FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA RODRIGUEZ TORNES, AKA

Maria Rodriquez-Tornes,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 19-71104

Agency No.

A088-669-863

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted February 3, 2021

Seattle, Washington

Filed April 5, 2021

Before: Susan P. Graber, M. Margaret McKeown, and

Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber;

Concurrence by Judge Paez
2 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel granted Maria Rodriguez Tornes’s petition for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision

reversing an immigration judge’s grant of asylum and

withholding of removal, and remanded, holding that the

evidence compelled the conclusion that Rodriguez established

a nexus between her mistreatment in Mexico and her feminist

political opinion. 

The panel noted that under the Attorney General’s recent

decision in Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021)

(“Matter of A-B- II”), in order to establish the requisite nexus

for asylum relief, a protected ground (1) must be a but-for

cause of the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) must play more than a

minor role—in other words, it cannot be incidental or

tangential to another reason for the act. The panel explained

that this standard was substantively indistinguishable from

this circuit’s precedent. The panel wrote that the fact that an

unprotected ground, such as a personal dispute, also

constitutes a central reason for persecution does not bar

asylum. Rather, if a retributory motive exists alongside a

protected motive, an applicant need show only that a

protected ground is “one central reason” for his or her

persecution. 

Observing that this court has held repeatedly that political

opinions encompass more than electoral politics or formal

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 3

political ideology or action, the panel wrote that it had little

doubt that feminism qualifies as a political opinion within the

meaning of the relevant statutes. The panel concluded that

Rodriguez’s testimony concerning equality between the

sexes, her work habits, and her insistence on autonomy

compelled the conclusion that she has a feminist political

opinion. The panel also held that the record compelled the

conclusion that Rodriguez’s political opinion was at least one

central reason for her past persecution. The panel explained

that some of the worst acts of violence came immediately

after Rodriguez asserted her rights as a woman, and that the

fact that some incidents of abuse may also have reflected a

dysfunctional relationship was beside the point, as Rodriguez

did not need to show that her political opinion—rather than

interpersonal dynamics—played the sole or predominant role

in her abuse. By demonstrating that her political opinion was

“one central reason” for her persecution, the panel concluded

that Rodriguez likewise established that her political opinion

was “a reason” for her persecution for purposes of

withholding of removal. 

Because in granting relief under the Convention Against

Torture the agency necessarily determined that Rodriguez

carried her burden to prove the other elements of her claims

for asylum and withholding of removal, the panel concluded

that Rodriguez’s petition presented a recognized exception to

the ordinary remand rule under I.N.S. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12

(2002) (per curiam). The panel explained that because the

agency concluded that Rodriguez met the higher burden of

establishing that she is likely to be tortured, she necessarily

met the lower burdens for asylum and withholding relief of

establishing that she has a well-founded fear, or clear

probability, of persecution. Similarly, because the Board

determined that the Mexican government would acquiesce to
4 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

Rodriguez’s torture, the panel concluded that the Board had

necessarily decided that the Mexican government would be

unwilling or unable to protect Rodriguez from future

persecution. The panel also concluded that because the Board

determined that it would be unreasonable for Rodriguez to

relocate within Mexico to avoid future torture, she likewise

could not relocate to avoid future persecution. 

The panel held that Rodriguez was thus eligible for

asylum and entitled to withholding of removal, and it

remanded for the Attorney General to exercise his discretion

whether to grant Rodriguez asylum, and if asylum is not

granted, to grant withholding of removal.

Concurring, Judge Paez wrote that in addition to ignoring

evidence that Rodriguez was targeted on account of her

feminist political opinion, the Board also ignored extensive

record evidence from a leading authority on domestic

violence that directly rejected the Board’s premise that

domestic violence is presumed to be motivated by nothing

more than the private dynamics of a “personal relationship.”

COUNSEL

Elaine J. Goldenberg (argued), Munger Tolles & Olson LLP,

Washington, D.C.; Sara A. McDermott, Munger Tolles &

Olson LLP, Los Angeles, California; Richard Caldarone,

Julie Carpenter, and Rachel Sheridan, Tahirih Justice Center,

Falls Church, Virginia; for Petitioner.

Timothy Bo Stanton (argued), Trial Attorney; Sabatino F.

Leo, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 5

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

Blaine Bookey, Karen Musalo, Neela Chakravartula, and

Anne Peterson, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, U.C.

