# Publicatieblad L 219/2015

| | ISSN 1977-0758 |
| --- | --- |
| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | L 219 |
| | |
| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Wetgeving | 58e jaargang20 augustus 2015 |

ISSN 1977-0758

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

L 219

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Wetgeving

58e jaargang20 augustus 2015

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| Inhoud | | II   Niet-wetgevingshandelingen | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | VERORDENINGEN |
| | * | Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1407 van de Commissie van 19 augustus 2015 tot wijziging van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 tot vaststelling van overgangsbepalingen in de sector suiker in verband met de toetreding van Kroatië | 1 |
| | * | Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1408 van de Commissie van 19 augustus 2015 tot verlening van een vergunning voor DL-methionyl-DL-methionine als toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding voor vis en schaaldieren (
  1
  ) | 3 |
| | | Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1409 van de Commissie van 19 augustus 2015 tot vaststelling van de forfaitaire invoerwaarden voor de bepaling van de invoerprijs van bepaalde groenten en fruit | 6 |
| | | BESLUITEN |
| | * | Council Decision (EU) 2015/1410 of 19 August 2015 giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit | 8 |
| | * | Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece | 12 |
| | | HANDELINGEN VAN BIJ INTERNATIONALE OVEREENKOMSTEN INGESTELDE ORGANEN |
| | * | Besluit nr. 1 van het Comité EU-Korea voor de handel in goederen van 28 mei 2015 inzake de vaststelling van regels voor het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van tariefcontingenten [2015/1412] | 17 |

Inhoud

II   Niet-wetgevingshandelingen

Bladzijde

VERORDENINGEN

*

Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1407 van de Commissie van 19 augustus 2015 tot wijziging van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 tot vaststelling van overgangsbepalingen in de sector suiker in verband met de toetreding van Kroatië

1

*

Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1408 van de Commissie van 19 augustus 2015 tot verlening van een vergunning voor DL-methionyl-DL-methionine als toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding voor vis en schaaldieren (
  1
  )

1

3

Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) 2015/1409 van de Commissie van 19 augustus 2015 tot vaststelling van de forfaitaire invoerwaarden voor de bepaling van de invoerprijs van bepaalde groenten en fruit

6

BESLUITEN

*

Council Decision (EU) 2015/1410 of 19 August 2015 giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit

8

*

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 of 19 August 2015 approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece

12

HANDELINGEN VAN BIJ INTERNATIONALE OVEREENKOMSTEN INGESTELDE ORGANEN

*

Besluit nr. 1 van het Comité EU-Korea voor de handel in goederen van 28 mei 2015 inzake de vaststelling van regels voor het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van tariefcontingenten [2015/1412]

17

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst |

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(1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst

1

| NL | Besluiten waarvan de titels mager zijn gedrukt, zijn besluiten van dagelijks beheer die in het kader van het landbouwbeleid zijn genomen en die in het algemeen een beperkte geldigheidsduur hebben.
  Besluiten waarvan de titels vet zijn gedrukt en die worden voorafgegaan door een sterretje, zijn alle andere besluiten. |
| --- | --- |

NL

Besluiten waarvan de titels mager zijn gedrukt, zijn besluiten van dagelijks beheer die in het kader van het landbouwbeleid zijn genomen en die in het algemeen een beperkte geldigheidsduur hebben.

Besluiten waarvan de titels vet zijn gedrukt en die worden voorafgegaan door een sterretje, zijn alle andere besluiten.

---

II Niet-wetgevingshandelingen

VERORDENINGEN

| 20.8.2015 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | L 219/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

L 219/1

---

UITVOERINGSVERORDENING (EU) 2015/1407 VAN DE COMMISSIE

van 19 augustus 2015

tot wijziging van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 tot vaststelling van overgangsbepalingen in de sector suiker in verband met de toetreding van Kroatië

DE EUROPESE COMMISSIE,

Gezien het Toetredingsverdrag van Kroatië,

Gezien de Akte van toetreding van Kroatië (1), en met name de artikelen 41 en 16, juncto bijlage IV, deel 3, onder a), punt 4,

Overwegende hetgeen volgt:

| (1) | In Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 van de Commissie (2) zijn voor de sector suiker overgangsbepalingen vastgesteld in verband met de toetreding van Kroatië tot de Unie. Hoofdstuk II, afdeling 2, van die verordening heeft betrekking op de vaststelling en wegwerking van de overtollige hoeveelheden suiker die op de datum van de toetreding van Kroatië in dat land aanwezig waren. Met name zijn daarin termijnen vastgesteld voor de vaststelling en de wegwerking van de overtollige hoeveelheden suiker en voor het door de betrokken marktdeelnemers in Kroatië te leveren bewijs van de wegwerking. Voorts zijn daarin de referentieperioden vastgesteld voor de berekening van de bedragen die aan Kroatië in rekening worden gebracht indien de overtollige hoeveelheden niet worden weggewerkt. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 van de Commissie (2) zijn voor de sector suiker overgangsbepalingen vastgesteld in verband met de toetreding van Kroatië tot de Unie. Hoofdstuk II, afdeling 2, van die verordening heeft betrekking op de vaststelling en wegwerking van de overtollige hoeveelheden suiker die op de datum van de toetreding van Kroatië in dat land aanwezig waren. Met name zijn daarin termijnen vastgesteld voor de vaststelling en de wegwerking van de overtollige hoeveelheden suiker en voor het door de betrokken marktdeelnemers in Kroatië te leveren bewijs van de wegwerking. Voorts zijn daarin de referentieperioden vastgesteld voor de berekening van de bedragen die aan Kroatië in rekening worden gebracht indien de overtollige hoeveelheden niet worden weggewerkt.

| (2) | Bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 1345/2014 van de Commissie (3) zijn de overtollige hoeveelheden suiker in Kroatië vastgesteld die vóór de toetreding van het land waren opgebouwd en op kosten van Kroatië van de Uniemarkt moeten worden weggewerkt conform de termijnen die zijn vermeld in Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013, als gewijzigd bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 968/2014 van de Commissie (4). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 1345/2014 van de Commissie (3) zijn de overtollige hoeveelheden suiker in Kroatië vastgesteld die vóór de toetreding van het land waren opgebouwd en op kosten van Kroatië van de Uniemarkt moeten worden weggewerkt conform de termijnen die zijn vermeld in Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013, als gewijzigd bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 968/2014 van de Commissie (4).

| (3) | Bij brief van 19 mei 2015 heeft Kroatië de Commissie ervan in kennis gesteld dat het de verplichting ervoor te zorgen dat de door de Commissie vastgestelde overtollige hoeveelheden suiker uiterlijk op 30 september 2015 van de markt zijn weggewerkt, niet ter discussie stelt, maar onvoorziene procedurele moeilijkheden ondervindt bij de uitvoering van de verplichting om de betrokken marktdeelnemers te dwingen die overtollige hoeveelheden weg te werken, en extra tijd nodig is om deze moeilijkheden te overwinnen. Daarom moeten de termijnen van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 met zes maanden worden verlengd. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Bij brief van 19 mei 2015 heeft Kroatië de Commissie ervan in kennis gesteld dat het de verplichting ervoor te zorgen dat de door de Commissie vastgestelde overtollige hoeveelheden suiker uiterlijk op 30 september 2015 van de markt zijn weggewerkt, niet ter discussie stelt, maar onvoorziene procedurele moeilijkheden ondervindt bij de uitvoering van de verplichting om de betrokken marktdeelnemers te dwingen die overtollige hoeveelheden weg te werken, en extra tijd nodig is om deze moeilijkheden te overwinnen. Daarom moeten de termijnen van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 met zes maanden worden verlengd.

| (4) | Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 moet derhalve dienovereenkomstig worden gewijzigd. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 moet derhalve dienovereenkomstig worden gewijzigd.

| (5) | De in deze verordening vervatte maatregelen zijn in overeenstemming met het advies van het Beheerscomité voor de gemeenschappelijke ordening van de landbouwmarkten, |
| --- | --- |

(5)

De in deze verordening vervatte maatregelen zijn in overeenstemming met het advies van het Beheerscomité voor de gemeenschappelijke ordening van de landbouwmarkten,

HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD:

Artikel 1

Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:

| 1) | In artikel 9, lid 1, wordt „30 september 2015” vervangen door „31 maart 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

1)

In artikel 9, lid 1, wordt „30 september 2015” vervangen door „31 maart 2016”.

| 2) | Artikel 10 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:






  a) | „30 september 2015” wordt vervangen door „31 maart 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2)

Artikel 10 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:

a)

„30 september 2015” wordt vervangen door „31 maart 2016”;

| b) | „31 mei 2016” wordt vervangen door „30 november 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

b)

„31 mei 2016” wordt vervangen door „30 november 2016”.

| 3) | Artikel 11 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:






  a) | in lid 1 wordt „31 december 2015” vervangen door „30 juni 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

3)

Artikel 11 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:

a)

in lid 1 wordt „31 december 2015” vervangen door „30 juni 2016”;

| b) | in lid 2, vierde alinea, wordt „30 september 2015” vervangen door „31 maart 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

b)

in lid 2, vierde alinea, wordt „30 september 2015” vervangen door „31 maart 2016”.

| 4) | Artikel 12 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:






  a) | in lid 1 wordt „31 januari 2016” vervangen door „31 juli 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

4)

Artikel 12 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:

a)

in lid 1 wordt „31 januari 2016” vervangen door „31 juli 2016”;

| b) | lid 2 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:






  i) | in de eerste alinea wordt „30 september 2015” vervangen door „31 maart 2016”; |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

lid 2 wordt als volgt gewijzigd:

i)

in de eerste alinea wordt „30 september 2015” vervangen door „31 maart 2016”;

| ii) | in de tweede alinea wordt „31 mei 2016” vervangen door „30 november 2016”; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

in de tweede alinea wordt „31 mei 2016” vervangen door „30 november 2016”;

| iii) | in de derde alinea wordt „31 maart 2016” vervangen door „30 september 2016”. |
| --- | --- |

iii)

in de derde alinea wordt „31 maart 2016” vervangen door „30 september 2016”.

