115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2736 

AN ACT 

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 

multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the 

Indo-Pacific region, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

3 ‘‘Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018’’. 

4 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

5 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Findings. 

TITLE I—UNITED STATES POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY 

IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 101. Policy. 

Sec. 102. Diplomatic strategy. 

TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN 

THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 202. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. 

Sec. 203. United States-China relationship. 

Sec. 204. United States-India strategic partnership. 

Sec. 205. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership. 

Sec. 206. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security partnership. 

Sec. 207. Quadrilateral security dialogue. 

Sec. 208. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 209. Commitment to Taiwan. 

Sec. 210. North Korea strategy. 

Sec. 211. New Zealand. 

Sec. 212. The Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 213. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of international law. 

Sec. 214. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia. 

Sec. 215. Cybersecurity cooperation. 

Sec. 216. Nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific region. 

TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS 

IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 301. Findings; sense of Congress. 

Sec. 302. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional economic 

summits. 

Sec. 303. United States-ASEAN economic partnership. 

Sec. 304. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation. 

Sec. 305. Intellectual property protection. 

Sec. 306. Energy programs and initiatives. 

Sec. 307. Lower Mekong initiative. 

Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on economic growth and natural resource conservation. 

Sec. 309. Sense of Congress in support of women’s economic rights. 
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TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDOPACIFIC REGION 

Sec. 401. Findings. 

Sec. 402. Trafficking-in-persons. 

Sec. 403. Freedom of the press. 

Sec. 404. Democracy, human rights, and labor personnel. 

Sec. 405. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people engagement. 

Sec. 406. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Human Rights Strategy. 

Sec. 407. Freedom of information to North Korea. 

Sec. 408. Sense of Congress on imposition of sanctions and suspension of 

United States assistance. 

Sec. 409. Authorization of appropriations. 

Sec. 410. Indo-Pacific human rights defenders. 

Sec. 411. Young leaders people-to-people initiatives. 

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The Indo-Pacific region— 

4 (A) represents nearly 50 percent of the 

5 global population; 

6 (B) is home to some of the most dynamic 

7 economies in the world; and 

8 (C) poses security challenges that threaten 

9 to undermine United States national security 

10 interests, regional peace, and global stability. 

11 (2) The core tenets of the United States-backed 

12 international system are being challenged, including 

13 by— 

14 (A) China’s illegal construction and mili15 tarization of artificial features in the South 

16 China Sea and coercive economic practices; 

17 (B) North Korea’s acceleration of its nu18 clear and ballistic missile capabilities; and 
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1 (C) the increased presence throughout 

2 Southeast Asia of the Islamic State (referred to 

3 in this Act as ‘‘ISIS’’) and other international 

4 terrorist organizations that threaten the United 

5 States. 

6 (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific re7 gion continues to transform, presenting opportuni8 ties and challenges to United States economic inter9 ests. 

10 (4) The United States has a fundamental inter11 est in defending human rights and promoting the 

12 rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region. Although 

13 many countries in the region have improved the 

14 treatment of their citizens, several Indo-Pacific gov15 ernments continue to commit human rights abuses 

16 and place restrictions on basic human rights and po17 litical and civil liberties. 

18 (5) Without strong leadership from the United 

19 States, the international system, fundamentally root20 ed in the rule of law, may wither, to the detriment 

21 of United States, regional, and global interests. It is 

22 imperative that the United States continue to play 

23 a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by— 

24 (A) defending peace and security; 

25 (B) advancing economic prosperity; and 
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1 (C) promoting respect for fundamental 

2 human rights. 

3 (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, 

4 the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy 

5 of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

6 held a series of hearings on United States leadership 

7 in the Indo-Pacific region, in which— 

8 (A) experts, including Representative 

9 Randy Forbes, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, 

10 Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert Orr, Ambassador 

11 Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, Mr. 

12 Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the secu13 rity challenges, economic opportunities, and im14 peratives of promoting the rule of law, human 

15 rights, and democracy, in the Indo-Pacific re16 gion; and 

17 (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dil18 lon Professor of Government at the John F. 

19 Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 

20 University, testified, ‘‘As realistic students of 

21 history, Chinese leaders recognize that the role 

22 the United States has played since World War 

23 II as the architect and underwriter of regional 

24 stability and security has been essential to the 

25 rise of Asia, including China itself. But they be-
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1 lieve that as the tide that brought the United 

2 States to Asia recedes, America must leave with 

3 it. Much as Britain’s role in the Western Hemi4 sphere faded at the beginning of the twentieth 

5 century, so must America’s role in Asia as the 

6 region’s historic superpower resumes its place.’’. 

7 (7) The United States National Security Strat8 egy (referred to in this Act as the ‘‘National Secu9 rity Strategy’’), which was released in December 

10 2017, states— 

11 (A) ‘‘A geopolitical competition between 

12 free and repressive visions of world order is tak13 ing place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, 

14 which stretches from the west coast of India to 

15 the western shores of the United States, rep16 resents the most populous and economically dy17 namic part of the world. The United States in18 terest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends 

19 back to the earliest days of our republic.’’; and 

20 (B) ‘‘Our vision for the Indo-Pacific ex21 cludes no nation. We will redouble our commit22 ment to established alliances and partnerships, 

23 while expanding and deepening relationships 

24 with new partners that share respect for sov25 ereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule 
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1 of law. We will reinforce our commitment to 

2 freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution 

3 of territorial and maritime disputes in accord4 ance with international law. We will work with 

5 allies and partners to achieve complete, 

6 verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on 

7 the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-pro8 liferation regime in Northeast Asia.’’. 

9 TITLE I—UNITED STATES POL10 ICY AND DIPLOMATIC STRAT11 EGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

12 REGION 

13 SEC. 101. POLICY. 

14 It is the policy of the United States to develop and 

15 commit to a long-term strategic vision and a comprehen16 sive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for 

17 the Indo-Pacific region that— 

18 (1) secures the vital national security interests 

19 of the United States and our allies and partners; 

20 (2) promotes American prosperity and economic 

21 interests by advancing economic growth and develop22 ment of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic commu23 nity; 
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1 (3) advances American influence by reflecting 

2 the values of the American people and universal 

3 human rights; 

4 (4) supports functional problem-solving regional 

5 architecture; and 

6 (5) accords with and supports the rule of law 

7 and international norms. 

