United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-2676

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Dan Charleston

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Bill McCarthy, in his individual capacity and official capacity as the Polk County 

Sheriff; Kevin Schneider, in his individual capacity; Victor J. Munoz, in his 

individual capacity; Ron Richards, in his individual capacity; Tim Krum, in his 

individual capacity; James B. Brown, in his individual capacity; Joe Simon, in his 

individual capacity; Brent Long, in his individual capacity; Shawn Van Hoozer, in 

his individual capacity; Lola Evans, in her individual capacity; Michael Campbell, 

in his individual capacity

 Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Central 

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Submitted: April 14, 2021

Filed: August 10, 2021 

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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
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Appellant Dan Charleston returns to this Court, again attempting to salvage

failed claims related to his employment with the Polk County Sheriff’s Department. 

This time, Charleston appeals the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary 

judgment on his political retaliation claim related to disciplinary measures and his 

ultimate termination from the Sheriff’s Office. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we affirm. 

I. 

Dan Charleston joined the Polk County Sheriff’s Office in 1997 and was 

promoted to Sergeant in 2002. In 2012 and 2016, Charleston challenged the Polk 

County Sheriff Bill McCarthy in the race for Sheriff, but McCarthy won reelection

both times. Following his first loss, Charleston filed suit against Sheriff McCarthy 

and other Polk County officials, alleging political discrimination and retaliation as a 

result of his campaign as the Republican candidate for Sheriff.2

 

In 2015, while that ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit was still pending, 

Charleston was serving as one of three sergeants assigned to the Court Services 

Division.3

 The Court Services Division is responsible for transporting and housing 

inmates for their court appearances. While Charleston was serving in this position, 

certain deputies complained that Charleston engaged in favoritism, alleging that 

1

The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of Iowa.

2

In Charleston v. McCarthy, 926 F.3d 982, 991 (8th Cir. 2019), this Court 

affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, 

concluding that Charleston failed to establish a connection between his protected 

activity and any adverse employment actions. 

3

Charleston filed another lawsuit in 2015, again alleging claims of political 

discrimination and retaliation. The district court dismissed that suit in its entirety, 

and Charleston did not appeal the dismissal. See Charleston v. McCarthy, 175 F. 

Supp. 3d 1115, 1130 (S.D. Iowa 2016).
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Charleston gave his friends within the division preferential treatment by giving them 

the more desirable assignments or assigning them fewer court trips, while giving the 

less desirable assignments, which required deputies to come in early or stay late, to 

those with whom he was not friendly. In response to these complaints, then-Chief 

Kevin Schneider and Lieutenant Ron Richards made changes to Charleston’s job 

duties, ordering him to consult with his direct supervisors before making any 

changes to the list assigning deputies to specific court trips. 

On April 22, 2016, Charleston made changes to the court trip list without first 

consulting with his supervisors. Charleston received a Notice of Disciplinary 

Action, which cited Charleston for being insubordinate and violating a lawful order. 

After reviewing the Notice of Disciplinary Action form and upon recommendations 

from the command staff, Sheriff McCarthy also imposed a two-day suspension. 

Charleston appealed his suspension to the Polk County Civil Service Commission, 

which upheld his suspension. Charleston filed an appeal of this decision in the Polk 

County District Court, but that appeal was dismissed on February 23, 2017, and 

Charleston did not pursue any further appeal. Less than one month later, on May 

10, 2016, Charleston again made changes to the court trip list without first consulting 

with his supervisors. Charleston again received a Notice of Disciplinary Action for 

insubordination and violation of a lawful order, which recommended that he be 

demoted for his repeated incidents of insubordination. Command staff ultimately 

recommended to Sheriff McCarthy that Charleston be terminated because of his 

continued unwillingness to follow verbal and written orders.

At the same time the disciplinary review of both of the April and May 2016

incidents was pending, Sheriff McCarthy asked the Polk County Human Resources 

Department to investigate numerous complaints that Charleston was creating a 

hostile work environment in the Court Services Division. During this investigation, 

Michael Campbell, who had been assigned by McCarthy to lead the investigation, 

interviewed Deputy Beverly Pursley about her experience with Charleston. Deputy 

Pursley recounted an incident where Charleston demanded that she pick up toilet 

paper in the holding cells while she was on her lunch break. Deputy Pursley told 
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Campbell that she had been humiliated by the incident. Campbell followed up the 

investigation of this incident with Charleston, asking him details about the event but 

declining to specifically name Deputy Pursley. The following day, while Pursley 

was eating lunch, she overheard another deputy, Deputy Mark VanDePol, make a 

joke about toilet paper in the holding cells and overheard Charleston laughing with 

