[Cite as Cobb v. Summit Cty. Prosecutor, 2020-Ohio-636.]

{¶1} The Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, provides that upon request, a public 

office “shall make copies of the requested public record available to the requester at 

cost and within a reasonable period of time.” R.C. 149.43(B)(1). Ohio courts construe 

the Public Records Act liberally in favor of broad access, with any doubt resolved in 

favor of disclosure of public records. State ex rel. Hogan Lovells U.S., L.L.P. v. Dept. of 

Rehab. & Corr., 156 Ohio St.3d 56, 2018-Ohio-5133, 123 N.E.3d 928, ¶ 12. “‘The Public 

Records Act serves a laudable purpose by ensuring that governmental functions are not 

conducted behind a shroud of secrecy.’” (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. ESPN, Inc. v. 

Ohio State Univ., 132 Ohio St.3d 212, 2012-Ohio-2690, 970 N.E.2d 939, ¶ 40. 

{¶2} On March 4, 2019, requester Cindee Cobb made a request to respondent 

Office of the Summit County Prosecutor (Prosecutor’s Office) for 

The initial offense and incident report: all follow-up reports; all witness 

statements; autopst [sic] and coroner reports; all investigation notes about 

witness statements; and all reports/results of any forensic or scientific 

tests related to the death of Ashley Biggs in Summit County, Ohio, on 

6/21/2012 

(Complaint at 2.) Other than verbal acknowledgement that the request had been 

received, Cobb received no records or other response from the Prosecutor’s Office prior 

to filing this action. (Id. at 3.) Cobb was provided with a copy of the requested “initial 

CINDEE COBB 

 Requester 

 v. 

OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY 

PROSECUTOR 

 Respondent 

Case No. 2019-00597PQ 

Special Master Jeff Clark 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -2- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

offense and incident report * * * related to the death of Ashley Biggs” by the New 

Franklin Police Department prior to filing her complaint against the Prosecutor’s Office. 

(Reply at 2.) See Cobb v. New Franklin Police Department, Ct. of Cl. No. 2019-

00435PQ. On April 1, 2019, Cobb filed a complaint pursuant to R.C. 2743.75 alleging 

denial of access to public records by the Prosecutor’s Office in violation of R.C. 

149.43(B). Following unsuccessful mediation, the Prosecutor’s Office filed a motion to 

dismiss (Response) on December 17, 2019. Cobb filed a reply on January 21, 2020. 

{¶3} R.C. 2743.75 provides “an expeditious and economical procedure” to 

resolve public records disputes in the Court of Claims. A claim under R.C. 2743.75 to 

enforce the Public Records Act must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 

Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-7820, 97 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 27-30 (5th Dist.). However, if 

the public office asserts that an exception applies, “[e]xceptions to disclosure under the 

Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records 

custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an 

exception. A custodian does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested 

records fall squarely within the exception.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. JonesKelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Any doubt as to an exception should be resolved in favor of disclosure. State 

ex rel. James v. Ohio State Univ., 70 Ohio St.3d 168, 169, 637 N.E.2d 911 (1994). 

Motion to Dismiss 

{¶4} In order to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts 

warranting relief after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all 

reasonable inferences are made in claimant’s favor. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. 

v. Schroeder, 76 Ohio St.3d 580, 581, 669 N.E.2d 835 (1996). As long as there is a set 

of facts consistent with the complaint that would allow the claimant to recover, dismissal 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -3- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

for failure to state a claim is not proper. State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith, 138 Ohio St.3d 84, 

2013-Ohio-5477, 3 N.E.3d 1184, ¶ 10. 

{¶5} The Prosecutor’s Office asserts that Cobb has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted because the requested records are exempt as confidential 

law enforcement investigatory records (CLEIRs). On review, I find that the facts required 

to support the application of the CLEIRs exceptions are not shown on the face of the 

complaint and attachments. I therefore recommend that the motion to dismiss based on 

CLEIRs be denied, and Cobb’s claim for production of records be determined on the 

merits. 