8 SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. 

9 It is the diplomatic strategy of the United States— 

10 (1) to work with United States allies— 

11 (A) to confront common challenges; 

12 (B) to improve information sharing; 

13 (C) to increase defense investment and 

14 trade; 

15 (D) to ensure interoperability; and 

16 (E) to strengthen shared capabilities; 

17 (2) to strengthen relationships with partners 

18 who— 

19 (A) share mutual respect for the rule of 

20 law; 

21 (B) agree with fair and reciprocal trade; 

22 and 

23 (C) understand the importance of civil so24 ciety, the rule of law, the free and reliable flow 

25 of information, and transparent governance; 
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1 (3) to support functional problem-solving re2 gional architecture, including through the Associa3 tion of Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific Eco4 nomic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit; 

5 (4) to emphasize the commitment of the United 

6 States— 

7 (A) to freedom of navigation under inter8 national law; 

9 (B) to promote peaceful resolutions of 

10 maritime and territorial disputes; and 

11 (C) to expand security and defense co12 operation with allies and partners, as appro13 priate; 

14 (5) to pursue diplomatic measures to achieve 

15 complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization 

16 of North Korea; 

17 (6) to improve civil society, strengthen the rule 

18 of law, and advocate for transparent governance; 

19 (7) to develop and grow the economy through 

20 private sector partnerships between the United 

21 States and Indo-Pacific partners; 

22 (8) to pursue multilateral and bilateral trade 

23 agreements in a free, fair, and reciprocal manner 

24 and build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific 

25 committed to free markets; 
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1 (9) to work with and encourage Indo-Pacific 

2 countries— 

3 (A) to pursue high-quality and transparent 

4 infrastructure projects; 

5 (B) to maintain unimpeded commerce, 

6 open sea lines or air ways, and communication; 

7 and 

8 (C) to seek the peaceful resolution of dis9 putes; and 

10 (10) to sustain a strong military presence in the 

11 Indo-Pacific region and strengthen security relation12 ships with allies and partners throughout the region. 

13 TITLE II—PROMOTING UNITED 

14 STATES SECURITY INTERESTS 

15 IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION 

16 SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

17 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term ‘‘ap18 propriate committees of Congress’’ means— 

19 (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

20 Senate; 

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

22 Senate; 

23 (3) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 

24 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

25 House of Representatives; 
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1 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

2 House of Representatives; and 

3 (6) the Committee on Ways and Means of the 

4 House of Representatives. 

5 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

6 are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of 

7 State, the United States Agency for International Devel8 opment, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, 

9 $1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 

10 2023, which shall be used— 

11 (1) to advance United States foreign policy in12 terests and objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in 

13 recognition of the value of diplomatic initiatives and 

14 programs in the furtherance of United States strat15 egy; 

16 (2) to improve the defense capacity and resil17 iency of partner nations to resist coercion and deter 

18 and defend against security threats, including 

19 through foreign military financing and international 

20 military education and training programs; 

21 (3) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 

22 engagements, particularly with the United States’ 

23 most highly-capable allies and partners, to meet 

24 strategic challenges, including— 
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1 (A) certain destabilizing activities of the 

2 People’s Republic of China; and 

3 (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear 

4 and ballistic missile programs of the Demo5 cratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

6 (4) to build new counterterrorism partnership 

7 programs in Southeast Asia to combat the growing 

8 presence of ISIS and other terrorist organizations 

9 that pose a significant threat to the United States, 

10 its allies, and its citizens’ interests abroad; 

11 (5) to help partner countries strengthen their 

12 democratic systems, with a focus on good govern13 ance; 

14 (6) to ensure that the regulatory environments 

15 for trade, infrastructure, and investment in partner 

16 countries are transparent, open, and free of corrup17 tion; 

18 (7) to encourage responsible natural resource 

19 management in partner countries, which is closely 

20 associated with economic growth; and 

21 (8) to increase maritime domain awareness pro22 grams in South Asia and Southeast Asia— 

23 (A) by expanding the scope of naval and 

24 coast guard training efforts with Southeast 

25 Asian countries; 
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1 (B) by expanding cooperation with demo2 cratic partners in South Asia, including Ban3 gladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; 

4 (C) through intelligence sharing and other 

5 information-sharing efforts; and 

6 (D) through multilateral engagements, in7 cluding by involving Japan, Australia, and 

8 India in such efforts. 

9 (c) COUNTERING CHINA’S INFLUENCE TO UNDER10 MINE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.—Amounts appro11 priated pursuant to subsection (b) shall be made available 

12 for United States Government efforts to counter the stra13 tegic influence of the People’s Republic of China, in ac14 cordance with the strategy required under section 

15 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper16 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 

17 (division K of Public Law 113–76; 128 Stat. 536) and 

18 in consultation with the appropriate committees of Con19 gress. 

20 (d) BURMA.—None of the amounts appropriated pur21 suant to subsection (b) may be made available for Inter22 national Military Education and Training and Foreign 

23 Military Financing Programs for the armed forces of the 

24 Republic of the Union of Myanmar (historically known as 

25 ‘‘Burma’’). 
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1 (e) PHILIPPINES.— 

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—None of the amounts appro3 priated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made 

4 available for counternarcotics assistance for the Phil5 ippine National Police unless the Secretary of State 

6 determines and reports to the appropriate commit7 tees of Congress that the Government of the Phil8 ippines has adopted and is implementing a counter9 narcotics strategy that is consistent with inter10 national human rights standards, including inves11 tigating and prosecuting individuals who are credibly 

12 alleged to have ordered, committed, or covered up 

13 extrajudicial killings and other gross violations of 

14 human rights in the conduct of counternarcotics op15 erations. 

16 (2) EXCEPTION.—The limitation under para17 graph (1) shall not apply to funds made available— 

18 (A) for drug demand reduction, maritime 

19 programs, or transnational interdiction pro20 grams; or 

21 (B) to support for the development of such 

22 counternarcotics strategy, after consultation 

23 with the appropriate committees of Congress. 

24 (f) CAMBODIA.—None of the amounts authorized to 

25 be appropriated pursuant to subsection (b) may be made 
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1 available for United States assistance programs that ben2 efit the Government of Cambodia unless the Secretary of 

3 State certifies and reports to the appropriate congres4 sional committees that the requirements under section 

5 7043(b)(1) of division K of the Consolidated Appropria6 tions Act, 2018 (Public Law 115–141) have been met. 

7 SEC. 202. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC RE8 GION. 

9 (a) UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE.—The United 

10 States Government— 

11 (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Co12 operation and Security between the United States 

13 and Japan, done at Washington, January 19, 1960, 

14 and all related and subsequent bilateral security 

15 agreements and arrangements concluded on or be16 fore the date of the enactment of this Act; 

17 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be18 tween the United States and Japan in promoting 

19 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

20 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

21 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

22 the United States and Japan. 