Artikel 2

Deze verordening treedt in werking op de derde dag na die van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.

Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk in elke lidstaat.

Gedaan te Brussel, 19 augustus 2015.

Voor de Commissie

De voorzitter

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  PB L 112 van 24.4.2012, blz. 10.

1

(2)  Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 van de Commissie van 25 februari 2013 tot vaststelling van overgangsbepalingen in de sector suiker in verband met de toetreding van Kroatië (PB L 55 van 27.2.2013, blz. 1).

2

(3)  Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 1345/2014 van de Commissie van 17 december 2014 inzake de vaststelling van de overtollige hoeveelheid suiker, isoglucose en fructose voor Kroatië (PB L 363 van 18.12.2014, blz. 80).

3

(4)  Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 968/2014 van de Commissie van 12 september 2014 tot wijziging van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 170/2013 tot vaststelling van overgangsbepalingen in de sector suiker in verband met de toetreding van Kroatië (PB L 272 van 13.9.2014, blz. 6).

4

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| 20.8.2015 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | L 219/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

L 219/3

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UITVOERINGSVERORDENING (EU) 2015/1408 VAN DE COMMISSIE

van 19 augustus 2015

tot verlening van een vergunning voor DL-methionyl-DL-methionine als toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding voor vis en schaaldieren

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

DE EUROPESE COMMISSIE,

Gezien het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie,

Gezien Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 22 september 2003 betreffende toevoegingsmiddelen voor diervoeding (1), en met name artikel 9, lid 2,

Overwegende hetgeen volgt:

| (1) | De verlening van vergunningen voor toevoegingsmiddelen voor diervoeding, met inbegrip van de vergunningsgronden en -procedures, is geregeld bij Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

De verlening van vergunningen voor toevoegingsmiddelen voor diervoeding, met inbegrip van de vergunningsgronden en -procedures, is geregeld bij Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003.

| (2) | Overeenkomstig artikel 7 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 is een aanvraag voor de verlening van een vergunning voor DL-methionyl-DL-methionine als toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding ingediend. De krachtens artikel 7, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 vereiste gegevens en documenten zijn bij de aanvraag verstrekt. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Overeenkomstig artikel 7 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 is een aanvraag voor de verlening van een vergunning voor DL-methionyl-DL-methionine als toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding ingediend. De krachtens artikel 7, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 vereiste gegevens en documenten zijn bij de aanvraag verstrekt.

| (3) | Die aanvraag betreft de verlening van een vergunning voor DL-methionyl-DL-methionine als toevoegingsmiddel in de categorie „nutritionele toevoegingsmiddelen” voor alle waterdieren. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Die aanvraag betreft de verlening van een vergunning voor DL-methionyl-DL-methionine als toevoegingsmiddel in de categorie „nutritionele toevoegingsmiddelen” voor alle waterdieren.

| (4) | De Europese Autoriteit voor voedselveiligheid (hierna de „EFSA” genoemd) heeft in haar advies van 27 januari 2015 (2) geconcludeerd dat DL-methionyl-DL-methionine onder de voorgestelde gebruiksvoorwaarden geen ongunstige effecten voor de diergezondheid, de gezondheid van de mens of het milieu heeft en dat het als een doeltreffende bron van het aminozuur L-methionine voor vis en schaaldieren kan worden beschouwd. Specifieke eisen voor toezicht na het in de handel brengen acht de EFSA niet nodig. De EFSA heeft ook het rapport over de analysemethode voor het toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding geverifieerd dat door het bij Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 ingestelde referentielaboratorium was ingediend. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

De Europese Autoriteit voor voedselveiligheid (hierna de „EFSA” genoemd) heeft in haar advies van 27 januari 2015 (2) geconcludeerd dat DL-methionyl-DL-methionine onder de voorgestelde gebruiksvoorwaarden geen ongunstige effecten voor de diergezondheid, de gezondheid van de mens of het milieu heeft en dat het als een doeltreffende bron van het aminozuur L-methionine voor vis en schaaldieren kan worden beschouwd. Specifieke eisen voor toezicht na het in de handel brengen acht de EFSA niet nodig. De EFSA heeft ook het rapport over de analysemethode voor het toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding geverifieerd dat door het bij Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 ingestelde referentielaboratorium was ingediend.

| (5) | Uit de beoordeling van DL-methionyl-DL-methionine blijkt dat aan de voorwaarden voor vergunningverlening van artikel 5 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 is voldaan. Het gebruik van die stof, zoals gespecifieerd in de bijlage bij deze verordening, moet daarom worden toegestaan. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Uit de beoordeling van DL-methionyl-DL-methionine blijkt dat aan de voorwaarden voor vergunningverlening van artikel 5 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1831/2003 is voldaan. Het gebruik van die stof, zoals gespecifieerd in de bijlage bij deze verordening, moet daarom worden toegestaan.

| (6) | De in deze verordening vervatte maatregelen zijn in overeenstemming met het advies van het Permanent Comité voor planten, dieren, levensmiddelen en diervoeders, |
| --- | --- |

(6)

De in deze verordening vervatte maatregelen zijn in overeenstemming met het advies van het Permanent Comité voor planten, dieren, levensmiddelen en diervoeders,

HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD:

Artikel 1

Voor de in de bijlage beschreven stof, die behoort tot de categorie „nutritionele toevoegingsmiddelen” en de functionele groep „aminozuren, de zouten en de analogen daarvan”, wordt onder de in de bijlage vastgestelde voorwaarden een vergunning voor gebruik als toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding verleend.

Artikel 2

Deze verordening treedt in werking op de twintigste dag na die van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.

Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk in elke lidstaat.

Gedaan te Brussel, 19 augustus 2015.

Voor de Commissie

De voorzitter

Jean-Claude JUNCKER

---

(1)  PB L 268 van 18.10.2003, blz. 29.

1

(2)  EFSA Journal 2015;13(2):4012.

2

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BIJLAGE

| Identificatienummer van het toevoegingsmiddel | Naam van de vergunninghouder | Toevoegingsmiddel | Samenstelling, chemische formule, beschrijving, analysemethode | Diersoort of -categorie | Maximumleeftijd | Minimumgehalte | Maximumgehalte | Overige bepalingen | Einde van de vergunningsperiode |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| mg/kg volledig diervoeder met een vochtgehalte van 12 % |
| Categorie nutritionele toevoegingsmiddelen. Functionele groep: aminozuren, de zouten en de analogen daarvan |
| 3c306 | — | DL-methionyl-DL-methionine | Samenstelling van het toevoegingsmiddel

  Kristallijn poeder uit chemische synthese met een minimum van 93 % DL-methionyl-DL-methionine, een maximum van 3 % DL-methionine en een maximum van 3 % natriumsulfaat (op basis van de droge stof)

  Karakterisering van de werkzame stof

  DL-methionyl-DL-methionine (2-[(2-amino-4-methylsulfanylbutanoyl)amino]-4-methylsulfanylbutaanzuur)
  Chemische formule: C10H20N2O3S2

  CAS-nummer: 52715-93-2

  Analysemethode
   (1)

  Voor de kwantificering van DL-methionyl-DL-methionine in het toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding: Reversed-phase hogedrukvloeistofchromatografie gekoppeld aan fotometrische detectie bij 205 nm (RP-HPLC-UV).
  Voor de kwantificering van DL-methionyl-DL-methionine in voormengsels, mengvoeders en voedermiddelen: methode van ionenwisselingschromatografie met post-column derivatisering en fotometrische detectie bij 570 nm (IEC-UV). | Vis en schaaldieren | — | | | Het vochtgehalte op het etiket vermelden. | 9 september 2025 |

Identificatienummer van het toevoegingsmiddel

Naam van de vergunninghouder

Toevoegingsmiddel

Samenstelling, chemische formule, beschrijving, analysemethode

Diersoort of -categorie

Maximumleeftijd

Minimumgehalte

Maximumgehalte

Overige bepalingen

Einde van de vergunningsperiode

mg/kg volledig diervoeder met een vochtgehalte van 12 %

Categorie nutritionele toevoegingsmiddelen. Functionele groep: aminozuren, de zouten en de analogen daarvan

3c306

—

DL-methionyl-DL-methionine

Samenstelling van het toevoegingsmiddel

Kristallijn poeder uit chemische synthese met een minimum van 93 % DL-methionyl-DL-methionine, een maximum van 3 % DL-methionine en een maximum van 3 % natriumsulfaat (op basis van de droge stof)

Karakterisering van de werkzame stof

DL-methionyl-DL-methionine (2-[(2-amino-4-methylsulfanylbutanoyl)amino]-4-methylsulfanylbutaanzuur)

Chemische formule: C10H20N2O3S2

CAS-nummer: 52715-93-2

Analysemethode
   (1)

Voor de kwantificering van DL-methionyl-DL-methionine in het toevoegingsmiddel voor diervoeding: Reversed-phase hogedrukvloeistofchromatografie gekoppeld aan fotometrische detectie bij 205 nm (RP-HPLC-UV).