Confidential Law Enforcement Investigatory Records (CLEIRs) 

Exception 

{¶6} Under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h), “public record” does not include confidential law 

enforcement investigatory records (CLEIRs). R.C. 149.43(A)(2) codifies the CLEIRs 

exceptions claimed by the Prosecutor’s Office as follows:

(2) “Confidential law enforcement investigatory record” means any record 

that pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, 

civil, or administrative nature, but only to the extent that the release of the 

record would create a high probability of disclosure of any of the following: 

(a) The identity of a suspect who has not been charged with the

offense to which the record pertains, * * *; 

* * * 

(c) Specific confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or 

specific investigatory work product; 

(d) Information that would endanger the life or physical safety of law 

enforcement personnel, a crime victim, a witness, or a confidential 

information source. 

Application of the CLEIRs exception involves a two-part test; first, whether a record 

“pertains to a law enforcement matter” of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or 

administrative nature, and second, whether release of the record would create a high 

probability of disclosure of information detailed in subdivisions (2)(a) through (d). State 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -4- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ex rel. Miller v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 136 Ohio St.3d 350, 2013-Ohio-3720, 995 

N.E.2d 1175, ¶ 25. None of the second-part exceptions in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) through 

(d) apply unless the records first “pertain to a law enforcement matter.” State ex rel. 

Beacon Journal Publ. Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 56-57, 741 N.E.2d 511 (2001). 

With One Exception, The Requested Records Pertain to a Law 

Enforcement Matter of a Criminal Nature 

{¶7} A record “pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal nature” if it 

arises from suspicion by an agency with authority to investigate of the violation of a 

criminal law. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 Ohio 

St.3d 433, 2016-Ohio-7987, 71 N.E.3d 258, ¶ 39. The Summit County Prosecuting 

Attorney is a law enforcement officer with authority to investigate and prosecute criminal 

laws. R.C. 2901.01(A)(11)(h); R.C. 309.08(A). The investigation in this case arose from 

suspicion that a person or persons had committed criminal offenses related to the death 

of Ashley Biggs on June 21, 2012. (Response, LoPrinzi Aff. at ¶ 3-5, 15.) I find that the 

withheld records of the investigation “pertain to a law enforcement matter of a criminal 

nature” – for all but one requested record: the initial incident and offense report. 

{¶8} Incident reports initiate criminal investigations, but are not part of the 

investigation. Incident reports are thus not confidential law enforcement investigatory 

records, and are public records subject to immediate release upon request. Maurer at 

56; Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994), paragraph five of 

the syllabus. The incident report kept by the Prosecutor’s Office is therefore a public 

record that was subject to immediate release to Cobb’s request. 

{¶9} With regard to the second part CLEIRs exceptions, the Prosecutor’s Office 

asserts that the remaining records fall in whole or in part under: 1) the “uncharged 

suspect” exception contained in subdivision 149.43(A)(2)(a), 2) the “specific 

investigatory work product” exception contained in (A)(2)(c), 3) the “specific confidential 

law enforcement techniques or procedures” exception contained in (A)(2)(c), and 4) the 

“endangerment of life or physical safety” exception contained in subdivision (A)(2)(d). 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -5- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Records Identifying an Uncharged Suspect 

{¶10} One subject of the investigation, Chad Jay Cobb, has been convicted of 

aggravated murder and related charges. The Prosecutor’s Office attests that at the time 

of Cobb’s request it had been investigating the involvement of a second suspect in the 

matter, but had not yet charged that suspect. (Response at 3, LoPrinzi Aff. at ¶ 5, 14-

16.) These uncontested facts satisfy the agency’s burden to show the applicability of the 

uncharged suspect exception at the time Cobb’s public records request was made. 

{¶11} Had the uncharged suspect exception remained applicable as of the date 

of this report, the court would need to determine what specific information within the 

records falls squarely within the exception. State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. 

Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 11-15; Narciso 

v. Powell Police Dept., Ct. of Cl. 2018-01195PQ, 2018-Ohio-4590, 8-14, 28-34. 

