noted that his attorney speaks Arabic and seemed to question whether that explanation was plausible.

B. The Decision of the IJ
The IJ denied Mr. Tarraf’s requests for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief.
First, with respect to his asylum claim, he noted that Mr. Tarraf had filed his application more than one year after entering the country and had not demonstrated changed or exceptional circumstances to overcome the statutory bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
Turning to his claim for withholding of removal, the IJ reviewed Mr. Tarraf’s in-court testimony. He noted the
claims of his brother’s murder in 1990 and of the 1994 incident in which Mr. Tarraf was shot, but continued, “despite his refusal to support the Hezbollah, he continued to return to Lebanon every ye ar without great difficulty,” including one stretch of more than a year shortly before leaving for the United States in 2000. A.R. at 50. The IJ noted that his final departur e followed, according to Mr. Tarraf, an arrest and detention of a month, during which time he was beaten and pressured to join Hezbollah; he
also noted that Mr. Tarraf believed that he would be
harmed or killed for his continued refusal to cooperate
with Hezbollah.
After reviewing the Government’s objections to relief, the IJ determined that Mr. Tarra f’s applications should be denied. He concluded that Mr. Tarraf’s testimony was notNo. 06-2835 9

credible and that he had faile d to explain the discrepancies or provide corroborative ev idence or detailed facts “affect[ing] his credibility and also prevent[ing] him from meeting his standard of proof.” Id. at 52.
On the credibility issue, the IJ noted that a petitioner’s testimony alone can establish the basis for asylum, but must be detailed, credible and persuasive, all of which he found lacking in this case. The IJ stated that, if Mr. Tarraf had feared persecution since 1990 when his brother was killed, his repeated trips to Lebanon undercut his claimed fear. The IJ next considered the 1994 incident in which
Mr. Tarraf testified that he had been shot by Hezbollah while leaving his parents’ home. The IJ noted that Mr. Tarraf had been taken by the shooters to receive medical treatment and was permitted to leave the clinic without incident. The IJ further observed that Mr. Tarraf had provided virtually no deta ils in his description of this event. Again, the IJ noted that he returned home on numerous occasions following the incident. Under these circumstances, the IJ concluded that this incident did not support a finding that Hezbollah sought to harm
Mr. Tarraf.
“More significant” to the cr edibility issue, according tothe IJ, were the “drastic” discrepancies between the written application and the in-courttestimony, specifically in regard to the final claimed incident in 2000. Id. at 54. Given that Mr. Tarraf had left Lebanon permanently in response to this final incident, the IJ concluded that the discrepancies “went to the heart of” Mr. Tarraf’s credibility and his claim.
Id. The IJ did not believe that it made sense that the most serious allegations of persecution were not presented orwere grossly understated in Mr. Tarraf’s written application submitted before trial. Therefore, the IJ concluded that10 No. 06-2835

Mr. Tarraf’s “in-[c]ourt contenti on that he was held for one month and tortured by Hezbollah [was] simply not credible in light of this inconsistency.” Id. at 55.

The IJ went on to state that, even if Mr. Tarraf was shot in 1994 and detained in 2000 for the shorter period of three days that he had described in his written application, those incidents did not rise to the level of past persecution. The IJ ruled that, if Mr. Tarraf had been shot in 1994, the circumstances surrounding the injury as described “remain
unclear.” Id. at 56. The three-day detention and questioning without “any evidence that he was seriously injured, that
he needed medical attention or hospitali zation following his detention” did not supporta finding of past persecution. Id.
Having found no past persecution, and finding that the fear of future persecution re sted on the testimony regarding past events that he had ruled was “exaggerated and false,” the IJ stated that Mr. Tarraf had not shown that it was more likely than not that he would be persecuted if
returned. Id. Because he already had determined that the testimony was not credible, the IJ further stated that the
absence of corroborative eviden ce was fatal to Mr. Tarraf’s claim. The IJ denied the claim for CAT relief on the same
basis.