Voor de kwantificering van DL-methionyl-DL-methionine in voormengsels, mengvoeders en voedermiddelen: methode van ionenwisselingschromatografie met post-column derivatisering en fotometrische detectie bij 570 nm (IEC-UV).

Vis en schaaldieren

—

Het vochtgehalte op het etiket vermelden.

9 september 2025

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(1)  Nadere bijzonderheden over de analysemethoden zijn te vinden op het volgende adres van het referentielaboratorium: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/eurl/feed-additives/evaluation-reports

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| 20.8.2015 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | L 219/6 |
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20.8.2015

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

L 219/6

---

UITVOERINGSVERORDENING (EU) 2015/1409 VAN DE COMMISSIE

van 19 augustus 2015

tot vaststelling van de forfaitaire invoerwaarden voor de bepaling van de invoerprijs van bepaalde groenten en fruit

DE EUROPESE COMMISSIE,

Gezien het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie,

Gezien Verordening (EU) nr. 1308/2013 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 17 december 2013 tot vaststelling van een gemeenschappelijke ordening van de markten voor landbouwproducten en tot intrekking van de Verordeningen (EEG) nr. 922/72, (EEG) nr. 234/79, (EG) nr. 1037/2001 en (EG) nr. 1234/2007 van de Raad (1),

Gezien Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011 van de Commissie van 7 juni 2011 tot vaststelling van nadere bepalingen voor de toepassing van Verordening (EG) nr. 1234/2007 van de Raad, wat de sectoren groenten en fruit en verwerkte groenten en fruit betreft (2), en met name artikel 136, lid 1,

Overwegende hetgeen volgt:

| (1) | Bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011 zijn, op grond van de resultaten van de multilaterale handelsbesprekingen van de Uruguayronde, de criteria vastgesteld aan de hand waarvan de Commissie voor de producten en de perioden die in bijlage XVI, deel A, bij die verordening zijn vermeld, de forfaitaire waarden bij invoer uit derde landen vaststelt. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011 zijn, op grond van de resultaten van de multilaterale handelsbesprekingen van de Uruguayronde, de criteria vastgesteld aan de hand waarvan de Commissie voor de producten en de perioden die in bijlage XVI, deel A, bij die verordening zijn vermeld, de forfaitaire waarden bij invoer uit derde landen vaststelt.

| (2) | De forfaitaire invoerwaarde wordt elke dag berekend overeenkomstig artikel 136, lid 1, van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011, met inachtneming van de variabele gegevens voor die dag. Bijgevolg moet deze verordening in werking treden op de dag van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

De forfaitaire invoerwaarde wordt elke dag berekend overeenkomstig artikel 136, lid 1, van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011, met inachtneming van de variabele gegevens voor die dag. Bijgevolg moet deze verordening in werking treden op de dag van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie,

HEEFT DE VOLGENDE VERORDENING VASTGESTELD:

Artikel 1

De in artikel 136 van Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 543/2011 bedoelde forfaitaire invoerwaarden worden vastgesteld in de bijlage bij de onderhavige verordening.

Artikel 2

Deze verordening treedt in werking op de dag van de bekendmaking ervan in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.

Deze verordening is verbindend in al haar onderdelen en is rechtstreeks toepasselijk in elke lidstaat.

Gedaan te Brussel, 19 augustus 2015.

Voor de Commissie,

namens de voorzitter,

Jerzy PLEWA

Directeur-generaal Landbouw en Plattelandsontwikkeling

---

(1)  PB L 347 van 20.12.2013, blz. 671.

1

(2)  PB L 157 van 15.6.2011, blz. 1.

2

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BIJLAGE

Forfaitaire invoerwaarden voor de bepaling van de invoerprijs van bepaalde groenten en fruit

| (EUR/100 kg) |
| --- |
| GN-code | Code derde landen (1) | Forfaitaire invoerwaarde |
| 0702 00 00 | MA | 164,5 |
| MK | 51,2 |
| ZZ | 107,9 |
| 0709 93 10 | TR | 131,0 |
| ZZ | 131,0 |
| 0805 50 10 | AR | 143,0 |
| BO | 154,5 |
| CL | 163,3 |
| UY | 153,9 |
| ZA | 153,7 |
| ZZ | 153,7 |
| 0806 10 10 | EG | 253,2 |
| IL | 390,7 |
| TR | 166,5 |
| US | 339,9 |
| ZZ | 283,1 |
| 0808 10 80 | AR | 122,9 |
| BR | 92,7 |
| CL | 124,5 |
| NZ | 146,7 |
| US | 109,0 |
| UY | 141,9 |
| ZA | 120,2 |
| ZZ | 122,6 |
| 0808 30 90 | AR | 136,4 |
| CL | 152,7 |
| CN | 85,3 |
| NZ | 108,4 |
| TR | 136,3 |
| ZA | 111,8 |
| ZZ | 121,8 |
| 0809 30 10, 0809 30 90 | MK | 69,5 |
| TR | 131,7 |
| ZZ | 100,6 |
| 0809 40 05 | BA | 44,3 |
| IL | 99,6 |
| MK | 36,8 |
| XS | 57,7 |
| ZZ | 59,6 |

(EUR/100 kg)

GN-code

Code derde landen (1)

Forfaitaire invoerwaarde

0702 00 00

MA

164,5

MK

51,2

ZZ

107,9

0709 93 10

TR

131,0

ZZ

131,0

0805 50 10

AR

143,0

BO

154,5

CL

163,3

UY

153,9

ZA

153,7

ZZ

153,7

0806 10 10

EG

253,2

IL

390,7

TR

166,5

US

339,9

ZZ

283,1

0808 10 80

AR

122,9

BR

92,7

CL

124,5

NZ

146,7

US

109,0

UY

141,9

ZA

120,2

ZZ

122,6

0808 30 90

AR

136,4

CL

152,7

CN

85,3

NZ

108,4

TR

136,3

ZA

111,8

ZZ

121,8

0809 30 10, 0809 30 90

MK

69,5

TR

131,7

ZZ

100,6

0809 40 05

BA

44,3

IL

99,6

MK

36,8

XS

57,7

ZZ

59,6

---

(1)  Landennomenclatuur vastgesteld bij Verordening (EU) nr. 1106/2012 van de Commissie van 27 november 2012 tot uitvoering van Verordening (EG) nr. 471/2009 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende communautaire statistieken van de buitenlandse handel met derde landen, wat de bijwerking van de nomenclatuur van landen en gebieden betreft (PB L 328 van 28.11.2012, blz. 7). De code „ZZ” staat voor „overige oorsprong”.

---

BESLUITEN

| 20.8.2015 | EN | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | L 219/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

EN

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

L 219/8

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COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2015/1410

of 19 August 2015

giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 126(9) thereof,

Having regard to the recommendation from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) establishes that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits and sets out the excessive deficit procedure to that effect. The Stability and Growth Pact, which in its corrective arm implements the excessive deficit procedure, provides the framework supporting government policies for a prompt return to sound budgetary positions taking account of the economic situation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) establishes that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits and sets out the excessive deficit procedure to that effect. The Stability and Growth Pact, which in its corrective arm implements the excessive deficit procedure, provides the framework supporting government policies for a prompt return to sound budgetary positions taking account of the economic situation.

| (2) | On 27 April 2009, the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community that an excessive deficit existed in Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 27 April 2009, the Council decided, in accordance with Article 104(6) of the Treaty establishing the European Community that an excessive deficit existed in Greece.

| (3) | On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/320/EU (1) addressed to Greece under Article 126(9) and Article 136 TFEU with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fiscal surveillance and giving notice to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit at the latest by the deadline of 2014. The Council established 2014 as the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and annual targets for the government deficit. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 10 May 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/320/EU (1) addressed to Greece under Article 126(9) and Article 136 TFEU with a view to reinforcing and deepening the fiscal surveillance and giving notice to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit at the latest by the deadline of 2014. The Council established 2014 as the deadline for correcting the situation of excessive deficit, and annual targets for the government deficit.

| (4) | Council Decision No 2010/320/EU was substantially amended several times. Since further amendments were to be made, it was recast, on 12 July 2011, by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2) in the interest of clarity. Subsequently, that Decision was significantly amended several times between 8 July 2011 and December 2012 (3). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Council Decision No 2010/320/EU was substantially amended several times. Since further amendments were to be made, it was recast, on 12 July 2011, by Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 addressed to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary to remedy the situation of excessive deficit (2) in the interest of clarity. Subsequently, that Decision was significantly amended several times between 8 July 2011 and December 2012 (3).

