alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of TIMCO Aviation
Services, Inc. (the "Company") for the period ended June 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Form 10-Q"), I,
Roy T. Rimmer, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


                                                     /s/ Roy T. Rimmer, Jr.
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Roy T. Rimmer, Jr.
                                                     Chief Executive Officer
                                                     August 28, 2002
EX-10.1







	 	 	 	 	 



Exhibit 10.1




AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO THE

DATATRAK INTERNATIONAL, INC.

2005 OMNIBUS EQUITY PLAN





     This Amendment No. 2 (the “Amendment”) to the DATATRAK International, Inc. 2005
Omnibus Equity Plan (the “Plan”) is made this 7th day of August, 2008 by DATATRAK
International, Inc. (the “Company”).



W I T N E S S E T H




     WHEREAS, the Company’s Board of Directors adopted the Plan on May 3, 2005; and



     WHEREAS, the Plan was approved at a meeting of the Company’s shareholders on July 22, 2005;
and



     WHEREAS, the Board of Directors has deemed it necessary and appropriate to adopt an amendment
to the Plan to increase the annual limit of shares underlying awards that may be granted to any
individual participant under the Plan from 35,000 shares to 50,000 shares.



     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Plan is amended as follows:



     Article III, Section 3.2(b), is replaced in its entirety with the following:



          Participant Limitation. The aggregate number of Shares underlying Awards granted under this
Plan to any participant in any fiscal year (including but not limited to Awards of Options and
SARs), regardless of whether such Awards are thereafter canceled, forfeited or terminated, shall
not exceed 50,000 Shares. The foregoing annual limitation is intended to include the grant of all
Awards, including but not limited to, Awards representing “performance-based compensation” as
described in Section 162(m)(4)(C) of the Code.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, DATATRAK International, Inc., by its appropriate officers duly authorized,
has executed this Amendment as of the 7th day of August, 2008.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	DATATRAK INTERNATIONAL, INC.

 	 
	 	By:  	     /s/ Jeffrey A. Green
 	 
	 	 	Jeffrey A. Green, Chief Executive Officer 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	By:  	     /s/ Raymond J. Merk
 	 
	 	 	Raymond J. Merk, Vice President of Finance, 	 
	 	 	Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5



<S>                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>         12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>     DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>          DEC-31-1999

<CASH>                               36
<SECURITIES>                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                       418
<ALLOWANCES>                         22
<INVENTORY>                          62
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                    681
<PP&E>                              230
<DEPRECIATION>                       53
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    1,871
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             3,885
<BONDS>                             0
<COMMON>                             19
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>               0
<PREFERRED>                         0
<OTHER-SE>                       (2,059)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      1,871
<SALES>                           1,040
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  1,040
<CGS>                               542
<TOTAL-COSTS>                       542
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  4,615
<LOSS-PROVISION>                     23
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   86
<INCOME-PRETAX>                  (4,226)
<INCOME-TAX>                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>              (4,226)
<DISCONTINUED>                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                     0
<CHANGES>                           0
<NET-INCOME>                     (4,226)
<EPS-BASIC>                      (.29)
<EPS-DILUTED>                      (.29)



</TABLE>
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 5 0 514

CHARLES I. IKEKWERE,

P laintiff−Appellant,

versus

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY , Defendant−Appellee.

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas No. 1 :1 5

- CV

- 418

Before HIGGINBOTHAM , SMITH , and CLEMENT , Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM: *

Charles Ikekwere sued h is former employer , the Treasury Department,
under Title VII for race and national origin discrimina tion and hostile work environment, under the Rehabilitation Act for disability discrimination, and under both for retaliation . The district court granted summary judgment for
the DoT , reasoning that Ike kw ere had not shown he was qualified for the

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 17, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-50514 Document: 00514477480 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/17/2018No. 17

- 5 0 514

2 position, that there was no evidence that race or mental disability motivated the decision to terminate him, and that there was no evidence of a hostile work
envir onment or evidence that the a dverse employment actions were motivated by Ike k were’s EEO complaints.
We have reviewed the briefs, the applicable law, and pertinent por tions of the record and have heard the arguments of counsel. We affirm , essen tially for the reasons given by the d istrict court in its compelling forty

