alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     EXHIBIT 3.1


                            CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION

                                       OF

                               MOORE MEDICAL CORP.

                    -----------------------------------------

                    PURSUANT TO SECTION 103(F) OF THE GENERAL
                    CORPORATION LAW OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

                    -----------------------------------------


         I, Mark Karp, President of Moore Medical Corp., a corporation organized
and existing under the General Corporation law of the State of Delaware (the
"Corporation"), in accordance with the provisions of Section 103(f) of such law,
DO HEREBY CERTIFY that:

         1. The Certificate of Amendment of Certificate of Incorporation of the
Corporation filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware on June
30, 1981 (the "June 30, 1981 Amendment") inadvertently set forth an inaccurate
record of the corporate action therein referred to.

         2. Paragraph FIRST of the June 30, 1981 Amendment should be corrected
by deleting the words "By striking out the whole of Article FOURTH thereof as it
now exists and inserting in lieu and instead thereof a new Article FOURTH,
reading as follows: "in the second paragraph of Paragraph FIRST of the June 30,
1981 Amendment and replacing such words with the following; "By deleting the
first full paragraph of Article Fourth thereof and substituting the following:".

         3. This Certificate of Correction shall not be deemed to amend or
correct (a) any other provision of the June 30, 1981 Amendment or (b) any
certificate of amendment of the Corporation's Certificate of Incorporation of
certificate or designations of the Corporation filed with the Secretary of State
of the State of Delaware at any time after June 30, 1981.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed and subscribed this Certificate of
Correction and do affirm the foregoing as true under the penalties or perjury
this 6th day of November, 1998.

                                               /s/                       
                                              ---------------------------------
                                                         Mark Karp
                                                         President


ATTEST:


/s/     
-------------------------------
      Joseph Greenberger
      Secretary

                                      33
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                      38,641,000
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       1,308,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            40,233,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                406,523,000
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                  1,090,377,000
<ALLOWANCE>                                 13,031,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           1,642,684,000
<DEPOSITS>                               1,344,749,000
<SHORT-TERM>                                14,457,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                         24,703,000
<LONG-TERM>                                 70,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  9,250,000
<COMMON>                                       224,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 179,301,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>           1,642,684,000
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             64,007,000
<INTEREST-INVEST>                           18,024,000
<INTEREST-OTHER>                             1,514,000
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            83,545,000
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                          32,964,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          36,691,000
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                       46,854,000
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                2,050,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             132,000
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                             36,668,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             26,008,000
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                  17,788,000
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                17,788,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .78
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .76
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.25
<LOANS-NON>                                  4,151,000
<LOANS-PAST>                                 2,314,000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                            12,443,000
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                4,178,000
<RECOVERIES>                                 2,716,000
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                           13,031,000
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                        13,031,000
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ICG COMMUNICATIONS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND MARCH 31, 1997 AND FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH
31, 1996 AND 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001013240
<NAME> ICG COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         459,288
<SECURITIES>                                    31,747
<RECEIVABLES>                                   46,877
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,006
<INVENTORY>                                      2,595
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               541,362
<PP&E>                                         522,980
<DEPRECIATION>                                  66,255
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,089,681
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           76,114
<BONDS>                                        882,476
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          261,909
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         5,282
<OTHER-SE>                                   (137,030)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,089,681
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                63,050
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   59,572
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,268
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              25,140
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (61,028)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (66,781)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (66,781)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
From: Dewees.Jason@epamail.epa.gov [mailto:Dewees.Jason@epamail.epa.gov]

Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2009 4:13 PM

To: Telander.Jeff@epamail.epa.gov

Cc: Oldham.Conniesue@epamail.epa.gov; Westlin.Peter@epamail.epa.gov; Marinshaw, Richard

Subject: Re: Discussion Of Test Methods and Costs For Brick Kilns

Here is the costing estimate for the testing that we discussed

Assuming -

Site - 8 hours/~500 miles from testing firm - no airline flights Kiln Cycle - 52 hrs Testing One Cycle 

Reasonable accessible testing location

Method 320 for HCl and HF - Testing continuously during entire cycle except for 1 hr break every 8 hrs 

for calibrations and/or maintenance (filter replacement, etc) Method 5 - 2hr tests with a one hour break 

between runs - 18 tests - 1 field blank - 1 reagent blank - 20 total analysis

Flows, moistures and O2/CO2 for Method 320 emission rates are assumed to come from Method 5 

testing data

Man power - assumed two shifts of 2 technicians with a single project manager and a single FTIR 

operator

My total came to $50k depending on the market conditions and additional factors like amount of travel 

needed to site this number could easily range by $15k.

(See attached file: brick kiln.xls)

Jason M DeWees

USEPA/OAQPS/AQAD/MTG

109 TW Alexander Drive (E143-02)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

(919)541-9724(Voice)/(919)541-0516(Fax)

email: dewees.jason@epa.gov
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ADAM CONTI,

Petitioner,

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent.

______________________ 

2013-3071

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. NY0752090041-I-1.

______________________ 

JUDGMENT

______________________ 

DAVID RESTAINO, Fox Rothschild, LLP, of Lawrenceville, New Jersey, argued for petitioner. With him on the 

brief was JOEL M. FERDINAND. 

LINDSEY SCHRECKENGOST, Attorney, Office of the 

General Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With her on the 

brief was BRYAN G. POLISUK, General Counsel.

______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is
 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (NEWMAN, BRYSON, and MOORE, Circuit 

Judges).

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

February 24, 2014 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Date Daniel E. O’Toole 

 Clerk of Court
#### AMERICAN CENTRAL INS. CO. OF ST. LOUIS, MO., v. MARTIN.

No. 2194.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

May 23, 1940.

Bryan & Bryan, of Houston, and Joe E. Webb, of Madisonville, for appellant.

Brownlee & Brownlee, of Madisonville, and Bennett & Bennett, of Normangee, for appellee.

ALEXANDER, Justice.

This is a suit on a fire insurance policy. The policy was a Texas Standard Fire policy and was attached to and made a part of the petition. It contained the usual exceptions and conditions under which the company would not be liable for a loss by fire, among these being a provision exempting the company in the event the loss was caused by an invasion, insurrection, riot, civil war, and the like. The plaintiff wholly failed to allege or prove that the loss did not come within any of these excepted causes. The defendant’s general demurrer to the petition was overruled, and at the conclusion of the evidence its motion for an instructed verdict was denied. These rulings are assigned as error.

It appears to be a well settled rule in this state that in a suit on a policy containing exceptions such as are here under consideration, the burden is on the plaintiff to both allege and prove that the loss did not come within any of the excepted causes as set out in the policy. International Travelers Association v. Marshall, 131 Tex. 258, 114 S.W.2d 851; Pelican Ins. Co. v. Troy Co-operative Ass’n, 77 Tex. 225, 13 S. W. 980; Century Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Hogan, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 224; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Trice, Tex.Civ. App., 70 S.W.2d 356; American Ins. Co. v. Maddox, Tex.Civ.App., 60 S.W.2d 1074. While the writer does not agree with the rule as above announced, we feel compelled to follow it. This necessarily requires that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. It is accordingly so ordered.
EXHIBIT  32(A)


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     I,  Dennis  Sunshine, Chief Executive Officer of Orbit International Corp.,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.   1350, as enacted by  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act  of  2002,  that:

     (1)     the  Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31,
2003  (the "Annual Report") which this statement accompanies fully complies with
the  requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934;  and

     (2)     information  contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial condition and results of operations of Orbit
International  Corp.

Dated:  March  29,  2004
                                   /s/  Dennis  Sunshine
                                    --------------------
                                   Dennis  Sunshine
                                   Chief  Executive  Officer

A  signed  original  of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document  authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears  in  typed  form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Orbit International Corp. and will
be  retained  by  Orbit  International Corp. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  or  its  staff  upon  request.
#### WHITE v. STATE.

No. 20044.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 21, 1938.

Earl M. Greer, of Wills Point, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for driving an automobile while appellant was intoxicated, punishment being a fine of fifty dollars and confinement in jail for five days.

The record contains neither statement of facts nor bills of exception. Nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6942

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ALPHONSO DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,

District Judge. (CR-95-59; CA-99-230-3)

Submitted: September 29, 2005 Decided: October 11, 2005

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alphonso Davis, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
*

Because this was not Davis’ first § 2255 motion, the district

court was not required to notify Davis prior to construing the

motion as a successive § 2255 motion, and we accordingly reject

Davis’ challenge to the district court’s action in this regard.

See United States v. Emmanuel, 288 F.3d 644, 650 (4th Cir. 2002).

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Alphonso Davis seeks to appeal the district court’s order

construing his motion titled “Motion to Reopen Title U.S.C. § 2255"

as an unauthorized successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000),

and dismissing it without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The

district court correctly found that no provision exists that allows

for the “reopening” of § 2255 motions that have been addressed on

the merits by the district court, and that the district court had

no jurisdiction to consider a successive § 2255 motion.*

In accordance with United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d

200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003), we consider Davis’ notice of appeal and

informal brief as a motion for authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244

(2000) to file a successive § 2255 motion. To obtain permission to

bring a second or successive § 2255 motion, a movant must show that

his claim: (1) “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,

that was previously unavailable” or (2) relies on newly discovered

facts that tend to establish the movant’s innocence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244 (2000). We conclude that Davis has not satisfied either

standard.
- 3 -

Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis,

deny Davis’ implicit application for leave to file a successive

§ 2255 motion, deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The Mutual Loan and Savings Association of Chambersburg *v.*National Surety Company, Appellant.

Practice, *Supreme Court*— Appeals—Record—Motion *to*quash— *Vacation of judgment.*

On appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict of a jury, where a motion to quash has been made on the ground that the charge and answers to points were not certified by the official stenographer who took the notes of the same upon trial, as required by Section 4 of the Act of May 1, 1907, P. L. 135, and it appears that the requirements of the Act of Assembly were not complied with because the official stenographer died shortly after the trial without having transcribed his notes, the motion to' quash will be overruled and the judgment will be vacated and a venire facias de novo awarded.

Argued March 7, 1916.

Appeal, No. 358, Jan. T., 1915, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Frantlin Co., Sept. T., 1913, No. 110, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of The *352Mutual Loan and Savings Association of Chambersburg v. National Surety Company.

Before Brown, C. J., Stewart, Moschzisker, Frazer and Walling, JJ.

Judgment vacated.

Assumpsit on a bond. Before Gillan, P. J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.

Verdict for plaintiff for $5,422.50 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.

*Errors assigned*were various instructions to the jury.

*Donald Thompson*and *Charles*Walter, of *Walter & Grillan,*with them *J. A. Strite, Arthur J. Stobbart*and *Blalceley & Calvert,*for appellant.

O. *C. Boioers,*with him *Sharpe & Elder*and *William S. Hoerner,*for appellee.

April 17, 1916 :

Per Curiam,

When this case was called for argument a motion was made to quash the appeal, one of the reasons for the motion being that the “charge and answer to points were not certified to by the official stenographer, who took the notes of the same upon trial, in the manner and form required by Section 4 of the Act of Assembly approved the 1st day of May, A. D. 1907, P. L. 135.” This is true, but the requirements of the act of assembly were not complied with because the official stenographer of the court below died shortly after the trial, without having transcribed his notes. Though this is admitted by counsel for the appellee, they insist upon their motion to quash, instead of acting upon the suggestion to allow the case to be heard on its merits, notwithstanding the condition of the record. Under the circumstances, we feel that the only course to pursue to prevent possible injustice to the appellee, which is not blamable for the condition of the record, is to remand the case for an*353other trial, that on appeal from any judgment that may be entered we may have a proper record. The judgment is, therefore, vacated and a veniré facias de novo awarded.
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH NO. 02 - 12 - 00544 - CR

CLIFFORD ORAN CRAIG APPELLANT
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appell ant Clifford Oran Craig was convicted in 19 85 of aggravat ed sexual assault of a child. The jury assessed his punishment at life imprisonment, the trial court sentenced him accordingly, and we affirmed his conviction. 2 In A ugust 2009 , Appellant filed a pr o se motion for postconviction DNA testing in the trial

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2 See Craig v. State , 704 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref’d).2 court under chapter 64 of the code of criminal procedure. 3 He received appointed counsel the next day and filed a supp lemental motion in July 2010. The trial court denied the motion on March 30, 201 1. Appellant’s court

- appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a br ief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel avers that, in his professional opinion, th is appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief
and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California 4 by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for appeal. 5 This court gave Appellant the opportunity to file a brief on his own behalf, and Appellant filed a pro se brief raising t wo issues. The State also filed a brief. After an appellant’s court

- appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders , we are obligated to undertake an i ndependent examination of the record to see if there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. 6 Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 7

3 See Tex. Code Cr im. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01 (West Supp. 2013 ).

4 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967)

. 5 See Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State , 904 S.W.2d 920, 922

– 23 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.).

6 See Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 511; Mays , 904 S.W.2d at 923.

7 See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 82

– 83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).3 We have carefully reviewed the record and the briefs filed by Appellant, his counsel, and the State. We agree with counsel that th is appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that arguably might support any appeal. 8 Accordingly, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s order denying DNA te sting.

PER CURIAM PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: February 20, 2014

8 See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 8 26

– 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005 ).