J - A16012 - 16

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v. FREDERICK W. KARASH, Appellant No. 1318 WDA 2015 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 5 , 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP - 25 - SA - 0000074 - 2015 BEFORE: SHOGAN , OLSON, and STRASSBURGER, * JJ. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2016 Appellant, Frederick W. Karash, appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. We affirm. We summarize the histo ry of this case as follows. On March 29, 2015, Appellant was traveling on Route 8 in Erie County when he drove by Pennsylvania State Trooper Joshua Deitle and was clocked with a radar gun as traveling 73 miles per hour (“mph”) in a 55 mph zone. The troop er cited Appellant for traveling 60 mph in a 55 mph zone. Prior to the hearing before the district magistrate, the Commonwealth amended the citation to reflect that Appellant was traveling 73 mph. The magistrate convicted Appellant and sentenced him to p ay fines. Appellant then appealed to the court of

____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.J - A16012 - 16

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common pleas. On August 5, 2015, the trial court convicted Appellant and imposed a $61.00 fine, plus fees and costs. This timely pro se appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we reproduce verbatim: 1 Q - Did the Judge err in allowing the “amended” citation to be presented as evidence? 2 Q - Did the Judge Show discriminatory bias and incompetent arrogance by failing to review the motions brought by the defendant while wasting not a moments time in granting the Commonwealths motions? 3 Q - Did the judge err by failing to adhere strictly to ruling in regard to the Constitution of the United States ( specifically 5 th and 14 th Amendment)? 4 Q - Did the Commonwealth fail to strictly adhere to the rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to properly issue the Citation? 5 Q - Did the Commonwealth meet the burden set forth for amending a citation pursuant to The Rules of Criminal Procedure as delineated in Commonwealth v Palmer? 6 Q - Did the Issuing authority fail to comply with the Rules of Criminal Procedure thus biasing me for future hearings/ thus violating my rights? 7 Q - Did the Judge Completely disreg ard the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time of reaching a verdict thus expounding on the argument that she is discriminatively biased and arrogantly incompetent? 8 Q - Did the Judge allow contradicting stories from the prosecution to be submitted as ev idence yet fail to address the issue of credibility of Commonwealth witnesses, Thus Showing reckless disregard for the interest of justice?J - A16012 - 16

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9 Q - Did the Judge Show Bias by granting the continuance request of the Commonwealth (without considering the respon sive pleading) while denying the continuance request of the defendant? 10 Q - Did the Judge have a responsibility to recuse herself? Did her failure to do so create a prejudice? Did She act outside of her Judicial Function/athority? 11 Q - Does the Judge understand the concept of a de novo hearing? Does her disinterest in the violative manner in which the initial hearing transpired elude to the fact that she has interests in revenue generation and not neutral fact finding and justice? 12 Q - Did the Comm onwealth meet the Burden of Proof? Appellant’s Brief at ii
- iii. As a prefatory matter, we observe that appellate briefs must materially conform to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P . Chapter 21. When a party’s brief fails to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and the defects are substantial, an appellate court may, in its discretion, quash or dismiss the appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2101. It is well settled that the argumen t portion of an appellate brief must be developed with pertinent discussion of the issue, which includes citations to relevant authority. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See Commonwealth v. Genovese , 675 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. 1996) (stating that “[t]he argument p ortion of an appellate brief must be developed with a pertinent discussion of the point which includes citations to the relevant authority”).J - A16012 - 16

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In Commonwealth v. B.D.G. , 959 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2008), a panel of this Court offered the following relevant o bservation regarding the proper formation of the argument portion of an appellate brief: In an appellate brief, parties must provide an argument as to each question, which should include a discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a ). This Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. Commonwealth v. Williams , 566 Pa. 553, 577, 782 A.2d 517, 532 (2001) (Castille, J., concurring). To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. Id . When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived. Commonwealth v. Luktisch , 680 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. 1996). Id . at 371 - 372. Thus, failure to ci te case law or other legal authority in support of an argument results in waiver of the claim. Commonwealth v. Owens , 750 A.2d 872, 877 (Pa. Super. 2000). As we have often stated, “Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.” Commonwealth v. Adams , 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Lyons , 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa. Super. 2003)). “To the contrary, any person choosing to rep resent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Adams , 882 A.2d at 498 (citing Commonwealth v. Rivera , 685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996)).J - A16012 - 16

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Here, the argument port ion of Appellant’s pro se brief contains rambling discussions of purported error lacking any pertinent analysis. Appellant’s Brief at 3
- 11. Essentially, we are perplexed by Appellant’s incomprehensible analyses and discussions. This unclear discourse has hampered meaningful appellate review. We recognize that Appellant is acting pro se . As we previously mentioned , Appellant’s status as a pro se litigant does not relieve him of his responsibility to conform to the applicable rules of appellate procedure. While this particular defect in Appellant’s brief warrants dismissal of the appeal, we decline to do so at this juncture. Instantly, we have thoroughly reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, and the certified record before us, including the sixteen
- page opinion of the trial court dated October 26, 2015, which addresses the issues raised by Appellant in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. We conclude that the issues presented by Appellant lack merit, and the trial court’s opinion adequately addresses Appellant’s various claims raised on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s o pinion and adopt its reasoning as our own. The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter. Judgment of sentence affirmed.J - A16012 - 16

