alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
c55674_ex10-2.htm -- Converted by SEC Publisher, created by BCL Technologies Inc., for SEC Filing





EXHIBIT 10.2


WAIVER


I, __________________________________, an executive of First Horizon National Corporation, hereby agree as follows: 



In consideration for the benefits I will receive as a result of my employer’s participation in the United States Department of the Treasury’s TARP Capital Purchase Program, I hereby voluntarily waive any claim against
the United States or my employer for any changes to my compensation or benefits that are required to comply with the regulation issued by the Department of the Treasury as published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2008. 


I acknowledge that this regulation may require modification of the compensation, bonus, incentive and other benefit plans, arrangements, policies and agreements (including so-called “golden parachute” agreements) that I
have with my employer or in which I participate as they relate to the period the United States holds any equity or debt securities of my employer acquired through the TARP Capital Purchase Program. 


This waiver includes all claims I may have under the laws of the United States or any state related to the requirements imposed by the aforementioned regulation, including without limitation a claim for any compensation or other
payments I would otherwise receive, any challenge to the process by which this regulation was adopted and any tort or constitutional claim about the effect of these regulations on my employment relationship. 




Agreed and acknowledged as of November 12, 2008




______________________________________
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C.§1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Webb Interactive Services, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the datehereof (the “Report”), I, Lindley S. Branson, Vice President – General counsel currently the only executive officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: 

 

(1) The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 

Date: May 16, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THERMEDICS
DETECTION INC.'S REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JULY 4, 1998 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>   1,000
       
<S>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-END>                     JUL-04-1998
<CASH>                                29,684
<SECURITIES>                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                         17,842
<ALLOWANCES>                           1,016
<INVENTORY>                           19,040
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                      70,488
<PP&E>                                11,603
<DEPRECIATION>                         7,373
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       130,957
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 18,300
<BONDS>                                    0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<COMMON>                               1,932
<OTHER-SE>                           110,725
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         130,957
<SALES>                               39,366
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      47,664
<CGS>                                 17,613
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         21,739
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                       5,066
<LOSS-PROVISION>                         150
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       303
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        7,083
<INCOME-TAX>                           2,798
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    4,285
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                           4,285
<EPS-PRIMARY>                           0.22
<EPS-DILUTED>                           0.22

        

</TABLE>
#### MARMION v. HERRIN TRANSP. CO., Inc.

No. 3431.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

April 18, 1939.

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1939.

G. C. Bradfield, of Beaumont, for appellant.

John H. Benckenstein and Jack M. Moore, both of Beaumont, for appellee.

COMBS, Justice.

This suit was filed by appellant, W. H. Marmion, as plaintiff, for damages for alleged breach of a contract entered into with appellee, Herrin Transportation Company, Inc., for transporting certain freight from Houston to Beaumont. An attempted appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff w,as dismissed at a former term of this court because the judgment'was not final. See Herrin Transportation Company v. Marmion, Tex.Civ.App., 113 S.W.2d 291. In dismissing the case it was suggested in the-opinion that defendant’s motion for new-trial be granted by the trial court for reasons there stated. After the mandate of this court was returned to the trial court, the defendant presented a motion for new trial and for judgment in its favor. The plaintiff also filed a motion for new trial, for permission to amend his pleadings in the light of the opinion of this court, and for a setting and trial of the case. The-plaintiff's motion was overruled and the defendant’s motion was granted, setting aside-the former judgment and entering judgment against the plaintiff and in favor of' the defendant on its cross action. The record shows that the judgment was entered, without the hearing of any additional testimony. In fact, it is clear from the record, that the trial court simply set aside the-former judgment and entered the present, one on the record and the testimony as developed at the former trial. This appeal, is from that judgment.

Opinion

The judgment will have to be reversed'- and the case remanded. The authorities settle the proposition that, when a new trial was granted by the trial court, the case stood. on the docket for trial as though there had been no previous trial of it. The trial court, was without authority to proceed to enter another and different judgment without: *559trial. Smith v. Thornton, 119 Tex. 344, 29 S.W.2d 314; Wichita Falls Traction Company v. Cook, 122 Tex. 446, 60 S.W.2d 764; Schaffer v. Speckels, Tex.Com.App., 62 S.W.2d 85.

