*The Honorable James G. Carr, United States District Judge for theNorthern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0054P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0054p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________ISSACLYDELLHERRON,Plaintiff-Appellant,v.JIMMYHARRISON, et al.,Defendants-Appellees.;>1No. 98-5726Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.No. 96-03051—J. Daniel Breen, Magistrate Judge.Submitted: December 7, 1999Decided and Filed: February 14, 2000Before: COLE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; CARR,District Judge.*2Herron v. Harrison, et al.No. 98-5726_________________COUNSELON BRIEF:Pamela S. Lorch, OFFICE OF THEATTORNEY GENERAL, CIVIL RIGHTS & CLAIMSDIVISION, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. Issac L.Herron, Only, Tennessee, pro se._________________OPINION_________________RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.Issac L. Herron,a Tennessee state prisoner, filed a civil rights complaintagainst various officials of the Cold Creek CorrectionalFacility and the Tennessee Department of Corrections(collectively, CCCF officials) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,1985, and 1986. Herron alleges that those officials violatedhis civil rights both directly, by burdening the exercise of hisconstitutional rights, and indirectly, by retaliating against himfor exercising those rights. The magistrate judge to whom thecase was transferred dismissed Herron’s complaint for failureto state a claim upon which relief may be granted, finding thatthe majority of Herron’s claims did not allege sufficient factsto constitute unlawful retaliation and the remainder of hisclaims were barred by issue preclusion due to prior suits thatHerron had brought.On March 8, 1999, several months after the briefs in thisappeal were filed, this court issued its en banc decision inThaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999), whichclarified the burden borne by a prisoner alleging retaliationclaims. Under theThaddeus-Xstandard, one of Herron’sallegations of retaliation potentially states a claim upon whichrelief may be granted. We thereforeAFFIRMin part,REVERSEin part, andREMANDfor further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion.No. 98-5726Herron v. Harrison, et al.11he asserts that “[t]he acts and practices of the defendantsdescribed in . . . this complaint violates [sic] plaintiff’sFourteenth Amendment right against discrimination based onreligion.” He has not, however, alleged specific incidents ofreligious discrimination outside of the claims alreadyconsidered and dismissed inHerron v. Bradley. These claimsmay not be raised again.See Montana v. United States, 440U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (“Under res judicata, a final judgmenton the merits bars further claims by parties or their priviesbased on the same cause of action.” (citations omitted)).III. CONCLUSIONFor all of the reasons set forth above, weREVERSEthemagistrate judge’s order of dismissal as to the retaliationclaim found in Herron’s first supplemental complaint andREMANDfor further proceedings consistent with thisopinion. WeAFFIRMthe dismissal of the remainder ofHerron’s claims.10Herron v. Harrison, et al.No. 98-5726authority.” Under the properstandard expressed inThaddeusX, however, this court has found that placing an inmate inadministrative segregation “could deter a person of ordinaryfirmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.”Dunham-Bey v. Holden, No. 98-15220, 1999 WL 1023730, at*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1999).See also Gibbs, 10 F.3d at 378(stating that segregation of a jailhouse lawyer in retaliation forproviding legal aid would be constitutionally impermissible).With the exception of demonstrating that his assistance wasneeded by Muhammad, then, Herron has made out a primafacie claim of First Amendment retaliation underThaddeus-X.He alleged that he engaged in protected conduct (legalassistance), that he was subsequently disciplined to a degreethat might deter an ordinary person from such conduct, andthat the two incidents were causally linked. Should Herronproduce evidence showing that the inmate he assistedrequired that assistance, he will have established all threeelements of a prima facie claim of unconstitutional retaliation.We therefore reverse the magistrate judge’s dismissal of theretaliation claim alleged in Herron’s first amended complaintand remand to allow Herron to amend his complaint if he sochooses.C. Herron’s equal protection claimThe magistrate judge properly dismissed Herron’s equalprotection claim, which was raised in both his original andsupplemental complaints. An equal protection claim mustassert that the plaintiff suffered class-based discrimination.See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987);Henry v.Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990)(“To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a§ 1983 plaintiff must allege that a state actor intentionallydiscriminated against the plaintiff because of membership ina protected class” (citation and internal quotation marksomitted)). In his original and first supplemental complaints,Herron invokes the Equal Protection Clause withoutidentifying the protected class to which he belongs. Herronis more specific in his second supplemental complaint, whereNo. 