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9 /12/2016

# E I \-

" Gene s is " m o del wi th a s erial number of GHDI 7 653. I d. , p g. 1 6, li n e 1 7

-pg. 1 7 , l i n e 1
. 1 Trooper D e itle w as al so u s in g a hand- h eld s pe e d ti ming d ev i c e , id e n ti fied as a D ec atur El e c tr o ni cs traffic s p e e ds on Route 8 in Uni o n Township , Erie Coun ty , Pennsyl v ani a . Notes of T es ti mon y, S um mary Con vic ti o n Appe a l hea ri ng , A ug u st 5 1 h , 2 015, p g. 1 6 , li n e s 5

- 8
. Tro o per D e itle was i n a
m arke d po lice c rui s e r and was in full P e nns y l v ani a St ate P o li ce un i form . I d ., pg . 16 , l i n e s 1 0 -13. On March 29th, 2015 , P e nn sy l v ani a State Po l ic e Troo p er Jo s hua D av id Dei tle w as monitorin g I. Factual and Procedural History p e ri o d b y a stati o n appr ove d b y the D epartmen t of Tran s port ation
. Tr an s portati o n , a s w ell as appropriat el y calibrated and te s ted for accur acy w ithin th e pre s crib e d tim e us in g a s pe e d timin g d e vice pro p e rl y appr ov ed by th e C omm o n we alth of Pe nn sy l vani a D e p artm e n t of C ompute r and al l court costs. Appellant ' s s pe e d was d e tecte d b y a P e nn s yl v an ia State P oli c e troop er M ax imum S p eed Limit s, at T R 317- 2015 , in v iol ati o n of 7 5 Pa
. C
. S. §3362(a) ( 2) at 73 m. p.h
. i n a 5 5
m . p . h. zo n e , an:d imp os ed a se n te n ce of a $6 1.0 0 fine , $ 1 0 .00 E MS , $45

. 00 S urchar g e , $ 10
. 00 Judi cial wh ereby this Trial Co urt found , at the de nov o trial , Appellan t g uilty o f the summ ary ch arg e o f (her eaft er re ferre d to as " App e ll ant") app eal from thi s Trial Court 's Ord e r date d Au g ust 5 th, 201 5 , The instant m atter i s before the Penn sy lvania S u perior Co urt o n Fred e rick W. Kara s h 's Domitrovich, J. , October 2 6th, 20 1 5 

### OPINION

Frederick W
. Karash, Prose (App e ll ant) N athaniel E. Strass e r, Assi s tant Di s trict Attorn ey , on b e hal f of the C o mm o nwealth of Penns y lvania (Appellee) APPEARA N CES : 

### ' " ) ,· · . , , ., . ... . - , ·-i

, , ~' : ·· . .- ; . • ' r. · · r ,. · : · . . . . . : i · ··= - · : . NO
. SA 7 4 o f20 15 c "\ FREDERJCK W. KARASH ,

App e llant 1 , 1 I • 

## . . '

. 

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### . . . ~ . . : v . j • I

. • i

. · , . ·• · : r· - : . IN THE COUR T OF C OMMON PLEAS OF ERJ E COUNTY, PENNSY L, V AN I N. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee Circulated 08/30/2016 02:54 PM2

On that date, a Mitsubishi Outlander, black in color and traveling northbound on Route 8, came into the speed timing device's field of influence traveling at initially 73 miles per hour. Id, pg. 18, line 24 - pg. 19, line 2. Once the vehicle passed the police cruiser, Trooper Deitle pulled out and initiated a traffic stop of the Mitsubishi Outlander. Id. , pg. 19, lines 2-3. Trooper Deitle discovered the vehicle was being operated by Appellant Frederick W. Karash, whose identity was confirmed by his Pennsylvania Driver's License. Id, pg. 19, lines 4-7. Prior to the traffic stop on March 29th , 2015, Trooper Deitle had no other interaction with Appellant. Id., pg. 20, lines 2-7. Trooper Deitle advised Appellant he was exceeding the maximum speed limit, but cited Appellant for a lower speed in order to "cut him [App e llant] a little bit of a break" and due to Appellant recording the traffic stop. 

### Id. , pg. 20, line 17-pg. 21, line 21. Trooper Deitle cited Appellant for traveling 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Id., pg. 21, lines 11-12. On April 21 s t, -2015, Assistant District Attorney and Trooper Deitle amended the traffic citation at Appellant's hearing in front of Magisterial District Judge Carol L. Southwick. Id., pg. 23, lines 2-4. The traffic citation was amended before a hearing had commenced, with Appellant present, and was amended to reflect 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, the speed Appellant was actually traveling when Trooper Deitle timed his vehicle. Id, pg. 23, lines 5-15. Appellant was found guilty by Magisterial District Judge Carol L. Southwick of violating 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2) at 73 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone, and sentence was properly imposed. Appellant filed both a Notice of Summary Appeal and a Motion to Quash Citation "Exceeding Maximum Speed Limits" on May 11th, 2015. A Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was scheduled before this Trial Court for July ih, 2015. Assistant District Attorney Nathaniel E. Strasser filed a Motion to Reschedule Summary Appeal Hearing on June 9th, 2015, which was granted by this Trial Court on June 11th, 2015. Appellant's Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was rescheduled for August 5th, 2015 before this Trial Court, at which testimony was taken and evidence was received. Following the Summary Conviction Appeal de novo hearing, this Trial Court found Appellant guilty of3

the crimes specified in the amended complaint, citation, summons, or warrant. See Palmer at 1320 summons, or warrant involve the same basic elements and evolved out of the same factual situation as Pennsylvania courts employ the test of whether the crimes specified in the original complaint, citation, Pa. R. Crim. P. 109; see Commonwealth v. Palmer , 482 A.2d 1318, 1319 (Pa. Super. 1984). A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect in the form or content of a complaint, citation, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the procedures of these rules, unless the defendant raises the defect before the conclusion of the trial in a summary case or before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing in a court case, and the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. Rul e 109 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states: separate issues on appeal, which this Trial Court will summarize into ten (10) issues as follows: 1. As to Appellant' s first, fourth and eighth issues, the traffic citation, issued by Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Joshua David Deitle to Appellant on March 29th, 2015, was properly amended to reflect 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, the actual speed Appellant was traveling when Trooper Deitle timed Appellant's vehicle. In his "Precise Statement of Matters to be Raised on Appeal," Appellant- raises twelve (12) Super. 1992). appeal except for a manifest abuse of discretion. Se e Commonwealth v. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d I, 2 (Pa. correct conclusions of law erroneously made; and the action of a trial court will not be disturbed on novo is to determin e whether or not the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and to II
. L e gal Argument The Pennsylvania Superior Court's scope of review where a trial court has heard the case de Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court on August 

## zs", 2015. This Trial Court filed its 1 925(b) Order on August 

## zs" , 2015. Appellant filed his "Prec i se Statement of Matters to be Raised on Appeal" on September 1 5 \ 2015. imposed. violating 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2) at 73 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone, and sentence was properly4

(citing Commonwealth v. Stanley, 401 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Super. 1979)). If so, then a defendant is deemed to have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct. See id. Appellant argues the traffic citation itself states Appellant was traveling at a speed of 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone and, pursuant to 75 Pa. C. S. §3368, said speed "is not a convictable offense." At the time of the de nova hearing, Trooper Deitle clearly stated that, on March 29th, 2015, Appellant's vehicle was traveling 73 miles per hour northbound on Route 8 in Union City, Pennsylvania. NT., pgs. 16-19. Trooper Deitle, using an approved Decatur Electronics model handheld speed timing device, rather than citing Appellant for the initial speed of 73 miles per hour, gave Appellant "a break" on his original citation at 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Id, pgs. 20-21. Prior to the hearing commencing before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick, the Commonwealth amended Appellant's traffic citation to reflect 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour

zone - the original speed Appellant as timed by Trooper Deitle. The amended traffic citation formed the basis of Appellant's conviction before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick on April 21 5 \ 2015 and before this Trial Court on August 5t\ 2015. Furthermore, the amendment to the traffic citation was proper as the same basic elements were involved and the traffic citation arose from the same factual situation - Appellant traveling in excess of the maximum speed limit, which was timed by a Pennsylvania State Police trooper using an approved speed timing device. See Palmer, 482 A.2d at 1320. Therefore, Appellant's argument that traveling 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone "is not a convictable offense" is not relevant because Appellant's traffic citation was properly amended to the original speed timed by Trooper Deitle - 73 miles per hour. As the amended traffic citation for traveling 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone formed the basis of Appellant's conviction, Appellant's first issue is without merit. 2. The Trial Court properly denied Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation.5