23 (b) UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA ALLI24 ANCE.—The United States Government— 
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1 (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty 

2 Between the United States and the Republic of 

3 Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and all 

4 related and subsequent bilateral security agreements 

5 and arrangements concluded on or before the date of 

6 the enactment of this Act; 

7 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be8 tween the United States and South Korea in pro9 moting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; 

10 and 

11 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

12 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

13 the United States and the Republic of Korea. 

14 (c) UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA ALLIANCE.—The 

15 United States Government— 

16 (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Be17 tween Australia and the United States of America, 

18 done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and all 

19 related and subsequent bilateral security agreements 

20 and arrangements concluded on or before the date of 

21 the enactment of this Act; 

22 (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance be23 tween the United States and Australia in promoting 

24 peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
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1 (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

2 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

3 the United States and Australia. 

4 (d) UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINES ALLIANCE.—The 

5 United States Government is committed to the Mutual 

6 Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines 

7 and the United States of America, done at Washington 

8 August 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral 

9 security agreements and arrangements concluded on or be10 fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including the 

11 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at Ma12 nila April 28, 2014. 

13 (e) THAILAND.—The United States Government is 

14 committed to— 

15 (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assist16 ance Between the Government of the United States 

17 of America and the Government of Thailand, done 

18 at Bangkok October 17, 1950; 

19 (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Trea20 ty, done at Manila September 8, 1954; and 

21 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral security 

22 agreements and arrangements concluded on or be23 fore the date of the enactment of this Act, including 

24 the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-United 
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1 States Defense Alliance, issued in Bangkok Novem2 ber 15, 2012. 

3 SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

5 (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese ac6 tions that seek— 

7 (A) to further constrain space for civil so8 ciety and religion within China; and 

9 (B) to undermine a rules-based order in 

10 the Indo-Pacific region; 

11 (2) encourages China to play a constructive role 

12 in world affairs by demonstrating consistent respect 

13 for the rule of law and international norms; 

14 (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 

15 comprehensive relationship with China— 

16 (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and 

17 (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, 

18 including over human rights, economic policies, 

19 and maritime security; and 

20 (4) is committed to working with China on 

21 shared regional and global challenges, especially— 

22 (A) upholding and strengthening the rules23 based international system; and 

24 (B) the denuclearization of North Korea. 
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1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con2 gress that the United States should— 

3 (1) welcome a decision by China to change 

4 course and pursue a responsible results-oriented re5 lationship with the United States and engagement 

6 on global issues; 

7 (2) encourage China to play a constructive role 

8 in the Indo-Pacific region and globally; and 

9 (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that un10 dermine the rules-based international system. 

11 SEC. 204. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

13 (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic 

14 partnership between the United States and India in 

15 promoting peace and security in the Indo-Pacific re16 gion; 

17 (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening 

18 of diplomatic, economic, and security ties between 

19 the United States and India; and 

20 (3) is committed to— 

21 (A) the New Framework for the United 

22 States-India Defense Relationship, done at Ar23 lington, Virginia on June 28, 2005; 

24 (B) the United States-India Defense Tech25 nology and Trade Initiative, launched in 2012; 
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1 (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo2 Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, announced on 

3 January 25, 2015; 

4 (D) the United States-India Joint State5 ment on Prosperity Through Partnership, 

6 issued on June 26, 2017; and 

7 (E) all related and subsequent bilateral 

8 and security agreements and arrangements con9 cluded as of the date of the enactment of this 

10 Act. 

11 (b) INDIA AS MAJOR DEFENSE PARTNER.—Congress 

12 makes the following findings: 

13 (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National De14 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Pub15 lic Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 

16 note) requires the recognition of India as a major 

17 defense partner. 

18 (2) The designation of India as a major defense 

19 partner, which is unique to India— 

20 (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 

21 facilitate defense trade and technology sharing 

22 between the United States and India; 

23 (B) elevates defense trade and technology 

24 cooperation between the United States and 
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1 India to a level commensurate with the closest 

2 allies and partners of the United States; 

3 (C) facilitates technology sharing between 

4 the United States and India, including license5 free access to a wide range of dual-use tech6 nologies, after taking into account national se7 curity concerns; and 

8 (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination 

9 on defense strategy and policy, military ex10 changes, and port calls in support of defense 

11 cooperation between the United States and 

12 India. 

13 SEC. 205. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNER14 SHIP. 

15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con16 gress that the United States should— 

17 (1) support and reaffirm the elevation of the 

18 United States-Association of Southeast Asian Na19 tions (referred to in this section as ‘‘ASEAN’’) rela20 tionship to a strategic partnership; 

21 (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping 

22 build a strong, stable, politically cohesive, economi23 cally integrated, and socially responsible community 

24 of nations that has common rules, norms, proce25 dures, and standards which are consistent with 
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1 international law and the principles of a rules-based 

2 Indo-Pacific community; 

3 (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos4 ter greater integration among its members; 

5 (4) recognize the value of— 

6 (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, 

7 political, and security partners within Asia and 

8 elsewhere, including Australia, Canada, the Eu9 ropean Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Nor10 way, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; and 

11 (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as 

12 activities under the United States–ASEAN 

13 Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement 

14 and the United States-ASEAN Connect, which 

15 demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the 

16 ASEAN Economic Community and build upon 

17 economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific re18 gion; 

19 (5) support efforts by the nations comprising 

20 ASEAN— 

21 (A) to address maritime and territorial dis22 putes in a constructive manner; and 

23 (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, dip24 lomatic, and legitimate regional and inter25 national arbitration mechanisms, consistent 
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1 with international law, including through the 

2 adoption of a code of conduct in the South 

3 China Sea to further promote peace and sta4 bility in the Indo-Pacific region; 

5 (6) support efforts by United States partners 

6 and allies in ASEAN— 

7 (A) to enhance maritime capability and 

8 maritime domain awareness; 

9 (B) to protect unhindered access to, and 

10 use of, international waterways in the Asia-Pa11 cific region that are critical to ensuring the se12 curity and free flow of commerce; 

13 (C) to counter piracy; 

14 (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 

15 activities such as the trafficking of persons, 

16 goods, and drugs; and 

17 (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of 

18 countries or regional organizations to respond 

19 to emerging threats to maritime security in the 

20 Asia-Pacific region; and 

21 (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 

22 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the 

23 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling with respect 

24 to the case between the Republic of the Philippines 

25 and the People’s Republic of China. 
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1 (b) REPORT ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR EN2 GAGEMENT WITH ASEAN.— 

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an5 nually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec6 retary of State, in consultation with other Federal 

7 agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate 

8 congressional committees on a strategic framework 

9 to administer programs, projects, and activities of 

10 the United States to support diplomatic and eco11 nomic engagement between the United States and 

12 ASEAN member countries for the 10-year period be13 ginning on the date of the enactment of this Act. 

14 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

15 paragraph (1) shall address the following elements 

16 of United States strategy: 

17 (A) Promoting commercial engagement be18 tween the United States and member countries 

19 of ASEAN. 

