In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-3042

MALVINWASHINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHELLE PARKINSON,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:08-cv-06245 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2013 — DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2013

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Malvin Washington filed a civil suit

alleging that the officer who arrested him during a double

homicide investigation used excessive force. The jury found in

favor of the officer. Washington now appeals, arguing that the

district court abused its discretion in denying Washington’s

challenge for cause to one of the jurors who heard his suit. But

Washington waived this challenge, and we reject his argument. 
2 No. 12-3042

I. BACKGROUND

Washington was arrested on January 30, 2007, as a suspect

in the double homicide of Jesse Brown and Jacqueline Lemons.

While the criminal charges against him were pending, he filed

a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Michelle

Parkinson, alleging that she kicked him in the face and hit him

with a flashlight while he was transported in a police wagon

following his arrest.

A. Voir Dire

The district court judge conducted voir dire of 28 potential

jurors to select the twelve-person jury that would hear Washington’s case. The judge explained to the prospective jurors

that each juror would be asked a series of questions. If a

question touched on something a potential juror preferred not

to discuss in open court, she could request a sidebar. The judge

added that some of the questions would cover civil lawsuits,

administrative proceedings, and criminal prosecutions, and

carefully described each legal proceeding.

When the court called Juror Evans, he answered questions

concerning his demographic and family background with no

incident. The judge then asked Evans if he had ever been

involved with the civil or criminal justice system. Evans

responded, “Not that I know of.” Upon prompting by the

judge, Evans said he had no clue what the question meant. The

judge then broke the question down, asking Evans whether he

had ever sued anyone or been sued, and whether he had ever

been arrested. Evans admitted he had been arrested. When

asked to elaborate, Evans requested a sidebar.
No. 12-3042 3

At sidebar, Evans explained that he had a DUI pending that

had been pending for over two years. The court then asked

whether Evans had any strong feelings about the police arising

from that arrest. Evans said, “I have no clue. I—I was—I

was—I died at the scene.” The court questioned him further,

and Evans clarified that he had been in a motorcycle accident

after which he had to be revived three times. He said he

suffered head injuries in the accident but that he did not have

difficulty sitting and listening or any lasting cognitive problems. Throughout questioning, Evans spoke slowly and would

frequently tilt his head back and close his eyes.

Washington challenged Evans for cause, arguing that “even

though he says he doesn’t have cognitive problems, he does

seem to have trouble getting his words out.” The district court 1

considered Washington’s point and thenaskedParkinson what

she thought. Parkinson responded that she did not think there

was enough to show that Evans had cognitive difficulties, and

that overall, Evans seemed capable of being an impartial juror.

The court concluded that it would not strike Evans for cause.

B. Offer to Empanel a New Jury

When trial began, Washington was represented by counsel,

who presented his opening statement without incident.

Defense counselthen began his opening statement, in which he

described Washington at the crime scene kneeling over one of

the victims. At this point, Washington interrupted, saying,

“Can you let the jury know that I’m related to these people?

They need to know that I’m related. My sister-in-law. Make me

 Washington had already used his three peremptory strikes. 1
4 No. 12-3042

look like I’m a stranger.” Washington’s counsel requested a

recess, which the court granted. Even after the recess was

granted, Washington continued to speak. The court cut him off

and asked the jury to leave the courtroom.

After the jury left, Washington said he wanted to address

the court. He said he was concerned about the way the case

was being presented and that he intended to fire his appointed

counsel and proceed pro se. The judge told Washington that he

could represent himself if he chose, but also told him that his

attorney was an experienced civil rights litigator. She also told

Washington he would have to refrain from any further

outbursts, and that he should confer with counsel about how

to proceed. After a brief discussion, counsel informed the court

that Washington wished to proceed on his own. The judge

excused Washington’s attorney, but invited him to stay and

watch the trial.

The judge discussed with Washington how the trial would

proceed. She then called a recess in order to determine whether

a new jury needed to be called. After the recess, the judge

asked Washington whether he wanted to continue with the 12

jurors who had originally been chosen, despite the fact that

they saw him argue with his attorney. Washington consented

to continue with the original jury.

But shortly thereafter, Washington decided he did not want

to proceed pro se after all. Washington’s appointed counsel

was still present, and the court asked him to talk with Washington to see if they could reach an agreement. After a discussion, Washington apologized to the court for his earlier
No. 12-3042 5

conduct, the jury was called back in, and defense counsel

began his opening statement again.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Officer Parkinson.

Washington appeals that verdict, arguing that the district court

inappropriately denied his challenge for cause to Juror Evans.

II. ANALYSIS

Washington argues on appeal that the district court erred

in denying his challenge for cause to Juror Evans because

Evans was incompetent to serve as a juror. Although he

preserved this argument by objecting to Evans during voir

dire, United States v. Brazelton, 557 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2009),

he later agreed to the originally-selected jury and thus has

waived any right to challenge the jury’s composition on

appeal.

Washington explicitly agreed to proceed with the

originally-selected jury when asked by the district court judge

if he wished to do so. As we have previously noted, a more

obvious intentional relinquishment of a known right is hard to

imagine. Id. at 753. This is a textbook example of waiver.

Washington tries to argue that because he was not present at

sidebar, he did not know of the for-cause challenge to Juror

Evans, and thus could not have intentionally relinquished any

right. But an attorney is the agent of her client, and an agent’s

knowledge is imputed to her principal. Bakery Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir.

2009) (attorney is agent of client); Frey v. Fraser Yachts, 29 F.3d

1153, 1158 (7th Cir. 1994) (knowledge of attorney imputed to

client).
6 No. 12-3042

III. CONCLUSION

Given Washington’s explicit waiver of any challenge to the

jury composition, we cannot consider his claim. We thus

AFFIRM the decision of the district court.