'amending the citation' secondary to my [Appellant's] refusal to plead guilty
. " Appellant also argues Appellant argues this Trial Court allowed "the Prosecuting Attorney's narrative regarding 3. Appellant's assertion of "intimidating, threatening or coercive" behavior of the Commonwealth's attorney during initial plea negotiations is not relevant to Appellant's conviction for violation 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). is without merit. properly denied Appellant's Motion prior to the beginning of testimony, and Appellant's second issue Therefore, this Trial Court did acknowledge Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation and 1320. Pennsylvania State Police trooper using an approved speed timing device. See Palmer, 482 A.2d at factual situation - Appellant traveling in excess of the maximum speed limit, which was timed by a was proper as the same basic elements were involved and the amended citation arose from the same Citation. As stated above, the amendment to Appellant's traffic citation to cure a defect in the citation Furthermore, this Trial Court had a proper basis for denying Appellant's Motion to Quash Id , pg. 13, lines 8-11. Ultimately , this Trial Court denied Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation, stating: THE COURT: Okay. And the Court has heard from both sides. I think we thoroughly had you discuss your arguments and the Court will rule that the Motion to Quash is denied. Commonwealth's attorney time to respond to Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation. NT, pgs. 6-13. Court provided Appellant ample time to argue his Motion to Quash Citation and then provided the during the Summary Conviction Appeal hearing on August 

### 5t\ 2015. Prior to any testimony , this Trial Procedure. First and foremost, this Trial Court did acknowledge Appellant's Motion to Quash Citation doing so, ignored the provisions of Rules 109 and 403 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Appellant argues the Trial Court refused to acknowledge his Motion to Quash Citation and, byrequired by Rule 403." contemporaneously shall give the defendant a paper copy of the citation containing all the information in a summary case is instituted by issuing a citation to the defendant. .. the law enforcement officer Rule 405 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states "when a criminal proceeding an issuing authority, rather than an officer, can amend a citation."

6 405 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant also argues he "rejects the theory that Appellant argues the amended traffic citation was never "issued" to him in violation of Rule issue is without merit. negotiations and did not plead guilty before this Trial Court due to said negotiations. Appellant's third
4. Appellant was issued the original traffic citation and had notice of the amended traffic citation. Appellant did not plead guilty before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick due to said lines 1-3. In addition, any "intimidating, threatening, or coercive" negotiations are not relevant as were not relevant to the charge Appellant had allegedly violated. Id, pg. 30, lines 11-13, 20-22; pg. 31, indicated the Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was de novo; therefore, any prior plea negotiations before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick. NT., pgs. 28-31. Ultimately, this Trial Court negotiations occurring between the Commonwealth's attorney and Appellant prior to the hearing R. Crim. P. 462(a). During cross-examination of Trooper Deitle, Appellant elicited testimony regarding plea case shall be heard de novo by the judge of the court of common pleas sitting without a jury
. " See Pa. after the entry of a guilty plea or a conviction by an issuing authority in any summary proceeding
.. . the Rule 462 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states ''when a defendant appeals negotiations. the Commonwealth's attorney was intimidating and threatening m his behavior during pleas7

( 4 ) the c har g e agai nst th e defendan t as se t forth i n th e prosec ut or ' s co mp l ain t ; ( 5 ) the date of i ss u an c e pros e c ut or, d e fen d an t and witnesses; (3) th e n ames and o ffic e addresses of co un se l i n th e proceed in g; A u th ority mu st co n tain ( 1 ) the date an d p l ace o f h eari ngs ; (2 ) the n ames and addresse s of th e tran sc rip ts and o th er requ ire d p ape rs from th e l ower co urt . See Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(a)
. Furth e rm ore, Rule 13 5 of the P e nn sylv an ia Rul es of Civil Procedure s t ates a "transc ript" before the Iss u i n g afte r the e n try of a gu il ty p l e a or a co n victi o n by an i ss uin g auth o ri ty, said i ss uin g au tho rity mu st file Rul e 462 of th e P e nn sylv ani a Rules of Cri min al Procedure states, w h e n a defe n dant ap p eals were not no te d , as requ ire d b y Rul e 4 62 o f the Pennsy l van i a Rul es of Crimi n al Proce dure
. from th e Mag i strat e Di s tric t J u d ge h earin g were n ot forw ard e d and hi s o bj ecti o n s fro m s ai d hearin g Ap pell an t argues th at , up on the filin g o f h is Noti ce of S umm ary Conv i cti o n Ap p eal , tr ansc rip ts 5. Upon A pp

e ll a n t's N ot ice o f Ap

p e a l, tr a n scr ipt s fr om t h e Mag i s trat e Di s trict J

udg e hearin g wer e filed pursuan

t to P a . R. Cr i m. P. 4 6 2 ; how

ever, Rule 462 does no t r e qu i re the M agis t r ate Distri

ct Judge t

o n o te A pp e llant 's obj e cti o n s . Caro l L. Sou thwi ck, App ellan t's fo urth i ss u e i s withou t m erit. th e am e n dment t o the traf fic cit ati o n pri o r to th e h e arin g co mm e n c in g b efore Ma gi s tr ate Distric t J ud ge re quired b y Rul e 40 5 of th e Pe nn sy l van ia Rul es of Crimin al Proc edure, and App ellant h ad n o ti c e o f Therefore, as the o ri gin al ci tation was pro vide d to Appe ll an t at th e ti m e o f the violation, as ci t atio n, w hich in d icate d 7 3 mile s per h o ur , w as bo th m a d e part o f th e re c o rd
. Furtherm ore, bo th the o ri g inal c itatio n, w hi ch indi c ated 6 0 mil e s p er h o ur , an d th e o rall y ame nd e d h o ur in a 55 mi l e p er h o ur zo ne , th e s p eed ori g i n all y tim e d by Troo p er D ei tle
. 

### Id., pg. 23, lines 2

- 15
. Co mm onwe alth o rall y ame nd e d th e tr affic c i tati on t o in d i cat e App e ll ant was tr aveling 73 miles p er b efo re Ma gistr ate D is tric t Jud ge Caro l L. So uth wic k and in the presence of Appell ant, the was trave ling 6 0 mile s per hour in a 55 mi l e p e r h o ur zo n e . N T , pg . 20, lines 19
. Pri o r to th e hearin g Appell ant c on taini ng all the inf orm ati o n re quire d b y P a . R. C rim
. P
. 4 03, w hi c h indi cat ed A p p ellan t Fo ll owing th e traffi c stop o n M arc h 29 1 \ 2015, Troope r D e itl e i ssued a traffic citatio n tothe trial judge shall.
.. issue a written order imposing sentence, signed by the trial judge and including

Rule 462(g) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states "at the time of sentencing, Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure in that regard.

8 6. This Trial Court did issue both an oral and written Order at the time of sentencing following Appellant's Summary Conviction Appeal hearing. Appellant argues this Trial Court failed to provide Appellant with a written Order or follow the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure was satisfied. Appellant's fifth issue is without merit. after Appellant filed bis Notice of Summary Conviction Appeal. Therefore, Rule 462(a) of the Therefore, as the Transcripts from the lower court, pursuant to Rule 462(a), were properly filed of proceedings in a trial or hearing." See Black's Law Dictionary, 1636 (lh Ed 2009). from the Issuing Authority does not mean "a typed copy of testimony given orally or an official record addition, Rule 462(a) does not require objections from the lower court be noted. Finally, "transcripts" be forwarded to Appellant or anyone else; rather, the filing of said transcripts satisfies Rule 462(a). In 2015 satisfies the requirements of Rule 462( a). There is no requirement that the lower court transcripts Lower Court Filed" were filed on May 18 1 h, 2015. Filing of the lower court transcripts on May 18 1 \ required by the Rules to be in the Issuing Authority's transcript. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 135. thereof, and the judgment of sentence and place of confinement, if any; and (13) any other information the defendant's plea of guilty or not guilty, the decision that was rendered in the case and the date

Contrary to Appellant's assertion, a review of the docket clearly reveals "Transcripts from (11) a notation that the defendant was advised of the right to apply for the assignment of counsel; (12) fingerprinted; (10) a specific descripting of any defect properly raised in accordance with Rule 109; corporate surety or individual surety; (9) a notation that the defendant has or has. not been held for court, the amount of bail set; (8) the nature of the bail posted and the name and address of the the parties and witnesses were sworn and which of these persons testified; (7) when the defendant was of any citation, summons or warrant of arrest and the return of service thereon; ( 6) a statement whether1 As a se n te n ce o f impri so nm ent wa s n o t imp ose d b y th is Tri al C ou rt for Ap pell ant's v i o l ati o n of7 5 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2),

th e info rm atio n spe ci fi e d in Ru l e 4 62(g)(3) was not re quire d i n thi s Trial Co urt 's Ord er date d A u g ust 

### s " , 2 0 1 5
.

. 9 d e n ying th e conti nu ance." 

### See Pa . R
. Cri m . P. 1 06 ( c)
. ju dge s hall on th e re c o rd id e n ti fy th e m ov i ng p arty and s tate of recor d the re as on s for gr antin g or ei th er p arty . " See Pa
. R
. C ri m . P. 1 06( a ). " Wh e n th e matt er is i n th e c ou rt of co mmon pl eas, th e trial au th ori ty may , i n th e i nteres t s o f ju s ti ce , g r an t a c o n ti n uance, o n it s o wn m otio n , or on th e m otion of Rule 10 6 of th e Pe nn sy l vani a Rule s of C rimi nal Proc edur e states "a tri al court or i ss uin g 