20 (B) Helping member countries of ASEAN 

21 use sustainable, efficient, and innovative tech22 nologies in their respective energy sectors. 

23 (C) Supporting economic conditions in 

24 member countries of ASEAN that promote in25 novation, the creation of new businesses, sus-
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1 tainable growth, and the education of the re2 gion’s future innovators, entrepreneurs, and 

3 business leaders. 

4 (D) Working with member countries of 

5 ASEAN to improve the policy and regulatory 

6 environment for growth, trade, innovation, and 

7 investment. 

8 (E) Supporting the regional integration ob9 jectives of member countries of ASEAN under 

10 the ASEAN Economic Community. 

11 (F) Partnership opportunities with the 

12 governments of other countries friendly to the 

13 United States that have committed to a high 

14 set of standards for investment and develop15 ment with ASEAN, as determined by the Sec16 retary of State. 

17 SEC. 206. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRI18 LATERAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIP. 

19 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

20 develop a strategy to deepen the trilateral security co21 operation between the United States, South Korea, and 

22 Japan, including missile defense, intelligence-sharing, and 

23 other defense-related initiatives. 

24 SEC. 207. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE. 

25 It is the sense of Congress that— 
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1 (1) the security dialogue between the United 

2 States, Australia, India, and Japan is vital to ad3 dress pressing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific 

4 region in order to promote— 

5 (A) a rules-based order; 

6 (B) respect for international law; and 

7 (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and 

8 (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, 

9 rather than to replace, current mechanisms. 

10 SEC. 208. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTH11 EAST ASIA. 

12 (a) INDONESIA.—The United States Government is 

13 committed to— 

14 (1) the United States-Indonesia Comprehensive 

15 Partnership, done in Washington November 9, 2010; 

16 (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive De17 fense Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 

18 2015; and 

19 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se20 curity agreements and arrangements between the 

21 United States and Indonesia concluded on or before 

22 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

23 (b) MALAYSIA.—The United States Government is 

24 committed to— 
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1 (1) the United States-Malaysia Comprehensive 

2 Partnership, done at Putrajaya April 27, 2014; 

3 (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the 

4 Comprehensive Partnership between the United 

5 States of America and Malaysia, done in Wash6 ington September 13, 2017; and 

7 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se8 curity agreements and arrangements between the 

9 United States and Malaysia concluded on or before 

10 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

11 (c) SINGAPORE.—The United States Government is 

12 committed to— 

13 (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Be14 tween the United States of America and the Repub15 lic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partner16 ship in Defense and Security, done at Washington 

17 July 12, 2005; 

18 (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agree19 ment, done at Arlington, Virginia December 7, 

20 2015; and 

21 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se22 curity agreements and arrangements between the 

23 United States and Singapore concluded on or before 

24 the date of the enactment of this Act. 
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1 (d) VIETNAM.—The United States Government is 

2 committed to— 

3 (1) the United States-Vietnam Comprehensive 

4 Partnership, done at Washington December 16, 

5 2013; 

6 (2) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision 

7 Statement on Defense Relations, done at Hanoi on 

8 June 1, 2015; 

9 (3) the United StatesVietnam Joint Vision 

10 Statement, done at Washington May 31, 2017; and 

11 (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and se12 curity agreements and arrangements between the 

13 United States and Vietnam concluded on or before 

14 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

15 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con16 gress that the United States should deepen diplomatic, 

17 economic, and security cooperation, especially in the areas 

18 of maritime security and counterterrorism, with Indonesia, 

19 Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. 

20 SEC. 209. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN. 

21 (a) UNITED STATES COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.—It 

22 is the policy of the United States— 

23 (1) to support the close economic, political, and 

24 security relationship between Taiwan and the United 

25 States; 
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1 (2) to faithfully enforce all existing United 

2 States Government commitments to Taiwan, con3 sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Pub4 lic Law 96–8), the 3 joint communiques, and the Six 

5 Assurances agreed to by President Ronald Reagan 

6 in July 1982; and 

7 (3) to counter efforts to change the status quo 

8 and to support peaceful resolution acceptable to both 

9 sides of the Taiwan Strait. 

10 (b) ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.—The President should 

11 conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan 

12 that are tailored to meet the existing and likely future 

13 threats from the People’s Republic of China, including 

14 supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate 

15 asymmetric capabilities, as appropriate, including mobile, 

16 survivable, and cost-effective capabilities, into its military 

17 forces. 

18 (c) TRAVEL.—The President should encourage the 

19 travel of highlevel United States officials to Taiwan, in 

20 accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115– 

21 135). 

22 SEC. 210. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY. 

23 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find24 ings: 
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1 (1) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

2 Republic of Korea has flagrantly defied the inter3 national community by illicitly developing its nuclear 

4 and ballistic missile programs, in violation of United 

5 Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 

6 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 

7 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 

8 and 2397 (2017). 

9 (2) The Government of the Democratic People’s 

10 Republic of Korea engages in gross human rights 

11 abuses against its own people and citizens of other 

12 countries, including the United States, the Republic 

13 of Korea, and Japan. 

14 (3) The United States is committed to pursuing 

15 a peaceful denuclearization of the Democratic Peo16 ple’s Republic of Korea through a policy of max17 imum pressure and engagement, in close concert 

18 with its partners. 

19 (b) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

20 TO SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE21 PUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

22 (1) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

23 the United States to continue to impose sanctions 

24 with respect to activities of the Government of the 

25 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, persons act-
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1 ing for or on behalf of such government, or other 

2 persons in accordance with Executive Order 13551 

3 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property 

4 of certain persons with respect to North Korea), Ex5 ecutive Order 13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating 

6 to imposing additional sanctions), Executive Order 

7 13694 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking 

8 the property of certain persons engaging in signifi9 cant malicious cyberenabled activities), Executive 

10 Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to 

11 blocking the property of the Government of North 

12 Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and prohib13 iting certain transactions with respect to North 

14 Korea), and Executive Order 13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 

15 44705; relating to imposing additional sanctions 

16 with respect to North Korea), as such Executive or17 ders are in effect on the day before the date of the 

18 enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People’s 

19 Republic of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit 

20 activities described in such Executive orders, includ21 ing actions in violation of the United Nations Secu22 rity Council resolutions referred to in subsection 

23 (a)(1). 