VanDePol in response. VanDePol later admitted that he had heard about the incident 

between Charleston and Pursley. Charleston was transferred from Court Services to 

Patrol Services due to his interference with a confidential investigation and was 

again issued a Notice of Disciplinary Action. The Notice stated that Charleston had 

discussed confidential HR matters with other employees, that VanDePol’s comment 

in front of Pursley was a coordinated act of retaliation which contributed to a hostile 

work environment, and that Charleston should have intervened and stopped the 

conversation with VanDePol but failed to do so. Charleston’s supervisor, Lieutenant 

Shawn VanHoozer, recommended that Charleston be terminated based on a charge 

of neglect of duty and his failure to encourage harmony and respect in the Sheriff’s 

Office. Command staff agreed with Lieutenant VanHoozer’s recommendation, and 

after meeting with Charleston and reviewing his reply to the Notice, they formally 

recommended that Sheriff McCarthy terminate Charleston. 

On June 23, 2017, Sheriff McCarthy, after reviewing the recommendations of 

the command staff, terminated Charleston based on his second incident of 

insubordination and the neglect of duty charge. Charleston appealed his termination 

to the Polk County Civil Service Commission, and after a four-day hearing, the 

Commission upheld Charleston’s termination. Charleston challenged the 

Commission’s determination in state court, where the decision was upheld both by 

the Polk County District Court and the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Charleston filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging political 

discrimination, political retaliation, and violation of his due process rights against 

Sheriff McCarthy, members of his command staff, and Polk County officials, 

including Human Resources Department employees Michael Campbell and Lola 

Evans, who had been involved in the investigation into Charleston. By the summary 
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judgment stage, the only remaining claims were a political retaliation claim against 

Sheriff McCarthy and a due process claim against McCarthy, Evans, and Campbell. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The 

district court held that McCarthy was entitled to summary judgment on Charleston’s 

retaliation claim. It concluded that Charleston was collaterally estopped from 

rearguing his claims—that his termination for his second incident of insubordination 

and his neglect of duty were retaliation for running against McCarthy for sheriff—

because they had been conclusively resolved through the Civil Service Commission 

and state court proceedings. It further concluded Charleston failed to prove a causal 

connection between his two-day suspension and his campaign for sheriff. The 

district court also granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Charleston’s 

due process claim, which Charleston does not challenge on appeal. Instead, 

Charleston challenges only the district court’s determinations as to the political 

retaliation claim against Sheriff McCarthy. 

II. 

Charleston asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

on the political retaliation claim, specifically asserting that it erroneously concluded 

that collateral estoppel barred Charleston’s claim based on his termination for 

insubordination and neglect of duty and that the district court erred in concluding 

that Charleston had failed to establish a prima facie case of political retaliation based 

on his two-day suspension. “This [C]ourt reviews de novo the grant of summary 

judgment. Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Green Plains 

Otter Tail, LLC v. Pro-Env’t, Inc., 953 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation 

omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact 

to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Torgerson v. 

City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

“In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we review de novo its 

conclusions of law, including the availability of [collateral estoppel].” Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. FAG Bearings Corp., 335 F.3d 752, 757 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
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A.

We first consider Charleston’s argument that the district court erred in 

concluding that collateral estoppel barred Charleston from pursuing his political 

retaliation claim based on those issues he raised in his termination appeal. The 

district court determined that Charleston had already litigated the issues related to 

his termination—specifically whether his discipline was unfounded and whether his 

termination was retaliation—through the Civil Service Commission and in state 

court. Charleston asserts that collateral estoppel does not apply because the Polk 

County District Court and Iowa Court of Appeals did not directly address whether 

political retaliation occurred, with only the Civil Service Commission reaching a 

determination on this issue, and that body’s decisions are not entitled to preclusive 

effect. We disagree. 

“Pursuant to federal law, judicial proceedings in one state will have the same 

full faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have by law in 

the courts of such state from which they are taken.” Haberer v. Woodbury Cnty., 

188 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). This applies “to issues decided 

by state courts even where the subsequent federal case is brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. 

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, 

“[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by 

a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 

judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action 

between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” 

Turner v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 815 F.3d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 2016) (alteration in 

original) (citation omitted). “Issue preclusion serves a dual purpose. First, it protects 

litigants from the ‘vexation of relitigating identical issues with identical parties or 

those persons with a significant connected interest to the prior litigation.’ Second, 

it furthers the interest of judicial economy and efficiency by preventing unnecessary 

litigation.” Haberer, 188 F.3d at 961 (citations omitted).
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“We look to state law in determining whether to apply issue preclusion.” FAG 

Bearings Corp., 335 F.3d at 758. Because the state proceedings occurred under Iowa 

law, we apply Iowa law, which provides: 

The party invoking issue preclusion must establish four 

elements: (1) the issue in the present case must be identical, (2) the 

issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action, (3) the 

issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the 

prior case, and (4) the determination of the issue in the prior action must 

have been essential to the resulting judgment. 