Reversed and remanded.
EX-10.1







	 	 	 	 	 



EXHIBIT 10.1




November 10, 2008




Advanced Viral Research Corp.

6 Executive Plaza, Suite 283

Yonkers, New York 10701





     Re: Employment Agreement



To Whom It May Concern:




This is to set forth our agreement regarding the payment of my salary. Reference is made to my
Employment Agreement dated as of May 15, 2007 (the “Agreement”). By executing this letter
agreement, we agree that the following terms and conditions shall be incorporated into the
Agreement effective as of August 8, 2008 notwithstanding any other provisions in the Agreement to
the contrary.




From the two week pay period ending August 8, 2008 through the two week pay period ending
October 3, 2008, the obligation of the Company to pay my base salary as well as any other cash
amounts shall be deferred until the Company acquires sufficient cash resources to pay such
deferred amounts (the “Triggering Event”). We agree that the determination as to the
appropriate time to pay the deferred amounts shall be within the sole discretion of the Board of
Directors. For purposes of clarification, amounts that are referred to as deferred amounts
herein shall be amounts that are accrued as obligations of the Company but which shall not be
paid until and unless there is a Triggering Event.




From the two week pay period ending October 17, 2008 until the Triggering Event, the Company
shall pay 40% of my base salary and all other cash amounts obligated to be paid by the Company
to me under the Agreement (e.g. $350,000 per annum) shall be deferred. For purposes of
clarification, amounts that are referred to as deferred amounts herein shall be amounts that are
accrued as obligations of the Company but which shall not be paid until and unless there is a
Triggering Event.



Except as otherwise specifically provided in this letter agreement, the terms of the Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect.



This letter agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, all of which taken together
shall constitute one letter agreement.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	Sincerely,

 	 
	 	/s/ Stephen Elliston
 	 
	 	Stephen Elliston 	 
	 	 	 
	 



Agreed and Acknowledged as of August 8, 2008




ADVANCED VIRAL RESEARCH CORP.




By: /s/ Martin Bookman, Acting Chief Financial Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30162

Summary Calendar 

GERALD NEAL BABINEAUX, 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT; EARL B. 

TAYLOR, 

Defendants-Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 2:15-CV-1792

Before DAVIS, SOUTHWICK, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Gerald Neal Babineaux, Louisiana prisoner # 222961, appeals the 

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which 

relief could be granted. The district court did not err in dismissing the 

complaint, as Babineaux’s claim that he has been denied access to the courts 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 3, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-30162 Document: 00513861940 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/03/2017
No. 16-30162

2 

lacked an arguable basis in law or contained insufficient factual matter to state 

a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); 

Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the 

judgment is AFFIRMED. Babineaux’s motions relative to discovery are 

DENIED. 

The dismissal of Babineaux’s Section 1983 complaint as frivolous and for 

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted counts as a strike under 

Section 1915(g). See § 1915(g); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763–64 

(2015); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1996). 

Babineaux is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be 

allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action or appeal filed while 

he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

 Case: 16-30162 Document: 00513861940 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/03/2017
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 220 (Tuesday, November 15, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 70709-70710]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-29589]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting; Emergency Meeting Notice

    This notice that an emergency meeting was held is published 
pursuant to the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 
Public Law 94-409, 5 U.S.C. 552b.

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

TIME AND DATE: The Commission held an emergency closed meeting on 
November 9, 2011 at approximately 11:10 a.m. The Commission, by a 
recorded vote of 4-0, determined that the business of the agency 
required that the meeting be held at that time. The Chairman of the

[[Page 70710]]

Commission did not participate in this meeting.

PLACE: Three Lafayette Center, 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, 9th 
Floor Commission Conference Room.

STATUS: Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Registrant Financial Matters.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Sauntia S. Warfield, Assistant 
Secretary of the Commission, 202-418-5084.

David A. Stawick,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-29589 Filed 11-10-11; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```
Filed 4/13/04 by Clerk of Supreme Court

IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2004 ND 68

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Randy Scott Provost, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20030228

Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, the Honorable Debbie Gordon Kleven, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Sonja Clapp, Assistant State’s Attorney, 124 South Fourth Street, P.O. Box 5607, Grand Forks, N.D. 58206-5607, for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.

