alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ACCEPTED

03-15-00378-CV

7070244

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

9/23/2015 7:30:40 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

NO. 03-15-00378-CV 

IN THE TIDRD COURT OF APPEALS 

JAMES HANSEN 

v. 

LONNIE ROACH and BEMIS, ROACH & REED 

APPEAL FROM THE 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

OF TRAVIS COUNTY 

APPELLANT'S AGREED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO 

FILE APPELLANT'S BRIEF 

Comes now Appellant James Hansen and files this motion to extend time to 

file appellant's brief. Appellant's brief is due to be filed in this court on October 5, 

2015. Due to the press of other deadlines and family medical issues, additional time 

is needed for the preparation of appellant's brief. John Shepperd, opposing counsel, 

has been consulted concerning this motion and has agreed to the granting of the 

additional time requested. Appellant requests that the court extend the appellant's 

briefing schedule until on or before October 19, 2015. 

Wherefore, Appellant prays that the court grant this motion and extend the 

time to file appellant's brief until on or before October 19,2015. 

1 

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/23/2015 7:30:40 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
KIDD LAW FIRM 

819 West 11th Street 

Austin, TX 78701 

512-330-1709 (fax) 

Is/Scott R. Kidd 

Scott R. Kidd 

State Bar No. 11385500 

512-330-1713 

scott@kiddlawaustin.com 

Scott V. Kidd 

State Bar No. 24065556 

512-542-9895 

svk@kiddlawaustin.com 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Certificate of Conference 

Appellee's attorney, John Shepperd, was consulted concerning this motion 

and has agreed to the granting of the motion. 

Is/Scott R. Kidd 

Certificate of Service 

A copy of this motion has been served on John Shepperd by fax this 23rd day 

of September, 2015. 

Is /Scott R. Kidd 

2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
Article 9 financial data schedule is restated for 10% stock dividend declared
September 28, 1998.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED> 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                      49,441,000
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       3,114,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            13,400,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                535,687,000
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                    965,482,000
<ALLOWANCE>                                 10,116,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           1,642,538,000
<DEPOSITS>                               1,417,394,000
<SHORT-TERM>                                23,486,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                         13,569,000
<LONG-TERM>                                 30,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  9,250,000
<COMMON>                                       220,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 148,619,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>           1,642,538,000
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             79,816,000
<INTEREST-INVEST>                           33,656,000
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               898,000
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                           114,370,000
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                          52,258,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          56,558,000
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                       57,812,000
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                2,875,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                           3,838,000
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                             54,051,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             18,602,000
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                  13,317,000
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                13,317,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .57
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .56
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.96
<LOANS-NON>                                  4,718,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                 1,946,000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               510,000
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             9,435,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                2,766,000
<RECOVERIES>                                   572,000
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                           10,116,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                        10,116,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00320-CR

TODD HOWARD BART APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR12908

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

A jury convicted Appellant Todd Howard Bart of possession with intent to 

deliver between four and 200 grams of methamphetamine and assessed his 

punishment at thirty years’ confinement. Bart’s court-appointed appellate 

counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support of that motion. 

Counsel avers that in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a 

professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no 

arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). In 

compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel notified Bart of his motion to withdraw, 

provided him a copy of the motion and brief, informed him of his right to file a 

pro se response, informed him of his right to seek discretionary review should 

this court hold the appeal is frivolous, and took concrete measures to facilitate 

Bart’s review of the appellate record. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014). This court informed Bart that he could file a pro se response to his 

counsel’s brief, but he did not do so. The State also did not submit a brief.

Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on 

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this 

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See 

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may 

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we agree 

with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing 

in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 
3

684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to 

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Bill Meier

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 25, 2016
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-40991

Conference Calendar

 

MODESTO RIOS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

JOHN W. TOMBONE,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:01-CV-338

--------------------

December 12, 2001

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Modesto Rios, federal prisoner # 48766-079, argues that the

district court erred in dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas

petition alleging that his trial and appellate counsel were

ineffective in failing to challenge the manner in which his

sentence was determined. He argues that he does not have an

adequate postconviction remedy to challenge his sentence under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 because this court has previously denied his

request to file a successive motion.
No. 01-40991

-2-

 The proper vehicle for attacking errors that occurred

during or before sentencing is a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. ReyesRequena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Under the "savings clause," however, if a prisoner can

demonstrate that the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 remedy would be

"ineffective or inadequate to test the legality of [the

prisoner's] detention," he may be permitted to bring a habeas

corpus claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 instead. See id.