98-5726Herron v. Harrison, et al.3I. BACKGROUNDHerron brought two earlier lawsuits against the prison staffat CCCF before initiating this suit. In May of 1994, he filedan action titledHerron v. Bradley, alleging violations of theReligious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.§ 2000bb, and his First Amendment rights to the free exerciseof religion. In that case, Herron charged CCCF officials withpurposely interfering with his observance of religious feastsand services as a member of the Church of God. He alsocharged prison officials with violating his rights byterminating the visitation privileges of Marvin Brunken, areligious volunteer who had led Church of God services at theprison.At an evidentiary hearing in theBradleycase, Herronalleged that prison officials were then in the process oftransferring him to another institution in retaliation for hisattempts to seek legal redress against them. In an order datedMarch 28, 1997, the district court granted Herron’s motionto temporarily enjoin CCCF officials from transferring him toanother facility. The district court concluded that RFRAprovided Herron with a valid First Amendment claim and thatCCCF officials were therefore not permitted to retaliateagainst Herron for asserting that claim. After the SupremeCourt issued its opinion inCity of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.507 (1997), overruling RFRA and thus eliminating the legalgrounds for Herron’s complaint, the district court vacated thepreliminary injunction and dismissed Herron’s entire suit.In his second case,Herron v. Campbell, filed in Novemberof 1995, Herron alleged unconstitutional interference with thefund-raising activities of the Church of God at Cold Creek(CGCC), a church that Herron had incorporated. That casewas dismissed in January of 1997 on the grounds that Herronhad no standing to raise the corporation’s rights and, as a nonlawyer, had no right to argue on its behalf.In the present case, filed in October of 1996, Herroncharges CCCF officials with a series of civil rights violations,some of which are new and others of which were raised in4Herron v. Harrison, et al.No. 98-5726Herron’s prior lawsuits. First, in his original complaint,Herron charges defendants with unconstitutional retaliationagainst the exercise of his First Amendment right to seeklegal redress. Herron relates that he has filed severalgrievances on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of a groupof Muslim inmates. In retaliation, he alleges that prisonofficials interfered with his religious services, denied hisrequest to conduct business on behalf of CGCC, suspendedhis wife’s visitation privileges, terminated him from hisprison job, and ordered him transferred to the South CentralCorrectional Center (SCCC). (Herron was not, in fact,transferred to SCCC, although he was subsequentlytransferred to Turney Center Industrial Prison—a move thathe does not challenge in this case).In his first supplement to the pending complaint, Herroncharges three CCCF officials with taking further retaliatoryactions against him for appearing before the institutionalgrievance board on behalf of a fellow inmate, Abu BakarMuhammad. Two days after his appearance, Herron allegesthat defendant Tuggle approached Herron while Herron wasvisiting with his wife and instructed him to put his feet underthe table. Herron and Tuggle then entered into a dispute overthe validity of this rule. Herron was later charged with andconvicted of creating a disturbance, and sentenced to fivedays of punitive segregation, thirty days’ loss of visitationprivileges, two months’ loss of package privileges, and aninfraction fine of three dollars. Herron claims that thedisciplinary action was taken in retaliation for his havingasserted his First Amendment rights to file grievances and toprovide legal assistance to another inmate. He also allegesseveral violations of his due process rights in the conduct ofhis disciplinary proceeding and sentencing.Finally, in his second supplement to the pending complaint,Herron alleges that his right to privacy was violated whenprison officials requested an additional copy of the charterand bylaws of CGCC. When Herron declined this request,CCCF officials allegedly retaliated against him by firingBrunken from his position as a religious volunteer. HerronNo. 