NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

PAUL GARY WALLACE, AKA Bill, AKA 

Doc, AKA Lil Doc, AKA Lil Doc Thone, 

AKA Still Bill, AKA Uncle Bill, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-50176 

D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00293-AB-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2024

Pasadena, California

Before: SILER,** GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

Paul Gary Wallace appeals his conviction and sentence for RICO conspiracy 

and using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. He argues that the 

district court erred by failing to suppress evidence and admitting unqualified expert 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 2 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-50176 

testimony and his admissions to prior murders. Both his conviction and sentence, 

he argues, must be vacated because the evidence was insufficient to support the 

verdict, and his sentence must be vacated because the district court improperly 

imposed a mandatory consecutive sentence and three conditions of supervised 

release. Finding no error, we affirm.

1. Wallace attacks his conviction on three grounds. First, he argues that the AK47-pattern rifle police saw in his van could have been legal under California law and 

therefore could not have established probable cause for a search warrant. But this 

argument fails because he neglected to raise it before the district court, so it is 

therefore forfeited. Also, Wallace fails to wrestle with the fact that “assault 

weapons” are presumptively illegal in California except as specified under certain 

statutory provisions, Cal. Penal Code § 30605(a), and therefore officers had probable 

cause to suspect that the rifle was illegal pending further investigation. See, e.g., 

United States v. Vandergroen, 964 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2020). Although there 

were innocent explanations for the rifle, “probable cause does not require officers to 

rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” District of Columbia 

v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018). 

Second, Wallace argues that the district court erred regarding expert 

testimony; specifically, that allowing LAPD Officer Andres Fernandez to offer 

expert testimony on the structure and operations of Wallace’s gang, the East Coast 
3 22-50176 

Crips (“ECC”), violated Wallace’s rights under the Confrontation Clause; that 

allowing Daniel Rubin, an LAPD ballistics expert, to testify violated Daubert and 

Rule 702; and that the district court’s failure to make express reliability findings 

requires reversal. None of these arguments has merit. 

Wallace argues that Officer Fernandez’s testimony was not based on his own 

investigations and analysis but was simply regurgitated information gleaned from 

prior gang member interviews. But while Fernandez’s testimony relies on 

information obtained from other gang members, we have repeatedly affirmed the use 

of similar expert testimony to describe the structure, operation, and codes of conduct 

of criminal organizations. See United States v. Holguin, 51 F.4th 841, 856 (9th Cir. 

2022) (collecting cases). Like our prior cases, Wallace fails to argue “that a gang 

investigator would not rely on the kind of information” Fernandez described. Id. 

Fernandez’s testimony is similar, albeit not identical to that in United States v. Vera, 

770 F.3d 1232, 1237 (9th Cir. 2014), and Holguin, both of which permitted the 

challenged expert testimony. See Holguin, 51 F.4th. at 857 (“The gatekeeping 

inquiry is always case-specific.”). The testimony was properly admitted.

Next, Officer Rubin testified to his ballistics toolmark analysis which matched 

the casings fired at a murder scene to the rifle discovered in the rental van. Wallace 

argues that this methodology has never been subjected to peer review and is therefore 

inherently unreliable and inadmissible under Daubert. However, as the prosecution 
4 22-50176 

observes, “no federal court has categorically rejected toolmark analysis,” and our

precedent “squarely foreclose[s] that argument.” See United States v. Johnson, 875 

F.3d 1265, 1281 (9th Cir. 2017). In the end, Wallace cannot show that admitting 

any ballistics toolmark testimony was an abuse of discretion. His criticisms rely 

entirely on reports that predate our approval of ballistics toolmark analysis in 

Johnson. 

Likewise, Wallace objects that Officer Rubin failed to characterize his 

findings as within a “reasonable degree of ballistics certainty,” which the court failed 

to correct sua sponte. But this is an overly technical reading of our precedent in 

Johnson. 875 F.3d at 1280. That phrase was used simply because it was the one the 

expert used; our opinion did not mandate incantation of the phrase by every expert 

henceforth. Here, the expert chose simply to forgo suggesting any level of certainty. 