C. The Decision of the BIA
The Board adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ. In its one-paragraph of analysis, the Board stated only that (1) it concurred that no exce ption to the one-year deadline for asylum applications applie d; (2) it did not find the IJ’s adverse credibility finding clearly erroneous on the record presented to it; and (3) it agreed with the IJ that theNo. 06-2835 11

5 Mr. Tarraf has not asked this court to review the portion of the IJ’s decision denying him asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (providing, in pertinent part, th at no court shall have jurisdiction to review decisions regarding the timeliness of asylum applications and the applicability of the statutory exceptions).

6 We note that the Government ra ised a jurisdictional challenge in its brief, contending that Mr. Tarraf had failed to file his petition for review in this court within the thirty-day time period provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). We informed the Government at oral argument th at this court was closed for a holiday at the end of the thirty-day period and, therefore, that (continued...) specific inconsistency between the statement and the testimony was material, as it related to “the length of his alleged detention and the severity of his treatment, which suggests that [he] is attempting to embellish the basis for his asylum claim.” Id. at 2. The Board “agree[d] with the [IJ] that this inconsistency goes to the heart of [Mr. Tarraf’s] claim and undermines [his] credibility.” Id. Accordingly, the Board dismissed the appeal.
Mr. Tarraf timely petitioned for review in this court, pursuing only his claims fo r withholding of removal and
CAT relief. 5

II

DISCUSSION
Because the BIA adopted and affirmed the opinion of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by any discussion in the BIA’s opinion. Mema v. Gonzales , 474 F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2007). Mr. Tarraf raises three challenges to the decision of the IJ and BIA. 6First, he claims that the IJ12 No. 06-2835

6 (...continued) Mr. Tarraf’s filing was timely. The Government thereafter orally withdrew its jurisdictional challenge. applied an incorrect standa rd in making his adverse credibility determination. Next , he claims that the IJ’s conclusion that he did not suffer past persecution waserror. Finally, he claims that the IJ erred in denying summarily his claim for CAT relief.
We review a decision denying withholding of removal
and CAT relief under the deferential substantial evidence
standard. Boci v. Gonzales , 473 F.3d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 2007); Pavlyk v. Gonzales , 469 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2006). Under this standard, we shall grant the petition only when the record compels the conclusion that the alien was entitled to the relief sought. Boci , 473 F.3d at 767. An alien seeking withholding of re moval bears the burden ofdemonstrating a clear probability that he will face persecution if removed. Shymelskyy v. Gonzales , 477 F.3d 474, 481 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing INS v. Stevic , 467 U.S. 407, 410 (1984)). “The question under [the clear probability] standard is whether it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution.” INS v. Stevic , 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984). The standard for establishing entitlement to CAT relief is similarly stringent. Gomes v. Gonzales , 473 F.3d 746, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that, to obtain CAT relief, an
alien must demonstrate that itis more likely than not thathe will be tortured if removed). With these general constraints on our review in mind, we now examine each of
Mr. Tarraf’s claims.No. 06-2835 13

A. Credibility Determination
Mr. Tarraf claims that the IJ focused on “only two discrepancies” and therefore fa iled to consider the totalityof circumstances in making an adverse credibility determination. Appellant’s Br. at 11.
Credibility determinations are factual findings that we review deferentially. Shmyhelskyy , 477 F.3d at 479. We shall uphold an adverse cred ibility determination if the record, considered as a whol e, does not compel a conclusion to the contrary. Feto v. Gonzales , 433 F.3d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Kenyeres v. Ashcroft , 538 U.S. 1301, 1306 (2003)); Lin v. Ashcroft , 385 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.2004). “We will not overturn adverse credibility determinations simply because the evidence might support an alternate finding.” Kllokoqi v. Gonzales , 439 F.3d 336, 341 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Giday v. Gonzales , 434 F.3d 543, 553 (7th Cir. 2006) (not ing that an adverse credibility determination cannot be reversed simply because this court would conclude that a posi tive credibility finding was supported by substantial ev idence). Nevertheless, this
court also has stated that it will not hesitate to overturn an adverse credibility determinatio n when the IJ fails to give specific, cogent reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the finding. Ayi v. Gonzales , 460 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2006). We thus have reversed when the discrepancies were minor, Adekpe v. Gonzales , 480 F.3d 525, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2007), when they concerned irrelevant details in light of the alien’s broader claim of persecution, see Kllokoqi , 439 F.3d at 341-42 (reversing the cred ibility determination where “the number of traumatic and tragic events that have happened to” the alien made his lack of memory on thename of a high school he attended a decade earlier insufficient to support the finding), or when the IJ failed to14 No. 06-2835