| (5) | The very severe deterioration of the financial situation of Greece has led euro area Member States to decide to provide it stability support, with a view to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund. From May 2010 to June 2015, support provided by the euro area Member States took the form of both a bilateral Greek Loan Facility and a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The lenders' support was accompanied by extensive policy conditionality, including the respect by Greece of Council Decision 2011/734/EU and subsequent amendments thereto. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The very severe deterioration of the financial situation of Greece has led euro area Member States to decide to provide it stability support, with a view to safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with multilateral assistance provided by the International Monetary Fund. From May 2010 to June 2015, support provided by the euro area Member States took the form of both a bilateral Greek Loan Facility and a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’). The lenders' support was accompanied by extensive policy conditionality, including the respect by Greece of Council Decision 2011/734/EU and subsequent amendments thereto.

| (6) | On 8 July 2015, Greece requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in the form of a three-year loan, and on 12 July 2015 an agreement in principle was reached on the provision of a loan of the amount of up to EUR 86 000 million to Greece. On 17 July, the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, and with the International Monetary Fund, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) detailing the policy conditionality for a financial assistance facility covering the period 2015-2018 in accordance with Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 8 July 2015, Greece requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in the form of a three-year loan, and on 12 July 2015 an agreement in principle was reached on the provision of a loan of the amount of up to EUR 86 000 million to Greece. On 17 July, the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank, and with the International Monetary Fund, with the task of negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) detailing the policy conditionality for a financial assistance facility covering the period 2015-2018 in accordance with Article 13(3) of the ESM Treaty.

| (7) | In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, a Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM must prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (‘the Programme’) for approval by the Council. Such a programme should ensure the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances and the regulatory environment. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (4), and in particular Article 7 thereof, a Member State requesting financial assistance from the ESM must prepare a macroeconomic adjustment programme (‘the Programme’) for approval by the Council. Such a programme should ensure the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances and the regulatory environment.

| (8) | The Programme prepared by Greece was approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Programme prepared by Greece was approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 (5).

| (9) | Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 also establishes that, in case a Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 7 of that Regulation is also subject to a decision under 126(9) TFEU for the correction of its excessive deficit, the annual budgetary targets in its macroeconomic adjustment programme shall be integrated into the decision to give notice under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (6); in addition, the measures conducive to those targets in the macroeconomic adjustment programme shall also be integrated into the decision to give notice in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Article 10(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 further establishes that the Member State shall be exempt from submitting reports under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Finally, Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 establishes that the monitoring shall be undertaken as provided for by Article 7(4) of that Regulation and the Member State shall be exempt from monitoring under Article 10(1) and Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and from monitoring underlying any decision under Article 6(2) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Article 10(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 also establishes that, in case a Member State subject to a macroeconomic adjustment programme under Article 7 of that Regulation is also subject to a decision under 126(9) TFEU for the correction of its excessive deficit, the annual budgetary targets in its macroeconomic adjustment programme shall be integrated into the decision to give notice under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (6); in addition, the measures conducive to those targets in the macroeconomic adjustment programme shall also be integrated into the decision to give notice in accordance with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Article 10(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 further establishes that the Member State shall be exempt from submitting reports under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97. Finally, Article 10(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 establishes that the monitoring shall be undertaken as provided for by Article 7(4) of that Regulation and the Member State shall be exempt from monitoring under Article 10(1) and Article 10a of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 and from monitoring underlying any decision under Article 6(2) of that Regulation.

| (10) | Economic activity in Greece is currently projected to be much weaker than was expected when the latest amendment to Council Decision 2011/734/EU was adopted in December 2012. Both real and nominal GDP are expected to be at much lower levels in 2015 and 2016 than was expected in the 2015 Spring Forecast of the Commission, due to policy uncertainty, lack of implementation of reforms, a shortfall in government revenues, bank holidays, and the imposition of capital controls. The Commission updated its forecast for GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the MoU required for an ESM programme. According to this forecast, real GDP in 2015-2016 is projected to contract by 2,3 % and 1,3 % respectively, (against a positive growth of 0,5 % and 2,9 % in the 2015 Spring Forecast for the corresponding years), before growing by 2,7 % in 2017 and 3,1 % in 2018. This marked worsening of the economic scenario in 2015-2016 implies a corresponding deterioration of the outlook for public finances given unchanged policies. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Economic activity in Greece is currently projected to be much weaker than was expected when the latest amendment to Council Decision 2011/734/EU was adopted in December 2012. Both real and nominal GDP are expected to be at much lower levels in 2015 and 2016 than was expected in the 2015 Spring Forecast of the Commission, due to policy uncertainty, lack of implementation of reforms, a shortfall in government revenues, bank holidays, and the imposition of capital controls. The Commission updated its forecast for GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the MoU required for an ESM programme. According to this forecast, real GDP in 2015-2016 is projected to contract by 2,3 % and 1,3 % respectively, (against a positive growth of 0,5 % and 2,9 % in the 2015 Spring Forecast for the corresponding years), before growing by 2,7 % in 2017 and 3,1 % in 2018. This marked worsening of the economic scenario in 2015-2016 implies a corresponding deterioration of the outlook for public finances given unchanged policies.

| (11) | Greece is estimated to have improved its structural deficit by 16 percentage points of GDP from a 15,2 % deficit in 2009 to an estimated 1 % surplus in 2014, thus ensuring an improvement in the structural balance in 2009-2014, which is significantly larger than the requirement of at least 10 percentage points of GDP over the period recommended by the Council. In 2014, the general government deficit reached 3,5 % of GDP, clearly within the 4,5 % of GDP government deficit (ESA2010 basis) ceiling for 2014 established by the Council Decision. However, the primary balance outturn of 0,4 % of GDP was substantially weaker than expected and undershot the target set at 1,5 % of GDP due to a combination of factors including the reversal in the economic cycle and the related negative impact on budget revenues, the relaxation of fiscal policy and increased economic uncertainty. The weakening macroeconomic environment accompanied with expiring temporary fiscal measures in 2015 have, however, made it impossible to achieve the primary balance target of 3 % of GDP in 2015 envisaged in the latest amendment to Decision 2011/734/EU adopted in December 2012. The fiscal targets have, therefore, been revised down substantially, taking into account the macroeconomic circumstances and the current fiscal situation, to avoid overtightening fiscal policy in the short term. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Greece is estimated to have improved its structural deficit by 16 percentage points of GDP from a 15,2 % deficit in 2009 to an estimated 1 % surplus in 2014, thus ensuring an improvement in the structural balance in 2009-2014, which is significantly larger than the requirement of at least 10 percentage points of GDP over the period recommended by the Council. In 2014, the general government deficit reached 3,5 % of GDP, clearly within the 4,5 % of GDP government deficit (ESA2010 basis) ceiling for 2014 established by the Council Decision. However, the primary balance outturn of 0,4 % of GDP was substantially weaker than expected and undershot the target set at 1,5 % of GDP due to a combination of factors including the reversal in the economic cycle and the related negative impact on budget revenues, the relaxation of fiscal policy and increased economic uncertainty. The weakening macroeconomic environment accompanied with expiring temporary fiscal measures in 2015 have, however, made it impossible to achieve the primary balance target of 3 % of GDP in 2015 envisaged in the latest amendment to Decision 2011/734/EU adopted in December 2012. The fiscal targets have, therefore, been revised down substantially, taking into account the macroeconomic circumstances and the current fiscal situation, to avoid overtightening fiscal policy in the short term.

| (12) | Greece will accordingly pursue a new fiscal path, premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with the expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Greece will accordingly pursue a new fiscal path, premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with the expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017.

| (13) | Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

| (14) | The budget for 2016 to be adopted by the Greek parliament forms part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2016-2019, with the aim to deliver a sizeable and front-loaded fiscal consolidation bringing savings of more than EUR 6 900 million, close to 4 % of GDP. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The budget for 2016 to be adopted by the Greek parliament forms part of the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) 2016-2019, with the aim to deliver a sizeable and front-loaded fiscal consolidation bringing savings of more than EUR 6 900 million, close to 4 % of GDP.

| (15) | The failure to complete the final EFSF programme review, the missed debt service payments, the expiration of the EFSF programme and the introduction of capital controls have created new circumstances that have led to a further strong deterioration in debt sustainability. This is due to lower growth estimates, a downward revision of the primary surplus targets, a downward revision of privatisation receipts, a strong deterioration in the financing needs of the banking sector following the imposition of capital controls, the need for a higher clearance of arrears following the liquidity shortage experienced by the sovereign and valuation effects due to the depreciation of the euro with respect to the SDR. As a result of these developments debt-to-GDP is expected to reach 198,3 % in 2016, before decreasing to 169,3 % in 2020, 154,5 % in 2022 and 115,9 % in 2030 in the baseline scenario. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The failure to complete the final EFSF programme review, the missed debt service payments, the expiration of the EFSF programme and the introduction of capital controls have created new circumstances that have led to a further strong deterioration in debt sustainability. This is due to lower growth estimates, a downward revision of the primary surplus targets, a downward revision of privatisation receipts, a strong deterioration in the financing needs of the banking sector following the imposition of capital controls, the need for a higher clearance of arrears following the liquidity shortage experienced by the sovereign and valuation effects due to the depreciation of the euro with respect to the SDR. As a result of these developments debt-to-GDP is expected to reach 198,3 % in 2016, before decreasing to 169,3 % in 2020, 154,5 % in 2022 and 115,9 % in 2030 in the baseline scenario.

