IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs July 11, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEVIN WHITESIDE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 14-644 Kyle Atkins, Judge

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No. W2016-00671-CCA-R3-CD

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The Appellant, Devin Whiteside, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, and he 

received concurrent sentences of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. 

Thereafter, the Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging that after 

the plea hearing, he obtained information relating to the testimony of two of the State’s 

witnesses. He maintained that, if he had been provided the information prior to the plea, 

he would not have pled guilty. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant 

appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. KELLY 

THOMAS, JR., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Joshua B. Dougan, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Devin Whiteside.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Robert W. Wilson, Assistant 

Attorney General; James G. Woodall, District Attorney General; and Aaron J. Chaplin, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On December 1, 2014, the Madison County Grand Jury returned a multi-count 

indictment charging the Appellant and his co-defendant, Gerald Hampton, with two 

counts of aggravated robbery and three counts of identity theft. At the November 30, 

2015 guilty plea hearing, the Appellant assured the trial court that he understood the 

charges he was facing and that he understood the proceedings. The trial court informed 

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the Appellant that by pleading guilty, he was waiving certain rights, including his rights

to a trial by jury, to confront witnesses, to compel witnesses, and to appeal his 

convictions. The trial court asked if the Appellant understood the rights he was waiving.

Instead of answering the trial court’s question, the Appellant asked, “How – how long do 

I have to withdraw this plea?” The trial court responded, “[I]f you’re already talking 

about withdrawing, it makes me think that you don’t want to go forward.” The Appellant 

explained that he wanted to know if he could change his mind and go to trial after he 

signed the plea agreement. The trial court cautioned that if the Appellant pled guilty, it 

was “[v]ery unlikely that’s going to happen.” The Appellant said that he had no more 

questions. 

The trial court agreed to stop the proceeding if the Appellant had other questions 

in order to clear up any misunderstandings. The Appellant then acknowledged that he 

understood the rights he was waiving by entering his guilty pleas. The Appellant asserted 

that he was entering his guilty pleas “freely and voluntarily”; that he was not being 

threatened, coerced, forced, or pressured into pleading guilty; and that he thought 

pleading guilty was the “best course of action” for him. 

The trial court asked if the Appellant had any questions for his attorney or for the 

trial court, and the Appellant responded, “Nothing other than that withdraw the plea.” 

The court stated that the Appellant’s questions about withdrawing the plea gave the court 

concerns about allowing the Appellant to plead guilty. The court again warned the 

Appellant that if he pled guilty, his “chances of withdrawing it [were] very slim.” The 

Appellant said that he understood. The court asked if the Appellant wanted to plead 

guilty then immediately file a motion to withdraw the plea. The Appellant said that he 

did not intend to file a motion “immediately” but that he wanted to know “how long [he] 

had.” The trial court asked if the Appellant needed more time to consider the plea, and 

the Appellant said yes. The trial court noted that the Appellant’s case was set for trial the 

following Friday and allowed the Appellant to wait until then to plead guilty or to 

proceed to trial. 

However, later on the day of the plea, counsel told the court that she and the 

Appellant had a “miscommunication” earlier and that the Appellant “understands where 

we are now.” Counsel explained that the Appellant wanted to accept the plea but that he 

also thought counsel wanted him to accept the plea because she did not want to go to 

trial. Counsel said that after she and the Appellant discussed the matter again, the 

Appellant wanted to go forward with the guilty plea.

The trial court reiterated the advice and cautions it had given the Appellant 

previously then asked, “Did you clear up the misunderstanding you had about 

withdrawing your guilty plea?” The Appellant responded, “Yes, sir, I did.” The 

Appellant asserted that he had no further questions for the trial court. The Appellant 
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agreed to stipulate to the facts stated in the indictment. He further agreed that he was 

accepting concurrent sentences of eight years for each conviction with release eligibility 

after serving eighty-five percent of the sentences, that the sentences would run 

consecutively to two previously imposed sentences, and that the identity theft charges 

were to be dismissed. 

On December 30, 2015, the Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas. The Appellant alleged that “due to coercion, duress and fear from [counsel], he did 

not knowingly and voluntarily enter[] a plea of guilty.” The Appellant further alleged 

that counsel was ineffective, that the Appellant was innocent of the crimes, and that he 

should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. 

On February 29, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, during 

which the Appellant was represented by another attorney. The Appellant testified that his 

family had hired counsel around August 2014. The Appellant was indicted in December 

2014. The Appellant said that counsel did not talk with him much and that she told him 

to let her handle the case. Counsel told the Appellant that the State’s case was weak and 

that she would do her best at trial. The Appellant asked her to file pretrial motions, but 

no motions were filed. 

