NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0071

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS21741

The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Ed Johnson PLLC, Peoria

By Edward D. Johnson

Counsel for Appellant

Kellee McDowell, Phoenix

Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

FILED 09-26-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.M.

Decision of the Court

2

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Randolph Hatch (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to Pat, born in 2008.

1 We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Kellee McDowell (“Mother”) and Father are Pat’s biological 

parents. Mother and Father never married, ending their relationship a few 

months after Pat was born.

¶3 The juvenile court granted Mother and Father joint 

decision-making for Pat but granted Mother the final say on school and 

medical-related disputes. Father had overnight parenting time with Pat

until kindergarten. After that, Father exercised his parenting time less and 

less, only picking Pat up from school a few times during her fourth-grade

year and stopping altogether in middle school.

¶4 In 2020, at the start of COVID-19, Mother did not allow Father 

to take Pat on a trip to California because Pat “did not feel safe” taking the 

trip with Father as he would not take precautions. During COVID-19, 

Father did not have contact with Pat for several months until Father’s Day 

in 2021. Father most recently saw Pat at his mother’s funeral in January 

2022.

¶5 In November 2022, Mother moved to change Pat’s name 

because Pat wanted to transition from a boy to a girl. Mother contacted 

Father, informing him of Pat’s name-change trial in January 2023. Father 

opposed Pat’s name change and would not refer to Pat by her preferred 

name or pronouns. After researching the impact of transitioning on 

adolescents’ mental health, Father expressed concern and wanted an 

opportunity to talk to Pat about transitioning. But Pat did not respond to 

his text messages.

¶6 After the name-change trial, Mother petitioned the family 

court to modify the legal decision-making orders. In September 2023, 

Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights to Pat on the 

grounds of abandonment, neglect, and chronic substance abuse. Father 

later petitioned to enforce the family court’s visitation and custody orders. 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the child’s identity.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.M.

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The family court dismissed Mother and Father’s petitions because the

termination proceedings were ongoing.

¶7 In November 2023, the juvenile court held an initial 

termination hearing and directed Father to complete a social study before 

the pretrial conference. A child protective services case manager conducted 

the social study. According to the study, Pat wanted to have Father’s 

parental rights terminated because she found “his attitude regarding 

transgender difficult and . . . he bullies her about her life choices.” After 

spending time with Mother and talking with Father, the case manager 

found that Father did not express an interest in developing a relationship 

with Pat and instead “only want[ed] [to talk to Pat] to express his 

disapproval [of her desire to transition]” which would cause her “undue 

distress and trauma.” Based on her observations, the case manager

concluded that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in Pat’s best 

interests.

¶8 In April 2024, the juvenile court held a termination hearing. 

Father blamed Mother for his lack of contact with Pat, but the court found 

Father’s testimony lacked credibility. Father conceded that he had not 

provided Pat with financial support in seven years, had not sent her cards, 

letters, or gifts, and had only contacted Pat recently through text messages

to which she did not respond.

¶9 After the hearing, the juvenile court denied termination under 

the neglect, abuse, and prolonged substance abuse grounds, finding Mother 

had not met her burden by clear and convincing evidence. But it granted 

termination on the abandonment ground. After considering Pat’s wishes 

and the effect of Father’s opinions on Pat’s mental health, the court found 

that the termination of Father’s parental rights was in Pat’s best interests.

¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION 

¶11 Father argues that “the evidence does not support the 

termination of [his] parental rights” and termination “is not in [Pat’s] best 

interest” because his refusal to support Pat’s life choices around

transitioning “is not a reason to terminate the parent-child relationship.” 

He also argues that the juvenile court should not have terminated his 

parental rights because of the pending family court case.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.M.

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¶12 Father’s second argument lacks merit. Mother and Father 

filed petitions in the family court, which the court dismissed because the 

termination proceedings were ongoing. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 5.1(a) (The 

“juvenile division has jurisdiction over the children” if simultaneous cases 

are pending.). If the juvenile court had reached a different result, the parties 

could have reinstituted the family-court filings.

¶13 Turning to the termination order, we will affirm such an order

unless the juvenile court abused its discretion or its factual findings were 

clearly erroneous. See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 

47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). “The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination 

proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the 

parties, [and] judge the credibility of witnesses.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We accept the juvenile court’s 

factual findings unless no reasonable evidence supports them. Id. We do 

not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8.

¶14 The juvenile court granted termination on the abandonment 

ground. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Under A.R.S. § 8-531(1),

“Abandonment” means the failure of a parent to provide 

reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the 

child, including providing normal supervision. 

Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has 

made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with 

the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship 

with the child without just cause for a period of six months 

constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.