Steven J. Simonson, 301 North Third Street, 2nd Floor, Grand Forks, N.D. 58203, for defendant and appellant; submitted on brief.

State v. Provost

No. 20030228

Per Curiam.

[¶1]Randy Provost appeals from a Northeast Central Judicial District Court criminal judgment upon a jury verdict convicting him of simple assault on a peace officer, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17-01.  Provost argues the record does not support beyond a reasonable doubt a conviction for simple assault on a peace officer.  He also argues he received an unfair trial because testimony was allowed regarding conduct for which he was not charged.  We affirm the judgment of conviction under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3) and (4).

[¶2]Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

Dale V. Sandstrom

William A. Neumann

Mary Muehlen Maring

Carol Ronning Kapsner
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**

 

To the Board of Directors and Stockholders 

Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc. and Subsidiaries 

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements No. 33-68856, No. 33-53001, No. 33-57813, and No. 333-28749 on Form S-3 and inRegistration Statements No. 33-91494, No. 33-91492, No. 33-07397, No. 33-67180 and No. 33-51441 on Form S-8 of Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc. and subsidiaries of our reports dated March 31, 2003 (which report expressed an unqualified opinionand includes an explanatory paragraph relating to a going concern discussed in Note 1), appearing in the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Acceptance Insurance Companies Inc. and subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2002. 

 

/s/    Deloitte &Touche LLP 

 

Omaha, Nebraska

April 9, 2003
U.S. DEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS FEDERALAVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON D.C. 

## H

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Complainant, DOT Docket No: FAA-2014-0544
vs. CHERIF DIALLO, Respondent. FAA Case No: 2014S0290047 U.S. Administrative Law Judge J.E. Sullivan

COMPLAINANT'S AMENDED NOTICE OFAPPEARANCE The Complainant, by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby submits this Amended Notice of Appearance in accordance with Section 13.204(b) ofthe Rules of Practice inFAA Civil Penalty Actions [14 C.P.R. Section 13.204(b)]. Complainant's Counsel ofRecord is hereby amended to Erin Oliver. The service addresses and contact numbers remain the same. Respectfully submitted this

# --"?'-r_a
__day ofNovember, 2015.

ERIN OLIVER Attorney Enforcement Division, Southern Team P.O. Box 20636 Atlanta, GA 30320 (404) 305-5200

1CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have mailed the foregoing Complainant's Amended Notice of Appearance this date to the following bythe listed methods: Original and One (1) CopyVia Certified Mail to: Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. ATT: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 WilburWright Building Suite 2WIOOO Washington, DC 20591 One (1) CopyVia Certified Mail and Facsimileto: Honorable Judge J.E. Sullivan Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 New JerseyAvenue, S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, D.C. 20590 Facsimile (202) 366-7536 One (1) Copy Via Certified Mail and Regular Mail to: CherifDiallo 263 W 153'd Street Apartment 6D New York, NY 10039 

# dwJCJb ( 0 NOV, 

# ,J DATED

2
Fw:Fact Sheet Request for Veolia Fact Sheet Request for Veolia

Andrea Morgan to: David Ogulei 01/04/2013 12:48 PM

----- Forwarded by Andrea Morgan/R5/USEPA/US on 01/04/2013 12:48 PM -----

From: Dennis J Warchol <dennis.warchol@veoliaes.com>

To: Andrea Morgan/R5/USEPA/US@EPA, 

Date: 08/27/2012 10:52 AM

Subject: Fact Sheet Request for Veolia

Andrea,

Attached are some simplified flow diagrams for the three incinerators. Please let me know if these are 

what you are looking for. There were also Fact Sheets developed by USEPA and IEPA when the Title V 

permit and RCRA Part B permit were issued in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Let me know if you need 

anything else. 

SERVICE FIRST SAFETY ALWAYS

Dennis J. Warchol

EHS Manager

Veolia ES Technical Solutions, L.L.C.

Trade Waste Incineration Facility

#7 Mobile Avenue

Sauget, IL 62201

618-271-2804 (ext.169)

618-271-2128 (fax)

Dennis.warchol@VeoliaES.com

www.VeoliaES.com

This e-mail message from Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC is for the sole use of the intended 

recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, 

disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please communicate 

with the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message and delete it from all 

computers.