Hastings College of Law, San Francisco, California, for

Amicus Curiae Center for Gender & Refugee Studies.

Betsey Boutelle, DLA Piper LLP (US), San Diego,

California; Anthony Todaro, Jeffrey DeGroot, and Lianna

Bash, DLA Piper LLP (US), Seattle, Washington; for Amicus

Curiae National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Maria Luisa Rodriguez Tornes, a native and

citizen of Mexico, testified to a lifetime of severe abuse from

her mother, her estranged husband, and her partner for, in

their eyes, being insufficiently subservient to men. An

immigration judge (“IJ”) granted asylum, and alternatively

granted withholding of removal and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), in a detailed decision. 

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed in part,

holding that Petitioner’s past persecution and fear of future

persecution lacked a nexus to a protected ground. Because

the record compels a contrary conclusion, we grant the

petition and remand for further proceedings.
6 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Since the age of five, Petitioner has been told that men

will beat her if she does not submit. Her mother demanded

that she learn how to do housework, how to accept spousal

abuse, and how “to obey everything that [her] husband would

say.” She beat Petitioner with various objects almost daily,

in part to prepare her for future beatings from her husband. 

Yet Petitioner came to believe that “there should be equality

in opinions[] and in worth” between men and women. She

became a teacher.

Petitioner’s husband, Esteban Baron Mata, began a

regime of grueling abuse months after they married. When

he once wanted food at 1 a.m., for example, he awakened

Petitioner by sticking a lit cigarette into her arm and ordered

her to cook. She told him to do it himself; he grabbed her

hair and dragged her into the kitchen. Petitioner “had to do

it because [she] was his woman, [she] was his wife, and it

was [her] responsibility to serve him,” he said. On another

occasion, he burned Petitioner’s face with a cigarette because

she refused to leave her teaching job. He told her that she had

no right to work and that, as a man, it was his duty to provide. 

“You think that because you studied, you can step on me,” he

said during one beating. “You’re not going to step on me. 

I’m the man and you’re going to do what I say.” Petitioner

said that she did not report her husband’s abuse to the police

because doing so would have been futile. When a friend tried

to report her own husband, a police officer told her to stop

gossiping, return home, and do her “duties.”
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 7

Baron1left Petitioner in 1993 when she was pregnant. 

Her Catholic family prohibited divorce and required that she

live with them until Baron returned. Petitioner fled to the

United States. Years later, in phone calls and messages

through Facebook, Baron sought Petitioner’s location and

insisted that they reunite. After Petitioner changed her phone

number and deleted her account on Facebook, Baron visited

Petitioner’s daughter. He appeared aggressive and threatened

“revenge.” “His family also says that he is still a violent man

towards women and beats” his current girlfriend.

Petitioner met Jorge Hernandez Fernandez in Phoenix,

Arizona. They moved in together. He, too, beat, raped,

burned, and strangled her. Petitioner’s assertions of female

independence and equality prompted his abuse. When

Petitioner declined to give Hernandez money so that she

could save for household expenses, he cut her with a broken

beer bottle and raped her. “If you’re not going to give me

money, give me sex,” he said. During another instance when

Petitioner declined sex, Hernandez responded that she had no

choice in the matter because she was his property. When she

spoke up in front of his friends in their home, he said that she

had to just “come in and not say anything.” He then punched

her so hard that she suffered a vaginal hemorrhage.

The cycle of abuse occurred almost weekly. Hernandez

said that Petitioner, as a woman, was not allowed to have

opinions; Petitioner expressed opinions anyway; Hernandez

abused Petitioner. When Petitioner took a job in which she

would have to speak to men—despite Hernandez’s demand

that she not take such a job—he left bite marks and visible

signs of strangulation on her neck to show other men that she

1

 The parties refer to Petitioner’s abusers by their first surnames.
8 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

“had an owner.” “What’s wrong with it? . . . You’re my

woman, and they need to know it,” he said. When she tried

to kick him out, he returned and raped her. He also dictated

her clothing. “I wasn’t allowed to have an opinion about . . .

anything,” Petitioner wrote in her declaration. “He couldn’t

stand that I, as the supposedly weaker sex, was the

breadwinner . . . .”

Petitioner and Hernandez had three children, all of whom

are citizens of the United States. After several foiled

attempts, Petitioner escaped the relationship.