However, the court is not limited to considering the facts and circumstances at the time 

a public records enforcement proceeding was instituted, but should consider the facts 

and conditions at the time it renders its determination. This includes changed 

circumstances that remove records from previously justified application of a public 

records exception. See State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. FitzGerald, 145 Ohio 

St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, 47 N.E.3d 124, ¶ 24, 27-28; State ex rel. Quolke v. 

Strongsville City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 142 Ohio St.3d 509, 2015-Ohio-1083, 33 

N.E.3d 30, ¶ 25-31; Gannett GP Media, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, Ohio Ct. of Cl. 

No. 2017-00051, 2017-Ohio-4247, ¶ 21-33. In this case, further analysis is unnecessary 

because the second suspect has now been indicted, thereby terminating the uncharged 

suspect exception with respect to that suspect. (LoPrinzi Aff. at ¶ 15-16, Exh. B.) Based 

on the facts and circumstances existing at this time, I find that the uncharged suspect 

exception may no longer be applied to any portion of the requested records. See State 

ex rel. Moreland v. Dayton, 67 Ohio St. 3d 129, 131-132, 616 N.E.2d 234 (1993). 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -6- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Specific Investigatory Work Product 

{¶12} After the point where an investigation has been initiated, the subsequent 

work product of investigating officers is presumptively “investigatory” in nature. See 

State ex rel. Fields v. Cervenik, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86889, 2006-Ohio-3969, ¶ 2-7; 

Gannet GP Media, Inc. v. Chillicothe Police Dept. Ct. of Cl. No. 2017-00886, 2018-Ohio1552, ¶ 14, 19. The definition of “[s]pecific investigatory work product” has been found 

to include “any notes, working papers, memoranda or similar materials,” and all other 

“information assembled by law enforcement officials in connection with a probable or 

pending criminal proceeding.” Cincinnati Enquirer v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 148 

Ohio St.3d 433, 2016-Ohio-7987, ¶ 41. In State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio 

St.3d 420, 434, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994), the Supreme Court stated that “[t]his definition 

(working papers) is broad enough to bring under its umbrella any records compiled by 

law enforcement officials.” The exception applies seamlessly from the initial law 

enforcement agency’s investigation through any additional investigation conducted by or 

with the prosecutor. See State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-

Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 25-30. 

The remainder of Cobb’s request seeks: 

all follow-up reports; all witness statements; autopst [sic] and coroner 

reports; all investigation notes about witness statements; and all 

reports/results of any forensic or scientific tests related to the death of 

Ashley Biggs in Summit County, Ohio, on 6/21/2012 

(Complaint at 2.) As described, these are records that are investigatory in nature when 

compiled by law enforcement officials, unless incorporated in the initial incident or 

offense report. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 741 N.E.2d 511 (2001).1

 1 Not all records placed in a law enforcement investigatory file are thereby subject to the 

investigatory work product exception, see State ex rel. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor, 89 

Ohio St.3d 440, 448, 732 N.E.2d 969 (2000) (copies of newspaper articles and statutes); State ex rel. 

WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 77 Ohio St.3d 357, 361, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (1997) (copies of the indictment, statutes, 

news articles, blank charitable organization registration form, organization’s yearbook and buyer’s guide, 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -7- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

{¶13} There is no express time limit in the CLEIRs statute for law enforcement 

investigatory work product. Investigatory work product records “continue to be exempt 

despite the passage of time, [or] the lack of enforcement action, * * *.” (Citations 

omitted.) State ex rel. National Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 57 Ohio St.3d 77, 78-80, 

566 N.E.2d 146 (1991). However, this does not mean that the exception extends 

indefinitely. In State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 434, 639 N.E.2d 

83 (1994), paragraph five of the syllabus, the Court held that the investigatory work 

product exception applied so long as a record was maintained “in connection with a 

probable or pending criminal proceeding.” The Steckman Court defined the duration of 

the analogous “trial preparation record” exception using more specific terms of trial and 

appellate activity: 

Once a record becomes exempt from release as a “trial preparation 

record,” that record does not lose its exempt status unless and until all 

“trials,” “actions” and/or “proceedings” have been fully completed. 