| (16) | Taking into account those developments, the adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit needs to be updated. The commitment undertaken by Greece concerns not only the fiscal consolidation measures, but also those measures needed to enhance the growth-friendly nature and to minimise any negative social impact. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Taking into account those developments, the adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit needs to be updated. The commitment undertaken by Greece concerns not only the fiscal consolidation measures, but also those measures needed to enhance the growth-friendly nature and to minimise any negative social impact.

| (17) | Each measure required by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 is instrumental in achieving the required budgetary adjustment. Some measures have a direct impact on the budgetary situation of Greece while the others are structural measures that will result in improved fiscal governance and a sounder budgetary situation in the medium term. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Each measure required by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 is instrumental in achieving the required budgetary adjustment. Some measures have a direct impact on the budgetary situation of Greece while the others are structural measures that will result in improved fiscal governance and a sounder budgetary situation in the medium term.

| (18) | In light of the above considerations, it appears necessary to revise the previous annual budgetary targets and the measures conducive to those targets. The new annual budgetary targets and measures conducive to those targets are those contained in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411, |
| --- | --- |

(18)

In light of the above considerations, it appears necessary to revise the previous annual budgetary targets and the measures conducive to those targets. The new annual budgetary targets and measures conducive to those targets are those contained in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   Greece shall put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible, and at the latest, by 2017.

2.   The adjustment path towards the correction of the excessive deficit shall aim to meet the annual general-government-deficit targets, as laid down in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411 and will be based on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. The revised path means that the general government budget deficit will fall below 3 % of GDP in 2017.

3.   Greece shall adopt and fully implement all fiscal, economic and structural adjustment measures incorporated in the economic and financial adjustment programme as approved by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1411.

4.   Greece shall stand ready to adopt further measures if risks to the budgetary plans materialise. Budgetary consolidation measures shall secure a lasting improvement in the general government structural balance in a growth-friendly manner.

Article 2

This Decision shall take effect on the day of its notification.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 19 August 2015.

For the Council

The President

J. ASSELBORN

---

(1)  OJ L 145, 11.6.2010, p. 6.

1

(2)  OJ L 296, 15.11.2011, p. 38.

2

(3)  Council Decision 2011/791/EU of 8 November 2011 (OJ L 320, 3.12.2011, p. 28), Council Decision 2012/211/EU of 13 March 2012 (OJ L 113, 25.4.2012, p. 8), Council Decision 2013/6/EU of 4 December 2012 (OJ L 4, 9.1.2013, p. 40).

3

(4)  OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1.

4

(5)  See page 12 of this Official Journal.

5

(6)  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

6

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| 20.8.2015 | EN | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | L 219/12 |
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20.8.2015

EN

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

L 219/12

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (EU) 2015/1411

of 19 August 2015

approving the macroeconomic adjustment programme of Greece

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (1), and in particular Article 7(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | Article 136(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) foresees the possibility of adopting measures specific to Member States whose currency is the euro in order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 136(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) foresees the possibility of adopting measures specific to Member States whose currency is the euro in order to ensure the proper functioning of economic and monetary union.

| (2) | Since 2010, Greece has been granted financial assistance by the Member States and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). A first Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was been agreed on 2 May 2010: the euro area Member States agreed to provide bilateral loans, pooled by the European Commission, for a total amount of EUR 80 000 million to be disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013 and the IMF committing additional EUR 30 000 million under a stand-by arrangement. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was approved on 14 March 2012. The euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus an additional EUR 130 000 million for the years 2012-2014. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on bilateral loans, it was agreed that — on the side of euro area Member States — the second programme would be financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’), which had been fully operational since August 2010. In total, the second programme foresaw financial assistance of EUR 164 500 million until the end of 2014 (the period was later extended until the end of June 2015). Of that sum, the euro area commitment amounts to EUR 144 700 million to be provided via the EFSF, while the IMF contributed EUR 19 800 million, as part of a four-year EUR 28 000 million arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece that the IMF approved in March 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Since 2010, Greece has been granted financial assistance by the Member States and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). A first Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was been agreed on 2 May 2010: the euro area Member States agreed to provide bilateral loans, pooled by the European Commission, for a total amount of EUR 80 000 million to be disbursed over the period May 2010 through June 2013 and the IMF committing additional EUR 30 000 million under a stand-by arrangement. The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was approved on 14 March 2012. The euro area Member States and the IMF committed the undisbursed amounts of the first programme plus an additional EUR 130 000 million for the years 2012-2014. Whereas the financing of the first programme was based on bilateral loans, it was agreed that — on the side of euro area Member States — the second programme would be financed by the European Financial Stability Facility (‘EFSF’), which had been fully operational since August 2010. In total, the second programme foresaw financial assistance of EUR 164 500 million until the end of 2014 (the period was later extended until the end of June 2015). Of that sum, the euro area commitment amounts to EUR 144 700 million to be provided via the EFSF, while the IMF contributed EUR 19 800 million, as part of a four-year EUR 28 000 million arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Greece that the IMF approved in March 2012.

| (3) | On 8 July 2015, in view of the ongoing severe economic and financial disturbance, the Greek authorities requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in order to ensure a properly-functioning Greek banking system, to meet Greece's debt obligations, to support the return of Greece's economy to sustainable growth and safeguard financial stability of the euro area and of its Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 8 July 2015, in view of the ongoing severe economic and financial disturbance, the Greek authorities requested financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM’) in order to ensure a properly-functioning Greek banking system, to meet Greece's debt obligations, to support the return of Greece's economy to sustainable growth and safeguard financial stability of the euro area and of its Member States.

| (4) | Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ESM Treaty, and to form the basis for a decision of the ESM Board of Governors, in line with Article 13(2) thereof, whether to grant, in principle, stability support to Greece in the form of a loan, on 8 July 2015 the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’), with assessing the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member States; assessing, together with the IMF, whether public debt is sustainable; and estimating the actual or potential financing needs of Greece. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ESM Treaty, and to form the basis for a decision of the ESM Board of Governors, in line with Article 13(2) thereof, whether to grant, in principle, stability support to Greece in the form of a loan, on 8 July 2015 the Chairperson of the ESM Board of Governors entrusted the European Commission, in liaison with the European Central Bank (‘ECB’), with assessing the existence of a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member States; assessing, together with the IMF, whether public debt is sustainable; and estimating the actual or potential financing needs of Greece.

| (5) | In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and with input from IMF staff, completed those assessments on 10 July 2015, concluding that conditions for the financial support for Greece, to be provided in the form of an ESM loan, are in place. The financing needs were estimated to be up to EUR 86 000 million. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

In compliance with Article 13 of the ESM Treaty, the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and with input from IMF staff, completed those assessments on 10 July 2015, concluding that conditions for the financial support for Greece, to be provided in the form of an ESM loan, are in place. The financing needs were estimated to be up to EUR 86 000 million.

| (6) | On 17 July 2015, Greece was granted EUR 7 160 million short-term financial assistance under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (‘EFSM’), by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 (2), for facing July 2015 repayment obligations and settling its arrears to the IMF. The assistance was disbursed in one instalment on 20 July 2015, and was linked to economic policy conditionality. The ESM assistance will be used, inter alia, to repay that short-term EFSM bridge loan. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 17 July 2015, Greece was granted EUR 7 160 million short-term financial assistance under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (‘EFSM’), by Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1181 (2), for facing July 2015 repayment obligations and settling its arrears to the IMF. The assistance was disbursed in one instalment on 20 July 2015, and was linked to economic policy conditionality. The ESM assistance will be used, inter alia, to repay that short-term EFSM bridge loan.

| (7) | On 16 July 2015, the ESM Board of Governors invited the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, the ESM, the Greek authorities, and, where appropriate, the IMF, to agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme for Greece. The programme was prepared in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013. On 11 August 2015, those institutions reached an agreement at technical level on a macroeconomic adjustment programme (the ‘Programme’) with the Greek Government. The Programme submitted by Greece to the Commission and the Council aims at ensuring the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances, as well as to ensure financial stability and to promote growth, employment, and social fairness. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 16 July 2015, the ESM Board of Governors invited the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, the ESM, the Greek authorities, and, where appropriate, the IMF, to agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme for Greece. The programme was prepared in accordance with the procedure provided for under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 472/2013. On 11 August 2015, those institutions reached an agreement at technical level on a macroeconomic adjustment programme (the ‘Programme’) with the Greek Government. The Programme submitted by Greece to the Commission and the Council aims at ensuring the adoption of a set of reforms needed to improve the sustainability of public finances, as well as to ensure financial stability and to promote growth, employment, and social fairness.

| (8) | Following that agreement, Greece should adopt a comprehensive policy package, to be implemented in a three-year macroeconomic adjustment programme which would span from the third quarter of 2015 to the third quarter of 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Following that agreement, Greece should adopt a comprehensive policy package, to be implemented in a three-year macroeconomic adjustment programme which would span from the third quarter of 2015 to the third quarter of 2018.

| (9) | The comprehensive policy package, to be laid down in an ESM Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’), should aim at restoring financial market confidence, re-establishing sound macroeconomic balances and enabling the economy to return to sustainable growth. It should be structured on four pillars: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The comprehensive policy package, to be laid down in an ESM Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’), should aim at restoring financial market confidence, re-establishing sound macroeconomic balances and enabling the economy to return to sustainable growth. It should be structured on four pillars: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration.

| (10) | The Commission services updated their forecast for nominal GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the ESM programme. Under this forecast, which centres around a nominal GDP growth rate of – 3,2 % in 2015, – 0,7 % in 2016, 3,4 % in 2017, 4,1 % in 2018 and 4,2 % in 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio would amount to 196,3 % in 2015, 200,9 % in 2016, 198,6 % in 2017, 190,7 % in 2018 and 182,3 % in 2019. The debt-to-GDP ratio would therefore increase until 2016 and move to a declining path thereafter, reaching an estimated 174,5 % in 2020, with debt dynamics affected by several below-the-line operations. Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The Commission services updated their forecast for nominal GDP growth in August 2015, as needed to underpin the negotiations for the ESM programme. Under this forecast, which centres around a nominal GDP growth rate of – 3,2 % in 2015, – 0,7 % in 2016, 3,4 % in 2017, 4,1 % in 2018 and 4,2 % in 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio would amount to 196,3 % in 2015, 200,9 % in 2016, 198,6 % in 2017, 190,7 % in 2018 and 182,3 % in 2019. The debt-to-GDP ratio would therefore increase until 2016 and move to a declining path thereafter, reaching an estimated 174,5 % in 2020, with debt dynamics affected by several below-the-line operations. Under the Commission services' update of the forecast for nominal GDP growth, the primary general government balance is projected to attain a deficit of EUR 7 631 million (4,4 % of GDP) in 2015, a deficit of EUR 6 166 million (3,6 % of GDP) in 2016, a deficit of EUR 4 089 million (2,3 % of GDP) in 2017 and a deficit of EUR 753 million (0,4 % of GDP) in 2018.

| (11) | The authorities will pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The authorities will pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 % of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. The trajectory of the fiscal targets is consistent with expected growth rates of the Greek economy as it recovers from its deepest recorded recession.

| (12) | Enhancing the long-term resilience of the Greek banking sector is critical to restoring financial stability in Greece and to preserving financial stability in the euro area as a whole. To preserve the liquidity of the Greek banking sector, temporary administrative measures were imposed, including capital controls. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Enhancing the long-term resilience of the Greek banking sector is critical to restoring financial stability in Greece and to preserving financial stability in the euro area as a whole. To preserve the liquidity of the Greek banking sector, temporary administrative measures were imposed, including capital controls.

| (13) | The implementation of comprehensive and ambitious reforms in financial, fiscal and structural areas should safeguard the medium-term sustainability of the Greek public debt. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The implementation of comprehensive and ambitious reforms in financial, fiscal and structural areas should safeguard the medium-term sustainability of the Greek public debt.

| (14) | The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, should verify at regular intervals the rigorous implementation of Greece's Programme through missions and regular reporting, on a quarterly basis, by the Greek authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, should verify at regular intervals the rigorous implementation of Greece's Programme through missions and regular reporting, on a quarterly basis, by the Greek authorities.

| (15) | Throughout the implementation of Greece's comprehensive policy package, the Commission should provide additional policy advice and technical assistance in specific areas. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Throughout the implementation of Greece's comprehensive policy package, the Commission should provide additional policy advice and technical assistance in specific areas.

| (16) | The Greek authorities should involve, in accordance with current national rules and practices, the social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Greek authorities should involve, in accordance with current national rules and practices, the social partners and civil society organisations in the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Programme.

| (17) | Any form of financial assistance received by Greece to help it implement the policies under its Programme should be in line with the legal requirements and policies of the Union, in particular the Union's economic governance framework. Any intervention in support of financial institutions should be carried out in accordance with the Union's rules on competition. The Commission should ensure that any measures laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding in the context of requested ESM financial assistance are fully consistent with this Decision, |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Any form of financial assistance received by Greece to help it implement the policies under its Programme should be in line with the legal requirements and policies of the Union, in particular the Union's economic governance framework. Any intervention in support of financial institutions should be carried out in accordance with the Union's rules on competition. The Commission should ensure that any measures laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding in the context of requested ESM financial assistance are fully consistent with this Decision,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   In order to facilitate the return of the Greek economy to a path of sustainable growth and to fiscal and financial stability, Greece shall rigorously implement the Programme, the main elements of which are laid down in Article 2 of this Decision. The Programme shall address the specific risks emanating from Greece for the financial stability of the euro area and shall aim to rapidly re-establish a sound and sustainable economic and financial situation in Greece and restore its capacity to finance itself fully on the international financial markets. The Programme shall take due account of the Council recommendations addressed to Greece under Articles 121, 126, 136 and 148 TFEU as well as Greece's actions to comply with them, while aiming to broaden, strengthen and deepen the policy measures required.

2.   The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, shall monitor Greece's progress in implementing its Programme. Greece shall give the Commission and the ECB its full cooperation. It shall, in particular, provide them with all the information that they deem necessary for the monitoring of the Programme.

3.   The Commission, in liaison with the ECB and, where appropriate, the IMF, shall examine with the Greek authorities any changes and updates to the Programme that may be needed in order to take proper account of, inter alia, any significant gap between macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts and realised figures, negative spillover effects, as well as macroeconomic and financial shocks.

In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the Programme and to help the correction of imbalances in a sustainable way, the Commission shall provide continued advice and guidance on fiscal, financial market and structural reforms.

The Commission shall at regular intervals assess the economic impact of the Programme and shall recommend necessary corrections with a view to enhancing growth and job creation, securing the necessary fiscal consolidation, and minimising harmful social impacts.

Article 2

1.   The key objectives of the Programme shall be: restoring fiscal sustainability, safeguarding financial stability, enhancing competitiveness and growth, and modernising the state and the public administration.

2.   Greece shall pursue fiscal consolidation by means of high-quality permanent measures while minimising the impact on disadvantaged people. The Greek authorities commit to ensuring sustainable public finances and achieve sizeable and sustainable primary surpluses over the medium-term that will reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio steadily. The authorities shall accordingly pursue a new fiscal path premised on primary surplus targets of – 0,25, 0,5, 1,75, and 3,5 per cent of GDP in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 and beyond, respectively. Greece shall target a medium-term primary surplus of 3,5 % of GDP to be achieved through a combination of upfront parametric fiscal reforms, including to its VAT and pension system, supported by an ambitious programme to strengthen tax compliance and public financial management, and fight tax evasion, while ensuring adequate protection of vulnerable groups. In addition to the measures above, the authorities commit to legislate in October 2015 credible structural measures yielding at least 0,75 % of GDP coming into effect in 2017 and 0,25 % of GDP coming into effect in 2018 to support the achievement of the medium-term primary balance target of 3,5 % of GDP. The authorities commit to take further structural measures in October 2016, if needed to secure the 2017 and 2018 targets. Those would include containing defence expenditure, the planned personal income tax reform and freezing statutory spending. Parametric fiscal measures shall be bolstered by a wide range of administrative actions to address shortfalls in tax collection and enforcement. The Greek Government shall monitor fiscal risks, including court rulings, and shall take offsetting measures as needed to meet the fiscal targets. The authorities intend to transfer at least 30 % of any over-performance to the segregated account earmarked for debt reduction. In addition, another 30 % of the over-performance would be used for clearing unpaid government obligations linked to the past.