In 2017, the government deported Hernandez to

Guatemala and Petitioner to Mexico. Hernandez called

Petitioner and her children, demanding to know where

Petitioner now lived. Because he lacks family in Guatemala,

Petitioner believes that Hernandez now lives in Mexico,

where he has family and can obtain residency. Fearing for

her safety, Petitioner returned to the United States. The

government initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner

in December 2017.

The IJ found Petitioner credible and granted her asylum. 

In the alternative, the IJ granted withholding of removal and

CAT protection. The IJ found that Petitioner’s feminist

political opinion was at least one central reason for her past

persecution by Baron and for her well-founded fear of future

persecution by Baron and Hernandez. The IJ also found that

Petitioner’s membership in a particular social group of

“Mexican females” was at least one central reason for her

past persecution by Baron and for her well-founded fear of
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 9

future persecution by Baron and Hernandez.2 Citing reams of

documentary evidence, the IJ found that if the Mexican

government did not condone violence against females, it at

least “demonstrated a complete helplessness” to protect

Petitioner.

The BIA affirmed the grant of CAT protection but

reversed the grants of asylum and withholding of removal. It

tersely disposed of the IJ’s pages of factual findings. Citing

the Attorney General’s opinion in Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N.

Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“Matter of A-B- I”), the BIA held that

“the record lacks findings that [Petitioner’s] domestic

partners abused her for ‘reasons unrelated to their

relationship[s].’” Nevertheless, the BIA did not disturb the

IJ’s finding that Petitioner is credible. It also acknowledged

that Petitioner “suffered severe mental and physical abuse

from her mother, her ex-husband, and her former domestic

partner, including, but not limited to,repeatedrapes, beatings,

burns, and verbal and mental abuse.” More broadly, the BIA

did “not disturb the [IJ]’s factual findings regarding the

‘pandemic’ of violence against females in that country or the

import of ‘culturally constructed’ and entrenched identity

roles.” The government did not challenge the IJ’s findings

that Petitioner (1) suffered past persecution and torture;

(2) has a political opinion; and (3) is a member of a

cognizable social group of Mexican females.

2 The IJ found that Petitioner’s feminist political opinion was “a

reason” for persecution by her mother and that her membership in a

particular social group of Mexican females was “at least one central

reason” for her mother’s persecution of her. But the IJ found that

Petitioner lacks a well-founded fear of future persecution by her mother. 

Petitioner does not challenge that finding.
10 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

In affirming CAT relief, the BIA held that the IJ did not

clearly err in finding that authorities acquiesced in

Petitioner’s torture and that it would be “unreasonable for her

to relocate within Mexico.” Petitioner timely petitions for

review, challenging the denial of asylum and withholding of

removal.3

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence

and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is

limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s

opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d

1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We review de novo the BIA’s conclusions of law. 

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir.

2017) (en banc).

We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual

findings, “including whether an applicant was persecuted on

account of h[er] political opinion.” Regalado-Escobar v.

Holder, 717 F.3d 724, 726–27 (9th Cir. 2013). Those

findings are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). 

3 Nothing in our opinion disturbs the agency’s grant of CAT

protection, which the government does not challenge.
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 11

DISCUSSION

A. General Principles

To be eligible for asylum, Petitioner must prove that she

is “unable or unwilling” to return to her country of origin

“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution

on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Thus, Petitioner has the

burden of establishing that (1) her treatment rises to the level

of persecution or that she has a well-founded fear of future

persecution; (2) the persecution was or would be on account

of one or more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was

or would be committed by the government, or by forces that

the government was unable or unwilling to control. 

Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir.

2010); Rodriguez-Rivera v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigr. &

Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam). To obtain withholding of removal, Petitioner must

show that her “life or freedom would be threatened in

[Mexico] because of [her] race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). “Past persecution ‘triggers a

rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future

persecution.’” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir.

2019) (citation omitted). At issue here is whether Petitioner

“establish[ed] a nexus between [the] mistreatment and a

protected ground.” Baghdasaryan, 592 F.3d at 1023.

For asylum, Petitioner must show that a protected ground

“was or will be at least one central reason” for persecution. 

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
12 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

A “central” reason is a reason of primary

importance to the persecutors, one that is

essential to their decision to act. In other

words, a motive is a “central reason” if the

persecutor would not have harmed the

applicant if such motive did not exist. 

Likewise, a motive is a “central reason” if that

motive, standing alone, would have led the

persecutor to harm the applicant. As noted

above, persecution may be caused by more

than one central reason, and an asylum

applicant need not prove which reason was

dominant. Nevertheless, to demonstrate that

a protected ground was “at least one central

reason” for persecution, an applicant must

prove that such ground was a cause of the

persecutors’ acts.

Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009)

(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). A central

reason cannot be “incidental, tangential, superficial, or

subordinate to another reason for harm.” Id. (quoting In re JB-N- & S-M, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007)).

That an unprotected ground, such as a personal dispute,

also constitutes a central reason for persecution does not bar

asylum. Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1073. “[I]f a

retributory motive exists alongside a protected motive, an

applicant need show only that a protected ground is ‘one

central reason’ for his [or her] persecution.” Madrigal v.

Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

The Acting Attorney General recently agreed that our

nexus standard is the correct one. “To establish the necessary
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 13

nexus, the protected ground: (1) must be a but-for cause of

the wrongdoer’s act; and (2) must play more than a minor

role—in other words, it cannot be incidental or tangential to

another reason for the act.” Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec.

199, 208 (A.G. 2021) (“Matter of A-B- II”). That test is

substantively indistinguishable from our own. Under

Parussimova, Petitioner must first show that “the persecutor

would not have harmed [her] if such motive did not exist,”

555 F.3d at 741, that is, but-for cause, see But-for Cause,

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The cause without

which the event could not have occurred.”). As discussed

above, Parussimova next requires Petitioner to show that her

protected ground was not “incidental, tangential, superficial,

or subordinate to another reason for harm.” 555 F.3d at 741

(citation omitted). In sum, Matter of A-B- II did not change

the standard for establishing nexus, at least in our circuit.

4

The government’s motion to remand so that the BIA can

consider Matter of A-B- II’s effect on nexus is therefore

denied.

B. Political Opinion

Petitioner must establish two facts to show persecution on

account of her political opinion. Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d

1183, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007). First, she “must show that [s]he

held (or that h[er] persecutors believed that [s]he held) a

political opinion.” Id. (citing Navas v. I.N.S., 217 F.3d 646,

656 (9th Cir. 2000)). Second, she “must show that h[er]

4 And as we held recently, the Attorney General’s opinion in Matter

of A-B- I did not “endorse any sort of categorical” bar to asylum for those

fleeing domestic violence predicated on a protected ground. 

Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2020).
14 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

persecutors persecuted h[er] because of [that] political

opinion.” Id.

We have held repeatedly that political opinions

“encompass[] more than electoral politics or formal political

ideology or action.” Id. Although “the mere presence of

some political element does not require the conclusion that

some maltreatment was on account of political opinion,”

Kozulin v. I.N.S., 218 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000),

applicants need not “espouse political theory,” Grava v.

I.N.S., 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2000). Like the Third

Circuit, we have “little doubt that feminism qualifies as a

political opinion within the meaning of the relevant statutes.” 

Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).5

Direct and indirect evidence can show that persecution

was on account of a political opinion. Singh v. Holder,

764 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). “Testimony regarding

a persecutor’s statements serves as direct evidence that the

persecution was motivated by a political opinion . . . .” Id.

So long as the IJ finds that a petitioner is credible, that

testimony can come from the petitioner herself. Id. A short

temporal gap between a petitioner’s actual or imputed

assertion of a political opinion and her mistreatment provides

“indirect evidence of a nexus.” Khudaverdyan v. Holder,

778 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2015).

Here, substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s

conclusion that the record lacks evidence of a nexus between

Petitioner’s persecution and her political opinion. At the

5 We have held the same in a non-precedential disposition. 

Moghaddam v. I.N.S., 95 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (citing

Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1242).
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 15

outset, it bears repeating that the BIA did not disturb the IJ’s

factual findings regarding Petitioner’s favorable credibility

and the severity of her mistreatment. Therefore, the only two

pertinent questions are those described above: (1) whether

Petitioner had an actual or imputed political opinion, and

(2) whether she was persecuted because of that political

opinion. Ahmed, 504 F.3d at 1192. We are compelled to

answer both questions in the affirmative.