### I i 

# I
t 

# I

1 

# I

1 7. T hi s Trial Cour

t prop e rl y g ranted the Common w ealth' s M o t ion for Continuan

ce of S ummary Hea

ring , fil e d prio

r to the scheduled S umma ry Con v iction Appeal h

e aring with · good cau

s e sh o w n , and properl

y d e nied A p p e llan t's M oti o n to Co ntinu e, made during the r es ch e dul e d S umm

ary Con vic tion A ppeal h

e arin g. Procedu r e we re sati s fi ed. Ap pe ll ant's si xth i ss u e i s w ithout m eri t. wa s s uppli e d t o Appe ll an t , th e r equ i r e m e n ts of Ru l e 462(g) o f th e Pe nn sy l vani a Rul es o f C rimin al w h ic h in c l u d e d th e i n form atio n s p e cifi e d in Rul e 4 62(g )( l ) thr o u g h ( g) ( 3) , an d a co p y o f said O r de r Th erefore, as th is Trial Co urt d id issue b oth an oral and wri tte n O rd er at th e ti me of se nten c in g, a co p y o f th is Trial C ourt 's O rd e r w as s u pp li e d t o Ap pe llan t v ia m ai l. impositio n o f s entence , an d that , if an ap pe al is fil e d , the e xe cution o f se nten ce w ill be s t ay ed
. 1 Finall y, fine s, cos t s an d fees were du e an d (2) th e ri g ht to ap p eal t o th e Superio r Co urt within 3 0 d ay s of th e s p ec ifi e d in Rul e 4 62(g)(l) thr o ugh (g )(3) , as it s t ate d ( 1 ) th e d ate o n w hi c h p ay ment o f App e ll ant's O r der wa s prepared and wa s signed b y the under s i g n e d j u d ge . Said Or d er includ e d th e in fo rm atio n C. S
. . §3 3 6 3 ( a) (2 ). T he Trial Court impo se d th e appropriate s e n ten c e. F o llo wi n g s aid hearing , a writte n Trial Co urt anno un ce d i ts d ec isi o n oral l y fr o m th e b enc h an fo und App e llant gui lty o f vio l ation 7 5 P a. App e llant 's S umm ary Co n v i cti o n Appe al he ari ng was h e ld b efo re th is Trial C o urt o n Au g u s t 

## s t\ 2015. A fter h e aring testimon y and re c e i vi n g ev ide nce fr om Ap pe ll an t and th e C o mm o n we alth , thi s th e de fe nd an t." See Pa
. R
. Cr im
. P
. 462(g)(4)
.



## I I 

# l 

# I th e i n fo rm ation s p eci fi e d in paragraphs (g) (l ) thr o u g h (g) (3), an d a cop y of the o rd er s h al l b e g i ve n towas provided the citation and all of the paperwork provided to Magistrate District Judge Carol L. was present during the hearing before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick; and Appellant

10 circumstance" for continuing the hearing other than not having all of his evidence ready; Appellant Commonwealth's attorney responded by noting Appellant had not stated any "extraordinary defense" and he "hadn't been apprised of any crime until now." Id, pg. 38, lines 15-19. The continuance he had "a lot more evidence to bring into the nature of this case in order to prepare his proceedings, Appellant requested a continuance. See NT, pg. 38, lines 1-2. Appellant requested a At the rescheduled Summary Conviction Appeal hearing, after a pause in the middle of the hearing for August 

### 5t\ 2015, and a copy of said Order was provided to Appellant via mail. Trial Court granted the Commonwealth's Motion and rescheduled the Summary Conviction Appeal was necessary in the interest of justice. Pa. R. Crim. P. 106(a). 

### By Order dated June 

### n", 2015, this testify, pursuant to Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(c); no prior continuances had been granted; and a continuance good cause for granting the Commonwealth's Motion as Trooper Deitle was required to appear and date; and (3) there were no prior continuances in this · matter. This Trial Court concluded there was scheduled for July 

### ih, 2015; (2) the affiant, Trooper Joshua David Deitle, would be unavailable on this Hearing. In said Motion, Attorney Strasser averred (1) a Summary Conviction Appeal hearing was Assistant District Attorney Nathaniel E. Strasser filed a Motion to Reschedule Summary Appeal Prior to the originally scheduled Summary Conviction Appeal hearing on July 

### ih, 2015, See Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(c)(3). (3) The trial judge determines that good cause exists for the law enforcement officer's unavailability and grants a continuance. In appeals from summary proceedings arising under the Vehicle Code or local traffic ordinances, other than parking offenses, the law enforcement officer who observed the alleged offense must appear and testify. The failure of a law enforcement officer to appear and testify shall result in the dismissal of the charges unless: Furthermore, Rule 462 states:2 According to Rule 2.ll(a), a judge must recuse himself or herself where said judge: (I) has a personal bias or prejudice

concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge offacts that are in dispute in the proceeding; (2) knows they are a party in the proceeding; (3) knows they have an economic interest in the proceedings; (4) knows a party has made contributions to the judge ' s campaign; (5) made a public statement committing the judge to rule a particular way in the proceeding; or (6) served as an attorney, governmental employee or material witness in the proceeding
. 

### 11 filed, of which the undersigned judge had no notice of. Id, pg. 13, lines 17-22. After hearing judge's recusal was an investigation by the Judicial Conduct Board because of a Complaint Appellant instant case. See NT, pg. 13, lines 13-15. The reason behind Appellant's request for the undersigned testimony, Appellant indicated the undersigned judge had a responsibility to recuse herself from the be questioned. See Pa
. Code Judicial Conduct 2.11 (a)(l)-(6)
. 2 shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably Rule 2.11 of Chapter 33 "Code of Judicial Conduct" provides several circumstances where a judge

After the Summary Conviction Appeal had commenced, but prior to the commencement of disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law." Pa. Code Judicial Conduct 2. 7. Furthermore, matters assigned to the judge, except where the judge has recused himself or herself or when Rule 2
. 7 of Chapter 33 "Code of Judicial Conduct" states "a judge shall hear and decide 8. This Trial Court was not required to recuse herself from Appellant's Summary Conviction Appeal hearing as there was no evidence of impartiality, bias or the appearance of impropriety. seventh issue is without merit. Commonwealth's continuance and properly denied Appellant's request for a continuance. Appellant's hearing, failed to show good cause for a continuance. This Trial Court properly granted the show good cause for a continuance. Appellant, during the rescheduled Summary Conviction Appeal cause was not shown by Appellant. Id, pg. 39, line 13. for a continuance since this Summary Conviction Appeal hearing had already commenced and good Southwick. Id., pg. 38, line 23 - pg. 39, line 12
. This Trial Court ultimately denied Appellant ' s request

Therefore, the Commonwealth, prior to the initial Summary Conviction Appeal hearing, did12 amended citation at Appellant's 

### de novo proceeding. citation, were both made part of the record, and it was proper for this Trial Court to consider the P. 

### 109; see also Palmer, 482 A.2d at 1320. In addition, the amended citation, along with the original timed by a Pennsylvania State Police trooper using an approved speed timing device. 

### See Pa. R. Crim. same factual situation - Appellant traveling in excess of the maximum speed limit, which was properly Southwick was proper as the same basic elements were involved and the traffic citation arose from the above numerous times, the amendment of the traffic citation before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. First, Appellant argues the amended citation was not only illegal, but also moot. As stated 9. This Trial Court conducted a proper de novo Summary Conviction Appeal hearing on August 

## s", 2015. issue is without merit. against her, the undersigned judge properly denied Appellant's request for recusal. Appellant's eighth the undersigned judge to recuse herself from the instant case, other than Appellant's Complaint filed Therefore, as Appellant has failed to raise any specific requirement which would have required Complaint against said judge. Rule 2.11 ( a) requiring a judge to recuse simply because a litigant has filed a Judicial Conduct Board not raise any argument to further support his request for recusal. There are no requirements within recuse herself because of a Complaint Appellant filed against the undersigned judge, and Appellant did Statement of Matters to be Raised on Appeal." In fact, Appellant only requested the undersigned judge Summary Conviction Appeal hearing, and does not raise any of the provisions in his "Precise undersigned judge to disqualify or recuse herself from the instant case, at the August 5th, 2015 lines 11-21. Appellant did not raise any of the provisions of Rule 2.1 l(a), which would require the Appellant's argument, the undersigned judge did not recuse herself from the instant case. Id, 

### pg. 14,Conviction Appeal hearing before this Trial Court.

Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof following the 

### Summary 10. The Commonwealth has met its burden of proof regarding Appellant's violation of 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). issue is without merit. to Appellant's de novo hearing regarding his violation of 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). Appellant's ninth negotiations, ex parte communications and alleged mathematical errors on the citations are not relevant Therefore, the citation was properly amended and received by this Trial Court, and any plea Summary Conviction Appeal hearing and when the fines, costs and fees are to be paid.

13 was served upon Appellant, clearly indicates the fines, costs and fees imposed after Appellant's but it does not add up." A review of this Trial Court's Order dated August 5 1 \ 2015, a copy of which Appellant's de novo hearing regarding this amended citation at 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). communications, this Trial Court concludes any alleged ex parte communications are not relevant to testimony on direct or cross-examination to refute Trooper Deitle's testimony regarding no ex parte

Finally, Appellant argues his original written citation has an area "where fines are delineated, Judge Carol L. Southwick, see 

### NT., pg. 22, line 8 - pg. 23, line I, and Appellant did not offer any witnessed the Commonwealth's attorney engage in ex parte communications with Magistrate District the Issuing Authority undertaking ex parte communications. Although Trooper Deitle stated he never not plead guilty before Magistrate District Judge Carol L. Southwick or before this Trial Court. the plea negotiations were "intimidating, threatening and coercive" are not relevant as Appellant did plea negotiations had no bearing on Appellant's violation of 75 Pa. C. S. §3362(a)(2). Also, whether stated above, said negotiations were not relevant to the de nova hearing before this Trial Court as the coercive" plea negotiations at the Magistrate District Judge level shows deprivation of due process. As

Third, Appellant argues this Trial Court ignored evidence of the Commonwealth's attorney and Second, Appellant argues the Commonwealth's attorney's "intimidating, threatening and14

To sustain a conviction for speeding, the Commonwealth must show beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) an accused was driving in excess of the speed limit; (2) the speed timing device was approved by the Department of Transportation; and (3) the device was calibrated and tested for accuracy within the prescribed time period by a station which has been approved by the Department of Transportation. Commonwealth v. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 1992); see also Commonwealth v. Hamaker, 541 A.2d 1141, 1142 (Pa. Super. 1988). Trooper Deitle stated, on March 29 1 \ 2015, he was monitoring traffic speeds along Route 8 in Union City, Pennsylvania. NT, pg. 16, lines 5

- 8. Trooper Deitle was using a hand-held speed timing device, identified as a Decatur Electronics "Gensis" model with a serial number of GHDl 7653, to time traffic speeds. Id, pg. 16, line 17 - pg. 17, line 1. A Mitsubishi Outlander, black in color and traveling northbound on Route 8, came into the speed timing device's field of influence traveling at initially 73 miles per hour. Id, pg. 18, line 24 - pg. 19, line 2. Trooper Deitle discovered the vehicle was being operated by Appellant, whose identity was confirmed by his Pennsylvania Driver's License. Id., pg. 19, lines 4-7. Therefore, as Trooper Deitle indicated Appellant was driving in excess of the maximum speed limit, i.e. 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, the first element has been sustained. In sustaining its burden of proof, the Commonwealth need not produce a certificate from PennDOT which expressly indicates approval of a particular speed timing device; rather, the Pennsylvania Legislature has considerably lessened the Commonwealth's evidentiary burden by enabling a trial court to take judicial notice of the fact that the device has been approved by PennDOT, provided that the approval has been published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d at 3. According to 44 Pa. Bulletin 8064, dated December 

### 2ih, 2014, the Genesis GHD model hand-held speed timing device, manufactured by Decatur Electronics, has been approved for use by the Pennsylvania State Police. See. 44 Pa.B. 8064. Therefore, as this Trial Court may take judicial notice3 44 Pa. Bulletin 8064 also states that Wisco Calibration Services, Inc., 820 Washington Boulevard, Pittsburgh, Allegheny

County, PA 15206, was appointed as an official Electronic Device Testing Stations for radar devices used by members of the Pennsylvania State Police on July 14 1 \ 1999 as Station RIO. See 44 Pa.B. 8064. 15 accuracy within the prescribed time period by a station which has been approved by the Department of was approved by the Department of Transportation; and (3) said device was calibrated and tested for excess of the speed limit; (2) the speed timing device used by Trooper Deitle to time Appellant's speed James Bonaparte, the third element has been sustained. a hill. Id, pg. 50, lines 2-20. Therefore, based upon the Certificate of Accuracy and the testimony of hand-held speed timing device Trooper Deitle was using on March 29th, 2015, either at a distance or on

The Commonwealth has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Appellant was driving in Appellant's own questioning, Mr. Bonaparte stated there was no possibility of operator error with the electrical engineering degree, which Mr. Bonaparte has attained. NT, pg. 49, lines 3-15. Based upon Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires for calibrating speed timing devices in the acquisition of an devices. Id, pg. 47, line 16 - pg. 49, line 2. Mr. Bonaparte stated the only qualification the the State," stated he signed the Certificate of Accuracy as an individual qualified to calibrate said Bonaparte of WISCO Calibration Services 3 who signs all of the calibration certificates for ''this side of completed the testing. Id, pg. 18, lines 6-13. Finally, Appellant's own subpoenaed witness, James was last calibrated for accuracy on October 22nd, 2014 and was signed by the individuals who Said Certificate stated the Genesis GHD model hand-held speed timing device used by Trooper Deitle 'used by Trooper Deitle on March 

## z9t\ 2015 as Commonwealth's Exhibit A. NT, pg. 18, lines 3-5. Commonwealth offered a copy of the Certificate of Accuracy for the particular speed timing device facts in every proceeding in which a violation of this title is charged. 75 Pa. C. 

### S. 3368(d). The required period and that the device was accurate shall be competent and prima facie evidence of those A certificate from the station showing that the calibration and test were made within the element has been satisfied
. of the notice of approved speed timing devices, published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, the secondcc: Frederick W. Karash , 21 Center Street, Apt. #1, North East, PA 16428

Nathaniel E. Strasser, Assistant District Attorney 16 and respectfully reque s ts the Pennsylvania Superi or Court affirm its Order dated August 5 1 \ 2015
. BY THE COURT: 

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_ ---,. -' 1steplfanie Domitrovich, Judge 

## r HI. Conclusion C. S. §3362(a)(2). Appellant's tenth issue is without merit. Transportation. The Commonwealth met its burden of proof regarding Appellant's violation of 75 Pa.

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Trial Court concludes the instant appeal is without merit