NUMBER 13-18-00463-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

EX PARTE CHRISTOPHER FLOYD

On appeal from the 28th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Christopher Floyd was indicted for several offenses, including 

intoxication manslaughter. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08(B). Floyd filed an 

application for habeas corpus, arguing that the intoxication manslaughter charges were 

barred by the statute of limitations; the trial court denied habeas relief. By one issue on 

appeal, Floyd argues that the trial court erred in denying habeas relief. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
2

As far as this appeal is concerned, the facts are undisputed. On May 19, 2017, 

Floyd was indicted (Petition One) for manslaughter, a second-degree felony, criminally 

negligent homicide, a state jail felony, and possession of cocaine in an amount of less 

than one gram, a state jail felony. See id. §§ 19.04, 19.05; TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 

ANN. § 481.115(b). Count one, relating to manslaughter, stated:

on or about December 8, 2014, in Nueces County, Texas, [Floyd] did then 

and there recklessly cause the death of an individual, namely, Teresa 

Moody, by causing a vehicle operated by Christopher Floyd to collide with 

a vehicle in which Teresa Moody was an occupant, and/or causing a vehicle 

operated by Christopher Floyd, while Christopher Floyd was under the 

influence of a narcotic and/or narcotics, to collide with a vehicle in which 

Teresa Moody was an occupant.

Count two was identical except it named a different victim: Faye Mosier.

On December 14, 2017, Floyd was re-indicted (Petition Two), alleging the same 

offenses as Petition One but also adding the offense of intoxication manslaughter, a 

second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08(b). Count one in Petition Two

read as follows:

On or about December 8, 2014, in Nueces County, Texas, [Floyd] did then 

and there operate a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated by 

reason of the introduction of alcohol into his body or by reason of the 

introduction of a combination of alcohol and a controlled substance or 

substances, a drug or drugs, or a dangerous drug or drugs into his body, 

and did by reason of such intoxication cause the death of another, namely 

Teresa Moody, by accident or mistake, namely by causing a vehicle 

operated by Christopher Floyd to collide with a vehicle in which Teresa 

Moody was an occupant,

Count two was identical except it listed Mosier as the victim.

On July 27, 2018, Floyd filed an “Application for Habeas Corpus and Alternative 

Motion to Quash Indictment.” Floyd asserted that the offense of intoxication 

manslaughter has a three-year statute of limitations. Therefore, because Petition Two
3

was filed more than three years after the alleged offense occurred, the prosecution 

against him for intoxication manslaughter was barred by the statute of limitations.

On August 2, 2018, the State re-indicted (“Petition Three”) Floyd, alleging the same 

offenses as Petition Two, but this time including a tolling provision, claiming that the 

statute of limitations was tolled. On August 16, 2018, the trial court held a hearing; the 

trial court denied habeas relief and denied Floyd’s motion to quash. This appeal ensued.

II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Our review of a trial court’s habeas corpus ruling should be based 

upon the court’s application of the law to the facts. In reviewing the trial 

court’s ruling, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the ruling, and 

we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of 

historical facts that are supported by the record, especially when the fact 

findings are based on an evaluation of credibility. We afford the same 

amount of deference to the trial court’s rulings on “application of law to fact 

questions” that involve an evaluation of credibility. If resolution of those 

ultimate questions turns on an application of legal standards, we review 

those determinations de novo.

State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d)

(internal citations omitted). Additionally, “[w]e will uphold the trial court’s decision on any 

theory of law applicable to the case.” See Ex parte Nelson, 546 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.).

Generally, a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus is only appropriate in very limited 

circumstances. See Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). One 

such instance is to challenge the jurisdiction of the court by showing that “any prosecution 

is barred by the statute of limitations.” Id. Habeas relief should be granted if the face of 

the petition shows that the prosecution would be barred by limitations. See id.

B. Analysis
4

In his sole issue, Floyd argues that the trial court erred in denying habeas relief 

because the two counts of intoxication manslaughter are barred by the statute of 

limitations. According to Floyd, intoxication manslaughter has a three-year statute of 

limitations and Petition Two, which was the first petition to allege intoxication 

manslaughter, fell outside the three-year window. The State argues that intoxication 

manslaughter does not have a limitations period. We agree with the State.

Chapter 12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure lists the relevant statutes of 

limitations for various felonies. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.01. For “murder 

and manslaughter,” there is no limitation. Id. art. 12.01(1)(a). For “all other felonies,” 

there is a three-year statute of limitations. Id. art. 12.01(8). Floyd argues that intoxication 

manslaughter falls within the catch-all provision of Article 12.01(8) because intoxication 

manslaughter is not specifically referenced anywhere in Chapter 12. We have found no 

court of criminal appeals cases discussing whether intoxication manslaughter falls under 

the “no limitations” period for manslaughter and murder or the general three-year 

limitations period for “all other felonies.” However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 

has addressed an analogous argument. In Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 80 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986), the defendant argued that capital murder fell under the “all other 

felonies” section of Chapter 12 because it was not specifically referenced. However, the 

Court held that “[c]apital murder is a species of murder and as such is provided for 

by Article 12.01(1)” rather than the “all other felonies” provision. Id.

Recently, the court of appeals in San Antonio addressed Floyd’s exact argument. 

See Gallegos v. State, No. 04-18-00806-CR, 2019 WL 4280071, at *2 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio Sept. 11, 2019, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Citing to 
5

Demouchette, our sister court concluded that “intoxication manslaughter is encompassed 

within the term manslaughter in article 12.01(1)(A) and is subject to no limitations period.” 

Id.

Additionally, we note that for double jeopardy purposes, the court of criminal 

appeals has held that intoxication manslaughter and manslaughter are “the same 

offense.” Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Even though 

Bigon did not specifically address the statute of limitations, we find its analysis insightful. 

In reaching its conclusion, the court observed that prior to 1994, intoxication manslaughter 

was in the same chapter as manslaughter because it “was considered an alternative way 

to commit manslaughter.” Id. at 371. The court opined that moving intoxication 

manslaughter to Chapter 49 of the Texas Penal Code was “largely for housekeeping 

purposes” because despite being moved to a chapter about intoxication-related offenses, 

intoxication manslaughter is ultimately still “an offense that addresses homicide.” Id. The 

court also concluded that despite being moved to Chapter 49, intoxication manslaughter 

“kept the title of manslaughter, indicating that it is still considered a homicide.” Id.

Therefore, we conclude that intoxication manslaughter is a species of 

manslaughter and is thus provided for by Article 12.01(1) rather than article 12.01(8). See 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.01(1), (8); Bigon, 252 S.W.3d at 372; Demouchette, 

731 S.W.2d at 80; see also Gallegos, 2019 WL 4280071, at *2. Accordingly, intoxication 

manslaughter is not subject to any limitations period, and the trial court did not err in 

denying habeas relief. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.01(1); Collazo, 264 

S.W.3d at 126.
6

Alternatively, even if we assume that intoxication manslaughter falls under the 

three-year statute of limitations, “a prior indictment tolls the statute of limitations under 

Article 12.05(b) for a subsequent indictment when both indictments allege the same 

conduct, same act, or same transaction.” Hernandez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2004); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.05(b) (“The time during the 

pendency of an indictment, information, or complaint shall not be computed in the period 

of limitation.”). Floyd argues that the present case is similar to Marks v. State, 560 S.W.3d 

169, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). However, we find Marks to be distinguishable. In 

Marks, the court of criminal appeals concluded that the State’s original indictment did not 

toll the limitations period for the offenses alleged in the amended indictments. See id. 

The State’s original indictment alleged the defendant provided security services as an 

unlicensed guard company. The amended indictments alleged that the defendant

accepted employment to carry a firearm without being personally commissioned as a 

security officer. See id. However, the court concluded that it was “not clear at all that the 

same transaction, much less the same act or conduct, is being alleged.” Id. 

In contrast, in the present case, the original manslaughter counts in Petition One

alleged the same victims that were killed as a result of the same car collision as alleged 

in Petitions Two and Three. Even though there would be a difference in proving whether 

the collision involved recklessness or intoxication, it is clear that each of the indictments 

are referring to a singular transaction—a car crash that resulted in two deaths. Therefore, 

the State’s petition in this case would have tolled the statute of limitations. See 

Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 774. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying habeas 

relief. See Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d at 801.
7

We overrule Floyd’s sole issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

10th day of October, 2019.