In determining abandonment, the juvenile court considers relevant factors,

including whether the “parent has provided reasonable support, 

maintained regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to support and 

communicate with the child, and maintained a normal parental 

relationship.” Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 36, ¶ 15 (App. 2010) 

(citation omitted). “What constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, 

and normal supervision varies from case to case.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000) (citation omitted). Abandonment 

exists if a parent makes only “minimal efforts to support and communicate 

with the child.” Kenneth B., 226 Ariz. at 36, ¶ 14 (quoting A.R.S. § 8-531(1)

(2007)).

¶15 Father does not meaningfully challenge the juvenile court’s 

finding of abandonment, and the record supports that finding. Father has 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.M.

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5

not had in-person contact with Pat in over two years. See A.R.S. 

§ 8-531(A)(1) (“Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the 

child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie 

evidence of abandonment.”). Father picked Pat up from school when Pat

was younger and had overnight visits with her. But his visits with Pat

decreased, and eventually, they stopped as she got older. Father contacted 

Mother a couple of times during COVID-19 about spending time with Pat.

But Mother would not let Father see Pat because he would not take the 

necessary COVID-19 precautions to make Pat comfortable. Despite Father’s 

complaints that Mother interfered with his parental relationship, he never 

sought to enforce parenting time before the termination proceedings began. 

The court found his testimony lacked credibility, and “Father never 

complained in writing to the Court or anyone else that Mother was unjustly 

limiting his access to [Pat].” The last time Father saw Pat was at his mother’s 

funeral in January 2022.

¶16 Father also conceded he had not financially supported Pat in 

seven years and had not sent her gifts, letters, or cards. See Michael J., 196 

Ariz. at 251, ¶ 24 (Abandonment supported by Father’s failure to send gifts, 

letters, and cards.). Father sometimes texted Pat, but she did not respond.

Father tried to contact Pat and expressed a desire to be involved in her 

decision-making, but these efforts were minimal and did not reflect a 

normal parental relationship. See Angel S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 

132, 139, ¶ 23 (App. 2015) (Minimal phone contact, without personal 

contact, does not maintain a normal parental relationship with a young 

child.). Thus, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of 

abandonment.

¶17 Father suggests the juvenile court improperly terminated his 

parental rights because he disagreed with Pat’s gender identification and 

life choices around transitioning. As explained below, the court terminated 

Father’s parental rights partly because his opinions affected Pat’s mental 

health and his relationship with her. But the court did not terminate 

Father’s rights based on his opinions alone. The court found that Father’s 

“positions on these issues are not what this case is about.” Father failed to 

develop a parental relationship with his child, support his child 

emotionally or financially, and then wanted to exercise parental control 

over her decisions.

¶18 After finding at least one statutory ground for termination, 

the juvenile court must determine whether termination would be in the 

child’s best interests. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12. The petitioner must 

show either that “(1) the child will benefit from [termination]; or (2) the 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.M.

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child will be harmed if [termination] is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018). The court must consider the totality 

of the circumstances in its best interests determination. Id. at 150-51, ¶ 13.

¶19 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that termination was in Pat’s best interests as continuing the relationship 

with Father “would be detrimental to [Pat] because Father has not shown a 

respect for [her] choices, her development, or her mental health needs for 

many years.” As stated in the social study, Pat wanted Father’s rights 

terminated “because he bullie[d] her about her life choices.” Mother 

testified that Father had not contacted her over the past few years to ask 

about Pat’s well-being or if she needed anything. He only started showing 

concern after Mother told him about Pat’s name change.

¶20 The evidence shows that Father’s opinions about Pat

transitioning affected his ability to develop a normal parental relationship 

with Pat. But independent of his belief about her transitioning, he failed to 

support his child in a manner that was conducive to a parental relationship. 

During the name change trial, with Pat present, Father discussed his 

opposition to the “LGBTQ community” at length and afterward would not 

refer to Pat by her preferred pronouns. The case manager found that 

because of Father’s strong opinions, “[h]e did not want to consider or talk 

about anything that did not [agree] with his opinion.” Father’s behavior did 

not suggest that he wanted to develop a relationship with Pat but that he 

wanted to tell her he disagreed with her choices, which the case manager 

believed would “cause undue distress and trauma to [Pat].”

¶21 The case manager concluded that terminating Father’s rights 

would be in Pat’s best interests because “father’s refusal to even 

acknowledge [Pat’s] feelings . . . is abusive and detrimental to [her] mental 

health.” Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s 

parental rights because denying the petition could harm Pat. See Kent K. v. 

Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 287, ¶ 37 (2005) (“[T]he child’s interest in obtaining 

a loving, stable home, or at the very least avoiding a potentially harmful 

relationship with a parent, deserves at least as much weight as that 

accorded the interest to the unfit parent in maintaining parental rights.”).
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.M.

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CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm.