alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

Filed 10/5/23 P. v. Clark CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDON ALLAN CLARK,

Defendant and Appellant.

C097501

(Super. Ct. No. CS202259)

Appointed counsel for defendant Brandon Allen Clark filed an opening brief that 

sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine 

whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 

436.) Finding no arguable errors that would result in a disposition more favorable to 

defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
2

FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

In July 2020, defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code sections 29800, 

subdivision (a)(1), 22210, and Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). He was 

released on post-release community supervision in August 2020. His supervision was 

scheduled to expire in January 2024. 

Defendant repeatedly violated the terms of his release. In November 2022, the 

probation department filed a petition for revocation alleging three violations of the 

condition of his release: 1) failing to submit to a search; 2) failing to abstain from 

possession of illegal drugs; and 3) threatening, harassing, or annoying a protected person. 

The trial court summarily revoked supervision and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial 

court found the first two allegations true. The trial court sentenced defendant to 120 days 

in jail, and awarded him 37 days of presentence credits. Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Appointed counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts and procedural 

history of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there 

are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant 

was advised by counsel of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days from the 

date the opening brief was filed. More than 30 days have elapsed, and defendant has not 

filed a supplemental brief.

Having undertaken an examination of the entire record pursuant to Wende, we find 

no arguable errors that are favorable to defendant. Accordingly, we will affirm the 

judgment.
3

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

 

HULL, J.

We concur:

 

EARL, P. J.

 

ROBIE, J.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
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                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4799-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2024-0001]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of New Hampshire (FEMA-4799-DR), dated July 10, 2024, and related determinations.

# DATES:

This amendment was issued July 22, 2024.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dean Webster, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The notice of a major disaster declaration for the State of New Hampshire is hereby amended to include the following area among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the event declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of July 10, 2024.

Grafton County for Public Assistance.

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050 Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters);

97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Deanne Criswell,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2024-21207 Filed 9-17-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 4440** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. GARRON TAUFEEQ SPARKS , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro
. Thomas D. Schroeder , District Judge. ( 1:13

- c r - 00357

- TDS

- 1 )

Submitted : November 24, 2014 Decided: December 4, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, KING , and DUNCAN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greg Davis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston

- Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Stephen T. Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, N orth Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Garron Taufeeq Sparks pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced him to a Guidelines sentence of fifty

- five months’ imprisonment. Sparks appeal s , claiming that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
. We affirm. We review the district court’s sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[,]” for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse

- of

discretion standard.” Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). Because Sparks does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, we turn our attention to substantive reasonableness , “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. “ Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines ra nge is presumptively reasonable [ , ] ” and this “presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.” United States v. Louthian , 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) , cert . denied ,
__ U.S.L.W.

__ , 2014 WL 4717386 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2014) (No. 14

- 336)
. Sparks asserts that the district court inadequately considered his youth when imposing a Guidelines sentence. We disagree. The district court expressly relied on Sparks’ age as3 its basis for imposing a sentence near the low end of the Guidelines range , while also taking into account Sparks’ criminal history, which included tw o prior convictions for illegal gun possession . Sparks has not show n that this sentence is unreasonable w hen measured against the § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, we hold that the Guidelines sentence imposed by the district court is substantively reasonable, and we affirm the judgment of the district court . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process
.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 10(a)




	CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
      




	We consent to the incorporation by reference in this Amendment
      No. 11 to Registration Statement No. 

      811-21162 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 of Merrill Lynch Basic
      Value Principal Protected Fund (the “Fund”) of Merrill Lynch Principal
      Protected Trust on Form N-1A of our report dated August 23, 2004, appearing
      in the June 30, 2004 Annual Report of the Fund, which is incorporated by
      reference in Part B of this Registration Statement.




	/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP




	Princeton, New Jersey  

      October 25, 2004
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</TABLE>
#### Morris McMULLEN et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. Mrs. G. W. SCOTT et al., Defendants in Error.

No. 2185.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

Jan. 11, 1940.

Strasburger, Price, Holland, Kelton & Miller, of Dallas, M. E. Gates, of Huntsville, Bennett & Bennett, of Normangee, and Brownlee & Brownlee, of Madison-ville, for plaintiffs in error.

Collins, Pate, Hatch ell & Garrison, of Lufkin, and Joe E. Webb, of Madisonville, for defendants in error.

ALEXANDER, Justice.

Mrs. G. W. Scott, a widow, brought this suit against Morris McMullen and Elto'n McMullen, partners doing business under the trade-name of Mack’s Motor Coaches, and William M. Forrest, to recover damages for injuries resulting in the death of Rachel Janice Scott, the minor daughter of the plaintiff. A trial before a jury resulted in verdict and judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants, Morris McMullen and Elton McMullen, for the sum of $5,000. Said defendants have appealed.

This is a companion case with the case of Morris McMullen et al. v. W. N. Coleman, et ux., 135 S.W.2d 776, this day decided. The facts in this case and the errors committed in the trial court are substantially the same as were involved in that case. For the reasons stated in the opinion in that case, the judgment of the trial court in this case is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
----

| 1. | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of GCI, Inc. for the period ended December 31, 2009; and |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   Date: May 25, 2010 |   /s/ G. Wilson Hughes |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                      | G. Wilson Hughes            |
|                      | Chief Executive Officer     |

| 1 | Paragraph 3 is omitted since no financial statements are included in the amended filing.  Paragraphs 4 and 5 are omitted since the amendment does not contain an amendment to the Regulation S-K Item 307 and 308 disclosures regarding the evaluation of disclosure controls and procedures and internal controls over financial reporting. |
|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

BRIAN J. SHEPARD,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-2868

[September 3, 2020]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Charles A. Schwab, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 562012CF001942.

Robert David Malove of The Law Offices of Robert David Malove, Fort 

Lauderdale, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, GROSS and FORST, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2694 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2694

  To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to lengthen the statute of 
 limitations for enforcing robocall violations, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 18, 2018

  Mr. Schatz (for himself, Mr. Udall, Ms. Klobuchar, Mr. Markey, Ms. 
 Cortez Masto, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. Tester, Mr. Peters, Mr. Blumenthal, 
  Ms. Hassan, Ms. Baldwin, and Ms. Cantwell) introduced the following 
 bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, 
                      Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to lengthen the statute of 
 limitations for enforcing robocall violations, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Robocall Enforcement Enhancement Act 
of 2018''.

SEC. 2. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR ROBOCALL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.

    (a) Provision of Inaccurate Caller Identification Information.--
Section 227(e)(5)(A)(iv) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
227(e)(5)(A)(iv)) is amended--
            (1) in the heading, by striking ``2-year'' and inserting 
        ``3-year''; and
            (2) by striking ``2 years'' and inserting ``3 years''.
    (b) Use of Automated Telephone Equipment.--Section 503(b)(6)(B) of 
the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 503(b)(6)(B)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``occurred more than 1 year'' and inserting 
        the following: ``occurred--
                    ``(i) except as provided in clause (ii), more than 
                1 year''; and
            (2) by striking ``liability.'' and inserting the following: 
        ``liability; or
                    ``(ii) in the case of a violation of section 
                227(b)(1), more than 3 years prior to the date of 
                issuance of the required notice or notice of apparent 
                liability.''.

SEC. 3. IMPOSITION OF FORFEITURES WITHOUT CITATIONS.

    Section 503(b)(5) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
503(b)(5)) is amended, in the second sentence--
            (1) by striking ``or in the case of'' and inserting ``in 
        the case of''; and
            (2) by inserting before the period at the end the 
        following: ``, or in the case of a violation of section 
        227(b)(1)''.
                                 <all>
```
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

JOSE MARES, ) 

 ) 

 Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D13-2731 

 ) 

STATE OF FLORIDA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

 ) 

Opinion filed May 6, 2015. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee 

County; John F. Lakin, Judge. 

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and 

Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public 

Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. 

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Bilal A. Faruqui, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. 

CASANUEVA, Judge. 

 Jose Mares appeals the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Mr. Mares alleged in his motion that he 

received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a 

first-degree murder that he committed when he was sixteen years old. The motion was 

denied based on Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), and Gonzalez v. 
- 2 -

State, 101 So. 3d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), which held that Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 

2455 (2012), did not apply retroactively. The Florida Supreme Court has recently held 

that the Miller decision applies retroactively to all juvenile offenders whose convictions 

and sentences were final when Miller was decided. Falcon v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly 

S151, S151 (Fla. Mar. 19, 2015). Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court's 

order summarily denying the claim. 

 We note that the Florida Supreme Court has further held in Horsley v. 

State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S155, S155 (Fla. Mar. 19, 2015), that the proper remedy in 

cases involving juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller is 

to apply chapter 2014–220, Laws of Florida. The court concluded that "applying chapter 

2014–220, Laws of Florida, to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are 

unconstitutional under Miller is the remedy most faithful to the Eighth Amendment 

principles established by the United States Supreme Court, to the intent of the Florida 

Legislature, and to the doctrine of separation of powers." Id. at S160. The relevant 

provisions of chapter 2014–220 have been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 

921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014). Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Mr. 

Mares' motion and remand for a resentencing proceeding consistent with this new 

juvenile sentencing legislation. See Horsley, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S155; Falcon, 40 Fla. L. 

Weekly S151. 

 Reversed and remanded with directions. 

WALLACE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
#### In re Susan Lee DENOCHICK. Brian Krasinski and Sandra Krasinski, Appellants, v. James R. Walsh, Esq., Trustee, Appellee.

No. CIV.A. 01-370J.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Jan. 14, 2003.

*633Paul W. Johnson, New Castle, PA, for appellants.

James R. Walsh, David J. Novak, Esquire, Spence, Custer, Saylor, Wolfe *&*Rose, Johnstown, PA, for appellees.

*MEMORANDUM ORDER*

CINDRICH, District Judge.

This bankruptcy appeal fulfills the old adage, “No good deed goes unpunished.” It also illustrates the wisdom of Proverbs 22:26: “Be not one of those who give pledges, who become surety for debts.” Revised Standard Version.

In this case, appellants agreed to guarantee a debt consolidation loan from NBOC to Sandra Krasinski’s sister, Susan Lee Denochick (the debtor). The debtor made $1,713.35 in loan payments to NBOC in the year prior to filing bankruptcy. Appellants received none of this money, but the payments had the indirect effect of reducing their exposure on the guarantee they gave to NBOC. The trustee commenced an adversary action to avoid as a preference and recover from appellants the money Denochick paid to NBOC. After a trial, at which appellants did not testify, the bankruptcy court concluded by a memorandum order dated September 10, 2001 that appellants fell within the definition of “creditors” and that they had failed to establish the applicability of the “ordinary course of business” exception. Thus, the court concluded that the trustee could avoid the $1,713.35 and recover that amount from appellants.

We affirm. As the bankruptcy court thoroughly explained, the definition of a “creditor” under the bankruptcy code and Pennsylvania law is very broad and encompasses a guarantor of a debt. Appellants were “creditors,” even though then-claim was derivative of NBOC’s and was contingent upon the debtor’s default. Ms. Denochick’s payments to NBOC conferred a benefit upon appellants, to the detriment of her other creditors.

We also agree that appellants failed to meet their burden, *see*11 U.S.C. § 547(g), of demonstrating that the payments occurred in the ordinary course of business, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). That burden, of course, is increased by our standard of review such that appellants must show that the bankruptcy court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. *In re Brown,*951 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir.1991); *see also*Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8013. The rec*634ord here supports the inference that the debt owed to NBOC was extraordinary. *Conclusion*

In summary, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order and judgment dated September 10, 2001. The clerk is directed to mark this case closed.
#### RATTNER v. KLEIMAN et al.

No. 8802.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

April 6, 1932.

See, also, 36 S.W.(2d) 249.

Galbraith & Goodrich, of Brownsville, for plaintiff in error.

John C. My rick, of Harlingen, for defendants in error.

COBBS, J.

The record and statement of facts only were filed in this case, and neither party filed briefs.

We have examined the record for fundamental error, but find none that should cause a reversal; hence, in the absence of briefs of either party, we find it our duty to affirm the judgment of the court, which we do.

The judgment is affirmed.