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 

The savings clause applies to a claim that is based upon a

retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision which establishes

that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent

offense, and that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when

the claim should have been raised in the petitioner's trial,

appeal, or first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Reyes-Requena, 243

F.3d at 904. Rios has failed to demonstrate that his claim is

based upon a change in the law resulting from a retroactively

applicable Supreme Court decision rendering his conduct

noncriminal. Thus, he has failed to show that his 28

U.S.C. § 2255 remedies are ineffective and inadequate under the

savings clause. The district court did not err in dismissing

Rios’ 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition.

AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 29, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-60610

Summary Calendar

 

OLUWAFEMI ADEBOLA KYKOYI,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

--------------------

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A28 327 914

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Oluwafemi Adebola Kukoyi, a native and citizen of Nigeria

seeks review of the BIA’s denial of his request for discretionary

relief pursuant to former § 212(c) of the Immigration and

Naturalization Act. As we do not have jurisdiction, we dismiss

the petition.

Kukoyi pleaded guilty in 1987 to sexually molesting his

step-daughter. Adjudication was deferred and he was placed on

probation for ten years. The offense of which Kukoyi was

convicted constitutes sexual abuse of a minor, see United States
No. 04-60610

-2-

v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000), which is

an aggravated felony under the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(43)(A); United States v. Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d 314,

315-16 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction

to review his petition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); Nehme v.

INS, 252 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001). 

We decline to consider Kukoyi’s assertion that he is not an

alien. He admitted in the removal proceedings that he was

neither a citizen nor national of the United States, and he

contested his status for the first time in his reply brief. See

Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 390 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001);

Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). We

similarly do not consider the documents he provided as they were

not part of the record, see Goonsuwan, 252 F.3d at 390 n.15, and

which, in any event, do not demonstrate that he is a United

States national. 

We reject Kukoyi’s argument that the current definition of

aggravated felony does not apply to his 1987 conviction. See

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); Alfarache v. Cravener, 203 F.3d 381, 384

(5th Cir. 2000). Further, his deferred adjudication constituted

a conviction for purposes of IIRIRA. See Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d

994, 1005 (5th Cir. 1999).

DISMISSED.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2679 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2679

 To provide access to and manage the distribution of excess or surplus 
              property to veteran-owned small businesses.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 16, 2018

    Mr. Durbin (for Ms. Duckworth (for herself, Mr. Durbin, and Mr. 
   Kennedy)) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
    referred to the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide access to and manage the distribution of excess or surplus 
              property to veteran-owned small businesses.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Veterans Small Business Enhancement 
Act of 2018''.

SEC. 2. ACCESS TO SURPLUS PROPERTY FOR VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESSES.