Stwiscanner12082709250.pdf
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-1043

Filed April 29, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRIAN JACOB COREY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Tod Deck, Judge.

Brian Corey appeals his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.

Priscilla E. Forsyth, Sioux City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
2

MAY, Judge.

Brian Corey pled guilty to possessing marijuana, third offense, a class “D”

felony, as well as delivery of methamphetamine, a class “C” felony. On appeal, 

Corey argues the sentencing court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive 

prison terms instead of probation. We affirm.

We review sentencing challenges “for abuse of discretion or defect in the 

sentencing procedure.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015). We 

bear in mind that “[t]he district court’s sentence is cloaked with a strong 

presumption in its favor.” State v. Goad, No.17-1057, 2018 WL 2084834, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) (citing State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 

2002)). And “[w]e afford [a] strong presumption of regularity to the sentencing 

court due to the great confidence we place in our judges to exercise their discretion 

appropriately.” Id. (citing State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998)). We

will find an abuse of discretion only “when a court acts on grounds clearly 

untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d at 553 

(citation omitted).

Corey claims the sentencing court failed to consider his testimony 

concerning mitigating factors such as his attendance at treatment, his acceptance 

into college, his employment and business opportunities, his lengthy period of 

sobriety, and his mental-health struggles. We disagree. Rather, the record shows

the court considered Corey’s testimony but did not find him believable. We decline 

to second guess the sentencing court’s credibility evaluations. State v. Farnum, 

397 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 1986) (“The trial court was free to accept or disregard 

evidence according to its own evaluation of credibility.”).
3

Moreover, the record shows the sentencing court specifically considered 

Corey’s age, intelligence, ambition, likelihood of success on probation, and prosocial activities (“assistance you’ve provided”). Additionally, the court specifically 

considered the presentence investigation report, which contained extensive 

mitigating information—and even recommended probation. So we find “no merit” 

in Corey’s “contention that the court failed to give adequate consideration to the 

mitigating circumstances of the case.” State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 679 

(Iowa 1998).

The sentencing court properly exercised its discretion. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.
#### POYNOR v. ADAMS.

No. 8861.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

Dec. 30, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1940.

T. R. Johnston, of San Angelo, for appellant.

Murphy & Leslie, of San Angelo, for ap-pellee.

McCLENDON, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from a- judgment in favor of Adams against Poynor alone in a suit by Adams against Poynor and Robinson as partners upon a promissory note executed by Poynor alone and payable to Adams. The only ground for reversal is the assertion that Adams’s petition was insufficient to support a judgment against Poynor as sole obligee on the note, since it was allegéd (and only alleged) that the note was executed by Poy-nor in a partnership transaction.

The petition copies the note in haec verba, and there was a prayer for general relief. The note was, as stated, signed by Poynor alone, and bore no evidence of being other than his individual obligation. Poynor and Robinson filed separate answers in each of which was a verified denial of the existence of any partnership relation between them. Execution of the note was not denied. Poy-nor’s answer contained additionally a cross-action for damages against Adams upon the allegation that at the time the suit was filed Poynor was “working out of the office of” Robinson, on commission in the sale of real estate, and Robinson was joined in the suit “for the sole and only purpose of embarrassing and harassing” Poynor “into the paying of the note alleged, and so to cause” Robinson “to sever his connection with” Poynor. It was alleged that such was the result of such joinder, to Poynor’s damage in the sum of $400, for which he sued.

We hold:

(1) The petition showing on its face that the note as drawn was an individual obligation of Poynor, and there being a prayer for general relief, it was sufficient to support the judgment.

(2) The answer of Poynor, denying under oath partnership liability on the note, and not denying under oath execution of the note, but-pleading a cross-action growing out of his individual liability thereon, was tantamount to an admission of such individual liability; and was therefore sufficient to support the judgment.

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.
TERRELL M. SURRANCY

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 3026

____ _________________________/

Opinion filed November 1, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Washington County

. Christopher N. Patterson , Judge

.

Terrell M. Surrancy , pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROWE, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.