Steckman, paragraph four of the syllabus. In State ex rel. WLWT-TV5 v. Leis, 77 Ohio 

St.3d 357, 673 N.E.2d 1365 (1997) the Court 

adopted the Steckman reasoning regarding trial preparation records in 

holding that “[a]nalogously, once applicable, the records continue to be 

exempt work product until all proceedings are fully completed.” WLWTTV5 at 360, citing Steckman at 437. 

 Caster at 34. The Leis adoption of the trial preparation duration standard for CLEIRs

investigatory work product made no change to the comprehensive nature of the criminal 

“trials,” “actions” and/or “proceedings” that were covered. In Caster, the Court overruled 

Steckman and Leis in part, but only to the extent those cases extended the CLEIRs 

investigatory work product exception “beyond the completion of the trial for which the 

 

transcript of plea hearing, videotape of news reports, and campaign committee finance report). However, 

Cobb did not request a copy of the entire investigatory file so as to trigger a search for such non-exempt 

items. She requested only specific, inherently investigatory record categories. 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -8- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

information was gathered.” (Emphasis added.) Caster at ¶ 47. As in Leis, the Court in 

Caster did not change the previous language including “trials,” plural, other than to limit 

the exception beyond a trial for which the investigatory information was gathered. 

Cobb asks the court to consider 

whether the specific-investigatory-work-product exception of R.C. 

149.43(A)(2)(c) that does not extend beyond the completion of the trial for 

which the information was gathered applies to a completely separate trial 

related to the co-defendant and/or the same criminal conduct. 

(Reply at 3.) Cobb apparently argues that “the trial” was deliberately used in Caster as a 

singular term, meaning that investigatory work product gathered in connection with 

multiple suspects to an offense loses its exempt status upon the trial of the first suspect. 

Cobb admits she has found no case authority for this proposition (Id.), nor is there any 

reason to believe that the legislature or the Supreme Court intend such a result in the 

context of criminal investigations where the same information may be gathered to 

support more than one suspect’s trial. In that context, and applying the rules of grammar 

and common usage, I find that the phrase “the completion of the trial for which the 

information was gathered” can only mean the completion of every trial for which the 

information was gathered.2 The CLEIRs investigatory work product exception thus 

applies to information gathered in connection with any probable or pending criminal trial 

that has not yet concluded. 

{¶14} The Prosecutor’s Office attests that the investigation in this case continued 

after the first suspect was charged, and that the prosecution of the recently charged 

second suspect has not concluded. (Response at 3-4; LoPrinzi Aff., ¶ 5, 15.) I find that 

the Prosecutor’s Office has met its burden of proof in showing that the withheld 

investigatory records pertain to a law enforcement matter of a criminal nature that has 

 2 Analogous to the rule of statutory construction that “the singular includes the plural, and the 

plural includes the singular.” R.C. 1.43(A). 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -9- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

not yet concluded with the completion of all trials for which the information was 

gathered. I conclude that the law enforcement investigatory work product exception 

continues to apply to all requested records other than the initial incident and offense 

report. 

Specific Confidential Investigatory Techniques or Procedures, and 

Information That Would Endanger the Life or Physical Safety of a 

Crime Victim or Witness 

{¶15} “Confidential law enforcement investigatory records” includes “[s]pecific 

confidential investigatory techniques or procedures,” and “any record * * * the release of 

[which] would create the high probability of disclosure of * * * [i]nformation that would 

endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel, a crime victim, a 

witness, or a confidential information source.” R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c) and (d). The 

Prosecutor’s Office asserts that release of requested “autopsy and coroner reports, and 

all reports/results related to forensic and scientific tests” are subject to the specific 

confidential investigatory techniques or procedures exception, and that “there existed 

real and articulable safety concerns for third parties in this case.” (Response at 6-7.) 