To the degree that Rubin stated categorically that the bullet casings came from the 

same gun, Wallace’s failure to object at trial dooms his objection. The district 

court’s Daubert gatekeeping role does not oblige it to “step in,” as Wallace puts it, 

when a witness makes an improper statement without objection. There was no plain 

error.

The parties agree that the district court erred in failing to either hold a Daubert

hearing on Rubin’s testimony or make an explicit reliability finding. Holguin, 51 

F.4th at 853–55. Nevertheless, this was harmless error because the “record supports 
5 22-50176 

the reliability of [the] expert testimony.” Id. at 855. Rubin’s conclusions were 

supported by other testimony, including Wallace’s own repeated admissions that the 

rifle seized from the rental van was used in a murder, and Wallace did not avail 

himself of the opportunity to cross-examine Rubin. 

Third, Wallace argues that evidence of his admissions of prior murders was 

unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. He essentially contends that, because his 

confessions would be insufficient standing alone to prove first degree murder of 

anyone beyond a reasonable doubt, they are irrelevant. But that is not how relevance 

works. If there is insufficient evidence—including the confessions—that Wallace 

murdered Brown, then that would be a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, 

not a Rule 403 challenge. Confessions to murder are highly relevant to a charge of 

murder, even if they are not dispositive. And although they are assuredly prejudicial, 

even “highly prejudicial” evidence is “not necessarily unfairly prejudicial.” United 

States v. Thornhill, 940 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Reviewing for abuse of discretion, we find no error.

2. Wallace next claims that the jury never properly found that he had committed 

murder sufficient to justify his 300-month sentence on the RICO charge. That 

charge required the jury to find that “the violation is based on a racketeering activity 

for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). 

Under the government’s theory of the case, that activity would be conspiracy to 
6 22-50176 

commit murder or aiding and abetting murder. But Wallace does not address the 

fact that California law makes no distinction between principals and aiders and 

abettors. The text of the jury instructions asking the jury whether “Wallace . . . 

murdered” could support any theory of liability. Indeed, the jury verdict form for 

Wallace’s § 924 charge likewise asked the jury to find “Wallace” guilty or not guilty 

“of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, first 

degree murder of Reginald Brown in aid of racketeering.” Wallace never explains 

why “Wallace . . . murdered” cannot include coconspirator or aiding and abetting 

liability. And just as importantly, Wallace also ignores the fact that the jury also

found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Wallace’s “pattern of racketeering activity” 

included “acts involving murder.” Under the highly deferential standard of review 

here, we find no error. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

3. Finally, Wallace challenges two aspects of his sentence: the imposition of a 

ten-year mandatory consecutive sentence and a supervised release condition 

prohibiting him from associating with gang members. Wallace was originally 

charged with violating both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j). The latter provision carries 

no mandatory minimum or requirement that the sentence be consecutive. But the 

United States notified the court it intended to dismiss the § 924(j) charge, and the 

jury was instructed in all respects under only § 924(c), which requires sentences be 

at least ten years and run consecutive to other sentences. Therefore, the jury did not 
7 22-50176 

convict Wallace of violating § 924(j), the district court did not sentence Wallace 

under § 924(j), and at most, any typographical error on the written judgment was 

harmless and insufficient to show plain error. 

Finally, Wallace contends that the court’s supervised release condition was 

inappropriate in light of his pre-arrest work to bring reconciliation between rival 

gangs. The parties agree that our review is for plain error. United States v. 

Magdaleno, 43 F.4th 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2022). But Wallace ignores the district 

court’s “wide latitude” to impose supervised release conditions. United States v. 

Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009). It was not unreasonable for the district 

court to restrict a former gang leader from associating with known gang members, 

particularly given that Wallace had, while in custody, allegedly ordered another 

inmate stabbed. Finally, because Wallace’s release from prison is decades away, he

can move to modify the condition once he is on supervised release if “the situation 

in his community” calls for it. In short, the district court was entitled to conclude 

that there was “good reason to forbid” Wallace’s association with ECC gang 

members “so as to prevent his reversion into a former crime-inducing lifestyle”—

especially given that Wallace was not a “bit player” in the gang but rather had a 

leadership role. Magdaleno, 43 F.4th at 1224 (cleaned up). We find no error. 

AFFIRMED.