First, Petitioner has a feminist political opinion. The

government did not challenge that conclusion before the

agency. To the extent that the BIA determined otherwise,

Petitioner’s testimony, work habits, and insistence on

autonomy compel a contrary conclusion. Under our

precedents, it is no answer that Petitioner did not engage in

feminist “electoral” activities, Ahmed, 504 F.3d at 1192, or

“espouse political theory,” Grava, 205 F.3d at 1181. 

Petitioner’s testimony that “there should be equality in

opinions[] and in worth” between the sexes suffices.

Second, Petitioner was persecuted because of that

political opinion. The record contains episode after episode

of men stating, quite plainly, that they were beating, burning,

raping, and strangling her because she sought an equal perch

in the social hierarchy.6 Hernandez left bite and strangulation

marks on Petitioner after she took a job against his wishes, to

show other men that she “had an owner.” Petitioner’s

6 Petitioner’s expert witness, Professor Nancy Lemon, described

domestic abusers as generally harboring views that men should dominate

women and squelch female independence. That testimony corroborates

Petitioner’s experiences; her persecution occurred when she expressed a

contrary opinion, and her abusers expressly made the very points noted by

Professor Lemon.
16 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

husband, Baron, burned a cigarette into her face because she

refused to leave her job and, according to her husband,

acknowledge “that [he] and [Petitioner] were not equals.” 

Petitioner was doing something wrong, Baron said, by

“providing money” when, “as a man, it was his duty to do

[that].” When he said that Petitioner “didn’t have th[e] right

to have that job,” Petitioner countered that she did. Baron

responded by hitting her.

Indeed, some of the worst acts of violence came

“immediately after” Petitioner asserted her rights as a woman. 

Khudaverdyan, 778 F.3d at 1107. After Petitioner said that

she was not obligated to have sex whenever Hernandez

wished, he said that “it was [her] obligation as a woman to

serve him when he wanted,” and he raped her. Similarly,

after Petitioner bought her own trailer with her wages and

attempted to prevent Hernandez’s entry onto her property,

Hernandez raped and strangled her so that she “would

understand that he wasn’t going to go anywhere.”

The government’s argument that there is no evidence that

Baron and Hernandez were “aware” of Petitioner’s political

opinion thus lacks any rational basis. Petitioner does not

claim that she was persecuted for being a feminist merely

because she, a woman, was mistreated by men. Rather, she

claims that she was persecuted when those men mistreated

her because she expressly asserted to them her political

opinion that she was their equal.

That some incidents of abuse may also have reflected a

dysfunctional relationship is beside the point. See

Parussimova, 555 F.3d at 741 (holding that “persecution may

be caused by more than one central reason”). Petitioner need

not show that her political opinion—rather than interpersonal
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 17

dynamics—played the sole or predominant role in her abuse. 

See id. (holding that “an asylum applicant need not prove

which reason [is] dominant”).

Thus, the record compels the conclusion that Petitioner’s

political opinion is at least one central reason for her past

persecution and her presumptively well-founded fear of

future persecution. See Ahmed, 504 F.3d at 1197 (holding

that past persecution on account of a political opinion gives

rise to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future

persecution on account of that opinion). It then follows that

Petitioner’s political opinion is “a reason” for her persecution

for purposes of withholding of removal. SeeBarajas-Romero

v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A person may

have ‘a reason’ to do something that is not his [or her]

‘central’ reason or even ‘one central reason.’”).

C. Fear of Future Persecution

Because the BIA determined that nexus is lacking, it

“f[ound] it [un]necessary to address the [government’s]

argument that [Petitioner] . . . did not have a well-founded

fear of future persecution.” Yet it then held that the IJ did not

err in granting CAT protection. To receive CAT protection,

Petitioner had to prove “that it is more likely than not that . . .

she will be tortured in the country of removal.” Parada v.

Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914 (9th Cir. 2018); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(2).

Thus, this petition presents a recognized exception to the

ordinary remand rule that we allow the BIA to decide issues

in the first instance. Singh, 764 F.3d at 1163 (citing I.N.S. v.

Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)). Because

Petitioner “met the high burden of demonstrating that [s]he is
18 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

likely to be tortured, . . . [s]he necessarily meets the lower

burden for eligibility for asylum that [s]he has a well-founded

fear of future persecution.” Id. In other words, when the

agency grants CAT protection, it necessarily has decided that

there is a well-founded fear of future persecution. Fedunyak

v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2007). Similarly,

Petitioner “has demonstrated the existence of a clear

probability of future persecution” for her withholding of

removal claim. Id. at 1131. “Having established a nexus

between h[er] persecution and . . . political opinion, and

having established a well-founded fear of future persecution,

a Ventura remand is unnecessary.” Singh, 764 F.3d at 1163.

D. Inability or Unwillingness to Control Persecution

The BIA did not discuss whether Petitioner fears

persecution “by the government, or by forces that the

government was unable or unwilling to control.” 

Baghdasaryan, 592 F.3d at 1023. It did, however, affirm the

IJ’s finding that the Mexican government would acquiesce in

Petitioner’s torture. As with Petitioner’s fear of future

persecution, our precedents and the BIA’s own opinion show

that it necessarily decided that the government was unable or

unwilling to control Petitioner’s persecutors. “Public

officials acquiesce in torture if, ‘prior to the activity

constituting torture,’ the officials: (1) have awareness of the

activity (or consciously close their eyes to the fact it is going

on); and (2) breach their legal responsibility to intervene to

prevent the activity because they are unable or unwilling to

oppose it.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034

(9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also

Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding

that “[a]cquiescence by government officials ‘requires only

that [they] were aware of the torture but remained willfully
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 19

blind to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or

unwillingness to oppose it’” (second alteration in original)

(emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

Thus, on this record, the agency’s finding that the

government “would acquiesce” in Petitioner’s torture

necessarily includes the determination that the government

would be unable or unwilling to stop Petitioner’s future

persecution, a less severe form of mistreatment than torture. 

See Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018)

(holding that the concept of torture is more severe than

persecution). That is especially so here, because the BIA

parroted the Acting Attorney General’s own standard for

persecution in concluding that the government showed

acquiescence by “routinely breach[ing] the duty to intervene

in these matters.” See Matter of A-B- II, 28 I. & N. Dec. at

204 (“The word ‘persecution’ therefore should be read to

require that the government in the home country has fallen so

far short of adequate protection as to have breached its basic

duty to protect its citizens . . . .” (emphasis added)).

E. Ability to Relocate

If the government proves that Petitioner “can reasonably

relocate internally to an area of safety,” then she is ineligible

for asylum. Singh, 914 F.3d at 659. In its analysis of asylum

and withholding of removal, the BIA stated that it was

unnecessary to address Petitioner’s “ability to relocate”

because it found nexus to be lacking. Once again, the BIA’s

holding with respect to Petitioner’s CAT claim necessarily

resolved that issue.

For purposes of asylum and withholding of removal,

assessing Petitioner’s ability to relocate “consists of two
20 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

steps: (1) ‘whether [she] could relocate safely,’ and

(2) ‘whether it would be reasonable to require [her] to do

so.’” Id. (emphases added) (citation omitted). In resolving

Petitioner’s CAT claim, the BIA held that country conditions

“render it unreasonable for [Petitioner] to relocate within

Mexico.” Accordingly, the BIA necessarily decided that

Petitioner also could not relocate for purposes of asylum and

withholding of removal.7

In sum, we hold that (1) we are compelled to conclude

that Petitioner established a nexus between her mistreatment

and political opinion and (2) the BIA necessarily concluded

that she carried her burden to prove the other elements of her

claims for asylum and withholding of removal.8 Petitioner is

thus eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of

removal.

7 As we have noted before, Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1101

(9th Cir. 2020), the text of the regulation governing relocation under CAT,

8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii), lacks a requirement that the relocation be

reasonable, whereas the regulations governing relocation under asylum

and withholding of removal, id. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B),

1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B), expressly require that the relocation be reasonable. 

But, as in Akosung, “nothing turns on the distinction here” because the

BIA affirmatively found that relocation would be unreasonable, and

because “[t]he government [has] not suggest[ed] that the standards in the

two regulations are different.” 970 F.3d at 1101 (emphasis added). To the

contrary, in its brief to the BIA, the government lumped together the

relocation analysis for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

protection as a single issue.

8 Because Petitioner established persecution on account of her

political opinion, we need not decide whether she did so on account of her

membership in a particular social group of Mexican females.
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 21

On remand, the Attorney General shall exercise his

discretion in determining whether to grant Petitioner asylum. 

If he does not grant asylum, Petitioner shall receive

withholding of removal.