{¶16} Autopsy and coroner reports are subject to the records disclosure and 

withholding provisions set forth in R.C. Chapter 313. Except as otherwise provided in 

R.C. 313.10, all records of the coroner, including the final autopsy report and “the 

detailed descriptions of the observations written during the progress of an autopsy and 

the conclusions drawn from those observations” are public records. R.C. 313.10(A)(1); 

State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Pike Cty. Coroner’s Office, 153 Ohio St.3d 63, 2017-

Ohio-8988, 101 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 29-30. However, Chapter 313 does provide an exception 

for “[r]ecords of a deceased individual that are confidential law enforcement 

investigatory records as defined in section 149.43 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 

313.10(A)(2)(e). “Autopsy and coroner reports” are thus ordinarily available to the 

public, but may be excepted from release if shown to be CLEIRs records as defined in 

R.C. 149.43(A)(2). Pike Cty. Coroner at ¶ 31-33. As with any exception, only the 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -10- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

portions of a coroner’s report proven to fall squarely within the CLEIRs exception may 

be redacted, and the remainder of the report must be disclosed. Id. at ¶ 40-44, 55. In 

this case, the Prosecutor’s Office makes no such showing. The Prosecutor’s Office has 

not identified what portions of particular reports are allegedly excepted, or provided any 

evidence supporting the exception by affidavit or otherwise. The Prosecutor’s Office 

offers only the bare assertion that autopsy and coroner reports are subject to the 

confidential investigatory techniques or procedures exception. Likewise, the 

Prosecutor’s Office does not identify or provide any evidence by affidavit or otherwise 

that any requested forensic or scientific test records meet the definition of confidential 

investigatory techniques or procedures. In the absence of this required support, the 

Prosecutor’s Office has not met its burden to prove that any portion of any requested 

record falls squarely within the CLEIRs confidential law enforcement techniques or 

procedures exception. 

{¶17} The Prosecutor’s Office also fails to support application of the CLEIRs 

endangerment of life or physical safety exception to any record. Where a public office 

claims an exception based on risks that are not evident within the records themselves, 

the office must provide more than conclusory statements in affidavits to support that 

claim. State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 89 Ohio St.3d 396, 400-404, 732 N.E.2d 

373 (2000). To satisfy the burden of proof for the physical safety exception, more than 

bare allegations are necessary to show that a record would disclose information that 

would endanger the life or physical safety of a particular person. State ex rel. Nelson v. 

Cleveland P.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 62558, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4134, *5-7; 

State ex rel. Jenkins v. Cleveland, 82 Ohio App.3d 770, 785, 613 N.E.2d 652 (8th 

Dist.1992). See also Gannett GP Media, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, Ct. of Cl. No. 

2017-00051-PQ, 2017-Ohio-4247, ¶ 16-33. Physical safety exceptions may not be 

asserted beyond the person(s) demonstrably at risk, or after the risk has abated. State 

ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. FitzGerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, 47 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -11- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

N.E.3d 124; State ex rel. Quolke v. Strongsville City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 142 Ohio 

St.3d 509, 2015-Ohio-1083, 33 N.E.3d 30, ¶ 25-31. 

{¶18} The Prosecutor’s Office cites Martin v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 

616 N.E.2d 886 (1993) for the proposition that “a document does not need to specify 

within its four corners the * * * threat to physical safety.” (Response at 7.) However, 

Martin did not allow the Cleveland PD to rest on the bare allegation of a threat to safety, 

but instead recognized that Cleveland had submitted “adequate evidence” regarding the 

documents determined by the court of appeals to be exempt. Martin at 157. Notably, the 

lower court in Martin had found evidentiary support for only six of the fourteen 

documents claimed to be subject to the exception: 

Records 23, 24, 87, and 93 are the four records involved in the

confidentiality exemption. They also qualify for the physical safety 

exemption because the records reveal actual threats of physical violence 

to the concerned individuals. 

The City claims the physical safety exemption for records 99, 101 and 

103. In his affidavit Detective Moore states that the information in those 

records could lead to discovery of the individual’s current whereabouts. 