- two

- page Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment issued May 15 , 2017.
The district court correctly ruled, inter alia , that Ikekwere “fails to pro

duce any evidence that he, himself, was qualified for the pay grad e increase” that he was denied, especially given that, as the court noted, “[h]e does not
dis pute that he received a ‘fails’ rating on his performance evaluation.” The court properly concluded that “[o]n this record, [Ikekwere] “has failed to make

out a prima facie case of failure to promote based on his race.” The court simi

larly dispelled Ike k were’s claims for discriminatory discharge and hostile work
environment.
As for failure to accommodate, the court observed that Ikekwere showed an inability to perform his job even after being afforded accommo da tions. Regarding discriminatory discharge, the court opined that “there is no genuine issue of material fact that [Ikekwere] was not qualified for his job as a Revenue Agent. Finally, while finding a prima facie case of retaliation, at least at the summary judgment stage, the court correctly decided that the Do T “has produced several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for [Ikekwere’s]
termination ,” including “poor performance and inappropriate behav ior.”
There is no error. The summary judgment is AFFIRMED. Case: 17-50514 Document: 00514477480 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/17/2018
7. Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in counterparts, each of which shallbe deemed a part of an original and all of which together shall constitute one agreement.Signature pages may be detached from the counterparts and attached to a single copy of thisAmendment to form one document.8. Prohibited Persons and Transactions. To the best of its knowledge, neither Tenantnor any of Tenant’s parent, subsidiary or other entity controlled by or under common control withsuch parent or subsidiary (an “Affiliate”) is listed, controlled by, or acting for, or on behalf ofany person or entity, appearing on the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Controllist of restrictions and prohibited persons or any replacement thereof (the “OFAC List”). To thebest of its knowledge, neither Landlord nor any Affiliate of Landlord is listed, controlled by, oracting for, or on behalf of any person or entity, appearing on the OFAC List.9. Voidable if Not Fully Executed. If a fully-executed original of this Amendment isnot received by Tenant at 810 DSW Dr., Columbus, Ohio 43219 before the date that is 60 calendardays following the execution of this Amendment by Tenant, then this Amendment shall be voidable byTenant at its option by giving written notice to Landlord under this paragraph.[signatures appear on the following page]
 
2

 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be executed on the day and yearfirst written above.           LANDLORD:   TENANT:            By: JUBILEE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,an Ohio limited partnership   DSW SHOE WAREHOUSE, INC.,a Missouri corporation Its:Member                   By: SCHOTTENSTEIN PROFESSIONAL   By: /s/ William L. Jordan               ASSET MANAGEMENTCORPORATION,     William L. Jordan, EVP/General Counsel    a Delaware corporation        Its: General Partner                   By: /s/ Jay Schottenstein                     Its: Chairman      {acknowledgements on next page}     STATE OF                                          )   ) ss: COUNTY OF                                          ) 
 
3
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-8212

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARY KING, a/k/a Kitty,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:04-cr-00259-HEH-4)

Submitted: April 29, 2010 Decided: May 3, 2010

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary King, Appellant Pro Se. Olivia N. Hawkins, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Mary King appeals the district court’s order finding 

her ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2) (2006). In her informal appellate brief, King 

failed to challenge the district court’s reason supporting the 

denial of relief. King therefore has forfeited appellate review 

of the eligibility issue. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (“The Court 

will limit its review to the issues raised in the informal 

brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
The Honorable David Laro, United States Tax Court Judge. 1

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-4035 

___________

Herbert C. Elliott, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * Tax Court.

*

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 15, 1998

Filed: April 30, 1998

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Herbert Elliott appeals the United States Tax Court's determination that the

1

Internal Revenue Service's assessment of certain tax deficiencies was correct. Upon

review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the tax court for

the reasons stated in its decision. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
-2-

A true copy.

 ATTEST:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**EXHIBIT 99.01**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**18U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the quarterly report onForm 10-Q of WellPoint Health Networks Inc. (the “Company”) for thequarterly period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Leonard D. Schaeffer, ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.     The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.     Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/   LEONARD D. SCHAEFFER |   |
|--------------------------------------|--------|
| Leonard D. Schaeffer                 |   |
| *Chief Executive Officer*            |   |
| May 15, 2003                         |   |

 

----
Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2011-0999 Directorate Identifier: 2010-NM-235-AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update accordingly. If 

they do not, click (or Tab) into and then out of the changed cell.

Estimated Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Do not include oncondition costs here

Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

propeller, appliance)

Work-hours

(include 

access, testing, 

and close-up)

Labor 

cost 

(@$85/h

our)

Parts Cost Total Costs 

(labor + 

parts)

Number of 

U.S. 

Registered

Products

Total Cost 

for U.S. Fleet

Inspection 4.0 $ 340.00 $ 340.00 0 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

The known number of products in compliance:

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $ 0

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $

On-Condition Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Work-hours

(include access, 

testing, and closeup)

Labor cost 

(@$85/hour)

Parts Cost Cost per Product

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table 

that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explain warranty costs):
Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? 

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for 

either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO 

Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requirements for 

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES* NO 

*Explanation:
#### CLEVELAND et ux. v. ALPINE LUMBER CO.

No. 4155.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

March 17, 1934.

A. L. Brantley, of Alpine, for appellants.

PER CURIAM.

This is an original proceeding in this court brought by O. D. Cleveland and wife. The petition discloses the following:

On February 26, 1934, judgment was rendered by the district court of Brewster county in favor of Alpine Lumber Company against Cleveland and his wife for $4,544.85, with foreclosure of lien on realty. Motion for new trial by Cleveland and wife was overruled March 2,1934, and notice of appeal to this court given. On March 10th Cleveland and wife filed their appeal bond, which was duly approved by the clerk. Thereafter order of sale upon said judgment was issued, and the property has been advertised for sale by the sheriff of Brewster county. The prayer is that this court grant an injunction or writ of prohibition, restraining the sale of the property until the appeal can be disposed of by this court.

There is no doubt of the power and jurisdiction of this court to issue such writs as may be necessary to enforce its jurisdiction. Article 1823, R. S.

The averments of the petition disclose that the jurisdiction of this court has attached, but they do not disclose whether the appeal bond given was a cost bond or super-sedeas bond. If the appeal is by supersedeas, the bond suspended and stayed the execution of the judgment, and it was the duty of the clerk of the lower court to forthwith issue a supersedeas. Articles 2270 and 2275, R. S. If such be the nature of the bond and the clerk has refused to issue a supersedeas, this court, for the protection of its jurisdiction, could properly grant the relief prayed for herein. Houston, B. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hornberger (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 311.

If the appeal was effected simply by cost bond, the judgment was not suspended, but execution might issue thereon as if the appeal had not been taken. Article 2268, R. S. In such case this court would not be authorized to grant the relief herein sought. Durham v. Scrivener (Tex. Civ. App.) 228 S. W. 282.

*258Being unable to determine whether the appeal was perfected by cost bond or super-sedeas bond, it therefore follows the petitioners have not shown themselves entitled to the relief they seek. It is therefore unnecessary to set the petition for hearing and order process issued to the respondents to show cause. The petition should be summarily dismissed. Hume v. Schintz, 90 Tex. 72, 36 S. W. 429; Moore v. Waco, 92 Tex. 265, 47 S. W. 716; Herf v. James, 86 Tex. 230, 24 S. W. 396; Burnett v. Powell, 86 Tex. 382, 24 S. W. 788, 25 S. W. 17; Steele v. Goodrich, 87 Tex. 401, 28 S. W. 939; Raley v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.) 25 S. W. 144.

In view of. the uncertainty as to the true status of this appeal, the dismissal will be without prejudice. It is so ordered.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T MAR I A L UI S A Z AV AL Z A, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 70338 A ge nc yN o. A 073- 863- 085 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d M ay25, 2010 ** B efo re: C A N B Y , T H O M A S , an dW . F L E T C H E R , C i rcu i tJu d g es. M ar i aL ui s aZ a va l z a , ana t i ve and c i t i z e n of M e xi c o, pe t i t i ons f

orr e vi e w of the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ (“ B IA ”) order di sm i ss i ng her app ea l fr om an im m ig r a tio n ju d g e ’s d e c is io n d e n y in g h e rm o tio n to r e o p e n r e m o v a l p r o c e e d in g s . W e ha ve j ur i s di c t i on unde r8 U . S . C . § 1252. W e r e vi e w de novo c l a i m s of due 

# FI LED JU N 02 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 70338 2 p r o c e s s v io la tio n s . Co lm e n a rv . I NS , 210 F . 3d 967, 971 ( 9th C i r . 2000) . W e de ny th e p e t i t i o n f

o rr e v i e w. I n he rope ni ng br i e f

, Z a va l z af

a i l s t o a ddr e s s , and the r e f or e ha s w a i ve d any c ha l l e nge t o, the B I A ’ s di s pos i t i ve de t e rm i na t i on tha ts he f a i l e d t o de m ons tr a t e the evi dence s he subm i tt ed w i th the m ot i on t o reopen cou l d n othave been di sc ov er ed o rp r e s e n te da t h e rf

o rm e rh e ar in g . Se e M

a r ti n ez - Se rra n o v . I

NS , 94 F . 3d 1256, 1 2 5 9 -6 0 (9 thC ir. 1 9 9 6 ) ( issu es n o t sp ec ifically ra ised an dar g u ed ina p arty’s o p e n in g b r ie f

ar e w a iv e d ) ; s e e al

s o 8 C . F . R . § 1003. 23( b) ( 3) . W e the r e f or e do not r e a c h Z a v a lz a ’s c o n te n tio n s r e g ar d in g e n tryin to th e U n ite dS ta te s p u r s u an t to advance parol e. W e r e je c t a s u np e r s u a s iv e Z a v a lz a ’s c o n te n tio n , r a is e df o rth e f ir s t tim e in he rope ni ng br i e f

, tha ts he w a s pr e

j udi c e d bythe a dm i ni s tr a t i ve r e c or d a s f i l e d by R e s p o n d e n t. P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W DE NI E D.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-30628 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus WARREN J. BROUSSARD, JR., Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. CR-94-20018

- - - - - - - - - - September 20, 1996 Before JONES, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Warren J. Broussard, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841. Broussard argues that the district court erred in denying the downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because he gave a signed confession and did not contest the presence or amount of narcotics, and the only issueNo. 95-30628 - 2 - at trial was whether he could be held accountable for the mental state of the crime rather than his participation. He contends that application note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 applies. Broussard denied his guilt and put the Government to its burden of proof on an element of the crime, intent to distribute. The district court did not clearly err in denying the adjustment. United States v. Cartwright , 6 F.3d 294, 304 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 671 (1994). Broussard argues that, based on expert testimony, cocaine base and powder cocaine are scientifically the same substance, that the disparity in the guidelines ranges for the two drugs is unfounded, and that the lesser guideline range for powder cocaine should apply according to the rule of lenity and the Equal Protection Clause. This court rejected this identical argument in United States v. Flanagan , 87 F.3d 121, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Cherry , 50 F.3d 338, 342-44 (5th Cir. 1995)(rejecting equal protection argument). Broussard’s statement is sufficient evidence from which to infer his intent to distribute the cocaine. The record is not devoid of evidence of his intent to distribute. United States v. Laury , 49 F.3d 145, 151 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 162 (1995); United States v. Pierre , 958 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir.) (en banc). Broussard’s speedy trial argument is abandoned for failure to brief it. Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). Likewise, Broussard has failed to brief and has thus abandoned his argument that his later consent to search the vanNo. 95-30628 - 3 - was tainted by the alleged prior illegal arrest, rendering the arrest issue moot. AFFIRMED.