3.   Greece shall adopt the measures specified below:

| (i) | take measures in the short term to raise revenues and to target and contain expenditure. Among the measures to raise revenue, Greece shall gradually abolish the refund of excise tax on diesel oil for farmers and increase the tonnage tax. The authorities shall take actions to launch the 2015 property tax (ENFIA) exercise in order to issue bills in October 2015 with the final instalment due in February 2016. They shall also correct identified issues with the revenue measures recently implemented. The authorities also committed to target and contain expenditure by reducing the cost of healthcare and launching the comprehensive social welfare review. The package includes further measures with budgetary impact, such as public administration reforms, reforms addressing shortfalls in tax collection enforcement, and other parametric measures; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

take measures in the short term to raise revenues and to target and contain expenditure. Among the measures to raise revenue, Greece shall gradually abolish the refund of excise tax on diesel oil for farmers and increase the tonnage tax. The authorities shall take actions to launch the 2015 property tax (ENFIA) exercise in order to issue bills in October 2015 with the final instalment due in February 2016. They shall also correct identified issues with the revenue measures recently implemented. The authorities also committed to target and contain expenditure by reducing the cost of healthcare and launching the comprehensive social welfare review. The package includes further measures with budgetary impact, such as public administration reforms, reforms addressing shortfalls in tax collection enforcement, and other parametric measures;

| (ii) | to demonstrate its commitment to credible fiscal policies, adopt in October 2015, a supplementary 2015 budget as needed, the draft 2016 budget and a 2016-2019 Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, supported by a sizable and credible package of parametric measures and structural fiscal reforms; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

to demonstrate its commitment to credible fiscal policies, adopt in October 2015, a supplementary 2015 budget as needed, the draft 2016 budget and a 2016-2019 Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy, supported by a sizable and credible package of parametric measures and structural fiscal reforms;

| (iii) | enact reforms of both direct and indirect taxation to improve efficiency, collectability and boost labour supply. To break from past practice and improve the tax and social security payment culture, the Government shall take strong action to improve collection, and neither introduce new instalment or other amnesty or settlement schemes nor extend existing schemes; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

enact reforms of both direct and indirect taxation to improve efficiency, collectability and boost labour supply. To break from past practice and improve the tax and social security payment culture, the Government shall take strong action to improve collection, and neither introduce new instalment or other amnesty or settlement schemes nor extend existing schemes;

| (iv) | continue reforms that aim at improving the budget process and expenditure controls, clearing arrears, and strengthening budget reporting and cash management. The Government is committed to making the Fiscal Council operational; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

continue reforms that aim at improving the budget process and expenditure controls, clearing arrears, and strengthening budget reporting and cash management. The Government is committed to making the Fiscal Council operational;

| (v) | take further action in the area of public procurement to increase efficiency and transparency of the Greek public procurement system, prevent misconduct, and ensure more accountability and control. Policies will be agreed with the European Commission, which shall assist with the implementation of an action plan; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

take further action in the area of public procurement to increase efficiency and transparency of the Greek public procurement system, prevent misconduct, and ensure more accountability and control. Policies will be agreed with the European Commission, which shall assist with the implementation of an action plan;

| (vi) | implement fully the existing reforms and also proceed with further reforms to strengthen long-term sustainability, targeting savings of around 0,25 % of GDP in 2015 and around 1 % of GDP by 2016. The package inter alia aims to create strong disincentives for early retirement through increasing early retirement penalties and by the gradual elimination of the grandfathering of rights to retire before the statutory retirement age; |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

implement fully the existing reforms and also proceed with further reforms to strengthen long-term sustainability, targeting savings of around 0,25 % of GDP in 2015 and around 1 % of GDP by 2016. The package inter alia aims to create strong disincentives for early retirement through increasing early retirement penalties and by the gradual elimination of the grandfathering of rights to retire before the statutory retirement age;

| (vii) | continue reforming the healthcare sector, controlling public expenditure, managing prices of pharmaceuticals, improve hospital management, increase centralised procurement of hospital supplies, manage demand for pharmaceuticals and health care through evidence-based e-prescription protocols, commission private sector healthcare providers in a cost-effective manner, modernise IT systems, developing a new electronic referral system for primary and secondary care that allows the formulation of care pathways for patients; |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

continue reforming the healthcare sector, controlling public expenditure, managing prices of pharmaceuticals, improve hospital management, increase centralised procurement of hospital supplies, manage demand for pharmaceuticals and health care through evidence-based e-prescription protocols, commission private sector healthcare providers in a cost-effective manner, modernise IT systems, developing a new electronic referral system for primary and secondary care that allows the formulation of care pathways for patients;

| (viii) | adopt by March 2016 a further series of guaranteed employment support schemes with individualised active labour market measures for participants, using local partnerships, involving the private and social economy sectors and ensuring the efficient and effective use of the resources available.
  Achieving a fairer society will require that Greece improve the design of its welfare system, so that there is a genuine social safety net which targets scarce resources at those in most need. The authorities plan to benefit from available technical assistance from international organisations for the social welfare review and for the guaranteed minimum income implementation. |
| --- | --- |

(viii)

adopt by March 2016 a further series of guaranteed employment support schemes with individualised active labour market measures for participants, using local partnerships, involving the private and social economy sectors and ensuring the efficient and effective use of the resources available.

Achieving a fairer society will require that Greece improve the design of its welfare system, so that there is a genuine social safety net which targets scarce resources at those in most need. The authorities plan to benefit from available technical assistance from international organisations for the social welfare review and for the guaranteed minimum income implementation.

4.   To safeguard financial stability, Greece shall immediately take steps to tackle Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and restore liquidity and capital in the banking system. A recapitalisation process of banks should be completed before the end of 2015, which shall be accompanied by concomitant measures to strengthen the governance of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (‘HFSF’) and of banks. Further measures involve the resolution of Non-Performing Loans (‘NPLs’) and the governance of the HFSF and of banks.

5.   To promote growth, competitiveness and investment, Greece shall design and implement a wide range of reforms in labour markets and product markets (including energy) that not only ensure full compliance with European Union requirements, but also aim at achieving European best practices. More open markets are essential to create economic opportunities and improve social fairness, by curtailing rent-seeking and monopolistic behaviour, which has translated into higher prices and lower living standards. In line with their growth strategy, the authorities shall intensify their efforts to bring key initiatives and reform proposals to fruition as well as enrich the agenda with further ambitious reforms that shall support the country's return to sustainable growth, attract investments and create jobs.

6.   The Greek energy markets need wide-ranging reforms to bring them in line with Union legislation and policies, make them more modern and competitive, reduce monopolistic rents and inefficiencies, promote innovation, favour the wider adoption of renewables and gas, and ensure the transfer of benefits of all these changes to consumers. The authorities shall adopt the reform of the gas market and its specific roadmap, leading inter alia to full eligibility to switch supplier for all customers by 2018, and notify the reformed capacity payments system (including a temporary and a permanent mechanism) and New Organisation of Markets in Electricity products to the Commission. In any case, by 2020 no undertaking shall be permitted to produce or import, directly or indirectly, more than 50 % of total electricity produced and imported in Greece.

7.   There shall be an ambitious privatisation programme and policies which support investment. The Government commits to facilitate the privatisation process and complete all needed Government actions to allow tenders to be executed successfully. In this respect the Government shall complete all actions needed as agreed on a quarterly basis between the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (‘HRADF’), the institutions and the Government. The List of Government Pending Actions has been approved by the Board of Directors of the HRADF. In line with the statement of the Euro Summit of 12 July 2015, a new independent fund (the ‘Fund’) shall be established and have in its possession valuable Greek assets. The overarching objective of the Fund is to manage valuable Greek assets; and to protect, create and ultimately maximise their value which it shall monetise through privatisations and other means.

8.   A modern state and public administration shall be a key priority of the Programme. Particular attention shall be paid to increasing the efficiency of the public sector in the delivery of essential public goods and services. Measures shall be taken to enhance the efficiency of the judicial system and to upgrade the fight against corruption. Reforms shall strengthen the institutional and operational independence of key institutions such as the revenue administration and the statistics institute (Elstat).

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 19 August 2015.

For the Council

The President

J. ASSELBORN

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(1)  OJ L 140, 27.5.2013, p. 1.

1

(2)  OJ L 192, 18.7.2015, p. 15.

2

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HANDELINGEN VAN BIJ INTERNATIONALE OVEREENKOMSTEN INGESTELDE ORGANEN

| 20.8.2015 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | L 219/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.8.2015

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

L 219/17

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BESLUIT Nr. 1 VAN HET COMITÉ EU-KOREA VOOR DE HANDEL IN GOEDEREN

van 28 mei 2015

inzake de vaststelling van regels voor het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van tariefcontingenten [2015/1412]

HET COMITÉ VOOR DE HANDEL IN GOEDEREN,

Gezien de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen de Republiek Korea („Korea”), enerzijds, en de Europese Unie en haar lidstaten, anderzijds, („de partijen” en „de overeenkomst”), en met name de artikelen 2.16, 15.2, lid 1, en aanhangsel 2-A-1, punten 2 en 3,

Overwegende hetgeen volgt:

| (1) | Bij artikel 15.1 van de overeenkomst is een Handelscomité opgericht dat onder meer moet zorgen dat de overeenkomst naar behoren functioneert en moet toezien op de werkzaamheden van alle gespecialiseerde comités. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Bij artikel 15.1 van de overeenkomst is een Handelscomité opgericht dat onder meer moet zorgen dat de overeenkomst naar behoren functioneert en moet toezien op de werkzaamheden van alle gespecialiseerde comités.

| (2) | Overeenkomstig artikel 15.2 van de overeenkomst zijn gespecialiseerde comités opgericht, die onder toezicht van het Handelscomité staan. Het Comité voor de handel in goederen, overeenkomstig artikel 2.16 van de overeenkomst, is een van die gespecialiseerde comités. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Overeenkomstig artikel 15.2 van de overeenkomst zijn gespecialiseerde comités opgericht, die onder toezicht van het Handelscomité staan. Het Comité voor de handel in goederen, overeenkomstig artikel 2.16 van de overeenkomst, is een van die gespecialiseerde comités.

| (3) | Overeenkomstig aanhangsel 2-A-1, punt 2, van de overeenkomst mag Korea voor het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van de tariefcontingenten die Korea ingevolge de overeenkomst toepast op bepaalde goederen van oorsprong uit de Europese Unie gebruikmaken van een veilingstelsel. De voorwaarden van het veilingstelsel moeten in onderling overleg door de partijen bij besluit van het Comité voor de handel in goederen worden vastgesteld. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Overeenkomstig aanhangsel 2-A-1, punt 2, van de overeenkomst mag Korea voor het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van de tariefcontingenten die Korea ingevolge de overeenkomst toepast op bepaalde goederen van oorsprong uit de Europese Unie gebruikmaken van een veilingstelsel. De voorwaarden van het veilingstelsel moeten in onderling overleg door de partijen bij besluit van het Comité voor de handel in goederen worden vastgesteld.

| (4) | Overeenkomstig aanhangsel 2-A-1, punt 3, van de overeenkomst mag Korea voor het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van bepaalde tariefcontingenten gebruikmaken van een vergunningenstelsel. De partijen moeten in het Comité voor de handel in goederen overeenstemming bereiken over het beleid en de procedures voor het vergunningenstelsel, inclusief de voorwaarden waaraan moet worden voldaan om voor tariefcontingenten in aanmerking te komen, en over eventuele wijzigingen daarvan, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Overeenkomstig aanhangsel 2-A-1, punt 3, van de overeenkomst mag Korea voor het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van bepaalde tariefcontingenten gebruikmaken van een vergunningenstelsel. De partijen moeten in het Comité voor de handel in goederen overeenstemming bereiken over het beleid en de procedures voor het vergunningenstelsel, inclusief de voorwaarden waaraan moet worden voldaan om voor tariefcontingenten in aanmerking te komen, en over eventuele wijzigingen daarvan,

HEEFT HET VOLGENDE BESLUIT VASTGESTELD:

| 1. | Bij het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van de tariefcontingenten die Korea ingevolge de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen de Republiek Korea, enerzijds, en de Europese Unie en haar lidstaten, anderzijds, toepast op bepaalde goederen van oorsprong uit de Europese Unie, volgt Korea de in de bijlage bij dit besluit vastgestelde regels. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bij het beheer en de tenuitvoerlegging van de tariefcontingenten die Korea ingevolge de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen de Republiek Korea, enerzijds, en de Europese Unie en haar lidstaten, anderzijds, toepast op bepaalde goederen van oorsprong uit de Europese Unie, volgt Korea de in de bijlage bij dit besluit vastgestelde regels.

| 2. | Dit besluit treedt in werking op de dag van de vaststelling ervan. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dit besluit treedt in werking op de dag van de vaststelling ervan.

Gedaan op 28 mei 2015.

Voor het Comité voor de handel in goederen

Helena KÖNIG

Waarnemend directeur

Directoraat-generaal Handel van de Europese Commissie

Chang K. KIM

Directeur-generaal van het departement Handelsbeleid

Ministerie van Handel, Industrie en Energie van de Republiek Korea

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BIJLAGE

REGELS VOOR HET BEHEER EN DE TENUITVOERLEGGING VAN DE TARIEFCONTINGENTEN

Artikel 1

Tijdschema van veilingen en vergunningsaanvragen

(1)   Veilingen voor mageremelkpoeder, vollemelkpoeder, gecondenseerde melk en natuurlijke honing moeten voorafgaan aan de invoerperiode, d.w.z. in juni voor contingenten die in juli worden geopend.

(2)   De specifieke richtsnoeren van de Korea Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation dienen te bepalen dat de publieke aankondigingen voor de veilingen acht kalenderdagen vóór de uiterste termijn voor het indienen van de aanvraag tot deelname aan de veilingen worden gedaan.

(3)   Voor producten waarvan het tijdschema voor het aanvragen van een contingentvergunning niet is vastgesteld in de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen Korea en de EU, dienen de specifieke richtsnoeren van de agentschappen die zijn aangewezen voor het beheer van tariefcontingenten (hierna „aanbevelende instanties” genoemd) te voorzien in een vergunningaanvraagperiode van ten minste zeven kalenderdagen vanaf de eerste werkdag van het jaar van tenuitvoerlegging als bedoeld in bijlage 2-A, punt 5, van de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen Korea en de EU.

Artikel 2

Borgsom en vergoedingen

(1)   Voor diensten die verband houden met een aanvraag voor de toewijzing van een tariefcontingent via veiling mogen geen andere administratieve kosten of vergoedingen worden aangerekend dan de borgsom — het bedrag dat wordt betaald door bieders die een veilingaanvraag indienen.

(2)   De algemene instructies voor bieders voor elke veiling dienen voor te schrijven dat de borgsom, zodra de veiling is voltooid, zo spoedig als normale administratieve procedures toelaten, aan de bieders wordt terugbetaald.

(3)   Voor aanvragers van vergunningen wordt geen waarborg of borgsom vereist.

Artikel 3

Afgifte en geldigheid van een aanbeveling

(1)   Na een veiling of een vergunningaanvraag dienen de aanbevelende instanties een aanbeveling voor de invoer van tariefcontingenten in het kader van de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen Korea en de EU (hierna „aanbeveling” genoemd) af te gegeven.

(2)   Aanbevelingen worden binnen twee kalenderdagen aan de aanvragers afgegeven op voorwaarde dat de ingediende aanvraag voor een tariefcontingentenaanbeveling aan de aanbevelingsvereisten voldoet.

(3)   Een aanbeveling voor de invoer van tariefcontingenten is 90 dagen geldig. De geldigheidsduur kan met 30 dagen worden verlengd, maar mag de laatste dag van het jaar van tenuitvoerlegging als bedoeld in bijlage 2-A, punt 5, bij de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen Korea en de EU niet overschrijden.

Artikel 4

Bekendmaking van informatie over tariefcontingentenbeheer

(1)   De richtsnoeren van het ministerie voor Landbouw, Levensmiddelen en Plattelandsaangelegenheden van Korea (hierna „MLLPA” genoemd) en de specifieke richtsnoeren van de aanbevelende instanties dienen te worden bekendgemaakt op hun respectieve websites.

(2)   De aanbevelende instanties dienen op hun website regelmatig informatie te publiceren met betrekking tot onder meer publieke aankondigingen van vergunningaanvragen en veilingen, vergunningverlening en veilingperioden, toegewezen hoeveelheden, resterende hoeveelheden voor elk tariefcontingent en de geplande datum van de volgende veiling/vergunningsperiode.

(3)   De basisvoorwaarden voor veilingen, waaronder voorwaarden inzake toelating, betaling en terugbetaling van de borgsom, veilingdata, veilingcode en -informatie dienen te worden opgenomen in specifieke richtsnoeren van de Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation of in de algemene instructies voor bieders voor elke veiling.

Artikel 5

Voorschriften voor de toewijzing van tariefcontingenten

De MLLPA-richtsnoeren laten toe het jaarlijkse tariefcontingentvolume over het jaar te verdelen door het jaarlijkse tariefcontingentvolume in verschillende subvolumes te verdelen, waarvan de som gelijk is aan het jaarlijkse tariefcontingentvolume. Het totale tariefcontingentvolume voor elk jaar van tenuitvoerlegging zoals vastgesteld in de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen Korea en de EU wordt niet verlaagd.

Beheer van tariefcontingenten: Verklarende woordenlijst

| Aanbevelende instanties | Voor het beheer van tariefcontingenten aangewezen Koreaanse instanties: Korea Dairy Industries Association, Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation, Korea Feed Ingredients Association en Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association
  Websites: | Korea Dairy Industries Association (enkel beschikbaar in het Koreaans):
  http://www.koreadia.or.kr/ |
| --- | --- | --- |

Aanbevelende instanties

Voor het beheer van tariefcontingenten aangewezen Koreaanse instanties: Korea Dairy Industries Association, Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation, Korea Feed Ingredients Association en Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association

Websites:

Korea Dairy Industries Association (enkel beschikbaar in het Koreaans):

http://www.koreadia.or.kr/

| | Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation:
  http://www.at.or.kr/home/apen000000/index.action |
| --- | --- |

Korea Agro-Fisheries & Food Trade Corporation:

http://www.at.or.kr/home/apen000000/index.action

| | Korea Feed Ingredients Association (enkel beschikbaar in het Koreaans):
  http://www.kfeedia.org/main.html |
| --- | --- |

Korea Feed Ingredients Association (enkel beschikbaar in het Koreaans):

http://www.kfeedia.org/main.html

| | Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association (enkel beschikbaar in het Koreaans):
  http://milkreplacer.or.kr/ |
| --- | --- |

Korea Feed Milk Replacer Association (enkel beschikbaar in het Koreaans):

http://milkreplacer.or.kr/

Borgsom

Bedrag dat wordt betaald door inschrijvers die een aanvraag tot deelname aan een veiling indienen. De borgsom wordt onmiddellijk na de contingentaanbeveling aan de inschrijver terugbetaald.

Aanbeveling

Afgifte van een invoertariefcontingent na een veiling of vergunningaanvraag.

Geldigheidsduur

Periode gedurende welke een aanbeveling voor een invoertariefcontingent geldig is.

Jaar van tenuitvoerlegging

Periode van twaalf maanden tussen opeenvolgende verjaardagen van de vrijhandelsovereenkomst (1 juli) waarvoor een jaarlijks tariefcontingentvolume is vastgesteld in de Vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen Korea en de EU.

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