7 Adekpe v. Gonzales , 480 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Shmyhelskyy v. Gonzales , 477 F.3d 474, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding an adverse credibility determination based on the alien’s unexplained failure in the written application to mention the most severe allegations of detention and physical violence
that were described at trial); Korniejew v. Ashcroft , 371 F.3d 377,384-85 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding an adverse credibility determination when the alien failed to explain adequately the
omission from her testimony of the most recent incident described in her written statement) ; Capric v. Ashcroft , 355 F.3d 1075, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I ]t is reasonable to expectparticularly invasive events to be mentioned in asylum applications . . . .”). consider the alien’s reasonab le explanations offered for a discrepancy, see Shtaro v. Gonzales , 435 F.3d 711, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2006) (faulting an IJ for fa iling to “attempt to ascertain whether [the discre pancies] could be accounted for”).

We further have noted that the failure to mention, in an asylum application, certain deta ils that later appear in live testimony does not render an alien’s testimony per se
incredible. Capric v. Ashcroft , 355 F.3d 1075, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Lopez-Reyes v. Ashcroft , 79 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 1996)). We repeatedly have stated, however, that when an IJ’s adverse credib ility determination is based on
inconsistencies between an alien’s earlier statements and his testimony at his hearing th at go to the heart of hisclaim, that are substantive and that are not easily explained or superficial, we shall uphold the adverse determination. 7

The discrepancies in this case concern the most serious allegations of persecution, and, indeed, relate to one of onlyNo. 06-2835 15

two events Mr. Tarraf described in which he personally was targeted. Mr. Tarraf’s in-court testimony was that he was taken from his friend’s home, detained, severely beaten, tortured and interrogate d for a period of thirty days before he finally relented to his captors’ demands that he join Hezbollah. His asylum application, by contrast,
had stated that he was ta ken from his parents’ home and detained and questioned for three days; he had made no mention of any physical violence or torture in his asylum application.
The BIA found that the changed accounts constituted an attempt by Mr. Tarraf to “embellish” his claim. A.R. at 2. The record, considered in whole, does not compel a contrary conclusion. The changed account substantially alters the length and severity of the critical incidentthat Mr. Tarraf says precipitated his final journey to the United States. In addition, although no t mentioned by the IJ in his decision, a letter submitted al ong with the asylum application from Mr. Tarraf’s brothe r states, “they found you and put you in the prison 3 dey [s ic] until you agreed to work with them. At last you escaped to America . . . .” A.R. at
166-67. To the extent that the letter corroborates any part of Mr. Tarraf’s claim, it supports the version of events the IJultimately credited and considered, a three-day detention under less severe conditions than those alleged inMr. Tarraf’s in-court testimony. The IJ’s additional determination that Mr. Tarraf’s description of events lackedsufficient detail further supports the IJ’s credibility finding. See Balogun v. Ashcroft , 374 F.3d 4 92, 499- 500 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that, among re levant considerations in determining credibility are inte rnal consistency and level of detail). Mr. Tarraf’s description of the major events involved in his claim was perfunctory; even when pressed16 No. 06-2835

for details, Mr. Tarraf said only that he was “tortured very badly” or “so beaten up,” A.R. at 111.
Finally, Mr. Tarraf suggests that the IJ erred in declining to credit his explanation thatperhaps language difficulties contributed to errors in the original statement. The IJ did
not fail to inquireinto the reasons for the discrepancy, see Uwase v. Ashcroft , 349 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2003), and Mr. Tarraf gives no explanation of why the IJ should have been required to credithis explanation, especially where, as here, the IJ noted that Mr. Tarraf was represented by the same Arabic-speaking attorney both at the time of his application and his hearing. See A.R. at 120; see also Feto