24 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after ter25 minating any sanction with respect to the activities 
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1 of the Government of the Democratic People’s Re2 public of Korea, a person acting for or on behalf of 

3 such government, or any other person provided for 

4 in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the 

5 Secretary of State, in consultation with the Sec6 retary of the Treasury, shall submit a report to the 

7 appropriate congressional committees justifying the 

8 termination of the sanction and explaining the rela9 tionship between such termination and the cessation 

10 of any illicit activity that violates any of the United 

11 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in 

12 subsection (a)(1) by such Government or person. 

13 The reporting requirement under this paragraph 

14 shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act. 

16 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 

17 subsection shall be construed to limit the authority 

18 of the President pursuant to the International 

19 Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 

20 et seq.). 

21 (c) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT

22 TO NEGOTIATION ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S RE23 PUBLIC OF KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE

24 PROGRAMS.—It is the policy of the United States that the 

25 objective of negotiations with respect to the nuclear and 
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1 ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People’s Re2 public of Korea be the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 

3 dismantlement of such programs. 

4 (d) REPORT ON A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE

5 THREATS POSED BY, AND THE CAPABILITIES OF, THE

6 DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

8 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 

9 days thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec10 retary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, in 

11 consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, 

12 shall submit a report to the appropriate congres13 sional committees that describes actions taken by 

14 the United States to address the threats posed by, 

15 and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s Re16 public of Korea. 

17 (2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required under 

18 paragraph (1) shall include— 

19 (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the 

20 United States to identify strategies and policies, 

21 including an assessment of the strengths and 

22 weaknesses of such strategies and policies— 

23 (i) to achieve peaceful 

24 denuclearization of the Democratic Peo25 ple’s Republic of Korea; and 
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1 (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by 

2 the ballistic missile program of the Demo3 cratic People’s Republic of Korea; 

4 (B) an assessment of— 

5 (i) potential road maps toward peace6 ful denuclearization of the Democratic 

7 People’s Republic of Korea and the elimi8 nation of the nuclear and ballistic missile 

9 threats posed by the Democratic People’s 

10 Republic of Korea; and 

11 (ii) specific actions that the Demo12 cratic People’s Republic of Korea would 

13 need to take for each such roadmap to be14 come viable; 

15 (C) a summary of the United States strat16 egy to increase international coordination and 

17 cooperation, whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or 

18 multilaterally, including sanctions enforcement 

19 and interdiction, to address the threat posed by 

20 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 

21 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which 

22 shall include— 

23 (i) a description of the actions taken 

24 by the Secretary of State, or designees of 

25 the Secretary, to consult with governments 
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1 around the world, with the purpose of in2 ducing such governments to fully imple3 ment the United Nations Security Council 

4 resolutions referred to in subsection (a)(1); 

5 (ii) a description of the actions taken 

6 by such governments to fully implement 

7 United Nations Security Council resolu8 tions related to the Democratic People’s 

9 Republic of Korea; 

10 (iii) a list of countries with govern11 ments that the Secretary has determined 

12 are noncooperative with respect to imple13 menting the United Nations Security 

14 Council resolutions referred to in sub15 section (a)(1); and 

16 (iv) a plan of action to engage, and 

17 increase cooperation with respect to the 

18 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 

19 with the governments of the countries on 

20 the list described in clause (iii); 

21 (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the 

22 national export control regimes of countries 

23 that are members of the United Nations, and 

24 multilateral export control regimes, that are 

25 necessary to enforce sanctions imposed with re-
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1 spect to the Democratic People’s Republic of 

2 Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security 

3 Council resolutions referred to in subsection 

4 (a)(1); and 

5 (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 

6 countries in adopting and using authorities nec7 essary to enforce export controls required by 

8 United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

9 (3) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report required 

10 under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi11 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

12 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that— 

14 (1) representatives of the United States shall 

15 use the voice and vote of the United States in all 

16 international organizations, as appropriate, to advo17 cate for the expulsion of the Democratic People’s 

18 Republic of Korea from such organizations, until 

19 such time as the Democratic People’s Republic of 

20 Korea meets its commitments under the United Na21 tions Security Council resolutions referred to in sub22 section (a)(1); and 

23 (2) the Secretary of State should work to in24 duce countries to meet their commitments under the 

25 United Nations Security Council resolutions referred 
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1 to in subsection (a)(1), including by considering ap2 propriate adjustments to the diplomatic posture and 

3 foreign assistance of the United States with govern4 ments that the Secretary has determined are non5 cooperative with respect to implementing the United 

6 Nations Security Council resolutions referred to in 

7 subsection (a)(1). 

8 SEC. 211. NEW ZEALAND. 

9 The United States Government is committed to— 

10 (1) the Wellington Declaration, signed on No11 vember 5, 2010, which reaffirmed close ties and out12 lined future practical cooperation between the 

13 United States and New Zealand; 

14 (2) the Washington Declaration, signed on 

15 June 19, 2012, which strengthened the defense rela16 tionship by providing a framework and strategic 

17 guidance for security cooperation and defense dia18 logues; and 

19 (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and se20 curity agreements and arrangements between the 

21 United States and New Zealand concluded on or be22 fore the date of enactment of this Act. 

23 SEC. 212. THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that 

25 the United States should— 
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1 (1) support strong United States engagement 

2 with the nations of the South Pacific, including Fiji, 

3 Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States 

4 of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 

5 Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 

6 Vanuatu; 

7 (2) deepen its cooperation with the nations of 

8 the South Pacific in areas of mutual interest, includ9 ing— 

10 (A) fisheries and marine resource con11 servation; 

12 (B) environmental challenges and resil13 ience; 

14 (C) global health; 

15 (D) development and trade; and 

16 (E) people-to-people ties; and 

17 (3) continue to provide assistance to the Pacific 

18 Islands, as appropriate, to support the rule of law, 

19 good governance, and economic development. 

20 (b) UNITED STATES-COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIA21 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that the Compacts of 

22 Free Association entered between the United States and 

23 the Freely Associated States (Republic of Marshall Is24 lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Repub25 lic of Palau)— 
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1 (1) enhance the strategic posture of the United 

2 States in the Western Pacific; 

3 (2) reinforce United States regional commit4 ment; 

5 (3) preempt potential adversaries from estab6 lishing positional advantage; and 

7 (4) further self-governance, economic develop8 ment, and self-sufficiency of the Freely Associated 

9 States. 

10 SEC. 213. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; 

11 PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 

12 (a) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.—It is the policy of 

13 the United States— 

14 (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of 

15 Navigation Program, regular freedom of navigation, 

16 and overflight operations in the Indo-Pacific region, 

17 in accordance with applicable international law; and 

18 (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations 

19 to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South 

20 China Sea, in accordance with applicable inter21 national law. 

22 (b) JOINT INDO-PACIFIC DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY.— 

23 It is the sense of Congress that the President should de24 velop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with 

25 United States allies and partners to conduct joint mari-
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1 time training and freedom of navigation operations in the 

2 Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the 

3 South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international 

4 system benefitting all countries. 