PETITIONGRANTEDANDREMANDED. The panel

shall retain jurisdiction over any future petitions for review.

PAEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join Judge Graber’s fine opinion in full. I write

separately on a point the court’s opinion does not address. In

rejecting Ms. Rodriguez Tornes’s political opinion claim, the

BIA suggests that the presence of a “personal relationship”

motivation for intimate partner violence implies that there

were no intersectional or additional bases for the violence Ms.

Rodriguez Tornes experienced. The court’s opinion

thoroughly documents the record evidence, which the BIA

ignored, demonstrating how Ms. Rodriguez Tornes was

targeted for violence by her domestic partners on account of

her feminist political opinion. The BIA, however, also

ignored extensive record evidence from expert witness Prof.

Nancy Lemon, a leading authority on domestic violence, that

directly rejects the BIA’s premise that domestic violence is

presumed to be motivated by nothing more than the private

dynamics of a “personal relationship.”

In contrast to the BIA’s “personal relationship” view of

domestic violence,1 Prof. Lemon draws on more than three

1 The BIA cites Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316, 338–39 (A.G.

2018) as the basis for its assumption.
22 ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND

decades of research, writing, legal representation, and

lawmaking to explain that “the socially or culturally

constructed and defined identities, roles and responsibilities

that are assigned to women, as distinct from those assigned to

men, are the root of domestic violence.” She analyzes data

from the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics and studies from leading medical and social science

publications to highlight “compelling evidence that

heterosexual domestic violence is, in significant part,

motivated by bias against women and the belief that men are

entitled to beat and control women.” Prof. Lemon

summarizes cross-cultural studies within the United States

and internationally that demonstrate “a correlation between

patriarchal norms that support male dominance and violence

against women by intimate partners.”

In her report, which the IJ referenced in her decision,

Prof. Lemon provides a lengthy examination of social science

research exploring how particular behaviors exhibited by

male abusers—including emotional abuse, sexual abuse,

marital rape, economic abuse, blaming, guilt and using

children—are each tied to social belief systems that “men are

entitled to dominate and control women because the male sex

is considered superior” and operate to “exploit the traditional

socially constructed roles, identities, duties and status of

women in intimate relationships.” In describing the legal,

social, cultural, and political structures that lay the

foundations for intimate partner violence, Prof. Lemon

explains that “domestic violence is not typically caused by

behaviors unique to the victim or by inter-personal dynamics

unique to the relationship between the abuser and the

abused. . . . Rather, heterosexual male batterers have certain

expectations of intimate relationships with regard to which

partner will control the relationship and how control will be
ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 23

exercised. These expectations are premised on a dogmatic

adherence to male privilege and rigid, distinct, and unequal

roles for women and men.”

The record evidence of Prof. Lemon’s rigorous expert

analysis undermines the BIA’s unsubstantiated premise that,

unless otherwise shown, domestic violence is a purely private

matter. The BIA makes no mention of the record evidence of

Prof. Lemon’s expert analysis, let alone the decades of

publicly available social science research and public policy

that all reject the BIA’s outdated view of domestic violence

as a quirk within a “personal relationship.”2 Thus, the BIA’s

assertion that domestic violence is presumptively a private

matter is not supported by substantial evidence.

2

See e.g., Nina Rabin, At the Border Between Public and Private:

U.S. Immigration Policy for Victims of Domestic Violence, 7 Law &

Ethics Hum. Rts. 109, 111–12 (2013) (“Fifty years ago, domestic violence

was widely understood to be a private matter, and the extent to which it

was appropriate for the state to intervene was highly contested. Now,

domestic violence shelters, state laws and policies specific to the

prosecution of domestic violence crimes, and significant state and federal

government support for efforts to eradicate domestic violence are all

commonplace. Crucial to bringing about this shift in the state’s role vis-àvis domestic violence victims has been the acknowledgment of the

structural roots of domestic violence. When conceived of as a problem

tied to gender subordination and pervasive inequality rather than

interpersonal conflict, the violence at issue demands a state response.”);

Violence Against Women: Victims of the System, 102d Cong., 63 (1991);

Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973

(1991); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative

and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117 (1996); Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v.

Kaguyutan, Offering A Helping Hand: Legal Protections for Battered

Immigrant Women: A History of Legislative Responses, 10 Am. U. J.

Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 95 (2001); see generally Am. Br. of the National

Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project.