    Section 32 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 657b) is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
    ``(g) Access to Surplus Property for Veteran-Owned Small 
Businesses.--The Administrator, in coordination with the Administrator 
of General Services, shall provide access to and manage the 
distribution of surplus property and foreign excess personal property 
returned to a State for handling as surplus property owned by the 
United States to small business concerns owned and controlled by 
veterans (as verified by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under 
section 8127 of title 38, United States Code) pursuant to a memorandum 
of understanding between the Administrator, the Administrator of 
General Services, and the head of the applicable state agency (as 
defined in section 549 of title 40, United States Code) for surplus 
properties.''.
                                 <all>
```
[ARTICLE] 5
<TABLE>
<S>                             <C>
[PERIOD-TYPE]                   YEAR
[FISCAL-YEAR-END]                          DEC-31-1996
[PERIOD-END]                               DEC-31-1996
[CASH]                                      31,201,000
[SECURITIES]                                10,040,000
[RECEIVABLES]                               25,978,000
[ALLOWANCES]                                 5,474,000
[INVENTORY]                                 66,799,000
[CURRENT-ASSETS]                           148,934,000
[PP&E]                                      67,747,000
[DEPRECIATION]                              25,965,000
[TOTAL-ASSETS]                             196,033,000
[CURRENT-LIABILITIES]                       44,293,000
[BONDS]                                              0
[PREFERRED-MANDATORY]                                0
[PREFERRED]                                          0
[COMMON]                                       118,000
[OTHER-SE]                                 137,959,000
[TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY]               196,033,000
[SALES]                                    444,766,000
[TOTAL-REVENUES]                           452,441,000
[CGS]                                      300,495,000
[TOTAL-COSTS]                              154,955,000
[OTHER-EXPENSES]                                     0
[LOSS-PROVISION]                                     0
[INTEREST-EXPENSE]                           1,088,000
[INCOME-PRETAX]                            (4,097,000)
[INCOME-TAX]                               (5,216,000)
[INCOME-CONTINUING]                          1,119,000
[DISCONTINUED]                                       0
[EXTRAORDINARY]                                      0
[CHANGES]                                            0
[NET-INCOME]                                 1,119,000
[EPS-PRIMARY]                                      .09
[EPS-DILUTED]                                      .09
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERIM
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                       7,421,001
<SECURITIES>                                19,063,274
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            28,908,217
<PP&E>                                       2,152,259
<DEPRECIATION>                               (431,299)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              33,541,950
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       10,536,625
<BONDS>                                      1,253,419
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,916
<OTHER-SE>                                  21,741,990
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                33,541,950
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                88,000
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             8,779,013
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              38,707
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (9,448,205)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (9,448,205)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (9,448,205)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.95)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.95)
        

</TABLE>
#### SAMES v. NAUER.

No. 10623.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Nov. 29, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 1939.

*717Lori D. Herbert, of Alice, for appellant.

L. D. Griffin, of Alice, for appellee.

SLATTON, Justice.

H. E. Sames, doing business under the name of Alice Motor Sales Company, 'brought this suit against John Nauer, in the County Court of Jim Wells County, to recover the unpaid balance on a promissory note, plus interest and attorney’s fees, and ■to foreclose a chattel mortgage lien securing the payment of said note against one automobile. John Nauer answered by general denial and alleged “that on or about the 14th day of October, 1938, when this ■defendant could not make on said debt one installment payment on said note and which •was secured by lien on said automobile; ■said automobile was of the reasonable market value of $625.00, and that the plaintiff herein forceably took possession of said automobile and converted the value thereof to its own use and benefit and at which time this defendant only owed the plaintiff the sum of $508.69, and thereby damaged this defendant in the sum of $116.31.”

A trial to the court resulted in a judgment denying a foreclosure of the lien and in favor of Nauer against Sames in the ■sum of $116.31 and costs. Sames appeals. ■

The appellant complains of the failure of the court to allow a recovery for the .amount of the unpaid balance of the note, plus interest and attorney’s fees, and foreclosure of the chattel mortgage lien, and •that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment accorded to Nauer upon his cross-action. There is some question in the minds of some of the Justices of this Court .as to whether the cross-action of Nauer seeks a recovery for the value of the auto-mobile or the sum of $116.31. However, the act of conversion pleaded by Nauer was .a forceable taking of the automobile and the proof shows without dispute that the automobile was voluntarily turned over to the holder of the indebtedness by Nauer, ■the trial court so found. The trial court found that Sames had a legal right to repossess the car under the terms óf the chattel mortgage, but evidently concluded that because Sames did not immediately advertise the car for salé under the terms of the mortgage he was thereby guilty of conversion.

If Sames had the legal right to repossess the car then he could not be guilty of forcibly taking possession thereof, which was specifically alleged by Nauer. It may be that on another trial facts may be pleaded and proved which in law amount to a conversion, occurring after the legal repossession by Sames, but such acts were not pleaded by Nauer on the trial in the court below. Therefore, we must sustain the appellant’s complaint that the evidence does not support the allegations contained in Nauer’s cross-action, and that the judgment entered thereon cannot stand.

In view of another trial, perhaps upon recast pleadings and a different record, we deem it unnecessary to pass on other questions raised by the appellant.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
# C_2022272EN.01000101.xml

| 15.7.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 272/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.7.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 272/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.10391 – RTL GROUP / TALPA NETWORK)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2022/C 272/01)

On 11 July 2022, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the ‘Competition policy’ website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the ‘Competition policy’ website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32022M10391. EUR-Lex is the online point of access to European Union law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32022M10391. EUR-Lex is the online point of access to European Union law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---