5 SEC. 214. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 

6 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

7 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON8 GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con9 gress’’ means— 

10 (A) the Committee on Armed Services of 

11 the Senate; 

12 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

13 the Senate; 

14 (C) the Committee on Armed Services of 

15 the House of Representatives; and 

16 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

17 the House of Representatives. 

18 (2) ISIS.—The term ‘‘ISIS’’ means the Islamic 

19 State of Iraq and Syria. 

20 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

21 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In22 telligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the 

23 Secretary of Defense, and other appropriate Federal offi24 cials, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees 

25 of Congress that contains an assessment of the current 
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1 and future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al2 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist groups in South3 east Asia that pose a significant threat to the United 

4 States, its allies, and its citizens interests abroad. 

5 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub6 section (b) shall include— 

7 (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al8 Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-af9 filiated fighters in Southeast Asia; 

10 (2) an estimate of the number of ISIS-linked, 

11 al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group12 affiliated fighters expected to return to Southeast 

13 Asia from fighting in the Middle East; 

14 (3) an analysis of the amounts and sources of 

15 ISIS-linked, al Qaeda-linked, and other various ex16 tremist group affiliated-fighters in Southeast Asia; 

17 (4) the current resources available to combat 

18 the threat of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other 

19 violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in South20 east Asia, and the additional resources required to 

21 combat such threat; 

22 (5) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of 

23 ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent ex24 tremist group-affiliated fighters to operate effectively 
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1 in the Indo-Pacific region, including the Philippines, 

2 Indonesia, and Malaysia; 

3 (6) a description of the capabilities and re4 sources of governments in Southeast Asia to counter 

5 violent extremist groups; and 

6 (7) a list of additional United States resources 

7 and capabilities that the Department of Defense and 

8 the Department of State recommend providing to 

9 governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent ex10 tremist groups. 

11 SEC. 215. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION. 

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that there should be robust cybersecurity coopera14 tion between the United States and nations in the Indo15 Pacific region— 

16 (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity 

17 threats, including state-sponsored threats; 

18 (2) to share best practices to combat such 

19 threats; 

20 (3) to strengthen resilience against 

21 cyberattacks, misinformation, and propaganda; and 

22 (4) to strengthen the resilience of critical infra23 structure. 

24 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

25 are authorized to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each 
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1 of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to enhance coopera2 tion between the United States and Indo-Pacific nations 

3 for the purposes of combatting cybersecurity threats. 

4 SEC. 216. NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE 

5 INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Government— 

7 (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear and 

8 other weapons of mass destruction, and their means 

9 of delivery, constitutes a threat to international 

10 peace and security; 

11 (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique chal12 lenge posed to regional and global stability by the il13 licit use, and the proliferation to and from North 

14 Korea, of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies, 

15 and other weapons of mass destruction; 

16 (3) notes efforts by China and Russia— 

17 (A) to expand and modernize their respec18 tive nuclear arsenals, including through signifi19 cant research and development resources in 

20 hypersonic glide vehicles and other advanced 

21 technologies; and 

22 (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 

23 technologies; and 
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1 (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many 

2 countries in the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear en3 ergy for a variety of peaceful applications. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con5 gress that the United States Government should under6 take all reasonable and appropriate efforts to pursue effec7 tive arms control and nonproliferation policies in the Indo8 Pacific region to limit the further spread of weapons of 

9 mass destruction and their means of delivery. 

10 TITLE III—PROMOTING UNITED 

11 STATES ECONOMIC INTER12 ESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 

13 REGION 

14 SEC. 301. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find16 ings: 

17 (1) According to the United States Chamber of 

18 Commerce, by 2030— 

19 (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 

20 population will be living in Asia; and 

21 (B) 59 percent of middle class consump22 tion will take place in Asia. 

23 (2) According to the Asian Development 

24 Bank— 
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1 (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilat2 eral or regional trade agreements; and 

3 (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian 

4 countries are under negotiation or concluded 

5 and awaiting entry into force. 

6 (3) Free trade agreements between the United 

7 States and 3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region 

8 (Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea) 

9 have entered into force. 

10 (4) The member states of the Association of 

11 Southeast Asian Nations (referred to in this section 

12 as ‘‘ASEAN’’), as a group— 

13 (A) represent the fifth largest economy in 

14 the world; and 

15 (B) have a combined gross domestic prod16 uct of $2,400,000,000,000. 

17 (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member 

18 states grew by 66 percent between 2006 and 2015, 

19 and the total value of bilateral trade between the 

20 United States and ASEAN member states has in21 creased by 78 percent since 2004. 

22 (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by 

23 companies in ASEAN member states to consumers 

24 in the United States was $77,000,000,000, while the 

25 United States 2015 trade surplus of services pro-
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1 vided to consumers in ASEAN member states was 

2 $8,000,000,000. 

3 (7) According to US-ASEAN Business Council, 

4 goods and services exported from the United States 

5 to ASEAN member states support 550,000 jobs in 

6 the United States. 

7 (8) According to the Business Roundtable— 

8 (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, 

9 Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 

10 Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam were re11 sponsible for a combined 40 percent of global 

12 gross domestic product in 2017; and 

13 (B) United States bilateral trade with the 

14 other nations referred to in subparagraph (A) 

15 supports 15,600,000 jobs in the United States. 

16 (9) According to the United States National Se17 curity Strategy— 

18 (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic 

19 Cooperation ‘‘remain centerpieces of the Indo20 Pacific’s regional architecture and platforms for 

21 promoting an order based on freedom’’; and 

22 (B) the United States will ‘‘work with 

23 partners to build a network of states dedicated 

24 to free markets and protected from forces that 

25 would subvert their sovereignty.’’. 
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1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con2 gress that trade between the United States and the na3 tions in the Indo-Pacific region is vitally important to the 

4 United States economy, United States exports, and jobs 

5 in the United States. 

6 SEC. 302. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREE7 MENTS, AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SUMMITS. 