, 433 F.3d at 911 (“The IJ was not, however, compelled to accept [the alien’s] explanatio n for the plain inconsistencies in his story.”); cf. Chen v. Gonzales , 420 F.3d 707, 710 (7thCir. 2005) (noting that, although “[s]ignificant discrepancies among different versions of an alien’s statement are generally a permissible basis for an adverse credibility decision [,] . . . . initial asylum applications should not always be considered completely reliable, particularly when filled out without the assistance of counsel ”) (emphasis added). Mr. Tarraf’s apparent language difficulties may have contributed, in some measure, to the discrepancies between
the different versions of his story; this possibility, however, does not mean that it was impermissible for the IJ to conclude that the character of the particular discrepancies in issue should weigh against the petitioner.
The IJ’s credibility analysis also mentions Mr. Tarraf’s repeated trips back into Lebanon following his brother’s alleged murder and the shooting incident in 1994. The IJ’s opinion states that this tr avel “undercut [Mr. Tarraf’s] credibility concerning his fear .” A.R. at 39. A proposition
that anyvoluntary return to one’s home country rendersNo. 06-2835 17

8 See Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales , 475 F.3d 881, 893 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that, when the a lien previously had entered and left the United States on three occasions after claiming to have endured severe incidents of past persecution, the IJ was not “compelled to believe th at . . . return trips [to the alien’s home country] are what a person in dire fear of persecution . . . would do”). anyclaim regarding past and future persecution incrediblewould be far too broad a proposition to serve as a working rule for assessing an alien’s testimony. Although we have recognized that return tr avel might be an appropriate factor weighing against an alien’s credible fear, 8 each case must be considered in light ofits own specific facts. There well may be circumstances when a person who legitimatelyfears persecution nevertheless might elect to return temporarily to his home country. Health conditions made worse abroad, health conditions offamily members and other major life events might drive a person to choose to take
certain risks and return ho me, while doing his best to mitigate them. Here, Mr. Tarraf contended that his trips could be justified in these terms. While we may have reached a different conclusion, we cannot say that, under the circumstances here, the IJ erred in characterizing the trips as he did.
In any event, even without th is factor weighing againsthis credibility, we believe that the other legitimate considerations that influenced the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination are sufficient to sustain that ruling. We therefore uphold that determination as supported by
substantial evidence.18 No. 06-2835

9 With respect to the 1994 incident, the IJ stated only that the
circumstances of this incidentremain “unclear.” A.R. at 41. B. Past Persecution
The IJ ruled that, even crediting Mr. Tarraf’s testimony to the extent of the unembellished story of a three-day detention in 2000 and the shooting in 1994, those incidents did not support a finding of past persecution. 9 We review the conclusion that the harm the petitioner may have suffered did not rise to the level of persecution under the
substantial evidence standard. Diallo v. Ashcroft , 381 F.3d 687, 698 (7th Cir. 2004). The IJ did not believe that
Mr. Tarraf had demonstrated that his final detention resulted in serious injuries requiring medical attention or hospitalization. That the IJ de clined to credit the full extent of Mr. Tarraf’s claimed harms does not, in and of itself, require his subsequent conclusion that Mr. Tarraf did not suffer past persecution. Physical abuse causing serious injuries is not the sine qua non of persecution. Dandan v. Ashcroft , 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003). Persecution can include confiscation of property, surveillance and
behavior that threatens future harm. Gomes , 473 F.3d at 754 (citing Capric , 355 F.3d at 1084). Conduct can rise to the level of persecution without be ing life-threatening, including even such acts as seve re economic deprivation. Capric