The Appellant agreed that he decided to plead guilty based upon his knowledge of 

the case at the time of the plea hearing. The Appellant said that after the plea, he 

received a copy of the statement made by Alexis Blue,

1 who was not indicted as a codefendant but used one of the stolen credit cards with the Appellant. The Appellant 

maintained that in the statement, Blue “clearly separated the time from . . . the aggravated 

robbery that I allegedly committed and the identity theft that I committed.” The 

Appellant acknowledged that he was aware of Blue’s statement prior to the plea hearing 

because counsel had read it to him, he complained that she had not given him a copy to 

“read it, diagnose it.” 

The Appellant also said that on November 12, 2014, Investigator Aubrey 

Richardson, who was the lead investigator in the Appellant’s case, testified at a hearing to 

revoke the Appellant’s parole. The Appellant acknowledged that he was at the hearing 

and that he heard the investigator’s testimony. However, he complained that he did not 

have a written copy of the testimony to review until after the November 2015 plea 

hearing. The Appellant said that if he had been given a written copy of Investigator 

Richardson’s testimony and Blue’s statement prior to the plea hearing, he would not have 

pled guilty and would have gone to trial.

 

1

In the record, this individual is referred to occasionally as Alexis Hawkins. 
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On cross-examination, the Appellant said that he was twenty-seven years old and 

that he had pled guilty on multiple occasions. He acknowledged that he was “pretty 

familiar with the system.” 

The Appellant conceded that he admitted to police that he used a credit card that 

was stolen during one of the aggravated robberies. The same credit card was also the 

subject of one of the identity theft charges. The Appellant conceded that the State had a 

security video that showed Blue and him using the stolen credit card. 

The Appellant said that the trial court reviewed the charges and his rights at the 

guilty plea hearing. The Appellant agreed that counsel provided him with copies of the 

discovery and that he was satisfied with her representation at the time of the guilty plea 

hearing. 

Counsel testified that she was retained by the Appellant’s family in the summer of 

2014 and that the Appellant was indicted in December 2014. She obtained discovery and 

mailed a copy to the Appellant. Counsel and the Appellant discussed the case. He asked 

her to file pretrial motions, but she did not think any motions needed to be filed. Initially, 

counsel thought that the case would be “open and shut” because the State had difficulty 

obtaining witnesses. However, after the State obtained their witnesses, counsel advised

the Appellant that the case would not be as easy to get dismissed. 

Counsel said that she had known about Blue since the beginning of the case. She 

noted that Blue was not indicted with the Appellant and Hampton because the State had 

been unable to locate her until 2015. On November 20, 2015, Blue gave her statement to 

Investigator Richardson. Counsel received Blue’s statement a couple of weeks before the 

Appellant pled guilty and learned that Blue was going to testify against the Appellant. 

Counsel said that Blue was not involved in the aggravated robberies and that she could 

only testify about the identity thefts. Counsel said that Blue’s statement was consistent 

with the other information provided in discovery. 

Counsel acknowledged that she did not provide a copy of the statement to the

Appellant; however, she read the statement to him, told him how Blue would testify, and 

advised him about how the case should proceed. Counsel asserted that the conversation 

about Blue’s statement occurred before the Appellant pled guilty. 

Counsel said that she and the Appellant reviewed the plea agreement in “great 

detail” and that she explained his rights to him. 

On cross-examination, counsel explained that she was unable to mail the 

Appellant a copy of Blue’s statement because he was incarcerated, repeatedly moved to 

different prison facilities, and she often did not know to which location to mail the 
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information. Counsel and the Appellant discussed the identity theft charges and 

determined that the State’s evidence on those charges was “slightly weak.” Because the 

identity theft charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement, counsel opined that 

Blue’s “statement really . . . didn’t hurt [the Appellant] at all.” On the day of the plea 

hearing, counsel asked if the Appellant wanted a copy of Blue’s statement. He said that 

he did not because he knew the substance of the statement and agreed it would not hurt 

his case.

The Appellant testified in rebuttal that on November 30, 2015, he was in the 

Madison County Jail when he and counsel discussed the plea agreement. He 

acknowledged that they also discussed Blue’s statement. The Appellant said that he 

asked counsel for a copy of the statement but that he never received it. He said that if he 

had received a copy, he “could have went through it and diagnosed it all myself and kind 

of been – had a clear mind of what I needed to do.” 

On cross-examination, the Appellant said that counsel read Blue’s statement to 

him while he was in jail and again just before he pled guilty. The Appellant told counsel 

about Investigator Richardson’s parole hearing testimony but never asked for a written 

copy of it. 

The State recalled counsel, who said that the Appellant never told her about 

Investigator Richardson’s parole hearing testimony and that she would have researched it 

if she had known about it. Counsel knew the Appellant had a parole hearing, and they 

had talked about Investigator Richardson, but they never discussed the specifics of the 

parole hearing. 