The court recognizes the substantial risk to the concerned individual. * * * 

Similarly as to records, 21, 30, 76, 77, 82, 83 and 84, the court has doubts 

about how protecting the disputed information will better ensure the safety 

of the concerned individuals. Neither the records nor the supporting 

materials overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure. The supporting 

affidavit is silent on why and how records 82-84 could endanger 

someone’s physical safety. 

(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Martin v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 60977,

1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 98, *22-24 (Jan. 8, 1992). As with the records ordered released 

in Martin, the Prosecutor’s Office is “silent on why and how records [in the file] could 

endanger someone’s physical safety.” Id. 

{¶19} The Prosecutor’s Office fails to identify which portion of any record is 

allegedly subject to the exception, and has not submitted any evidence, by affidavit or 

even unsworn factual allegation, of a specific physical threat or known substantial risk of 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -12- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

physical violence directed to any person. The Prosecutor’s Office therefore fails to meet 

its burden to prove that any portion of any requested record falls squarely within the 

CLEIRs exception for records the release of which would endanger life or physical 

safety. 

Trial Preparation Records 

{¶20} Although not asserted by the Prosecutor’s Office, R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g) 

provides an exception for trial preparation records. R.C. 149.43(A)(4) defines trial 

preparation records as 

any record that contains information that is specifically compiled in 

reasonable anticipation of, or in defense of, a civil or criminal action or 

proceeding, including the independent thought processes and personal 

trial preparation of an attorney. 

Other than the initial incident and offense report, which cannot be shielded merely due 

to placement in a prosecutor’s file, this broad language would cover any requested 

records that were compiled for the upcoming trial of the second suspect. Follow-up 

reports, witness statements, autopsy and coroner reports, investigation notes about 

witness statements, and reports/results of forensic or scientific tests are all typical 

information compiled or created by prosecutors for criminal trials. The Supreme Court 

affirms the breadth of this exception by observing: 

It is difficult to conceive of anything in a prosecutor’s file, in a pending 

criminal matter, that would not be either material compiled in anticipation 

of a specific criminal proceeding or the personal trial preparation of the 

prosecutor. 

Steckman at 431-432. Other than the initial incident and offense report, I find that any of 

the requested records that were specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of the 

upcoming trial of the second suspect are independently subject to withholding as trial 

preparation records. 
Case No. 2019-00597PQ -13- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Availability of Records Upon Conclusion of Investigation 

{¶21} As detailed above, the CLEIRs specific investigatory work product 

exception does not persist indefinitely. Once the criminal investigation ends, this 

exception will terminate. Pike Cty. Coroner at ¶ 53-56. Nothing precludes Cobb from 

making a new public records request at that time, subject to any other exception for 

which adequate proof may be submitted. 

Conclusion 

{¶22} Upon consideration of the pleadings, attachments, and affidavits filed in 

this case, I recommend the court ORDER respondent to provide requester with a copy 

of the initial incident and offense report. I further recommend that the court DENY 

requester’s remaining claims for production of records. I recommend that court costs be 

assessed to requester.3

{¶23} Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), either party may file a written objection 

with the clerk of the Court of Claims of Ohio within seven (7) business days after 

receiving this report and recommendation. Any objection shall be specific and state with 

particularity all grounds for the objection. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the 

court’s adoption of any factual findings or legal conclusions in this report and 

recommendation unless a timely objection was filed thereto. R.C. 2743.75(G)(1). 

 JEFF CLARK 

 Special Master 

Filed January 31, 2020 

Sent to S.C. Reporter 2/25/20

 3 Although the prosecutor violated his clear obligation to immediately release the initial incident 

and offense report upon request, the prompt disclosure of the same record by the New Franklin PD 

mitigates the extent to which Cobb is “aggrieved” by this violation. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. 

Allen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040838, 2005-Ohio-4856, ¶ 14-16 (analogous mitigation analysis of 

whether requester was “aggrieved” pursuant to R.C. 149.351).