, 355 F.3d at 1084. Frequency and severity of the harms suffered by a petitioner, however, remain relevant factors in an inquiry into whether those particular harms compel a court to conclude that the alien suffered persecution. See
Dandan , 339 F.3d at 573. We further have recognized
that actions such as detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confisca-No. 06-2835 19

10 See also Mema v. Gonzales , 474 F.3d 412, 417-18 (7th Cir. 2007) (kidnapping at gunpoint, interrogation and beating did not compel a finding of past persecution); Prela v. Ashcroft , 394 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2005) (repeated interrogations and twentyfour hour detention did not compel a finding of persecution); Dandan v. Ashcroft , 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2003) (three-day detention, in which alien was deprived of food and beaten, leaving his face swollen, did not compel a finding of past persecution).

11 We note that the IJ did not discuss specifically any of Mr. Tarraf’s testimony other than the two most significant incidents of claimed persecution, in which Mr. Tarraf himself came into
contact with Hezbollah. Our conclusion that the record does not compel a finding of past persecution, however, is based on the totality of evidence Mr. Tarraf produced in support of his
claims. See Bejko v. Gonzales , 468 F.3d 482, 486-87 (7th Cir. 2006). tion of property, surveilla nce, beatings, or torture might cross the line from harassment to persecution. However, recognizing that these sorts of activities might rise to the level of persecution is not the equivalent of saying that they always do. Persecution claims cannot simply be evaluated against a generic checklist. Review of an applicant’s past experience must be carried out on the most specific level—it is the details that reveal the severity of the particular situation.
Liu v. Ashcroft , 380 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 10

As Liu acknowledges, many of the claims Mr. Tarraf makes in his testimony as a whole could support a finding of past persecution, and in deed, on another record, this court might conclude that they compel such a finding. 11 The extremely scant details in Mr. Tarraf’s testimony, however,20 No. 06-2835

12 Mr. Tarraf claims that, althoughhe did not couch his appeal of the denial of CAT relief in due process terms, he did fairly present this claim to the BIA. His brief to the Board does statethat he appeals the denial of CAT relief. In substance, however, that brief discusses only th e IJ’s determinations that: (1) Mr. Tarraf is statutorily barred from asylum, (2) the harm did not rise to the level of persecution, (3) that there was no clear probability of future persecutio n, and (4) that Mr. Tarraf was incredible and his claim was unsupported by corroboration. See
A.R. 11-14. prevent this court from reaching that conclusion in this case. We do not hold that a pe titioner must provide a blowby-blow, minute-by-minute account of his experiences in his home country in order to establish past persecution; we note only that something more than the general allegations of detention and torture provided to the IJ in this case will compel a finding ofpast persecution. On the record before us, the IJ’s conc lusion that Mr. Tarraf did not carry his burden to establish past persecution is supported by substantial evidence.

C. CAT Relief

Mr. Tarraf’s final claim in his petition is that the IJ denied him due process of law by summarily rejecting his request for CAT relief without applying the proper standards.
This court lacks jurisdiction to review this claim, however, because it was not presented to the BIA. 12 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also Pjetri v. Gonzales , 468 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Where . . . a due process argument is based on procedural failings that the BIA is capable of addressing, the petitioner must exhaust his or her remedies at the BIA before bringing the claim in this court.”).No. 06-2835 21

Conclusion
The agency’s conclusions that Mr. Tarraf’s in-court testimony was not credible and that, to the extent it could be credited, it did not demons trate past persecution, are conclusions supported by substantial evidence on the administrative record as a whole. Therefore, we deny his petition for review and affirm the decision of the Board.

P ETITIOND ENIED D ECISIONA FFIRMED

A true Copy:

Teste:

_____________________________ Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C-0072—7-30-07