Counsel said that she first told the Appellant about Blue’s statement during a 

telephone conversation. Shortly thereafter, they met at the jail and “went over it in 

detail.” Counsel said, “I read it to him, he read it himself, he had it in his hand.” She 

acknowledged that she “didn’t think to bring a copy of it with me to the jail that day.” 

She told him that if he pled guilty, he would not need a written copy of the statement but 

that if he chose to go to trial, she would give him a copy. They discussed the statement 

again on the day of the plea hearing. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court noted that during the guilty plea 

hearing, the court reviewed the guilty plea procedure with the Appellant twice, and the 

Appellant assured the court that he understood, that he was pleading guilty freely and 

voluntarily, that he had not been forced or pressured into pleading guilty, that he 

reviewed the case with counsel, and that she had answered all of his questions. The trial 

court said the Appellant “didn’t mention anything at the plea [hearing] about a statement 

or motions that weren’t filed or any testimony of [Investigator] Richardson.” The 

Appellant admitted the facts alleged in the indictment. 
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The trial court found that Investigator Richardson’s testimony was not new 

information to the Appellant, noting that the testimony occurred approximately one year 

prior to the plea hearing and that the Appellant heard the testimony when it occurred. 

The court also found that Blue’s statement would not have made a difference in the 

Appellant’s decision to plead guilty to aggravated robbery and observed that the identity 

theft charges were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. Further, the trial court 

accredited the testimony of counsel. The trial court held that the Appellant failed to 

prove that manifest injustice required that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas. 

On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. 

II. Analysis

Generally, a guilty plea cannot be withdrawn as a matter of right. State v. Mellon, 

118 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2003). Nevertheless, Rule 32(f) of the Tennessee Rules of 

Criminal Procedure provides that “[b]efore sentence is imposed, the court may grant a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any fair and just reason.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 

32(f)(1). However, “[a]fter sentence is imposed but before the judgment becomes final, 

the court may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw 

the plea to correct manifest injustice.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(2); see also State v.

Green, 106 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tenn. 2003). The decision to allow a defendant to 

withdraw a plea is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v.

Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Tenn. 2005).

In the instant case, the Appellant did not indicate a desire to withdraw his pleas 

until after he was sentenced. Therefore, he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas only 

to correct manifest injustice. Rule 32 does not provide a definition of manifest injustice.

Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 741-42. Regardless, our courts have determined that

[w]ithdrawal to correct manifest injustice is warranted where: 

(1) the plea was entered through a misunderstanding as to its 

effect, or through fear and fraud, or where it was not made 

voluntarily; (2) the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory 

evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 

S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and this failure to 

disclose influenced the entry of the plea; (3) the plea was not 

knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly entered; and (4) 

the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel 

in connection with the entry of the plea.
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State v. Virgil, 256 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008); see also State v. Turner, 

919 S.W.2d 346, 355 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, “a defendant’s change of heart 

about pleading guilty or a defendant’s dissatisfaction with the punishment ultimately 

imposed does not constitute manifest injustice warranting withdrawal.” Crowe, 168 

S.W.3d at 743.

On appeal, the Appellant contends that counsel’s failure to obtain a written copy 

of Investigator Richardson’s testimony at the Appellant’s parole revocation hearing 

“caused [him] to enter a plea based on incomplete information.” The Appellant further 

contends that counsel’s failure to provide him with a copy of Blue’s statement prior to his 

pleas deprived him of the ability to “adequately review[] the statement and analyze[] its 

impact on his case.” The Appellant maintains, therefore, that his “plea was involuntary 

because it was based on incomplete information.” The State asserts that the Appellant 

knew all of the information relevant to his case prior to his guilty plea hearing and that he 

failed to prove that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas to correct manifest 

injustice. We agree with the State. 

The trial court found that the Appellant knew about Investigator Richardson’s 

testimony, noting that the Appellant was present at the parole revocation hearing at which 

the investigator testified. The hearing occurred approximately one year before the 

Appellant pled guilty. Further, the trial court accredited counsel’s testimony that the 

Appellant did not tell her about Investigator Richardson’s parole hearing testimony or ask 

her to obtain a written copy of the testimony. The trial court also accredited counsel’s 

testimony that she reviewed Blue’s statement with the Appellant on two occasions before 

the day of the Appellant’s guilty plea hearing and again on the day of the hearing. The 

trial court further accredited counsel’s assertion that the statement concerned only the 

identity theft charges, which were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Therefore, 

the Appellant failed to establish manifest injustice. Moreover, the Appellant did not 

submit a copy of Blue’s statement or a copy of Investigator Richardson’s testimony as 

exhibits; therefore, any benefit this evidence may have offered is speculative. Cf. Black 

v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). The record contains no evidence 

to suggest the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Appellant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty pleas. 

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

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NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE