Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

THE STATE OF INDIANA:

ELDEN E. STOOPS, JR.

Law Offices of Elden E. Stoops, Jr. GREGORY F. ZOELLER

North Manchester, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

KYLE HUNTER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN RE THE PATERNITY OF T.T.: )

)

D.T., )

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 85A02-1311-JP-1006

)

S.B., )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE WABASH CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Robert R. McCallen, III, Judge

Cause No. 85C01-9411-JP-53

May 29, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

D.T. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to modify court-ordered 

child support for T.T. (“Child”), the daughter he shared with S.B. (“Mother”).1

We affirm.

Issue

Father raises two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as a single 

issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father’s petition to modify 

child support.

Facts and Procedural History

Father and Mother are the parents of Child, who was born out of wedlock on August 

23, 1994. Father’s paternity was subsequently established, and Father was ordered to pay 

child support.

On September 11, 2012, the trial court entered an agreed order for modification of 

child support. The order required Father to pay child support totaling $137.00 per week, 

based upon Father’s weekly adjusted income of $869.76. (App’x at 14-17.)

Around the time the trial court entered its order, Child was diagnosed with a form of 

cancer. Child required treatment for her cancer at M.D. Anderson Hospital in Houston, 

Texas. Mother and Child relocated together to Houston. Father and his wife also relocated 

to Houston so that Father could provide assistance transporting Child to and from treatments. 

 

1 Though Father and Mother are the named parties, the Wabash County Title IV-D Prosecutor was responsible 

for enforcement of the child support orders in this action. As a result, the State submitted an Appellee’s Brief 

on Mother’s behalf, though it is not a named party to this appeal.
3

Father left his job in Indiana and obtained temporary employment in Texas for the severalmonth period during which Child was actively treated for cancer.

After Child’s cancer treatment concluded, Mother and Child returned to Indiana. 

Father and his wife also returned to Indiana, and Father obtained new employment. Mother 

and Child began to plan Child’s return to school, Mother returned to work, and Child 

attempted to work at various jobs.

With Child’s nineteenth birthday approaching,2 on July 11, 2013 Mother filed a 

petition to continue Father’s child support obligation in light of Child’s treatment for cancer 

and the continued requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of the cancer treatment. 

On August 12, 2013, a hearing was conducted on Mother’s petition. During the 

hearing, Father and Mother provided testimony concerning their respective incomes. Also 

during the hearing, the trial court observed that Father might pursue a modification of the 

court-ordered child support, but that such a request was not properly before the court at that 

time. The court suggested, “I think you all can agree on what his income is and what her 

income is and recalculate support.” (Tr. at 15.) After the end of the hearing, the trial court 

ordered that Father continue to pay support in accordance with the September 11, 2012 order. 

On August 23, 2013, Father filed his petition to modify child support. A hearing was 

conducted on the petition on October 28, 2013. Father did not submit a Child Support 

Worksheet or other documentation of his income, and no testimony was introduced at the 

hearing concerning his or Mother’s respective incomes. Instead, testimony centered on 

 

2 Except in cases of incapacity, in Indiana child support obligations generally terminate when a child reaches 

nineteen years of age. Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6(a)(2).
4

Child’s school enrollment and employment, both of which were different from the plans that 

had been discussed at the prior hearing on August 12, 2013. At the conclusion of the 

October 28, 2013 hearing on Father’s petition to modify support, the trial court ruled from 

the bench and denied Father’s petition. 

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to modify the child support order.

Our statutes set forth the circumstances under which a child support order may be 

modified:

(a) Provisions of an order with respect to child support or an order for 

maintenance (ordered under IC 31-16-7-1 or IC 31-1-11.5-9(c) before their 

repeal) may be modified or revoked.

(b) Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter, modification may be made 

only:

(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and 

continuing as to make the terms unreasonable; or

(2) upon a showing that:

(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support 

that differs by more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount 

that would be ordered by applying the child support guidelines; 

and

(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at 

least twelve (12) months before the petition requesting 

modification was filed.

(c) Modification under this section is subject to IC 31-25-4-17(a)(6).

Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1.
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The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the Indiana Child Support Rules and Guidelines 

to provide a framework for trial courts to apply the child support statutes enacted by our 

Legislature. See Ind. Child Support Rule 1. In order to ensure courts have adequate 

evidence of both parents’ incomes for purposes of determining appropriate child support 

payments by a non-custodial parent, Child Support Guideline 3(B) requires that “[i]n all 

cases, a copy of the worksheet which accompanies these Guidelines shall be completed and 

filed with the court when the court is asked to order support. Ind. Child Support Guideline 

3(B)(1). Further, the Guidelines require that “[i]ncome statements of the parents shall be 

verified with documentation of both current and past income.” Child Supp. G. 3(B)(2).

We reverse a trial court’s decision on a request to modify child support only when the 

court has abused its discretion. In re Paternity of E.C., 896 N.E.2d 923, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect 

of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 924-25. We consider the evidence 

most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. Id.

at 925. Because Father moved for the modification of the support obligation, he had the 

burden of proof to establish grounds for modifying the amount of support. Id.

Father first contends that the change in his income from the September 2012 support 

order was a sufficient basis for the trial court to order a change in his support obligation. 

Father notes that the change in income was due to his temporary relocation to Texas to help 

with Child’s needs during her cancer treatments, which resulted in changing jobs and an 

ensuing reduction of income. In light of these facts, Father directs us to Subsection 31-16-8-
6

1(b)(2) and argues that the trial court erred when it denied his petition to modify the support 

obligation.

Our review of the record reveals that Father’s petition to modify support was filed on 

August 23, 2013—less than a year after the trial court entered the most recent support order 

of September 11, 2012. As Father notes, the purpose of the statute was to create a “bright 

line” for parents and courts to determine when support must be altered based upon a parent’s 

income. MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. 2005). Father’s income 

meets part of that bright-line test. But the passage of time between the September 2012 order 

and Father’s petition does not. We accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

denial of Father’s petition to modify support solely on the basis of a change in his income.

Father also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not reduce his 

support obligation due to changed circumstances. Specifically, Father points to his income 

and changes in Child’s school enrollment and employment status as substantial and continual 

changes in circumstances that rendered as unreasonable the continuation of the September 

2012 support order.

Turning first to the question of Father’s income, we observe that evidence of Father’s 

income was not before the court during the evidentiary hearing during which the trial court 

addressed Father’s August 23, 2013 petition to modify support. Father argues that such 

evidence was properly before the court because, during the hearing on August 12, 2013, both 

he and Mother testified concerning their respective incomes. Our review of the record does 

show that such testimony occurred. However, our review of the record does not reveal the 
7

submission of a Child Support Worksheet or other documentation in support of Father’s 

petition. Father also did not request that the trial court take judicial notice of his and 

Mother’s testimony from the August 12, 2013 hearing during the October 28, 2013 hearing 

on his petition to modify support.3 Accordingly, we conclude that Father did not produce 

evidence sufficient to bear the burden of proof for demonstrating a change in circumstances 

under Subsection 31-16-8-1(b)(1).

Further, we cannot conclude that Child’s change in school enrollment and 

employment constitutes a change in circumstances sufficient to modify support under 

Subsection 31-16-8-1(b)(1). Here, Father’s argument walks a narrow line. He concedes that 

it is appropriate that he continue to provide child support because of Child’s prior illness and 

its continued effects, but argues that some reduction in support payments is required because 

Child is capable of working.

The testimony at the October 28, 2013 hearing that favors the trial court’s decision 

indicates that although Mother and Child had initially planned for Child to return to high 

school full-time to obtain a diploma, Child eventually enrolled in an evening GED program. 

Child attempted to hold at least two jobs in this time. One of these, at a fast-food restaurant, 

was extremely fatiguing and caused Child other physical problems. The other of these, 

cleaning rooms at a hotel, was sustainable because it afforded Child opportunities to rest 

between cleaning rooms, but could not be reconciled with her school schedule. Without a job 

 

3 Evidence Rule 201 permits trial courts discretion to take judicial notice of prior proceedings either sua sponte

or upon motion of a party. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b), (c) & (d). Here, the trial court did not take notice 

sua sponte, and does not directly argue that the trial court erred in failing to do so.
8

that afforded opportunities for rest, Child was unable to work a full day. And because Child 

and Mother continued to travel to M.D. Anderson Hospital in Houston every few months to 

check on the progress of Child’s cancer treatments, Mother opined that it would be difficult 

for Child to retain steady employment.

In light of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it denied Father’s petition to modify child support based on changed circumstances. 

We accordingly affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s petition to modify support.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., and MAY, J., concur.