Winger v. CM Holdings, L.L.C., 881 N.W.2d 433, 451 (Iowa 2016). “Before 

applying the four-part test, a status test must be met, i.e., ‘the parties in both actions 

must be the same,’ or ‘there must be privity between the parties against whom issue 

preclusion is invoked and the party against whom the issue was decided in the first 

litigation.’” Haberer, 188 F.3d at 962 (citation omitted) (applying Iowa law). The 

district court determined that the status test and all elements of collateral estoppel 

were satisfied.

On appeal, Charleston does not raise a challenge to the district court’s 

determinations regarding the status test or the elements of collateral estoppel. 

Instead, Charleston argues that collateral estoppel is inapplicable because only the 

Civil Service Commission determined his claim on the merits, and it is not a court 

of competent jurisdiction for which collateral estoppel may apply.4

 Charleston urges 

4

We note that both the Polk County District Court and the Iowa Court of 

Appeals issued written opinions affirming the Civil Service Commission’s 

upholding of Charleston’s termination. Each determined that substantial evidence 

supported the Civil Service Commission’s conclusion that the disciplinary action 

was warranted based on Charleston’s insubordination and neglect of duty. Neither 

court discussed specifically Charleston’s claims of retaliation. Although we do not 

agree with Charleston’s characterization that only the Civil Service Commission 

rendered a decision on the merits, because we conclude that the Civil Service 

Commission order is entitled to preclusive effect even if it were the only decision on 
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application of a per se rule that decisions from the Civil Service Commission cannot 

be entitled to preclusive effect. But that misreads Iowa law, which does not demand 

a per se rule. Indeed, Iowa courts “have given preclusive effect to an agency’s 

adjudicatory decisions in subsequent court proceedings under certain 

circumstances[,] . . . [b]ut [the Iowa Supreme Court] ha[s] cautioned against 

routinely according preclusive effect to agency determinations.” Winger, 881 

N.W.2d at 450. The Iowa Supreme Court’s caution is rooted in the lack of formality 

often seen in administrative proceedings:

[R]esolution of a[n administrative] dispute does not require formal 

court-like proceedings, and informality is considered a virtue of most 

administrative proceedings. When, however, collateral estoppel effect 

is given [to] issue determinations made in an administrative proceeding, 

informality becomes a problem. Judicial proceedings operate within a 

system where each issue resolved is subject to appellate review. Parties 

develop the crucial issues, introduce the important evidence, and have 

an independent fact finder resolve legal and evidentiary conflicts. The 

reviewability of this process ensures clear and careful issue resolution.

Administrative proceedings are not structured with the same goals in 

mind as those of formal court-like proceedings, especially with regard 

to issue determinations.

Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). Here, none of those concerns 

apply. Charleston’s termination appeal before the Polk County Civil Service 

Commission lasted four days, and each party was represented by counsel. An 

administrative law judge presided over the proceedings, where the parties presented 

opening statements, questioned witnesses, and were permitted to cross-examine the 

opposing party’s witnesses and present documentary, video, and audio evidence. 

The Civil Service Commission then issued a 19-page decision detailing the 

background of the case, the proceedings, and the issues for resolution before 

affirming Charleston’s termination. Although not all formalities of a court 

the merits, any question about what precisely the Iowa courts addressed in their 

decisions is immaterial. 
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proceeding, including observation of the rules of evidence, were present, the 

adjudicatory process here was so detailed and court-like that we conclude this case 

presents those “certain circumstances” under which it is appropriate to afford 

preclusive effect to the Civil Service Commission’s determination. Id.; cf. Haberer, 

188 F.3d at 964 (“We hold that collateral estoppel does apply because the issue of 

constructive discharge was specifically and directly raised, litigated, and decided 

before the [Civil Service Commission], appealed to the state district court, and 

thereafter appealed and resolved on the merits by the Iowa Supreme Court.”); Yancy 

v. McDevitt, 802 F.2d 1025, 1030 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding school board hearing 

regarding teacher’s termination was adjudicatory in nature, entitling it to preclusive 

effect because issue preclusion requirements under Iowa law were all satisfied). The 

district court thus did not err in concluding that collateral estoppel barred 

Charleston’s claims arising from his termination appeal. 

B. 

We next consider Charleston’s argument that the district court erred in 

concluding that he failed to make a prima facie showing of political retaliation. 

Because we conclude that he is collaterally estopped from claiming his termination 

was retaliation for his campaign, we consider his retaliation claim only as it relates 

to his two-day suspension. To make a prima facie showing of First Amendment 

retaliation, the plaintiff must show that “(1) [ ]he engaged in conduct protected by 

the First Amendment; (2) [ ]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the 

protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s decision 

to take the adverse employment action.” Charleston, 926 F.3d at 989 (alterations in 

original) (citation omitted). “To prove a causal connection under the third element, 

a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse 

employment action. ‘[E]vidence that gives rise to an inference of a retaliatory 

motive on the part of the employer is sufficient to prove a causal connection.’” 

Hughs v. Stottlemyre, 454 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) 

(citations omitted). 
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Charleston asserts that he engaged in protected conduct by running for sheriff 

and that he suffered adverse employment actions in the form of his two-day 

suspension and termination. Again, we consider only the two-day suspension as the 

adverse employment action. McCarthy does not dispute that Charleston’s campaign 

constitutes a protected activity or that his two-day suspension constituted an adverse 

employment action; thus, we need consider only the third element of a political 

retaliation claim: whether “the protected activity was a substantial or motivating 

factor in the adverse employment action.” Charleston, 926 F.3d at 989 (citation 

omitted). 

Charleston asserts that a causal connection exists between the suspension and 

his campaign for sheriff, arguing that he had an unblemished employment record 

prior to announcing his run for sheriff; that other employees were treated differently 

than Charleston after committing similar transgressions; and that the temporal 

proximity between his run for sheriff and his termination demonstrates causation. 

First, the record simply contradicts any possible argument that Charleston had an 

unblemished employment record. Charleston’s employment with the Polk County 

Sheriff’s Department was marred with numerous disciplinary issues dating back to 

at least early 2012, all of which have been exhaustively detailed by this Court, the 

district court, the Civil Service Commission, and Iowa state courts through 

Charleston’s numerous legal challenges.5

 

Second, with regards to Charleston’s argument that other employees were 

treated differently than him, this argument is typically deployed in employment 

discrimination actions as a means to prove pretext, and “[t]he test to determine 

whether employees are ‘similarly situated’ to warrant a comparison to a plaintiff is 

a ‘rigorous’ one.” E.E.O.C. v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 775 (8th Cir. 2003)

5

See Charleston, 926 F.3d at 985; Charleston v. McCarthy, No. 14-CV-00164 

2018 WL 11026361, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 2018); Charleston, 175 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1115; Charleston v. Polk Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm’n, No. 18-0584, 2019 WL 

3330627, at *1-3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2019); R. Doc. 79-2, at 39-47; R. Doc. 79-

2, at 121-39; R. Doc. 79-2, at 150-64. 
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(citation omitted). Assuming, as the district court did, that Charleston’s argument is 

applicable here, Charleston still fails to satisfy the dictates of this “rigorous” test

because Charleston “has the burden of proving that he and the disparately treated 

[employees] were similarly situated in all relevant respects,” id. at 775-76 (alteration 

in original) (citation omitted), and Charleston has failed to provide evidence of 

similarly situated employees being treated differently. Although he argues other 

employees did not receive the same treatment for similar behavior, the other officers 

he identifies were never disciplined for insubordination or failure to obey a direct 

order. The underlying differing bases for discipline is a significant enough disparity 

between Charleston and other officers to render them insufficiently similarly situated 

for the purposes of proving causation. 

Finally, the temporal proximity alone between Charleston’s 2016 run for 

sheriff and his 2017 suspension is insufficient to show causation. See Bassett v. City 

of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1105 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that temporal 

proximity alone may establish causation where the time lapse between the protected 

activity and the adverse employment action was two months or fewer), abrogated on 

other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043, 1059. Without more evidence to 

support an inference of causation, the length of time between Charleston’s 2016 

campaign and his 2017 termination is simply insufficient to demonstrate causation. 

Because Charleston has failed to show causation, he has failed to meet his burden of 

showing a prima facie case of retaliation. The district court therefore did not err in 

granting summary judgment on Charleston’s retaliation claim stemming from his 

two-day suspension.

6

 

6

Charleston also asserts that the district court applied the incorrect burdenshifting framework to his retaliation claim; however, as we conclude that Charleston 

fails to make a prima facie showing, we need not address this argument because “the 

burden-shifting framework is inapplicable until a plaintiff has successfully shown a 

prima facie case.” Charleston, 926 F.3d at 991 n.3. 
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III. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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