98-5726Herron v. Harrison, et al.9own First Amendment rights. The question, then, is whetherHerron’s failure to allege that Muhammad required hisassistance warrants dismissal of his claim at this stage. Asstated above, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint should only bedismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it is clear that relief wouldnot be appropriate under any set of facts that could be proved.See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Such is not the case here.The case ofGibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1993),is directly on point. In that case, an inmate alleged that prisonofficials retaliated against him for providing legal assistanceto other inmates. Like Herron, the plaintiff inGibbsneglected to allege that his services were vital to the otherinmates’ right of access to the courts. The trial court grantedsummary judgment to the defendants based on this omission.On appeal, this court reversed and remanded, stating that“[w]e . . . believe that Gibbs should be allowed to amend hiscomplaint to properly allege a constitutional claim of denialof access to the courts, including an allegation that there areno reasonable alternatives which ensure access to the courtsfor the prisoners at the Chippewa Correctional Facility.”Id.at 379. Given the fact that Rule 56 imposes a moredemanding burden on a plaintiff than Rule 12(b)(6), it wouldbe incongruous to dismiss Herron’s retaliation claim in viewofGibbs’s reversal of summary judgment when consideringthe same omission.As an alternative ground for its holding, the magistratejudge also concluded that none of the disciplinary actions thatHerron alleges in his first supplemental complaint rise to thelevel of impermissible retaliation. The magistrate judge drewupon pre-Thaddeus-Xprecedents in so holding, andmistakenly applied the general retaliatory standard to claimsthat allege retaliation against Herron’s exercise of FirstAmendment rights. Thus, regarding Herron’s most seriousallegation that he was sentenced to five days of administrativesegregation in retaliation for assisting Muhammad, themagistrate judge found that “a prison disciplinary convictionand confinement to segregation for creating a disturbanceneither shocks the conscience nor egregiously abuses8Herron v. Harrison, et al.No. 98-5726dismissed Herron’s entire complaint as frivolous in an orderdated July 7, 1997, after RFRA was overruled.In the same order vacating the preliminary injunction, thedistrict court stated that “[a]s Herron has no claim forinterference with his First Amendment rights, he has no claimfor retaliation . . . .” Herron therefore may not now allegespecific retaliation by prison officials against him for pursuingthe free exercise claims that were dismissed as frivolous inBradley. To the extent that Herron is alleging a general claimof retaliation, the retaliatory acts alleged by Herron in thiscomplaint, such as the suspension of his wife’s visitationprivileges and a threatened transfer to another facility, fall farshort of the “shock the conscience” test.2. Herron’s right to provide legal assistance to othersHerron’s other retaliation claim, contained in his firstsupplemental complaint, alleges that CCCF officialsimpermissibly disciplined him for assisting Abu BakarMuhammad in arguing a grievance before the prison board.The magistrate judge dismissed this claim, recognizing theprinciple that an inmate does not generally have anindependent right to help other prisoners with their legalclaims.See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395. Such assistance isprotected, however, when the inmate receiving the assistancewould otherwise be unable to pursue legal redress.Assistance is then protected as a derivative of thecomplainant’s right of access to the courts.See Thaddeus-X,175 F.3d at 395; Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir.1993). As an example, the assisting inmate inThaddeus-Xwas found to have engaged in protected conduct because thecomplainant had no knowledge of the law, was being held inadministrative segregation, and could only access legal booksby requesting them by title.Herron does not assert in his complaint that Muhammadwould have been unable to obtain access to the courts withouthim. Indeed, it appears that Herron is unaware of thisrequirement, because his brief erroneously asserts that hislegal work on behalf of other inmates is protected by Herron’sNo. 98-5726Herron v. Harrison, et al.5claims that his First Amendment rights to the free exercise ofreligion were thereby infringed because, without Brunken, hewas unable to observe the Feast of Pentecost in the propermanner, congregate for Sabbath evening services, conductacts of charity, or produce his church newsletter. In deprivinghim of the opportunity to associate with Brunken, Herron alsomaintains that prison officials violated his freedom toassociate and his right to privacy. Furthermore, Herronclaims that he was singled out for differential treatment on thebasis of his religious affiliation, in violation of the EqualProtection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Herron’soriginal and supplemental complaints also charge CCCFofficials with parallel violations of the Tennessee constitution.On October 21, 1997, the defendants moved to dismiss allof Herron’s complaints for failure to state a claim upon whichrelief may be granted. By order dated April 16, 1998, themagistrate judge to whom the case had been transferred byconsent of the parties granted Herron’s motion to file hissecond supplemental complaint, but contemporaneouslygranted the prison officials’ motion to dismiss all of Herron’sclaims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure. Herron filed a timely notice of appeal on April 29,1998.II. ANALYSISA. Standard of reviewWe review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion todismiss de novo.See Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88(6th Cir.1997). When considering a motion to dismisspursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure, the trial court must accept all of the allegations inthe complaint as true, and construe the complaint liberally infavor of the plaintiff.See Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377(6th Cir.1995). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to anespecially liberal standard, and should only be dismissed forfailure to state a claim if it appears “beyond doubt that theplaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim6Herron v. Harrison, et al.No. 98-5726which would entitle him to relief.”Estelle v. Gamble, 429U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (citation omitted).B. Herron’s allegations of impermissible retaliationThe primary thrust of Herron’s complaint is that CCCFofficials impermissibly retaliated against him for exercisinghis First Amendment right to file grievances and petition thecourts for redress. In March of 1999, eight months afterHerron had filed his appeal in this case, an en banc panel ofthis court decidedThaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6thCir. 1999).Thaddeus-Xclarified the law governing prisonerretaliation claims where the retaliation is alleged to have beendirected at an inmate’s efforts to litigate on behalf of himselfor others. As the most recent, on-point decision of this court,Thaddeus-Xis controlling, despite the fact that Herron did notbring the case to our attention as a supplemental authority.There are two categories of retaliation claims—generalclaims of retaliation and claims that allege that an individualwas retaliated against for the exercise of specificconstitutional rights.Thaddeus-Xclarifies the elements ofeach category and supplants previous cases that had blurredthe lines between the two. General claims of retaliation arebrought under the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment. To state a successful case of general retaliation,a prisoner must establish “an egregious abuse ofgovernmental power” or behavior that “shocks theconscience.”See id.at 387. In the great majority of cases,inmates are unable to survive summary judgment under thisdemanding standard. The rare exceptions have been in caseswhere, for example, a prison official issued death threatsagainst an inmate with a cocked pistol at his head, or whereprison officials trumped up false disciplinary charges againstan inmate and then proceeded to physically abuse him andlevy harsh disciplinary sanctions against him.See Cale v.Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing cases).The second category of retaliation claims involvesallegations that state officials penalized an individual for theexercise of a specific constitutional right. In such cases, anNo. 98-5726Herron v. Harrison, et al.7inmate bears a lesser burden, and is only required to establishthe following three elements: (1) the inmate engaged inprotected conduct, (2) an adverse action was taken that woulddeter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engagein that conduct, and (3) the adverse action was motivated, atleast in part, by the inmate’s protected conduct.SeeThaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394.1. Herron’s right to pursue his own grievancesAn inmate has an undisputed First Amendment right to filegrievances against prison officials on his own behalf.SeeNoble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996). This rightis protected, however, only if the grievances are not frivolous.See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996) (“Deprivingsomeone of a frivolous claim . . . deprives him of nothing atall, except perhaps the punishment of Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 11 sanctions.”). Thus Herron’s pursuit of legalclaims against CCCF officials in the instant case and inprevious cases was protected conduct only to the extent thatthe underlying claims had merit.Herron’s only claim of retaliation for the exercise of hisownright of access to the courts is advanced in his originalcomplaint. In that complaint, he describes a series of adverseactions that CCCF officials allegedly took in response to hisfiling a lawsuit inHerron v. Bradley, a suit that chargedprison officials with violating his First Amendment right tothe free exercise of religion. Herron specifically claims thatCCCF officials suspended his wife’s visitation privileges,terminated his job, and ordered him transferred to the SCCC,all in retaliation for his filing a legal complaint.The underlying free exercise claims that allegedly sparkedthese incidents of retaliation were presented inBradley.Indeed, concerned by Herron’s allegations that prison officialsmight retaliate against Herron for filing theBradleysuit, thedistrict court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent CCCFofficials from transferring Herron to another facility while thecase was pending. Ultimately, though, the district court