8 Congress supports— 

9 (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade 

10 agreements that increase United States employment 

11 and expand the economy; 

12 (2) formal economic dialogues that include con13 crete, verifiable, and measured outcomes; 

14 (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties 

15 between the United States and nations in the Indo16 Pacific region; 

17 (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agree18 ment and the Environmental Goods Agreement that 

19 include several major Asian economies; and 

20 (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing 

21 high-level use of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera22 tion forum, the East Asia Summit, and the Group 

23 of 20 to pursue United States economic objectives in 

24 the Indo-Pacific region. 
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1 SEC. 303. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNER2 SHIP. 

3 The President should seek to develop to negotiate a 

4 comprehensive economic engagement framework with the 

5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 

6 SEC. 304. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILI7 TATION. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to 

9 produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity build10 ing and trade facilitation strategy, including leveling the 

11 playing field for American companies competing in the 

12 Indo-Pacific region. 

13 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

14 are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may 

15 be necessary to carry out subsection (a). 

16 SEC. 305. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should takes steps 

18 to strengthen the enforcement of United States intellec19 tual property laws as a top priority, including taking all 

20 appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber21 enabled theft of intellectual property. 

22 (b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 

23 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there24 after for the following 5 years, the President shall submit 

25 a report to Congress that— 
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1 (1) describes the efforts of the United States 

2 Government to combat intellectual property viola3 tions and commercial cyber-enabled theft in the 

4 Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People’s Repub5 lic of China; and 

6 (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of 

7 priority areas for United States engagement and ca8 pacity building assistance. 

9 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

10 are authorized to be appropriated to the United States 

11 Trade Representative such amounts as may be necessary 

12 to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to 

13 build capacity in the identified priority areas described in 

14 the annual report required under subsection (b). 

15 SEC. 306. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES. 

16 (a) INDO-PACIFIC ENERGY STRATEGY.— 

17 (1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after 

18 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

19 thereafter for the following 5 years, the President 

20 shall establish a comprehensive, integrated, 

21 multiyear strategy to encourage the efforts of Indo22 Pacific countries to implement national power strat23 egies and cooperation with United States energy 

24 companies and the Department of Energy national 

25 laboratories to develop an appropriate mix of power 
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1 solutions to provide access to sufficient, reliable, and 

2 affordable power in order to reduce poverty, drive 

3 economic growth and job creation, and to increase 

4 energy security in the Indo-Pacific region. 

5 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

6 There are authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 

7 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to 

8 carry out paragraph (1). 

9 (b) RELIABLE ENERGY PARTNERSHIPS.—It is the 

10 sense of Congress that the United States should explore 

11 opportunities to partner with the private sector and multi12 lateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian 

13 Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable 

14 electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar 

15 (historically known as ‘‘Burma’’). 

16 SEC. 307. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in co18 operation with the Administrator of the United States 

19 Agency for International Development, should increase re20 gional engagement in the areas of environment, health, 

21 education, and infrastructure development with the Lower 

22 Mekong countries, including— 

23 (1) assisting in the development of programs 

24 that focus on forecasting environmental challenges 

25 and resilience; 
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1 (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on 

2 sustainable uses of forest and water resources with 

3 the goal of preserving the biodiversity of the Mekong 

4 Basin and access to safe drinking water; 

5 (3) assisting with education enrollment and 

6 broadband internet connectivity, particularly English 

7 training and connectivity in rural communities; and 

8 (4) improving global health in the Lower 

9 Mekong countries, including— 

10 (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; 

11 and 

12 (B) helping regional partners to track and 

13 treat malaria and tuberculosis. 

14 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

15 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

16 through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with 

17 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter18 national Development, shall submit a report to Congress 

19 that includes— 

20 (1) a list and evaluation of Lower Mekong Ini21 tiative activities since its inception in 2009; 

22 (2) a strategy for any increased regional en23 gagement and measures of success for the activities 

24 described in paragraph (1); and 
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1 (3) an accounting of funds used to execute 

2 Lower Mekong Initiative activities. 

3 SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 

4 AND NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

6 encourage the governments of countries in the Indo-Pa7 cific region and United States private sector interests with 

8 operations and investments in the region to deploy agri9 culture practices that— 

10 (1) conserve natural resources; and 

11 (2) preserve culturally and ecological valuable 

12 lands and water bodies. 

13 SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN SUPPORT OF WOMEN’S 

14 ECONOMIC RIGHTS. 

15 It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 

16 should— 

17 (1) support activities that secure private prop18 erty rights and land tenure for women in developing 

19 countries in Asia, including— 

20 (A) establishing legal frameworks to give 

21 women equal rights to own, register, use, profit 

22 from, and inherit land and property; 

23 (B) improving legal literacy to enable 

24 women to exercise the rights described in sub25 paragraph (A); and 
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1 (C) increasing the capacity of law enforce2 ment and community leaders to enforce such 

3 rights; 

4 (2) work with Asian civil society, governments, 

5 and multilateral organizations to increase the capa6 bility of disadvantaged women and girls in Asia— 

7 (A) to realize their rights; 

8 (B) to determine their life outcomes; 

9 (C) to assume leadership roles; and 

10 (D) to influence decision-making in their 

11 households, communities, and societies; and 

12 (3) seek to expand access to appropriate finan13 cial products and services for women-owned micro, 

14 small, and medium-sized enterprises in Asia. 

15 TITLE IV—PROMOTING UNITED 

16 STATES VALUES IN THE INDO17 PACIFIC REGION 

18 SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

19 Congress makes the following findings: 

20 (1) The promotion of human rights and respect 

21 for democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in 

22 the United States’ national security interest. 

23 (2) Continued support for human rights, demo24 cratic values, and good governance is critical to a 
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1 successful United States diplomatic strategy in the 

2 Indo-Pacific. 

3 (3) Strong support for human rights and de4 mocracy in the Indo-Pacific region is critical to ef5 forts to reduce poverty, build rule of law, combat 

6 corruption, reduce the allure of extremism, and pro7 mote economic growth. 

8 (4) There are serious concerns with the rule of 

9 law and civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North 

10 Korea, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all 

11 been identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Not Free’’. 

12 (5) There have been unacceptable human rights 

13 developments in— 

14 (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been 

15 identified by Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’, 

16 and the Department of State has declared that 

17 the violence against the Rohingya constitutes 

18 ethnic cleansing; 

19 (B) the Philippines, which has been identi20 fied by Freedom House as ‘‘Partly Free’’, and 

21 where there are continued disturbing reports of 

22 extra-judicial killings; and 

23 (C) China, where forced disappearances, 

24 extralegal detentions, invasive and omnipresent 
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1 surveillance, and lack of due process in judicial 

2 proceedings remain troublesome. 

3 (6) according to the National Security Strategy, 

4 the United States— 

5 (A) will ‘‘support, with our words and ac6 tions, those who live under oppressive regimes 

7 and who seek freedom, individual dignity, and 

8 the rule of law’’; 

9 (B) ‘‘may use diplomacy, sanctions, and 

10 other tools to isolate states and leaders who 

11 threaten our interests and whose actions run 

12 contrary to our values’’; and 

13 (C) ‘‘will support efforts to advance wom14 en’s equality, protect the rights of women and 

15 girls, and promote women and youth empower16 ment programs’’. 

17 SEC. 402. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS. 

18 The President is encouraged to pursue additional ef19 forts to combat trafficking in persons and human slavery 

20 in the Indo-Pacific region. 

21 SEC. 403. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. 

22 It is the sense of Congress that— 

23 (1) United States Government officials should 

24 lead by example— 
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1 (A) by continuing to advocate for freedom 

2 of the press in the Indo-Pacific region; and 

3 (B) by engaging with the press corps at 

4 every appropriate opportunity; and 

5 (2) the United States should advocate and sup6 port a Ministerial to Advance Press Freedom in the 

7 Indo-Pacific to convene government and civil society, 

8 including journalists, to discuss and address the 

9 challenges facing press freedom in the Indo-Pacific 

10 region. 

11 SEC. 404. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR PER12 SONNEL. 

13 It is the sense of Congress that— 

14 (1) United States embassies and consulates in 

15 the Indo-Pacific region should have personnel, as ap16 propriate, who are dedicated to reporting on and ad17 vancing United States democracy, human rights, 

18 labor, anti-corruption, and good governance policy 

19 interests; and 

20 (2) appropriate resources should be made avail21 able to carry out such activities. 

22 SEC. 405. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE23 TO-PEOPLE ENGAGEMENT. 

24 The Secretary of State should, as appropriate— 
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1 (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional 

2 dialogues with nations in the Indo-Pacific region re3 garding human rights and religious freedom viola4 tions; 

5 (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people 

6 exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region, par7 ticularly programs engaging young leaders; and 

8 (3) establish educational exchanges and capac9 ity-building programs emphasizing civil society devel10 opment. 

11 SEC. 406. ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS 

12 HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGY. 

13 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con14 gress that the United States should continue to work with 

15 ASEAN to improve the capacity of ASEAN to address 

16 human rights, democracy, and good governance issues in 

17 Southeast Asia. 

18 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the 

19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

20 after consultation with the Administrator of the United 

21 States Agency for International Development, shall submit 

22 a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees to 

23 increase cooperation with ASEAN to promote human 

24 rights, democracy, and good governance in Southeast 

25 Asia. 
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1 (c) CONTENTS.—The strategy submitted under sub2 section (b) should include— 

3 (1) an assessment of the types of United States 

4 Government resources available to support increased 

5 cooperation; and 

6 (2) an assessment to identify entities within 

7 ASEAN that the United States could potentially 

8 support or partner with to promote human rights, 

9 democracy, and good governance in Southeast Asia. 

10 SEC. 407. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION TO NORTH KOREA. 

11 The President is encouraged to continue efforts to en12 hance freedom of information access with regard to North 

13 Korea. 

14 SEC. 408. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPOSITION OF SANC15 TIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES 

16 ASSISTANCE. 

17 (a) SANCTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the 

18 President should impose targeted financial penalties and 

19 visa ban sanctions, in accordance with applicable law and 

20 other relevant authorities, on any individual or entity 

21 that— 

22 (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; 

23 or 

24 (2) engages in censorship activities. 
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1 (b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—It is 

2 the sense of Congress that the President should, in accord3 ance with applicable law, terminate, suspend, or otherwise 

4 alter United States economic assistance to any country 

5 that has engaged in serious violations of human rights or 

6 religious freedoms. 

7 SEC. 409. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

8 (a) PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN THE INDO-PA9 CIFIC REGION.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 

11 appropriated $210,000,000, for each of the fiscal 

12 years 2019 through 2023, to promote democracy, 

13 strengthen civil society, human rights, rule of law, 

14 transparency, and accountability in the Indo-Pacific 

15 region, including for universities, civil society, and 

16 multilateral institutions that are focusing on edu17 cation awareness, training, and capacity building. 

18 (2) DEMOCRACY IN CHINA.—Amounts appro19 priated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be made 

20 available for United States Government efforts, led 

21 by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

22 Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, 

23 the rule of law, and human rights in the People’s 

24 Republic of China. 
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1 (3) TIBET.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to 

2 paragraph (1) shall be made available for non3 governmental organizations to support activities pre4 serving cultural traditions and promoting sustainable 

5 development, education, and environmental conserva6 tion in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autono7 mous Region and in other Tibetan communities in 

8 China, India, and Nepal. 

9 SEC. 410. INDO-PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS. 

10 (a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term 

11 ‘‘human rights defenders’’ means individuals, working 

12 alone or in groups, who nonviolently advocate for the pro13 motion and protection of universally recognized human 

14 rights and fundamental freedoms if the advocacy of such 

15 issues may result in the risk of safety or life. 

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con17 gress that human rights defenders in the Indo-Pacific re18 gion have been facing increased difficulties with the rise 

19 of unprecedented crackdowns and conflicts. 

20 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

21 are authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of 

22 the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to provide critical as23 sistance to human rights defenders through the Depart24 ment of State’s Human Rights Defenders Fund. 
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1 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

2 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

3 through 2023, the Secretary of State, in cooperation with 

4 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter5 national Development, shall submit a report to Congress 

6 that includes— 

7 (1) a list and evaluation of the Human Rights 

8 Defenders Fund activities since its inception; 

9 (2) a strategy for any increased regional en10 gagement and measures of success for the activities 

11 described in paragraph (1); and 

12 (3) an accounting of funds used to execute the 

13 Human Rights Defender Fund activities. 

14 SEC. 411. YOUNG LEADERS PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIA15 TIVES. 

16 There are authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 

17 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023 to support 

18 Indo-Pacific young leaders initiatives, including the Young 

19 Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth 

20 Volunteers Program, and other people-to-people exchange 

21 programs that focus on building the capacity of democ22 racy, human rights, and good governance activists in the 

23 Indo-Pacific region. 
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1 SEC. 412. SAVINGS PROVISION. 

2 Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing 

3 the use of military force. 

Passed the Senate December 4, 2018. 

Attest: 

Secretary. 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2736 

AN ACT 

To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comother purposes. States policy for the Indo-Pacific region, and for prehensive, multifaceted, and principled United